In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 04-1580

TYRONE HOOD,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ALAN M. UCHTMAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 03 C 2709—Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.

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ARGUED MAY 5, 2005—DECIDED JULY 8, 2005

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Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit

Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a bench trial, Tyrone

Hood was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery in 1996. He appealed his conviction without success

and then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on

April 22, 2003. The district court denied the writ, and we

affirm.

Background

Hood was convicted of the murder of Marshall Morgan,

Jr. Morgan Jr. was last seen on May 8, 1993, and his body
2 No. 04-1580

was later found inside his blue Chevrolet Cavalier on

May 17, 1993. He had been shot multiple times and was

partially covered with a beige jacket. The medical examiner

estimated that he had been dead for six to ten days. Among

other things, a checkbook, some money, six beer bottles, and

five beer cans were found in the car.

Morgan Jr.’s mother, Marcie Escoffery, testified that she

was with her son on May 8 at about 2:30 p.m., cleaning the

inside of their car. Several things were left in the car, including her beige jacket. Escoffery gave her son $20 to get

the car washed, and Morgan Jr. left. Morgan Jr.’s fiancée,

Lorena Peete, testified that she had a date with Morgan Jr.

later that evening, but he never arrived to pick her up and

never called.

The state’s case against Hood consisted of both fingerprint and eyewitness evidence. Hood’s fingerprints were

found on two of the beer bottles that were found in

Morgan Jr.’s car. Emanuel Bob testified that he saw Hood,

whom he recognized from the neighborhood, driving a blue

Chevy Cavalier on May 9, 1993. Another neighborhood

man, Joe West, told police that he had seen Hood driving in

a blue Chevy and flagged him down. The two shared a beer

in the front seat, and West noticed a body on the floor in the

back seat partially covered with a beige jacket. Hood told

West that the victim in the back seat was “whacked” and

that he intended to “go out and find another victim.” Hood,

however, maintains his innocence and asserts that the

culprit is the victim’s father, Marshall Morgan, Sr.

Morgan Sr. testified that he saw his son on the morning

of May 8 at Corliss High School, where Morgan Sr. worked.

Morgan Sr. gave his son $350 and did not see him again.

The trial court did not allow the defense to question Morgan

Sr. about his previous voluntary manslaughter conviction

or the life insurance policies that he carried on his former

fiancée and son. Hood claims that Morgan Sr.’s former
No. 04-1580 3

fiancée was killed under very similar circumstances to

Morgan Jr., as they were both found dead in a car and

Morgan Sr. had taken out life insurance policies on both of

them. He complains that the trial court violated his right to

present a defense when it prevented him from developing

his theory that Morgan Sr. was responsible for the murder.

Discussion

Because Hood filed his habeas petition after April 24,

1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, governs our review. We may

not issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court

proceedings either: (1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Hood contends that

the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are contrary to clearly

established federal law as articulated by the Supreme Court

in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). We review

Hood’s claim de novo. Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 522

(7th Cir. 1999).

The district court’s evidentiary ruling was not contrary to

Chambers. The defendant in Chambers sought to introduce

into evidence the out-of-court statements of a man, Gable

McDonald, who declared that it was he, and not the defendant, who had committed the murder at issue. Chambers,

410 U.S. at 289. McDonald made a sworn confession at the

offices of the defendant’s attorneys and also admitted to the

murder in private conversations with several of his friends.

Id. McDonald later repudiated his confession, and the trial

court prevented the defense from calling McDonald as an

adverse witness in order to cross-examine him because to do
4 No. 04-1580

so would violate Mississippi’s “voucher” rule. Id. at 294. The

court also refused to allow the testimony of three witnesses

to whom McDonald admitted committing the murder, ruling

those statements to be hearsay. Id. at 292. The Supreme

Court ruled that under the facts and circumstances of that

particular case, the mechanistic application of state evidentiary rules which prevented the defense from introducing

evidence regarding McDonald’s confession violated the

defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Id. at 302-03. The Court took particular note

of the fact that the statements were made “under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their

reliability.” Id. at 300.

In contrast to Chambers, Hood offered no evidence that

tied Morgan Sr. to the murder scene or otherwise connected

him to the crime. The evidence he offered regarding Morgan

Sr.’s fiancée and the insurance policies he carried was

speculative at best. Morgan Sr.’s conviction and a possible

motive do not directly link him to the crime. Hood’s case is

therefore distinguishable from the defendant in Chambers,

who had reliable evidence in the form of multiple admissions by another individual that he was the actual killer. A

defendant “does not have an unfettered right to offer

[evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise

inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Montana v.

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois,

484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988)). “The right to confront and to

cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate

cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the

criminal trial process.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295. The trial

court in the instant case did not exclude vital evidence by

applying evidentiary rules in an unyielding or mechanistic

fashion. Rather, the court, for good reason, found the

evidence at issue to be speculative, remote, and therefore

irrelevant, and it applied the state evidentiary rules

accordingly.
No. 04-1580 5

It also warrants mentioning that Hood was convicted

after a bench trial; the judge heard defense counsel make

their offers of proof and was aware of Hood’s argument.

This is not a case where a jury did not have the opportunity

to hear anything about Hood’s theory regarding Morgan Sr.

The judge heard about Morgan Sr.’s prior conviction and the

circumstances of his former fiancée’s death, but was

ultimately unconvinced by the evidence Hood offered.

Conclusion

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of a writ of habeas

corpus to Hood.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—7-8-05