alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CURTIS vs. STRONG.

Appeal from Clay county.

*Practice.*— Where a mistake has occurred in reducing an agreement to writing in which the intention of the parties by reason of the mistake is not truly expressed, such writing may be corrected by a proper resort to a court of equity, so as to disclose the true intention. But as a condition precedent, the mistake must be clearly shown, and generally, that it was mutual, and to effect this result, parol evidence is admissible.

*58
      *Same*— Evidence.—An issuable fact in this case was whether or not the intention was to incorporate in a bill of sale of stock, the words “except the beef cattle,” and that the mistake was in the omission. Parol evidence to establish the intention and omission was admisible.

*Same.*— That one of the parties to the controversy testified that he did not intend that the words should form part of the contract, was not conclusive of the question.

*Same.*— Harden *of Proof*to establish the mistake is upon the party seeking relief, but the mere fact of a conflict of evidence on the issue does not preclude him from complying with this requirement.

*Same— Evidence.*— -Partnership books are admissible in evidence in a suit by one partner agaiust another, but it must first appear that the partner sued had access to the books, or in some way authorized the entries charging him, and that the books were fairly kept. These conditions are preliminary, and are addressed to the discretion of the trial court.

*Presumptions of Haw*— Charge *of the Court,*— It is not true as matter of law, that partnership books are presumed to be correct, and that statements therein can only be corrected for fraud or mistake; and charge to such effect is error both as law, and as a charge upon the weight of evidence.

Reversed and remanded on report of

Watts, Commissioner.
II 

Calendar No. 465 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6651 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 4, 2024 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AUGUST 1, 2024 

Reported by Mr. PETERS, without amendment 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 603 West 3rd Street in Necedah, Wisconsin, 

as the ‘‘Sergeant Kenneth E. Murphy Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SERGEANT KENNETH E. MURPHY POST OFFICE 

4 BUILDING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 603 West 3rd Street in Necedah, 

7 Wisconsin, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Ser8 geant Kenneth E. Murphy Post Office Building’’. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6651 RS

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Sergeant Kenneth 

5 E. Murphy Post Office Building’’. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS

ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 465 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6651 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostE. Murphy Post Office Building’’. Necedah, Wisconsin, as the ‘‘Sergeant Kenneth al Service located at 603 West 3rd Street in 

AUGUST 1, 2024 

Reported without amendment 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
#### August Immig, App’lt, *v.*John Hoesloop, Resp’t.

*(City Court of Brooklyn, General Term,*

*Filed May 26, 1891.)*

Depositions—Examination before trial.

An order for the examination of a plaintiff before trial to enable the defendant to prepare his answer and prove his defense should not be granted where it is apparent from the affidavit that the answer will be a general denial, and the only information of any value can be obtained through a bill of particulars.

Appeal from order denying motion to vacate an order for the examination of the plaintiff before trial.

Action to recover upon an alleged promise by defendant to guaranty the payment of sales of goods that might be made to. one Fritz Schnatmeyer, not exceeding $600.

The affidavit on which the order for examination was obtained stated that defendant had no knowledge of any such promise, for none was made or intended to be made, and that he could not imagine on what circumstance or in what way such promise was inferred, and that he had no knowledge of the state of the accounts between plaintiff and Schnatmeyer.

*Ayres & Walker,*for app’lt; *Barnum & Rebhann,*for resp’t.

Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a prior order for the examination of the plaintiff before trial. The application for the examination was made by the defendant before issue was joined, in order to prepare his answer and to prove his defensa It is apparent from the affidavit of the defendant that the answer will be a general denial, and that any information given by the plaintiff will in no wise help him in preparing his answer. If the defendant desired a statement of the account he could obtain a bill of particulars. We think that the application was premature, and that the examination was not necessary.

Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted.

Clement, Ch. J., and Osborne, J., concur.
#### ILAOA and UO, Plaintiffs v. MALOATA, Defendant

No. 3-1916

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Pu’avai”]

January 30, 1919

A. M. NOBLE and MOLIOO, *Judges of the High Court*

JUDGMENT

This cause coming on to be heard before their Honors A. M. Noble and Molioo on the 30th day of January, 1919, and being heard:—

It is ordered, considered and adjudged by the Court that the land “PU’AVAI” is, and the same is hereby declared to be the property of the Ilaoa family and that the holder of the “matai” name Ilaoa, shall have and exercise authority over the same and shall hold and use the same for the benefit of the members of the Ilaoa family.

It is further ordered, considered and adjudged that the costs of this action, to-wit; $20.00 be taxed against Maloata, the defendant in this action.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATE



As required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, (as amended by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002), I certify that:



(1)        The Annual Report of VirTra Systems, Inc. for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)        The information contained in that Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







/s/ Perry V. Dalby

Perry V. Dalby

chief executive officer

April 13, 2007
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Mark Christopher SCHMADER, Appellant.

No. 80-5187.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 8, 1981.

Decided June 9, 1981.

*534David N. Kuryk, Baltimore, Md., for appellant.

David B. Irwin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md. (Russell T. Baker, Jr., U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.

Before WINTER, Chief Judge, and RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The defendant-appellant, Mark Christopher Schmader, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to import heroin (of a multiple count indictment) in fulfilling his part of a plea bargaining agreement. In accord with a Rule 11(e)(1)(A) agreement, the government moved to dismiss three other counts, which was done by the district court. Further, in a Rule 11(e)(1)(B) agreement, the government agreed to recommend that the district court sentence the defendant to a term of five years in prison. The defendant protests the district court’s refusal to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea after the court sentenced him to a term of ten years after the government had lived up to its agreement and recommended five.

The defendant does not deny that he understood at the time he pleaded guilty that the district court was not bound by the government’s sentencing recommendation and that he could not withdraw his guilty plea if the district court sentenced him to a term longer than five years. Nonetheless, he contends that, by imposing a more severe sentence than the government recommended, the district court rejected the plea bargaining agreement and triggered the right to withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 11(e)(4).

The rule in this circuit refutes the defendant’s position. The imposition of a longer sentence than that recommended by the government to fulfill a Rule 11(e)(1)(B) agreement does not constitute a rejection of the plea bargaining agreement bringing the provisions of 11(e)(4) into operation. *United States v. Savage,*561 F.2d 554, 556 (4th Cir. 1977). The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules show the intention of the 1979 Amendments to Rule 11 to make Rule 11 consistent with *Savage.*Indeed, the Committee Notes, which may be found at 28 U.S.C.A. 1981 suppl. p. 6, resolved a hypothetical case that is precisely similar to the case at hand. The Committee’s description of the proper result agrees with that obtained by the district court in this case, and we decline the defendant’s invitation that we reconsider *Savage.*

The judgment of the district court is

*AFFIRMED.*
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra, J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 14, 2011

jam 

# Order

September 14, 2011

143720 (51)

GORDON SCOTT DI TTMER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v SC: 143720 COA: 298997 DEPARTMENT OF CORREC TIONS, CT of CL AIMS: 09-000126 MP DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR, ST. LOUIS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WARDEN, ST. LOUIS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY DEPUTY WARDEN and ST. LOUIS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY CORRECTIONS OFFICER,

Respondents-Appellees.

___________________ ________________

On order of the Chief Ju stice, the motion to waive f ees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2 963 requires that a prisone r pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Within 21 days of the ce rtification of this order, appellant shall pay to the Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $9.00, shall submit a copy of this order with the payment, and shall refile the copy of the pleadings which is being returned with this order. Failure to comply with this orde r shall result in the appeal not being filed in this Court. If appellant timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in an amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant’s account un til the payments equal the balance due of $366.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) appellant shall not file further appeals in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return appellant’s pleadings with this order.2
#### ALLEN vs. THE STATE.

Appeal from Palo Pinto county.

*Swindling*— Indictment.—Presumably the offense attempted to be charged in the information is that of swindling as denounced by article 790 of the Penal Code. It charges in substance, that the appellant promised one Bradford that if he, Bradford, would deliver four certain fish at the house of him, the appellant, he would pay the said Bradford fifty cents for the same ; that the said Bradford did deliver the fish, and that the said lepresentations of the appellant were false. *Held,*insufficient to charge any offense. To constitute swindling there must have been false representations relating to existing facts or future events. Mere promises or false professions of intention, though acted upon, are not sufficient.

Reversed and remanded.

Willson, Judge.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6668 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6668

  To prohibit the use of Federal funds to purchase at-home tests for 
               SARS-CoV-2 from certain foreign entities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 7, 2023

Mrs. Harshbarger (for herself, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Ogles, Mr. 
 Van Drew, Mr. Norman, Mr. Jackson of Texas, and Mr. Dunn of Florida) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                          Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To prohibit the use of Federal funds to purchase at-home tests for 
               SARS-CoV-2 from certain foreign entities.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Taxpayer Dollars for Communist 
China COVID Tests Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USING FEDERAL FUNDS TO PURCHASE CERTAIN TESTS.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Federal funds may be 
used to purchase any at-home test for SARS-CoV-2 that is--
            (1) manufactured, in whole or in part, in the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (2) imported from the People's Republic of China; or
            (3) manufactured by any entity that is a subsidiary of a 
        Chinese company.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.4

                           AMENDMENT TO CEO AGREEMENT
                           --------------------------


     This Amendment to CEO Agreement (this "Amendment") is entered into by and
between Sterling Commerce, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), and
Sterling L. Williams (the "Executive").

     A.  The Company and the Executive entered into a CEO Agreement, dated as of
February 12, 1996 (the "Agreement").

     B.  For good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, the Company and the Executive desire to amend the Agreement as set
forth below.

     NOW, THEREFORE, the Company and the Executive agree as follows:

     1.  Effective October 11, 1996, the words "CEO Agreement" in the title and
introduction of the Agreement are hereby deleted and replaced with the words
"Chairman Agreement."

     2.  Effective October 11, 1996, the words "and Chief Executive Officer" in
the second recital of the Agreement and in the second and third lines of Section
1 of Agreement are hereby deleted.

     3.  The time period "five years" in Section 3 of the Agreement is hereby
deleted and replaced with the time period "seven years."

     4.  The words "five (5) year" in Section 6 of the Agreement are hereby
deleted and replaced with the words "seven (7) year."

     5.  In all other respects, the terms of the Agreement will remain in full
force and effect.

     Except as provided above, this Amendment is effective as of December 1,
1996.

                              STERLING COMMERCE, INC.


                              By:  /s/ Warner C. Blow
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                                   Warner C. Blow, President and CEO

                              EXECUTIVE


                              /s/ Sterling L. Williams
                              --------------------------------------------------
                              Sterling L. Williams
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6834 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6834

 To direct the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to 
      issue a final rule adding as a class all perfluoroalkyl and 
 polyfluoroalkyl substances with at least one fully fluorinated carbon 
 atom to the list of hazardous air pollutants under section 112(b) of 
     the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(b)), and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 14, 2023

Ms. Stevens (for herself, Mr. Posey, Mrs. Dingell, Mr. Fitzpatrick, and 
  Ms. Tlaib) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To direct the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to 
      issue a final rule adding as a class all perfluoroalkyl and 
 polyfluoroalkyl substances with at least one fully fluorinated carbon 
 atom to the list of hazardous air pollutants under section 112(b) of 
     the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(b)), and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Prevent Release Of Toxics Emissions, 
Contamination, and Transfer Act of 2023'' or the ``PROTECT Act of 
2023''.

SEC. 2. LISTING OF PERFLUOROALKYL AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES AS 
              HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS.

    (a) Listing.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
shall issue a final rule adding as a class all perfluoroalkyl and 
polyfluoroalkyl substances with at least one fully fluorinated carbon 
atom to the list of hazardous air pollutants under section 112(b) of 
the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(b)).
    (b) Sources Categories.--Not later than 365 days after the final 
rule is issued pursuant to subsection (a), the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency shall revise the list under section 
112(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(1)) to include 
categories and subcategories of major sources and area sources of 
perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances listed pursuant to such 
final rule.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of the Revocation of Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Robert Liney, Deceased.

Decree of the surrogate of Monroe county affirmed, with costs to both parties payable out of the estate.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew Charles JACKSON, a/k/a William Benbow, a/k/a Ricky Antonio Bady, Sway, Defendant-Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew Charles Jackson, a/k/a William Benbow, a/k/a Ricky Antonio Bady, a/k/a Sway, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 17-6220, No. 17-6221

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 22, 2017

Decided: June 27, 2017

Andrew Charles Jackson, Appellant Pro Se. Paul Thomas Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Andrew Charles Jackson appeals the district court’s orders denying his motions to reduce sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v.*Jackson, Nos. 3:00-cr-00046-JPB-RWT-1; 3:00-cr-00006-JPB-RWT-1, 2017 WL 662115 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 9, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Henry N. Fults, App’lt, *v.*Wilbur Paul, Adm’r, Impl’d, Resp’t.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,*

*Filed April 16, 1891.)*

Appeal—Case.

Where the case on appeal does not state that it contains all the evidence, the appellate court cannot review the referee’s finding on a question of fact.

_ Appeal from a judgment entered on the report of a referee, dismissing the complaint as to the respondent

*J. F. Dorthy,*for app’lt; *J. W.*Dinniny, for resp’t.

Per Curiam.

This was a creditor’s bill to set aside a conveyance of land as in fraud of the plaintiff. The only question presented by this appeal is that of the fraudulent intent of the respondent’s intestate, and that question is, by statute, one of fact and not of law. 2 R. S., 137, § 4. The case on this appeal, which was submitted at the last term without oral argument, nowhere shows that it contains all the evidence given on the trial, and we cannot, therefore, review the referee’s finding on the question of fact.

The judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment appealed from affirmed, with costs.

Dwight, P. J., Macomber and Corlett, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elias CABALLERO-GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50087

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*719Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 17, 2017

Daniel Earl Zipp, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Timothy Garrison, Trial Attorney, Kristi A. Hughes, Michael Marks, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Elias Caballero-Gonzalez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 10-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Caballero-Gonzalez contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to -respond to his sentencing arguments and explain the sentence adequately. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court considered Caballero-Gonzalez’s arguments and sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing the sentence. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Furthermore, the record belies Caballero-Gonzalez’s contention that the district court impermissibly imposed the custodial sentence in order to promote his rehabilitation in violation of *Tapia v. United States,*564 U.S. 319, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011). Rather, the record reflects that the district court granted Caballero-Gonzalez’s request to complete residential drug treatment upon his release from custody, and invited probation to seek a sentence modification if it appeared that Caballero-Gonzalez’s admission to the facility would be delayed.

Caballero-Gonzalez next contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. The significantly below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.