alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit
      32.1**




**Certification
      of Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer**


**Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350**


**As
      Adopted Pursuant to**


**Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of Carter Acquisition Corp. II (the "Company")
      on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John
      C.
      Lipman, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.
      906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
                    John C. LipmanJohn
                    C. Lipman
                  Principal
                    Executive Officer
                  Principal
                    Financial Officer
                  December
                    31, 2007
#### Sterling National Bank *&*Trust Company of New York, as Trustee, Respondent, *v.*1231 Park Ave. Holding Co., Inc., et al., Defendants. Joshua Morrison et al., Appellants.

Submitted November 22, 1943;

decided December 2, 1943.

*754
      *Leslie Kirsch*for motion.

*Mitchell Salem, Fisher*opposed.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs and ten dollars costs of motion, unless within ten days appellants file the required undertaking and pay ten dollars costs, in which event the motion is denied, with leave, however (if the undertaking be so filed and the ten dollars costs paid), to plaintiff to raise anew on the argument, if it be so advised, the question as to whether appellants are parties aggrieved.
#### Francis ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patricia REHMER, Suing in her official capacity, Helene Vartelas, Suing in her official capacity, Scott Semple, Suing in his official capacity, Anne Cournoyer, Suing in her official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

16-2322

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

August 25, 2017

*537FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Francis Anderson, pro se, Newtown, CT.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Jacqueline S. Hoell, Stephen R. Strom, Assistant Attorneys General, for George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT.

PRESENT: JON 0. NEWMAN, PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Francis Anderson is currently serving a sentence in a Connecticut prison. He has previously been confined in a Connecticut psychiatric facility and has filed numerous lawsuits. Proceeding pro se, Anderson appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. ’ 1983 complaint because the district court concluded that the only relief sought, a preliminary injunction (sought in the complaint and in a series of motions), had previously been denied. An appeal from the denial of those motions was affirmed. *See Anderson v. Rehmer,*No. 15-3569 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review *sua sponte*dismissals *de novo. See Giano v. Goord,*250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001).

Anderson’s transfer to a new facility prevents him from seeking either injunc-tive or declaratory relief against officials of his prior facility. *See Shepherd v. Goord,*662 F.3d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
[Cite as State v. Snyder , 2018-Ohio-4260.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2018-05-089

: D E C I S I O N - vs - 10/22/2018 : PETE SNYDER, : Defendant-Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CR2009-03-0515

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, John C. Heinkel, Government Services, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appelleeMary K. Martin, 4660 Duke Drive, Suite 101, Mason, Ohio 45040, for defendantappellant

Per Curiam. {¶ 1} This cause came on to be considered upon a notice of appeal, the transcript of the docket and journal entries, the transcript of proceedings and original papers from the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, and upon a brief filed by appellant's counsel. {¶ 2} Counsel for appellant, Pete Snyder, has filed a brief with this court pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), which (1) indicates that a careful review of the record from the proceedings below fails to disclose any______________________

- 2 - errors by the trial court prej udicial to the rights of appell ant upon whic h an assignment of error may be predicated; (2) lists two potential errors "that might arguably support the appeal," Anders at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; (3) requests that this court review the record independently to determine whether the proceedings are free from prejudicial error and without infringement of appellant's constitutional rights; (4) requests permission to withdraw as counsel for appell ant on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (5) certifies that a copy of both the brief and motion to withdraw have been served upon appellant. {¶ 3} Having allowed appellant sufficient time to respond, and no response having been received we have accordingly examined the record and find no error prejudicial to appellant's rights in the proceedings in the trial court. The motion of counsel for appellant requesting to withdraw as counsel is granted, and this appeal is dismissed for the reason that it is wholly frivolous.

HENDRICKSON, P.J., RINGLAND and PIPER, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 23.03
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENTREGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (nos.333-72192, 333-58510, 333-55828, 333-54886, 333-48582, 333-46252, 333-84545, 333-89170, 333-89172and 333-113662) and on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-107963, 333-72746, 333-61410 and 333-80419) of Homestore,Inc. of our report dated March 7, 2005, with respect to the consolidated financial statements andfinancial statement schedule of Homestore, Inc., Homestore, Inc, management’s assessment of theeffectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internalcontrol over financial reporting of Homestore, Inc. included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K forthe year ended December 31, 2004.                                                   /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP         
Los Angeles, California
|   | (i)    | the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company, for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2009, and to which this certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|   | (ii)   | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                                                                                                 |

|   | By:    | /s/ Glenn McQuiston                                        |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                       |
|   | Name:  | GLENN McQUISTON                                            |
|   |   |                                                       |
|   | Title: | Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) |
|   |   |                                                       |
|   | Date:  | October 16, 2009                                           |
EXHIBIT 13.2




CERTIFICATION OF


CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER




PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I, Greg McCunn, Chief Financial Officer of Keegan Resources Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:




(i)
the Annual Report on Form 20-F, of the Company for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2011 (the “Annual Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(ii)
the information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







By:
“Greg McCunn”Name:
Greg McCunnTitle:
Chief Financial OfficerDate:
June 29, 2011




This certification accompanies this Annual Report on Form 20-F pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"). Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
#### C. Raymond North, Appellant, *v.*City of Cohoes, et al., Defendants, and Margaret O’Donnell et al., Defendants-Respondents.

Submitted November 15, 1943;

decided November 24, 1943.

*727
      *John Lane*for motion.

*Borden H. Mills*opposed.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed with costs, and ten dollars costs of motion, on the ground that the judgment or order appealed from does not finally determine the action.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Frank Kerrigan, Appellant, against Walter B. Martin, as Warden of Clinton Prison, Respondent.

Submitted October 4, 1943;

decided October 14, 1943.

Motion for reargument denied. (See 291 N. Y. 513.)
#### The Mayor, etc., of the City of Troy, Respondents, *v.*The Troy and Lansingburgh Railroad Company, Appellant.

(Argued March 29, 1872;

decided April 9, 1872.)

By the acceptance by a railroad corporation of a license from a municipal corporation to lay and operate its tracks in the streets of the latter, the terms and conditions upon which the license is granted become a contract between the parties.

A reservation of power on the part of the municipal corporation to revoke the license in case of failure to comply with the terms, does not affect the liability of the railroad corporation while operating its road under the license,

Where a judgment is obtained against a city in an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained, in consequence of a failure of a railroad corporation-to comply with its contract to keep that portion of the street occupied by its track in good repair and safe for travel, and where the latter has notice of the action and an opportunity to defend, the record of the judgment is competent evidence in an action against it brought by the city, and is conclusive as to its liability and as to the amount the city is entitled to recover.

This action was brought to recover the amount of a judgment paid by plaintiffs for damages sustained by the overturning of a sleigh in one-of its streets.

*658Plaintiffs granted a license to defendant to lay its track through, certain streets upon condition that it should keep in thorough repair the pavement between and for eighteen inches outside of its track, and should remove the snow and afford a safe and unobstructed passage for sleighs and wagons. In default the common council, after thirty days, had the right to revoke the license. After a heavy fall of snow, defendant, to run its cars, removed the snow from its tracks, leaving it on the sides. In consequence, one Nathaniel Purdy was precipitated into the excavation by the overturning of a sleigh, and was injured. He brought an action against the city. Notice was given defendant of the action, and it was requested to defend and indemnify the city, but declined. Purdy obtained judgment for $3,825, which was paid by plaintiffs. On the trial herein the court received the judgment in evidence and held it conclusive upon defendant as to extent of damages, and that the excavation by defendant rendered the streets unsafe and dangerous, and that Purdy was not chargeable with contributory negligence. To these rulings defendant excepted. Plaintiffs obtained judgment for the amount paid on the Purdy judgment, with costs, counsel fees and expenses incurred in the defence. The judgment was affirmed by the General Term.

*W. A. Beach*for the appellant.

*M. I Townsend*for the respondents.

Grover, J.,

reads for affirmance.

All concur. Judgment affirmed with costs.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order (continued...) 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 28 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

CYNTHIA STORER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. COUNTY OF SANTA FE; SANTA FE SOLAR HOMES; KEITH MACDUFFEE; HOLLY HART, Attorney; ATTORNEY GENERAL, Consumer Protection Division; TINI GARCIA; RISK MANAGEMENT OF C.I.D.; ORLANDO MARTINEZ;ED’S FLOOR; BRUCE BEERSGREEN; JOHN STEVER; KORTZ, Journeyman; KISSENGER, Journeyman; POND GENALD, Appraiser; AMREP; ECIA; ELDORADO SUBDIVISION; THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; INTERSTATE LENDING CORPORATION; FIRST INTERSTATE MORTGAGE; C. FRIEDMAN,

Defendants-Appellees. No. 97-2198 (D.C. No. CIV-96-1582-JC) (D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ** (...continued)

and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

-2- Before TACHA , LOGAN , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

The district court, after finding plaintiff’s compl aint incomprehensible, granted defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We uphold a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6 ) only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of fact s in support of the claims that would entitle [her] to relief, acceptin g the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construingthem in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Yoder v. Honeywell Inc. , 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir.) (quotation omitte d), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 55 (1997). After our de novo review o f the briefs, pleadings, and record in this case, we agree with the district court that plaintiff’s claims are incomprehensible and further conclude th at this appeal is frivolous.-3-

The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

PASCAL LARRIEUX

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 19

- 2255

[ October 31, 2019 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Martin S. Fein , Judge;

L.T. Case No. 11

- 18070CF10A

.

Pascal Larrieux, Crawfordville, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

C ONNER

, F ORST and K UNTZ

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Sims v. Moore *et al.*

Fraudulent Conveyance : to wife to defeat husband's creditors. Where a wife delivers money to her husband to be invested and proceeds accounted for, but no special accounting is ever had, but the obligation is never released, she may take a conveyance of property belonging to her husband in order to protect her interests, even though the husband has other creditors who may suffer thereby.

*Appeal from Page .District Court.*

Filed, May *22,*1888.

*498Tins defendants are husband and wife. The plaintiff is a judgment creditor of the husband. This action was brought to subject certain property, the title to which is in the wife, to the payment of the judgment, upon the ground that the title was taken in the name of the wife in fraud of the creditors of the husband. There was a decree in the district court for the defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

*W. P.*Ferguson, for appellant.

*G. B. Jennings, for*appellees.

Rothuock, J.

The case is here for trial anew. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the averments of his petition by a preponderance of the evidence. The proof is undisputed that, within a short time after the marriage of the defendants, the wife received eight hundred and thirty dollars from her father1 s estate. It is also undisputed that she delivered this money to her husband. Both of the defendants testify that the delivery of the money to the husband was not a gift to him, but that it was1 agreed between them that he should loan and invest it for her as her agent, and account to her for the proceeds.' No special accounting was had, but it appears that the obligation to do so was never released nor abandoned. It is claimed by the defendants that the property in controversy was paid for from this fund, and that the wife, being a creditor, had the right to protect her interests notwithstanding the husband had other creditors who might suffer thereby. There is the usual effort upon the part of the plaintiff to show a fraudulent transaction. A careful examination of all the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the decree of the district court ought not to be disturbed.

AE’KIRMED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6924

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ROBERT MCNATT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Fayetteville. W. Earl Britt, Senior

District Judge. (CR-89-34)

Submitted: September 10, 1998 Decided: September 29, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert McNatt, Appellant Pro Se. Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorney, Anne Margaret Hayes, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Robert McNatt appeals the district court’s order denying his

“motion to reconsider sentence.” To the extent McNatt’s motion can

be construed as a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c) motion, the district court

properly dismissed the motion because it was untimely. To the

extent the motion can be construed as a motion filed under 28

U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998), the district court properly denied the motion both because it was untimely and because

McNatt failed to seek authorization from this court to file a

successive § 2255 motion. See Brown v. Angelone, ___ F.3d ___, Nos.

97-7173, 96-7208 (4th Cir. July 14, 1998); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 

### Deidre Taber Official Court Reporter Fergus County Courthouse 712 West Main St. Lewistown, MT 59457 (406) 535-1081

MONTANA, TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FERGUS COUNTY

STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. DAVID 

### ALLEN PEIN, Defendant. Case No.: DC 23-15 ORDER

Upon reading the Affidavit ofDeidre Taber, Official Court Reporter, for an extension oftime of time to transmit the record, and good cause having been shown: IT IS HEREI3Y ORDEREDthatthe Appellant shall have 50 additional days in which totransmit the record in this case or until September 24th, 2024. 

### DATED this a(

4 „ day ofJuly, 2024. 

# roxA-4.A4:- NICKOLAS C. MURNION JUDGE

Copies e-mailedto: Attorney Theresa Diekhans

Attorney Alex Jacobi Hon. Nickolas C. Murnion 07/29/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0387
### TACLE 

### OF CONTENTS



## ....................... A

# . Overview: The Framework of Legal Authority 1 B

## . Statutory Responsibilities and Authorityof theARB 

## ............... 2 C

# . Responsibilities and Authority of Air Poilution



## ....................................... Control Districts (APCDs) 3



## .................... D 

## . Enforcement of the 

### SIP (Nonvehicular Controls) 

### 4



## ................ 1 

## . Enfonenent Through Administrative Mechanisms 4



## .................................... a

# . Hearing Board Powers 4 b 

# . Permit Actions 

## ..........................................5 

### c 

# . Variances 

## ............................................... 6 d 

# . Abatement Orders 

## .......................................... 6



## ............................. 2

# . Enforcement Through Court Action 

### 7 

### a 

# . Criminal Penalties 

## ...................................... 7



## ......................................... b 

# . Civil Penalties 

### 7 c

# . Civil injunctive Action 

## ............................... 8 E

## . Right of Entry and Source !nformation Gathering 

## .................... 3 

### F . Public Availability of Data 

## ....................................... 9 

### G

# . Emergency Episodes 

## ................................................ 9



## .................................................. 

# . H New Source Review 10 I 

### . Air Conservation (Prevention 

### of Significant



### .................................................. Deterioration) I0 

### J 

## . Air QualityMaintecance Planning 

## .................................. 11



## .................................. K

## . Authority for Vehicular Controls 

### 11

... 

## ................................................. 1

## . New Vehicl'es 

### 12



## .......................................... 2. Used ktor Vehicles 

### 12



## ................................... 3

# . Low Emissior; Xoior Vehicles 13 4 

### . Inspection an2 Haintenance 

## ................................... i3



## ..................................... . 5 Vehjc? E 

### RF~ ate< Control s 

### 14



### ...................... 6

# . Ouality Contrei and 

### Consumer Frotecticn 14 7 

### . Enfo;censnc Mechanisms 

### ....................................... 12 L 

### . Transportation and Lan~ Use Controls 

### .............................. 74 1 c M

### . Hazardous'Poilutants 4 State Azhient Air Cual ity Stzndards ............................... 16 43 

## . Policy Cansjstancy ...ith thc S!F 

### ................................... 113Appendix 3-A 

### Gal jfornia Air Pol1 ution Co"t01 Laws , 1978 Edjtion, Cal i fornia Air Resources 

### aoard, Sacramento, CA 95812 (available separately from ARB' 

### z Pub1 i c Inf~mation Office) ............................-.---a-a.-.--