alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jimmy D. BIZZELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF ADULT AND JUVENILE DETENTION, AKA RJC, Maleng Regional Justice Center, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-36031

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 30, 2017

Jimmy D. Bizzell, Pro Se

Richard L. Anderson, Esquire, King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2),

MEMORANDUM **

Jimmy D. Bizzell, a former pretrial detainee, appeals pro se from -the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from his inability to access religious services, meals, and head coverings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Albino v. Baca,*747 F.3d 1162, 1168-71 (summary judgment is proper procedural vehicle for determining exhaustion). We affirm.

Summary judgment was proper because Bizzell failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. *See Ross v. Blake,*— U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858-60, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (describing limited circumstances under which administrative remedies are deemed unavailable); *Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 85, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that proper exhaustion is mandatory); *see also Lira v. Herrera,*427 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] district court must dismiss a case without prejudice when there is no presuit exhaustion, even if there is exhaustion while suit is pending.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in *751the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7009 

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to approve as allowable costs 

the expenses of certain security measures in a revenue producing parking 

lot under section 47119 of title 49, United States Code, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 17, 2024 

Ms. CARAVEO (for herself and Mr. BUCK) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to approve 

as allowable costs the expenses of certain security measures in a revenue producing parking lot under section 

47119 of title 49, United States Code, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securing Airport Fa5 cilities for Enhanced Parking Act’’ or the ‘‘SAFE Parking 

6 Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 7009 IH

1 SEC. 2. SECURITY PROJECTS IN REVENUE PRODUCING 

2 PARKING LOTS. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—In making a decision under para4 graph (1) of section 47119(a) of title 49, United States 

5 Code, the Secretary of Transportation may approve as al6 lowable costs under such section the expenses of security 

7 measures in a revenue producing parking lot, including— 

8 (1) CCTV systems; 

9 (2) physical barriers; 

10 (3) alarm systems; 

11 (4) analytical tools to be developed in partner12 ship with law enforcement to identify criminal 

13 trends; and 

14 (5) any other measure the Secretary determines 

15 to be appropriate. 

16 (b) APPLICABILITY.—The authority to approve allow17 able costs for security measures under subsection (a) shall 

18 terminate on December 31, 2025. 

19 (c) REPORT.—Not later than December 31, 2025, the 

20 Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to 

21 the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of 

22 the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

23 Science, Commerce, and Transportation of the Senate a 

24 report describing— 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•HR 7009 IH

1 (1) the funds used for security measures in a 

2 revenue producing parking lot under section 47119 

3 of title 49, United States Code; and 

4 (2) recommendations for updating the airport 

5 improvement program under subchapter I of chapter 

6 471 of such title. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
### Attachment links for Gabor Simon, Skypropics:

1. Phantom 3 User manual http://download.dji innovations.com/downloads/phantom_3/en/Phantom_3_Professional_User_Manual_v1.4_en.pdf 

### 2. Phantom 3 Intelligent Flight Batter y Safety Guidelines http://download.dji innovations.com/downloads/phantom_3/en/Intelligent_Flight_Battery_Safety_Guidelines_en.pdf 3. Phantom 3 Safety Guidelines and D isclaimer http://download.dji - innovations.com/downloads/phantom_3/en/Safety_Guidelines_Disclaimer_en.pdf
OFFICt: OF SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTAifON COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLV,\NIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17101·1900 -· .{"';,_ c·

The Honorable Anthony Foxx Secretary ofTransportation U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 NewJerseyAvenue, SE Washington, DC 20590

Dear Mr. Foxx: --**~)** t

July22, 2014

This letter is to inform you that PennDOT is still in support ofour previously letter dated June 19, 2014. I write to express myfull supportfor the granting ofthe waiver process regarding Essential Air Service at both Franklin's Venango County Regional Airportand Bradford Regional Airport. On April 24, 2014, the Department ofTransportation issued Order 2014-4-26 proposing to eliminate subsidized service atthese two markets due to their being under 10 enplanements per service day during the period from October 1, 2012 thru September 30, 2013. Pennsylvania has invested significant capital funds overtime in these two airports. If EAS service is cancelled, those investments will have been wasted. The communities and Pittsburgh International Airport have spent nearly three years and a significant amount ofmoneystudying the issue with current air service, and have identified a viable solution to improve passengertraffic and allow both communities to fully satisfy EAS minimums of not only the 10 enplanement rule, butalso the $200 subsidy per passenger rule. The result has been the addition ofthree newcarriers applying for bids to PITwith greaterfrequency, reduced costsand strong model ofefficiency.

Air service within the state is an important economic generatorand in some cases of Pennsylvania EAS airports, a direct business relationship to the burgeoning Marcellus natural gas sector. As a result ofdiscussions, I am committed to fund a marketing effort to advertise and promote new connections between PA EAS airports and PITto help rhake the service successful

I appreciate your time and consideration, and believe a positive model has been brought forth to betterthe EAS system ensuring access to the National Transportation System. Ifyou have any questions please contact Toby Fauver, Deputy Secretary for Multimodal Transportation, at 717.787.8197.

cc: Mr. Kevin Schlemmer, USDOT PA Congressional Delegation Sincerely, 

# ftu'J

# j**Jt4e~**

Barry

### J. Schoch, P.E. Secretary ofTransportation
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Evan Williams, Chief Executive Officer of Border Management,
Inc., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Border Management, Inc. for the year
ended December 31, 2006 (the 'Report') fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Border
Management, Inc.

Dated: July 13,2007

/s/ Evan Williams
------------------
Evan Williams
Chief Executive Officer,
Border Management, Inc.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Border Management,
Inc. and will be retained by Border Management, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                            9
         
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
       
<S>                                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                 JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                          510,515
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       21,747,685
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                              1,710,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                      0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                   1,170,889
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                       21,000,000
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         21,018,287
<LOANS>                                      127,247,120
<ALLOWANCE>                                      234,763
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               174,604,556
<DEPOSITS>                                   108,429,998
<SHORT-TERM>                                           0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            2,875,756
<LONG-TERM>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                      41,897,031
<OTHER-SE>                                    21,401,771
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               174,604,556
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                7,593,549
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              2,114,939
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                       0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               9,708,488
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             3,995,915
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             3,995,915
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          5,712,573
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                          0
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                     0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                2,480,236
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                3,312,937
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     3,312,937
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                   2,053,922
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        .50
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                      7.50
<LOANS-NON>                                      280,711
<LOANS-PAST>                                           0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                       0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                        0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 234,763
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                          0
<RECOVERIES>                                           0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                234,763
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             234,763
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                                0
        


</TABLE>
#### FORT WORTH & DENVER R. R. CO. vs. DABNEY et al.

Appeal from Wise county.

*Practice in the Supreme Gourt.*— When the record fails to show action of the court upon a general demurrer, such demurrer, unless it presents fundamental error, will not be considered.

*Practice*— Mviclence.—When Objection to evidence is general, and no ground of objection is specially assigned, the rule is, that if such evidence would tend to prove any of the facts put in issue by the pleadings, it will be hold to have been admissible, and *contra.*The rule does not cover evidence admitted over objection in the case.

*Same,*— The remaining objection urged to the judgment is that it is not supported by the evidence. But the objection is not sustained by the record.

Affirmed on report of

Watts, Commissioner.
#### Shear v. Bolinger *et al.*

Intoxicating Liquors: removal of causes to federal courts. *(Shear v. Kelson,*73 Iowa, 705, followed.)

*Appeal from Chickasaw District Court.*

Filed, March 12, 1888.

*758This is an action in equity to enjoin and abate a nuisance which it is alleged the defendants are maintaining by keeping a saloon. An application was made for the removal of the cause to the circuit court of the United States, which was sustained, and an order of removal was made. From this order plaintiff appeals.

*J. H. Powers,*for appellants. '

*Hiram Shaver,*for appellees.

Rothrock, J.

It was held in *Shear v. Kelson,*and other cases determined at the present term, that the defendants in causes like this have no right to remove the same to the federal court. Following those cases the order of removal in this case is

Reversed.
#### R+L CARRIERS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. MICRODEA, INC., PeopleNet Communications Corporation, DriverTech LLC, Intermec Technologies Corp., Defendants-Appellees PeopleNet Communications Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee v. R+L Carriers, Inc., Defendant-Appellant DriverTech LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee v. R+L Carriers, Inc., Defendant-Appellant R+L Carriers, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Intermec Technologies Corp., Defendant-Appellee

2016-2688, 2016-2689, 2016-2690, 2016-2692

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

October 11, 2017

Anthony C. White, Thompson Hine LLP, Columbus, OH, argued for appellant. Also represented by Philip B Sineneng; Stephen Butler, Sr., Cincinnati, OH; Arthur P. Licygiewicz, Cleveland, OH.

Jonathan S. Franklin, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP, Washington, DC, argued for all appellees. Appellees Microdea, Inc., PeopleNet Communications Corporation also represented by James George Warri-ner, Austin, TX; Richard Stephen Zembek, Houston, TX.

Scott M. Peterson, Fabian VanCott, Salt Lake City, UT, for appellee Driver-tech LLC. Also represented by Philip Daniel Dracht.

Carson P. Veach, Freeborn & Peters, LLP, Chicago, IL, for appellee Intermec Technologies Corp.

(Dyk, O’Malley, and Wallach, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Aaron Keith REYNOLDS, a.k.a. Key, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-16392 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(June 20, 2017)

*652Sandra J. Stewart, George L. Beck, Jr., Kevin P. Davidson, John J. Geer, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Susan R. Redmond, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Paul Roy Cooper, Cooper & Cooper, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Aaron Reynolds .appeals his 48-month sentence, imposed after a jury found him guilty of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At the time of his sentencing, Reynolds’s trial judge was unavailable, so the judge transferred his case to a different judge (the sentencing judge). On appeal, Reynolds argues that (1) the trial judge’s decision to reassign his case was improper and (2) the sentencing judge should have transferred the case back to the trial judge because the sentencing judge was not familiar with the trial record. After careful consideration of the record and the parties’ briefs, we find both arguments unavailing.

I

The trial judge did not err in reassigning Reynolds’s case. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a]fter a verdict or finding of guilty, any judge regularly sitting in or assigned to a court may complete the court’s duties if the judge who presided at trial cannot perform those duties because of absence, death, sickness, or other disability.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1). “Because [the trial judge] became absent at the time of sentencing, reassignment of the case to [the sentencing judge] was proper under Rule 25.” *See United States v. Dowd,*451 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006).

II

The sentencing judge did not err in presiding over Reynolds’s sentencing. The judge “was sufficiently familiar with [Reynolds’js trial to sentence him.” *See id.*First, prior to Reynolds’s sentencing hearing, testimony from his trial was filed with the district court for consideration by the sentencing judge, and the sentencing judge conducted sentencing hearings for several of Reynolds’s co-defendants. Second, at the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge (1) heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including testimony from a key trial witness which overlapped with the witness’s trial testimony; (2) noted that he reviewed both Reynolds’s Pre-sentence Investigation Report and Reynolds’s sentencing memorandum; and (3) engaged in colloquy with counsel about Reynolds’s trial. Finally, the sentencing judge, during the colloquys with counsel, demonstrated familiarity with relevant trial issues and indicated that Reynolds’s sentencing memorandum assisted him in familiarizing himself with the case. “[T]his record contains ample evidence that [the sentencing judge] was familiar enough with the trial to impose [a] sentence.” *See United States v. Caraza,*843 F.2d 432, 437 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

III

Because neither the trial judge nor the sentencing judge erred, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.
# ,
Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 March 19, 1998 WORKSHOPREGARDINGENERGY EFFICIENCY TESTPROCEDURES, LABELING, STANDARDS COMPLIANCEAND RELATED MATTERS FOR COMMERCIALWATERHEATERS, BOILERS,FURNACES,AIRCONDITIONERS AND HEAT PUMPS

The Department ofEnergy (Department) is convening a workshop to solicit views and information that interested parties believe would aid in the development ofrules regarding energy efficiency test procedures, labeling and standards compliance as they relate to commercial water heaters, boilers, furnaces, air conditioners and heat pumps. The Department would also like to receive comments on a number ofspecific issues. Specific issues are: 1) the interpretation ofAmerican Society ofHeating, Refrigerating and AirConditioning Engineers, Inc. (ASHRAE) Standard 90.1 as it applies to these products; 2) costeffective and reliable regimes for sampling, certification and enforcement; and 3) appropriate labeling requirements. The workshop for the test procedures rulemaking will be held Tuesday, April 14, 1998, from 9:00 a.m. until 4:45 p.m. and Wednesday, April 15, 1998, from 9:00 a.m. until 3:30 p.m. in Room lE-245 at the US Department ofEnergy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585. A draft agenda is enclosed. Copies ofthe notice announcing the workshop and other preliminary material, including apaper outlining specific issues, will be available onthe Department's Office ofCodes and Standards worldwide web site beginning the week ofMarch 30, 1998. The URL address for the web site is http://www.eren.doe.gov/builtlingsicodes_standardsiindex.htm. Ifyou have any questions or plan to attend the workshop, or ifyou are unable to access the web site and wish to obtain background materials, please contact Ms. BrendaEdwards-Jones, ofmy staff, by phone at (202) 586-2945 orby fax at (202) 586-4617. I look forward to seeing you at the workshop.

Enclosure Sincerely,

11. Mc abe, Director Office ofCodes and Standards Office ofBuilding Technology, State

and Community Programs Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 

# . *

Printed with soy ink on recycled paper
#### Mosely and Others *against*Taylor.

*Cuaxcf.*ar.

[hiessrs. Sanders and Depew for plaintiffs: no appearance for defendant.]

From the Circuit Court for Orno County.

*October*27.

The promise of an ex’or to pay the debt of his testator, tho’ in writing (according to the statute of frauds) would not be binding, unless it was founded upon a valuable consideration. But/or*bearance*may be a sufficient consideration, even when there was no assets of which the debt *543could be macle. Thecreditorstipulated to allow ten years indulgence; gave up the note of the testator *and his co-obligor,*and took that of the ex’or.: held that these facts clearly constituted a sufficient consideration to uphold the personal obligation of thb executor.

*542Chief Justice Robertson

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

On a bill filed by John Á. Taylor, to enjoin a judgment obtained against him by Presley Mosely, as assignee of Robert Mosely, on a promissory note, which he had given, in his individual capacity, to the assignor, in lieu of a demand against his deceased father, of whose will he was then executor—the Circuit Court, on final hearing, perpetually enjoined the judgment, on the ground, as we presume, that, in the opinion of that Court, there were no assets at the date of the note or since, and that, therefore, there was no binding consideration for the personal undertaking by the executor to pay the demand out of his own pocket.

*543There can be no doubt that, although the promise to pay the debt of the testator is in writing, according to the statute of frauds and perjuries, nevertheless, it is not enforcible unless it was founded on some valuable consideration. But forbearance, for a certain or a reasonable time, if it operate to the prejudice of the creditor, may be a sufficient consideration. The more prevailing opinion has been, that forbearance will be a binding consideration even though there were no assets out of which the creditor might have made his debt. 1 *Saunders, 21*0-11, n. 1, 2. *Yel.*11, *Goring*v. *Goring;*2 *Lev.*3, *Davis v. Rayner;*1 *Vent. Davis*v. *Wright;*1 *Ves.*126, *Reech*v. *Kennegal.*

But whatever may be the true doctrine upon that point, we have no doubt that, in this case, the stipulated forbearance for ten years, and the exoneration of *another person who icas jointly liable with the testator,*constituted a sufficient consideration to make the personal urndertaking of the executor binding in law;

And moreover, it does not clearly appear that, at the date of his note, the demand could not have been made out of assets in the executor’s hands.

Wherefore, as there is no proof of either fraud or iilistake, it is the opinion of this Court, that the decree of the Court below is erroneous.

Wherefore, the decree is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to dissolve the injunction, and dismiss the bill.