[Cite as State v. Dillard, 2014-Ohio-439.]

STATE OF OHIO, JEFFERSON COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

V. 

QUENTIN DILLARD, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

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CASE NO. 12 JE 29 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas of Jefferson County, Ohio 

Case No. 03CR111 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee Jane Hanlin 

Prosecutor 

Jefferson County Justice Center 

16001 S.R. 7 

Steubenville, Ohio 43952 

For Defendant-Appellant Quentin Dillard, Pro-se 

A452749 

Warren Correctional Institution 

P.O. Box 120 

Lebanon, Ohio 45036 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

 

 

 Dated: February 5, 2014 
[Cite as State v. Dillard, 2014-Ohio-439.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Quentin Dillard, appeals a decision of the 

Jefferson County Common Pleas Court overruling his “Motion to Correct a Void 

Sentence and for Resentencing.” 

{¶2} On August 26, 2003, subsequent to a jury trial, Dillard was found guilty 

of five first-degree felony offenses and four second-degree felony offenses, including 

one count of aggravated burglary, four counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of 

felonious assault, one count of improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation, and 

seven accompanying firearm specifications. The trial court conducted a sentencing 

hearing the next day, and imposed a sentence of ten years for aggravated burglary, 

five years for each aggravated robbery count, eight years for one count of felonious 

assault and five years for each of the remaining two counts of felonious assault, five 

years for improper discharge of a firearm, and three years for each firearm 

specification. The trial court ran some of the robbery and assault sentences as well 

as some of the firearm specifications concurrently to each other but consecutively 

with all other counts, for a total sentence of forty-seven years. 

{¶3} Dillard filed a timely appeal and argued that the trial court erroneously 

failed to declare a mistrial, prohibited alibi witness testimony, and erroneously 

considered Dillard's gang affiliation. Dillard also argued that the jury verdict was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the trial court abused its 

discretion by imposing maximum and consecutive sentences. This Court affirmed all 

of Dillard's convictions but remanded the case for resentencing pursuant to State v. 

Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165, 793 N.E.2d 473. State v. Dillard, 7th 

Dist. No. 03 JE 32, 2005-Ohio-1656, (Dillard I). Specifically, this Court affirmed the 

trial court's decision to impose maximum sentences, and additionally found that the 

sentencing entry included all necessary findings to justify consecutive sentences, but 

found that the trial court did not state the findings on the record pursuant to R.C. 

2929.14(E)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences, as required by Comer. Dillard 

I, at ¶ 127-128, 135-136. 

{¶4} At the April 18, 2005 resentencing hearing the trial court stated its 
findings on the record pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) to support imposing 

consecutive sentences for several counts. The trial court imposed the same fortyseven year sentence, and repeated its explanation of post-release control and 

firearm disability ramifications. Dillard raised no objections during the resentencing 

hearing. The judgment entry of sentence was filed on April 28, 2005, and Dillard 

timely filed an appeal. 

{¶5} Dillard argued in his second appeal that the trial court conducted 

improper judicial fact-finding in order to impose maximum sentences against him, in 

violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 

(2004) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 

(2005). While Dillard's case was pending with this Court, the Ohio Supreme Court 

decided State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. On June 

28, 2006, this Court reversed and remanded the trial court's resentencing decision in 

light of Foster. State v. Dillard, 7th Dist. No. 05 JE 22, 2006-Ohio-3524 (Dillard II). 

This Court held that, because the trial court followed the dictates of the now 

unconstitutional R.C. 2929.14(C) and R.C. 2929.14(E)(4), Dillard's sentence had to 

be vacated and remanded for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 11. 

{¶6} Dillard's third sentencing hearing took place on July 24, 2006. The trial 

court stated that “[t]he state of the record still is what it was. The findings in the 

original sentencing were true and are still true. So, by reference I am finding all those 

again.” The trial court sua sponte held that it must order all of the three-year firearm 

specifications to be served concurrently, for a total of three instead of nine years. The 

trial court otherwise imposed the same sentences for each offense, for a new total of 

forty-one years. The trial court repeated its explanation of post-release control and 

firearm disability ramifications. Dillard raised no objections during the resentencing 

hearing. At the end of the sentencing hearing, Dillard indicated that he would retain 

the same attorney to pursue an appeal, but then indicated that he needed to have an 

attorney appointed. 

{¶7} For reasons not apparent in the record, the trial court filed the judgment 

entry of sentence one year later, on July 17, 2007. State v. Dillard, 7th Dist. No. 08 

JE 35, 2010-Ohio-1407, ¶ 9 (Dillard III). The judgment entry stated that the trial court 
considered the purposes and principles of sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and 

balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12. The 

judgment entry listed the factual findings and considerations supporting the sentence 

as it had in the previous two sentencing entries, and described the forty-one year 

sentence. 

{¶8} On October 19, 2007, the trial court filed an order appointing counsel to 

pursue a delayed appeal, noting that Dillard did not retain counsel subsequent to his 

July 24, 2006 resentencing hearing. On October 31, 2008, Dillard filed a pro se 

notice of appeal, affidavit of indigency, and motion for leave to file a delayed appeal, 

stating that he had never been contacted by the counsel that had been appointed on 

October 19, 2007. On November 20, 2008, this court granted Dillard's motion, and 

appointed the Ohio Public Defender to assist Dillard with his appeal. Pursuant to 

Dillard's motion, this court relieved appointed counsel and permitted Dillard to 

proceed in a pro se capacity on December 31, 2008. 

{¶9} In his third appeal, Dillard argued that the trial court erroneously 

prevented him from calling alibi witnesses to testify without prior notice, that the trial 

court erroneously failed to merge certain allied offenses of similar import, and that his 

convictions on five of the counts were not supported by sufficient evidence. 

Additionally, Dillard asserted that the trial court conducted improper fact-finding 

regarding merger in its third sentencing determination in contravention of Foster and 

the previous directives of this Court. Upon review, this Court found Dillard’s 

arguments to be meritless. Dillard III, at ¶ 30. 

{¶10} Specifically, this Court held that Dillard’s first and third assignments of 

error were barred by res judicata because, respectively, Dillard raised the alibiwitness argument in his original appeal and because he could have, but did not, raise 

the sufficiency of the evidence issue. Res judicata likewise barred Dillard’s second 

assignment of error because a merger analysis constitutes a review of underlying 

convictions and this Court had already affirmed Dillard’s convictions in Dillard I. See

Dillard III, at ¶ 23. Finally, this Court also overruled Dillard’s fourth assignment of 

error on the grounds that a trial court’s decision that a defendant’s convictions are not 

allied offenses of similar import does not involve judicial fact-finding; that the trial 
court’s sentence was within the relevant statutory range; and that nothing else in the 

record suggested that the trial court’s sentencing decision was otherwise 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Accordingly, this Court reaffirmed the 

trial court’s July 17, 2007 resentencing judgment. See Dillard III, at ¶ 28-29. 

{¶11} On March 31, 2011, Dillard filed both a “Motion for Leave to Appeal” in 

this Court, and a “Motion for Resentencing” in the Jefferson County Common Pleas 

Court, requesting a Merger Hearing. On April 5, 2011, the trial court overruled that 

motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to re-sentence because Dillard filed both an 

appeal in this Court and the resentencing motion simultaneously, and because 

Dillard’s sentencing had become final by way of appeal. 

{¶12} On May 2, 2011, Dillard filed a second Motion for Resentencing in the 

Jefferson County Common Pleas Court, again requesting a Merger Hearing. On May 

20, 2011, the trial court again overruled Dillard’s motion. 

{¶13} On June 10, 2011, Dillard timely appealed that decision in this Court 

and on October 28, 2011, this Court, sua sponte, granted Dillard thirty days to file 

assignments of error and brief. Thereafter, this Court sua sponte dismissed Dillard’s 

appeal because he failed to timely prosecute it under the Ohio Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. 

{¶14} On June 6, 2012, Dillard filed a “Motion to Correct a Void Sentence and 

for Resentencing” in the Jefferson County Common Pleas Court. Dillard attached a 

memorandum in support arguing that under the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in 

State v. Johnson, which was decided after Dillard III, his sentence is void. 128 Ohio 

St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061. Johnson held: “[w]hen determining 

whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger under 

R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of the accused must be considered.” Id. at syllabus. 

However, while changing the way courts are to analyze the issue of allied offenses of 

similar import, Johnson did not provide a controlling test to use because it does not 

contain a majority opinion. See State v. Ryan, 7th Dist. No. 10-MA-173, 2012-Ohio1265, ¶ 50. Rather, “[o]ur only new guidance is to consider the defendant’s conduct 

and thus the particular facts of each case to determine whether the offenses are of 

similar import.” Id., quoting State v. Gardner, 7th Dist. No. 10-MA-52, 2011-Ohio-
2644, ¶ 23. Nonetheless, Dillard asserted that under Johnson, certain offenses of his 

were allied offenses, and that accordingly, his convictions for those offenses should 

be merged. Additionally, Dillard asserted that his sentence did not comport with due 

process. On this point, Dillard suggested that his trial counsel was ineffective and that 

he was precluded from raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal 

because his trial counsel and his counsel on appeal were the same. 

{¶15} On October 22, 2012, the trial court overruled Dillard’s “Motion to 

Correct a Void Sentence and for Resentencing,” along with all other pending 

motions. 

{¶16} This appeal followed. 

{¶17} In his fourth appeal in this Court, Dillard lists two assignments of error 

which he combines in his argument. 

{¶18} In the first, Dillard argues that: 

A SENTENCE IMPOSED WHICH EXCEEDS A SENTENCE 

MANDATED BY LAW IS VOID. APPELLANT RECEIVED AN 

EXCESSIVE, VOID SENTENCE WHICH VIOLATES DUE PROCESS. 

{¶19} In the second, Dillard argues that: 

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL ON APPEAL WAS THE SAME AS 

HIS TRIAL COUNSEL, AND THIS CONFLICT OF INTEREST 

PREVENTED COUNSEL FROM ASSIGNING INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL FOR NOT ENSURING 

THAT APPELLANT’S ALLIED OFFENSES WERE PROPERLY 

MERGED. 

{¶20} Under these two assignments, Dillard ultimately suggests that some of 

his offenses are allied offenses of similar import and should be merged. As 

aforementioned, in Dillard III this Court held that this same merger argument was 

barred by res judicata because Dillard’s convictions had already been affirmed. Thus, 

in support of his merger claim this time around, Dillard further suggests that his 

counsel was ineffective and that he would have asserted and prevailed on the 
merger issue in his original appeal before this Court affirmed his convictions had he 

been appointed different counsel. However, Dillard asserts, because his trial counsel 

also represented him on appeal, he was precluded from obtaining new counsel by 

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel in his initial direct appeal. Dillard also 

implies that he did not raise ineffective assistance of counsel in his first pro se appeal 

(Dillard III), because at that time, “he was unaware that it was inappropriate for 

counsel at trial to also represent the same defendant on appeal.” 

{¶21} It is well settled that “any issue that could have been raised on direct 

appeal and was not is res judicata and not subject to review in subsequent 

proceedings.” State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, 

¶ 16. Moreover, “[t]he Ohio cases which appear to absolutely prohibit the review of 

an ineffectiveness of counsel argument where trial counsel continues to represent on 

appeal are based on a misreading of certain post-conviction relief and habeas 

decisions.” State v. Harris, 7th Dist. No. 00 BA 26, 2002-Ohio-2411, ¶ 23. Rather, 

“there does not appear to be an absolute bar to arguing one’s own ineffectiveness in 

federal criminal appeals.” Id., at ¶ 22, citing Barker v. United States, 7 F.3d 629, 632 

(7th Cir.1993). Thus, counsel who represents defendant both at trial and on appeal is 

not barred from arguing ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. See 

Harris, at ¶ 22-27 (distinguishing post-conviction relief appeals from direct appeals in 

holding that counsel who represents a defendant both at trial and on appeal may 

argue ineffective assistance on direct appeal). Accordingly, contrary to his assertions, 

Dillard was not precluded by law from raising ineffective assistance of counsel in his 

first direct appeal despite the fact that his appellate counsel also represented him at 

trial. Additionally, Dillard could have, and should have, raised this issue in his first pro 

se appeal. Because he did not raise this issue in either instance, he is precluded by 

the doctrine of res judicata from litigating this issue in this proceeding. 

{¶22} That said, Dillard further asserts that the trial court did not adequately 

address the merits of his motion and that State v. Johnson, supra, which post-dates 

this Court’s decision in Dillard III, should be applied retroactively to his 2003 

conviction and sentencing. Dillard suggests that his sentence is not in accordance 

with Johnson and is thus void because it “exceeds a sentence mandated by law.” 
Additionally, as this Court dismissed Dillard’s merger claim in Dillard III on res 

judicata grounds, Dillard further asserts that res judicata does not apply here 

because he raised the merger issue on a direct appeal and this Court issued an 

adverse ruling on the basis of unsettled law. 

{¶23} Dillard is incorrect. “The majority of Ohio’s Appellate Districts believe 

that the issue of merger must be raised in an appellant’s first direct appeal, or else it 

is barred by res judicata.” Dillard III, at ¶ 20, citing State v. Howard, 2d Dist. No. 2008 

CA 87, 2009-Ohio-3432, ¶ 9-10 (holding that res judicata barred the court’s 

consideration of appellant’s merger of allied offenses of similar import claim because 

“it could have been made in [appellant’s] original direct appeal”); see also State v. 

Parson, 2d Dist. No. 24641, 2012-Ohio-730, ¶ 10, citing Smith v. Voorhies, 119 Ohio 

St.3d 345, 2008-Ohio-4479, 894 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 10-11 for the proposition that “‘alliedoffense claims are nonjurisdictional,’ and thus, barred by the doctrine of res judicata 

where they were raised, or could have been raised, on direct appeal.” 

{¶24} Here, Dillard did not raise the issue of merger in his first, or even in his 

second, direct appeal. Dillard seems to suggest that he failed to do so because his 

counsel was ineffective and he could not raise ineffective assistance on appeal to 

obtain different counsel who would have in turn raised the merger issue. Even if this 

claim were a valid way around res judicata on the merger issue, as aforementioned, 

the claim itself is barred by res judicata. Thus, whereas res judicata barred Dillard’s 

merger claim in Dillard III because this Court had already affirmed Dillard’s 

convictions, res judicata bars review in the instant case because Dillard failed to raise 

the merger issue in his first direct appeal. 

{¶25} Nonetheless, even if res judicata did not bar review, Dillard’s argument 

would still be meritless because Johnson is inapplicable here. “Johnson identified a 

change in the manner in which a state law is interpreted and applied. It is not a 

United States Supreme Court case, and thus, does not identify any new, retroactive, 

federal or state right recognized by the United States Supreme Court.” State v. 

Norris, 7th Dist. No. 11 MO 4, 2013-Ohio-866, ¶ 14. Moreover, “[a] new judicial ruling 

may be applied only to cases that are pending on the announcement date.” Ali v. 

State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-6592, 819 N.E.2d 687, ¶ 6, citing State v. 
Evans, 32 Ohio St.2d 185, 186, 291 N.E.2d 466 (1972). Accordingly, this Court has 

applied Johnson retroactively only in those cases in which an appeal was pending in 

this Court when Johnson was announced. Compare State v. Burns, 7th Dist. No.09-

MA-193, 2012-Ohio-2698, ¶ 64 (applying Johnson retroactively where appeal was 

pending), and State v. Stoffer, 7th Dist.No.09-CO-1, 2011-Ohio-5133, ¶ 182 (applying 

Johnson retroactively where appeal was pending), with State v. Norris, supra 

(refusing to apply Johnson in a post-conviction relief case where no appeal was 

pending at the time Johnson was announced). 

{¶26} Here, as aforementioned, Johnson was announced after this Court’s 

decision in Dillard III. Moreover, while Dillard appealed (but never prosecuted the 

appeal) to this Court in March 2011 after Johnson was released, he did not have an 

appeal pending at the time of Johnson’s announcement. Accordingly, Dillard cannot 

rely on Johnson. 

{¶27} In sum, the doctrine of res judicata bars both Dillard’s merger argument 

and his ineffective assistance of counsel argument in support thereof because he 

failed to raise both issues in his first direct appeal. Additionally, even if res judicata 

did not apply here, Johnson cannot be applied retroactively to Dillard’s 2003 

convictions and sentence, and thus, the analysis undertaken by the trial court would 

remain in effect. 

{¶28} Accordingly, both of Dillard’s assignments of error are without merit. 

{¶29} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Waite, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, P.J., concurs.