alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Sidney M. Wittner, an Attorney, Appellant. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Respondent.

Argued May 24, 1943;

decided July 20, 1943.

*I. Maurice Wormser, Samuel Bader*and *Lloyd Paul Stryker*for appellant.

*Binar Chrystie*for respondent.

Order affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ. Taking no part: Lehman, Ch. J.
#### Jerry HOOKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruce R. BANNISTER; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16764

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017*

Filed July 17, 2017

Jerry Hooks, Pro Se

Clark G. Leslie, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGNV—Nevada Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, NV, Defendant-Appellee

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Jerry Hooks appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and retaliation for filing grievances. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *see Toguehi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hooks’s deliberate indifference claim against defendants Koehn and Smith because Hooks failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants were deliberately indifferent to Hooks’s medication needs. *See id.*at 1057-60 (“A prison official acts with deliberate indifference ... only if the [prison official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health”; neither a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment nor mere negligence in treating a medical condition amounts to deliberate indifference (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hooks’s retaliation claims against defendant Koehn because Hooks failed to raise á genuine dispute of *675material fact as to whether Koehn took any adverse action against Hooks. *See Watison v. Carter,*668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth the elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Hooks’s claims against defendant Byrne for failure to effectuate service of process because Hooks did not file a proof of service, despite being warned of the consequences of failing to doing so. *See*Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (imposing 90-day time limit to effect service absent showing of good causé).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); *Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle,*7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived).

Hooks’s requests for judicial notice (Docket Entry Nos. 14 and 28) and petition for mandate relief (Docket Entry No. 48) are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
U.	S.	Department	of	Transportation

Docket	Management	System	

1200	New	Jersey	Ave,	SE	

Washington,	DC	20590	

04/11/15

Re:	Amendment	to	Exemption	11240	issued	pursuant	to	Section	333	of	the	FAA	

Reform	Act	and	Part	11	of	the	Federal	Aviation	Regulations	in	Regulatory	Docket	

No.	FAA-2014-0353-0001.	

Dear	Sir	or	Madam;	

Aerius	Flight	LLC,	was	issued	an	Exemption	numbered	11240	(hereinafter	

the	Exemption)	for	the	purpose	of	commercial	aerial	survey	and	photography	

operations.	Aerius	Flight	LLC,	herby	requests	an	amendment	to	the	Exemption	to	

allow	an	additional	type	of	unmanned	aircraft	system	(UAS)	that	fully	complies	

with	the	conditions	of	the	Exemption.	

Aerius	Flight	LLC, wishes	to	operate	a	DJI	Phantom	3 under	the	same	terms	

and	conditions	contained	in	the	Exemption.	Attached	hereto,	and	submitted	as	a	

confidential	document,	is	the	Flight	Operations	Manual	(FOM)	for	the	additional	

UASs.	All	operations	of	the	additional	UASs	will	be	in	full	compliance	with	the	

terms	of	the	Exemption.	

As	this	is	an	amendment	to	an	existing	exemption	asking	for	only	the	

addition	of	another	type	of	unmanned	aerial	vehicle,	Aerius	Flight	LLC	respectfully	

submits	that	good	cause	exists	so	that	notice	does	not	need	to	be	published	in	the	

Federal	Register	for	the	requested	amendment.	

Please	contact	the	undersigned	should	you	have	any	question	concerning	this	

request	for	an	amendment	to	the	Exemption.	

Sincerely	yours,	

Kenneth	Beason

CEO,	Aerius	Flight	LLC

kbeason@aeriusflight.com

1	(248)	767-9092

CC:

Robert	Pappas	

Jake	Troutman
# Diario Oficial C 11A/2014

| | ISSN 1977-0928
  doi:10.3000/19770928.CA2014.011.spa |
| --- | --- |
| Diario Oficial
  de la Unión Europea | C 11A |
| | |
| Edición en lengua española | Comunicaciones e informaciones | 57o año15 de enero de 2014 |

ISSN 1977-0928

doi:10.3000/19770928.CA2014.011.spa

Diario Oficial

de la Unión Europea

C 11A

Edición en lengua española

Comunicaciones e informaciones

57o año15 de enero de 2014

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| Número de información | Sumario | Página |
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| | Corrección de errores |
| 2014/C 011A/01 | Corrección de errores del Anuncio de vacante para el puesto de director ejecutivo de la Agencia Ferroviaria Europea (AFE), en Francia (Agente temporal — Grado AD 14) — COM/2014/10345 (DO C 6 A de 10.1.2014) | 1 |

Número de información

Sumario

Página

Corrección de errores

2014/C 011A/01

Corrección de errores del Anuncio de vacante para el puesto de director ejecutivo de la Agencia Ferroviaria Europea (AFE), en Francia (Agente temporal — Grado AD 14) — COM/2014/10345 (DO C 6 A de 10.1.2014)

(DO C 6 A de 10.1.2014)

1

HISTORIAL DE LOS DIARIOS OFICIALES, SERIE C A, CONCURSOS

A continuación figura la lista de los Diarios Oficiales, serie C A, publicados en el año en curso.

Salvo indicación contraria, los Diarios Oficiales se publican en todas las versiones lingüísticas.

| 5 | |
| --- | --- |
| 6 | |
| 11 | |

5

6

11

| ES | |
| --- | --- |

ES

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Corrección de errores

| 15.1.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | CA 11/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

CA 11/1

---

Corrección de errores del Anuncio de vacante para el puesto de director ejecutivo de la Agencia Ferroviaria Europea (AFE), en Francia

(Agente temporal — Grado AD 14)

COM/2014/10345

(
  Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea C 6 A de 10 de enero de 2014
  )

(2014/C 11 A/01)

En la página 4, bajo el epígrafe «Procedimiento de solicitud», el enlace del párrafo tercero debe sustituirse por el siguiente:

«https://ec.europa.eu/dgs/human-resources/seniormanagementvacancies/».

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#### Alden Lamont MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C. HAMMOND; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56027

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 21, 2017

Alden Lamont Moore, Pro Se

Sylvie Snyder, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGCA — Office of *514the Attorney General (San Diego), San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alden Lamont Moore, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a violation of his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Moore’s claim for monetary damages because Moore failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his disability. *See Duvall v. County of Kitsap,*260 F.3d 1124, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2001) (claims for monetary relief under Title II of the ADA require the plaintiff to establish intentional discrimination based on deliberate indifference, namely, “both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that ... likelihood”).

Moore has waived his right to appeal the district court’s summary judgment on his claim for injunctive relief. *See Yeti by Molly,*Ltd. *v. Deckers Outdoor Corp.,*259 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A stipulation ... is tantamount to a waiver of an issue for appeal”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We reject as meritless Moore’s contentions concerning ineffective assistance of counsel. *See Nicholson v. Rushen,*767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Generally, a plaintiff in a civil case has no right to effective assistance of counsel”).

Moore’s motion regarding his personal property (Docket Entry No. 28) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6894 

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to prohibit the misrepresentation of actions on behalf of candidates, political parties, and 

political committees and organizations, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 22, 2023 

Ms. PORTER (for herself and Mr. CRENSHAW) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on House Administration 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to 

prohibit the misrepresentation of actions on behalf of 

candidates, political parties, and political committees and 

organizations, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Scam PACs Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. PROHIBITING MISREPRESENTATION OF ACTION. 

6 (a) COVERAGE OF ALL MISREPRESENTATION OF AC7 TION ON BEHALF OF CANDIDATES, POLITICAL PARTIES, 

8 AND POLITICAL COMMITTEES AND ORGANIZATIONS.— 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6894 IH

1 Section 322 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

2 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30124) is amended— 

3 (1) in the heading, by striking ‘‘FRAUDULENT’’; 

4 (2) in subsection (a)— 

5 (A) by striking ‘‘who is a candidate for 

6 Federal office or an employee or agent of such 

7 a candidate’’; and 

8 (B) in paragraph (1)— 

9 (i) by striking ‘‘fraudulently’’; 

10 (ii) by striking ‘‘under his control’’; 

11 and 

12 (iii) by striking ‘‘other candidate or 

13 political party or employee or agent thereof 

14 on a matter which is damaging to such 

15 other candidate or political party or em16 ployee or agent thereof’’ and inserting 

17 ‘‘real, potential, spurious, or non-existent 

18 candidate, political party, or political com19 mittee or organization, or employee or 

20 agent of any such candidate, political 

21 party, or political committee or organiza22 tion’’; and 

23 (3) in subsection (b)— 

24 (A) in the heading, by striking ‘‘FRAUDU25 LENT’’; and 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•HR 6894 IH

1 (B) in paragraph (1)— 

2 (i) by striking ‘‘fraudulently’’; and 

3 (ii) by striking ‘‘candidate or political 

4 party or employee or agent thereof for the 

5 purpose of soliciting contributions or dona6 tions’’ and inserting ‘‘real, potential, spu7 rious, or non-existent candidate, political 

8 party, or political committee or organiza9 tion, or employee or agent of any such can10 didate, political party, or political com11 mittee or organization when soliciting 

12 money or any other thing of value’’. 

13 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

14 subsection (a) shall take effect upon the expiration of the 

15 90-day period which begins on the date of the enactment 

16 of this Act. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### Village of Buchanan, Respondent, *v.*Town of Cortlandt et al., Appellants.

Argued February 23, 1943;

decided March 4, 1943.

*Charles Blank*for motion.

*Robert E. Dempsey*opposed.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed with costs, and ten dollars costs of motion.
#### Delia Kelly et al., Appellants, *v.*Maurice H. Rose, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Argued June 16, 1943;

decided July 20, 1943.

*612
      *John J. Stewart*and *William H. Monroe*for appellants.

„ *William B. Davis, T. L. Karpf*and *E. C. Sherwood*for respondent.

*613Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ.
#### JENNIE MARTIN, Adm’x, V. W. M. SHUMATTE AND JOHN A. MATHEWS.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS,

TYLER TERM, 1884.

*Promissory Note*— It by some clause in tlie body of the instrument, the elements, which impart to it negotiability are limited or qualified, the negotiable character of the paper as an ordinary promissory note is distroyed.

*Pleading.*— In an action upon such an instrument, the nature character and extent of the obligation incured by the parties must be fully set forth in the pleadings.

Appeal from Anderson County.

We are of the opinion that upon the whole case here made by the pleadings of the appellant, taking them altogether, that the learned judge below, for several good reasons, committed no error in sustaining the special exceptions taken to the appellant’s cause of ac*337tion in the manner and form in which it was presented to the court in her pleadings.

The instruments therein set forth were not negotiable promissory notes. The authorities are very full indeed, and satisfactory to the effect., that though the written contract which is made the basis of the party’s cause of action may have on its face several of the ordinary features of a common promissory note, and may in the body of the written instrument use some of the conventional terms that would ordinarily confer upon it the character of negotiability, yet if by some clause or stipulation in the body of the instrument these elements which impart to it negotiability are limited or qualified, the negotiable character of the paper as an ordinary promissory note is destroyed.

In order to maintain an action on such an instrument, the nature, character and extent of the obligation incurred by the parties executing it, must be fully and distinctly set forth. Alves v. Hodgson, 7 Tenn. 241; ManrOw v. Durham, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 584; Brewster v. Silence, 4 Seld. 207; Parsons on Notes and Bills, vol. 1, p. 42, ch. 3, sec. 5: also vol, 2, ch. 15, sec. 3, p. 534; also same author on Contracts, vol. 2, p. 525; 1 Daniel on Negotiable Insts., 59, 60, 79,149; See also Goldman v. Blum et al., 58 Texas, 630; see also in this connection Salinas v. Wright, 11 Texas 572; Hutchins v. Wade, 20 Texas 57. Many other authorities have been examined and could bo referred to, but the above are deemed to be sufficient.

The statement of the nature and character of the instrument made the basis of the appellant’s cause of action, was not in the pleadings set forth with sufficient certainty. Under the circumstances, the special exceptions of appellees were properly sustained.

The judgment of the district court in-dismissing the cause is affirmed.

West, J.
Exhibit  32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



         In connection with the Annual Report of Nanoscience Technologies, Inc.,
(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Jim Ruzicka,  Principal Accounting Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C.  Sec. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Sec. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or
         15 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects,  the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.



/s/ JIM RUZICKA
------------------------------
Jim Ruzicka
Principal Accounting Officer
January 27, 2004


A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
has been  provided  to the  Company  and will be  retained  by the  Company  and
furnished to the Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its staff upon request.
The foregoing  certifications  are accompanying the Company's Form 10-QSB solely
pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and
(b) of section  1350,  chapter 63 of title 18,  United  States  Code) and is not
being filed as part of the Form 10-QSB or as a separate disclosure document.
#### ALMAND, commissioner, *et al. v.*WALLACE.

No. 13375.

July 16, 1940.

*667Spalding, *Sibley, Troutman &*Brock, *W. S: Northcutt,*and *E. Harold*Sheats, for plaintiffs in error.

*George •& John L.*Westmoreland, contra.

Duckworth, Justice.

As agreed by the parties, a proper construction of sections 12 and 14 of the 1939 act is all that is required to reach a decision in this case. There is a very definite provision in section 12, that, as to the employees therein made subject to the act, it is mandatory. This means that the employees covered by section 12 have no choice, and are not permitted to escape coming under the provisions of the act. Since this is so, they would not be heard if they attempted to withdraw while continuing in the employment of the county. They can not claim the privilege of nullifying the mandatory provision of the act by simply withdrawing at their election after it has applied to them. While it is true that this case does not deal with one to whom the act is involuntarily applied, but deals with one who is given the free choice as to whether or not he will have it apply to him, nevertheless the issue here is not whether before exercising the option given to him by the act the defendant is bound by it. He crossed this line when he voluntarily elected to come under the act. He now raises the sole question in the case, to wit, whether he can at will withdraw after having elected to come under the act. On this question section 12 is indeed illuminating. Section 14, after providing for defendant and similar employees the privilege of choosing whether or not they shall come under the act, states that it is intended by this option to allow such a person “to come under the terms of this act in all particulars, just as if such person was a member of the class as set out in section 12 hereof.” By virtue of the language last quoted the entire application of the act in all particulars to defendant is exactly the same as that to the class in section 12. It is mandatory, and allows no withdrawal or escape. Further in section 14 it is provided: “ Once exercising said option such employees are entitled to all the rights and privileges and benefits under this act and are subject to all the conditions of this act.”

The law does not authorize the defendant in error to withdraw, *668but binds him to all the terms of the act, as well as entitles him to its benefits. He is neither entitled to a refund of the money deducted from his salary, nor to have these deductions stopped. The demurrer should have been sustained, and the mandamus absolute denied. *Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
MEMORANDUM

TO: Air and Radiation Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2012-0401

FROM: EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality

DATE: May 16, 2014

SUBJECT: Meeting with Element Markets

On December 3, 2013, Office of Transportation and Air Quality (OTAQ) staff held a meeting 

with staff of Element Markets. This memorandum provides written documentation and a brief 

summary of this meeting.

This meeting explained the substance of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulation of 

Fuels and Fuel Additives: RFS Pathways II and Technical Amendments to the RFS 2 Standards

(Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2012-0401). OTAQ staff participating included Vincent Camobreco, 

David Babson, Dallas Burkholder and Sharyn Lie. Element Markets representatives included 

Randall N. Lack, Chief Marketing Officer.
14311

#### TROTTER v. MERCHANTS & FARMERS BANK

(186 S. E., 371)

January, 1936.

*458*Messrs. Wittkowsky & Wittkowsky, C. J. Shannon, 4th,*and *Edgar A. Brown,*for appellant,

*Messrs. I. C. Hough*and *T. K. Trotter,*for respondent

June 11, 1936.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Fishburne.

This action was brought by T. K. Trotter, Receiver of the Bank of Bethune, against Merchants & Farmers Bank of Bethune, to recover the sum of $4,445.53, which amount had been previously paid to the defendant bank by the former Receiver of the Bank of Bethune as a preferential claim.

The cause was referred to the Master for Kershaw County, who found all issues of law and fact against the defendant. Upon exceptions being taken to the Circuit Court, the Referee’s report was confirmed in its entirety. The appeal to this Court involves and comprehends *459the same issues which were before the Master and the Circuit Court, except that it, for the first time, brings into the case the question as to whether the transaction in litigation constituted a trust *ex maleficio.*As this issue was not presented to nor passed upon by the Circuit Court, it may not be considered here.

Upon a careful consideration of the record and the issues made by the exceptions, this Court is satisfied with the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by the Master and confirmed by the Circuit Court. As additional support to the Circuit decree, we cite the case of *South Carolina State Bank v. Citizens’*Bank, 173 S. C., 496, 176 S. E., 346, 95 A. L. R., 667, where similar and applicable principles of law are discussed.

Let the report of the Master, commencing at “Findings of Fact,” be reported, together with the decree of the Circuit Court.

All exceptions are overruled.

It is the judgment of this Court that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Stabler and Messrs. Justices Carter, Bonham and Baker concur.