alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Anna Keating, Respondent, *v.*The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Appellant.

(Argued May 21, 1872;

decided May 28, 1872.)

When passengers are getting on or off a train, suddenly to put it in motion, so as to endanger their safety, without giving any signal, is an act of negligence.

Where a railroad company has provided a depot and conveniences for getting on and off its trains, in the absence of other proof, passengers have no right to get on at other places, and to attempt to do so would be such negligence as would preclude them from recovery for an injury received thereby. But when the company has been in the habit of receiving and discharging passengers at other places, it is not negligence for passengers to get on or off at those places while the train is standing still, and there is no apparent danger in so doing.

Plaintiee attempted to get upon defendant’s train at Niagara Falls. The passenger depot was on the south side of the *674track, and passengers usually got on and off there; but passengers residing in the part of the village where plaintiff lived were in the habit of getting on and off upon the north side, to the knowledge and without objection on the part of the defendant’s employes. The train was standing still, partly filled with passengers; as plaintiff stepped up on the steps of the car, the train, without any signal or notice, and without any examination by those in charge to ascertain whether any one was getting on or off, was started with a violent jerk, which threw plaintiff from the car; she fell with her arm under it, which was crushed by the wheels. Defendant moved for a nonsuit, upon the ground that no negligence was shown upon the part of the defendant, and that the negligence of plaintiff caused or contributed to the injury. *Held)*the motion was properly denied, and there was no error in submitting the question of negligence to the 3 7-

*A. P. Lcmmg*for the appellant.

*John G. Sf/rong*for the respondent.

Grover, J.,

reads for affirmance.

All concur, except Raparlo, J., not voting.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### John L. Campbell, Respondent, *v.*City of New York, Appellant.

Argued May 18, 1943;

reargument ordered October 21, 1943.

Reargument ordered and argument set down for November, 1943, session.
Order entered April 23, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05 - 15 - 00060 - CR No. 05 - 15 - 0006 1 - CR No. 05 - 15 - 0006 2 - CR No. 05 - 15 - 0006 3 - CR MARK ANTHONY JOHNSON , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the C riminal District Court No. 2

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F - 1359739 - I , F - 13597 40 - I , F - 13597 41 - I , F - 1359739 - I 

### O RDER The Court GRANTS appellant’s Aril 17 , 201 5 agreed motion to substitute appellate counsel. William T. Hughey and Pasquel Lee are substituted for Lawrence B. Mitchell as appellant’s counsel of record. We DIRECT the Clerk to send all correspondence to William T. Hughey and Pasquel Lee , 2201 Main Street , Suite 400

- 10 , Dallas, Texas 75 201 ; telephone: ( 903 ) 935

- 5550 ; facsimile: ( 86 6 ) 823

- 7185

. /s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
Filed June 9, 1891.

#### The People, App’lts, *v.*Wm. J. H. Ballard *et al.,*Resp’ts.

*J. Langdon Ward,*for app’lts; *Treadwell Cleveland,*for resp’ts.

*1011See 29 N. Y. State Rep., 926.

Re-argument ordered and case transferred to the second division for the re-argument.
Opinion issued November 26, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00813-CV

———————————

IN RE LTP REAL ESTATE, LLC, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On November 5, 2013, Relator LTP Real Estate, LLC filed a Motion to 

Dismiss Petition for Writ of Mandamus as Moot. No opinion has issued and 

although appellants did not include a certificate of conference in their motion, 

more than 10 days have passed and no party has responded to the motion. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 10.1(a)(5), 10.3(a). 

Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus as moot.
2

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
Exhibit
32.1
  
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
§1350
 
 Each of
the undersigned hereby certifies, for the purposes of Section 1350 of Chapter 63
of Title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in his capacity as an officer of Brownshire
Holdings, Inc. (“Brownshire”), that, to his knowledge, the Annual Report of
Brownshire on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2007, fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operation of Brownshire. This written statement is being furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to such Form
10-KSB.
 
 
 Date:
      March 31, 2008
              /s/ Steven A. RothsteinSteven
      A. Rothstein, President(Principal
      Executive Officer)Date:
      March 31, 2008
              /s/ Norman S. LynnNorman
      S. Lynn, Vice President, CorporateSecretary,
      and Treasurer(Principal
      Financial and Accounting
Officer)
SUPPLEMENT TO FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND RESTATEMENT OF LOAN


AGREEMENT AND PROMISSORY
NOTE





THIS SUPPLEMENT TO FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
RESTATEMENT OF LOAN AGREEMENT AND PROMISSORY NOTE by and between BLINK COUTURE,
INC., a Delaware corporation (the “Maker”) and REGENT PRIVATE CAPITAL, LLC, an
Oklahoma limited liability company (the “Payee”) entered into as of July 31,
2010, supplements and amends that certain Fourth Amendment and Restatement of
Loan Agreement and Promissory Note dated as of March 15, 2010 (the “Amendment
and Note Restatement”). Capitalized terms used herein without definition shall
have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Amendment and Note
Restatement.





For value received, the Maker and Payee
hereby agree, effective as of the date hereof, that the following provisions
shall supplement and become part of the Amendment and Note
Restatement:





1.           Additional
Advances.  The Parties hereby agree that during the period from
May 1, 2010 through July 31, 2010, the Payee has made additional advances to the
Maker, in the aggregate amount of $15,377, in payment of the Maker’s operating
expenses during that period, so that effective as of July 31, 2010, the total
outstanding principal amount due and payable pursuant to the Note is
$156,502.





2.           No
Further Changes; Full Force and Effect.  The additional
advances described in Paragraph 1 above reflect all changes to the Amendment and
Note Restatement. All other terms of the Amendment and Note Restatement shall
remain unchanged and in full force and effect, unless and until further
supplemented or amended hereafter.





IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Maker has caused this Supplement to Fourth Amendment and
Restatement of Loan Agreement and Promissory Note to be duly executed and
delivered as of the day and year first written above.





BLINK
      COUTURE, INC.By:
              /s/ Lawrence FieldName:
      Lawrence FieldTitle:
      President & CEOREGENT
      PRIVATE CAPITAL, LLCBy:
              /s/ Anurag AgarwalName:  Anurag
      AgarwalTitle:
      Managing Director
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6764 

To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to modify the HIPAA 

privacy regulation with respect to the disclosure of certain protected 

health information. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 13, 2023 

Mr. NEGUSE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 

modify the HIPAA privacy regulation with respect to 

the disclosure of certain protected health information. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Patient Privacy and 

5 Caregiver Awareness Act of 2023’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF HIPAA PRIVACY REGULATION. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the 

8 date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of 

9 Health and Human Services shall revise the HIPAA priVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:47 Dec 30, 2023 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H6764.IH H6764
2 

•HR 6764 IH

1 vacy regulation to require that, if an individual (or a per2 sonal representative of the individual or another person 

3 responsible for the care of the individual) provides consent 

4 in accordance with such regulation for a covered entity 

5 to use or disclose any protected health information of the 

6 individual that is related to a mental health condition or 

7 a substance use disorder— 

8 (1) the authorization with respect to such use 

9 or disclosure shall have an expiration date that is 

10 not less than 2 years after the date on which such 

11 consent is provided; and 

12 (2) the covered entity shall provide the indi13 vidual (and, in the case that such consent is pro14 vided by a personal representative or another person 

15 responsible for the care of the individual, such per16 sonal representative or person so responsible) with 

17 written notice of the expiration of such authorization 

18 not later than the date that is 30 days before such 

19 expiration date. 

20 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the following defi21 nitions apply: 

22 (1) HIPAA PRIVACY REGULATION.—The term 

23 ‘‘HIPAA privacy regulation’’ has the meaning given 

24 such term in section 1180(b)(3) of the Social Secu25 rity Act (42 U.S.C. 1320d–9(b)(3)). 

3 

•HR 6764 IH

1 (2) HIPAA TERMS.—The terms ‘‘authoriza2 tion’’, ‘‘covered entity’’, and ‘‘protected health infor3 mation’’ have the meanings given such terms for 

4 purposes of the HIPAA privacy regulation. 

Æ
#### Olger Abel SALTO-SEICO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent.

15-2773

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 26, 2017

FOR PETITIONER: Gregory Osakwe, Hartford, CT.

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Nancy K Canter, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROBERT D. SACK, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

*662SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Olger Abel Salto-Seico, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of a March 4, 2015, decision of the BIA affirming a February 5, 2013, decision of the Immigration Judge denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and an August 25, 2015, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. *In re Olger Abel Salto-Seico,*No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 4, 2015), *aff'g*No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. Hartford Feb. 5, 2013); *In re Olger Abel Salto-Seico,*No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 25, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We dismiss the petition for review as to the BIA’s March 2015 decision ordering Salto-Seico removed to Ecuador and denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. We lack jurisdiction to review that decision because the September 2015 petition for review is untimely to challenge a March 2015 decision. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (“A petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”); Luna *v. Holder,*637 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011). “[T]he filing of a motion to reopen does not toll the time for filing a petition for review of the BIA’s final exclusion or deportation orders[.]” *Kaur v. BIA,*413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005).

Salto-Seico’s brief raises no arguments with respect to the BIA’s denial of reopening. “Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.” *Norton v. Sam’s Club,*145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, he has waived review of that determination and we deny the petition as to the August 2015 decision. M; *see also Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,*426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Justin TURNER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-1398

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

*748Submitted August 30, 2017 *

Decided August 31, 2017

Renai Scherri Rodney, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Justin Turner, Pro Se

Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

*

We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the appeal is frivolous. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(A).

ORDER

Justin Turner was convicted in 2013 of conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine and heroin. *See*21 U.S'.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). As part of a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), Turner cooperated with the government. He also admitted purchasing at least 1,500 kilograms of cocaine and 20 kilograms of heroin. The parties agreed that Turner’s cooperation warranted a prison sentence of 160 months, substantially below the range of 324 to 405 months that otherwise would have applied under the sentencing guidelines. The district court accepted the plea agreement and imposed the agreed prison term.

Then in 2014 the Sentencing Commission promulgated, and made retroactive, Amendment 782, which lowered the base offense level for most drug offenses. *See*U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 782 (2014). Turner responded by moving under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his prison sentence. The district court denied that motion with the explanation that Turner wasn’t eligible for a reduction because his sentence had been imposed pursuant to a plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), not the guidelines range. *See Freeman v. United States,*564 U.S. 522, 538-39, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L,Ed.2d 519 (2011) (Soto-mayor, J., concurring); *United States v. Dixon,*687 F.3d 356, 358-59 (7th Cir. 2012).

Turner never appealed that decision. That should have been the end of it, but instead, more than a year after the district court had denied his motion, Turner filed three additional § 3582(c)(2) motions asking the district court to reduce his sentence. The court denied all three requests, reasoning that Turner wasn’t entitled to ask a second time for a reduction based on Amendment 782. Turner appeals from that decision. But the district court was right; a defendant is limited to a single § 3582(c)(2) motion for any given change in the guidelines range. *United States v. Beard,*745 F.3d 288, 292 (7th Cir. 2014); *United States v. Redd,*630 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2011). Turner used his one shot in 2015. He contends now that his 2015 motion was wrongly denied, but that contention could, and should, have been made in an appeal from the court’s decision on that motion.

AFFIRMED.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Energy

###### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

          - [Project No. 13806-012]

                    1. On January 24, 2022, 5440 Hydro, Inc., exemptee for the 600-Kilowatt Brooklyn Dam Hydroelectric Project No. 13806, filed a letter notifying the Commission that the project was transferred from 5440 Hydro, Inc. to Ampersand Brooklyn Dam Hydro, LLC. The exemption from licensing was originally issued on August 14, 2015.[1]                                          The project is located on the Upper Ammonoosuc River, Coos County, New Hampshire. The transfer of an exemption does not require Commission approval.                

                    2. Ampersand Brooklyn Dam Hydro, LLC is now the exemptee of the Brooklyn Dam Hydroelectric Project No. 13806. All correspondence must be forwarded to: Mr. Amit Pinjani, Asset Manager, Ampersand Brooklyn Dam Hydro, LLC, 717 Atlantic Avenue, Suite 1A, Boston, MA 02111, Email:                     *amit@ampersandenergy.com.*

Dated: February 25, 2022.

Kimberly D. Bose,

Secretary.

# Footnotes

1.                                                     *5440 Hydro, Inc.,*                         152 FERC ¶ 62,113 (2015).                    
        Back to Citation      

[FR Doc. 2022-04538 Filed 3-3-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
IIB 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6633 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2024 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 9355 113th Street in Seminole, Florida, as 

the ‘‘Army SSG Ryan Christian Knauss Memorial Post 

Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 6633 RFS

1 SECTION 1. ARMY SSG RYAN CHRISTIAN KNAUSS MEMO2 RIAL POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 9355 113th Street in Seminole, 

5 Florida, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Army SSG 

6 Ryan Christian Knauss Memorial Post Office Building’’. 

7 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg8 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

9 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

10 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Army SSG Ryan 

11 Christian Knauss Memorial Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 23, 

2024. 

Attest: KEVIN F. MCCUMBER, 

Clerk. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fernando RUIZ-GUZMAN, a.k.a. Gerardo Torres Ruiz-Guzman, a.k.a. Gerardo Torres-Guzman, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30172

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 17, 2017

Laurel Jane Holland, Assistant U.S. Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office, Yakima, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

John Stephen Roberts, Jr., FPDWA— Federal Public Defender’s Office (Eastern WA & ID), Spokane, WA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Fernando Ruiz-Guzman appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 19-month sentence imposed *706upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Ruiz-Guzman contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the 41-month sentence he received for the criminal offense underlying the revocation and other mitigating factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct, 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The sentence, which was ordered to run consecutively to the 41-month sentence, is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Ruiz-Guzman’s criminal history. *See*U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) (term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of supervised release shall run consecutively to sentence defendant is already serving); *United States v. Simtob,*485 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he -violator should be punished both for breaching the court’s trust *and*for the new criminal conduct, as each act is separately and distinctly offensive.”). Contrary to Ruiz-Guzman’s contention, the court’s discussion of his criminal history was proper, *see*18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3583(e), and did not reflect any reliance on unad-mitted conduct.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid*706ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the 
Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets and Condensed Consolidated Statements of 
Earnings as reported on second quarter Form 10Q and is qualified in its entirety
by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
                       
<MULTIPLIER>                                     1,000
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          Jan-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             May-03-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               Aug-01-1998
<CASH>                                         273,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  157,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  2,745,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,251,000
<PP&E>                                       5,767,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,519,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,367,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,116,000
<BONDS>                                        787,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        30,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,046,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,367,000
<SALES>                                      4,063,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,063,000
<CGS>                                        2,807,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               122,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              44,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 52,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                    19,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             33,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                    33,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .12
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