alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-3120

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Filed November 30, 2016

James A. Brown, Office of the United States Attorney, District of Kansas, Topeka, KS, Sheri Catania, Esq., Office of the United States Attorney, District of Kansas, Kansas City, KS, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jose Lopez, Pro Se

Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge

Defendant Jose Lopez appeals the dismissal by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

On April 8, 2009, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The district court adopted his pre-sentence report (PSR), which stated that he had been apprehended with 10.62 kilograms of actual methamphetamine. Under the 2009 Sentencing Guidelines the threshold weight of actual methamphetamine required to reach the maximum base offense level of 38 was 1.5 kilograms. *See*USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2009). The district court set that offense level and sentenced Defendant to 405 months in prison.

Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines raised to 4.5 kilograms the threshold weight of actual methamphetamine needed to reach the maximum base offense level of 38, *see*USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2014); and Amendment 788 made that change retroactive. Defendant moved for a sentence reduction under those amendments. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Defendant’s offense level remained the same under the amended guidelines.

The dismissal was correct. Amendment 782 “did not lower [Defendant’s] sentenc*990ing range because his [2009] conviction involved too much [actual methamphetamine] for him to qualify for relief.” *United States v. Gay,*771 F.3d 681, 683 (10th Cir. 2014); *see also United States v. Pace,*650 Fed.Appx. 940, 943 (10th Cir. 2016) (denying reduction when sentencing court determined that defendant was responsible for sufficient drug quantity that guidelines amendment did not reduce offense level (and hence did not reduce his guidelines sentencing range)). Because Defendant’s sentencing range was not lowered by Amendment 782, he is not entitled to relief.

We AFFIRM. Mr. Lopez’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED.

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
# In the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

══════════ No. WR

- 94,427

- 01

══════════

EX PARTE RENO PRESTON ROBERTS , Applicant

═══════════════════════════════════════ On Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Cause No. CR15

- 135A in the 235th District Court F rom Cooke County

═══════════════════════════════════════

Y EARY , J., filed a concurring opinion , in which S LAUGHTER , J., joined.

Applicant pled guilty in 2015 to indecency with a child by contact
and was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Applicant did not appeal his conviction. In November of 2022 , Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC . art. 11.07. In his application, he alleges that his trialROBERTS

– 2

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Applicant’s competency before Applican t pled guilty

. Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court to further develop the record. I join the Court’s remand order. But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to thi s case. See Ex parte Smith , 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a trial court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille , ___ S.W.3d ___,
No. WR

- 89,851

- 02, 2022 WL 108348 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (Y eary, J., concurring). The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant pled guilty in 2015 , but he did not file this writ application until seven years later. 1 The record is also silent regarding circumstances that may exc use Applicant’s delay, and at least some explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided. Consistent with this Court’s precedent, the trial court “ may sua sponte consider and determine whether laches should bar relief.” Smith , 444 S.W.3d at 667. If the trial court does so, it must give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay and give the State’s prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant’s delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant’s claims. Id. at 670. And ultimately, the trial court

1 “Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State’s evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final.” Ex parte Perez , 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe , 132 S.W.3d 434, 437

– 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).ROBERTS

– 3

may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court’s remand order. With these additional thoug hts, I join the Court’s order.

FILED : January 25, 2023 DO NOT PUBLISH
#### Michael E. HEILBRUN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF PORTLAND; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-35640

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 **

OCTOBER 4, 2017

Michael E. Heilbrun, Umatilla, OR, pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM *

Michael E. Heilbrun, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -action alleging federal and state law claims. We review de novo a dismissal under *Heck v. Humphrey,*512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). *Whitaker v. Garcetti,*486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

To the extent that Heilbrun alleged that he was wrongfully convicted of parole violations, the district court properly dismissed these claims as *Heck-barred*because success on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Heilbrun’s conviction and sentence. *See Heck,*512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (explaining that if “a judgment in favor of. the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed’ unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”).

However, as to the remaining claims, the district court did not address Heilbrun’s allegations in his verified complaint that adverse side effects from pain medication and failure to install safety measures resulted in his back injury, and that he was administered medication without his informed consent. *See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,*489 U.S. 189, 200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (explaining that the state has a duty to provide inmates with “basic human needs,” including medical care and “reasonable safety”); *Johnson v. Meltzer,*134 F.3d 1393, 1397 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[D]ue process requires that if a doctor gives a drug to an inmate without his consent, the drug must be medically appropriate.”). We vacate the judgment in part, and remand for the district court to consider these allegations in the first instance, and to determine whether leave to amend would be appropriate. *See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr.,*66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to.amend prior to dismissal of the action.”).

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Nathan Clark *et ux. versus*The Inhabitants of Worthington.

In an action on *St*1786, *c.*81, § 7, to recover double damages for an injury occasioned by a defect in a highway, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to allege, in bis declaration, that he is entitled to double damages.

Action on the case for an injury done to the wife, through a defect in the highway. A verdict being found for the plaintiffs, the defendants moved in arrest of judgment, because the plaintiffs, in their declaration, have not alleged that they are entitled to have and recover double damages ; wherefore the defendants pray that the judgment may be wholly arrested, or entered up for only single damages.

*C. A. Dewey*and *Briggs*supported the motion.

*Sept. 22d.*

*Sept. 28th.*

*Hubbard*and Lanckton, for the plaintiffs,

cited *St.*1786, c. 81, §7 ; *Lobdell*v. *New*Bedford, 1 Mass. R. 153 ; Yelv. (Metcalf’s edit.) 116, note ; *Commonwealth*v. Searle, *2*Binn. 332 ; 1 Chit. Pl. (1st edit.) 218 ; Bull. N. P. 222.

The cause was continued *nisi.*

*Per Curiam.*

It was not necessary for the plaintiffs, in their declaration, to allege that they were entitled to double damages. The provision in the statute giving the plaintiffs, under such circumstances, double damages, is an authority and direc*579tion to the court, as to the mode of entering up judgment, after the damages, that is, after the actual, single damages have been found and assessed by the jury.1

*Judgment for plaintiffs for double damages.*

1

 See *Worster*v. *Proprietors of Canal Bridge,*16 Pick. 541; Rev. St e.25, § 22.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-20168

ESOTERICK, INC; DENNIS THOMPSON; JUDITH THOMPSON,

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:07-CV-2824

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

The court has carefully considered the briefs and oral arguments of the

parties, and have done so, finds no reversible error of law or fact and affirms on

the basis of the district court opinion.

AFFIRMED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 11, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 09-20168 Document: 00511291427 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/11/2010
#### Hugley *vs.*Gregg.

[Mr. Monroe and Mr. Roberts for Plaintiff: Messrs. Sanders, Dej>et$t for Defendant.]

Dower..

From the Circuit Court eor Henry County.

*April*13.

Bef’t in a writ of dower may defeat the claim, by showing that bft holds under a title superior to that of demand-ant’s husband;3 tho’ he purchased of the husband, and entered originally under his deed,that does not estop Inin from introducing an adverse patent, and record of a recovery and evic tion under it, since his pui't cjiase.

Chief Justice Robertson

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is a writ of dower—¿n which the demandant ob-. tained a judgment for the seizin of one third of a tract, of land which, her husband, during coverture, had conveyed to the tenant Hugley.

On the trial, Hugley offered fo read a patent adverse-to the title of his vendor, and a judgment of eviction rendered against his vendor, on that patent, *since*the-date of the conveyance to himself and also an official return, of the actual eviction of himself and his vendor^ on a *habere facias*on that judgment; but the Circuit Court refused to admit either the patent or the record.

In this respect, we think, that the court below erred:. for if Hugley had been evicted by a paramount title, and now holds under that "title, the demandant has no right of dower as against *him.*And proof of those facts would not be inconsistent with any obligation or estoppel resulting from the conveyance by her-husband.

Wherefore, as the rejected record might, *in some degree,*have tended to prove the foregoing facts, it seems to us that the Circuí Court erred in refusing to permit it to be read.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, an.d the cause, remanded.
#### William S. Edsall et al., Appellants, *v.*The Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Co., Respondent.

No presumptions will be indulged in, in favor of exemptions from common law liability.

While it is competent for common carriers to provide by contract for such exemptions, it must be done in clear and unambiguous terms, and the rule that the language of contracts if ambiguous is to be construed against the party using it should be rigidly applied to such contracts.

(Argued June 6, 1872;

decided November 12, 1872.)

This action was brought to recover for a quantity of wool destroyed by fire while on the defendant’s pier in New York. The wool was shipped at Fort Wayne, Indiana, by the Pittsburgh and Chicago Railway Company. By the bill of lading that company agreed to transport the wool to its station at Pittsburgh (the company to be exempted from loss by fire), and to deliver it to the connecting carrier, where its responsibility as common carrier should cease. The company guaranteed that the through rate should not be over $1.33 per 100 pounds. It carried the property to Pittsburgh and there delivered the same to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, which company delivered it to defendant, who carried it to New York. Judgment below was ordered for plaintiffs. The General Term reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial.

It is decided here upon authority of *Ætna Ins. Co.*v. *Wheeler*(49 N. Y., 616) and *Babcock*v. *L. S. and M. S. R. R. Co.*(49 id., 491). The opinion also lays down the general proposition stated above.

*662
      *H. E. Knox*for the appellants.

*Charles F. Sanford*for .the respondent.

Church, Ch. -J.,

reads opinion for reversal. Allen, Grover and Rapallo, JJ., concur; Peckham J., not sitting. Folger and Andrews, JJ., did not hear argument.

Order reversed and judgment below affirmed, with costs.
Exhibit
31.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  I, Malcolm Skolnick,
President and Chief Executive Officer certify that:  1. I
have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of CytoGenix, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows
of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly
report;  4. The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:  a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
this quarterly report (the Evaluation Date); and  c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;  5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrants auditors and the audit
committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent function):  a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of
internal controls which could adversely affect the registrants ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrants auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
controls; and     6. The registrants other certifying officers and I have indicated in
this quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.  Date:  April 4,
2008  /s/ Malcolm
Skolnick Malcolm
SkolnickPresident & CEO
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###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases Special Emphasis Panel; NIDDK SEP for IBDGC Research Centers (U01) and Data Coordinating Centers (U24).                    

*Date:*                         March 25, 2022.                    

*Time:*                         11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate cooperative agreement applications.                    

*Place:*                         National Institutes of Health/NIDDK, 6707 Democracy Blvd., Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual Meeting).                    

*Contact Person:*                         Cheryl Nordstrom, Ph.D., MPH, Scientific Review Officer, NIDDK/Scientific Review Branch, National Institutes of Health, 6707 Democracy Blvd., Room 7013, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301-402-6711,                         *cheryl.nordstrom@nih.gov*.                    

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.847, Diabetes, Endocrinology and Metabolic Research; 93.848, Digestive Diseases and Nutrition Research; 93.849, Kidney Diseases, Urology and Hematology Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: March 1, 2022.

Miguelina Perez,

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2022-04624 Filed 3-3-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
#### Mary H. Powers, Respondent, *v.*Everett P. Wheeler et al., Appellants.

(Argued April 29, 1872;

decided November 12, 1872.)

*F. P. Wheeler*and *F. J. Fithian*for the appellants.

*I). P. Barnard*for the respondent.

This case presented the same questions, and was argued and decided with *House*v. *JaeTcson (mée,*p. 161).

Judgment modified and affirmed as modified.

All concur.