UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2366

GEORGE RISHELL, on his own behalf and on behalf of those 

similarly situated,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

and

VICTORIA RHODES; QUINTON GARDNER; SELINA RIGGS; DONELL ELLIS; 

KWAN JOHNSON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION, a Foreign Profit Corporation,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-2376

VICTORIA RHODES; QUINTON GARDNER; SELINA RIGGS; DONELL ELLIS; 

KWAN JOHNSON,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION,

Defendant - Appellant.
2

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior

District Judge. (1:13-cv-00931-CMH-TCB; 1:14-cv-00213-CMH-TCB)

Argued: January 27, 2016 Decided: May 2, 2016

Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and Loretta C. BIGGS, 

United States District Judge for the Middle District of North 

Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Catherine Emily Stetson, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellant. Angeli Murthy, MORGAN & MORGAN, Plantation, 

Florida; Mike Farrell, MIKE FARRELL, PLLC, Jackson, Mississippi, 

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Thomas J. Woodford, Mobile, Alabama, 

Samuel Zurik, III, Robert P. Lombardi, THE KULLMAN FIRM, New 

Orleans, Louisiana, for Appellant. Thomas Farrell Egge, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees Victoria Rhodes, Quinton 

Gardner, Selina Riggs, Donell Ellis and Kwan Johnson. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

This consolidated appeal arises from two independent actions, 

each involving a contract dispute between employer, Computer 

Science Corporation (“CSC”), and certain employees. The employees 

of CSC brought suit, claiming that when working overseas, they 

were entitled to hourly wages for every hour worked, rather than 

the fixed salaries they were paid by CSC. Both actions, which 

originated in different jurisdictions, were transferred to the 

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The 

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employees 

in each case. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

The employees involved in this appeal are George Rishell 

(“Rishell”) in one action, and in the second action Victoria 

Rhodes, Quinton Gardner, Selina Riggs, Donell Ellis, and Kwan 

Johnson (collectively, “Rhodes Appellees”). At the time of hiring, 

each employee signed an Offer Letter and a Foreign Travel Letter 

provided by CSC. Rishell’s Offer Letter states, “[Y]our 

compensation will consist of an hourly rate of $32.93 ($68,500 

annually), which will be paid biweekly.” J.A. 246. The Offer 

Letter of each of the Rhodes Appellees contains an identical 

statement, but with a different hourly rate and no mention of an 

annual amount: “[Y]our compensation will consist of an hourly 
4

rate of $31.25, which will be paid biweekly.”1 J.A. 844, 866, 878, 

902, 916. The Foreign Travel Letter details the compensation and 

benefits that each respective employee will receive while 

overseas. The section of the letter outlining compensation 

discusses categories of pay to include base pay, pay differentials, 

hardship pay, and danger pay. With respect to base pay, the letter 

states, “Your base weekly salary will not change as a result of 

this assignment.” J.A. 105, 848, 870, 882, 906, 920.

After joining CSC, Rishell and the Rhodes Appellees were each 

assigned to work overseas. While overseas, they each regularly 

worked 84-hour weeks but received fixed pay for only 40 hours each 

week. Claiming they were entitled to hourly wages for every hour 

worked under their respective Offer Letter and Foreign Travel 

Letter, Rishell and the Rhodes Appellees filed suit. On crossmotions for summary judgment in each case, the district court 

concluded that the letters unambiguously provided for hourly 

wages, rather than fixed salaries, and granted summary judgment in 

favor of Rishell in his case and each of the Rhodes Appellees in 

their case. This appeal followed.

 1 $31.25 was the hourly rate for Rhodes and Ellis. Gardner 

and Riggs were offered $31.49, and Johnson was offered $32.69.
5

II.

We review a district court’s award of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court. 

Calderon v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 809 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2015). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In this case, the 

parties do not argue that material facts are in dispute. Rather, 

the issue here is a matter of contract interpretation; thus, it 

will be decided as a matter of law. See Homeland Training Ctr., 

LLC v. Summit Point Auto. Research Ctr., 594 F.3d 285, 290 (4th 

Cir. 2010). Because the parties filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment, “we consider each motion separately on its own merits to 

determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a 

matter of law.” Defenders of Wildlife v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 

762 F.3d 374, 392 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bacon v. City of 

Richmond, 475 F.3d 633, 638 (4th Cir. 2007)).

III.

A.

As an initial matter, we must consider what law governs the 

interpretation of the Offer Letter and Foreign Travel Letter signed 

by each employee. As to Rishell, who originally filed suit in 

federal court in Florida, the district court applied Florida’s 

choice-of-law rules and determined that Florida law governs. CSC 
6

does not dispute this determination on appeal. As to the Rhodes 

Appellees, who originally filed suit in federal court in 

Mississippi, the district court applied Mississippi’s choice-oflaw rules and determined that Virginia law governs. CSC challenges 

this determination, arguing that Kuwaiti law should govern instead 

because the employees were stationed in Kuwait for the majority of 

their time overseas. We disagree.

In choice-of-law determinations, Mississippi relies on the 

“center of gravity” doctrine, which requires courts to consider 

(1) “the place of contracting;” (2) “the place of negotiation of 

the contract;” (3) “the place of performance;” (4) “the location 

of the subject matter of the contract;” and (5) “the domicile, 

residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 

business of the parties.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 920 So. 

2d 427, 433, 435 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Conflict of Laws § 188 (Am. Law Inst. 1971)). Balancing these 

factors, we agree with the district court that as it relates to 

the Rhodes Appellees, Virginia is the center of gravity. While 

Kuwait is the employees’ place of performance and the location of 

the subject matter of the contracts, the remaining factors tip in 

favor of Virginia. Virginia is where CSC’s headquarters are 

located, where the employees mailed their signed contracts, where 

the decisions were made to hire the employees, and where CSC 

performed its obligations under the contracts. Also, while none 
7

of the employees are residents or domiciliaries of Virginia, 

neither party argues that they are residents or domiciliaries of 

Kuwait. However, the employees all are residents and domiciliaries 

of the United States. Ultimately, the center-of-gravity doctrine 

directs courts to apply “the law of the place which has the most 

significant relationship to the event and parties or which, because 

of the relationship or contact with the event and parties, has the 

greatest concern with the specific issues with respect to the 

liabilities and rights of the parties to the litigation.” Id. at 

433 (quoting Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509, 514–15 (Miss. 

1968)). That place, as the district court determined, is Virginia.

We will therefore apply Florida law to Rishell’s Offer Letter 

and Foreign Travel Letter and Virginia law to the Rhodes Appellees’ 

Offer Letters and Foreign Travel Letters.

B.

We next address the central dispute of the parties: whether 

each employee’s Offer Letter and Foreign Travel Letter, construed 

as single contracts, provide for hourly wages or fixed salaries 

when an employee is overseas.2 Our primary objective in 

 2 When two documents are executed by the same parties, at the 

same time, as part of the same transaction, as in this case, the 

documents are generally construed together as a single contract. 

See Wilson v. Terwillinger, 140 So. 3d 1122, 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 2014); Parr v. Alderwoods Grp., Inc., 604 S.E.2d 431, 434–35 

(Va. 2004) (stating that two such documents must receive the same 

construction). The various provisions are then harmonized, giving 
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interpreting a contract is to determine and give effect to the 

parties’ intent. Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So. 3d 

256, 270 (Fla. 2015); Pocahontas Mining Ltd. Liab. Co. v. CNX Gas 

Co., 666 S.E.2d 527, 531 (Va. 2008). To determine the parties’ 

intent, we begin with the language of the contract. See

Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 2015); 

Pocahontas, 666 S.E.2d at 531. When the language of a contract is 

clear and unambiguous, we enforce the contract as it is written. 

Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d at 986; TravCo Ins. Co. v. Ward, 736 S.E.2d 

321, 325 (Va. 2012). A contract is ambiguous when it can 

reasonably be interpreted in more than one way. CitiMortgage, 

Inc. v. Turner, 172 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); 

Robinson-Huntley v. George Washington Carver Mut. Homes Ass’n, 

Inc., 756 S.E.2d 415, 418 (Va. 2014). “However, a contract is not 

ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to the meaning of 

the terms used.” Robinson-Huntley, 756 S.E.2d at 418 (quoting 

Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 561 S.E.2d 663, 668 

(Va. 2002)); accord Minassian v. Rachins, 152 So. 3d 719, 725 (Fla. 

Dist. Ct. App. 2014).

Here, the parties agree that the Offer Letter unambiguously 

provides for hourly wages; however, their dispute centers around 

 

effect to each when reasonably possible. See City of Homestead v. 

Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000); Schuiling v. Harris, 747 

S.E.2d 833, 836 (Va. 2013).
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the meaning of “base weekly salary,” as it appears in the Foreign 

Travel Letter provision discussing “base pay.” The provision 

states that an employee’s “base weekly salary will not change as 

the result of [an overseas] assignment.” J.A. 105, 848, 870, 882, 

906, 920. Rishell and the Rhodes Appellees interpret “base weekly 

salary” simply as an hourly rate stated in weekly terms, with no 

effect on an employee’s base pay. They argue that under the terms 

of the Offer Letter and Foreign Travel Letter, employees working 

overseas are entitled to the same hourly wages they would receive 

while working in the United States. CSC, on the other hand, argues 

that the Foreign Travel Letter controls the compensation terms of 

an employee’s overseas assignment, and thus base weekly salary 

trumps hourly wages as required under the Offer Letter. CSC thus 

interprets the Offer Letter and Foreign Travel Letter to provide 

for a fixed salary when an employee is overseas, paid without 

regard to whether the employee works under or over 40 hours per 

week.3

Having considered the plain meaning of the parties’ 

contracts, we conclude that each employee’s Offer Letter and 

 3 CSC argues that the pay differential outlined in the Foreign 

Travel Letter is specifically intended to make up for an employee’s 

hours over 40. This intended purpose, however, appears nowhere in 

either letter. Also of significance is the fact that whether an 

employee is entitled to the pay differential is not guaranteed. 

Rather, it is in the discretion of the employee’s manager.
10

Foreign Travel Letter, read together, unambiguously provide for 

hourly wages for every hour worked, rather than fixed salaries, 

when the employee is working overseas. Though the Foreign Travel 

Letter does not define the term “base weekly salary,” the letter 

states unequivocally that when an employee is on an overseas 

assignment, his “base weekly salary will not change as a result of 

this assignment.” J.A. 105, 848, 870, 882, 906, 920. This 

statement appears as a clarification of “base pay,” and makes clear 

that the intent of the parties is that an employee working overseas 

would be entitled to the same base pay that an employee would 

receive when not working overseas. Id. Since the Foreign Travel 

Letter is otherwise silent on the meaning of “base weekly salary,” 

we must look to the Offer Letter to determine the base pay an 

employee would receive when working in the United States. The 

Offer Letter expresses an employee’s base pay in terms of an 

“hourly rate.”4 J.A. 246, 844, 866, 878, 902, 916. The hourly 

rate therefore represents the base pay that “will not change” when 

an employee is overseas, regardless of whether it is stated in 

 4 Rishell’s Offer Letter includes both an hourly rate and an 

annual sum, which is his hourly rate multiplied by 40 hours per 

week and by 52 weeks per year. However, nothing suggests that the 

annual sum takes precedence over the hourly rate or that Rishell’s 

pay will be capped at the annual sum. Rather, the annual sum 

appears in parentheses following the hourly rate, suggesting it is 

supplementary or illustrative information. See Rawls v. Rideout, 

328 S.E.2d 783, 786 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
11

hourly or weekly terms. Merely invoking the term “salary” does 

not transform hourly pay into fixed pay, particularly when 

accompanied by a statement that an employee’s base pay “will not 

change.”

CSC’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Neither 

letter provides that the Foreign Travel Letter supersedes the Offer 

Letter when an employee is overseas; nor does either letter specify 

that an employee’s weekly pay is capped at 40 hours per week, 

regardless of the number of hours worked.5 To accept CSC’s 

interpretation of the letters would be to rewrite their terms, 

which we cannot do. See Corwin v. Cristal Mizner’s Pres. Ltd. 

P’ship, 812 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“[I]t is 

axiomatic that the courts may not rewrite or add to the terms of 

a written agreement.”); TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Va., 

L.L.C., 557 S.E.2d 199, 200 (Va. 2002) (“Contracts are construed 

as written, without adding terms that were not included by the 

parties.”).

 5 CSC also argues that employees received over $37 per hour 

while overseas, which includes discretionary uplifts such as pay 

differentials and hardship pay. After-the-fact rationalizations, 

however, do not alter the meaning of the contract. By capping 

base pay at 40 hours per week, when employees regularly worked 84-

hour weeks, CSC effectively reduced employees’ hourly wages from 

$31 or $32 to around $15. Neither letter contains language 

demonstrating that this was the intent of the parties. Nor do the 

letters place the employees on notice of this base pay reduction.
12

Construing the contracts as written, we hold that Rishell and 

the Rhodes Appellees are entitled to the same base pay overseas as 

they would have received if working in the United States—hourly 

wages for every hour worked.

IV.

For the reasons outlined, we affirm the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment in favor of Rishell and each of the Rhodes 

Appellees, and we affirm its denial of CSC’s motions for summary 

judgment.

AFFIRMED