#### Ohan KARAGOZIAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAM’S EAST, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-3024-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 22, 2017

*760FOR APPELLANT: John R. Williams, Esq., New Haven, Connecticut,

FOR APPELLEE: Hugh F. Murray, III, Pamela J. Moore, Sami Asaad, McCar-ter & English, LLP, Hartford, Connecticut.

PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges, ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, District Judge.*

*

 Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation,

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Ohan Karagozian, a licensed optician, appeals from an award of summary judgment to defendant Sam’s East, Inc. (“Sam’s Club”) on Karagozian’s claim of sex discrimination pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46a-60(a)(1)' *et seq.**1***We review an award of summary judgment *de novo,*resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-movant, and we will affirm only if the record reveals no genuine dispute of material fact. *See*Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,*477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); *Matthews v. City of New York,*779 F.3d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Sex discrimination claims under CFEPA are evaluated under the familiar burden-shifting framework of *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,*411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). *See Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp.,*609 F.3d 537, 556 (2d Cir. 2010); *Craine v. Trinity Coll.,*259 Conn. 625, 636-37 *&*637 n.6, 791 A.2d 518, 530-31 *&*531 n.6 (2002). Under that feme-work, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a *prima facie*case of discrimination. *See Craine v. Trinity Coll.,*259 Conn. at 638, 791 A.2d at 531. The burden then shifts to the employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action. *Id.*at 643, 791 A.2d at 543. If the employer does so, the ultimate burden is the plaintiffs to prove that the justification is merely a “pretext for an unlawful motive.” *Id.*at 644, 791 A.2d at 535. Karagozian challenges the district court’s conclusion that, even assuming he could articulate a *prima facie*case, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence to carry his ultimate burden. The argument fails on the merits.

Karagozian does not dispute any material fact of this case, including that (1) he was convicted of a felony possession-with-intent-to-distribute drug offense in 1989; (2) in applying for a Sam’s Club optician position, his hiring was contingent on completion of a background check authorization form; (3) he disclosed his felony conviction on that form; (4) Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., which owns Sam’s Club, has a uniform policy against hiring those convicted of felony possession-with-intent drug offenses for positions in the department to which Karagozian was applying; and (5) his conditional offer of employment was re*761scinded pursuant to that “facially neutral hiring policy.” Appellant’s Br. 16. Karago-zian argues only that the hiring policy is neither “nondiscriminatory” nor “legitimate," *see Craine v. Trinity Coll.,*259 Conn. at 643, 791 A.2d at 543, because Equal Employment Opportunity Commission statistics demonstrate that men and women are convicted of drug crimes at different rates, causing a “disparate impact .., upon male job applicants,” and Sam’s Club has not “artieulate[d], much less demonstrate^], any business necessity for [its] policy” as applied to opticians, Appellant’s Br. 13.

These arguments fail' as a matter of law. First, while the statistics — which Karago-zian cites for the first time on appeal— could be relevant to a disparate-impact claim, Karagozian concedes that he does not bring such a claim. The statistics do not support the *disparate-treatment*claim he brought because Karagozian’s burden on that claim is to show that Sam’s Club’s justification for adverse action was a pretext for actual discrimination, *see Craine v. Trinity Coll.,*259 Conn. at 644, 791 A.2d at 535, not the policy’s possible discriminatory effect.2

Second, while Karagozian concedes that Sam’s explanation for not hiring him was “undoubtedly genuine,” he contends that the policy was not “legitimate” because it lacked any “relationship to the job.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 6. That argument fails because disputes as to the wisdom of an employment policy cannot alone raise an inference of unlawful discrimination. *See Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp.,*766 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Board of Educ. of City of Norwalk v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities,*266 Conn. 492, 513, 832 A.2d 660, 672 (2003) (“[W]e do not second-guess an employer’s hiring standards.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, Sam’s Club’s justification cannot be illegitimate for this reason.

We have considered Karagozian’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the August 11, 2016 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

1

. Although Karagozian also asserted claims for age and national-origin discrimination, he does not pursue them in this appeal. Accordingly, we deem those claims waived. *See Norton v. Sam’s Club,*145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998).

2

. Because Karagozian concededly does not bring a disparate-impact claim, we need not address whether the statistics, if properly presented as evidence, would be sufficient to sustain such a claim.