alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: Irene Howie To: Finamore, Robert (OST) Subject: AirTanker Services DOT-OST-2013-0109 Date: Tuesday, June 18, 2013 4:05:20 PM 

# Bob,In reference to the Application of AirTanker Services Limited, Docket Number DOTOST-2013-0109, this will confirm the application includes a request for the full scope of rights available to conduct foreign charter air cargo transportation between any point in the United States and any other point or points. Kind regards, Irene

Irene E. Howie Law Offices 13 Decatur Avenue Annapolis, MD 21403 

## T: 410-267-7228 F: 410-267-7246 ihowie@verizon.net This message and any files or text attached to it are intended only for the recipients named above and may contain information that is confidential or privileged. If you are not an intended recipient, you must not read, copy, use or disclose this information. Please also notify the sender by replying to this message and then delete all copies of it from your system. Thank you.
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Andrew J. England, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of National CineMedia, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

Date: April 10, 2018

 

| /s/ Andrew J. England                                                                  |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Andrew J. England

Chief Executive Officer and Director

(Principal Executive Officer) |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KARLEEN CRYSTAL LINFORD,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Defendant - Appellee,

No. 15-35758

D.C. No. 4:13-cv-00194-BLW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 9, 2017** 

Portland, Oregon

Before: GOULD and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and RAYES, District Judge.*** 

 

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except 

as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without 

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge for the District 

of Arizona, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 13 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Karleen Linford appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

United States in this Federal Tort Claims Act case. We have jurisdiction pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, Szajer v. 

City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011), viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to Linford to determine whether any triable issue of fact exists 

and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant law, Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We affirm.

Linford asserted a negligence claim arising out of injuries she sustained while 

riding an all-terrain vehicle across a cattle guard on national forest land in Idaho.

There is no dispute that, absent willful and wanton conduct, the United States is 

entitled to immunity under Idaho’s recreational use statute, Idaho Code § 36-1604(d), 

because it allowed Linford to use the national forest land for recreational purposes 

without charge. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the United 

States engaged in willful and wanton conduct. The Forest Service’s construction 

and maintenance of the cattle guard constitutes, at most, mere negligence.

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 4.2 Form of Promissory Note

   
 Exhibit 4.2
 PROMISSORY NOTE
 

 

 $_________.00
 Date:  ____________ ___, 2012 
 

 FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, hereinafter referred to as "Payor", unconditionally promises to pay to the order of ______________________, hereinafter referred to as "Payee or Holder" the principal sum of $___________.00 with _____________ interest thereon to maturity on ________________, ______.  Payment of principal and any other sum due hereunder shall be made in lawful money of the United States of America.
 Upon default by Payor in the payment of the principal amount of or any other sum due in accordance with the terms of this note, the Payee, at its option, may proceed against the Payor.  In the event of such default, the Payor agrees to pay all cost and expenses of collection, including reasonable attorney's fees and interest from the date of such default, on the principal amount unpaid, at the maximum rate permitted by law.
 Presentment and demand for payment, notice or dishonor, protest and notice of protest, are hereby waived by the Payor.  This note (i) may not be changed, waived, discharged or terminated except by an instrument in writing signed by the party against which enforcement of such change, waiver, dischargement or termination is sought and (ii) shall be binding upon Payor, its successors, assigns and transferees and shall inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by Payee, its successors and assigns.
 This note shall be construed and governed in all respects by the laws of the state of Nevada applicable to contracts made and to be performed therein.
 If any provisions of this note are declared invalid, illegal or unenforceable, the balance of this note shall remain in full force and effect.
 

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Payor has executed this note on the day and year first written above.
 

 

 /s/ Kyle W. Carlson
 Kyle W. Carlson
 

 GreenPlex Services, Inc.
 Company
 

 President
 Title
 

 Paid in full on ________________________
 

 

 ___________________________________
 

 ___________________________________
#### Maurice F. Simon, Appellant and Respondent, *v.*Noma Electric Corporation et al., Respondents and Appellants, et al., Defendants.

Submitted January 3, 1944;

decided January 13, 1944.

*David J. Colton*and *Joseph Lieberman*for motion.

*Philip Warshaw*for Noma Electric Corporation, Air Conditioners Sales Corporation and Henri Sadacca, defendants, respondents and appellants.

Motion to dismiss appeal denied and substitution denied, without prejudice to an application to be made under section 578 of the Civil Practice Act. The court has no power to grant a motion substituting the next of kin.
#### Jeffrey L. HILL Plaintiff-Appellant v. Ray WALLACE; Lee Kriehbiel; University of Arkansas at Fort Smith Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-4434

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2017

Filed: July 31, 2017

Jeffrey L. Hill, Pro Se

David A. Curran, Associate General Counsel, University of Arkansas, Office of General Counsel, Little Rock, AR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before GRUENDER, BOWMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Jeffrey Hill appeals after the district court1 adversely granted summary judgment in his consolidated actions asserting due process and Thirteenth Amendment claims arising from his conditional admission to the University of Arkansas at Fort Smith.

We conclude that defendants’ motion for summary judgment was appropriately granted, *see Beaulieu v. Ludeman,*690 F.3d 1017, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012) (grant of summary judgment is reviewed *de novo),*because there was no genuine issue as to whether Hill was deprived of his liberty or property, as required for a due process claim, *see Creason v. City of Washington,*435 F.3d 820, 824 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing requirements for due process claim), or subjected to slavery or involuntary servitude within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, *see United States v. Kozminski,*487 U.S. 931, 942, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988) (discussing meaning of words “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” in Thirteenth Amendment). We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hill’s motions for sanctions, *see Exec. Air Taxi Corp. v. City of Bismarck,*518 F.3d 562, 571 (8th Cir. 2008) (denial of motion for sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion), or his motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), *see In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig.,*496 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 2007) (denial of Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion; Rule 60(b) authorizes relief in only most exceptional cases).

*454Accordingly, we affirm. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B. We also deny Hill’s pending motion for sanctions.

1

. The Honorable P.K. Holmes, III, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas.
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<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
The  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information   extracted  from  the
consolidated  balance  sheets  and  consolidated  statements  of  income  and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

       
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</TABLE>
**Exhibit 18.1**

 

**[PwC Letterhead]**

 

March 29, 2005 

 

Board of Directors 

Blockbuster Inc. 

1201 Elm Street 

Dallas, Texas 75270 

 

Dear Directors: 

 

We are providing this letter to you for inclusion as an exhibit to your Form 10-K filing pursuant to Item 601 of Regulation S-K. 

 

We have audited the consolidated financial statements included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004 and issued ourreport thereon dated March 29, 2005. Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements describes a change in accounting principle from expensing share-based awards with graded vesting periods utilizing a straight-line amortization method to expensingsuch awards utilizing an accelerated method in accordance with Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 28, *“Accounting for Stock Appreciation Rights and Other Variable Stock Option or Award Plans.”* It should beunderstood that the preferability of one acceptable method of accounting over another for the expensing of share-based awards with graded vesting periods has not been addressed in any authoritative accounting literature, and in expressing ourconcurrence below we have relied on management’s determination that this change in accounting principle is preferable. Based on our reading of management’s stated reasons and justification for this change in accounting principle in theForm 10-K, and our discussions with management as to their judgment about the relevant business planning factors relating to the change, we concur with management that such change represents, in the Company’s circumstances, the adoption of apreferable accounting principle in conformity with Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20. 

 

Very truly yours, 

 

 

 

 

/s/PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-1074

MESITA L. LOVE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus JOHN E. POTTER, in his capacity as Postmaster General, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CA-02-498) Submitted: March 31, 2003 Decided: May 1, 2003 Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Mesita L. Love, Appellant Pro Se. Debra Jean Prillaman, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia; Christopher John Burton, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Mesita L. Love appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendant in this action alleging employment discrimination based on gender, race, disability, and retaliation. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. SeeLove v. Potter , No. CA-02-498 (E.D. Va. Jan. 7, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4156

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus SHANIYRUS S. BOGLE, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District Judge. (CR-04-231) Submitted: June 30, 2005 Decided: July 27, 2005 Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Amy L. Austin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Brian L. Whisler, Michael S. Dry, A ssistant United States Attorneys, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Bogle does not seek to challenge his sentence. Thus, United States v. Booker , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), does not impact this appeal. - 2 - PER CURIAM: Shaniyrus S. Bogle appeals his convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000). * Bogle entered a guilty plea conditioned on his ability to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Finding no error, we affirm. Bogle argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppre ss. This court reviews the factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and the district court’s legal determinations de novo. See Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). When a suppress ion motion has been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. SeeUnited States v. Seidman , 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). With these standards in mind, and having reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the officer who seized Bogle did so based on a reasonable articulable suspicion that Bogle was engaged in criminal activity. “[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable- 3 - suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); see alsoTerry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). We conclude that, given the totality of the circumstances,
see United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989), Bogle’s suspicious and evasive behavior justified the officer’s actions. See United States v. Mayo , 361 F.3d 802, 807-08 (4th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we affirm Bogle’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### William Hays, Resp’t, v. The Phenix Ins. Co., App’lt.

*Wm. W. Goodrich,*for resp’t; *Geo. A. Black,*for app’It.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Affirming 25 N. Y. State Rep., 123.
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Summary of Analytical Results

662 - March 2012

Sample ID 662-GRAB 662-GRAB 662-GRAB 662-GRAB

Date 3/5/12 3/12/12 3/19/12 3/26/12

Top (ft) 0 0 0 0

Total (T)/ Bottom (ft) 0 0 0 0

Analyte units Diss. (D) Duplicate # 1 1 1 1

PFOA ug/L T 2.23 2.90 NQ (<2.00) NQ (<2.00)

ug/L = micrograms per liter or parts per billion (ppb)

ND = not detected (shown as <LOD)

NQ = not quantifiable (shown as <LOQ)

ND<LOD<NQ<LOQ

LOD - limit of detection

LOQ = limit of quantification

Samples were analyzed by Critical Path Services LLC. Reported results 

 represent a single analysis, except for the sample collected on 3/12/12.

 Acceptable precision was obtained and the reported result for the sample

 collected on 3/12/12 represents the average of lab duplicate results.

 The NJDEP lab certification number for Critical Path Services LLC is PA072.

PFOA = Perfluorooctanoic Acid

ug/L = micrograms per Liter

< and ND = Non detect at stated reporting limit Page 1 of 1

090000648104790a.xls:Sheet1

6/14/2012 3:43 PM
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-13-0005130 19-NOV-2014 09:10 AM
#### Llewellen Fernando SMITH, a.k.a. Llewelen F. Smith, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN—LOW, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15-13996 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(August 28, 2017)

Llewellen Fernando Smith, Pro Se

*617Linda Julin McNamara, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, Roberta Josephina Bodnar, U.S. Attorney’s Office—FLM, Ocala, FL, for Respondent-Appellee

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Leland H. Kynes, appointed counsel on appeal for Llewellen F. Smith in this appeal from the dismissal of Smith’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition, has filed a motion to withdraw on appeal, supported by a brief prepared pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the dismissal of Smith’s § 2241 petition is AFFIRMED.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Kendall Bell v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-15-00510-CR

Trial court case number: 1394740

Trial court: 263rd District Court of Harris County

In December 2016, we reversed appellant Kendall Bell’s transfer from juvenile court to 

criminal district court based upon Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

In its first ground in its petition for discretionary review to the Court of Criminal Appeals 

from this panel’s opinion, the State raised for the first time a jurisdictional challenge. The Court 

of Criminal Appeals granted the petition on this ground, vacated this Court’s judgment, and 

remanded the case so that the jurisdictional issue could be “fully vetted . . . in the first instance.” 

Bell v. State, – S.W.3d –, No. PD-0052-17, 2017 WL 1067892, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. March 

22, 2017).

Bell had been released on bail while the petition was pending in the Court of Criminal 

Appeals. But the criminal district court issued an alias capias for Bell’s arrest on Friday, May 

19, 2017, shortly after the mandate issued from the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Bell has filed a motion asking this Court to set bail under article 44.04(h) of the Code of 

Criminal Procedure and a separate motion to stay the alias capias. However, article 44.04(h) 

permits us to set bail only when a conviction is reversed and a petition has not yet been filed with 

the Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.4(h). Our judgment has been 

vacated and thus Bell’s conviction has been reinstated. Accordingly, we do not have authority to 

set bail at this time. 

We therefore deny Bell’s Motion for $50,000 Bail and his Motion for Stay of Alias 

Capias.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Rebeca Huddle

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Huddle.

Date: May 23, 2017
#### Leon B. Kwartler, Respondent, *v.*Rebecca I. Kwartler, Appellant.

Submitted October 5, 1943;

decided November 18, 1943.

*690
      *George G. Lake*for appellant.

*Morris Akner*and *Benjamin Koenig*for respondent.

Order affirmed, without costs. Question certified answered in the affirmative. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ.