J-S68040-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

STANLEY E. ROMANOSKI, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

DEBRA E. GRAD, :

:

Appellee : No. 982 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered on March 3, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Domestic Relations Division, No. D 09068496

BEFORE: ALLEN, JENKINS and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2014

Stanley E. Romanoski (“Husband”) appeals from the Order equitably 

distributing the marital property owned by Husband and his former wife, 

Debra E. Grad (“Wife”). We affirm.

Husband and Wife married on July 1, 2001, and separated in April 

2009. The parties had two children together during their marriage. 

Additionally, Wife has a daughter, Rachel, from a previous marriage. After 

the initiation of the divorce proceedings,1the Divorce Master issued a Report 

and Recommendation concerning equitable distribution of the parties’ marital 

property in September 2013. In response, Husband filed a Praecipe for Trial 

De Novo with the trial court. 

 

1 We observe that Husband sought and was granted alimony pendente lite 

(“APL”). Husband continues to receive a monthly APL payment from Wife of 

$550.00.
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On February 18, 2014, the trial court conducted a de novo hearing on 

the economic issues in the divorce proceedings. Subsequently, on March 3, 

2014, the trial court issued a Decree and Order, divorcing the parties from 

the bonds of matrimony, and distributing their marital property. Both 

parties filed Motions for Reconsideration. On April 11, 2014, the trial court 

conducted a hearing (hereinafter “reconsideration hearing”), at the close of 

which the court denied both parties’ Motions for Reconsideration.2 In 

response, Husband timely filed a Notice of Appeal, and a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 

after which the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.

On appeal, Husband presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in excluding the balance of 

TruMark Account No. 2266430 from the marital estate 

and by concluding that Wife overcame the presumption 

that said account was marital in nature[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred in attributing debt solely 

to Husband as to Bank of America Credit Card No. 5445 

and AT&T Credit Card No. 1800[,] and by finding that 

Wife overcame the presumption that said debt is marital 

in nature[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred in attributing an erroneous 

value to the parties[’] Charles Schwab account[,] in 

disregard of the weight of the evidence[?]

 

2 At the reconsideration hearing, the trial court judge found as follows 

regarding Husband’s continued receipt of APL: “I am putting it on the record 

that I think part of this appeal and part of this reconsideration and part of 

everything is [H]usband’s attempt to continue receiving APL.” N.T., 

4/11/14, at 36.
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4. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award 

Husband separate items of personalty owned by 

Husband prior to the marriage[, and w]hether the trial 

court erred in failing to award Husband any items of 

marital personalty as requested[?]

Brief for Husband at 5.

We review an equitable distribution order according to the following 

standard:

The equitable distribution of marital property is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court and its decision will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Under the 

abuse of discretion standard, we are not to usurp the trial court’s 

duty as the finder of fact. An abuse of discretion is not found 

lightly, but only upon a showing of clear and convincing

evidence. However, an abuse of discretion will be found by this 

Court if the trial court failed to follow proper procedure or 

misapplied the law.

Dean v. Dean, 98 A.3d 637, 640 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and ellipses 

omitted). “Furthermore, the determination of whether an asset is a marital 

asset is a matter with the sound discretion of the divorce court.” Nagle v. 

Nagle, 799 A.2d 812, 818 (Pa. Super. 2002).

“In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts 

must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We measure the 

circumstances of the case against the objective of effectuating economic 

justice between the parties and achieving a just determination of their 

property rights.” Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted). 
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In equitable distribution disputes, “[t]he finder of fact is entitled to 

weigh the evidence presented and assess its credibility.” Smith v. Smith, 

904 A.2d 15, 20 (Pa. Super. 2006). In so doing, “[t]he fact finder is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence[,] and the Superior Court will not 

disturb the credibility determinations of the court below.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Finally, it is well established that, “[i]f supported by credible 

evidence of record, the trial court’s findings of fact are binding upon the 

appellate court.” Green v. Green, 69 A.3d 282, 285 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Husband first argues that the trial court improperly excluded from the 

marital estate the funds in an account that Wife held, in her name alone, 

with TruMark under account number 2266430 (hereinafter “the TruMark 

Account”). See Brief for Husband at 8-11. Husband points out that 

[t]he [trial] court reasoned that the funds [in the TruMark 

Account] originated from [Wife’s] former spouse[,] in the nature 

of child support for [Wife’s] child[, Rachel,] and reasoned that 

this was sufficient to exclude the funds from the marital estate. 

[Husband] disagrees that this is permissible reasoning under the 

law. 

Id. at 8. Husband asserts that the funds in question were undisputedly 

acquired during the parties’ marriage, and points out that there is a 

statutory presumption that all property acquired by either party during the 

marriage is marital property, unless one of the enumerated statutory 

exceptions applies. Id. (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3501(b)).

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim as 

follows:
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The TruMark Account ... was titled in Wife’s sole name. Based on 

the evidence presented and testimonies of both parties, the [trial 

c]ourt found that this account was earmarked specifically for the 

support of Rachel, a child not of the marriage .... This was 

confirmed by Husband during his testimony, [wherein he stated] 

“that was an account I believe [Wife] put child support from her 

first husband in.” [N.T.,] 2/18/2014[,] at 28[.] It should also 

be noted, no testimony was presented that the [TruMark 

A]ccount was used for marital purposes nor used for any 

household purpose.

Moreover, at the ... reconsideration hearing, the [trial 

c]ourt found [that], “based on the testimony of the parties, th[e] 

money [in the TruMark Account] was clearly earmarked for child 

support of [Rachel]. [Wife] and the father of [Rachel] agreed 

that they would take that money and put it in the account for the 

benefit of [Rachel,] and that’s what th[e trial c]ourt i[s] finding.” 

[N.T.,] 4/11/2014[,] at 14[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 6/13/14, at 4. Our review confirms that the trial court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record. The money in the TruMark 

Account belongs to Rachel, and is not marital property. Accordingly, the trial 

court properly ruled that this money was not subject to equitable 

distribution. See Nagle, supra (stating that “the determination of whether 

an asset is a marital asset is a matter with the sound discretion of the 

divorce court.”).

Next, Husband argues that the trial court erred by attributing solely to 

him debt that the parties had on two of their credit cards, which were titled 

in Wife’s name alone: a Bank of America credit card (“the BofA Card”); and 

an AT&T credit card (“the AT&T Card”). See Brief for Husband at 11-13. 

Specifically, Husband challenges the trial court’s finding that the charges he 

placed on these credit cards were used solely for the benefit of Husband and 
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his separate business, and that Wife had no knowledge that Husband had 

made some of these purchases. Id. at 11-12. According to Husband, the 

trial court improperly ignored evidence of record that many of the purchases 

were for improvements to the parties’ home, and regular household 

expenses. Id. at 12. Additionally, Husband argues, “[s]ince the charges 

were incurred during the parties[’] marriage and prior to separation, all of 

the debts are marital, including any for Husband’s business[,] from which 

[Wife] benefitted.” Id. at 13.

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Husband’s claim as follows:

The [BofA] Card ... had a balance of $3,986.00 on the date 

of separation .... [T]he parties shall equally divide this amount. 

In the ensuing month, charges were incurred on [the BofA Card] 

amounting to $13,000.00. However, after review of the charges 

incurred on this account, the [trial c]ourt finds that [] Husband 

used this account to his benefit, for his business, without the 

consent or knowledge of Wife. Therefore, Husband will be solely 

liable for the increase in debt that occurred thereafter. Husband 

will have to reimburse Wife the sum of $12,034.00 ($16,020.00-

$3,986.00).

The [trial c]ourt noted [at the reconsideration hearing 

that] “the court painstakingly went down each and every single 

transaction. A lot of these charges were late payments, and I’m 

going to attribute every single late payment to [Husband] 

because he changed the address to the account, and [W]ife 

didn’t even know that he was getting bills.” [N.T.,] 4/11/2014[,] 

at 22[.] [The trial court further found at the hearing that] 

“[Wife] found out when she started getting calls from the credit 

card company that there were non-payments, aside from the 

fact that ... 90 percent of the charges – at a minimum 90 per 

cent – were for [H]usband’s business.” [Id.] at 23[.]

As with the aforementioned, the [trial c]ourt finds, after

review of the charges incurred, that [the] AT&T Credit Card ... 

had a balance as of May 2009 [in the amount of] $6,621.00, all 
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of which should be [] subject [to] reimbursement by Husband to 

Wife[,] as the [AT&T Credit C]ard was used solely by [] Husband 

for work[-]related expenses.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/13/14, at 4-5 (emphasis omitted). 

Our review confirms that the trial court’s above-mentioned factual 

findings are supported by competent evidence of record; therefore, we are 

bound by these findings. See Green, 69 A.3d at 285. Moreover, the trial 

court credited Wife’s testimony that Husband had made many of the 

purchases in question for the sole benefit of his business, without her 

knowledge, and discredited Husband’s testimony to the contrary. See N.T., 

4/11/14, at 22-23. We may not disturb the trial court’s credibility 

determination or its weighing of the evidence. See Smith, 904 A.2d at 20. 

Finally, we observe that regarding Husband’s claim that, since the charges in 

question were made during the parties’ marriage, the debt created therefore 

is necessarily marital debt, this claim lacks merit. Wife did not authorize the 

purchases, which were made for Husband’s sole benefit. Therefore, we 

discern no error by the trial court in determining that the debt associated 

with the AT&T Card and the BofA Card was solely attributable to Husband.

In his third issue, Husband argues that the trial court erred in 

attributing an erroneous value to the parties’ Charles Schwab account. See

Brief for Husband at 7, 14. Husband asserts that “[t]he [t]rial [c]ourt 

indicated that no evidence had been submitted by [Husband regarding the 

Charles Schwab account], which is not factual, and instead relied on [] 
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documents submitted by [Wife] that did not evidence the value of the 

account.” Id. at 7.

At the reconsideration hearing, the trial court observed that Husband 

and Wife had submitted two separate, “contradictory” written statements 

concerning the amount of money in the Charles Schwab account, both of 

which the court took into consideration. N.T., 4/11/14, at 27-28. Therefore, 

there is no merit to Husband’s claim that the trial court failed to consider the 

evidence he submitted to the court on this issue. After considering both 

parties’ statements, and hearing argument from their counsel regarding the 

value of the Charles Schwab account, the trial court “f[ou]nd that [W]ife’s 

evidence was more credible than [H]usband’s evidence[.]” Id. at 30. This 

Court may not disturb the trial court’s credibility determination. See Smith, 

904 A.2d at 20. 

Finally, Husband argues that the trial court erred by disregarding his 

request that the court order Wife to return to Husband items of personal 

property, which he had purchased prior to the marriage, and many items 

that he and Wife jointly purchased during the marriage. See Brief for 

Husband at 15-16.

A review of the testimony at the reconsideration hearing reveals that 

Husband had requested an extensive list of items contained in the marital 

household (hereinafter referred to as “the requested personalty”). See N.T., 

4/11/14, at 30-33; see also id. at 31 (wherein the trial court judge stated 
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that “[Husband] doesn’t want everything; he just wants everything under 

that roof.”). The trial court also observed at the reconsideration hearing 

that Husband had unilaterally removed from the marital household a large 

quantity of tools worth approximately $3,500.00. Id. at 34. Concerning 

Husband’s claim for the requested personalty, the trial court reasoned that 

Husband’s having taken these valuable tools resulted in an “almost equal 

trade.” Id. at 34, 37; see also id. at 39 (wherein the court noted that 

regarding Husband’s “testi[mony] that very few items were in the home 

prior to the marriage, ... I didn’t find him credible, because this was a 

premarital home – [Wife’s] home, in which she lived.”). The trial court 

further noted that, regarding the list of the requested personalty that 

Husband presented to the court, “[Husband] prepared the list and he never 

presented the list to [] [W]ife until we came to this trial. So, he never 

afforded [W]ife the opportunity to return anything because she didn’t even 

know the items that he wanted.” Id. at 38-39. Based upon the foregoing 

evidence, and the trial court’s credibility determinations, we conclude that 

the court properly exercised its broad discretion in refusing to order Wife to 

give Husband the requested personalty. 

Because we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial 

court in equitably distributing the parties’ marital property, and the court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record, we affirm the Order on appeal.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/15/2014