alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit      32.1**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS      ADDED BY**

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

| 1. | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2. | To                my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents,                in                all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations                of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report. |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:                March 30, 2008 | By:   | /s/                Adiv Baruch                       |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------|
|                                     |            | Adiv                Baruch                           |
|                                     |            | Chief                Executive Officer and President |

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Claudia Appelbaum, Plaintiff, v. Eric APPELBAUM, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-1949

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 2, 2017

Decided: June 8, 2017

Amended: August 29, 2017

William R. Terpening, TERPENING MOORS PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Caroline D. Ciraolo, .Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Clark, Marion E.M. Erickson, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Eric Appelbaum appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (2012). We have reviewed the materials before the court, including the parties’ briefs and the district court’s opinions, and we find no reversible error. Accordingly,. we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Appelbaum,*No. 5:12-cv-00186-RLV-DSC, 2016 WL 4059680 (W.D.N.C. July 27, 2016. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
# EUR-Lex - 32001R1456 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001R1456

**Council Regulation (EC) No 1456/2001 of 16 July 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No 2549/2000 establishing additional technical measures for the recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES Division VIIa) **

*
Official Journal L 194 , 18/07/2001 P. 0001 - 0001 *

Council Regulation (EC) No 1456/2001

of 16 July 2001

amending Regulation (EC) No 2549/2000 establishing additional technical measures for the recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES Division VIIa)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 37 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(1),

Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(2),

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee(3),

Whereas:

(1) The conditions laid down in Regulation (EC) No 2549/2000(4) are intended to ensure that the selectivity of fishing gears deployed in the Irish sea are such that few young cod are captured.

(2) Article 2(1) and (2) stipulate that it is prohibited to use any demersal towed net other than beam trawls incorporating a cod/end and/or extension piece made entirely or partly of multiple twine netting materials and any demersal towed net other than beam trawls incorporating a cod-end and/or extension piece of which the thickness of the twine exceeds 6 mm.

(3) However, recent scientific advice concurs with the opinion of fishermen that a cod-end and/or extension piece constructed of double twine of thickness no more than 4 mm is technically equivalent to a cod-end and/or extension piece as currently defined.

(4) There is a requirement on the part of some fishermen to deploy double-twine cod-ends.

(5) Article 3 of the current regulation refers to conditions which were relevant only during 2000 and it should therefore be replaced with provisions which set out the required amendment.

(6) Regulation (EC) No 2549/2000 should accordingly be amended,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 2549/2000 shall be replaced by the following: "Article 3

Notwithstanding the conditions laid down in Article 2(1) and (2), when fishing with towed gears in the Irish Sea, it shall be permitted to use a cod-end and/or extension piece constructed of double-twine netting material of which the thickness of any individual twine does not exceed 4 mm."

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 16 July 2001.

For the Council

The President

L. Michel

(1) OJ C 180 E, 26.6.2001, p. 311.

(2) Opinion delivered 5.7.2001 (not yet published in the Official Journal)

(3) Opinion delivered 30.5.2001 (not yet published in the Official Journal)

(4) OJ L 292, 21.11.2000, p. 5.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Eugene Maciaszczyk, Appellant.

Submitted November 15, 1943;

decided November 19, 1943.

*Eugene Maciaszczyk,*in person, for motion for leave to appeal and in opposition to motion to dismiss appeal.

*Samuel J. Foley, District Attorney (George Tilzer*of counsel), in opposition to defendant’s motion and for motion to dismiss appeal.

Motion for leave to prosecute appeal as a poor person denied.

Motion to dismiss appeal granted and appeal dismissed on the ground that no direct appeal from the order of the Court of Special Sessions lies to this Court.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of CytoGenix, Inc. (the Company) on Form 1O-Q for the period ending September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Malcolm H. Skolnick, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





/s/ Malcolm H. Skolnick

Malcolm H. Skolnick

Chief Executive Officer





November 14, 2007
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6033 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6033

To expand the tropical disease product priority review voucher program 
   to encourage treatments for the Middle East respiratory syndrome.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 14, 2016

   Mr. Peters (for himself, Mr. Rothfus, and Mr. Brendan F. Boyle of 
Pennsylvania) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To expand the tropical disease product priority review voucher program 
   to encourage treatments for the Middle East respiratory syndrome.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Adding Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome to the FDA Priority Review Voucher Program Act''.

SEC. 2. EXPANDING TROPICAL DISEASE PRODUCT PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHER 
              PROGRAM TO ENCOURAGE TREATMENTS FOR MIDDLE EAST 
              RESPIRATORY SYNDROME.

    Section 524(a)(3) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
U.S.C. 360n(a)(3)) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subparagraph (S) as subparagraph (T); 
        and
            (2) by inserting after subparagraph (R) the following:
                    ``(S) Middle East respiratory syndrome.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Lee THOMAS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7707

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 24, 2017

David Lee Thomas, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

David Lee Thomas, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certifícate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

*296We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Thomas has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)

                            PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION

RE: RALI SERIES 2006-QA9 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The  undersigned,  a duly  authorized  officer of PHH  Mortgage  Corporation  as
servicer (the "Servicer") pursuant to the applicable  servicing agreement,  does
hereby certify that:

1.      A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during  the  period covered  by
the Issuing Entity's report on Form 10-K and of the Servicer's performance under
the applicable servicing agreement has been made under my supervision.

2.      To the  best of my knowledge, based  on  such  review,  the Service  has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable servicing agreement in all
material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 16
day of March 2007.

PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION



By:     /s/ Deborah Rocchi
        Name: Deborah Rocchi
        Title: Assistant Vice President
#### Walter Craig SPRAGGINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of FLORIDA, Walton County, Florida, City of Freeport, Florida, Hammock Bay Community Development District, Jay Odom, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-10117 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(July 11, 2017)

Walter Craig Spraggins, Pro Se

Pam Bondi, Attorney General’s Office, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant-Appellee

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Walter Spraggins appeals pro *se*the *sua sponte*dismissal without prejudice of his fourth amended complaint against the State of Florida, Walton County, the City of Freeport, Hammock Bay Community Development District, and Jay Odom. The district court dismissed Spraggins’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, even though he was not a prisoner proceeding as an indigent. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (h). Although the Act did not apply to Spraggins, we affirm the dismissal of his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

One standard of review governs this appeal. We review *de novo*the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under the Litigation Reform Act. *Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp.,*850 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). “The existence of jurisdiction [also] is a question of law we review *de novo.” Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co.,*735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2013). A federal “court should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings” and “is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction *sua sponte*whenever it may be lacking.” *Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co.,*168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).

• The Litigation Reform Act did not apply to Spraggins. He was not an inmate nor was he a prisoner, as that term is defined in the Act. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1915(h); *Tro-ville v. Venz,*303 F.3d 1256,1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he PLRA’s straightforward definition of ‘prisoner’ ... applies] only to persons incarcerated as punishment for a criminal conviction.”). Spraggins also did not apply to proceed *in forma pauperis-,*he paid the required fee when he filed his complaint.

The district court correctly dismissed Spraggins’s fourth amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction. “When a plaintiff files suit in federal court, [ ]he must allege facts that, if true, show federal subject matter jurisdiction over [his] case exists.” *Travaglio,*735 F.3d at 1268. The district court ruled that Spraggins’s complaint failed either to allege complete diversity of citizenship among the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), or to state a claim arising under federal law, *id.*§ 1331, and Spraggins does not challenge that ruling. Spraggins argues that he should have been given a fifth opportunity to amend his complaint, but the district court dismissed the complaint *846without prejudice, so Spraggins is free to file another complaint against the defendants.

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Sprag-gins’s complaint.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF DIGITAL TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS, INC. FOR THE NINE MONTHS
ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           3,564
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,850
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,967
<INVENTORY>                                     12,332
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                24,779
<PP&E>                                           8,698
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,944
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  52,306
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           45,520
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      4,314
<COMMON>                                            69
<OTHER-SE>                                         428
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    52,306
<SALES>                                          6,887
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,887
<CGS>                                            4,289
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,411
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   498
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 291
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (104)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (104)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.02)


</TABLE>
#### Frank SIBERT, an individual and president of Sibco Products Co., Inc., and Sibco Products Co., Inc., Petitioners, v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Respondent.

No. 9, Docket 30270.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Sept. 21, 1966.

Decided Oct. 17, 1966.

*365Frank Siebert, Newark, N. J., pro se.

W. Risque Harper, Washington, D. C. (James Mcl. Henderson, Gen. Counsel, and J. B. Truly, Asst. Gen. Counsel, F. T. C., Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.

Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and WATERMAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In a complaint issued by the Federal Trade Commission, the petitioners, sellers of water filtration systems, were charged with deceptive advertising practices. After a hearing the Commission concluded that Sibert and his company had violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1959), on each of three separate charges and issued an appropriate cease and desist order. Sibert and his company now petition this court either to set aside the cease and desist order or to remand for further hearings on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the Commission’s findings.

The Commission found that the petitioners had generally advertised the claim that their filtration device would make “pure” and “clean,” water which was run through it. The Commission concluded that this representation might well cause the public to believe, what was conceded to be contrary to fact, that any microorganisms in the water would thereby be removed. This was clearly within the area of permissible inference and was in no sense arbitrary. F. T. C. v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 49, 86 S.Ct. 219, 15 L.Ed.2d 128 (1965); Keele Hair and Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. F. T. C., 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960).

The petitioners also advertised in newspapers that their product was guaranteed for ten years, but the circulars sent to customers, who responded to the advertisements, disclosed that the guarantee was conditional upon payment by the customer of shipping costs and a $30 service charge. The Commission could properly conclude under the circumstances that the initial deception called for a cease and desist order. Exposition Press, Inc. v. F. T. C., 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961); Carter Products, Inc. v. F. T. C., 186 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1951).

Finally, the Commission found that the petitioners’ assertion in their advertisements that the filtration units in their water purifying device would function indefinitely was not true. There was ample expert testimony in the record to support this finding, and the order relating to it was fully warranted.

The petition to review and set aside the cease and desist order of the Commission is denied and enforcement of the order is granted.
#### Brian Thomas EFTENOFF, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles L. RYAN and Attorney General of the State of Arizona, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 16-15781

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted August 16, 2017 San Francisco, California

Filed September 7, 2017

Colleen Maring, Director, Aspey, Watkins & Diesel, PLLC, Flagstaff, AZ, for Petitioner-Appellant

Julie Ann Done, Assistant Attorney General, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondents-Appel-lees

Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and WATTERS,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Susan P. Watters, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

*507MEMORANDUM **

Brian Eftenoff appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for second degree murder.

Eftenoff argues he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when his trial counsel did not request a Frye1 hearing to exclude Dr. Baselt’s toxicology opinion. Trial counsel’s performance was not deficient because he made a reasonable strategic decision not to request a *Frye*hearing after consultation with his own toxicologist, Dr. Karch. *Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 687-689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Eftenoff next argues the procedural default of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to consult an independent pathologist should be excused under *Martinez v. Ryan,*566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). However, we are not convinced this ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is “substantial.” *Martinez,*566 U.S. at 14, 132 S.Ct. 1309. Trial counsel’s performance was not deficient because he made a reasonable strategic decision to rely on the state’s medical examiner, Dr. Mosley. *Strickland,*466 U.S. at 687-689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Furthermore, trial counsel’s performance did not prejudice the defense because the postconviction testimony of Dr. Dressier, a pathologist, does not create a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. *Strickland,*466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. *Frye v. United States,*293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with this Amendment No. 1 to Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Toga Limited (the “Company”) for the period ended July 31, 2019 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

 

|  | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                                   |
|--|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  |    |                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|  | 2. | The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the periods presented therein. |

 

Date: June 12, 2020

 

| By:    | /s/ Alexander D. Henderson             |  |
|--------|----------------------------------------|--|
| Name:  | Alexander D. Henderson                 |  |
| Title: | Chief Financial and Accounting Officer |  |