alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 35.2
                  SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)
                               GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC
             RFMSI SERIES 2006-SA4 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized  officer of GMAC Mortgage,  LLC, as servicer
(the "Servicer")  pursuant to the applicable  servicing  agreement,  does hereby
certify that:

1.   A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during the  period  covered by the
     Issuing  Entity's  report  on Form 10-K and of the  Servicer's  performance
     under  the   applicable   servicing   agreement  has  been  made  under  my
     supervision.

2.   To the  best of my  knowledge,  based  on such  review,  the  Servicer  has
     fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable  servicing  agreement
     in all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:      /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      ------------------------
      Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
      Title: Executive Vice President
Opinion filed December 17, 2009

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

___________

No. 11-09-00254-CR

__________

 OLAN FLOYD BOATWRIGHT, Appellant

V.

 STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 142nd District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR32240

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from a judgment adjudicating guilt. We dismiss.

Olan Floyd Boatwright originally entered a plea of guilty to the offense of aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon. Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, the adjudication of his guilt was

deferred, and he was placed on community supervision for ten years. At the hearing on the State’s

motion to adjudicate, appellant entered pleas of true to the allegations that he violated the terms and

conditions of his community supervision. The trial court found that the allegations were true,
2

revoked his community supervision, adjudicated his guilt, and imposed a sentence of confinement

for eight years.

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. The motion is supported

by a brief in which counsel professionally and conscientiously examines the record and applicable

law and states that he has concluded that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel has provided appellant

with a copy of the brief and advised appellant of his right to review the record and file a response

to counsel’s brief. A response has not been filed. Court-appointed counsel has complied with the

requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State, 573

S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);

Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); and Eaden v. State, 161 S.W.3d 173

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, no pet.).

Following the procedures outlined in Anders, we have independently reviewed the record,

and we agree that the appeal is without merit. We note that counsel has the responsibility to advise

appellant that he may file a petition for discretionary review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Likewise, this court advises appellant

that he may file a petition for discretionary review pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 66. Black v. State,

217 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.). 

The motion to withdraw is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM

December 17, 2009

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange, J.
#### Antoine LEBLANC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Debbie ASUNCION, Warden, in individual and official capacity; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-55103

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 30, 2017

Antoine LeBlanc, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Antoine LeBlanc, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action after denying his application to proceed in forma pauperis status (“IFP”) on the ground that LeBlanc has “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the interpretation and application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *Richey v. Dahne,*807 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly denied Le-Blanc’s request to proceed in forma pau-peris because at least three of LeBlanc’s prior cases qualified as “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See Knapp v. Hogan,*738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (defining when a case is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim, and can be considered a strike); *see also Cato v. United States, 70*F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that it was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss a duplicative complaint as frivolous or malicious under an earlier version of 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Because we affirm on the ground that the district court properly concluded LeBlanc had at least three strikes, we treat the dismissal of the action as being without prejudice. *See Tierney v. Kupers,*128 F.3d 1310, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s dismissal of case without prejudice where prisoner had accumulated three strikes).

In light of our disposition, we do not consider the district court’s order on the merits of LeBlanc’s claims.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### LaSandra NORMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLACK ENTERTAINMENT TELEVISION LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1001

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted August 30, 2017 *

Decided September 5, 2017

Rehearing Denied October 3, 2017

LaSandra Norman, Pro Se

Larry L. Barnard, Attorney, Calvert Sterling Miller, Attorney, Carson Boxber-ger LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, for Defendant-Appellee

Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

*

We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the appeal is frivolous. See FED. R. APP, P. 34(a)(2)(A).

ORDER

This lawsuit from the Northern District of Indiana is the third in which LaSandra Norman says she is the singer Beyoncé. She named as defendants Black Entertainment Television LLC (“BET”), Debra Lee (Chairman and CEO of BET Television, a related company), Stephen Hill (formerly BET’s President of Programming), and Wendy Hunter (television host of The Wendy Williams Show). Norman asserts that she is Beyoncé and that the defendants have broadcast her music and lyrics without permission. She has demanded $2 billion in damages. Lee, Hill, and Hunter had no connections to Indiana and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the district court granted. BET separately moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court understood Norman to be accusing BET of copyright infringement; the court agreed with BET that Norman does not state a plausible claim against the network but inexplicably entered judgment without prejudice as to all defendants, including BET.

*755Norman has appealed. The defendants contend that we must dismiss Norman’s appeal because, they say, the dismissal without prejudice is nonfinal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That’s incorrect; the district court made clear it was done with the case by entering judgment and terminating the action, so- we have appellate jurisdiction. See *Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP,*796 F,3d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2015), Even so, this appeal is frivolous. The district court adequately disposed of the' claims against Lee, Hill, and Hunter, and in her brief Norman does not engage the district court’s reasons for dismissing her copyright claim against BET. Thus we need not say any more about the court’s analysis. We caution Norman, however, that further suits like this one may lead to sanctions. Norman previously sued the State of Tennessee (in the Western District of Tennessee, where she resided before moving to Indiana) demanding $31 million after receiving a state-issued I.D. “with a false photo of my self being the singer and actor Beyoncé Knowles.” *Norman v. Tennessee,*No. 1:07-cv-01153-JDT-STA (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2007). While living in Tennessee, she also filed an action in federal court demanding royalties for her music from “Mr. and Mrs. Sean Cater” (presumably meaning Jay-Z and Beyoncé, who are married and whose real names are Shawn Carter and Beyoncé Knowles-Carter), *Norman v. Cater,*No. 1:08-cv-01160-JDB-egb (W.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008). Those suits, like this one, were wholly without merit.

AFFIRMED.
#### Ray *et al. v.*Oconee Naval Stores Company *et al.*

No. 13288.

May 17, 1940.

Rehearing denied June 14, 1940.

Duckworth, Justice.

The bill of exceptions does not designate or otherwise show who were intended as parties defendant in error. Furthermore it appears that R. 0. Thompson, as administrator of the estate of B. R. Benton, was a party defendant in tile trial court and was duly served. It further appears that by reason of the warranties of title contained in the various mortgages and security deeds executed by B. R. Benton the representative of his estate is interested in sustaining the judgment of the trial court. There was no service or waiver of service of the bill of exceptions as to this defendant. For these reasons the motion to dismiss the writ of error must be sustained. See *Gehr*v. *Atlanta,*189 *Ga.*701 (7 S. E. 2d, 264), and cit.

*Writ of error dismissed. '*

*All the Justices concur.*

*403*William B. Kent & Son,*for plaintiffs.

*W. S. Mann*and *Kennedy & McWhorter,*for defendants.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                           5
<CIK>                                               0001005335
<NAME>                       Smith Barney Principal Plus Futures Fund L.P.II

<S>                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                       9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                      JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                        SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                                       8,389,558
<SECURITIES>                                                12,893,714
<RECEIVABLES>                                                  255,260
<ALLOWANCES>                                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                            21,538,532
<PP&E>                                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                              21,538,532
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                          537,762
<BONDS>                                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                0
<PREFERRED>                                                          0
<COMMON>                                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                                  21,000,770
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                21,538,532
<SALES>                                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                              (120,021)
<CGS>                                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                               362,523
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                               (482,544)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                      0
<CHANGES>                                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                                  (482,544)
<EPS-BASIC>                                                   (29.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                        0




</TABLE>
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

262 CAF 12-00247 PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF LILLIANNA G.

------------------------------------------ ERIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PETITIONER-RESPONDENT;

ORENA G., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

DAVID J. PAJAK, ALDEN, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

JOSEPH T. JARZEMBEK, BUFFALO, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

DAVID C. SCHOPP, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (CHARLES D. HALVORSEN OF COUNSEL), FOR LILLIANNA G.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Lisa Bloch Rodwin, J.), entered January 11, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order, among other things, transferred the guardianship and custody of the subject child to petitioner.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated her parental rights with respect to the subject child and ordered that the child be freed for adoption. Contrary to the mother’s contention, petitioner established “by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the relationship between [the mother] and the child” ( Matter of Ja-Nathan F ., 309 AD2d 1152, 1152; see Social Services Law § 384-b [3] [g] [i]; [7] [a]; see generally Matter of Star Leslie W ., 63 NY2d 136, 142). Furthermore, “Family Court properly determined that the child is a neglected child based upon the derivative evidence that [three] of the mother’s other children were determined to be neglected children . . . , including the evidence that [the mother] had failed to address the mental health issues that led to those neglect determinations and the placement of the custody of those children” in a foster home ( Matter of Sophia M.G.-K. [Tracy G.-K.] , 84 AD3d 1746, 1746-1747 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Contrary to the mother’s further contention, the court properly denied her request for a suspended judgment. A suspended judgment, as-2- 262 CAF 12-00247 provided for in section 633 of the Family Court Act, “is a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child” ( Matter of Michael B ., 80 NY2d 299, 311; see Matter of Baron C. , 101 AD3d 1622, 1622; see also Matter of Ada M.R. , 306 AD2d 920, 920-921, lv denied 100 NY2d 509). “The court’s assessment that [the mother] was not likely to change [her] behavior is entitled to great deference” ( Matter of Philip D ., 266 AD2d 909, 909; see Matter of Jane H. [Susan H.] , 85 AD3d 1586, 1587 , lv denied 17 NY3d 709).
We have considered the mother’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.

Entered: March 15, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
#### The Franklin Society for Home-Building and Savings, Respondent, *v.*Martin K. Flavin, Appellant.

Argued June 11, 1943;

decided July 20, 1943.

*533
      *Sidney S. Levine*for appellant.

*Leon Quat*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Dissenting: Rippey and Lewis, JJ. Taking no part.:, Thacheb, J.
| (1)   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: March 15 ,2011 |   | /s/ JOSEPH  PASSALAQUA                                                                                             |
|----------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                 |   | Name: Joseph  PassalaquaTitle: Secretary, Director and Chief Financial Officer,(Principal Financial Officer)  |

----
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 43 (Friday, March 4, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 12466]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04624]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases; 
Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive 
and Kidney Diseases Special Emphasis Panel; NIDDK SEP for IBDGC 
Research Centers (U01) and Data Coordinating Centers (U24).
    Date: March 25, 2022.
    Time: 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate cooperative agreement 
applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health/NIDDK, 6707 Democracy 
Blvd., Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual Meeting).
    Contact Person: Cheryl Nordstrom, Ph.D., MPH, Scientific Review 
Officer, NIDDK/Scientific Review Branch, National Institutes of 
Health, 6707 Democracy Blvd., Room 7013, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301-
402-6711, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b1d2d9d4c3c8dd9fdfdec3d5c2c5c3dedcf1dfd8d99fd6dec7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="debdb6bbaca7b2f0b0b1acbaadaaacb1b39eb0b7b6f0b9b1a8">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.847, 
Diabetes, Endocrinology and Metabolic Research; 93.848, Digestive 
Diseases and Nutrition Research; 93.849, Kidney Diseases, Urology 
and Hematology Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: March 1, 2022.
Miguelina Perez,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2022-04624 Filed 3-3-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  RULE 13a-14(a) and 15d-14(a) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED

I, Christian L. Oberbeck, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Saratoga Investment Corp.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
company's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have:



5.     The
company's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company's
auditors and the audit committee of the company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



Date:
May 23, 2011

/s/ Christian L. Oberbeck Christian L. Oberbeck
Chief Executive Officer and President


---



QuickLinks
#### Jesus IZQUIERDO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-16086 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(June 15, 2017)

Eric M. Cohen, Bonnie Phillips-Williams, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant

Jonathan Colan, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Juan Antonio Gonzalez, Jr., Nicole D. Mar-iani, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Respondent-Appel-lee

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jesus Izquierdo appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Izquierdo argued that, under *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), the district court violated his due process rights by increasing his sentence under the residual clause of the career offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The dis*651trict court ruled that Izquierdo’s argument “fail[ed] as a matter of law” based on *United States v. Matchett,*802 F.3d 1185, 1194-95 (11th Cir. 2015), and denied it as untimely. We affirm the denial of Izquier-do’s motion on the ground that it failed on the merits.

The district court correctly ruled that *Johnson*did not affect Izquierdo’s sentence under the Guidelines. After Izquier-do appealed, the Supreme Court held in *Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), as we had in *Matchett,*that “the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause and that § 4B1.2(a)’s'residual clause is not void for vagueness.” *Beckles,*137 S.Ct. at 895. *Beckles*confirms that *Johnson*did not affect the validity of Izquierdo’s sentence.

We AFFIRM the denial of Izquierdo’s motion to vacate.
#### JEFFREY J. DONTIGNEY *v.*DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

(AC 20563)

Foti, Schaller and Flynn, Js.

Submitted on briefs April 6

officially released May 8, 2001

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. B & M EXCAVATING, INC., Respondent.

No. 20936.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Nov. 8, 1966.

*625Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Nancy M. Sherman, Gregory L. Hell-bung, Attys., N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Patrick B. Phelan, Long Beach, Cal., for respondent.

Before HAMLEY and ELY, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The National Labor Relations Board (Board) did not err in finding and concluding that B & M Excavating, Inc., is subject to the Board's jurisdiction, and that the company had violated section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158.

The Board’s cease and desist order of November 23,1965, based upon such findings and conclusions, will therefore be enforced.