Present: All the Justices 

JOSEPHINE A. ABBOTT, ET AL. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 960984 January 10, 1997 

KATHLEEN E. WILLEY, ET AL. 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Timothy J. Hauler, Judge 

 The primary issue that we consider in this appeal is 

whether Code § 64.1-193 permits a person to disclaim an 

interest in the proceeds of a life insurance policy to the 

detriment of her creditors. 

 Anthony V. Lanasa and Josephine A. Abbott filed their 

bill of complaint against Kathleen E. Willey, J. Patrick 

Willey, and Shannon J. Willey. The plaintiffs alleged the 

following. Patrick Willey and Shannon Willey are the 

children of Kathleen Willey and her deceased husband, Edward 

E. Willey, Jr. Plaintiffs recovered a judgment in the sum 

of $274,495.22 plus interest and costs against Kathleen 

Willey based upon a note she had executed with her husband. 

 Edward Willey, Jr. died shortly after the note was executed 

in November 1993.*

 

 A life insurance company had issued a life insurance 

policy on the life of Edward E. Willey, Jr., and Kathleen 

Willey was entitled to receive $350,845.92 plus interest 

from the date of his death. Patrick and Shannon Willey were 

entitled to receive an equal sum from the life insurance 

 

 *This judgment was the subject of a prior appeal to 

this Court, Lanasa v. Willey, 251 Va. 231, 467 S.E.2d 786 

(1996). 
policy. 

 According to the plaintiffs' allegations, Kathleen 

Willey, "without consideration, fraudulently and 

voluntarily, with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the 

[p]laintiffs, disclaimed the benefits due to her under the 

life insurance policy. Upon disclaiming her death benefit 

proceeds, the [d]efendant Kathleen Willey became insolvent." 

 Kathleen Willey's children received the death benefits and 

used those funds to support their mother. 

 The plaintiffs asserted that Kathleen Willey's 

disclaimer constituted a fraudulent transfer or conveyance 

under Code § 55-80 and a void voluntary conveyance under 

Code § 55-81. The plaintiffs also contended that Patrick 

and Shannon Willey, with fraudulent intent, received funds 

in the amount of $274,495.22 as a result of Kathleen 

Willey's disclaimer, and that they have been unjustly 

enriched and, therefore, hold these funds constructively for 

the benefit of the plaintiffs. 

 The defendants filed a demurrer, asserting, inter alia, 

that Kathleen Willey had an absolute right to disclaim the 

proceeds of the life insurance policy. The defendants also 

asserted that the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim is 

barred by Code § 38.2-3122. The trial court sustained the 

defendants' demurrer and entered judgment in their favor. 

We awarded the plaintiffs an appeal. 

 Code § 64.1-191 states in relevant part that a 

"beneficiary under a nontestamentary instrument . . . may 
disclaim in whole or in part the succession to any property, 

real or personal, or interest therein." Code § 64.1-192 

prescribes the method of delivering or filing a disclaimer 

under a nontestamentary instrument. Code § 64.1-193, which 

governs our resolution of this appeal, states: 

 "Unless otherwise provided in the 

nontestamentary instrument, the property or part 

thereof or interest therein disclaimed and any 

future interest which is to take effect in 

possession or enjoyment at or after the 

termination of the interest disclaimed shall be 

distributed as if the disclaimant had died before 

the effective date of the nontestamentary 

instrument. The disclaimer shall relate back for 

all purposes to the effective date of the 

instrument. A person who has a present and a 

future interest in property and disclaims his 

present interest in whole or in part, shall be 

deemed to have disclaimed his future interest to 

the same extent if such disclaimer of a present 

interest would cause the future interest to become 

a present interest." 

 The plaintiffs contend that Kathleen Willey had no 

absolute right to disclaim the insurance policy proceeds and 

that such disclaimer was void because she made a voluntary 

or fraudulent conveyance. The defendants respond that Code 

§ 64.1-193 confers upon Kathleen Willey an absolute right to 

disclaim any interest she might have in a nontestamentary 

instrument. The defendants also assert that Kathleen 

Willey's disclaimer relates back to the effective date of 

the insurance policy and, therefore, she had no vested 

interest in the life insurance proceeds at the time she 

exercised her right to disclaim them and, thus, she was 

incapable of making a fraudulent or involuntary transfer of 

property. 
 We have repeatedly articulated principles of statutory 

construction that we must apply when a statute, such as Code 

§ 64.1-193, is clear and unambiguous: 

 "While in the construction of statutes the 

constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain 

and give effect to the intention of the 

legislature, that intention must be gathered from 

the words used, unless a literal construction 

would involve a manifest absurdity. Where the 

legislature has used words of a plain and definite 

import, the courts cannot put upon them a 

construction which amounts to holding the 

legislature did not mean what it has actually 

expressed." 

Barr v. Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 

S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990) (quoting Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 

924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934)). Accord Conner v. Rose, 

252 Va. 57, 58, 471 S.E.2d 478, 479 (1996). 

 Applying the plain language contained in Code § 64.1-

193, we conclude that once Kathleen Willey disclaimed her 

interest in the insurance proceeds, those proceeds were 

required to be distributed to Patrick and Shannon Willey as 

if Kathleen Willey had died before the effective date of the 

insurance policy. Code § 64.1-193 makes it perfectly clear 

that the disclaimer relates back "for all purposes" to the 

effective date of the life insurance policy. The plaintiffs 

and defendants agree that the effective date of the 

insurance policy precedes the events that gave rise to the 

plaintiffs' purported cause of action against the 

defendants. 

 Code § 64.1-193 does not contain an exception which 

permits creditors to contest a disclaimer on the basis of a 
fraudulent or voluntary conveyance, and we decline the 

plaintiffs' invitation to add such an exception to the 

statute. Therefore, we hold that Kathleen Willey had an 

absolute right under Code § 64.1-191 to disclaim any 

interest she may have had in the insurance policy, and as a 

result of such disclaimer, she acquired no interest in the 

insurance proceeds because the disclaimer related back to 

the effective date of the insurance policy. 

 We find no merit in the plaintiffs' contention that the 

trial court erred by holding that their claim for unjust 

enrichment against Patrick and Shannon Willey is barred. 

Code § 38.2-3122 states in relevant part: 

 "The assignee or lawful beneficiary of an 

insurance policy shall be entitled to its proceeds 

against any claims of the creditors or 

representatives of the insured or the person 

effecting the policy, except in cases of transfer 

with intent to defraud creditors. . . ." 

Here, Kathleen Willey's disclaimer related back "for all 

purposes" to the effective date of the insurance policy and, 

thus, she acquired no property interest which could be 

transferred. 

 In view of our holdings, we need not consider the 

plaintiffs' remaining arguments. Accordingly, we will 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed.