alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Lee R. CANIDA, Appellant, v. John W. GARDNER, Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, Appellee.

No. 23441.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 10, 1966.

Marilyn W. Carney, Columbus, Ga., for appellant.

Walker P. Johnson, Jr., Edward A. Davis, Asst. U. S. Attys., Floyd M. Buford, U. S. Atty., Macon, Ga., for appellee.

Before RIVES, BELL and THORN-BERRY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant sought review in the District Court of the administrative denial of disability benefits claimed under the provisions of §§ 205(g), 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act. Title 42 U.S. C.A. §§ 405(g), 416(i) and 423.

The Hearing Examiner concluded that appellant had failed to establish that his impairments, either singly or in combination, were of such severity as would preclude him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity during the period in question. The Appeals Council denied review. The District Court reviewed the evidence and filed a detailed opinion in support of its judgment in favor of the Secretary. It was the District Court’s opinion that the record contains substantial evidence in support of the administrative denial. We agree. It is abundantly clear that the evidence supports the finding that appellant was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Beshears v. Celebrezze, 5 Cir., 1964, 338 F.2d 998; Estes v. Celebrezze, 5 Cir., 1964, 338 F.2d 997; Clinch v. Celebrezze, 5 Cir., 1964, 328 F.2d 778.

Affirmed.
#### J. Hermon McLear, as Director and Officer of McLear Mines, Inc., Appellant, *v.*Clara McLear and Herbert G. McLear, Respondents, et al., Defendants.

Argued October 6, 1943;

decided January 13, 1944.

*810
      *Benedict 8. Bosenfeld, Benjmnin Algase, Arthur B. Hart*and *Albert Jalcobson*for appellant.

*Herbert G. McLear,*respondent, in person.

*Alfred J. Gonforti*for Clara McLear, respondent.

Judgments affirmed, with costs, on the ground that plaintiff has not shown facts sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the verity and conclusiveness of the documentary evidence establishing acquiescence and ratification on his part. The ten-year Statute of Limitations is the statute applicable. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 By The Chief Executive Officer,

As Adopted
Pursuant To Section 906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002.

I, Gerald L. Storch, Chief Executive Officer of Toys R Us, Inc. (the
Company), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



| | 1. | The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended August 4, 2007 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S.C. 78m); and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                  
|------------------------------------------------------------------
|September 12, 2007                                                
|                                                                  
|/s/ Gerald L. Storch                                              
|Gerald L. Storch                                                  
|Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
Memorandum

To: GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)

From: JONATHAN MELCHI, HEATING, AIR-CONDITIONING AND REFRIGERATION 

DISTRIBUTORS INTERNATIONAL (HARDI)

Date: 1/12/2012

Subject: EX PARTE COMMUNICATION MEMO

DOE ATTENDEES: Ashley Armstrong, John Cymbalsky, David Case, LauraBarhydt

HARDI ATTENDEES: Talbot Gee, Jonathan Melchi 

AREAS OF DISCUSSION: DOE Framework Document and Stakeholder Meeting regarding the 

Enforcement of the updated Energy Conservation Standards for Air Conditioners, Furnaces and Heat 

Pumps. The meeting took place on Thursday January 5th, 2012 from 2pm to 3-pm. The following topics 

were discussed. 

1.) Sell-Through. HARDI asked for clarification on the DOE’s notation on the Framework Document 

that indicated the effective date for regionalized standards would carry an installation ban and no sellthrough would be allowed. This differs from the published rule, which indicated that the effective 

dates would carry manufacturing and importation bans. HARDI reiterated its concern with the cost of 

stranded inventory that an installation ban would bring. 

2.) DOE Enforcement Authority. HARDI expressed concern with the DOE Framework document, 

since the document proposes enforcement responsibility upon distributors. HARDI cited existing law, 

which does not name distributors as liable entities in the enforcement of energy efficiency standards. 

3.) Three DOE Framework Proposals. HARDI walked through each of the enforcement scenarios as 

provided in the Framework Document. HARDI maintained that proposed serial tracking was 

extremely burdensome as not all distributors track inventory by serial numbers and those that do, 

utilize various methods of doing so (i.e. handwritten, manual data entry, scanning) . HARDI also 

communicated the deviation from standard and established business practices that the proposals 

would bring. 

4.) Waiver Provision. HARDI detailed its concerns with the proposed waiver provision. HARDI asked 

if DOE has considered providing a waiver for both furnaces and air-conditioners in locations with 

regionalized standards. HARDI expressed concern that the lack of sell through would force 

distributors to attempt to liquidate inventory, yet a waiver provision would force them to maintain 

stock. HARDI stated that distributors like to stock product or not stock product, and that a waiver 

provision leaves distributors in a precarious middle ground. 

5.) Severing Enforcement Rulemaking. HARDI asked that DOE not divide enforcement rulemakings 

for furnaces and air-conditioners as discussed at the Stakeholder meeting.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 December 10, 2014

t1203

Order 

Clerk

December 10, 2014

149630

GARY BRUGGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 149630

COA: 313925 

Ottawa CC: 12-002711-CZ

CITY OF HOLLAND,

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 29, 2014 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### HONG KHUN, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-71237

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*627Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Ramin Ghashghaei, Attorney, Attorney at Law, Los Angeles, OA, for Petitioner

Janette L. Allen, Esquire, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Hong Khun, a native and citizen of Cambodia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for adjustment of status. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The agency’s determination that an applicant knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum is reviewed de novo for compliance with the procedural framework set forth by the BIA, *Kulakchyan v. Holder,*730 F.3d 993, 995 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing the procedural safeguards set forth in *Matter ofY- L-,*24 I. & N. Dec. 151 (BIA 2007)), and we review for substantial evidence the agency’s findings of fact, *see id.*at 995. We deny the petition for review.

The agency found that Khun was barred from adjustment of status because she filed a frivolous asylum application. Contrary to Khun’s contentions, the record supports the agency’s finding that Khun was adequately notified of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application based on the notice printed on the asylum application that she signed, and her testimony about the written and oral warnings she received at her asylum interview. *See Cheema v. Holder,*693 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). We reject Khun’s contention that the agency erred in finding that she filed a frivolous asylum application where she only sought to proceed with her application for adjustment of status. *See Kulakchyan,*730 F.3d at 996 (“the only action required to trigger a frivolousness inquiry is the filing of an asylum application”) (internal citation omitted); *see Chen v. Mukasey,*527 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2008) (“withdrawal of an asylum application does not obviate the need for an IJ to determine whether a false application should be deemed frivolous”). Because Khun filed a frivolous asylum application, the agency properly found her ineligible for adjustment of status. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Kevin Donavon ATKINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-55146

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed June 26, 2017

Kevin Donavon Atkinson, Pro Se

Michael Garabed, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Ap-pellee

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and LEAVY and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). ■

MEMORANDUM **

Kevin Donavon Atkinson appeals pro se from .the district court’s judgment dismiss*831ing his Federal Tort Claims Act action alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of treatment provided at a Veteran’s Affairs health center. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Atkinson’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because Atkinson failed to establish that defendant owed him a duty of care. *See Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc.,*48 Cal.3d 583, 257 Cal.Rptr. 98, 770 P.2d 278, 281 (1989) (setting forth elements of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim under California law); *Burgess v. Superior Court,*2 Cal.4th 1064, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200-03 (1992) (discussing duty of care).

The district court properly dismissed Atkinson’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because Atkinson failed to establish that defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous conduct. *See Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.,*6 Cal.4th 965, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795, 819 (1993) (discussing elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under California law).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Douglas STILTNER, Appellant, v. B. J. RHAY, Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, Washington, et al., Appellees.

No. 20484.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

July 7, 1966.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1966.

William A. Franke, Spokane, Wash., for appellant.

John J. O’Connell, Atty. Gen. of Washington, Olympia, Wash., for appellees.

Before CHAMBERS, BARNES and BROWNING, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

We affirm the order of the district court, 258 F.Supp. 487, dismissing appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus upon the grounds stated in the district court’s opinion of June 28, 1965. With respect to the allegation that appellant’s plea of guilty was coerced, we add that we have examined the record of the state evidentiary hearing, upon which the parties stipulated the present petitions might be decided (as noted in the district court’s order of November 23, 1964), and we are satisfied that the district court’s conclusion that appellant’s plea was voluntary is fully supported.
14910-1

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administr-ation 14CFR Part 39

## PMIDocket N0j'\2009-1215; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-126-AD; Amendment 39-16364; AD 2010-14-191 R1N2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 Series Airplanes, and Model A340-200, -300, -500 and -600 Series Airplanes AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department ofTransportation (DOT). ACTION: Finalrule; correction. SUMMARY: The FAA is correcting airworthiness directive (AD) 2010-14-19, whi 1 published inthe Federal Register on July 13,2010. That AD applies 10certain Mode A330-200 and -300 series airplanes, andModel A340-200, -300, -500 and -600 serie airplanes. Acertain service bulletin number IIINote 3 ofthe regulatory section is incorrect. This document corrects that service bulletin Humber. In all other respects, e original document remains the same. DATES: This correction iseffective [INSERT DATE OF PUBLICATION INTHE FEDERA.L REGISTER]. The effective date ofAD 20] 0-14-19 remains August] 7,2 ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at

a.m. and 5p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other inronnation. The address fortheDocket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is the Document Management Facility, U.S. Department ofTransportation, Docket Operations,

FAAForm 1360·14.1 (6-89) OFFICIALALE COPY ~ u.s. GOVERNr.ENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1995

- 7(>g-211
#### In the Matter of Robert F. Meehan et al., Respondents, v County of Westchester et al., Appellants.

[770 NYS2d 753]

*534In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to set aside a contract to construct a shelter for the homeless, the County of Westchester and Volunteers of America-Greater New York, Inc., separately appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered June 19, 2003, which granted the petition, set aside the contract, and enjoined them from performing any acts in furtherance of the contract on the ground that the County of Westchester failed to comply with certain competitive bidding requirements.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs payable to the County of Westchester, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

The petitioners do not have standing to challenge the validity of the subject contract to construct a shelter for the homeless in the Town of Mount Pleasant. To establish standing in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, a petitioner must show that he or she will suffer an injury in fact that is distinct from that of the general public *(see Matter of Transactive Corp. v New York State Dept. of Social Servs.,*92 NY2d 579, 587 [1998]; *Society of Plastics Indus, v County of Suffolk,*77 NY2d 761, 774 [1991]). Thus, a private citizen who does not show any special rights or interests in the matter in controversy, other than those common to all taxpayers and citizens, has no standing to sue *(see Kadish v Roosevelt Raceway Assoc.,*183 AD2d 874 [1992]). In the present case, it cannot be said that the petitioners have a special right or interest in the competitive bidding requirements for public contracts that is different than that of all taxpayers in the County of Westchester.

Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, there were no allegations in the petition to support a finding that they stated a claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 51, which permits a taxpayer to maintain an action against *certain*government officials to prevent an illegal act or to prevent waste or injury to public property *(see Matter of Schulz v DeSantis,*218 AD2d 256 [1996]; *Matter of Savino v Lindsay,*72 Misc 2d 609 [1972]).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the remaining issues. Altman, J.P., Krausman, Crane and Cozier, JJ., concur.
### Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585
November 6,2009 Philip Giudice, COm1nissioner Department ofEnergy Resources 100 Cambridge Street, Rm. 1020 Boston, Massachusetts 02114 Dear Commissioner Giudice: This letterresponds to the petition submitted by the Commonwealth ofMassachusetts, dated October 1,2009, which the U.S. Department ofEnergy's (DOE) Office ofEnergy Efficiency and Renewable Energy received on October 6, 2009. Due to the substantial number ofrulemaking activities currently being undertaken by the agency to improve the energy efficiency ofboth consumer and commercial equipment, we were unable to provide you with an acknowledgement ofthe agency's receipt ofthe petition in a more timely manner. We apologize for this situation and regret any inconvenience thatthis may have caused. DOE accepts the Commonwealth's petition for filing purposes under Title 10 ofthe Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 430.42(f). Our acceptance ofthe petition for filing purposes, however, does not constitute a determination regarding the sufficiency ofthe petition, nor does it reflectDOE's views as to the petition's merits orthe final disposition thereof. Consistent with the requirements under 10 CFR 430.42(a), the Commonwealthis under a continuingobligation to provide any new or newly discovered information relevantto its petition. Appropriate DOE staffare carefully reviewing the contents ofthe petition, which has been assigned a high priority by the agency. Shouldyou have any questions or concerns regarding the petition, please feel free to contact me at (202) 586-8423 or bye-mail at ronald.lewisfai.hg.doe.gov. Yours truly,



### , Appliance Standards Buildings Technology Program Cc: Fred Augenstern AssistantAttorney General Environmental Protection Division Office ofthe Attorney General I Ashburton Place, 18th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108

# *

Printed with soy ink on recycled paperPostmark Here

Postage $ 1-------1 Postage 1-'$--------1 Certified Fee

Total Postage & Fees $

Return Receipt Fee (Endorsement Required) 1-' --\ Restricted Delivery Fee (Endorsement Required) 1-' 1

.T ..n CJ LI1 

### ru ..n CJ CJ .-'I "- CJ LI1**ruL_~..2.....2.,--"-:::E::..:::E::..~-'T_-""--=-=-=--J** ..n CJ CJ CJ CJ CJ CJ CJ <0 ..n .-'I Ir CJ CJ "-

Certified Fee Postmark Here

Total Postage & Fees $ CJ Cl Return ReceiptFee o (Endorsement Required)
o Restricted Delivery Fee 1----------1 (Endorsement Required) 1-'------1 CJ <0 ..n .-'I
#### James J. Gearns, Ad’mr, App’lt, v. The Bowery Savings Bank, Resp’t.

Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered on verdict for defendant.

*Titus*& *Dowling,*for app’lt; *Carlisle Norwood,*for resp’t.

Per Curiam.

On account of a division of opinion of judges the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Albert A. Troescher, Deceased. State Tax Commission, Appellant, Anna E. Troescher et al., as Executors of Albert A. Troescher, Deceased, Respondents.

Argued October 7, 1943;

decided December 8, 1943.

*761
      *Mortimer M. Kassell*and *Paul Newman*for appellant.

*Christian PL. Genghof, James D. Ewing*and *Lasater Terrell*for respondents.

Order affirmed, with costs. The motion to modify having been made within two years after the entry of the order originally fixing the tax, the order appealed from was within the power of the Surrogate. *(Matter of Willets,*190 N. Y. 527; Tax Law, § 249-aa.) No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Lotjghban, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacheb, JJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL 

DEFENSE FOUNDATION,

Appellant

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; 

THE PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES AND JOANNA E. 

MCCLINTON, IN HER OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS ITS SPEAKER; THE 

PENNSYLVANIA SENATE AND KIM 

WARD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

THE SENATE PRESIDENT PRO 

TEMPORE; AND JOSH SHAPIRO, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF 

PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellees

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 111 MAP 2022

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court at No. 447 

MD 2021 dated November 8, 2022

ORDER

PER CURIAM DECIDED: November 22, 2023

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2023, the order of the Commonwealth 

Court is AFFIRMED.