# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 25 , 2022

Decided October 26 , 2022

Before

DIANE S. SYKES
, Chief Judge

DIANE P. WOOD
, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 2 2-1091

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff -Appellee ,

v

. JOHN L. LEE III
, Defendant -Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division

.

No. 1:20 CR 00343-001

James Patrick Hanlon , Judge

.
O R D E R
John Lee , while on probation for child molesting, was discovered in 2019 to have hundreds of sexually explicit images of minors, including infants
, that depict ed acts of sadism and masochism . He later pleaded guilty to 12 counts of receiving and 2 counts of possessing child pornography

. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (4)( B)

. The district judge accepted the plea and sentenced Lee to prison terms of 300 months for receipt and 240 months f or possession

— to be served concurrently

— with a life term of supervised release. Lee appeal ed , but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 32.1No. 2 2-1091 Page 2

moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Because the analysis in counsel’s brief appears thorough, and Lee has not responded to counsel’s motion, see C IR

. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the issues that counsel has properly identified. See United States v. Bey , 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

C ounsel first informs us that s he consulted with Lee and confirmed that Lee does not wish to withdraw his plea

. Thus , counsel appropriately decline s to discuss any potential challenge to the plea’s validity

. See United States v. Konczak , 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox , 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002 ).

Counsel then considers whether Lee could raise a nonfrivolous challenge to his sentence and rightly concludes that he could not. To begin, counsel accurately explains that Lee’s 300- and 240- month prison terms did not exceed the statutory maximums. Accounting for Lee’s prior conviction s of child molesting, the district judge could have lawfully impose d a prison term of up to 480 months for receiving child pornography
, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1), and 240 months for possessing it , id. § 2252(b)(2).

Next, counsel correctly determines that a procedural challenge to the calculation of the advisory range under the Sentencing Guidelines w ould be pointless

. The district judge adopted the guidelines range from the presentence investigation report , which advised 262 to 327 months in prison . ( Both offenses were grouped for guideline scalculation purposes

. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d).) Lee made one written object ion to th at calculation after reviewing the report : He argu ed that the four

- level enhancement for possessing material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct should not apply. See U.S.S.G

. § 2G2.2(b)(4). But he withdrew that objection at his sentencing hearing and made no other objections. Thus , Lee waived a ny procedural challenge to the calculation of the guidelines range

. See United States v. Boyle , 28 F.4th 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2022).

We also agree with counsel t hat any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of Lee’s sentence would be futile

. Lee’s 300- month prison term for receipt (which subsumes the concurrent 240

- month sentence for possessi on ) falls within the guidelines range, and so we would presume that it is reasonable. See United States v. Jarigese , 999 F.3d 464, 471 (7th Cir. 2021). Like counsel, we cannot identify anything in the record that might rebut that presumption. The district judg e reasonably balanced the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by highlighting Lee’s “extremely serious” offense of child pornography
, see id. § 3553(a) (2)(A), his history of repeating th is type of crim e, see id. § 3553(a) (1) , and the need to protect the public , see id. § 3553(a) (2)(C) ,No. 2 2-1091 Page 3

against Lee’s principal mitigating arguments , including his mental health and history of sexual abuse. See United States v. Modjewski , 783 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2015).

Finally, counsel contemplates whether Le e could plausibly c halleng e the term or conditions of supervised release , but she appropriately decides that any such challenge would be pointless

. As with the objection to the calculation of the guideline s range , Lee made a written object ion to one condition of supervised release outlined in the presentence investigation report (polygraph testing) . B ut here too he withdrew the objection at sentencing and declined to raise any additional concern s when invited to object to the report or the fin al sentence

. He thus waived any objections

. See United States v. Anderson , 948 F.3d 910, 911–12 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Schrode , 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th Cir. 2016).

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.