alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### F. H. VAHLSING, INC., TEXAS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 22488.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 26, 1966.

*578O. C. Hamilton, Jr., Ewers, Toothaker, Ewers, Byfield & Abbott, McAllen, Tex., for appellant.

James R. Gough, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., Woodrow Seals, U. S. Atty., William B. Butler, Jerald D. Mize, William A. Jackson, Asst. U. S. Attys., Houston, Tex., for appellee.

Before WISDOM, BELL and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The United States brought this action against *F.*H. Vahlsing, Inc. to remedy the defendant’s violation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624, and Federal Marketing Order No. 970, 7 C.F.R. Part 970. According to the complaint, the only violation was Vahlsing’s failure to pay certain assessments due under the order. The district court entered a default judgment against Vahlsing, ordering it to pay certain back assessments and enjoining the company from “handling carrots in violation of the terms and provisions of said Act and Order 970, as it is now in effect and as it may subsequently be amended.”

On appeal, Vahlsing does not contest its liability for the back assessments due but argues only that the injunction is too broad in that it orders compliance with the act in general terms, rather than enjoining only “further violations of the Act by the means [previously] employed.” Russell C. House Transfer & Storage Co. v. United States, 5 Cir. 1951, 189 F.2d 349, 351.

After the appeal was filed, the carrot producers who were subject to Order No. 970 voted to terminate the marketing order. Consequently, the Secretary of Agriculture terminated the order effective July 31, 1966. See 31 Fed. Reg. 8178 (1966). The injunction is therefore inoperative, and" this appeal has become moot.

The company argues that it will be subject to an overbroad injunction should the marketing order be reinstated at a later date. If the order is reinstated, and if the company is sought to be held in contempt for violation of the injunction, the company may test the overbroadness of the injunction in the contempt proceedings. See Russell C. House Transfer & Storage Co. v. United States, supra; Nasif v. United States, 5 Cir.1947, 165 F. 2d 119.

The appeal is dismissed as moot.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT

TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002


In connection with the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of Art Technology Group, Inc. (the
Company) for the period ended September 30,
2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned,
Robert D. Burke, the President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| |                                                                                                                                                                 
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) the Report fully complies with the
    requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
    Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
|
| | (2) the information contained in the Report
    fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
    condition and results of operations of the Company.



| |                                          
| | -----------------------------------------
| | /s/ ROBERT D. BURKE                      
| |                                          
| | Robert D. Burke                          
| | President and Chief Executive
    Officer
| | (principal executive officer)            

Date: March 15, 2004

A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to Art Technology
Group, Inc. and will be retained by Art Technology
Group, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

84
#### EMC CORPORATION, EMC Israel Development Center Ltd., Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants v. ZERTO INC., Defendant-Appellant

2016-1856

2016-1883

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

June 12, 2017

Michael N. Radee, Wolf, Greenfield <& Sacks, PC, Boston, MA, argued for plaintiffs-cross-appellants. Also represented by Nathan R. Speed, Richahd Giunta; Paul T. Daciee, Thomas A. Beown, Krishnendu Gupta, EMC Corporation, Hopkington, MA.

Matthew B, Lowrie, Foley & Lardner LLP, Boston, MA, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by Lucas I. Silva, Kevin M. Littman.

(Newman, Schall, and Wallach, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Lance Bradley WILLIAMS, also known as Crush, also known as Lil’Crush Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-1035

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 4, 2017

Filed: October 13, 2017

Aaron L. Jennen, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Candace L. Taylor, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Lance Bradley Williams, Pro Se

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Lance Williams pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a child, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a), (c), 1594(c), and the District Court1 sentenced him to 120 months in prison. On appeal, in a brief filed in accordance with Anders v. Califor*854nia, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Williams’s counsel challenges the District Court’s application of sentence enhancements under United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 2G1.3(b)(3) and 4B1.5(b)(l), and Williams echoes the challenge to the latter enhancement in a pro se supplemental brief.

We have reviewed the evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing, which included testimony that Williams used a cellular telephone to place website advertisements soliciting persons to engage in sexual conduct with the minor and testimony that Williams facilitated several acts of prostitution involving the minor over the course of the conspiracy. We find no error in the application of either enhancement. See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir.) (setting forth the standard of review and applying Guidelines § 2G1.3(b)(3)), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1039, 131 S.Ct. 2977, 180 L.Ed.2d 258 (2011); United States v. Rojas, 520 F.3d 876, 883 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying Guidelines § 4B1.5(b)). In addition, we have reviewed the record in accordance with Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and we find no non-frivolous issues.

We affirm the judgment and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
#### Joseph Will WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 23376.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 10, 1966.

Aaron A. Foosaner, Miami, Fla., for appellee.

Before RIVES, BELL and THORN-BERRY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The District Court denied appellant’s motion brought under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 to vacate his sentence. There was no hearing. Appellant is serving a ten year sentence on a plea of guilty to a charge of violating the narcotic laws. 18 U.S. C.A. § 371. The fair inference from his inartfully drawn pleadings is that two contentions were made to the District Court. First, his sentence is invalid because he was mentally incompetent when he entered the plea of guilty, and second, because of promises made by his attorney. We limit our review to these contentions.

These allegations, mere conclusions, are not supported by a single allegation of fact. There is some suggestion in a brief, filed in the District Court on a motion for reconsideration that appellant had “a history of being a narcotic addict”, and there is also an allegation that he was not advised by the court of his right to request a mental examination. An allegation of a history of addiction, without more, is likewise a mere conclusion and is not a sufficient factual allegation to require a hearing. Also, without some indication of incompetency and none is alleged, there would be no occasion for the sentencing court to advise a defendant that he might request a mental examination. Thus there was no error in denying relief. Cf. Sanders v. United States, 1963, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148.

This is not to say, however, that appellant may not file an additional petition for relief alleging the underlying facts of his contentions if any he has. As examples of decisions where the allegations of fact have been found sufficient to require a hearing in the District Court on an allegation of mental incompeteney, see Floyd v. United States, 5 Cir., 1966, 365 F.2d 368, [September 21, 1966]; Anderson v. United States, 5 Cir., 1962, 318 F.2d 815; Praylow v. United States, 5 Cir., 1962, 298 F.2d 792; Alexander v. *144United States, 5 Cir., 1961, 290 F.2d 252, cert. den., 368 U.S. 891, 82 S.Ct. 144, 7 L.Ed.2d 89; Brown v. United States, 5 Cir., 1959, 267 F.2d 42; Gregori v. United States, 5 Cir., 1957, 243 F.2d 48.

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leon WOODS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-14802 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(May 16, 2017)

Franklin George Monsour, Jr., Wifredo A. Ferrer, Daren Grove, Daya Nathan, Laura Thomas Rivero, Emily M. Smachet-ti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Christine Carr O’Connor, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before MARTIN, ANDERSON, and ■ EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Leon Woods, Jr. appeals his 105-month sentence, imposed after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court’ correctly concluded that Woods’s Florida manslaughter conviction was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)’s residual. clause because this Court’s prior precedent establishes the residual clause’s constitutional validity and categorically qualifies Florida manslaughter as a .crime of violence. For background, see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Burgest, 829 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). In addition, even if the district court committed error, the error was harmless, as the district court stated that it would impose the 105-month sentence as a reasonable sentence, regardless of any Sentencing Guideline calculation; and the sentence was, in fact, reasonable. For background, see United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Fidel Salvador GARCIA-ESPINOZA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41577 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 18, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Fidel Salvador Garcia-Espinoza, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and ELROD, Circuit'Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Fidel Salvador Garcia-Espino*833za has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Garcia-Espinoza has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *833published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**EXHIBIT 31.2** **CERTIFICATIONS**     I, Charles F. Dunleavy, certify that:      1.     I have reviewed this Annual Report on    Form 10-K    of Ocean Power Technologies, Inc.;      2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue    statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact    necessary to make the statements made, in light of the    circumstances under which such statements were made, not    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;      3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other    financial information included in this report, fairly present in    all material respects the financial condition, results of    operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the    periods presented in this report;      4.     The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are    responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls    and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act    Rules 13a-15(e)    and    15d-15(e))    for the registrant and have:      (a)     Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such    disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our    supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the    registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made    known to us by others within those entities, particularly during    the period in which this report is being prepared;      (b)     Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure    controls and procedures and presented in this report our    conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls    and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this    report based on such evaluation; and      (c)     Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s    internal control over financial reporting that occurred during    the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the    registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual    report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to    materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over    financial reporting; and      5.     The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have    disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal    control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s    auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board    of directors:      (a)     All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the    design or operation of internal control over financial reporting    which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the    registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and    report financial information; and      (b)     Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or    other employees who have a significant role in the    registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. /s/  CHARLES    F. DUNLEAVY    Charles F. Dunleavy    Chief Financial Officer     Dated: July 27, 2007
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Louis BOYD, Jr., Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-30577 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 2, 2017

Andre’ G. Jones, . Esq., Kevin G. Boit-mann, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Diane Hol-lenshead Copes, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Louis Boyd, Jr., Pro Se

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

A jury convicted Louis Boyd, Jr., of multiple drug and firearms offenses, and he ultimately received a 147-month total prison sentence. In 2015, the district court granted' his motion for a sentence modification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. It determined that Boyd’s amended guidelines range on the drug counts was 57 to 71 months of imprisonment and imposed a 71-month term to run consecutively to Boyd’s 60-month prison sentence on a firearms count. In 2016, Boyd moved for'a further reduction pursuant to the same guidelines amendment. The district court denied that motion, and Boyd now appeals that decision. Boyd’s motion for leave to file his reply brief'out of time is GRANTED.

Boyd argues that the district court did not provide adequate reasons to justify the denial of his motion, but there was no error because the court was not required to provide any reasons at all. *See United States v. Evans,*587 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 2009). Boyd also contends that the Court did not appropriately account for relevant law, sentencing policy, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors’, Boyd’s post-sentencing *448conduct, the fact that his prison is overcrowded, and the need to avoid sentencing disparities. Boyd, though, has not shown that the district court abused its discretion. *See United States v. Henderson,*636 F.3d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 2011). The court correctly recognized that he was eligible for a sentence reduction; however, it denied the motion as a matter of discretion, referencing the § 3553(a) factors in general and specifically the seriousness of the offense and the need to provide just punishment, which were proper factors to consider. *See Dillon v. United States,*560 U.S. 817, 826-27, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). It also had before it Boyd’s argument that he was entitled to a further reduction based on his post-sentencing conduct, but it was not required to grant a reduction based on this factor. *See*U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, p.s., comment. (n.l(B)(iii)). A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion where, as here, it gives due consideration to the motion and considers the § 3553(a) factors. *See United States v. Whitebird,*55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### James E. Eggleston, App’lt, *v.*Miles Beach, Resp’t.

See 33 N. Y. State Rep., 835.

*Henry S. Bennett,*for app’lt; *Aug. C. Brown,*for resp’t.

Appeal dismissed, with costs. All concur, except Finch, J., absent.
#### WILLIS vs. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.

Appeal from Grayson county.

*Extra Territorial Jurisdiction of State Courts*— Practice.—In an action for damages against a railway company for the negligent killing of husband, the plaintiff alleged in her petition that the injuries and consequent death occurred in the Indian Territory; that the charter under which the road operated had been adopted in this state; that the company had an office in Grayson county; that plaintiff resided in Grayson county when the suit was instituted; that at the time of the killing the Indian Territory was without law applicable to deceased, plaintiff or other person residing outside of its limits. Among other things the defendant set up by special demurrer that the petition showed on its face that the State of Texas had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. This special demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff declining to amend, the cause was dismissed. Held, that the statute conferring the right of action in certain survivors for the negligent killing of an individual, provides only for cases arising within the jurisdiction proper of the State of Texas. The special demurrer was, therefore properly sustained.

Affirmed.

Willie, Chief Justice.
AJPIERRO PHOTOGRAPHY

DRONE PRE-FLIGHT CHECKLIST

PIC signature: ___________________________________ Date: ______________

Body and Props

All screws are securely fastened

All propellers are properly mounted and secure to motors

Camera, Gimbal and all related wires and screws are secure for flight

Surroundings 

Visual inspection of flight area

Area free of and/or obstructions noted

Flight area is 3 miles or more from any airport

Take-off and landing zone is clearly marked

Flight area is clear of all persons

Atmospheric conditions are suitable for flight

System Functions

All batteries, in drone and extra, are charged completely

Audible signals function at start-up

External light are functioning properly

Wifi and RC functionality

RC unit and drone are connected 

Drone responds to all RC commands

Camera and iphone are connected and visuals are functioning properly

S1 and S2 switches are in the up position

GPS connection confirmed with no less than 8 satellites connected

Return to home location set

Drone hovers for 15 seconds free of controls after take-off
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 13 - 00575 - CR

CHRISTOPHER XAVIA FR ANKLIN APPELLANT
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 78TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellant Christopher Xavia Franklin attempts to appeal from his 2004 conviction for burglary of a habitation

. 2 Franklin filed a notice of appeal on November 25, 2013

. On December 11, 2013 , we sent Franklin a letter informing

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47. 4.

2 O n October 22, 2013 , Franklin filed with the trial court a motion seeking the trial court’s permission to pursue a second appeal of this case, which the trial court den ied for lack of jurisdiction.2

him of our concern that we l acked jurisdiction over the appeal because of the untimely

- filed notice of appeal and because his conviction has already been affirmed on direct appeal

. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a) ; Franklin v. State , No. 02

- 04

- 00 255

- CR, 2005 WL 1356452 , at *6 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth June 9, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op, not designated for publication) . We requested that he or any party desiring to continue the appeal file a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal by December 23 , 2013 , or the appeal could be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. Franklin has filed a response, but it does not show grounds for continuing the appeal. This court does not have authority to grant an out

- of

- time appeal. See Slaton v. State , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (reasoning that if an appeal is not timely perfected, a court of appeals has no jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal and can take no action other than to dismiss it). And to the extent that Franklin is attempting to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion seeking permission to pursue a second appeal, we lack jurisdiction over that attempted appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2 (a) ; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02 (West 2006)

. Accordingly , we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f); Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

PER CURIAM3

PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: February 6, 2014