NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDUIN RENE MIRAMONTES,

Petitioner,

v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 19

- 70433 Agency No. A095

- 681

- 973

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 20, 2020 * * San Francisco, California Before: NGUYEN, HURWITZ, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Eduin Rene Miramontes

- Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied both applications,
and t he Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Miramontes

-

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

DEC 7 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Hernandez’s subsequent app eal

. Miramontes

- Hernandez now petitions for review. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
1. Miramontes

- Hernandez argues that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceed ing s because his Notice to Appear (“NTA”) failed to designate the court where the NTA would be filed , in violation of 8 C.F.R. § § 1003.14(a) and 1003.15(b)(6)

. This argument is foreclosed by Aguilar Fermin
v. Barr , which held that such a failure does not strip the immigration court of jurisdiction if a subsequent hearing notice provides the missing information. 958 F.3d 887, 894

– 95, 895 n.4 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, although the original NTA did not designate the immigration court, this error was cured by subsequent hearing
notices

. 2. Miramontes

- Hernandez next argues that the BIA violated its duty of impartiality in Matter of Bermudez

- Cota , 27 I. & N. Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), when it
held that the immigration court could remedy a NTA that lacked information required by regu lation

. This argument is foreclosed by Karingithi v. Whitaker , 913 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2019)

. In Karingithi , we found that Bermudez

- Cota

“ reflect [ed] the agency’s fair and considered judgment. ” 913 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Lezama

- Garcia v. Holder , 666 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2011))

. 3. Finally, Miramontes

- Hernandez argues that the phrase “violent or dangerous crimes” in 8 C.F.R. § 1212.7(d) is unconstitutionally vague under Sessions v.3

Dimaya , 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). Bu t Dimaya ’s reasoning does not appl y to § 1212.7(d). Dimaya held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) 1 was unconstitutionally vague . 138 S.
Ct. at 1216. Section 16(b) define s a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature , involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (emphasi s added). T he Supreme Court held that
two features of §16(b) combined to create “ ‘ hopeless indeterminacy , ’ inconsistent with due process. ” Dimaya , 138 S. Ct. at 1213 ( quoting Johnson v. United States , 57 6 U.S. 591, 598 (2015)) . First, the clause “calls for a court to identify a crime’s ‘ordinary case’ in order to measure the crime’s risk.” Id. at 1215. This “ordinary case,” according to the Court, is “an excessively ‘ speculative, ’ essentially inscrutable thing.” Id. ( quoting Johnson , 576 U.S. at 597 ). Second, the “substantial risk” standard was uncertain. Id. Importantly, the uncertainty of the “substantial risk” standard alone did not make § 16(b) vague. Id. Rather, “[t]he difficulty comes . . . from applying such a standard to . . . ‘ an ide alized ordinary

1 The Immigration and Nationality Act incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) into its aggravated felony deportability ground at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii)

. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felonies and including crime of violence at § 1101(a)(43)(F)).4

case of the crime. ’ It is then that the standard ceases to work in a way consistent with due process.” Id. at 1215

– 16 ( quoting Johnson , 57 6 U.S. at 604 ). Rather than identify ing an “ordinary case,” s ection 1212.7(d) requires a determina tion of whether a particular crime is “violent or dangerous” based on the
facts of the case

. See Torres

- Valdivias v. Lynch , 786 F.3d 1147, 1151

– 52 (9th Cir. 2015). This difference is determinative because, as explained in Dimaya , we “ ‘ do
not doubt ’ the c onstitutionality of applying § 16(b)’s ‘ substantial risk [ s tandard ] to real

- world conduct. ’ ” 138 S. Ct. at 1215 (alteration in original) ( quoting Johnson , 576 U.S. at 604

– 05 ). Section 1212.7(d) is therefore not unconstitutionally vague.
See Guerrero v. Whitaker , 908 F.3d 541, 54 5 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that “particularly serious crime” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) was not unconstitutionally vague because the inquiry “applies only to real

- world facts” so “the fatal comb ination at issue in

. . . Dimaya is absent”).
PETITION DENIED.