alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Brown *vs.*Calvert.

Assumpsit.

{Messrs. Morehead & Brown for appellant: Mr. Charles A. Wickliffe for appellee.]

From the Circuit Court for Spencer County.

*June*14.

Whenever a declaration is so general as not to apprize the defendant of the nature and extent ¡of the demand, he is entitled to a bill of particulars—to which the plaintiff will be restricted ip his proof.

Judge Ewing

delivered the Opinion of the Court,

This is an action of assumpsit, brought by Calvert against Brown, with general counts in the declaration. And the only question is—did the Court err in overruling the motion of the defendant for a *bill of particulars,*made before the trial commenced?

Whenever the form of the declaration is so general, as not to apprize the defendant of the nature, character and extent of the claim set up against him, he may demand a *bill*of *particulars.*Such a bill is not only proper, by way of limiting the plaintiff in his proof, to the specific demands claimed by him, but is essential to enable the defendant to prepare fully for his defence, and to guard him against surprise. The *right*is not only sanctioned by authority, but by reason and propriety. 3 *Starkie on Ev.*1054. It was therefore erroneous to overrule the defendant’s motion.

Wherefore, it is considered by the Court, that the judgr ment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and the cause remanded, that a new trial may be granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                              2,014
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             397,462
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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT
32





CERTIFICATION
OF OFFICERS


OF
CYBERDEFENDER CORPORATION


PURSUANT
TO 18 USC § 1350





Pursuant
to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsection (a) and (b) of
Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) each of the
undersigned officers of CyberDefender Corporation (the “Company”) does hereby
certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:




(a)
            The
      annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 of the
      Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(b) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




(b)
            Information
      contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the
      financial condition and results of operations of the
    Company.





Dated:
March 31, 2010








/s/ Gary
Guseinov


Gary
Guseinov


Chief
Executive Officer








/s/ Kevin
Harris


Kevin
Harris


Chief
Financial Officer
MEMORANDUM

DATE: 7/29/15

FROM: Ken Mitchell/EPA Region 4

TO: Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket Id: OAR–2013-0602

SUBJECT: Discussion of the Clean Power Plan at the Flexible Packaging Association 2015 EHS Summit

SUMMARY: 

Region 4 provided information on the Clean Power Plan to participants at the Flexible Packaging 

Association 2015 EHS Summit in St. Petersburg, FL, on January 29, 2015. The Clean Power Plan 

for Existing Power Plants was proposed on June 2, 2014.

ATTENDEES:

EPA

Alan Farmer/EPA R4

External Stakeholders

Approximately 30 attendees

ATTACHMENT
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA
F OURTH D ISTRICT

WENDY SOLOMON , Appellant,

v.

U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION , Appellee

.

No. 4D 18

- 1509

[ May 23, 2019 ]

Appeal of nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Joel T. Lazarus

, Senior Judge; L.T. Case
No. CACE 14

- 02616

.
Wendy Solomon, Fort Lauderdale, pro se

.
Sara F. Holladay

- Tobias and Emily Y. Rottmann of McGuire Woods LLP, Jacksonville, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.
Affirmed.

G ERBER , C.J., W ARNER and F ORST , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS

EPA METHOD 26A

Determination of HCl & HF Emissions

Guardian Fiberglass

Inwood, WV

Line 1 Melter Baghouse Stack

Run Number 1 2 3 Avg

Date: 02/22/12 02/23/12 02/23/12 ---

 Net Time of Test, minutes 240 240 240 ---

Tstart Test Start Time 1228 755 1210

Tend Test End Time 1631 1158 1612 ---

Pbar Barometric Pressure, in. Hg 29.00 28.84 28.91 28.92

Pg Static Pressure, in. Hg 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019

PS Stack Pressure, Absolute, in. Hg 29.019 28.859 28.929 28.936

VM Actual Meter Volume Sampled, cu. ft. 164.1 160.3 168.3 164.2

H Avg. Delta H, in. H20 1.35 1.28 1.41 1.35

TM Avg. Gas Meter Temp., Deg. F 72.7 68.0 81.8 74.2

 Dry Gas Meter Correction Factor 1.006 1.006 1.006 1.006

VSTD Volume Sampled at Stand. Cond., cu. ft. 159.1 156.0 160.0 158.3

VSTD M Volume Sampled at Stand. Cond., cu.m 4.51 4.42 4.53 4.48

VC Volume of Water Collected, ml 64.6 49.0 47.6 53.7 .

VWC Volume of Water Vapor at Std. Cond.,SCF 3.04 2.31 2.24 2.53

BWS Moisture Content of Gas Stream 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.016

PMV Percent Moisture in Stack 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.6

MFD Mole Fraction of Dry Gas 0.981 0.985 0.986 0.984

Md Mole. Wt. Stack Gas, Dry Basis, lb/lb mole 29 29 29 29

MS Mole. Wt. Stack Gas, Wet Basis, lb/lb mole 28.637 28.682 28.690 28.670

Cp Pitot Tube Constant 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84

PS Avg. Sqrt. Delta P, in. H20 0.822 0.791 0.811 0.808

TS Avg. Stack Temp., Deg. F 120.92 124.04 130.13 125.0

VS Avg. Stack Velocity, ft/sec 49.3 47.7 49.1 48.7
SUMMARY OF RESULTS

EPA METHOD 26A

Determination of HCl & HF Emissions

Guardian Fiberglass

Inwood, WV

Line 1 Melter Baghouse Stack

A Area Stack, ft2 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.98

QSD Gas Volume Flow, Dry Std. Cond. CFM 10,180 9,776 9,993 9,983

QA Actual Gas Volume Flow, CFM 11,768 11,377 11,713 11,619

QSW Gas Volume Flow, Wet Std. Cond., CFM 10,374 9,921 10,133 10,142

Dn Sample Nozzle Diameter, inches 0.215 0.215 0.218 0.216

An Area of Nozzle, ft2 0.00025 0.00025 0.00026 0.00025

I Percent Isokinetic 102.8 104.9 102.4 103.3

PPR Process Pull Rate, lbs/hr 6,822 6,827 6,827 6,825

PPRS Process Pull Rate, tons/hr 3.41 3.41 3.41 3.41

 Back Half Analysis - Hydrogen Chloride - Method 26A

mn Hydrogen Chloride Catch, mg <0.0617 <0.0674 <0.0611 <0.0634

Cs Hydrogen Chloride Concentration, gr/dscf <0.000006 <0.000007 <0.000006 <0.000006

Ca Hydrogen Chloride Concentration, mg/dscm <0.0137 <0.0152 <0.0135 <0.0141

CAW Hydrogen Chloride Emission Rate, lbs/hr <0.00052 <0.00056 <0.00050 <0.00053

E Hydrogen Chloride Emission Rate, lbs/TGP <0.00015 <0.00016 <0.00015 <0.00015

 Back Half Analysis - Hydrogen Fluoride - Method 26A

mn Hydrogen Fluoride Catch, mg <0.0632 <0.0691 <0.0625 <0.0649

Cs Hydrogen Fluoride Concentration, gr/dscf <0.000006 <0.000007 <0.000006 <0.000006

Ca Hydrogen Fluoride Concentration, mg/dscm <0.0140 <0.0156 <0.0138 <0.0145

CAW Hydrogen Fluoride Emission Rate, lbs/hr <0.00053 <0.00057 <0.00052 <0.00054

E Hydrogen Fluoride Emission Rate, lbs/TGP <0.00016 <0.00017 <0.00015 <0.00016
#### Ralph S. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. Charles E. GIBSON, U. S. Probation Officer et al., Appellees.

No. 23587.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 25, 1966.

See also 5 Cir., 364 F.2d 507.

Kendell W. Wherry, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., for appellees.

Before WISDOM, BELL and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant has appealed from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. While serving a three-year sentence imposed by United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, for mail fraud, appellant was brought by writ of habeas corpus before the United States District Court, Middle District of North Carolina, for arraignment on a Dyer Act charge (18 U.S.C.A. § 2312). He was there represented by counsel and, upon entering a plea of guilty, was sentenced on December 16,1960 by the federal court in North Carolina on Count I to imprisonment for four years (the term is in dispute, appellant contending the sentence was for two years), to commence at the expiration of the sentence for mail fraud imposed in the federal court in Florida. On Count II he was sentenced to a term of five years, execution was suspended and he was placed on probation for a period of five years to begin with the date of completion of the sentence imposed on Count I. He has now been returned to custody for parole violation. Appellant contends, however, that he had completely served both the sentence imposed in the Florida federal court and the sentence imposed in the North Carolina federal court because he claims the sentence on Count I in the federal court in North Carolina was for two years rather than four years. If so, the parole would have expired prior to the occurrence, which is the basis for the contention he has violated parole.

An evidentiary hearing was held in the present proceedings and appellant was represented by counsel. The official court reporter at the time of sentencing in the federal court in North Carolina testified that there had been an error in the transcription of the proceedings, as reflected in his written summary of the proceedings which shows the term to be two years. He said that he had taken down the judge’s oral pronouncement of sentence verbatim by shorthand notes and on an electronic recording device simultaneously. He later checked his notes on the voice record, dictated the report to a secretary who typed the transcript, and when the discrepancy was discovered he was unable to find the voice record. At the hearing the court report*391er read from his shorthand notes and testified that in writing down the number of years imposed in the sentence he had used the numerical figure “4”. His shorthand notes were received in evidence.

Both the judgment and commitment, and the oral pronouncement as reduced to the court reporter’s shorthand notes, are consistent and they show a four-year sentence was imposed on Count I by the court. Accordingly, there was no error in dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Affirmed.
#### Lon O. OWSLEY, Appellee, v. C. C. PEYTON, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellant.

No. 10688.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 5, 1966.

Decided Nov. 15, 1966.

*1003Reno S. Harp, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Virginia, (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen., of Virginia, on the brief) for appellant.

Eddie Cantor, Richmond, Va. (Court-assigned counsel) [Cantor & Cantor, Richmond, Va., on the brief] for appellee.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and BRYAN and WINTER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

After our decision1 on Lon 0. Owsley’s appeal from the refusal of habeas corpus to him, he was accorded a full hearing by the District Court and awarded the writ, entitling him to release from State custody unless seasonably retried. His custodian, the Superintendent of the Virginia penitentiary, appeals. We affirm.

At the hearing on remand the testimony revealed reasonable ground for questioning Owsley’s mental competency at the time of his 1957 felony trials in Virginia. Under the State statute 2 this proof entitled him to a preliminary inquiry — at a State hospital or by a commission — upon his mental capability to understand the nature of the charge against him and to assist in his defense. The District Court concluded that the State criminal court should have granted the pre-trial motion of Owsley’s court-appointed lawyer for such an inquiry, and that his subsequent convictions and imprisonment were void for this omission in due process.

The State is quite right that no evidential showing was made to the criminal court of any doubt as to Owsley’s mental condition. However, it appears that his attorney must have been aware that proof of the uncertainty was at hand. The lawyer’s failure to adduce it in court, we think, rendered his representation of Owsley ineffective to the point of depriving him of his Constitutional right to counsel.

The Attorney General of Virginia argues that Owsley has not exhausted his State remedies, in that the effect of the failure to offer evidence on his motion for a pretrial inquiry was never submitted to the State court, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Owsley has once carried his cause on habeas corpus through the State courts without success. To require him to retrace these steps seems unreasonable and an abuse of the discretion reposing in the Federal court under the statute. Thomas v. Cunningham, 4 Cir., 335 F.2d 67, 69-70 (1964).

Affirmed.

1

. Owsley v. Peyton, 4 Cir., 352 F.2d 804 (1965).

2

. Virginia Code of 1950, section 19.1-228; Thomas v. Cunningham, 4 Cir., 313 F.2d 934 (1963).
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.12

                                J2 COMMUNICATIONS
                            10850 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
                                   SUITE 1000
                              LOS ANGELES, CA 90024


                                  May 17, 2002


CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Daniel S. Laikin
25 West 9th Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

Mr. Paul Skjodt
9920 Towne Road
Carmel, Indiana 46032

Gentlemen:

        Re: Termination of Surviving Provisions of Letter Agreement

Gentlemen:

        Pursuant to Section 11(c) of the Letter Agreement, dated as of March 5,
2001 (as amended, the "Letter Agreement"; capitalized terms used in this letter
but not otherwise defined herein shall have the respective meanings assigned to
them in the Letter Agreement), by and among J2 Communications, a California
corporation (the "Company"), James P. Jimirro, Daniel S. Laikin and Paul Skjodt,
the parties agreed that, in the event that the Closing did not occur for any
reason, including termination of the Letter Agreement as provided in Section
11(b) thereof, the Letter Agreement would be of no further force and effect;
provided, however, that the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 11(c), 12(e), 14
and 19 were to remain in full force and effect regardless of any termination of
the Letter Agreement, and that no such termination was to release any party
thereto from liability for his or its willful breach thereof.

        This letter confirms the parties' understanding, and when signed, their
binding agreement that, notwithstanding Section 11(c) of the Letter Agreement,
the Letter Agreement is terminated and of no further force or effect, including,
without limitation, Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 11(c), 12(e), 14 and 19 thereof.

                  [remainder of page intentionally left blank]


<PAGE>

        If the foregoing is acceptable to you, please so indicate by executing a
counterpart of this Letter Agreement below and returning it to the Company.


                                          Sincerely,


                                          J2 COMMUNICATIONS

                                          By:___________________________________
                                          Name:
                                          Title:



                                          By:___________________________________
                                          Name:
                                          Title:


THE FOREGOING IS ACCEPTED
AND AGREED TO AS OF THE FIRST
DATE SET FORTH ABOVE:


______________________________________
JAMES P. JIMIRRO


______________________________________
DANIEL S. LAIKIN


______________________________________
PAUL SKJODT
No. 07-13-00089-CR

John Dennis Clayton Anthony

Appellant

v.

The State of Texas

Appellee §

§

§

§ From the 287th District Court of

Bailey County

February 12, 2015

Opinion by Justice Pirtle

Concurring Opinion by

Chief Justice Quinn

J U D G M E N T

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated February 12, 2015, it is ordered,

adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and this cause is

remanded to the trial court.

Inasmuch as this is an appeal in forma pauperis

, no costs beyond those that

have been paid are adjudged.

It is further ordered that this decision be certified below for observance.

o O o
#### GRADY et. al. v. ROGAN, County Judge.

Appeal from Caldwell county.

*Jurisdiction.*— A suit to recover a penalty for breach of the condititions of a liquor dealers bond, is not a suit in behalf of the state to recover a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of section 8, article 5, Constitution of Texas, and the amount sought to be recovered not exceeding $500, the county court has jurisdiction.

*Disqualification of Judge.*— Although the bond is made payable to the county judge and the action is brought in his name, he is merely a nominal party and not disqualified from trying the cause.

*Liquor Dealers' Bond.*— Where the appellant procured a liquor dealer’s license to be issued in his name and gave bond as required by law, he is liable for breach of the conditions of the bond, although he may have no interest in the business. Affirmed.

Opinion by

Willson, J.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Javier Ponce CASTELLON, a.k.a. Harvey Castellon, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50213

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 20, 2017

Francisco Sanchez-Garcia, Pro Se

Michael Christopher Heyse, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Javier Ponce Castellón appeals from the district court’s order denying his pro se motion to reopen, which challenged his conviction and sentence for multiple drug trafficking offenses. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.

Castellón contends that the district court erred by failing to recharacterize his motion to reopen as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and ordering the government to respond. The district court’s order denying Castellon’s motion to reopen does not disclose the basis for its decision. However, the court may have mistakenly believed, based on a docketing error, that in 2005, a section 2255 motion had been filed on Cas-tellon’s behalf and denied on the merits. Because the relief Castellón sought in his motion to reopen is available only through a section 2255 motion and he has not filed a first section 2255 motion, we vacate and remand with instructions that the district court evaluate Castellon’s motion as one arising under section 2255. *See United States v. Eatinger,*902 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir. 1990).1 We express no opinion as to the merits of Castellon’s claims.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. Recharacterized as a section 2255 habeas, Castellon’s motion appears to be untimely. Any such finding, however, cannot be made until the district court follows the procedures set forth in *Castro v. United States,*540 U.S. 375, 383, 124 S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003).
#### George Marquardt, Respondent, *v.*Erie Railroad Company, Appellant. Marie Dudzik, Respondent, *v.*Erie Railroad Company, Appellant. Vera Andrasiak, Respondent, *v.*Erie Railroad Company, Appellant. Elizabeth Kostraba, Respondent, *v.*Erie Railroad Company, Appellant.

Argued June 17, 1943;

decided July 20, 1943.

*541
      *LeRoy II. Hurlbert*and *William G. Conable*for appellant.

*Arthur E. Often, Joseph Ambrusko*and *Ueffren J. Cohen*for respondents.

Judgments affirmed, with, costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughean, Rippey, Lewis, Conway. Desmond and Thacheb, JJ.
#### John Carlos TORRES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Its Successors and/or Assigns; Does, 1-25 Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56023

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 3, 2017

John Carlos Torres, Pro Se

Howard D. Hall, Attorney, Green & Hall, LLP, Santa Ana, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

John Carlos Torres appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action seeking rescission of his home loan due to alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *Dumas v. Kipp,*90 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Torres’ action because Torres’ TILA rescission claim is time-barred. *See*15 U.S.C. *568§ 1635(f) (borrower has three years to rescind under TILA); *Miguel v. Country Funding Corp.,*309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (three-year limitation period under TILA is a statute of repose that once expired completely extinguishes the underlying right).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David L. BULLOCK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10721 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(August 29, 2017)

Michelle Thresher Taylor, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, Joseph K. Ruddy, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, Plaintiff-Appellee

Before HULL, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Thomas A. Burns, appointed appellate counsel for David Leon Bullock in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that the counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Bullock’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.