[Cite as In re Guardianship of Hyde, 2024-Ohio-1878.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF ARIANA 

HYDE

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:

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APPEAL NO. C-230576

TRIAL NO. 2018003726

 O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Probate Court

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 17, 2024

Glenda A. Smith, for Appellant Melissa Payne,

Resch, Root, Philipps & Graham, LLC, and Derek Graham, for Appellee Advocacy 

and Protective Services, Inc.
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BERGERON, Judge.

{¶1} Following years of mental health challenges and a severe mental healthrelated incident, Ariana Hyde (at age 18) was involuntarily committed to the care of 

the Southern Ohio Developmental Center (“SODC”). Given Ms. Hyde’s serious mental 

health and cognitive diagnoses, appellee Advocacy and Protective Services, Inc. 

(“APSI”) filed an application for guardianship. Appellant Melissa Payne (Ms. Hyde’s 

mother) also sought guardianship at the same time. But because Ms. Payne struggled

to acknowledge and address her daughter’s mental health, the probate court opted to 

appoint APSI as guardian. Years later, frustrated with the delayed efforts to transition

Ms. Hyde to a less restrictive environment, Ms. Payne moved to remove APSI as 

guardian and to appoint herself as guardian. Following a hearing, the magistrate 

denied the motions, citing APSI’s attentiveness and its plan (created in partnership

with SODC) to transition Ms. Hyde to a less restrictive setting. Ms. Payne objected to 

the magistrate’s decision, but the probate court denied her objections and adopted the 

magistrate’s decision. Ms. Payne now appeals.

{¶2} At the outset, we acknowledge that it is clear from the record that Ms. 

Payne loves her daughter and is doing her best to look out for her daughter’s interests. 

Unfortunately, the legal inquiry before us is not simply whether the parent genuinely 

cares for the child. When a child has significant needs, and a probate court has 

determined that the child’s best interests are served by a different guardian, we cannot 

overturn that decision of the probate court unless it fails to comply with the governing 

legal standards. After a thorough and complete review of the record, we ultimately 

affirm the probate court’s judgment denying Ms. Payne’s motions.
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I.

{¶3} Ms. Hyde presented as a typical child until she began to experience 

psychotic symptoms at age 13. Between the ages of 13 and 15, she was hospitalized 

repeatedly (some of her hospitalizations resulted from medication non-compliance

while in Ms. Payne’s care). During this time, she engaged in self-harm. Ultimately, 

she was diagnosed with schizophrenia with catatonia and developmental disabilities. 

She returned to school and was placed on an Individualized Education Plan because 

she began struggling to keep up with her classwork. But even with this support 

structure, she could not stay on top of her studies, and she eventually dropped out of 

school.

{¶4} In 2017, Ms. Hyde went to live with her grandmother. Ms. Payne was 

working and completing nursing school at the time and felt that the grandmother 

would have more time to supervise her. But while living with her grandmother, Ms. 

Hyde jumped from the fifth floor of her grandmother’s apartment building in a suicide 

attempt. Following this incident, she was again hospitalized and was ultimately 

involuntarily committed to SODC pursuant to a civil commitment order. She has 

resided in SODC since age 18, and she is now 24 years old. The record demonstrates 

that she has made substantial progress and is stabilized, but she is not capable of 

independently carrying out the activities of daily life.

{¶5} In 2018, APSI, a private, nonprofit entity dedicated to protecting the 

rights of adults in Ohio with developmental disabilities, filed an application for 

guardianship of Ms. Hyde. Ms. Payne filed a competing application. Because the 

probate court did “not believe [Ms. Payne] will be able to make all requisite decisions 

necessary to properly provide for Ariana’s needs given her reluctance to fully accept 
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her daughter’s mental health diagnosis[,]” in February 2019, it appointed APSI as the 

legal guardian of Ms. Hyde.

{¶6} Ms. Payne and Ms. Hyde reunite at weekly visits where Ms. Payne takes 

her daughter from the SODC’s facility for about eight hours at a time. By all accounts, 

everything seems to proceed well during these visits. As a result, Ms. Payne has 

requested overnight visits, but so far, APSI has denied her requests. Ms. Payne 

provides Ms. Hyde with personal hygiene products and clothing. It is undisputed that 

she has capably advocated for her daughter’s needs, including her quality of care at 

SODC and her transition to a less restrictive environment. 

{¶7} In August 2022, Ms. Payne moved to remove APSI from the position of 

guardian of Ms. Hyde and to appoint herself as guardian. In January 2023, the 

probate court convened a hearing on the motions. Ms. Payne called four witnesses: 

Dr. Stuart Bassman (the chief psychologist at SODC), Jill Esz (a supervisor at SODC), 

Kristina Gaible (a regional director at APSI), and she testified as well. The APSI 

employee directly assigned to Ms. Hyde (Mr. Potter) could not attend the hearing 

because of his paternity leave. 

{¶8} Dr. Bassman testified regarding his role as chief psychologist, Ms. 

Hyde’s significant progress while at SODC, SODC’s plans to move her to a less 

restrictive facility “within weeks,” his communications with Ms. Payne and Mr. Potter, 

Ms. Hyde’s lack of any unmet needs, and his lack of concern with APSI’s performance 

as guardian.

{¶9} Ms. Esz shared her role as a liaison between the agency, families, courts, 

and other entities, her understanding regarding Ms. Hyde’s stability with her 

medication, her relationship with Ms. Payne and her observations that Ms. Payne has 
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her daughter’s best interests at heart and has served as a good advocate, the attempts 

to move Ms. Hyde to a less restrictive facility, Ms. Hyde’s desire to have an apartment 

(which she will have at the new facility), APSI’s support in moving her to a less 

restrictive setting, and her observations that APSI has acted in her best interests and 

has met its responsibilities as guardian.

{¶10} Ms. Gaible communicated APSI’s role as court appointed guardian, her 

role overseeing Ms. Hyde’s direct assigned representative (Mr. Potter), Mr. Potter’s 

visits with Ms. Hyde, Mr. Potter’s training, Ms. Hyde’s dislike for her current 

placement at SODC, the team’s challenges in finding a less restrictive placement 

suitable for her, and her current involuntary commitment at SODC.

{¶11} And finally, Ms. Payne testified to Mr. Potter’s lack of attendance at the 

annual mental health hearings, her visits with her daughter, what she provides, her 

concerns with Ms. Hyde’s care and quality of life at the SODC facility, her 

communication with Mr. Potter and Ms. Esz, the denial of an overnight visit pass, and 

her perception that APSI sought to block the move into a less restrictive setting. She 

also shared that she feels that she acts in her daughter’s best interests while Mr. Potter 

does not.

{¶12} APSI called one witness: Amanda Lee (a residential care supervisor at 

SODC). Ms. Lee discussed her regular interaction with Ms. Hyde over the past two 

and a half years, her observation that her needs are being met, APSI’s ability to meet 

her needs, her need for 24-hour care, and her failure to express any desire to stay 

overnight with her mother.

{¶13} The magistrate issued his decision denying the motion to remove APSI 

as guardian (and therefore, he also denied Ms. Payne’s motion to be appointed 
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guardian). In response, Ms. Payne filed objections arguing that APSI breached its duty 

of care to Ms. Hyde, that the court should apply the “best interest” standard to 

terminate APSI’s guardianship, and that she has a constitutional right to the 

maintenance of the parent-child relationship. In October 2023, the probate court 

denied her objections and adopted the decision of the magistrate. Ms. Payne now 

appeals.

II.

{¶14} The decisions of probate courts regarding guardianship matters are not 

reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See In re Guardianship of Keane,

7th Dist. Carroll No. 19 CA 0934, 2020-Ohio-1105, ¶ 65, citing In re Estate of

Bednarczuk, 80 Ohio App.3d 548, 551, 609 N.E.2d 1310 (12th Dist.1992). An abuse of 

discretion occurs when “a court exercis[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in 

regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 

166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. And “[w]hen reviewing 

the trial court’s [factual] findings, this court must be guided by the presumption that 

the trial court’s findings were correct.” In re Guardianship of Rahbek, 3d Dist. Shelby

No. 17-19-11, 2020-Ohio-3223, ¶ 22, citing In re Guardianship of Slone, 3d Dist.

Crawford No. 3-04-13, 2004-Ohio-6041, ¶ 3.

{¶15} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Payne contends that the magistrate 

did not make a best interests finding and that the record supports a determination that

it is in the best interests of Ms. Hyde to appoint her mother as her guardian. Before 

analyzing this assignment of error, we must sketch the statutory background. R.C. 

Chapter 2111 governs guardians and conservatorships, but it fails to address the 

process of removal of the guardian of an incompetent ward. R.C. Chapter 2109, on the 
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other hand, governs fiduciaries appointed by the probate court with respect to 

financial matters. It contains a provision that specifically enumerates the permissible 

reasons to remove a fiduciary: “habitual drunkenness, neglect of duty, incompetency, 

or fraudulent conduct, because the interest of the property, testamentary trust, or 

estate that the fiduciary is responsible for administering demands it, or for any other 

cause authorized by law.” R.C. 2109.24.

{¶16} Because R.C. Chapter 2111 does not contain a removal standard for 

guardians of incompetent wards, Ohio courts have generally borrowed the removal 

standard of R.C. 2109.24 to apply to the removal of such guardians. See, e.g., In re

Spangler, 11th Dist. Geauga Nos. 2007-G-2800 and 2007-G-2802, 2011-Ohio-6686,

¶ 25. Based on the arguments presented by the parties, we have no reason to question

this conclusion. Moreover, probate courts serve as the “superior guardian” of any

ward. R.C. 2111.50(A)(1). And their “ultimate concern is the welfare of the ward.” In

re Spangler at ¶ 54. Therefore, courts have interpreted the best interests of the ward

as a basis for the removal of a guardian that is authorized by the catchall provision of

R.C. 2109.24. Id. at ¶ 32.

{¶17} Here, Ms. Payne maintains that the magistrate erred by not using the 

best interests standard in evaluating the removal of the guardian. But “in an appeal 

from a ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision, an appellate court reviews the 

trial court’s judgment, not the magistrate’s decision.” Frey v. Amazon Home

Warranty LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 23AP-114, 2023-Ohio-3899, ¶ 8, citing Vice v.

Sexton, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3371, 2011-Ohio-1647, ¶ 24.

{¶18} Turning to the probate court’s decision, while it adopted the 

magistrate’s factual findings and legal conclusions, based on the evidence presented 
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at the hearing, it also separately concluded “that none of the criteria for removal of a 

guardian set forth in R.C. 2109.24 had been met and the Court cannot find that it is in 

the ward’s best interests to remove the guardian.” While it would facilitate our review 

if the probate court explained its reasoning for its best interests finding, nonetheless, 

the court established that it considered Ms. Hyde’s best interests in its decision to 

maintain APSI as her guardian.

{¶19} And further, the record supports this best interests conclusion. Because 

of Ms. Hyde’s significant mental health needs and cognitive delays, she is not capable 

of independently carrying out the activities of daily life and requires 24-hour care. 

Nevertheless, Ms. Payne questioned the delay in moving her daughter to a less 

restrictive setting. But the record explains the basis for the delay. Her daughter’s care 

team determined that a less restrictive setting with apartment-style living, 24-hour 

staffing, and remote monitoring would be most appropriate for her needs and further 

her development. Members of her care team emphasized the importance of finding 

the right placement to ensure that she did not experience any developmental setbacks 

following her transition. Testimony at the hearing established that locating this type 

of placement proved extremely challenging, and after much effort, her care team 

finally found an appropriate placement. 

{¶20} The magistrate determined (and the court adopted the finding) “that 

APSI has done a good job of making decisions regarding the care of Ariana Hyde, 

sometimes under difficult circumstances” and that “APSI and SODC have a good plan 

to transition Ariana to a less restrictive environment which will be in line with her 

future needs.” The testimony presented at the hearing demonstrated that APSI has 

been involved and has been actively working toward the goal of identifying a less 
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restrictive placement that will meet her complex needs. Additionally, while certain 

testimony established that Ms. Payne is a good advocate for her daughter, we see no 

indication that APSI took any measures to interfere with her advocacy. Therefore, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Payne’s motion to remove 

APSI as guardian.

{¶21} Thus, we overrule her first assignment of error.

III.

{¶22} Turning to Ms. Payne’s second assignment of error, she challenges the 

court’s determination that the guardian satisfied industry standard guidelines, 

alleging that the guardian failed to exercise due diligence and make decisions for her 

daughter in pursuit of her least restrictive alternative.

{¶23} As an initial matter, it is important to note that APSI serves as the 

guardian in this case. Ms. Payne’s brief references actions of APSI’s assigned 

representative—Mr. Potter—and argues that “he” failed to meet industry standards. 

But ultimately, APSI, not Mr. Potter, was appointed as Ms. Hyde’s guardian. 

Therefore, we evaluate Ms. Payne’s arguments with respect to APSI’s role as guardian.

{¶24} Ms. Payne seemingly equates “industry standard guidelines” to the

provision on guardianship found in the Ohio Rules of Superintendence for the Courts. 

See Sup.R. 66. But these rules “are administrative directives only and do not function 

as, or have the force of, law in the same manner as rules of practice and procedure.” 

In re Guardianship of Bernie, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-01-005, 2019-Ohio-334,

¶ 27, citing Pettit v. Pettit, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2011-08-018, 2012-Ohio-1801. 

Consequently, they “do not provide a ground for reversal.” Id. at ¶ 28.
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{¶25} And regardless, the record does not support Ms. Payne’s arguments

that APSI violated these rules. Ms. Payne asserts that APSI failed to meet the following 

responsibilities of a guardian to their ward:

(B) Exercising due diligence

A guardian shall exercise due diligence in making decisions that are in 

the best interest of a ward, including but not limited to communicating 

with the ward and being fully informed about the implications of the 

decisions.

(C) Least restrictive alternative

Unless otherwise approved by the probate division of a court of common 

pleas, a guardian shall make a choice or decision for a ward that best 

meets the needs of the ward while imposing the least limitations on the 

ward’s rights, freedom, or ability to control the ward’s environment. To 

determine the least restrictive alternative, a guardian may seek and 

consider an independent assessment of the ward’s functional ability, 

health status, and care needs.

Sup.R. 66.09(B) and (C).

{¶26} We first consider APSI’s performance with respect to Sup.R. 66.09(B). 

All three SODC employees who Ms. Payne called as witnesses expressed that they did

not have any concerns with APSI’s performance as guardian. And further, Ms. Esz

indicated that APSI supported moving Ms. Hyde to a less restrictive setting and that

she had observed APSI acting in her best interests. And the 2021 guardian’s report 

discussed at the hearing demonstrated that Mr. Potter had five visits with Ms. Hyde 

during that year. Ms. Gaible (an APSI supervisor) clarified that these visits do not 
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encompass all of the interactions between Ms. Hyde and Mr. Potter but rather are 

limited to visits that meet specific criteria: the visits must be face-to-face and discuss 

her wants, needs, placement, services, and any necessary changes.

{¶27} Turning to Sup.R. 66.09(C), the record provides ample evidence

demonstrating APSI’s efforts (along with the rest of Ms. Hyde’s support team) to

transition her to a less restrictive placement. Ms. Hyde was placed in SODC on a courtordered, involuntary basis. While the process to transition her placement took

substantial time, and Ms. Hyde expressed her dissatisfaction with her placement at

SODC, her care team made significant efforts to secure her an appropriate placement

that could sufficiently meet her complex needs. They wanted to be certain that her

placement would be stable and sustainable to ensure she would not have to return to

SODC and have her progress disrupted. The process also required a placement

provider to accept Ms. Hyde as a client (which was out of the control of APSI). And

ultimately, shortly after the hearing, in April 2023, Ms. Hyde was transitioned from

SODC to a less restrictive, apartment-style placement that her care team felt could

provide her with sufficient support.

{¶28} In light of the record and the applicable law, we overrule Ms. Payne’s

second assignment of error.

* * *

{¶29} Considering the foregoing analysis, we overrule both of Ms. Payne’s 

assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judgment affirmed.

BOCK, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.
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Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.