alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6870 

To amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to clarify creditor’s rights 

and remedies with respect to the consideration of immigration status 

with respect to the extension of credit, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 19, 2023 

Mr. OGLES (for himself, Mr. TIFFANY, Mr. CLYDE, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, Mr. 

DUNN of Florida, Mr. SELF, Mr. NORMAN, Ms. BOEBERT, Mr. WILLIAMS

of Texas, Mr. NEHLS, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. MCCORMICK, and Mr. 

MOONEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to clarify creditor’s rights and remedies with respect to the consideration of immigration status with respect to the extension 

of credit, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CONSIDERATION OF IMMIGRATION STATUS 

4 WITH RESPECT TO THE EXTENSION OF CRED5 IT. 

6 Section 701(b) of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 

7 (15 U.S.C. 1691(b)) is amended— 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6870 IH

1 (1) in paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘or’’ at the 

2 end; 

3 (2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at 

4 the end and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

5 (3) by adding at the end the following new 

6 paragraph: 

7 ‘‘(6) to make an inquiry or to consider the sta8 tus in the United States under the immigration laws 

9 (as such term is defined in section 101 of the Immi10 gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)) of an 

11 applicant if such inquiry is for the purpose of 

12 ascertaining the creditor’s rights and remedies appli13 cable to the particular extension of credit and not to 

14 discriminate in a determination of creditworthi15 ness.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
ALASKAN SEAFOOD CBI REPL AC EME NT PAGE EPA - HQ - OW - 2013 - 0652

DCN: 00409cbi

THE FO LL OW ING H AS BEE N REMOVED BE CAUSE IT CONT AINS CONF ID ENT IAL B USIN E SS IN FO RMA TION (CB I) PER 40 CFR P ART 2, SU BP ART B .
July 9, 2012

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

Dennis DeVany

Chief, EAS & Domestic Analysis Division

Department of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Ave., S.E.

Washington, DC 20590

RE: Spirit Airlines – DCA-FLL Service

Docket DOT-OST-2000-7182

Dear Mr. DeVany: 

In supplement to our prior letter of July 3, 2012, this is to clarify that effective August 11, 2012, 

Spirit will terminate use only of its DCA Air-21 slots. Spirit will continue to operate its four 

other DCA slots through September 5, 2012. 

Sincerely,

Joanne Young

Counsel for Spirit Airlines, Inc.

cc: Brian Meehan

Docket OST-2000-7182
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6510

JIMMY RAY OXENDINE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

RANDALL LEE, Superintendent, Caledonia

Correctional Institution,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior

District Judge. (1:06-cv-00355-WLO)

Submitted: August 23, 2007 Decided: August 29, 2007

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and WILKINS and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jimmy Ray Oxendine, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III,

Mary Carla Hollis, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh,

North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Jimmy Ray Oxendine seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The

district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The magistrate judge recommended

that relief be denied and advised Oxendine that failure to file

timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate

review of a district court order based upon the recommendation.

Despite this warning, Oxendine failed to object to the magistrate

judge’s recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate

judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of

the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been

warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins,

766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140 (1985). Oxendine has waived appellate review by failing

to timely file specific objections after receiving proper notice.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Jacob B. Herrman, Resp’t, *v.*Edw’d A. Currier, App’lt.

Appeal from eleventh district court.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### William G. Hodgkinson *et ux.*Petitioners &c.

One seised in fee of an undivided part of certain real estate, and for life of the residue, cannot have partition as between himself and those having a contingent remainder in such residue.

This was a petition by husband and wife for partition of real estate devised to the wife, one third in fee simple, and the other two thirds for her life, remainder to her issue, and if she should die without leaving issue, then over to certain persons named in the will.

Sullivan, in support of the petition,

cited *St.*1783, c. 41 ; *St.*1786, c. 53 ; *Swett*v. Bussey, 7 Mass. R. 504 ; *Bonner*v. *Kennebeck*Purchase, ibid. 475 ; *Mussey*v. Sanborn, 15 Mass. R. 155 ; *St.*1817, c. 190, § 24 to 31 inclusive.

*March*31

*per Curiam.*

But A petition for partition is an adversary suit, and where there can be no adversary, as in the case before us, a partition would be unavailing.

*Petitioners take nothing fyc.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
The  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information   extracted  from  the
consolidated  balance  sheets  and  consolidated  statements  of  income  and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                9-MOS     
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                 SEP-30-1998 
<CASH>                                         1,562,460
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    571,167 
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                      270,124
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       0 
<PP&E>                                        50,364,449 
<DEPRECIATION>                                         0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                57,065,980 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                  0
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                               0
<OTHER-SE>                                    37,597,067 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  57,065,980
<SALES>                                           82,825
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              14,345,843
<CGS>                                                  0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 12,995,115
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 425,558
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  25,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,054,688
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,350,728
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            1,350,728 
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,350,728
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       2.62
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       2.62
        


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT
32





STATEMENT
FURNISHED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002,


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350




The
undersigned, Xiqun Yu, is Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of
Tia I, Inc. (the “Company”). This statement is being furnished in connection
with the filing by the Company of the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for
the year ended  September 30, 2009 (the “Report”).




By
execution of this statement, we certify that:




The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and





The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company as of the dates
and for the periods covered by the Report.





This
statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so that this
statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.




It is not
intended that this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




Date:
      December 18, 2009
                  /s/ Xiqun YuXiqun
      YuChief
      Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer
REGULATORY EVALUATION

Directorate Identifier: 2010-NM-050-AD

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific 

requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of 

transportation?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)
Exhibit
      32





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes- Oxley
      Act
      of 2002, I, Daniel W. Finch, Chief Executive Officer of Advanced
      ID Corporation (the “Company"), hereby certify, that to the best
      of
      my knowledge, the Quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the
      quarterly period ended September 30, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with
      the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
      and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





Date:December
      6, 2006





/s/Daniel
      W. Finch


----------------------------------------


Daniel
      W.
      Finch, Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit
32.2





iDNA,
INC.


CERTIFICATION
OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934


AND
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Robert
V. Cuddihy, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of iDNA, Inc., a Delaware corporation
(the “Registrant”), in connection with the Registrant’s Quarterly Report on Form
10-Q for the period ended October 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), do hereby represent,
warrant and certify, in compliance with Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.





/s/ Robert V. Cuddihy, Jr.Name:
      Robert V. Cuddihy, Jr.Title:
      Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer(principal accounting and financial
    officer)Date:  December
      19, 2008




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to iDNA, Inc. and will be retained by iDNA,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
#### THE DO CORPORATION; Daniel Silva, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Paul J. SHASTANY; Town of Stoughton; John M. Anzivino; Cynthia A. Walsh; Stephen G. Anastos; Robert J. O’Regan; Thomas J. Recupero; Michael Hartman, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 15-1978

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

January 11, 2017

Anthony Ivan Wilson, Springfield, MA, for appellants.

Jackie Cowin, with whom Janelle M. Austin and Kopelman and Paige, P.C., Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellee Paul J. Shastany.

Thomas R. Donohue, with whom Leonard H. Kesten, Deidre Brennan Regan, and Brody, Hardoon, Perkins *&*Kesten, LLP, Boston, MA, were on brief, for ap-pellees Town of Stoughton, John M. An-zivino, Cynthia A. Walsh, Stephen G. Anastos, Robert J. O’Regan, Thomas J. Recupero, and Michael Hartman.

Before Howard, Chief Judge, Selya and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam.

After carefully considering on de novo review the record and the briefs op appeal, as well as oral argument by counsel, we affirm for substantially the same reasons as those stated by the district court. There were numerous and escalating incidents of violence, including most notably a shooting, in and around the ‘Whiplash” nightclub that plaintiffs owned and operated. The nature and frequency of those incidents preclude any reasonable factfinder from concluding that the proffered comparators were similarly situated in all relevant respects. See Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2013). Additionally, the police chiefs accurate factual descriptions of a change in the type of music played at the club and the urban origin of many patrons attracted by certain disc jockeys were germane to answering a question asked of the chief concerning the circumstances coincident with the escalation of violence at the club, were similar to the descriptions provided by plaintiffs themselves, and, in context, provide too thin of a reed to support a reasonable finding that impermissible discrimination rather than obvious public-safety considerations motivated the challenged restrictions.

Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 24, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-10931

Conference Calendar

PETER MARTIN BERNARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BRANNIGAN, Correctional Officer; JOHN AND OR JANE DOE,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:05-CV-14

--------------------

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Peter Martin Bernard, Texas prisoner # 581959, appeals the

dismissal of his pro se, in forma pauperis (IFP) 42 U.S.C. § 1983

complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for which

relief can be granted. In his complaint, he alleged that in July

2000, the defendants planted a shank in his cell in retaliation

for his filing a grievance against Brannigan regarding

Brannigan’s noncompliance with the prison guard dress code. 

Federal courts apply state personal-injury limitations

periods to actions brought under § 1983. Burrell v. Newsome,
No. 05-10931

-2-

883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989). The applicable Texas

limitations period is two years. Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438,

439 (5th Cir. 1990). 

There is no dispute that Bernard’s claim accrued, at the

latest, on July 11, 2000, when he was released from solitary

confinement. Thus, his complaint should have been filed on or

before July 11, 2002. Although Bernard’s first § 1983 complaint

alleging the same claim was filed before the expiration of the

limitations period, because the complaint was dismissed without

prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee, it had no tolling

effect. See Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir.

1995). Thus, Bernard’s current § 1983 complaint filed in 2005 is

untimely. We affirm the judgment of the district court on this

basis. Sojourner T v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992).

The district court’s dismissal of Bernard’s complaint as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim counts as a strike

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d

383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996). Bernard accumulated one previous

strike in Bernard v. Tong, No. 2:97-CV-0368 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8,

1998). Bernard is cautioned that if he accumulates three

strikes, he will not be allowed to proceed IFP in any civil

action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in

any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury. See § 1915(g). 

AFFIRMED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-6154

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MICHAEL TRAVIS WIGGINS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge. (1:00-cr-330-2; 1:05-cv-456-FWB-WWD) Submitted: March 10, 2006 Decided: March 30, 2006 Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Michael Travis Wiggins, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Hewlett Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Michael Travis Wiggins seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as untimely his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Wiggins has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We deny Wiggins’s motion for release pending appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.- 3 - DISMISSED
#### TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY v. DYE et al.

Appeal from Dallas county.

*/J'Ol’foiaffgs*— JToíct —The report ol the commission or Appea.L adopredin so far as it. holds that deceased came to his death through the negligence of the railway company, and that the appellees were on that account entitled to recover. We think, 'however, that the turn allowed by the jury ($1300) was clearly excessive, and not warranted by the evidence. We are. always reluctant to disturb a verdict because of the large amount of damages found, and have refused to interfere in some cases, when in our opinion, the jury have been somewhat extravagant in their finding, if no improper influences have been brought to bear upon them „ But in the present case the damages are so obviously disproportioned to the amount of loss proved, as to lead to the conclusion that the language used by appellees’ counsel in his address to the jury must have had some influence upon their verdict. For this reason we think the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded, and it Is accordingly so ordered.

Opinion by

Willie, O. J.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-31140 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MILCIADES MINA-CUERO, also known as Minea Miliades, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Louisiana

(96-CR-116-L)

September 5, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *



### Convicted on a guilty p lea of unlawful reentry after deportation, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(1), Milciades Mina-Cuero appeals his sentence, challenging the use of

a prior conviction in Texas state court. Mina-Cuero claims that his inability to1 United States v. Garza

,

_____ F.3d

_____ (5th Cir. July 16, 1997, No. 95-21094) 1997

WL 400812 at *4.

2 United States v. Howard , 991 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1993).

2 

### understand English rendered his state court conviction of a drug violation invalid

and he contends that it should no t have been used in the calculation of his

sentence. Our review of the record and briefs persuades that the district court’s

finding and conclusion that the testimony of Mina-Cuero lacked credibility is not

clearly erroneous 1 

### and that the trial court did not err in considering the prior state

felony conviction in determining the sentence imposed. 2



### The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.