IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1132

Filed February 20, 2019

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JASON D. GRYP,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Thomas G. Reidel and 

Mark D. Cleve, Judges.

The defendant appeals his ten-year sentence. AFFIRMED.

Lauren M. Phelps, Davenport, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.

Jason Gryp appeals the district court’s imposition of a ten-year sentence of 

incarceration for his conviction for possession with intent to deliver 

(methamphetamine), a class “C” felony. Gryp maintains the court should have 

suspended his sentence. He argues the court abused its discretion by failing to 

place more weight on positive factors outlined in the report from the presentence 

investigation (PSI) and failing to consider the “naturally deterrent effect” of the fact 

that, during the commission of this crime, Gryp was shot multiple times by the 

friend to whom he intended to sell methamphetamine.

“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within 

the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only 

be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate 

matters.” State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Iowa 2008) (alteration in original) 

(citation omitted). “Abuse of discretion occurs only when ‘the decision was 

exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.’” 

Id. (citation omitted).

As Gryp concedes, the sentence imposed by the district court is within the 

statutory limits. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(c)(6) (defining the crime as a class 

“C” felony); 902.9(1)(d) (providing the maximum sentence for a class “C” felony is 

“no more than ten years”). Additionally, we note that both the State and the 

preparer of the PSI recommended incarceration. Still, Gryp maintains the court 

abused its discretion because it did not place more emphasis on the facts that Gryp 

did not commit any additional offenses during the thirteen months he was out on 

bond between his arrest and sentencing, he was prepared for and cooperated with 
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the preparation of the PSI report, only one crime in his long criminal history was 

violent in nature, he had been steadily employed at the same job for two years at 

the time of sentencing, he has a consistent employment history, and he graduated 

high school. 

First, we cannot agree with all Gryp’s contentions. While he maintains he 

did not committ any additional offenses while out on bond, the more accurate 

statement would be that he was not charged with any additional offenses during 

that time period. According to Gryp’s statements to the PSI preparer, he continued 

to smoke marijuana “a couple times per week” until “a few weeks” before meeting 

with the preparer on May 23, 2018. Additionally, Gryp told the preparer he 

continued to use methamphetamine monthly until a week before their meeting. 

And while Gryp has generally maintained employment during the times he has not 

been incarcerated, having a job has not prevented Gryp from using or selling illegal 

substances. At the time of the present offense, he was employed but decided to 

sell drugs in order “make some quick cash.” 

That being said, the factors Gryp claims the court should have placed more 

emphasis on—including the specific facts surrounding his commission of the 

crime—were included in the PSI report, which the district court explicitly stated it 

considered. During the sentencing colloquy, the court said:

The—it has been noted by both parties, the primary issue 

before the Court this morning is whether or not the Court should 

suspend that sentence. And in making that determination, I have 

taken into consideration all of the information contained in the 

presentence investigation report as well as the recommendations 

made by the presentence investigation writer, by the State, and by 

the defense in this case.

And when I put all that together, I note with considerable 

concern, Mr. Gryp, your prior criminal conviction history which 
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consists of two felony convictions and a conviction of 2013 that led 

to your probation being revoked on two occasions in connection with 

that file, ultimately landing you in prison on that offense and the fact 

that this offense took place less than a year—or approximately a 

year, I should say, after you finished your parole from that offense. I 

also note the positive information that’s contained in the presentence 

investigation report, and again, all of the statements that have been 

made by the various parties here today.

In—on balance, the Court does find that for the protection of 

the community, that imposition of the sentence is the most 

appropriate sentence to be entered here today. 

I do note the positive things, Mr. Gryp. These are things you 

should have taken into consideration before this particular offense 

was undertaken. And for all of the reasons I have stated, I—the

Court concludes it is the most appropriate sentence. And therefore, 

the Court will order that mittimus will issue immediately.

It is the role of the sentencing court, in an exercise of its discretion, to determine

the weight to place on the various considerations. See State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 

590, 593 (Iowa 1983) (“The right of an individual judge to balance the relevant 

factors in determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the discretion 

standard.”). Though the court did not give the same weight to the factors Gryp 

emphasizes, the sentence imposed by the court was not based “on grounds or for 

reasons clearly untenable,” nor was its choice “clearly unreasonable” under the 

circumstances. See Bentley, 757 N.W.2d at 262 (providing standard for 

determining an abuse of discretion). Thus, we affirm the sentence imposed by the 

district court.

AFFIRMED.