alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Hugh BROWNE, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 10395.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 30, 1966.

Decided Sept. 21, 1966.

*387Robert L. Millard, El Paso, Tex., for petitioner.

Stephen H. Paley, Atty., Dept, of Justice (Richard M. Roberts, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and Gilbert E. Andrews, Attys., Dept, of Justice, on brief), for respondent.

Before SOBELOFF, BOREMAN and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges.

SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge:

The Tax Court determined that petitioner, Dr. Hugh Browne, was liable for unpaid income taxes in the amount of $27,073.89, plus civil fraud penalties of $14,452.01, due to understatement of income from 1950 through 1959. Because there were no adequate records from which to determine accurately petitioner’s income, the Commissioner and the Tax Court employed the net worth method to estimate income during this period. Dr. Browne does not question the propriety of the method, but objects to the manner in which it was applied to reconstruct his income.

The Tax Court dealt in great detail with each of Dr. Browne’s claims; some were modified in his favor, while others were unchanged. We in turn have reviewed each of the assigned errors, and conclude that the Tax Court correctly decided the questions presented to it; and in fact gave petitioner the benefit of the doubt wherever possible.1 The income estimates of the Tax Court were based on a thorough consideration of all the evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1958); Rule 52(a) Fed.R.Civ.Proc.

We turn to the additional finding of fraud and the assessment of a fraud penalty. Over a ten year period the income reported by Dr. Browne was less than 10% of his taxable income as determined by the Tax Court, a strong indication of fraud in the preparation of the returns. See, e. g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); Romm v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1957). This, in conjunction with his failure to keep records and his admitted falsification in FHA loan applications, amply justifies the Tax Court’s finding of civil fraud and assessment of penalties. See Diffendall v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1956); Romm v. Commissioner, supra.

Affirmed.

1

. For example, although the only evidence of depreciation on a building owned by petitioner was the testimony of an accountant who had never seen the property, the Tax Court raised the Commissioner’s depreciation rate from 2%% to 3%. Similarly, despite evidence that Dr. Browne frequented racetracks, drove a new Cadillac, had a private nurse, and asserted income of up to $30,000 per year in FHA loan applications, the Tax Court reduced the Commissioner’s estimates of annual income by almost 10% — from an average of $6,000 per year to an average of about $5,500.
#### PEOPLE *v.*SHAW.

1. Appeal and Error — Criminal Law — Sufficiency op Evidence.

Conviction of a erime will not be reversed by an appellate court if there is evidence in the reeord which, if believed, will support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Criminal Law — Sufficiency of Evidence — Carnal Knowledge of Eem:ale Patient.

Conviction of carnally knowing a female patient of a State institution based partially upon contradictory and conflicting testimony of complaining witness is affirmed, where a review of the reeord establishes that there was sufficient evidence, if believed, to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doiibt (CL 1948, § 750.341).

References for Points in Heádnotes

[1] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 948.

[2] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 786, 883.

Appeal from Lenawee; Martin (Rex B.), J.

Submitted Division 2 May 2, 1967, at Lansing.

(Docket No. 2,481.)

Decided March 27, 1968.

Damon Shaw was convicted of carnal knowledge of a female committed to a State institution.

Affirmed.

*Frank J. Kelley,*Attorney General, *Robert A. Derengoski,*Solicitor General, and *Harvey A. Koselka,*Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

*Russell & Bird,*for defendant.

*316T. Gr. Kavanagh, P. J.

This is an appeal from a conviction of a violation of CL 1948, § 750.341 (Stat Arm 1954 Rev § 28.573) which makes it a crime to carnally know a female patient in a State or county institution.

The only error asserted on appeal is that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.

Appellant argues that the complaining witness testified in a contradictory and conflicting manner and that such testimony should not serve to support a conviction.

The rule on review is that if there is evidence in the record which, if believed, will support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt we will not reverse. *People*v. *Williams*(1962), 368 Mich 494, 501.

We have examined the record carefully, and despite some questionable cross-examination by the prosecutor of his main witness, we have discovered no reversible error. We are satisfied that the defendant had a fair trial.

Affirmed.

Levin and Sullivan, JJ., concurred.
CERTIFICATIONI, Kokmeng Koh, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-Drequired to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K ofPrincipal Life Income Fundings Trust 2006-69 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);  2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as whole, donot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;  3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and otherinformation required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by thisreport is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;  4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement(s) required inthis report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the ExchangeAct period reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicingagreement(s) in all material respects; and  5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria forasset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment ofcompliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be includedin this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwisedisclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in suchreports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by thefollowing unaffiliated parties: Citibank, N.A. and Bankers Trust Company, N.A.Date: March 28, 2007   /s/ Kokmeng Koh     Kokmeng Koh  Second Vice President
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6971 

To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to immediately initiate removal 

proceedings for aliens whose visas are revoked on security or related grounds. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 11, 2024 

Mr. HUNT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to immediately initiate removal proceedings for aliens whose visas 

are revoked on security or related grounds. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Mandatory Removal 

5 Proceedings Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6971 IH

1 SEC. 2. MANDATORY INITIATION OF REMOVAL PRO2 CEEDINGS FOR ALIENS WHOSE VISAS ARE 

3 REVOKED ON SECURITY OR RELATED 

4 GROUNDS. 

5 Section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality 

6 Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)) is amended— 

7 (1) by striking ‘‘After the issuance’’ and insert8 ing the following: ‘‘VISA REVOCATION.— 

9 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—After’’; 

10 (2) by striking ‘‘his discretion’’ and inserting 

11 ‘‘in the discretion of the Secretary’’; 

12 (3) by striking ‘‘Attorney General’’ and insert13 ing ‘‘Secretary of Homeland Security’’; 

14 (4) by striking ‘‘issuance: Provided, That car15 riers’’ and inserting the following: ‘‘issuance. 

16 ‘‘(2) EXCEPTION.—Carriers’’; and 

17 (5) by striking ‘‘There shall be no means’’ and 

18 inserting the following: 

19 ‘‘(3) MANDATORY REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS.—If 

20 the visa of an alien is revoked pursuant to para21 graph (1) as a result of a ground for deportation de22 scribed in section 237(a)(4), the Secretary of Home23 land Security shall immediately initiate removal pro24 ceedings for such alien. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•HR 6971 IH

1 ‘‘(4) JUDICIAL REVIEW.—There shall be no 

2 means’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### Chiles *vs.*Calk.

October 19.

Error to the Montgomery Circuit; Silas W. Robbins, Judge.

*Bonds,for Costs. Conditions. Breaches.*

Debt.

Case 113.

Condition of a bond for costs, to pay the officers of the court their fees to which defendant might be liable, is not broken by a failure to pay the fees to *obligee*: & such an assignment of breach is insufficient.

Chief Justice Boyle

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The breach of the condition of the bond alleged in the declaration, is plainly insufficient. The condition nf the bond is awkwardly expressed, but the fairest and indeed the only sensible construction which can be placed upon it, is to give it the effect of a stipulation on the part of the obligor to pay to the officers of the court, the fees to which Calk the defendant. in the ejectment, refered to in the condition of the bond, should become liable But the declaration alleges the breach Jn a failure to pay the fees to Calk, and not in a failure to pay them to the officers of the court, and the allegation might, therefore, be true, and yet there might be no breach of the condition of the.bond; for the failure to pay the fees to Calk, does not necessarily imply a failure to pay them to the officers of the court

There are other irregularities in the subsequent proceedings of the cause, but as the declaration is insufficient, and the judgment in favor of Calk on *342that account erroneous, it seems unnecessary *to*notice the subsequent irregularities.

*Mayes*for plaintiff; *Triplett*for defendant;

The judgment must he reversed with costs, and the cause he remanded, for new proceedings to he had, not inconsistent herewith.
Att. 00 8 **Contains Confidential Business Information** Confidential Information Redacted
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Alan HOLT, Rosario Palermo, William H. Brown, a/k/a Bill, John D. Fisher, Robert D. Young, Joseph Macaluso, a/k/a Joe, Frank Scionti, John Nicholas Lostracco, Sam C. Martino, Paul Guarino, Jimmy Farina, Berton B. Chase, a/k/a Bert, Rolando Gonsalez Rodriguez, a/k/a Roland Rodriguez, Joseph D. Lazzara, a/k/a Joe, Joseph C. Russello, a/k/a Joe, and Amalia Morgado, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 78-5260.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 13, 1981.

Gary L. Betz, U. S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., Eleanor J. Hill, Sp. Atty., Dept, of Justice, Crim. Div., Tampa, Fla., Sara Criscitelli, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellee.

William B. Plowman, Tampa, Fla., for Farina.

Mark J. Kadish, Edward T. M. Garland, Atlanta, Ga. (Court-appointed), for Brown.

Peter N. Macaluso, Tampa, Fla., for Rodriguez.

Barry A. Cohen, Richard G. Pippinger, Tampa, Fla., for Lazzara.

Raymond E. LaPorte, Tampa, Fla., for Rusello.

*652Michael Addison, Tampa, Fla. (Court-appointed), for Morgado.

Before TUTTLE, VANCE and POLITZ, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

It has been made known to the Court as a fact, supported by the official death certificate of the state of Florida, that JOHN ALAN HOLT, one of the co-appellants herein, died in Tampa, Florida on April 23, 1981. The decision of this Court as to JOHN ALAN HOLT, 648 F.2d 367, is reconsidered and his appeal is dismissed as moot, and his cause is remanded with directions to the district court to vacate the judgment and dismiss the indictment as against him. *United States v. Pauline,*625 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1980).
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 1 7

- 5296

_____________________________ A NGELO D ARILLO B AKER , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County

. Brantley S. Clark, Jr. , Judge

. October 21, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. W OLF , K ELSEY , and W INOKUR , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### Patrick Morgan et al., Respondents, *v.*James Mulligan et al., Appellants.

(Argued June 17, 1872;

decided November 12, 1872.)

The prominent point raised upon this appeal was that the findings of the referee before whom the case was tried were defective, in that he omitted to find upon certain issues presented by the pleadings. *Held,*that the proper remedy of the party would have been to apply to the court below for an order requiring the referee to pass upon the questions and re-settle his report as prescribed in *Van SlyTce*v. *Hyatt*(46 R. Y., 259); that the objection cannot be made in this court, but the presumption is that the referee has found in harmony with the conclusions of the report upon all questions where the evidence is capable of that construction.

*J. M. Smith*for the appellants.

*Samuel Ha/nd*for the respondents.

*666Church, Ch. J.,

reads opinion for affirmance.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.
Careview Communications 10-K





EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of CareView Communications, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Samuel A. Greco, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




/s/ Samuel A. GrecoSamuel A. GrecoChief Executive OfficerApril 15, 2011




A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




74
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6825 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6825

   To amend the Securities Act of 1933 to raise the offering amount 
    threshold for when issuers using the crowdfunding exemption are 
 required to file financial statements reviewed by a public accountant 
       who is independent of the issuer, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 14, 2023

 Mr. Meuser (for himself, Mr. Huizenga, Mr. Sessions, and Mr. Nunn of 
    Iowa) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Securities Act of 1933 to raise the offering amount 
    threshold for when issuers using the crowdfunding exemption are 
 required to file financial statements reviewed by a public accountant 
       who is independent of the issuer, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Amendment for Crowdfunding Capital 
Enhancement and Small-business Support Act of 2023'' or the ``ACCESS 
Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. OFFERING THRESHOLD FOR REVIEWS BY PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT.

    (a) In General.--Section 4A(b)(1)(D) of the Securities Act of 1933 
(15 U.S.C. 77d-1(b)(1)(D)) is amended by striking ``$100,000'' each 
place such term appears and inserting ``$250,000''.
    (b) Technical Correction.--Section 4A of the Securities Act of 1933 
(15 U.S.C. 77d-1) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``section 4(6)'' each place such term 
        appears and inserting ``section 4(a)(6)''; and
            (2) by striking ``section 4(6)(B)'' each place such term 
        appears and inserting ``section 4(a)(6)(B)''.
                                 <all>
```
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A0743. KIMBERLY CLARK v. THE STATE.

In 1987, a jury found Kimberly Clark guilty of rape, aggravated sodomy, and

burglary. We affirmed his judgment of conviction on direct appeal. Clark v. State,

186 Ga. App. 882 (369 SE2d 282) (1988). In 2014, Clark filed a motion for an outof-time appeal, which the trial court denied. On appeal from that decision, we

vacated and remanded for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to inquire into

the circumstances surrounding Clark’s alleged failure to timely file an appeal and his

delay in filing the motion for an out-of-time appeal.

1 Clark v. State, No. A15A1149

(Sept. 3, 2015). On remand, following a hearing, the trial court again denied an outof-time appeal, noting that Clark in fact had filed a direct appeal in 1988. Clark now

appeals the trial court’s order on remand. We lack jurisdiction.

“An out-of-time appeal is a judicial creation that serves as the remedy for a

frustrated right of appeal.” Kilgore v. State, 325 Ga. App. 874, 875 (1) (756 SE2d 9)

(2014) (punctuation omitted). Because Clark already has had a direct appeal, he is

not entitled to an out-of-time appeal. See Richards v. State, 275 Ga. 190, 191 (563

SE2d 856) (2002) (“[T]here is no right to directly appeal the denial of a motion for

out-of-time appeal filed by a criminal defendant whose conviction has been affirmed

on direct appeal.”); Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320 (540 SE2d 612) (2001) (a defendant

“is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal”). 

1 The trial court record before this Court at that time did not reflect that Clark

previously had filed a direct appeal from his judgment of conviction.

December 19, 2016
Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

12/19/2016
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Terrence Tompkins v. State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-12-00592-CR

Trial court case number: 1337275

Trial court: 232nd District Court of Harris County

Appellant Tompkins has filed a motion to supplement the clerk’s record with a 

bill of costs. The motion to supplement the clerk’s record is granted. Pursuant to Texas 

Rules of Appellate Procedure 34.5(c) and 44.3, the trial court clerk is ordered to prepare, 

certify, and file a supplemental record containing a bill of costs. If no bill of costs 

currently exists, the trial court clerk or an officer of the court is ordered to prepare a bill 

of costs for inclusion in the supplemental record. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

103.006 (West 2001) (“If a criminal action or proceeding . . . is appealed, an officer of 

the court shall certify and sign a bill of costs stating the costs that have accrued and send 

the bill of costs to the court to which the action . . . is . . . appealed.”); see also Cardenas 

v. State, No. 01-11-01123-CR, 2013 WL 1164365, at *4−5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] Mar. 21, 2013, no pet. h.) (op. on reh’g). 

The supplemental clerk’s record shall be filed in the First Court of Appeals no 

later than May 3, 2013.

At the same time he filed his motion to supplement the record, appellant 

Tompkins also filed a motion for extension of time to file his brief. The motion for 

extension of time to file the appellant’s brief is granted. Although Tompkins only 

requested until May 5, 2013 to file his appellant’s brief, the supplemental clerk’s record 

ordered above is not due until May 3, 2013. Accordingly, we order Tompkins’s 

appellant’s brief to be filed no later than 15 days after the date the supplemental 

clerk’s record is filed. No further extensions of time will be granted absent extraordinary 

circumstances. 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Harvey Brown______

 Acting individually 

Date: April 23, 2013
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gilberto LOPEZ-ROMO, a.k.a. Romero Gilberto Lopez, Defendant-Appellant,

Nos. 16-50219, 16-50220

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 18, 2017

Michael J. Heyman, Helen H. Hong, Emily J. Keifer, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jesus Mosqueda, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

*598Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2),

MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated appeals, Gilberto Lopez-Romo challenges the 18-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the 12-month consecutive sentence imposed following revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Lopez-Romo contends that the district court proeedurally erred by failing to adequately address his mitigating arguments in favor of lower sentences for his illegal reentry conviction and violation of supervised release. The district court did not plainly err. *See United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). The record demonstrates that the district court listened to Lopez-Romo’s arguments, identified what the court believed to be the only legitimate mitigating factor, and weighed that factor against aggravating factors before imposing the within-Guidelines sentences in both cases. The district court’s explanation was sufficient. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en bane).

Lopez-Romo next argues that the district court impermissibly based the revocation sentence on the need to punish his underlying criminal conduct. The record does not support Lopez-Romo’s argument, and instead, demonstrates that the district court permissibly based the sentence on Lopez-Romo’s breach of the court’s trust, his history and characteristics, and the need for deterrence. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); *United States v. Simtob,*485 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.