IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-07-00379-CR

No. 10-07-00394-CR

DEMARCUS DONTRELL RIDGE

AND MICHAEL LYNN HENDERSON,

Appellants

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 54th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2006-603-C2 and 2007-1731-C2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Demarcus Dontrell Ridge and Michael Lynn Henderson (Appellants) were tried 

together, represented by different counsel, and a jury convicted each of murder. See 

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 2003). The jury assessed a sixty-year prison 

sentence and $500 fine for Ridge and a sixty-five-year prison sentence and $500 fine for 

Henderson. Appellants assert the same points on appeal; thus, we will address their 

points in a single opinion. We will affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Ridge v. State Page 2

In their first points, Appellants contend that fundamental error occurred when, 

upon direct questioning by the parties, a juror withheld information that she knew 

Ridge, which more likely than not produced bias in favor of the State. Specifically, 

Appellants state in their briefs that Ridge recognized one of the jurors as someone who 

coached where he had attended high school. Appellants further stated that Ridge

comes from a very large family and that this particular juror would routinely come to 

his home to give rides to other members of his family who were attending the high 

school and being coached by the individual. Based on this, Appellants concluded that 

the juror knew both Ridge and his family yet withheld this information, which “leads 

one to the conclusion that she was demonstrating bias or prejudgment.” To support 

these contentions, Appellants attached to their respective briefs a notarized but 

unsworn statement from someone who “went to [the relevant school district] from 

fourth grade to twelfth” and who states, “There is no way a teacher much less a coach 

did not know Demarcus Ridge or one of his family.”

The defense may challenge a potential juror for cause if that juror has a bias or 

prejudice in favor of or against the defendant or against any of the law applicable to the 

case upon which the defense is entitled to rely. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

35.16(a)(9), (c)(2) (Vernon 2006). But in this case, although Appellants state that Ridge 

informed his trial counsel that he recognized the juror, they both acknowledge in their 

briefs that “[t]here is no evidence in the record that [Ridge’s] trial court counsel ever 

brought this to the attention of the court.”
Ridge v. State Page 3

Moreover, a motion for new trial is the proper course to be taken in preserving 

alleged jury misconduct. Trout v. State, 702 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); see 

TEX. R. APP. P. 21.2. It is further required that such motions for new trial alleging jury 

misconduct be supported by the affidavit of a juror or some other person who was in a 

position to know the facts. Trout, 701 S.W.2d at 620. Here, Appellants’ motions for new 

trial are not verified, and no affidavits were filed to support the motions. Thus, 

Appellants’ first points were not properly preserved for appeal and are therefore 

overruled. Because Appellants filed no affidavits supporting their motions for new 

trial, we also overrule Appellants’ points arguing that the trial court erred by denying 

them a hearing on their motions for new trial and, later, denying the motions.

In their final points, Appellants contend that their respective trial court counsel 

was ineffective in that they did not bring to the attention of the court, despite being 

asked to by their respective clients, that one of the jurors actually knew Ridge and lied 

by omission by not relating that fact to the court.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the familiar Strickland v. 

Washington test must be met. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 

156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 

2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)); Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 101-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005) (same). Under Strickland, we must determine: (1) whether counsel’s performance 

was deficient, and if so, (2) whether the defense was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 

performance. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S.Ct. at 2535; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 

S.Ct. at 2064; Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 101. The second prong of Strickland requires a 
Ridge v. State Page 4

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious that they deprived the defendant of a fair 

trial, i.e., a trial whose result is reliable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 

A defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at 

694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.

Appellants have not shown that their defenses were prejudiced by their 

respective counsel’s alleged deficient performance. Although Ridge believed he knew 

the juror, there is nothing in the record showing that the juror actually knew Ridge or 

his family. As stated above, Appellants’ motions for new trial were not verified, and no 

affidavits were filed to support the motions. Furthermore, we cannot consider the 

unsworn notarized statement attached to each of Appellants’ briefs because it is outside 

the record. See Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d 866, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, 

Appellants failed to demonstrate prejudice and cannot establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel in these appeals. We overrule their final point.

Having overruled all of Appellants’ points, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Reyna, and

Justice Davis

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 26, 2009

Do not publish

[CRPM]