alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Victor SORIANO-JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-73288

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

Filed October 6, 2017

Victor Soriano Jimenez, Pro Se

Jacob Bashyrov, Esquire, Patricia Bruckner, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Victor Soriano-Jimenez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico, and thus is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the IJ’s factual findings. *Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch,*828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Soriano-Jimenez failed to demonstrate a reasonable fear of persecution on account of a protected ground. *See Zetino v. Holder,*622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Soriano-Jimenez failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government of Mexico. *See Andrade-Garcia,*828 F.3d at 836-37. Thus, Soriano-Jimenez’s challenges to the IJ’s negative reasonable fear determination fail.

We do not consider the materials Sori-ano-Jimenez references and attached to his opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. *See Fisher v. INS,*79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### YAN SUI; Pei-Yu Yang, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Richard Alan MARSHACK, an individual; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56130

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2017 *

Filed May 18, 2017

Yan Sui, Pro Se

Pei-Yu Yang, Pro Se

Chad V. Haes, Attorney, D. Edward Hays, Esquire, Attorney, Marshack Hays LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Richard Alan Marshack, Jess Bressi, R.C. Stottlemeyer, Judith E. Marshack, Chanel Mendoza, Pickford Real Estate Co., Clarence Yoshikane, D. Edward Hays

D. Edward Hays, Esquire, Attorney, Marshack Hays LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Marshack & Hays, LLC, Chad V. Haes

Chad V. Haes, Attorney, Marshack Hays LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees for David M. Goodrich

David M. Goodrich, Pro Se

Marium Moore, Esquire, Selman Breit-man LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Chad V. Haes, Attorney, Marshack Hays LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee for Scottsdale Insurance Co,

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Yan Sui and Pei-Yu Yang appeal pro se from the district court’s order dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims against, among others, a bankruptcy judge and the chapter 7 trustee representing Sui’s bankruptcy estate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion a court’s imposition of sanctions under its inherent power. *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,*501 U.S. 32, 55, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing terminating sanctions under its “inherent equitable powers to dismiss actions for ... abusive litigation practices.” *TeleVideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826*F.2d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 1987).

We reject as without merit plaintiffs’ contentions that the district court demonstrated bias.

Appellants’ request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 12) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[No. 1287,

January 6, 1910.]

#### THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. CARL ADAMSON, et al., Appellants.

Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court.

Affirmed.

J. E. Wharton for Appellant.

D. J. Leahy, United States Attorney, for Appellee.

OPINION- OF THE COURT.

PER CURIAM

The only point raised by this record is as to alleged error of the admission of evidence. The appellant and one Sullivan and one Webb were indicted for conspiracy to bring unlawfully into the United States, Chinese persons not entitled to- enter. The defendant Sullivan took the stand as a witness and, on cross examination, was. asked whether,, at the time of his arrest, he did not state that unless he was furnished bond he would implicate a prominent man in El Paso. Sullivan denied the admission and the United States in rebuttal, proved the admission. Objection was made to the testimony on the ground of immateriality. It is impossible to understand how it was immaterial. Sullivan was on trial and the admission reflected directly on his guilt. He was also a witness and it reflected upon his credibility. Counsel for appellant urges here the inadmissibility of the evidence on the ground that the admission was made for the consummation of the conspiracy and was consequently inadmissible against the other two defendants. But no such objection was made in the court below and no request was made of the court to limit the testimony tó the defendant making the admission. We cannot, therefore, consider the objection. There being no error in the record the judgment of Hie court below will be affirmed; and, it is so ordered.

WILLIAM J. MILLS, Chief Justice.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6284 

To amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to prohibit the 

marketing of authorized generic drugs. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 28, 2016 

Mr. SMITH of Washington introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to 

prohibit the marketing of authorized generic drugs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Eliminate Price In5 creases Act of 2016’’ or the ‘‘EPI Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF AUTHORIZED GENERICS. 

7 Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 

8 Act (21 U.S.C. 355) is amended by adding at the end the 

9 following: 


rfrederick on DSKBCBPHB2PROD with bills
2 

•HR 6284 IH

1 ‘‘(y) PROHIBITION OF AUTHORIZED GENERIC

2 DRUGS.— 

3 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other 

4 provision of this Act, no holder of a new drug appli5 cation approved under subsection (c) shall manufac6 ture, market, sell, or distribute an authorized ge7 neric drug, direct or indirectly, or authorize any 

8 other person to manufacture, market, sell, or dis9 tribute an authorized generic drug. 

10 ‘‘(2) AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUG.—For pur11 poses of this subsection, the term ‘authorized generic 

12 drug’— 

13 ‘‘(A) means any version of a listed drug 

14 (as such term is used in subsection (j)) that the 

15 holder of the new drug application approved 

16 under subsection (c) for that listed drug seeks 

17 to commence marketing, selling, or distributing, 

18 directly or indirectly, after receipt of a notice 

19 sent pursuant to subsection (j)(2)(B) with re20 spect to that listed drug; and 

21 ‘‘(B) does not include any drug to be mar22 keted, sold, or distributed— 

23 ‘‘(i) by an entity eligible for exclu24 sivity with respect to such drug under sub25 section (j)(5)(B)(iv); or 


rfrederick on DSKBCBPHB2PROD with bills
3 

•HR 6284 IH

1 ‘‘(ii) after expiration or forfeiture of 

2 any exclusivity with respect to such drug 

3 under such subsection (j)(5)(B)(iv).’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSKBCBPHB2PROD with bills
#### Maxwell B. Fields, Appellant, *v.*Predionica i Tkanica A. D., Defendant, and Royal Yugoslav Government, Respondent.

Submitted April 5, 1943;

decided April 15, 1943.

*William M. Chadbourne*and *Gerald B. O’Neill*for motion.

*Meyer Grouf*and *Samuel R. Wachtell*opposed.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs, and ten dollars costs of motion.
#### Christopher Jose MCLEAN, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lorenz P. KIELHORN, (M.O) Doctor at Sussex 1 State Prison, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-6250

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 23, 2017

Decided: July 6, 2017

Christopher Jose McLean, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Jose McLean, Jr., appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). *714We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See McLean v. Kielhorn,*No. 1:16-cv-00136-JCC-IDD (E.D. Va. Jan. 19, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
<Page>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.1


[Letterhead of PricewaterhouseCoopers]

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

         As independent accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation
by reference in the Form S-8 Registration Statements (Reg. Nos. 333-44590,
333-45070 and 333-66444), filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on August 25, 2000, September 1, 2000 and August 1, 2001, respectively, of
our report dated March 4, 2002, except the information presented in Note 35,
for which the date is June 10, 2002, with respect to the financial statements
of Pearson plc and of the financial statements included in Pearson plc's
Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2001 to be
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and to all references to
our Firm included in such Form 20-F.

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers
PricewaterhouseCoopers
London, England
June 10, 2002
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Luis Alberto HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41339 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 18, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Luis Alberto Hernandez-Garcia, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and ELROD, Circuit Judges;

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Luis Alberto Hernandez-Garcia has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Hernandez-Garcia has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir, R. 47.5.4.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6251 

To promote transparency by permitting the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to allow its disciplinary proceedings to be open to the 

public, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 28, 2016 

Mr. GARRETT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To promote transparency by permitting the Public Company 

Accounting Oversight Board to allow its disciplinary proceedings to be open to the public, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘PCAOB Enforcement 

5 Transparency Act of 2016’’. 

6 SEC. 2. OPEN MEETINGS AUTHORIZED. 

7 Section 105(c)(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 

8 (15 U.S.C. 7215(c)(2)) is amended to read as follows: 


SSpencer on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6251 IH

1 ‘‘(2) PUBLIC HEARINGS.—Hearings under this 

2 section shall be open to the public unless the Board, 

3 on its own motion or after considering the motion of 

4 a party, orders otherwise.’’. 

5 SEC. 3. PUBLICATION OF DETERMINATIONS. 

6 Section 105(d)(1)(C) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 

7 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7215(d)(1)(C)) is amended by striking 

8 ‘‘(once any stay on the imposition of such sanction has 

9 been lifted)’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT
23.1







CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





As independent registered public
accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of our report dated March
31, 2010 relating to the consolidated financial statements of American DG Energy
Inc. and its subsidiaries as of and for the years ended December 31, 2009 and
December 31, 2008 included in this Amendment No. 2 to Annual Report (Form
10-K/A) into the Company’s previously filed Registration Statements on Form S-8
(File No. 333-146628 and File No. 333-151287) and Form S-3, as amended (File No.
333-167392).





/s/ CATURANO AND COMPANY,
    INC.Caturano
      and Company, INC.November
      19, 2010Boston,
      Massachusetts
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-7100

DUANE HARRISON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

BRYAN STIRLING, Commissioner South Carolina Department of Corrections; 

KEVIN FORD, Acting Warden Kershaw Correctional Institution,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. 

Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (4:18-cv-02373-CMC)

Submitted: November 19, 2019 Decided: November 22, 2019

Before WILKINSON and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Duane Harrison, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Duane Harrison seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012). The magistrate judge recommended that 

relief be denied and advised Harrison that failure to file timely, specific objections to this 

recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the 

recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is 

necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the 

parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins, 766 

F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Because 

Harrison failed to file objections, he has waived appellate review of the district court’s 

order.

Harrison also seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b) motion for reconsideration. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A 

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief 

on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists 

would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or 

wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 
3

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that 

the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Harrison has not 

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk January 27, 2009

d0120 

# Order

January 27, 2009

136294(48)

SAM ANDRES, d/b/a SCHOOLCRAFT AUTO BODY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 136294 COA: 276473 Kalamazoo CC: 06-000065-NO TIM BROWN, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for re consideration of this Court’s September 19, 2008 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it doe s not appear that the order was entered erroneously.
From: Rogers, Bob

To: Srivastava, Pragati; "Steven Stout"; Marc Corrigan

Cc: Gray, Carter; Fritchie, Denis

Subject: follow-up

Date: Wednesday, September 11, 2013 4:10:48 PM

It would be an understatement to say I was pleased with how the call went today, but I have been

feeling more certain over time that the proposal would be at least generally acceptable. I am not

so happy about the prospect of having to reset the MVEB. I know when I started drafting this, I

considered whether or not that would be necessary and concluded it was not – of course, now I

can’t recall the logic I used to make that decision. I note, however, that on the recent Wisconsin

case that Mr. Stout found, it appears they did not reset their budgets. I will look a little closer into

that to make sure I am not missing something.

Anyhow, if the worst that happens is we have to do the budget exercise, that’s not too bad.

Bob Rogers, Manager

Pollution Control

Shelby County Health Department

814 Jefferson Ave.

Memphis TN 38105

(901)222-9599
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesus REYES-LIZARRAGA, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 16-10353, 16-10354

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017*

Filed July 17, 2017

Michael LoGalbo, USPX—Office of the US Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Francisco Leon, Esquire, Attorney, Law Office of Francisco Leon, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.'

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*694MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated appeals, Jesus Reyes-Lizarraga appeals the 28-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the four-month consecutive sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Reyes-Lizarraga contends that his aggregate sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to give sufficient weight to the 2016 amendments to the illegal reentry guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which were promulgated but not effective at the time of his sentencing. The record reflects that the court took account of the pending changes to the guideline and granted a significant downward variance. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a further downward variance was unwarranted in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Reyes-Lizarraga’s significant immigration history. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); *see also United States v. Ruiz-Apolonio,*657 F.3d 907, 918 (9th Cir. 2011) (“That the Commission has promulgated a not-yet-adopted amendment that is very likely to be adopted and that would result in reduced Guidelines ranges does not render a district court’s failure to grant a variance substantively unreasonable.”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Ralph Oden ANDERSON and Raymond L. Reese, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Nos. 8860, 8846.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Oct. 7, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1966.

John E. Archibold, Denver, Colo., for appellants.

M. R. Barnes, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah (William T. Thurman, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and LEWIS and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners bring this consolidated appeal from denial without hearing of their respective § 2255 motions.

Anderson and Reese were jointly charged, tried and convicted by a jury on two counts of an indictment charging burglary of the United States Post Offices in Elsinore and Centerfield, Utah, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2115. Each was sentenced to five year consecutive terms on each count. On appeal the judgment was affirmed, Anderson v. United States, 10 Cir., 344 F.2d 792.

In this collateral proceedings petitioners complain for the first time of denial of their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when the trial judge required them to sit in the jury box, separate and apart from their retained counsel, during the hearing on their Motion for the Return of Seized Property and for the Suppression of Evidence. The argument is that this was a critical stage of the proceedings against them and that by the trial court’s ordering them to sit in the jury box, they were precluded from conferring with their counsel throughout the entire hearing and were thus unable “to plan defense strategy in privacy and independently of interference or dictation by the court”, i. e. see United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 3 Cir., 203 F.2d 407, 427.

*554In the first place there is nothing in the record to indicate that any objection was raised to petitioners’ being seated in the jury box or that a request was ever made that they be seated with counsel. Moreover, the record shows that on several occasions during the hearing the defendants conferred with their counsel and that the court inquired whether they wished to confer further, advising them they could talk with counsel outside the courtroom if they so desired.

Complaint is also made of the trial court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the question whether petitioners were denied the effective assistance of counsel. General conclusory allegations to this effect impose no obligation upon the trial court to conduct a hearing. Rivera v. United States, 9 Cir., 318 F.2d 606; Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148.

The judgments are affirmed.