alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

J.B.R., a child,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-54

[October 11, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; Michael C. Heisey, Judge; L.T. Case Nos.

562014CJ000760A, 562014CJ000881B, 562017CJ000239A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Virginia Murphy, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GERBER, C.J., WARNER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Filed May 7, 1891.

#### Henry Hanson *et al.,*App’lts, v. Patrick T. Langan *et al.,*Resp’ts.

Appeal from order of the general term city court affirming order of the special term denying motion for a new trial.

Order affirmed, with costs.
<PAGE>


                                                                   EXHIBIT 10(x)

October 10, 2001

Michel Farkouh
The Scotts Company
21 Chemin de la Sauvegarde
69136 Ecully France

Dear Mr. Farkouh:

         Pursuant to our various discussions, we confirm that in the event of
termination of your employment contract by SCOTTS France SAS(2), for whatever
reason except for serious or intentional misconduct, you will be entitled to a
severance package equivalent to 2 years salary. The indemnity for dismissal
provided for by the collective bargaining agreement ("indemnite conventionnelle
de licenciement") will be considered to be included in said lump sum severance
payment. The severance payment will however have no incidence on your right to a
period of notice and will not be considered to include any indemnity which may
be due with respect to the notice period (indemnite de preavis").

         The company also undertakes to compensate you for any net loss which
you may incur on sale of your principal residence, if you are obliged to move
for business reasons for The Scotts Company.

Sincerely,

/s/ HADIA LEFAVRE

Hadia Lefavre
Executive Vice President
Human Resources Worldwide
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6879 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6879

 To amend title 17, United States Code, to provide for the diagnosis, 
  maintenance, and repair of certain digital electronic agricultural 
                               equipment.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 19, 2023

 Mrs. Spartz introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 17, United States Code, to provide for the diagnosis, 
  maintenance, and repair of certain digital electronic agricultural 
                               equipment.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Farm Freedom to Repair Act''.

SEC. 2. DIAGNOSIS, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIR OF CERTAIN DIGITAL 
              ELECTRONIC AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT.

    Section 1201 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(l) Diagnosis, Maintenance, and Repair of Digital Electronic 
Agricultural Equipment.--(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of 
subsection (a)(1)(A), it is not a violation of that subsection for a 
person, for the purpose of the diagnosis, maintenance, or repair of 
digital electronic agricultural equipment, to circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title.
    ``(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(2), it is 
not a violation of that subsection for a person, for the purpose of the 
diagnosis, maintenance, or repair of digital electronic agricultural 
equipment, to manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or 
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, 
component, or part thereof described in that subsection.
    ``(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b)(1), it is 
not a violation of that subsection for a person, for the purpose of the 
diagnosis, maintenance, or repair of digital electronic agricultural 
equipment, to manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or 
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, 
component, or part thereof described in that subsection.
    ``(4) For the purposes of this subsection, the term `digital 
electronic agricultural equipment' means any agricultural product 
dependent, in whole or in part, upon attached or embedded digital 
electronics to function.''.
                                 <all>
```
[L. A. No. 3342.

In Bank.

October 18, 1912.]

#### J. SCOTT ALLEN, Petitioner, v. H. J. LELANDE, County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles, and J. HENRY BAETZ, Respondents.

Election—Member of Assembly—Legislature Sole Judge of Qualifications of Members—Law Providing for Official Ballot.— Under section 7 of article IV of the state constitution, the assembly is made the exclusive judge of the qualifications of its members, and the law providing for an official ballot cannot be held to have *57changed the intent of the people that such body, should be the sole and exclusive judge of the eligibility of those whose election is properly certified.

Id.—Mandamus—Ineligibility of Candidate—Striking Name from Official Ballot.—A writ of mandate will not lie to compel the county clerk to strike from the official ballot the name of a candidate for member of the assembly, on the ground that he was ineligible for that office by reason of nonresidence. For the court to undertake to try the question of eligibility, and to deprive the candidate of any chance to be elected, would be to usurp the jurisdiction of the assembly.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Mandate directed to the County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Milton K. Young, and Theodore Bell, for Petitioner.

John D. Fredericks, District Attorney, for Respondents.

THE COURT.

J. Henry Baetz has been nominated as a Republican candidate for the assembly in the sixty-fifth assembly district. The secretary of state has certified to the county clerk of Los Angeles County that he is the Republican nominee for member of the assembly from said district. It is alleged that he is ineligible for that office by reason of non-residence. The county clerk has been requested to strike his name from the official ballot as such candidate, and has refused. We are asked to issue a writ of mandate compelling the clerk to comply with that demand. The constitution of the state (art. IV, sec. 7) reads as follows: “Each house shall choose its officers, and judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns of its members.” By that article the assembly is made the exclusive judge of,the qualifications of its members. The law providing for an official ballot cannot be held to have changed the intent of the people in adopting that constitutional provision that the assembly should be the sole and exclusive judge of the eligibility of those whose election is properly certified. For this court to undertake to try the question of eligibility and to deprive the candidate of any chance to be elected, would simply be to usurp the jurisdiction of the assembly.

The petition is denied.
THE STATE OF TEXAS

M A N D A T E

TO THE 186TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas on February 4, 2015, the cause upon appeal to

revise or reverse your judgment between

Gary A. Campbell, Appellant(s)

V.

The State of Texas, Appellee(s)

No. 04-14-00918-CR and Tr. Ct. No. 2013CR3125

was determined, and therein our Court of Appeals made its order in these words:

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is

DISMISSED.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals for the Fourth

District of Texas, in this behalf and in all things have the order duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

Witness the Hon. Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas,

with the seal of the Court affixed and the City of San Antonio on April 6, 2015.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853
<PAGE>   1




                                                                     EXHIBIT 3.3


                                STATE OF DELAWARE

                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                                       OF
                          CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                                       OF
                           ENGINEERING ANIMATION, INC.




FIRST: That by unanimous written consent, dated February 11, 1998, in accordance
with Section 141(f) of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, the
Board of Directors of Engineering Animation, Inc. (the "Corporation") duly
adopted resolutions setting forth a proposed amendment of the Certificate of
Incorporation of said Corporation, declaring said amendment to be advisable and
submitting such amendment to the stockholders of said Corporation for
consideration thereof. The resolution setting forth the proposed amendment is as
follows:

RESOLVED, that the Certificate of Incorporation of this Corporation be amended
by changing Section 1 of Article Fourth thereof so that, as amended, said
Section shall be and read as follows:

                  "1. AUTHORIZED SHARES. The total number of shares of stock of
         all classes which the Corporation shall have authority to issue is
         eighty million (80,000,000), of which twenty million (20,000,000) shall
         be shares of Preferred Stock of the par value of $0.01 per share, and
         sixty million (60,000,000) shall be shares of Common Stock of the par
         value of $0.01 per share."

SECOND: That thereafter, pursuant to resolution of its Board of Directors, a
majority of the holders of Common Stock of said Corporation, by action of such
stockholders at the annual meeting of the stockholders of the corporation, on
May 1, 1998 in accordance with Section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware, voted as follows: of the 9,890,949 shares of outstanding
Common Stock entitled to vote thereon, (1) the holders of 6,155,394 shares of
the outstanding stock voted in favor of the approval of said amendment; (2) the
holders of 1,322,084 shares of the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon
voted against the approval of said amendment and (3) the holders of 11,589
shares of the outstanding stock did not vote on said amendment. There were no
shares of outstanding Preferred Stock entitled to vote thereon.

THIRD: That said amendment was duly adopted in accordance with the provisions of
Section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.



                                       15
<PAGE>   2





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said Board of Directors has caused this certificate to be
signed by Jamie A. Wade, its Vice President, this eleventh day of May, 1998.



                                                By: /s/ Jamie A. Wade
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                        Vice President



                                       16
EXHIBIT
32.2



CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Ocean Power Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended
April 30, 2018 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned,
Matthew T. Shafer, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



| | (1) | The
    Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
    and                   
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |     |                                                                                                                                                             
| | (2) | The
    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
    of the Company.



|/s/
    Matthew T. Shafer                 | 
|----------------------------------------- | 
|Matthew
    T. Shafer                     | 
|Chief
    Financial Officer and Treasurer | 



Date:
July 17, 2018



A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company
and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
                    The Schedule contains summary financial
                    information extracted from the financial
                    statements for Prudential Securities Strategic
                    Trust and is qualified in its entirety by
                    reference to such financial statements
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<CIK>               0001005006
<NAME>              Prudential Securities Strategic Trust
<MULTIPLIER>        1

<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               Dec-31-2000

<PERIOD-START>                  Jan-1-2000

<PERIOD-END>                    Mar-31-2000

<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-Mos

<CASH>                          24,026,789

<SECURITIES>                    (315,483)

<RECEIVABLES>                   2,774

<ALLOWANCES>                    0

<INVENTORY>                     0

<CURRENT-ASSETS>                23,714,080

<PP&E>                          0

<DEPRECIATION>                  0

<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  23,714,080

<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           2,603,763

<BONDS>                         0

<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0

<PREFERRED>                     0

<COMMON>                        0

<OTHER-SE>                      21,110,317

<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    23,714,080

<SALES>                         0

<TOTAL-REVENUES>                (7,600,308)

<CGS>                           0

<TOTAL-COSTS>                   0

<OTHER-EXPENSES>                512,629

<LOSS-PROVISION>                0

<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0

<INCOME-PRETAX>                 0

<INCOME-TAX>                    0

<INCOME-CONTINUING>             0

<DISCONTINUED>                  0

<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0

<CHANGES>                       0

<NET-INCOME>                    (8,112,937)

<EPS-BASIC>                   (31.77)

<EPS-DILUTED>                   0

</TABLE>
#### Edward Dane JEFFUS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Stephanie HOLLEMBAEK, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-7659

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 18, 2017

Decided: April 21, 2017

*270Edward Dane Jeffus, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Edward Dane Jeffus appeals the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Jeffus v. Hollembaek,*No. 5:15-hc-02240-D (E.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Niki-Alexander SHETTY, AKA Satish Shetty, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC., a Virginia Corporation; Does, 1-10, Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56476

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 24, 2017

Niki-Alexander Shetty, Pro Se

*830Allison 0. Chua, Brian A. Paino, McGlin-chey Stafford, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Niki-Alexander Shetty, AKA Satish Shetty, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging claims related to a consent judgment and an unlawful detainer action between SunTrust Mortgage, Ine. and third parties. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Thompson v. Paul,*547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Shetty’s action was proper because Shetty lacks standing to enforce the terms of a government consent judgment with SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., and he failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he has standing to prosecute claims arising from an allegedly wrongful unlawful detainer action filed against the third-party borrower. *See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc.,*554 U.S. 269, 273-74, 289-90, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008) (elements of Article III standing; prudential standing requires that a party must assert its own legal rights and may not assert the legal rights of another).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend because amendment of the complaint would be futile. *See United States ex rel. Lee v. Smith-Kline Beecham, Inc.,*245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### IN RE: Peli Popovich HUNT, Debtor. Peli Popovich Hunt, individual and Trustee, Appellant, v. Elissa D. Miller, Chapter 7 Trustee; et al., Appellees.

No. 14-55776

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 5, 2017

Peli Popovich Hunt, Pro Se

Daniel A. Lev, Esquire, Bankruptcy Counsel, SulmeyerKupetz, Los Angeles, CA, for Appellee Elissa D. Miller

Paul R. Pearlson, Esquire, Cameron & Pearlsqn, Long Beach, CA, James R. Selth, Weintraub & Selth, APC, Los Ange-les, CA, for Appellees Khiem D. Dao, Howard J. Marans, Daniel A. Capen, Tim*590othy J. Hunter, Amir Azizi, Andrew Ja-minski, Robert A. Rafael

Hatty Yip, Office of the U.S. Trustee, Los Angeles, CA, for Trustee

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Peli Popovich Hunt appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting the chapter 7 trustee’s motion to sell real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the district court’s decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court and apply the same standards of review applied by the district court. *In re Thorpe Insulation Co,,*677 F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to approve the sale of the real property because an order approving the sale of estate property is enumerated as a core bankruptcy proceeding that bankruptcy judges are empowered to hear and determine. *See*11 U-S.C. § 157(b). Hunt’s interest in the property became property of the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of her bankruptcy petition. *See*11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); *Turner v. Cook,*362 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (all legal or equitable interests of a debtor in property become property of the bankruptcy' estate upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case).

Contrary to Hunt’s contention, the trustee’s motion was timely noticed. Hunt was not entitled to the additional three days provided by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(f) because the deadline to oppose the trustee’s motion was fixed by the scheduled hearing date, and not the date of service. *See*Bankr. C.D. Cal. R. 90134(f) (setting a party’s deadline to oppose a noticed motion).

To the extent Hunt challenges the bankruptcy court’s order as the representative of a separate legal entity, the appeal is dismissed because “a non-lawyer ‘has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.’ ” *Johns v. County of San Diego,*114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting *C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States,*818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject Hunt’s contentions that the bankruptcy court and district court demonstrated bias.

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Peter Norman LEEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONTANA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-35006

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 30, 2017

Peter Norman Leek, Pro Se

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Peter Norman Leek, a Montana state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the Montana Board of Pardons and Parole placed unconstitutional conditions on his eligibility for parole. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Leek’s action as barred by the doctrine of *759res judicata because the parties or those in privity with them, subject matter, issues, and capacities of the parties are the same as in Leek’s prior state court action for habeas corpus. *See Furnace v. Giurbino,*838 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that a “reasoned habeas judgment” has the same preclusive effect in federal court as in state court and that federal courts apply state law in determining whether a plaintiffs earlier state habe-as petition bars his § 1983 claims); *Wiser v. Mont Bd. of Dentistry,*360 Mont. 1, 261 P.3d 675, 677, 679 (2011) (setting forth requirements for application of res judica-ta under Montana law and explaining that res judicata not only bars issues actually litigated but also those that could have been litigated).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Leek leave to file an amended complaint because amendment would be futile. *See U.S. ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc.,*245 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be futile).

We reject as unsupported by the record Leek’s contention that the district court improperly denied his requests for assistance.

We reject as without merit Leek’s contention that the district court denied him due process.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.