alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Kendall Bell v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01

- 15

- 00510

- CR

Trial court case number: 1394740

Trial court: 263rd District Court of Harris County

In December 2016 , we reversed appellant Kendall Bell’s transfer from juvenile court to criminal district court based upon Moon v. State , 451 S. W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

In its first ground in its petition for discretionary review to the Court of Crimina l Appeals from this panel’s opinion, the State raised for the first time a jurisdictional challenge. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the petition on this ground, vacated this Court’s judgment, and remanded the case so that the jurisdictional issue co uld be “fully vetted . . . in the first instance.”
Bell v. State

, – S.W.3d

– , No. PD

- 0052

- 17, 2017 WL 1067892, at *1 (T ex. Crim. App. March 22, 2017).

Bell had been released on bail while the petition was pending in the Court of Criminal Appeals . But t he criminal district court issued an alias capias for Bell’s arrest on Friday, May 19, 2017, shortly after the mandate issued from the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Bell has filed a motion asking this Court to set bail under article 44.04(h) of the Code of
Crimi nal Procedure and a separate mo tion to stay the alias capias. However, article 44.04(h) permits us to set bail only when a conviction is reversed and a petition has not yet been filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals

. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. art. 44. 4(h). O ur judgment has been vacated and thus Bell’s conviction has been reinstated

. Accordingly, we do not have authority to
set bail at this time.

We therefore deny Bell’s Motion for $50,000 Bail and his Motion for Stay of Alias Capias

. It is so ORDERE D.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Rebeca Huddle

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Huddle.
Date: May 23, 2017
DFPIOFTBANSR 

nncKFTS 

:\< M .'X U: li 

OST-2010-0046 

Secretary of the DOT 

Dear Sir: 

If Mountain time is replaced with Central Time our county will fail and it's 

citizens will be miserable. Keep Mountain Time. Let us vote. 

Rural Mercer County Resident 

iHriii
|   | 1. | The Report      fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                         |  /s/      Len De Melt                                                                                            |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dated:      October 14, 2008 |  Len De Melt                                                                                                                         |
|                         |  President, Chief      Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer,      Secretary, Treasurer, Director |
#### Donald York EVANS, Plaintiff, and John Witherow, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lea BAKER and I. Connally, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15502

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted January 11, 2017 San Francisco, California

Filed May 30, 2017

*489Lee Tucker, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDAZ — Federal Public Defender’s Office (Tucson), Tucson, AZ, for Petitioner-Appellant

David Andrew Simpson, Attorney, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondents-Appellees

Before: CLIFTON and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSON,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, United States District Judge for the District of North Dakota, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

John Witherow, a former inmate at the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), appeals the grant of summary judgment to NDOC on his Fourth Amendment claim. The threshold issue on remand before the district judge was whether NDOC’s practice of initially screening and occasionally “checking in” on Witherow’s legal calls was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, including whether there were alternative prison policies that could satisfy NDOC’s objectives in screening telephone calls. *Evans v. Skolnik,*637 Fed.Appx. 285, 288 (9th Cir. 2015).

A district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed *de novo. Colwell v. Bannister,*763 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014). Generally, before granting summary judgment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) requires a court to give the parties notice and a reasonable time to respond. Further, before entering summary judgment *sua sponte,*Rule 56(f)(3) requires the court to “identify!] for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.” However, in this case the district court did not provide the parties with notice and a reasonable time to respond, nor did it identify the facts it relied on in reaching its decision or set forth a full analysis of the existing record.

Under these circumstances, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings for compliance with Rule 56(f).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard C. SIHNER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10202

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 16, 2017 * San Francisco, California

Filed September 7, 2017

Matthew Gould Morris, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Katherine Lydon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USSAC—Office of the US Attorney, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Christopher Haydn-Myer, Attorney, Haydn-Myer Law Office, Rocklin, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and WATTERS,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Susan P, Watters, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Richard Sihner appeals his conviction for making material false statements to federal agents, an order imposing restitution in the amount of $78,000, and a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice.

The special verdict form did not constructively amend the indictment because it did not alter the terms of the indictment. *United States v. Ward,*747 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2014).

Trial counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to object to the special verdict form because the special verdict form did not constructively amend the indictment, and it correctly reflected that either false statement was sufficient to convict Sihner. *See United States v. UCO Oil Co.,*546 F.2d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 1976). Counsel is not deficient for failing to raise *511a meritless objection. *See Rupe v. Wood,*93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996).

Even if there was insufficient evidence to find Sihner made one false statement, the error was harmless because the jury found Sihner made both false statements. *United States v. Plascencia-Orozco,*852 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2017).

The restitution order may be summarily affirmed because Sihner provided an insufficient record to review the issue. *In re O’Brien,*312 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the district court did not clearly err in calculating the amount of payments made to Sihner. *See United States v. Sarno,*73 F.3d 1470, 1503 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We review ... the factual findings underpinning [restitution] orders for clear error.”). The court may rely on hearsay evidence at sentencing, and Sihner has failed to demonstrate that such reliance was improper here. *See United States v. Petty,*982 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) (hearsay may be considered at sentencing as long as it bears some minimal indicia of reliability).

Based on the above conclusions, Sihner’s argument that the district court erred when it imposed a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice is without merit.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Alexis Rashaad FAVORS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-10389 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 27, 2017

Gary C. Tromblay, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Kevin Joel Page, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, William Ernest Hermesmeyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Alexis Rashaad Favors pleaded, guilty, without a plea agreement, to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. He now challenges his sentence, contending that the district court plainly erred in characterizing his prior *282conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under Texas Penal Code § 22.02 as a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 222.1(a)(3) (2015) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015). Favors insists that, even though aggravated assault is enumerated as a crime of violence in Application Note One in the commentary of § 4B1.2, the Supreme Court’s decision in *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), invalidated both the residual clause of § 4B 1.2(a)(2) and the note. He further maintains that his prior Texas offense does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2) because aggravated assault is not one of the four offenses it enumerates. Finally, Favors claims that his prior offense does not satisfy the force-as-an-element clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1).

After Favors submitted his appellate brief, the Supreme Court held, in *Beckles v. United States,*— U.S.-, 137 S.Ct. 886, 892, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), that § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause “is not void for vagueness” because “the Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause.” Favors’s arguments regarding § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause and Application Note One are thus unavailing. We have previously held that a Texas aggravated assault conviction constitutes the enumerated “aggravated assault” offense. *United States v. Guillen-Alvarez,*489 F.3d 197, 199-201 (5th Cir. 2007); *United States v. Rayo-Valdez,*302 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, we have recently confirmed that Texas’s crime of aggravated assault satisfies § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s force-as-an-element clause. *See United States v. Shepherd,*848 F.3d 425, 427-28 (5th Cir. 2017). The district court did not plainly err. *See United States v. Fields, 777*F.3d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 2015).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### County of Nassau, Respondent, *v.*Joseph P. Day et al., as Trustees, Appellants, et al., Defendants.

Argued October 19, 1943;

decided December 2, 1943.

*733
      *Fred L. Gross*for appellants.

*Eugene R. Hurley*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughban, Rippey, Lewis, Conway Desmond and Thacheb, JJ.
1 Greenridgg Lane #2 

Lincoln, MA 01773 

(7SI) 259-0219) 

June 29,2004 

Mr, Robert T. Donaldson, Associate Director 

Business Compliance Division 

Bureau of Waste Prevention 

Department of Environmental Protection 

One Winter Street Eighth Floor 

Boston, Massachusetts 021 OS 

Subject: Proposed Revisions to Emergency Engine Regulations 

Massachusetts 310 CMR 7,02(8ttft. 7.0SftVf aY. Etc. 

Massachusetts is proposing to revise their 310 CMR 7,00 regulations to require that all 

emergency engines > 37 Kw use the new ultra low sulfur diesel oil mandated by 40 CFR 80.29, 

etc. when it becomes available, In general, this aspect of proposed rule changes should provide 

useful environmental benefits with only modest costs, and therefore does seem an appropriate 

revision. 

However, for facilities that use a single diesel oil storage tank to supply both (power/heating) 

boilers and emergency diesel engines, this rule would effectively require the source to either: (1) 

install separate storage tanks for the emergency engines; or (2) use ultra low sulfur oil for the 

boilers as well as the emergency engines. Either option could entail a significant cost. As these 

proposed rule changes also extend applicability of these provisions to engines down to 37 kW, its 

impact could be substantial at very small sources. For small sources, such as hospitals and 

schools, using a single storage tank for all combustion sources, it may be appropriate to provide 

either a compliance extension or an exemption to avoid their being inadvertently saddled with a 

significant new expense as a result of having to use ultra low sulfur oil for all combustion 

sources. 

Thank you for your Consideration of this comment. 

Sincerely, 

Bob Madiaver 

BT20-6G2 IBL 2 ' d
### DRAFT

Transformer_DRAFT_TSD_Appendix12B_version8-01-05_DOE.doc 

## APPENDIX 12B. MANUFACTURER IMPACT ANALYSIS

SMALL BUSINESS INTERVIEW GUIDE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

12B.1 MIA Interview Guide for Small Businesses 12B-1

12B-i

### DRAFT

Transformer_DRAFT_TSD_Appendix12B_version8-01-05_DOE.doc 

## Distribution Transformer Energy Conservation Standards Rulemaking Manufacturer Impact Analysis Interview Guide for Small Businesses

1. Are you aware of the US Department of Energy’s on-going rulemaking to establish national minimum efficiency standards for distribution transformers? 1 Would you like to be added to the DOE’s email database for updates relating to this rulemaking?

2. We are assessing the potential impacts of a potential minimum efficiency standard on small businesses. Is your company a small business (defined as less than 750 employees, including all subsidiaries and parent companies, and employees in all countries where you operate)?

3. Does your company manufacture LV dry-type, MV dry-type, and/or liquid-immersed distribution transformers? How many different kVA ratings and designs do you produce within these three major groupings?

4. Are you familiar with NEMA’s TP-1 / the E NERGY S TAR voluntary standard? Are any of your products TP-1 compliant? If so, what percent of your sales does this represent?

5. Would a TP-1 standard, mandated by the US DOE (whereby all your competitors would also required to meet the same standard), cause any burdens on your business?

6. What if the US DOE required an efficiency standard higher than TP-1? Would that change your answer to #5? Please consider costs such as new designs, capital investment, prototype testing, and marketing that might be required.

7. Are there any reasons that a small business such as yours might be at a competitive disadvantage relative to a larger business under mandatory efficiency standards? Please consider such factors as technical expertise, capital budgets, bulk purchasing power for material inputs (e.g., electrical steels), etc.

8. Would the Department’s proposed test procedure impose an undue burden on small business (explanation required)? 2 Please consider such factors as technician time, statistical expertise, reporting burden, etc.

1 For information on the US DOE’s efficiency standards rulemaking for distribution transformers, visit: http://www.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/commercial/distribution_transformers_anopr.html

2 For information on the US DOE’s draft test procedure for distribution transformers, visit: http://www.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/commercial/distribution_transformers_snopr.html

12B-1
<Page>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 32.01

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

In connection with this quarterly report of ML JWH Strategic Allocation Fund
L.P. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (this "Report"),
I, Robert M. Alderman, Chief Executive Officer, President and Manager of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. This Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: August 12, 2005

By /s/ ROBERT M. ALDERMAN
   ----------------------
Robert M. Alderman
Chief Executive Officer, President and Manager
(Principal Executive Officer)
Exhibit 13.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report of AudioCodes Ltd. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Nachum Falek, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.







/s/ NACHUM FALEK



Nachum Falek

Vice President Finance and

Chief Financial Officer





September 22, 2004







| |  | 
| |  |
| 1. | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2. | To      my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in      all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations      of the Company as of and for the period covered by the    report. |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:      April 12, 2010 | By:    | /s/      Ronen Zadok                |
|---------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|
|                      |   | Ronen      Zadok                    |
|                      |   | Chief      Financial Officer        |
|                      |   | (Principal      Accounting Officer) |

----
4828
      Loop
      Central Drive


Houston
      TX 77081


Telephone
      713-966-8966


Fax
      713-218-4595


www.littonloan.com


**SERVICER
      COMPLIANCE STATEMENT**





Ownit
      Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-7








The
      undersigned officer of Litton Loan Servicing LP provides the Annual Statement
      as
      to Compliance as required by the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the above
      referenced security and certifies that (i) a review of the activities of the
      Servicer during such preceding calendar year (or such shorter period in the
      case
      of the first such report) and of performance under this Agreement has been
      made
      under my supervision, and (ii) to the best of my knowledge, based on such
      review, the Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under this Agreement
      in
      all material respects for 2006, except as disclosed below:





*Reconciliations
      for Asset-Backed Securities Related Bank Account -
      1122(d)(2)(vii)(D)*





Our
      investor bank account reconciliations included certain reconciling items that
      were not resolved within 90 calendar days of their original identification
      on
      eleven of sixty-three investor bank account reconciliations selected for
      testing. The sum of the reconciling items for those eleven reconciliations
      was
      $216,950.





*Adjustments
      to Interest Rates for Pool Assets With Variable Rates -
      1122(d)(4)(ix)*





Our
      testing of sixty-five adjustable rate mortgages revealed two instances where
      certain adjustable rate mortgages for which the interest rate reset in the
      servicing system did not agree to interest rates in the appropriate source
      index
      per the borrower’s note documents. These were the result of incorrect
      information transferring from the prior servicer. Additionally, the same
      sixty-five mortgages selected for testing included one instance where the
      adjustable rate mortgage payment change date in the servicing system did not
      agree to the loan documents.








Date:  February
      27, 2007








*/s/
      Elizabeth Folk*


__________________________________


Elizabeth
      Folk


Senior
      Vice President and


Chief
      Financial Officer


Litton
      Loan Servicing LP






Inv
        499 -
        Servicer Compliance Statement
#### In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Emma B. Johnson, Deceased. Norma D. Owen et al., Appellants; Norman W. Roe et al., Respondents.

Argued November 17, 1943;

decided January 13, 1944.

*816
      *Nathan L. Miller*and *Frederick M. Schlater*for Norma D. Owen appellant.

*Frederick M. Schlater*for George B. Dare, appellant.

*Archibald B. Watson, Harold B. Medina, Balph 0. Willguss*and *Lamar Hardy*for Norman W. Roe, respondent.

*Samuel B. Stewart, Jr., Bruce Bromley, Bobert H. Wilson, Jr., Gerald Fitzgerald*and *Louis A. Perkins*for charitable and other legatees, respondents.

Order affirmed, with costs to all parties filing separate briefs payable out of the estate, and questions certified answered in the negative. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughban, Rippby, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacheb, JJ.
Filed May 12, 1891.

#### The A. Hall Terra Cotta Co., Resp’t, v. Andrew T. Doyle, App’lt.

Appeal from judgment on referee’s report.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Saratoga Investment Corp. (the Company) for the annual period ended
February 28, 2015, as filed with the Securities Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Christian L. Oberbeck, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, Henri J. Steenkamp, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, each certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to our knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. The information contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: May 20, 2015



/s/ CHRISTIAN L. OBERBECKChristian L. OberbeckChief Executive Officer/s/ HENRI J. STEENKAMPName:

Henri J. SteenkampChief Financial Officer and Chief Compliance Officer