alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6779 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6779

         To end unemployment payments to jobless millionaires.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 14, 2023

  Mr. Curtis introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
         To end unemployment payments to jobless millionaires.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ending Unemployment Payments to 
Jobless Millionaires Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. ENDING UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS TO JOBLESS MILLIONAIRES.

    (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
Federal funds may be used to make payments of unemployment compensation 
(including such compensation under the Federal-State Extended 
Compensation Act of 1970) in a year to an individual whose adjusted 
gross income is equal to or greater than $1,000,000.
    (b) Compliance.--Any application for unemployment compensation 
shall include a form or procedure for an individual applicant to 
certify that such individual is not prohibited from receiving 
unemployment compensation pursuant to subsection (a).
    (c) Audits.--The certifications required by subsection (b) shall be 
auditable by the Department of Labor or the Government Accountability 
Office.
    (d) Effective Date.--The prohibition under subsection (a) shall 
apply to weeks of unemployment beginning on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 10.44

                          AMENDMENT OF LEASE EXTENSION

CB Richard Ellis Limited
#600 - 1111 West Georgia Street
Vancouver, BC  V6E 4M3

Attention: Ms. Lisa Bailey and Mr. Blair Quinn

Re:  Lease between  Pivotal  Corporation  (the "Tenant") and Dunsmuir and Hornby
     Ltd. (the  "Landlord")  for the 4th and 6th floor  premises of the building
     located at 885 Dunsmuir,  Vancouver,  BC (the "Building")  dated August 18,
     2000.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

By a Lease  Extension  dated the 30th day of October 2001, the Tenant  exercised
their Option to extend the lease of the 4th and 6th floor  premises for a period
of five (5) months commencing May 1, 2002 and expiring September 30, 2002 on the
same terms and conditions as the 6th floor premises less the leasing commission.

The Tenant also  exercised  their Right of First  Refusal of the 7th floor lease
commencing May 1, 2002 and expiring September 30, 2002 at Market Rental Rates.

And Whereas the Tenant wishes to amend the Lease Extension.

Now Therefore this Lease Extension  Amendment witnesses that in consideration of
the mutual covenants hereafter contained,  the parties hereto covenant and agree
with each other that the said Lease Extension is hereby amended as follows:

     1)   The expiry date of the 4th & 6th floor  premises  shall be October 31,
          2002,
     2)   The expiry  date of the 7th floor  premises  shall be October 31, 2002
          and the Basic  Rental  Rate shall be $12.00 per square  foot per annum
          commencing May 1, 2002

A party  hereto may  signify  its  agreement  to the terms  hereof by  facsimile
transmission.  A telecopy facsimile of this agreement received by a party hereto
which shows the signature(s) of the authorized signatory(ies) of the other party
will be good proof of execution by that other party.

<PAGE>

DATED at Vancouver this 11th day of April, 2002.

DUNSMUIR & HORNBY LTD.


Per: [ILLEGIBLE SIGNATURE]              [ILLEGIBLE SIGNATURE]
     ------------------------------     ----------------------------------------
       (Authorized Signatory)                      (Witness)

ACCEPTED at North Vancouver, B.C. this 29th day of April, 2002.

PIVOTAL CORPORATION


Per: [ILLEGIBLE SIGNATURE]              [ILLEGIBLE SIGNATURE]
     ------------------------------     ----------------------------------------
       (Authorized Signatory)                      (Witness)





                                      -2-
#### Hart v. Hart.

Appeal: trial de novo : defective abstract. A canse cannot be tried on its merits in this court where appellant’s abstract shows on its face that it does not contain all the evidence *offered by bis*adversary in the court below, even though the abstract states that it contains all the evidence.

*Appeal from Carroll District Court.*— Hon. C. F. Loofbourow, Judge.

Filed, May 18, 1888.

This is an action for a divorce. There was a decree by the court below for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

*B. I.*Salinger, for appellant.

*BJ. If.*Betzer, for appellee.

*488Rotuno ck, J.

The parties were married on the filth day of April, 1881, and lived together as husband and wife until July 25, 1882, at which time a separation took place, and the plaintiff went with her child (the issue of the marriage) to her father’s house, where she has ever since resided. She and her child have been supported by her father, and by her own personal labor. This action was commenced in April, 1885. The grounds for divorce, as set forth in the petition, ai'e (1) desertion ; (2) cruel and inhuman treatment; and (3) the drunkenness of the defendant.

It is claimed that the evidence was insufficient to authorize a decree. It is probably true that the evidence as to the alleged desertion would be insufficient. It appears that the separation was by consent. The parties were boarding at the time, and the plaintiff left the boarding-house with her child, and went to her father’s house, and did not return. The defendant assisted her in going away from the boarding-house, securing her an opportunity to ride in the wagon of another person in the direction of her father’s place of residence. But we think the decree may be sustained upon the ground of cruelty, and that the claim made by the appellant that this ground is not sustained by evidence, in addition to the testimony of the plaintiff, is not well founded. It appears from evidence other than the testimony of the plaintiff that for much of the time after the marriage of the parties they lived with relatives ; that the defendant was addicted to drunkenness j and that, from the time of the separation until the trial in the court below, the defendant has not offered to contribute anything to the support of the plaintiff and his child. It is not shown that he is physically unable to contribute to their support by his labor. He makes no claim to the custody of his child, but seems to be entirely content that his family shall be maintained without his assistance. We do not think the record is in a condition which will authorize us to review the questions of fact in the case. It appears from an inspection of the *489abstract and amended abstract filed by appellant that the plaintiff introduced and examined five witnesses. The testimony of three witnesses is presented in the abstracts, but the testimony of the other two is entirely omitted. Nor, although the claim is made in the abstracts that they are abstracts of all the evidence, they show on their face that the claim is not correct. In this state of the record we cannot determine the cause upon its merits.

Aeeirmed.
#### Abraham RIOS, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-73579

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 19, 2017

Aimee Souza, Souza Immigration Law, PLLC, Suquamish, WA, for Petitioner

Drew Brinkman, Suzanne N. Nardone, Esquire, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P, 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Abraham Rios, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying administrative closure and dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order of removal. We dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of administrative closure. *Diaz-Covarrubias v. Mukasey,*551 F.3d 1114, 1118-20 (9th Cir. 2009).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Rios’ unexhausted contentions that the IJ failed to apply mandatory presumptions in his favor and applied legally erroneous standards of proof. *See Tijani v. Holder,*628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before the BIA.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 

 

 **** SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITING   

 The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of 

Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27, 

1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice 

Thomas J. Moyer. 

 Please call any errors to the attention of the Reporter's 

Office of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Attention: Walter S. 

Kobalka, Reporter, or Deborah J. Barrett, Administrative 

Assistant. Tel.: (614) 466-4961; in Ohio 1-800-826-9010. 

Your comments on this pilot project are also welcome. 

 NOTE: Corrections may be made by the Supreme Court to the 

full texts of the opinions after they have been released 

electronically to the public. The reader is therefore advised 

to check the bound volumes of Ohio St.3d published by West 

Publishing Company for the final versions of these opinions. 

The advance sheets to Ohio St.3d will also contain the volume 

and page numbers where the opinions will be found in the bound 

volumes of the Ohio Official Reports. 

 

The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Fair, Appellant. 

[Cite as State v. Fair (1994), Ohio St. 3d .] 

Appellate procedure -- Application for reopening appeal from 

 judgment and conviction based on claim of ineffective 

 assistance of appellate counsel -- Application denied when 

 applicant fails to establish good cause for filing the 

 application more than ninety days after the effective date 

 of App.R. 26(B) and when no colorable issue of ineffective 

 assistance of counsel is found. 

 (No. 94-1680 -- Submitted November 1, 1994 -- Decided 

December 30, 1994.) 

 Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 

90AP-363. 

 Appellant, Eddie J. Fair, was convicted of aggravated 

murder, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and rape, and sentenced 

to thirty years to life. He appealed, and the court of appeals 

affirmed the convictions. State v. Fair (July 6, 1991), 

Franklin App. No. 90AP-363, unreported. He asserts that on 

February 8, 1994 he filed a motion for delayed reconsideration 

(reopening) in the court of appeals based on "State v. Murnahan 

(1992), 63 Ohio St. 3d 60 [584 N.E. 2d 1204], and ** * by 

App.R. 26(B), as amended effective July 1, 1993," alleging 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the 

presentation of issues concerning testimony of appellant's 

alleged common-law wife and a "jailhouse lawyer." The court of 

appeals held that appellant failed to establish good cause for 

filing the application more than ninety days after the 

effective date of App.R. 26 (B), and otherwise found no 

colorable issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, and 

denied the application. Appellant appeals from that decision. 

 

 Michael Miller, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Joyce S. Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Eddie J. Fair, pro se. 
 Per Curiam. The decision of the court of appeals is 

affirmed for the reasons stated in its opinion. 

 Judgment accordingly. 

 Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. 

Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
#### Mary E. Lee, Appellant, *v.*Glens Falls Hospital, Respondent.

Submitted October 4, 1943;

decided October 14, 1943.

Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 291 N. Y. 526.)
From: Khan, Mohammed 

Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 2010 2:27 PM 

To: 'cdigiovanni@apsp.org' 

Subject: Shipments Clarification

Dear Carvin DiGiovanni,

The following is a request for an additional information related to the comment you provided to DOE 

regarding DOE's rulemaking which includes pool heaters.

Your comment provided pool heaters shipments data, and you stated, "The data collected by the APSP is 

only available in 2 classifications (Spa – 130,000 Btuh and lower; and Pool – above 130,000 Btuh and 

less than or equal to 400,000 Btuh). The data we will share with you today is the sum of these 2 

classifications."

Since the shipments are a key component of DOE's analysis, it would be very helpful if you could provide 

the same data separately for Spas and for Pools or simply provide an estimate of the average fraction of 

Spa shipments versus Pool shipments.

Currently DOE's assumes that Spa heaters account for about 15% of the shipments (source: DOE 

Technical Support Document for Pool Heaters Standard, 1993). Your input will help to improve DOE's 

analysis.

Thank you very much.

 

Mohammed Khan

Building Technologies Program

(202) 586-7892 voice

(202) 586-4617 fax

 

EERE-2006-BT-STD-0129 COMMENT 65
#### Florence E. Harrison et al., Respondents, *v.*Senator-Ridge Corp., Appellant.

Submitted April 7, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*771
      *Louis Helfenstein*and *Joseph S. Robinson*for appellant.

*A. Michael Katz*and *Irving Stoopack*for respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, . Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Finch, J.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6627 

To reinstate pilots fired or forced to resign because of a COVID–19 vaccine 

mandate. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 6, 2023 

Ms. GREENE of Georgia introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To reinstate pilots fired or forced to resign because of a 

COVID–19 vaccine mandate. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REINSTATING PILOTS FIRED OR FORCED TO 

4 RESIGN BECAUSE OF A COVID–19 VACCINE 

5 MANDATE. 

6 Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment 

7 of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad8 ministration shall take such actions as are necessary to 

9 require air carriers to reinstate any pilot who was fired 

2 

•HR 6627 IH

1 or forced to resign because of a COVID–19 vaccine man2 date. 

Æ
#### Albertus Larrowe, App’lt, *v.*Herman J. Lewis *et al.,*Resp’ts.1

*(Court of Appeals,*

*Filed June 16, 1891.)*

Contract—Sale—Construction of.

Plaintiff paid defendant for a large number of railroad ties, delivered under a contract which stated one price to be paid for all ties delivered, and now claims that the money was paid in advance and that he should not pay for “ seconds ” and is entitled to recover their price as an overpayment. *Held,*that while the finding that the word “counted” meant "inspected” it would not justify the conclusion that the plaintiff might accept both classes and pay for the second class their actual value, in the absence of any provision in the contract to that effect.

Appeal from judgment of the supreme court, general term, fifth department, affirming judgment entered upon report of referee, dismissing complaint

*E. A. Nash,*for *app’lt; J. F. Parkhurst,*for resp’ts.

1

 Affirming 33 N. Y. State Rep., 769.

Andrews, J.

It is conceded that the defendants were not paid any money in excess of that to which they were entitled for ties delivered and accepted by the plaintiff, reckoning them at the price fixed by the contract. The claim of the plaintiff is that the payments were made in advance, and that as part of the ties delivered were, upon inspection by the plaintiff’s inspector, classified as seconds, and were, in fact, seconds, that the plaintiff was not bound to pay therefor the price of first-class ties, and consequently that he is entitled to recover the deficiency as an over payment

The difficulty is, that by the contract one price was to be paid for all the ties the defendants should deliver. The finding that the word “counted” means “inspected,” might authorize the rejection of all but first-class ties, but it does not justify the conclusion that the plaintiff might accept both classes, and pay only for the second class their actual value, in the absence of any provision in the contract to that effect

The plaintiff requested a finding that this was the custom in contracts of this kind The evidence is contradictory upon the point, and the referee refused the request of the plaintiff to find the custom alleged, and to this refusal no exception was taken.

Upon the case as presented there appears to be no error in the record, and the judgment should, therefore, be affirmed.

All concur, except Finch, J., absent.
#### Jacob Rieser, App’lt, *v.*Ernest P. Plath, Adm’r, Resp’t.

*Edward W. S. Johnston,*for app’lt; *H. M. Gescheidt,*for resp’t.

Order affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Affirming 36 N. Y. State Rep., 34.
#### ANTHONY *v.*CITY OF ATLANTA *et al.*

No. 13510.

September 26, 1940.

*Morgan Belser*and *Philip Btheridge,*for plaintiff.

*Bertram 8. Boley,*for persons at interest.

*J. O. Savage, B. L. Sterne, J. C. Murphy,*and *F. A. Hooper Jr.,*for defendants.

G-ricb, Justice.

An equitable petition was brought by B. Anthony, the owner and operator of a beauty-shop known as Anthony Permanent Waving Salon, against the City of Atlanta et al., seeking to enjoin enforcement of the penal provisions of an ordinance fixing hours of work and minimum prices to be charged by operators of such beauty-shops for specified services, and to enjoin threatened criminal prosecutions for violations thereof. There appears to be nothing alleged which takes the case out of the general rule that courts of equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution. The judg,ment sustaining, .the demurrer to the petition is affirmed. See *Powell*v. *Hartsfield,*190 *Ga.*839.

*842
      *Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Atkinson, P. J., who dissents.*
#### Morris, Tasker & Co., Resp’t, *v.*Lee Chamberlin, App’lt.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,*

*Filed May 21, 1891.)*

Pleading—Counterclaim must be described as such to require reply.

An answer set up facts arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint which if described as a counterclaim would have been sufficient to constitute one. These facts, however, were only-stated in the answer as matters of defence. *Held,*that no reply was-necessary.

Appeal from order denying motion made by defendant forudgment on the pleadings for want of a reply.

*Rufus M.*Townsend, for app’lt; *C. S. McChesney,*for resp’t.

Learned, P. J.

The action is for goods sold and delivered. A schedule of the items is annexed to the complaint, showing, the goods to be what are called “Ells and Fees.”

The answer set up for the defense a contract for the goods specified in the complaint, and also for other goods, being certain sizes and quantities of pipe, which were not delivered at the time specified, and a portion of which were afterwards tendered on condition of immediate payment of the price. It avers, also, that by *477this breach of contract defendant has suffered damages to a certain amount, which he “demands to recover from the plaintiff to the destruction of plaintiff’s claim in this action and to recover the balance.” The defendant did not state that this was a counterclaim.

The plaintiff did not reply.

The defendant noticed the cause for trial at the circuit to be held May 19 th.

He then moved for a judgment on the pleadings May 3d, on the ground that no reply had heen served. The motion was denied and defendant appeals.

How, it is true that the matter set up in the answer constituted a distinct cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint, and is, therefore, a counterclaim as distinguished from a defense. Code, § 501, sub. 1.

But in order that the plaintiff shall understand that the defendant so treats the allegations, the defendant must expressly state that they are averred as a counterclaim. This must be done so that plaintiff shall know that a reply is necessary. There is ho good sense in requiring the plaintiff to conjecture whether the defendant intends a counterclaim as a defense. The defendant must state this plainly. Otherwise the defendant is misled. If the defendant does not say that he intends a counterclaim no reply is needed. *Eq. Life Ass.*v. *Cuyler,*75 N. Y., 514; *Acer v. Hotchkiss,*97 id., 408; *Avery v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.,*6 N. Y. Supp., 547; 24 N. Y State Rep., 918; *Wood*v. *Gordon,*13 N. Y. Supp., 595; 38 N. Y. State Rep., 455; *Favilla*v. *Moretti,*13 N. Y. Supp., 707.

This is a plain rule which prevents any mistake. It is abundantly settled by precedent, and is reasonable.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and printing disbursements.

Landon and Mayham, JJ., concur.
#### W. D SHORT, et al. vs. THE STATE.

Appeal from Collin county.

Jenkins, Thomas & Abernathy, for the appellants.

Assistant Attorney General Burts, for the State.

*Scire Facias*— Pleading.—The effect of a general denial is to put in issue all the material issuable allegations in plaintiff’s petition. In a proceeding upon a forfeited bail bond the citation serves the purpose of a petition, and a general denial thereto puts in issue all the allegations constituting the State’s cause of action, and casts upon the State the burden of proof. Wherefore it was error to hold that such a proceeding involved no question of fact.

*Practice.*— Jiight *of Trial by Jury*is declared by the Bill of Rights (Sec. 15.) to be inviolate. In criminal cases the only mode of trial of an issue of fact is by jury, except in specially enumerated cases. (C. O. P. Art. 591.) Proceedings in forfeited bail cases, after judgment msi and.the issuance of citation, are the same as in civil suits, except where otherwise specially provided by statute (13 Texas Ct. App., 555 ;) and in civil cases, either party is entitled to atrial by jury upon complying with the requirements of the law. (Rev. St. Art. 3061.) The appellants having complied with the requirements of the law, it was error to refuse them a trial by jury.

*Arrest.*— When a sheriff or other_peace officer has arrested a person upon the warrant of a magis'nte for felony, it is the duty of such officer to take the arrested party before the magistrate^ named in the warrant. In such cases thepfficeT'has~nO~JioweFto take bail.

Judgment reversed and remanded!

Willson, Judge.