alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7003 

To amend the National Landslide Preparedness Act to reauthorize such 

Act. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 17, 2024 

Ms. DELBENE (for herself, Ms. SCHRIER, Ms. PEREZ, Ms. STRICKLAND, Mr. 

KILMER, Mr. CARTWRIGHT, Mr. SMITH of Washington, Mr. LARSEN of 

Washington, Mrs. RODGERS of Washington, Ms. BONAMICI, and Mr. 

NEWHOUSE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources, and in addition to the Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions 

as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To amend the National Landslide Preparedness Act to 

reauthorize such Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Landslide 

5 Preparedness Act Reauthorization Act of 2024’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 7003 IH

1 SEC. 2. NATIONAL LANDSLIDE PREPAREDNESS ACT REAU2 THORIZATION. 

3 The National Landslide Preparedness Act (43 U.S.C. 

4 3101 et seq.) is amended— 

5 (1) in section 3(h) (43 U.S.C. 3102(h)), by 

6 striking ‘‘2021 through 2024’’ and inserting ‘‘2024 

7 through 2028’’; and 

8 (2) in section 5(e), by striking ‘‘2021 through 

9 2024’’ and inserting ‘‘2024 through 2028’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### Jacqueline Lenorlia TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROYAL AHOLD NV, Koninkijke Ahold (Ahony), Ahold USA, Giant Martins Food & Pharmacy, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1242

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 31, 2017

Decided: August 14, 2017

Jacqueline L. Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Padraic Kevin Keane, JORDAN COYNE LLP, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jacqueline Lenorlia Taylor appeals the district court’s order dismissing her civil action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See Taylor v. Royal Ahold NV,*No. 3:16-cv-00241-REP (E.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Manuel De Jesus RODRIGUEZ-ROJAS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41609 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 18, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Manuel De Jesus Rodriguez-Rojas, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Manuel De Jesus Rodriguez-Rojas has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Rodriguez-Rojas has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s; assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of DanaPC.com (the "Company") on Form  10-KSB for the  period  ending June 30, 2007,  as filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the   "Report"),  I, Yuri Semenov, Chief Executive and Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Yuriy Semenov

By: Yuriy Semenov

Chief Executive and Financial Officer

October 15, 2007
# EUR-Lex - 32001R1526 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001R1526

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 1526/2001 of 26 July 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 388/92 laying down detailed rules for implementation of the specific arrangements for the supply of cereal products to the French overseas departments (FOD) and establishing the forecast supply balance **

*
Official Journal L 202 , 27/07/2001 P. 0006 - 0007 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1526/2001

of 26 July 2001

amending Regulation (EEC) No 388/92 laying down detailed rules for implementation of the specific arrangements for the supply of cereal products to the French overseas departments (FOD) and establishing the forecast supply balance

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3763/91 of 16 December 1991 introducing specific measures in respect of certain agricultural products for the benefit of the French overseas departments(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1448/2001(2), and in particular Article 2(6) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) The quantities of products eligible for the specific supply arrangements are determined by means of periodic forecast balances which may be revised according to the essential requirements of the market taking into account local production and traditional trade flows.

(2) Pursuant to Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 3763/91, the forecast supply balance of cereal products to the FOD for 2001 was established by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 388/92(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 110/2001(4). In order to meet the needs of this region, amendments must be made to this forecast supply balance. Subsequently, Regulation (EEC) No 388/92 should be amended.

(3) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 388/92 is replaced by the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

It shall apply from 1 January 2001.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 26 July 2001.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 356, 24.12.1991, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 198, 21.7.2001, p. 3.

(3) OJ L 43, 19.2.1992, p. 16.

(4) OJ L 19, 20.1.2001, p. 9.

ANNEX

"ANNEX

Cereals supply balance for the French overseas departments (2001)

>TABLE>"
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR, a.k.a. Guayabo, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30104

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 17, 2017

*704Kathleen Louise Bickers, I, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kelly A. Zusman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAD, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Per C. Olson, Hoevet Olson Howes, PC, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Samuel Navarrette-Aguilar appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 168-month concurrent sentences imposed upon remand for resentencing following his convictions for heroin trafficking conspiracy, distribution of heroin, and possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Navarrette-Aguilar contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Navarrette-Aguilar’s sentence. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Navar-rette-Aguilar’s criminal history and the nature of the offense. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; see also *United States v. Carter,*560 F.3d 1107, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009) (sentencing disparities are not unwarranted where defendant and his co-conspirators are not similarly situated).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jamar BRADLEY, a.k.a. Vick, a.k.a. Yungg Fye Bandzo, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-12212 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(October 24, 2017)

*912R. Brian Tanner, U.S. Attorney Service—Southern District of Georgia, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Savannah, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jason Monroe Tate, Roberts Tate, LLC, St Simons Island, GA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jamar Bradley appeals the 215-month sentence he received after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. As part of his written plea agreement, Bradley agreed to a sentence appeal waiver. Bradley signed the waiver, and the district court specifically questioned him about it during his plea colloquy. Bradley acknowledges this waiver, but asserts thqt he is excepted from its enforcement.

None of the exceptions provided for in the plea agreement apply. Bradley was not sentenced above the statutory maximum or outside the guidelines range, and the government did not appeal. And this is not one of those extreme circumstances that allow an appeal to proceed notwithstanding a waiver. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 & n.17 (11th Cir. 1993). As a result, Bradley’s sentence appeal waiver is enforceable. See id. at 1350-51 (holding that sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and voluntarily); see also United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that waiver of the right to appeal “includes the waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable legal issues or even blatant error”). The government’s motion to dismiss this appeal pursuant to the appeal waiver in Bradley’s plea agreement is GRANTED.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 26, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

131420 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 131420 

 COA: 268116 

Washtenaw CC: 02-002080-AR 

District Court: DR-5-02-126-SM 

TODD MATTHEW CELLEY, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 1, 2006 order of 

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that 

the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

l0918 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 26, 2006 

 Clerk
#### WEISS v. THE STATE.

Appeal from Robertson county.

*Indictment*— Gaming.—An indictment alleging that defendant *317did “unlawfully and willfully play at a certain game with cards at and in a certain gaming room, used for gaming,’etc.; held bad, in that it does not allege that the room was attached to some one of the public houses named in the statute. Reversed and dismissed.

Opinion by

White, P. J.
#### Heathcote v. Haskins *& Co.*

Judgment : vacation : newly-discovered evidence. Where a minor was defendant in an action at law, and the court appointed a guardian *ad litem*to answer for him, and an answer was filed denying the allegations of the petition, but neither the minor nor his guardian *ad litem*knew that the debt had been paid, and judgment was rendered against the minor, but afterwards they discovered the fact of payment and the evidence by which it could be proved, *held*that the judgment was properly vacated and a new trial granted, under section 8151 of the Code.

*Appeal from Lucas District Qourt.—*Hon. Dell Stuart, Judge.

Filed, May 29, 1888.

*571*Mitchell & PenicTc,*for appellant.

*Dung an <&*Leech, for appellee.

Reed, J.

This is a proceeding to vacate the judgment referred to in the (last preceding) case of Robert Heathcote against the same defendant. The case made by the petition, however, is quite different from that. Plaintiff is a minor, and the court appointed a guardian *ad litem,*to answer for him in the action in which the judgment was rendered, and an answer was filed, denying the allegations of the petition in that action. It is alleged, however, in the petition that neither plaintiff nor the guardian *ad litem*knew, when the cause was tried, that the claim had been paid, or that the receipts of defendant acknowledging the payment were in existence, but that they had discovered that fact, and the evidence by which it could be proven, since the trial. We are of the opinion that, on the facts alleged in the petition and which are admitted by the demurrer, plaintiff is entitled to have the judgment vacated on the ground of newly-discovered evidence and of fraud on the part of defendants in obtaining it.

Afeikmed.
Order entered July 31, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00195-CV

DR. ERIC VANDERWERFF, D.C., Appellant

V.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE-DIVISION OF WORKERS'

COMPENSATION AND COMMISSIONER RYAN BRANNAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AND THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT,

Appellee

On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-02886

ORDER

Appellant Dr. Eric Vanderwerff, D.C.’s unopposed motion for extension of time to file a 

rely brief is GRANTED. Appellant’s reply brief is due August 31, 2015. 

/s/ DAVID L. BRIDGES 

PRESIDING JUSTICE
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Ronald HELMS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4586

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 28, 2017

Decided: May 23, 2017

Charles R. Brewer, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

James Ronald Helms, Jr., pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846. Helms now appeals, asserting that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Helms contends that his trial counsel failed to object to the insufficient indictment and erred in executing a plea agreement in which Helms pled guilty to conspiracy charges that did not identify a coconspirator. However, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised — if at all — in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion rather than on direct appeal, unless the appellate record conclusively demonstrates that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. *United States v. Faulls,*821 F.3d 502, 507-08 (4th Cir. 2016). Because the record does not conclusively establish ineffective assistance of counsel, *see Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (providing standard), we decline to review this claim on direct appeal.

Accordingly, because Helms presents no issue suitable for review, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A25E0022. JONATHAN MARCANTONIO v. SARAH MARCANTONIO.

Upon consideration of Jonathan Marcantonio’s emergency motion for an

extension of time in which to file an application for discretionary review, the same

is hereby GRANTED. Movant shall have until October 29, 2024, to file his

application.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

September 25, 2024

09/25/2024
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricardo DAVALOS-CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10488

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*552Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 3, 2017

William Ramsey Reed, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Elizabeth Olson White, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USRE—Office of the US Attorney-Reno, Reno, NV, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Erica Choi, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ricardo Davalos-Castillo appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 27-month custodial sentence and one-year term of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a deported alien found unlawfully in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Davalos-Castillo contends that the district court procedurally erred by relying on clearly erroneous facts regarding his likelihood of reentering the United States and his criminal history. He also contends that the court failed to calculate the applicable Guidelines range for his supervised release term and erroneously believed that the Guidelines recommended imposition of a term of supervised release. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The court’s factual findings and inferences were supported by the record. Moreover, the record reflects that the court adopted the presentence report’s calculation of the Guidelines range for supervised release and understood that the Guidelines recommend against imposition of supervised release for a deportable alien.

Davalos-Castillo also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the pre-indictment delay, his cultural assimilation, and other mitigating factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion. *See Gall v. United States, 552*U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The 27-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Davalos-Castillo’s immigration and criminal history. *See Gall, 552*U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. Furthermore, the term of supervised release is substantively reasonable in light of the need for deterrence. *See*U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5; *United States v. Valdavinos-Torres,*704 F.3d 679, 693 (9th Cir. 2012).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit
32.2


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO




SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Annual Report of Qingdao Footwear, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Joseph
Meuse, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:




(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:
August 2, 2010





/s/
      Joseph MeuseJoseph
      Meuse, Principal Financial and
              Accounting
      Officer
#### IN RE: James E. BAUMANN, Debtor. James E. Baumann, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PNC Bank, N.A., Bank of America, N.A., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15906 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(July 19, 2017)

James E. Baumann, Pro Se

Lisa Monica Schiller, McGlinchey Stafford, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Daniel C. Con-suegra, Law Office of Daniel C. Consueg-ra, Tampa, FL, William Lee Grimsley, McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellee PNC Bank, N.A.

Sara D. Dunn, Steven Douglas Knox, Quarles & Brady, LLP, Tampa, FL, Connie Jean Delisser, Marinosci Law Group, PC, Lauderdale Lakes, FL, for Defendant-Appellee Bank of America, N.A.

Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

James Baumann, a Chapter 13 debtor proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s final orders, confirming Baumann’s Chapter 13 plan and denying Baumann’s motion for reconsideration. Briefly stated, Baumann contends that the bankruptcy court modified impermissibly the terms of his Chapter 13 plan when it issued the amended confirmation order.

After the close of briefing in this appeal, Baumann dismissed voluntarily his Chapter 13 case in the bankruptcy court. Because the issues raised on appeal involve the terms of Baumann’s Chapter 13 plan, this appeal is rendered moot (no controversy remains) by Baumann’s voluntary dismissal of his bankruptcy case. See Neidich v. Salas, 783 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding that “the dismissal of a Chapter 13 case moots an appeal arising from the debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings.”). We dismiss this appeal as moot.

DISMISSED.