alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### John D. Locke, Respondent, *v.*William B. Borrows. Appellant.

(Argued June 10, 1872;

decided June 20, 1872.)

*652
      *William D. Booth*for the appellant.

*Benjamin W. Downing*for the respondent.

Agree to affirm. No opinion.

Judgment affirmed.
## SUMMARY OF WV PSD PROGRAM SIP SUBMISSION CHANGES 45CSR14 Comments 2012 1.1 Summary of the scope of 45CSR14 added. 2012 2014 1.3-6 Regulatory text was updated to reflect filing and effective date of this version of 45CSR14

2012 2.9.a. Changed the definition of Baseline Area. Replaced:"any conty of West Virginia" with: "intrastate area (and every part thereof) designated as attainment or unclassifiable under §107(d)(1)(A)(ii) or (iii) of the CAA". Added table with air quality impact values for SO2, NOx, PM10, and PM2.5

2012 2.9.b.1 - b.2Added new requirements for area redesignations under CAA section 107(d)(1)(A)(ii)or(iii)

2012 2.42.a.1 Replaced:" particulate matter" with "PM10 2012 2.42.a.3 Added this subsection which provides the major source baseline date for PM2.5 2012 2.42.b1 Replaced:" particulate matter" with "PM10 2012 2.42.b.3 Added this subsection which provides the minor source baseline date for PM2.5 2012 2.42.c.1 Changed CAA reference from: "CAA Section 107(d)(i)(D)" to "CAA Section 107(d)(1)(A)(ii) or(iii) 2012 2.43.f & g relocated below Table 1 2012 2.46.b Removed phrase:"of this section" for clarity 2012 2.46.e Removed wording regarding use of PM10 emissions to evaluate emissions increase for PM10 2012 2.46.i Added this subsection regarding determination of creditable increases Submissions2014 2.66.a Deleted wording identifying precursors. Added words to introduce precursors listed in the proceeding table
2014 2.66.a.1 Added PM condensable emissions to definition of "regulated NSR pollutant" 2014 2.66.a.2 Added language identifying precursors to NAAQs pollutants to the definition of regulatre NSR pollutant
2014 2.66.a.2.A-CReorders these subdivisions from 2.66.a.1-3 to

2.66.a.2.A-C 2014 2.66.a.2.D Reorders this subdivision from 2.66.a.4 to 2.66.a.2.D 2014 2.66.f deleted 2014 2.80.b.1 Removed provision exempting the combustion of nonfossilized and biodegradeable material from GHG emissions calculations. 2012 4.1 Added annual and 24-hour Baseline concentration threshold values for PM2.5 for class I,II,III areas 2012 9.1 Added Header entitled:"Required Demonstration" 2012 9.1.a deleted: "West Virginia"; Added: "in any air quality control region" 2014 9.2 Deleted in its entirety 2012 9.2 Deleted language talking about ambient impact of Major sources and major modifications 2012 9.2 Added Significant Impact Levels (SILs) requirement and values for PM2.5 2012 13.6 Replaced:" particulate matter" with "PM2.5"
2012 13.6 Added annual and 24-hour minor source Baseline concentrationmaximum allowable increases threshold values for PM2.5 . Corrected PM10 labeling for clarity
2012 16.7.c Added 24-hour de minimis air quality impact concentration values fore PM2.5 (aka SMC Values)2014 16.7.c Deleted 24-hour de minimis air quality impact concentration value for PM2.5 (aka SMC for PM2.5) 2014 16.1.a & b Added provision ot exempting requirements of 9.1 for

stationary sources based on completeness date of permit applications k
[Civ. No. 3268.

Second Appellate District, Division Two.

August 13, 1920.]

#### S. A. BAKER, Respondent, v. THOS. A. SLOCUM, Appellant.

[1] Appeal—Failure to File Undertaking—Jurisdiction—Preparation op Record.—The filing of a notice of appeal, without any undertaking, complies with the provisions of section ,941b of the Code of Civil Procedure, and vests jurisdiction in the appellate court; and after jurisdiction is thus vested in the appellate court, the appellant may elect to prepare his transcript under section 950 of the Code of Civil Procedure, instead of adopting the alternative method permitted by section 953a of said code, without affecting the validity of his appeal.

*57MOTION to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ventura Couhty. Merle J. Rogers, Judge.

Motion denied.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

James R. Jaffray for Appellant.

Arthur H. Blanchard for Respondent.

WELLER, J.

Respondent moves to dismiss the appeal because of the failure of appellant to file the undertaking for costs required by section 940 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Notice of appeal was filed with the clerk of the superior court November 16, 1919, and the printed transcript, containing the judgment-roll' and two bills of exceptions, was filed in this court on December 24, 1919.

[1] The filing of the notice of appeal without an undertaking complied with the provisions of section 941b of the Code of Civil Procedure, and thereupon this court acquired jurisdiction of the appeal. After jurisdiction is thus vested in this court, the appellant may elect to prepare his transcript under section 950 of the Code of Civil Procedure, instead of adopting the alternative method permitted by section 953a of the same code, without affecting the validity of his appeal. (L*ang*v. *Lilley & Thurston Co.,*161 Cal. 295, [119 Pac. 100].)

Motion denied.

Finlayson, P. J., and Thomas, J., concurred.
#### JUN CUI, AKA Jun Cui Riih, AKA Jun Cui Semen, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72905

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 18, 2017

Samuel Insoo Mok, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Samuel I. Mok, Saipan, MP, for Petitioner

Rosanne Perry, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jun Cui, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reopen. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Granados-Oseguera v. Mukasey,*546 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cui’s motion to reopen, where she failed to depart the United States during her voluntary departure period and was therefore statutorily ineligible for the relief requested. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(l)(B) (imposing a ten-year bar to certain forms of relief, including adjustment of status, for aliens who fail to depart within the time period specified); *Granados-Oseguera,*546 F.3d at 1015-16 (when a petitioner files a motion to reopen after the expiration of the voluntary departure period, the BIA is compelled to deny the motion based on the petitioner’s failure to depart where the ten-year bar applies to the relief sought).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Cui’s challenge to the BIA’s March 9, 2015, dismissal of her appeal because this petition is not timely as to that order. *See 8*U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<LEGEND>
The  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information   extracted  from  the
consolidated  balance  sheets  and  consolidated  statements  of  income  and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           1,548,389
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       23,310
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         0
<PP&E>                                          34,127,607
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  39,419,345
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
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<COMMON>                                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                                      19,601,189
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    39,419,345
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,583,946
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,428,644
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    58,049
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 148,888
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    155,302
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                155,303
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</TABLE>
Attachment B 

Rule Language and Preamble Language that is Consistent with a Fuel Category 

Comparison Approach

Rule Language: 

The non-hazardous secondary material must contain contaminants at levels comparable 

in concentration to or lower than those in traditional fuels which the combustion unit is 

designed to burn. Such comparison is to be based on a direct comparison of the 

contaminant levels in the nonhazardous secondary material to the traditional fuel itself. 

40 C.F.R. 241.3(d)(1)(iii). 

The first sentence is written the plural. 

Preamble Language

With that said, we agree with those commenters who argue that there are a wide range of 

raw materials and fuels that can be used and that the level of contaminants in these 

secondary materials can also vary. Thus, for purposes of comparing levels of 

contaminants found in non-hazardous secondary materials to traditional products, a 

person can make that comparison with traditional raw materials and fuels that come 

from multiple sources, provided such sources can be used in the combustion unit. 76 

Fed. Reg. 15528.

In determining which traditional fuel(s) the owner or operator of the boiler unit would 

make a comparison to with respect to contaminant levels, the Agency will allow any 

traditional fuel(s) that can be or is burned in the particular type of boiler. For example, if 

the boiler burns fuel oil, the level of contaminants to be compared would be the level of

contaminants in fuel oil or other liquid traditional fuels that is or can be burned in such 

unit. For gas-fired boilers, the level of contaminants in the nonhazardous secondary 

material fuels would be compared to natural gas or other gaseous traditional fuels. The 

Agency believes that this approach is most appropriate since the nonhazardous 

secondary material would be replacing the use of a particular type(s) of fuel. In addition, 

as discussed in the preamble to the boiler MACT, boilers designed to combust different 

types of fuels (e.g., coal vs. oil) cannot easily be modified to burn another fuel. Therefore 

we have determined that any comparison of the contaminants in a non-hazardous 

secondary material should be to the type(s) of fuel that are (or can be) used in the boiler. 

76 Fed. Reg. at 15542.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ervin Ronaldo MALDONADO-GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50145

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 24, 2017

*572Karla Davis, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, Colin M. McDonald, Assistant U.S. Attorney, US Department of Justice, Southern District of California, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

James Fife, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

**The panel unanimously concludes this case is ' suitable for decision without oral argument. *572*See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ervin Ronaldo Maldonado-Gomez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 48-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for importation of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Maldonado-Gomez first contends that the district court failed to calculate the Guildeline range correctly because it bypassed the issue of whether he was entitled to a minor role adjustment, and instead considered the minor role factors in its variance analysis. The record belies this argument. The court denied a minor role adjustment based on the facts of Maldonado-Gomez’s case. The court’s subsequent consideration of some of the facts asserted in support of the minor role adjustment to grant downward departures totally six levels was not improper. *See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Medina,*706 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] court may consider acceptance of responsibility separately in imposing a sentence, even if the court determined that the defendant did not qualify for a formal adjustment on those grounds under the Guidelines.”).

Maldonado-Gomez next contends that the court’s minor role analysis was flawed because the court did not compare him to his co-participants in the offense and did not consider the five factors enumerated in the commentary to the minor role Guideline. However, the record demonstrates that the district court properly compared Maldonado-Gomez' to his co-participants in the offense and considered the factors enumerated in the Guideline and the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether Maldonado-Gomez was “substantially less culpable than the average participant.” *See*U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A), (C); *United States v. Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d 519, 523 (9th Cir. 2016); *see also Carty,*520 F.3d at 992 (district judges are presumed to know the law and need not “tick off’ all of the sentencing factors). Moreover, in light of the circumstances of the offense, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Maldonado-Gomez was not a minor participant. *See Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d at 523.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**OF GASCO ENERGY, INC. UNDER SECTION 906 OF**

**THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1350**

 

I, W. King Grant, Chief Executive Officer of Gasco Energy, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that the accompanying report on Form 10-K/A, Amendment No. 1, for the period ending December 31, 2010 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

 

I further certify that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

|   |   | /s/   W. King Grant |
|--------|--------|---------------------|
|   |   | Name:               | W.   King Grant |
|   |   | Title:              | President   and Chief Executive Officer |
|   |   | Date:               | April 29,   2011 |

 

----
#### Vivian DIETZ-CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HDR, INC.; HDR Ltd Inc. Plan; United of Omaha Life Insurance Co., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35889

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted August 15, 2017 Anchorage, Alaska

Filed August 29, 2017

Michael William Flanigan, Attorney, Walther & Flanigan, Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Brewster H. Jamieson, Esquire, Attorney, Lane, Powell, Spears & Lubersky LLP, Anchorage, AK, for Defendants-Ap-pellees

Before: GRABER, CLIFTON, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Vivian Dietz-Clark appeals the district court’s order dismissing her civil enforcement action under section 502 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court properly declined to apply Alaska’s notice-prejudice rule to the administrative appeals deadline here. First, because Alaska’s notice-prejudice rule is not limited to state insurance law, *see Long v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc.,*26 P.3d 430, 435-36 (Alaska 2001) (applying rule to contractual limitations restricting personal injury claims resulting from certain tour-related accidents), the rule does not meet the ERISA definition of state regulation of insurance necessary to avoid ERISA preemption, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). ERISA preemption therefore applies. *See UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward,*526 U.S. 358, 368, 119 S.Ct. 1380, 143 L.Ed.2d 462 (1999) (holding that California’s notice-prejudice rule is not subject to ERISA preemption because the rule “is directed specifically at the insurance industry and is applicable only to insurance contracts” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Second, even assuming that Alaska’s notice-prejudice rule is not subject to ERISA preemption, such a rule typically applies only to initial denial of benefits. There is no case applying Alaska law that has extended the rule to administrative appeal deadlines like the one here.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
DAN WEISS

MANAGING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & REGULATORY

(312) 997-7573

DAN.WEISS@COAIR.COM

June 6, 2012

Mr. Paul L. Gretch

Director

Office of International Aviation

Department of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

Re: Applications of United/United Express and Qatar

Dockets DOT-OST-2007-28628 and –OST-2007-29161

Dear Mr. Gretch:

In the above dockets,1the Department granted Statements of Authorization 

authorizing code-share services by Continental/United/United Express2and 

Qatar. Consistent with Department requirements, Continental/United/United 

Express notify the Department that they will terminate all code-share services 

with Qatar, effective September 15, 2012.

Sincerely,

Dan Weiss

Managing Director, International and

Regulatory Affairs

UNITED AIR LINES, INC. AND

 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.

cc: Robert Finamore

 Esta Rosenberg

Anita Mosner

 

1 By Order 2011-3-14, the Department reissued authorities originally granted to United in the name of 

“Continental, Continental Micronesia and Air Micronesia and/or United”.

2 United is filing this notice on behalf of United Express carriers that hold a statement of authorization to 

code share with Qatar (GoJet, SkyWest, Mesa and Shuttle America), all of which were granted in Docket 

DOT-OST-2007-29161.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I have this date served a copy of the foregoing document on all 

persons named below by causing a copy to be sent via email:

anita.mosner@hklaw.com (UPS)

carl.nelson@aa.com

robert.wirick@aa.com

charters@evergreenairlines.com

howard.kass@usairways.com

kevin.montgomery@polaraircargo.com

mlbenge@zsrlaw.com (World Airways)

rpommer@atlasair.com

sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com

william.stallings@usdoj.gov

dwight.moore@ustranscom.mil

john.allen@faa.gov

Annalei Avanceña 

International Regulatory Advisor

June 6, 2012
1 The HONORABLE JOHN A. JARVEY, United St ates District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 09-2623

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Southern District of Iowa. * Chad Michael Lee Welsh, * [TO BE PUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: June 1, 2010 Filed: June 11, 2010

___________ Before LOKEN, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Chad Welsh pleaded guilty to receivi ng and distributing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); and possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Granting Welsh a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines imprisonment range of 151-188 months, the district court 1 sentenced him to concurrent terms of 100 months in pris on and 10 years of supervised release that included a number of special conditions. Welsh timely appeals. His counsel has moved to withdr aw and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386-2- U.S. 738 (1967), raising two issues, the reas onableness of Welsh’s sentence and the constitutionality of a supervised-release c ondition imposing a lifetime requirement to register as a sex offender.
First, after careful review of the record , we conclude that the district court committed no procedural sentencing error, made an individualized assessment of facts relevant to sentencing, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and did not impose an unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Stults , 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir. 2009).
Second, counsel advises that he raised the lifetime registry issue at Welsh’s request but believes that Welsh does not understand that the c ourt only required, in both an express and a special condition of s upervised release, that he “register with the state sex offender registration agency” in the State where he re sides or works, and “comply with all sex offender laws” in that State. Counsel is correct. These conditions of supervised release are limite d to the ten-year period of supervised release. Whether Welsh will be subject to sex-offender registration requirements after that term will depend upon applicable state and federal statutes, not this judgment. If Welsh is also contending that the district court abused its discretion in imposing these registration conditions, the contention is without merit because Congress has mandated their inclusion for those convicted of sex offenses. See18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(1), 16913(a); United States v. Rhone , 535 F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir. 2008). Having reviewed the record i ndependently under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issu es. Accordingly, we affirm, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________