alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Annual
      Statement of Compliance**


**Bear
      Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE8**





VIA:
      EMAIL





Bear
      Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC


383
      Madison Avenue


New
      York,
      New York 10179


regabnotifications@bear.com





EMC
      Mortgage Corporation


2780
      Lake
      Vista Drive


Lewisville,
      Texas 75067







Re:  The
      Pooling and Servicing agreement dated as of October 1, 2006 (the “Agreement”),
      among Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC, as Depositor and Purchaser,
      EMC Mortgage Corporation, as Seller and Master Servicer, and LaSalle Bank
      National Association, as Trustee.




I,
      Barbara L. Marik, a First Vice President of LaSalle Bank National Association,
      as Trustee hereby certify that:





(1)
      A
      review of the activities of the Trustee during the preceding calendar year
      and
      of the performance of the Trustee under the Agreement has been made under my
      supervision; and





(2)
      To
      the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Trustee has fulfilled all
      its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout such
      year or a portion thereof.







Date: February
      1, 2007





LaSalle
      Bank National Association, as Trustee





/s/
      Barbara L Marik


Barbara
      L. Marik


First
      Vice President
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jon Phillip DUMIRE, a/k/a JP, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4799

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 20, 2017

Decided: July 6, 2017

Paul G. Beers, GLENN,. FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Jean Barrett Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Char-lottesville, Virginia; Rick A, Mountcastle, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Ap-pellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jon Phillip Dumire pled guilty, pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). The district court imposed a sentence of 72 months’ imprisonment, within the range agreed to by the parties in the plea agreement. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), questioning whether the district court correctly found that malicious wounding qualified as a crime of violence pursuant to U.S. Sen-tencing_Guidelines_Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2016). Dumire has filed a pro se supplemental brief further contending that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

Generally, we review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “However, not all sentences are subject to appellate review." *United States v. Williams,*811 F.3d 621, 622-23 (4th Cir. 2016). In this case, we lack jurisdiction to review Dumire’s sentence of imprisonment because the district court sentenced Du-mire in accordance with the terms of his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, Dumire’s sentence is not unlawful, nor was the sentencing range in the agreement expressly based on the Sentencing Guidelines. *See id.*at 623-25.

In accordance with *Anders,*within the constraints set forth in *Williams,*811 F.3d at 621, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for review. We therefore dismiss Dumire’s challenge to his sentence of imprisonment and affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Dumire, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Dumire requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Dumire.

*722We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART .*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6894

PATRICK NICOLE SCOTT,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

COLIE L. RUSHTON, Warden; CHARLES M. CONDON,

South Carolina Attorney General,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.

(CA-01-3491-4-24BH)

Submitted: August 5, 2003 Decided: August 18, 2003

Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Patrick Nicole Scott, Appellant Pro Se. Samuel Creighton Waters,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Patrick Scott, a South Carolina inmate, seeks to appeal the

district court’s order dismissing his petition filed under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The district court referred this case to a

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The

magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised

Scott that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation

could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon

the recommendation. Despite this warning, Scott failed to object

to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate

judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of

the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been

warned that failure to object will waive appellate review. See

Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Scott has waived appellate

review by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
----

**ANNUAL      STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE**

**Pooling      and Servicing Agreement dated November 28, 2006 (the "Pooling and Servicing      Agreement") by and among J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,      as depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as master servicer, LaSalle Bank National      Association as trustee and paying agent and LNR Partners, Inc. as special      servicer (the "Special Servicer")**

**JPMCC      2006-CIBC17**

| 1.   | I                have reviewed the activities performed by the Special Servicer under                the                Pooling and Servicing Agreement during the period ending the end                of the                fiscal year 2006 (the “Reporting                Period”)                and the Special Servicer’s performance under the Pooling and Servicing                Agreement has been made under my supervision;                and |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | To                the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Special Servicer                has                fulfilled its obligations under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement                in all                material respects throughout the Reporting Period. |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----
# EUR-Lex - 32001D0383 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001D0383

**2001/383/EC: Commission Decision of 3 May 2001 amending Decision 2000/666/EC laying down the health requirements and veterinary certification for the import of birds other than poultry and the conditions for quarantine (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2001) 1168) **

*
Official Journal L 137 , 19/05/2001 P. 0028 - 0028 *

Commission Decision

of 3 May 2001

amending Decision 2000/666/EC laying down the health requirements and veterinary certification for the import of birds other than poultry and the conditions for quarantine

(notified under document number C(2001) 1168)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2001/383/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 92/65/EEC of 13 July 1992 laying down animal health requirements governing trade and imports into the Community of animals, semen, ova and embryos not subject to animal health requirements laid down in specific Community rules referred to in Annex A(I) to Directive 90/425/EEC(1) as last amended by Commission Decision 95/176/EC(2), and in particular Article 17(2)(b) and (3) and Article 18(1), first and fourth indents thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Commission Decision 2000/666/EC lays down the animal health conditions and the certification requirements for imports of birds other than poultry from certain third countries(3).

(2) Certain Member States have requested additional time to fully prepare for the implementation of the requirements for the quarantine laid down in the above decision. In the circumstances, the Commission considers it appropriate to allow more time to adjust to the requirements of the new measures and therefore the date of implementation laid down in this Decision must be amended accordingly.

(3) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The date in Article 10 of Decision 2000/666/EC shall be replaced by "1 November 2001".

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2001.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 268, 14.9.1992, p. 54.

(2) OJ L 117, 24.5.1995, p. 23.

(3) OJ L 278, 31.10.2000, p. 26.
Exhibit
23.1





CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT


REGISTERED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM







We consent to the incorporation by reference in the
Registration Statements on Form S-3 (File Nos. 333-109495 and 333-143292) and
Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-34156 and 333-122242) of our report, dated March 27,
2008, relating to the financial statements of deltathree, Inc.
appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of deltathree, Inc. for the
year ended December 31, 2007.




/s/Brightman Almagor &
Co.


Certified
Public Accountants


A member
firm of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu




Tel Aviv,
Israel


March 31,
2008
#### Phillips v. Kirby.

1. Limitation of Actions: account for family supplies: judgment on husband’s note: wife’s liability. Where the husband gives his own individual note for goods purchased and used as family supplies, the cause of action against the wife, who is also liable for such supplies, is not barred until the cause of action upon the note is barred against the husband; *(Waggoner v. Turner,*69 Iowa, 127;) and this is so where the note has been put in judgment against the husband. *(Frost v, Parker,*65 Iowa, 178.)

*Appeal from Harrison Girouit Oouri.*

Thursday, October 27.

This action was brought against the defendant, as the wife of G. 0. Kirby, to recover for goods sold to the latter, but used' in the family, and which were a part of the family expenses. The goods were sold during the years 1872, 1873, 1874 and 1875. This action was brought more than five years later. G. G. Kirby, however, gave his promissory note for the goods in 1876, and this action was brought within ten years from that time. It appears also that the note was not taken in payment of the account, nor with intent to release the defendant, but to change the form of the evidence of the indebtedness. In 1877 the plaintiff obtained judgment upon the note against G. 0. Kirby, but with no intent to release the defendant. The defendant demurred to the petition, on the ground that it shows that the cause of action is barred by *279the statute of limitations. The demurrer was sustained, and, the plaintiff electing to stand upon his petition, judgment was rendered against him for costs.

/S'. *I.*King, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Adams, Oh. J.

Where the husband gives his individual note for goods purchased and used as family expenses, the cause of action against the wife is not barred until the cause of action upon the note would be barred as against the husband, (Wa*ggoner v.*Turner, 69 Iowa, 127,) and this is so where the note has been put in judgment against the husband. *(Frost v.*Parker, 65 Iowa, 178.) Following those decisions, the judgment must be Ee versed.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 41 (Wednesday, March 2, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11704-11705]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04305]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION


Sunshine Act Meetings

    Time and Date: 9:00 a.m., Thursday, March 10, 2022.
    Place: You may physically, at 1501 Farm Credit Drive, McLean, 
Virginia 22102-5090, or virtually observe the open portions of this 
meeting. If you would like to observe, at least 24 hours in advance, 
visit FCA.gov, select ``Newsroom,'' and then select ``Events.'' From 
there, access the linked ``Instructions for board meeting visitors'' 
and complete the described registration process.
    Status: Parts of this meeting will be open to the public. The rest 
of this meeting will be closed to the public.
    Matters to be Considered: The Farm Credit Administration Board will 
consider the following matters:

Portions Open to the Public

<bullet> Approval of February 10, 2022, Minutes
<bullet> Spring 2022 Unified Agenda
<bullet> Funding Conditions for the Farm Credit System

[[Page 11705]]

Portions Closed to the Public

<bullet> Office of Secondary Market Oversight Periodic Report \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Session Closed-Exempt to 5 U.S.C. Section 552b(c)(8) and 
(9).

    Contact Person for More Information: If you need more information 
or assistance for accessibility reasons, or if you have questions, 
contact Ashley Waldron, Secretary to the Board. Telephone: 703-883-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4009. TTY: 703-883-4056.

Ashley Waldron,
Secretary to the Board.
[FR Doc. 2022-04305 Filed 2-28-22; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6705-01-P
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marc Pierre HALL, a/k/a Marc Valeriano, a/k/a Fella, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7630

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 24, 2017

Marc Pierre Hall, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

*292Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Marc Pierre Hall seeks to appeal the district court’s order treating his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Hall has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Hall’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. *United States v. Winestock,*340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims based on either:

> (1) newly discovered evidence that ... would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or

> (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Hall’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2256 motion.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Michael SALAZAR, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 16-50351, 16-50352

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 17, 2017

Jean-Claude Andre, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Matthew O’Brien, Attorney, DOJ—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Nadine Hettle, Gia Kim, Esquire, Deputy Federal Public Defender, FPDCA—• Federal Public Defender’s Office (Los An-geles), Los Angeles, CA, Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated appeals, Robert Michael Salazar appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 20-month concurrent sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Salazar contends that the district court procedurally erred by relying on facts not supported by the record in imposing an above-Guidelines sentence, and by failing to explain the sentence adequately. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record, does not support Salazar’s argument that when imposing the sentence, the district court relied on an assumption that Salazar was driving under the influence. Rather, the record reflects that the district court considered Salazar’s history of drug use, which was well documented in the record, and sufficiently explained its determination that an above-Guidelines sentence was warranted. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### John M. Carpenter et al., Respondents, *v.*Anna M. O’Dougherty, Appellant.

(Argued June 6, 1872;

decided November 12, 1872.)

Decided on authority of *Corn Exchange Ins. Co.*v. *Babcook*(42 N. Y., 613).

*661
      *Starbuck dt Sarmyer*for the appellants

*Samuel Hamel*for the respondents.

Peokham, J.,

reads opinion for affirmance.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Mario GONZALEZ-ZAVALA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40120 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 12, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for.Plaintiff-Appellee

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal-Public Defender, Kayla R. Gassmann, Assistant Federal Public Defender, H. Michael Soko-low, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Mario Gonzalez-Zavala pled guilty to importing into the United States 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a)(1), (b)(1). He was sentenced to 175 months in prison and three years of supervised release. Gonzalez-Zavala now asserts that the factual basis' for his guilty plea was inadequate because the Government failed to meet its obligation to prove that he had knowledge of the particular types and quantities of controlled substances involved in his offense.

As Gonzalez-Zavala concedes, his argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Betancourt,*586 F.3d 303, 308-09 (5th Cir. 2009), which held that *Flores-Figueroa*v. *United States,*556 U.S. 646, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009), did not overturn *United States v. Gamez-Gonzalez,*319 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 2003), and that the Government is not required to prove knowledge of the drag type and quantity as an element of a 21 U.S.C. § 841 drug trafficking offense. Likewise, knowledge of drug type and quantity is not an element that must be proven for an offense under two related drug importation statutes, §§ 952(a) and 960(a). *United States v. Restrepo-Granda,*575 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1978); see *United States v. Valencia-Gonzales,*172 F.3d 344, 345-46 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, the Government was not required to prove that Gonzalez-Zavala knew *331the drug types and quantities involved in his drug importation offense. *See United States v. Zuniga-Martinez,*512 Fed.Appx. 428, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a similar challenge to a conviction for importing a controlled substance as foreclosed by *Betancourt, Restr&po-Granda,*and Valencia-Gonzales).

Accordingly, Gonzalez-Zavala’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.