F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT Sep tember 1 7, 2007 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1579 1 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNos . 04-014 03-CV- T- 27-MSS 02-004 42-CR-T -2 VICTOR OTERO,

Pet it io ne r-Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Res po nd en t-Ap pe ll ee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 17, 200 7) Be fo re T JO FL A T , A

N D E RS O N and H U L L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:2

In200 3, V ic tor

O te ro ple ad ed

gui lty to one c ount

of pos se ssi ng w iththe int en t t o di str ibu te f

ive or m or e kil ogr am s of

am ixt ur e or sub stanc e co nta ini ng a de te ct ab le a m ount

of c oc ai ne w hil e on b oard

aspe ed boat su bj ec t t o th e j ur isd ic tio n of

the U nit ed

S ta te s, in vio la tio n of

46 App. U . S. C. §§ 1 903( a) and 1903 (g) and 21 U. S. C. § 960 (b)(1)( B)(ii) . Oter o, who was re presented by a lawy er in th e d is tri ctco ur t p ro ceed in gs , was s en te nc edto 13 5 m on th s i n fe de ral pri so n. Oter o did n ot appeal his conv iction or sentence. In 2004, Oter o, w ithou t represe ntation , f iled a m otion pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 225 5 to vacate, set aside, or correc t his sentence. A m ong o ther things , O tero alleged that his trial lawy er r endered constituti onally ineffec tive assistance when he f ai le d to f ile a not ic e of a ppe al of O te ro ’ s 13 5- m onth se nte nc e ev entho ugh Oter o specifically

“ insis ted” that he do so. T he district court scheduled an evidentiary

hearing on Otero’ s ineffec tive assistance claim and appoin ted a new lawy er to re present him . Following the evident iary hearing, the district court re j ec te d O te ro ’ s in ef

fe ct ive a ssi stanc e cl ai m , e xpr es sly f ind ing O te ro ’ s “ te sti m ony that he directed his attorney to appeal is not credible.” T he district court considered and rej ected O tero’ s other claim s on the briefs and they are not before us in th is appeal. T he district court denied Otero’ s subs equent request for a c e rt i f i c a t e o f ap p e a l ab i l i ty.We w ill a ssume fo r t he sake of

argume nt t

hat O te ro ’s lawye r f

a ile d to c on su lt 1 with Otero a

bout his appeal options — that is, failed to “a dvis[ e] [ Otero] about the adva ntag es and disadva

ntag es of takingan appe al” a nd failed to “ mak[e] a reasona ble ef fort to discover [Ote ro ’s ] wis he s. ” Roe v. F lor e s- Or te g a , 5 28 U. S. 4 70 , 4 78 , 1 20 S. Ct . 1 02 9, 10 35 (2 00 0) . T his me ans the ans we r t o th e fi rs t CO A i ssu e is n o. Ho we ve r, fo r t he re a so ns dis c us se d in

the te xt, the fa ilure of Ote ro’s lawy er in this reg ard doe s not itself constitute deficient pe rfor mance beca use there was, unde r the c ircumstance s of this case, no c onstitut ional duty to consult in the first place . We theref

ore ne ed not addr ess the sec ond COA issue. 3 W e gr an te d ac er

tif ic at e of appe al ab ili ty

on tw o is sue s: (1 ) Whe the r co unse l’ s c om m uni catio ns w ithO te ro r eg ar din g hi s right to appeal were sufficient to fulfill his du ty to consul t. S ee United States v. Thom

pson , 481 F. 3d 12 97 (11th Cir. 1997 ). (2) Whether, if counsel did n ot fulfill his duty to consul t, O tero has sh own a reas on ab le pro babi li ty tha t h e wou ldha ve ap pe al ed . Se e id. Af ter a thoroug h reviewof the briefs, the rec ord, and the re levant legal au tho ri ty , w e co nc lud e that O te ro ’ s tr ia l l awy er ha d no c onst itu tio na l du ty to co nsul t O te ro about

an a ppe al and thus did

not r en de r co nst itu tio na lly

ine ff ec tiv e as s i s t an ce b y fa i l i n g t o d o s o . Ac co rd i n g l y, we a ff i rm th e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s 1 j udgm en t de ny ing O te ro ’ s § 2 255 m oti on. I. DISCUSSI ON

“ InaS ec tio n 22 55 p ro ce ed ing , w e re vie wle ga l i ssu es de nov o and f ac tua l fi ndi ngs unde r a cl ear er

ro r standard . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. W al ke r, 198 F . 3d 8 11, 813 (11th Cir. 1999).The testimony of Oter o’s lawyer w as cor roborated by

the testimony

of the 2 interpre ter. 4 A t the out se t, w e m

ust r ej ec t O te ro ’ s a sse rt ionthat he dir ec te d hi s law y er to fi le anot ic e of

appe al on h is b eh al f. T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ar d li ve te sti m ony on this iss ue f ro m O te ro , O te ro ’ s tr ia l l awy er , and the S panis h- E ngl ishint er pr et er w ho participated in Oter o’ s sentencing h earing. The district court expressly cre dited the testim ony

of O tero’ s lawy er, who said that Oter o never instructed him to file a 2 not ic e of appe al , and e xpr es sly

dis cr ed ite d O te ro ’ s c ontrary te sti m ony

that he did in f ac t gi ve suc h in str

uc tio ns. W e m

ust r es pe ct the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio n onthi s is sue ; the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ac tua l f ind ing is not

c le ar ly erro ne ou s. See Tho m

ps on v. Un it edSta te s, 4 81 F.3d12 97 , 13 00 (11 th Cir . 20 07 ). W e thu s c onc lud e that O te ro did not dir ec t hi s law y er

to fi le anot ic e of

appe al . W e have been told by

the Suprem e Court that in cases like this — “ cases w he re the de fe ndant [ doe s no t] ins tr uc t[ ] c ouns el to fi le an a

ppe al ” — “ the que sti on whe the r co unse l pe rf orm ed de fi ci en tly

by not f ili ng a not ic e of appe al is best answere d by

. . . asking a separate, but antecedent, question: whether counsel in fact consulted with the defendant about an appeal.” F lores-O rtega, 528 U.S . at 478, 120 S . Ct . a t 10 35. A s w e not ed above , w e w ill a ssum e fo r the sake of ar gum en t tha t O te ro ’ s law y er did not “ co nsul t” — a s th at

te rm is use d inF lor es -The testimony of Oter o’s lawyer, which was c redited by the district court, wa s that 3 he did consult with and advise O tero on thre e occ asions conce rningthe appe al waive r. He advised Ote ro that with the guilty plea he would likely

rec eive a sentenc e within the guideline rang e of 135 to 168 months (that is, rec eivingacc eptanc e of r esponsibility and saf ety valve reduc tions), and that if he r ece ived such a sentenc e, ther e would be no pr omising basis to appe al. He f ully advised Ote ro about the a ppeal wa iver, a lthough c ounsel also told Otero that e ven tho ugh h e ha d s ig ne d th e a pp e a l w a ive r, c ouns e l w ou ld n e ve rt he le ss f ile a no tic e of a pp e a l if reque sted (although it would probably be futile). F inally , counsel told Otero he intended to see k a m i n o r r o l e r e d u c t i o n( w h i c hw o u l d

f urth e r r e d u c e th e l i k e l y s e n t e n c e ) , b u tth atth i s w a s o n l y a possibili ty . Howeve r, counse l acknowle dg ed that, af ter the se ntence was imposed, he did not consult with Otero about a ppealing . Acc ording ly , we a ssume arguendo (but e x pressly do not decide ) that counse l did not consult wit h Otero a s that term is contemplated in F lores- O rteg a and Thompson. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

4 5 O rt eg a — w ithO te ro about an a ppe al . G ive n th is a ssum pti on, the dis posi tiv e 3 que sti on i n th is a

ppe al is “ w he the r co unse l’ s f ai lur e to c onsu lt w iththe de fe ndant it se lf c on st it ut es de fic ie nt pe rfo rm an ce.” Id . Ac ri m ina l de fe nse law y er is not und er ape r se c onst itu tio na l ob lig at ionto co nsul t w ithhis or

he r cl ie nt a

bout an a ppe al . I n so m e ca se s, the S ixth Am endm ent requires such consult ation; in others, it does not. “ W e cannot say , a s a co nst itu tio na l m atte r, that i n e ve ry c as e co unse l’ s f

ai lur e to c onsu lt w iththe defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable, and theref ore deficie nt.” Flores-O rtega, 528 U.S . at 479, 120 S. Ct. at 1036. T he Suprem e Court has re j ec te d abr igh t- lin e ru le in thi s c ont ex t be ca use suc h ar

ule w oul d be

“ inc onsi ste nt w ithS tr ic kland’ s hol din g th at ‘ the pe rf orm an ce inquir

y m ust be 4 wh et h erco u n s el ’s as s i s t an ce wa s re as o n ab l e c o n s i d er i n g al l th e c i rc u m s t an ce s .’”6

Id . a t 47 8, 120 S . Ct . a t 10 35. Rathe r than c ount en an ci ng an in fl ex ibl e ru le , the Co urt i n F lor es -O rt eg a he ld tha t “ co unse l ha s ac onst itu tio na lly im pose d du ty

to co nsul t w iththe defendant about an appeal when there is r eason to thin k either (1) that a rational de fe ndant w oul d w an t t o a ppe al ( fo r ex am

ple , be ca use the re are non fr ivo lou s ground s for appeal), or (2) that this particular def endant reasonably

dem onstrated to co un se l t ha t h e was in te res te d i n app eal in g.” Id. at 48 0, 1 20 S. Ct. at 10 36 . This inquiry

is inform ed by

several “ high ly

relevant” f

actors, includi ng: whether the convictio n follows a guilty plea, whether

the defendant rec eived the sentence he barg ai ne d f

or , and “ w he the r the ple a [a gr ee m en t] e xpr es sly . . . w ai ve d so m e or al l ap pe al rig ht s.” Id . H er e, O te ro ’ s c onvi ct ionw as the r es ult of agui lty ple a, w hic h te nds to in di cat e th athe was i nt eres te d i n “ se ek [in g] an en d t o ju di ci al pro ceed in gs .” Id . A nd a lth oughhis se nte nc e of 135 m onths w as le ngthie r than hi s law y er tol d hi m he m igh t po ssi bly

r ec ei ve if

the c ourt w er e to g rant h im am ino r- ro le r ed

uc tio n unde r the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s, his law y er a dvi se d O te ro that he w oul d pr oba bly re ce ive ase nte nc e w ith in the r an ge of 135 to 168 m onths and tha t the re w oul d be no p ro m isi ng a

ppe al of suc h ase nte nc e. A ft er

r ec ei vin g and unde rs tandi ng this advic e, O te ro e xpl ic itl y

a gr ee d a s part

of his gui lty

ple a to w ai ve the r igh t t oThe district cour t rejec ted Oter o’s alleg ation (also conta ined in his moti on for 5 relief under § 2255) that his sentence should be set aside be cause he did not fully understand the te rm s o f h is p le a

a g re e me nt. Ot e ro do e s n ot c ha lle ng e that r uli ngon a pp e a l. 7 challenge on appeal any

application of the Guidelines (with exceptions which are not r el ev an t) . O te ro a ct

ua lly r ec ei ve d ase nte nc e of

135 m onths, the lowe nd o f th e g ui de li ne ran ge pre di ct edby his lawyer. Inansw er ing the que sti on o f w he the r a ratio na l de fe ndant w oul d w an t t o ap pe al his se nte nc e, it

is re le vant t o a sk whe the r the re are any pot en tia l no nfrivolous g rounds for appeal, whether there w as a guilty

plea, and whether the plea expressly wa ived the right to appeal. See Flores-O rtega, id. at 480, 120 S. Ct. at 10 36 . All t ho se fact or s wei gh he av il y in fav orof t he go ve rn m en t i n t hi s ca se . T he ple a ag re em en t si gne d by O te ro c ont ai ne d aty

pic al appe al -w ai ve r pr ovi sio n, pursuant to which O tero “ expressly wa ive[d] the right to appeal [his] sentence, dir ec tly or c oll at er al ly , on any

gr ound . ” T his br oa d w ai ve r co nta ine d f our exceptions. Those exce ption s allowed O tero to appeal (1) “ an upward departure b y t h e s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e , ” ( 2 ) “as e n t e n c e ab o v e th e s t a tu t o ry ma x i mu m, ” ( 3 ) “a se nte nc e in v iol at ionof

the lawapart

f ro m se nte nc ing gui de lin es , ” or ( 4) any se nte nc e if

the G ove rn m en t a

ppe al ed . O te ro doe s no t arg ue that any of the se 5 exceptions app ly

in this case. T herefor e, on account of the plea agreem ent’ s broad ap pe al w ai ve r, any

appe al take n by

O te ro w oul d have be enf ri vol ous an d w oul d8

have be enan a

ppe al that no r at ion al de fe ndant w oul d have take n. T he onl y e vid en ce r el ie d up on b y

O te ro to es ta

bli sh tha t he sho w ed

any int er es t i n a

ppe al ing is his ow n te sti m ony a t the e vid en tiary

he ar ing in w hic h he sa id tha t ( 1) he ins tr

uc te d hi s law y er

( thr oughthe int er

pr et er , a t the c onc lus ionof the se nte nc ing he ar ing ) to f ile anot ic e of

appe al and tha t ( 2) he tr ie d to c ont ac t hi s lawy er via letter

and telephone to comm

unicate this request. A s we noted abov e, how ev er , the dis tr ic t c ourt di sc re dit ed O te ro ’ s te sti m ony

on b othof

the se poi nts , an d w e ar e boun d to r es pe ct the c ourt’ s f

ac tua l f ind ing . W e the re fo re c onc lud e that the re is no e vid en ce ind ic at ing that O te ro r ea sona bly de m onstrate d to his lawy er any

interest in appealing his sentence. T o the contrary , O tero’ s lawy er te sti fi ed that O te ro ne ve r ind ic at ed ade sir e to a

ppe al . T he dis tr ic t c ourt, c re dit ing co unse l’ s te sti m ony , so f ound . I nde ed , the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound : “ Pr ior

to sentencing, Petitioner agree d with Ostrander [his counsel] that no vi able appeal would be available if a se ntence within the guidelin e range was im posed.” Be ca use no r at ion al de fe ndant i n O te ro ’ s po sit ionw oul d have sou ght to ap pe al in lig ht o f the br oa d a ppe al w ai ve r, and b ec au se O te ro did not c om m uni cate to his lawy er a

desire to appeal, we conclude that Otero’ s lawy er w as not und er a co ns ti tu ti on al ob li ga ti on to co ns ul t Ot ero ab ou t an ap pe al .9 II. CONCLUSION Fo r the se r ea sons , w e co nc lud e that the pe rf orm an ce of

O te ro ’ s tr ia l l aw yer w as n o tco n s t i tu t i o n al l y d ef i ci en t . Ac co rd i n g l y, th e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s j udgm en t de ny ing O te ro ’ s § 2 255 m oti on i s AFFIR MED.