Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

BENJAMIN E. NORDMANN GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

J. T. WHITEHEAD

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

BRUCE KEVIN POND, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 90A05-1202-CR-73

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE WELLS CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Kenton W. Kiracofe, Judge

Cause No. 90C01-1107-FC-12

September 19, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Bruce Pond (Pond), appeals his sentence for voluntary 

manslaughter, a Class A felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a).

We affirm.

ISSUES

Pond raises three issues on appeal, and restate as the following two issues:

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing Pond; and

(2) Whether the trial court erred when it ordered Pond to pay restitution.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 22, 2011, Pond was drinking beer with his son Blake and a family friend 

on the back porch of his mother’s house in Ossian, Indiana. Pond became annoyed with a 

light shining from the pier of a neighboring pond. Matt Michuda (Michuda) along with 

his four year old son Jacob and two friends were fishing off the pier. Pond went inside 

the house, obtained a .22 caliber rifle, and fired two shots toward the area where the light 

was shining. One of the shots hit Jacob in the right temple. Jacob cried for his father 

who picked him up and carried him back to Michuda’s nearby home. An ambulance 

arrived and took Jacob to a hospital where he was later pronounced dead.

Officers arrived at the scene in the early morning hours of July 23, 2011. After 

interviewing Matt’s friends, officers learned that the shots had come from Pond’s 

mother’s home. Officers contacted Pond, Blake, and the family friend and all three came 
3

to the police station where they were interviewed. Each one denied knowing anything 

about the shooting. In particular, Pond denied possessing any guns. However, later that 

day, Pond’s friend called the police to change his story and admitted that Pond had shot 

the rifle and that Blake had hid it before the officers arrived. After executing a search 

warrant, the officers located the rifle behind a barn on Pond’s mother’s property. Blake 

also later admitted that Pond had fired the shots and instructed him to hide the rifle 

behind the barn. Pond was arrested later that day and upon learning that Jacob had died 

admitted to possessing the rifle and firing the shots. 

On July 25, 2011, the State filed an Information charging Pond with Count I, 

reckless homicide, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-42-1-5 and Count II, unlawful possession 

of a firearm by a domestic batterer, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-47-4-6(a). On 

August 2, 2011, the State filed an Amended Information amending Count I to murder, a 

felony, I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1). 

On December 16, 2011, the State filed an additional Information, charging Pond 

with Count III, voluntary manslaughter, a Class A felony, I.C. § 35-42-1-3(a). That same 

day, Pond entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty 

to Count III in exchange for the State’s dismissal of Counts I and II as well as a charge of 

invasion of privacy in a separate case. The State also agreed to obtain written 

confirmation from the United States Attorney’s Office that federal charges would not be 

brought against Pond for unlawful possession of a firearm. The plea agreement left 
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Pond’s sentence to the trial court’s discretion, but capped the sentence at forty years. The 

trial court accepted Pond’s plea agreement and scheduled a sentencing hearing.

On January 17, 2012, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing. The State 

argued that the following factors justified aggravating Pond’s sentence: the harm 

suffered by Jacob was greater than the elements required to prove the offense; Jacob’s 

age; Pond’s criminal history and probationary status at the time of the crime; and his 

failure to cooperate with law enforcement. Pond argued that his prior offenses were 

dissimilar and minor in comparison to the instant offense, that the State and Jacob’s 

family benefitted from his guilty plea, and that he was remorseful. Although finding that 

Pond had no intent to kill Jacob, the trial court concluded that the mitigating factors 

advanced by Pond were of little or no weight while the aggravating factors were 

sufficiently supported and outweighed the mitigating factors. As a result, the trial court 

sentenced Pond to forty years of incarceration and ordered him to pay $9,958.64 as

restitution, which was later amended to $9,800.44.

Pond now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Pond first argues that the trial court improperly aggravated his sentence for 

voluntary manslaughter. In particular, he contends that the trial court improperly

weighed aggravating and mitigating factors and also failed to consider his remorse over 

Jacob’s death. Second, Pond argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay 

restitution to Jacob’s family. 
5

I. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Pond was convicted of voluntary manslaughter as a Class A felony and received a 

sentence of forty years’ incarceration. See I.C. 35-42-1-3 (a)(2). The sentencing range 

for a Class A felony is twenty to fifty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. 

I.C. § 35-50-2-4. Here, Pond received a sentence ten years shorter than the maximum 

possible sentence. 

As Pond’s sentence is within the statutory range, we review it only for an abuse of 

discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 

N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against 

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, 

probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. Ways in which the trial court

may abuse its discretion include: wholly failing to issue a sentencing statement; issuing a 

sentencing statement that bases a sentence on reasons unsupported by the record, or that 

includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Phelps v. State, 914 N.E.2d 283, 

290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

A. Aggravating Factors

Pond argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a forty year 

sentence because it gave undue weight to three aggravating factors: (1) his criminal 

history, (2) his probationary status at the time of the crime, and (3) his dishonesty to 

police during the initial investigation. 
6

Pond first argues that the trial court gave too much weight to his criminal history 

since his five prior misdemeanor convictions and juvenile delinquency adjudication 

differed in gravity and similarity to the present offense. Pond’s prior misdemeanor 

convictions consisted of two domestic battery convictions as well as single convictions 

for battery, invasion of privacy, and operating while intoxicated. His juvenile 

delinquency adjudication involved minor possession of alcohol. Pond claims that the 

harm and gravity of these offenses differs significantly from the present offense in that no 

firearm was used. However, the trial court is no longer required to weigh aggravating 

and mitigating factors against each other under the advisory sentencing scheme. 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Accordingly, the trial court had discretion in the weight it 

afforded to Pond’s criminal history, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in that regard.

Next, Pond contends that the trial court placed undue weight on Pond’s 

probationary status at the time of the offense by relying on Pond’s prior probation 

revocations. Under I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(6), the trial court may consider a defendant’s

recent violation of probation as an aggravating circumstance. Here, Pond was on 

probation for domestic battery at the time of the offense. Thus, we find no abuse of 

discretion. 

Finally, Pond challenges the trial court’s conclusion that his early denials of 

culpability constituted an aggravating factor. Pond argues that the trial court erred by not 

specifying how much weight it placed on this factor. However, the trial court is not 
7

required to weigh aggravating factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Pond also 

contends that there is no evidence that Pond’s statements to police hampered their 

investigation. We find Pond’s argument incredulous. The record shows that Pond denied 

culpability to police and also directed his son Blake to hide the gun. Accordingly, the 

trial court committed no abuse of discretion here. 

Furthermore, we note that the trial court found two additional aggravating factors: 

the age of the victim and Pond’s unlawful possession of a firearm. In general, a single 

aggravating circumstance is adequate to support the enhancement of a sentence. See 

Anderson v. State, 961 N.E.2d 19, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Pond does not 

challenge these two aggravating factors on appeal. We therefore conclude that there were 

sufficient aggravating factors supporting Pond’s aggravated sentence even without the 

trial court’s findings on Pond’s criminal history, probationary status at the time of the 

offense, and his statements to the police prior to his arrest. Accordingly, Pond has not 

shown that the trial court abused its discretion in enhancing his sentence.

B. Mitigating Factors

Pond also challenges the trial court’s consideration of certain mitigating factors. 

He argues that the trial court did not give sufficient weight to his guilty plea and failed to 

identify his remorse over Jacob’s killing as a mitigating factor. 

Pond contends that his guilty plea saved the State both time and expense and 

spared Jacob’s family from the pain and anguish of going through a trial where gruesome 

autopsy photos would have been displayed. While the trial court afforded some 
8

mitigating weight to Pond’s guilty plea, we find his argument disingenuous in light of the 

substantial benefit Pond received for his guilty plea. The State dismissed the murder and 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted domestic batterer Counts and capped his 

sentence at forty years in exchange for Pond’s guilty plea. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not err in finding that Pond’s guilty plea was not a significant mitigator. See 

Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221. 

Next, we consider Pond’s argument that the trial court did not consider his 

remorse as a mitigating factor. When alleging that a trial court failed to identify or find a 

mitigating factor, a defendant must establish that mitigating evidence is both significant 

and clearly supported by the record. Lavoie v. State, 903 N.E.2d 135, 141 (Ind. Ct. App.

2009). Pond expressed his regret to police officers, his probation officer, and at the 

sentencing hearing. Pond cites Scott v. State, 840 N.E.2d 376, 384 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006), trans. denied, for the proposition that expressions of remorse may be considered 

as a valid mitigating circumstance. However, in Scott, we found that the sincerity of the 

defendant’s remorse was entitled to slight weight in light of the “unprovoked shooting of 

a randomly selected victim.” Id. Similarly, we find Pond’s expression of remorse to be 

of slight weight given the unprovoked and random act that took Jacob’s life. In sum, we 

do not agree that Pond’s remorse was of such significance that the trial court abused its 
9

discretion by declining to acknowledge it. We therefore affirm the trial court’s 

imposition of Pond’s forty year executed sentence.1

II. Restitution

Pond also challenges the trial court’s restitution order. Specifically, Pond argues 

that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay restitution without inquiring into his 

ability to pay. In support, Pond cites I.C. § 35-38-2-2.3, which requires the trial court to 

conduct an indigency inquiry prior to imposing restitution as a condition of probation. 

Pond also challenges the trial court’s calculation of the restitution amount. 

An order of restitution is within the trial court’s discretion and we will only review 

the order for an abuse of discretion. Bennett v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is clearly against 

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or if it misinterprets or 

misapplies the law. See id. Pursuant to I.C. § 35-50-5-3(a), the trial court “may, as a 

condition of probation or without placing the person on probation, order the person to 

make restitution to [...] the family of a victim who is deceased.” The trial court’s 

restitution order must be based on actual costs, whether for property damage, medical

expenses, lost earnings, or funeral costs. Id. The purpose of a restitution order is to 

 

1

 Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) enables appellate review of the appropriateness of a sentence based on the 

nature of the crime and the character of the offender. Although citing App. R. 7(B) in his brief, Pond

makes no argument that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense or character of 

the offender. Therefore, we do not address it. 
10

impress upon the criminal defendant the magnitude of the loss he has caused and to 

defray costs to the victim caused by the offense. Bennett, 862 N.E.2d at 1286. 

We find no error by the trial court. It is undisputed that Pond’s sentence did not 

include probation. Thus, no prior determination of indigency was required. See Pearson 

v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ind. 2008). We also conclude that the amount of the 

restitution order was supported by the record. Evidence supporting a restitution order is 

sufficient “if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier 

of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.” T.C. v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2005), reh’g denied. On the date of the sentencing hearing, both of Jacob’s parents 

submitted an itemized claim form listing their damages. While both parents claimed 

funeral expenses of $9,738.64, Michuda claimed an additional $220, representing $70 for 

lost wages and $150 for Jacob’s clothing. The trial court ordered Pond to pay $9,958.64

in restitution, but later amended the amount to $9,800.44. Although the record does not 

reveal the reasons for the trial court’s decision, we find no abuse of discretion because the 

State presented two separate pieces of evidence reciting the actual expenses incurred by 

Jacob’s parents. Thus, the trial court could determine the amount of restitution due. See

I.C. § 35-50-5-3(a).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by sentencing Pond to forty years for voluntary manslaughter and the trial court did not 

err by ordering Pond to pay restitution.
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Affirmed.

BAILEY, J. and CRONE, J. concur