Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Ronald Marc Levin, Miscellaneous Docket

AG No. 75, September Term, 2012

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT – Respondent, Ronald

Marc Levin, violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”)

during his employment at Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A. Levin misrepresented his

workload and created fictitious clients and fictitious client papers in order to distort his net

originated income and shield his salary from adjustments reflecting his lower than anticipated

performance. Such conduct violated MLRPC 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d). Taken together,

Levin’s violations of the MLRPC warrant disbarment.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 28279-M

Argued: March 6, 2014

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Misc. Docket AG No. 75

September Term, 2012

 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION

OF MARYLAND

v.

RONALD MARC LEVIN

 

Barbera, C.J.

Harrell

Battaglia

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts,

JJ.

 

Opinion by Adkins, J.

 

Filed: May 16, 2014
Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“AGC”), acting through

Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against

Respondent, Ronald Marc Levin. Bar Counsel alleged that Levin, in connection with his

employment at the law firm of Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A. (“JGL”) from December

2010 through November 2011, engaged in professional misconduct as defined by Md. Rule

16-701(i), violating sections (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Rule 8.4 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules

of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”), as adopted by Md. Rule 16-812. Rule 8.4 of the

MLRPC states, in pertinent part:

Rule 8.4 Misconduct.

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland

Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,

knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do

so through the acts of another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely

on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness

as a lawyer in other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice[.]

Following a hearing before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the hearing

judge found that Levin violated Rule 8.4(a) and Rule 8.4(c), but did not violate Rule 8.4(b)

or Rule 8.4(d).

THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS

The disciplinary hearing was held before a judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County. Both parties appeared and presented evidence. The hearing judge made the

following findings of fact based upon clear and convincing evidence:

The following facts are not in dispute. Respondent Levin

became a member of the Maryland Bar on June 17, 1992. The

Respondent practices exclusively bankruptcy law, and appears

in bankruptcy courts in both Maryland and the District of

Columbia. On November 1, 2010, Respondent signed an

Employment Agreement with JGL. According to the terms of

the Agreement, Respondent’s employment with JGL would

commence on December 1, 2010 and continue for a period of

one year. The Agreement also indicated that Respondent’s

salary would be 50% of his net originated income (“NOI”). 

During the hearing on April 25, 2012, David Bulitt, Esquire, a

shareholder and Assistant Managing Director with JGL, testified

that NOI is defined as the attorney’s gross fee income from all

cases and clients originated by that attorney minus certain

charges (costs and other attorneys working on the cases). 

Respondent’s initial salary could not be determined in advance,

so his initial salary was set at $200,000. This salary would be

reviewed on a quarterly basis by the firm’s Director of Finance

and the firm’s Executive Committee, per the terms of the

Agreement, and adjustments could be made based on actual

performance. 

The Respondent worked for JGL from December 2010 to

October 2011, and during the course of Respondent’s

employment, Respondent made false statements to Mr. Bulitt

with respect to the number of cases he was handling, the number

of legitimate bills he had sent, and his expectation of payment. 

Mr. Bulitt, who has been a personal acquaintance of the

Respondent since childhood days, conducted the quarterly

reviews of the Respondent’s work performance. During these

reviews, as well as on other occasions, Respondent

misrepresented to Mr. Bulitt the size of his caseload and the fee

amounts he expected to receive from such work. In furtherance

of these oral misrepresentations, the Respondent created

fictitious clients and drafted paperwork for these fictitious

clients and showed these documents to Mr. Bulitt. 

2
In October 2011, the Respondent received a job offer from

another law firm and notified JGL of his intention to resign. 

The [R]espondent left his employment with JGL in October

2011. Based on a final review conducted by Mr. Bulitt of the

Respondent’s work performance, a significant deficiency was

discovered between Respondent’s initial salary and his actual

earnings for the firm. It was determined that the Respondent

owed the firm $151,191.17 based on the deficiencies in his

client billings. The Respondent did not contest the deficiency

and paid this debt in full to JGL on December 29, 2011. 

Mr. Bulitt testified that, had the Respondent been candid with

him about his actual work performance and client billings, the

firm would have reduced the Respondent’s $200,000 salary

accordingly. This Court accepts that statement as true because,

if salary adjustments were not going to be made, Mr. Bulitt

would not have met with the Respondent until the end of the

year. Furthermore, the Respondent feared a decrease in his pay

and went to great lengths in order to deceive the firm. 

The Respondent concedes [that] he has violated sections (a) and

(c) of Rule 8.4 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional

Conduct. Therefore, the issues in dispute in this case are:

whether the Respondent’s misrepresentations to Mr. Bulitt and

JGL and the falsified client billings he created violated sections

(b) and (d) of Rule 8.4, and what if any aggravating and/or

mitigating factors exist. Because of the Respondent’s willful

misrepresentations and dishonest conduct, JGL continued

paying the Respondent installments of his $200,000 annual

salary. 

The Court finds that the Respondent’s motivations for his

misrepresentations to JGL were his need to support himself and

his family, and to avoid embarrassment. The Court finds that

the Respondent’s misrepresentations were deliberate and

continuous throughout his employment with JGL. The

Respondent was fully aware of the wrongfulness of his acts and

specifically intended to conceal such conduct. The Respondent

did not elect to self-report his deficient performance to the firm

prior to his departure from JGL and JGL’s detection of his

3
deceptive practices. Mr. Bulitt’s and the Executive Committee’s

final audit revealed the extent of the Respondent’s dishonest

conduct. Furthermore, it was only after JGL threatened to report

the Respondent’s conduct to the Attorney Grievance

Commission that the Respondent reported his activities to

Maryland Bar counsel. 

Once the Respondent was made aware of the financial toll of his

poor performance at JGL[,] the Respondent paid the entire debt

of $151,191.17 within two months. As a Member of the

Maryland Bar and an employee of JGL, it was the Respondent’s

obligation to maintain honesty and candor toward his employer

with respect to his performance and financial compensation. 

Conclusions of Law

Maryland Rule 16-757 governs a disciplinary hearing before the

Circuit Court. The Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance

Commission, has the burden of proving the averments of the

petition by clear and convincing evidence. Maryland Civil

Pattern Jury Instruction 1:9 gives the definition of clear and

convincing evidence as follows:

To be clear and convincing, evidence should be

“clear” in the sense that it is certain, plain to the

understanding, and unambiguous and convincing

in a sense that it is so reasonable and persuasive

as to cause you to believe it. This burden of proof

requires more than a preponderance of the

evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable

doubt.

Here, the Petitioner is seeking to prove that Respondent

committed four acts of misconduct under Rule 8.4. The Court

considers each provision separately. The Respondent concedes

that he violated sections (a) and (c) and this Court finds that

there is ample evidence to support that conclusion.

Rule 8.4(a) is a catch-all provision that is violated when any

other Rule of Professional Conduct is violated. The Respondent

4
concedes his violation of Rule 8.4(a) due to his violation of Rule

8.4(c). Because the factual circumstances and case law

presented by the parties support the Respondent’s violation of

section (c), the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence

that the Respondent also violated Rule 8.4(a).

Rule 8.4(b) provides that misconduct exists where an attorney

commits a “criminal act” affecting the attorney’s honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney “in other respects.” For

purposes of section (b), an actual conviction is unnecessary to

demonstrate that the Respondent’s [sic] committed misconduct. 

The Petitioner identifies the “criminal act” committed under

these circumstances as Unauthorized Control Over Property –

By Deception, Section 7-104(b) of the Maryland Criminal Code. 

This provision states:

(b) A person may not obtain control over property

by willfully or knowingly using deception, if the

person:

(1) intends to deprive the owner of

the property;

(2) willfully or knowingly uses,

conceals, or abandons the property

in a manner that deprives the owner

of the property; or

(3) uses, conceals, or abandons the

property knowing the use,

concealment, or abandonment

probably will deprive the owner of

the property. 

The Petitioner argues that the Respondent deprived the firm of

its property (money) by creating false clients and client billings. 

It further contends that as a direct consequence of the

Respondent’s fraudulent conduct and misrepresentations, JGL

continued to pay the Respondent a salary that he had not earned

5
according to the terms of the Employment Agreement.

The Respondent counters that, as “deprive” is defined under

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §7-101(c), the Respondent had no

intent to deprive JGL of the property, either permanently or for

a period of time that was sufficient to appropriate a portion of its

value. Instead, he was aware that, upon financial review by Mr.

Bulitt, the Respondent would be indebted to the firm for any

deficiency between his salary and his NOI, and he would merely

have to repay the firm. 

The Court finds that the Petitioner has not proven by clear and

convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b). 

The evidence presented by the Petitioner demonstrates that the

Respondent intended to misrepresent his client billings in order

to maintain his initial salary. However, the Petitioner failed to

prove that the Respondent intended to deprive the firm of its

property permanently or for a period of time sufficient to

dispose of a part of its value. The Respondent’s acts did not rise

to the level of a criminal act. The Respondent’s prompt

repayment of his entire debt is a mitigating factor only and does

not disprove intent to commit a criminal act. Nevertheless, the

Petitioner did not meet its burden of proof.

Rule 8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct for an

attorney to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation.” The Respondent concedes that he

violated section (c) and admits that he made untrue statements

to Mr. Bulitt and other JGL officials about his caseload and

client billing; though he denies that they rise to the level of

fraud. The Respondent admitted that he knew that he would

have to “pay the piper” at some point in time. The Court finds

that the factual circumstances and case law presented by the

Petitioner support the conclusion that the Respondent violated

Rule 8.4(c).

The Petitioner argues lastly that, pursuant to Rule 8.4(d), the

Respondent engaged in conduct that was “prejudicial to the

administration of justice.” The Respondent argues that the

Petitioner’s burden is higher to prove misconduct under section

6
(d) than section (c), because conduct that is “prejudicial to the

administration of justice” must “seriously impair public

confidence in the entire profession, without extenuating

circumstances.” The Respondent distinguishes his conduct as

“private” and not something that affects public confidence in the

profession. As support for this contention, the Respondent cites

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Link, 380 Md. 405[, 844 A.2d

1197] (2004), wherein the Maryland Court of Appeals held that

“[o]nly when such purely private conduct is criminal or so

egregious as to make the harm, or potential harm, flowing from

it patent will that conduct be considered as prejudicing, or being

prejudicial to, the administration of justice.” This Court

concludes that case law supports the finding that the

Respondent’s conduct here was essentially private in nature,

consisting of false representations to his employer. The conduct

did not “seriously impair public confidence” in the profession,

and this Court holds that the Petitioner failed to satisfy its

burden of proof under section (d).

This Court is vested with the responsibility to examine every

attorney grievance on its own merits, taking into account its

unique factual circumstances. Thus, the Court must evaluate

any aggravating and mitigating factors presents [sic] in this case.

The Court first analyzes any mitigating factors present in this

case. Mitigating factors in attorney grievance cases can include:

[A]bsence of a prior disciplinary record; absence

of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal or

emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to

make restitution or to rectify consequences of

misconduct; full and free disclosure to

disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings; inexperience in the practice of law;

character or reputation; physical or mental

disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary

proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of

other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and finally,

remoteness of prior offenses.

7
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 63,

991 A.2d 51[, 61] (2010) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n

v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 599, 911 A.2d 440, 448 (2006)). 

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the

following mitigating factors exist: the Respondent’s recognition

of the wrongfulness of his actions, his full payment of the

financial debt to the firm within two months, and his selfreported misrepresentations and falsified billings to the

Maryland Bar.

However, the Court must also weigh these circumstances against

the aggravating factors identified in Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147[, 994 A.2d 928] (2010), and

located at Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association

Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The parties dispute

four of these factors specifically: the Respondent’s (b) dishonest

or selfish motive, (c) a pattern of misconduct, (d) multiple

offenses, and (i) substantial experience in the practice of law. 

Based upon the factual circumstances of this case, this Court

agrees with both parties that the other aggravating factors of

Standard 9.22 are inapplicable here.

As to (b), the Court acknowledges that the Respondent’s

motivation was not due to a purely selfish desire to gain money

from JGL. The Respondent was supporting his wife and three

children, two of whom were in college. As a consequence of

this and other personal financial problems, the Respondent

chose to proactively mislead his employer into believing that he

was performing at an acceptable level of productivity. This was

not a matter of willful ignorance or even passive recognition: the

Respondent affirmatively made statements and drafted

documents attesting to falsified information in order to

misrepresent his performance to JGL.

Furthermore, the Respondent’s defense of “embarrassment” and

fear for his reputation within the firm provides little defense. 

The Respondent’s conduct and statements were dishonest and

selfish, and thus the Court finds that (b) is an aggravating factor

in evaluating the Respondent’s misconduct.

8
The Respondent’s behavior was also systemic because the

Respondent made misrepresentations to Mr. Bulitt at each

quarterly review and on other occasions, too. He also provided

false client billings in aid of these oral statements. The Court

thus incorporates (c) and (d) together as factors contributing to

its conclusion that the Respondent engaged in a continuous

pattern of misconduct during his employment for JGL.

The Respondent had nearly twenty years of experience in

bankruptcy law. Furthermore, the Respondent engaged in

private practice within a firm setting for this same period of

time, and should have had a thorough understanding that his

conduct was unacceptable. Therefore, the Court finds that

aggravating factor (i) exists.

Wherefore, this Court concludes this 10th day of June, 2013,

that the Petitioner met its burden of proof and proved by clear

and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rule

8.4(a) and (c), but failed to meet its burden of proof and did not

prove that the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) and (d). 

Therefore, the Circuit Court recommends that violations under

(a) and (c) be upheld, and that violations under (b) and (d) be

dismissed by the Court of Appeals, but [sic].

(Citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Our task in attorney discipline proceedings is well established:

“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and

complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the

record.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147,

167, 994 A.2d 928, 940 (2010) (citations omitted). “We accept

a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they

are clearly erroneous.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415

Md. 696, 706, 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010) (quoting Att’y Grievance

Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095

(2006)). That deference is appropriate because the hearing

judge is in a position to assess the demeanor-based credibility of

9
the witnesses. Id. at 707, 4 A.3d at 964. In that regard, “[t]he

hearing judge is permitted to ‘pick and choose which evidence

to rely upon’ from a conflicting array when determining findings

of fact.” Guida, 391 Md. at 50, 891 A.2d at 1095 (quoting Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 253, 760 A.2d 1108,

1118 (2000)). 

We review de novo the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions of

law. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 351, 368,

952 A.2d 226, 236 (2008). In other words, “the ultimate

determination . . . as to an attorney’s alleged misconduct is

reserved for this Court.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield,

369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 764 (2002) (quoting Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 322, 786 A.2d

763, 768 (2001) (alteration in original)). In that regard, we

examine the record to ascertain whether there was sufficient

evidence to support the hearing judge’s legal conclusions, by a

“clear and convincing” standard of proof. Att’y Grievance

Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54, 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007). 

Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 427 Md. 15, 27–28, 45 A.3d 281, 288 (2012) (citations

omitted).

EXCEPTIONS

The AGC submitted exceptions to the hearing judge’s failure to find that Levin

violated Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(d). Respondent did not file any exceptions to the trial court’s

findings of fact or conclusions of law.

Concerning Rule 8.4(b), Petitioner argues that the hearing court erred by failing to

conclude that “the Respondent intended to deprive the firm of its property permanently or for

a period of time sufficient to dispose a part of its value.” Petitioner contends that Respondent

deprived his employer of its property through deception, thereby violating Md. Code (2002,

10
2012 Repl. Vol.), § 7-104(b) of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”). Parsing the statute, 1

Petitioner highlights that CL § 7-101(c) defines “deprive” as withholding the property of

another: 

(1) permanently; (2) for a period that results in the appropriation

of a part of the property’s value; (3) with the purpose to restore

it only on payment of a reward or other compensation; or (4) to

dispose of the property or use or deal with the property in a

manner that makes it unlikely that the owner will recover it. 

Because Respondent repaid his employer from a home equity line of credit, Petitioner argues,

Respondent no longer possessed the unearned compensation, and thus had appropriated this

property, satisfying the intent element under CL § 7-101(c)(2). Alternatively, Petitioner

alleges that Respondent’s prompt repayment evinced an intent to restore the funds upon

completion of his employment, satisfying the intent element under CL § 7-101(c)(3). 

Respondent counters that he never had the intent to deprive JGL of the funds, as he

Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 7-104(b) of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”) 1

states the following:

(b) Unauthorized control over property — By deception. — A

person may not obtain control over property by willfully or

knowingly using deception, if the person:

(1) intends to deprive the owner of the property;

(2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons

the property in a manner that deprives the owner of the

property; or 

(3) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the

use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive

the owner of the property.

11
always knew he would have to repay JGL and always intended to do so. Moreover,

Respondent claims that he misrepresented his client billings in order to avoid embarrassment

at the firm, not to maintain his unwarranted salary. Thus, Respondent urges us to affirm the

hearing court’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to meet its burden in proving 8.4(b). 

In declining to hold that Respondent violated CL § 7-104(b), the hearing court stated:

The Court finds that the Petitioner has not proven by clear and

convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b). 

The evidence presented by the Petitioner demonstrates that the

Respondent intended to misrepresent his client billings in order

to maintain his initial salary. However, the Petitioner failed to

prove that the Respondent intended to deprive the firm of its

property permanently or for a period of time sufficient to

dispose of a part of its value. The Respondent’s acts did not rise

to the level of a criminal act. The Respondent’s prompt

repayment of his entire debt is a mitigating factor only and does

not disprove intent to commit a criminal act. Nevertheless, the

Petitioner did not meet its burden of proof.

But the hearing judge never specifically explained why, in its view, Petitioner failed

to meet its burden of proof. In our view, after evaluating Respondent’s conduct against each

element of the statute, the record is clear that Respondent violated CL § 7-104(b)(1). 

First, the hearing court found that Respondent misrepresented his caseload and

expected fees, creating fictitious clients and paperwork to support these misrepresentations. 

Additionally, the court found that JGL would have reduced Respondent’s salary to its

warranted level had Respondent been candid and not misrepresented his billings. Thus,

Respondent obtained control over the unwarranted salary through the willful use of

deception.

12
Second, Respondent repaid JGL with funds from a home equity line of credit. In 2

other words, when Respondent paid back JGL, he did not remit the unearned compensation

that he obtained from JGL, but instead transmitted different funds from a separate source. 

Although there is not specific evidence in the record as to where the unwarranted salary

went, we can only infer that those monies were used to address Respondent’s “personal

financial problems.” See supra. Consequently, Respondent’s repayment only underscored

that he had withheld the property of JGL for a period sufficient to appropriate part of its

value.3

The remaining question is whether Respondent intended to so deprive his employer

of its property. Based on our reading of the hearing court’s conclusions of law, its failure to

find a violation of CL § 7-104(b) was premised on Petitioner having not proven the intent

In the Circuit Court, Respondent testified as follows: 2

THE COURT: Now you paid the $151,000 back at the end of

2011?

[RESPONDENT]: Yes sir.

THE COURT: Where’d you get the money?

[RESPONDENT]: My home equity line.

THE COURT: So you took out more debt?

[RESPONDENT]: Yes sir.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines appropriation as “[t]he exercise of control over 3

property; a taking of possession.” Black’s Law Dictionary 117–18 (9th ed. 2009). 

13
element. This was erroneous. In addressing the predecessor theft statute to CL § 7-104(b)

in Lane v. State, the Court of Special Appeals held that a criminal defendant’s intent may be

inferred from the circumstances surrounding the conduct. 60 Md. App. 412, 423, 483 A.2d

369, 375 (1984) (“[A]ctual deprivation to the owner is merely one circumstance from which

the jury may infer that the offender committed the prohibited act with the requisite criminal

intent.”). 

We find that principle to be instructive here. In our view, the numerous findings set

forth by the hearing court compel the conclusion that Respondent intended to deprive JGL

of the money constituting the unearned portion of his salary for a period sufficient to

appropriate a part of its value. As the hearing court itself observed, “[t]he Respondent’s 4

We highlight the following facts from the Circuit Court’s findings: 4

• [T]he Respondent feared a decrease in his pay and went

to great lengths in order to deceive the firm.

• The Court finds that the Respondent’s motivations for his

misrepresentations to JGL were his need to support

himself and his family, and to avoid embarrassment. . . .

The Respondent was fully aware of the wrongfulness of

his acts and specifically intended to conceal such

conduct. The Respondent did not elect to self-report his

deficient performance to the firm prior to his departure

from JGL and JGL’s detection of his deceptive practices.

• [T]he Court acknowledges that the Respondent’s

motivation was not due to a purely selfish desire to gain

money from JGL. The Respondent was supporting his

wife and three children, two of whom were in college. 

(continued...)

14
prompt repayment of his entire debt is a mitigating factor only and does not disprove intent

to commit a criminal act.” Considering all these circumstances, and for the purposes of this

proceeding, we conclude that Respondent possessed the requisite intent to constitute a

violation of CL § 7-104(b). 

That Respondent has not been convicted of a crime under CL § 7-104(b) in no way

bars our conclusion that he violated that statute or Rule 8.4(b). See Tanko, 427 Md. at 47,

45 A.3d at 300 (“An actual conviction is not required to establish that an attorney violated

MRPC 8.4(b), so long as the underlying conduct that constitutes the crime is proven by clear

and convincing evidence.”). Accordingly, we sustain Petitioner’s exception to the hearing

court’s failure to find a violation of Rule 8.4(b). 

Concerning Rule 8.4(d), Petitioner argues that the hearing court erred in failing to find

that Respondent’s conduct did not “‘seriously impair public confidence’” in the legal

profession and “was essentially private in nature, consisting of false representations to his

employer.” “An attorney engages in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when

he or she engages in conduct which erodes public confidence in the legal profession.” Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Carithers, 421 Md. 28, 56, 25 A.3d 181, 198 (2011) (citing Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Clark, 363 Md. 169, 183, 767 A.2d 865, 873 (2001)). “Dishonest

(...continued) 4

As a consequence of this and other personal financial

problems, the Respondent chose to proactively mislead

his employer into believing that he was performing at an

acceptable level of productivity.

15
conduct by an attorney also may be prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 411 Md. 83, 96, 981 A.2d 1234, 1242 (2009). Conduct that is

not directly related to the practice of law is not often prejudicial to the administration of

justice, but can be if it is criminal or sufficiently egregious. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.

Coppock, 432 Md. 629, 647, 69 A.3d 1092, 1102 (2013) (“‘[O]nly when such purely private

conduct is criminal or so egregious as to make the harm, or potential harm, flowing from it

patent will that conduct be considered as prejudicing, or being prejudicial to, the

administration of justice.’” (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Link, 380 Md. 405, 429,

844 A.2d 1197, 1211–12 (2004))); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 250,

812 A.2d 981, 996 (2002) (“Generally, this Court has found conduct to be prejudicial to the

administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d) when there has either been conduct that

is criminal in nature or conduct that relates to the practice of law.”). 

Because we hold that Respondent violated the criminal law by means of deception,

thereby violating Rule 8.4(b), we also hold that Respondent has necessarily violated Rule

8.4(d). See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kapoor, 391 Md. 505, 532, 894 A.2d 502, 518

(2006) (“Because [the offending attorney’s] conduct was dishonest, deceitful, and criminal,

it was prejudicial to the administration of justice and, also, in violation of Rule 8.4(d).”). 

Public knowledge that an attorney deceived his own colleagues through dishonest criminal

conduct in order to in maintain an unwarranted salary reinforces the most damaging

cynicisms concerning lawyers’ honesty, avarice, and candor. Accordingly, we sustain

16
Petitioner’s exception to the hearing court’s failure to find a violation of Rule 8.4(d). 

SANCTION

“When imposing disciplinary sanctions for violations of the Maryland Rules of

Professional Conduct, it is this Court’s purpose to protect the public, promote general and

specific deterrence, and maintain the integrity of the legal profession.” Att’y Grievance

Comm’n v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137, 165, 904 A.2d 557, 574 (2006) (citing Att’y Grievance

Comm’n v. Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 160, 879 A.2d 58, 80 (2005)). The appropriate

sanction depends on the facts and circumstances of the case before us, including our

assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors promulgated by the American Bar

Association. See Coppock, 432 Md. at 648, 69 A.3d at 1103. 5

Aggravating factors include: 5

(a) prior disciplinary offenses;

(b) dishonest or selfish motive;

(c) a pattern of misconduct;

(d) multiple offenses;

(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by

intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the

disciplinary agency;

(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other

deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;

(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 

(h) vulnerability of victim;

(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;

(j) indifference to making restitution;

(k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled

substances.

American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 9.22, Compendium

(continued...)

17
Bar Counsel recommends that Respondent be disbarred. Emphasizing that candor and

(...continued) 5

of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards (2012).

Mitigating factors include:

(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;

(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;

(c) personal or emotional problems;

(d) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify

consequences of misconduct;

(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative

attitude toward proceedings;

(f) inexperience in the practice of law;

(g) character or reputation;

(h) physical disability;

(i) mental disability or chemical dependency including

alcoholism or drug abuse when:

(1) there is medical evidence that the

respondent is affected by a chemical

dependency or mental disability;

(2) the chemical dependency or mental

disability caused the misconduct;

(3) the respondent’s recovery from the

chemical dependency or mental disability

is demonstrated by a meaningful and

su sta in e d p erio d o f su c c essf u l

rehabilitation; and

(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct

and recurrence of that misconduct is

unlikely;

(j) delay in disciplinary proceedings;

(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;

(l) remorse;

(m) remoteness of prior offenses.

American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 9.32, Compendium

of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards (2012).

18
truthfulness are indispensable traits of a lawyer, Petitioner urges us to follow our rule that

disbarment follows “‘when a member of the bar is shown to be willfully dishonest for

personal gain by means of fraud, deceit, cheating or like conduct, absent the most compelling

extenuating circumstances[.]’” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Guberman, 392 Md. 131, 137,

896 A.2d 337, 341 (2006) (quoting Maryland State Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543,

553–54, 318 A.2d 811, 817 (1974)). Petitioner underscores that we have found disbarment

to be appropriate when addressing “‘repeated material misrepresentations that constitute a

pattern of deceitful conduct, as opposed to an isolated instance[.]’” Att’y Grievance Comm’n

v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 373, 910 A.2d 429, 450 (2006) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n

v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 647, 790 A.2d 621, 629 (2002)).

Respondent counters that a public reprimand is appropriate here, not disbarment. He

contends that he lacked the intent to deprive JGL of his unearned salary, always knew that

he would have to repay the unearned salary, and did repay that salary within months of

leaving the firm. Respondent characterizes his misconduct as private in nature, and

highlights his twenty-one years of practice without a previous attorney grievance complaint. 

Monetary gain, Respondent states, was not the real motivation for his misrepresentations and

deceit; rather, embarrassment and humiliation over his slow business pushed him to this

misconduct. 

The hearing court found that “the Respondent’s recognition of the wrongfulness of

his actions, his payment of the financial debt to the firm within two months, and his self19
reported misrepresentations and falsified billings to the Maryland Bar” were mitigating

factors. See supra. While we accept the first two factors as supported by the evidence, we

question the significance of Respondent’s self-reporting. Respondent did not contact the

AGC until after JGL indicated that they would be reporting him to the AGC and he retained

counsel. 

The hearing court also found several aggravating factors, including the Respondent’s

dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial

experience in the practice of law. See supra. We accept these findings as demonstrated by

a preponderance of the evidence. 

When attorneys engage in dishonest and deceitful conduct for personal gain, this

Court does not hesitate to sanction such conduct with disbarment:

[W]e have held that disbarment follows as a matter of course

“when a member of the bar is shown to be willfully dishonest

for personal gain by means of fraud, deceit, cheating or like

conduct, absent the most compelling extenuating circumstances

. . .” Agnew, 271 Md. at 553–54, 318 A.2d at 817. To do

otherwise, we concluded, “would constitute a travesty of our

responsibility.” Id. And, because “[c]andor and truthfulness are

two of the most important moral character traits of a lawyer,”

[Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 449, 635 A.2d

1315, 1319 (1994)] deliberate and systematic conduct

amounting at least to “fraud or deceit” has resulted in the

imposition of the ultimate sanction of disbarment. 

Guberman, 392 Md. at 137–38, 896 A.2d at 340–41 (footnote and citations omitted). See

also Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 567, 810 A.2d 487, 491 (2002)

(holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who “converted

20
partnership money to his own use without authorization and without disclosure to [his] other

partners.”). 

We explained the rationale behind this aggressive disciplinary posture in Att’y

Grievance Commission v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001), stating

that: 

Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like,

intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most

important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make

intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse. 

Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney’s

character. 

In this case, honesty was not present in Levin’s character. Respondent systematically

engaged in a pattern of dishonest conduct. His misrepresentations stretched over several

months, extending from communications with a colleague and personal acquaintance, to the

creation of fictitious client papers. Levin’s conduct was similar to that in Guberman, in

which an attorney repeatedly misrepresented the status of a client’s appeal to supervisors at

his firm, even placing fake copies of court pleadings in the firm’s file. 392 Md. at 134–35,

896 A.2d at 339. There, we disbarred the offending attorney. Guberman, 392 Md. at 139,

896 A.2d at 342. Because the mitigating factors in this case are not sufficiently compelling

to excuse Respondent’s misconduct, we hold that disbarment is also the appropriate sanction

here. For this reason, we entered the March 7, 2014, per curiam order disbarring Respondent

and awarding costs against him.

21