alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### NATIONAL BONDHOLDERS CORPORATION *v.*CHEESEMAN *et al.*

No. 13185.

April 11, 1940.

*167
      *Pearce & John 8.*Matthews, for plaintiff.

*J. Howell*Green, for defendants.

*168Duckworth, Justice.

The demurrer attacks paragraph 6 of the petition, because, as asserted, it fails to show by whom the sale under the power contained in the security deed was made, and whether the sale was by the plaintiff or other parties. Looking to the petition in considering this portion of the demurrer, it appears that as amended it explicitly alleges that the sale was made by John E. Lee. This allegation, in addition to answering the first inquiry as to who made the sale, also answers the further question raised by the demurrer as to whether the sale was by the plaintiff or other parties. Consequently this portion of the demurrer is completely without merit. The remainder of paragraph 4 calls upon the petitioner to set out or refer to a transfer of the security deed or conveyance of the property, and to show authority for sale of the above-described property pursuant to the security deed, provided and only provided such sale was made by plaintiff. Since the sale was not made by the plaintiff, the demurrer calls for no information and requires no amendment. If in stating this ground of the demurrer it was desired by the defendant to obtain information on these questions relative to the party making the sale, whether such party be the plaintiff or some one else, the demurrer should have so stated. Demurrer, being a critic, should itself be free from imperfection. A special demurrer must put its finger upon the exact point of weakness. *Southern States Portland Cement Co.*v. Helms, 2 *Ga. App.*308 (58 S. E. 524); *Marietta*
      *169
      *Realty & Development Co.*v. Reynolds, 189 *Ga.*147 (5 S. E. 2d, 347). There is no merit in paragraph 4 of the demurrer.

Paragraph 5 of the demurrer constitutes no valid attack upon the petition. The petition conforms to all legal requirements with reference to showing the plaintiff’s right to sue on the note, when it sets forth copy of the same, showing indorsement in blank by the payee and the amount due thereon, and alleges that plaintiff is the owner and holder thereof. These facts make a prima facie case of “holder in due course.” Code, § 14-509. When the Mortgage Guarantee Company of America, the payee, signed its name on the back of the note sued on, that, without more, constituted an indorsement in blank. Code, § 14-402; *Heard*v. *DeLoach,*105 *Ga.*500 (30 S. E. 940); *Hendrix v. Bauhard,*138 *Ga.*473 (75 S. E. 588, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1028, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 688). With .this the only indorsement in blank appearing on the note, it is payable to “bearer.” Code, § 14-209 (5). And it may be negotiated by delivery. § 14-405. Maturity of the note does not affect its negotiability. *Bank of Oglethorpe*v. *Swindle,*155 *Ga.*69 (116 S. E. 604, 33 A. L. R. 695). Ist was error to sustain the demurrer and dismiss the action.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
EPA Registration Jacket 83588

‐ 1

Vol.2
IIB 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6983 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 4, 2024 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 15 South Valdosta Road in Lakeland, Georgia, 

as the ‘‘Nell Patten Roquemore Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 6983 RFS

1 SECTION 1. NELL PATTEN ROQUEMORE POST OFFICE. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 15 South Valdosta Road in Lake4 land, Georgia, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Nell 

5 Patten Roquemore Post Office’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Nell Patten 

10 Roquemore Post Office’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives June 3, 2024. 

Attest: KEVIN F. MCCUMBER, 

Clerk. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6922 

To amend section 242 of the National Housing Act to provide parity with 

respect to access to the mortgage insurance for hospitals program for 

licensed hospitals, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 9, 2024 

Mr. EMMER (for himself and Mr. TORRES of New York) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend section 242 of the National Housing Act to provide parity with respect to access to the mortgage insurance for hospitals program for licensed hospitals, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securing Facilities for 

5 Mental Health Services Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MORTGAGE INSURANCE FOR HOSPITALS PARITY. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 242(b)(1) of the National 

8 Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1715z–7(b)(1)) is amended— 

2 

•HR 6922 IH

1 (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking the semi2 colon at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; 

3 (2) by striking subparagraph (B); and 

4 (3) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as sub5 paragraph (B). 

6 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

7 this section shall apply upon the date of the enactment 

8 of this Act. 

Æ
To: EPA Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0505

From: Greg Nizich, USEPA, OAQPS/SPPD

Subject: Placeholder for DVD pending submittal to Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0505-DRAFT-0118

This video file contains footage from oil and natural gas activities that includes video recorded with an

infrared camera (i.e., FLIR camera). The material was presented at a public meeting in Arlington , TX on 

August 2, 2010 by Sharon Wilson.
Exhibit 32.2
 Certification Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 By The Chief Financial Officer,
As Adopted Pursuant To Section 906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002.
  1.
    
    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Toys R Us, Inc. (the Company) for the
quarterly period ended May 2, 2009 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S.C.
78m); and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/ F. Clay Creasey, Jr.F. Clay Creasey, Jr.Executive Vice President -Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
EX-33 (d)
REPORT ON ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE

First American Real Estate Solutions of Texas, L.P. (an indirect subsidiary of
The First American Corporation, and the "Asserting Party") is responsible for
assessing compliance as of December 31, 2006, and for the period from January 1,
2006 through December 31, 2006 (the "Reporting Period") with the servicing
criteria set forth in Title 17, Sections 229.1122(d)(1)(iv), (d)(2)(v),
(d)(2)(vi), (d)(2)(vii), (d)(4)(xi), (d)(4)(xii) and (d)(4)(xiii) of the Code of
Federal Regulations (the "CFR") applicable to the Asserting Party (the
"Applicable Servicing Criteria"). The transactions covered by this report
include all loans for residential mortgage loan outsourcing customers for which
the Asserting Party served as the residential tax service provider (the
"Platform").

The Asserting Party has assessed its compliance with the Applicable Servicing
Criteria for the Reporting Period and has concluded that, except as set forth
hereinbelow, the Asserting Party has complied, in all material respects, with
the Applicable Servicing Criteria as of December 31, 2006, and for the Reporting
Period with respect to the Platform taken as a whole.

The Asserting Party assessed its compliance with the Applicable Servicing
Criteria for the Reporting Period and has identified a material instance of
noncompliance with the servicing criterion set forth in Section
229.1122(d)(2)(vii)(B) of the CFR with respect to the Platform. Specifically,
the Asserting Party did not prepare reconciliations for all asset-backed
securities related bank accounts within 30 calendar days after the bank
statement cut-off date or such number of days specified in the transaction
agreements.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, an independent registered public accounting firm,
has issued an attestation report on the assessment of compliance with the
Applicable Servicing Criteria as of December 31, 2006, and for the Reporting
Period as set forth in this assertion.


FIRST AMERICAN REAL ESTATE SOLUTIONS OF TEXAS, L.P.
By: First American Real Estate Solutions LLC
General Partner

/s/ Lucy A. Przybyla
Lucy A. Przybyla
Senior Vice President
February 28, 2007
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Marcus A. GARZA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50708 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 11, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Michael Robert Hardy, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Michael W. McCrum, Esq., McCrum Law Office, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Marcus A. Garza pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and one count of failure to file income tax returns. The district court imposed a total sentence of 30 months and restitution of $681,943.27. On direct appeal, we vacated the restitution order and remanded the case for assessment of restitution. On remand, the district court denied motions by Garza seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and to expand resentencing beyond the issue of restitution. The district court amended the judgment of conviction to reflect $0 in restitution.

Garza argues that the district court erred by refusing to address the validity of his plea or the calculation of his sentence on remand. Garza did not challenge either the validity of his conviction or the calculation of his prison sentence on direct appeal. As neither issue had been challenged before this court, neither was subject to examination by the district court on remand or by this court in this subsequent appeal. *See United States v. Teel,*691 F.3d 578, 583 (5th Cir. 2012).

In this second appeal, Garza first argues that the district court was without jurisdiction to convict him because the Government failed to allege and prove an element of the offense. Defects in an indictment, such as insufficient factual allegations, do not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. *United States v. Cotton,*535 U.S. 625, 630-31, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002); *United States v. Scruggs,*714 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 2013).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 33.1

                             REPORT ON ASSESSMENT OF
                       COMPLIANCE WITH SERVICING CRITERIA

Bank of Scotland plc (the "Asserting Party") is responsible for assessing
compliance as at 31 December 2007 and for the period from 1 January 2007 through
31 December 2007 (the "Reporting Period") with the servicing criteria set forth
in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB, excluding the criteria set forth in Item 1122
(d)(1)(ii),(iii) and (iv), (d)(2)(iii), (d)(4)(x) and (xii) of Regulation AB,
which the Asserting Party has concluded are not applicable to the activities it
performed with respect to the asset-backed securities transactions covered by
this report (such criteria, after giving effect to the exclusions identified
above, the "Applicable Servicing Criteria").

The transactions covered by this report include the residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions conducted by Permanent Master Issuer plc that were
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the
Securities Act of 1933 where the related asset-backed securities were
outstanding during the Reporting Period (the "Platform"), as listed in Appendix
A.

The Asserting Party has assessed compliance using criteria set forth by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in paragraph (d) of Item 1122 of Regulation
AB for the Reporting Period and has concluded that it has complied, in all
material respects, with the Applicable Servicing Criteria for the Reporting
Period with respect to the Platform taken as a whole.

KPMG Audit Plc, an independent registered public accounting firm, has issued an
attestation report on this Report on Assessment of Compliance with Servicing
Criteria for the Reporting Period.



By:   /s/ Dan Watkins
     --------------------------
Name:  Dan Watkins
Title: Chief Executive, Retail
Date: 19th March 2008

<PAGE>

                                   APPENDIX A

                           Permanent Master Issuer plc

                       Series 1 Class A Issue 2006-1 Notes
                       Series 1 Class B Issue 2006-1 Notes
                       Series 1 Class C Issue 2006-1 Notes
                       Series 2 Class A Issue 2006-1 Notes
                       Series 2 Class B Issue 2006-1 Notes
                       Series 2 Class C Issue 2006-1 Notes
                       Series 5 Class A Issue 2006-1 Notes

                       Series 1 Class A Issue 2007-1 Notes
                       Series 1 Class B Issue 2007-1 Notes
                       Series 1 Class C Issue 2007-1 Notes
                      Series 2 Class A1 Issue 2007-1 Notes
                      Series 2 Class A2 Issue 2007-1 Notes
                       Series 4 Class A Issue 2007-1 Notes
#### Maud H. Loyd, Respondent, *v.*Third Avenue Railways Company, Appellant.

Argued January 13, 1943;

decided March 4, 1943.

*603
      *Alfred T. Davison, Addison B. Scoville*and *J. Stuart Riedel*for appellant.

*Stanley J. Harte*and *Sidney S. Allen*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
[Civ. No. 3508.

First Appellate District.

September 16, 1920.]

#### HUTCHINSON COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. CHARLES S. MARSHALL, Appellant.

[l] Findings—Time op Signing—Construction op Code.—In view of the fact that the provisions of section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requiring findings to be filed within thirty days after the submission of the cause, are directory, a delay of almost one year and a half in the signing of findings after announcement of judgment is not in itself a ground of reversal, and in the absence of a showing of detriment from the delay, the judgment must be afSrmed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. W. M. Conley, Judge Presiding.

Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Howard Harron for Appellant.

Fitzgerald, Abbott & Beardsley for Respondent.

RICHARDS, J.

This action was commenced to foreclose a street assessment lien. Upon the trial of the cause on July 7, 1917, the plaintiff introduced evidence to sustain the material allegations of its complaint; the defendant introduced no evidence, and accordingly at the close of .the trial the court announced that judgment would be given in the plaintiff’s favor. Findings, not having been waived, were to be thereafter prepared and submitted to the court. Nothing further was done in the cause so far as the record discloses until December 6, 1918, when findings were presented to the trial judge, and were signed a few days later over the objection of the defendant, and judgment having been entered thereon defendant has appealed from the judgment.

[1] The only error of law which the appellant urges upon this appeal is that the court erred in signing findings in the cause after the lapse of time between the trial and the date of their presentation, the appellant contending that the' court had lost jurisdiction over the case. There is no merit in this contention. The provision of section 632 *308of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring findings to he filed within thirty days after the submission of the cause has been held to be directory. *(Eddy*v. *American Amusement Co., 21*Cal. App. 487, [132 Pac. 83]; *Kepfler*v. *Kepfler,*134 Cal. 205, [66 Pac. 208].) This being so, and the appellant having failed-to show any detriment by reason of the delay, nor any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, nor any error committed by said court, either upon the trial of the cause or in making the findings therein which it finally signed, we hold that this appeal is without merit, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

Waste, P. J., and Kinsell, J., *pro tem.,*concurred.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Feliciano ALBITER-MIRANDA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50139 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 11, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Feliciano Albiter-Miranda, Pro Se

Before PRADO, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Feliciano Albiter-Miranda, federal prisoner # 57748-180, moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. Albiter-Miranda pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute at least 500 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He seeks to challenge the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion in which he sought a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Albiter-Miranda’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. *See United States v. Henderson,*636 F.3d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 2011); *United States v. Contreras,*820 F.3d 773, 774-75 (5th Cir. 2016). The appeal is not taken in good faith because it lacks arguable merit and is frivolous. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). Albiter-Miranda’s motion for leave to proceed IFP is denied.

The facts surrounding the IFP decision are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the appeal. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 *777F.3d 197, 202 *&*n.24 (5th Cir. 1997). The appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues and is dismissed as frivolous. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir, R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7737

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GEMINI BOYD, a/k/a Jaraun Boyd, a/k/a Gemini,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

District Judge. (3:96-cr-00134-FDW-4)

Submitted: December 13, 2012 Decided: December 19, 2012

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gemini Boyd, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Gemini Boyd appeals the district court’s text order 

denying his motion to take judicial notice of his pro se motions 

as moot. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible 

error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the 

district court. United States v. Boyd, No. 3:96-cr-00134-FDW-4 

(W.D.N.C. Sept. 5, 2012). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anton WATKINS, a.k.a. Anton Twan Watkins, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-16730 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(May 26, 2017)

Sivashree Sundaram, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, Brandy Brentari Galler, U.S. Attorney’s Office, West Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Anton Watkins, Pro Se

Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Anton Watkins, proceeding *pro se,*appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence, brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3682(c)(2) and Amendment 599 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court found that Watkins was not entitled to relief because the amendment was already in effect when Watkins was sentenced and, thus, he received whatever benefit may have been afforded by the amendment. On appeal, Watkins argues that he is entitled to relief under Amendment 599, which directs that a weapons enhancement may not be applied to an underlying offense when the defendant has also received an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction, which provides separate punishment for the use or possession of a firearm in a violent crime.

We review *de novo*a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. *United States v. Davis,*587 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009). Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court may reduce the prison sentence of a “defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); *see also*U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(a)(l).

Amendment 599 may serve, when applicable, as the basis for a sentence reduction. *See*U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(d). Amendment 599 took effect on November 1, 2000. U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 599. Amendment 599 provides, in pertinent part, that where a defendant is convicted of an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense for using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime, the defendant cannot also receive an offense-level enhancement in the underlying offense for his use of a firearm during the commission of that offense. *Id.; see also United States v. Brown,*332 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2003).

We affirm the district court’s denial of Watkins’s § 3582(c)(2) motion because Amendment 599 does not apply to his guideline calculation and does not have the effect of lowering his guideline range. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Amendment 599 took effect in November 2000, ten years before Watkins was sentenced in July 2011. *See*U.S.S.G. App. C., Amend. 599. Thus, Watkins was not “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has been subsequently low*825ered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Watkins was ineligible for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 599, and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.
#### THE STATE OF TEXAS vs. WELLS.

Appeal from Travis county.

*Official Bond.*— This suit like that of same caption, reported in full was brought by the State upon the bond of an alleged defaulting tax collector. On the trial below judgment was rendered ior defendants upon the ground that the bond was insufficient and of no effect. Held that the judgment was correct. Onr 1 aw reqñires that bonds of this character shall be roved 'mission erecourts’ BñfHaVwtffTbythe state comptroller. In this caso was rejected by the comptroller. It follows that the. bond “Vas materially defecuLUaiñlLfót sucfTas would support a judgment.

Affirmed.

Waits, Commissioner.

Adopted.