alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### AYCOCK vs. KIMBROUGH.

Appeal from Falls county.

*Execution*— Sale *of the Interest of a Tenant in Common.*— The proposition as stated by the court upon its finding as to law, was, that where two are tenants in common of separate tracts of land, a creditor cannot sell the undivided interesTbT~o]Te~in one of the tracts under execution. But this case is this : A creditor is attempting to sell the midivided intm:estun_ojueAxactj3LJan¿owned by a_co-tenant, who owns that and several othePtracts in connection with other co-tenants^ This, it is held, can be done. '"The finding or the court below on this question.of law was therefore error.

Reversed and remanded.

Delany, Commissioner.

Adopted.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.2

                                PROMISSORY NOTE
                                        
$87,500.00                                                   Bothell, Washington
                                                                November 3, 1998


FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Orca Technologies, Inc. (the undersigned) agrees to pay to
the order of Roger P. Vallo, the sum of Eighty Seven Thousand Five Hundred and
00/100ths Dollars ($87,500.00) in lawful money of the United States of America.

(a) This Note bears interest at the rate of 8% (eight percent) per annum.

(b) This Note is payable February 2, 1999.

After default, at the option of the holder, the entire indebtedness evidenced
hereby shall become immediately due and payable.  Failure to exercise the rights
and remedies available to the holder of this Note shall not waive the right to
exercise them in the event of any subsequent default.  In the event of default,
the undersigned promises to pay collection expenses, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, incurred by the holder of this note, with or without suit on
appeal and in bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings.

The Note is delivered to the payee in the state of Washington and is made with
reference to, and shall be construed in accordance with, the laws of the state
of Washington without  reference to their conflict of law principles.


                                     /s/ Casey F. Seremek
                                    ------------------------
                                    Casey F. Seremek
                                    Orca Technologies, Inc.
                                    Controller
                                    Date:  November 3, 1998
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jamal MINOR, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-10067 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 4, 2017

Gail A. Hayworth, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Douglas C. Greene, Sr., Esq., Greene Law Firm, P.C., Arlington, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Jamal Minor was sentenced to a within-guidelines term of imprisonment following his plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, a Glock pistol, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Minor now appeals, contending that the district court erred in applying offense-level enhancements pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) and (b)(6)(B) baspd on his earlier arrest for possession of a different firearm, a Hi-Point pistol with an obliterated serial number, in connection with another felony drug offense.

Minor’s challenges are without merit. First, Minor has failed to brief and therefore waived any challenge to the application of the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement based on the district court’s alternative finding that he possessed the Glock in connection with the felony of aggravated robbery. *See United States v. Wikkerink,*841 F.3d 337, 336 n.6 (5th Cir. 2016). We affirm the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement on that unchallenged basis. *Capital Concepts Props. 85-1 v. Mut. First, Inc.,*35 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1994).

Second, although Minor denies that he possessed the Hi-Point pistol at the time of his arrest in December 2015, he fails to establish how the district court clearly erred in relying on the PSR’s unrebutted factual finding to the contrary. *See United States v. Fuentes,*775 F.3d 213, 220 (5th Cir. 2014). Minor likewise fails to demonstrate any clear error in the district court’s determination that his possession of both pistols in connection with criminal activity less than four months apart was part of the same series of offenses. *See*U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; *United States v. Brummett,*355 F.3d 343, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2003). Because the Hi-Point pistol with the obliterated *339serial number was therefore relevant conduct for the purposes of sentencing, the district eourt did not clearly err in applying the § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R‘. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jennifer MARTIN DEL CAMPO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50071

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 20, 2017

Ryan A. Sausedo, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mark R. Rehe, Assistant U.S, Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Bridget Lynn Kennedy, Esquire, Trial Attorney, James Fife, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jennifer Martin Del Campo appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 24-month sentence imposed *489following her guilty-plea conviction for importation of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Martin Del Campo first contends that the district court failed to calculate the Guideline range correctly because it bypassed the issue of whether she was entitled to a minor role adjustment, and instead considered the minor role factors in its variance analysis. The record belies this argument. The court denied a minor role adjustment based on the facts of Martin Del Campo’s case. The court’s subsequent consideration of some of the facts asserted in support of the minor role adjustment to grant downward departures totaling six levels was not improper. *See,*e.g., *United States v. Ramos-Medina,*706 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] court may consider acceptance of responsibility separately in imposing a sentence, even if the court determined that the defendant did not qualify for a formal adjustment on those grounds under the Guidelines.”).

Martin Del Campo next contends that the court’s minor role analysis was flawed because the court did not compare her to her co-participants in the offense and did not consider the five factors enumerated in the commentary to the minor role Guideline. We review the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. *See United States v. Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d 519, 522 (9th Cir. 2016). The record reflects that the district court considered Martin Del Campo’s arguments, applied the correct legal standard, and determined that Martin Del Campo had failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she was substantially less culpable than the average participant in the offense. *See*U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A), (C); *see also United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (adequate explanation may be inferred from the record as a whole). The district court was not required to “tick off’ the relevant factors, *see Carty,*520 F.3d at 992, nor was it required to weight the factors in a particular manner, *see Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d at 523.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### American Surety Company of New York *v.*Adams, ordinary, for use, etc., *et al.*

Atkinson, Presiding Justice.

1. There is no authority of law for a guardian by private contract to invest funds of his ward in land. Such an investment is a breach of the guardian’s statutory bond that will authorize suit to recover the amount from the guardian and his surety.

2. “Guardians are authorized to invest any funds held by them as such guardians in lands: Provided, that an order to that effect shall first be obtained from the judge of the superior court, who is authorized to consider and pass upon such applications either in term time or vacation.” Code, § 49-216. A petition of a guardian to invest funds of his ward under this law is an ex parte proceeding of the ward acting through the guardian. It does not require appointment of a guardian ad litem for the ward. *Callaway*v. *Bridges,*79 *Ga.*753 (2) (4 S. E. 687). See also *Sanders*v. *Hinton,*171 *Ga.*702, 709 (156 S. E. 812) ; *Marshall*v. *Citizens & Southern National Bank,*54 *Ga. App.*123, 128 (187 S. E. 240). In such proceeding the guardian acts in a fiduciary capacity, and is bound to utmost good faith with the court, and the ward in the interest of the latter.

3. In such proceeding', the guardian and the ward being widow and minor child of’ a decedent, if the petition describes land in which it is prayed for leave to invest individual funds of the ward, and the land has in fact been previously set apart from the estate of the decedent as a statutory year’s support to the widow and minor children, but the guardian in her petition omits to inform the court of such fact or that the guardian (widow) has an individual interest in the land, such omission, in view of the confidential relations and duty of disclosure, is actual fraud upon the court whose jurisdiction is invoked, which will authorize a decree in equity setting aside an order granting the prayer of the petition for investment.

*576No. 13170.

July 12, 1940.

*(а)*Tlie guardian occupies a dual position in relation to the land. Her personal interest was to obtain the highest price, while that of her wards was to pay the lowest price; and not to pay at all for an interest in the land they already had. Appropriate is the language of Lumpkin, J., in *Loyless*v. *Rhodes,*9 *Ga.*547, 551: “I ask, would the ordinary— would any honest court, have granted this dismission, with a knowledge ■of the facts charged in the bill?”

(б) If under such order the guardian invests the individual funds of the ward in the land so set apart as a year’s support, the whole transaction will be a breach of the guardian’s bond that will support an equitable action against the guardian, or her legal representative, and the surety on the guardian’s bond, to set aside the order for investment, and to recover the amount of the invested fund.

4. Applying the foregoing principles, the petition for equitable relief alleged a cause' of action, and the judge did not err in overruling the demurrer of the surety. *Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices eoneur.*

*577*B. M. Daley,*for plaintiff in error.

*Stanley A. Beese*and *Blackshear <& Blackshear,*contra.
#### ASHLOCK vs. THE STATE.

Appeal from Collin county.

Assistant Attorney General Burts, for the State.

*Theft*— Venue.—That the stolen animal was seen on its accustomed range in 0. county one week before it was traced to the city of 1). was a showing sufficient to establish the venue in C. county.

*Practice*— Evidence.—A leading question is one which suggests the desired answer. “Did K, and R. tell you they saw the mare in I).?” is uot a leading question.

*Same.*— It was proper as showing bias to permit the State to prove by the defendant’s witnesses that they went before the grand jury at the instance of the defendant.

*Same*— Charge *of the Court*— The court, instead of charging that the taking, to constitute theft, must have been fraudulent if' the “defendant took the mare with intent,’’ etc. Objection not tenable as against a charge though good against an indictment.

*Same*— Reasonable *Doubt.*— It is not required that the doctrine of reasonable doubt be specially charged with reference to every is*60sue developed by the evidence. It is sufficient if it be charged generally with reference to the whole case.

*Same.-*— -Where the State has disproved the statement of the defendant concerning his connection with the stolen property, made when his possession was first challenged it is not called upon to disprove his subsequent statements with reference thereto.

The judgment is affirmed.

Willson, J.
```

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 247 (Wednesday, December 24, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 77590]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-30215]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 8981]

In the Matter of the Designation of Ajnad Misr, Also Known as 
Egypt's Soldiers, Also Known as Soldiers of Egypt, Also Known as Ajnad 
Masr, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Pursuant to Section 
1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as Amended

    Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(b) 
of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive 
Order 13268 of July 2, 2002, and Executive Order 13284 of January 23, 
2003, I hereby determine that the entity known as Ajnad Misr, also 
known as Egypt's Soldiers, also known as Soldiers of Egypt, also known 
as Ajnad Masr, committed, or poses a significant risk of committing, 
acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the 
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.
    Consistent with the determination in section 10 of Executive Order 
13224 that ``prior notice to persons determined to be subject to the 
Order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States 
would render ineffectual the blocking and other measures authorized in 
the Order because of the ability to transfer funds instantaneously,'' I 
determine that no prior notice needs to be provided to any person 
subject to this determination who might have a constitutional presence 
in the United States, because to do so would render ineffectual the 
measures authorized in the Order.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register.

    Dated: December 11, 2014.
John F. Kerry,
Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 2014-30215 Filed 12-23-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-AD-P
```
<PAGE>

Exhibit 99.3 Press Release


PRESS RELEASE
August 27, 1999

                              For further information contact:
                              David M. Bradley
                              Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
                              North Central Bancshares, Inc.
                              825 Central Avenue
                              Fort Dodge, Iowa 50501
                              515-576-7531

                    NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC. ANNOUNCES
                            STOCK REPURCHASE PROGRAM
                                      AND
                       DECLARATION OF QUARTERLY DIVIDEND

Fort Dodge, Iowa, August 27, 1999 - North Central Bancshares, Inc. (Nasdaq:
"FFFD") (the "Company"), the holding company for First Federal Savings Bank of
Iowa, announced that it will commence a stock repurchase program beginning on or
about September 2 , 1999.  The program authorizes the Company to repurchase up
to 5.98 % or 150,000 shares of its 2,507,242 outstanding shares of common stock
during the next twelve months.  The repurchases will be made from time to time,
in open market transactions, at the discretion of management.

North Central also announced today that the Company declared a regular quarterly
cash dividend of $0.10 per share on the Company's common stock for the fiscal
quarter ended September 30, 1999. The dividend will be payable to all
stockholders of record as of September 16, 1999 and will be paid on October 6,
1999.

North Central Bancshares, Inc., with over $343 million in assets, is the holding
company for First Federal Savings Bank of Iowa, a federally chartered stock
savings bank.  First Federal is a community-oriented institution serving Iowa
through 8 full service locations in Fort Dodge, Nevada, Ames, Burlington, Mt.
Pleasant, and Perry, Iowa.  First Federal's deposits are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Exhibit
31.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  I, Greg S. Taylor,
Chief Financial Officer certify that:  1. I
have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of CytoGenix, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows
of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly
report;  4. The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:  a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
this quarterly report (the Evaluation Date); and  c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;  5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrants auditors and the audit
committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent function):  a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of
internal controls which could adversely affect the registrants ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrants auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
controls; and     6. The registrants other certifying officers and I have indicated in
this quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.  Date: April 4,
2008  /s/ Greg S.
Taylor Greg S.
Taylor Chief Financial
Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Leslie MOORE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-2529-cr

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 31, 2017 *

FOR APPELLANT: Paul D. Silver, Katherine E. Kopita, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Richard S. Hartuni-an, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, ■ Albany, New York.

FOR APPELLEE: Robert J. Boyle, Law Office of Robert J. Boyle, New York, New York.

PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges, LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge.†

*

 This summary order was filed under seal on May 31, 2017.

†

 Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

[REDACTED VERSION]

The United States appeals from what the district court itself characterized as an “illegal sentence.” J.A. 75. The challenged sentence of [redacted] was imposed on defendant Leslie Moore following her guilty plea to conspiracy to traffic in 500 grams or more of cocaine, 28 grams or more of cocaine base, and an unspecified amount of heroin. *See*21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846. [redacted] The government urges us to identify procedural error [redacted] and to vacate Moore’s sentence as unreasonable. We apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard to reasonableness challenges to sentences, *see United States v. Young,*811 F.3d 592, 598 (2d Cir. 2016), which “incorporates *de novo*review of questions of law” and “clear-error review of questions of fact,” *United States v. Legros,*529 F.3d 470, 474 (2d Cir. 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to vacate and remand.

[redacted]

The district court here concluded that the applicable 60-month mandatory minimum required a Guidelines calculation for Moore that presumed a total offense level of 22 and a criminal history category of III, thereby yielding a sentencing range *642of 51 to 63 months, [redacted] The district court [redacted] and appears to have accepted the government’s assessment [redacted] as evidenced by its repeated reference to [redacted] as the limit of its [redacted] authority. *See*J.A. 75 [redacted], Despite this acknowledgment [redacted] the district court continued as follows:

> That having been said, for the reasons that are articulated by [defense counsel] here and in his sentencing submissions, I impose an *illegal sentence*[redacted]

[redacted]1

Moore argues that the district court did not, in fact, impose an illegal sentence because its statements manifest [redacted] We do not think the district court’s statements support that conclusion, [redacted] Nevertheless, we cannot completely dismiss the possibility of such adoptions, [redacted] Thus, whether there was actual [redacted] error, or simply ambiguity, we must vacate Moore’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

[redacted]

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.

1

. [redacted]
Exhibit 4.13
 AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
     1. Amendment
  2. Miscellaneous.
 (a)
    
    Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law
of the State of New York, USA.
 (b)
    
    Effect of Amendment. Except as specifically amended by this Amendment, the Agreement remains
in full force and effect according to its terms. Except as specifically provided in this
Amendment, nothing contained in this Amendment is intended to affect the parties existing or
continuing rights or obligations under the Agreement, as modified hereby.
 (c)
    
    Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in counterparts, each of which will be deemed
an original, but all of which together will constitute one and the same instrument.
 [signature page follows]




---



##### 



HUIPING YAN/s/ Huiping YanHOME INNS & HOTELS MANAGEMENT INC.By:
    /s/ Jian SunName:
    Jian SunTitle:
    CEO  2