alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Charles A. ARMSTRONG, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15436.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Oct. 21, 1966.

Raymond J. Smith, Chicago, III, for appellant.

Edward V. Hanrahan, U. S. Atty., Chicago, 111., for appellee; John Peter Lulinski, Lawrence Jay Weiner, Lawrence J. Cohen, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel.

Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and SWYGERT and FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

A motion to vacate sentence under Title 28, U.S.C.A. sec. 2255, was denied and petitioner appealed.

Petitioner’s present claim is that his conviction came about in violation of the second jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment. The trial at which he was found guilty followed a trial which ended in mistrial.

The first jury was sworn and opening statements made November 22, 1963. The case was continued to November 25. On November 26, court and counsel speculated on the effect the assassination of the President, November 22, might have on the attitude of the jury, and discussed the propriety of a mistrial. Petitioner’s counsel moved for a mistrial, and the court so ordered. Petitioner, though present, was not asked for his views, and did not volunteer.

The claim of double jeopardy was not raised at or before the second trial, nor on direct appeal. 339 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied. 381 U.S. 905, 85 S. Ct. 1452, 14 L.Ed.2d 287 (1965).

We readily conclude that (1) because the claim of second jeopardy rests upon the proposition that the mistrial was improperly ordered, petitioner was bound to make his claim before the second trial, and on direct appeal, and cannot assert it on collateral attack; (2) the motion for mistrial, made by his counsel, was a matter of trial procedure ordinarily entrusted to counsel, and petitioner is bound by his counsel’s choice in the absence of express objection; and (3) even if petitioner had objected, it could not be said, in view of the tragic *822circumstances of the time, that the court went beyond the proper area of discretion in concluding that declaration of a mistrial was necessary to secure the ends of justice.

The order denying the motion is

Affirmed.
#### Serafino GUIDO, Appellant, v. Cornelius BALL, Postmaster of the United States Post Office, Purdy Avenue, Rye, New York, and the United States Post Office Department, Appellees.

No. 66, Docket 30098.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Oct. 6, 1966.

Decided Oct. 25, 1966.

Cherry . S. Krassner, White Plains, N. Y. (Tachna & Krassner, White Plains, N. Y., on the brief), for appellant.

Dawnald R. Henderson, Asst. U. S. Atty., for Southern District of New York (Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., and James G. Greilsheimer, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellees.

Before SMITH, HAYS and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, a former probationary Post Office employee, brought an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking to obtain judicial review of his discharge from employment. The court, Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Judge, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. We find that this court lacks jurisdiction of this appeal because not timely filed, and dismiss the appeal.

Judgment entered in the District Court on July 8, 1965. Since the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, plaintiff had 60 days in which to file a notice of appeal with the District Court. F.R.Civ.P.Rule 73(a) (1). Since the sixtieth day was a holiday, Labor Day, filing on the following day, September 7, would have been timely. The first communication from Guido was received by the District Court on September 8 and a notice of appeal and request to proceed *in forma, pawperis*on September 13, 1965. The timely filing *883of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Napier v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western RR Co., 223 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1955); Knowles v. United States, 260 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1958).

As indicated above, after the time for appeal had run, appellant sought leave to appeal *in forma pawperis,*from the denial of which he also attempts to appeal. But in 1965 the only ground on which the District Court could extend the time for taking an appeal was on a showing of excusable neglect based on the failure of the party to learn of the entry of judgment. See Rule 73(a) prior to the 1966 amendment. No showing of such failure was made, so the District Court lacked power to allow an extension, even if it thought the appeal meritorious.

The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.1

1

. As was the case in Napier v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western RR Co., supra, “we dismiss with less reluctance because the argument and briefs have failed to impress us with the merit of the appeal.”
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT CHRISSHAWN ARRINGTON, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-4676 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed June 19, 2019. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Charles Sniffen, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See § 775.087(1)(a), (2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011); Strickland v. State, 437 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1983); Robinson v. State, 37 So. 3d 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Williams v. State, 836 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

SILBERMAN, BLACK, and SMITH,JJ., Concur.
**SPAR Group, Inc.**

 

EXHIBIT        32.2

**Certification of the Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to**

**Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the three month        period ended March 31, 2008 (this “report”), of SPAR Group, Inc. (the        “registrant”), the undersigned hereby certifies that, to his        knowledge:

1.         The report fully        complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of        1934, as amended, and

2.         The information        contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition        and results of operations of the registrant.

|   | /s/ James R. SegretoJames R. SegretoChief Financial Officer, Treasurer andSecretaryMay 15, 2008 |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**A signed        original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to SPAR Group,        Inc. and will be retained by SPAR Group, Inc., and furnished to the Securities and Exchange        Commission or its staff upon request.**

 

 

Ex-4
#### Paul HUPP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Terrance R. HUBBS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55266

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 21, 2017

Paul Hupp, Pro Se

Daniel W. Doyle, Esquire, Attorney, Doyle Schafer McMahon LLP, Irvine, CA, *540for Defendant-Appellee Terrance R. Hubbs

Arthur K. Cunningham, Esquire, Attorney, Wai Hung Wong, Attorney, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard *&*Smith LLP, San Ber-nardino, CA, for Defendant-Appellee City of Beaumont

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Paul Hupp appeals pro se from district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourth Amendment and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Naffe v. Frey,*789 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hupp’s Fourth Amendment claim arising out of defendant Hubbs’ alleged license plate check because Hubbs’ act of running a license plate check to access Hupp’s home address did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment and thus did not require probable cause. *See United States v. Diaz-Castaneda,*494 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (a police officer does not conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment when he sees a license plate in plain view and uses it to access non-private information about the car and its owner).

We reject as without merit Hupp’s various contentions about the district court’s bias, its assignment of cases to particular judges, and its failure to provide an 'opportunity for oral argument.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE>
                                                                                                                       EXHIBIT 11.01


                                                        THE INDUS GROUP, INC.

                                                STATEMENT OF COMPUTATION OF PRO FORMA

                                                        NET INCOME PER SHARE

                                                (In thousands, except share amounts)

                                                             (Unaudited)


<CAPTION>
                                                                                      Three Months Ended           Six Months Ended
                                                                                            June 30,                    June 30,
                                                                                       -------------------       -------------------
                                                                                        1997         1996         1997         1996
                                                                                       ------       ------       ------       ------
<S>                                                                                   <C>          <C>          <C>          <C>  
Pro forma net income ...........................................................      $ 2,931      $ 2,051      $ 5,744      $ 3,854
                                                                                       ======       ======       ======       ======
Shares used in per share computation:
     Weighted average outstanding ..............................................       19,038       17,752       18,834       16,868
     Equivalent shares assumed to be outstanding had options
     granted prior to 1995 been exercised and used to repurchase
     shares at their then fair value ...........................................          778        1,623          879        1,666
                                                                                       ------       ------       ------       ------
                                                                                       19,816       19,375       19,713       18,534
                                                                                       ======       ======       ======       ======
Pro forma net income per share .................................................      $  0.15      $  0.11      $  0.29      $  0.21
                                                                                       ======       ======       ======       ======

</TABLE>
IIB 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6918 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 22, 2024 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, 

Labor, and Pensions 

AN ACT 

To prohibit the Secretary of Health and Human Services 

from restricting funding for pregnancy centers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

HR 6918 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Supporting Pregnant 

3 and Parenting Women and Families Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PREG5 NANCY CENTERS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Health and 

7 Human Services may not finalize, implement, or enforce, 

8 with respect to expenditures for any pregnancy center, the 

9 modification to section 263.11 of title 45, Code of Federal 

10 Regulations, as described in the proposed regulation set 

11 forth beginning on page 67697 of volume 88 of the Fed12 eral Register, or any substantially similar regulatory ac13 tion. 

14 (b) DEFINITION OF PREGNANCY CENTER.—In sub15 section (a), the term ‘‘pregnancy center’’ means any orga16 nization, such as a pregnancy resource center, pregnancy 

17 help center or organization, or pregnancy medical center, 

18 that— 

19 (1) supports protecting the life of the mother 

20 and the unborn child; and 

21 (2) offers resources and services to mothers, fa22 thers, and families, including but not limited to rela23 tionship counseling, prenatal and pregnancy eduVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:01 Jan 22, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H6918.RFS H6918

kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

HR 6918 RFS

1 cation, pregnancy testing, diapers, baby clothes, or 

2 material supports. 

Passed the House of Representatives January 18, 

2024. 

Attest: KEVIN F. MCCUMBER, 

Clerk. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*John O'Neil, Appellant.

Submitted April 14, 1943;

decided June 18, 1943.

*882
      *Ray F. Fowler*for appellant.

*Daniel J. O’Mara, District Attorney (Clarence J. Henry*of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment affirmed; no opinion.

*883Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Lewis and Desmond, JJ. Dissenting: Reppey and Conway, JJ., on the ground the evidence as a matter of law is insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Exhibit 35 a) [OCWEN logo} ANNUAL SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO ITEM 1123 OF REGULATION AB  March 8, 2007  RE: CS HEMT 2006-5 For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006 (the "Reporting Period"), Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC ("OLS") furnishes this annual servicer compliance statement pursuant to Item 1123 of Regulation AB, indicating its compliance with the servicing standards of the Securities & Exchange Commission as set forth in Regulation AB, 17 CFR 229.1100, et seq., ("Regulation AB"). In this regard, I make the following representations, which are true to the best of my knowledge and belief in all material respects.  1. A review of the servicing activities of OLS during the Reporting Period, and of its performance under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of October 1, 2006 (the "Agreement") has been performed under my supervision.  2. To the best of my knowledge, based on this review, OLS has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.  By: /s/ Ronald M. Faris Name: Ronald M. Faris Title: President  Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC  1661 Worthington Road Suite 100  Centrepark West  West Palm Beach, FL 33409 b) Agreement:  Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Depositor, DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., Seller, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., Servicer and Master Servicer, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Servicer and U.S. Bank National Association, Trustee - Pooling and Servicing Agreement - Home Equity Mortgage Trust Series 2006-5 Dated:   October 1, 2006 **ANNUAL STATEMENT AS TO COMPLIANCE**In accordance with the applicable section in each of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements specified: i.a review of the activities of the Servicer and the Master Servicer during the  **year ended  December 31, 2006** and of performance under this Agreement has been made under such officers' supervision; and ii.to the best of such officers' knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer and the Master Servicer have fulfilled all of their obligations and no default has occurred under this Agreement throughout such year. By: Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. As Servicer and Master Servicer /s/ Matthew L. Hollingsworth Matthew L. Hollingsworth Chief Executive Officer March 16, 2007
Exhibit 32.1














CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q (the "Report") for
the period ended March 31, 2009 of Dime Community Bancshares, Inc.,
(the "Company") as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof, I, Vincent F. Palagiano, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.









May 11,
2009


Date









By:  /s/ VINCENT F.
PALAGIANO


Vincent F. Palagiano


Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
AMENDMENT
NO. 3 TO THE PROMISSORY NOTE dated as of April 29, 2012 (this “Amendment”), among CERES VENTURES,
INC. (formerly PhytoMedical Technologies, Inc.), a Nevada corporation (the “Borrower”)
and JEET SIDHU, a resident of the Province of British Columbia (“Holder”).


 


WHEREAS, the Borrower issued to the
Holder a 8 1⁄2 % Convertible Promissory Note dated May 20, 2011, and as amended on July 14, 2011, and December
29, 2011, in the original principal amount of $100,000 (the “Note”), of which $50,000 and interest thereon have
previously been paid.


 


WHEREAS, the Borrower has requested,
and the Holder has agreed, to amend the Note as set forth below.


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration
of the premises and the agreements hereinafter contained, and for other good and valuable consideration, notwithstanding any provisions
of the Promissory Note to the contrary, the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:


 


The Note shall be paid as follows:


 


1. $50,000, and the interest due on that
amount, shall be paid no later than June 30, 2012.


 


This Amendment may be executed in one or
more counterparts, all of which shall be considered one and the same agreement, and shall become effective when one or more counterparts
have been signed by each of the Parties and delivered to the other Parties, it being understood that all Parties need not sign
the same counterpart. This Amendment may be executed by facsimile signature and a facsimile signature shall constitute an original
for all purposes.


 


Except as amended hereby, the terms and
conditions of the Note remain in full force and effect.


 


 


[Signature Page Follows]


 








    	1
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 29, 2019

No. 04

- 18

- 00505

- CR

Richard Alcorta GARZA, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 198th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. B15467 Honorable Rex Emerson, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The State’s brief was originally due to be filed on December 12, 2018. On December 12, 2018, the State filed its first motion for extension of time, requesting an additional 45 days to file the brief. We granted the motion and ordered the brief filed on or before January 28, 2019. On January 25, 2018, the State filed its second motion for extension of time, requesting an additional 30 days to file the brief. The motion is granted. The brief is due no later than Feb ruary 27, 2019. Further requests for extension of time will not be granted absent extraordinary

circumstances.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of t he said

court on this 29th day of January, 2019

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
#### In the Matter of Alma M. Fabricius, Appellant, against Board of Education of the City of New York, Respondent.

Argued November 15, 1943;

decided January 6, 1944.

*Alma M. Fabricius*in person for appellant.

*Ignatius M. Wilkinson, Corporation Counsel (Nicholas Bucci*and *James Hall Prothero*of counsel), for respondent.

*788Appeal dismissed, without costs, on the ground that no substantial constitutional question is involved. No opinion.

Concur: Lotjghran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ, Taking no part: Lehman, Ch. J., and Thacheb, J.
KOREA TESTING & RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

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#### H. C. HOSKINS vs. J. A. HULING

Appeal from Collin county.

*.Damages*— Pleading *.*— ■’Vo the appellee’s action for damages for wilfully and maliciously shooting certain milch cows, the appellant' pleaded in reconventiOn that the appellee wilfully and maliciously permitted his cows to break into his, appellant’s premises and injure his crop. Held, that if, as alleged, the appellant’s feuce was a law - ful one*, and appellee did wilfully and maliciously permit his cattle to break into and injure his crop, then the appellant was entitled to recover, not only actual, but exemplary damages; wherefore the court erred in sustaining exceptions to the appellant’s plea in reconvention.

*59
      *Practice*— llcmittitur.—The doctrine of remittitur to cure excessive judgment does not apply to actions for damages for torts where the damages are uncertain and within the discretion of the jury, but only where the measure of damages is matter of law.

*Same*— Measure *of Damages.*— As special actual damages in this case, the appellee was not entitled to more than the loss of his cows as milch cows, which was the market value of the milk lost; if of no market value, then its reasonable value to appellee with legal interest. As general actual damage he would be entitled to recover for loss which was the natural and proximate result of the injuiry to ’’his cows, the measure of which is the difference between the value of the animals just before and after the injury. The evidence in this case is insufficient to show any certain damages.

*Same.*— Lawful *Pence*is one at least five feet high, and compact enough to prevent the passage of hogs. If appellant’s 'fence was lawful, he was entitled to damage done his crop by appellee’s stock, but was not justified in shooting them to prevent injury.

Re-versed and remanded.

Willson, J.
Exhibit 32.1
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 The undersigned, Timothy J. Turner, President, of Mogul Energy International, Inc., hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 (1)
the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Mogul Energy International, Inc. for the period ended March 31, 2010 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Mogul Energy International, Inc.
 
 April 15, 2011
 
 /s/ Timothy J. TurnerTimothy J. turner, President(Principal Executive Officer)
 
 
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Mogul Energy International, Inc. and will be retained by Mogul Energy International, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.