Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1693 | February 17, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Marielena Duerring

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Samantha M. Sumcad

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dominic Jones,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

February 17, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1693

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable John M. 

Marnocha, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D02-1709-F6-912

May, Judge.

[1] Dominic Jones appeals the revocation of his probation. He raises two issues, 

which we restate as: (1) whether the hearsay evidence admitted at Jones’ 
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probation revocation hearing was substantially trustworthy; and (2) whether the 

State presented sufficient evidence to support revocation. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jones pled guilty to Level 6 felony domestic 

battery1 on March 26, 2018. On April 24, 2018, the trial court entered 

judgment of conviction and sentenced Jones to a term of thirty months, with 

twelve months executed and the remaining eighteen months suspended. The 

trial court also placed Jones on probation for a period of twelve months. A 

term of Jones’ probation required that he not violate any laws.

[3] At approximately 2:45 a.m. on February 11, 2019, LaPorte County Sheriff 

Deputy Slawek Czupryna received a dispatch regarding suspicious activity at a 

trailer park in Westville, Indiana. While on his way to the trailer park, Deputy 

Czupryna learned that another deputy on the scene had stopped a car, and the 

driver of the car told the deputy that he was there to pick up two individuals 

who were breaking into the cars of trailer park residents. The driver identified

Jones as one of the individuals breaking into the cars. Officers found footprints 

in the trailer park and the footprints led them to a Casey’s General Store in 

Westville where the officers discovered Jones. Officers also arrested Austin 

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3. 
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Wood for breaking into vehicles at the trailer park and Wood identified Jones 

as his accomplice. 

[4] The State charged Jones with eleven counts of theft and one count of 

unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle in LaPorte County, and the State filed a 

petition to revoke Jones’ probation in the case before us. The trial court held a 

hearing on the State’s petition to revoke Jones’ probation on May 31, 2019. 

Deputy Czupryna was the only witness to testify at the hearing, and the 

following exchanged occurred during direct examination:

[State:] And do you know if Mr. Jones admitted to breaking into 

the cars?

[Deputy Czupryna:] At first he didn’t, but he said—he mentioned 

that he was in the area with some other people. At first I believe 

he mentioned that he got into an argument with his girlfriend, or 

something like that.

[State:] So he wasn’t immediately forthcoming?

[Deputy Czupryna:] No. No, he was not.

[State:] But he did ultimately say, yes, I broke into the vehicles?

[Deputy Czupryna:] Correct. When the pat-down search was 

conducted, he was found in possession of several items on his 

person that were later found to be stolen from the vehicles.

(Tr. Evidentiary Hearing May 31, 2019 Vol. II at 7-8.) At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the trial court stated:
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As I see in this case from the evidence, the testimony of the 

officer, the officers of the Laporte Sheriff’s Department were 

being dispatched to a trailer park on February 11, 2019 with 

respect to a report that a vehicle had dropped off other 

individuals in the trailer park and those people were going 

through various cars. The individuals were apprehended. The 

defendant was found in possession of items, although I 

understand the description of the items were somewhat vague. 

Nonetheless, I think the officer testified the items—the defendant 

first denied being involved in the case, but when there was a patdown search, he was found in possession of items which had 

been reported stolen from the cars. He then admitted to breaking 

into the cars.

I think based upon that evidence the State has proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence its petition. As a result, the Court 

finds the defendant has violated the terms of probation.

(Id. at 15.)

[5] On June 26, 2019, the trial court issued an order revoking Jones’ probation:

On the Court’s finding that the defendant violated the terms of 

his probation the Court imposes the eighteen (18)-month 

sentence as an executed sentence. The defendant is given credit 

for thirty-six (36) days served in custody. The sentence will be 

consecutive to, if there is one, LaPorte County Case No. 46C01-

1902-F6-000207.

(App. Vol. II at 128.)

Discussion and Decision
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1. Admission of Evidence

[6] Jones argues the trial court erred in admitting Deputy Czupryna’s testimony

about what officers at the scene relayed to him. Jones argues this testimony 

should not have been admitted because it was hearsay and not substantially 

trustworthy. Generally, we will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on the 

admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Peterson v. State, 909 

N.E.2d 494, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Further, Indiana Rule of Evidence 

101(d) provides that, except for rules involving privileges, the Indiana Rules of 

Evidence do not apply in probation revocation hearings. Nonetheless, a 

probationer has certain due process rights at a probation revocation hearing, 

which include “the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” 

Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 649 (Ind. 2008); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f) 

(stating probationer in revocation proceeding “is entitled to confrontation, 

cross-examination, and representation by counsel”). Therefore, the trial court 

may consider hearsay evidence at a probation revocation hearing only if the 

court finds the hearsay to be substantially trustworthy. Reyes v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 438, 442 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied.

[7] While Jones did object to admission of Deputy Czupryna’s probable cause 

affidavit, Jones did not object to Deputy Czupryna’s testimony at the probation 

revocation hearing. The State argues Jones has therefore waived his right to 

challenge Deputy Czupryna’s testimony on appeal. Generally, a party’s failure 

to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence results in 

waiver of the issue. Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), 
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trans. denied. Nonetheless, “a claim that has been waived by a defendant’s 

failure to raise a contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the 

reviewing court determines there was fundamental error.” Id. “Fundamental 

error is error that constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or 

potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant 

fundamental due process.” Carden v. State, 873 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007). The error must be so egregious as to make a fair trial impossible. Id.

[8] Deputy Czupryna testified regarding his personal involvement in the 

investigation of the robbery of vehicles at the trailer park and the information he 

learned in the course of that investigation. Additionally, Indiana Rule of 

Evidence 801 provides that an out-of-court statement by a party opponent is not 

hearsay. See Bell v. State, 29 N.E.3d 137, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding 

defendant’s statement to detective that he was good at “reading” people was a

statement by a party opponent and therefore not hearsay), trans. denied. 

Consequently, Jones’ admission that he broke into vehicles at the trailer park is 

not hearsay. Therefore, we hold Deputy Czupryna’s testimony was

substantially trustworthy, and admission of any hearsay statements contained 

therein did not constitute fundamental error. See Votra v. State, 121 N.E.3d 

1108, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding statement in probable cause affidavit 

was substantially trustworthy to be admitted at probation revocation hearing).
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2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which 

a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 

2007). “The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke 

probation if the conditions are violated.” Id. 

[10] We review a decision to revoke probation under the abuse of discretion 

standard. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. 

When reviewing whether sufficient evidence supported revocation, we do not 

reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Morgan v. State, 691 

N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). If there is substantial evidence of 

probative value to support concluding by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the defendant violated a term of probation, we will affirm. Menifee v. State, 600 

N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), clarified on other grounds on denial of reh’g

605 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

[11] Jones argues no evidence was produced that Jones had unauthorized control 

over someone else’s property or that he entered someone else’s vehicle without 

permission.

2

 However, Jones admitted breaking into vehicles at the trailer park

2 Jones also notes that Deputy Czupryna did not identify the Dominic Jones present at the hearing as the 

same Dominic Jones officers encountered in Westville on February 11, 2019. However, while not explicitly 

identified, it is clear from the context of Deputy Czupryna’s testimony that he is talking about the defendant 

in this case.
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when officers apprehended him. The driver of Jones’ getaway vehicle and 

Jones’ accomplice both identified Jones as one of the individuals breaking into 

cars at the trailer park. Jones was apprehended near the trailer park and found 

with items stolen from the vehicles of trailer park residents. Thus, we hold 

there was sufficient evidence of probative value that Jones committed a new 

crime to support revocation of his probation. See Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 

756 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding State presented sufficient evidence 

probationer committed a new crime to support revocation). 

Conclusion

[12] The trial court did not commit fundamental error in allowing Deputy Czupryna

to testify to information he learned in the course of his investigation. Further, 

the State presented evidence that Jones admitted breaking into vehicles at the 

trailer park, his cohorts identified him as a fellow participant, and he was found 

in possession of stolen items. We therefore affirm the revocation of Jones’ 

probation.

[13] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.