alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
January 28, 2015

**Docket FAA-2010-1254** Docket Management Facility US Department of Transportation 1200 Jersey Avenue, SE West Building Ground Floor - Room W12-140 Washington, DC 20590

Dear, Sir or Madam,



### Re: Exemption 10208 ; FAA-2010-1254 Extension Request

Endeavor Airlines Inc., (formally Pinnacle Airlines), certificate REXA257A petitions pursuant to Sections 11.61 and 11.63 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) for an extension of Exemption No. 10208,

Docket FAA-2010-1254. This ex emption expires on 3/31/2015.

Subject to certain conditions and limitations, Exem ption 10208 provides relief from §121.619 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) by permitting Endeavor Air, its certific ated dispatchers, and its pilots in command (PIC) to dispatch aircraft to domes tic airports without designating an alternate for the destination airport where for at least 1 hour before and 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival at the destination airport the appropriate weather reports or fo recasts, or any combination of them, indicate the ceiling will be at least 2,000 feet to 1,000 feet abov e the airport elevation and visibility may be reduced

from at least 3 statute miles to 2 statute miles fo r Category (CAT) I approaches and 2 statute miles for CAT II approaches.

The conditions and reasons relative to public intere st and safety that formed the basis for granting the original exemption have not changed. Furthermore, the renewal of this exemption is not a controversial issue. For these reasons, and because granting the requested relief will not set precedent, Endeavor Air requests that a finding of good cause exists fo r waiving publication in the Federal Register.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have an y questions or require additional information.

Respectfully submitted,

David Wilson Director, Flight Operations

612-801-6331

david.wilson@endeavorair.com Endeavor Air, Inc. 7500 Airline Drive | M.S. 01P Minneapolis, MN 55450-1101

www.EndeavorAir.com
#### Rachel Weinberg *et al,*Resp’ts, *v.*Philip Weinberg *et al.,*App’lts.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,*

*Filed May 11, 1891.)*

Election between actions.

Where a defendant after service of the summons upon him brings an ac*735tion in another county upon a claim which might have been interposed as a counterclaim, and in such action the plaintiffs interpose as a counterclaim the facts on which their action is based, they should not be required to elect in which action their claim be tried.

Appeal from order denying motion of defendants that plaintiffs be ordered to elect to either proceed in this action or coniine themselves to the counterclaims set up in their answer in an action brought by defendant, and if they elect to confine themselves to such counterclaims for a stay in this action.

This action was commenced on November 12, 1890, to recover damages for breach of contract, and the complaint was served November 26th. On the 18th of November the defendant brought an action against the plaintiffs for moneys paid, laid out and advanced and for moneys loaned, in which action these plaintiffs interposed as counterclaims the causes of action set forth in the complaint in this action. Thereafter this motion was made and denied.

*Ferdinand Kurzman,*for app’lts; *Charles E. Burke,*for resp’ts.

Pratt, J.

This action was begun November 12, 1890. Defendants have, a claim against plaintiffs which they might have pleaded as a counterclaim. They preferred to bring an independent action in another county.

In that action these plaintiffs interpose as a counterclaim the facts on which this action is based.

A motion is now made that the plaintiffs be required to elect in which action their claim be tried, and that they be stayed from proceeding in the other action. Various answers to the motion •suggest themselves. The causes of action in dispute between the parties are in no way connected, and it is very doubtful whether justice will be promoted by trying all the claims in one action.

Moreover, the plaintiffs were entirely within their rights in beginning this action, and if defendants desired to try all the claims together, they should have interposed their demand to this action. Not having done so, they have lost their right.

It is by. their own choice that two actions are pending, and for the inconveniences, if any, resulting, they are alone responsible.

The motion appealed from must be affirmed, with ten dollars •costs and disbursements. .

Barnard, P. J., and Dykman, J., concur.
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
   1.
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Exchange Act; and2.
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of GSC Investment Corp.
  /s/ Seth M. KatzensteinName:
    Seth M. KatzensteinChief Executive Officer and President /s/ Richard T. Allorto, Jr.Name:
    Richard T. Allorto, Jr.Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit
32.1
  CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In connection with the Annual Audit of PTL Energy Inc., formerly Tia
III, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10KSB for the period ending September 30,
2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Daniel Del Sonno, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:
 
 (1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 /s/
      Daniel Del SonnoDaniel
      Del SonnoTitle:    President,
      CFO and DirectorDate: January
      7, 2009
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

In connection with the quarterly report of Morton’s Restaurant Group, Inc. (“Morton’s”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 3, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Thomas J. Baldwin, the Chief Financial Officer of Morton’s, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(i) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(ii) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Morton’s.

 
| Date:  November 15, 2004 |
|--------------------------|
|                     |
|                     | /s/ THOMAS  J. BALDWIN |   |
|                     | Thomas J.  Baldwin |
|                     | Chief  Financial Officer |

 

----
# EUR-Lex - 32001D0184 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001D0184

**2001/184/EC: Commission Decision of 27 February 2001 amending Decision 92/452/EEC establishing lists of embryo collection teams and embryo production teams approved in third countries for export of bovine embryos to the Community (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2001) 451) **

*
Official Journal L 067 , 09/03/2001 P. 0077 - 0077 *

Commission Decision

of 27 February 2001

amending Decision 92/452/EEC establishing lists of embryo collection teams and embryo production teams approved in third countries for export of bovine embryos to the Community

(notified under document number C(2001) 451)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2001/184/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 89/556/EEC of 25 September 1989 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in and imports from third countries of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species(1), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, and in particular Article 8 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Commission Decision 92/452/EEC(2), as last amended by Decision 2000/557/EC(3) establishes a list of embryo collection teams and embryo production teams approved in third countries for the export of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species to the Community.

(2) The competent veterinary services of Canada have forwarded a request for amendment to the list of teams officially approved in their territories for the export of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species to the Community. It is therefore necessary to amend the list of approved teams. Guarantees regarding compliance with the requirements specified in Article 8 of Directive 89/556/EEC have been received by the Commission.

(3) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

In the Annex to Decision 92/452/EEC, in the list concerning Canada the following teams are added:

>TABLE>

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 February 2001.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 302, 19.10.1989, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 250, 29.8.1992, p. 40.

(3) OJ L 235, 19.9.2000, p. 30.
#### Jamal Damon HENDRIX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROHAN, C/O; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16229

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 21, 2017

Jamal Damon Hendrix, Pro Se

Lyssa Anderson, Attorney, Ryan W. Daniels, Kaempfer Crowell Renshaw Gro-nauer & Fiorentino, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ,,Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jamal Damon Hendrix, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations, including excessive force and inadequate medical care during his pretrial detention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A.,*656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We vacate and remand.

The district court dismissed Hendrix’s § 1983 claims as time-barred because, even allowing for tolling while Hendrix was allegedly incompetent, Hendrix’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. *See Perez v. Seevers,*869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1989) (§ 1983 actions are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims; two-year statute of limitations under Nevada law). However, Hendrix alleged in his amended complaint that he had exhausted available administrative grievance procedures at the Clark County Detention Center. Liberally construed, these allegations show that Hendrix may be entitled to further tolling on the ground that he was completing the mandatory exhaustion process. *See Brown v. Valoff,*422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process.”); *Cervantes v. City of San Diego,*5 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting dismissal as time-barred at the pleading stage is inappropriate where complaint alleges facts indicating potential tolling may apply); *see also Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States,*68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] complaint cannot be *531dismissed [for untimeliness] unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.”).

We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

Appellees shall bear the costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

** **

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

** **

 

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Concierge Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2018, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Stuart Crumbaugh, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)     Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Date: November 14, 2018

 

|   |   |                        |   |
|--------|--------|-----------------------------|--------|
|   |   |  /S/*Stuart Crumbaugh* |   |
|   |   | Stuart Crumbaugh            |   |
|   |   | Chief Financial Officer     |   |

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Concierge Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by Concierge Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Anibal Almodovar, Appellant.

Argued June 15, 1943;

decided July 20, 1943.

*Rudolph Stand, Robert Mitchell*and *Joseph D. Allen*for appellant.

*Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney (Richard Q. Denser*and *Stanley H. Fuld*of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment of conviction affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ.
#### D. SCHWARTZ & CO. v. S. LEIBERMAN & CO.,

COURT OF APPEALS,

AUSTIN TERM, 1884.

*Terms of the County Court*— Constitutional *Law.*— It was not until forty days after the general election at which the Amendment to Article V of the Constitution was voted on that the amendment became operative, and clothed commissioner’s courts with power to change the time fixed by law for holding civil terms of the county courts. The election was held August 14,18S3, and the amendments took effect September 23,1883.

*Judgment*rendered at a term of court not authorized by law is a nullity.

Appeal from Tarrant County.

*Ball*& *McCart,*for the appellant.

The judgment appealed from was rendered at a term of the county court of Tarrant county, beginning on the first Monday in September, 1883, being the third day of said month.

There was no authority of law for holding a term of the county court for civil business to commense on the first Monday in September, 1883. Under the law then in force the September terms of county courts were fixed by law, to begin on the third Monday in that month, and the commissioners court at that time had no power to change the time of holding said courts. (See Con., art. 5, sec. 17; Rev. S., art. 1173.) It was not until the amendment to article five of the constitution became operative that the commissioners courts were clothed with the power to change the time fixed by law, for holding the regular terms of the county courts for civil business. (See amendment to Constitution, acts eighteenth legislature, p. 134.)

This amendment did not become operative until the fortieth day after the election at which it was adopted. (Rev. S. art. 1810; Con. art. 17.) The election occurred on the second Tuesday in August, 1883, which was the fourteenth day of the month. (See acts eighteenth legislature, sec. 2, p. 134.) It was, therefore, not until the twenty-third day of September, 1883, that said amendment went into effect. It was not until then that it was knrwn to have been adopted (Sewell v. The State of Texas, L. Rev. 254; Rear v. The People, 24 N. Y. 270.)

*3It being apparent that the term of court at which the judgment was rendered, was held without authority of law, the judgment is a nullity, and the same is reversed and remanded.

Opinion by

Willson, J.
1

 After he filed his petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner filed what is styled “amended

petition for a w rit of habea s corpu s.” The issue rais ed in this plea ding is the s ame as in the po stconviction petition. The trial court’s order denying relief, however, does not distinguish between the two

pleading s. Rega rdless, the petition for w rit of habea s corpu s was filed in the wron g court, see T.C.A. §

29-21-1 05, and, th erefore , would oth erwise h ave bee n dism issed. 

2

 The indictment reads, in pertinent part: “by the use of force did unlawfully engage in sexual

condu ct with [the victim ] and cau se bod ily injury to [the victim].”

FILED

August 31, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

GARY RUSSELL, )

)

Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9712-CC-00475

)

 vs. ) MADISON COUNTY

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. C96-362

)

Respondent. )

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the trial

court judgment in this case in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal

Appeals. The record has been filed and the petitioner, by and through counsel, has

filed his brief. 

This case represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the

petitioner’s post-conviction petition.1 The petitioner is challenging the sufficiency of the

indictment. Specifically, the petitioner claims the indictment charging him with

aggravated sexual battery is void because it fails to allege the requisite mens rea.2 In

Kimmel v. State, No. 02C01-9701-CR-00006 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jan. 12, 1998), faced

with this very issue, this Court held that the indictment was constitutionally and

statutorily sufficient to support the conviction.

Accordingly, having reviewed the petitioner’s brief in light of the entire

record on appeal, we find that the trial court did not err by dismissing the petition. It is,

therefore, ORDERED that the state’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial
2

court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

_______________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

_______________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

_______________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
Exhibit 35

THE BANK OF NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY, N.A.

OFFICERS CERTIFICATE

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TRUSTEE

GENWORTH
GLOBAL FUNDING TRUST 2005-A

SECURED MEDIUM-TERM NOTES

GENWORTH GLOBAL FUNDING TRUST 2006-A

SECURED MEDIUM-TERM NOTES

GENWORTH GLOBAL FUNDING TRUST 2006-B

SECURED
MEDIUM-TERM NOTES

GENWORTH GLOBAL FUNDING TRUST 2006-C

SECURED MEDIUM-TERM NOTES

GENWORTH GLOBAL FUNDING TRUST 2006-D

SECURED MEDIUM-TERM NOTES

GENWORTH GLOBAL
FUNDING TRUST 2006-E

SECURED MEDIUM-TERM NOTES

GENWORTH GLOBAL FUNDING TRUST 2006-F

EXTENDIBLE SECURED MEDIUM-TERM NOTES

GENWORTH GLOBAL FUNDING TRUST 2006-G

SECURED
MEDIUM-TERM NOTES

The undersigned does hereby certify that the undersigned is an officer of The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A. (the
Trustee), and does hereby further certify pursuant to Section 4.05 of the Expense and Indemnity Agreement for the above-captioned Trusts (the Trusts) that:

(i) A review of the activities of the Trustee during the preceding calendar year and of the performance of the Trustee under the Trusts has been made under my supervision; and

(ii) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Trustee has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Trusts in all material respects throughout such
calendar year.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY, N.A.

AS
TRUSTEE



|               |  |                      
|-------------- |  | ---------------------
|/s/ R. Tarnas  |  | Dated: March 29, 2007
|               | 
|R. Tarnas      |  |                      
|Vice President |  |
Exhibit 32.1

Written Statement of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)

The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority (the Authority), hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, on the date hereof:



| | (a) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Authority for the quarter ended March 31, 2007 filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) | information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Authority.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/    MITCHELL GROSSINGER
ETESSMitchell Grossinger Etess Chief Executive Officer, Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority May 15, 2007


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
to the Authority and will be retained by the Authority and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Attachment B

Rule Language and Preamble Language that is Consistent with a Fuel Category Comparison Approach Rule Language: The non - hazardous secondary material must contain contaminants at levels comparable in concentration to or lower than those in traditional fuels wh ich the combustion unit is designed to burn. S

uch comparison is to be based on a direct comparison of the contaminant levels in the nonhazardous secondary material to the traditional fuel itself. 40 C.F.R. 241.3(d)(1)(iii). The firs t sentence is written the plural. Preamble Language With that said, w

e agree with those commenters who argue that there are a wide range of raw materials and fuels that can be used and that the level of contaminants in these secondary materials can als o vary. Thus, for purposes of comparing levels of contaminants found in non

- hazardous secondary materials to traditional products, a person can make that comparison with traditional raw materials and fuels that come from multiple sources, provided such sou rces can be used in the combustion unit

. 76 Fed. Reg. 15528. In determining w

hich traditional fuel(s) the ow ner or operator of the boiler unit w ould make a comparison to with respect to contaminant levels, the Agency w ill allow any traditional fuel(s) th at can be or is burned in the particular type of boiler. For example, if the boiler burns fuel oil, the level of contaminants to be compared w ould be the level of contaminants in fuel oil or other liquid traditional fuels that is or can be burned in such u nit. For gas

-

fired boilers, the level of contaminants in the nonhazardous secondary material fuels wo uld be compared to natural gas or other gaseous traditional fuels . The Agency believes that this approach is most appropriate since the nonhazardous second ary material w

ould be replacing the use of a particular type(s) of fuel. In addition, as discussed in the preamble to the boiler MACT, boilers designed to combust different types of fuels (

e.g., coal vs. oil) cannot easily be modified to burn another fuel. Therefore we have determined that any comparison of the contaminants in a non

- hazardous secondary material should be to the type(s) of fuel that are (or can be) used in the boiler. 76 Fed. Reg. at 15542.