NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

GARY LEE WALLS, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-35265

D.C. No. 

6:13-cr-00433-MC-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 10, 2019**

Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and HARPOOL,

*** District 

Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for

the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

FILED

DEC 12 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

The United States appeals the district court’s judgment granting Gary 

Walls’s habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The parties are familiar 

with the facts, so we do not repeat them here. 

We review de novo a district court’s order granting a habeas petition. See 

United States v. Jones, 877 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and we affirm.

The Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) residual clause mandated a 

sentence enhancement when a defendant who violates 18 U.S.C § 922(g) has three 

previous convictions that quality as “violent felon[ies].” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The 

Supreme Court struck down the ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally 

vague in Johnson v. United States, holding that “[i]ncreasing a defendant’s 

sentence under the clause denies due process of law.” 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557

(2015). Johnson’s new rule applies retroactively on collateral review. Welch v. 

United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264–65 (2016).

To prevail on a claim that a district court violated due process by imposing a 

“sentence founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional 

magnitude,” United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972), a defendant “must 

establish the challenged information is (1) false or unreliable, and (2) demonstrably 

made the basis for the sentence.” United States v. Hill, 915 F.3d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 

2019) (quoting United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935–36 (9th Cir. 
3 

2009)).

The threatened application of an unconstitutional sentence enhancement is

misinformation of a constitutional magnitude. Walls agreed in plea negotiations to 

a sentence three times his advisory guideline range to avoid prosecution under the 

ACCA’s residual clause, which in Johnson was found invalid in all its 

applications. 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58. In light of Johnson, it would have been 

unconstitutional to sentence Walls under the residual clause. The unconstitutional 

sentence enhancement leveraged by the United States during plea negotiations was 

a false premise demonstrably relied upon by the sentencing court in violation of 

due process.

The sentencing court’s pre-Johnson presumption that Walls was potentially 

eligible for sentencing enhancement through the ACCA residual clause impacted 

the court’s formulation of Walls’s sentence and constitutes objectively false 

information. Walls’s prior Oregon Burglary II conviction would not have qualified 

as a violent felony under the ACCA without reliance on the residual clause. See 

United States v. Strickland, 860 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding prior 

third-degree robbery conviction under Oregon law was not a violent felony under 

ACCA’s force clause); United States v. Cisneros, 826 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 

2016) (holding prior first-degree burglary convictions under Oregon law did not 

qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA).
4 

Discussing the risk of an ACCA sentencing enhancement, the sentencing 

court acknowledged Walls was agreeing to a ten-year sentence rather than run the 

risk of a guilty verdict at trial and a subsequent 15-year minimum sentence under 

the ACCA. Although the plea agreement was not binding on the district court, the 

court indicated that “in all likelihood I am going to follow a ten-year term.” At 

Walls’s sentencing hearing, the court cited the parties’ agreement, among other 

reasons, as a basis for the sentence. The district court followed the parties’ 

recommendation of 120 months, three times Walls’s advisory guideline range of 

37 to 46 months. 

A pre-Johnson sentence demonstrably based on the threatened application of 

the ACCA’s unconstitutional residual clause deprived Walls of his liberty in 

violation of due process.

AFFIRMED.