J-A22011-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PHILIP B. FLOYD

v.

JULIE C. FLOYD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 266 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s): 

2017-FC-001777-15

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2020

Julie C. Floyd (Wife) appeals from the trial court’s order adopting the 

Master’s report and recommendation resolving the parties’ economic claims in 

this divorce action.1 Upon review, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and 

remand for further proceedings.

Wife and Philip B. Floyd (Husband) were married in June 2007, and are 

the parents of three minor children. Husband is employed at an insurance 

agency, where he has worked for 15 years. Approximately six months into 

the parties’ marriage, in January 2008, Wife became a registered nurse. 

However, following the birth of the parties’ second child in 2012, Wife stopped 

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1 Wife has separately appealed, at 1564 MDA 2019, from the trial court’s order 

awarding Wife child and spousal support. We address and dispose of that 

appeal in a separate memorandum.
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working as a nurse to care full-time for the parties’ children. In September 

2017, after approximately 10 years of marriage, the parties separated. 

The divorce master (Master) recounted the ensuing procedural history:

A Complaint in Divorce was filed on September 20, 2017. Robert 

A. Kulling, Esq., was appointed Master on April 22, 2019 to hear 

the issues of equitable distribution, alimony, counsel fees, costs 

and expenses. A preliminary conference was held on May 23, 

2019. A settlement conference was held on July 16, 2019. The 

parties were unable to reach a settlement in this matter and a 

hearing was scheduled for August 28, 2019. The hearing was 

continued by the master and held on September 20, 2019. In 

addition to issues related to the master’s appointment, Husband 

argue[d] that Wife’s conduct was dilatory, obdurate and vexatious 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7).

Report and Recommendation of the Master, 10/31/19, at 1.

At the time of the hearing, Husband was 48 years old and Wife was 43 

years old; both parties represented to the court that they were in good health. 

Pursuant to a prior support order, Husband’s annual income was determined 

to be $239,593, based upon paystubs, tax returns and social security 

statements submitted by the parties. Wife had recently accepted a position 

as a full-time school nurse at the Bermudian Springs School District. As to 

her income, the Master determined: “Effective 4/1/2019 Wife’s earning 

capacity was $0. Effective 9/1/2019 and 10/1/2019, Wife’s earning capacity 

was/is $35,500. Effective 1/1/2020, Wife’s earning capacity will be $53,500.” 

Id. at 4.

Following a hearing, the Master recommended equitable distribution as 

follows:
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For the reasons set forth above, the master recommends that the 

net marital estate should be distributed 54% to Wife as shown in 

the following table:

Asset Value To H To W

Mt. Zion proceeds 

[(the former marital 

residence)]

$16,354 $16,354

[Wife’s] 2011 Odyssey $7,700 $7,700

[Husband’s] 2012 

Avalon 

$0 $0

M[ember’s] 1st FCU 

Chk/Sav

$8,610 $3,508 $5,102

First National Bank $559 $559

M[ember’s] 1st Kids 

Club

$3,458 $3,458

Ameritas Life $684 $684

Money (W parents) $0 $0 $0

[Wife’s] Wellspan 

Pension

$17,662 $17,662

[Husband’s] Voya 

401(k)

$320,733 $205,733 $115,000

[Wife’s] Charles 

Schwab IRA

$91,900 $91,900

SSGA Upromise 529 $1,386 $1,386

Furnishings/Personalty $9,529 $6,428 $3,101

Disney Chase $0 $0 $0

Members 1st Visa $0 $0 $0

York Hospital Bills $-2,967 $-2,967

Total: $475,608 $216,719 $258,889

Percentage: 46% 54%

Id. at 13-14. 
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With respect to alimony, the Master discussed the 17 statutory factors 

pursuant to Section 3701(b) of the Divorce Code. Notably, the Master 

acknowledged that Husband will be earning significantly more than Wife 

following the parties’ divorce. The master determined that the parties’ income 

disparity “favors an award of alimony.” Id. at 15. Wife’s role as primary 

caretaker of the parties’ three minor children also supported an award of 

alimony, though the Master noted that the children’s expenses would be 

addressed in a separate child support order. Id. at 16. Moreover, although 

the parties testified that they enjoyed a “seemingly comfortable standard of 

living,” the Master found that “though comfortable, the parties lived at or 

above their [means], leaving little in way of savings.” Id. Finally, in 

discussing the relative needs of the parties, the Master concluded that alimony 

was appropriate, “but for a short period of time.” Id. at 18-19.

Following discussion of the 17 statutory factors for alimony, and 

considering that Wife was to receive 54% of the marital estate in equitable 

distribution, the Master recommended that Wife receive $530 per month in 

alimony for one year. With respect to counsel fees, costs and expenses, the 

Master determined that “neither party provided testimony nor evidence 

regarding the desire for counsel fees, costs and expenses.” Id. Specifically 

as to Husband’s motion for sanctions, the Master found that there was a lack 

of evidence to suggest that the conduct of Wife or her counsel was dilatory, 

vexatious or obdurate. Accordingly, the Master did not recommend sanctions 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(7).
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On November 18, 2019, Wife filed exceptions to the Master’s report and 

recommendation;

2 Husband filed cross-exceptions on November 19, 2019. 

Both parties filed briefs in support of their exceptions and in opposition to 

cross-exceptions. On January 15, 2020, the trial court adopted the Report 

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2 Although the trial court states, incorrectly, that “[n]either Wife nor Husband 

filed any exceptions to the Master’s Report and Recommendation,” Trial Court 

Opinion, 3/16/20, the record indicates that both parties filed exceptions. They 

also filed briefs in support of and in opposition to the exceptions. On January 

9, 2020, the trial court entered an order confirming that exceptions were filed, 

the time to file briefs had expired, and “the matter was assigned to the 

Honorable N. Christopher Menges for disposition. If you would like the Judge 

to consider oral argument, file a request for oral argument with the assigned 

judge.” Order, 1/9/20. The parties did not request oral argument. On 

January 15, 2020, the court entered an order stating “the Report and 

Recommendation of the master dated October 30, 2019, is hereby adopted as 

the FINAL ORDER of this Court with respect to all issues addressed 

therein. The parties are directed to take such steps as may be necessary to 

implement the master’s recommendation forthwith.” Order, 1/15/20 

(emphasis added). Although the trial court did not expressly state it was 

denying exceptions, the intent and implication is clear, such that the January 

15, 2020 order was a de facto denial of both parties’ exceptions. See Weir 

v. Weir, 631 A.2d 650, 653 (Pa. 1993) (citing McCormick v. Northeastern 

Bank of Pennsylvania, 561 A.2d 328, 330 n.1 (Pa. 1989)) (“in the interests 

of judicial economy, we may disregard a defect of this type and ‘regard as 

done that which ought to have been done’”). 
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and Recommendation of the Master. Wife filed a notice of appeal on February 

13, 2020.3 On February 21, 2020, the trial court issued a decree in divorce.4

Wife raises ten issues on appeal, which we have reordered as follows:

I. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in failing to find that Wife had premarital retirement funds of $20,533.37 from Amundi 

Pioneer?

II. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in failing to award Wife a 60/40 

division of assets, when her standard of living, income and 

prospects for future income are so much lower than 

Husband’s who earns five (5) to ten (10) times what Wife 

earns?

III. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in failing to find that Husband 

received $11,040.61 from Member’s 1st (and after netting 

out the money taken from the child’s account), while Wife 

only received $5,102.27 from said accounts?

IV. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in failing to assign credit card debt 

to Husband who is clearly in a superior position to pay the 

same?

V. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in failing to account for Wife’s 

payment of eight (8) months of the HELOC while Husband 

lived in the premises?

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3 A pre-divorce order of equitable distribution is not a final order. Campbell 

v. Campbell, 516 A.2d 363, 365. While “[t]he courts of common pleas have 

been given [subject matter] jurisdiction to hear and decide divorce actions 

and related economic claims[,] . . . [t]o enter a decree of equitable distribution 

prior to a divorce decree . . . is improper.

Reese v. Reese, 506 A.2d 471, 474 (Pa. Super. 1986). Here, Wife filed her 

notice of appeal from the trial court’s order before the order was made final 

by the entry of the divorce decree. Nevertheless, because a divorce decree 

has been entered, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

4 Both Wife and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.
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VI. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in crediting [Husband] with 

medical bills when there was no proof of payment of the 

same and as sole wage earner of the family, that he should 

have been solely responsible to pay the same?

VII. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in unilaterally reducing Wife’s 

expenses and only granting alimony of $530.00 per month 

for a duration of only one (1) year after divorce?

VIII. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding Wife’s earning capacity 

to be in excess of $50,000.00 per year when she clearly is 

not, and cannot earn the same and raise three (3) children?

IX. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in ignoring the fact that Wife has 

been out of the work force for over eight (8) years?

X. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in overlooking Wife’s health care 

costs which were provided in her employment exhibits and 

testimony?

Wife’s Brief at 5-6.

In addressing Wife’s issues, we are guided by the following: 

We review a challenge to the trial court’s equitable distribution 

scheme for an abuse of discretion. Brubaker v. Brubaker, 201 

A.3d 180, 184 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “We do not 

lightly find an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of 

clear and convincing evidence.” Id. We will not find an abuse of 

discretion “unless the law has been overridden or misapplied or 

the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the 

evidence in the certified record.” Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 

127, 131 (Pa. Super 2017). When reviewing an award of equitable 

distribution, “we measure the circumstances of the case against 

the objective of effectuating economic justice between the parties 

and achieving a just determination of their property rights.” 

Hayward v. Hayward, 868 A.2d 554, 558 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

When determining the propriety of an equitable distribution 

award, this Court must consider the distribution scheme as a 

whole. Mundy v. Mundy, 151 A.3d 230, 236 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

“We do not evaluate the propriety of the distribution order upon 

our agreement with the court’s actions nor do we find a basis for 

reversal in the court’s application of a single factor. Rather, we 
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look at the distribution as a whole in light of the court’s overall 

application of the 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a) factors for consideration 

in awarding equitable distribution. If we fail to find an abuse of 

discretion, the order must stand.” Harvey v. Harvey, 167 A.3d 

6, 17 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and internal brackets omitted). 

Finally, “it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the 

evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse 

those determinations so long as they are supported by the 

evidence.” Brubaker, 201 A.3d at 184 (citation omitted).

Hess v. Hess, 212 A.3d 520, 523 (Pa. Super. 2019).

In her first issue, Wife asserts the trial court erred in failing to find that 

her Charles Schwab IRA account contained a premarital component. Prior to 

the marriage, Wife held shares with Amundi Pioneer valued at $20,533.37. 

Wife maintains that those shares were used to fund her Charles Schwab IRA

when she opened the account during the marriage. The Master stated that 

because “Wife has been unable to provide a roll-over statement showing the 

transfer from Amundi to Charles Schwab . . . the [M]aster cannot definitely 

determine that the Charles Schwab is a non-marital asset.” Report and 

Recommendation of the Master, 10/31/19, at 6. Accordingly, the Master 

determined that for purposes of equitable distribution, Wife’s entire Charles 

Schwab IRA account, valued at $91,900, was marital. Wife filed exceptions 

to the Master’s ruling, which the trial court denied. 

Our review of the record reveals that both Husband and Wife testified 

that Wife’s Charles Schwab IRA account contained a premarital component. 

Specifically, Husband testified:

[Counsel for Husband]: . . . Do you have any separate CDs, 

mutual funds, investment accounts, et cetera?
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[Husband]: I do not.

[Counsel for Husband]: However, your wife does have an IRA, 

correct?

[Husband]: That is correct.

[Counsel for Husband]: And do you agree that a portion of 

that IRA was funded by some premarital assets that she 

had?

[Husband]: Some of it, yeah.

[Counsel for Husband]: I believe it’s from Amundi, A-M-UN-D-I, Pioneer. Do you agree with that?

[Husband]: Yes, sir.

N.T., 9/20/19, at 52 (emphasis added).

Wife similarly testified:

[Counsel for Wife]: . . . You have a Charles Schwab IRA?

[Wife]: Yes.

[Counsel for Wife]: And the monies that are in the Charles Schwab 

IRA, where did they emanate from?

[Wife]: During marriage or before marriage?

[Counsel for Wife]: Well, before marriage?

[Wife]: Well, before marriage, I had made some deposits, 

from my own working, whenever I was working before 

marriage, and then I hadn’t contributed to it for years and 

years and years, and then the companies changed hands 

several times, so we had to roll over money.

[Counsel for Wife]: Maybe it’s easier to take a look at [Wife’s] 

Exhibit 5. It appears to be a letter from Amundi Pioneer.

[Wife]: Yes.
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[Counsel for Wife]: Did you obtain that letter at my request?

[Wife]: Yes.

[Counsel for Wife]: Did it indicate the values of these accounts on 

June 15th, 2007?

[Wife]: Yes.

[Counsel for Wife]: And is it your position that the values 

that are suggested there are all premarital values?

[Wife]: Yes.

[Counsel for Wife]: And is it your position that the values 

that are suggested there are all premarital values?

[Wife]: Yes.

[Counsel for Wife]: And with respect to [Wife’s Exhibit 4], 

does that indicate the current values of those funds at 

Charles Schwab?

[Wife]: Yes.

Id. at 108-09 (emphasis added).

The parties do not dispute that Wife’s Charles Schwab IRA account was 

funded with Wife’s premarital shares from Amundi Pioneer. Thus, we disagree 

with the trial court’s conclusion that Wife’s Charles Schwab IRA account is 

entirely marital. See Oaks v. Cooper, 638 A.2d 208, 213 (Pa. 1994) (only 

the interest from the initial [non-marital] contribution can be realized as an 

asset available for equitable distribution).

Having concluded that the trial court erred in determining that Wife’s 

entire Charles Schwab IRA account was subject to equitable distribution, we 
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vacate the equitable distribution award and remand for the calculation of the 

marital portion of the account. We further note:

The Divorce Code does not specify a particular method of valuing 

assets. Thus, the trial court must exercise discretion and rely on 

the estimates, inventories, records of purchase prices, and 

appraisals submitted by both parties. When determining the value 

of marital property, the court is free to accept all, part or none of 

the evidence as to the true and correct value of the property. 

Where the evidence offered by one party is uncontradicted, 

the court may adopt this value even though the resulting 

valuation would have been different if more accurate and 

complete evidence had been presented. A trial court does 

not abuse its discretion in adopting the only valuation 

submitted by the parties.

Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 456 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis 

added; citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted).

In this case, Wife submitted as evidence a statement from Amundi 

Pioneer Asset Management, valuing her shares at $20,533.37 as of June 15, 

2007. Husband did not rebut that value during cross-examination or admit 

any evidence regarding the value of Wife’s premarital portion of her Charles 

Schwab IRA account. Accordingly, upon remand, we direct the trial court to 

exclude, at a minimum, the $20,533.37 premarital Amundi Pioneer funds,

when calculating the marital portion of Wife’s Charles Schwab IRA account. 

In her second issue, Wife assails the trial court’s overall distribution of 

the marital estate. The Master’s Report and Recommendation, as adopted by 

the trial court, awarded 54% of the marital estate to Wife, and 46% of the 

marital estate to Husband. Wife argues:
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The parties enjoyed an upper middle-class lifestyle and were able 

to live in nice dwellings and enjoy many events in which the 

children were active. Husband continues to reside in a big house 

on a golf course. Wife took up residence in an old small house to 

be close to her parents and be able to afford a home. Husband is 

a commissioned salesman whose income will increase 

exponentially. Wife is largely dependent upon child support and 

spousal support. If Wife worked more hours or evenings, child 

care providers would be necessary. Given the disparity in income 

and Husband’s significant savings compared to Wife’s, if the 

Master’s Recommendation is accepted, Wife will be required to 

establish a new household and support herself and three (3) 

children with no significant financial asset to her name . . . .

Wife’s Brief at 14-15. 

In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, we 

consider the distribution scheme as a whole. Section 3502 of the Divorce 

Code provides, inter alia, that upon request from either party in a divorce 

action:

the court shall equitably divide, distribute or assign, in kind or 

otherwise, the marital property between the parties without 

regard to marital misconduct in such percentages and in such 

manner as the court deems just after considering all relevant 

factors. The court may consider each marital asset or group of 

assets independently and apply a different percentage to each 

marital asset or group of assets.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a). The factors relevant to the equitable division of 

marital property include:

(1) The length of the marriage.

(2) Any prior marriage of either party.

(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, 

vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of 

each of the parties.
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(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training or 

increased earning power of the other party.

(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital 

assets and income.

(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not 

limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, 

preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, 

including the contribution of a party as homemaker.

(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the 

marriage.

(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the 

division of property is to become effective.

(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated 

with each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned, which 

ramifications need not be immediate and certain.

(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation associated with 

a particular asset, which expense need not be immediate and 

certain.

(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any 

dependent minor children.

Id.

As noted, the trial court awarded 54% of the marital estate to Wife and 

46% to Husband. Upon review of the record and prevailing law, we cannot 

agree with Wife that this award is economically unjust. The Master specifically 

discussed each and every factor to the extent they were applicable to the 

parties. The Master was aware of and commented on the contributions each 
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party made during the marriage, and the extent of their assets and future 

opportunities. Other than the error we identified regarding Wife’s Charles 

Schwab IRA account, we discern no abuse of discretion in the 54/46 

distribution of the marital estate. 

Wife emphasizes that her childcare responsibilities and eight-year 

absence from the workforce limit her ability to obtain employment and greater 

income, and thus she should have received a larger percentage of the marital 

estate. The Master and trial court, however, disagreed, in part because they

determined that Wife was capable of obtaining full-time employment as a 

registered nurse. As discussed infra, the Master specifically considered Wife’s 

absence from the workforce and childcare responsibilities when formulating 

the equitable distribution and alimony awards. Upon review, we may not 

disturb credibility determinations, and consistent with prevailing legal 

authority, we find no merit to Wife’s second issue as to the overall award of 

equitable distribution.

In her third, fourth and fifth issues, Wife contends the trial court erred 

in distributing the parties’ Members 1st account $11,040.61 to Husband and 

$5,102.27 to Wife. Wife asserts that “Husband presented no evidence or 

testimony as to why he should be entitled to a larger share of the distribution 

of that account.” Wife’s Brief at 14. Wife further claims the trial court erred 

in failing to assign credit card debt to Husband “who is clearly in a superior 

position” to pay the debt, and challenges the trial court’s failure to credit her 

for payments she made toward the parties’ home equity line of credit 
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(HELOC). Id. at 18. Wife testified that she made eight payments of $61.54 

toward the HELOC, and references Husband’s hearing testimony that he did 

not make any payments toward the HELOC after separation. Id. at 18-19.

Wife’s argument in support of these three issues mirrors her argument 

in support of her second issue challenging the overall distribution scheme. 

Since we have already determined that the trial court did not err in the overall 

award of equitable distribution, Wife’s third, fourth and fifth issues are 

redundant, and subsumed by our prior review. We reiterate that in the 

context of equitable distribution, a trial court “has the authority to divide the 

award as the equities presented in the particular case may require.”

Mercatell v. Mercatell, 854 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). As such, it was within the trial court’s discretion to divide the 

parties’ assets, with consideration of debts and payments, to effectuate 

equitable distribution. Wife’s third, fourth and fifth issues do not warrant 

relief. 

In her sixth issue, Wife claims the trial court “erred in crediting 

[Husband] with medical bills when there was no proof of payment. . . .” Wife’s 

Brief at 19. In the argument section of her brief, however, Wife states, 

“[a]lthough Husband did provide statements of payments on those bills[,] the 

medical procedures correlated to the hospital bills occur[ing] during the 

marriage. Additionally, Husband was the sole wage earner of the family and 

should have been responsible for those payments.” Id. at 19-20.
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Wife argument is flawed because she first asserts that Husband failed 

to present evidence that he paid the medical bills he sought credit for, but 

then concedes that Husband did, in fact, provide proof of payment. In 

addition, Wife presents little argument, and cites no statutory authority or 

case law. In an appellate brief, parties must provide an argument as to each 

question, which should include a discussion and citation of pertinent 

authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). “This Court is neither obliged, nor even 

particularly equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do so places 

the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter. When an 

appellant fails to develop his issue in an argument and fails to cite any legal 

authority, the issue is waived.” Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 

371–72 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). Accordingly, we find Wife’s sixth issue 

waived.

In her seventh issue, Wife contends the trial court erred in awarding her 

only $530.00 per month in alimony for one year following the divorce. Wife 

claims that since the parties separated, she has been “forced to secure 

employment and undertake expenses of renting a home and daily living needs 

for herself and the children while they are in her care.” Wife’s Brief at 16-17. 

She avers that “her commitment to raising” the children prevents her from 

working night shifts or at distances greater than 30 minutes. Id. at 16. Thus, 

because Wife’s standard of living “has been ‘cut’ drastically” by the divorce, 

“$530.00 per month is not enough to assist her with monthly bills and childrelated expenses.” Id. at 17.
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Our standard of review regarding questions pertaining to the 

award of alimony is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

We previously have explained that the purpose of alimony is not 

to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to ensure 

that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to support

himself or herself through appropriate employment, are met. 

Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the 

lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties during 

the marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay. Moreover, 

alimony following a divorce is a secondary remedy and is available 

only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of the 

parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution 

award and development of an appropriate employable skill.

Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Section 3701(b) of the Divorce Code states:

In determining whether alimony is necessary and in determining 

the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony, 

the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:

(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.

(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of 

the parties.

(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not 

limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.

(5) The duration of the marriage.

(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or 

increased earning power of the other party.

(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or financial 

obligations of a party will be affected by reason of serving as the 

custodian of a minor child.

(8) The standard of living of the parties established during the 

marriage.
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(9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary 

to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party 

seeking alimony to find appropriate employment.

(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.

(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.

(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.

(13) The relative needs of the parties.

(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the 

marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the parties from 

the date of final separation shall not be considered by the court in 

its determinations relative to alimony, except that the court shall 

consider the abuse of one party by the other party. As used in 

this paragraph, “abuse” shall have the meaning given to it under 

section 6102 (relating to definitions).

(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the alimony 

award.

(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property, 

including, but not limited to, property distributed under Chapter 

35 (relating to property rights), to provide for the party's 

reasonable needs.

(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of selfsupport through appropriate employment.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b). “To determine whether alimony is necessary and to 

establish the appropriate nature, amount, and duration of any alimony 

payments, the court is required to consider all relevant factors, including the 

17 factors that are expressly mandated by statute.” Lawson v. Lawson, 940 

A.2d 444, 447 (Pa. Super. 2007). We note the factors in Section 3701(b) do 
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not create an exhaustive list. Ressler v. Ressler, 644 A.2d 753 ([Pa. Super.] 

1994).

After reciting the Section 3701(b) factors, the Master recommended 

Husband pay $530 per month in alimony for one year following the parties’ 

divorce. The Master reasoned:

[D]espite Wife receiving 54% of the marital estate, Wife is still in 

a position in which she needs additional support to maintain her 

monthly expenses. The master has determined that Wife will be 

unable to meet her reasonable needs until at least 1/1/2020, and 

even after that, will need a buffer against the potential costs of 

health insurance and retirement contributions. As mentioned 

earlier, Wife will be in need of an additional $530 to meet her 

personal expenses, but the master believes this award should be 

extended to counteract those above additional expenses. 

Therefore, it is the recommendation of the master that Wife 

receive alimony in the amount of $530 per month for a period of 

one (1) year commencing with the finalization of the divorce. 

Report and Recommendation of the Master, 10/31/19, at 19-20.

In determining the amount of alimony, the Master found Wife’s budget 

to lack credibility. Wife’s monthly expenses far exceeded her income. Her 

monthly expenditures totaled $5,552.00, including $541 for fuel, $1,252.00 

in grocery expenses, and $330 for clothing. The Master approximated Wife’s 

monthly expenses to be $3,133.00, a figure that comported with the parties’ 

standard of living during the marriage. From this figure, the Master arrived 

at the monthly alimony amount of $530.

Again, upon review of the record, we discern no error. At the hearing, 

Wife introduced an expense statement that neither the Master nor the trial 

court found credible. N.T., 9/20/19, at Df.’s Ex. 16. The Master recognized 
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that Wife’s expenses far exceeded her income. Both the Master and trial court 

acted within their discretion in crediting the testimony of Husband regarding 

the parties’ standard of living and consistent with that testimony, assessing

Wife’s reasonable needs. “A master’s report and recommendation, although 

only advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration, particularly on the 

question of credibility of witnesses, because the master has the opportunity 

to observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.” Childress 

12 A.3d at 455-56. Further, and in regard to witness credibility, “[i]t is within 

the province of the trial court to weigh the evidence and decide credibility and 

this Court will not reverse those determinations so long as they are supported 

by the evidence.” Id. Here, the findings of the Master and trial court are 

supported by the record, and refute Wife’s seventh issue.

In her eighth and ninth issues, Wife argues that the trial court erred by 

assigning her an annual earning capacity of $53,500. Wife avers that the 

earning capacity belies the evidence presented at trial, and is impossible given 

her child care responsibilities. Wife’s Brief at 21.

“A person's earning capacity is defined not as an amount which the 

person could theoretically earn, but as that amount which the person could 

realistically earn under the circumstances, considering his or her age, health, 

mental and physical condition and training.” Gephart v. Gephart, 764 A.2d 

613, 615 (Pa. Super 2000). Past earnings alone are not sufficient to support 

a determination of earning capacity without corroborating evidence that the 

party still has the capacity to earn that amount. See D.H. v. R.H., 900 A.2d 
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922 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding trial court erred in determining earning 

capacity based solely upon party’s most recent tax return).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure address earning capacity as 

follows:

If the trier of fact determines that a party to a support action has 

willfully failed to obtain or maintain appropriate employment, the 

trier of fact may impute to that party an income equal to the 

party’s earning capacity. Age, education, training, health, work 

experience, earnings history and child care responsibilities are 

factors which shall be considered in determining earning capacity. 

In order for an earning capacity to be assessed, the trier of fact 

must state the reasons for the assessment in writing or on the 

record. Generally, the trier of fact should not impute an earning 

capacity that is greater than the amount the party would earn 

from one full-time position. Determination of what constitutes a 

reasonable work regimen depends upon all relevant circumstances 

including the choice of jobs available within a particular 

occupation, working hours, working conditions and whether a 

party has exerted substantial good faith efforts to find 

employment.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4).

In the companion case docketed at 1564 MDA 2019, Wife raised this

identical issue. We declined to review Wife’s claim, concluding that Wife failed 

to timely challenge the assignment of her earning capacity. See J.C.F. v. 

P.B.F., 1564 MDA 2019, at *7 (Pa. Super. Oct. 2, 2020) (unpublished 

memorandum). In particular, this Court noted that the trial court assigned 

Wife’s earning capacity on February 28, 2018, following a Special Support 

Hearing, and although the order was appealable, Wife did not appeal. Id. at 

8. Consistent with that disposition, we reject Wife’s eighth issue as to earning 

capacity.
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Finally, in her tenth issue, Wife contends the trial court erred in 

overlooking her healthcare costs. Wife’s entire argument on this issue reads

follows:

Husband testified during the Master’s Hearing that a health 

insurance policy for just himself would cost $75.00 per month as 

an insurance sales professional. He later testified that he 

currently pays $699.72 per month for health insurance for the 

entire family. Wife testified that health insurance is not offered 

for free at her current place of employment. Should she be forced 

to carry the three (3) children on her health insurance she would 

be forced to pay a fairly significant monthly amount, even if she 

were to find a ‘cheap’ rate. Given her monthly income and only 

$530 in alimony for one (1) year this would not be fair or practical, 

especially when Husband’s monthly health insurance payment 

would be $75.00 by himself.

Wife’s Brief at 23-24. We again note deficiencies in Wife’s argument. Wife 

provides no citation to legal authority or otherwise develop a legal argument.

Nonetheless, we repeat that we will not usurp the role of factfinder, or 

disturb the fact finder’s credibility determinations. See Miller v. Miller, 744 

A.2d 778 (Pa. Super. 1999). Here, the Master noted that Wife failed to 

introduce evidence regarding her potential healthcare costs, and that any 

calculation of costs by the Master would be speculative. See Report and 

Recommendation of the Master, 10/31/19, at 18 (“The master has not been 

able to include any potential health insurance costs, as they were not provided 

by wife and therefore are speculative.”). Despite Wife’s failure to introduce 

evidence of her healthcare costs, the Master considered the additional support 

Wife would need to offset the additional cost of health insurance. Id. at 19 

(“Wife . . . will need a buffer against the potential costs of health insurance 
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and retirement contributions.”). On this record, we find Wife’s final argument 

availing. 

Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded with 

instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/26/2020