alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles M.F. KAHALEHOE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10359

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*598Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 5, 2017

Chris Alan Thomas, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ—Office of the US Attorney, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Peter C. Wolff, Jr., Federal Public Defender, FPDHI—Federal Public Defender’s Office (Honolulu), Honolulu, HI, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Charles M.F. Kahalehoe appeals special condition of supervised release number seven, which was imposed following revocation of his supervised release and which states: “If the defendant is able to be compliant with the conditions of supervised release, the Court would have no objection to the defendant resuming school in the fall of 2017.” We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we remand for further proceedings.

As an initial matter, we note that Kaha-lehoe’s supervised release was revoked again while this appeal was pending. He was sentenced to a custodial term of six months, to be followed by a supervised release term of 50 months, and the challenged condition was reimposed, this time as special condition number eight. In light of these circumstances, we agree with Ka-halehoe that his appeal is not moot. *See Foster v. Carson,*347 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness).

We also agree that the challenged condition as written is vague as to the meaning of “school” and as to what constitutes compliance sufficient to permit Kahalehoe’s return to school. *See United States v. Sales,*476 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 2007) (this court must review the language of the condition as written and defendant “cannot be left to guess” about the intended meaning of that language). Therefore, we remand to the district court to vacate special condition eight in the February 22, 2017, judgment. On remand, the court must explain how any educational restriction is reasonably related to deterrence, protection of the public, and Kahalehoe’s rehabilitation, and involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve those goals. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

REMANDED with instructions.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 12.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302(a) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Nachum Falek, certify that:

1.

I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of AudioCodes Ltd.;

2.

Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.

The companys other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have:

a.

designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b.

evaluated the effectiveness of the companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c.

Disclosed in this report any change in the companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the companys internal control over financial reporting; and

5.

The companys other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the companys auditors and the audit committee of companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

a.

all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b.

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the companys internal controls.







Date: June 30, 2004







/s/ NACHUM FALEK



Nachum Falek

Vice President Finance and

Chief Financial Officer



| |  | 
| |  |
### IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 13

- 00217

- CV

IN RE HARI B. ANCHA

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.8(d). Real

- party

in

- interest’s motion for sanctions is denied.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis , and

Justice Scoggins

Petition denied

Opinion delivered and filed August 15, 2013

[OT06]
#### Alvaro SANCHEZ-ORTEGA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 12-73829

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Filed May 19, 2017

Submitted May 19, 2017 * Pasadena, California

Charles Lee Gillig, Attorney, CASA Cornelia Law Center, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner

Dana Michelle Camilleri, Tracey McDonald, OIL, Anthony ‘ Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, Colette Jabes Winston, Esquire, Attorney, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: PREGERSON, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 Oral argument was vacated. The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for de-cisión without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*379ORDER **

The case is submitted as of the date of this order.

Respondent’s motion to remand is granted. This case is remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals for further consideration in light of *Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions,*850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

Costs on appeal are awarded to petitioner. This order shall serve as the mandate of the court.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 99.1  Press Release

PRESS RELEASE

April 29,1999                 For further information contact:
                              David M. Bradley
                              President and Chief Executive Officer
                              North Central Bancshares, Inc.
                              825 Central Avenue
                              Fort Dodge, Iowa 50501
                              515-576-7531

           NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC. COMPLETES STOCK REPURCHASE

Fort Dodge, Iowa - North Central Bancshares, Inc. (Nasdaq: "FFFD") announced
that it has completed a 5.07% stock repurchase program on April 29, 1999. The
Company said it repurchased 150,000 shares of its outstanding common stock, par
value $.01 per share, at the aggregate cost of $2,640,000, in open market
transactions. The repurchase program began on April 22, 1999. Upon settlement of
the last transaction on or about May 4, 1999, there will be 2,807,242 shares of
North Central Bancshares, Inc. common stock outstanding.

North Central Bancshares, Inc., with over $334 million in assets, is the holding
company for First Federal Savings Bank of Iowa, a federally chartered stock
savings bank. First Federal is a community-oriented institution serving Iowa
through 7 full service locations in Fort Dodge, Nevada, Ames, Burlington and Mt.
Pleasant, Iowa. First Federal's deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
#### Lucio Ernesto GOMEZ-ALVARENGA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-70603

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 9, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed May 23, 2017

Gary Finn, Law Offices of Gary Finn, Indio, CA, for Petitioner

OIL, Manuel Palau, DOJ- — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: WALLACE, CHRISTEN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not abuse its discretion in denying Lucio Gomez-Alvarenga’s motion to reopen his proceedings or to reconsider, his prior motion to remand to the immigration judge.

Both motions to reopen and motions to remand must establish a prima facie showing of eligibility for the underlying relief sought in order to be granted. *Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch,*816 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016); *Angov v. Lynch,*788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015). For Gomez-Alvarenga to be eligible for temporary protected status, his felony conviction barring that relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B) must have been vacated for reasons related to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, as opposed to rehabilitative or immigration reasons. *See Matter of Marroquin-Garcia,*23 I. *&*N. Dec. 705, 713 (A.G. 2005). Yet neither Gomez-Alvarenga’s motion to reopen nor his motion to remand alleged that his felony conviction was vacated for reasons related to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings. The BIA could not be expected to infer that *416allegation from his newly submitted evidence, which indicates only that the conviction was vacated in furtherance of justice under California Penal Code § 1385, a provision encompassing a broad range of reasons for relief. *See People v. Superior Court (Romero),*13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628, 648 (1996). Gomez-Alvarenga’s motion to reopen and his motion to remand thus failed to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to the underlying relief sought.

PETITION DENIED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
Exhibit 99.2
                                                                    ------------

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Capital Preferred Yield Fund-IV, L.P.
(the "Partnership") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2004, as filed with the Security and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Mary M. Ebele, Principal Financial Officer of CAI Equipment
Leasing V Corp., the General Partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Partnership.


By:      /s/ Mary M. Ebele                             Dated:  November 12, 2004
         -----------------
         Mary M. Ebele
Title:   Principal Financial Officer
#### Christopher FOSTER; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SPOKANE; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35056

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 19, 2017 Seattle, Washington

Filed May 26, 2017

Richard David Wall, Attorney, Richard D. Wall, P.S., Spokane, WA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Heather C. Yakely, Attorney, Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., Spokane, WA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*452MEMORANDUM *

Christopher Foster, Shannell Haddon, Lawrence Johnson, and Dina Tellez (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s summary judgment grant to Spokane County, David Skogen and Craig Chamberlain (“Defendants”). Plaintiffs argue summary judgment was improper as to their unlawful arrest and false arrest claims against Defendant Skogen, and as to their defamation claim against Defendant Chamberlain. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. At the time of Plaintiffs’ arrests, the facts and circumstances within Defendant Skogen’s knowledge were sufficient for a reasonable officer to believe that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs on suspicion of trafficking. *See Rosenbaum v. Washoe County,*663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Accordingly, Defendant Skogen was entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful arrest claim. *See id.*

2. The district court also properly granted summary judgment to Defendant Sko-gen on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim. Lydia’s tip satisfied both *Aguilar-Spinelli*prongs. *See State v. Conner,*58 Wash.App. 90, 791 P.2d 261, 265 (1990). Because Defendant Skogen was “aware of facts or circumstances, based on reasonably trustworthy information, sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe a crime ha[d] been committed,” *State v. Gaddy,*152 Wash.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872, 875 (2004) (en banc) (emphasis omitted), probable cause existed for Plaintiffs’ arrests, and Defendant Skogen was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim, *see Hanson v. City of Snohomish,*121 Wash.2d 552, 852 P.2d 295, 301 (1993) (en banc); *see also Luchtel v. Hagemann,*623 F.3d 975, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2010).

3.In addition, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Defendant Chamberlain on Plaintiffs’ defamation claim. Plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual dispute that Defendant Chamberlain abused the qualified privilege that protects a police officer’s statements to the press in the course of a criminal investigation. *See Stansfield v. Douglas County,*107 Wash. App. 20, 26 P.3d 935, 942-43 (2001).

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Syl JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UMG RECORDINGS, INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-2260

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted July 28, 2017 *

Decided August 3, 2017

Syl Johnson, Pro Se

Before William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge, Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, Michael S. Kanne, Circuit Judge

*

 This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and argument would not significantly aid the court, See Fed. R. App. P, 34(a)(2)(C).

Order

Syl Johnson filed and settled copyright litigation. Then he filed the current, overlapping, copyright suit, which was dismissed as precluded by the disposition of the first suit. In 2016 Johnson appealed that decision to us, contending that the settlement was a sham and a fraud on the court. We affirmed, however, observing that the remedy for any fraud in the first case is to ask the judge in the first case to set aside the judgment. The decision is not subject to collateral attack by filing a new suit. *Johnson v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,*663 Fed.Appx. 478 (7th Cir. 2016) (nonpre-cedential disposition).

Instead of asking the judge who had handled the first suit to reopen the judgment, Johnson asked the judge who handled the second suit to reopen the second judgment. The motion relied on every sub-part of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The district judge summarily denied this motion, stating that Johnson had not provided any reason for reopening the judgment.

Johnson’s appeal from that decision presents a large number of arguments. He contends, for example, that there is not complete overlap in the songs subject to the two suits and the litigants involved in them. He contends that there were problems with service of process on some defendants. He maintains that some defendants, and their lawyer, deceived the district court. But all of these arguments could have been presented on direct appeal last year. None is based on extraordinary circumstances discovered only after the judgment became final. Accordingly the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to reopen.

It is unnecessary to wait for the appel-lees’ brief in this appeal. The decision of the district court is summarily affirmed.

Affirmed
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6633 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6633

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 24, 2024

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 9355 113th Street in Seminole, Florida, as the ``Army SSG Ryan 
           Christian Knauss Memorial Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ARMY SSG RYAN CHRISTIAN KNAUSS MEMORIAL POST OFFICE 
              BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 9355 113th Street in Seminole, Florida, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Army SSG Ryan Christian Knauss Memorial Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Army SSG 
Ryan Christian Knauss Memorial Post Office Building''.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 23, 2024.

            Attest:

                                             KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
American Wagering, Inc.
Financial Data Schedule Required under:
Appendix A to Item 601(c) of Regulation S-B
Commercial and Industrial Companies
Article 5 of Regulation S-X
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-1998
<CASH>                                       2,428,223
<SECURITIES>                                 2,804,234
<RECEIVABLES>                                  198,113
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (55,444)
<INVENTORY>                                    427,500
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,268,243
<PP&E>                                       3,786,730
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,430,187
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        5,298,613
<BONDS>                                      2,869,342
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        78,408
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,183,824
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,430,187
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,335,368
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,160,011
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (38,545)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (101,125)         
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                112,777
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            112,777
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   112,777
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.01
        


</TABLE>
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-08-00033-CV

______________________________

IN RE: EXPUNCTION REQUEST BY BERTHA DAVIS

 

On Appeal from the 71st Judicial District Court

Harrison County, Texas

Trial Court No. 07-0794

 

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is an agreed motion to reverse the trial court's judgment and remand

this cause to the trial court for entry of an order denying expunction. The trial court had entered an

order of expunction, which the Texas Department of Public Safety appealed to this Court. The

parties have agreed that the cause should be reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of an

order denying expunction—and also that the Department will not thereafter oppose a "Petition for

Nondisclosure" of the records of this arrest and deferred adjudication community supervision. 

Rule 42.1(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

(a) On Motion or By Agreement. The appellate court may dispose of an

appeal as follows:

. . .

(2) By Agreement. In accordance with an agreement signed by

the parties or their attorneys and filed with the clerk, the court may:

(A) render judgment effectuating the parties' agreements;

(B) set aside the trial court's judgment without regard to

the merits and remand the case to the trial court for rendition of

judgment in accordance with the agreements; or

(C) abate the appeal and permit proceedings in the trial

court to effectuate the agreement. 

In the motion, Appellant and Appellee represent that they have reached an agreement and

settled their differences. 
3

The Court has considered this cause on the parties' motion and concludes the motion should

be granted. See Brinker Tex., L.P. v. Muniz, 225 S.W.3d 229, 230 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no

pet.). 

Accordingly, we set aside the trial court's judgment without regard to the merits and remand

this cause to the trial court for rendition of judgment in accordance with the agreement of the parties.

Jack Carter

Justice

Date Submitted: July 15, 2008

Date Decided: July 16, 2008
## Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In re : Carolyn Barnes

No. 06

- 17

- 00019

- CV Original Mandamus Proceeding

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice

Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice

Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the petition for writ of mandamus

should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss the petition.

RENDERED JANUARY 2 4 , 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTIC E

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk