UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURTFORTHEDISTRICTOFCOLUMBIAFEDERALTRADECOMMISSION,Plaintiff,CivilActionNo.19-1080(JDB)SURESCRIPTS,LLC,Defendant.MEMORANDUMOPINIONTheFederalTradeCommissionpetitionsthisCourtforequitablerelieiincludingapermanentinjunctionandmonetaryrelief,againstSurescripts,LLCpursuanttoSection13(b)oftheFTCAct.See15U.S.C.$53(b).TheFTCallegesthatSurescriptshasviolatedSection2oftheShermanActbymaintainingamonopolyintwomarkets-electronicprescriptionroutingandeligibility(explainedbelow)-throughanticornpetitiveconduct,includinganexclusiveloyaltybasedpricingpolicy.Surescriptsmovestodismiss,arguing(1)thattheCourtlackssubjectmatterjurisdictionunderSectionl3(b)oftheFTCAct,and(2)thattheFTCfailstostateaclaimunderSection2oftheShermanActbecauseitdoesnotallegeeitherthatSurescriptsemployedpredatorypricingorthatSurescripts'smarketbehaviorviolatedtheruleofreason.Forthereasonsexplainedbelow,theCourtwilldenySurescripts'smotion.BlcxcRouNtAtthepleadingsstage,theCourtassumesthefactsallegedinthecomplaintaretrueandpresentstheminthelightmostfavorabletotheplaintiff-here,theFTC.Felterv.Kempthorne,473F.3d1255,1257(D.C.Cir.2007).Sulescriptsisahealthinformationtechnologycompanyoperatingintwocomplementarymarkets:electronicprescriptionrouting("routing")andv1eligibility,collectivelyknownas"e-prescribing."Compl.follnjunctive&OtherEquitableRelief("Compl.")[ECFNo.1]111.Routinginvolvesthetransmissionofprescription-relateddatafromaprescribertoapharmacyviatheprescriber'selectronichealthrecord("EHR")system.Id.Eligibilityinvolvesthetransmissionofapatient'sforrnularyandbenefitinformationfi'omapayer(oftenthepatient'spharmacybenefitmanager("PBM"))toaprescriber'sEHR.Id.SurescriptschargespharmaciesafeeforeachroutingtransactionandchargesPBMsafeeforeacheligibilitytransaction.Id.T49.AccordingtotheFTC,Surescriptsmainlainsatleasta95Yoshare(bytransactionvolume)ineachmarketusingvariousanticompetitivemeasures.Id.lifl2-3.Beginningaround2009,Surescriptsimplementedapricingpolicythatrewarded"loyal"(i.e.,exclusive)customerswithlowerprices.Id.T2."Tobeconsideredexclusive,Surescriptsrequiresthatapharmacy...route100%ofitstransactionsttn'oughandonlythroughtheSurescriptsnetwork."Id.1l66(internalquotationmarksomitted)."ThesamestructureexistsforPBMsineligibility."Id.1167.Forrouting,thecosttonon-loyalcustomersvariesbyvolume,butcanbeashighasImorethanforloyalcustomers;foreligibility,ashighas|*o...Id.T1l70_71.SurescriptsstructureditscontractswithEHRproviderssuchthatloyaltyineithertheroutingoreligibilitymarketsresultedinanincentivepaymenttotheEHRproviderofIofthefeespaidbythecustomersinthatmarket;exclusivityinbothmarketsresultedinanincentivepayrnentof!ofthefeesfrombothmarkets.Id.n77.TheFTCcontendsthat"[t]hoseeffectivelyexclusivecontractsforeclosedatleast7}Yoofeachmarket,eliminatingmultiplecompetitiveattemptsfromothercompanies...thatofferedlowerpricesandgreaterinnovation."Id.113.TheFTCnotesthattheseloyaltycontractsareespeciallyeffectiveatexcludingcompetitionintheroutingandeligibilitymarketsbecause,given2Surescripts'sdominantposition,almostallmarketentrantsmustcompeteforcustomerswhoalreadyuseSurescripts.Id.1132.Togainafootholdineithernarket,entrantsmustconvincecustomerstoengagein"multihoming,"orthesimultaneoususeofSurescriptsaswellasoneormorecompetitors.Id.TheFTCallegesthat,byraisingthecostofmultihoming,Surescriptshinderedcustomers'abilityto"multihome"and"significantlyelevat[ed]thecriticalmassfofinitialcustomers]aSurescriptscornpetitorwouldneedtobecomeaviablenetworkin'eitherroutingoreligibility."Id.Beyondtheloyaltyprogram,Surescriptsemployed"threatsandothernon-meritsbasedcompetition"tokeepitscustomersfromworkingwithitscompetitors.Id.fl4.Forinstance,whenacompetitor,Emdeon,attemptedtoenterthemarketthroughcontractswithAllscripts,alargeEHR,SurescriptsreliedonitsmarketpowertoforceAllscriptsintoexclusivecontractsthatpreventedarenewalofAllscripts'scontractwithEmdeon.Id.ll'1TIl0-11.Surescriptsalsoenteredintoanon-competeagreementwithanothercompetitor,RelayHealth,whichpreventedRelayHealthfromcapturingupto15-20o/ooftheroutingmarket.Id.T5;seealsoid.TT88-99.TheFTCallegesthattheseexclusivearrangementshaveallowedSuperscriptstoimposeheightenedpricesonlargeportionsofthemarkets,see.e.q.,id.llfl187-95,andhavestifledinnovationandreducedqualityinthetwoe-prescribingmarkets,id.lTT196*215.SurescriptsmovestodismisstheFTC'scomplaint,arguingthatthiscaseisbothprocedurallyandsubstantivelydefective.Surescripts,LLC'sMot.toDismissCompl.("Def.'sMot.")[ECFNo.32]1T'1T1-3.First,SurescriptsarguesthattheCourtlackssubjectmatterjurisdictionovertherequestforapermanentinjunctionbecausetheFTCcannotestablishthatthiscaseis"proper"underSection13(b)oftheFTCAct.Id.T1;seealso15U.S.C.$53(b).Second,SurescriptsarguesthattheFTC'scomplaintfailstostateaclaimunderSection2oftheShermanJActbecauseitdoesnotallegethatthepricesofferedbySurescriptswerepredatoryorthatSurescripts'smarketpracticesviolatedtheruleofreason.Def.'sMot.flfl2-3.LpcalSra¡lnano'WhenconsideringamotiontodismissunderFederalRuleofCivilProcedure12(b)(6),acouftpresumesthetruthofacomplaint'sfactualallegations,thoughitis"notboundtoacceptastruealegalconclusioncouchedasafactualallegation."BellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S.544,555(2007)(internalquotationomitted).Thecourtthenaskswhetherthefactsallegedsuffice"tostateaclaimtoreliefthatisplausibleonitsface."Aú*eqqhal,556U.S.662,678(2009)(internalquotationomitted).Thecourtconsiders"factsallegedinthecomplaint,anydocumentseitherattachedtoorincorporatedinthecomplaintandmattersofwhichftheCourt]maytakejudicialnotice."Mpo),v.Rhee,758F.3d285,291n.l(D.C.Cir.2014)(internalquotationomitted).UnderRulel2(b)(l),acourthasanaffirmativeobligationtoensurethatitisactingwithinthescopeofitsjurisdictionalauthority.GrandLodgeoftheFraternalOrderofPolicev.Ashcroft,185F.Supp.2d9,13(D.D.C.2001)."[The]courtmustdismissacasewhenitlackssubjectmatterjurisdiction."Randolphv.INGLifeIns.&AnnuityCo.,486F.Supp.2dl,4(D.D.C.2007)."[P]laintiffsfactualallegationsinthecomplaint...willbearcloserscrutinyinresolvingal2(bxl)motionthaninresolvingal2(bX6)motionforfailuretostateaclaim."GrandLodge,185F.Supp.2dat13-14(internalquotationmarksomitted).Andthecoufimayconsidermaterialotherthanallegationsinthecomplaintindeterminingwhetherithasjurisdictiontohearthecase.SeeSettlesv.U.S.ParoleComm'n,429F.3d1098,I107(D.C.Cir.2005).4AN,qlvs¡sI.SubiectMatterJurisdictionUnderSectionl3lb)SurescriptsfirstcontendsthattheCourtlackssubjectmatterjurisdictionoverthisdispute.Mem.inSupp.ofSurescripts,LLC'sMot.toDismissCompl.("Def.'sMem.")IECFNo.32]at13-29..Surescriptsarguesthat.section13(b)oftheFTCActlimitstheCourt'spowertoissuepermanentinjunctionsupoltrequestbytheFTCto"propercases,"whichSurescriptsintetpretsas'oroutine,straightforward"cases.Id.atl7-18seealsol5U.S.C.$53(b).Thiscase,Surescriptscontinues,doesnotqualifyasroutineorstraightforwardbecauseitinvolvescomplexandnovelissuesofantitrustlaw,suchashowtounderstandthetwo-sidede-prescriptionmarketsofroutingandeligibilityinlightoftheSupremeCourt'srecentdecisioninOhiov.AmericanExpressCo("Amex"),138S.Cf.2274(2018).Def.'sMem.at2419.TheFTCrespondsintwoways.First,theFTCarguesthatthe"propercases"languageinSection13(b)doesnotlimitcourts'jurisdictiontohearcasesbroughtundertheAct.Pl.FTC'sMem.ofLawinOpp'ntoDef.Surescripts,LLC'sMot.toDismissCompl.("PI.'sOpp'n")[ECFNo.361at10-12.TheFTCarguesthatthelanguageofSection13(b)doesnotclearlyspeaktocourts'powertoadjudicatesuchclaims.Pl.'sOpp'nat11(citingArbaughv.Y&HCorp.,546U.S.500,515-16(2006)).Second,theFTCcontendsthatthiscaseis"proper"becausethattermjustmeans"anycaseinwhichapermarlentinjunctionwouldbe'appropriate,'i.e.,anycaseinwhichalawenforcedbytheFTChasbeenviolatedandequitableremediesareneededtomakeharmedconsumerswhole."Id.at13.TheFTChasthestrongerargumentonbothpoints.A.Whether"ProperCases"IsaJurisdictionalRequirementTheSupremeCourthasestablishedaclear-statementrulefordeterminingwhetherstatutoryelementsconstitutejurisdictionalrequirements.SeeArbaush,546U.S.at515."[W]hen5Congressdoesnotrankastatutorylimitation...asjurisdictional,courtsshouldtreattherestrictionasnonjurisdictionalincharacter."Id.at516.Here,therelevantprovisionreads:"inpropercasestheCommissionmayseek,andafterproperproof,thecourtmayissue,apenxanentinjunction."15U.S.C.$53(b).NeitherthisspecificprovisionnorSection13(b)'sbroaderframeworkforseekingequitablereliefevenincludetheword'Jurisdiction,"letaloneaclearstatementthatanyofthestatutoryrequirenrentsarejurisdictional.AstheThirdCircuitrecentlyconcludedwhenanalyzingthesameprovision,"Section13(b)includesnoindiciathatCongressintendedtorankastatutorylimitation...asjurisdictional."FTCv.ShireViroPharma.Inc.,917F.3d147,154(3dCir.2019)(internalquotationmarksomitted).Surescripts'sbesttextualargumentforreading"propercases"asajurisdictionalrequirementcomesfromthelabelofSectionl3(a)-"PowerofCommission;jurisdictionofcourts."ReplyMem.inSupp.ofSurescripts,LLC'sMot.toDisrnissCompl.("Def.'sReply")[ECFNo.39]at4.BecauseSection13(a)"isidenticaltoSection13(b)instructure,"Surescriptsarguesthatthelattersectiontooshouldbereadasjurisdictional.Id.UnderArbaush,however,theinquiryiswhetherCongress"clearlystatesthatathresholdlimitationonastatute'sscope"isjurisdictional,andSurescripts'sstructuralargumentfromSection13(a)'slabelfallsshortofthishighbar.546U.S.at515(emphasisadded).Indeed,Section13(b)-theactualsectionatissuehere-hasaseparateanddistinctlabel("Temporaryrestrainingorders;preliminaryinjunctions")thatdoesnotincludeanyreferencetojurisdiction.See15U.S.C.$53(a)-(b);cf.ReedElsevier.Inc.v.Muchnick.559U.S.154,164(20i0)(notingthattheCopyrightAct'sregistrationrequirementforbringinganinfringementaction"islocatedinaprovision'separate'fromthosegrantingfederalcourtssubject-matterjurisdictionoverthoserespectiveclaims")SurescriptsalsoemphasizesthattheFTChasitselfcitedSection13(b)asthebasisfor6personaljurisdictionandas"empower[ing]thisCoufttoissueapermanentinjunction."SeeDef.'sReplyat4(internalquotationandemphasisomitted);seealsoCompl.at54.Buttheagency'sfi'amingofthislanguageas"empower[ing]"theCourtdoesnottherebytransformthelanguageofSectionl3(b)intoathresholdjurisdictionalrequirement..Finally,althoughnotdispositive,itisworthnotingthattheopposite.conclusionwouldcreateacumbersomethresholdtestwhenevertheFTCseeksapermanentinjunction.Pl.'sOpp'nat20-21.;seealsoTr.ofMot.Hr'g[ECFNo.4l]at49:3-6(arguingthattheFTC's"interpretationistheonethatreliesontheplainlanguageofthestatuteanddoesn'tsaddletheCourtwiththeburdenofdecidingwhataroutinecaseisornot").Underdefendant'sjurisdictionalinterpretation,courlswouldneedtodecidewhethertheclaimsbroughtare"straightforward"or"routine"andtoassessthenoveltyorcomplexityoftheclaims'meritsbeforedecidingwhethertohearthecaseinthefirstplace.Pl.'sOpp'nat20-21.Thisrequirementisunwieldlyand,giventhedearthoftextualsupportforajurisdictionalreading,suggeststhatthe"propercases"elementisnotjurisdictional.B.WhethertheFTCPleadeda"ProperCase"TheFTCalsoprevailsonthesubstanceofthisissue,forevenif"propercases"isjurisdictional,theagencyhaspleadedsufficientfactstoclearthemark.Cf.Def.'sReplyat3(arguingthatthe"propercases"questioncanbeaddressedundereitherFed.R.Civ.P.l2(b)(l)orFed.R.Civ.P.12(bX6)).Surescriptsarguesforanarrowinterpretationof"propercases"thatlimitstheFTC'spowertoseekpermanentinjunctionstoinstancesofroutinefïaudorotherstraightforwardviolationsoftheFTC'ssubstantivestatutes.Def.'sMem.at17-18.Surescriptsinsiststhat"propercases"cannotconsistof"'allcases'inwhichtheFTCassertsaviolationofthelawsitenforces"becausethatwouldrenderthephrasesuperfluous.Id.at11.Surescriptsalsopointstothelegislative7history,whichsuggeststhatatleastonepurposeforthepermanentinjunctionprovlslonwastopermittheFTC"intheroutinefraudcase,tomerelyseekapermanentinjunctioninthosesituationsinwhichitdoesnotdesiretofunherexpandupontheprohibitionsoftheFederalTradeCommissionAct."Id.atl8(internalquotationandemphasisomitted).AndSurescriptscitestwocasesthatrelyonanarrowinterpretatiouof"propercases"-FTcv.AbbottLabs.,Civ.A.No.92-1364,1992WL335442(D.D.C.Oct.13,1992),andFTCv.Vy'orldTravelVacationBrokers.Inc.,861F.2d1020(7thCir.1988)-aswellaspublicstatementsbyfonnerFTCofficialsframing"propercases"asinvolvingstraightforwardviolations.Def.'sMem.at18-24.ThereisthusconsiderableweighttoSurescripts'sargumentthat"propercases"isnotsynonymouswith"allcases,"forsuchaninterpretationwouldmakethephrasesuperfluous.Atthesametime,thisCourt'staskisnottodefinethetertn"propercases"forallscenarios,buttodeterminewhetherthiscaseisproper.TheFTCgroundsitslegalargumenthereinCircuitprecedent,UnitedStatesv.MicrosoftCorp.,253F.3d34(D.C.Cir.2001)(enbanc)(percuriam),anddoesnotseektorelyonitsagencyexpertisetodevelopthelaw.SeePl.'sOpp'nat21;Tr.ofMot.Hr'gat6J:12-16(FTCnotingthat"Microsoftistheprimaryauthorityinthiscase"andsuggestingthattheCourtwillnot"havetogomuchbeyondMicrosoft").Undersuchcircumstances,theCourtconcludesthatthecomplaintadequatelyallegesa"propercase."Intermsofthestatutorytext,thelanguageofSection13(b)affordslittleevidenceonewayortheother,butitisatleastnotnecessarytoreadthephrase"ptopercases"sonarrowlyastomean"straightforward"or"non-novel"cases,asSurescriptssuggests.Def.'sMem.at22-24.Giventhatthephrase"propercases"isembeddedinthesecond"Provided"portionofSectionl3(b),thephrasemightbeseenasmerelydistinguishingbetweenthosedisputessuitedforatemporaryinjunction-thesubjectofmostofSection13(b)-andthosecasesbettersuitedforapermanent8injunction.See15U.S.C.$53(b).Or,giventherequirementthattheFTCmustpresent"properproof,""propercases"mightbeinterpretedasinvolvingdisputesthatdonotrequiretheexerciseoftheFTC'sscientificexpertise.SeeJ.HowardBealesIII&TimothyJ.Muris,StrikingtheProperBalance:RedressUnderSection13(þ)oftheFTCAct,79AntitrustL.J.1,31-33(2013).Ifadistrictcouftdeterminedthatthetargetedentitydidnothavefairnoticeorthatanadministrativeproceedingwouldbemore"proper,"thenthecourtmightruleagainstapermanentinjunction.Seeid.at3I;seealsoid.at9-13.Thetextalone,then,thusdoesnotdictateeitherSurescripts'snalrowreadingof"propercases"ortheFTC'sbroaderinterpretation.Lookingbeyondthetext,allotherfactorssuggestthatabroaderreadingiscorrect.Intermsofcaselaw,anumberofothercourtshaveconcludedthat"propetcases"includemorethan"routine"violations.See.e.g.,FTCv.EvansProds.Co.,775F.2d1084,1086-87(9thCir.1985)(notingthatSection13(b)mayauthorizeapermanentinjunctionininstancesbeyondtheroutinefraudcase);FTCv.AmeriDebt.Inc.,373F.Supp.2d558,562-63(D.Md.2005)(agreeingwiththeFTC'sreadingof"propercase"as"simplyonethatinvolvesaviolationofanyprovisionoflawenforcedbytheCommission"(internalquotationmarksomitted));seealsoPl.'sOpp'nat17-20.Indeed,theFTCstatesthatithasoftenreliedon"sectionl3(b)inawidevarietyofnon-'routine"'cases.SeePl.'sOpp'nat18&n.17(citingFTCv.QualcommInc.,No.17-CV-00220-LHK,2019WL2206013(N.D.Cal.May21,2019);FTCv.Cepþlqq-lnc.,No.2:08-cv-2141-MSG,2019WL2lll253(E.D.Pa.Feb.2l,2019);FTCv.AbbVieInc.,329F.Supp.3d98(E.D.Pa.2018));seealsoFTCv.MylanLabs..Inc.,62F.Supp.2d25,36(D.D.C.1999)("[T]hisCourtfindsthatthepermanentinjunctionprovisomaybeusedtoenjoinviolationsofanyprovisionoflawenforcedbytheFTC."(internalquotationmarksomitted)).Surescripts'sauthoritiestothecontraryareallwanting.InWorldTravel,theSeventh9Circuitheldthat"itisquiteclearthatCongressatleastexpectedthattheFTCcouldrelyon[Sectionl3(b)lwhenitsoughttohaltastraightforwardviolationofsection5[oftheFTCAct]thatrequirednoapplicationoftheFTC'sexpertisetoanovelregulatoryissuethroughadministrativeproceedings."861F.2dat1028(emphasisadded).AbbottLabs.,quotingthislanguagefromV/orldTravel.notedthat"FederalCourlshaveshiedawayfromacceptingdirectcourtactionsbytheCommission...iftheoffendingconductinterjectsthecourtintoareasofCommissionexpertiseinvolvingthecreationandmonitoringofnewconceptsofunfaircompetitivetradepractice."1992WL335442,at*2.ButAbbottLabs.citesnoauthorityotherthanWorldTravelforthisglossonSection13(b),andWorldTravelelsewhereacknowledgesthat"[a]substantialargumentcanbemadethatthestatutorylanguage,whenreadwith[the]legislativehistory,permitstheFTCtoproceedunderthelastprovisoof13(b)foranyviolationofastatuteadministeredbytheFTC."861F.2dat1028.Surescripts'sotherargumentsfarenobetter.TotheextentthattheCourtconsiderslegislativehistory,theSenatereportcitedbySurescriptsdoeshighlighttheabilityoftheFTCtoseekapermanentinjunctionimmediately"intheroutinefraudcase."Def.'sMem.at18(quotingSenateCommitteeonCommerce,Magnuson-Moss'Warranty-FederalTradeCommissionImprovementAct,S.Rep.No.93-151,af3l(1973)).ButtherepoftdoesnotsaythatsuchcircumstancesaretheonlytimethattheFTCcanseeksuchaninjunction.Seeid.Likewise,manyofthestatementsandacademicarticlesthatSurescriptsmarshalsfi'omformerFTCCommissionersandotheragencyofficialsconcludethatpermanentinjunctionsareillsuitedforcasesrequiringtheFTC'sexpertiseandthedevelopmentoflawthroughtheadministrativeprocess,buttheydonotthengoontoprecludeacasebroughtundercircuitprecedent.Seeid.at2l23.Surescripts'sargumentthuslargelyrestsonauthoritiesthatacknowledgestraightforward10casesastheparadigmapplicationsofSectionl3(b),butdonotprecludepursuingotherclaims.SeeEvansProds.775F.2dat1086-87.Inagreementwiththeclearweightofrelevantcases,theCourtconcludesthattheFTC'scomplaintsufficientlypleadsa"proper"caseforapermanentinjunctionunderSection13(b)II.tr'ailuretoStateaClaimUnderSection2oftheShermanActSurescriptsnextarguesthattheFTC'sclaimshouldbedismissedunderFed.R.Civ.P.12(bX6)becausetheFTC'scomplaintfailstoallegeaviolationofSection2oftheShermanAct.SeeDef.'sMem.at2945.First,SurescriptssuggeststhattheFTC'smonopolizationclaimmustfailbecauseSurescripts'sloyaltyprogramwasentirelyoptionaland,therefore,itslowpricescouldconstituteanticompetitiveconductonlyiftheywere"predatory,"whichSurescriptsdenies.Id.at30-31.SurescriptsemphasizesthattheFTC'scomplaintdidnotpleadthenecessaryelementsofpredatorypricing.Id.at33-34.Second,Surescriptsarguesthat,evenundertheframeworkofexclusivedealing,theFTC'sclaimwouldfailundertheruleofreasonbecausetheFTC'scomplaintdidnotadequatelyallegethatSurescripts'sloyaltyprogramscreatedanyanticompetitiveeffects.Id.at3445.Onceagain,theFTChasthestrongerargumentonbothfronts.ContractsvTheoffenseofmonopolizationhastwoelements:"(1)thepossessionofmonopolypowerintherelevantmarketand(2)thewillfulacquisitionormaintenanceofthatpowerasdistinguishedfromgrowthordevelopmentasaconsequenceofasuperiorproduct,businessacumen,orhistoricaccident."UnitedStatesv.GrinnellCorp.,384U.S.563,510-71(1966).Surescriptsdoesnotchallengetheallegationthatthecompanymaintainsamonopolyovertheroutingandeligibility11markets,seeDef.'sMem.at29-30,andthustheonlyquestioniswhether"Surescriptshasillegallymaintaineditsmonopoliesthroughexclusionaryconduct,"Pl.'sOpp'nat22.Foranexclusionaryacttobeanticompetitive,"itmustharmthecompetitiveprocessandtherebyharmconsumers."MicrosoftCorp.,253F.3dat58(emphasisomitted).Ilere,theFTCallegesthatSurescripts'sloyaltyprograms-andtheimplicitthreattochargenon-exclusivecustomershigherprices-preventedtheentranceofcompetitorsintoe-prescribingmarkets.Compl.tl58.Theabsenceofcompetitors,inturn,allegedlyledtoincreasedpricesforpharmaciesandPBMsandlowerincentivepaymentsforEHRs.Seeid.'1lT187-93.Atleastonthefaceofitscomplaint,then,theFTCappearstoallegefactssufficienttostateaclaimunderSection2oftheShermanAct.SeeIqbal,556U.S.at678.Surescripts'sargurnentstothecontraryareunavailing.First,thecompanyemphasizesthatitsloyaltyprogramsareentirelyoptionalandthusdonotnecessarilyconstituteexclusivecontracts.SeeDef.'sMem.at31.Butacontractneed"notcontainspecificagreementsnottousethefservices]ofacompetitor"aslongas"thepracticaleffect...istopreventsuchuse."TampaElecCo.v.NashvilleCoalCo.,365U.S.320,326(1961)(quotingUnitedShoeMach.Corp.v.UnitedStates,258U.S.451,457(1922)).TheFTCallegesthatthethreatofincreasedpriceshadthe"practicaleffect"ofpreventingcustomersfromworkingwithothere-prescribingplatforms,"sincedoingsowouldtriggerthemassivepenaltyprovisionsintheircontractswithSurescripts...andcostroutingfandeligibility]customersmillionsofdollarsthroughincreasedpricesor,forEHRs,decreasedincentivepayments."Compl.\129;seealsoid.I79(allegingthatEHRsthat"violate[]theexclusivitycommitment"must"payback[toSurescripts]theincentivefeesforhistoricaltransactionvolume").Surescriptshighlightsthatsomecustomers,likeKroger,didmanageto"multihome"andhaveanon-exclusiverelationshipwithSurescripts,Def.'sMem.af31,buttheT2testofwhetheramonopolistforeclosescompetition"isnottotalforeclosure,butwhetherthechallengedpracticesbarasubstantialnumberofrivalsorseverelyrestrictthemarket'salnbit."UnitedStatesv.DentsplvInt'1.Inc.,399F.3dl8l,191(3dCir.2005);seealsoMicrosoft,253F.3dat70_71(notingthattheuseofexclusivecontractscanviolate$2evenifthecontractsforecloselessthan40o/oor50Yoofthemarketshare).Here,thegovetnmenthaspleadedfactsdemonstratingsuchsubstantialfbreclosure.See.e.s.,Cornpl.TT3,135.Surescriptsnextsuggeststhatoptionallowpricingloyaltyprogramsareunlawfulonlywhentheyconstitute"predatory"pricing,whichtheFTChasnotpled.Def.'sMem.at31.ButnoneoftheauthoritiesSurescriptscitesstandsforthepropositionthataplaintiffrnustallegepredatorypricingtosucceedonaSection2claim.Forinstance,Pac.BellTel.Co.v.LinklineCommc'ns.Inc.,555U.S.438(2009),didnotconcerneffectivelyexclusionarycontracts,butprice-squeezing.Id.at451InConcordBoatCornv.Rrrrns\,r¡ickCnrn207F.3d1039(8thCir2000),thecourtexaminedaloyaltydiscountprogramthatrequiredatmost80%complianceintheboatmarket,makingtheexclusivepressurescreatedbytheprogrammateriallydifferentthanthedynamicsarisingfromSurescripts'stotalloyaltyscheme.Id.at1044.AndinNicSand-Inc.v3MCo.,507F.3d442(6fhCir.2007)(enbanc),thedefendant3Mwasnotamonopolist.Id.at45t-52.SurescriptsalsomischaracterizestheholdingsinMicrosoft.Itquotesthecourt'sstatementthat"offeringacustomeranattractivedealisthehallmarkofcompetition"unlessthatpriceis"predatory,"butthatstatementconcernedonlyMicrosoft'sofferingInternetExplorerfreeofcharge.Microsoft,253F3dat67-68;Def.'sMem.at31.TherelevantportionoftheenbancD.C.Circuit'sdecisionforthiscaseisitsrulingthatMicrosoft'sexclusivecontractsdidviolateSection2oftheShermanAct;thecourtnotedthatMicrosoft'sexclusivedealingwithfourteenof13thefifteenaccessprovidersinNorthAmericaeffectivelycutoffoneofthetwomajorchannelsbywhichcompetitorscouldentertheinternetbrowsermarket.Microsoft,253F.3dat68-71.Thesecontracts"clearlyha[d]asignificanteffectinpreservingitsmonopoly;theyhelp[ed]keepusageof[Microsoft'scompetitor]belowthecriticallevelnecessaryfor[it]oranyotherrivaltoposearealthreattoMicrosoft'smonopoly."Id.at71.LikethebehavioratissueinMicrosoft,Surescripts'sallegedpracticeofchargingloyalpharmaciesandPBMsless,andpayingloyalEHRsgreaterincentives,donotneedtoconstitutepredatorypricingforSurescripts'sexclusionarypracticestoconstituteillegalmaintenanceofanronopoly.SeeGrinnell,384U.S.at570-71."'Where,ashere,adominantsupplierentersintodefactoexclusivedealingaffangementswitheverycustomerinthemarket,otherfirmsmaybedrivenoutnotbecausetheycannotcompeteonapricebasis,butbecausetheyarenevergivenanopportunitytocompete...."ZFMeritor.LLCv.EatonCorp.,696F.3d254,28I(3dCir.2012).SurescriptsarguesthatThirdCircuitcaseslikeZFMeritorhavenotbeenadoptedintheD.C.Circuitandthat(forthisCourt)predatorypricingstillremainsanessentialelementofprovingthataloyaltyprogramisunlawful.Def.'sMem.at32-33.However,althoughtheD.C.CircuithascastdoubtontheThirdCircuit'sdecisioninLePase'sInc.v.3M,324F.3d141(3rdCir.2003)(enbanc),seeFTCv.Church&DwightCo.,665F.3d1372,1316(D.C.Cir.20ll),muchofthatcriticismwasfocusedontheconclusionthat"bundling"rebates(i.e.,requiringretailerstocamymultipleploductstoreceivecertainrebates)areanticompetitive,ratherthanontheThirdCircuit'sdiscussionoftheexclusionarypracticesinquestionhere,seeid.at1316-17.Andevenwithoutthesepersuasiveprecedents,theFTC'sallegationsstillstateaclaimofmonopolizationundertheD.C.Circuit'sdecisioninMicrosoft.See253F.3dat69-71.I4B.RuleofReasonSurescriptsnextcontendsthat,ifitsloyaltycontractsareviewedasexclusivedealing,theFTC'sclaimsfailundertheruleofreason.Def.'sMem.at34.Surescriptsarguesthat"theFTCbearstheburdenofdemonstratingthatSurescripts'[s]allegedcontractualprovisionshaveananticompetitiveeffectoncompetition,"whichinan.exclusivedealingcasemeansthatSurescripts'sconduct"foreclosefd]competitioninasubstantialshareofthelineofcommerceaffected."Id.at35(quotingMicrosoft,253F.3dat69).Inparticular,Surescriptssuggeststhat,becausetheFTCconcedesthatbothroutingandeligibilityaretwo-sidedmarkets,"theFTCmustplausiblypleadforeclosureofasubstantialshareofeachofthosemarketsasawhole."Id.SurescriptsinsiststhattheFTC'scomplaintfailstoallegeeitheranticompetitiveeffectsorforeclosure.Id.TheCourtconcludes,tothecontrary,thattheFTChasmetitsburdens.Exclusivityprovisionscoveringabout40-50%oftherelevantmarkethavebeenfoundtoforeclosecompetitionillegally,seeMicrosoft,253F.3dat70,andSurescripts'sloyaltyprogramallegedlyplaces70-80%oftheroutingandeligibilitymarketsintoeffectivelyexclusivecontracts,Pl.'sOpp'nat35;Compl.nnll2-76.Surescriptsinsiststhat,undertheSupremeCouft'srecentdecisioninArnex,theFTCmustpleadfactsshowing"anticompetitiveeffectsinthemarketasawholeandcannotfocusonlyontheeffectsononeside."Def.'sMem.at37;seealsoid.at35-40.ButtheFTC'scomplaintdoesjustwhatSurescriptswants,allegingthatSurescripts'sloyaltyprogram"foreclosedatleast70o/oofeachmarket,"i.e.,atleast70Yoofbothtwo-sidedmarketsatissue.Compl.fl3(emphasisadded);seealsoid.lT187("ButforSurescripts'santicompetitivecourseofconduct,thenetprice(takingintoaccountbothsidesofthenetwork)oftherouting15transactionwouldbelower.Similarly,withoutSurescripts'sloyaltycontracts,thenetprice(takingintoaccountbothsidesofthenetwork)oftheeligibilitytransactionwouldbelower.").SurescriptsarguesthatthesestatementsareconclusoryandthattheFTCdoesnotpleadsufficientfactstosurvivethemotiontodismiss.Def.'sMem.at38;seealsoIqbal,556U.S.at6J8("Aclaimhasfacialplausibilitywhentheplaintiffpleadsfactualcontentthatallowsthecourttodrawthereasonableinferencethatthedefendantisliableforthemisconductalleged.").Surescriptsacknowledges,forinstance,thatthecorlplaintincludesanallegationthat,"intheroutingmarket,theFTCstatesthat[acornpetitor]charges[certain]pharmacieslowerpricesthandoesSurescripts,"butnotesthat"theFTCdoesnotmakeanyallegationsconcerningEHRs'incentivepaymentsfromSurescriptsorfthecompetitor]forthose[same]routingtransactions."Def.'sMem.at39.SurescriptssimilarlyconcedesthatthecornplaintallegesthatacompetitorchargedonePBMalowerpricethanSurescripts,buthighlightstheabsenceof"factsshowinghighernet-transactionpricesacrossthatmarketasawhole."Id.Thisargumentiswrongfortworeasons.First,SurescriptsreadstoomuchintoAmex.ThatcaseconcernedanallegedrestraintoftradeinviolationofSectionIoftheShermanAct,andtheSupremeCourtdeterminedthatplaintiffsfailedtoofferevidencethatthepriceofcredit-cardtransactionswashigherthanwouldbeexpectedinacompetitivemarketbecausetheplaintiffsprovidedno"reliablemeasureofAmex'stransactionpriceorprofitmargins."138S.Ct.at2288.TheCourtalsoconcludedthat"Amex'sincreasedmerchantfeesreflect[ed]increasesinthevalueofitsservicesandthecostofitstransactions,notanabilitytochargeaboveacompetitiveprice."Id.Amexwasnotamonopolist.Id.ar2282("Visa...has45Yoofthemarketasmeasuredbytransactionvolume.AmexandMasterCardtrailwith26.40/oand23.3o/o,respectively....").16Here,ontheotherhand,theFTCbringsaclaimofmonopolizationunderSection2oftheShermanActagainstSurescripts,anundisputedmonopolist.RegardlessofSurescripts'sspecificabove-marketfeesorbelow-marketincentives,thecentralquestioniswhethertheFTCallegedthatSurescriptsengagedinexclusionaryconductthat"harmedcompetition,notjustacompetitor,"byblockingentrantsintothemarket.Microsoft,253F.3dat59.TheFTChasdonejustthat.See.e.s.,Compl.'1i113,135.172-81But,evenassumingthatSurescriptsiscorrectinitsinterpretationofAmex,theFTCstillpleadedsufficientfactsaddressingthetotalityofbothtwo-sidedmarkets.InadditiontocharginglowerfeestopharmaciesandPBMs,theFTCallegesthatonecompetitorwasalsowillingtopayhigherincentivestoEHRs.Id.ll192.Thus,onbothsidesofthemarket,Surescriptsstoodtogainabove-marketreturns,charginghigherfeesandpayingoutlowerincentivesthanitscompetitors.TheFTCalsoallegesthatSurescriptsengagedinotheranticompetitiveconduct,likeforcingkeycustomerstoterminateassociationwithcompetitors.Id.TI11.TheFTCallegesthatthisconducthurtinnovation,decreasedoutput,andloweredquality.fd.IT196-215.Surescripts'sresponseislargelyfactual,denyingtheFTC'sallegations.Def.'sMem.at4142.ButsuchdenialsarenotadequategroundsfordismissingtheFTC'scornplaint;rather,theyspeaktothemeritsandtheneedforfurtherfactualdevelopmentthroughdiscovery.Finally,SurescriptsarguesthattheFTCfailedtopleadsufficientfactsshowingthatSurescripts'sbusinesspracticesforeclosedmarketcompetitiontoa"substantial"degree.Id.at4245.Surescriptsobservesthatexclusivedealingisillegalonlyiftheanangement"substantially"weakenscompetition,seeEisai.Inc.v.SanofiAventisU.S..LLC,821F.3d394,403-04(3dCir.2016),andinsiststhatitscontracts,eveniffaciallyexclusive,wereeasilyt7terminable,ofshortduration,andthereforepresumptivelylawful,see.e.g.RolandMach.Co.v.DresserIndus..Inc.,749F.2d380,395(7thCir.1984).Def.'sMem.at42.Onceagain,however,Surescripts'sargumentturnsonafactualdisputeillsuitedforthepleadingsstage.ComparePl.'sOpp'naf30-32;Compl.TT84-86,withDef.'sReplyat18-20.UnderSupremeCourtprecedent,therelevantinquiryisfactintensive:Todeterminesubstantialityinagivencase,itisnecessarytoweightheprobableeffectofthecontractontherelevantareaofeffectivecompetition,takingintoaccounttherelativestrengthoftheparties,theproportionatevolumeofcommerceinvolvedinrelationtothetotalvolumeofcommerceintherelevantmarketarea,andtheprobableimmediateandfutureeffectswhichpre-emptionofthatshareofthemarketmighthaveoneffectivecompetitiontherein.TampaElec.,365U.S.at329Evenifthecontractswereshorttermandeasilyterminable,theFTCarguesthattheirexclusiveterms,whencombinedwiththenatureofthetworelevantmarketsandSurescripts'sdominantmonopolyposition,hadtheeffectofforeclosinglargepartsofbothmarketsandharmingcompetition.Pl.'sOpp'nat31-32;cf.Microsoft,253F.3dat70-71(analyzingwhetherMicrosoft'sexclusivecontractshad"asignihcanteffectinpreservingitsmonopoly").FurtherfactualdevelopmentmayvindicateSurescripts'sposition,buttheFTC'scornplaintcontainssufficientfactstomovebeyondthepleadingsstage.Cot'lcl-ustoNForalltheforegoingreasons,Surescripts'smotiontodismisswillbedenied.Aseparateorderwillissueonthisdate.lslJOHND.BATESUnitedStatesDistrictJudgeDaled:January17.202018