## IN THE COURT OF CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXA S NO. PD-1340-18 CHRISTOPHER MIRANDA, Appellant

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS

EL PASO COUNTY H E R V E Y , J., delivered the opinion of the Court in w hich KE L L E R , P.J., R I C H A R D S O N , N E W E L L , K E E L , and M C C L U R E , JJ., joined . Y E A R Y , J., filed a concurring opinion in w h ich S L A U G H T E R , J., joined. W A L K E R , J., concurred. O P I N I O N Appellant, Christopher Miranda, a high school gy mn astics coach in El Paso, was accused of

having im

proper relationships with three of his f e m ale students. He conf

essed to a school adm inistrator to engaging in sexual intercourse with each student. This case involves one of

those students and whether the corpus delicti of the of f enses perpetrated against her has been shown by independent corroborating evidence. The court of appeals concluded that they

had not, f

inding instead no evidence corroborating Appellant’sM iranda –2 conf ession and that the closely -related-crim es exception to strict application of the corpus delicti r ule did not apply . It rendered acquittals on som e counts. W e will reverse the lower court’s judgm ent and reinstate Appellant’s convictions. I. FACTS In Decem ber 2011, Appellant was hired as a teacher at Eastwood High School in El Paso. Just over a y ear later, a teacher accused himof having an im

proper relationship with P.V., a 16-y ear-old girl. Bobbi Russell Garcia (Russell) was the Em ploy ee Relations Coordinator at the Yselta Independent School District (YISD), and she was responsible f or investigating the allegation. She asked Appellant to m eet with her at her of f ice. Appellant verbally

denied the allegation and gave a written statem ent. He wrote, These allegations of

sexual relations with these students are com pletely f alse. My relationship with these students were coach or teacher -- student related. I did text them

on occasion in accordance [ to] the practices and gy mnastics related issues. They did start gy

mnastics with m e and they had continued to do so f

or som e tim e. I know [ P.V.] stopped com ing to practice because she was having an issue with her best f riend at the tim e . The best f riend [ ] was pregnant and did not want to tell any one about the issue. They thought about it and both stopped com ing to gy mnastics. [ K.R.] was a soccer play er who wanted to transf er to gy mnastics. I allowed and started working with her until she stopped com ing to practice due to gy mn astics being m ore and m ore dif

f icult. She was in the class f or the 2012 spring sem ester. My

relationship with [ K.R.] had ceased in the summ er (illegible) -- she had no interest in gy mnastics. My r elationship with [ P.V.] had stopped in f

all 2011 because she also too had stopped com ing to gy mnastics. Even though Appellant was accused of having an im

proper relationship with only P.V., he wrote about another student, K.R. Af ter he f inished his statem ent, Russell toldM iranda –3 Appellant that he was being placed on adm inistrative leave, and Appellant lef t. Over the next two day s , Russell spoke to P.V., K.R., and other students bef ore she

m et with Appellant a second tim e. W hen they m et again, Appellant denied the allegations; this tim e in a recorded statem ent. Russell told Appellant that she had inf orm ation conf

irm ing the allegation, and she said she would give him a f ew m inutes to consider his story . Five m inutes later, Appellant told Russell that “other things had also occurred.” Russell began recording again, and Appellant adm itted to having sex with P.V., K.R., and I.G. He had not been accused of having an im

p roper relationship with I.G., and his adm ission was new and unsolicited. Russell then gave Appellant the option to resign or to have his contract term inated by the board of

trustees, and she asked him to give another statem ent to ensure she “had all of the inf orm ation on the students that could have potentially been af

f ected.” Appellant chose to resign and agreed to give another written statem ent. He wrote that, I, Christopher Miranda, had sexual relations with [ P.V.]. I started out by a class land building [ sic] that I did my f irst sem ester there. She was progressing quite f

ast and the connection was m ade. W e exchanged num bers then eventually had sex. [ K.R.] was the sam e scenario. [ I.G.] was dif f erent. She was very

(illegible) and we did go out a f ew tim es, but never had sex. [ K.R.] had wanted to keep the relationship going, but I stopped it because I knew it was im m oral. [ P .V.] and I both agreed to stay because the circum stances of

teacher/student. I know she was carry ing the burden on her shoulders because she really wanted to continue the relationship. I have done f ew wrongs in my

lif e, but these 3 are the worst things I’ve done. I can only ask f orgiveness f

or any one involved and any one whose f eelings were hurt in the process. I was starting this y ear sm ooth, and I wanted to m ake this a career. I’m

asham ed of

my actions and with this experience I will continue lif

e with better judgm ent.M iranda –4 Russell noticed that Appellant denied having sex with I.G. in his written statem ent and said that they

only had a “kissing relationship.” Russell accepted his resignation af ter he f inished writing his second statem ent, and Appellant lef t . She then reported the inf orm ation to another m em ber of the adm inistration, who contacted the El Paso Police Departm ent. Detective Tany a Marie Rohwer with the El Paso Police Departm ent conducted f orensic interviews with I.G. and P.V., and Detective Olga Gom ez conducted a f orensic interview with K.R. Detective Rohwer testif ied that police obtained f

ive arrest warrants af ter the f orensic interviews were conducted. Three warrants were f or im p roper student/teacher relationship and two f or sexual assault against I.G. and K.R. Detective Rohwer said that they

did not obtain an arrest warrant f or sexual assault against P.V. because she was 17 y ears old when the allegations cam e to light and did not want to proceed with the charge. (There was no dispute that P.V. was 16 y ears old at the tim e of the assault.) I.G.’s f ather testif

ied at trial. He said that his daughter, who went by the nicknam e “Belly ,” lef

t him a book to read with a letter in it f r om Appellant. It was dated Septem ber 9, 2012. Appellant wrote that, Dear Most Gracious & Precious Belly , I know how sad y o u

are about hom ecom ing and all, but I f eel as if there is nothing I can do to m ake y ou happy . I do have an idea which will be at the end of this letter.M iranda –5

First of f , I want to let y ou know that I’m super happy

with y ou and can’t believe what we are doing. Most people would think that f inding love between a teacher and a student should be f orbidden. I would not have it any other way , though. I really do f eel that I can spend the rest of my lif e with y ou. W e have about 20 m ore m onths bef ore we can start doing f

un stuf f . I hope we do because going out will be a m illion tim es easier, and I would be able to do cute things f or y ou like the ones y o u have been witnessing. I really

like the way

this pen writes. It’s one I got f rom Austin. I really wanted to get y ou one that had y our nam e but it wasn’t there. Sunday ? ? So our sixth m onth anniversary is com ing up soon. And I don’t know what to do since we’ve pretty

m uch done every

thing we can already . I’m going to need som e ideas f

rom y ou. Any thing on this? So without f

urther ado, here is my

proposition f

rom [ sic] y ou: W ould y o u, [ I.G.], like to accom pany m e at the 2012/2013 EHS hom ecom ing? G Yes* G No Sincerely , with lots of love, Christopher Miranda, Dorney

. [ 1] *If y ou agree, note that this is only a cordial invitation and any obligation, slash, duties a norm al person would do f or this situation is null and void based on the decision of

the inviter.* K.R. also testif

ied. She said that her f

am ily m oved to El Paso in April 2011 and that she play ed soccer until the end of her sophom ore y ear when she and a f r iend switched to gy

mnastics. She was 16 y ears old when she m et Appellant. According to K.R., she and Appellant began talking outside of school when he texted her one night.

1 “Dorney ” was one of Appellant’s nickname at school. He was also known as “Coach Sensei.”M iranda –6 She did not know how Appellant got her phone num ber. The assault happened af ter they had been texting f

or a f ew weeks. The night of

the incident, Appellant texted K.R. and invited her to hang out with him at his parent’s house, where he lived. She agreed and snuck out of her parent’s house at about m idnight, and Appellant picked her up. Once they got back to his parent’s house and went inside, K.R. noticed that it was dark, and she said that he told her to be quiet. K.R. realized that she should not have been with Appellant at his house “as soon as I entered and walked up the stairs [ to his room ] and realized nobody -- it didn’t seem like any one was hom e and then I was told to be quiet, I f e lt uncom f

ortable.” They

hung out in his room f or a bit. He play e d video gam es while she was on Facebook. Eventually , Appellant turned of

f the video gam e and started talking to K.R. During the conversation, he took her phone and set it aside, then began m o ving closer to her. K.R. kept scooting away until she reached the wall and had nowhere else to go. W hile Appellant was cornering her, she said that she nervously joked with him

about how she needed m ore space, but Appellant started to kiss her f ace. He then lif

ted her up and set her down in the

m iddle of the bed and started to take of f her clothes. She did not resist because Appellant

was so m u ch bigger. Appellant then took of f his shorts, crawled on top of K.R., and had vaginal intercourse with her. Af ter they had sex, they continued to hang out in his room

. K.R. said that she did not leave because she was af raid to walk hom e in El Paso at night, especially because she lived a couple of m i les away . Appellant f

inally drove her hom eM iranda –7 around 3 or 4 a.m . W hen she was getting out of his car, he told her to “stop acting weird.” K.R. said that she did not report the crim e or tell her parents about what happened f or about a y ear because she was asham ed. She also said that her f am ily m oved a lot because her f

a ther was in the m ilitary , but she had f riends at Eastwood that she liked, and she was getting ready

to go to prom

and graduate. She thought that she m i ght not be allowed to graduate f

rom Eastwood if

she turned him

in. She also knew that her f riends, who were very

close to Appellant, would be upset. W h en Russell learned f

rom Appellant’s statem ent that K.R. m ight also have been involved, she called K.R.’s parents, then m et with K.R., who denied every thing. 2 But she told her f ather the truth when she arrived hom e f rom school. She said that she only adm itted what happened because Appellant conf essed. K.R.’s f

ears about what m ight happen were also realized. Students close to Appellant began threatening “the student” who accused Appellant. (K.R.’s identity was not public knowledge, but she was af raid that it would becom e public knowledge.) She subsequently transf erred to and graduated f rom Plato Academy . She said that graduating f r om P lato was “sham ef

ul,” and she thought that it af

f ected her college applications because m any students go there because they cannot m e et academ i c standards. P.V. and I.G. did not testif y . II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2 K.R. was upset that Russell was questioning her without her parents present.M iranda –8 Appellant was indicted f

or various crim es related to his conduct:

• Count I: Im

proper relationship by engaging in sexual intercourse with “Jane Doe” [ P.V.] on or about Septem ber 1, 2011.

• Count II: Im

proper relationship by

engaging in sexual intercourse with “Jane Doe” [ I.G.] on or about October 1, 2012.

• Count III: Im

proper relationship by

engaging in sexual intercourse with “Jane Doe” [ K.R.] on or about April 1, 2012.

• Count IV: Sexual assault of a child by

causing penetration of

the sexual organ of

I.G. by m eans of the sexual organ of

the def endant on or about October 1, 2012.

• Count V: Sexual assault of a child by

penetration of

the sexual organ of K.R. by m eans of the sexual organ of the def endant on or about April 1, 2012.

• Count VI: Sexual perf orm ance by a child by inducing I.G. to engage in sexual intercourse on or about October 1, 2012.

• Count VII: Sexual perf orm ance by

a child by

inducing P.V. to engage in sexual intercourse on or about Septem ber 1, 2011.

• Count VIII: Sexual perf orm ance by

a child by

inducing K.R. to engage ins sexual intercourse on or about April 1, 2012. The jury f ound Appellant guilty

of Counts I, III, V, and VII, which dealt with P.V. and K.R. It acquitted him of Counts II, IV, and VI, which dealt with I.G., and it also acquitted him

of Count VIII f

o r sexual perf

orm ance of

a child by

K.R. The jury

sentenced Appellant to term s of

conf inem ent of 10 and 4 y ears f or his im proper relationships with P.V. and K.R., 2 y ears f

or inducing P.V. to engage in a sexual perf o rm ance, and 10 y ears f or his sexual assault of

K.R. The judge ordered the sentences to run concurrently

.M iranda –9 III. COURT OF APPEALS Appellant argued on appeal that his statem ents to Russell, a school adm inistrator, were inadm issible because they were the product of

an unwarned custodial interrogation. He also argued that the trial court should have given a voluntariness instruction and that the evidence was legally

insuf f icient. The court overruled all points of error except the suf f i ciency point. 3 It af

f irm ed Appellant’s convictions on Counts III and V (K.R.) because the corpus delicti of

those of f e nses had been shown, but it rendered acquittals on Counts I and VII (P.V.), f

i nding that the corpus delicti of those of f enses had not been shown. It reasoned that, while K.R. testif ied, P.V. did not, and there was no other evidence corroborating Appellant’s conf e ssion. It f

urther concluded that the closely -related-crim es exception did not apply

because Appellant’s of

f enses took place over too long a tim e. Miranda , 2018 W L 5862160, at *7 (quoting Miller v. State , 457 S.W .3d 919 (Tex. Crim

. App. 2015)). The exception, it noted, had been applied only once by this Court and to of f enses that took place over a 27-day period, but Appellant’s crim e s spanned just over a y ear. IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES The parties’ argum e nts are sim ple: Appellant argues that the court of appeals was correct that the closely

- related-crim es exception does not apply and that Miller

is distinguishable. The State argues that the court of appeals erred and that the closely

3 Appellant did not refer in his brief specifically to the corpus delicti d octrine, but he did discuss the necessity

of corroborating

an ex trajudicial confession.Miranda –10

related-crim es exception should apply

. It acknowledges that these f acts are distinguishable f

rom Miller

but say s that this Court should extend the exception to cover the f acts of this case. According to the State, the of f e nses are closely

related in character and all occurred during a single course of conduct, and it concludes that the key consideration is whether application of the exception would violate the policy underly ing the corpus delicti rule, asserting that it would not here. V. C ORPUS DELICTI RULE a. Background The corpus delicti rule is a comm on law rule of evidentiary suf f iciency that applies to convictions based on extrajudicial conf essions. Salazar v. State , 86 S.W .3d 640, 644 (Tex. Crim . App. 2002). W hen a conviction is based on a def endant’s extrajudicial conf ession, that conf

ession does not constitute legally suf f icient evidence of

guilt without corroborating evidence independent of that conf ession showing that the “essential nature” of the of f ense was comm itted. Miller , 457 S.W .3d at 924. The corroborating evidence need not prove that the crim e was comm itted; it “need only m ake this conclusion m ore probable.” W

illiams v. State , 958 S.W .2d 186, 190 (Tex. Crim . App. 1997). W e consider all the adm itted evidence except the extrajudicial conf ession and view it in the light m ost f avorable to the verdict. Fisher v. State , 851 S.W .2d 298, 303 (Tex. Crim . App. 1993).

b. Miller —Closely Related Crim es Ex ception In Miller , we recognized an exception to strict application of the corpus delicti ruleMiranda –11

when a def

endant is charged with m ultiple, closely -related of f e nses, but the corpus delicti of only som e of the of f enses is shown. Id. at 927. The appellant in Miller c onf essed to police that he engaged in sexual conduct with his then three-m onth-old daughter. Id. at 920. He adm itted to m olesting his daughter at least three dif f erent tim es, including once in her nursery

and twice in his bedroom

. Id. Later, the appellant conf essed to police that he rem em bered a f ourth tim e when he took a picture of his penis on his daughter’s vagina, but he said that he deleted the picture, which police later conf irm ed. I d. Police were able to corroborate only one of the incidents. Id. at 920–21. They f ound his sem en in carpet near his daughter’s changing table where he said it would be af ter he m asturbated and ejaculated. Id. T he crim es took place over a 27-day period. Id. at 920. The jury convicted the appellant of all f our counts and sentenced him to lif e im prisonm ent f

or each of f ense. Id. at 921. The issue was whether this Court should adopt the closely -related-crim es exception and apply

it. Id. Analy sis began with an exam ination of cases f rom other jurisdictions, In Indiana, . . . when a suspect conf esses to m

ultiple crim inal of

f e nses f rom a single crim inal episode or course of conduct, the corpus delicti rule is satisf ied if the prosecution can suf

f iciently corroborate the m ost serious of f ense. In Pennsy lvania, the rule is satisf ied if one of the related of

f enses to which the suspect conf essed is corroborated. Id. at 925. W e also cited to courts of appeals in other states. Id. at 927. The crim es in those cases took place over vary ing lengths of tim e, but the courts stressed thatMiranda –12

application of

the exception was decided on a case-by -case basis, and m any of them spoke about comm o nalities between the crim es and the nature of the of f enses. Id. at 926. W e also noted the Colorado Suprem e Court’s concern that strict application could f rustrate convictions in cases involving “the m ost vulnerable victim s, such as inf ants, y oung children, and the m entally inf irm . . . .” Id. at 927 (citing C olorado v. LaRosa , 293 P.3d 567, 574 (Colo. 2013)). VI. ANALYSIS W e cannot f

a ult the court of

appeals f or concluding that the closely -related-crim es exception did not apply

based on Miller . However, we decided that case based on its f acts, and whether the exception to strict application of the rule applies is a f

act-specif ic one. This case presents dif f erent f acts, but we nonetheless conclude that the closely

related-crim es exception applies. In Miller , although we noted that the of f enses were identical, com m itted against the sam e victim , and that they took place during a course of conduct, we chief

ly f ocused on the tem

poral relationship between the crim es. W e now take the opportunity to clarif y that the tem

p oral proxim ity

of the of f enses is not dispositive of whether the closely

related-crim es exception applies. The sine qua non of the inquiry

is whether the relationship between the crim es is suf f iciently “close” to “avoid adm itting a conf e ssion f or a crim e that did not occur . . . .” Pennsylvania v. Taylor , 831 A.2d 587, 594 (Pa. 2003)

. This m a kes sense because it ref lects our recognition that the purpose of the corpusMiranda –13

delicti d octrine is to protect people who would conf ess to im aginary

crim es. It also aligns with the f act that application of

the exception is determ ined on a case-by -case basis. The “closeness” of

of f enses should be determ ined by exam ining not only

the tem poral proxim ity of the of f enses but also the ty

pe of of f enses, sim ilarities in how the of f enses

were comm itted, whether the of f ense arose f

rom a single crim inal episode or a course of conduct, whether the corpus delicti of other of f enses have been shown, and any other consideration that would logically inf o rm the inquiry

. According to the court of appeals, the only

corroborating evidence that Appellant

comm itted the alleged crim e s was the letter f rom Appellant to I.G., which at m o st showed an im proper relationship between Appellant and I.G., and K.R.’s testim ony that Appellant had an im proper relationship with her and sexually assaulted her. Miranda , 2018 W L 5862160, at *7. W e think there is m ore corroborating evidence. Detective Rohwer testif i ed that I.G. alleged during her f orensic interview that Appellant engaged in im p roper sexual contact with her. According to Detective Rohwer, despite the allegation and her belief

that police could obtain an arrest warrant f or sexual assault, they

decided not to because, although I.G. was 16 y ears old at the tim e of the assault, she was 17 y ears old at the tim e of

the interview and did not want to proceed with the charge. Appellant also adm itted to engaging in sexual intercourse with I.G. 4

4 Althoug hthe jury

acquitted Appellant of the alleg ed offenses committed ag ainst I .G., we consider all the admitted evidence to determine if the corpus delicti of an offense has been shown. Fisher , 851 S.W .2d at 303. W e also note that the evidence necessary to establish the corpus delicti of an offense is much less than what is leg ally sufficient to support a criminalMiranda –14

Independent of Appellant’s conf ession regarding P.V., the evidence shows that he engaged in a course of

conduct, groom ing his underage f em ale students, I.G. and K.R. Using his position of

authority as a teacher and a coach, he convinced them to participate in a rom antic relationship, then engaged in sexual intercourse with them . He used the

sam e tactics with both students. Given the identical nature of all the sexual of

f enses, the strikingly sim ilar modus operandi f or each of

f ense, and the f

act that the corpus delicti of

m any of the crim es were shown, we are satisf ied that the of

f e nses are suf

f i ciently closely related to alleviate any concern that the crim es against P.V. were never com m itted. Appellant’s conf

ession has been corroborated and the corpus delicti rule satisf ied. VII. CONCLUSION Because we conclude that the closely -related-crim es exception applies, we reverse the judgm ent of

the court of

appeals rendering acquittals on Counts I and VII and reinstate the trial court’s judgm ents of conviction. Delivered: April 21, 2021 Publish

conviction. Compare W

illiams v. State , 958 S.W .2d 186, 190 (Tex . Crim. App. 1997), with Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979).