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motion for summary judgment, awarding it specific performance. This 

appeal followed. 

On appeal, Gullo argues that genuine issues of fact remain, 

precluding summary judgment. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 

729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). He argues he was not contacted 

sufficiently far in advance of July 1 to make arrangements to 

accommodate a July 1 closing and should have been afforded a reasonable 

time to do so. The City answers that it is entitled to specific performance 

because it timely performed all of its responsibilities, and yet Gullo 

refused to sign the closing documents. This court reviews a summary 

judgment de novo. Id. 

Specific performance is available when, according to the 

contract terms, the purchaser has tendered performance or can 

demonstrate that it is "ready, willing, and able to perform." Mayfield v. 

Koroghli, 124 Nev. 343, 351, 184 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (quoting Serpa v. 

Darling, 107 Nev. 299, 304, 810 P.2d 778, 782 (1991)). Here, the district 

court found that payment was timely tendered and that the escrow agent 

was in a position to close on July 1. Although Gullo asserts that the City 

provided no proof that the funds were available on that date, the City 

submitted an escrow officer's affidavit to that effect, which shows at least 

that the City was ready, willing, and able to perform, even if the funds had 

not yet cleared. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting 

summary judgment or abuse its discretion in awarding specific 

performance. See Mayfield, 124 Nev. at 348, 184 P.3d at 366 (noting that 

this court reviews a district court's decision to award specific performance 

for an abuse of discretion). Further, because the City deposited the full 

purchase price, including the periodic payment amount, on July 1, even if 

the July periodic payment remained due, any failure to remit it will not 

defeat the district court's decision to grant specific performance. See 

2 

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Chsut 

Cherry 

J. 

Mosso v. Lee, 53 Nev. 176, 182, 295 P. 776, 777-78 (1931) ("Even where 

time is made material, by express stipulation, the failure of one of the 

parties to perform a condition within the particular time limited will not 

in every case defeat his right to specific performance, if the condition be 

subsequently performed, without unreasonable delay, and no 

circumstances have intervened that would render it unjust or inequitable 

to give such relief. The discretion which a court of equity has to grant or 

refuse specific performance, and which is always exercised with reference 

to the circumstances of the particular case before it, may and of necessity 

must often be controlled by the conduct of the party who bases his refusal 

to perform the contract upon the failure of the other party to strictly 

comply with its conditions." (quoting Cheney v. Libby, 134 U.S. 68, 78 

(1890)) (internal citations omitted)). 

Therefore, we conclude that the City is entitled to enforce the 

purchase agreement and the district court did not err when it granted the 

City summary judgment and specific performance. Mayfield, 124 Nev. at 

350-51, 184 P.3d at 367; Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.' 

Douglas 

"We have considered Gullo's other arguments on appeal and 

conclude that they are without merit. We also decline to take Gullo's 

requested judicial notice regarding the potentiality for same-day wire 

transfers to be deposited the next day. 

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cc: Hon. Carolyn Ellsworth, District Judge 

Lansford W. Levitt, Settlement Judge 

Brian K. Berman 

Las Vegas City Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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(0) 1947A 4040.