alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1

                   SUBSIDIARIES OF ART TECHNOLOGY GROUP, INC.


NAME OF ORGANIZATION                                          JURISDICTION
------------------------------------------                    ----------------

ATG Securities Corporation                                    Massachusetts
ATG Global, Inc.                                              Massachusetts
Art Technology Group B.V.                                     Netherlands
Art Technology Group GmbH                                     Germany
Art Technology Group (Europe) Limited                         United Kingdom
Art Technology Group Australia Pty Limited                    Australia
Art Technology Group (Canada) Inc.                            Canada
Art Technology Group Canada ULC                               Canada
Art Technology Group, S.A.R.L.                                France
Art Technology Group, KK                                      Japan
Primus Knowledge Solutions, Inc.                              Washington
Primus Knowledge Solutions (UK) Limited                       United Kingdom
Primus Knowledge Solutions France                             France
Amacis Group, Limited                                         Northern Ireland
Amacis, Inc.                                                  Massachusetts
Amacis Ltd.                                                   Northern Ireland
Amacis Trustees Ltd.                                          Northern Ireland
Broad Daylight, Inc.                                          Delaware
#### Benjamin William FAWLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gene M. JOHNSON, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6188

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 9, 2017

Decided: July 10, 2017

Benjamin William Fawley, Appellant Pro Se. David Michael Uberman, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Ap-pellee.

Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

*737Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Benjamin William Fawley seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely and, alternatively, denying as without merit his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of its prior order dismissing as time-barred his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012); *Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Faw-ley has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny Pawley’s motions for a delayed appeal, to expand the record, to address the time bar, to enter facts and evidence, and to raise actual harm, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately .presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Emission Guarantees for Boiler U1B and U2B 

SRP Coronado Generating Station

Boiler ID Pollutant Guaranteed Value

UIB SO2

 Removal 97% or 0.04 lb/MMBtu, whichever occurs first

Hg capture 90% of Oxidized Mercury or 2 μg/Nm3

COa≤ 265 ppm (4 hour average)

SO3 Removal 20% or 2 ppmvd whichever occurs first

U2B SO2

 Removal 97% or 0.04 lb/MMBtu, whichever occurs first

Hg capture 90% of Oxidized Mercury or 2 μg/Nm3

COa ≤ 265 ppmvd @ 3% O2

 when firing 80% Jacobs Ranch and 

20% Spring Creek Coal

SO3 Removal 20% or 2 ppmvd whichever occurs first

a CO emission guarantee based on steam flow of 2,747,000 lb/hr and firing of 80% Jacob's Ranch and

 20% Spring Creek Coal
### M A N D A T E

THE STATE OF TEXAS

TO THE 224TH JUDICIA L DISTRICT COU RT OF BEXAR COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas on August 6, 2014

, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

Donald E. Carter, Appellant

V.

Attorney General of the State of Texas, Appellee

No. 04

- 13

- 00424

- CV and Tr. Ct. No. 1993EM500955

was determined, and therein our said Court of Appeals made its order in these words:



## In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Costs of the appeal are taxed against the party that
incurred them.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas, in this behalf and in all things have the order duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS t he Hon. Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas, with the seal of the Court affixed and the City of San Antonio on February 12, 2015

.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLE RK

____________________________ Cynthia A. Martinez Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853BILL OF COSTS



### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DISTRICT, AT SAN ANTONIO

No. 04

- 13

- 00424

- CV

Donald E. Carter

v.

Attorney Gen eral of the State of Texas

(NO. 1993EM500955 IN 224T H JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNT Y)

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID BY

REPORTER'S RECORD CLERK'S RECORD FILING REPORTER'S RECORD $0.00 $292.00 $175.00 $0.00 INDIGENT INDIGENT INDIGENT INDIGENT VICTORIA GWYNN

VICTORIA GWYNN

Balance of costs owing to the Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, Texas: 0.00

**Court costs in this cause shall be paid as per the Judgment issued by this Court.**

I, KEITH E. HOTTLE

, CLERK OF THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS OF TH E STATE OF TEXAS, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the cost bill of THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, showing the charges and payments, in the above numbered and styled cause, as the same app ears of record in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my hand and the Seal of the COURT OF APPEALS for the Fourth District of Texas, this February 12, 2015

.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

____________________________ Cynthia A. Martinez Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                     AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                      SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

         In connection with the Report of Joystar, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-KSB for the for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), we, William Alverson,
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ William Alverson
-------------------------------------
William Alverson
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
April 15, 2005
#### Sascha LYNCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PFIZER, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-55494

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 21, 2017

Sascha Lynch, Pro Se

Alicia Donahue, Esquire, Attorney, Patrick J. Gregory, Attorney, Shook, Hardy *&*Bacon LLP, San Francisco, CA, Brian P. Ziska, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Sascha Lynch appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her diver*542sity action alleging claims arising from an intrauterine device. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations. *Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco,*535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Lynch’s action as barred by the statute of limitations because Lynch was on inquiry notice of her injury more than two years before filing this lawsuit. *See Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.,*36 Cal.4th 797, 808, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914 (2005) (plaintiffs are charged with “presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have information of circumstances to put them on inquiry” (citations omitted and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Norgart v. Upjohn Co.,*21 Cal.4th 383, 398 n.3, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453, 981 P.2d 79 (1999) (knowledge of the harm is not required for the claim to accrue).

We do not consider issues which are not supported by argument. *See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle,*7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993).

Lynch’s request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 17) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Filed April 6, 1891

#### Lida C. Schtwarz *v.*The Family Fund Society.

Freedman, J.

The cases alleged to have been overlooked are all cases in which the general term acquired full jurisdiction over the whole case by the notice of appeal. They do not apply to the case at bar.

Motion denied.
#### BOWMAN *v.*GIVENS.

No. 13373.

June 14, 1940.

*523
      *Tom P. Edwards,*for plaintiff in error. *Olin Hammock,*contra.

Grice, Justice.

Error is assigned on the refusal to grant a new trial. Grounds 1 and *%*of the amendment to the motion attack portions of the charge, not because the instructions stated incor*524reet principles of law, but it is contended that there was no evidence to warrant the instructions. In each instance the charge contained a statement as to the law applicable to the case as made by petitioner in her suit, and the criticism is but another way of presenting the contention that she offered no sufficient evidence to justify the submission of her case to the jury. Grounds 5 and 6 are but reiterations of the grounds asserting that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. Whether or not these four grounds are meritorious is a question to be determined upon a consideration of the general grounds.

Ground 4 complains that the judge admitted, over objection of the movant that it was not properly executed and sworn to, a copy of a taxpayer’s return of property for taxation. It was a copy of Pet Givens’ tax return, duly certified by the tax-collector, as the same appeared of record in his office. This ground is without merit. *Jett*v. *Hart,*152 *Ga.*266 (109 S. E. 654).

Ground 3 was as follows: “Because upon the trial of said case the court erred in the following point and particular: On page three, line three, of the brief of the evidence, C. EL Peddy, sworn in behalf of the plaintiff, testified as follows, on cross-examination by movant’s attorney: ‘She said that she got him to pay the money.’ Said testimony was admitted in evidence over objection timely made by counsel for defendant. The court erred in admitting said testimony in evidence over timely and proper objection by counsel for defendant, for the reason that said evidence was hearsay, illegal, and was prejudicial to the defendant’s rights, and assigns same as error.” Without an examination of the brief of evidence, we can not know whether the answer was in direct response to a question of movant’s counsel or not; nor whom “she” or “him” refers to; nor whether the one meant defendant in error, and the other plaintiff in error. It is not shown that at the time the objection was made movant stated to the court what the' objection was. *Henslee*v. *Harper,*148 *Ga.*621 (97 S. E. 667). This ground presents no sufficient reason for reversal. Upon a consideration of the general grounds of the motion and upon an examination of the evidence, we have reached the conclusion that the verdict was^supported; and it having received the approval of the trial judge, his discretion in refusing a new trial will not be disturbed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### Louis A. GAETA, Claimant-Appellant v. David J. SHULKIN, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee

2016-1812

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Decided: April 10, 2017

Sandra E. Booth, Columbus, OH, argued for claimant-appellant.

Alexander Orlando Cañizares, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued’for respondent-appellee. Also represented by Benjamin C. Mizer, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Martin F. Hockey, Jr.; Brian D. Griffin, Brandon A. Jonas, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

Before Wallach, Taranto, and Stoll, Circuit Judges.

Stoll, Circuit Judge.

Louis A. Gaeta appeals from the final decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirming the decision of the Board of Veterans Appeals that there was no clear and unmistakable error in a 1994 rating decision denying Mr. Gaeta’s entitlement to service connection for a nervous condition. *Gaeta v. McDonald,*No. 14-3628, 2016 WL 7077240 (Vet. App. Nov. 13, 2016). Because Mr. Gaeta fails to present a question within our jurisdiction, we dismiss.

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited by statute. We may review a Veterans Court decision with respect to the validity of a decision on a rule of law or the validity or interpretation of any statute or regulation relied on by the Veterans Court in making the decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). Unless a constitutional issue is presented, we have no jurisdiction to review questions of fact or the application of a law or regulation to a particular set of facts. *Id.*§ 7292(d)(2).

On appeal, Mr. Gaeta argues that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. § 1111 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b), which establish a presumption that a veteran was in sound condition when he entered service. Specifically, Mr. Gaeta contends that the evidence relied on by the Veterans Court is insufficient to constitute a “noting” of a defect, infirmity, or disorder under the statute or regulation. While he couches his argument as a challenge to the Veterans Court’s interpretation of a statute and regulation, Mr. Gaeta is actually challenging the Veterans Court’s factual finding that the evidence of record was adequate to rebut the presumption of soundness. Because we may not review a challenge to a factual determination or a challenge to the application of law to facts, *see*38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2), we dismiss Mr. Gaeta’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

We have considered Mr. Gaeta’s other arguments and find them equally ineffective in invoking the jurisdiction of this court. Accordingly, we dismiss Mr. Gaeta’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED

Costs

No costs.
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Derek KOK, formerly known as Xuong Manh Quach Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-1836

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 18, 2017

Filed: October 27, 2017

John E. Beamer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Derek Kok, Pro Se

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Derek Kok appeals after the district court1 revoked his supervised release and imposed a revocation sentence of 11 months in prison, and 60 months of supervised release. Kok’s counsel has filed a brief arguing that the district court erroneously viewed revocation as mandatory, and imposed a substantively unreasonable revocation sentence. Counsel also moves for leave to withdraw.

As to the first argument, which was not raised before the district court, we conclude that review is for plain error, and that plain error did not occur, particularly in light of the court’s thorough explanation of its revocation decision. See United States v. Callaway, 762 F.3d 764, 759 (8th Cir. 2014) (procedural errors not objected to at sentencing are reviewed for plain error); see also United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 2017) (plain-error standard). We also conclude that the revocation sentence is not substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Merrival, 521 F.3d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 2008) (abuse-of-discretion standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable Rebecca Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           9,241
<SECURITIES>                                    10,726
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,481
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                21,689
<PP&E>                                           3,127
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,364
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  41,190
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           14,911
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            1,750
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            11
<OTHER-SE>                                      71,045
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    41,190
<SALES>                                          1,594
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,594
<CGS>                                              257
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      257
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 9,932
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 443
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (8,804)
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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*John Regan, Appellant.

Submitted October 4, 1943;

decided November 18, 1943.

Motion for reargument granted. (See 291 N. Y. 508.)

Motion for an order waiving the printing of the transcript of testimony taken on the hearing ordered by Hon. John J. Fbeschi of the Court of General Sessions of the County of New York* and for a further order permitting the appellant to submit said stenographic typewritten copy of testimony as a part of this motion granted. Case set down for argument on December 6, 1943.

*

 On motion for a new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence.
Exhibit
32.1


CERTIFICATE
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of North Central Bancshares, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, David
M. Bradley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:




1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or
      78o(d)) and




2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
      as of the dates and for the periods covered by the
  Report.




August 12, 2009
                /s/ David M. BradleyDated
                David
      M. BradleyChairman,
      President & CEO
#### City of New Rochelle, Respondent, *v.*Morgan H. Seacord, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Argued June 10, 1943;

decided July 20, 1943.

*625
      *Lyle Evans Mahan*for appellant.

*Aaron Simmons, Corporation Counsel,*for respondent.

Judgment modified to the extent that the description under which the property is to be sold is stricken out, and the cause remanded to the Special Term to decide the correct description under which the property is to be sold, and as so modified" affirmed, without costs. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Lotjghran, Rippey, Conway, Desmond and Thacheb, JJ. Taking no part: Lewis, J.