alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Craig MOSBY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D16-2183

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 30, 2018

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender and Jonathan Greenberg, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Nikole Hiciano, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Michelle Jean BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Daniel SCHMEDHORST, C/O Warden Vikki Wright; Sergeant Alphonso Stevens; Lieutenant Darrell Mandigo, C/O Warden Vikki Wright; Lieutenant Gilbert Martinez, C/O Warden Vikki Wright; Unknown Female Correctional Officer, C/O Warden Vikki Wright; Office of the Attorney General, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-51150

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 7, 2017

Michelle Jean Brown, Pro Se

Ariel Nicole Wiley, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Law Enforcement Defense Division, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellee

Before DENNIS, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Michelle Jean Brown, Texas prisoner # 01066458, has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. The district court denied Brown’s motion to proceed IFP, certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith. By moving in this court for leave to proceed IFP on appeal, Brown is challenging this certification. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

In her brief, Brown does not address the dismissal of defendants Daniel Schme-dhorst and unidentified female corrections officer; the dismissal of the official capacity monetary claims against defendants Alphonso Stevens, Gilbert Martinez, and Darrell Mandigo; or the district court’s grounds for denying her motion to amend the complaint. Brown has therefore abandoned any challenge to the district court’s certification decision on these grounds. *See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

Brown’s individual capacity claims against Stevens, Martinez, and Mandigo, accepted as true, show only that she experienced a delay in receiving treatment, not a denial of treatment, and that her condition was fully treated. A delay in medical treatment is not actionable unless the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need and their indifference resulted in substantial harm. *Mendoza v. Lynaugh,*989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). Brown’s complaint does not cite facts which meet these requirements. *See id.*Her appeal lacks arguable merit and is therefore frivolous. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983).

Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2. Brown’s motion for permission to proceed IFP is DENIED. The dismissal of Brown’s complaint and the dismissal of her appeal both count as strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See Brown v. Megg,*857 F.3d 287, 290-92 (5th Cir. 2017); *Adepegba v. Hammons,*103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996). Brown is WARNED that if she *345accumulates a third strike, she will not be allowed to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal while incarcerated or detained in any facility unless she is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. *See*§ 1915(g).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
05/05/2010 16:14 FAX 2024935142 FAA * DMS iaOOI/003 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 1 RANSPORTATIO N 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

FEDKRAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

Complainant, 

vs. 

AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC. 

Respondent. 

FAA Docket No. CP10SO0002 

Judge BenMn 

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF 

MOTION FOR DECISION ON THE PLEADINGS 

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE. 

MOTION FOR HEARING ON SANCTION ONLY 

c^ 

Complainant, by and through the undersigned counsel, pursuant to §13.218(0(5) 

of the Rules of Practice (14 C.F.R. 13.218(f)(5)), hereby files Supplemental 

infomxation iii support of its Motion for Decision on the Pleadings or in the alternative, 

Motion for Hearing on Sanction Only served this date. In further support of the 

motion, Complainant states the following: 

On page 4 of the Complainant's Motion, Complainant states thai the Table of 

Penalties establishes for flight and duty time violations the appropriate sanction is a 

Moderate Civil Penalty. The citation for this assertion can be found in Exhibit 2 attached 

to the Motion at p. B-15, Fig. B-l-n (4). 
05/05/2010 16:14 FAX 2024935142 FAA * DMS 12002/003 

Submitted this 30"* day of April 2010. 

Respectfully submitted. 

RAS^AWN RICH GKORGE 

Attorney 

Office of the Regional Counsel 
05/05/2010 16:14 FAX 2024935142 FAA •V DMS @l003/003 

CERTinCATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Supplemental Information in Support of 

Motion for Decision on the Pleadings, or in the Alternative Motion for Hearing on 

Sanction Only was mailed by facsimile to: 

The Honorable Isaac D. Bcnkin 

DOT, Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M'20 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

East Building Ground Floor 

Room El 2-320 

Washington, DC 20590 

(FAX) (202) 366-7536 

and 

Stephen J. Kolski, Esq. 

Executive Vice President Corporate Affairs 

AirTran Airways, Inc. 

9955 AirTran Blvd. 

Orhindo, FL 32827 

(FAX) (407) 318-5901 

and the original and one copy via Federal Express to 

Hearing Docket Clerk 

FAA, AGC-430, Suite 2W1000 

Wilbur Wright Building 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

APfi 3 0 2010 

Dated
#### Ophelia J. Cuthbert v. Margaret S. Ives, Impl’d, etc.

Order affirmed, with costs and disbursements.
#### Juan Carlos VAZQUEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Warden Leroy CARTLEDGE, Respondent-Appellee, and Attorney Gen Alan Wilson, Respondent.

No. 17-6429

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 25, 2017

Juan Carlos Vazquez, Appellant Pro Se. Susannah Rawl Cole, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Juan Carlos Vazquez seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition, and its order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration. The orders are not appealable un*257less a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certifícate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Vazquez has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
ICRAS 1403 1845-0022 v10 – Affected Public – For-Profit Institutions 4/29/2014

The Department of Education (the Department) proposes to amend the Student 

Assistance General Provisions regulations issued under the Higher Education Act of 1965, as 

amended (HEA), to implement the changes made by the Violence Against Women 

Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA) (Pub. L. 113-4), which, among other provisions, amended 

section 485(f) of the HEA, otherwise known as the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security 

Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act). These proposed regulations are a result of 

negotiated rulemaking and would update and clarify the current regulations. 

This is a revision to the current collection due to changed regulatory action that requires 

additional collection and reporting by the institutions. Burden that is impacted is in proposed 

§668.46 (b), §668.46(c) §668.46(j), and §668.46(k). The Department is requesting continued 

approval of the current collection along with consideration of the following revisions.

34 CFR §668.46 Institutional security policies and crimes statistics. 

Under proposed §668.46(b) Annual security report, we have revised and expanded 

existing language and added new requirements for items to be reported annually. 

Under proposed §668.46(c), Crime statistics, we have revised and expanded existing 

language and added new reporting requirements for items to be reported in the annual survey.

Under proposed §668.46(j), Programs to prevent dating violence, domestic violence, 

sexual assault, and stalking, we are proposing particular elements of the required description of 

the institution’s programs and ongoing campaigns about prevention and awareness that must be 

included in the institution’s annual security report. 

Under proposed §668.46(k), Procedures for institutional disciplinary action in cases of 

alleged dating violence, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, we would implement the 

statutory changes requiring an institution that participates in any title IV, HEA program, other 

than a foreign institution, to include a statement of policy in its annual security report addressing 

the procedures for institutional disciplinary action in cases of alleged dating violence, domestic 

violence, sexual assault, or stalking. 

§668.46 New Burden:

Respondents Responses Hours/Response Hours of Burden

For-Profit Institutions 3,365

§668.46 (b) Annual Security

Report

x 2.5 = 8,413

§668.46 (c) Crime Statistics x 1.5 = 5,048

§668.46 (j) Programs/Training x 4 = 13,460

§668.46 (k) 

Procedures/Discipline

x 2.75 = 9,254

Total 36,175
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 7660

CHARLES EUGENE DUCKETT, JR. , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. WARDEN FRANK BISHOP; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND , Respondents

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt

. George Jarrod Hazel , District Judge. ( 8:17

- cv
- 02577

- GJH )

Submitted : March 12, 2020 Decided: March 17, 2020

Before KING, KEENAN, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Charles Eugene Duckett, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Charles Eugene Duckett, Jr. , seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissin g as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (201 8 ) petition. See Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 148 & n.9 (2012) (explaining that § 2254 petition s are subject to one

- year statute of limitations, running from latest of four commencement dates enumerated in 28 U. S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2018)). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (201 8 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial o f a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (201 8 ). When , as here, the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatab le claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez , 565 U.S. at 140

- 41 (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000))

. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Duckett has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argume nt would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### November 29, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 134377 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 134377 COA: 266277 Wayne CC: 03-012024-01 TYRONE ANTHONY BELL, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the May 15, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

t1119 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 29, 2007

Clerk
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-14-00038-CR

Allan Latoi Story

v.

The State of Texas

On appeal from the

19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 2011-2499-C1

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

November 19, 2015.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6574 

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to clarify the contempt 

authority of immigration judges, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 4, 2023 

Mr. GALLAGHER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to clarify 

the contempt authority of immigration judges, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Empowering Immigra5 tion Courts Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CONTEMPT AUTHORITY OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES. 

7 Section 240(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality 

8 Act (8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(1)) is amended by striking 

9 ‘‘(under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General) 

10 to sanction by civil money penalty any action (or inaction) 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6574 IH

1 in contempt of the judge’s proper exercise of authority 

2 under this Act’’ and inserting ‘‘to sanction by fine con3 tempt of its authority in accordance with section 401 of 

4 title 18, United States Code’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Marvin Kenneth MORALES, also known as Miguel Higareda, also known as Jose Ayala, also known as Victor Morales, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51225 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 8, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Laura G. Greenberg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Maureen Scott Franco, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Marvin Kenneth Morales appeals the above-guidelines sentence imposed following his guilty plea for illegal reentry into the United States. He challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. “A non-Guidelines sentence unreasonably fails to reflect the statutory sentencing factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) where it- (1) does not account for a factor that should, have received significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.” *United States v. Diehl,*775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 2015). “[R]eview for substantive reasonableness is highly deferential.” *Id.*(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

We review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The district court based its above-guidelines sentence on permissible statutory sentencing factors. *See*§ 3553(a). Morales asks, explicitly in part, that we reweigh the §. 3553(a) factors, which is not within the scope of our review. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. There is no indication that the district court gave improper weight to his history of past offenses or any mitigating factors. *See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez,*526 F.3d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 2008). Likewise, the degree of the upward variance here does not render the sentence substantively unreasonable. *See United States v. Key,*599 F.3d 469, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2010); *United States v. Brantley,*537 F.3d 347, 348-50 (5th Cir. 2008).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED; '

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**EXHIBIT 32.01**

** **

**SECTION 1350CERTIFICATION**

** **

**In connection with this quarterlyreport of ML Trend-Following Futures Fund L.P. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and  Exchange Commission on the date hereof (this “Report”),I, Justin C. Ferri, Chief Executive Officer, President and Manager of MerrillLynch Alternative Investments LLC, the general partner of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:**

** **

1. This Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2. The informationcontained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date: August 14,  2009                     |                |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
|                                            |
|                                            |
| By                                              | /s/ JUSTIN C. FERRI |   |
| Justin  C. Ferri                                |
| Chief Executive Officer  ,President and Manager |
| (Principal  Executive Officer)                  |
|                                                 |                     |  |

 

1

----
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In re: Carolyn Barnes

No. 06-17-00019-CV

Original Mandamus Proceeding

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the petition for writ of mandamus 

should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss the petition.

RENDERED JANUARY 24, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### Sigmund Oppenheimer, Resp’t, *v.*The Manhattan Railway Co. *et al.,*App’lts.

Appeal from a judgment entered on the decision of the court after a trial at an equity term.

*Davies*& *Rapallo,*for app’lts; *Leo C. Dessar,*for resp’t.

Per Curiam.—Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEMPERVIRENS MENTAL HEALTH FACILITY, an agency of the County of Humboldt; Asha George, Dr. and Director; Chris Starets-Foote, Dr. and Deputy Director, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16612

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 18, 2017 San Francisco, California

Filed September 08, 2017

Michael J. Tonsing, Sr., Esquire, Tons-ing Lawfirm, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

. Nancy K. Delaney, Mitchell, Brisso, Delaney & Vrieze, Eureka, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: SCHROEDER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and DRAIN,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Gershwin A. Drain,-United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Appellant John Doe (Doe) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judg*516ment in favor of Sempervirens Mental Health Facility (Sempervirens), Dr. Asha George, and Dr. Chris Starets-Foote (Ap-pellees) in Doe’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his Second Amendment rights.1 We review *de novo. See United States Small Bus. Admin. v. Bensal,*853 F.3d 992, 996 (9th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment in Appellees’ favor because Doe failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Appellees were deliberately indifferent in correcting the reporting error that prevented issuance of a gun permit. *See Kirkpatrick v. Cty. of Washoe,*843 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (observing that deliberate indifference occurs if a constitutional violation is “patently obvious” and a “highly predictable consequence” of the municipal actor’s conduct) (quoting *Connick v. Thompson,*563 U.S. 51, 63, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011)). At bottom, the action complained of was the result of failure to completely adhere to a very technical administrative process complicated by an intervening change in the governing law. This situation does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. *See id.*

As Doe conceded, Appellees ultimately rectified the reporting error, alleviating any constitutional injury. *See Bauer v. Becerra,*858 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 2017) (examining burden on Second Amendment right to determine whether the plaintiff suffered a constitutional injury). Absent a constitutional injury, no liability ensues under § 1983. *See Yousefian v. Cty. of Glendale,*779 F.3d 1010, 1014-16 (9th Cir. 2015).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DUANE E. FULGER

PETITION OF: WILLIAM E. MOORE,
ESQUIRE :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 89 MM 2022

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 22 nd day of December , 2022, in consideration of the Application

to Withdraw as Counsel , this matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of

Montgomery County for that court to determine whether Attorney William E. Moore should

be permitted to withdraw.

If Attorney Moore is permitted to withdraw, the court is DIRECTED to resolve any

issues relative to Duane E. Fulger being appointed counsel or granted leave to proceed

pro se

.

The Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County is DIRECTED to enter its

order regarding this rem and within 9 0 days and to notify this Court promptly of its

determination.