[Cite as State v. C.L., 2021-Ohio-3396.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

C.L. 

 Defendant 

 and 

T-BONDS 

 Appellant

C.A. No. 20CA011699 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 14CR090081 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: September 27, 2021 

 

CALLAHAN, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, T-Bonds, appeals an order of the Lorain County Court of Common 

Pleas that forfeited bond. This Court reverses. 

I. 

{¶2} On August 11, 2014, C.L. was charged with one count of gross sexual imposition. 

He pleaded not guilty, and T-Bonds posted a $5,000 bond as surety to secure his appearance. In 

October 2014, an indictment issued that charged C.L. with gross sexual imposition and assault. 

C.L. failed to appear for arraignment, and the trial court revoked his bond on December 2, 2014. 

The docket does not bear any indication that the clerk served notice of the forfeiture upon TBonds. 
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{¶3} Nothing further occurred in the case until March 29, 2019, when the State of Ohio 

moved to set a hearing on the forfeiture of C.L.’s bond, noting that C.L. remained at large. The 

certificate of service indicates that the motion was sent to counsel for T-Bonds. Five days later, 

the trial court journalized an order that scheduled a show cause hearing on April 15, 2019. The 

bottom of the order indicates that counsel for C.L. and the State were provided with a copy, but 

not counsel for T-Bonds. The docket does not bear indication that the clerk served notice of the 

forfeiture on T-Bonds at any point. Nonetheless, counsel for T-Bonds appeared on April 15, 

2019, and requested a continuance, which the trial court granted. A second continuance was 

granted in August 2019 and, shortly thereafter, T-Bonds filed a brief addressing whether there 

was good cause for the bail not to be forfeited. In that brief, T-Bonds argued that the notice 

required by law had not been given, resulting in inability to locate C.L. Seven further 

continuances were granted so that T-Bonds could make further attempts to locate him. On 

November 2, 2020, with C.L. still at large, the trial court denied T-Bonds’ final request for a 

continuance and heard arguments regarding forfeiture. On November 4, 2020, the trial court 

ordered the bond forfeited. T-Bonds filed this appeal. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 

SURETY IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2937.36 AS NOTICE WAS NEVER GIVEN 

TO THE SURETY OF FORFEITURE. 

{¶4} T-Bonds’ first assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by forfeiting 

bond when notice of the forfeiture was never served in compliance with R.C. 2937.36(C). This 

Court agrees. 
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{¶5} Crim.R. 46 permits pretrial release subject to financial conditions in the form of 

unsecured bail bond, bail bond secured by a deposit, or a surety bond. Crim.R. 46(B)(1). “A 

surety bond is a contract in which the surety promises the court that it will pay a monetary 

penalty if the accused who is released on the bond posted by the surety fails to appear in court 

when ordered.” State v. Scherer, 108 Ohio App.3d 586, 590 (2d Dist.1995). A surety does not 

have a duty to perform unless the accused fails to appear. Id. In the event of nonappearance, the 

surety can still be excused from payment if it demonstrates “good cause by production of the 

body of the accused or otherwise[.]” R.C. 2937.36(C). See also Scherer at 590-591. This Court 

generally reviews a trial court’s determination that bond should be forfeited for an abuse of 

discretion, but we review the interpretation and application of R.C. 2937.36 de novo. State v. 

T.G-B., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 19CA011556, 2020-Ohio-4343, ¶ 7. But see State v. Dye, 5th Dist. 

Fairfield No. 17 CA 00045, 2018-Ohio-4551, ¶ 34 (concluding that a trial court abused its 

discretion by entering judgment against a surety on a bond without meeting the relevant notice 

requirements). 

{¶6} R.C. 2937.36(C)1

 governs the forfeiture of recognizance bonds, providing that 

[u]pon declaration of forfeiture, the magistrate or clerk of the court adjudging 

forfeiture shall * * * notify the accused and each surety within fifteen days after 

the declaration of forfeiture by ordinary mail * * * of the default of the accused 

and the adjudication of forfeiture and require each of them to show cause on or 

before a date certain to be stated in the notice, and which shall not be less than 

forty-five nor more than sixty days from the date of mailing notice, why judgment 

should not be entered against each of them for the penalty stated in the 

recognizance. 

(Emphasis added.) The notice requirement in R.C. 2937.36(C) serves to provide the surety with 

time to locate the defendant before the show cause hearing and avoid a judgment. Univ. Hts. v. 

1

 R.C. 2935.36 was amended in 2011. The time requirements now present in the statute 

were not contained in the previous version. 
4 

 

Allen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107211, 2019-Ohio-2908, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Lott, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-130543, 2014-Ohio-3404, ¶ 15. “‘The sweep of R.C. 2937.36(C) is broad 

enough to cover those situations where the surety is unaware of the non-appearance of the 

defendant-principal until the bond is forfeited. In those situations, the surety has a due process 

expectation of the notice and opportunity to show good cause provided for in R.C. 2937.36(C).’” 

Allen at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Martin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21716, 2007-Ohio-3813, ¶ 22. 

{¶7} In this case, the trial court journalized an order on December 2, 2014, that 

revoked C.L.’s bond upon his failure to appear. Under R.C. 2937.36(C), “the magistrate or 

clerk” was obligated to notify the surety of the forfeiture by ordinary mail within fifteen days, 

but it is undisputed that notice was not provided.2 The use of the word “shall” indicates that this 

obligation was mandatory, not permissive. See Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio 

St.2d 102 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus. As the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained, 

“‘“Shall” means must.’ * * * And ‘[t]he word “must” is mandatory. It creates an obligation.’” 

Wilson v. Lawrence, 150 Ohio St.3d 368, 2017-Ohio-1410, ¶ 13, quoting Application of Braden, 

105 Ohio App. 285, 286 (1st Dist.1957) and Willis v. Seeley, 68 N.E.2d 484, 485 (C.P.1946). 

Absent an expression of legislative intent that is clear and unequivocal from the language of the 

statute itself, this Court cannot construe R.C. 2937.36(C) as anything but mandatory. See 

Dorrian at 108 and paragraph one of the syllabus. See also State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 

196, 2017-Ohio-7565, ¶ 21-23. 

2

 In addition, T-Bonds raised compliance with R.C. 2937.36(C) in writing shortly after 

the trial court ultimately scheduled a show cause hearing. T-Bonds’ argument was timely 

asserted and has not been forfeited on appeal. See generally State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 

279, 2019-Ohio-4761, ¶ 10. 
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{¶8} Although it is apparent from the record that notice was not provided to T-Bonds 

in compliance with R.C. 2937.36(C), courts do not generally find error in connection with the 

forfeiture of bond without a showing of prejudice. In a case in which statutory notice of the 

forfeiture was not at issue, the Supreme Court of Ohio has concluded that “‘[t]he good cause 

contemplated’” by a former version of R.C. 2937.36(C) “‘goes to the presentation of good and 

sufficient reasons for the nonappearance, not to good and sufficient reasons why the surety could 

not locate the defendant.’” State v. Ward, 53 Ohio St.2d 40, 42 (1978), quoting State v. Ward, 3d 

Dist. Putnam No. 1-76-59, 1976 WL 189013, *3 (Dec. 22, 1976). When compliance with the 

statutory notice provisions is at issue, however, courts have also accounted for the surety’s due 

process interest in receiving notice. Thus, in those circumstances, courts consider whether the 

surety “could have demonstrated good cause * * * had [it] received the statutory notice[.]” See 

Dept. of Liquor Control v. Calvert, 195 Ohio App.3d 627, 2011-Ohio-4735, ¶ 27 (6th Dist.). See 

also State v. Jackson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200153, 2021-Ohio-1646, ¶ 22; State v. Wane, 

12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2020-01-010, CA2020-01-011, CA2020-01-014, CA2020-01-015, 

2020-Ohio-4874, ¶ 22. Although this Court would not suggest that the passage of time 

necessarily contributes to a demonstration of prejudice in every case, in this case—as T-Bonds 

noted in its argument before the trial court—the five-year delay hampered its ability to locate 

C.L. despite its efforts to find him in both Florida and Puerto Rico. 

{¶9} In reaching this conclusion, this Court also emphasizes that it is incumbent upon 

sureties to remain abreast of court proceedings in cases in which they undertake to secure the 

appearance of the accused. Nonetheless, given the mandatory nature of R.C. 2937.36(C), the 

failure of notice over a period of five years, and the prejudice that T-Bonds suffered in this case, 
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this Court concludes that the trial court erred by ordering the bond forfeited absent compliance 

with the notification requirements of R.C. 2937.36(C). 

{¶10} T-Bond’s first assignment of error is sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 

SURETY IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2937.36 AS A SHOW CAUSE HEARING 

WAS NOT SET WITHIN FORTY-FIVE TO SIXTY DAYS OF NOTICE TO 

THE SURETY. 

{¶11} T-Bonds’ second assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by entering 

judgment forfeiting the bond after failing to conduct a show cause hearing within the timeframe 

provided by R.C. 2937.36(C). In light of this Court’s resolution of T-Bonds’ first assignment of 

error, the second assignment of error is moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

III. 

{¶12} T-Bonds’ first assignment of error is sustained. The second assignment of error is 

moot. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is 

remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 
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period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellee. 

 

 LYNNE S. CALLAHAN 

 FOR THE COURT 

SUTTON, J. 

CONCURS. 

CARR, P.J. 

DISSENTING. 

{¶13} I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the majority. On appeal, T-Bonds 

raises issues concerning whether the trial court complied with the timing requirements in R.C. 

2937.36. However, T-Bonds has failed to demonstrate that it was prejudiced by any errors made 

by the trial court. See State v. Patel, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24024, 2008-Ohio-4692, ¶ 55 (noting 

it is the duty of the appellant to demonstrate error on appeal); see also State v. Ward, 53 Ohio 

St.2d 40, 42 (1978). As to the first assignment of error, T-Bonds has made no argument or 

showing that it was prejudiced by any failure to follow the statutory requirements. With respect 

to the second assignment of error, T-Bonds fails to point to anything in the record demonstrating 

that it was actually prejudiced by the lack of compliance with the statutory requirements. 

Instead, it offers conclusory assertions and policy reasons for the timing requirements. 

Accordingly, I would conclude that T-Bonds failed to meet its burden on appeal to demonstrate 

prejudice, especially regarding the showing of good and sufficient reasons for C.L.’s 

nonappearance. 
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APPEARANCES: 

GIOVANNA V. BREMKE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

J.D. TOMLINSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and BRIAN P. MURPHY, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.