alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Daniel T. STRINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, (FOREST SERVICE), Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-35988

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 12, 2017 Portland, Oregon

Filed May 19, 2017

*382Robert Brendan Dummigan, Esquire, Attorney, James Randolph Pickett, Pickett Dummigan LLP, Portland, OR, Matthew D. Kaplan, Matthew D. Kaplan, LLC, Attorney at Law, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant

James Edward Cox, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kelly A. Zusman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USÁO, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: BYBEE and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and ZOUHARY,* District Judge.

*

The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Stringer brought this action under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) against the U.S. Forest Service after sustaining injures in a snowmobile accident ón the snowmobile trails of the Deschutes National Forest. The district court dismissed Stringer’s complaint under Oregon’s recreational immunity statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 105.682(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (waiving sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to torts caused by government employees as long as “the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred”). We review that dismissal de novo, *see Young v. United States,*769 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014), and now affirm.

Stringer argues that recreational immunity cannot shield the Forest Service from liability because Or. Rev. Stat. § 105.688(3) permits suits against landowners who “make[] any charge for , permission to use the land for recreational purposes.” Although Stringer acknowledges that the Forest Service does not charge and has never charged *any*individual — including him and those in his snowmobile party — for permission to use the snowmobile trails for recreational purposes, he claims that § 105.688(3) nonetheless applies because the Forest Service has charged *other*individuals for the use of *other*parts of the Deschutes. We disagree. We believe that the Oregon Supreme Court would find Section 105.688(3) applicable only if either the plaintiff or someone in the plaintiffs party was required to pay for access to the land. *Cf. Coleman v. Or. Parks & Rec. Dep’t,*347 Or. 94, 217 P.3d 651, 656 (2009) (holding that campers who paid to use campsite in state park were not barred from suing the state for injuries sustained while biking on a park trail). Because no one in Stringer’s party was required to pay, his claim fails. *See O’Neal v. United States,*814 F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (applying Oregon’s recreational immunity statute to bar FTCA claims involving injury on federal land where plaintiffs “paid no charge”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Alfred KING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; California Department of Corrections, Defendants, and C. Ferguson; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15209

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*468Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 20, 2017

Alfred King, Pro Se

Christopher Findley, AGCA — Office of the Attorney General (San Diego), San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Alfred King appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his health. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Williams v. Paramo,*775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because King failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. *See Ross v. Blake,*— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858-60, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (setting forth circumstances when administrative remedies are unavailable); *Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)).

We treat the judgment as a dismissal without prejudice. *See Lira v. Herrera,*427 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] district court must dismiss a case without prejudice when there is no *presuit*exhaustion .... ” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). -

King’s motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 21) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk December 26, 2012

s1217 

# Order

December 26, 2012

145908

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 145908

COA: 299518

Jackson CC: 09

- 006140

- FC

LONNIE RICHARD MANNING,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 31, 2012

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

C AVANAGH

, J., would grant leave to appeal.
#### Carl Struver, Appellant, *v.*Euphroisine Poirier et al., Respondents.

(Argued April 30, 1872;

decided May 3, 1872.)

*John E. Porter*for the appellant.

*J. S. Bosworth*for the respondents.

Agree to affirm. No opinion.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### Alvin E. WILLIAMS; Judith M. Brown-Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BENTLEY MOTORS, INC.; Rusnak Pasadena, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56317

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 6, 2017

Alvin E. Williams, Pro Se

Judith M. Brown-Williams, Pro Se

Sean P. Conboy, I, Esquire, Gonzalo C. Martinez, Attorney, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM *

Alvin E. Williams and Judith M. Brown-Williams appeal pro se from the district court’s order denying their post-judgment motion for reconsideration in their action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. *Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,*5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ fourth motion for reconsideration because appellants failed to establish any basis for such relief. *See id.*at 1262-63 (setting forth grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).

Appellants’ pending motions (Docket Entry Nos. 22, 23, and 24) are denied.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-28-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                          17,143
<SECURITIES>                                     7,972
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,229
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      1,276
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                23,113
<PP&E>                                           1,473
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  29,714
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,741
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             9
<OTHER-SE>                                      26,801
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    29,714
<SALES>                                          2,832
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 2,832
<CGS>                                            1,994
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,994
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,186
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 359
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,989)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,989)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,989)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  ($0.23)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  ($0.23)
        

</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Bert Kahn, Also Known as Bert Kalan, Appellant.

Submitted October 4, 1943;

decided October 14, 1943.

*664
      *Bert Kahn,*in person, for motion.

No one opposed.

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed. Such a motion cannot be considered by the Court of Appeals under section 520, subdivision 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It cannot be granted by a judge of the Court of Appeals because leave has already been denied by another judge, and because the present application is not made within the time limited by the statute.*

See Code Grim. Pro., § 521; *People*v. *Geffin,*245 N. Y. 75.— [Rep.
#### Kiias STOCKTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Warden FCI WILLIAMSBURG, Respondent-Appellee, and United States of America, FBOP, Respondent.

No. 17-6414

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 31, 2017

Decided: August 18, 2017

Kiias Stockton, Appellant Pro Se. Mar.shall Prince, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

*725Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Kiias Stockton, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Stockton v. Warden FCI Williamsburg,*No. 4:16-cv-01393-TLW, 2017 WL 784757 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Floyd Dean BEST, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30030

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 6, 2017

Matthew F. Duggan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USSP—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Spokane, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Bryan Paul Whitaker, Attorney, Bryan P. Whitaker, Attorney at Law, Spokane, WA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision-without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Floyd Dean Best, Jr., appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the ten-year term of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of a methamphetamine mixture or substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Best contends that the district court im-permissibly imposed the term of supervised release to punish him, We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that the district court did not plainly err. Contrary to Best’s contention, the record reflects that the district court properly based the term of supervised release on Best’s history and characteristics, as well as the need for deterrence, and did not rely on any improper factors. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(c).

Moreover, the ten-year term of supervised release is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the need to deter Best from future criminal conduct. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1


                         Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 Nos. 333-38926, 333-83321, 333-83325, 333-83327, 333-73664 and
333-100003) of Art Technology Group, Inc. of our report dated January 20, 2003
except for Note 14, as to which the date is March 24, 2003, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements of Art Technology Group, Inc. included in the
Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2002.

                                                           /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
March 24, 2003
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6558 

To prohibit the issuance of the rule entitled ‘‘Upholding Civil Service 

Protections and Merit System Principles’’ or any successor rule. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 1, 2023 

Mr. OGLES (for himself, Mr. JACKSON of Texas, Mr. CLOUD, Mr. BRECHEEN, 

Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. BURLISON, Mr. ALFORD, Mr. CLYDE, Mr. LAMALFA, 

Mr. GOOD of Virginia, Ms. BOEBERT, and Mr. PERRY) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To prohibit the issuance of the rule entitled ‘‘Upholding 

Civil Service Protections and Merit System Principles’’ 

or any successor rule. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Enabling Necessary 

5 Discipline with the Defense of Executives’ Endeavors to 

6 Properly Staff Their Agencies with Trustworthy Employ7 ees Act’’ or the ‘‘END the DEEP STATE Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6558 IH

1 SEC. 2. WITHDRAWAL OF PROPOSED RULE. 

2 The Director of the Office of Personnel Manage3 ment— 

4 (1) shall withdraw the proposed rule titled ‘‘Up5 holding Civil Service Protections and Merit System 

6 Principles’’ (88 Federal Register 63862 (September 

7 18, 2023)); and 

8 (2) may not take any action to finalize, imple9 ment, or enforce the proposed rule described in 

10 paragraph (1) or any substantially similar rule. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### Viktor Nikolayevich OSTAPENKO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-71883

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

Filed October 2, 2017

Viktor Nikolayevich Ostapenko, Pro Se

OIL, Joanna L. Watson, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S, Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

*490Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N. R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Viktor Nikolayevich Ostapenko, a native and citizen of Moldova, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his third motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen, *Toufighi v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2008), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ostapenko’s third motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Os-tapenko failed -to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief he sought, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); *Toufighi,*538 F.3d at 996 (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 10.1


 


Warrant
Amendment Agreement


 





May
10, 2012


 


 


 


ACCBT Corp., a British Virgin Islands company
(“ACCBT”), and Brainstorm Cell Therapeutics Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”),
hereby agree as follows with respect to any and all validly issued and outstanding warrants to purchase Company common stock held
by ACCBT as of the date hereof (the “Warrants”):


   


Upon the effectiveness of a six (6)
month lock-up agreement entered into by ACCBT in connection with proposed offering of common stock by the Company, the then
expiration date for each Warrant shall be automatically extended by an additional 18 months. This document shall serve as an
amendment to each Warrant affected hereby. In the event the proposed offering is not completed by October 31, 2012, then this
Warrant Amendment Agreement shall automatically be terminated and of no further force or effect.


  


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this agreement
as of the date first set forth above.


 


 


 


	 	ACCBT CORP.
	 	 
	 	By: 	/s/ Chaim Lebovits
	 	 	Name: Chaim Lebovits
 Title: Director


 





 


	 	BRAINSTORM CELL THERAPEUTICS INC.
	 	 
	 	By: 	/s/ Adrian Harel
	 	 	
        Name: Adrian Harel

        Title: CEO
#### IN RE: Peter F. BRONSON; Sherri L. Bronson, Debtors, Peter F. Bronson; Sherri L. Bronson, Appellants, v. Thomas M. Thompson, Appellee.

No. 16-60099

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 18, 2017

Peter F. Bronson, Pro Se

Sherri L. Bronson, Pro Se

Jimmie D. Smith, Attorney, Jimmie D. Smith, Yuma, AZ, for Appellee

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Peter F. Bronson and Sherri L. Bronson appeal pro se from a judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing their state law claims and closing an adversary proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions, and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. *Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian),*564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

*524The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the Bronsons’ state law claim and closing the adversary proceeding because the underlying bankruptcy proceeding is complete. *See Carraher v. Morgan Elecs., Inc. (In re Carraher),*971 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that whether to retain jurisdiction over state law claims is within the bankruptcy court’s discretion subject to considerations of judicial economy, fairness, convenience, and comity).

We do not consider the Bronsons’ contentions regarding the merits of the underlying adversary proceeding, which are not within the scope of this appeal.

The appellee’s request for sanctions and attorney’s fees, set forth in the answering brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 10.3


 


Foamix Pharmaceuticals Ltd.


 


Lease Agreement – Premises in Rehovot







On May 7, 2008 Foamix Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (the “Company”) executed a lease agreement with Gav Yam Real Estate Ltd. (the “Lessor” and the “Original Agreement”).


 


Leased property: 1,069 square meters (approximately 11,507 square feet) in A2 building, first floor, located in the Science Park in Rehovot.


 


Original Agreement Period: March 3, 2008 to February 28, 2010 with an option to extend the lease term for 24 months, from March 1, 2010 until February 28, 2012.


 


Rent: Monthly rental fees of NIS 59 per square meter (a total of NIS 63,071) plus VAT. The rental fees are linked to the Consumer Price Index according to the Original Agreement. In addition, management fees (NIS 9 per square meter, a total of NIS 9,621 per month) are paid monthly, linked to the Consumer Price Index according to the Original Agreement.


 


Under the terms of the Original Agreement, the Company submitted to the Lessor a bank guarantee in the amount of NIS 189,213.


 


On March 1, 2010, upon the exercise of the Company’s aforesaid option, the Company and the Lessor extended the Original Agreement, under the same terms, until February 28, 2012.


 


On March 1, 2012 the Company and the Lessor amended the Original Agreement and extended the lease period for an additional 30-month period, with regard to a smaller space (991 square meters – approximately 10,667 square feet), under the same terms, until August 31, 2014.


 


On August 5, 2014, the Company and the Lessor amended the Original Agreement and extended the lease period for an additional 36-month period, from September 1, 2014 until August 31, 2017, with regard to a smaller space (i.e. – the lease with regard to the office space sub-leased by the Company was not extended, so that the extended lease shall apply to 678 square meters – approximately 7,298 square feet), under the same terms.


 


The Company was also granted the right to terminate the extended lease period, by submitting a 180-day prior notice, during an 18-month period, commencing as of September 1, 2014.


 


On April 18, 2016, the Company and the Lessor amended the Original Agreement and extended the lease period until December 31, 2020. The amendment included the current space (678 square meters – approximately 7,298 square feet) and an additional space (“New Space”) (1,521 square meters – approximately 16,371 feet). The lease period for the New Space will commence September 1, 2016, once the old tenants evacuate the premises, however if the old tenant do not evacuate the property by December 1, 2016 the Company shall have the right to cancel the agreement relating to the “New Space” with no penalty.


 


Rent:  The monthly rent fee is NIS 64.4 per square meter (a total of NIS 141,616) until June 30, 2016, and NIS 65.4 per square meter (a total of NIS 143,815) until December 31, 2020. All payments are linked to the Israeli Consumer Price Index. In addition, the Company shall pay a monthly management fee in the amount of up to $3 per square meter.