alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Commerce

###### National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

          - [RTID 0648-XB852]

# AGENCY:

National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

# ACTION:

Notice; public meeting.

# SUMMARY:

                        The Mid-Atlantic and New England Fishery Management Councils (Councils) will hold a public meeting of their joint Northeast Trawl Advisory Panel (NTAP). See                         **SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION**                         for agenda details.                    

# DATES:

The meeting will be held on Thursday, March 17, 2022, from 9 a.m. until 12:30 p.m.

# ADDRESSES:

                        The meeting will be held via webinar. Connection information will be posted to the calendar prior to the meeting at                         *www.mafmc.org.*

*Council address:*                         Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, 800 N State Street, Suite 201, Dover, DE 19901; telephone: (302) 674-2331;                         *www.mafmc.org.*

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Christopher M. Moore, Ph.D., Executive Director, Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, telephone: (302) 526-5255.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Councils' Northeast Trawl Advisory Panel (NTAP) will review recent developments related to relevant fishery surveys and develop future priorities.

## Special Accommodations

The meeting is physically accessible to people with disabilities. Requests for sign language interpretation or other auxiliary aid should be directed to Shelley Spedden, (302) 526-5251, at least 5 days prior to the meeting date.

                        (Authority: 16 U.S.C. 1801*et seq.*)                    

      ( print page 11419)    
Dated: February 24, 2022.

Tracey L. Thompson,

Acting Deputy Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service.

[FR Doc. 2022-04280 Filed 2-28-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-22-P
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald Mitchell JOHNSON, AKA Ski Johnson, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30356

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted February 7, 2017 Seattle, Washington

Filed April 21, 2017

Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, Chad Spraker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USHE — Office of the US Attorney, Helena, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Michael Donahoe, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDMT-Federal Defenders of Montana (Helena), Helena, MT, for DefendantrAppellant

Before: PAEZ and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and ENGLAND,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

In 2015, Donald Johnson was found guilty of wire fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Johnson falsely represented himself as a Grammy-nominated musician while defrauding a charitable organization of thousands of dollars. Johnson moved for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 at the close of the Government’s case, at the close of all evidence, and post-trial. On appeal, Johnson argues that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

1. We review sufficiency of the evidence de novo. *United States v. Sullivan,*522 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2008). “There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, *any*rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” *Id.*(quoting *Jackson*v. *Virginia,*443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original).

2. The government’s indictment alleged that fraud occurred “in Montana and elsewhere.” At trial, the court limited evidence to fraud within Montana. Johnson argues that the government failed to prove the acts it alleged in the indictment because it did not prove fraud “elsewhere,” and thus his conviction should be overturned. This argument is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. *See United States v. Miller,*471 U.S. 130, 136, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (“[T]he right to a grand jury is not normally violated by the fact that the indictment alleges more crimes or other means of committing the same crime”).

3. Finally, Johnson argues that the government’s evidence of Montana-related fraud was insufficient to support his conviction. However, the government presented ample evidence that Johnson (1) falsely claimed to a charity that he was a Grammy-nominated musician; (2) falsely claimed *306that his foundation was a children’s charity; and (3) never donated Grammy tickets to the charity as promised. Thus, a rational jury could have concluded that Johnson was guilty of wire fraud, *See*18 U.S.C. § 1343.

4. Johnson’s conviction is AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kelvin PACE, Defendant-Appellee. Kelvin Pace, Petitioner-Appellee, v. United States of America, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 16-16427, No. 16-16429 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(September 29, 2017)

Jane Mackenzie Duane, Wifredo A.-Ferrer, Nicole D. Mariani, Emily M. Sma-chetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, Charles E. Duross, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Brenda Greenberg Bryn, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Government appeals the district court’s grant of Kelvin Pace’s motion to vacate sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Pace had been sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The Government asserts the district court erred by concluding Pace lacked a sufficient number of predicate “violent felonies” in light of *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). After review,1 we reverse and remand to the district court.

Pace contends the cases cited by the Government are unpersuasive. We do not agree. Following close review, we conclude our binding precedent counsels in favor of reversal and remand because, in light of his convictions for Florida robbery pursuant to Florida Statute § 812.13, Pace has a sufficient number of predicate “violent felonies” to support an armed career criminal designation under the ACCA. *See United States v. Fritts,*841 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2016); *United States v. Lockley,*632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011); *United States v. Dowd,*451 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2006). The district court’s amended judgment is VACATED. The district court’s order granting Pace’s motion to vacate sentence is REVERSED. We REMAND to the district court for reinstatement of its original judgment and further action consistent with this opinion.

1

. In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding we review a district court's findings of fact for clear error, and its legal conclusions *de novo. Garcia v. United States,*278 F.3d 1210, 1212 (11th Cir. 2002).
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Adrian COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-12970 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(March 10, 2017)

Wifredo A. Ferrer, Adam C. McMichael, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Adrian Coleman, FCI Coleman Medium—Inmate Trust Fund, Coleman, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Randee J. Golder, appointed counsel for Adrian Coleman in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Coleman’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
#### The Board of Health of the Village of New Rochelle, Resp’t, v. Eugenia Valentine, App’lt.

Appeal from judgment for plaintiff, granted at circuit, in an action to recover $100 penalty for a violation of plaintiff’s health regulations.

*Chas. H. Young,*for resp’t; *Chas. H. Noxon,*for app’lt.

Pratt, J.

None of the exceptions have any merit. The charge of the judge was not excepted to.

The questions are all settled by the previous decision reported, 11 N. Y. Supp., 112; 32 N. Y. State Rep., 919.

The case of *Sturgis*v. *Spofford,*45 N. Y., 446, has no application, for the reason that the statute there construed gave a single penalty of $100, and it was pointed out by the court that it was not given for each offence.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Barnard, P. J., and Dykman, J., concur.
#### Roena L. COLE, Trustee for the A.B. & Roena Cole Joint Trust, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASSOCIATED ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-17233

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 3, 2017

*426Roena L. Cole, Trustee for the A.B. & Roena Cole Joint Trust, Princeville, HI, pro se.

Augustus H. Shaw, IV, Esquire, Managing Senior Counsel, Shaw *&*Lines LLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided ' by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

MEMORANDUM **

Roena L. Cole appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims challenging various homeowner’s association fees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Cole’s action because Cole failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. *See id.*at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); *see also Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.,*559 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that a creditor is not a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act); *Jones v. Williams,*297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining personal participation requirement for § 1983 claim); *Wright v. Riveland,*219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth elements of procedural due process claim); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1802(1) (homeowner association may assess association members to pay costs and expenses incurred by association); *Pinetop Lakes Ass’n v. Hatch,*135 Ariz. 196, 659 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1983) (purchaser of real property who has “notice of restrictive covenants” and “who accepts a deed referring to those restrictions is deemed to assent to be contractually bound by the restrictions as if he had individually executed an instrument containing them”).

We reject as unsupported by the record Cole’s contention that the district judge was biased.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); *see also United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

Appellees’ request for attorney’s fees, set forth in the answering brief, is denied.

Appellees’ request for costs, set forth in the answering brief, is denied without prejudice to filing a bill of costs.

AFFIRMED.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P, 34(a)(2).
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Depomed, Inc. (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Tammy L. Cameron,Interim Principal Accounting and Financial Officer of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

(1)  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|   |   | Date:  August 6, 2010   |
|--------|--------|-------------------------|
|   |   |                    |
|   |   |                    |
|   |   | /s/  Tammy L. Cameron   |
|   |   | Tammy  L. Cameron       |
|   |   | Vice President, Finance |

 

----
<PAGE>   1

EXHIBIT 15.2

The Board of Directors and Stockholders
NCS HealthCare, Inc. and Subsidiaries

We are aware of the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 No. 333-49417) of NCS HealthCare, Inc. for the registration of 
883,528 shares of its Class A common stock of our report dated April 28, 1998
relating to the unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial statements
of NCS HealthCare, Inc. and subsidiaries that are included in its Form 10-Q 
for the quarter ended March 31, 1998.

                                   /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

April 28, 1998
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Depomed, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James A. Schoeneck, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|   | Date:   May 6, 2011                |
|--------|-----------------------------------------|
|   |                                    |
|   |                                    |
|   | /s/   James A. Schoeneck                |
|   | James   A. Schoeneck                    |
|   | President   and Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
#### Willie James POOLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Warden CARTLEDGE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6214

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

Willie James Poole, Appellant Pro Se. Caroline M. Scrantom, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Willie James Poole seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitution*294al right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Poole has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofDepomed, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period endingSeptember 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (the “Report”), I, Tammy L. Cameron, Interim Principal Accountingand Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, asadopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|   | Date: November 8,  2007                             |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                |
|   |                                                |
|   | /s/ Tammy L.  Cameron                               |   |
|   | Tammy L. Cameron                                    |
|   | Interim  Principal Accounting and Financial Officer |

 

 

 

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Severiano V. SANTIBANEZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40405 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 26, 2017

*428Ernest Gonzalez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Plano, TX, for Plaintiff-, Appellee

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Severiano V. Santibanez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2011). Santibanez has filed an untimely response, which we construe as a motion for leave to file an out-of-time response and GRANT.

The record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of Santibanez’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore decline to consider the claims without prejudice to collateral review. *See United States v. Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record re-fleeted therein, as well as Santibanez’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*6th Cíe, R. 42.2.

The record reflects a clerical error in the written judgment. Although the judgment refers to the offense of conviction as conspiracy to possess with intent to *manufacture*and distribute methamphetamine, the record reflects that Santibanez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Accordingly, we REMAND for the limited purpose of correction of the clerical error in the written judgment in accordance with Federal Rule, of Criminal Procedure 36.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47,5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Herodita LOPEZ; Jorge Alberto Rivera Lopez, Petitioners, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-72701

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 19, 2017

Herodita Lopez, Pro Se

Jorge Alberto Rivera Lopez, Pro Se

Michael Christopher Heyse, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Herodita Lopez and Jorge Alberto Rivera Lopez, natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying their motion to reconsider. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reconsider, *Cano-Merida v. INS,*311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002), and we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We do not consider the materials petitioners reference in them opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. *See Fisher v. INS,*79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

We lack jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ contention regarding Lopez’s criminal convictions because they did not raise it to the BIA. *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); *see also Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (court “defer[s] to the *529BIA’s exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.