IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )

) 

v. ) IK12-09-0484-01 

) PFBPP PABPP (F)

WILLIAM T. WARREN ) In and for Kent County

)

 Defendant. )

ID No. 1207020480 )

COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief

Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61

Stephen R. Welch, Esq., for David Favata, Esq., Deputy Attorney General,

Department of Justice, for the State of Delaware.

William T. Warren, Pro se.

FREUD, Commissioner

February 24, 2016

The defendant, William T. Warren (“Warren”), pled guilty on November 29, 2012, to

one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP), 11 Del. C. §

1448. He was also facing sixteen additional counts of PFBPP.

1 Nolle prosequis were

1 Warren had originally faced a number of additional charges which the State had

previously nolle prosequis on October 2, 2012 for lack of merit due to new facts uncovered.
entered by the State on the additional 16 PFBPP charges in exchange for Warren’s

plea. As part of the Plea Agreement the parties agreed that Warren was a habitual

offender and that he should be sentenced to eight years minimum mandatory

incarceration followed by probation. Warren faced a minimummandatory sentence of

eight years on each of the 17 PFBPP charges, and a maximumoflife in prison if he had

he gone to trial and been found guilty as charged. The Court agreed with the

recommended sentence and sentenced Warren accordingly. 

The chargesstemfroma home invasion duringwhich the victimsreported having

numerous firearms stolen. Initially the victims identified Warren and his co-defendant,

AnthonyRichardson (“Richardson”), asthe perpetrators ofthe home invasion and theft.

Warren and Richardson were quickly stopped by the police based upon the victims’

description of their vehicle. Warren was the driver of the vehicle. Once stopped, the

police were able to see the stolen firearms in plain view on the car’s back seat. Warren

and Richardson were then charged with multiple offenses including Robbery and Theft

along with PFBPP. Subsequently, the victims changed their report and admitted that

Warren and Richardson had not stolen the firearms but that the victims had offered

Warren and Richardson a reward forrecovering the weapons. Warren and Richardson

successfully recovered the firearms but the victim failed to give the promised reward

so Warren and Richardson kept the weapons. Consequently, the victims then called

the police and identified the defendants as having the weapons in their vehicle leading

to their arrest with the weapons in the car. Warren was a person prohibited from

possessing a firearm due to his previous felony convictions and his admitted habitual

offender status. For this reason Warren would have faced a minimum mandatory

sentence of eight years in prison on each PFBPP charge and the possibility of life in

prison had he been found guilty.

2
Clearly, given the evidence, Warren’s plea was extraordinarily beneficialto him.

Warren did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the Delaware Supreme Court.

Instead he filed the pendingmotion for postconviction relief pursuant to SuperiorCourt

Criminal Rule 61 on March 19, 2013 in which he alleges, in part, ineffective assistance

of counsel.

The matter was set for briefing and Warren’s trial counsel responded to the

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Next Warren moved to amend his motion

to add additional grounds for relief. The motion was granted and trial counsel was

given an opportunity to reply to the new allegation. The State also responded to the

motion and Warren filed a response. Next, prior to the matter being set for decision,

Warren filed a motion for Appointment of Counsel, which was granted and Alexander

Funk, was appointed to represent Warren in his motion. After reviewing the file,

appointed counsel determined that there were no meritorious grounds for relief and

moved to withdraw as counsel. He subsequently filed a memorandum with the Court

detailing his review of the case and Warren’s arguments. On October 7, 2015 the

Court granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw.

WARREN’S CONTENTIONS

In his original motion filed April 11, 2013 Warren raised a variety of claims, all

grouped together under one ground for relief; 

Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Defense counsel failed to consult with Movant about the

right to appeal.

Defense Counsel and State promised Movant on November

29, 2012 that Movant would receive 18 month Level 3

Probation sentence - the same sentence offered to codefendant Anthony Richardson.

3
Defense Counsel pressured Movant to provide information

to assist his case and gain a more favorable plea offer for

movant.

Brady Material not requested by Defense Counsel.

Defense Counsel did not file Motion to Suppress. 

Defense Counsel Failed to Develop Mitigating Evidence.

On May 15, 2013 Warren filed an amendment to his motion seeking to

incorporate an affidavit by Movant that “outlines a series of questions” that Movant

would like Defense Counsel to answer, to-wit. It is listed as ground two.

Ground Two: Defense Counsel should not recommend to a defendant

acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and

study of the case has been completed. Do you agree or

disagree?

An appropriate investigation involves interviewing the

victims and visiting the crime scene. Were these two things

included in your investigation?

Are you aware that Brady material is a part of Due Process?

Did you file for, and provide to Movant, Brady material?

Defense Counsel should not misrepresent matters of fact or

law.

Important rights of the accused can be protected and

preserved only by prompt legal action. Defense Counsel

should consider all proceduralsteps which in good faithmay

be taken, including, for example, Motion for Pre-Trial

Release; Motion for Change of Venue or Continuance;

Motion to Suppress Evidence.

4
Motion to Suppress Movant’s Statement no filed.

Defense Counsel did not keep Movant promptly informed

regarding developments in the case and the progress of

preparing the defense.

Defense Counsel did not provide copies of the statements

from the alleged victims.

Certain decisions relating to a case are ultimately for the

Movant to decide and Defense Counsel to decide. The

decisions to be made by Movant after consultation with

Defense Counsel include: what plea to enter; whether to

accept a plea agreement; whether to waive jury trial;

whether to testify in his or her own behalf; and whether to

appeal.

Movant’s desire to appeal.

As noted above, after reviewing the two grounds for relief were meritless and

that appointed counsel concluded that Warren’s time were no legitimate grounds for

relief.

DISCUSSION

Under Delaware law, this Court must first determine whether Warren has met

the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(I) before it may

considerthe merits of his postconviction relief claim.

2 Thisis Warrens’ first motion for

postconviction relief, and it was filed within one year of his conviction becoming final.

Therefore, the requirements of Rule 61(i)(1) - requiring filing within one year and (2) -

requiring that all grounds for relief be presented in initial Rule 61 motion, are met.

None of Warren’s claims were raised at the plea, sentencing, or on direct appeal.

2 Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991).

5
Therefore, they are barred by Rule 61(i)(3), absent a demonstration of cause for the

default and prejudice. To some extent each of Warren’s claims are based on

ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, he has alleged cause for his failure to have

raised them earlier.

At this point, Rule 61(i)(3) does not bar relief as to Warrens’ grounds for relief,

provided he demonstrates that his counsel was ineffective and that he was prejudiced

by counsel’s actions. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

Warren must meet the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington.

3

In the context of

a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires a defendant show: (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness; and (2)that counsel's

actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial

and that the result of a trial would have been his acquittal.

4 The failure to establish that

a defendant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial is sufficient

cause for denial of relief.

5

In addition, Delaware courts have consistently held that in

setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make

concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary

dismissal.

6

 When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong

of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was

3

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

4

Id. at 687.

5

Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997)(citing Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53,

60 (Del. 1988))(citations omitted).

6

See e.g., Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998) (citing Boughner v. State, 1995

WL 466465 at *1 (Del. Supr.)).

6
professionally reasonable.7 This standard is highly demanding.

8

Strickland mandates

that, when viewing counsel'srepresentation, this Court must endeavorto “eliminate the

distorting effects of hindsight.”

9

Following a complete review of the record in this matter, it is abundantly clear

that Warren has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his

attorney wasineffective. Ifind trial counsel’s affidavit and appointed counsel’s motion

to withdraw, in conjunction with the record, more credible that Warrens’ self-serving

claims that his counsel’s representation was ineffective. Warrens’ counsel clearly and

unequivocally denies the allegations. Furthermore, appointed counsel thoroughly

reviewed the record in this case an concluded that none of Warren’s claims were

meritorious and that no other meritorious claims could be found.

As noted, Warren was facing the possibility of life in prison had he been

convicted, and the sentence and plea were reasonable under all the circumstances,

especially in light of the overwhelming evidence against him. Prior to the entry of the

plea, Warren and his attorney discussed the case. The plea bargain was clearly

advantageous to Warren. Counsel’s representation was certainly well within the range

required by Strickland. Additionally, when Warren entered his guilty plea, he stated

he was satisfied with defense counsel’s performance. He is bound by his statement

unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.10 Consequently,

7 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

8 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990)(quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477

U.S. 365, 383 (1986)).

9

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

10 Mapp v. State, 1994 WL 91264, at *2 (Del.Supr.)(citing Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d

931, 937-938 (Del. 1994)).

7
Warren has failed to establish that his counsel’s representation was ineffective under

the Strickland test.

Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel’s representation of Warren was

somehow deficient, Warren must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test,

prejudice. In setting forth a claimofineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate themor risk dismissal.

11

In an attempt to show prejudice, Warren simply assertsthat his counsel wasineffective.

His statements are insufficient to establish prejudice, particularly in light of the

overwhelming evidence against him. Therefore, I find Warrens’ ground for relief are

meritless.

To the extent that Warren alleges his plea wasinvoluntary, the record contradicts

such an allegation. When addressing the question of whether a plea was

constitutionally knowing and voluntary, the Court looksto a plea colloquy to determine

if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary.

12 At the guilty-plea

hearing, the Court asked Warren whether he understood the nature of the charges, the

consequences of his pleading guilty, and whether he was voluntarily pleading guilty.

The Court asked Warren if he understood he would waive his constitutional rights if

he pled guilty; if he understood each of the constitutional rights listed on the Truth-inSentencing Guilty Plea Form (“Guilty Plea Form”); and whether he gave truthful

answers to all the questions on the form. The Court asked Warren if he had discussed

the guilty plea and its consequences fully with his attorney. The Court asked Warren

if he was giving the plea of his own free will because he was satisfied that the State had

11 Larson v. State, 1995 WL 389718, at *2 (Del. Supr.)(citing Younger, 580 A.2d 552,

556 (Del. 1990)).

12 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993).

8
sufficient evidence to convict him. The Court also asked Warren if he was satisfied

with this counsel’s representation. Warren answered each of these questions

affirmatively.

13

I find counsel’s representations far more credible than Warrens’ selfserving, vague allegations.

Furthermore, prior to entering his guilty plea, Warren signed a Guilty Plea Form

and Plea Agreement in his own handwriting. Warrens’signatures on the formsindicate

that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and

that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the Plea

Agreement. Warren is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty Plea

Form, unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.14I confidently

find that Warren entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that Warrens’

first ground for relief are completely meritless.

CONCLUSION

I find that Warrens’ counsel represented him in a competent and effective

manner and that Warren has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the

representation. I also find that Warrens’ guilty plea was entered knowingly and

voluntarily. I recommend that the Court deny Warrens’ motion for post conviction

relief as procedurally barred and completely meritless. 

/s/Andrea M. Freud

Commissioner

AMF/jb

oc: Prothonotary

13

State v. Warren, (November 29, 2012) Tr. at 6-9.

14

Sommerville 703 A.2d at 632.

9