[Cite as In re A.C., 2021-Ohio-2116.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In the Matter of: : 

 No. 20AP-82 

A.C. : (Prob. Ct. No. MI-030965)

 [Appellant]. : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on June 24, 2021 

 

On brief: Steven McGann, for appellant. Argued: Steven 

McGann. 

On brief: J. Michael Evans, for appellee Franklin County 

Alcohol, Drug and Mental Health Board. Argued: J. Michael 

Evans. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Probate Division 

PER CURIAM 

{¶ 1} Appellant, A.C., appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas, Probate Division, declaring appellant a mentally ill person subject to courtordered hospitalization for a period not to exceed 90 days. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On January 8, 2020, Licensed Independent Social Worker Emily Holley 

submitted an affidavit of mental illness to the probate court. In the affidavit, Holley avers 

appellant is a mentally ill person subject to court order under the criteria set forth in R.C. 

5122.01(B)(2) and (4). The facts supporting Holley's assertion are set forth in the narrative 

portion of her affidavit as follows: 
No. 20AP-82 2 

[Appellant] is assigned the diagnosis of Unspecified 

Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder. On 

the afternoon of 01/07/2020, [appellant's] housing staff 

contacted Netcare with concerns for [appellant's] 

decompensation and increased aggression. Housing staff 

reported that [appellant] had invited a neighbor into her car 

on 01/06/2020 under the pretense of going to the grocery 

store but instead, drove recklessly for 7 hours with the 

neighbor and [appellant's] children trapped in the car. 

[Appellant] reportedly threatened to kill her neighbor and 

told the neighbor that the neighbor's "spirit was affecting the 

behavior" of [appellant's] children. [Appellant] was 

reportedly laughing inappropriately and appeared to be 

attending to internal stimuli. Housing staff reported another 

incident on 01/02/2020 where [appellant] threatened to have 

her dog bite another neighbor. [Appellant] has reportedly not 

been compliant with outpatient treatment in at least 3 

months. 

Pre-screener attempted to meet with [appellant] on the 

morning of 01/08/2020 but [appellant] did not answer. 

Probate Manager, Meredith Rinehart, LPCC, recommended 

that probate order be filed sight unseen due to reliable 

information about immediate and acute risk. [Appellant] 

needs to be brought into Netcare to ensure the safety of others 

and to facilitate psychiatric stabilization. 

(Holley Aff. at 2, filed Jan. 8, 2020.) 

{¶ 3} A magistrate reviewed the affidavit and determined there was probable cause 

to believe appellant was a mentally ill person subject to court order. Accordingly, the 

magistrate issued an order of detention on January 8, 2020. Appellant was subsequently 

taken into custody by the Franklin County Sherriff and turned over to appellee, Franklin 

County Alcohol, Drug and Mental Health ("ADAMH") Board. Appellee admitted appellant 

to Ohio State University ("OSU") Harding Hospital in Columbus for inpatient treatment. 

{¶ 4} On January 10, 2020, the probate court issued an entry appointing legal 

counsel to represent appellant and appointing William Bates, M.D., as "Court doctor" for 

the purpose of examining appellant and reporting his opinion to the court pursuant to R.C. 

Chapter 5122. (Jan. 10, 2020 Entry at 1.) The probate court also scheduled an evidentiary 

hearing before a magistrate for January 15, 2020 to consider the affidavit of mental illness. 

{¶ 5} At the January 15, 2020 evidentiary hearing, a probate court magistrate 

heard testimony from appellant and Dr. Bates. The probate court also admitted exhibits, 
No. 20AP-82 3 

including appellant's mental health records. At the hearing, appellant stipulated Dr. Bates 

was an expert in psychiatry, and he was qualified to offer his opinion regarding appellant's 

mental health and whether she is subject to court-ordered hospitalization. 

{¶ 6} On January 15, 2020, the magistrate issued a decision. Based on the evidence 

submitted at the January 15, 2020 hearing, the magistrate concluded appellant was a 

mentally ill person subject to court order pursuant to R.C. 5122.01(B)(3) and (4). The 

magistrate recommended inpatient hospitalization for a period not to exceed 90 days. 

{¶ 7} On January 21, 2020, appellant filed an objection to the magistrate's decision 

and the transcript of the evidentiary hearing. The probate court scheduled a hearing on the 

objection for January 30, 2020. On January 30, 2020, the probate court issued a decision 

and judgment entry overruling appellant's objections and adopting the magistrate's 

decision as its own. The probate court determined appellant "was a mentally ill individual 

subject to court-ordered involuntary commitment who was properly committed to Franklin 

County ADAMH Board for treatment for a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days 

from the date the Magistrate's Decision was issued, with placement at the Ohio State 

University Harding Hospital." (Jan. 30, 2020 Decision at 11.) 

{¶ 8} Appellant timely appealed to this court from the January 30, 2020 judgment. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 9} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error: 

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE 

JANUARY 15, 2020 MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND 

DECISION FINDING THAT APPELLANT SUFFERS FROM A 

MENTAL ILLNESS REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION. 

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE 

JANUARY 15, 2020 MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND 

DECISION FINDING THAT APPELLANT SUFFERS FROM A 

MENTAL ILLNESS AND REQUIRES FORCED 

PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶ 10} The clear-and-convincing evidence requirement applies to involuntary 

commitment cases brought pursuant to R.C. 5122.01(B). In re P.A., 10th Dist. No. 17AP728, 2018-Ohio-2314, ¶ 13, citing State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990), and In re 

R.T., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-291, 2013-Ohio-4886, ¶ 12. Accordingly, " 'a reviewing court will 

examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it 
No. 20AP-82 4 

to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.' " P.A. at ¶ 13, quoting Schiebel at 74. If the judgment 

is supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the 

case, an appellate court must affirm it. P.A. at ¶ 13, citing Schiebel at 74. "In determining 

whether the record contains the necessary competent, credible evidence, a reviewing court 

must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, 

and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost 

its way." P.A. at ¶ 13, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. 

"However, reviewing courts 'must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the 

finder of fact.' " P.A. at ¶ 13, quoting Eastley at ¶ 21. 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

A. First Assignment of Error 

{¶ 11} In appellant's first assignment of error, appellant contends the probate court 

erred in adopting the magistrate's finding that appellant is a mentally ill person in need of 

hospitalization. We disagree. 

{¶ 12} "R.C. Chapter 5122 sets forth specific procedures for the involuntary 

commitment of a person to a mental hospital. In a non-emergency situation, that process 

commences with the filing of an affidavit of mental illness in the probate court." P.A. at ¶ 9, 

citing R.C. 5122.11; In re Miller, 63 Ohio St.3d 99, 101 (1992). "In the affidavit, the affiant 

must state facts sufficient to indicate probable cause to believe that the person named in 

the affidavit is a mentally ill person subject to court order." P.A. at ¶ 9, citing R.C. 5122.11; 

Miller at 105. "If the probate court determines that such probable cause exists, the court 

may order the temporary detention of the person and/or set the matter for further hearing." 

P.A. at ¶ 9, citing R.C. 5122.11. 

{¶ 13} Appellant does not challenge the probable cause determination in this case. 

Appellant concedes that Holley's affidavit supports the magistrate's finding that there was 

probable cause to believe appellant was a mentally ill person subject to court order under 

the criteria set forth in R.C. 5122.01(B)(2) and (4). Rather, appellant contends the trial 

court erred when it overruled her objections to the magistrate's decision and adopted the 

magistrate's finding that she was a mentally ill person subject to court order pursuant to 

R.C. 5122.01(B)(3) and (4). 
No. 20AP-82 5 

{¶ 14} A "mentally ill person subject to court order" is a mentally ill person, who 

because of the person's illness: 

(1) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to self as 

manifested by evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or 

serious self-inflicted bodily harm; 

(2) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to others as 

manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent 

behavior, evidence of recent threats that place another in 

reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm, 

or other evidence of present dangerousness; 

(3) Represents a substantial and immediate risk of serious 

physical impairment or injury to self as manifested by 

evidence that the person is unable to provide for and is not 

providing for the person’s basic physical needs because of the 

person’s mental illness and that appropriate provision for 

those needs cannot be made immediately available in the 

community; 

(4) Would benefit from treatment for the person’s mental 

illness and is in need of such treatment as manifested by 

evidence of behavior that creates a grave and imminent risk to 

substantial rights of others or the person. 

R.C. 5122.01(B)(1) through (4). 

{¶ 15} A "mental illness" is a "substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, 

orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize 

reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life." R.C. 5122.01(A). Under the 

statutory criteria, in order for the probate court to order involuntary commitment of a 

person, a probate court must find by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the person has 

a substantial mental disorder, (2) the mental disorder grossly impairs the person's 

functioning, and (3) the person must be hospitalized for one of the reasons set forth in R.C. 

5122.01(B)(1) through (4). P.A., 2018-Ohio-2314, at ¶ 12, citing In re D.B., 10th Dist. No. 

14AP-44, 2014-Ohio-1464, ¶ 10; In re R.T., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-291, 2013-Ohio-4886, ¶ 12. 

The Supreme Court of Ohio has established a totality of the circumstances test to determine 

whether a person is subject to hospitalization under R.C. 5122.01(B)(1), (2), (3), or (4). In 

re T.B., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-99, 2011-Ohio-1339, ¶ 13, citing In re Burton, 11 Ohio St.3d 147, 

149 (1984). 
No. 20AP-82 6 

{¶ 16} Each component in the definition of a "mentally ill person subject to court 

order" must be established by clear and convincing evidence. " 'Clear and convincing 

evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere "preponderance of 

the evidence," but not to the extent of such certainty as is required "beyond a reasonable 

doubt" in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief 

or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.' " In re R.T., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-288, 

2019-Ohio-618, ¶ 10, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of 

the syllabus. 

{¶ 17} Burton set forth a non-exclusive list of the factors a court must consider in 

determining whether a person is subject to hospitalization under R.C. 5122.01(B). The 

factors include: 

(1) whether, in the court's view, the individual currently 

represents a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or 

other members of society; (2) psychiatric and medical 

testimony as to the present mental and physical condition of 

the alleged incompetent; (3) whether the person has insight 

into his condition so that he will continue treatment as 

prescribed or seek professional assistance if needed; (4) the 

grounds upon which the state relies for the proposed 

commitment; (5) any past history which is relevant to 

establish the individual's degree of conformity to the laws, 

rules, regulations and values of society; and (6) if there is 

evidence that the person's mental illness is in a state of 

remission, the court must also consider the medically 

suggested cause and degree of the remission and the 

probability that the individual will continue treatment to 

maintain the remissive state of his illness should he be 

released from commitment. 

Id. at 149-50. 

{¶ 18} The question presented by appellant's first assignment of error is whether 

appellee proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) appellant is suffering from a 

substantial mental disorder that grossly impairs her functioning, (2) without the 

commitment order sought, appellant is unable to provide for and is not providing for her 

basic physical needs because of her mental illness and appropriate provision for those 

needs cannot be made immediately available in the community, (3) appellant would benefit 

from outpatient treatment for her mental illness and is in need of such treatment as 

manifested by evidence of behavior that creates a grave and imminent risk to substantial 
No. 20AP-82 7 

rights of others or herself, and (4) inpatient commitment for a period not to exceed 90 days 

is the least restrictive alternative available that is consistent with her treatment goals. In re 

D.F., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-252, 2008-Ohio-2294, ¶ 20. Having reviewed the entire record 

in light of the Burton factors, we find competent, credible evidence in the record to support 

the probate court's determination that appellant is a mentally ill person subject to court 

order pursuant to the criteria set forth in R.C. 5122.01(B)(4) and that hospitalization for a 

period of no more than 90 days is the least restrictive option available.1 After meeting with 

appellant and reviewing her mental health records, Dr. Bates reached the following 

diagnosis relative to appellant's mental health: 

Q. Doctor, how long did you spend in conversation with 

[Appellant]? 

A. Maybe 20 minutes. 

Q. And based upon your examination of her, did she suffer 

from a mental illness? 

A. Yes, she does. 

Q. And what is that mental illness? 

A. I think she has schizophrenia spectrum disorder. 

Q. And for purposes of this hearing, can you just go over it? 

What is a schizophrenia spectrum disorder? 

A. Well, you would start from – schizophrenia itself is 

considered a psychotic disorder. The person is out of touch 

with reality, perhaps experiencing hallucinations and 

delusions. And for research purposes, schizophrenia gets 

defined fully, specifically, like a certain period – must last a 

certain period of time, must have a certain number of features. 

(Tr. at 8-9.) 

{¶ 19} With respect to the question whether appellant suffers from a "mental 

illness," as that term is defined in R.C. 5122.01(A), Dr. Bates opined as follows: 

Q. Doctor, based on your examination of the patient, of 

[Appellant], does she suffer from a substantial disorder of 

thought, mood, orientation, perception, memory? 

A. I think it's primarily one of thought, this tendency toward 

delusional interpretation of reality and a lack of insight that 

goes along with it. 

 

1 The record shows that appellant was released from OSU Harding Hospital prior to the hearing on appellant's 

objections. 
No. 20AP-82 8 

Q. And that – that thought disorder, in your opinion, is – is 

substantial? 

A. It is. It's substantial enough that it's got her into trouble 

here. 

Q. And does this substantial disorder of thought, does it 

grossly impair her judgment and her behavior, her ability to 

recognize reality and meet the ordinary demands of life, or – 

A. I would say all of those areas. 

(Tr. at 12-13.) 

{¶ 20} Dr. Bates further opined on direct examination that appellant was a mentally 

ill person subject to court-ordered hospitalization under the criteria set forth in R.C. 

5122.11(B)(4): 

Q. Does her – does her behavior create a grave and imminent 

risk to her rights as well as the substantial rights of others? 

* * * 

A. Yes, I think hers, and certainly interfering with her life, and 

to others, and that people are apparently feeling threatened to 

the point that they initiated proceedings to get her treated. 

(Tr. at 16-17.)2

{¶ 21} Appellant argues her testimony at the evidentiary hearing refuted the 

assertions in Holley's affidavit and completely undermined the opinion testimony from Dr. 

Bates. We disagree. 

{¶ 22} Appellant testified she has two young children, and she home schools her 

oldest daughter. Appellant testified all the information in the affidavit came from a 

 

2 Dr. Bates also opined that appellant was a mentally ill person subject to court-ordered hospitalization under 

the criteria set forth in R.C. 5122.11(B)(2): 

Q. Does [Appellant] presently represent a substantial risk of physical 

harm to others as representative of maybe violent behavior, homicidal 

ideations, behavior that would put a reasonable person at risk of their 

lives? 

A. Yes, I believe so. It appears that she – even though she denies doing 

any, like, kidnapping someone, apparently there was a friend who reported 

that she had been kidnapped, that she had been denied the ability to get 

out of the car and go home, and that she was driven around. Apparently 

she's made threats to harm a particular neighbor. 

So I think in that regard, she represents a danger to others. 

(Tr. at 14.) 
No. 20AP-82 9 

neighbor who told lies about appellant to get her hospitalized. With respect to the incident 

on January 6, 2020, appellant claimed her neighbor voluntarily accompanied her while she 

ran errands. Appellant claims she first stopped at the Franklin County Courthouse to pay 

her rent into escrow, and she produced a receipt she received from the clerk, dated 

January 6, 2020 at 4:28 p.m., in support of her testimony. (Ex. A.) Appellant told the 

magistrate her neighbor and her two children left the vehicle and accompanied her to the 

clerk's office. Appellant testified she stopped at the drive-thru window of both Wendy's and 

Taco Bell after paying her rent before stopping at a department store at the Polaris Mall. 

Appellant testified her neighbor and her two children went into the store with her. 

Appellant produced a receipt for some items she purchased at Burlington Coat Factory 

dated January 6, 2020 at 6:58 p.m. (Ex. B.)3

{¶ 23} In determining whether the record contains the necessary competent, 

credible evidence, this court "must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way." P.A., 2018-Ohio-2314, at ¶ 13, citing 

Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 20. This court must always be mindful of the presumption 

in favor of the finder of fact. P.A. at ¶ 13, quoting Eastley at ¶ 21. Appellant's testimony 

and the receipts she produced establish only that appellant visited the clerk's office and the 

Burlington Coat Factory on the day in question and at the times indicated. In our view, 

appellant's evidence did not require the trial court to dismiss all the averments in the 

affidavit as untrue as she now claims. Moreover, in her testimony at the evidentiary 

hearing, appellant claimed her neighbor agreed to accompany her on January 6, 2020 for 

the purpose of purchasing new car battery terminals because her neighbor had broken the 

terminal bushings on her other vehicle in an attempt to help appellant repair the vehicle.4 

Appellant did not provide any evidence that she purchased a battery or battery terminals, 

nor did she provide any evidence that she visited a store that carried them. 

{¶ 24} During her testimony, appellant also related an odd story involving another 

neighbor and a shower curtain. Appellant maintained that she is a plus size model and that 

she has a public Facebook account where she posts photos. In one of her photos, an 

 

3 The magistrate withheld a ruling on the admission of Exhibits A and B, but the probate court admitted the 

exhibits in ruling on appellant's objections. 

4 Appellant referred to the terminal bushings as the "bolt[s] that go into the battery." (Tr. at 23.) 
No. 20AP-82 10 

"elegant" and "different" shower curtain in her residence can be seen in the background. 

(Tr. at 43.) Appellant claims that subsequent to posting the photo, she drove by her 

neighbor's residence and saw through her neighbor's window that her neighbor either had 

the same shower curtain or had a window curtain with the same pattern. Appellant 

maintained that by displaying the curtain, her neighbor was attempting to "personize [sic] 

me and * * * attack my character, and trying to accuse me of things I'm not doing." (Tr. at 

35.) Dr. Bates testified appellant referred to her neighbor's conduct with the shower curtain 

as "voodoo," but appellant denied this. (Tr. at 34.) 

{¶ 25} Appellant further stated the neighbor who attempted to appropriate her 

shower curtain is the same neighbor who earlier attempted to run her over with her car. 

Appellant claimed another neighbor had captured the attempt on video, but no video 

evidence was produced at trial. Appellant claimed the neighbor subsequently smeared dog 

feces on her windows and fence. According to appellant, the same neighbor had previously 

assaulted her when appellant was five months pregnant and then got into a "fistfight" with 

the neighbor who appellant allegedly kidnapped on January 6, 2020. (Tr. at 42.) Appellant 

stated her current dispute with her landlord began when nothing was done about this 

incident. 

{¶ 26} Appellant claimed she sought a restraining order against the neighbor who 

attempted to run her over with her car, but she was unable to testify in support of the 

restraining order because she had been hospitalized at OSU Harding Hospital. According 

to appellant, the neighbor she allegedly kidnapped gave false information to Holley so that 

appellant would be hospitalized and unable to testify in support of her restraining order 

against the other neighbor. Appellant also claimed the staff in her apartment complex knew 

she was being targeted by other neighbors but did nothing to help her. 

{¶ 27} Appellant stated while she was in OSU Harding Hospital, she was the victim 

of an assault that left bruises on her body. Appellant told hospital staff that unidentified 

individuals were entering her room at night, and she asked them to check the video cameras 

to obtain proof of her claim. According to appellant, hospital staff responded to the incident 

by filing a "fake" report. (Tr. at 50.) 

{¶ 28} When appellee's trial counsel asked appellant if she had ever been diagnosed 

with a mental illness, appellant responded as follows: 
No. 20AP-82 11 

A. Well, for – I can agree with basically when I got in a car 

accident, I have basically anxiety attacks. So, basically, like, 

when I was driving – but I got over that period. So I – I don't 

have anxiety attacks anymore. Because I was in a car accident 

on the freeway. 

Q. How long ago was that? 

A. That was in 2016. 

(Tr. at 45.) 

{¶ 29} Appellant acknowledged she was previously committed to a mental health 

facility in 2016 and has been prescribed anti-psychotic medication, but she denied being 

psychotic. She testified she sees her doctor once a month, her nurse every other week, and 

her social worker visits her once a week. Appellant stated she would continue to take her 

medication after she was released from the hospital if it was necessary for her to keep her 

children. 

{¶ 30} According to Dr. Bates, appellant suffers from a mental illness with a 

diagnosis of "schizophrenia spectrum disorder." (Tr. at 9.) In the opinion of Dr. Bates, 

appellant's mental illness constitutes a substantial disorder of thought that grossly impairs 

appellant's judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary 

demands of life. Dr. Bates further opined appellant's mental illness creates a grave and 

imminent risk to her substantial rights and the substantial rights of others, and appellant 

would greatly benefit from inpatient treatment. Dr. Bates formed his opinions after 

reviewing Holley's affidavit, appellant's mental health records, including the records from 

her prior hospitalization in 2016, and conducting a personal interview with appellant. 

{¶ 31} Appellant nevertheless claims that because Dr. Bates retreated from his 

position that appellant represents a substantial risk of physical harm to others, the probate 

court erred when it overruled her objections to the magistrate's decision and declared her 

a mentally ill person subject to court order. We find this argument unavailing given the fact 

that neither the magistrate nor the probate court declared appellant a mentally ill person 

subject to court order under R.C. 5122.01(B)(2). Rather, both the magistrate and the 

probate court found appellant was a mentally ill person subject to court order under the 

criteria set forth in R.C. 5122.01(B)(3) and (4), and inpatient hospitalization for a period 

not to exceed 90 days was the least restrictive option. The criteria in R.C. 5122.01(B)(3) or 
No. 20AP-82 12 

(4) do not require a finding that appellant represents a substantial risk of physical harm to 

others. 

{¶ 32} Moreover, Dr. Bates acknowledged only that it would be "less likely" that 

appellant would represent a substantial risk of physical harm to others if the averments that 

appellant kidnapped and threatened to kill her neighbor on January 6, 2020 were proven 

untrue. (Tr. at 57.) Dr. Bates did not express a similar lack of confidence in his opinion 

that appellant qualifies as a mentally ill person subject to court-ordered hospitalization 

under the criteria set forth in R.C. 5122.01(B)(4). In fact, on re-direct examination, Dr. 

Bates expressly reasserted his prior opinion in regard to the criteria set forth in R.C. 

5122.01(B)(4) as follows: 

Q. You testified previously that in your opinion, [Appellant] 

suffers from a mental illness, correct? 

A. I believe this is the case, yes. 

Q. And – 

A. That's my testimony. 

Q. And do you still believe that she suffers from a mental 

illness? 

A. I do. 

Q. Do you still believe, Doctor, that she suffers from a 

substantial disorder of thought? 

A. I do. 

Q. Okay. And do you believe that that substantial disorder of 

thought grossly impairs her judgment and her behavior and 

her capacity to recognize reality and ability to meet the 

ordinary demands of life? 

A. I do. 

Q. Okay. Do you also believe that she would benefit for 

treatment from mental illness in an inpatient setting? 

A. Yes, I do. 

Q. And that her behavior creates a grave and imminent risk 

to her substantial rights and the substantial rights of others? 

A. Yes. 

(Tr. at 59-60.) 
No. 20AP-82 13 

{¶ 33} Dr. Bates was the only psychiatric expert to testify in this matter. Appellant 

did not submit the testimony of an expert psychiatrist to rebut the opinions expressed by 

Dr. Bates. Dr. Bates opined appellant would benefit from treatment for her mental illness 

in an inpatient setting, and her behavior creates a grave and imminent risk to her 

substantial rights and the substantial rights of others. Our review of appellant's testimony 

reveals support for Dr. Bates' conclusion as it is clear appellant lacks insight into her 

condition. She denies being psychotic even though she admits she has been prescribed 

anti-psychotic medication. She maintains the reason for her prior hospitalization was 

anxiety related to an automobile accident, and she fails to acknowledge either her preexisting or current diagnosis of schizophrenia spectrum disorder. Appellant stated she 

would continue to take her prescribed medication if it was required for her to maintain 

custody of her two children. 

{¶ 34} Appellant's testimony also corroborates Dr. Bates' claim that appellant 

suffers from delusional thinking. According to Dr. Bates, appellant told him that a 

neighbor's spirit was affecting one of her children. Dr. Bates also testified appellant has a 

tendency to "fill in [the] blanks in what she sees with perhaps delusional content," as 

evidenced by the shower curtain story. (Tr. at 10.) Appellant also referred to herself as a 

"public figure" and that she was "doing the modeling for career." (Tr. at 44.) Appellant 

admitted she told the staff at OSU Harding Hospital she had been assaulted, and 

unidentified individuals were entering her hospital room at night. 

{¶ 35} Appellant's testimony also shows her behavior creates a grave and imminent 

risk to her substantial rights and the substantial rights of others. Appellant readily 

admitted she has ongoing disputes with two of her neighbors and the staff at her apartment 

complex. Appellant told the magistrate she has "three different court dates this month." 

(Tr. at 52.) She testified the staff at her apartment complex are "trying to target me." (Tr. 

at 36.) Appellant unsuccessfully sought a restraining order against one of her neighbors, 

and she currently pays her rent into escrow due to a dispute with the staff at her apartment 

complex. Appellant denies any fault with regard to these ongoing disputes and maintains 

that her neighbors are liars who are determined to harm her or see her hospitalized. 

{¶ 36} Based on the foregoing, we hold that competent, credible evidence supports 

the probate court's finding that appellant was a mentally ill person subject to court order 
No. 20AP-82 14 

pursuant to R.C. 5122.01(B)(4) and that inpatient hospitalization for a period not to exceed 

90 days was the least restrictive treatment option. In re C.J., 12th Dist. No. CA2019-01-

013, 2019-Ohio-4403, ¶ 22 (because the record indicates C.J. continues to dispute his 

psychiatrist's working diagnosis, refuses to openly discuss his mental illness, and refuses to 

fully engage in the prescribed treatment plan, the probate court did not err in concluding 

that appellant would benefit from treatment for his mental illness and is in need of 

treatment as manifested by evidence of behavior that creates a grave and imminent risk to 

substantial rights of others or himself). 

{¶ 37} With regard to the criteria set forth in R.C. 5122.01(B)(3), Dr. Bates opined 

on direct examination as follows: 

Q. Does [appellant] represent a substantial immediate risk of 

serious physical harm to herself as evidenced by an inability 

to provide for her needs in the community and for the 

individuals to whom she is supposed to provide care? 

A. I don't know. I – you know, I – I have some concerns. She 

has children, and I think she is homeschooling them, training 

them on her own. And I think that suffering under the duress 

of mental illness, this is not really a good thing. 

Q. So she does represent a substantial and immediate risk of 

harm to herself? 

A. In that – in that sense, yes. 

Q. Would she benefit for treatment for mental illness? 

A. Yes, I believe so. 

Q. And what's the least restrictive environment for her to 

receive that treatment? 

A. I think inpatient stabilization right now would be the way 

to go. And then trans – transition her out to the community 

with follow-up in the community. 

Q. Does she already have an established community agency 

that she's been following prior to hospitalization, do you 

know? 

A. I – I don't recall offhand. 

(Tr. at 15-16.) 

{¶ 38} Though we have determined that clear and convincing evidence supports the 

probate court's determination that appellant is a mentally ill person, we do not believe clear 

and convincing evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing to support a finding that 
No. 20AP-82 15 

appellant is subject to court order pursuant to R.C. 5122.01(B)(3). First, Dr. Bates' opinion 

testimony is equivocal as to whether appellant represents a substantial and immediate risk 

of serious physical impairment or injury to self, as his opinion speaks to the risk to her 

children's education rather than a physical impairment or injury to herself. Substantial and 

immediate risk of serious physical impairment or injury to self is the primary requirement 

of R.C. 5122.01(B)(3). Finally, the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence 

that appellant is unable to provide for and is not providing for her basic physical needs 

because of her mental illness. 

{¶ 39} Nevertheless, having determined that clear and convincing evidence 

supports the probate court's determination that appellant is subject to court-ordered 

hospitalization under the criteria set forth in R.C. 5122.01(B)(4), we must affirm the 

probate court order even if we do not find clear and convincing evidence to satisfy the 

requirements of R.C. 5122.01(B)(3). See T.B., 2011-Ohio-1339, at ¶ 18 (even if the probate 

court lacked clear and convincing evidence to satisfy R.C. 5122.01(B)(2), the probate court 

order shall be affirmed because "clear and convincing evidence supports a finding under 

R.C. 5122.01(B)(4) that, without the hospital treatment, respondent creates a grave and 

imminent risk to the substantial rights of others"). 

{¶ 40} For the foregoing reasons, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. 

B. Second Assignment of Error 

{¶ 41} Appellant's second assignment of error challenges an order of forced 

psychotropic medication that the probate court did not make. Accordingly, appellant's 

second assignment of error is overruled. 

V. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 42} Having overruled appellant's two assignments of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division. 

Judgment affirmed.

DORRIAN, P.J., SADLER, and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur. 

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