NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 15

- 1056

_____________ DANIEL BOCK, JR.

v. PRESSLER & PRESSLER, LLP , A ppellant

_____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of New Jersey (District Court No.: 2

- 11

- cv - 07593 ) District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty

______ _______________________________ Argued on November 10 , 201 5
Before: CHAGARES , REN D ELL and BARRY , Circuit Judges

.

( Opinion Filed : July 27, 2016 ) Manuel H. Newburger, Esquire (Argued) Barron & Newburger 1212 Guadalupe Suite 104 Austin, TX 78701 Mitchell L. Williamson, Esquire Pressler & Pressler, LLP 7 Entin Road Parsippany, N J 07054 Counsel for Appellant2

Cary L. Flitter, Esquire (Argued) Andrew M. Milz, Esquire Flitter Milz 450 North Narberth Avenue Suite 101 Narberth, PA 19072 Deepak Gupta, Esquire Gupta Wessler 1735 20th Street, N. W. Washington, DC 20009
Phi lip D. Stern, Esquire Andrew T. Thomasson, Esquire Stern Thomasson 2816 Morris Avenue Suite 30 Union, NJ 07083 Counsel for Appellee

Jeanne L. Zimmer, Esquire Carlson & Messer 5959 West Century Boulevard Suite 1214 Los Angeles, CA 90045
Coun sel for Amicus

- Appellant s

Kristin Bateman, Esquire (Argued) Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 1700 G Street, N. W. Washington, DE 20552 Counsel for Amicus

- Appellee Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Theodore P. Metzler, Jr., Esquire Federal Trade Commission 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, DC 2058 03 Counsel for Amicus

- Appellee Federal Trade Commission

____________ O P I N I O N

____________ RENDELL , Circuit Judge :
Defendant

- Appellant Pressler and Pressler, LLP appeals the District Court’s order granting Plaintiff Bock’s motion for summary judgment . Bock alleged t hat Pressler and
Pressler made a false or misleading representation in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) , 15 U.S.C. § 1692 e , by filing a state complaint without meaningful attorney review. Although the issue of Article III standi ng was not raised by
the District Court or by the parties , “we are required to raise issues of standing sua sponte
if such issues exist.” Steele v. Blackman , 236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001). At the time of oral argument in this case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) , was pending before the United States Supreme Court. It had the potential to impact cases like Bock’s, when the alleged injury to the plaintiff flows from the violation of a procedural right granted by statute. We asked th e parties to address Spokeo at oral argument and requested written briefing after the opinion was published on M ay 16, 2016

. 1 The issue of standing is “an essential and unchanging part of the case

- or controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defs . of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “ The doctrine developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do not

1 The District Court ha d jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; w e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise de novo review over an order granting summary judgment. Curley v. Klem , 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).4

exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood

. ” Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at
1547. Constitutional standing requires the party invoking jurisdiction to meet three
elements: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”

— an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[.] Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct comp lained of

. . . . Third, it must be likely . . . that the injury will be red ressed by a favorable decision. Lujan , 504 U.S. 560

– 61 (internal citations and quotation marks om itted). The issue presented in Spokeo was whether the violation of a proced ural right granted by statute presents an injury sufficient to constitute an “injury

- in

- fact” and satisfy the “‘[f]irst and
foremost’ of standing’ s three elements. ” Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1547. While the Supreme Court did not change the rule for establishing standing in Spokeo , it use d strong language indicatin g that a thorough discussion of concreteness is

necessary in order for a court to determine whether there has been an injur y - in

- fact

. Id. at
1545. The Court made it clear that the requirements of particularization and concreteness required separate analyses and that neither requirement alone was sufficient. Id . at 154 8 (“ Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is not sufficient. An injury in fact must also be ‘concrete.’”). In determining whether there is a concrete injury, the presentation of an alleged statutory violation is not always sufficient. Id

. at
1549 ( “[ Plaintiff] could not, for exampl e, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury

- in

- fact requirement of Article III.”). However, the Court confirmed that “ because Congress is well positioned to identify5

intangible harms that meet minimum Art icle III requirements

. . . . [it] may elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). Essentially, “the question framed by [the Court’s] discussion [is] whether the particular procedural violations alleged in [a] case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.” Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1550.

We r ecently discussed Spokeo ’s impact on Article III standing in In r e Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig. , No. 15

- 1441, 2016 WL 3513782 (3d Cir. June 27, 2016)

. There, w e interpreted Spokeo to say that “even certain kinds of ‘intangible’ harms

can be ‘concr ete’ for purposes of Article III . . . . What a plaintiff cannot d o . . . is tre at a ‘bare procedural violation . . . [that] may result in no harm’ as an Article III injury

- in

fact.” I d

. at *7 (quoting Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1550). We observed that “in some cases an injury

- in

- fact may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.” Nickelodeon , 2016 WL 3513782 at *6. Specifically, we addressed the Supreme Court’s deference to Congress, noting that “ Spokeo directs us to consider whether an alleged injury

- in

- fact ‘has tr aditionally been regarded as providing a basis for lawsuit,’” and “Congress’ s judgment on such matters is . . . ‘instructive and important

. ’ ” Id . at *7 (quoting Spokeo , 1 36 S. Ct. at 1549).
Given the Supreme Court’s directive in Spokeo regarding the need for a court to specifically address concreteness and particularization, we will remand this case to the
District Court t o determine in the first instance whether Bock has Article III standing.