United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 9, 2022*

Decided November 17, 2022 

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 22-1809 

PETER J. LONG,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN F. MATZ, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 21-C-1210 

William C. Griesbach, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Peter Long sued Wisconsin jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raising two 

claims about COVID-19. First, he says that, although the staff quarantined new inmates, 

* The appellees were not served with process and have not participated in this 

appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the 

appellant’s brief and the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and 

oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 22-1809 Page 2 

gave them cleaning supplies, and later tested them to protect them from the virus, the 

Constitution required that the staff do more. Second, he accuses the staff of transferring

him to another facility in retaliation for complaining about the level of protection. The 

district court dismissed his complaint, correctly concluding that he failed to allege any 

constitutional violation; thus we affirm.

 We recount the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting them as true. Milchtein v. 

Milwaukee Cty., 42 F.4th 814, 819 (7th Cir. 2022). Long was housed at Winnebago County 

Jail from 2020 through early 2021, apparently on charges that he violated terms of his 

extended supervision. When he arrived, he was quarantined alone in a cell for two 

weeks—as were all new inmates during the COVID-19 pandemic. Afterward, he moved

to a pod with several dozen inmates, all of whom had successfully completed a twoweek quarantine. The jail began to test inmates for COVID-19 in November 2020, when 

an inmate in the pod was hospitalized with an infection. Afterward, it tested all inmates 

and staff. Long eventually tested positive for COVID-19 and experienced joint pain, 

dizziness, and nausea for over two weeks. When about one-third of the jail’s inmates 

also tested positive, the jail began conducting weekly tests of its employees.

All inmates were required to clean their housing units and the restrooms. Jail

staff provided the inmates with antibacterial cleaning supplies but not products 

containing bleach, which Long wanted, believing that it would kill both the COVID-19 
No. 22-1809 Page 3 

virus and bacteria. Two officials denied his request and refused to give him grievance 

forms. One explained that bleach was banned because the jail regarded it as a safety and 

security hazard; another said that “[n]o constitutional rights were violated.”

Long was transferred to a prison in 2021 when his supervision was revoked. He 

says that, although other inmates were ahead of him on the transfer list, he was moved 

to the top in retaliation for his complaints about the jail’s response to the pandemic.

Long next turned to federal court. He asserted that the defendants violated his 

constitutional rights by failing to implement COVID-19 testing before November 2020, 

refusing to provide him with bleach, denying him access to grievance forms, and 

retaliating against him for complaining by moving him to the top of the transfer list. A 

magistrate judge allowed Long to amend his complaint to specify who violated his 

rights and how. After Long did so, a district judge handled the case because not all 

parties had provided consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction.

The district judge dismissed Long’s amended complaint with prejudice. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. First, the court ruled that Long pleaded himself out of court on his 

claim that the jail’s COVID-19 response was unreasonable, because he alleged that the 

staff quarantined new inmates and began testing staff weekly after an outbreak 

occurred. Second, the court concluded, the jail’s staff did not violate Long’s rights by 

denying his requests for bleach, because he did not plausibly allege that non-bleach 
No. 22-1809 Page 4 

cleansers exposed him to an unreasonably high risk of contracting COVID-19. Third, the 

court ruled that Long did not have a constitutional right to grievance forms. Finally, 

regarding the retaliation claim, the court explained that Long had not alleged that his 

transfer would likely deter an ordinary inmate from complaining about jail conditions. 

On appeal, Long first raises an unfounded procedural challenge. He contests his 

case’s transfer from the magistrate judge to the district judge. But Long did not serve

any of the defendants with process, and they never consented to allowing a magistrate 

judge to enter judgment. Non-served defendants are “parties” under the Magistrate 

Judges Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)–(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 73(b)(1), and they must consent to 

allowing a magistrate judge to issue a final judgment. Coleman v. Labor and Indus. Review 

Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 470–71 (7th Cir. 2017). 

Next, Long contends that he adequately stated claims for relief. We review de 

novo the dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, drawing all reasonable 

inferences in Long’s favor and construing his pro se submission liberally to determine if

he pleaded a plausible claim. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015); see also 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 

We begin with his claim that the jail unreasonably failed to protect inmates 

before the jail’s COVID-19 outbreak in November 2020 by not testing them for the virus

or supplying antiviral cleansers, like bleach, which Long says that the CDC 
No. 22-1809 Page 5 

recommended. When a pretrial detainee complains about conduct at a jail, the claim 

arises under the due-process clause, and we ask whether the conduct was “objectively 

unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 392 (2015). The preventative 

measures that Long alleges that the defendants used to address the risks of the virus 

refute an inference that their measures were objectively unreasonable: Before the jail 

even had a COVID-19 outbreak, staff quarantined new inmates for two weeks before 

housing them together, supplied them with antibacterial cleansers, and required that 

they use them. After the outbreak occurred, they tested inmates and, each week, tested

those people—the staff—who left the jail and could upon reentry infect others. Even if 

other, potentially costlier measures, such as testing inmates before an outbreak 

materialized and supplying them with bleach, might have been superior, due process 

does not require superiority, just reasonableness, which occurred here. Because we 

conclude that the defendants behaved reasonably, we need not and do not decide 

whether, and if so when, the Constitution requires public officials to take steps to 

reduce the risk of infection within a prison or jail.

Long next argues that the defendants violated his due-process rights by 

preventing him from accessing the jail’s grievance forms. But Long does not have a 

liberty interest in a jail’s grievance procedures. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th 

Cir. 2011). A purported refusal to supply grievance forms may excuse inmates from the 
No. 22-1809 Page 6 

need to exhaust administrative remedies, but it does not violate constitutional rights. 

Id.; Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2008). 

That brings us to Long’s claim that the defendants violated his First Amendment

rights by accelerating his transfer to prison (after his supervision was revoked) to 

punish him for complaining about the jail’s COVID-19 response. Long has not 

presented a valid claim if the alleged punishment is unlikely to deter ordinary inmates 

from raising similar complaints. See Towne v. Donnelly, 44 F.4th 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2022). 

A transfer alone is not adverse enough to deter an ordinary inmate from protected 

speech. Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 2020). And Long did not allege 

that his prison—to which he was eventually going anyway after the revoked 

supervision—was worse than his jail.

Finally, Long argues that the district court should have offered him a second 

chance to amend his complaint. But Long did not ask to amend his complaint a second 

time, and so the court was not required to offer an unsolicited, second chance for him to 

do so. In any case, Long does not tell us how he would alter his complaint to cure its 

deficiencies. See Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (court may

dismiss complaint with prejudice when plaintiff fails to explain how proposed 

amendment would cure deficiencies).

AFFIRMED