alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

578 

CAF 11-02546 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, AND LINDLEY, JJ.

 

IN THE MATTER OF DAMIEN W. AND ANGELA O. 

--------------------------------------------- 

ORLEANS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ORDER

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; 

 

KENNETH O., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

LEAH K. BOURNE, ROCHESTER, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

JAMES D. BELL, BROCKPORT, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

HARRIET L. ZUNNO, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN, HILTON. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Orleans County (James

P. Punch, J.), entered December 7, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to

Family Court Act article 10. The order, inter alia, determined that

respondent had neglected the subject children. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Entered: June 7, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
      2002, the undersigned officer of ArthroCare Corporation (the “Company”) hereby
      certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that:





(i)
            The
                accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the
                three
                and six months ended June 30, 2007 (the “Report”) fully complies with the
                requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of
                the
                Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
                and





(ii)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.








Dated: August
      1,
      2007


/s/
      Michael A. Baker


Michael
      A. Baker


President
      and Chief Executive Officer








A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 (“Section 906”), or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or
      otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the
      electronic version of the written statement required by Section 906, has been
      provided to ArthroCare Corporation and will be retained by ArthroCare
      Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
      staff
      upon request.
#### Dexter BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sahir NASEER, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-17073

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 5, 2017

Dexter Brown, Stockton, CA, pro se.

Oliver Robert Lewis, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N. R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Dexter Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Brown failed to *466raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Dr. Naseer was “subjectively aware” that his failure to order requested testing and his order to restrict Brown’s fluid intake “created a substantial risk of harm” to Brown. *See id,*at 1060; *see also Estelle v. Gamble,*429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”); *Franklin v. Oregon,*662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (difference of opinion between prisoner and medical staff does not give rise to a deliberate indifference claim).

We reject as unsupported by the record Brown’s contention that he alleged a due process claim.

AFFIRMED.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**Exhibit 32**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**

In connection with the Annual Report of Pipeline Data Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-KSBA for the quarter ended December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), MacAllister Smith, Chief Executive Officer of the Company and , Donald Gruneisen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, respectively, do each hereby certify, pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to his knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. 

 

|         |                                  |   |         |                                                                |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|--------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| By:     | /s/ MacAllister Smith                 |   | By:     | /s/ Donald Gruneisen                                                |
| Name:   | MacAllister Smith                     |   | Name:   | Donald Gruneisen                                                    |
| Title:  | Chief Executive Officer and President |   | Title:  | Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) |

 

Date: November 28, 2007

 [A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Pipeline Data Inc. and will be retained by Pipeline Data Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.]
Scott DOMITROFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-5395

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 12, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-50876

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Gustavo Villegas, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:19-CR-2647-2

Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Gustavo Villegas pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent 

to distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine. The district court sentenced 

Villegas to 70 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised 

release. Villegas argues that the district court erred in adopting the cash-to-

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 12, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 21-50876 Document: 00516317057 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/12/2022
No. 21-50876

2

drugs conversion used in the presentence report (PSR). The district court’s 

drug quantity calculation is a factual determination reviewed for clear error. 

United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2005). The district 

court may consider any information that has a sufficient indicia of reliability. 

Id. at 247. 

On appeal, Villegas argues that the case agent’s information that the 

defendants were selling bags containing 0.5 grams of cocaine for $20 was 

unsubstantiated. Villegas has not produced any evidence outside of the PSR 

to challenge information in the PSR. The challenged information came from 

a case agent. The assertion that the case agent conducted surveillance and 

made controlled drug buys is substantiated by the warrant application. See

United States v. Trujillo, 502 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2007). Villegas’s 

arguments present a factual dispute between the specific statement of the 

case agent, supported by the probable cause affidavit, and the general 

statement of his codefendant regarding cocaine prices. We may not reweigh 

the competing evidence. See United States v. Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 377, 380 

(5th Cir. 2011). Nothing that Villegas has presented supports a definite 

finding that the district court made a mistake in determining drug quantity by 

adopting the cash-to-drugs conversion rate. See id. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Case: 21-50876 Document: 00516317057 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/12/2022
#### Charles M. CABRERA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jessie NEVILLE, Officer, P6900; NaphCare, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, and Neville, Officer; et al., Defendants.

No. 16-15829

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 25, 2017

Charles M. Cabrera, Pro Se

Lyssa Anderson, Attorney, Kaempfer Crowell Renshaw Gronauer *&*Fiorentino, Las Vegas, NV, for Jessie Neville, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

Shirley Blazich, Michael McLoughlin, LeAnn Sanders, Trial Attorney, Alverson, Taylor, Mortensen *&*Sanders, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellee NaphCare, Inc.

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

**The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*469MEMORANDUM **

Charles M. Cabrera, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego,*670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Neville on Cabrera’s excessive force claim because Cabrera failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Neville’s actions were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. *See Martinez v. Stanford,*323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003) (elements of excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment); *see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (elements of excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant NaphCare, Inc. on Cabrera’s deliberate indifference claim because Cabrera failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as .to whether NaphCare, Inc.’s policies or customs caused the alleged inadequate treatment. *See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.,*698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (elements of a § 1983 claim against an entity defendant); *Jett v. Penner,*439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (elements of medical deliberate indifference claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Cabrera’s motion for default judgment against NaphCare, Inc. because the factors weigh against entry of default judgment. *See Eitel v. McCool,*782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard of review and factors to be considered when district court decides whether to enter default judgment).

Cabrera’s motion to extend the prison copy work limit (Docket No. 36) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, .
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1999
<CASH>                                       5,353,256
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               32,569,272
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  1,012,594
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            48,005,977
<PP&E>                                      33,869,783
<DEPRECIATION>                               9,010,094
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             146,824,531
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       41,045,671
<BONDS>                                              0
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<COMMON>                                       247,119
<OTHER-SE>                                  56,697,091
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               146,824,531
<SALES>                                     43,968,030
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            43,968,030
<CGS>                                       30,462,925
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               30,462,925
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             8,678,828
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             844,789
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,981,488
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,595,463
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,386,025
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,386,025
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.10
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</TABLE>
1 April 7, 2015

Federal Aviation Administration

Office of Rulemaking and Flight Standards Office

SUBJ: EXEMPTION REQUESTED FOR TITLE 14 C.F.R PART 91.119, 91.121, and

91.15 1 FOR INSTANT EYE MK

- 2 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

San Diego Gas & Electric is requesting an exemption from section 91.119, 91.121, and

91.151 for the InstantEye MK

- 2 unmanned aircraft for FAA Order 8130.34. San Diego Gas & Electric has already received an e xemption from these C.F.Rs via Section 333 exemption number 11238 but wa s informed we must also apply again for FAA Order

8130.34.

a. § 91.119 Minimum Safe Altitudes, no person may operate an aircraft below the following altitudes: Over other than congested areas. An a ltitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. Due to the height of SDG&E assets, powerlines, poles, towers, equipment, the sUAS will fly in restricted airspace designated by 14 CFR 91.119, which is not normal o perating airspace for civilian and commercial aircraft.

This will pose no risk to the public because aircraft are not operating in these

restricted areas.

b. § 91.121 Altimeter settings: Each person operating an aircraft shall maintain the cruising altitude or fight level of that aircraft, as the case may be, by reference to an altimeter that is set to the appropriate station. The InstantEye sUAS uses baraalt p ressure but does not program in an altimeter setting. The altitude is monitored by the Pilot In Command and constantly watched by the visual observer.

This exemption will benefit the public because the visual observer and operator are visual line of sigh t at all times, and will not pose any risk to the public.

c. § 91.151 (b) Fuel requirements for flight in VFR conditions: No person may begin a flight in a rotorcraft under VFR conditions unless there is enough fuel to fly to the first point on intended lan ding and, assuming normal cruising speed, to fly that for at least 20 minutes. The sUAS is battery operated with a maximum flying time of 20 to 30 minutes. However, this poses no safety risk because the take

off point is also located at the landing point a nd will cause no safety hazard to the public.

SDG&&E flights will be limited to inspecting our assets. In general, SDG&E will be operating over our Right of Ways and not over the public or commercial/industrial buildings and residential housing.2 As yo u can see in Figure (1), (2) and (3), this Unma nned Aerial Vehicle is micro size and weighs less than one pound

.

• Wingspan . 22.5 cm (8.9 inches) (frame); 37.5 cm (14.8 inches) (frame + props)

• Length. 22.5 cm (8.9 inches) ( frame); 37.5 cm (14.8 inches) (frame + props)

Figure 1

- InstantEye Mk

- 2 Components

Figure 2

– top of UAV3 Figure 3

- InstantEye Bottom view

Sincerely,



# DALLAS CORMIER

Dallas Cormier, SD1173 San Diego Gas & Electric 8316 Century Park Court, CP52E San Diego, C A 92123
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM PACIFIC
COAST APPAREL CO., INC AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          (9171)
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   46,036
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    414,234
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               500,307
<PP&E>                                          83,148
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 619,121
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          644,035
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                     5,453,798
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   619,121
<SALES>                                      2,360,882
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                        1,334,743
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,120,101
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                (2863)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              43,444
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (91,099)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (91,899)
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (91,899)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Raul SAINZ-RIVERA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72698

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 3, 2017

Raul Sainz-Rivera, Pro Se

OIL, Nancy Ellen Friedman, Andrew Jacob Oliveira, Trial Attorneys, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Raul Sainz-Rivera, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings. *Cruz Rendon v. Holder,*603 F.3d 1104, 1109 *550(9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

We reject Sainz-Rivera’s contentions that the IJ violated his due process rights by not allowing him to present evidence of his good moral character or by exhibiting bias toward Sainz-Rivera. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim).

Sainz-Rivera does not otherwise challenge the agency’s denial of relief.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth'Circuit Rule 36-3.
**EXHIBIT 31.02**

**RULE13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Barbra E. Kocsis,certify that:

1. I have reviewed thisreport on Form 10-Q of ML Trend-Following Futures Fund L.P.;

2. Based on my knowledge,this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge,the financial statements, and other financial information included in thisreport, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this report;

4. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures,or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of theend of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;

c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and

5. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation ofinternal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions):

a) All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

b) Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
| Date: November 14, 2007                      |
|----------------------------------------------|
|                                         |
| By                                           | /s/ BARBRA E. KOCSIS |   |
| Barbra E. Kocsis                             |
| Chief Financial Officer                      |
| (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) |

 

----