alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,912,788
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               36,089,660
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    908,235
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            48,431,376
<PP&E>                                      34,857,576
<DEPRECIATION>                              10,518,340
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             144,456,657
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       37,386,520
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       247,119
<OTHER-SE>                                  58,179,277
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               144,456,657
<SALES>                                     87,293,701
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            87,293,701
<CGS>                                       60,951,915
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               60,951,915
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            18,059,900
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,832,688
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              6,449,198
<INCOME-TAX>                                 2,580,991
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          3,868,207
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,868,207
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.16
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.16


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-4896

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CHRISTOPHER C. DAVIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,

District Judge. (CR-02-69)

Submitted: August 25, 2004 Decided: November 15, 2004

Before WIDENER, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald E. Justice, Jr., GASPERSON & JUSTICE, P.A., Hendersonville,

North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., United States

Attorney, Donald D. Gast, Assistant United States Attorney,

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Chad Davis appeals his conviction for assault

on an officer with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 111 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004), alleging that the evidence was

insufficient to support the conviction. Construing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the Government, we find that any

rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United States, 315

U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Accordingly, we affirm Davis’ conviction. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Earl WARNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Y. FRIEDMAN, Rabbi; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15246

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*719Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 26, 2017

Earl Warner, Pro Se

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Earl Warner appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing as duplicative his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d-443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We vacate and remand.

The district court dismissed Warner’s action as duplicative of Warner’s prior action in *Warner v. Cate,*No. 4:11-cv-05039 YGR *(“Warner*I”). However, Warner’s religious diet claims are based on events that occurred after *Warner I,*the claim based on the alleged failure to provide Warner with hot meals did not arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts, and defendants Rivera, Shleffar, Soliz, Zamora, and Maurino were not parties to the prior action. *See Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs,,*487 F.3d 684, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that in determining whether a later-filed action is duplicative, this court examines “whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same”), *abrogated on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell,*563 U.S. 880, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008). Without reviewing the settlement agreement in *Warner I,*which is not in the record, we cannot determine whether the present action can properly be understood as an action to enforce the settlement agreement in *Warner I.*We vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Depomed, Inc.(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2008 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Tammy L. Cameron, Interim Principal Accounting and Financial Officer of theCompany, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)  The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.

 
|   | Date: August 8, 2008                          |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                               |
|   |                                               |
|   | /s/ Tammy L. Cameron                               |
|   | Tammy L. Cameron                                   |
|   | Interim Principal Accounting and Financial Officer |

 

----
#### Cyrus P. Dryden, in Error, *versus*John Dryden

Where upon a default damages are assessed on all the counts, and one of them would be bad on general demurrer, the judgment must be reversed.

John Dryden brought an action against Cyrus P. Dryden, in which he declared, 1. on a written contract, *2. for money*had and received, and 3. for goods sold and delivered. Judgment was rendered against Cyrus, on all the counts, at February term 1827, of the Court of Common Pleas, upon a default. Whereupon he brought his writ of error, assigning for error that the first count was insufficient to sustain the action.

*Wells,*for the plaintiff in error, said the default did not cure the defect, which was fatal on general demurrer.

*Collins*v. *Gibbs, 2*Burr. 899 ; 1 Wms’s Saund. 228, note 1 ; Hem*menway*v. *Hickes,*4 Pick. 500. Where one count is defective, and damages are assessed by the jury on the whole declaration, judgment will be reversed, except where the judge certifies that there was no evidence on the insufficient count. *Backus*v. *Richardson,*5 Johns. R. 476 ; *Cheetham*v. *Til-lot son,*ibid. 430 ; *Eddowes*v. *Hopkins,*1 Doug. 376 ; *Clark*v. *Lamb,*6 Pick. 516. [ *Wilde*J. If the damages are assessed by the Court, perhaps it is to be presumed that they are given only on a good count]. In point of fact, in cases of default, the damages are usually allowed by the clerk upon the statement of the plaintiff, and are not assessed by the court; and the court never inquire into the sufficiency of the counts. In the present inslance, we know from the calculations of the party on the clerk’s files, that he took judgment on the first count.

The defendant in error did not appear.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment in this case must be reversed. The first count in the declaration is clearly bad in substance, (and would be so adjudged on demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment,) inasmuch as it does not allege any breach of the contract set forth. The damages after a default are general, and without looking into the papers filed, to see how the damages were in fact assessed, there is no legal ground to presume that they were not assessed on this count. The rule is well settled in case of a verdict, and general damages, when one *557count is bad in substance, that the judgment must be reversed, except where it can be amended, by the certificate of the judge, so as to show that the damages were assessed on the good counts alone. The same reasons apply with even more force in case of general damages on a default; and the case of *Hemmenway*v. *Hickes, 4*Pick. 497, is an authority directly in point.

*Judgment reversed.*
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of RFG Acquisition II Inc. (the "Company")
      on
      Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David
      W. Matre, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/David
                W. MatreDavid
                W. Matre
              Principal
                Financial Officer
              March
                3, 2008
#### Richard A. CANATELLA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 14-73457

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*631Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Richard A. Canatella, Pro Se

Gilbert Steven Rothenberg, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Clint Carpenter, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division/Appellate Section, Washington, DC, Robert R. Di Trolio, Esquire, Clerk, U.S. Tax Court, Washington, DC, William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Richard A. Canatella, an attorney, appeals pro se from the Tax Court’s decision, after a bench trial, upholding the determination of income tax deficiencies and penalties. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a recusal motion. *Glide v. Edwards,*803 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Canatella’s motion for re-cusal because Canatella failed to establish any ground for recusal. *See Nobles v. Comm’r,*105 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the “mandatory recusal provisions in section 455 do not apply to tax court judges,” and noting the absence of a basis in statute or court rule for requiring tax court judges’ recusal); *see also United States v. Johnson,*610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth grounds for recusal including “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject as unsupported by the record Canatella’s contention that the Tax Court demonstrated bias, partiality, or otherwise violated Canatella’s due process rights.

We do not consider arguments, allegations, or evidence raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); *Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of Am.,*842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988).

The Commissioner’s motion to strike extra-record material and arguments (Docket Entry No. 26) is granted.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher Bradley CHASE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30136

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 20, 2017

Zeno Benjamin Baucus, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Gillian Elissa Gosch, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDMT — Federal Defenders of Montana (Billings), Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Chase’s request for oral argument is denied.

*483MEMORANDUM **

Christopher Bradley Chase appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 32-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Chase contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his pre-sentencing rehabilitation and the minimal risk he believes he poses to the public in view of his recovery. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Chase’s sentence. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The court varied downward 14 months to account for Chase’s mitigating circumstances. The below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the number and nature of the guns Chase obtained and the other circumstances of the offense. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
General Term—Fourth Department.

Filed May 8, 1891.

#### William Williams, Resp’t, v. Edward F. Wright, App’lt.

Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted, with ten dollars costs to abide the event.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
the undersigned officer of ArthroCare Corporation (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | The accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of the Company for the three months ended September 30, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|       |  |              |  |  |  |                                      
|------ |  | ------------ |  |  |  | -------------------------------------
|Dated: |  | May 11, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Michael A. Baker                 
|       |  |              |  |  |  | Michael A. Baker                     
|       |  |              |  |  |  | President and Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (Section 906), or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of the written statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to ArthroCare Corporation and will be retained by ArthroCare Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### IMPERIAL BOWL OF MIAMI, INC., Bankrupt, and Harry Rowan, Appellants, v. William R. ROEMELMEYER, as Trustee, Appellee.

No. 22746.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 4, 1966.

*324Albert M. Lehrman, Miami, Fla., for appellants.

Paul G. Hyman, Feibelman, Friedman, Hyman & Britton, Miami, Fla., for appellee.

Before BROWN, GEWIN and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

These proceedings were initiated March 27, 1964, with a petition for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. On June 4, 1964, an order was entered adjudicating the debtor bankrupt, which order the Bankrupt sought to overturn by a petition for review. On review the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed the order of adjudication, and no appeal was taken therefrom. Subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy led to the sale here under attack. This is an appeal by the Bankrupt and a prospective purchaser at such sale. They challenge the order of the District Court affirming the confirmation by the Referee in Bankruptcy of the sale of certain assets of the Bankrupt.

The right to file a petition for review is granted by Section 39 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 67, to “[a] person aggrieved by an order of a referee.” Neither the Bankrupt (Hartman Corp. of America v. United States of America, et al., 304 F.2d 429 (8 Cir. 1962); Edell v. Di Piazza, 345 F.2d 336 (5 Cir. 1965); Manda v. Sinclair, 278 F.2d 629 (5 Cir. 1960)) nor a prospective bidder (In Re Realty Foundation, 75 F.2d 286 (S.D.N.Y.1935)) is aggrieved under the statute. Nothing in the Record or the Brief suggests the specifics of any other basis for the alleged grief. Unhappy or disappointed as each might be, neither is aggrieved.

The order of the District Court is

Affirmed.
#### GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. SAMIA, a Samoan, Respondent

No. 13-1901

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Milomilo”]

December 10, 1902

U. SEBREE, Captain, U.S.N., *President of the High Court.*

Under the Ordinance to regulate the acquisition of Land by the Government of the United States Naval Station, Tutuila, for Public Uses.

JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE having been commenced by the Government of the United States Naval Station, Tutuila, for the object of obtaining the lands (the property of the above-named Respondent) hereinafter described, for public uses for the United States Government under and by virtue of the Ordinance No. 20, 1900, being the Ordinance to regulate the acquisition of land by the Government of the United States Naval Station, Tutuila, for public purposes, for the United States Government, and under the provisions of said regulation due and proper notice having been given to the said Respondent through the Registrar of Titles, and the Registrar of Titles, by his report to this Court bearing date the 6th day of May, 1901, having informed the Court that the tender of the Respondent herein, amounting to Six Hundred Dollars ($600) had been accepted by the Petitioner Government and recommended that the Government be declared the proprietor of the said lands at and for the said consideration to be paid by the said Government, *46IT IS NOW HEREBY ORDERED and ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS; to wit:—

> 1. That the Government of the United States is and the same is hereby declared to be the proprietor of ALL THAT PIECE or PARCEL of LAND CALLED “MILOMILO”, STARTING at a peg on the road at the northwestern corner of said land, bearing 9 degrees 24 minutes, distance 128 feet, to a monument marked ^ thence bearing 301 degrees 41 minutes, distance 135 feet to a stream; thence along stream 52 degrees 45 minutes, distance 35 feet, to the boundary of land the property of the United States Government, and recorded in Vol. 1, Folios 46, 47, and 48 of the Registrar of Transfers of the United States Naval Station, Tutuila; thence following along the boundary of said land of the United States Government, bearing 318 degrees, distance 49 feet; thence 331 degrees 15 minutes, distance 52 feet; thence 332 degrees 30 minutes, distance 21 feet; thence 27 degrees, 30 minutes, distance 49 feet, to high-water mark; thence bearing westerly along high-water mark to the starting point.

> 2. That the said Government shall pay in consideration of the release of all claims and demands of the said Respondent to said land, the sum of Six Hundred Dollars ($600) together with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum from the 7th day of March 1901 to the 10th day of December, 1902, amounting to $80.40, and shall pay further costs of Attorney, Arbitration and Registrar’s costs, amounting to $76.50, amounting in all to the sum of $756.90.

> 3. The Registrar of Titles is hereby instructed to draw up a transfer of said land, and to issue a certificate of title to said lands in favor of said Government.

GIVEN under my hand and seal of the court on this 10th day of December, 1902.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

DENNIS JEROME CALLOWAY, )

DOC# 144946, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. )

) Case Nos. 2D17-3096

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) 

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed February 16, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas 

County; William H. Burgess, III, Judge.

Dennis Jerome Calloway, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

VILLANTI, SLEET, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.