alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ike Shawndale NUNN, Appellant v. Jeff SESSIONS, Appellee

No. 16-5305

September Term, 2016

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed On: July 21, 2017

Ike Shawndale Nunn, Arkansas Department of Correction Cummins Unit, Grady, AR, pro se.

Warden, Arkansas Department of Correction Cummins Unit, Grady, AR for Appellant.

R. Craig Lawrence, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Washington, DC, for Appellee.

BEFORE: Tatél and Wilkins, Circuit Judges, and Ginsbürg, Senior Circuit Judge

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This appeal was considered on the- record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by appellant. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir, Rule 34(j). Upon consideration of the foregoing and the motion for appointment of counsel, it is

ORDERED that the motion for appointment of counsel be denied. In civil cases, appellants are not entitled to appointment of counsel when they have not demonstrated sufficient likelihood of success on the merits. It is

FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed September 20, 2016, dismissing appellant’s complaint be affirmed. The district court properly dismissed appellant’s complaint, because a government official’s decision whether to investigate and prosecute a case is within the absolute discretion of the Executive Branch. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
Order entered October 25, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00841-CV

JAYSON HOWARD MOORE, Appellant

V.

DALLAS MORNING NEWS, INC., KEVIN KRAUSE, Appellee

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-06923

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s October 22, 2021 unopposed motion for 

extension of time to file his principal brief. In light of the Court’s letter of that 

same date questioning the Court’s jurisdiction and suspending the deadline for the 

brief, we DENY the motion as moot.

/s/ KEN MOLBERG

JUSTICE
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shawnee Otto JENNINGS, a/k/a Frank White, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4825

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 31, 2017

Decided: June 30, 2017

*704Daniel Micah Blau, HALE, BLAU <& SAAD, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before DIAZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Shawnee Otto Jennings pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, marijuana, and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012), and the district court sentenced Jennings to 188 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Jennings’ counsel has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), certifying that no meritorious grounds exist for appeal but questioning the denial of a motion to suppress and the validity of Jennings’ sentence. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in Jennings’ plea agreement. Jennings has received notice of the right to file a pro se supplemental brief and, through counsel, has filed a response to the motion to dismiss, asking the court to conduct an *Anders*review.

We conclude that Jennings’ appeal waiver is valid because he entered it knowingly and intelligently. *See United States v. Manigan,*592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010). Jennings waived the right to appeal his conviction and any sentence within the statutory maximum. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal as to any issues within the compass of the waiver that are waiva-ble by law. *See United States v. Johnson,*410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that certain claims cannot be waived by plea agreement). We also conclude that the record does not support any claims that cannot be waived by plea agreement. *See, e.g., United States v. Copeland,*707 F.3d 522, 530 (4th Cir. 2013); *United States v. Attar,*38 F.3d 727, 732-33 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1994).

In accordance with *Anders,*we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the district court’s judgment as to any issue not precluded by the appeal waiver. This court requires that counsel inform Jennings, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Jennings requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Jennings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART*
file:///J|/SNURS/Quarterly%20SNUR%20Batches/Q13-3/June/P-13-0259/p130259.eng.txt[7/2/2013 9:31:47 AM] INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 13-0259 Focus Ready Draft 2/25/2013 ENGINEER: Avcin \ REC PV (kg/yr):file:///J|/SNURS/Quarterly%20SNUR%20Batches/Q13-3/June/P-13-0259/p130259.eng.txt[7/2/2013 9:31:47 AM] SAT (concerns) (02/15/2013): Related Cases and Related Cases and Misc SAT Info: Ecotox: Analogs: Migration to groundwater: Negligible PBT rating: P3B1T1 . Health: 1-2 Drinking Water, Inhalation Eco: 3 Water (All releases to water with a CC = 4.00 ppb) OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE RATING: 0-1 NOTES & KEY ASSUMPTIONS: Generated by the 06/07/2005 version of ChemSTEER.

POLLUTION PREVENTION CONSIDERATIONS:file:///J|/SNURS/Quarterly%20SNUR%20Batches/Q13-3/June/P-13-0259/p130259.eng.txt[7/2/2013 9:31:47 AM] EXPOSURE-BASED REVIEW: No INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 13-0259file:///J|/SNURS/Quarterly%20SNUR%20Batches/Q13-3/June/P-13-0259/p130259.eng.txt[7/2/2013 9:31:47 AM] INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 13-0259file:///J|/SNURS/Quarterly%20SNUR%20Batches/Q13-3/June/P-13-0259/p130259.eng.txt[7/2/2013 9:31:47 AM] INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 13-0259file:///J|/SNURS/Quarterly%20SNUR%20Batches/Q13-3/June/P-13-0259/p130259.eng.txt[7/2/2013 9:31:47 AM]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
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<NAME> NATIONAL AUTO CREDIT, INC.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-01-1997
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .17
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If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

- 1

- 

### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

JONATHAN F. BEARD,

Plaintiff

- Appellant, UNPUBLISHED September 14, 2023

v No. 360695 Wayne Circuit Court PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE, also known as PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 21

- 016469

- NF

Defendant

- Appellee.

Before: P ATEL , P .J., and S WARTZLE and H OOD , JJ.

S WARTZLE , J. ( concurring in part

, dissenting in part

, and concurring in the judgment )

. I respectfully concur in part, dissent in part, and concur in the judgment. I agree with the majority’s analysis in all respects with the exception of the majority’s discussion of the plain

- error standard (including footnote 4) and Part IV. I would not reach the subrogation issue because it was not raised

— or , for that matter, glanced at, even with a side

- eye

— before the trial court. Under our “raise or waive” jurisprudence in traditional civil matters, Napier v Jacobs , 429 Mich 222, 232

- 234; 414 NW2d 862 (1987), Beard waived appellate review on this claim. Although I acknowledge that there is published case law for applying the Carines plain

- error review in this circumstance, see, e.g., Henderson v Dep’t of Treasury , 307 Mich App 1, 9; 858 NW2d 733 (2014), for reasons similar to those set forth by Judge M.J. K ELLY in his concurring opinion in Mr Sunshine v Delta College Bd of Trustees , __ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (2022) ( M.J. K ELLY , P.J., concurring), I believe th at the sounder approach in traditional civil appeals like this is the “raise or waive” rule.

Until a conflicts panel of this Court (of which I am not calling for here, given that the matter is not outcome determinative, MCR 7.215(J)(3)(a)) or our Supreme C ourt definitively settles this matter (again), panels of this Court will continue to apply inconsistent standards of review to unpreserved claims in cases like this. In the meantime, litigants and trial courts will suffer from the uncertainty engendered b y our inconsistency. While it might just be easier to get in

- line with the least

- restrictive approach (here, the Carines plain

- error standard), I believe that precedent, principle, and prudence all favor the stricter standard in run

- of

- the

- mill civil matt ers like this one.- 2

-

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent with respect to the majority’s decision to reach the merits of the subrogation argument, and I otherwise concur as to the remainder of its opinion and the judgment.

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of BRIGHTCUBE, INC. (the "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned Michael Manion, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Brightcube, Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Dated: March 31, 2010





/s/Michael Manion





Michael Manion


Chief Executive Officer





/s/ Michael Manion





Michael Manion


Chief Financial Officer
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21

- 7341

FREDERICK LYNN SELLERS , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. BRYAN K. DOBBS, Warden , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Orangeburg

. R. Bryan Harwell, Chief District Judge. ( 5:20

- cv - 01683

- RBH )

Submitted : February 17, 2022 Decided: February 23, 2022

Before AGEE and RUSHING , Circuit Judges , and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed as modified by un published per curiam opinion

.
Frederick Lynn Sellers , Appellant Pro Se. Lauren L. Hummel, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 21-7341 Doc: 11 Filed: 02/23/2022 Pg: 1 of 32 PER CURIAM: Frederick Lynn Sellers , a federal prisoner, appeals the dis trict court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing for lack of jurisdiction his
28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in which he sought to challenge his conviction by way of the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Pursuant to § 22 55(e), a prisoner may challenge his conviction in a traditional writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 if a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. [Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction when: (1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law chang ed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.
In re Jones , 226 F.3d 328, 333

- 34 ( 4th Cir. 2000). We have reviewed the record and, following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Greer v. United States , 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021), find no reversible error in the district court’s determination that Sellers failed to demonstrate that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is an inadequate or ineffective means of challenging his conviction. However, because the district court lacked jurisdiction over Sellers’ § 2241 petition, Rice v. Rivera , 617 F.3d 802,
807

- 08 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), we modify the court’s order to reflect that the dismissal of Sellers’ petition is without prejudice and affirm the order, Sellers v. Dobbs , No. 5:20

- cv - 01683

- RBH (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 2021), as modified, see 28 U.S.C. § 2106;
S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner ’ s Ass ’ n , Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC , 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013). We deny Sellers’ motion to appoint counsel and USCA4 Appeal: 21-7341 Doc: 11 Filed: 02/23/2022 Pg: 2 of 33 dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument wou ld not aid the decisional

process.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED USCA4 Appeal: 21-7341 Doc: 11 Filed: 02/23/2022 Pg: 3 of 3
#### HUIFANG ZHENG, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 13-74174

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 14, 2017* San Francisco, California

FILED JULY 17, 2017

Armin Alexander Skalmowski, Law Office of Armin Skalmowski, Alhambra, CA, for Petitioner.

Arthur Leonid Rabin, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: WALLACE, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

ORDER AMENDING

The memorandum disposition, filed on March 16, 2017, is amended as follows: On page 2, line 10, replace “prosecution” with “persecution.” With the foregoing amendment, Zheng’s petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing will be accepted in this case.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM **

Huifang Zheng, a native of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (Board) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo. *Ridore v. Holder,*696 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir, 2012) (citations omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Zheng failed to establish past persecution. Although the IJ found that Zheng’s family suffered economic harm as a result of the number of children Zheng’s parents produced, substantial evidence supports the finding that such harm did not reduce the family to an impoverished existence. *See Gormley v.*
      *493
      *Ashcroft,*364 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Zheng failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. *See Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1016-18 (9th Cir. 2003).

As Zheng failed to establish eligibility for asylum, she has also failed to show she is eligible for withholding of removal, which imposes a heavier burden of proof. *Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Finally, substantial evidence supports the Board’s denial of Zheng’s CAT claim because she failed to establish it is more likely than not that she would be forced to undergo a sterilization procedure at the instigation of the Chinese government, or that she would be subject to other forms of torture. *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010).

PETITION DENIED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.01
                                                                   -------------




                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
                       ----------------------------------


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-88513, No. 333-39016 and No. 333-75230) of
DSL.net, Inc. of our reports dated February 26, 2002, except for the paragraph
in Note 15, as to which the date is March 1, 2002, relating to the financial
statements, which appear in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.



PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Stamford, CT
March 29, 2002
#### Ricardo LOPEZ-ZAMARRIPA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-74048

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*355Submitted September 26, 2017 *

FILED OCTOBER 3, 2017

Philippe Martinet, Martinet Law, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner.

Jesse Matthew Bless, Chief Counsel Ice, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ricardo Lopez-Zamarripa, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigrations Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law, *Cerezo v. Muka*sey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s determination of the governing statutes and regulations, *Simeonov v.*Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). We deny the petition for review.

The agency did not err in finding that Lopez-Zamarripa failed to establish membership in a cognizable social group. *See Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch,*816 F.3d 1226, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding “imputed wealthy Americans” returning to Mexico did not constitute a particular social group); *Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder,*600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding “returning Mexicans from the United States” did not constitute a particular social group). Thus, Lopez-Zamarripa’s withholding of removal claim fails.

As to his CAT claim, we reject Lopez-Zamarripa’s due process contention regarding the BIA’s standard of review because he did not show error. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim); *Ridore*v. *Holder,*696 F.3d 907, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2012) (the BIA reviews for clear error the IJ’s determination of whether an applicant is likely to be subject to torture). Lopez-Zamarripa does not otherwise challenge the agency’s denial of CAT. Thus, we deny the petition for review as to his CAT claim.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
ex10-14.htm




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