alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Lightfoot et als. *vs.*The Bank of the Commonwealth.

Error *Cor am' vobis.*

[¡Messrs. Sanders & Depew for appellants: Mr. Crittenden for appellee.]

From the Circuí? Court for Ohio County.

*October*19.

A writ of error *coram vobis,*up on whiohno other error is assigned' than that the Bank of the Com’th(thepl’lf in the judg-’t,) has no legal existence, no right to sue, and is un constitutional — questions repeatedly decided in this court—is obviouslyxlefective: especially, when the judgment on which the writ is founded, has itself bee.n- *affirmed:■*'jihe jndg’t of quashal, b’ro-’t up by appeal, is affirmed as *a delay case.*

Uniting errors of fact, arid errors of 'law,- in ' the same writ of error *coram vobis,*is a fatal defect.

Chief Justice Robertson

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

A judgment of the Circuit Court, in favor of- the Bank of the Commonwealth against the present appellants, having been affirmed by this Court, with damages, and an execution thereon having been replevied, they sued out a writ of error *coram*vobis, with a supersedeas, and assigned for error—first, that, when the suit.v as instituted, and when the judgment was rendered in this Court, and in the Circuit Court, and when the execution was issued, there were no such persons, *in law or in fact,*as the “ *President and Directors*of the Bank of the Common-, wealth;” second—that they had no valid authority to sue in their corporate character, and, third—that the charter of the said Bank is unconstitutional.

The Circuit Court having quashed the writ, the plaintiffs appealed to this Court, and we are now asked to decide that the appeal is prosecuted altogether for delay, and therefore to affirm the judgment.

The second and third errors assigned upon the writ of error *coram vobis,*being matters of law, of which this Court has judicial knowledge, which, according to former decisions, is against the assumption of the. appellants, and those errors, moreover, being concluded by the judgment of affirmance, rendered prior to the issuing of the writ, there can be no doubt that, so far as those two assignments may be concerned, the writ wquld not lie and might, therefore, have been properly quashed.

The first and only other assignment of error, if it should be understood as embracing error of law and of fact, was, radically defective, and the writ might, on that ground, have been quashed. And if, as we are in-*493dined to understand its constructive import and legal effect, it contain matter of law only, then, as it embraces, as well judgments which cannot be thus assailed, as the execution, which might be, if the law be as assumed, it was *therefore*quashable; and it was liable to quashal because also, the law, as assumed in the assignment, is inconsistent with the established doctrine of this Court, and therefore the deduction in the assignment, must be considered as judicially appearing tq he false.

We are, therefore, of the opinion, not only that the judgment of quashal was right, but that this should bp deemed a clear case pf delay; and therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, upon this submission qf the case as one of delay.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tony NIXON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10461

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017*

Filed July 17, 2017

Lauren G. LaBuff, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU-Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rosemary Gordon Panuco, Attorney, Law Office of Rosemary Gordon Panuco, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Tony Nixon appeals his bench-trial conviction and 18-month sentence for one count of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens for the purpose of financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(v)(I), (a)(l)(A)(ii), and (a)(1)(B)®, and two counts of transportation of illegal aliens for profit, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)®. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Nixon contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. He has not shown that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective. *See Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (to establish that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, defendant must show that counsel performed deficiently and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
assignmenthernandez.htm








	
 Exhibit 10.1 

	
 ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 BETWEEN HERNANDEZ VENTURES INC. AND LINGAS RESOURCES, INC. 

















 PROSPERIDAD GOLD CLAIM ASSIGNMENT 


 







 


 BY virtue of this DEED OF ASSIGNMENT, Hernandez Ventures Inc., a company duly incorporated in the Republic of the Philippines, hereby assigns all title rights and mineral rights to the Prosperidad Gold Claim located in Prosperidad, Philippines to Lingas Resources Inc., a company duly incorporated in the United States of America. 


 


 The assignor hereby acknowledges receipt of the sum of USD$5,000.00 from the assignee in full and final settlement of this transaction. 


 


 Both parties agree that the laws of the Philippines shall govern this agreement. 


 


 DATED THIS 20th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2010 


 







 


        “JANSON ALTERBURN”                                                                                              “JOHN NGITEW”                                            


 


 Hernandez Ventures Inc.                                                                             Lingas Resources Inc. 


 


 (As per authorized signature)                                                                                       (As per authorized signature) 


 














  





-1-
Exhibit 32.1

Written Statement of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)

The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority (the Authority), hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, on the date hereof:

(a) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Authority for the quarter ended June 30, 2006 filed on the date hereof with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(b) information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Authority.



/s/    MITCHELL GROSSINGER
ETESSMitchell Grossinger EtessChief Executive Officer, Mohegan Tribal Gaming AuthorityAugust 9, 2006


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
to the Authority and will be retained by the Authority and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6511

RONALD G. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

THOMAS S. LEEBRICK; MOSBY LEEBRICK,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, Chief District

Judge. (CA-98-159-R)

Submitted: June 18, 1998 Decided: July 9, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald G. Johnson, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, a Virginia inmate, appeals the district court’s

order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint under

28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1998). We have reviewed

the record and the district court’s opinion and find that this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Johnson v. Leebrick, No. CA-98-159-R

(W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 1998). Appellant’s motions to appoint counsel,

to expedite his appeal, and for oral argument are denied. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
J.O.L. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2160112

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 5, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                     AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                      SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

In connection with the Report of Travelstar, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-KSB/A-2 for the for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, William
Alverson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ William Alverson
------------------------------
William Alverson
Chief Executive Officer
December 10, 2007
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6563 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6563

 To repeal a requirement for the Secretary of Transportation to issue 
     certain regulations with respect to advanced impaired driving 
                  technology, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 1, 2023

 Mr. Perry (for himself, Mr. Duncan, Mr. Ogles, Mr. Massie, Mr. Gosar, 
 Ms. Boebert, Ms. Hageman, Mr. Rosendale, and Mr. Roy) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                                Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To repeal a requirement for the Secretary of Transportation to issue 
     certain regulations with respect to advanced impaired driving 
                  technology, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Kill Switches in Cars Act''.

SEC. 2. ADVANCED IMPAIRED DRIVING TECHNOLOGY.

    Section 24220 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public 
Law 117-58) is repealed.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodolfo Lopez SOTO, a.k.a. Francisco Carmelo Adames-Cruz, a.k.a. Rodolfo Lopez-Soto, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10277

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 31, 2017 *

Filed June 02, 2017

Krissa Marie Lanham, USPX—Office of the US Attorney, Two Renaissance Square, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

David Eisenberg, I, Esquire, Attorney, David Eisenberg, PLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Rodolfo Lopez Soto, Pro Se

Before: HUG, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Rodolfo Lopez Soto appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his 37-month sentence for re-entry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Soto’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Soto has waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Because the record discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the appeal waiver, we dismiss the appeal. *See United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1999
<CASH>                                      20,379,048
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  531,536
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           107,331,836
<PP&E>                                      20,808,396
<DEPRECIATION>                             (2,963,495)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              50,816,891
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       21,769,134
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                 27,929,000
<COMMON>                                        48,198
<OTHER-SE>                                 (4,111,065)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                50,816,891
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            33,256,457
<CGS>                                       17,818,010
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               57,718,335
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             430,753
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (24,705,192)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (24,705,192)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (24,705,192)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.73)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.73)


</TABLE>
07/29/201 0 15:09 FAX 2024935142 FAA ^ DMS @1001/002 

rn HARRISON 

'fACHT SALES, iNC^ 

Kent Narrows 

PO BOX 98 

Crasonville. MD 21638 

(410) 827-7800 hvs&.harrisonvachtsales.com Fax (410) 827-4830 

June 29. 2010 RtC£/V£0 

Regional Counsel for ihc Eastern Region 

Federal Aviation Administration JUL 1 3 

1 Aviation Plaza , 

Jamaica, NY 11434 ^bARlNQ DOCKET 

DoclcetNo.2009EA700446 CPIO^A^ ^ /S^/ O ' W^^ ^ 

Attention Hearing Docket Clerk, 

I am submitting a request Ibr a formal hearing in regards to the above docket number. 1 have included a 

copy of the Fiival Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty Response Attachment. I can be reached at 410-336-4242 

for further contact. 

Sincerely, 

'^:$^;;2)0a>O;^ rWjuLj^- — 

David Harrison 

Pre.sident 
07/29/201 0 15:1 0 FAX 2024935142 FAA + DMS @1002/002 

izlV't:[) 

^DOCKCT 

Regional Couiuel for the Eastern Region Dare ^ 

Federal Aviaiiun AdnuDislnuion ' ' ^ % OrtlQ 

1 Aviaaon PLua " 

Jamaica, NY 11434 

HaiTijon Yacht Sales, Inc. - 2009EA700446 

Subject: FinnI Noiice of Proposed Civil Penalty 

In reply to your Fio:iI Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty Hairi.'ion Yacht Sale.;, Inc. electa ro pioceecl as indicLiled by iki check muJc 

beside the numbered paragraph t>«low; 

1. (_} Harrison Yachi Sales, luc. hereby submit:! the lunuunl of the proposed civil pcnilty with tlic under&titnding that in Order 

Assessing Civil Penally will be issued in that amount. 

2, (»J J Hiurison Yacht Salw, Inc. hereby requests a formal licariug in accordance with Sccdon 13.16 of the Fedcial Aviation 

Regulations. 

- • By sendlug this fonu lo iLc Ftdcriil Aviutiun Admini.<(trat]on, Easlcrn Region, Harrison Yacht 

Sales, Inc. alw hereby cerilfits (bai a copy of this rorm has been filed with the Heoriiia Dock£L 

Clerk (Uearlug Docket, Federal Aviation Administration, ilUO Independence Avenue, S.W., 

Room 924A, Washington. DC 20591, Allcnliou: Ileurini; Docket Clerk). 

** Please note that Hamjion Yachi Sales. Inc. will not he entitled to a hearinz if it file.'; chi.-i form with the Fcrieral AviLHioii 

Administration. Easiem Region. WfrHOtlT hjvlnp filed ihi.s form or j ^rUtfU reauest for a hearini! with the HRARINCi DOrKRT 

CLERK: 

A'rrORNEY/REPRESENTATIVE " 

Name: 

Firm; 

Address: 

Phoi»c No.
#### Jehan Zeb MIR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANDZEL, ROBIN, BLOOM, CSATO, LC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56251

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*753Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 30, 2017

Jehan Zeb Mir, Pro Se

Thomas M. Robins, III, Attorney, Frandzel Robins Bloom & Csato, L.C., Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Frandzel, Robin, Bloom, Csato, LC, Peter Csato, Eleane Pang

Russell Iungerich, Iungerich & Spack-man, Pic, Rolling Hills, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Iungerich & Spackman, Paul Spackman, Bob Benjy

Russell Iungerich, Pro Se

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jehan Zeb Mir appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); *Headwaters, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,*399 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal based on res judicata). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Mir’s federal claims on the basis of res judicata because these claims were raised or could have been raised in a prior federal action between the parties or those in privity with them that resulted in a final judgment on the merits. *See Headwaters, Inc.,*399 F.3d at 1052 (elements of res judicata).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mir leave to amend his complaint. *See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court may dismiss without leave where amendment would be futile).

We reject as without merit Mir’s contention that his case was improperly transferred to Judge Snyder following appel-lees’ filing a notice of related cases. *See*C.D. Cal. General Order No. 16-05.

The request of appellees Iungerich & Spackman, Paul Spackman, and Russell Iungerich for attorney’s fees and costs, set forth in their answering brief, is denied without prejudice to filing a timely motion for fees and a timely bill of costs. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 38. Their request to modify the judgmént to declare Mir a vexatious litigant, also set forth in their answering brief, is denied.

Mir’s request for assignment of his case to a different appeal panel (Docket Entry No. 22) is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Amendment to Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of drugstore.com, inc. (the
Company) for the period ending December 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Dawn G. Lepore, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/ Dawn G. LeporeDawn G. LeporePresident, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
to drugstore.com, inc. and will be retained by drugstore.com, inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

September 10, 2008
#### Jose BARTOLO-VASQUEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72010

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 30, 2017

Zachary Miller Nightingale, Attorney, Genna Ellis Beier, Van Der Hout, Brigag-liano &' Nightingale, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, Tiffany L. Walters, Trial Attorney, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this.case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Bartolo-Vasquez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) or*746der dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s continuous physical presence determination. *Gutierrez v. Mukasey,*521 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008). We review de novo due process claims. *Colmenar v. INS,*210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Bartolo-Vasquez failed to present sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to establish the requisite continuous physical presence for cancellation of removal. *See*8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4)(B), 1229b(b)(1)(A).

We are not persuaded by, and the record does not support, Bartolo-Vasquez’s contention that the agency erred or violated due process by failing to consider his personal circumstances in its continuous physical presence determination, *See Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (the agency must consider the issues raised and express its decision “in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Almaghzar v. Gonzales,*457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner “had ample opportunity to present his case, and the record as a whole does not suggest that the IJ did not conduct the hearing with an open mind”).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Bartolo-Vasquez’s unexhausted contentions relating to the IJ’s alleged failure to notify him of the need to provide corroborative evidence. *See Tijani v. Holder,*628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before the BIA.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.