alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jack R. FINNEGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A. Patrick MUNOZ; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56081

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

Filed October 6, 2017

Jack R. Finnegan, Pro Se

Scott Grossberg, Esquire, Attorney, Grossberg & Hoehn, Upland, CA, for Defendants-Appellees A. Patrick Munoz, Noam Isaac Duzman, Jennifer J Farrell, Emily V. Hester

Sarah Lee Overton, Attorney, Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates, P.C., Riverside, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Franz E. Miller, Stacie D. Turner

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jack R. Finnegan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine. *Noel v. Hall,*341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Finnegan’s action as barred by the *Rook-er-Feldman*doctrine because Finnegan’s action is a “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment, and he raises claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. *See Cooper v. Ramos,*704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding plaintiffs claim for conspiracy was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision); *Henrichs v. Valley View Dev.,*474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) *(Rooker-Feldman*doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend the complaint because amendment would have been futile. *See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am.,*232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

We reject as unsupported by the record Finnegan’s contention that the district court was biased against him.

Finnegan’s motions for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (Docket Entry Nos, 21 and 22) are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)


         In  connection  with the  accompanying  Quarterly  Report of  Concierge
Technologies,  Inc.  (the  "Company")  on  Form  10-QSB  for the  quarter  ended
September 30, 2006 (the "Report"),  I, Allen E. Kahn, Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, hereby certify that to my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. ss.78o(d)); and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  November 20, 2006
                                                         /s/ Allen E. Kahn
                                                         -----------------------
                                                         Allen E. Kahn
                                                         Chief Financial Officer


         The above  certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.  ss.1350)  and is not being filed as
part of the Form 10-QSB or as a separate disclosure document.














                                                                    Exhibit 32.1
                                                                Page 1 of 1 Page
#### Jimmy TORRES, Petitioner-Appellant v. T. G. WERLICH, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Pollock, Respondent-Appellee

No. 16-30292 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 9, 2017

Jimmy Torres, Pro Se

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jimmy Torres, federal prisoner # 93181-280, appeals the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. In his petition, he challenged the total term of 180 months of imprisonment imposed following his conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, possession of a firearm by an illegal alien, and 31 counts of making a false statement during the purchase of a firearm. Torres argues that the district court’s imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment renders his sentence unconstitutional. He also contends that his petition meets the requirements of the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).

Torres’s argument is a collateral attack of a federal sentence. Section 2255 is the primary mechanism for bringing such a claim. *See Pack v. Yusuff,*218 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). However, had his pleading been construed as a § 2255 motion, the district court would have lacked jurisdiction to consider it because Torres was convicted and sentenced in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas and he filed the pleading in the Western District of Louisiana. § 2255(a), (e). Also, it would have been an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion. *See Leal Garcia v. Quarterman,*573 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2009); *Hooker v. Sivley,*187 F.3d 680, 681-82 (5th Cir. 1999); § 2244(b)(3)(A).

A § 2241 petition that attacks custody resulting from a federally imposed sentence may be entertained under the savings clause if the petitioner establishes that the § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention. § 2255(e); *see Reyes-Requena v. United States,*243 F.3d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2001). To make this showing, Torres must establish that his claims are based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision that establishes that he may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense, and his claims were foreclosed by circuit law at the time of his trial, direct appeal, or first § 2255 motion. *See Reyes-Requena,*243 F.3d at 904. Torres has failed to make the requisite showing.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cm. R. 47.5.4.
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41727

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KEITH A. SCHADE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 836

Filed: December 2, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and suspended, unified sentence of seven years, with a 

minimum period of confinement of two years, affirmed. 

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Keith A. Schade was found guilty of grand theft. I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b), and 

18-2409. The district court sentenced Schade to a unified term of seven years, with a minimum 

period of confinement of two years, but suspended the sentence and placed Schade on probation. 

Schade appeals.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 
2

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Schade’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### Tiemoko COULIBALY, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE and Office of Special Counsel, Respondents

No. 16-1156

September Term, 2016

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed On: August 15, 2017

Tiemoko Coulibaly, Silver Spring, MD, pro se.

Sean Siekkineñ, Allison Kidd-Miller, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

BEFORE: Millett, Pillard, and Wilkins, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This petition for review of letters from the Department of State dated February 6, 2015 and July 22,2015, and a letter from the Office of Special Counsel dated September 2, 2015, was considered on the briefs filed by the parties. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 84(j). Upon consideration of the foregoing and the motion to appoint counsel, it is

ORDERED that the motion to appoint counsel be denied. In civil cases, petitioners are not entitled to appointment of counsel when they have not demonstrated sufficient likelihood of success on the merits. It is

FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition for review be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner has failed to identify any statutory provision authorizing judicial review of the challenged communications, and transfer of the case to the district court for consideration as a petition for writ o'f mandamus, see Weber v. United States, 209 F.3d 756 (D.C. Cir. 2000), would not be in the interest of justice, see 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be' published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
#### Maher Conrad SUAREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott KERNAN; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16902

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 19, 2017

Maher Conrad Suarez, Pro Se

Kevin Allen Voth, Deputy Attorney General, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Maher Conrad Suarez appeals pro se from the district court dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations relating to his gang validation and placement in the administrative segregation unit and secured housing unit (“SHU”) for an indefinite term. We’ review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). *Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A.,*656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Suarez’s action as barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion because Suarez has previously litigated the same claims in California state court against the same parties or their privies. *See Furnace v. Giurbino,*838 F.3d 1019, 1023-26 (9th Cir. 2016) (California habeas petition had claim preclusive effect on civil rights litigation because both actions challenged plaintiffs gang validation and SHU placement); *Gonzales v. Cal. Dep't of Corr.,*739 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (reasoned denials of California habeas petitions have claim preclusive effect on civil litigation); *Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara,*604 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth elements of claim preclusion under California law and explaining that California’s doctrine of claim preclusion is based on a primary rights theory).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose GUTIERREZ-YANEZ, a/k/a Daniel Saucedo-Gutierrez, a/k/a Jose Gutierrez-Saucedo, a/k/a Daniel Gutierrez-Saucedo, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4743

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 16, 2017

Decided: June 30, 2017

*703Helen L. Parsonage, ELLIOT MORGAN PARSONAGE, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jose Gutierrez-Yanez appeals his sentence of 140 months in prison after pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and illegal reentry of an aggravated felon. The district court sentenced him below his Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months. On appeal, he questions whether his sentence is greater than necessary to satisfy the sentencing purposes in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). We affirm.

When reviewing a criminal sentence, we must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range. *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). If there is no procedural error, we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. *Id.*We consider a sentence within or below the Guidelines range to be presumptively reasonable on appeal. *United States v. White,*850 F.3d 667, 674 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2252, 198 L.Ed.2d 687, 2017 WL 1956227 (U.S. June 12, 2017); *United States v. Susi,*674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). The presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. *United States v. Louthian,*756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that Gutierrez-Yanez’s sentence is reasonable. He does not identify any procedural error by the district court, and we discern no such error. Moreover, we conclude that he fails to rebut the presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable. The district court properly considered the parties’ sentencing arguments and provided a reasoned explanation for the sentence, with specific consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and Gutierrez-Yanez’s downward variance request. The district court granted that request and imposed a reasonable sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
Facility and Unit specific emission reports for 2002 and 2018 are generated using a Microsoft Access

Database that is too large to upload to the docket materials.  File name is :   “Pechan CENRAP EI

Summary Project_Final Aug 2007.mdb”

This file is available upon request.
Exhibit 32.2

Written Statement of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 906

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)

The undersigned, the Chief Financial Officer of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority (the Authority), hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, on the date hereof:

(a) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Authority for the quarter ended December 31, 2006 filed on the date hereof with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(b) information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Authority.





/s/    LEO M.
CHUPASKALeo M. ChupaskaChief Financial Officer, Mohegan Tribal Gaming AuthorityFebruary 13, 2007


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
to the Authority and will be retained by the Authority and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
---

EXHIBIT 99.16

VIA EDGAR

|TO: | United States Securities and
      Exchange Commission
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                       
|Re: | Asanko Gold Inc. (the
      "Company")                
|    | Annual Report on Form 40-F                            
|    | Consent of Expert                                     

This consent is provided in connection with the Company's
annual report on Form 40-F for the financial year ended December 31, 2016, and
any amendments thereto (the Annual Report), as filed by the Company
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. The Annual Report
incorporates by reference, among other things, the Companys Annual Information
Form for the financial year ended December 31, 2016 (the Annual Information
Form), and the Managements Discussion and Analysis for the year ended
December 31, 2016 (the MD&A).

I, Philip Bentley, Company Executive: Geology and Resources
(Pr.Sci.Nat.), DO HEREBY CONSENT, to:

- the use of my name and the disclosure of me in the Annual Information Form
  as the person responsible for approving the new mineral resource estimates for
  the Nkran deposit and the Dynamite Hill deposit, each forming part of the
  Asanko Gold Mine located in Ghana, West Africa;
- The use of my name and the disclosure of me as the person responsible for
  verifying of certain scientific and technical information contained in the
  MD&A in respect of the Asanko Gold Mine; and
- the inclusion and incorporation by reference of such information in the
  Annual Report.



Dated March 15, 2017



|/s/ Philip Bentley          | 
|--------------------------- | 
|Philip Bentley, Pr.Sci.Nat. | 

---
#### Namstrad, Incorporated, Appellant and Respondent, *v.*Olavarria & Co., Inc., Respondent and Appellant.

Submitted November 15, 1943;

decided November 19, 1943.

*Winthrop E. Kellogg*for motion.

No one opposed.

Motion granted.
#### In the Matter of Paul J. McKinnon, as President of New York City Subway Police Association, et al., Appellants, against John H. Delaney et al., Constituting the Board of Transportation of the City of New York, et al., Respondents. Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen of America et al., Interveners, Respondents.

Submitted March 8, 1943;

decided March 11, 1943.

Motion to amend remittitur granted. Return of remittitur requested and when returned it will be amended by providing that the order is affirmed without costs.
Order filed September 18, 2015 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00862-CR

____________

WOODROW MILLER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 185th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 876249-F

O R D E R

The clerk’s record was filed November 4, 2014. Our review has determined that a 

relevant item has been omitted from the clerk's record. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c). The record 

does not contain Woodrow Miller's Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The Harris County District Clerk is directed to file a supplemental clerk’s record on or 

before September 28, 2015, containing Woodrow Miller's Application for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus.

If the omitted item is not part of the case file, the district clerk is directed to file a 

supplemental clerk’s record containing a certified statement that the omitted item is not a part of 

the case file.

PER CURIAM
Fourth Amended and Restated Lender Note dated May 22, 2012



 Exhibit 10.2 
 FOURTH AMENDED AND RESTATED LENDER NOTE 

 

			
	$50,000,000.00	 	May 22, 2012

 FOR VALUE RECEIVED, G&K RECEIVABLES
CORP., a Minnesota corporation (the “Borrower”), promises to pay to the order of SUNTRUST BANK (the “Lender”) on or before the Scheduled Commitment
Termination Date, the principal sum of Fifty Million and no/100 Dollars ($50,000,000.00) or, if less, the aggregate unpaid principal amount of all Loans shown on the schedule attached hereto (and/or any continuation thereof and/or in the records of
the Lender) made by the Lender pursuant to that certain Second Amended and Restated Loan Agreement, dated as of September 29, 2010 (together with all amendments and other modifications, if any, from time to time thereafter made thereto, the
“Loan Agreement”), among Borrower, G&K Services, Inc., as servicer, the Lender, SunTrust Bank, as LC Issuer and SunTrust Capital Markets, Inc., as Administrator (the “Administrator”). This note amends and
restates in its entirety that certain Third Amended and Restated Lender Note dated September 28, 2011. 
 Borrower also
promises to pay interest on the unpaid principal amount hereof from time to time outstanding from the date hereof until maturity (whether by acceleration or otherwise) and, after maturity, until paid, at the rates per annum and on the dates
specified in the Loan Agreement. 
 Payments of both principal and interest are to be made in lawful money of the United States
of America in immediately available funds to the account designated by Administrator pursuant to the Loan Agreement. 
 This
promissory note is the “Lender Note” referred to in, and evidences indebtedness incurred under, the Loan Agreement, and the holder hereof is entitled to the benefits of the Loan Agreement, to which reference is made for a
description of the security for this Lender Note and for a statement of the terms and conditions on which Borrower is permitted and required to make prepayments and repayments of principal of the indebtedness evidenced hereby and on which such
indebtedness may be declared to be immediately due and payable. Unless otherwise defined, capitalized terms used herein have the meanings provided in the Loan Agreement. 
 All parties hereto, whether as makers, endorsers, or otherwise, severally waive presentment for payment, demand, protest and notice of dishonor. 







 THIS LENDER NOTE SHALL
BE DEEMED TO BE A CONTRACT MADE UNDER AND GOVERNED BY THE
INTERNAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY
OTHERWISE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (OTHER THAN SECTION 5-1401
OF THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW). 
  

					
	G&K RECEIVABLES CORP.
		
	By	 	/s/ Jeffrey L. Wright
		 	Name:	 	Jeffrey L. Wright
		 	Title:	 	 Executive Vice President and

Chief Financial Officer










 SCHEDULE ATTACHED TO 

FOURTH AMENDED AND RESTATED LENDER NOTE
DATED MAY 22, 2012 OF 
 G&K RECEIVABLES
CORP. 
 PAYABLE TO THE ORDER OF
SUNTRUST BANK 
  

					
	 DATE OF

LOAN
	 	 AMOUNT OF

LOAN
	 	 AMOUNT OF

REPAYMENT