alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6752 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6752

 To require prompt reporting of any incident in which the Armed Forces 
   are involved in an attack or hostilities, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 13, 2023

 Mr. Gallego introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require prompt reporting of any incident in which the Armed Forces 
   are involved in an attack or hostilities, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPORT ON HOSTILITIES INVOLVING UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 48 hours after any incident in 
which the United States Armed Forces are involved in an attack or 
hostilities, whether in an offensive or defensive capacity, the 
President shall transmit to the congressional defense committees, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the 
incident, unless the President--
            (1) otherwise reports the incident within 48 hours pursuant 
        to section 4 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1543); or
            (2) has determined prior to the incident, and so reported 
        pursuant to section 1264 of the National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (50 U.S.C. 1549), that the United 
        States Armed Forces involved in the incident would be operating 
        under specific statutory authorization within the meaning of 
        section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)).
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report required by subsection (a) 
shall include--
            (1) the authority or authorities under which the United 
        States Armed Forces were operating when the incident occurred;
            (2) the date, location, and duration of the incident and 
        the other parties involved;
            (3) a description of the United States Armed Forces 
        involved in the incident and the mission of such Armed Forces;
            (4) the numbers of any combatant casualties and civilian 
        casualties that occurred as a result of the incident; and
            (5) any other information the President determines 
        appropriate.
                                 <all>
```
#### Anna Katz et al., Appellants, *v.*Bora Realty Corporation, Respondent.

Submitted April 5, 1943;

decided April 15, 1943.

Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 289 N. Y. 809.)
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED DE CEMBER 9, 2016

NO. 03

- 16

- 00503

- CR

Trevin Darnell Alexander, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROS E, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND BOURLAND

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction signed by the district court. Having revi ewed

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the

district court’s judgment of conviction . Therefore, the Court affirms the district court’s

judgment of conviction

. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication

of costs is made.
Exhibit 31.1**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**I, Tom D. Kilgore, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Tennessee Valley Authority;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state amaterial fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under whichsuch statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of,and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controlsand procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant andwe have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report isbeing prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors: a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date:December 15, 2006       /s/ Tom D. Kilgore         Tom D. Kilgore    President and Chief Executive Officer
14408

#### DANIEL *ET AL.*v. PERRY *ET AL.*

(189 S. E., 353)

*330
      *Messrs. Perrm &*Tinsley, for appellants,

*Mr. Horace L. Bomar,*for respondents,

January 6, 1937.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Baker.

Action by plaintiffs-respondents against defendants-appellants asking for specific performance of a contract of sale of certain real estate situate in the city and county of Spartanburg, this State. It involves the construction of the will of R. J. Daniel, deceased. Appellants desire to comply with the contract of sale and purchase if they can be given good title in fee simple. ■

The decree of Honorable T. S. Sease, Circuit Judge, which will be reported, is satisfactory to this Court. Plowever, for a better understanding of this decree, we set out in full the clauses of the will in question: “And to my son, P. S. Daniel, and my daughter Anabel Ruff, now of Atlanta, Ga., and their children and offspring, and if my son, Preston S. Daniel, should die, then his widow, M. Idella Daniel, shall have the proceeds or rents during her natural life or until she marries, and should she, Della, marry, then my daughter, Anabel and her children to have it, and not *331to be sold but the insurance and taxes to be kept paid up from the rents. I also give to my son, Preston S. Daniel, the lot a part of my old homestead lot on South Church Street, next and south of Mrs. Crigler; the other houses on South Liberty Street, and they can sell if they like or wish to do so, and divide the money, giving' Preston S. Daniel two-thirds of the money.”

On the incidental question of who should pay the costs, and supplementary to the decree of Judge Sease, the following excerpt from the brief of respondents, is directly in point: “The rule in our State that costs in equity cases are within the discretion of the Court is settled beyond dispute. In *Webb v.*Chisolm, 24 S. C., 487, which was an action for specific performance to purchase a city lot, just like the case now on appeal, it was held that the Circuit Judge had discretion to direct each party to pay his own costs. In *Matheson v. Rogers,*84 S. C., 458, 461, 65 S. E., 1054, 67 S. E., 476, 19 Ann. Cas., 1066, the Court said: ‘Except in a clear case of abuse of discretion, or the violation of some rule of law, this Court will not interfere with a decree fixing liability as to costs in an equity cause. *Brown v. Brown,*44 S. C., 378, 383, 22 S. E., 412; *Williams v. Jones,*74 S. C., 258, 281, 54 S. E., 588; *Cauthen v. Cauthen*81 S. C., 313, 315, 62 S. E., 319; *Anderson v. Silcox,*82 S. C., 109, 117, 63 S. E., 128.'”

Exceptions overruled and judgment affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice StabeEr and Messrs. Justices Carter, Bonham and Eishburne concur.
#### Mary Moneypenny, Respondent, *v.*Eugene Jackson, Appellant.

(Argued May 31, 1872;

decided June 4, 1872.)

*John H. Reynolds*for the appellant.

*H. Brewster*for the respondent.

Agree to affirm; no opinion.
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of RFG Acquisition II Inc. (the "Company")
      on
      Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David
      W. Matre, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
                David W. Matre
              David
                W. Matre
              Principal
                Financial Officer
              February
                20, 2007
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jose Isaac VELASQUEZ-ARGUETA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41377 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 18, 2017

Jimmy Eric Pardue, 'Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jose Isaac Velasquez-Argueta, Pro Se

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jose Isaac Velasquez-Argueta appeals his within-guideline sentence for his guilty-plea conviction of illegally reentering the United States after deportation. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that his Maryland conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon qualified as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2014). The Government moves for summary affirmance in *362light of *United States v. Segovia,*770 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2014), and alternatively moves for an extension of time to file its brief.

In *Segovia,*our court held that a Maryland conviction for robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon fell within the “use of force” catch-all of § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii). 770 F.3d at 355. We concluded that the Guideline applied “because robbery with a dangerous weapon under Maryland law requires the use of force or threatened use of force.” *Id.*(citing *Coles v. State,*374 Md. 114, 821 A.2d 389, 395 (2003)). Velasquez-Argueta argues that his Maryland robbery conviction is broader than generic robbery and does not fall under the “use of force” catch-all of § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii). *Segovia,*however, rejected these arguments and, thus, controls. 770 F.3d at 354-55.

Velasquez-Argueta advances one argument that *Segovia*did not address: that the Maryland statute does not require the *intentional*use of physical force and, thus, cannot fall within the § 2L1.2 catch-all. Nonetheless, this argument also lacks merit. As our court recently explained, the “use of force” requirement in the § 2L1.2 catch-all demands “that the act be more than involuntary” but does not concern itself with a specific *mens rea*required by the statute of conviction. *See United States v. Mendez-Henriquez,*847 F.3d 214, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2017). Despite Velasquez-Argue-ta’s argument, the intent requirement for a Maryland robbery conviction meets this standard. *See*Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-401(e)(2); *Harris v. State,*353 Md. 596, 728 A.2d 180, 188 (1999); *Hook v. State,*315 Md. 25, 553 A.2d 233, 236 (1989).

As *Segovia*does not foreclose all of Velasquez-Argueta’s arguments, the motion for summary affirmance is DENIED. Even so, in light of both *Segovia*and *Mendez-Henriquez,*Velasquez-Argueta’s challenges on appeal are unavailing. Therefore, we dispense with further briefing, and the alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED. The judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
11 TH C OURT OF A PPEALS

E ASTLAND

, T EXAS

J UDGMENT

Two thousand nine hundred eleven * From the 142nd District Court

dollars and twenty

- five cents U.S. of Midland County,

Currency and Jerry Dewitt Smith, Trial Court No. CV 45980

.

Vs. No. 11

- 15

- 00015

- CV * January 20, 2017

The State of Texas

, * Memorandum Opinion by Wright

, C. J

. (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson , J. , and Bailey, J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is

no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6461

UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DARREN L. KEYS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.

(1:98-cr-00144-CCB-1; 1:07-cv-02049-CCB)

Submitted: July 22, 2008 Decided: July 25, 2008

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Darren L. Keys, Appellant Pro Se. Harvey Ellis Eisenberg,

Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
*The motion was titled “Emergency Motion for Correction of

Court’s Records to Clarify Case Number Given to First and Only

§ 2255 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(a) and Fed. R. Cr. P. 36 and

Privacy Act Under 5 USC § 552a and 60(b).” (R. 78).

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Darren L. Keys seeks to appeal the district court’s

marginal order denying relief on his “motion”* filed in his 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) action. The order is not appealable unless a

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will

not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner

satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists

would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the

district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive

procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,

683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record

and conclude that Keys has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
American Wagering, Inc. Financial Data Schedule Required under: Appendix Item
601(c) of Regulation S-B Commercial and Industrial Companies Arxxxx Regulation
S-X
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-2000
<CASH>                                       1,645,886
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  473,737
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (27,903)
<INVENTORY>                                    350,810
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,470,975
<PP&E>                                       6,576,452
<DEPRECIATION>                             (2,817,789)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,699,025
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,908,788
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  1,466,200
<COMMON>                                        78,980
<OTHER-SE>                                     478,973
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,699,025
<SALES>                                      7,811,606
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,811,606
<CGS>                                          442,887
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                9,413,411
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                52,799
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             551,705
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,091,663)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (891,099)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,206,593)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0



</TABLE>
#### IN RE: David Wilbert SHANTON, Sr., Petitioner.

No. 17-1741

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 24, 2017

Decided: August 28, 2017

David Wilbert Shanton, Sr., Petitioner Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

David Wilbert Shanton, Sr., petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed in ruling on his 28 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012) motion. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. We find the present record does not reveal undue delay in the district court. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
1

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-2943

___________

Hussein Abdi Malin, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Starmark, a Masco Company, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: December 3, 2001

 Filed: December 13, 2001 

___________

Before HANSEN, FAGG, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Hussein Abdi Malin brought an employment-discrimination and hostile-workenvironment suit against StarMark. The district court1

 dismissed the suit with

prejudice after both parties filed a stipulation for dismissal so that Malin could pursue

his claims according to StarMark’s dispute resolution policy, which required

mediation and arbitration of all claims arising out of employment. Malin then moved

pro se to reopen the case, asserting he never knowingly agreed to the dismissal

stipulation. StarMark opposed the motion, and presented the affidavit of Malin’s
-2-

former attorney; he attested that he had fully discussed the stipulation with Malin,

who had given his informed and unequivocal consent to it. Malin presented no sworn

statement or other evidence contradicting his former attorney's affidavit. The district

court denied the motion, and Malin appeals. 

We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion,

because it was not clear error to credit the attorney’s affidavit. See Richards v.

Aramark Servs., Inc., 108 F.3d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 1997) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)

standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. See

8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 99.1

BRAUN CONSULTING, INC.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PUSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Braun Consulting, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Steven J. Braun, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|/s/STEVEN J. BRAUNSteven J. Braun Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer |  | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|March 11, 2003                                                                      |  | 

---

QuickLinks
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 11, 2009

s0831 

# Order

September 11, 2009

138151 & (24)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 138151 COA: 284673 Oakland CC: 2005-200959-FC GERALD DEWAYNE WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 9, 2008 order of the Court of Appeals is considered , and it is DENIED, because the defendant has
failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to re lief under MCR 6.508(D). The
motion for miscellaneous relief is DENIED.