alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6759 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6759

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide an exclusion from 
            gross income for AmeriCorps educational awards.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 13, 2023

 Mr. Larson of Connecticut (for himself and Mr. Bacon) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide an exclusion from 
            gross income for AmeriCorps educational awards.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Segal AmeriCorps Education Award Tax 
Relief Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME OF AMERICORPS EDUCATIONAL AWARDS.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (2) of section 117(c) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``or'' at the end of 
subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (C) 
and inserting ``, or'', and by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
                    ``(D) a national service educational award under 
                subtitle D of title I of the National and Community 
                Service Act of 1990.''.
    (b) Exclusion of Discharge of Student Loan Debt.--Subsection (f) of 
section 108 of such Code is amended by adding at the end the following 
new paragraph:
            ``(6) Payments under national service educational award 
        programs.--In the case of an individual, gross income shall not 
        include any amount received under a national service 
        educational award under subtitle D of title I of the National 
        and Community Service Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12601 et seq.).''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years ending after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Satish SHETTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC.; et. al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-56700

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 24, 2017

Satish Shetty, Pro Se

Kasey Curtis, Reed Smith LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Elena O. Gekker, Reed Smith LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Lorrie L, Pond, Jackie Miller, Janine Ford, Alicia J. Mickleberry, Jean A. Snyder

Joseph P. Buchman, Attorney, Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees MTC Financial, Inc., Pacific Coast Title Company, Clarisa Gastelum, Karen Talafus

*831Kevin Broersma, Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Lawyers Title Company

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Satish Shetty appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims relating to a mortgage loan on real property allegedly transferred to him by the borrower after foreclosure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on an basis supported by the record. *Thompson v. Paul,*647 F.3d 1065, 1058-69 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Shetty’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim was proper because Shetty failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he has standing to prosecute the claim on behalf of the third-party borrower. *See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc.,*554 U.S. 269, 273-74, 89-90, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008) (elements of Article III standing; prudential standing requires that a party must assert its own legal rights and may not assert the legal rights of another).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shetty leave to file a Second Amended Complaint because amendment would be futile. *See Lopez v. Smith,*203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 685 

To direct the President, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, 

to develop and carry out a strategy to seek reimbursement from the 

People’s Republic of China of funds made available by the United States 

Government to address the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19). 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 31, 2023 

Mr. STEUBE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To direct the President, in consultation with the Secretary 

of the Treasury, to develop and carry out a strategy 

to seek reimbursement from the People’s Republic of 

China of funds made available by the United States 

Government to address the Coronavirus Disease 2019 

(COVID–19). 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Chinese Government 

5 COVID–19 Accountability Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 685 IH

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress finds the following: 

3 (1) The United States economy has been se4 verely affected by the Government of the People’s 

5 Republic of China’s controls on media reporting that 

6 limit coverage of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 

7 (COVID–19). 

8 (2) United States Government senior officials 

9 have expressed concerns about the completeness and 

10 timeliness of information China is reporting on 

11 COVID–19 and about the overall economic impact of 

12 COVID–19 in the United States. 

13 (3) China should be held financially responsible 

14 for funds made available by the United States Gov15 ernment to address COVID–19. 

16 SEC. 3. EXECUTIVE STRATEGY TO SEEK REIMBURSEMENT 

17 FROM CHINA OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE BY 

18 THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO AD19 DRESS COVID–19. 

20 (a) EXECUTIVE STRATEGY.—The President, in con21 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop 

22 and carry out a strategy to seek reimbursement from the 

23 People’s Republic of China of funds made available by the 

24 United States Government to address COVID–19. 

25 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date 

26 of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 685 IH

1 President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

2 committees a report on the strategy required under sub3 section (a) and its implementation. 

4 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE5 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres6 sional committees’’ means— 

7 (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com8 mittee on the Budget, and the Committee on Ways 

9 and Means of the House of Representatives; 

10 (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com11 mittee on the Budget, and the Committee on Fi12 nance of the Senate; and 

13 (3) the Joint Economic Committee. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### John E. DRISCOLL, III; Robert E. Frazier; Jana M. Gantt; Laura D. Harris; Kimberly Lane; Deena L. Reynolds, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Renee L. MCCRAY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-1501

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 24, 2017

Decided: August 28, 2017

Renee L. McCray, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Harvey Hillman, SAMUEL I. WHITE PC, Rockville, Maryland, for Ap-pellees.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Renee L. McCray seeks to appeal the district court’s order remanding this foreclosure proceeding to the Maryland state court from which it was removed. Generally, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012). The Supreme Court has instructed that “§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with [28 U.S.C.] § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d),” *Things Re*membered, *Inc. v. Petrarca,*516 U.S. 124, 127, 116 S.Ct. 494, 133 L.Ed.2d 461 (1995). Thus, “§ 1447(d) is tightly circumscribed to cover only remand orders within the scope of ... § 1447(c), based on (1) a district court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in removal other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction....” *Doe v. Blair,*819 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a district court’s remand order is reviewable under § 1447(d) is not determined by whether the order explicitly cites § 1447(c) or not.” *Borneman v. United States,*213 F.3d 819, 824 (4th Cir. 2000).

Here, the district-court remanded on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to review the remand order and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
----

**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS**

We hereby consent to the inclusion in thisAnnual Report on Form 40-F of Lundin Mining Corporation for the year endedDecember 31, 2007 of our report dated March 31, 2008 relating to theconsolidated balance sheets of Lundin Mining Corporation as at December 31, 2007and 2006, and the related consolidated statements of operations, comprehensiveincome, changes in shareholders' equity and cash flows for each of the yearsthen ended and relating to the effectiveness of the Company's internal controlover financial reporting as at December 31, 2007.

*"PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP"***Chartered Accountants**Vancouver, BC, CanadaMarch 31, 2008

----
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6834 

To direct the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to issue 

a final rule adding as a class all perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl 

substances with at least one fully fluorinated carbon atom to the list 

of hazardous air pollutants under section 112(b) of the Clean Air Act 

(42 U.S.C. 7412(b)), and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 14, 2023 

Ms. STEVENS (for herself, Mr. POSEY, Mrs. DINGELL, Mr. FITZPATRICK, and 

Ms. TLAIB) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To direct the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 

Agency to issue a final rule adding as a class all 

perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances with at 

least one fully fluorinated carbon atom to the list of 

hazardous air pollutants under section 112(b) of the 

Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(b)), and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6834 IH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prevent Release Of 

3 Toxics Emissions, Contamination, and Transfer Act of 

4 2023’’ or the ‘‘PROTECT Act of 2023’’. 

5 SEC. 2. LISTING OF PERFLUOROALKYL AND 

6 POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES AS HAZ7 ARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS. 

8 (a) LISTING.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

9 of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Envi10 ronmental Protection Agency shall issue a final rule add11 ing as a class all perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl sub12 stances with at least one fully fluorinated carbon atom to 

13 the list of hazardous air pollutants under section 112(b) 

14 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(b)). 

15 (b) SOURCES CATEGORIES.—Not later than 365 days 

16 after the final rule is issued pursuant to subsection (a), 

17 the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agen18 cy shall revise the list under section 112(c)(1) of the Clean 

19 Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(1)) to include categories and 

20 subcategories of major sources and area sources of 

21 perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances listed pursu22 ant to such final rule. 

Æ 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Company's
consolidated financial statements for the forty weeks ended December 30, l997
included in this report on Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000 <F1>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-10-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-30-1997
<CASH>                                          46,600
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  147,600
<ALLOWANCES>                                     6,300
<INVENTORY>                                     65,600
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               299,100
<PP&E>                                       1,283,800
<DEPRECIATION>                                 610,900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,140,800
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          193,900
<BONDS>                                          1,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           200
<OTHER-SE>                                     604,700
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,140,800
<SALES>                                      1,274,600
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,274,600
<CGS>                                          729,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  729,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   800
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,600
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 49,800
<INCOME-TAX>                                    19,500
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             30,300
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                        1,800
<NET-INCOME>                                    28,500
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.34
<FN>
<F1>Footnote to electronic filing only:  as presented, 
data is rounded to the nearest $100 except for per 
share data.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
#### Jorge Alberto CRUZ-PINEDA, AKA Ricardo Molina-Rosales, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-72832

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 31, 2017

Douglas Jalaie, Esquire, Attorney, The Law Office of Douglas Jalaie, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner

David Nicholas Harling, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jorge Alberto Cruz-Pineda, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cruz-Pineda’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than fifteen years after the BIA’s final decision, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Cruz-Pineda failed to provide evidence of a material change in circumstances in El Salvador to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, *see 8*C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii); *see also Najmabadi,*597 F.3d at 991-92 (BIA did not abuse its discretion where petitioner failed to introduce material evidence)

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The State of TexasAppellee/s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 6, 2014

No. 04-14-00066-CR

Jesse Joe SALINAS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 218th Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12-11-00098-CRK

Honorable Stella Saxon, Judge Presiding

ORDER

On March 4, 2014, Appellant filed several pro se documents including a motion for new 

trial, a motion for court-appointed counsel on his motion for new trial, a memorandum of law 

supporting his appeal, and an out-of-time notice of appeal. 

Appellant is already represented in this appeal by court-appointed counsel: Richard 

Briggs, 7113 San Pedro Avenue, Box 312, San Antonio, Texas 78216.

Appellant does not have a right to hybrid representation. See Ex parte Taylor, 36 S.W.3d 

883, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Appellant’s pro se motions are DENIED.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 6th day of March, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 24, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-40856 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus FREDIE FERNANDO ARIAS-ORTEGA, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. L-02-CR-45-ALL

-------------------- Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *Fredie Fernando Arias-Ortega (“Arias”) appeals his guiltyplea conviction and sentence for being an alien unlawfully found in the United States after deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea, that his prior cocaine-possession conviction was not an aggravated felony for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (2001), and that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 isNo. 02-40856 -2- unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Arias concedes that his arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent; he raises these issues only to preserve them for possible Supreme Court review. See United States v. BolivarMunoz , 313 F.3d 253, 256-57 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied , 2003 WL 729161 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2003); United States v. Caicedo-Cuero , 312 F.3d 697, 706-11 (5th Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed , (U.S. Mar. 19, 2003)(No. 02-9747); United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). His arguments are foreclosed.
AFFIRMED.
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  M ARY D OE , a human embryo "born" in the United States (and subsequently frozen in which state of cryopreservaton her life is presently suspended) individually and on behalf of all other frozen human embryos similarly situated; T HE N ATIONAL A SSOCIATION FOR THE A DVANCEMENT OF P REBORN C HILDREN ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. No. 01-1298



#  D ONNA E. S HALALA , in her official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services; U.S. D EPARTMENT OF H EALTH & H UMAN S ERVICES ; H AROLD V ARMUS , in his official capacity as Director of the National Institutes of Health; N ATIONAL I NSTITUTES OF H EALTH ,

Defendants-Appellees.

N ATIONAL O RGANIZATION FOR E MBRYONIC L AW , Amicus Curiae. 

# 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA-99-2428-PJM)

Submitted: January 23, 2002

Decided: February 7, 2002Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

R. Martin Palmer, Jr., MARTIN PALMER & ASSOCIATES, Hagerstown, Maryland, for Appellants. Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Thomas M. DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Larry D. Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Mark B. Stern, Thomas M. Bondy, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Clifford J. Stevens, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR EMBRYONIC LAW, Virginia Dale, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Mary Doe, a human embryo "born" in the United States (and subsequently frozen in which state of cryopreservation her life is presently suspended), individually and on behalf of all other frozen human embryos similarly situated, and the National Association for the Advancement of Preborn Children (collectively "Appellants") appeal the district court’s order administratively closing their civil lawsuit challenging the Clinton Administration’s policies regarding federal funding of human stem cell research. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. 2 D OE v. S HALALAThis court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. It merely removes the case from the district court’s activedocket until the issue of federal funding for stem cell research is settled by the Bush Administration.

We therefore dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED 3 D OE v. S HALALA