J-S44031-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

ANTHONY TUSWEET SMITH 

 Appellant No. 137 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 18, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-04-CR-0000967-2001 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 13, 2014 

 Anthony Tusweet Smith appeals pro se from the order entered on 

December 18, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, that 

dismissed, without a hearing, his third petition filed pursuant to the 

Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. 

Smith claims (1) all prior appellate and post conviction counsel were 

ineffective with regard to a stipulation made at trial, (2) that Smith is 

entitled to discovery, and (3) that the PCRA’s time limitation is 

unconstitutional. Based upon the following, we affirm. 

 The PCRA court aptly summarized the relevant procedural history of 

this case in its Preliminary Order and Notice of Court, issued pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), and therefore we do not restate it here. See PCRA 

Court Preliminary Order and Notice of Court, 10/18/2013, at 1–2. 
J-S44031-14 

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In response to the court’s Rule 907 notice, Smith filed a pleading 

captioned “Amended Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition” on November 20, 

2013. On December 18, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed Smith’s petition as 

untimely, and this appeal followed. 

Preliminary, we state the principles that guide our review: 

This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s 

order is whether the determination of the PCRA court is 

supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal 

error. Great deference is granted to the findings of the 

PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed 

unless they have no support in the certified record. 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 72 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Furthermore, 

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, 

must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner's 

judgment of sentence became final, unless he pleads and 

proves one of the three exceptions outlined in 42 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final at

the conclusion of direct review by [the Pennsylvania 

Supreme] Court or the United States Supreme Court, or 

at the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 42 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may 

not address the merits of the issues raised if the petition 

was not timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to 

all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature of the 

individual claims raised therein. The PCRA squarely places 

upon the petitioner the burden of proving an untimely 

petition fits within one of the three exceptions. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16–17 (Pa. 2012) (case citations 

and footnote omitted). 
J-S44031-14 

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Instantly, Smith’s judgment of sentence became final on September 

29, 2004, upon expiration of the 90-day appeal period for filing a petition for 

writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3) (providing judgment is deemed final “at the conclusion of direct 

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 

States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time 

for seeking the review”); U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 13 (allowing 90 days to file a 

petition for writ of certiorari). Therefore, Smith had one year from that date 

to file a petition for collateral relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Here, 

Smith filed the current petition on August 28, 2013, nearly nine years after 

his judgment of sentence became final. 

Our review of the record in light of the PCRA and relevant case law 

confirms that the PCRA court correctly determined Smith’s petition was 

untimely and that he failed to prove a statutory exception to the PCRA’s one 

year time-bar. Moreover, we adopt the discussion of the PCRA court as 

dispositive of this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/19/2013.1

____________________________________________ 

1

 To the PCRA court’s analysis, we simply add that this Court has held that 

the PCRA’s time restriction is constitutionally valid. See Commonwealth v. 

Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa. 1998) (“the PCRA’s time limitation upon 

the filing of PCRA petitions does not unreasonably or unconstitutionally limit 

[a petitioner’s] constitutional right to habeas corpus relief.”); see also

Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 220 (Pa. 1999) (reiterating that 

the time-for-filing restriction of the PCRA is reasonable and does not run 

afoul of a petitioner’s due process rights). 
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Accordingly, as neither the PCRA court, nor this Court, has jurisdiction 

to address the substantive claims raised in Smith’s untimely petition, see 

Jones, supra, we affirm the order of the PCRA court that dismissed, without 

a hearing, this third petition seeking post-conviction relief. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/13/2014