Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1617 | April 16, 2019 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher K. Starkey

Shelbyville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory W. Guevara

Tyler J. Moorhead

Bose McKinney & Evans LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Indiana Commissioner of Labor, 

on the Relation of Heather 

Chamness,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

J.D. Byrider Systems, LLC,

Appellee-Defendant.

April 16, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PL-1617

Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Paul A. Felix, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

29C01-1705-PL-5002

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1617 | April 16, 2019 Page 2 of 8

Statement of the Case

[1] The Indiana Commissioner of Labor, on behalf of Heather Chamness, (“the 

Commissioner”) appeals the trial court’s order that it pay $3,950 in attorney’s 

fees to J.D. Byrider Systems, LLC (“J.D. Byrider”) after the court dismissed the 

Commissioner’s wage claim against J.D. Byrider because the claim was 

groundless. The Commissioner raises three issues for our review, which we 

consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when it ordered the 

Commissioner to pay J.D. Byrider’s attorney’s fees. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 29, 2017, the Commissioner filed a complaint for damages against 

J.D. Byrider. In the complaint, the Commissioner alleged that J.D. Byrider had 

failed to pay Chamness her wages in a timely fashion. In particular, the 

complaint alleged as follows:

5. Chamness started working for [J.D.] Byrider [o]n or about 

January 2010.

6. [J.D.] Byrider fired Chamness on or about 12 April 2017.

7. [J.D.] Byrider owed Chamness a commission when it fired 

her.

8. [J.D.] Byrider informed Chamness that it would not pay 

her the commission until she returned a company cellular phone.

9. [J.D.] Byrider paid Chamness that commission by 

envelope postmarked 1 May 2017.
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10. Chamness did not receive the commission until 4 May 

2017.

11. The gross amount of commission was $3,290.00.

12. This commission was legally a “wage” under Indiana law.

13. After her termination, the next pay date for Chamness was 

21 April 2017.

14. Pursuant to [Indiana Code Section] 22-2-9-2, all wages 

[J.D.] Byrider owed Chamness were due on the next pay date 

following her termination.

Appellant’s App. at 10.

[3] On July 3, J.D. Byrider’s attorney emailed the Commissioner’s attorney and 

requested the Commissioner to “voluntarily dismiss” the complaint because 

“[t]he Indiana Court of Appeals has already ruled that payments under a 

similar . . . incentive plan do not constitute statutory ‘wages’ under Indiana’s 

wage payment laws . . . .” Id. at 16 (citing Quezare v. Byrider Fin., Inc., 941 

N.E.2d 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied). J.D. Byrider’s attorney 

concluded that there was “no valid, good faith basis to continue to litigate these 

claims” and that, if the Commissioner did not voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit, 

J.D. Byrider would seek recovery of its attorney’s fees. Id. at 18. 

[4] The Commissioner did not respond to the July 3 email. On July 26, J.D. 

Byrider filed its answer and counterclaim in which it alleged that the 

Commissioner’s complaint was “frivolous, unreasonable,
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vexatious, . . . groundless” and “being litigated in bad faith” because, as a 

matter of Indiana law, the commissions complained of were not “wages.” 

Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 7. Accordingly, J.D. Byrider asked the court to 

award to J.D. Byrider reasonable attorney’s fees under Indiana Code Section 

34-52-1-1.

[5] On August 23, J.D. Byrider’s attorney again emailed the Commissioner’s 

attorney and requested the Commissioner to “voluntarily dismiss the suit” 

under threat of a recovery of attorney’s fees. Appellant’s App. at 20. The 

Commissioner’s attorney responded that he would “consult with [his] 

client . . . with how . . . to proceed . . . .” Id. at 19. After some time with no 

further follow-up from the Commissioner, J.D. Byrider’s attorney again 

emailed the Commissioner’s attorney on November 1 and asked if the 

Commissioner was going to “voluntarily dismiss this suit.” Id. The 

Commissioner did not respond to that email.

[6] On January 30, 2018, J.D. Byrider moved to dismiss the Commissioner’s 

complaint for failure to prosecute under Indiana Trial Rule 41(E) and to be 

awarded reasonable attorney’s fees. Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on 

J.D. Byrider’s motion to dismiss. At the commencement of that hearing, the 

Commissioner’s attorney promptly informed the court that he had “filed the 

case,” J.D. Byrider’s attorney had then “asked me to dismiss it,” and he

responded by “basically [doing] nothing with the case.” Tr. Vol. II at 4. The 

Commissioner’s attorney then “agree[d]” that “the case should be dismissed” 

and “apologized” to J.D. Byrider for his “dilatory actions.” Id.
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[7] J.D. Byrider’s attorney then explained to the court his rationale for why the 

Commissioner’s complaint was frivolous or in bad faith, relying on the facts of 

Chamness’ commission as they compared to the incentive payment at issue 

before our Court in Quezare and expressly referencing Indiana Code Section 34-

52-1-1 as the basis for his claim for attorney’s fees. The Commissioner’s 

attorney did not dispute or otherwise challenge J.D. Byrider’s assessment of 

Chamness’ commission as it related to Quezare; instead, the Commissioner’s 

attorney simply argued that, under Indiana Trial Rule 41(E), J.D. Byrider was 

entitled to its court costs but not to attorney’s fees.

[8] At the conclusion of the hearing, the court instructed J.D. Byrider’s attorney to 

file an attorney fee affidavit. He did so, claiming $8,825 in attorney’s fees. The 

trial court then dismissed the Commissioner’s complaint, found $3,950 in 

attorney’s fees to be reasonable, and ordered the Commissioner to pay that 

amount to J.D. Byrider by March 26, 2018, which was ten days after the court’s 

order. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] The Commissioner asserts that the trial court erred when it ordered the 

Commissioner to pay to J.D. Byrider $3,950 in attorney’s fees within ten days 

of the court’s order. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

A trial court may grant an award of attorney’s fees if a litigant 

“continued to litigate the action or defense after the party’s claim 

or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or 

groundless.” Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b)(2) (2008). . . . [T]he trial 

court’s decision to award attorney’s fees and any amount thereof 
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is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its 

discretion if its decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances or if the trial court has misinterpreted 

the law.

Purcell v. Old Nat’l Bank, 972 N.E.2d 835, 843 (Ind. 2012) (some citations 

omitted).

[10] The Commissioner first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

awarded attorney’s fees to J.D. Byrider because the Commissioner’s complaint 

stated a claim. But that is beside the point. “A claim is groundless if no facts 

exist which support the legal claim relied on and presented by the losing party.” 

Id. The Commissioner cites no authority for the proposition that the 

determination of whether a claim is groundless is established merely by the 

pleadings. Indeed, Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1(b)(2) expressly permits 

attorney’s fees for groundless claims when the plaintiff has “continued to 

litigate the action . . . after the party’s claim . . . clearly 

became . . . groundless . . . .” 

[11] Here, the Commissioner did not dispute at the final hearing before the trial 

court that post-pleading facts and law offered by J.D. Byrider showed that the 

Commissioner’s complaint was in fact “groundless.” Yet, despite that 

knowledge, the Commissioner refused to voluntarily dismiss the complaint and 

instead required J.D. Byrider to continue to employ counsel to contact the 

Commissioner and file motions and documents in the trial court. Accordingly, 

we reject the Commissioner’s first argument.
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[12] The Commissioner next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because 

Trial Rule 41(E), which permits the dismissal of actions due to the plaintiff’s 

failure to prosecute them, permits only an award of “costs” to the defendant. 

But again the Commissioner misses the mark. J.D. Byrider’s request for 

attorney’s fees in the trial court was expressly based on Indiana Code Section 

34-52-1-1, which permits an award of fees when an action on a claim is 

“frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless,” or “litigated in bad faith.” J.D. 

Byrider did not seek attorney’s fees under Trial Rule 41(E). Accordingly, we 

reject the Commissioner’s second argument.

[13] Third, the Commissioner asserts that the award of $3,950 is unreasonable. We 

cannot agree and must instead conclude that the Commissioner’s short

argument on this issue is merely a request for this Court to reweigh the

evidence, which we will not do. We reject the Commissioner’s third argument.

[14] Finally, the Commissioner asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it ordered the Commissioner to pay J.D. Byrider’s attorney’s fees within ten 

days of the court’s order. According to the Commissioner, if that deadline were 

missed, the trial court could hold the Commissioner in contempt, and if the trial 

court held the Commissioner in contempt, the Commissioner could be 

imprisoned, and imprisonment for debt would violate Article 1, Section 22 of 

the Indiana Constitution. But we agree with J.D. Byrider that the ten-day 

deadline is less significant for possible contempt proceedings than it is relevant 

for a determination of when interest on the award will begin to accrue. We also
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conclude that the Commissioner’s speculation as to potential future outcomes 

does not demonstrate reversible error in the award of fees itself.

[15] In sum, we affirm the trial court’s award of $3,950 for attorney’s fees to J.D. 

Byrider.

[16] Affirmed.

Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.