alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Plummer *et al. v.*People’s National Bank of Independence.

Appeal : ABSTRACT MUST SHOW THAT APPEAL WAS TAKEN. Where the abstract does not show that an appeal was taken, this court has no jurisdiction, except to dismiss the case, even though the appellee appears and raises no question of jurisdiction; for appearance does not confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court, and it is the duty of the court of its own motion to see that the case is one of which it appears to have jurisdiction.

*Appeal from Buchanan District Court.*

Filed, June 10, 1887.

This action was brought to obtain possession of a policy of life insurance. The defendant Edgar Holmes intervened. There was a trial to the court without a jury, and judgment ivas rendered for the intervenor. The plaintiff appeals.

*John J. ATey,*for appellant.

*Woodward & Cook,*for appellee.

*732Adams, C. J.

This court cannot take jurisdiction of a case unless our jurisdiction appears affirmatively from the record. Where cases ^ire submitted upon an abstract, we assume that the abstract shows the whole record, so far as it is material. If the abstract does not show that we have jurisdiction, we can do nothing but dismiss the case. The abstract before us does not show that an appeal was taken. This it should show. Rule of Court, 98. We have no jurisdiction of the case except upon appeal. It is true that the appellee appears; but appearance does not confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court. In the absence of an appeal, the appellate court lacks more than j urisdiction of the person of the appellee. It is true, also, that the appellee in this case does not raise the question of a want of jurisdiction; but a court should see to it of its own motion that the case is one of which it appears to have jurisdiction. We think that the appeal must be

Dismissed.
#### In the Matter of Helen Barnes, Respondent, against Margaret M. Burnet, Nominee, and S. Howard Cohen et al., Constituting the Board of Elections of the City of New York, Respondents, and Herman N. Schwartz, Nominee, Appellant.

Argued October 21,1943;

decided October 22, 1943.

*682
      *Maxwell J. Eile, A. Welles Stump*and *Mendel Lurie*for appellant.

*Anthony J. Grasiano*and *Josephine D. Grasiano*for Helen Barnes, respondent.

*Edward Eager*for Margaret M. Burnet, respondent.

Order affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacheb, JJ.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6602 

To amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 relating to the review 

of the interagency dispute resolution process. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 5, 2023 

Mr. MCCORMICK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 relating 

to the review of the interagency dispute resolution process. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REVIEW OF INTERAGENCY DISPUTE RESOLU4 TION PROCESS. 

5 Section 1763(c) of the Export Control Reform Act 

6 of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4822(c)) is amended— 

7 (1) by inserting ‘‘countries subject to a com8 prehensive United States arms embargo,’’ after 

9 ‘‘matters relating to’’; and 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6602 IH

1 (2) by striking ‘‘may be decided’’ and inserting 

2 ‘‘shall be decided’’. 

Æ 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                       3,837,000
<SECURITIES>                                 1,966,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,903,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (460,000)
<INVENTORY>                                 10,837,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            27,810,000
<PP&E>                                      24,867,000
<DEPRECIATION>                             (7,209,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              46,049,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,836,000
<BONDS>                                      4,632,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        80,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  33,365,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                46,049,000
<SALES>                                     26,021,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            26,021,000
<CGS>                                       15,437,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               15,437,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             199,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                940,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   310,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            630,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   630,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .08
        

</TABLE>
CIS Acquisition Ltd.


89 Udaltsova Street, Suite 84


Moscow, Russia 119607


 


 


_________, 2012


Intercarbo Holding AG


Aeulestr. 38, FL-9490


Vaduz, Liechtenstein


 


Gentlemen:


 


This letter will confirm
our agreement that commencing on the effective date (the “Effective Date”) of the registration statement (the “Registration
Statement”) relating to the initial public offering of the securities of CIS Acquisition Ltd. (the “Company”)
and continuing until the consummation by the Company of an acquisition transaction or the distribution of the trust
account to the Company’s then public shareholders (as described in the Registration Statement), Intercarbo Holding AG (the
“Firm”) shall make available to the Company certain general and administrative services, including the use of office
space, utilities and secretarial support, as may be required by the Company from time to time, at 89 Udaltsova Street, Suite 84,
Moscow, Russia 119607 (or any successor location). In exchange therefor, the Company shall pay the Firm at the rate of $7,500
per month.



 


	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 
	 	CIS ACQUISITION LTD.
	 	 
	 	By:	 
	 	Name:	 
	 	Title:	 


 


Agreed to and Accepted as of the date first written
above by:


 


	INTERCARBO HOLDING AG	 
	 	 
	By:	 	 
	Name:	 	 
	Title:	 	 




 


Services Agreement
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Solomon Nordine, Chief Financial Officer of Border
Management, Inc., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Border Management, Inc. for the
twelve month period ended December 31, 2009 (the 'Report') fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; and

(2)the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Border
Management, Inc.

Dated: March 29, 2010

/s/ Solomon Nordine
------------------
Solomon Nordine
Chief Financial Officer,
Border Management, Inc.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Border Management,
Inc. and will be retained by Border Management, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

November 6,2009

Philip Giudice, COm1nissioner

Department of Energy Resources

100 Cambridge Street, Rm. 1020

Boston, Massachusetts 02114

Dear Commissioner Giudice:

This letter responds to the petition submitted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, dated

October 1,2009, which the U.S. Department ofEnergy's (DOE) Office of Energy Efficiency and

Renewable Energy received on October 6, 2009. Due to the substantial number ofrulemaking

activities currently being undertaken by the agency to improve the energy efficiency of both

consumer and commercial equipment, we were unable to provide you with an acknowledgement

ofthe agency's receipt ofthe petition in a more timely manner. We apologize for this situation

and regret any inconvenience that this may have caused.

DOE accepts the Commonwealth's petition for filing purposes under Title 10 ofthe Code of

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 430.42(f). Our acceptance ofthe petition for filing purposes,

however, does not constitute a determination regarding the sufficiency ofthe petition, nor does it

reflect DOE's views as to the petition's merits or the final disposition thereof. Consistent with

the requirements under 10 CFR 430.42(a), the Commonwealth is under a continuing obligation

to provide any new or newly discovered information relevant to its petition.

Appropriate DOE staff are carefully reviewing the contents ofthe petition, which has been

assigned a high priority by the agency. Should you have any questions or concerns regarding the

petition, please feel free to contact me at (202) 586-8423 or bye-mail at

ronald.lewisfai.hg .doe.gov.

Yours truly,

,

Appliance Standards

Buildings Technology Program

Cc:

Fred Augenstern

Assistant Attorney General

Environmental Protection Division

Office ofthe Attorney General

I Ashburton Place, 18th Floor

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

*Printed with soy ink on recycled paper

EERE-2009-BT-PET-0024 DOC-ID 1.2.002
Postmark

Here

Postage $

1-------1

Postage 1-'$--------1

Certified Fee

Total Postage & Fees $

Return Receipt Fee

(Endorsement Required) 1-' --\

Restricted Delivery Fee

(Endorsement Required) 1-' 1

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EERE-2009-BT-PET-0024 DOC-ID 1.2.002
EERE-2009-BT-PET-0024 DOC-ID 1.2.002
EERE-2009-BT-PET-0024 DOC-ID 1.2.002
#### Reed *vs.*Rogers.

April 14.

.Error to the Madison Circuit; George Shannon, Judge.

*Pleading. Fraud. Cheat. Warranty.*

IteCEIT.

Case 61.

Question stated.

In a declaration for a cheat in an exchange of horses, it is not necessary to give a particular description of the unsoundness.

So is the rule in an action on the warranty, in suck case.

Judge Owsley

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This writ of error is brought to a judgment rendered against Reed, upon a demurrer put in to his declaration by Rogers.

Whether, or not, the declaration contains a good canse of action, is, therefore, the only question necessary to be considered in revising that judgment.

We have been incapable, after the most attentive examination, to discover any solid objection to the declaration. It, in apt and appropriate form, contains every essential allegation to show a right of action in Reed, for a fraud alleged to have been committed by Rogers, in a contract for the exchange of horses, entered into between them. The gist of the action consists in the alleged unsoundness of the horse given in exchange by Rogers, and which is charged to have been at the time known by Rogers, and by him fraudulently concealed from Reed *;*and vve have been unable even to conjecture a possible objection to the declaration, unless *it*was supposed by the court below, that instead of charging, as is done in the declaration, in general terms, that the horse was unsound a particular description of the unsoundness should have been stated. We do not, however, admit the necessity of such a description of the unsoundness.

It cannot, for any purpose, .be more important to describe in the declaration the particular unsoundness, where the action is brought for a fraud committed in the sale of property, than in an action upon the warranty, where the property is expressly warranted sound; and in the latter case, it is said the particular description of unsoundness, need not be stated in the declaration. 2 Chitty Plead. 102, *n. x.*and the authorities there cited.

The demurrer ought not, therefore, to have been sustained. The judgment must, consequently, be reversed, the cause remanded to the court below. *174and further proceedings there had, not inconsistent with this opinion.

*Turner*for plaintiff; *Breck*and *Caperton*for defendant.
# SPAR Group, Inc.

EXHIBIT 32.2

# Certification of Chief
Financial Officer Pursuant to 
Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the quarterly
report on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended September 30, 2006 (this
report), of SPAR Group, Inc. (the registrant), the undersigned
hereby certifies that, to his knowledge:

1.                 The
report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2.                 The
information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material           respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.

| |                                                 
| | ------------------------------------------------
| | /s/ Charles Cimitile                            
| |                                                 
| | Charles Cimitile                                
| | Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary
| |                                                 
| | November 14, 2006                               

# A signed original of
this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to SPAR Group, Inc. and
will be retained by SPAR Group, Inc., and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

Ex-4
#### Ronald Satish EMRIT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barbara CEGAVSKE; Secretary of State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Commerce; Small Business Administration, (SBA); U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, (USPTO); Library of Congress, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1474

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 20, 2017

Decided: June 30, 2017

Ronald Satish Emrit, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Satish Emrit appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil complaint for improper venue.* We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Even assuming, without deciding, that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for improper venue, “we may affirm a district court’s ruling on any ground apparent in the record.” *See U.S. ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey,*792 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015). As our review of Emrit’s complaint reveals that it is patently frivolous, we conclude the complaint was properly subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)© (2012). *See Neitzke v. Williams,*490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (“[A] complaint ... is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal con*707tentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

*

 Although Emrit’s notice of appeal was filed more than 60 days after the district court’s dismissal order, his appeal is timely because the court's order explains in full its reasons for dismissing the complaint and therefore is not a separate judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). See *Hughes v. Halifax Cnty. Sch. Bd.,*823 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1987). The order is deemed "entered,” for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), when "150 days have run from entry of the order in the civil docket.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). As Emrit's notice of appeal was filed within that 150-day period, we have jurisdiction to consider his appeal. *See Quinn v. Haynes,*234 F.3d 837, 843 (4th Cir. 2000).
#### The People ex rel. Samuel Marsh, Jr., Appellants, *v.*Michael Delaney et al., Assessors, etc., Respondents.

(Argued March 1, 1872;

decided April 2, 1872.)

A departure by assessors from the standard fixed by statute for estimating the value of property placed upon the assessment roll cannot be corrected upon *certiorari,*nor can their failure to assess the property of a corporation, as required, be so corrected. The court may reverse the assessment as made, and direct a reassessment; but after the roll has been delivered to the board of supervisors and the power of the assessors over it has ceased, a *c&rtiorm'i*should not be allowed; and if allowed, should be quashed even after return made.

*656Appeal from an order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, quashing a writ of certiorari issued to .defendants as assessors of the town of Southfield, Richmond county. The relatorj a tax-payer of the town of Southfield, obtained the writ upon the ground that defendants had omitted to make the proper entries required by the Revised Statutes (as amended, Laws of 1853, chap. 654; Laws of 1857, chap. 456) in respect to the Richmond County Gas-light Company, and had undervalued its property $226,600. It appeared that prior to the issuing of the writ, the defendants had completed their roll and it had been delivered to the board of supervisors.

*Wm. Henry Anthon*for the appellants.

*Geo. J. Greenfield*for the respondents.

Gboveb, J.,

reads opinion for affirmance. All concur.

Order affirmed, without costs.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wade Patrick WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30154

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 20, 2017

William Adam Duerk, Attorney, Milo-dragovich, Dale *&*Steinbrenner P.C., Mis-soula, MT, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee

John Rhodes, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDMT — Federal Defenders of Montana (Missoula), Missoula, MT, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Wade Patrick Wright appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 58-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We dismiss, but remand for the district court to correct the judgment.

*484Wright' contends that the district court violated his due process rights by relying on unreliable hearsay evidence in applying a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l). The government contends that this appeal is barred by the appeal- waiver contained in the parties’ plea agreement. Reviewing de novo, *see United States v. Bibler,*495 F.3d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 2007), we dismiss. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the hearsay statements had sufficient indicia of reliability given the corroborating firearm and drug evidence found in Wright’s apartment. See *United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero,*633 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 2011) (reliability determination reviewed for abuse of discretion); *United States v. Vanderwerfhorst,*576 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Challenged information is deemed false or unreliable if it lacks some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” (internal quotations omitted)). In any event, the district court correctly determined that, independent of the challenged hearsay, it was not “clearly improbable” that Wright possessed a firearm in connection with his drug offense. *See*U.S.S.G § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 11(A). Because Wright’s due process rights were not violated, we dismiss pursuant to the valid appeal waiver. *See Bibler,*495 F.3d at 624.

We remand to the district court with instructions to correct Wright’s judgment to reflect the correct statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C. § 841.

DISMISSED; REMANDED to correct the judgment.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Sandia VAZQUEZ-DELGADO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-72790

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 19, 2017

Fernando Luis Cosio, Law Office of Fernando L. Cosio, Honolulu, HI, for Petitioner

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Daniel Shieh, Esquire, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Sandra Vazquez-Delgado, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of ' Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying cancellation of removal. We dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion, where Vazquez-Delgado does not raise a colorable legal or constitutional claim that would invoke our jurisdiction. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); *Planes v. Holder,*652 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing petition challenging discretionary denial of cancellation of removal for failure to raise a colorable legal or constitutional challenge).

Because the BIA conducted an independent review of the IJ’s findings, we do not consider Vazquez-Delgado’s challenges to the IJ’s decision. *See Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008) (‘Where the BIA conducts an independent review of the IJ’s findings, we review the BIA’s decision and not that of the IJ.” (citation omitted)).

We also do not consider contentions raised by Vazquez-Delgado for the first time in her reply brief. *See Ghahremani v. Gonzales,*498 F.3d 993, 997 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (petitioner cannot raise new issues for the first time in a reply brief (citation omitted)); *Rizk v. Holder,*629 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (issues not raised in opening brief are waived).

*530Because the discretionary denial is dis-positive, we do not address Vazquez-Delgado’s contentions regarding the agency’s determination that she is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.