alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Sophie D. Cohen, Appellant, *v.*Eleanor C. Hughes, Respondent.

Argued October 7, 1943;

decided November 18, 1943.

*699
      *Meyer Kraushaar*for appellant.

*Milton Pollack*and *Frederick Zorn*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacheb, JJ.
#### Max LOUMENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Evalina BARTH, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-17130

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Max Loumena, Pro Se

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Max Loumena appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem and subsequent dismissal of his civil rights action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We dismiss this appeal as moot.

Approximately one month after Loume-na filed this appeal, he turned 18 years of age and was no longer required to secure the appointment of a guardian ad litem in order to pursue his claims. *See*Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(1) (the capacity of an individual to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the individual’s domicile); Cal. Civ. P. Code § 372(a) (a *minor*must be represented in court proceedings by a guardian ad litem or guardian or conservator of an estate (emphasis added)). Accordingly, this appeal is moot because this court cannot grant effective relief regarding the district court’s denial of Loumena’s motion to appoint a guardian ad litem and the resulting dismissal of the action. *See United States v. Tanoue,*94 F.3d 1342, 1344 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n appeal must be dismissed as moot if an event occurs while the appeal is pending that makes it impossible for the appellate court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Loumena’s request for a transfer to the Central District of California, raised for the first time in his opening brief, is denied.

In light of our disposition, we do not consider Loumena’s arguments regarding the merits of his claim.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kristopher M. STOREY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-17746 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(August 16, 2017)

Peter J. Sholl, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, Nicole M. Andrejko, Karen L. Gable, Sean Phillip Shecter, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Alisha Marie Scott, Rosemary Cakmis, Donna Lee Elm, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Orlando, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

*542Kristopher M. Storey, Pro Se

Before MARCUS, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Stephen J. Langs, appointed counsel for Kristopher Storey in this appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and has filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v.*California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the judgment revoking Storey’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                1,235,138
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<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            3,029,532
<LOANS>                                       123,767,073
<ALLOWANCE>                                       234,763
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                176,178,501
<DEPOSITS>                                    111,887,796
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<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                176,178,501
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</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED December 10, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-10848 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus FEDERICO CRUZ-BOLANOS, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 6:03-CR-16-ALL

-------------------- Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Federico Cruz-Bolanos appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United Statesafter deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. CruzBolanos contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been alleged in his indictment. Cruz-Bolanos maintains that heNo. 03-10848 -2- pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds the term of imprisonment which may be imposed for that offense.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. Cruz-Bolanos acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

October 26, 2017

No. 04

- 16

- 00149

- CR

Jose Roberto OBREGON

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

F rom the 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013CRO000781 D1 Honorable Jose A. Lopez, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant has filed a pro se motion requesting a copy of his trial transcripts for purposes of filing a post

- conviction writ of habeas corpus. This court has no jurisdiction over post

conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC . art. 11.07; In re Coronado , 980 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). Post

conviction writs of habeas corpus ar e to be filed in the trial court in which the conviction was obtained, and made returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. art. 11.07. In order to obtain a free copy of the record, appellant would need to file a motion in the trial court in which the conviction was obtained and demonstrate that his claim is not frivolous and that the record is needed to decide the issues presented. See United States v. MacCollom , 426 U.S. 317, 326 (1976); Escobar v. State , 880 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.). Appellant’s motion is denied without prejudice to seek ing relief in the proper court.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 26th day of October, 2017

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
#### Jose RODRIGUEZ-GARCIA, AKA Jose Garcia Rodriguez, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-73106

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*579Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 18, 2017

Matthew G. Holt, Esquire, Attorney, Hurwitz Holt, APLC, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner

OIL, Benjamin Zeitlin, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Offiee of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Rodriguez-Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s determination of continuous physical presence, *Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Rodriguez-Garcia was outside of the United States for a period of more than 90 days during the statutory period and thus failed to establish the requisite continuous physical presence. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(A), (d)(2) (a departure in excess of 90 days breaks continuous physical presence). Even assuming equitable estoppel could apply, he has not shown affirmative misconduct by United States immigration officials. *See Salgado-Diaz v. Gonzales,*395 F.3d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The government in immigration cases may be subject to equitable estoppel if it has engaged in affirmative misconduct.”).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Rodriguez-Garcia failed to establish that he could not reasonably relocate within Mexico. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2)-(3).

Rodriguez-Garcia has waived any challenge to the agency’s denial of CAT relief. *See Rizk v. Holder,*629 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (issues not raised in an opening brief are waived).

In light of this disposition, we do not reach Rodriguez-Garcia’s contentions regarding membership in a particular social group.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Brandon Lee STANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35926

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 27, 2017

Brandon Lee Stanley, Pro Se

Teal Luthy Miller, Helen J. Brunner, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Priscilla To-Yin Chan, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Brandon Lee Stanley appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies his civil rights action arising from defendants’ treatment of his broken hand. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We vacate and remand.

On appeal, Stanley argues that he complied with the administrative exhaustion requirement as to his claim arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In response, defendants have expressly waived the affirmative defense of exhaustion that they asserted in the district court, and request that we vacate and remand for further proceedings. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the ease for further proceedings.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Willis C. MCALLISTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAWAIIANA MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LTD.; AOAO Royal Capitol Plaza, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-15631

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 24, 2017

Willis C. McAllister, Pro Se

Carlos D. Perez-Mesa, Jr„ Esquire, Attorney, Clay Chapman Iwamura Pulice & Nervell, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants-Ap-pellees

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2),

MEMORANDUM **

Willis C. McAllister appeals pro se from the district court’s orders denying his motions for relief from the judgment following a jury trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the denial of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, *Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.,*778 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015), and for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for reconsideration, *Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc.,*452 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McAllister’s requests for relief from the judgment because McAllister’s contentions regarding vicarious liability and retaliation did not establish any basis for reconsideration or that he was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. *See Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,*— U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (discussing causation as a necessary element of any Title VII retaliation claim); *Vance v. Ball State Univ.,*— U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2434, 2441-42, 186 L.Ed.2d 565 (2013) (discussing vicarious liability of employers in the Title VII context).

*561Because McAllister fails to argue how the district court erred in rejecting his contentions regarding joint employers and the continuing violation doctrine, these issues are waived. *See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle,*7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief deemed abandoned).

We do not consider McAllister’s remaining contentions because McAllister failed to produce transcripts on appeal. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2); *Portland Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc.,*877 F.2d 787, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1989) (declining to consider plaintiffs’ argument where they failed to provide transcripts).

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal (Docket Entry No. 23) is denied. McAllister’s motion to disqualify counsel (Docket Entry No. 24) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition, is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 41 (Wednesday, March 2, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11810-11818]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04339]


=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of Foreign Assets Control


Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions

AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) is publishing the names of one or more persons that have 
been placed on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 
Persons List (SDN List) based on OFAC's determination that one or more 
applicable legal criteria were satisfied. Additionally, OFAC is 
publishing updates to the identifying information of one person 
currently included on the SDN List. All property and interests in 
property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these persons are blocked, and 
U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions 
with them.

DATES: See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for applicable date(s).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: OFAC: Andrea Gacki, Director, tel.: 
202-622-2490; Associate Director for Global Targeting, tel.: 202-622-
2420; Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.: 202-622-2480; Assistant 
Director for Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202-622-4855; or the Assistant 
Director for Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation, tel.: 202-622-2490.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Electronic Availability

    The Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and 
additional information concerning OFAC sanctions programs are available 
on OFAC's website (https://www.treasury.gov/ofac).

Notice of OFAC Actions

    A. On February 24, 2022, OFAC determined that the property and 
interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of the following 
persons are blocked under the relevant sanctions authority listed 
below.
BILLING CODE 4810-AL-P

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    On February 24, 2022, OFAC updated the entry on the SUN List for 
the following person, whose property and interests in property subject 
to U.S. jurisdiction continue to be blocked under E.O. 14038.
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    Dated: February 24, 2022.
Andrea Gacki,
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the 
Treasury.
[FR Doc. 2022-04339 Filed 3-1-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-AL-C
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6600 

To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to issue guidance 

on whether hospital emergency departments should implement fentanyl 

testing as a routine procedure for patients experiencing an overdose, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 5, 2023 

Mr. LIEU (for himself, Mr. LATTA, Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE, and Mr. CRENSHAW) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 

issue guidance on whether hospital emergency departments should implement fentanyl testing as a routine 

procedure for patients experiencing an overdose, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as ‘‘Tyler’s Law’’. 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6600 IH

1 SEC. 2. TESTING FOR FENTANYL IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY 

2 DEPARTMENTS. 

3 (a) STUDY.—Not later than 1 year after the date of 

4 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and 

5 Human Services shall complete a study to determine— 

6 (1) how frequently hospital emergency depart7 ments test for fentanyl (in addition to testing for 

8 other substances such as amphetamines, 

9 phencyclidine, cocaine, opiates, and marijuana) when 

10 a patient is experiencing an overdose; 

11 (2) the costs associated with such testing for 

12 fentanyl; 

13 (3) the potential benefits and risks for patients 

14 receiving such testing for fentanyl; and 

15 (4) how fentanyl testing in hospital emergency 

16 departments may impact the experience of the pa17 tient, including— 

18 (A) protections for the confidentiality and 

19 privacy of the patient’s personal health informa20 tion; and 

21 (B) the patient-physician relationship. 

22 (b) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 6 months after com23 pletion of the study under subsection (a), based on the 

24 results of such study, the Secretary of Health and Human 

25 Services shall issue guidance on the following: 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6600 IH

1 (1) Whether hospital emergency departments 

2 should implement fentanyl testing as a routine pro3 cedure for patients experiencing an overdose. 

4 (2) How hospitals can ensure that clinicians in 

5 their hospital emergency departments are aware of 

6 which substances are being tested for in their rou7 tinely-administered drug tests, regardless of whether 

8 those tests screen for fentanyl. 

9 (3) How the administration of fentanyl testing 

10 in hospital emergency departments may affect the 

11 future risk of overdose and general health outcomes. 

12 (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘hospital 

13 emergency department’’ means a hospital emergency de14 partment as such term is used in section 1867(a) of the 

15 Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395dd(a)). 

Æ 


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