alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Cesar PINA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-70173

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 15, 2017

Cesar Pina, Pro Se

David J. Schor, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Cesar Pina, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to remand and dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to remand. *Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

*287The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pina’s motion to remand, where he did not show that the hardship evidence submitted on appeal was not previously available or that the asylum application established prima facie eligibility for relief. *See id.*at 1063-64 (a motion to remand is subject to the same requirements as a motion to reopen, and alien must show the evidence submitted could not have been presented at prior hearings); *Najmabadi v. Holder, 597*F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (motion to reopen can be denied for failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought).

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of cancellation of removal for failure to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative, and Pina does not raise a colorable legal or constitutional claim to invoke jurisdiction. *See Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder,*688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (absent a colorable legal or constitutional claim, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary hardship determination). To the extent Pina challenges the IJ’s determination regarding continuous physical presence, we do not consider this contention because the BIA did not rely on the IJ’s determination in denying relief. *See Najmabadi, 597*F.3d at 992 (court’s review is limited to the grounds actually relied upon by the BIA).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This Disposition Is Not Appropriate for Publication and Is Not Precedent Except as Provided By Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
----

|   | (i) | Amendment No. 2 to the Annual Report on Form 40-F of the Company for the year ended March 31, 2012 (the “Annual Report”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (ii) | the information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  Date: January 16, 2013 |  /s/ Gregory McCunn      |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                         | Gregory McCunn                |
|                         | Chief Financial Officer       |
|                         | (principal financial officer) |
Filed May 13, 1891.

#### Elsie Hasbrouok, Resp't, *v.*The Manhattan Railway Co., App’lt.

Appeal from judgment on referee’s report.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


       
<S>                          <C> 

<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001004571
<NAME>                        Globe Business Resources, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             Feb-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                  Nov-30-1996
<CASH>                        392
<SECURITIES>                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                 5,928
<ALLOWANCES>                  590
<INVENTORY>                   49,343
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              0
<PP&E>                        7,754
<DEPRECIATION>                3,940
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                64,125
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         0
<BONDS>                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   0
<COMMON>                      19,303
<OTHER-SE>                    0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  64,125
<SALES>                       3,788
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              17,604
<CGS>                         2,351
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 15,522
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              0
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            470
<INCOME-PRETAX>               1,652
<INCOME-TAX>                  606
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           1,046
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  1,046
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 .24
<EPS-DILUTED>                 .24
        

</TABLE>
Fifth Amendment to Employment Agreement



 Exhibit 10.6 
 FIFTH AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
 This Fifth Amendment to
Employment Agreement (the “Fifth Amendment”) is made and entered into as of May 15, 2012 by and between Unified Grocers, Inc., a California corporation (the “Company”) and Alfred A. Plamann (the “Executive”).

 WHEREAS, the Company and Executive entered into an Employment Agreement (the “Employment Agreement”), as of
February 5, 1996, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit “A”, and further entered into the Amendment to Employment Agreement, as of August, 1999, the Second Amendment to Employment Agreement, as of April, 2001, the Third Amendment to
Employment Agreement, as of August 20, 2003, and the Fourth Amendment to Employment Agreement, as of December 30, 2011, copies of which are attached as Exhibit “B”. The Employment Agreement and the amendments are sometimes
referred to as the “Amended Employment Agreement”; and 
 WHEREAS, the Company and Executive desire to amend the terms
and conditions of the Amended Employment Agreement, as set forth in this Fifth Amendment. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of
the foregoing and of the mutual covenants herein contained, it is agreed as follows: 
 1. Section 3 of the Amended
Employment Agreement is amended in its entirety to read as follows: 
 “3. Duties of the Executive. The Executive
shall serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, serving at the pleasure of the Company’s Board of Directors (the “Board”). The Executive shall devote substantially all of his normal working time and his best efforts, full
attention and energies to the business of the Company, the responsibilities provided for the Chief Executive Officer in the Company’s Bylaws, and such other related duties and responsibilities as may from time to time be reasonably prescribed
by the Board. Notwithstanding the foregoing and with the advance approval of the Board, which approval may be withheld for any reason, the Executive may serve on the boards of directors of unrelated companies and may devote reasonable time to
fulfilling his responsibilities as a member of such boards.” 
 2. Subsection 8(a)(iv) of the Amended Employment Agreement
is amended in its entirety to read as follows: 
 “(iv) the Board fails to appoint the Executive as Chief
Executive Officer;” 
 [Signature Page to Fifth Amendment to Employment Agreement Follows] 

  
 -1-









 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Fifth Amendment as of the day and
year first above written. 
  

							
	Company:	 		 	Executive:
			
	UNIFIED GROCERS, INC.	 		 	
				
	By	 	 /s/    Richard E.
Goodspeed        
	 		 	 /s/    Alfred A.
Plamann        

		 	Richard E. Goodspeed	 		 	Alfred A. Plamann
		 	Chairman of the Board	 		 	


  
 -2-
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATION
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          45,725
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           1,865
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               326,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                65,439
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     45,653
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                      1,702,967
<ALLOWANCE>                                     19,640
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,330,170
<DEPOSITS>                                   2,025,302
<SHORT-TERM>                                    67,690
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             29,266
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           28,750
<PREFERRED>                                      1,500
<COMMON>                                        19,493
<OTHER-SE>                                     156,169
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               2,330,170
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                111,787
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                8,277
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               120,064
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              52,693
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              59,968
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           60,096
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    5,833
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 844
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 87,580
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 14,913
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      14,913
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     7,881
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .93
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .84
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    9.41
<LOANS-NON>                                     24,950
<LOANS-PAST>                                       266
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                19,640
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    3,024
<RECOVERIES>                                       358
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               19,640
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            19,640
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                         19,640
        

</TABLE>
ex10_6.htm


  
Exhibit 10.6


 



Amendment to Change in Control Agreement


 


THIS AMENDMENT TO CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is made on and as of the 19th day of January, 2012, by and between Community Partners Bancorp (“CPB”), a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey which serves as a bank holding company, with its principal office at 1250 Highway 35 South, Middletown, New Jersey 07748; Two River Community Bank (“TRCB”), a banking corporation organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey which is a wholly owned subsidiary of CPB, with its principal office at 1250 Highway 35 South, Middletown, New Jersey 07748; and Alan Turner (“Executive”), whose business address is 1250 Highway 35 South, Middletown, New Jersey 07748.


WHEREAS, CPB, TRCB and Executive entered into that certain Change in Control Agreement, which the parties wish to amend or further amend, as the case may be, by the execution and delivery of this Amendment so as to eliminate any doubt as to the Term of the Change in Control Agreement.


NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, which the parties to this Amendment acknowledge to be legally sufficient, CPB, TRCB and Executive, intending to be legally bound, agree that the Change in Control Agreement is amended by this Amendment only as follows:



	
  

	
1.

	
The text of Section 12a. of the Change in Control Agreement is deleted in its entirety, and is replaced by the following:







“Except as otherwise provided for hereunder, this Agreement shall commence on the date hereof and shall remain in effect until May 31, 2013 or until the end of the Contract Period, whichever is later.”


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, CPB and TRCB have caused this First Amendment to Change in Control Agreement to be signed by their respective duly authorized representatives pursuant to the authority of their Boards of Directors, and Executive has personally executed this Agreement, all as of the day and year first written above.


 




WITNESS:


 







 



	/s/ Nicole Nielsen                           	/s/ Alan B. Turner                                                 
	 	

    Alan Turner, individually




	 	 
	 	 
	ATTEST: 	COMMUNITY PARTNERS BANCORP
	 	TWO RIVER COMMUNITY BANK
	 	 
	 	 
	 	 
	/s/ Michael W. Kostelnik             	By: /s/ William D. Moss
	Michael W. Kostelnik, Secretary	William D. Moss
	 	Chief Executive Officer
N O T F O RP U B L IC A T IO NIN W E S T ' S H AWA I # I RE P O R T S A N D P A C IF IC RE P O R T E R



### NO. CAAP-19-0000502

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS O F THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

R EMAX PROPERTIES, authorized agent for RICHARD K. TAHARA and MARJORIE T. TAHARA, owners of the subject property, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant

A PPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT PUNA DIVISION (CIVIL NO. 3RC-18-1-1186)

ORDER DISMISSING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Chan and Hiraoka, JJ.) Upon consideration of the document, filed March 12, 2020, by self-represented Defendant-Appellant Christopher Young (Young), which the court construes as a motion for reconsideration of the February 28, 2020 order dismissing appeal (Motion), the papers in support, and the record, it appears that (1) on February 28, 2020, the court dismissed the appeal for failure to file the statement of jurisdiction and opening brief; (2) in the instant Motion, Young seeks reconsideration of the February 28, 2020 order; (3) a motion for reconsideration of the February 28, 2020 order was due on or before March 9, 2020. See Hawai # i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 40(a); and (4) the Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-19-0000502 06-APR-2020 09:22 AMN O T F O RP U B L IC A T IO NIN W E S T ' S H AWA I # I RE P O R T S A N D P A C IF IC RE P O R T E R



### instant Motion, filed March 12, 2020, is untimely as a motion for reconsideration.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is dismissed as untimely.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, April 6, 2020. /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza Chief Judge /s/ Derrick H.M. Chan Associate Judge /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge

2
Exhibit 99.2


          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Capital Preferred Yield Fund-IV, L.P.
(the "Partnership") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2002, as filed with the Security and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Joseph F. Bukofski, Chief Accounting Officer of CAI Equipment
Leasing V Corp., the General Partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
      2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Partnership.


By:      /s/Joseph F. Bukofski                         Dated:  November 14, 2002
         ---------------------
         Joseph F. Bukofski
Title:   Chief Accounting Officer

                                       22
#### Everth OSVALDO-MARTINEZ, AKA Euerth O. Martinez, AKA Everth Osvalso Martinez, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 13-74164

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 31, 2017

Frank P. Sprouls, Esquire, Attorney, Law Office of Ricci and Sprouls, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner

Matt A. Crapo, Attorney, OIL, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Everth Osvaldo-Martinez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the *768agency’s factual findings, and we review de novo questions of law. *Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

The agency did not err in determining that Osvaldo-Martinez was statutorily barred from establishing the good moral character required for special rule cancellation under NACARA, where substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that he provided false testimony about the details of the incident leading to his 2005 arrest in order to obtain immigration benefits. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(b)(3); *Ramos v. INS,*246 F.3d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 2001) (“For a witness’s false testimony to preclude a finding of good moral character, the testimony must have been made orally and under oath, and the witness must have had a subjective intent to deceive for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50333

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

GILDARDO CRUZ-RAMIREZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:18-CR-2218-1

Before SMITH, DENNIS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Gildardo Cruz-Ramirez appeals the 30-month above-guidelines sentence 

and three-year term of supervised release following his guilty plea conviction 

for being found unlawfully in the United States after previous deportation. He 

argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because it exceeds the maximum 

sentence of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) charged in the indictment. However, he correctly 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 3, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-50333 Document: 00515221486 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/03/2019
No. 19-50333

2

concedes that the issue whether his eligibility for a sentencing enhancement 

under § 1326(b) must be alleged in the indictment and proved to a jury is 

foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). See 

United States v. Wallace, 759 F.3d 486, 497 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. 

Pineda-Arrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625-26 (5th Cir. 2007). Thus, summary 

affirmance is appropriate. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 

1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is 

GRANTED, the Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to 

file a brief is DENIED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 19-50333 Document: 00515221486 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/03/2019
#### Juan Antonio FALCON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. R. PHILLIPS, Correctional Lieutenant at KVSP, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16177

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 21, 2017

Juan Antonio Falcon, Pro Se

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Juan Antonio Falcon appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process claim arising from a disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Falcon’s action because Falcon failed to allege facts implicating a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. *See Sandin v. Conner,*515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (protected liberty or property interest arises under due process clause when a restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *530*See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as meritless Falcon’s contention that the district court improperly restricted his ability to plead his claim. '

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.