1

Filed 12/26/13

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

ANNEMARIE DONKIN et al., )

)

Plaintiffs and Respondents, )

) S202210

v. )

) Ct.App. 2/1 B228704

RODNEY E. DONKIN, JR., et al., as )

Trustees, etc., )

) Los Angeles County

Defendants and Appellants. ) Super. Ct. No. BP109463

____________________________________)

Rodney E. Donkin and Mary E. Donkin, a married couple, executed a 

revocable trust in 1988 (the Family Trust) as part of their estate planning, naming 

their four children as equal primary beneficiaries after they both had died.1 

Rodney died in 2002. Shortly before her death in 2005, Mary executed a second 

amendment to the Family Trust instrument (hereafter the Trust‟s Second 

 

1 When we subsequently refer to the Donkins, we mean both Mary E. Donkin 

and Rodney E. Donkin. When we refer to one of them individually, we will use 

only the first name for clarity and convenience. After one of the Donkins‟ four 

children, Craig K. M. Donkin, predeceased the Donkins, the Donkins executed a 

first amendment to the Family Trust instrument to name their remaining three 

children, Rodney E. Donkin, Jr., Annemarie Donkin, and Lisa Donkin Kim as the 

primary beneficiaries. We will sometimes refer to these Donkin children by their 

first names, again for clarity and convenience. The Donkins‟ first amendment to 

the Family Trust instrument also changed the first-named successor trustees from 

all four of the Donkins‟ children to Rodney Jr. and his wife, Vicki Donkin 

(hereafter the successor trustees). 
2

Amendment) altering the provisions governing the allocation of the Family Trust‟s 

assets after her death. Both the Trust‟s Second Amendment and the original 

Family Trust instrument contain a “no contest” clause. In 2009, Annemarie and 

Lisa (hereafter the beneficiaries) filed a “safe harbor” proceeding in the probate 

court seeking a determination that the petition they proposed to file, challenging 

the conduct of the successor trustees under the asserted authority of the Trust‟s 

Second Amendment, would not trigger the no contest clauses of the amended 

Family Trust instrument.

We consider in this case whether the no contest clause law that became 

operative on January 1, 2010, while the beneficiaries‟ safe harbor application was 

still pending (Prob. Code, § 21310 et seq.; hereafter the current law) or the no 

contest clause law operative at the time of the filing of their safe harbor 

application (Prob. Code, former § 21300 et seq., repealed by Stats. 2008, ch. 174, 

§ 1, p. 567; hereafter the former law) applies to the beneficiaries‟ proposed 

petition and whether under the applicable law the beneficiaries may pursue their 

proposed claims without risk of being disinherited.2

We conclude that safe harbor proceedings filed before 2010 are not affected 

by the repeal of former section 21320, which previously authorized safe harbor 

applications, and therefore, the probate court did not err in ruling on the 

beneficiaries‟ application. As to the substantive question of whether the 

beneficiaries‟ proposed claims trigger the no contest clauses, we conclude that the 

current law is applicable because the amended Family Trust instrument became 

irrevocable after January 1, 2001. (§ 21315, subd. (a).) We further conclude that 

 

2 All further statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise 

indicated.
3

under the current law, the no contest clauses in the amended Family Trust 

instrument are unenforceable against the beneficiaries‟ proposed petition. We 

recognize that a party may be able to qualify for a fairness exception (§ 3, subd. 

(h)) to the presumptive applicability of the current law to instruments that became 

irrevocable after January 1, 2001, if application of the former law would compel a 

different conclusion as to enforceability of a no contest clause and it is established 

that the trustor(s) of the trust instrument drafted the no contest clause in reliance 

on the former law. Here, however, the successor trustees are not able to claim 

such a fairness exception, because application of the former law would yield the 

same conclusion regarding the unenforceability of the no contest clauses. We

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which determined that certain of the 

beneficiaries‟ claims constituted a contest violating the no contest clauses of the 

amended Family Trust instrument under the former law.

I. THE DONKINS’ ESTATE PLAN

Federal law allows the property of a deceased spouse to be passed to the 

surviving spouse without payment of federal estate tax through the allowance of a 

“marital deduction.” (Int.Rev. Code, § 2056.) The value of the estate of the 

surviving spouse is increased by such a passage of assets and it may be enlarged to 

the point where it will exceed the federal unified tax credit allowable to the estate 

when the surviving spouse dies. (Id., § 2010; see 2 Drafting Cal. Revocable Trusts 

(Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2003) Bypass and Disclaimer Trusts, § 14.1, pp. 14-2 to 14-3 

(rev. 9/13).) A common method of addressing such a situation, having the purpose 

of minimizing the estate taxes owed, is to provide for the transfer to the surviving 

spouse of only as much of the deceased spouse‟s property as necessary to reduce 

the deceased spouse‟s estate tax to zero with use of the applicable federal estate 

tax exemption. The property remaining in the deceased spouse‟s estate is placed 

in a bypass trust, which makes those assets available for the surviving spouse‟s use 
4

but does not give the surviving spouse rights to the property in the bypass trust 

that would cause any of the undistributed trust property to be included in the 

taxable estate of the surviving spouse upon his or her death. (Int.Rev. Code, 

§ 2041; 1 Drafting Cal. Revocable Trusts, supra, Marital Deduction Formulas and 

Funding, § 11.1B, pp. 11-4 to 11-5 (rev. 9/13); 2 Drafting Cal. Revocable Trusts, 

supra, Bypass and Disclaimer Trusts, § 14.1, at pp. 14-2 to 14-3 (rev. 9/13).) 

Thus, “the undistributed assets of the decedent‟s estate . . . „bypass‟ the survivor‟s 

estate.” (2 Drafting Cal. Revocable Trusts, supra, Bypass and Disclaimer Trusts, 

§ 14.1, at pp. 14-2 to 14-3 (rev. 9/13).) “To avoid federal estate tax inclusion in 

the surviving spouse‟s estate, the bypass trust must be irrevocable and 

unamendable on and after the first spouse‟s death.” (2 Drafting Cal. Revocable 

Trusts, supra, Revocation and Amendment, § 20.6, p. 20-14 (rev. 9/13), italics 

added.)

In August 1988, the Donkins executed the original Family Trust instrument, 

along with their individual wills. The Family Trust was formed to hold title to the 

couple‟s real and personal property for their benefit during their lives and 

ultimately after their deaths to provide for the transfer of their assets to their 

beneficiaries. The Family Trust was a revocable “grantor” trust (Int.Rev. Code, 

§ 676) for as long as the Donkins were both living. 

On the death of the first spouse, the Family Trust instrument requires the 

trustee to divide the trust estate into two shares — a survivor‟s share that is 

designated “Survivor‟s Trust A” and a decedent‟s share that is designated 

“Decedent‟s Marital Share.” Survivor‟s Trust A consists of the surviving spouse‟s 

separate property and his or her one-half interest in the community property. It 

remains revocable during the life of the surviving spouse, and becomes irrevocable 

upon the surviving spouse‟s death. Decedent‟s Marital Share consists of the 

decedent spouse‟s separate property and his or her interest in the community 
5

property. It is to be divided into two shares: Decedent‟s Trust B and Decedent‟s 

Trust C. The Family Trust instrument states that upon creation these subtrusts 

“are irrevocable.” The Family Trust instrument specifies that Decedent‟s Trust B 

is to contain property with a value equal to the largest amount possible that will 

not result in a federal estate tax being imposed on the estate of the deceased 

spouse. (Int.Rev. Code, § 2010.) Decedent‟s Trust C is a marital deduction trust, 

which is to contain essentially the residue of the deceased spouse‟s estate not 

allocated to Decedent‟s Trust B. (See, generally, id., § 2056.) 

The Family Trust instrument provides that the surviving spouse is entitled 

to all of the income of the Survivor‟s Trust A, and as much principal as requested. 

The surviving spouse retains the right to change the beneficiaries of the Survivor‟s 

Trust A. In addition, the surviving spouse is entitled to all of the income of the 

Decedent‟s Trusts B and C, and as much of the principal of either trust as the 

trustee deems necessary for the surviving spouse‟s medical care, education and 

comfortable maintenance. The surviving spouse has a noncumulative power to 

withdraw $5,000 or 5 percent of the aggregate value of the principal of the 

Decedent‟s Trusts B and C annually, and a testamentary power of appointment 

over the assets of Decedent‟s Trust C, the marital deduction trust. Consistent with 

the requirements of a bypass trust, nothing in the Family Trust instrument 

authorizes the surviving spouse to revoke or amend the provisions of Decedent‟s 

Trust B.3

Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the Family Trust instrument, 

originally and as amended by the Donkins in 2002, provides for the payment of 

 

3 Indeed, the Family Trust instrument and the Donkins‟ wills, as executed in 

1988, make a number of references to federal estate tax provisions, demonstrating 

the Donkins‟ clear intent to establish an estate plan that minimizes estate taxes. 
6

the debts and obligations of the trust estate and the distribution of any special 

bequests. It contains provisions governing “support and education” needs, 

“extraordinary distribution,” and “handicapped beneficiaries.” As relevant here, it 

then directs the trustee to allocate and divide the remaining assets of all three trusts 

into separate shares so as to provide one share for each of the surviving designated 

primary beneficiaries and one share for each deceased primary beneficiary leaving 

surviving issue. After allocating and dividing the residual of the trust estate into 

shares, the trustee is directed to distribute the allocated shares “outright as soon as 

is practicable.” 

In 2005, after the death of Rodney and shortly before her death, Mary 

executed the Trust‟s Second Amendment. The Trust‟s Second Amendment 

substituted a new paragraph regarding the allocation of the trust assets after her 

death as the surviving spouse. Instead of directing an immediate allocation and 

division of the assets into separate shares for the beneficiaries, the new paragraph 

grants the successor trustees “complete discretion” after the death of Mary to 

retain the assets of the Family Trust intact and to continue to manage the property 

for the equal benefit of the primary beneficiaries. The new paragraph also grants 

the successor trustees discretion to liquidate assets, and if they choose to do so, 

directs them to allocate and divide the liquidated assets into separate trust shares 

for the beneficiaries. The new paragraph provides that the successor trustees, in 

their sole discretion, may continue to manage and invest such liquidated assets. 

The new paragraph grants the successor trustees sole discretion over distribution 

of income and principal from the trust shares to the beneficiaries. The Trust‟s 

Second Amendment otherwise confirms and republishes the remainder of the 

provisions of the trust, including the paragraph in the Family Trust instrument that 

required the trustee, “after allocating and dividing the residual of the Trust Estate 
7

into shares,” to “distribute the shares allocated to Primary Beneficiaries outright as 

soon as is practicable.” 

The Family Trust instrument, as confirmed and republished, contains a no 

contest clause. The Trust‟s Second Amendment added a further no contest clause. 

The first no contest clause in the Family Trust instrument states as follows: 

“The Settlors [the Donkins] desire that this Trust, the Trust Estate and the Trust 

Administrators and beneficiaries shall not be involved in time consuming and 

costly litigation concerning the function of this Trust and disbursement of the 

assets. Furthermore, the Settlors have taken great care to designate, through the 

provisions of this Trust, how they want the Trust Estate distributed. Therefore, if 

a beneficiary, or a representative of a beneficiary, or one claiming a beneficial 

interest in the Trust Estate, should legally challenge this Trust, its provisions, or 

asset distributions, then all asset distributions to said challenging beneficiary shall 

be retained in Trust and distributed to the remaining beneficiaries herein named, as

if said challenging beneficiary and his or her issue had predeceased the 

distribution of the Trust Estate.” 

The no contest clause added by the Trust‟s Second Amendment provides: 

“If any beneficiary in any manner, directly or indirectly, contests or attacks this 

instrument or any of its provisions, any share or interest in the trust given to that 

contesting beneficiary under this instrument is revoked and shall be disposed of in 

the same manner provided herein as if that contesting beneficiary had predeceased 

the settlor.” 

II. PROCEEDINGS IN THE PROBATE COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL

In 2008, the beneficiaries filed an application in the probate court under the 

safe harbor provision of former section 21320 to determine whether the petition 
8

they proposed to file would trigger the no contest clause in either the Family Trust 

instrument or the Trust‟s Second Amendment.4 Their petition would seek to 

compel a proper accounting from the successor trustees, to fix the compensation of 

the successor trustees and surcharge them for any excess fees, to remove the 

successor trustees from office for misfeasance, and to compel the distribution of 

the assets of Decedent‟s Trusts B and C on the ground that the Family Trust 

instrument required such assets to be distributed upon the death of Mary in 2005. 

After a dispute arose over whether the beneficiaries were required to arbitrate their 

claims pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Family Trust instrument, the 

beneficiaries withdrew their safe harbor application. 

In 2009, the beneficiaries renewed their safe harbor application, alleging 

that their proposed action was not a contest within the meaning of either of the no

contest clauses contained in the amended Family Trust instrument. They included 

a request that the court, upon determining their claims do not constitute a violation 

of the no contest provisions, order that the disputes be submitted to arbitration. 

The probate court denied without prejudice the request for an order submitting the 

matter to arbitration, leaving pending the beneficiaries‟ safe harbor application. 

 

4 Former section 21320, subdivision (a), provided: “If an instrument 

containing a no contest clause is or has become irrevocable, a beneficiary may 

apply to the court for a determination of whether a particular motion, petition, or 

other act by the beneficiary . . . would be a contest within the terms of the no 

contest clause.” (As amended by Stats. 2002, ch. 150, § 3, p. 758, repealed by 

Stats. 2008, ch. 174, § 1, p. 567, eff. Jan. 1, 2009, operative Jan. 1, 2010.) Former 

“[s]ection 21320 has been referred to as a „safe harbor‟ provision,” meaning that a 

beneficiary may “obtain a ruling on the applicability of no contest clause issues 

without running the risk of disinheritance.” (Estate of Ferber (1998) 66 

Cal.App.4th 244, 248, fn. 4.) 
9

In early 2010, the successor trustees filed their response to the safe harbor 

application, noting that the former provisions of the Probate Code governing no 

contest clauses had been repealed and replaced with a new statutory scheme, 

operative January 1, 2010. Because the new statutory scheme eliminated the safe 

harbor process, the successor trustees argued that the beneficiaries‟ safe harbor 

application was subject to demurrer. Nevertheless, the successor trustees 

requested that the court apply the former safe harbor provisions, pursuant to 

section 3, subdivision (h),5 because the beneficiaries‟ pleadings had been filed 

under the former law. Under the former law, the successor trustees argued, the 

court should determine that the beneficiaries‟ proposed claims violate the no 

contest clauses. The beneficiaries responded, reiterating their request that the 

court find their proposed petition did not constitute a contest. 

The probate court authorized the successor trustees to file a petition for 

instructions further explaining their position regarding the applicability of the new 

law to the beneficiaries‟ safe harbor application. The successor trustees filed a 

petition arguing that the court should apply the former law and determine that the 

claims raised by the beneficiaries in their safe harbor application and proposed 

petition would violate the trust‟s no contest clauses. The successor trustees also 

 

5 Section 3 provides general transitional provisions for the applicability of 

the Probate Code and any changes to the code. (§ 3, subd. (b).) Subdivision (h) of 

section 3 provides an exception to the general rules that are otherwise stated in the 

section. Subdivision (h) states: “If a party shows, and the court determines, that 

application of a particular provision of the new law or of the old law in the manner 

required by this section or by the new law would substantially interfere with the 

effective conduct of the proceedings or the rights of the parties or other interested 

persons in connection with an event that occurred or circumstance that existed 

before the operative date, the court may, notwithstanding this section or the new 

law, apply either the new law or the old law to the extent reasonably necessary to 

mitigate the substantial interference.” 
10

argued that the beneficiaries‟ petition to compel arbitration of their claims itself 

violated the no contest clauses. At the same time, the successor trustees contended 

that the Family Trust instrument obligated the beneficiaries to arbitrate any 

disputes that could be legally raised, and that by filing the safe harbor application 

instead of arbitrating, the beneficiaries had triggered the no contest clauses. The 

successor trustees contended that once the no contest clauses were triggered, the 

beneficiaries were no longer beneficiaries and had no standing to contest the 

trustees‟ actions, and their safe harbor application should be dismissed with 

prejudice. The beneficiaries replied that their actions were consistent with the 

provisions of the amended Family Trust instrument and that the court had 

discretion to apply the former law and rule that the claims identified in their safe 

harbor application did not violate the no contest clauses. 

After a hearing on the matter, the probate court concluded, without making 

a specific finding whether the former or the current no contest clause law applied, 

that the matters raised in the beneficiaries‟ proposed petition did not constitute a 

contest under the terms of the no contest clauses of the subject trust. 

The successor trustees appealed, arguing, among other things, that the 

language used in the Trust‟s Second Amendment reflected a clear intent by Mary 

to change the distribution plan for all of the assets owned by the trust at the time of 

her death, including the assets in the Decedent‟s Marital Share trusts, by giving the 

successor trustees broad discretionary power over the disposition of the entire trust 

estate. The successor trustees contended, therefore, that the beneficiaries‟ demand 

for a distribution of the assets in the decedent‟s trusts on the ground that such 

trusts were irrevocable and unaffected by the Trust‟s Second Amendment 

constituted a challenge to and an attack on the validity of the Trust‟s Second 

Amendment, triggering the no contest clauses. In addition to opposing these 
11

claims, the beneficiaries argued that the successor trustees lacked standing to 

appeal. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. It concluded that 

both the beneficiaries and the successor trustees had standing and affirmed the 

probate court‟s order to the extent it impliedly determined that the former no 

contest law applied. The Court of Appeal otherwise reversed the judgment, 

concluding that “as a matter of law, the beneficiaries‟ challenges to Mary‟s ability 

to amend the Trust with the [Trust‟s] Second Amendment, the Trustees‟ failure to 

make distributions, and Mary‟s failure to create the subtrusts required by the Trust 

would, if pursued, constitute a contest under the no contest clause because these 

challenges attack the distributive scheme of the Trust by requiring the Trustees to 

exercise their discretion when they are not required to do so by the [Trust‟s] 

Second Amendment. The beneficiaries‟ contention that the [Trust‟s] Second 

Amendment does not apply to the Trust because the surviving settlor (Mary) 

lacked . . . the power to amend the Trust also constitutes a challenge to the 

distributive scheme of the Settlors.” 

We granted the beneficiaries‟ petition for review.

III. BACKGROUND REGARDING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 

NO CONTEST CLAUSES

Before we consider the issues on which we granted review, we find it 

helpful to review generally the development of California law regarding no contest 

clauses. 

An in terrorem or no contest clause in a trust instrument “essentially acts as 

a disinheritance device, i.e., if a beneficiary contests or seeks to impair or 

invalidate the trust instrument or its provisions, the beneficiary will be disinherited 

and thus may not take the gift or devise provided under the instrument.” (Burch v. 

George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 265 (Burch).) No contest clauses, whether in wills 
12

or trusts, have long been held valid in California. (Id., at p. 254; In re Estate of 

Kitchen (1923) 192 Cal. 384, 389; In re Estate of Hite (1909) 155 Cal. 436, 439-

441.) Such clauses promote the public policies of honoring the intent of the donor 

and discouraging litigation by persons whose expectations are frustrated by the 

donative scheme of the instrument. (Burch, supra, at p. 254.) 

In tension with these public policy interests are the policy interests of 

avoiding forfeitures and promoting full access of the courts to all relevant 

information concerning the validity and effect of a will, trust, or other instrument. 

(See Selvin, Comment: Terror in Probate (1964) 16 Stan. L.Rev. 355, 366-368.) 

In light of these opposing interests, the common law in California recognized the 

enforceability of no contest clauses, albeit strictly construed, “so long as the 

condition was not prohibited by some law or opposed to public policy.” (In re 

Estate of Kitchen, supra, 192 Cal. at p. 388.) 

In1989, the California Law Revision Commission (the Commission) 

studied the policies involved in enforcement of no contest clauses and concluded 

the balance between the conflicting policies established by existing California case 

law was “basically sound.” (Recommendation Relating to No Contest Clauses 

(Jan. 1989) 20 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1990) pp. 11-12.) The Commission 

recommended the partial codification of California‟s common law rules regarding 

the enforcement of no contest clauses with the addition of a number of changes 

thought to improve the existing law. (Id., at pp. 12-14.) 

Acting on such recommendations, the Legislature enacted in 1989 a series 

of statutes governing no contest clauses, which continued to generally recognize 

no contest clauses as enforceable, but incorporated several express limitations 

based on principles of existing law. (Former §§ 21303, 21306 & 21307; Stats. 

1989, ch. 544, § 19, pp. 1825-1826; see Estate of Bergland (1919) 180 Cal. 629, 

636-637; Estate of Lewy (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 729, 734; former § 6112, subd. (d), 
13

Stats. 1988, ch. 1199, § 75, pp. 3919-3920.) The adopted statutory limitations 

were, however, “not intended as a complete listing of acts that may be held exempt 

from enforcement of a no contest clause.” (Recommendation Relating to No 

Contest Clauses, supra, 20 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1990) p. 19; see Cal. 

Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 54A West‟s Ann. Prob. Code (1991 ed.) 

foll. former §§ 21306, 21307, pp. 314-315, 316.) The statutes were intended as 

only a partial codification of the common law. (Former § 21301, Stats. 1989, 

ch. 544, § 19, p. 1825.)6 

Over the next decade, the Legislature continued to amend the statutes 

regarding the enforcement of no contest clauses, specifically identifying various 

types of claims for which a safe harbor proceeding was expressly available and 

further identifying specific types of actions against which a no contest clause was 

not enforceable as a matter of public policy. (See Stats. 1994, ch. 40, § 3, p. 379 

[amending former § 21320 regarding safe harbor proceedings]; Stats. 1995, 

ch. 730, § 11, p. 5480 [expanding the express scope of former § 21306]; Stats. 

2000, ch. 17, §§ 5-7, pp. 73-75 [adding former § 21305, subd. (a)-(c) to reduce the 

actions that would be considered a contest and to specify eight public policy 

exceptions to enforcement of a no contest clause, including several actions relating 

 

6 The 1989 legislation also established the safe harbor declaratory relief 

procedure as a method of determining whether a particular motion, petition or 

other act by a beneficiary would be a contest within the terms of the particular no 

contest clause. (Former § 21305, Stats. 1989, ch. 544, § 19, p. 1825.) When the 

Probate Code was repealed and reenacted in 1990, the substance of the 1989 no 

contest clause provisions was continued, although section 21305 became former 

section 21320, which was limited to instruments that were or had become 

irrevocable. (Stats. 1990, ch. 79, § 14, pp. 463, 972.17.) 
14

to fiduciaries; amending former § 21320, subd. (a) regarding safe harbor 

proceedings].) 

In 2002, the Legislature for the first time distinguished “direct contests” 

and “indirect contests.” A “direct contest” was defined as a pleading in a court 

proceeding that alleged “the invalidity of an instrument or one or more of its 

terms” based on 10 specified grounds, including, inter alia, revocation, lack of 

capacity, fraud, undue influence, lack of due execution, and forgery. (Former 

§ 21300, subd. (b), Stats. 2002, ch. 150, § 1, p. 757.) An “ „[i]ndirect contest‟ ” 

was defined as a pleading “that indirectly challenges the validity of an instrument 

or one or more of its terms based on any other ground not contained in [the 

statutory list of direct contests].” (Former § 21300, subd. (c).) Reading the former 

statute and the applicable common law together, we described an indirect contest 

as “one that attacks the validity of an instrument by seeking relief inconsistent 

with its terms.” (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 605.) 

In 2002, the Legislature also added four further matters that would not 

violate a no contest clause as a matter of law. (Former § 21305, subds. (b)(9)-

(12), (d), Stats. 2002, ch. 150, § 2, pp. 757-758.)7 In addition, the Legislature 

expressly authorized the safe harbor procedure for a pleading that alleged a public 

policy exemption from the operation of a no contest clause. (Former § 21320, 

subd. (a), Stats. 2002, ch. 150, § 3, p. 758.) The 2002 amendments were again in 

significant part intended as clarification of the law as it had continued to be 

developed in the courts. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d 

 

7 The 2002 legislation specified that three of the then 12 listed public policy 

exemptions would not apply if the challenge was found to be a direct contest. 

(Former § 21305, subd. (e) [referencing subd. (b)(6), (9) & (11)].) 
15

reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1878 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 

17, 2002.) 

The effort by the Legislature to clarify the law was not, however, entirely 

successful. The complexity of the statutory scheme actually promoted further 

uncertainty as to the scope of application of a no contest clause, which in turn led 

to widespread use of the safe harbor declaratory relief procedure. The frequent 

use of the safe harbor procedure added an additional layer of litigation to probate 

matters, which undermined the goal of a no contest clause in reducing litigation by 

beneficiaries. (Revision of No Contest Clause Statute (Jan. 2008) 37 Cal. Law 

Revision Com. Rep. 359, 381 (Revision Report).) In 2005, the Legislature asked 

the Commission to once again study the advantages and disadvantages of 

enforcing a no contest clause in a will, trust, or other estate planning instrument. 

(Sen. Conc. Res. No. 42, Stats. 2005 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) res. ch. 122, p. 6159.) 

In 2008, the Commission issued a report recommending retention, but with 

significant revision, of the no contest clause statutes. (Revision Rep., supra, 37 

Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at pp. 391-399.)8 According to the Commission, no 

contest clauses are still supported by a number of important public policy interests, 

including respecting a transferor‟s ability to control the use and disposition of his 

or her own property and to avoid the cost, delay, public exposure, and additional 

discord between beneficiaries involved in litigation over the transferor‟s estate 

plan. (Revision Rep., at pp. 364-366.) When the proper disposition of a 

transferor‟s property is complicated by difficult property characterization issues, a 

 

8 “Explanatory comments by a law revision commission are persuasive 

evidence of the intent of the Legislature in subsequently enacting its 

recommendations into law.” (Brian W. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 618, 

623.)
16

no contest clause may also appropriately operate as a “forced election” in order to 

avoid ownership disputes.9 (Id., at pp. 367-368.) 

The Commission acknowledged, however, that other public policy concerns 

“can trump a transferor‟s intention to create a no contest clause.” (Revision Rep., 

supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 369.) It noted that as a matter of 

general public policy, “a person should have access to the courts to remedy a 

wrong or protect important rights.” (Ibid.) The Commission stated that a no 

contest clause should be applied conservatively to avoid a forfeiture that is not 

intended by the transferor. (Id., at pp. 369-370.) The Commission agreed that 

judicial proceedings may be necessary to determine a transferor‟s intentions. (Id., 

at pp. 370-372.) And it emphasized that important public policy interests support 

judicial supervision of an executor, trustee, or other fiduciary. (Id., at p. 372.) 

 

9 The Commission gave the following example of a beneficial use of a forced 

election: “A decedent is survived by his wife of many years. It was a second 

marriage for both spouses, each of whom had significant separate property assets 

of their own. Over the years of their marriage it became increasingly difficult to 

characterize ownership of their assets as separate or community property . . . . 

Rather than put his beneficiaries to the expense and delay that would be required 

for a thorough property characterization, the transferor uses a no contest clause to 

avoid the issue. [¶] The transferor claims that all of the disputed assets are his 

separate property, gives a gift to his surviving wife that is clearly greater than the 

amount she would recover if she were to contest the property characterization, and 

includes a no contest clause. This forces the surviving spouse to make a choice 

between acquiescing in the decedent‟s estate plan and taking the amount offered 

under that plan, or forfeiting that amount in order to pursue her independent rights 

under community property law. [¶] If the offer made in the estate plan is fair to 

the surviving spouse, she can save the estate money and time by accepting the gift 

offered . . . .” (Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 367.) 

Other situations, beside the disposition of marital property, may give rise to a 

similar type of “forced election.” (Id., at p. 368.)
17

Nevertheless, in light of the identified policy interests in favor of no contest 

clauses, the Commission recommended against making any fundamental 

substantive change to the existing no contest clause statutes. (Revision Rep., 

supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 391.) “As under existing law, a no 

contest clause should be enforceable unless it conflicts with public policy.” (Ibid.)

To address the “most common and serious problem” of uncertainty in 

application of the existing law (Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. 

Rep. at p. 382), the Commission recommended a simplification of the statutes. 

(Id., at p. 392.) As pertinent here, the Commission proposed to narrowly define 

the types of contest subject to a no contest clause, in place of the existing “openended definition of „contest,‟ combined with a complex and lengthy set of 

exceptions.” (Ibid.) Under such a statutory scheme, “any pleading that is not one 

of the expressly covered types would not be governed by a no contest clause” 

without the need for any further analysis. (Ibid.) 

According to the Commission, “[o]ne of the main benefits of limiting the 

enforcement of a no contest clause to an express and exclusive list of contest types 

is that the existing attempt to describe public policy exceptions can be 

abandoned,” eliminating “a significant source of complexity and confusion in 

existing law.” (Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 395.) 

Although enforcement of a no contest clause against an indirect contest would be 

eliminated, the Commission believed that the substantive effect of such a change 

“would be relatively modest.” (Ibid.) “Existing law already exempts nearly all 

types of indirect contests from the operation of a no contest clause (other than 

forced elections)” and, when the existing list of public policy exceptions does not 

apply, “the gap in coverage is probably inadvertent.” (Id., at p. 395 & fn. 95.) 

“The policy implication of that trend is clear. A beneficiary should not be 

punished for bringing an action to ensure the proper interpretation, reformation, or 
18

administration of an estate plan. Such actions serve the public policy of 

facilitating the fair and efficient administration of estates and help to effectuate the 

transferor‟s intentions . . . . [¶] The proposed law would merely extend that 

principle to its logical end . . . .” (Id., at p. 395.) 

Accordingly, the Commission recommended that a no contest clause should 

be enforceable only in response to three types of contests: (1) a direct contest, as 

specifically defined, brought without probable cause; (2) a creditor claim; and (3) 

a challenge to a transfer of property amounting to a forced election. (Revision 

Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at pp. 392-394, 397.) 

In response to the Commission‟s report, the Legislature repealed the 

existing statutes and replaced them with a new set of statutes governing no contest 

clauses, essentially as recommended by the Commission. (Stats. 2008, ch. 174, 

§§ 1, 2, p. 567 [repealing former § 21300 et seq., and adding § 21310 et seq.]; Sen. 

Rules Com., Floor Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1264 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended June 18, 2008.) Effective on January 1, 2009, operative on January 1, 

2010, and applying to instruments that became irrevocable on or after January 1, 

2001, the new statutory provisions generally limit enforceability of the no contest 

clause to (1) direct contests brought without probable cause; (2) challenges to the 

transferor‟s ownership of property at the time of the transfer, if expressly included 

in the no contest clause; and (3) creditor‟s claims and actions based on them, if 

expressly included in the no contest clause. (§§ 21311, subd. (a)(1)-(3), 21315; 

Stats. 2008, ch. 174, §§ 2, 3, p. 568.) The new law discontinued the safe harbor 

declaratory relief procedure of former section 21320. (Stats. 2008, ch. 174, § 1, 

p. 567.) 

With this background in mind, we consider whether the beneficiaries may 

litigate their proposed petition in this case without risk of disinheritance by 

operation of the no contest clauses of the amended Family Trust instrument. 
19

IV. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE CLAIMS PROPOSED TO BE FILED BY THE 

BENEFICIARIES IN THEIR 2009 SAFE HARBOR APPLICATION

A. The beneficiaries’ safe harbor application was not subject to 

dismissal after the current law became operative.

Section 3, subdivision (c), provides that “[s]ubject to the limitations 

provided in this section, a new law applies on the operative date to all matters 

governed by the new law, regardless of whether an event occurred or 

circumstance existed before, on, or after the operative date, including, but not 

limited to, . . . commencement of a proceeding, . . . , or taking of an action. (Italics 

added.) Subdivision (d) of section 3 further provides that “[i]f a petition, . . . is 

filed before the operative date, the contents, execution, and notice thereof are 

governed by the old law and not by the new law; but any subsequent proceedings 

taken after the operative date concerning the petition, . . . , including an objection 

or response, a hearing, an order, or other matter relating thereto is governed by 

the new law and not by the old law.” (Italics added.) 

The current law regarding no contest clauses became operative on January 

1, 2010, while the beneficiaries‟ safe harbor application was still pending. Safe 

harbor proceedings are not, however, matters “governed” by the current law, 

which discontinued the use of such proceedings and provides no procedures for 

those actions that may have been pending when the new law took effect. 

Although the current law repealed former section 21320, which authorized safe 

harbor applications (see fn. 5, ante), nothing in the current law suggests that safe 

harbor applications pending when the current law became operative were subject 

to dismissal. Instead, procedurally, the cause was properly before the probate 

court under the rule provided by section 3, subdivision (g), which states that “[i]f 

the new law does not apply to a matter that occurred before the operative date, the 

old law continues to govern the matter notwithstanding its amendment or repeal

by the new law.” (Italics added.) Therefore, the trial court did not err as a 
20

procedural matter in ruling on the beneficiaries‟ pending safe harbor application 

after the operative date of the current law. 

B. The current law was presumptively applicable to the substantive 

merits of the beneficiaries’ safe harbor application and, under such 

law, the no contest clauses of the amended Family Trust 

instrument are unenforceable.

We conclude, however, that concerning the substantive legal issue of 

whether the no contest clauses of the Family Trust instrument are enforceable 

against the beneficiaries‟ proposed claims, the current law was presumptively 

applicable because the Family Trust instrument became irrevocable after January 

1, 2001. (§ 21315, subdivision (a).) And under the current law, the no contest 

clauses are not enforceable against the claims that the beneficiaries have sought to 

raise by their proposed petition. We explain.

In proposing the current law, the Commission was plainly aware of the 

issue of retroactive or prospective application of the proposed law. Its staff 

expressly advised the Commission regarding the transitional issues presented by 

an adoption of new no contest clause statutes. (Cal. Law Revision Com., First 

Supp. to Memo. 2008-3, Revision of No Contest Clause Statute (Transitional 

Issues) (Jan. 15, 2008) pp. 1-15 (First Supplement).) In particular, staff brought to 

the attention of the Commission “two significant benefits to retroactive application 

of the proposed law.” (Id., at p. 6.) First, the public policy interests in allowing 

actions to determine or preserve the transferor‟s intentions or supervise a fiduciary 

without deterrence by a no contest clause apply equally to all instruments, 

whenever executed. (Ibid.) Second, retroactive application would significantly 

simplify the law going forward. (Id., at pp. 6-7.) However, staff pointed out, full 

retroactive application of the proposed law could, among other things, defeat a

transferor‟s expectations, which were presumably based on and relied on 

application of the law in existence at the time of executing an estate plan. (Id., at 
21

p. 7.) As an alternative to full retroactivity, staff suggested partial retroactivity, 

which “would achieve some of the simplification benefits of retroactive 

application, without creating the problems posed by full retroactivity.” (Id., at 

p. 12.) 

The Commission adopted its staff‟s partial retroactivity suggestion and 

recommended to the Legislature a carefully designed scheme of effective and 

operative dates for the proposed law. Specifically, the Commission proposed that 

the new statutes should have a one-year deferred operation date in order to provide 

a “grace period” for those who wished to revise their estate plans before the new 

law took effect. (Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 

398.) But, once the proposed law became operative, the Commission proposed 

that “it would apply to any instrument, whenever executed, with one exception. It 

would not apply to an instrument that became irrevocable before January 1, 2001.” 

(Id., at pp. 398-399.) The January 1, 2001 date was chosen to “preserve existing 

law as to instruments that became irrevocable before the enactment of the existing 

scheme of statutory exceptions to the enforcement of a no contest clause.” (Id., at 

p. 399.)10

The Commission noted that “[w]here there are differences in the effect of 

the proposed law and existing Section 21305, the retroactive application of the 

proposed law to January 1, 2001, would be limited by the exceptions provided in 

Probate Code Section 3,” including the “general exception that allows a court to 

 

10 In 2002, the Legislature expressly precluded retroactive application of the 

statutory public policy exceptions by limiting the application of former section 

21305, subdivision (b) to instruments of decedents dying post-2000 and to 

documents that become irrevocable post-2000. (Former § 21305, subd. (d); Stats. 

2002, ch. 150, § 2, p. 758; see First Supp., supra, at pp. 5-6.)
22

apply prior law if it determines that retroactive application of the new law would 

substantially interfere with the rights of interested persons.” (Revision Rep., 

supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 399; see First Supp., supra, at pp. 1-

4.) Section 3, subdivision (h), thus, would “provide[] a general fairness exception 

to the retroactive application of new law.” (First Supp., supra, at p. 3.)

The Legislature adopted the recommendation of the Commission. Effective 

on January 1, 2009, and operative on January 1, 2010, section 21315, subdivision 

(a), provides that the current no contest clause statutes apply “to any instrument, 

whenever executed, that became irrevocable on or after January 1, 2001.” 

(§ 21315, subd. (a).) 

As recommended by the Commission, section 21315 itself provides no 

exception to the applicability of the current law to instruments that became 

irrevocable on or after January 1, 2001. It appears clear from the legislative 

history we have described that the Legislature fully intended the current law to be 

applied to instruments drafted years before the current law‟s operative date as long 

as the instrument became irrevocable on or after January 1, 2001, the date when

the former law‟s statutory scheme of exceptions to the enforceability of no contest 

clauses became effective. Application of the current law to such category of 

instruments was reasonable because, as explained by the Commission‟s report, the 

current law would not likely change the substantive result regarding the 

enforceability of a no contest clause in those instruments. (Revision Rep., supra, 

37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 395.)

Rodney died in 2002. Mary died in 2005. Thus, the Family Trust

instrument became irrevocable after January 1, 2001, and by the terms of section 

21315, subdivision (a), the current substantive law governing no contest clauses is 

applicable. 
23

The successor trustees argue that the no contest clauses of the amended 

Family Trust instrument should be enforceable against the beneficiaries‟ claims 

under the current law. We disagree.

Section 21311, subdivision (a), of the current law provides in full as 

follows: “A no contest clause shall only be enforced against the following types of 

contests: [¶] (1) A direct contest that is brought without probable cause. [¶] (2) 

A pleading to challenge a transfer of property on the grounds that it was not the 

transferor‟s property at the time of the transfer. A no contest clause shall only be 

enforced under this paragraph if the no contest clause expressly provides for that 

application. [¶] (3) The filing of a creditor‟s claim or prosecution of an action 

based on it. A no contest clause shall only be enforced under this paragraph if the 

no contest clause expressly provides for that application.” (Italics added.) 

The effect of this statute is to make the trust‟s no contest clauses 

unenforceable unless the beneficiaries‟ proposed action is covered by one of the 

three specified categories of contest.

The successor trustees do not contend that the beneficiaries‟ proposed 

petition is a “direct contest” under the current law. (§§ 21310, subds. (a) & (b), 

21311, subd. (a)(1).) Nor do they contend that the beneficiaries‟ challenges assert 

a creditor‟s claim under subdivision (a)(3) of section 21311. But the successor 

trustees do argue that subdivision (a)(2) of section 21311, relating to forced 

elections, is applicable to the beneficiaries‟ proposed petition. According to the 

successor trustees, the beneficiaries‟ claims challenge a transfer of property (the 

assets in Decedent‟s Trust B) within the meaning of subdivision (a)(2) and 

therefore, the trust‟s no contest clauses are enforceable under the current law. To 

the contrary, the no contest clauses are unenforceable under the terms of section 

21311, subdivision (a)(2). 
24

Legislative history makes it clear that the Legislature intended, in enacting 

section 21311, subdivision (a)(2) to allow the continued enforcement of a no 

contest clause in order to facilitate a forced election.

Specifically, the current law was enacted upon the recommendation of the 

Commission after the Commission reflected and reported on the respective 

advantages and disadvantages of enforcing a no contest clause. Among the issues 

considered by the Commission was the historic use of a no contest clause to 

resolve disputes over the character of the property being transferred — in essence, 

the extent of the transferor‟s ownership of the property. In its 2008 report, the 

Commission explained that “[i]n some cases, the proper disposition of a 

transferor‟s property may be complicated by difficult property characterization 

issues.” (Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 367.) The 

Commission gave as an example a situation in which successive marriages 

resulted in difficult community property characterization issues, which could be 

avoided by forcing the surviving spouse to make a choice between accepting an 

amount offered through the decedent‟s estate plan or pursuing his or her 

independent community property claim. (Ibid.; see fn. 10, ante.) As another 

example, the Commission noted that “business partners may have mingled assets 

in a way that would make proper division difficult . . . .” (Revision Rep., supra, 

37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 368.) In such cases, the Commission 

reflected, “a no contest clause and a sufficiently generous gift can resolve the 

matter without litigation.” (Ibid.) The no contest clause forces the beneficiary to 

make an election.11 (See generally Burch, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 265-266 

 

11 As one case described the situation: “A no contest clause may result in a 

„forced election‟ where a beneficiary is obligated to choose between two 

inconsistent or alternative rights or claims because the testator or trustor clearly 

(Footnote continued on next page.)
25

[describing with approval the use of a forced election in the community property 

context].)

The Commission acknowledged a potential for misuse of such a forced 

election (Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at pp. 372-374), 

but it ultimately concluded, after a survey of the views of trust and estate 

attorneys, probate judges, and elder law practitioners (Cal. Law Revision Com., 

Memo. 2007-7, Revision of No Contest Clause Statute: Practitioner Survey (Feb. 

21, 2007) pp. 1, 4-5), that the incidences of a forced election deterring a 

reasonable claim of ownership of estate assets were rare and that there was no 

consensus for significant reform of the use of a no contest clause to force an 

election. (Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at pp. 389-390.) 

The Commission proposed that the ability of a transferor to use a no contest clause 

to create a forced election be continued, but recommended narrowing of the 

existing statutory language, which referred to any “action or proceeding to 

determine the character, title, or ownership of property” (former § 21305, subd. 

(a)(2); Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, at p. 394.) 

The Commission proposed statutory language that instead allowed a no contest 

clause to be enforced against: “A pleading to challenge a transfer of property on 

the grounds that it was not the transferor‟s property at the time of the transfer,” 

provided “the no contest clause expressly provides for that application.” (Revision 

Rep., at p. 402; see id., p. 394.) Accepting the recommendation (see Sen. Com. 

 

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

intended that the beneficiary not enjoy both. [Citation.] Put another way, a 

claimant cannot at the same time take the benefits under a testamentary instrument 

and repudiate the losses; [he or] she must accept the terms in toto, or reject them in 

toto.” (Colburn v. Northern Trust Co. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 439, 447.) 
26

on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1264 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended 

Mar. 24, 2008, pp. 9-10), the Legislature enacted the language proposed by the 

Commission, in section 21311, subdivision (a)(2). 

Because there is no ambiguity in the language of section 21311, subdivision 

(a)(2), concerning the requirement that the no contest clause expressly provide for 

its application to forced election challenges, the plain meaning of the language 

controls. (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265.) Here, the terms of the 

no contest clauses in the amended Family Trust instrument do not expressly 

provide that the clauses apply to pleadings that challenge a transfer of property on 

the grounds that it was not the transferor‟s property at the time of the transfer. 

Therefore, even assuming for purposes of the successor trustees‟ argument that the 

beneficiaries‟ claims could be characterized as a challenge to a transfer of property 

within the meaning of section 21311, subdivision (a)(2), an issue that we expressly 

do not decide, the no contest clauses cannot be enforced against such claims. 

In summary, the trust‟s no contest clauses cannot be enforced to disinherit 

the beneficiaries under the current law because the claims alleged in the 

beneficiaries‟ proposed petition do not fall into any of the categories of contest set 

forth in section 21311, subdivision (a). 

C. The Successor Trustees do not qualify for a fairness exception to 

the presumptive applicability of the current law.

Although the current law is presumptively applicable to instruments that

became irrevocable after January 1, 2001, like the Family Trust instrument here,

section 3, subdivision (h), provides a “fairness” exception. As we have previously 

noted, section 3, subdivision (h) provides, in pertinent part: “If a party shows, and 

the court determines, that application of . . . the new law would substantially 

interfere with . . . the rights of the parties or other interested persons in connection 

with an event that occurred or circumstance that existed before the operative date, 
27

the court may, notwithstanding this section or the new law, apply . . . the old law 

to the extent reasonably necessary to mitigate the substantial interference.” (See 

fn. 6, ante.) We reject the successor trustees‟ contention that the fairness 

exception is applicable in this case. 

The successor trustees claim that application of the current law after the 

death of both Rodney and Mary would unfairly defeat the Donkins‟ expectations 

regarding the no contest clauses that they included in the trust documents, thus, 

substantially interfering with the rights of the parties and other interested persons. 

As we have explained, however, the Legislature plainly intended that the current 

law be applied retroactively to instruments that became irrevocable by the death of 

the trustor(s) even years before the current law became operative, as long as the 

instrument did not become irrevocable before 2001. Thus, the mere fact that a 

trust instrument was drafted in reliance on the former law and became irrevocable 

before the operative date of the current law is not sufficient to invoke the fairness 

exception in subdivision (h) of section 3. 

Rather, as the Commission explained, it is “[w]here there are differences in 

the effect of the proposed law and existing Section 21305, [that] the retroactive 

application of the proposed law to January 1, 2001, would be limited by the 

exceptions provided in Probate Code Section 3,” including the “general exception 

that allows a court to apply prior law if it determines that retroactive application of 

the new law would substantially interfere with the rights of interested persons.” 

(Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 399; see also First 

Supp., supra, at pp. 1-4.) That is, unless a party can show that a different result 

would obtain under the former law on which the transferor relied when executing 

the estate plan, the current law applies retroactively to January 1, 2001. In most 

cases there will be no difference in result between the former law and the current 

law (Revision Rep., supra, 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. at p. 395 [substantive 
28

effect of current law will be “relatively modest”]) and the fairness exception will 

be inapplicable. We turn to a consideration of whether the application of the 

former law to the beneficiaries‟ claims in this case would lead to a different result.

The successor trustees contend that under the former law, the beneficiaries‟ 

claims would trigger the no contest clauses of the Family Trust instrument and of 

the Trust‟s Second Amendment because the claims constitute an attack on the 

validity of the terms of the trust within the meaning of former section 21300, 

subdivision (c), and related case law. (See former § 21300, subd. (c) [defining as 

an “indirect contest” a pleading “that indirectly challenges the validity of an 

instrument or one or more of its terms” based on a ground not enumerated as a 

“direct contest” in subdivision (b) of the section], Stats. 2002, ch. 150, § 1, 

p. 757.)

As noted earlier, turning both to this former statute and to case law defining 

the term “indirect contest,” we defined the term as referring to a claim “that 

attacks the validity of an instrument by seeking relief inconsistent with its terms.” 

(Johnson v. Greenelsh, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 605.) We also referred to such 

challenges as those that would thwart the testator‟s distributive scheme. (Id., at 

p. 606.) The successor trustees claim that the beneficiaries‟ claims violate the 

trust‟s no contest clauses because they attack the validity of the amended 

instrument and challenge its distributive scheme. 

We are not persuaded because we believe that the beneficiaries‟ claims, 

although sometimes couched in terms suggesting they are arguing the validity of 

the Trust‟s Second Amendment, at bottom seek an interpretation of the Family 

Trust instrument, rather than to void any portion of it or to set aside its distributive 

plan. Such calls for interpretation do not violate no contest clauses. 

We begin with former section 21305, subdivision (b). It provides that 

“notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any instrument, the following 
29

proceedings do not violate a no contest clause as a matter of public policy” and 

lists a number of types of claims, including one that governs here. (Stats. 2002, 

ch. 150, § 2, p 758.) Former section 21305, subdivision (b)(9) lists “[a] pleading 

regarding the interpretation of the instrument containing the no contest clause or 

an instrument or other document expressly identified in the no contest clause.” 

(Italics added.)12

Under the common law, too, disputes over the interpretation of instruments 

were not ordinarily seen as violating a no contest clause. “Rather than thwarting 

the testator‟s dispositive intent, the proceeding serves to ascertain and enforce that 

intent.” (Estate of Strader (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 996, 1004, relying on Estate of 

Kruse (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 471, 476; see Graham v. Lenzi (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 

248, 258.)

A proposed pleading concerns the interpretation of an instrument when its 

allegations put in issue a provision or term of the instrument that “is ambiguous 

and requires judicial interpretation.” (Cory v. Toscano (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 

1039, 1044.) As we shall see, even the successor trustees‟ own arguments make it 

plain that the issue in dispute is the proper interpretation of ambiguous provisions 

of the amended Family Trust instrument.

 

12 Former section 21305, subdivision (d) provides that subdivision (b)(9), 

(11), and (12) applies only to instruments of decedents dying on or after January 1, 

2003, and to documents that became irrevocable on or after January 1, 2003. 

(Former § 21305, subd. (d), Stats. 2002, ch. 150, § 2, p. 758.) Former section 

21305, subdivision (b)(9), is applicable under former section 21305, subdivision 

(d), to the beneficiaries‟ action seeking a determination of the effect of the Trust‟s 

Second Amendment because Mary died in 2005, and the Family Trust instrument 

as amended by the Trust‟s Second Amendment became irrevocable in 2005.
30

The beneficiaries proposed to file a petition seeking a determination of 

various issues pertaining to the administration of the Family Trust. Their 

proposed petition objected to the two accountings that had been provided to them 

by the successor trustees, claiming that the accountings were inadequate and 

disclosed inappropriate transactions and excessive fees by the successor trustees. 

The beneficiaries alleged that the accountings failed to disclose any segregation of 

the original trust estate into separate trusts after the death of Rodney, as required 

by the terms of the Family Trust instrument. Further, they alleged that the 

successor trustees had failed to make any distribution of Decedent‟s Trusts B and 

C after the death of Mary, as required by the terms of the trust agreement. The 

beneficiaries‟ proposed petition sought (1) to compel a proper accounting, (2) to 

fix the compensation of the successor trustees and surcharge them for any excess 

fees, (3) to remove the successor trustees from office for misfeasance, and (4) to 

compel the distribution of the assets of Decedent‟s Trusts B and C. 

The successor trustees argue that at least some of these claims amount to an 

indirect contest under the former law, thereby triggering the no contest clauses of 

the amended Family Trust instrument. Specifically, the successor trustees contend 

that the language used by Mary in the replacement “allocation” paragraph of the 

Trust‟s Second Amendment clearly manifested her intent to amend the provisions 

of the entire Family Trust and to allow the successor trustees to control the 

disposition of all of the assets owned by the Family Trust, regardless of which 

subtrust owns them.13 That is, they urge a particular interpretation of the 

amended allocation paragraph. They argue that, as the Court of Appeal 

 

13 The successor trustees fail to explain their interpretation of the Trust‟s 

Second Amendment‟s retention and republication of the “distribution” paragraph 

of the Family Trust instrument.
31

concluded, the beneficiaries‟ challenges to Mary‟s failure to create the subtrusts 

required by the Family Trust instrument, Mary‟s legal authority and ability to 

amend the Family Trust as set out in the Trust‟s Second Amendment, and the 

successor trustees‟ failure to make distributions, would, if pursued, constitute a 

contest under the no contest clauses because these claims legally challenge and 

attack the distributive scheme of the Family Trust, as they interpret that scheme. 

The successor trustees‟ argument, however, is premised on a description of 

the nature of the beneficiaries‟ claim that is not accurate. As we understand the

beneficiaries‟ argument, the beneficiaries are not challenging the actions of Mary 

in executing the Trust‟s Second Amendment per se, nor do they argue that the 

Trust‟s Second Amendment is void. Rather, the beneficiaries argue in favor of an 

interpretation of the Family Trust instrument, including the Trust‟s Second 

Amendment, different from the one urged by the successor trustees. The 

beneficiaries‟ contentions seek to establish the meaning of the instrument‟s terms 

through an understanding of what they view as Mary‟s probable intent. They 

argue that because Mary possessed only limited authority after the death of 

Rodney to alter the provisions of the Family Trust and could not validly amend the 

trust with respect to his Decedent‟s Marital Share, the new paragraph substituted 

by the Trust‟s Second Amendment regarding the allocation of trust assets after 

Mary‟s death must have been intended by her to govern, and should be interpreted 

to govern, only the assets of Survivor‟s Trust A. Consistent with this 

interpretation, the beneficiaries argue that the trust‟s distribution paragraph, left 

unaltered by the Trust‟s Second Amendment, required the assets of the Decedent‟s 

Trusts B and C to be distributed “outright as soon as is practicable” after the death 

of Mary. 

The allocation paragraph of the Family Trust instrument, as amended by the 

Trust‟s Second Amendment, does not expressly refer to Survivor‟s Trust A and 
32

Decedent‟s Trusts B and C. It does not state whether, or how, its provisions are 

applicable to the subtrusts. Nor is there language in the Trust‟s Second 

Amendment explaining how its new allocation provisions operate with the 

distribution paragraph in the Family Trust that the Trust‟s Second Amendment

confirmed and republished. In the context of these ambiguities, the successor 

trustees and the beneficiaries advocate for different interpretations of the language 

of the amended Family Trust instrument. 

In the present setting, the exception provided in former section 21305, 

subdivision (b)(9), applies, as a matter of law, because, fairly understood, the 

beneficiaries‟ claims seek to resolve issues regarding the interpretation of the 

Family Trust instrument as amended by the Trust‟s Second Amendment. The 

Court of Appeal erred in failing to apply the exception and in concluding, instead, 

that the beneficiaries‟ assertion of their interpretation of the amended trust 

instrument and request for distribution violated the no contest clauses of the 

amended Family Trust instrument under the former law.

The remainder of the beneficiaries‟ proposed claims fall within public 

policy exceptions for challenges to fiduciary misconduct and, therefore, as a 

matter of law, also do not violate the no contest clauses of the amended Family 

Trust instrument under the former law. Specifically, the beneficiaries allege that 

the accountings of the successor trustees are inadequate and disclose misfeasance 

of the successor trustees through inappropriate transactions and excessive fees. 

They complain about the failure of the successor trustees to reflect in a 2006 

accounting the segregation of the trust estate into the required subtrusts14 and their 

 

14 As we have earlier described, on the death of the first spouse (Rodney), the 

Family Trust instrument required the surviving trustee (Mary) to divide the trust 

estate into two shares — a survivor‟s share that was to be designated “Survivor‟s 

(Footnote continued on next page.)
33

failure to distribute the assets of the decedent‟s subtrusts. The beneficiaries seek 

an order compelling a new accounting, fixing the compensation of the successor 

trustees, surcharging them for any excess fees, and removing them from office for 

misfeasance. Substantively, these portions of the beneficiaries‟ proposed action 

allege that the successor trustees have failed in their fiduciary duty to administer 

the trust according to its terms (§ 16000) and have failed in their duty to properly 

report and account on their administration of the trust. (§§ 16061, 16062, 16063.) 

Such challenges to the actions of the successor trustees are covered by several of 

the public policy exceptions contained in the former law. Specifically, the former 

law provided that “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any instrument,” 

pleadings “regarding an accounting or report of a fiduciary,” pleadings that 

“challeng[e] the exercise of a fiduciary power,” pleadings that seek “to compel an 

accounting or report of a fiduciary,” and pleadings that seek “the removal of a 

fiduciary” “do not violate a no contest clause as a matter of public policy.” 

(Former § 21305, subd. (b)(6), (7), (8), & (12).) 

As explained by the court in Bradley v. Gilbert (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 

1058, when it was examining the scope and application of former section 21305, 

 

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

Trust A” and a decedent‟s share that was to be designated “Decedent‟s Marital 

Share.” The trust assets allocated to the Decedent‟s Marital Share were to be 

further divided into the bypass subtrust and the marital deduction subtrust as 

determined by the application of the specified formula. In complaining that the 

accounting did not reflect that the trust estate had been segregated into the 

required subtrusts, the beneficiaries contend that they are challenging the actions 

of the successor trustees, not the actions of Mary. And, indeed, their proposed 

petition does not allege a failure by Mary to create the subtrusts, but a failure of 

the successor trustees to properly report and account for the subtrusts. The Court 

of Appeal misconstrued the claims of the beneficiaries to the extent it found 

otherwise.
34

subdivision (a)(6), to the circumstances before it: “[A] beneficiary should be able 

to question the actions of a faithless fiduciary without being subject to the 

restrictions of [a no contest] clause: „[T]he Legislature has determined that in 

furtherance of the public policy of eliminating errant fiduciaries, a beneficiary who 

believes a fiduciary is engaged in misconduct should be able to bring the alleged 

misconduct to the court‟s attention without fear of being disinherited.‟ [Citation.] 

To place barriers to a court‟s review of alleged fiduciary misconduct would, 

moreover, be contrary to well-established policy to ensure that estates are properly 

administered.” (Bradley v. Gilbert, supra, at p. 1071.) Here, the beneficiaries are 

arguing that the successor trustees engaged in misconduct when they failed to 

carry out the terms of the Family Trust instrument, as interpreted by the 

beneficiaries. Such a claim is permitted as a matter of public policy under the 

former law.15

 

15 Notwithstanding the parties‟ arguments, in concluding that several of the 

public policy exceptions expressed in former section 21305, subdivision (b), are 

applicable to the beneficiaries‟ proposed claims here, it is unnecessary to embark 

on any extended consideration of the case law prior to the 2000 statutory 

amendments that added former section 21305 to the former no contest clause law 

(see, e.g., Estate of Ferber, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 244; Estate of Parrette (1985) 

165 Cal.App.3d 157) or the post-2000 case law regarding the enforcement of no 

contest clauses against allegations concerning fiduciaries. (See, e.g., Fazzi v. 

Klein (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1280; Hearst v. Ganzi (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 

1195.) As we have previously described, the law in California regarding no 

contest clauses has evolved over the course of many years, with an incremental 

specification by common law and statutory amendment of numerous public policy 

exceptions to the enforcement of no contest clauses. A number of the statutory 

public policy exceptions cover the beneficiaries‟ allegations of misconduct by the 

successor trustees under the circumstances of this case. We need not consider the 

circumstances presented by different cases at other points in time. 
35

The successor trustees are not aided by subdivision (c) of former section 

21320, which precluded a ruling in a safe harbor proceeding if a determination of 

the merits of the beneficiary‟s proposed claim was required. As a matter of law, 

and without the necessity of resolving the merits, the nature of the issues raised by 

the beneficiaries‟ proposed petition exempts the beneficiaries‟ proposed action 

from the no contest clauses for reasons of public policy expressed by the former 

law. (Estate of Ferber, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 251.) It is up to the court or 

arbitrator to rule on the merits of the parties‟ conflicting interpretation of the trust 

instrument in the future, if the beneficiaries choose to pursue their claims.

Finally, the successor trustees cannot establish that under the former law

the beneficiaries have already violated the no contest clauses by their filing of a 

request for an order of the probate court compelling arbitration of their claims or 

by their filing of the safe harbor application in lieu of proceeding to arbitration.

16

If, as we conclude, the substantive claims raised by the beneficiaries do not as a 

matter of law violate the no contest clauses on grounds of public policy, as 

expressed in the former law, the beneficiaries are not disinherited by the assertion 

of those claims in court or in arbitration. Nor did the filing of the safe harbor 

application, prior to commencing arbitration, trigger the no contest clauses under 

the former law, as the successor trustees argued. A ruling under former section 

21320, subdivision (a), determines neither the merits of the proposed claims nor 

 

16 Although not expressly addressed by the probate court in its order, the 

successor trustees raised such arguments in their response to the beneficiaries‟ safe 

harbor application, as well as in their petition for instructions. Therefore, the 

arguments may fairly be read as having been implicitly rejected by the probate 

court. Accordingly, we reject the successor trustees‟ claim that the Court of 

Appeal lacked jurisdiction (and implicitly that we lack jurisdiction) to consider 

whether the beneficiaries triggered the no contest clauses by their actions or 

inaction regarding arbitration of their claims. 
36

the appropriate forum for assertion of those claims. (Former § 21320, subds. (b),

(c).) It determines only whether pursuit of the claims will result in disinheritance 

under the terms of the no contest clauses and the law governing them. (Id., subd. 

(a).) 

In summary, we conclude that if the former law were to be applied the 

beneficiaries could pursue their proposed claims without risk of being disinherited.

Because this is the same result that is reached by applying the current law, the 

successor trustees cannot qualify for the fairness exception provided in section 3, 

subdivision (h). 

V. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

WERDEGAR, J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Donkin v. Donkin

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 204 Cal.App.4th 622

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S202210

Date Filed: December 26, 2013

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: Reva G. Goetz

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Snow Law Corporation and Stephen L. Snow for Defendants and Appellants.

Mark H. Boykin for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Stephen L. Snow

Snow Law Corporation

28212 Kelly Johnson Parkway, Suite 195

Valencia, CA 91355

(661) 259-9443

Mark H. Boykin

6355 Topanga Canyon Boulevard, Suite 420

Woodland Hills, CA 91367

(818) 883-0871