alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**


**(18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**




In
      connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Concierge Technologies,
      Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2007 (the
“Report”), I, David W. Neibert, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
      certify that to my knowledge:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78o(d)); and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:
      May 16, 2007




*/s/
                David W. Neibert*David
                W. Neibert
              Chief
                Executive Officer





The
      above
      certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-QSB
      or as a separate disclosure document.





Exhibit
            32
 Page
            1 of
            1 Page
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A0069. ALEXIS VELEZ-CALIZ v. THE STATE.

In 2012, a jury convicted Alexis Velez-Caliz of false imprisonment and several

other offenses. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial in

an unpublished opinion. Velez-Caliz v. State, Case No. A14A0237 (May 13, 2014). 

In May 2015, Velez-Caliz filed a “Motion to Render Indictments Void,” in which he

sought to have his judgment of conviction vacated. The trial court denied VelezCaliz’s motion, and he filed a notice of appeal to this Court. We lack jurisdiction.

“[A] petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate

remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) (686 SE2d 786)

(2009). Any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be

dismissed. See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 (690 SE2d 150) (2010); Harper,

supra at 218 (2). A direct appeal may lie from an order denying a motion to vacate

or correct a void sentence, but only if the defendant raises a colorable claim that the

sentence is, in fact, void. See Harper, supra at 217 n.1; Burg v. State, 297 Ga. App.

118, 119 (676 SE2d 465) (2009). When a sentence is within the statutory range of

punishment, it is not void. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004).

To the extent that Velez-Caliz seeks to challenge his sentence based on

allegedly void indictments, he has not raised a valid void-sentence claim. Rather, he

argues that his judgment of conviction should be vacated on grounds that: (i) he was

tried and sentenced while two indictments were pending against him, in violation of

his due process rights; and (ii) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In

neither of these claims, however, does he raise a colorable argument that he received

September 25, 2015
a sentence above the statutory maximum. See id. For these reasons, this appeal is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

09/25/2015
#### Jess Frank BROWN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 23297.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 21, 1966.

Robert E. Hauberg, U. S. Atty., E. Donald Strange, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jackson, Miss., for appellee.

Before JONES, WISDOM and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The appellant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 seeking relief from a conviction and sentence imposed after a plea of guilty to a violation of the Dyer Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. The question here seems to be the same as that which was presented by Marvel v. United States, 380 U.S. 262, 85 S.Ct. 953, 13 L.Ed.2d 960. Following the precedent of that decision, the judgment of the district court is vacated and the cause remanded for a hearing as to whether the appellant was misled by the trial judge as to the maximum sentence.

Vacated and remanded.
CERTIFICATIONS

I, Joseph Fuda, Chief Executive Officer of Micromem Technologies Inc.,certify that:

| 1.     | I have reviewed this annual    report on Form 20-F/A of Micromem Technologies Inc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 2.     | Based on my knowledge, this  report    does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a    material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the    circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with    respect to the period covered by this  report.     Date: June 22, 2005. /s/ Joseph Fuda                                           Joseph Fuda    Chief Executive Officer |
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed June 12, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-2195

Lower Tribunal No. 18-39111

________________

Ramon Lasa Gonzalez, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

SafePoint Insurance Company,

Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lisa S. 

Walsh, Judge.

Font & Nelson, PLLC, Angel I. Rivera, and Jose P. Font (Fort 

Lauderdale), for appellants.

Bickford & Chidnese, LLP, Frieda C. Lindroth, and Patrick M. Chidnese 

(Tampa), for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
2

Affirmed. See Indus. Affiliates, Ltd. v. Testa, 770 So. 2d 202, 204 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2000) (“Even though the trial court orally denied the motions for 

directed verdict during trial, [Rule 1.480(b)] treats the denial as constituting 

a reservation of ruling.”); Carratelli v. State, 832 So. 2d 850, 856 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2002) (finding challenge to defense counsel’s statement during jury 

selection was not preserved for appellate review because motion was not 

properly pursued and ruling not obtained based on “[a] plethora of Florida 

cases [that] support the notion that a party must obtain a ruling from the trial 

court in order to preserve an issue for appellate review”); Roosevelt v. State, 

42 So. 3d 293, 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (determining defendant failed to 

serve timely post-verdict motion and preserve matter for appellate review 

because “it was necessary that the defendant renew the motion [for directed 

verdict] at the conclusion of the case and make the appropriate post-trial 

motion”); Murray v. State, 27 So. 3d 781, 781–82 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“The 

defense made timely motions for a directed verdict. However, [Rule]

1.480(b) has been interpreted as requiring a party to file, in addition, a postverdict motion for entry of judgment in accordance with the motion for a 

directed verdict.”); see also Olsen v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 343 So. 3d 172, 

174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (finding no reversible error as to secondary issue 
3

that could lead to reversal because jury answered “no” to threshold question 

on verdict form).
#### Nelson BENITEZ-CRUZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-70714

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 20, 2017

Elizabeth P. Uribe, Esquire, Attorney, Uribe *&*Uribe, A Professional Law Corporation, South Pasadena, CA, for Petitioner

Suzanne N. Nardone, Esquire, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P, 34(a)(2),

MEMORANDUM **

Nelson Benitez-Cruz’s opposed motion to stay appellate proceedings or in the alternative refer this case to mediation (Docket Entry No, 27) is denied.

Benitez-Cruz, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his second motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 *501U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen and review de novo claims of due process violations. *Cano-Merida v. INS,*311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Benitez-Cruz’s second motion to reopen as time and number-barred where it was filed over seventeen years after the BIA’s final order of removal, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Benitez-Cruz failed to establish that he qualified for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations imposed on filing a motion to reopen, *see 8*C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); *Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (this court “defer[s] to the BIA’s exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law”). We reject Benitez-Cruz’s contention that the BIA erred by not addressing his application for temporary protected status in its order denying his motion to reopen. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring prejudice to prevail on a due process claim).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### LNV CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robynne Ariel FAULEY, Defendant-Appellant, and U.S. Bank, Defendant.

No. 16-35593

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 6, 2017

Erick J. Haynie, Perkins Coie LLP, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robynne Ariel Fauley, Sandy, OR, pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN,, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The-panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Robynne Ariel Fauley appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in LNV Corporation’s diversity ac*480tion arising out of judicial foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Doe v. Abbott Labs.,*571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Fauley failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether LNV was not entitled to judicial foreclosure. *See*Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 73.0301, 86.710-86.715, *Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co., N.A.,*353 Or. 668, 303 P.3d 301, 315 (2013) (en banc) (“A trust deed follows the promissory note that it secures.”); *Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Walmsley,*277 Or.App. 690, 374 P.3d 937, 940 (2016) (concluding plaintiff entitled to enforce a promissory note where plaintiff established “that it possessed the note at the time of the foreclosure action and that the note was indorsed to plaintiff.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fauley’s motion for reconsideration because Fauley failed to demonstrate any grounds for such relief. *See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,*5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and listing grounds warranting reconsideration).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Julia Pepper, Appellant, *v.*Charlotte Schmidlin et al., Respondents.

Submitted October 4, 1943;

decided October 14, 1943.

*Frederick Mellor*for motion.

No one opposed.

Motion granted, and appeal dismissed, with costs and ten dollars costs of motion, unless appellant, within ten days, serves and files undertaking on appeal and pays ten dollars costs, in which event the motion is denied.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6753 

To amend the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act to provide 

for the removal and dismissal of qualified civil liability actions. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 13, 2023 

Ms. HAGEMAN (for herself, Mr. FRY, Mr. GOSAR, Mr. OGLES, Mrs. MCCLAIN, 

Mr. WEBER of Texas, and Mr. CLYDE) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 

to provide for the removal and dismissal of qualified 

civil liability actions. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protection of Lawful 

5 Commerce in Arms Act Federal Jurisdiction Act’’ or the 

6 ‘‘PLCAA Federal Jurisdiction Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6753 IH

1 SEC. 2. REMOVAL AND DISMISSAL OF QUALIFIED CIVIL LI2 ABILITY ACTIONS. 

3 Section 3 of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in 

4 Arms Act (15 U.S.C. 7902) is amended by adding at the 

5 end the following: 

6 ‘‘(c) REMOVAL AND DISMISSAL.—In any action be7 fore a State court in which a defendant that is a manufac8 turer, seller, or trade association asserts that the action 

9 is a qualified civil liability action, the manufacturer, seller, 

10 or trade association may remove the action to the district 

11 court of the United States for the district and division em12 bracing the place wherein it is pending, and such district 

13 court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to deter14 mine whether such action is a qualified civil liability ac15 tion, and dismiss the action accordingly.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### Chas. B. De Klyn, App’lt, *v.*The Silver Lake Ice Co., Resp’t.

*H. Morrison,*for app’lt; *Wallace Macfarlane,*for resp’t.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Affirming 36 N. Y. State Rep., 84.
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Kelly J. Johnson, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of The PB Financial Services Corporation
(the Registrant); 2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this annual report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual
report; 4. The Registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)) for the
Registrant and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to
the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared; b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrants fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of this report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the Registrants internal control over financial reporting; 5. The Registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, base on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrants auditors and the audit
committee of Registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal control over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrants ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and




---



##### 



b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting. Date:  March 31, 2005
    /s/ Kelly J. JohnsonKelly J. JohnsonPrincipal Financial and Accounting Officer
Exhibit 11.1

BRAUN CONSULTING, INC.
STATEMENT RE. COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
(IN THOUSANDS EXCEPT PER SHARE AMOUNT)

|                                                                                 |  | YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, |           
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------- | ----------
|
|
|Net loss                                                                         |  | $                       | (28,138   
|                                                                                 |  |                         |           
|Shares used in computing loss per share                                          |  |                         | 20,245,150
|Effect of shares issuable under stock options based on the treasury stock method |  |                         |          
|                                                                                 |  |                         |           
|                                                                                 |  |                         | 20,245,150
|Loss per share(1)                                                                |  | $                       | (1.39     
|                                                                                 |  |                         |           

---

---

QuickLinks
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18
- 6105

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. RICHARD ASHBAUGH , Defendant

- Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia , at Martinsburg

. John Preston Bailey , District Judge. ( 3:05

- cr - 00060

- JPB

- RWT

- 1 )

Submitted : August 31, 2018 Decided: September 7, 2018

Before KEENAN and DIAZ , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded with instruction s by unpublished per curiam opinion

. Valena E. Beety, Christopher W. Maidona, Third

- Year Law Student, Victoria G. Bittorf, Third

- Year Law Student , Morgantown, West Virginia , Thomas J. Gillooly, West Virginia Innocence Project, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Powell, United States Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Tara Tighe, Assistant United States Attorn ey, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Richard Ashbaugh seeks to appeal the district court’s denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motio n to reconsider the denial of his motion to reopen his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)

case. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that Ashbaugh’s Rule 60(b)
motion was actually a second or successive habeas motion because he sought , in essence,
to c ollaterally attack his sentence and the district court adjudicated his first § 2255 motion on the merits

. Ashbaugh did not obtain prefiling authorization from this court to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, and, thus, the district court lacked ju risdiction to consider Ashbaugh’s motion for reconsideration. United States v. Winestock , 340 F.3d 200,
205 (4th Cir. 2003) . As a result, we must “ vacate the order denying [Ashbaugh’s] motion for reconsideration and remand to the district court with inst ructions to dismiss the motion. ” Id. at 208. Next, following Winestock , we “construe [Ashbaugh’s] notice of appeal and his appellate brief as a motion for authorization to file a successive application.” 340 F.3d at
208. To obtain permission to bring a second or successive § 2255 motion, a movant must show that his claim: (1) “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” or (2) relies on newly discovered facts that tend to establish the movant ’ s innocence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). W e conclude that Ashbaugh ’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand with instructions to dismiss Ashbaugh’s motion for lack of jurisdiction , and we deny authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts3 and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTI ONS