alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 3.2(d)

                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

                       OF THE CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

                                       OF

                              HARMONY TRADING CORP.

                UNDER SECTION 805 OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW

      THE UNDERSIGNED, being the President of HARMONY TRADING CORP., hereby
certifies:

      1. The name of the corporation is Harmony Trading Corp. (the
"Corporation").

      2. The certificate of incorporation of said Corporation was filed by the
Department of State on the 13th day of August, 1996.

      3. The certificate of incorporation of the Corporation is amended to
effectuate the elimination of pre-emptive rights held by the owners of the
Corporation's Common Stock.

      4. To accomplish the foregoing, the following new Article SEVENTH,
relating to the elimination of preemptive rights, is added to the Certificate of
Incorporation, to read in its entirety as follows:

            SEVENTH: No holder of any shares of the Corporation shall, because
            of such status, have a pre-emptive or other right to purchase,
            subscribe for, or take any part of any shares of the Corporation or
            any part of any notes, debentures, bonds or other securities
            convertible into or providing for options or warrants to purchase
            shares of the Corporation which are issued, offered or sold by the
            Corporation, no matter how the shares are offered or issued, and any
            of the foregoing may at any time be issued, offered for sale and
            sold or disposed of by the Corporation upon such terms and
            conditions as the Board of Directors of the Corporation may, in its
            sole discretion, deem proper and advisable, without first offering
            the existing shareholders any part of such shares, notes,
            debentures, bonds or other securities.


                                        1
<PAGE>

      5. The foregoing amendment was authorized by the unanimous written consent
of the Board of Directors of the Corporation, followed by the written consent of
the holders of the Common Stock of the Corporation owning a majority of the
outstanding shares of capital stock entitled to vote thereon.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed this certificate on the 3rd day of
January, 2001, and I affirm the statements contained herein as true under
penalties of perjury.


                                              /s/ Henry J. Yersh
                                              -------------------------
                                              Henry J. Yersh
                                              President


                                        2
#### George F. Vietor *et al.,*App’lts, *v.*William M. Halstead *et al.,*Resp’ts.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,*

*Filed May 15, 1891.)*

Costs—Extra allowance—Demureer.

_ A demurrer is a defense within the meaning of § 3253 of the Code, providing for granting an extra allowance in a difficult and extraordinary case where a defense has been interposed.

Appeal by the plaintiffs from that part of a final judgment in favor of defendants Coster *et al,*which awarded an additional allowance to said defendants.

*Blumenstiel & Hirsch,*for app’lts; *Charles E. Tracy,*for resp’ts.

*408Lawrence, J.

We are of the opinion that a demurrer is a defense, within the meaning of § 3258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that it is within the power of the court to grant an allowance. If an authority is needed for this proposition, beyond the sections of the Code relating to demurrers, it will be found in the case of *Kingsland*v. *The Mayor, etc., of New York,*52 Hun, 99; 22 N. Y. State Rep., 497 In that case the court held that in a controversy submitted upon an agreed state of facts, under § 1279 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court had power to grant an allowance, and the court said: “ The position of the defendant is the same as that of a defendant who demurs to the complaint in an ordinary action. He admits the facts as alleged, but denies that they entitle the plaintiff to any relief against him * *

The demurrer is deemed to be a defense under § 3253.

We see no reason for interfering with the discretion exercised by the court below, and shall, therefore, affirm the order appealed from, with costs and disbursements.

Van Brunt, P. J., and Daniels, J., concur.
#### Lillian Miller et al., Appellants, *v.*Home Owners' Loan Corporation, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Submitted April 5,1943;

decided April 15, 1943.

Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 290 N. Y. 566.)
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-1526

___________________________ United States of America, lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee ,

v. Joshua Don Lineberry, lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
.

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith

____________ Submitted: June 21, 2022 Filed: July 6, 2022 [Unpublished]

____________ Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Joshua Lineberry appeals a sentence imposed by the district court 1 after he pleaded guilty to an odometer tampering offense. His counsel has moved to withdraw

1 The Honorable P.K. Holmes, III, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.and has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the

reasonableness of the sentence. Lineberry has filed a motion for new counsel on appeal. Upon careful review, we conclude that Lineberry’s sentence was not unreasonable. There is no indication that the district court overlooked a relevant factor, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors. See United States v. Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (standard of review); see also United States v. Callaway , 762 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 2014). As to Lineberry’s pro se arguments that counsel was ineffective, we conclude that they would be better addressed on collateral review. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez , 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2006). We have also independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988), and we find no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we deny Lineberry’s motion for new counsel as moot.

______________________________

-2-
#### In the Matter of the Judicial Settlement of Accounts of Robert C. Reeves, Sole Acting Ex’r.

*Henry W. Bates,*for app'lt; *Henry J. Morris,*for resp’t.

Order affirmed, with costs. All concur, except Finch, J., absent.

Affirming 37 N. Y. State Rep., 959.
```

[Federal Register: September 30, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 189)]
[Notices]               
[Page 60423-60424]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr30se10-51]                         

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Docket No. DoD-2009-OS-0191]

 
Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department of Defense has submitted to OMB for clearance, the 
following proposal for collection of information under the provisions 
of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35).

[[Page 60424]]

DATES: Consideration will be given to all comments received by November 
1, 2010.
    Title and OMB Number: DoD Building Pass Application; DD Form 2249; 
OMB Number 0704-0328.
    Type of Request: Extension.
    Number of Respondents: 120,000.
    Responses per Respondent: 1.
    Annual Responses: 120,000.
    Average Burden per Response: 6 minutes.
    Annual Burden Hours: 12,000 hours.
    Needs and Uses: This information collection requirement provides 
for the collection of information from applicants for DoD Building 
Passes. The information collected from the DD Form 2249, ``DoD Building 
Pass Application,'' is used to verify the need for and to issue a DoD 
Building Pass to DoD personnel, other authorized U.S. Government 
personnel, and DoD consultants and experts who regularly work in or 
require frequent and continuing access to DoD-owned or occupied 
buildings in the National Capital Region.
    Affected Public: Individuals or households; businesses of other 
for-profit.
    Frequency: On occasion.
    Respondent's Obligation: Required to obtain or retain a benefit.
    OMB Desk Officer: Ms. Jasmeet Seehra.
    Written comments and recommendations on the proposed information 
collection should be sent to Ms. Seehra at the Office of Management and 
Budget, Desk Officer for DoD, Room 10236, New Executive Office 
Building, Washington, DC 20503.
    You may also submit comments, identified by docket number and 
title, by the following method:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency 
name, docket number and title for this Federal Register document. The 
general policy for comments and other submissions from members of the 
public is to make these submissions available for public viewing on the 
Internet at http://www.regulations.gov as they are received without 
change, including any personal identifiers or contact information.
    DOD Clearance Officer: Ms. Patricia Toppings.
    Written requests for copies of the information collection proposal 
should be sent to Ms. Toppings at WHS/ESD/Information Management 
Division, 1777 North Kent Street, RPN, Suite 11000, Arlington, VA 
22209-2133.

    Dated: September 23, 2010.
Patricia L. Toppings,
OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2010-24523 Filed 9-29-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
```
#### Adrienne L. MCADORY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VAIL TECHNOLOGIES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1605

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 17, 2017

Decided: August 21, 2017

Adrienne L. McAdory, Appellant Pro Se. Brittney Renee McClain, Craig Benson Young, KUTAK ROCK, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Before KEENAN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Adrienne L. McAdory appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Vail Technologies (“Vail”) on McA-dory’s pregnancy discrimination claim. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. *See*4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because McAdor/s informal brief does not challenge the district court’s alternative holdings that she failed to establish her prima facie case or that Vail’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the subcontract was a pretext for discrimination, McAdory has forfeited appellate review of the court’s order. *See Brown v. Nucor Corp.,*785 F.3d 895, 918 (4th Cir. 2015); *Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,*370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE CONSOLIDATED AND
COMBINED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED AND COMBINED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
OF THE COMPANY AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 AND THE YEAR THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<CAPTION>
<S>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>           YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                     OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                       SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                              39,020,000
<SECURITIES>                        54,857,000
<RECEIVABLES>                       19,932,000
<ALLOWANCES>                       (2,108,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                   111,141,000
<PP&E>                             105,144,000
<DEPRECIATION>                    (24,974,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                     248,038,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>               52,781,000
<BONDS>                                      0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0
<PREFERRED>                                  0
<COMMON>                                   511
<OTHER-SE>                       (122,868,489)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>       248,038,000
<SALES>                             73,615,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                    73,615,000
<CGS>                                        0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                    (125,126,000)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                       336,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 (6,999,000)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   (58,174,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                       (1,293,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          0
<DISCONTINUED>                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              0
<CHANGES>                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                      (59,467,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                           (1.35)
<EPS-DILUTED>                           (1.35)


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6604 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6604

   To prohibit the use of Federal funds to install permanent fencing 
      around the United States Supreme Court Building or grounds.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 5, 2023

  Ms. Norton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To prohibit the use of Federal funds to install permanent fencing 
      around the United States Supreme Court Building or grounds.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Fencing at the United States 
Supreme Court Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITING USE OF FUNDS FOR PERMANENT FENCING AROUND UNITED 
              STATES SUPREME COURT BUILDING OR GROUNDS.

    (a) Prohibition.--No Federal funds may be used to install permanent 
fencing around--
            (1) the perimeter of the United States Supreme Court 
        Building; or
            (2) the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds, or any 
        portion thereof, described in section 6101(b) of title 40, 
        United States Code.
    (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in subsection (a) shall be 
construed to prohibit the repair or replacement of fencing that was in 
existence on the date of enactment of this Act around an area described 
in subsection (a).
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 Nos. 333-38926, 333-83321, 333-83325, 333-83327, 333-73664,
333-100003, 333-106057, 333-106058 and 333-120154 and Form S-3 No. 333-110389)
of Art Technology Group, Inc. and in the related Prospectus of our reports dated
March 14, 2005 with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Art
Technology Group, Inc., Art Technology Group, Inc. management's assessment of
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Art Technology
Group, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
December 31, 2004.

                              /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Boston, Massachusetts

March 14, 2005
#### JINGYUAN FENG Plaintiff-Appellant v. Sheena KOMENDA Defendant *581Rockwell Collins, Inc. Defendant-Appellee

No. 17-1286

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 3, 2017

Filed: October 25, 2017

Jingyuan Feng, Pro Se

Kelly Randall Baier, Raymond Rinkol, Jr., Bradley & Riley, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant

Kelly Randall Baier, Raymond Rinkol, Jr., Bradley & Riley, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Jingyuan Feng appeals the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment in her action claiming employment discrimination and retaliation. Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted for the reasons stated in the district court’s order. See Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 2014) (de novo review). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.
The Board of Directors  Perficient, Inc.:
 We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos. 333-130624, 333-157799, 333-160465, 333-183422, and 333-198589) on Form S-8 of Perficient, Inc. and subsidiaries (the Company) of our report dated February 28, 2017, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of the Company as of December 31, 2016 and 2015, and the related consolidated statements of operations, comprehensive income, changes in stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2016, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2016, which report appears in the December 31, 2016 annual report on Form 10-K of the Company. Our report dated February 28, 2017, on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2016, contains an explanatory paragraph that states the Company acquired substantially all of the assets of Bluetube, LLC (Bluetube) in October 2016, and management excluded from its assessment of the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2016, Bluetube’s internal control over financial reporting representing 2% and less than 1% of the Company’s total assets and total revenues, respectively, included in the consolidated financial statements of the Company as of and for the year ended December 31, 2016. Our audit of internal control over financial reporting of the Company also excluded an evaluation of the internal control over financial reporting of Bluetube
  St. Louis, Missouri  February 28, 2017
#### Marie T. Hauser, Resp’t, *v.*The Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. *et al.,*App’lts. John Becker, Resp’t, *v.*The Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. *et al,*App’lts. Charles F. Hchus, Resp’t. *v.*The Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. *et al.,*App’lts.

*(New York Superior Court, General Term,*

*Filed May 4, 1891.)*

Appeals by defendants from judgments.

*Julien T. Davies*and *I. C. Thomson,*for app’lts; *Charles Gibson Bennett,*for resp’ts.

Per Curiam.

The judgments in these cases are severally affirmed, with costs.

Sedgwick, Oh. J., and McAdam, J., concur.
Exhibit 21

TIBCO SOFTWARE INC.

SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT*

Name (Jurisdiction of Incorporation)

3301 Hillview Holdings
Inc. (Delaware)

Spotfire AB (Sweden)

Spotfire, Inc.
(Delaware)

Spotfire Japan KK (Japan)

TIBCO BPM (United
Kingdom)

TIBCO BPM Australia Pty Ltd (Australia)

TIBCO BPM
Holdings Limited (United Kingdom)

TIBCO Software AB (Sweden)

TIBCO Software AS (Norway)

TIBCO Software Australia Pty Ltd (Australia)

TIBCO Software B.V. Holland (Netherlands)

TIBCO Software Brasil LTDA (Brazil)

TIBCO Software Canada Inc. (Canada)

TIBCO Software Cayman Holdings Ltd.
(Cayman Islands)

TIBCO Software France S.A.R.L. (France)

TIBCO Software FZ-LLC (United Arab Emirates)

TIBCO Software GmbH (Germany)

TIBCO Software Holdings LLC (Delaware)

TIBCO Software Holdings Ltd. (United Kingdom)

TIBCO Software Hong Kong Limited (Hong Kong)

TIBCO Software India Private
Limited (India)

TIBCO Software (Ireland) Limited (Ireland)

TIBCO Software International Inc. (Delaware)

TIBCO Software Japan, Inc. (Japan)

TIBCO Software Korea Ltd. (South Korea)

TIBCO Software Limited (United Kingdom)

TIBCO Software LLC (Russia)

TIBCO Software N.V. (Belgium)

TIBCO Software Portugal - Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda (Portugal)

TIBCO
Software S.A. de C.V (Mexico)

TIBCO Software (Schweiz) AG (Switzerland)

TIBCO Software S.L. (Spain)

TIBCO Software S.r.l. (Italy)

TIBCO Software Singapore Pte Ltd (Singapore)

TIBCO Software (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd (South Africa)

TIBCO Sweden Holdings AB (Sweden)

TIBCO Talarian Inc. (Delaware)

TS Innovations (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED (South Africa)



|* | Pursuant to Item 601(b)(21)(ii) of Regulation S-K, the names of other subsidiaries of TIBCO Software Inc. are omitted because, considered in the aggregate, they would not
constitute a significant subsidiary as of the end of the fiscal year covered by this Annual Report on Form 10-K.
|- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### Gregorio Santiago SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-71307

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed May 30, 2017

*484James B. Rudolph, Esquire, Attorney, Rudolph, Baker & Associates, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner

Rosanne Perry, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Gregorio Santiago Santiago, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, and we review de novo questions of law. *Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

The agency did not err in determining that Santiago Santiago was statutorily barred from establishing the good moral character required for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure, where substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that he did not sufficiently establish that his periods of incarceration did not exceed 180 days. *See 8*U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(7), 1229b(b)(l)(B), 1229c(b)(l)(B).

We do not consider the extra-record evidence submitted for the first time with Santiago Santiago’s opening brief. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (judicial review is limited to the administrative record); *Dent v. Holder,*627 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating standard for review of out-of-record evidence).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.