IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

JEFFREY L. RONSHAUGEN, 

KIMBERLY JEAN RONSHAUGEN, 

Respondent/Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Thomas McKittrick, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Daniel L. Falcon, Matteucci, Falcon, Squires & 

Lester, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Joan E. Cook & M. Gene Allison, Law Offices of Joan 

E. Cook, Great Falls, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: April 18, 1996 

Decided: August 15, 1996 

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Clerk / 
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3 (c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing 

Company. 

Appellant Jeffrey Ronehaugen appeals from the findings of 

fact, conclusions of law and order entered by the Eighth Judicial 

District Court, Cascade County, dissolving his marriage with his 

wife Kimberly, dividing the parties1 property, and awarding child 

support, custody, and visitation. we affirm. 

ISSUES 

Jeffrey raises the following issues on appeal: 

1) Did the District Court err in changing primary physical 

custody of the parties' three minor children from Jeffrey to 

Kimberly? 

2) Did the District Court err in calculating child support 

based on Jeffrey's income earned the previous year? 

3) Did the District Court err in its division of the parties' 

personal property? 

4) Did the District Court err in awarding Kimberly attorney 

fees? 

BACKGROUND 

Jeffrey and Kimberly Ronshaugen were married on April 1, 1988, 

in Seattle, Washington. Three children, now ages 7, 5, and 4, were 
born of the marriage. The parties acquired real property in Great 

Falls, Montana, which they sold when they separated in May 1993. 

At the time of the separation, Jeffrey worked for Cascade 

Circulation, a telemarketing firm, earning $74,207 in 1994. 

Because he thought that he might be laid off from employment and to 

gain more flexible hours. Jeffrey voluntarily terminated his 

position with Cascade Circulation and became self-employed, 

reducing his income to approximately $37,000. In his new job, 

Jeffrey had to work on weekends. 

Jeffrey petitioned for dissolution of the marriage on June 23, 

1993 and moved the District Court for temporary custody of the 

children. The court awarded the parties joint custody with primary 

physical custody with Jeffrey and first only allowed Kimberly 

supervised visitation but later allowed her unsupervised 

visitation. Upon Kimberly's request, the District Court appointed 

an attorney to represent the children. The District Court also 

granted Kimberly's motion to conduct psychological evaluations on 

the children. Following trial, the attorney for the children filed 

a recommendation that primary physical custody be changed to 

Kimberly. 

On August 15, 1995, the District Court issued its findings of 

fact, conclusions of law and order, granting the parties joint 

custody with primary phys'ical custody with Kimberly, awarding 

Jeffrey visitation for two days in alternating weeks, visitation 

for alternating holidays, and 30 consecutive days in the summer, 

awarding child support of $1,224 per month to Kimberly, ordering 
Jeffrey to pay 95% of all uncovered medical expenses, and ordering 

Jeffrey to pay one-half of Kimberly's attorney fees. Jeffrey 

appeals the District Court's findings of fact, conclusions of law 

and order. 

DISCUSSION 

1) Did the District Court err in changing primary physical 

custody of the parties' three minor children from Jeffrey to 

Kimberly? 

We review a district court's award of child custody to 

determine whether the district court's findings are clearly 

erroneous. In re Marriage of DeWitt (1995), 273 Mont. 513, 516, 

905 P.2d 1084, 1085 (citing In re Marriage of Dreesbach (1994), 265 

Mont. 216, 220-21, 875 P.2d 1018, 1021) . The findings of fact must 

be based on substantial credible evidence and will be upheld unless 

it is shown that the District Court clearly abused its discretion. 

Marriaqe of DeWitt, 905 P.2d at 1085. Jeffrey contends that in 

light of the applicable law and public policy, the District Court 

abused its discretion by appointing Kimberly as the primary 

physical custodian of the children. 

A district court must determine child custody in accordance 

with the best interests of the child as set forth in § 40-4-212, 

MCA. However, the court need not make specific findings on each 

factor of § 40-4-212, MCA. Marriaqe of Dreesbach, 875 P.2d at 

1021. 

In the instant case, the findings of fact and conclusions of 

law indicate that the District Court considered the best interests 
of the children. Specifically, the District Court noted that 

Kimberly's "work, daycare, and living arrangements appear to be 

more suited to a stable lifestyle for the children." Additionally, 

the District Court found that the oldest daughter expressed a 

desire to spend more time with her mother, that Kimberly's mother 

would be available to provide day care for the children, that 

Kimberly's treating psychiatrist opined that Kimberly could 

adequately parent her children and does not present a danger to 

herself or her children, and that although both parents expressed 

concerns about the threat of physical abuse or chemical abuse, 

neither appears to be a current factor that would favor one parent 

over the other. Accordingly, we conclude that there is substantial 

credible evidence to support the District Court's determination of 

child custody, and therefore, the court's findings are not clearly 

erroneous. 

2) Did the District Court err in calculating child support 

based on Jeffrey's income earned the previous year? 

Jeffrey contends that the District Court erred in calculating 

child support by imputing excessive income to Jeffrey and too 

little income to Kimberly. We review a district court's award of 

child support to determine if the District Court abused its 

discretion. Marriaqe of ~ewitt, 905 P.2d at 1086 (citing In re 

Marriage of Craib (1994), 266 Mont. 483, 490, 880 P.2d 1379, 1384). 

Section 40-4-204, MCA, sets forth the standards that a 

district court must consider when awarding child support. 

Furthermore, Title 46, Chapter 30 of the Administrative Rules of 
Montana sets forth the guidelines that must be used in all cases 

awarding child support. See also Brandon v. Brandon (1995) , 271 

Mont. 149, 152, 894 P.2d 951, 953. We have held that a district 

court may impute income to under-employed or unemployed parents 

after examining the reasons for the limitation on the earnings. In 

re Marriage of Gebhardt (19'89), 240 Mont. 165, 171, 783 P.2d 400, 

404. A district court is obliged to consider the employment 

opportunities available in the local job market for under-employed 

parents. 

In the instant case, the District Court based its award of 

$1,224 per month in child support on Jeffrey's gross income for 

1994. The court based its child support calculations on Jeffrey's 

demonstrated ability to earn $74,207 and on its finding that 

Jeffrey voluntarily terminated his employment with Cascade 

Circulation and therefore voluntarily took a 50% cut in pay. The 

District Court clearly examined Jeffrey's reasons for leaving his 

job with Cascade Circulation and acknowledged that Jeffrey thought 

that he might be laid off, but the court nonetheless found that 

Jeffrey left his job voluntarily. 

Because the District Court examined Jeffrey's reasons for 

taking a lower paying job before imputing income to him, we 

conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 

calculating child support based on Jeffrey's income earned the 

previous year. 

3) Did the District Court err in its division of the parties' 

personal property? 
Jeffrey contends that the District Court erred in equally 

dividing the proceeds from the sale of the parties' real property, 

the proceeds from the parties' joint bank accounts and erred in 

dividing Jeffrey's life insurance and pension without hearing 

testimony on them. Specifically, Jeffrey claims that Kimberly did 

not present substantial credible evidence regarding the division of 

the marital estate 

We review a district court's division of marital property to 

determine whether the district court's findings of fact are clearly 

erroneous. Marriase of DeWitt, 905 P.2d at 1087 (citing In re 

Marriage of Smith (1995), 270 Mont. 263, 267, 891 P.2d 522, 525). 

Where substantial credible evidence supports the court's findings 

and judgment, this Court will not alter the district court's 

decision unless there is an abuse of discretion. Marriaqe of 

DeWitt, 905 P.2d at 1087. 

Section 40-4-202, MCA, directs a district court to equitably 

apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to 

either or both. Similarly, we have granted broad discretion to the 

district courts to equitably apportion marital assets. See In re 

Marriage of Danelson (1992), 253 Mont. 310, 317, 833 P.2d 215, 219- 

20. 

Here, the record supports that the proceeds from the sale of 

real property amounted to $2,983.44 and the joint bank accounts 

totalled $7,126.72. The District Court concluded that these assets 

should be divided equitably and equally. Moreover, Jeffrey 

included his life insurance and pension on his list of property. 
Accordingly, we hold that substantial credible evidence supports 

the District Court's findings and judgment and there is nothing in 

the record to indicate that the District Court abused its 

discretion in apportioning the marital estate. 

4) Did the District Court err in awarding Kimberly attorney 

fees? 

Jeffrey contends that the District Court erred in failing to 

accurately consider Kimberly's financial resources when awarding 

her attorney fees. We review an order granting attorney fees for 

an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Barnard (1994), 264 

Mont. 103, 109, 870 P.2d 91, 95. Therefore, when reviewing a grant 

of attorney fees, this Court will not disturb a District Court's 

findings on appeal if substantial credible evidence supports those 

findings. In re Marriage of Hall (1990), 244 Mont. 428, 436, 798 

P.2d 117, 122. 

Section 40-4-110, MCA, gives a district court discretion, 

after considering the financial resources of both parties, to award 

attorney fees. Marriaqe of Barnard, 870 P.2d at 95. "An award of 

attorney fees under this statute must be based on necessity, must 

be reasonable, and must be based on competent evidence." Marriaqe 

of Barnard, 870 P.2d at 95. In Marriaqe of Barnard, we held that 

the party requesting attbrney fees must make a showing of 

necessity. 

Although Jeffrey contends that Kimberly's "financial picture 

was not as bleak as she presented," Kimberly contends that she pays 

for her own auto insurance and that she was $15,000 in debt at the 
time of trial. Moreover, the District Court found that Kimberly 

makes approximately $500 a month working for a log manufacturing 

business, but that her total monthly expenses total more than 

$1,200. The District Court also noted that Kimberly borrows money 

from her mother to cover the monthly deficit. After reviewing the 

record, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion. We hold that substantial credible evidence supports 

the District Court's conclusion that the award of attorney fees was 

based on necessity. 

Affirmed . 

We Concur: -R 

Chief Justi