COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges Mc Cullough and Decker Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

CARLTON SHELL OPINION BY v. Record No. 2070-13-1 CHIEF JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR. OCTOBER 28, 2014 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK Karen J. Burrell, Judge J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. Leah A. Darron, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Carlton Shell (“appellant”) was convicted by the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (“trial court”) for failing to register as a sex offender or providing false information, second or subsequent offense, in violati on of Code § 18.2-472.1. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to st rike the Commonwealth’s evidence. Specifically, he claims the

Commonwealth’s evidence fa iled to establish that he had previously been convicted of an offense that required him to register as a sex offender. For the following reasons, we affirm appellant’s conviction.

I. BACKGROUND At trial, the Commonwealth presented three certified orders showi ng that appellant had previously pled guilty, in the Circ uit Court for the City of Chesap eake, to two charges of failure to reregister as a sex offender, in violation of Code § 18.2-472. The third order showed he had been convicted of one charge of failure to rere gister as a sex offender, in violation of CodePUBLISHED- 2 - § 18.2-472 in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk. The two Chesapeake Circuit Court orders note that the offenses occurred on April 1, 2008 and June 2, 2008. 1 The Norfolk Circuit

Court order notes that offense occurred on Janua ry 12, 2009. All three orders reflect appellant was present in court with counsel. The Chesapeake Circuit Court orders show appellant entered his guilty “[p]lea[s] voluntarily and intelligently . . . after [appellant] was apprised of his right against compulsory self-incrimination and his right to confront the witnesses against him.” Specifically, the Chesapeake Circuit Court orders stated that appellant: [D]id unlawfully in violation of Section 18.2-472.1, Code of Virginia: as a person subject to Chapter 9 [§ 9.1-900 et seq.] of Title 9.1, but who had not been convicted of a sexually violent offense or murder as defined in § 9.1-902, knowingly fail to reregister with the Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry. The order from the Norfolk Circuit Court, entered April 23, 2009, additionally charged, “The accused previously has committed an o ffense under Subsection A of 18.2-427.1,” reflecting the charged offense to be a second or subsequent offense, and therefore a felony. The Norfolk Circuit Court reduced appellant’s charge to misdemeanor failure to register as a sex offender. Kai Wiggins, custodian of the records for th e Virginia State Police Sex Offender Crimes Against Minors Registry (“the Registry”), test ified that any person convicted of an offense designated in Code § 9.1-902 is required to register as a sex offender, and when registering, the offender signs a disclosure statement acknowledgi ng this responsibility. Code § 9.1-902 also requires convicted sex offenders to reregister any change of resi dence or work address within three days of the change.

1 On December 18, 2008, appellant was sent enced on both offenses by the Chesapeake Circuit Court.- 3 - The requisite disclosure form signed by appellant on September 26, 2012 was entered into evidence. Appellant’s disclosure form shows that on September 26, 2012, he registered indicating he resided at 1107 Jernigan Ave nue, Apartment E, Norfolk, VA 23513. The next registration appellant submitted indicated he resi ded at 811 E. City Hall Avenue in Norfolk on February 25, 2013. On March 14, 2013, appellant re gistered his address as 6437 Whittier Street, Norfolk. Appellant did not submit any change of address forms to the registry between September 26, 2012 and February 25, 2013. Between September 2012 and February 2013, Vi rginia State Trooper Michael Dooley worked as an investigator for the Registry. Hi s duties included verifying that offenders were living at their registered a ddresses and that the offenders were following through on their obligation to reregister any changes in their resi dences. Trooper Dooley had previously arrested appellant for failing to comply with the Registry ’s reregistration requi rements and had advised appellant of his requir ements to reregister. On February 25, 2013, Trooper Dooley was i nvestigating appellant for failing to reregister. He spoke to appellan t at his place of employment. At that time, appellant stated he was living at 6437 Whittier St reet in Norfolk. He said he ha d moved out of an apartment at 1107 Jernigan Avenue in Norfolk approximately three weeks prior to the February 25, 2013 interview.

He stated he understood that he was registered with the Registry and that he was required to report a change of address within three days. A ppellant admitted to Trooper Dooley that he was not in compliance with his requirement to reregister when he changed his residence. He said he had not completed a change of address form when he moved because he “didn’t get around to it. [He’d] been busy.”- 4 - Rakira Bostic testified she had resided at 1107 Jernigan Avenue, Apartment E, Norfolk, Virginia since approximately January 16, 2013. She stated that she had tw o roommates, that she had never met appellant, and that appe llant was not one of her roommates.

II. ANALYSIS On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in denyin g his motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, assertin g that the evidence failed to establish that he had been previously convicted of an offense requiring him to re gister as a sex offender. “‘Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favora ble to the Commonwealth, the prev ailing party below.’” Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 625, 629, 688 S.E .2d 154, 156 (2009) (quoting Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008)). “‘We also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 303, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2004)). “‘When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a convic tion, the Court will affirm the judgment unless the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. (quot ing Bolden, 275 Va. at 148, 654 S.E.2d at 586). In our review of a challenge to a criminal conviction, “‘[w]here the issue is whether the evidence is sufficient, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Baylor v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 82, 84, 683 S.E.2d 843, 844 (2009) (quoting Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 135, 455 S.E.2d 730, 731 (1995)). Code § 18.2-472.1(A) provides: Any person subject to Chapter 9 (§ 9.1-900 et seq.) of Title 9.1, other than a person convicted of a sexually violent offense or murder as defined in § 9.1-902, w ho knowingly fails to register or reregister, or who knowingly provide s materially false information- 5 - to the Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. A sec ond or subsequent conviction for an offense under this subsection is a Class 6 felony. Code § 9.1-902(B)(2) sets out the offenses for whic h registration as a sexual offender is required, including:

Where the victim is a minor or is physically helpless or mentally incapacitated as defined in § 18.2-67.10, . . . subsection A of § 18.2-47 [abduction], clause (i) of § 18.2-48 [abduction with intent to extort money or pecuniary benefit] . . . . The Commonwealth presented sufficient evid ence to prove appellant was required to reregister as a convicted sex offender. Hi s 2008 and 2009 misdemeanor convictions for failing to reregister as a sex offender clearly state appe llant entered guilty pleas to both charges. As noted by the trial court, “[h]e wasn’t required to [plead guilty], but he did. And in doing so, he acknowledged that he was a person subject to regist ration . . . .” Furthermore, appellant admitted to Trooper Dooley that he unders tood he was registered with th e Registry and that he was required to reregister whenever he changed his residence. Appella nt said he had not completed a change of address form when he moved because he “didn’t get around to it. [He’d] been busy.” A presumption of regularity atte nds appellant’s prior convictions for failing to reregister as a sex offender as “every act of a court of co mpetent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done ‘till the contrary appears. ’” Farmer v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 285, 289-90, 746 S.E.2d 504, 506 (2013) (quoting Nice ly v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 579, 584, 490 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1997)). Appellant did not challe nge his previous convictions for failing to reregister as a sex offender and cannot collaterally attack thos e convictions in this appeal. From the record before us on appeal, we conc lude that the trial cour t did not err in finding the evidence was sufficient to find appellant guilt y of failing to register as a sex offender or providing false information, second or subseque nt offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-472.1.- 6 - III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons , the judgment of the tr ial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.