alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Forms S-8 No. 333-83987, and 333-83531)
pertaining to the Tanning Technology Corporation 1997 Stock Option Plan, the Tanning Technology Corporation 1998 Stock Option Plan, the Tanning Technology Corporation 1999 Employee Stock Purchase
Plan, and the Tanning Technology Corporation 1999 Stock Option Plan of our report dated January 30, 2002, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Tanning
Technology Corporation included in its Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2001.



Denver,
Colorado
February 22, 2002

ATTEST:

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[SEAL]

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QuickLinks
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of ArthroCare Corporation
(the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | The accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2005 (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |  |  |                                      
|----------------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------------------
|                        |  | 
|Dated: November 2, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/    MICHAEL A. BAKER              
|                        |  |  |  | Michael A. Baker                     
|                        |  |  |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
#### IN RE: Mrs. Patricia DOUGHERTY, Brian A. Sidman, an individual, Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee, v. Joseph P. Dougherty, 11106 Crescent Bay Blvd. Clermont, FL 34711 352-988-3507 an individual, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Counter Claimant-Appellant, Domains By Proxy LLC, a Delaware corporation, et al., Defendants, *591Louis Rogers 10900 Nuckols Road Suite 200 Glen Allen, VA 23060 804-290-7900, et al., Third Party Defendants.

No. 15-15000

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(October 3, 2017)

Benjamin Henry Brodsky, Brodsky Fo-tiu-Wojtowicz, PLLC, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Edward Petrie Jordan, II, The Jordan Law Group, Clermont, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before HULL, JORDAN, and BOGGS,* Circuit Judges.

*

 Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, this Court finds no reversible error in the district court’s October 6, 2015 order denying Appellant Joseph P. Dougherty’s request for costs and attorney’s fees or in the district court’s April 19, 2016 order denying Appellant Dough-erty’s motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm both of the district court’s orders.

AFFIRMED.
#### Maria N. Garcia ARRIETA, AKA Maria Navor Garcia Arrieta, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 11-73047

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 5, 2017

Murray David Hilts, Law Offices of Murray D. Hilts, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner

Keith Ian McManus, Senior Litigation Counsel, OIL, Joseph Anthony O’Connell, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Maria N. Garcia Arrieta, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of .Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision sustaining the inadmissibility charge and ordering removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo. *Martinez-Medina v. Holder,*673 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny the petition for review.

The agency did not err in finding Garcia Arrieta removable as charged, because *Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder,*558 F.3d 897, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2009), forecloses her contention that her statements to immigration officials at the border were obtained in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c). To the extent that Garcia Arrieta contends that *de*
      *570
      *Rodriguez-Echeverria v. Mukasey,*534 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) controls the result of her case, we reject that contention.

The BIA did not err or violate due process by not addressing Garcia Arrieta’s contentions regarding the IJ’s handling of the remand, where the holding in *Samay-oa-Martinez*was dispositive. *See Samayoa-Martinez*at 901-02; *Simeonov v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to reach non-dispositive issues); *see also Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (an alien must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
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Exhibit
14.1

Schwartz Levitsky
Feldman llpCHARTERED ACCOUNTANTSLICENSED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTSTORONTO  MONTREAL



February 25, 2011



Security and Exchange Commission 100 Front Street, NE
Washington, D.C. 20549 USA



Dear Sirs:

We have read Item 16F of the form 20 F/A dated February 25,
2011 of Micromem Technologies Inc. (the Company) and are in agreement with the
statements contained in Item 16F therein.

We hereby confirm that there were no reportable events [as that
term is defined in Item 16F(a)(1)(iv)] for the fiscal years ended October 31,
2008 and 2007 and for the subsequent period through June 2009.



Yours very truly,

SCHWARTZ LEVITSKY FELDMAN LLP

SCHWARTZ LEVITSKY FELDMAN LLP





| | 1167 Caledonia Road     
| | ------------------------
| | Toronto, Ontario M6A 2X1
| | Tel: 416 785 5353       
| | Fax : 416 785 5663      

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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jonathan D. DAVEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6154

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 29, 2017

Decided: July 5, 2017

Jonathan D. Davey, Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin Bain-Creed, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Anthony Joseph Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan D. Davey appeals the district court’s text order of January 23, 2017 denying his motion to compel former counsel to surrender his case file. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Davey,*No. 3:12-cr-00068-RJC-DSC-1 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 23, 2017). We deny Davey’s motion to toll his habeas filing deadline and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
15464

#### TRUSTEES OF WOFFORD COLLEGE v. CITY OF SPARTANBURG *ET AL.*

(23 S. E. (2d), 9)

*330
      *Messrs. Carlisle, Brown & Carlisle,*of Spartanburg, Counsel for Appellant,

*333
      *Messrs. Johnson & Johnson,*of Spartanburg, Counsel for Respondents,

November 11, 1942.

PER CURIAM:

After due consideration, we are of the opinion that the Honorable E. H. Henderson, who heard this case on Circuit, has reached the proper conclusions and decision of the issues involved. This Court is satisfied with his well considered decree, which it adopts as the opinion of the Court, and which will be reported.

This opinion is written *per curiam*in accord with a recently adopted rule pertaining to cases in which this Court *334unanimously adopts as its opinion the decree of the trial Judge.

December 8, 1942.

Mr. Chief Justice Bonham and Messrs. Associate Justices Baker, Eishburne, and StuicES concur.

On Petition for Rehearing.

PER CURIAM.

We have read with care the petition for rehearing in this case, and we may state that the Court' ■ gave especially thoughtful care to the consideration of the Circuit decree in that case, from which the appeal came to us, realizing its importance to the educational institution interested therein, and we find no reason to change the views expressed in our opinion.

In the presentation of the appeal to the Court, the counsel for both parties laid stress almost entirely upon the one question of the constitutionality of the Acts involved in the consideration of the issues. We find nothing in the petition for rehearing which causes us to change our judgment that the Circuit Court was correct in its holding that the Acts relied upon to sustain the exemption claimed by the appellant are unconstitutional. We therefore adhere to our conclusion and decision that the decision of the Circuit Court be and is affirmed.

However, it appears that the Circuit Judge did not specifically pass upon the issues made in Paragraph 15, sub-paragraphs, b, c, d, and e of the complaint, which sub-paragraphs of Paragraph 15 of the complaint are as follows:

(b) “The lien for taxes three or more years past due and -expired prior to the attempted issuance of execution, levy and sale;

(c) “The attempted execution, levy and sale included a 10% penalty, a 5% commission to the Special Tax Collector, and a $2.00 execution cost, in violation of the law and without authority of an ordinance of the said City of Spartan-*335burg, as required by Section 7470 of the Statutes at Large, Vol. 38, page 128, passed March 10, 1933;

(d) “No warrant of execution or levy was served upon the plaintiff or its tenants or occupants or its predecessors, and no one acting for or on behalf of the defendants ever levied upon or took possession of said property for and on behalf of the City of Spartanburg.

(e) “I. T. Williams issued said execution without authority of any law or ordinance.”

It is therefore ordered that the case be remanded to the Circuit Court for its action insofar as these matters are concerned, and that alone.

Mr. Chief Justice Bonham and Messrs. Associate Justices Baker, Fisiiburne and Stukes concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
the undersigned officer of ArthroCare Corporation (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | The accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the three months ended March 31, 2006 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |                        
|------------------ |  | -----------------------
|Dated: May 5, 2006 |  | /s/ Fernando Sanchez   
|                   |  | Fernando Sanchez       
|                   |  | Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (Section 906), or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of the written statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to ArthroCare Corporation and will be retained by ArthroCare Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### William Viall *versus*Zenas Bliss and Trustee.

Where G., lieing summoned as trustee of B., disclosed an indenture of two parts, between B., of the one part, and the respondent of the other part, whereby all the goods and chattels of B. were assigned to the respondent in trust to pay B.’s creditors, and it did not appear that any creditor had signed or assented to ihe indenture, the respondent was adjudged trustee.

Church Gray, being summoned in a process of foreign attachment as the trustee of Bliss, disclosed an indenture of two parts, made by Bliss of the one part and the respondent of the other part, whereby Bliss assigned to the respondent certain parcels of real estate and all his goods and chattels and choses in action, in trust to pay certain of his creditors in full, and others *pro*rata, in case the property should be insufficient to pay them in full ; and the respondent covenanted to perform the trust.

Cobb, for the plaintiff,

contended that the indenture was invalid, inasmuch as it consisted of but two parts, and was not signed by any creditor of Bliss ; *Widgery*v. *Haskell,*5 Mass. R. 144 ; and inasmuch as the creditors named in the indenture had not assented to it, but, on the contrary, several of the credi tors named in it had summoned the respondent in processes of foreign attachment. *Stevens v.*Bell, 6 Mass. R. 339 ; *Marston*v, *Coburn,*17 Mass. R. 454. The plaintiff claims that the respondent may be adjudged trustee, so far as respects the govds and chattels assigned ; which are sufficient to cover the amount of the plaintiff’s demand.

*Hunt,*for the trustee.

*Per Curiam.*

The respondent is adjudged trustee.1

1

 See *Brewer*v *Pitkin,*11 Pick. 298; *Leeds*v. *Sayward,,*6 N. Hamp. R. 83; *Bradford*v. *Tappan,*11 Pick. 76; *Russell*v. *Woodward,*10 Pick. 415; *Ward*v. *Lamson,*6 Pick. 358; *Wales*v. *Rogers,*22 Pick. 245; *Everett*v. *Walcot,*15 Pick 94; *Copeland*v. Weld, 8 Greenl. 411.
#### Eleanor Dalton, Respondent, *v.*Costes Dritras, as President, and Sam Kramberg, as Treasurer of Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302, Appellants.

Submitted May 17, 1943;

decided June 18, 1943.

*Max Delson*for appellants.

*519
      *Elsie E. Kovacs*and *Leon R. Nemore*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

In this action to recover death benefits because of the death of her husband who was a member of the defendant union, plaintiff’s asserted right depends upon article XI of the Union’s by-laws. Only dependents of a member of the Union who dies in good standing are entitled to receive death benefits (art XI, § 1) and this right is subject to and expressly limited by rules, regulations, definitions and exceptions specified in the subsequent sections of article XI, including section 3 which provides: “ 3. A member in good standing within the meaning of this Article is one who for the year just prior to his death has fully paid all dues, assessments and fines of Local 302 falling due within said year, and who had not been in arrears more than two calendar months at a time vithin said year.” Thus the prescribed condition is not merely that there shall be no arrears when death occurs, but that there shall not have been arrears for more than two calendar months at a time within one year prior to death.

*520It was conceded upon the trial that for the year immediately preceding his death, Edward Dalton (plaintiff’s deceased husband) had been in arrears more than two months at a time. The courts below erroneously held plaintiff entitled to recover because Dalton was not in arrears at the time of his death. We could not hold that acceptance of payment of arrears before death waives or removes the further condition imposed by section 3 of article XI except by striking it out. This we may not do.

The judgments should be reversed and the complaint dismissed, without costs.

Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Ripfey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ., concur.

Judgments reversed, etc.
#### David Sears *et al.,*Resp’ts, *v.*The Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. *et al,*App’lts.

*(New York Superior Court, General Term,*

*Filed April 6, 1891.)*

Title—Partition.

A will directed a certain share of testator’s real estate to be set off to a trustee for the life of plaintiffs’ mother, remainder in fee to plaintiffs. In an action of partition, to which all persons interested were parties, the premises in question were so set off. *Held,*that the parties who received the fee of other lands in such action could not claim an interest in these lands, and that plaintiffs’ mother having died, the estate of the trustee ceased and plaintiffs’ title became absolute.

Appeal by the defendants from a judgment of the special term, enjoining the operation of the defendants’ elevated railroad in front of the premises No. 27 Park place and Nos. 24 and 26 Murray street, unless the defendants pay to the plaintiffs $25,000, with interest from November 14, 1890, the date of said judgment, *354for a conveyance of their easements in said streets taken by defendants for the use of said railroad; and also awarding to the plaintiffs the sum of $400 for damages to the rental value of said premises from March 27, 1888, to June 26, 1888, and $3,000 for damages to the rental value thereof from June 26, 1888, to May 15, 1890, $906.87 costs, disbursements and allowances.

*Edward C.*James, for app’lts; *G. Willett Van Nest,*for resp’ts.

Per Curiam.

It is claimed by the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiffs did not show title to the land, appurtenant easements to which have been taken as the complaint charges. The supposed defects in the title, as claimed, arise from the noncompliance with certain of the provisions of the will of one Hoyt, from whom the title comes.

If the land is a part of a share described in the will which was to be set off to the trustee for the mother of the present plaintiffs for her life, then under the will the plaintiffs took the remainder in fee at her death. This setting off was accomplished by the partition suit, to which all persons who could question plaintiffs’ title to the land were parties. These parties having received in lieu of undivided interests the whole of the fee of the other parcel of land, cannot claim that they have an undivided interest in the land conveyed by the referee to Hoyt as trustee for plaintiffs’ mother. The mother having died, the legal estate of the trustee then ceased.

The defendants have not a right to a jury trial in this case, as the action is for equitable relief. When a plaintiff brings an action for both legal and equitable relief, in respect of the same cause of action, the case presented is not one of right triable by jury under the constitution.” *Cogswell v. N.Y., N. H. & H. R R. Co.,*105 N. Y., 319; 7 N. Y. State Rep., 203.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Sedgwick, Ch. J., Tbuax and Dugro, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jesus CRUZ-CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-41706 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 17, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jesus Cruz-Castillo, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

*345PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jesus Cruz-Castillo has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed an initial brief and a supplemental brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Cruz-Castillo has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s briefs and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cíe. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47,5.4.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Annual Report of MDU Communications International, Inc.(the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2003, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 2003 (the“Report”), I, Sheldon Nelson, Chief Executive Officer and Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, asadopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to myknowledge: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to and will be retained by MDU Communications International, Inc. andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 
|                | /s/  SHELDON  NELSON                                                                              |   |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                | Sheldon  Nelson*Chief Executive Officer and  Chief Financial Officer*MDU Communications International, Inc. |
|                |                                                                                                        |
|                |                                                                                                        |
| December  23, 2003  |                                                                                                        |
| Totowa,  New Jersey |                                                                                                        |

 

1

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Exhibit 10.25
 DMC
stratex
NETWORKS
 
 Re:
    
    Employment Agreement
   Position and Duties
 Term of Employment
 Compensation
 Salary
 Bonus
 Benefits




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##### 



Voluntary Termination
 Other Termination
 Termination by Disability
 Termination for Cause or Death




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##### 



Termination Without Cause
       Resignation for Good Reason




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##### 



Termination or Resignation For Good Reason Following a Change of Control
  Change of Control/Good Reason




---



##### 








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##### 



Confidential and Emprietaor Information
 Termination Obligations
    Limitation of Payments and Benefits




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##### 



Other Activities
 Dispute Resolution
 Severability




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##### 



Applicable Withholding
 Assignment
 Entire Agreement
 Governing Law
 Modification
    By:
    
    /s/ Charles D. KissnerCharles D. KissnerChairman and Chief Executive Officer
  Date: 28 June, 2002
    
    
    
    /s/ Shaun McFallShaun McFall