The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

respondent on the ground that appellant failed to present evidence that 

the walkway caused her fall- On appeal, appellant contends that 

summary judgment was improper because her deposition testimony was 

sufficient to create a question of fact as to the issue of causation. We 

agree. 

We review summary judgments de novo. Wood v. Safeway, 

Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). In so doing, "the 

iThe district court's order does not make clear whether it also 

granted summary judgment on the ground that appellant failed to produce 

evidence supporting her allegation that the walkway presented an 

unreasonably unsafe condition. We note, however, that the photographs 

submitted by appellant with her opposition to summary judgment would 

be sufficient to create a question of fact in this regard. See Wood v. 

Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (indicating 

that evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party). 

To the extent that the district court did alternatively grant 

summary judgment based on the absence of an unreasonably unsafe 

condition and deemed these photographs inadmissible in doing so, the 

district court abused its discretion in not allowing appellant to acquire 

similar evidence from respondent through additional discovery. Choy v. 

Ameristar Casinos, Inc., 127 Nev. „ 265 P.3d 698, 700 (2011) 

(reviewing for an abuse of discretion the denial of an NRCP 56(f) request 

for a continuance). Namely, appellant's NRCP 56(f) affidavits indicate 

that she intended to elicit similar evidence during the scheduled 

deposition of respondent's person-most-knowledgeable, and the record 

demonstrates that the district court's stay order effectively prevented 

appellant from taking this deposition before summary judgment was 

granted. 

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evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, must be viewed in 

a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. 

Respondent points to various statements in appellants 

deposition in which she purports to not remember the cause of her fall. 

When these statements are viewed in the context of her entire deposition, 

however, appellant clearly testified that the walkway caused her fall and 

that she was simply unsure whether she lost her balance on loose boards 

or caught her foot on uneven boards. Cf. Wagon Wheel v. Mavrogan, 78 

Nev. 126, 127-28, 369 P.2d 688, 689 (1962) (upholding a jury verdict in 

favor of a plaintiff when the plaintiff testified that his fall was caused by 

either a nail or a piece of wood, despite his inability to identify which 

precise object caused the fall). 

Moreover, to the extent that Rickard v. City of Reno, 71 Nev. 

266, 288 P.2d 209 (1955), requires a plaintiff to produce evidence 

independent of her own testimony to support her theory of causation, 

appellant did so here by submitting photographs of the walkway with her 

opposition to summary judgment. Compare Rickard, 71 Nev. at 272-73, 

288 P.2d at 212 (concluding that an inference of causation may not be 

drawn when all evidence contradicts the plaintiffs theory of causation), 

with Worth v. Reed, 79 Nev. 351, 355, 384 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1963) 

(concluding that an inference of causation may be drawn when "some 

evidence" supports the plaintiffs theory of causation). 

Because the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom create a question of fact regarding causation, Wood, 121 Nev. at 

729, 121 P.3d at 1029, summary judgment was improper. See Nehls v. 

Leonard, 97 Nev. 325, 328, 630 P.2d 258, 260 (1981) (indicating that 

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proximate cause presents a factual issue for the jury to resolve). 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND 

REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 

this order. 2 

, J. 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

Cherry 

J. 

2Having considered the parties' arguments regarding whether 

appellant's reply appendix should be stricken, we deny respondent's 

motion to strike. Namely, the documents in the appendix were filed in 

district court before the district court granted summary judgment, NRAP 

10(b)(1), and appellant's reply brief relies on these documents to reply to 

arguments raised in respondent's answering brief. NRAP 30(b)(5). 

Moreover, in light of our resolution of the appealed-from summary 

judgment in Docket No. 60053, we reverse the district court's award of 

costs in Docket No. 60660. We have determined that these appeals should 

be submitted for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See 

NRAP 34(f)(1). 

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cc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge 

Parnell & Associates 

Olson, Cannon, Gormley, Angulo & Stoberski 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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