alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of drugstore.com, inc. (the Company) for the period ending January 2, 2005, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert A. Barton, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/    ROBERT A.
BARTONRobert A. BartonChief Financial Officer




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to drugstore.com, inc. and will be retained by drugstore.com, inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



March 17, 2005
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Efren BUCIO-CANO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40933 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 1, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Efren Bucio-Cano, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Efren Bucio-Cano has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Bucio-Cano has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. SON KIM LE, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-20170 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 5, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Son Kim Le, Pro Se

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Son Kim Le has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *286
      *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Le has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court- has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Depomed, Inc. (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Carl A. Pelzel, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

(1)  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|   | Date:  November 2, 2010           |
|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   |                                   |
|   |                                   |
|   | /s/  Carl A. Pelzel                    |
|   | Carl  A. Pelzel                        |
|   | President  and Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
#### Bart FANELLI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BMC SOFTWARE, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-14431 & 16-12339

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(April 20, 2017)

*667Michael Eric Ross, Scott G. Blews, Glianny Fagundo, Eric Seth Fisher, Kelly Casey Mullally, Taylor English Duma, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

A. Craig Cleland, Margaret H. Campbell, Margaret Santen Hanrahan, Amy Elizabeth Jensen, David Paul Thatcher, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC, Atlanta, GA, Theresia Maria Moser, Charles Edward Solley, Moser Law Group, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WILSON, and JULIE CARNES Circuit Judges, and TREADWELL,* District Judge

*

 Honorable Marc T. Treadwell, United States District Judge, for the Middle District of Georgia, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

We have considered all of BMC’s specifications of error. We have reviewed the following under an abuse of discretion standard:

> 1. Whether the district court erred in allowing the jury to find that BMC owed a duty to Fanelli?

> 2. Whether the district court erred in allowing the jury to find that BMC was the proximate cause of harm to Fanelli?

> 3. Whether the district court erred by not setting aside the award for damages to reputation?

> 4. Whether the district court erred by excluding evidence as to Fanelli’s post-BMC earnings?

> 5. Whether the district court erred in declining to overrule the jury’s finding that BMC acted in bad faith under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11?

> 6. Whether the district court erred in granting Fanelli’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68?

We have reviewed de novo the following specification of error:

> 7.Whether the district court erred in denying BMC’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on Fanelli’s claim for fraudulent nondisclosure?

After careful review of the briefs and the record, and having the benefit of oral argument, we find no reversible error. The decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
----

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Exhibit 23.1** **PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP **Chartered Accountants 
PO Box 82 
Royal Trust Tower, Suite 3000 
Toronto Dominion Centre 
Toronto, Ontario 
Canada M5K 1G8 
Telephone +1 416 863 1133 
Facsimile +1 416 365 8215**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**
We hereby consent to the inclusion in thisAnnual Report on Form 40-F of Lundin Mining Corporation (the Company) of ourreport dated February 25, 2009 relating to the consolidated financial statementsand the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, whichappears in an exhibit to this Annual Report on Form 40-F.

*/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP*

Chartered Accountants, Licensed PublicAccountants

Toronto, Ontario, Canada February 25, 2009

 

"PricewaterhouseCoopers" refers to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,an Ontario limited liability partnership, or, as the context requires, the PricewaterhouseCoopers global network or other member firms of the network, eachof which is a separate and independent legal entity.**** |
#### VELE, Plaintiff v. UO, Defendant

No. 16-1918

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Alofa”]

January 30, 1919

A. M. NOBLE, *Judge of the High Court;*and MOLIOO, *Associate Member*

JUDGMENT

This cause coming on to be heard before their Honors A. M. Noble and Molioo on the 30th day of January, 1919, and it appearing to the Court that the subject matter of this action, to-wit; the land “ALOFA”, was on the 25th day of July, 1917, sold and conveyed by the plaintiff Vele to the defendant Uo, as will fully appear by reference to Volume Two, Register of Transfers of the U.S. Naval Station, Tutuila, at pages 39 to 43 inclusive.

It is therefore ordered, considered and adjudged by the Court that the plaintiff take a non-suit.

It is further ordered, considered and adjudged that the costs in this action, to-wit; $10.00 be taxed against the plaintiff in this action.
#### William B. Roulstone, Appellant, *v.*Northern Terminal Corporation of New York et al., Respondents, and James N. Butterly, as Administrator of James N. Butterly, Deceased, et al., Defendants.

Argued October 15, 1943;

decided December 2, 1943.

*743
      *Bernard Hershkopf*and *William B. Boulstone,*in person, for appellant.

*Charles J. Nehrbas*for Northern Terminal Corporation of New York, et al., respondents.

*Reginald 8. Hardy*and *William J. Kent, Jr.,*for Catherine J. Heaney, as executrix of Frank J. Heaney, deceased, respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippby, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ.
-82 -80 -78 -76

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 40

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18 12 06 00

07/18

NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

 Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 18 Jul 06

 EDAS Meteorological Data

Source

★ at 38.86 N 77.06 W Meters AGL
#### In the Matter of Albert L. Ward, Individually and as Secretary of the State Committee of the Democratic Party of the State of New York, Respondent, against Thomas J. Curran, as Secretary of State of the State of New York, Appellant.

Argued August 19, 1943;

decided August 19, 1943.

*644
      *Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General (Orrin G. Judd*and *Wendell P. Brown*of counsel), for appellant.

*William J. O’Shea, Edward D. Burns, Henry Epstein, John P. McGrath, Andrew M. Lawlor*and *Saul Kaplan*for respondent.

Order affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ck. J., Loughban, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacheb, JJ.
Filed May 14, 1891.

#### Max Alexander, Resp’t, *v.*The N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., App’lt.

Appeal from order of Hon. H. W. Bookstaver, J.

Order affirmed, with costs.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 25, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50204

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RICARDO JAVIER RUBIO-GALVAN, also

known as Jorge Armando Serrano,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-02-CR-1643-ALL

--------------------

Before DeMOSS, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Ricardo Javier Rubio-Galvan appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United

States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Rubio-Galvan contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior

conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element

of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have
No. 03-50204

-2-

been alleged in his indictment. Rubio-Galvan maintains that he

pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds

the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed

for that offense.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Rubio-Galvan acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
#### Martha Lopez LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 13-70931

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 19, 2017

Thomas A. Lappin, Esquire, Attorney, Law Office of Thomas A. Lappin, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner

OIL, Carlton Frederick Sheffield, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Martha Lopez Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision finding her removable. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law and constitutional claims. *Martinez-Medina v. Holder,*673 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny the petition for review.

The agency did not err or violate due process in finding Lopez Lopez removable as charged, because *Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder*forecloses her contention that her statements to immigration officials at the border were unconstitutionally obtained in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c). 558 F.3d 897, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2009); *see Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (an alien must show error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONDENSED
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1997 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,200
<ALLOWANCES>                                       300
<INVENTORY>                                      1,618
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                27,603
<PP&E>                                           2,410
<DEPRECIATION>                                     772
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  41,961
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,604
<BONDS>                                              0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    41,961
<SALES>                                         22,356
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<CGS>                                            7,860
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    6,010
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</TABLE>
**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**


**(18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**




In
      connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Concierge Technologies,
      Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2007 (the
“Report”), I, Allen E. Kahn, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
      certify that to my knowledge:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78o(d)); and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:
      May 16, 2007




*/s/
                Allen E. Kahn*Allen
                E. Kahn
              Chief
                Financial Officer




The
      above
      certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-QSB
      or as a separate disclosure document.





Exhibit
            32.1
 Page
            1 of
            1 Page
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 10, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-10848

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FEDERICO CRUZ-BOLANOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:03-CR-16-ALL

--------------------

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Federico Cruz-Bolanos appeals the sentence imposed following

his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States

after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. CruzBolanos contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)

define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction

that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a

separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been

alleged in his indictment. Cruz-Bolanos maintains that he
No. 03-10848

-2-

pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds

the term of imprisonment which may be imposed for that offense.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Cruz-Bolanos acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.