NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________ No. 2 1

- 2273

____________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. HAMID MURDOCK , Appellant

____________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2

- 19

- cr - 00254

- 001 ) District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson

____________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 13 , 202 2
Before : HARDIMAN, SMITH , and FISHER , Circuit Judges

.

(Filed: June 14, 2022 )

____________ OPINION *

____________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge

. Hamid Murdock appeals his judgment of conviction

. We will affirm. 1
Murdock entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of
ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Murdock argues the District Court should have granted his motion to suppress because Officer Robert Bakos lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk Murdock

. F or the reasons stated by the District Court in its persuasive o pinion , we hold that reasonable suspicion supported the frisk.
The facts are essentially undisputed. Murdock was a backseat passenger in a car
Officer Bakos stopped on a January evening. Murdock concedes the validity of the traffic stop and that the smell of marijuana provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

. See United States v. Ramos , 443 F.3d 304, 30 8 (3d Cir. 2006)

. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is not enough to justify a frisk , however ; the officer must have reasonable suspicion that a person is “armed and dangerous.” United States v. Murray , 821 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). Th is inquiry is based on the totality of the circumstances, and “ we give considerable deference to police officers ’ determinations of reasonable suspicion given their own experience and specialized training .” United States v. Graves , 877 F.3d 494 , 498

– 99 (3d Cir. 2017)

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 1 8 U.S.C. § 3231

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “ We review denials of motions to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review over the District Court ’ s application of the law to those facts.” United States v. Hall , 28 F.4th 445, 449 n.1 (3d Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted)

.3

( quotation marks and citation omitted ).
The office rs had reasonable suspicion that Murdock was armed and dangerous , even though he complied with all of Officer Bakos’s requests. The traffic stop occurred after dark in a high

- crime area. See Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)

. In addition, Murdock was “extremely nervous” and “breathing heavily

. ” App. 73; s ee id. Most significantly, w hen Officer Bakos asked for Murdock’s license, Murdock answered that “he [did] not have it on him, but then ma[de] a quick motion up with his right hand ”
to his right breast pocket . App. 7 3

– 7 4

. “Quick and furtive movements,” along with other indicators of criminal activity, support a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous. United States v. Yamba , 506 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2007). Officer Bakos ’ s experience also informed his decision. See Graves , 877 F.3d at 499. He feared that Murdock was reaching for a gun because he has seen guns hidden in pockets the size of Murdock’s. Together, these facts provide d “a particularized and objective basis” to conclude that Murdock was armed and dangerous. See United States v. Brown , 448 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). For these reasons, we will affirm.