alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6656 

AN ACT 

To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the Commissioner of Social Security to implement automated systems with callback functionality for each customer service 

telephone line of the Department of Veterans Affairs 

and the Social Security Administration, respectively, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 6656 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stuck On Hold Act’’. 

3 SEC. 2. IMPROVEMENTS REGARDING WAIT TIMES FOR 

4 CALLERS TO CERTAIN SERVICE TELEPHONE 

5 LINES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

6 AFFAIRS. 

7 (a) AUTOMATED SYSTEM.—Not later than one year 

8 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

9 of Veterans Affairs shall implement, for each covered line, 

10 an automated system that— 

11 (1) informs any caller to a covered line about 

12 the anticipated wait time, if any; and 

13 (2) automatically offers a callback to any such 

14 caller with an anticipated wait time of more than 10 

15 minutes. 

16 (b) GUIDANCE REGARDING CALLER WAIT TIMES.— 

17 The Secretary shall issue such guidance the Secretary de18 termines necessary to reduce the average wait time of a 

19 caller to a covered line to not more than 10 minutes. 

20 (c) COVERED LINE DEFINED.—In this section, the 

21 term ‘‘covered line’’ means a customer service telephone 

22 line of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Such term 

23 does not include— 

24 (1) the toll-free hotline for veterans provided by 

25 the Secretary under section 1720F(h) of title 38, 

26 United States Code; or 
3 

•HR 6656 EH

1 (2) a phone line for the emergency department 

2 of a health care facility of the Department. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 25, 

2024. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6656 

AN ACT 

To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the 

purposes. curity Administration, respectively, and for other partment of Veterans Affairs and the Social Seeach customer service telephone line of the Deautomated systems with callback functionality for Commissioner of Social Security to implement
Electric
Lightwave                                           Service Order Summary

Last printed: 11/28/2001 08:10AM

PACIFIC WEBWORKS                                  Sales Module:  SLKC511
180 S 300 W                                    Service Order #:  SLKC6992
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101-1218                              PO#:
                                            Customer Account #:  102259
                                   Customer Preferred Due Date:  01/02/2002

Chris Larsen
(801) 578-9020

                                                                      Service
Product Ordered / Quoted In-Service Date  Qty      NRC      MRC       Term
______________________________________________________________________________

Internet over Dedicated DS3 / 12/14/01           $1,050.00  $3,250.00 2 Year

   DS3                                     1
   6Mbps                                   1

                                                   NRC      MRC
______________________________________________________________________________
Totals:                                          $1,050.00  $3,250.00
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Notes:



_____________________________________________________________________________

ELI does not guarantee the Customer will be assigned any particular telephone
number (s) prior to installation and activation of Service.  Customer's
reliance upon and / or use of any Service numbering information prior to
installation and activation of Service is at the Customer's sole risk.

I have read, understand, accept, and agree to the terms of this Service Order.
This Service Order is subject to the terms of the Master Services Agreement
which is incorporated herein by reference, and may not be effective until
approved by the FCC or State Commission.  All changes must be in writing, and
agreed to by both parties.  Any change may result in a new installation date
and additional charges.  The above rates doe not include any taxes, fees, or
surcharges applicable to the Services.

PACIFIC WEBWORKS

By: /s/ Christian Larsen           11/30/2001
------------------------------     -------------------
Authorized Signature               Date


Christian Larsen                   President______________
------------------------------     -------------------
Print Customer Name                Title


Electric Lightwave Inc. hereby submits the above services proposal to PACIFIC
WEBWORKS.  It is not effective until signed by Customer.  If this proposal is
not accepted by Customer within 90 days of the date set forth below, all
pricing, dates, and terms are subject to change.  This proposal is subject to
Credit approval.

Electric Lightwave, Inc.

By: _______________________________  _________________________________
Authorized Signature                 Date


1 of 1                                                      11/28/01 10:40 AM
#### Jamal Damon HENDRIX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of NEVADA; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16743

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 21, 2017

Jamal Damon Hendrix, Pro Se

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2),

MEMORANDUM **

Jamal Damon Hendrix, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action denying Hendrix in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status because he has three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Washington v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,*833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016). We reverse and remand.

The district court denied Hendrix’s IFP request on the basis that he had accrued three prior “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The district court improperly counted No. 3:14-cv-398-RCJ-VPC as a strike because the dismissal of a mislabeled § 1983 action on the ground that it *533should have been brought as a habeas petition does not count as a strike. *See El-Shaddai v. Zamora,*833 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir 2016) (dismissal of § 1983 action that is mislabeled as a habeas petition does not count as a strike); *Washington,*833 F.3d at 1057 (where a portion of the action sounds in habeas, dismissal does not count as a strike). The district court improperly-counted No. 3:15-cv-155-MMD-WGC as a strike because an initial dismissal of a complaint for violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), with leave to amend, does not count as a strike. *See Knapp v. Hogan,*738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[Dismissals following the *repeated*violation of Rule 8(a)’s ‘short and plain statement’ requirement, following leave to amend, are dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(g).”).

We reverse the district court’s order revoking Hendrix’s IFP status, and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Commonwealth *versus*Stephen Badlam.

A married woman may be imprisoned without her husband, upon an execution against both, provided it is not done by collusion between the creditor and the husband.

On a writ of *habeas corpus*directed to the keeper of the gaol in Suffolk, to bring up the bodyaof Mary Woodman, it -appeared that she was imprisoned upon an execution issued against her husband and herself, upon a judgment recovered against them by Philip Wentworth, for a debt contracted by her previously to the marriage. The husband was not within the Commonwealth when the judgment was recovered, nor when the wife was committed.

*B. Parsons*now contended,

that a married woman cannot

lawfully be imprisoned for debt. The husband has all her property, and she ought therefore to be protected so long as the marriage continues.

Upon mesne process, it is clear, that a wife cannot be com mitted without her husband : nor with him, according to some of the authorities. *Edwards*v. Rourke, 1 T. R. 486.

Our statute of 1784, c. 41, allowing debtors the liberty of *369the jail-yard upon their giving bond, and *St.*1784, c. 87, providing for their discharge upon their swearing that they have no property, repeal the supposed common law right to imprison a *feme covert*for debt; for *a feme covert*cannot give a valid bond, and the presumption of law is, that she has no property of her own. Here it is not pretended that the wife has any separate property, and she is entitled to be discharged. *Sparkes v.*Bell, 8 Barn. & Cressw. 1.

Imprisonment for debt is at variance with the principles of the constitution.

S. *D.*Parker, for the defendant.

*Per Curiam.*

The law is settled in England, that a wife cannot be legally arrested ón mesne process, and if she is arrested, she may be discharged on common bail. The law is different in the case of an execution, unless the wife is committed by collusion between the creditor and the husband. In New York the law agrees with that of England. We find no precedent which will authorize us to liberate this woman.*

It is urged that imprisonment for debt is unconstitutional ; and that it is contrary to the unalienable rights of man ; and other arguments have been used, which would be more properly addressed to a legislative body than to a court of justice.

The immemorial practice in this Commonwealth has been to imprison for debt, and there is nothing against it in our constitution.1

The prisoner will be remanded.

*

 See, on this subject, *Pitts*v. Meller, 2 Str. 1167; *Finch*v. Duddin, ibid. 1237; *Harrison*v. *Bearcliffe,*ibid. 1272; *Langstaff*v. Rain, 1 Wils. 149; *Anonymous,*3 Wils. 124; Tidd’s Pr. (3d ed.) 173; 1 Sellon’s Pr. 516; Rob*erts*v. Andrews, 2 W. Bl. 720; *M'Kinstry*v. *Davis,*3 Cowen, 339. *Reporter,*

1

 The law in reference to imprisonment of females for debt has been altered by Revised Stat. c. 97, § 46.
#### Frederick T. BREWSTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WACHOVIA MORTGAGE, FSB, Defendant, and Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-35561

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 26, 2017

Frederick T. Brewster, Pro Se

*707Molly J. Henry, Esquire, Attorney, Keesal, Young & Logan, Seattle, WA, for Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, Wells Fargo Bank, NA

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Wells Fargo Bank, NA, appeals from the district court’s order awarding it $5,000 in attorney’s fees and costs on its motion for an attorney’s fees award in the amount of $29,561.40. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We vacate and remand.

We are unable to review the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to Wells Fargo because the district court did not provide an adequate explanation for its decision. *See Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC,*757 F.3d 866, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2014) (a district court is required to reach attorney’s fee decisions by considering the factors set forth in *Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.,*526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) and “must also explain how it arrived at its determination with sufficient specificity to permit an appellate court to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in the way the analysis was undertaken.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We vacate the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and remand for the district court to articulate the basis for its fee determination with sufficient specificity.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not'appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Michael TATE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FAMILY AUTO GROUP, INC., a California corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-56087

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 6, 2017* Pasadena, California

Filed July 10, 2017

Russell Clive Handy, Esquire, Potter Handy LLP, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Ali Parvaneh, Esquire, Attorney, Madison Harbor, ALC, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Felicia Ruth Reid, Attorney, Hirschfeld Kraemer LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Amici Curiae National Automobile Dealers Association, National Independent Automobile Dealers Association, California New Car Dealers Association, National Mobility Equipment Dealers Association

Before: GRABER, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

*

The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

We vacate the district court’s dismissal of this action, and we remand for reconsideration in light of Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley, LLC, No. 15-55633.

VACATED and REMANDED. Costs on appeal awarded to Plaintiff.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge,

acquiescing dubitante:

I acquiesce *dubitante*for the reasons articulated in my separate opinion in *Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley, LLC,*No. 15-55633.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### In the Matter of Fred A. Healey, Respondent, against John Bazinet, Mayor of the City of Glens Falls, et al., Constituting the Board of Public Safety of Said City, Appellants.

Argued April 8, 1943;

reargument ordered July 20, 1943.

*C. E. Fitzgerald*and *Thomas J. McCarthy*for appellants. *Frank Hurley*for respondent.

Reargument ordered and argument set for first week in October next. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughban, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
#### Carver Washburn, Petitioner, &c.

Where A. occupies one half and B. the other half of a dwellinghouse, a notification left at B.’s part of the house, for A. to appear at a militia muster, is not a legal warning.

Petition for a *certiorari*to a justice of peace, by whom the petitioner bad been fined for neglecting to appear at a militia muster. At the trial before the justice it appeared, that the petitioner lived in one half of a dwellinghouse, the other half being occupied by another person, who was a witness ; that the notification to the petitioner was handed to the witness when standing at the door of his own part of the house, with a request that he would deliver it to the petitioner, but whether the witness had ever delivered it or not, he could not recollect.

Eddy, for the petitioner.

*W.*Baylies, for the respondent.

The *Court*

said, that leaving a notice at another man’s house was not a sufficient warning to the petitioner,1 *and a writ of *certiorari*was granted ; and at a subsequent term the proceedings were quashed.

1

 See Revised Stat. c. 12, § 89.
Order entered February 23, 2021

In The 

### Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas** No. 05 - 19 - 00466 - CR JUAN MANUEL AREVALOS , Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 19 4th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F 19 - 00219 - M O RDER Appellant has informed the Court that he wishes to file a pro se response to the Anders brief filed by appellate counsel. Accordingly, we ORDER appellate counsel La wrence B. Mitchell to provide appellant with copies of the clerk’s and reporter’s records. We fu rther ORDER appellate counsel to provide this Court, within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order, with written verification that the record has been sent to a ppellant. Appellant’s pro se response is due by APRIL 23, 2021

.We DIRECT the Clerk to send c opies of this order to the Honor able Ernest White , Presiding Judge, 194th Judicial District Court; Felicia Pitre , Dallas County District Clerk; Belinda Baraka , o fficial court reporter, 194th Judicial District Court; Lawrence B. Mitchell ; and the Dallas County Di strict Attorney’s Office. We DIRECT the Clerk to send a copy of this order, by first

- class mail, to Juan Manuel Arevalos , TDCJ # 02296291 , Ellis Unit , 1697 F.M. 980 , Huntsville, TX 77343

.

/s/ ERIN A. NOWELL JUSTICE
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I,   Pam Schertz, Controller certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of CytoGenix, Inc.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;



4.

The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:



a)

designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;



b)

evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the Evaluation Date); and



c)

presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;



5.

The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



a)

all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrants auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and



b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls; and



---







6.

The registrants other certifying officers and I have indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.



Date: November 20, 2006

/s/ Pam Schertz

Pam Schertz
Controller
#### Matthew C. Grier *et al.,*Ex’rs, Resp’ts, *v.*Hazard, Hazard & Co., App’lts.

*(City Court of New York, General Term,*

*Filed March 10, 1891.)*

1. Trial—Direction of verdict.

A statement by defendant's attorney at the close of the case that he does not see any question of fact in the case is equivalent to an admission, and authorizes the court to direct a verdict.

2. Corporations—Liable for work ordered by corporators.

Where work is ordered by corporators in contemplation of the corporate formation and goes to its benefit, the corporation is liable therefor.

Appeal from judgment entered on verdict in favor of plaintiffs.

*Gruber, Bard & Landon,*for app’lts; *Burnett & Whitney,*for resp’ts.

Ehrlich, Ch. J.

At the conclusion of the trial the defendants attorney said he did not see any question of fact in the case, which statement is tantamount to an admission on which the court was. at liberty to act The court is not bound to discover a point or objection in the case when counsel frankly concede that none exist. The court properly acted on the concession and directed a verdict No objection was raised by demurrer, or in the answer, as to the capacity of the executors to sue on the contract alleged, and that objection has therefore been waived. Code, § 499.

The work was evidently done in contemplation of the corporate formation, and went to its benefit Mr. Hazard, who ordered the work, seems to think he should not pay for it because the corporation got the benefit of it, and the corporation thinks it ought not to pay for the work because Hazard ordered it This may sound well to all concerned except the plaintiffs, who are entitled to-their earnings.

Upon the entire case it is apparent that no injustice has been done, and that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Van Wyck, J., concurs.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alejandro Flores ROJAS, a.k.a, Alejandro Flores-Rojas, a.k.a. Alejandro Rojas Flores, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 16-10472, 16-10473

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 27, 2017

Krissa Marie Lanham, USPX—Office of the US Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Alejandro Flores Rojas, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated appeals, Alejandro Flores Rojas appeals his guilty-plea conviction and 21-month sentence for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the revocation of supervised release and consecutive 11-month sentence imposed upon revocation. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Flores Rojas’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there *737are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Flores Rojas the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Flores Rojas waived his right to appeal his conviction, the revocation of supervised release, and his sentences. Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver. *See United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009). We accordingly dismiss these appeals. *See id.*at 988.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 3.18

CERTIFICATE OF FORMATION

OF

WISCONSIN TRIBAL GAMING, LLC

1. The name of the limited liability company is
Wisconsin Tribal Gaming, LLC.

2. The address of its registered office in the State of Delaware is: Corporation Trust Center, 1209 Orange
Street, in the City of Wilmington, Delaware 19801. The name of its registered agent at such address is The Corporation Trust Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate of Formation of Wisconsin Tribal
Gaming, LLC this 27thday of February, 2007.



By:

/s/ Michael J. CiaccioPrinted Name: Michael J. CiaccioIts:

Authorized Person