alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DUANE E. FULGER

PETITION OF: WILLIAM E. MOORE, 

ESQUIRE

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No. 89 MM 2022

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of December, 2022, in consideration of the Application 

to Withdraw as Counsel, this matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of 

Montgomery County for that court to determine whether Attorney William E. Moore should 

be permitted to withdraw. 

If Attorney Moore is permitted to withdraw, the court is DIRECTED to resolve any 

issues relative to Duane E. Fulger being appointed counsel or granted leave to proceed 

pro se. 

The Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County is DIRECTED to enter its 

order regarding this remand within 90 days and to notify this Court promptly of its 

determination.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-6136
FREED LEE DAWSON, Petitioner - Appellant, versus THOMAS R. CORCORAN, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson E. Legg, District Judge. (CA-97- 3245-L) Submitted: March 12, 1998 Decided: March 26, 1998 Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Freed Lee Dawson, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, David Jonathan Taube, Assistant Attorney General, Ann Norman Bosse, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court'sopinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Dawson v. Corcoran , No. CA-97-3245-L (D. Md. Jan. 8, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Mussel v. Tama County.

1. Paupers: aid to: certificate of township trustees conclusive on county. Where a claimant presents to the supervisors of a county a bill for aid furnished a pauper, and there is endorsed on the account a certificate of the trustees of the township where the pauper was cared for, to the effect that the items of the account were necessary and proper for the pauper, and were furnished by the claimant at their request, *held*that such certificate was binding on the county, and that it could not be allowed, in the absence of fraud, to contradict it by the parol testimony of the trustees that the aid was not furnished at their request, or on their order.

2.-: aid to in township other than residence. A pauper who is injured in a township of his county other than that of his residence, so that his attending physician forbids his removal, may lawfully be aided, at the expense of the county, upon the order of the trustees of the township in which he is. (Code, § 1365.)

*Appeal from Tama District Court.*

Monday, October 24.

Action to recover for services and aid furnished to a *102pauper, as plaintiff claims. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

*J. R. Caldwell,*for appellant.

*J. J. Mosnat*and *George G. Wright,*for appellee.

Seevers, J.

The amount in controversy being less than $100, we are required to determine questions which have been certified by the court.

oate<oí<3towncoñciuSveeon county. I. The plaintiff furnished aid to a poor person, as he claims, and upon the account presented to the board of supervisors for allowance was the following: “We, undersigned, trustees of Salt Creek township, Tama county, Iowa, hereby certify we have carefully examined the within bill, and that the several items thereof were necessary and proper, and were furnished by J. B. Mussel to the pauper therein named, at our request; that the prices charged therefor are reasonable, and that said bill is correct; and we recommend that the sum of $85.40 be allowed thereon. ” [Signed by the trustees.] The defendant pleaded that the aid was not “ furnished at the request of said trustees, or on their order.” And we are asked whether the defendant can be “ permitted to show, by oral testimony of said trustees, that such aid was not furnished at the request or by the order of said trustees, and is such certificate conclusive as to the facts certified and thus put in issue.” We think this question must be answered in the negative, and that the certificate is conclusive on the county. Under the statute, their determination partakes of a judicial character, and settles the relations of the parties, in the absence of fraud.

__ald t0 ouíeVthánP residence. II. It was conceded that the pauper was a resident of Toledo township, but was temporarily in Salt Creek' township, and while there his leg was broken. We are asked whether, under such circumstances, the trustees 0f the latter township could lawfully furnish him aid. It further appears that the physician hav*103ing the pauper in charge refused to have him moved. This question must be answered in the affirmative. ^Code, § 1365.)

Affirmed.
Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of AUG CORP. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2002, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Jeff Barocas, principal accounting officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fully presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


By:/s/Jeff Barocas
   ---------------
   Jeff Barocas

December 4, 2002
#### NAOMI, Plaintiff v. UO, Defendant

No. 13-1911

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Aoloau”]

January 30, 1919

A. M. NOBLE, *Judge of the High Court;*and MOLIOO.

JUDGMENT

This cause coming on to be heard before their Honors A. M. Noble and Molioo on the 30th day of January, 1919, and it appearing to the Court that the subject matter of this action, to wit: the land “AOLOAU” was by a former judgment of the High Court of American Samoa, on the 25th day of June, 1901, in a certain action entitled *Satele v. Sopoaga and Lili*(No. 18-1901), ordered and adjudged to be the property of Lili, one of the defendants named in said action, upon the payment by said Lili to Satele, the plaintiff therein named, of the sum of $30.00.

And it further appearing to the Court that the conditions of said judgment have been fully complied with by said Lili and that a decree final was on the 20th day of October, 1914, signed by his Honor A. Stronach, Judge of the High Court of American Samoa, which said final decree is recorded in Volume One, Register of Native Titles, at pages 125 to 127 inclusive.

It is therefore, ordered, considered and adjudged that the plaintiff take a non-suit.

*306It is further ordered, considered and adjudged that the costs of this action, to wit: $10.00 be taxed against the plaintiff in this action.
SPAR Group, Inc.

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

              Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the quarterly  report on Form 10-Q for the three month period
ended   September  30,  2004  (this   "report"),   of  SPAR  Group,   Inc.  (the
"registrant"), the undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge:

1. The report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2. The  information  contained in the report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.




                                /s/ Charles Cimitile
                                ------------------------------------------------
                                Charles Cimitile
                                Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary

                                November 15, 2004


A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to SPAR Group,  Inc.  and will be  retained  by SPAR Group,  Inc.,  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


                                      Ex-4
NUMBER 13-18-00463-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

EX PARTE CHRISTOPHER FLOYD

On appeal from the 28th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

ORDER OF ABATEMENT

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Longoria and Hinojosa

Order Per Curiam

Appellant’s brief was due on November 2, 2018. Pursuant to Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 38.8(b)(2), on November 7, 2018, the Clerk of the Court notified 

appellant’s counsel that the brief had not been timely filed, requested counsel to file a 

response concerning the failure to file the brief by November 19, 2018, and warned 

counsel that the Court would abate and remand this cause to the trial court for appropriate 

findings if a response was not filed. Counsel has nevertheless failed to file either a 

response or an appellate brief in this matter. 
2

Accordingly, we now ABATE this appeal and REMAND the cause to the trial court 

for further proceedings pursuant to Rule 38.8(b)(2) and (3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Upon remand, the trial court shall utilize whatever means necessary to make 

appropriate findings and recommendations concerning the following: (1) whether 

appellant desires to prosecute this appeal; (2) why appellant's counsel has failed to file a 

brief and whether counsel has effectively abandoned the appeal; (3) whether appellant 

has been denied effective assistance of counsel; (4) whether appellant's counsel should 

be removed; and (5) whether appellant is indigent and entitled to court-appointed counsel.

If the trial court determines that appellant does want to continue the appeal, that 

present counsel should be removed, and that appellant is indigent and entitled to 

court-appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint new counsel to represent appellant 

in this appeal. If new counsel is appointed, the name, address, email address, telephone 

number, and state bar number of said counsel shall be included in an order appointing 

counsel.

The trial court shall cause its findings and recommendations, together with any 

orders it may enter regarding the aforementioned issues, to be included in a supplemental 

clerk's record. Furthermore, the trial court shall cause a supplemental reporter's record 

of any proceedings to be prepared. The supplemental clerk's record and supplemental 

reporter's record, if any, shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court on or before the 

expiration of thirty days from the date of this order.
3

It is so ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

10th day of December, 2018.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements contained in the body of the accompanying Form 10-K of
MUZAK HOLDINGS FINANCE CORP and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001085319
<NAME>                        MUZAK HOLDINGS FINANCE CORP
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                                   0
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         0
<PP&E>                                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                           0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                                               0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                             0
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         0
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                          0
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                             0
<EPS-BASIC>                                              0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0


</TABLE>
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the 

Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound 

volumes go to press. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 22-BG-181

IN RE MICHAEL S. ARIF,

2021 DDN 171

A Member of the Bar of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bar Registration No. 391415

BEFORE: Beckwith and Deahl, Associate Judges, and Washington, Senior Judge.

O R D E R

(FILED—June 2, 2022)

On consideration of the certified order from the state of Virginia revoking 

respondent’s license to practice law in that jurisdiction by consent; this court’s April 

5, 2022, order directing respondent to show cause why reciprocal discipline in the 

form of disbarment should not be imposed; and the statement of Disciplinary 

Counsel; and it appearing that respondent has not filed a response or his D.C. Bar R. 

XI, § 14(g) affidavit, it is

ORDERED that Michael S. Arif is hereby disbarred from the practice of law 

in the District of Columbia. See In re Sibley, 990 A.2d 483, 487 (D.C. 2010) 

(explaining that there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of imposition of identical 

discipline and exceptions to this presumption should be rare); In re Fuller, 930 A.2d 

194, 198 (D.C. 2007) (rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal discipline 

applies to all cases in which the respondent does not participate); In re Laibstain, 

841 A.2d 1259, 1263 (D.C. 2004) (explaining that the equivalent sanction for 

revocation in the District is disbarment). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that for purposes of reinstatement, respondent’s 

disbarment will not begin to run until such time as he files an affidavit that fully 

complies with the requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g).

PER CURIAM
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6826 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6826

To designate the visitor and education center at Fort McHenry National 
   Monument and Historic Shrine as the Paul S. Sarbanes Visitor and 
                           Education Center.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 14, 2023

   Mr. Mfume (for himself, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Harris, Mr. 
  Raskin, Mr. Trone, Mr. Ruppersberger, and Mr. Ivey) introduced the 
    following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural 
                               Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To designate the visitor and education center at Fort McHenry National 
   Monument and Historic Shrine as the Paul S. Sarbanes Visitor and 
                           Education Center.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    (a) Designation.--The visitor and education center at Fort McHenry 
National Monument and Historic Shrine, currently located at 2400 E Fort 
Ave, Baltimore, MD 21230, is designated as the ``Paul S. Sarbanes 
Visitor and Education Center''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other document of the United States to the visitor center 
designated by subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
Paul S. Sarbanes Visitor and Education Center.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 31**
 
 **CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 I, Sheldon Nelson, certify that:
 
 1.

I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of MDU Communications International, Inc.;2.

Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;4.

I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15e and 15d-15e) for the registrant and have:(a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;(b)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this annual report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(c)
Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and5.

I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):(a)
All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information and(b)
Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls over financial reporting. 
 
 Date:  December 28, 2004
/s/ Sheldon NelsonSheldon NelsonPresident and Chief Executive Officer
#### Robert E. BROWN Plaintiff-Appellant v. Robert WILLIAMS; Norma B. Williams; Williams Home Service, Inc.; Wayne L. Watkins; Spring River Beach Club, Inc. Defendants Virgil Griffin; Mrs. Virgil Griffin; Griffin Park, LLC Defendants-Appellees Jesus is Lord Ministries, Inc.; Bigger Bluff Corporation Defendants

No. 16-2195

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 16, 2017

Filed: June 21, 2017

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 21, 2017

Larry Joe Steele, Walnut Ridge, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Arlon L. Woodruff, Woodruff Law Firm, Lake City, AR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before BENTON, BOWMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In his action for civil remedies under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Robert Brown filed this appeal after the District Court1 entered summary judgment in favor of defendants Virgil Griffin, Mrs. Virgil Griffin, and Griffin Park, LLC. While the parties have not raised the issue, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to entertain Brown’s appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (giving the courts of appeals jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts); Dieser v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 440 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that a federal court will sua sponte consider its own jurisdiction when there is an indication that jurisdiction is lacking). Brown had unresolved claims against three remaining defendants when he filed this appeal, and he did not *292file a new notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of the judgment disposing of those claims. See Thomas v. Basham, 931 F.2d 521, 523-24 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that an appeal was premature where some claims were still pending when the notice of appeal was filed); see also Dieser, 440 F.3d at 924-26 (noting that where a district court order appealed from did not dispose of all claims, the premature appeal cannot be saved by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states, “A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order — but before the entry of the judgment or order — is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.”).

The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the pending motion to supplement the record is denied as moot.

1

. The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas,