No. 13399 

IN THE SUPREPlE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1977 

JOHN CLARK, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

HENSEL PHELPS CONSTRUCTION CO., Employer 

and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO., 

Insurer and Respondent. 

Appeal from: Workers' Comp. Court 

Judge William E. Hunt, presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Hoyt and Bottomly, Great Falls, Montana 

John C. Hoyt argued, Great Falls, Montana 

Thomas Lewis appeared, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great 

Falls, Montana 

James Aiken argued, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted: January 27, 1977 

Decided: FEB 16 19a 

Filed: :E @ g/I 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This appeal concerns written notice to claimant and 

approval of the Division of Workers' Compensation prior to the 

termination of workers' compensation benefits to an injured workman. 

Claimant John Clark was injured in an industrial accident on August 16, 1973. He was employed by Hensel Phelps 

Construction Co. insured under Plan I1 of the Workers' Compensation Act. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., "carrier", was the construction company's insurer. Clark was paid temporary total 

disability benefits from the date of the accident through October 

2, 1973. The carrier stopped payment of benefits without notice 

to claimant or approval of the Division of Workers' Compensation. 

In June 1975, claimant requested a hearing before the Workers' 

Compensation Court. That court found claimant entitled to temporary 

total disability benefits from the date of the accident through 

October 2, 1973 and again from October 28, 1975 until further order 

of the court or until the claimant was able to return to work. No 

benefits were awarded for the period of October 3, 1973 through October 28, 1975, and it is from this omission claimant appeals. 

The record reveals the injury suffered by claimant was 

an extremely painful and disabling back injury. Since the accident 

claimant has experienced recurcihg- burning pains in his lower back 

and left leg. The injury has created a weakness in his left leg 

causing a limp which is becoming progressively more pronounced. 

Immediately after the accident claimant was examined by 

Dr. Schroeder in Eureka, Montana. Dr. Schroeder diagnosed claimant's 

1 I injury as a muscle spasm, left lumbar" and referred him to a 
specialist. Later Dr. Schroeder informed the carrier claimant 

could return to work on October 3, 1973. This bpinion was used 

by the carrier as the basis for termination of workers' compensation benefits to claimant. The record is clear, claimant was 

unable to do any kind of physical labor for the period in question. 

From the date of the accident through October 1975, claimant was 

examined by at least eight different doctors for treatment for 

his injured back. 

On October 28, 1975 claimant was examined for the first 

time by Dr. Richard A. Nelson. On that date Dr. Nelson determined 

claimant was disabled and unable to engage in his normal kind of 

work as a result of the existing back injury. 

Apparently Dr. Nelson's report was used by the Workers' 

Compensation Court in fixing the date for the resumption of benefit 

payments to claimant. There was no reason given by the court for 

the failure to require the carrier to comply with the notice and 

approval provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act prior to the 

termination of compensation benefit payments. 

At issue is the necessity of giving claimant written 

notice and acquiring approval of the Division of Workers' Compensation, prior to the termination of benefits. 

The controlling section of the Workers' Compensation Act 

is section 92-615, R.C.M. 1947, amended in 1974, but provided in 

1973: 

"* * * If the insurer determines to initially deny a 

claim, or after a claim has been accepted, terminates 

biweekly compensation benefits, it may do so only after 

fifteen (15) days written notice to the claimant and 

the division, and after written approval of the division." 
The effect of this statute upon a fact situation as in the 

instant case, is a matter of first impression. However, the statute 

clearly and unambiguously states that notice to claimant and the 

division, and written approval of the division are prerequisites 

to the termination of compensation benefits. Where the language 

of a statute is plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the statute 

speaks for itself and there is nothing left for the court construe. Hammill v. Young, Mont . , 540 P.2d 971, 32 St. 

Rep. 935; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 151Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660. 

The Rhode Island Workmens' Compensation Act contains a 

provision similar to section 92-615, R.C.M. 1947. Rhode Island 

General Laws 1956, section 28-35-46 states in pertinent part: 

"Before an employer may discontinue, suspend or reduce 

compensation payments whether they are being received 

under an agreement, award, order, finding or decree, 

the employer shall notify the commission and the employee 

of his intention to discontinue, suspend or reduce payments and the reason therefor.* * &'' 

An interpretation of the effect this statute fact 

situation similar to the instant case is found in Carpenter v. 

Globe Indemnity Co., 65 R.I. 194, 14 A.2d 235, 240. There the 

carrier terminated compensation payments to an injured workman 

on the basis of a doctor's report which stated claimant was able 

to return to work. Claimant denied receiving notice of the termination of benefits and it was clear the Workers' Compensation Commission had received no such notice. The court found the unilateral 

termination ineffective noting: 

"9; * * In our opinion, a finding that such disability 

has ended or diminished can be reached only by a supplemental agreement, also approved by the director of labor * Jc **'I 

A more recent case Raymond v. B.I.F. Industries, Inc., 112 R.I. 192, 

308 A.2d 820 is in accord. 
It is clear Rhode Island courts interpret their statute 

as meaning the employer or his insurer may not unilaterally terminate workers' compensation benefits. Further, if the employer 

does attempt to unilaterally terminate the payment of benefits 

such attempted termination is ineffective. The employer remains 

liable for the payment of benefits until the termination is 

accomplished by following the statutory notice provision. 

The cause is remanded to the Workers'. Compensation Court 

with instructions to direct payments to claimant for the period 

October 3, 1973 to October 28, 1975. With that exception,the 

decision of the Workers' Compensation Court is affirmed. 

We Concur: 

Chief Justice ll