alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### KWANG SHICK MYUNG, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 15409.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Nov. 2, 1966.

Melvyn E. Stein, Raymond F. Zvetina, Zvetina & Zvetina, Chicago, 111., for petitioner.

Edward V. Hanrahan, U. S. Atty., Chicago, 111., John Peter Lulinski, William J. Hurley, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel, for respondent.

Before MAJOR, Senior Circuit Judge, and KNOCH and FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks review of an order of deportation, denying his application for suspension of deportation under 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1254(a) (1).

The critical issue is whether deportation of petitioner would cause him “extreme hardship.” Petitioner argues that the inquiry officer applied an improper standard in finding that it would not.

Petitioner is 26 years old. He came to the United States from Korea at age 18, after completing high school. He attended college here, studying political science, and received a degree. He has attended *331law school and is employed by a patent law firm. His family, consisting of his mother, three brothers, and a sister live in Korea. Although he believes the only employment he could secure in Korea would be in his brother’s fishing business, one brother is a newspaper editor and the other a publisher. He testified that he would be unable to read intellectual writing in Korean because Chinese characters are used. These forms are taught at college level, and petitioner had his college work in the United States.

Petitioner testified: “I am to'o much Americanized at this moment to return to Korea and struggle for my living.”

The inquiry officer was convinced that petitioner’s life in Korea would be different from that in the United States, and that he would not be able to obtain employment comparable to that in the United States, but concluded that “these facts alone do not constitute extreme hardship.”

We cannot conclude that the hearing officer applied an improper standard, nor that the finding was arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion.

The order is

Affirmed.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6553 

To require the waiver of costs of activities relating to the evacuation of 

United States citizens endangered by acts of terrorism or war in Israel 

instigated by Hamas and other Islamist militant groups. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 1, 2023 

Mr. MAGAZINER (for himself, Mr. LAWLER, Ms. BALINT, Ms. LOIS FRANKEL

of Florida, Mr. GOTTHEIMER, Mr. LANDSMAN, Ms. MANNING, Mr. NADLER, Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. VARGAS, Ms. WASSERMAN

SCHULTZ, and Ms. LEE of Nevada) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To require the waiver of costs of activities relating to the 

evacuation of United States citizens endangered by acts 

of terrorism or war in Israel instigated by Hamas and 

other Islamist militant groups. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6553 IH

1 SECTION 1. WAIVER OF COSTS OF ACTIVITIES RELATING 

2 TO EVACUATION OF UNITED STATES CITI3 ZENS ENDANGERED BY ACTS OF TERRORISM 

4 OR WAR IN ISRAEL INSTIGATED BY HAMAS 

5 AND OTHER ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS. 

6 Section 4 of the State Department Basic Authorities 

7 Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2671) is amended by adding at 

8 the end the following: 

9 ‘‘(e) With regard to the repatriations loan program, 

10 the Secretary of State shall waive the costs of activities 

11 related to the evacuation of United States citizens endan12 gered by acts of terrorism or war in Israel instigated by 

13 Hamas and other Islamist militant groups on October 7, 

14 2023, through November 17, 2023, to include the evacu15 ation of United States citizens on United States Govern16 ment-coordinated transport, from Israel, the Gaza Strip, 

17 the West Bank, and affected countries, including Cy18 prus.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### STORK *v.*STELMACK.

Execution — Cancellation — Prior Execution — Satisfaction of Judgment.

Defendants were entitled to cancellation of execution and levy against certain real property where plaintiff’s judgment had been satisfied by execution sale of other property, and plaintiff may not contend that previous execution sale was void because of foreclosure of a prior recorded mortgage.

Reference for Points in Headnote

30 Am Jur 2d, Executions § 721.

Appeal from St. Clair; Miller (Alan C.), J.

Submitted Division 2 February 6, 1968, at Lansing.

(Docket No. 3,025.)

Decided August 30, 1968.

Complaint by Charles Stork against Stephen and Betty Stelmack. Judgment for plaintiff, and execution and levy against real estate. Motion by defendants to cancel subsequent execution and levy on other property. Motion granted. Plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

*Arthur M. Mann,*for plaintiff.

*Nelson S. Shaperd*and *Harold N. Weler,*for defendants.

Per Curiam.

An execution and levy was made against certain real property of defendants for the purpose of satisfying plaintiff’s judgment against defendants. Defendants’ motion to cancel the execu*165tion. was gi’anted by the circuit court on the ground that the judgment had been satisfied by a previous execution sale on other property of defendants and from this ruling plaintiff: appeals.

A review of the briefs and record discloses that there was a previous execution sale to plaintiff of real propex'ty of defendants at a bid in excess of the amount of the judgment. Plaintiff’s contention that the prior, executioxi sale is void because of the foreclosure of a prior recorded mortgage is untenable.

Affirmed. Costs to appellee.

Quinn, P. J., and T. K. Kavanagh and Corkin, JJ., concurred.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT LEVAR LEE SPENCE, : No. 43 MAP 2022 Appellant
V. THOMAS L. MCGINLEY, COAL TOWNSHIP SCI SUPERINTENDENT, DR. LAUREL R. HARRY, DEPT OF CORR ACTING SEC'Y, MICHELLE ANN HENRY, PA ATTY GEN (CHIEF CUSTODIAN), AND JOSH SHAPIRO, PA GOVERNOR, Appellees

ORDER Appeal from the Order ofthe Commonwealth Court at No. 319 MD 2021 dated February 18, 2022

PER CURIAM DECIDED: February 22, 2023 AND NOW, this 22nd dayofFebruary, 2023, the orderofthe Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gordon DRIVER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-50475

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 8, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed June 9, 2017

Jean-Claude Andre, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Paul G. Stern, Monica E. Tait, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Anthony Eaglin, Esquire, Attorney, Anthony Eaglin, Attorney at Law, Los Ange-les, CA, Becky S. James, Jessica Wynette Rosen, James & Associates, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

*449Before: KOZINSKI and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and SETTLE, District Judge *

*

 The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation,

MEMORANDUM **

1. Driver contends that his conviction for wire fraud constitutes an improper extraterritorial application of the statute. However, he failed to raise this objection below, and we therefore review for plain error. *United States v. Barragan-Espinoza,*350 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e review for plain error alleged violations of [Rule 11] raised for the first time on appeal.”). Under this standard of review, Driver fails to show any error of law, much less one that is clear or obvious. *United States v. Walls,*784 F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2015) (plain error standard of review). Although Driver claims that the focus of the wire fraud statute is the scheme to defraud, we held that “[t]he focus of [the mail and wire fraud statutes] is upon the misuse of the instrumentality of communication.” *United States v. Garlick,*240 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting *United States v. Alston,*609 F.2d 531, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Therefore, we affirm the conviction.

2. Next, Driver contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable and that the district court’s restitution calculation was flawed because the court considered foreign conduct in reaching its conclusions. Because Driver also failed to raise these objections below, we review for plain error. Under this standard, Driver has failed to show that any error was clear or obvious. *Walls,*784 F.3d at 546. Therefore, we affirm the sentence on procedural grounds.

3.Driver contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to consider all of the mitigating facts submitted in support of a more lenient sentence. Driver, however, has failed to provide any fact or argument supporting “a definite and firm conviction” that, in imposing the guidelines-range sentence, “the district court committed a clear error of judgment.” *United States v. Ressam,*679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *United States v. Hinkson,*585 F.3d 1247, 1260 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**EXHIBIT 31.2****CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING OFFICER**Section 302 CertificationI, Arnaldo F. Galassi, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of VendingData Corporation;     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:     a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;     b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report basedon such evaluation; and     c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s fiscal quarterpresented in this report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and     5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’sauditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):     a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial datainformation; and     b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financialreporting.        Date: August 14, 2007 By:  /s/ Arnaldo F. Galassi    Arnaldo F. Galassi    Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Kenneth A. Shewer, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Futures Strategic Trust for the period ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Quarterly Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                      |  |                                                                                                                                         
|--------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Kenneth A. Shewer
|Name:                 |  | Kenneth A. Shewer                                                                                                                       
|Title:                |  | Co-Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive
Officer) Preferred Investment Solutions Corp., Managing Owner
of Futures Strategic Trust
|                     
|Date: May 14, 2007
**EXHIBIT 31.2**

 

I, Curtis J. Parker, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Cotelligent, Inc. certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this interim report on Form 10-Q of Cotelligent, Inc.;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures, and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions): 

 

a) All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report financialinformation; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or notmaterial, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: November 14, 2003
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Arnold Reyna ALANIZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51295 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*346Arnold Reyna Alaniz, Pro Se

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Arnold Reyna Alaniz, federal prisoner # 53351-080, was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, conspiracy to distribute heroin, and using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and was sentenced to a total of 138 months of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. He now moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) from the denial of his second motion seeking a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court found that a sentence reduction was not warranted and certified that Reyna Alaniz’s appeal was not taken in good faith.

By moving to proceed IFP, Reyna Alan-iz challenges the district court’s certification that his appeal was not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into a litigant’s good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

When denying IFP and certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith, the district court noted that Reyna Alaniz failed to make any argument that he was entitled to relief. In his IFP motion, Reyna Alaniz fails to directly challenge this conclusion. Although pro se briefs are liberally construed, *see Haines v. Kerner,*404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them, *Yohey v. Collins,*985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

Regardless, Reyna Alaniz’s appeal does not involve any “legal points arguable on their merits.” *Howard,*707 F.2d at 220 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The district court gave due consideration to the arguments Reyna Alaniz presented in favor of his original motion, and concluded that a reduction was not warranted in light of the § 3653 factors and the particular circumstances of the case. *See United States v. Whitebird,*55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995). Reyna Alaniz’s most recent motion was denied for the same reasons.

Accordingly, Reyna Alaniz’s motion to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<PAGE>

                                 EXHIBIT 10.24


                        TANNING TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION
                               November 1, 1999


To:    Mark Tanning

From:  Larry Tanning

Re:    Five Quarter Compensation Plan


    As we have discussed, Tanning has developed a compensation plan for certain
senior executives for the five-quarter period beginning October 1, 1999 and
ending December 31, 1999.  Your cash compensation for the period will be an
annual rate of $155,000 ($6,458.33 on  a semi-monthly basis).  In addition, you
will be granted stock options to purchase 6,250  shares of Tanning common stock
at a per share exercise price of  $35 under our 1999 Stock Option Plan.  These
options will become exercisable (vest) monthly on a ratable basis (417 shares
per month), beginning on October 31, 1999, in all cases subject to the terms and
conditions of the 1999 Stock Option Plan and the related stock option agreement.

    Your existing employment and related agreements with Tanning (including
provisions relating to non-competition, etc.) will remain in full force and
effect except to the extent related to cash compensation matters.  As to all
matters relating to cash compensation, including cash incentive compensation and
bonus arrangements, the cash compensation described above will govern, effective
October 1, 1999.

    We are extremely excited about our company's future, and look forward to
more success together. Please indicate your agreement with the provisions of
this memorandum by signing below.

                                            Very truly yours,

                                            TANNING TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

                                            By:  /s/ Larry G. Tanning



AGREED AND ACCEPTED


By:  /s/ Mark W. Tanning
BF

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0461

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

NICOLE ABENIIA NOLI,

Defendant and Appellant.

GRANT OF EXTENSION

Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30-day extension of time, 

and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is granted an extension of time to 

and including May 8, 2022, within which to prepare, serve, and file its response

brief.

04/01/2022

Case Number: DA 20-0461

FILED

Bowen Greenwood

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF MONTANA

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

April 1 2022

04/01/2022

Case Number: DA 20-0461
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of Central Freight Lines, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert V. Fasso, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.



                                                /s/ Robert V. Fasso
                                                ---------------------------
                                                Robert V. Fasso
                                                Chief Executive Officer
                                                March 29, 2004