alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(LOGO) PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS


PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
200 East Las Olas Boulevard
Suite 1700
Ft. Lauderdale FL 33301
Telephone (954) 764 7111
Facsimile (954) 525 4453

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

To the Board of Directors of
Ocwen Federal Bank FSB

We have  examined  management's  assertion  about Ocwen Federal Bank FSB's ("the
Bank")  compliance  with  the  minimum  servicing  standards  identified  in the
Mortgage  Bankers  Association of America's  (MBA's) Uniform Single  Attestation
Program for Mortgage  Bankers  (USAP) as of and for the year ended  December 31,
1999,  included  in  the  accompanying   management  assertion.   Management  is
responsible for the Bank's  compliance with those minimum  servicing  standards.
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's  assertion about the
entity's compliance based on our examination.

Our  examination  was  made in  accordance  with  standards  established  by the
American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,  accordingly,  included
examining,  on a test  basis,  evidence  about the  Bank's  compliance  with the
minimum servicing  standards and performing such other procedures as we consider
necessary  in the  circumstances.  We believe  that our  examination  provides a
reasonable  basis for our  opinion.  Our  examination  does not  provide a legal
determination on the Bank's compliance with the minimum servicing standards.

In  our  opinion,  management's  assertion  that  the  Bank  complied  with  the
aforementioned minimum servicing standards as of and for the year ended December
31, 1999 is fairly stated, in all material respects.


PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP


Fort Lauderdale, Florida
March 24, 2000
#### IN RE: WOODCRAFT STUDIOS, INC., Debtor, Albert M. Kun, Attorney, Appellant, v. Paul Mansdorf, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellee.

No. 16-60061

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

Filed October 3, 2017

Albert M. Kun, San Francisco, CA, pro se.

Jeremy William Katz, Shierkatz RLLP, San Francisco, CA, for Appellee.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Albert M. Kun, an attorney, appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order vacating its prior order employing Kun as counsel for the debtor, and disallowing Kun’s proofs of claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the BAP’s decision, and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. *In re Boyajian,*564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in vacating its prior employment order because Kun was not eligible for retention by the debtor. *See*11 U.S.C. § 327; 11 U.S.C. § 101(14); *Cisneros v. United States (In re Cisneros),*994 F.2d 1462, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1993) (bankruptcy court was authorized to vacate order entered while court was under misapprehension of facts).

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the trustee’s objections to Kun’s proofs of claim because Kun was not entitled to receive any payment from the estate. *See*11 U.S.C. § 330(a); *see also Kun v. Mansdorf,*558 Fed.Appx. 755 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2014) (holding that Kun failed to disclose his status as a creditor and that the bankruptcy court properly exercised its discretion by denying his application for attorney’s fees, and ordering disgorgement of the retainer).

*504We reject as meritless Kun s arguments that this panel may revisit the court’s prior determinations that Kun was not disinterested, and not entitled to compensation. *See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States,*55 F.3d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (under law of the case doctrine, one panel of an appellate court will not reconsider matter resolved in a prior appeal by another panel in the same case).

We reject as unsupported by the record Kun’s contentions that the bankruptcy court’s decision was barred by laches, that the bankruptcy court violated his due process rights, and that the bankruptcy court voided Kun’s contract with the debtor.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or matters raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Eduardo BERNAL-RIVAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50212

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 3, 2017

Jennifer L. Gmitro, Esquire, Attorney, Connie V. Wu, Assistant U.S. Attorney, US Department of Justice, Southern District of California, San Diego, CA, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Ajay Krishnamurthy, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Bridget Lynn Kennedy, Esquire, Trial Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

David Eduardo Bernal-Rivas appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 65-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for importation of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Bernal-Rivas contends that the district court erred by denying his request for a minor role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. He argues that the court (1) assumed that couriers are average participants, which improperly required him to demonstrate that he was less culpable than the average courier; (2) did not consider all of the likely participants in the offense when conducting its comparative analysis; (3) misinterpreted the five factors relevant to the minor role determination; and (4) relied on case law that was superseded by *560the 2015 amendment to the minor role Guideline. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines. *See United States v. Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d 519, 522 (9th Cir. 2016).

The record reflects that the court properly compared Bernal-Rivas to his co-participants in the offense. *See id.*at 523. The court not only compared Bernal-Rivas to the two co-participants he identified, but also considered his role in the overall smuggling hierarchy. The court’s observation that Bernal-Rivas’s lack of knowledge of the details of the smuggling scheme and lack of an ownership interest in the drugs rendered him an “average” participant does not reflect that the court was comparing him to the typical courier. The record also reflects that the court properly applied the five newly enumerated factors, as well as other considerations, to determine whether Bernal-Rivas played a minor role in the offense. *See*U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(c); *Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d at 523 (because the five factors are non-exhaustive, “a district court may also consider other reasons for granting or denying a minor role reduction”). Contrary to Ber-nal-Rivas’s claim, the district court did not apply this court’s precedent in any way that conflicts with the 2015 amendment to the minor role Guideline;

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Sarah E. JUNGWIRTH v. Wen-Hsien H. LEE

2160073

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 5, 2017 Reh. denied June 9, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
                              CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND THE 
                              CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          5,666
<SECURITIES>                                   29,533
<RECEIVABLES>                                  22,906
<ALLOWANCES>                                      549
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               59,211
<PP&E>                                         12,961
<DEPRECIATION>                                  5,787
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 76,703
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          18,607
<BONDS>                                             0
<COMMON>                                           19
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                     58,077
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   76,703
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               22,422
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   9,518
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                8,465
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 4,850
<INCOME-TAX>                                    2,037
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             2,813
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    2,813
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    0.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0.14
        


</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-20-00104-CV

Russell CALLAHAN,

Appellant

v.

Barbara Susan JUDKINS,

Appellee

From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014CI05321

Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE MARTINEZ, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the appellant’s motion to dismiss is 

GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED. Costs of the appeal are taxed against the appellant, 

Russell Callahan.

SIGNED April 22, 2020.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
OCWEN (LOGO)

MANAGEMENT ASSERTION ON COMPLIANCE WITH USAP

March 24, 2000

As of and for the year ended  December 31, 1999,  except as  specifically  noted
below, Ocwen Federal Bank FSB (the "Bank") has complied in all material respects
with  the  minimum  servicing  standards  set  forth  in  the  Mortgage  Bankers
Association of America's ("MBA's') Uniform Single Attestation Program for
Mortgage Bankers ("USAP").

Standard:   Custodial   bank   accounts  and  related  bank   clearing   account
reconciliations  shall be prepared within 45 calendar days after the cutoff date
and documented  reconciling  items shall be resolved  within 90 calendar days of
their original identification.

During 1999, certain of the Bank's 1999 custodial account  reconciliations  were
not   prepared   within  45  days  after  the  cutoff   date.   However,   these
reconciliations  and all subsequent  reconcilations  have been prepared  through
December 31, 1999.

In  addition,  certain  reconciling  items  which  arose  during  the year ended
December  31,  1999 were not  specifically  identified  and/or  were not cleared
within 90 days of  identification.  Management  has developed an action plan and
has continued to follow the action plan to resolve all  outstanding  reconciling
items. All significant  reconciling items have been isolated and reviewed by the
Company, and the Company believes these items will not have a material impact on
the status of any custodial accounts.

Standard:  Mortgage  payments  shall be deposited  into the custodial bank
accounts and related bank clearing  accounts  within two business day's of
receipt.

Mortgage  payments  were  credited  to  the  investors  in the  Bank's  internal
servicing records within two business days of receipt. However, certain mortgage
payments were not deposited into  investors'  custodial bank accounts within two
business days of receipt.

Standard:  Escrow funds held in trust for a mortgagor shall be returned to
the  mortgagor  within thirty (30) calendar days of payoff of the mortgage
loan.

During 1999, escrow funds held in trust for certain mortgagors were not returned
to the  mortgagor  within  thirty  days of the  payoff of their  mortgage  loan.
However,  these escrow funds were returned within the required number of days as
required by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.

As of and for this same  period,  the Bank had in effect a fidelity  bond in the
amount  of  $15,000,000  and an errors  and  omissions  policy in the  amount of
$10,000,000.

Ronald M. Faris
Executive Vice President

Scott W. Anderson
Vice President of Residential Assets

Joseph P.Hillery
Director Of Investor Reporting
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Company's
consolidated financial statements for the twenty-four weeks ended September 12,
2000 included in this report on Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-28-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-21-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-12-2000
<CASH>                                           18500
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   273800
<ALLOWANCES>                                      3800
<INVENTORY>                                      97500
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                497000
<PP&E>                                         1645200
<DEPRECIATION>                                  750800
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2322600
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           362200
<BONDS>                                         686900
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           400
<OTHER-SE>                                      659700
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2322600
<SALES>                                        1202800
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1202800
<CGS>                                           645400
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   645400
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   800
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               34000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  36600
<INCOME-TAX>                                     16400
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              19800
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     19800
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.49
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.48<F1>
<FN>
<F1>Footnote to electronic filing only: as presented, data is rounded to the
nearest $100 except for per share data.
</FN>


</TABLE>
#### Griggs *vs.*Bondurant.

April 14.

Krror to the Clarke Circuit; Geo. Shaknok, Judge.

*Pleading. Warranty. Demand.*

CoVEXAKT. Case 64.

ís a special demand of a conveyance for land necessary, where no time is fixed, and it is not expressed to be on demand?

Worley vs. Mourning-, 1 Bibb, 254, on this question, is not law.

Where the stipulation is to do a transitory act, as the execution of a deed of conveyance, nothing being said of demand, or when to be performed, no demand is necessary before suit.

So are all the ancient and modern cases,

Judge Mills

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The only question made in this canso, by a demurrer to the declaration, is, whether a special demand of a conveyance is necessary, before a breach, or an action, can be maintained oh a bond conditioned to convey a tract of land, wherein no particular time is mentioned, and where the conveyance is not'expressly to be made on demand.

It is true, that one - case is found, which makes a demand in such case necessary, in point of time and place. Worley *vs.*Mourning, l. Bibb, 254. We have not the means of examining the record in that case, or we should be inclined to do so, on the suspicion that the covenant is not truly recited in the opinion published, or that some typographical error has occurred in the publication. If this was not the case, the opinion must, have been improvidently rendered *

For if we recur to the well known principles of the common law, before that decision, the rule is well settled, that where the stipulation, is to do a transitory act, which can lie performed any where, as the conveyance of a tract of land undoubtedly is, no demand was necessary, where the stipulation was not that the thing should be done on demand, and there was no time specified. ‘

If we look at subsequent decisions, we- find (hat the same common law principle is recognized, and admitted. Early after the decision alluded to, the case of Clay *vs.*Houston’s adm’r. 1 Bibb, 461, and Dunn and wife vs. M’Millan, *Ibid,*409, the case of Worley *vs,*Mourning was dissented from, and the ancient rule adhered to, and such has been the rule *179followed in subsequent decisions ; so that the new principle adopted in the latter case, was speedily corrected, and it was not allowed to have any Nor are we now put to the necessity of deciding between two conflicting cases, or of overruling an opinion long undisturbed? because it conflicts with the law of the land ; but are constrained to follow numerous cases and the law, as opposed to a solitary case^ which has ever since been exploded.

Worley and Mourning *s*exc®Pt"

*Sanson*for *plaintiffMian*fot^efendanb

This opinion agrees with the decision of the court 'below, and the judgment must, therefore, be affirmed with costs.
#### STATE OF CONNECTICUT *v.*WILLIE JOSEPH FULLER

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 47 Conn. App. 917 (AC 16061), is denied.

*970
      *Laila M. Ghabrial,*in support of the petition.

*James M. Ralls,*assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided February 3, 1998
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6591 

To amend section 8(a) of the Small Business Act to require the Administrator 

of the Small Business Administration to regularly reassess the asset 

and net worth thresholds for qualifying as an economically disadvantaged 

individual, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 5, 2023 

Mr. ELLZEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Small Business 

A BILL 

To amend section 8(a) of the Small Business Act to require 

the Administrator of the Small Business Administration 

to regularly reassess the asset and net worth thresholds 

for qualifying as an economically disadvantaged individual, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Encouraging Success 

5 Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6591 IH

1 SEC. 2. REGULAR REASSESSMENT OF THE THRESHOLDS 

2 FOR ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED INDI3 VIDUALS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 8(a)(6) of the Small Busi5 ness Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)(6)) is amended by adding at 

6 the end the following new subparagraph: 

7 ‘‘(F)(i) Not later than one year after the date 

8 of the enactment of this subparagraph, and not less 

9 frequently than every four years thereafter, the Ad10 ministrator shall assess and, if appropriate, revise 

11 the maximum value of asset and the maximum net 

12 worth an individual may have to qualify as an eco13 nomically disadvantaged individual under subpara14 graph (A) to account for changes in the economy, 

15 including inflation and other factors as determined 

16 appropriate by the Administrator. 

17 ‘‘(ii) The Administrator shall make each cov18 ered revision by issuing a rule after an opportunity 

19 for public notice and comment. 

20 ‘‘(iii) To the extent practicable, the Adminis21 trator shall coordinate the activities carried out 

22 under clause (i) with the activities required under 

23 section 1344(a)(2) of the Small Business Jobs Act 

24 of 2010 (15 U.S.C. 632 note). 

25 ‘‘(iv) In this subparagraph, the term ‘covered 

26 revision’ means a revision described in clause (i) 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•HR 6591 IH

1 that the Administrator determines is appropriate 

2 pursuant to an assessment under such clause.’’. 

3 (b) COMPLIANCE WITH CUTGO.—No additional 

4 amounts are authorized to be appropriated to carry out 

5 this Act or the amendments made by this Act. Such Act 

6 and the amendments made by this Act shall be carried 

7 out using amounts otherwise appropriated to the Adminis8 trator of the Small Business Administration. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
**Exhibit 21.1**

**Blockbuster Inc. Subsidiaries**

Ardnasillagh Ltd. 

Blockbuster Argentina, S.A. 

Blockbuster Canada Co. 

Blockbuster Canada Inc. 

Blockbuster de Mexico, SA de CV 

Blockbuster Digital Inc. 

Blockbuster Distribution, Inc. 

Blockbuster Entertainment Limited 

Blockbuster Entertainment (Ireland) Limited 

Blockbuster Global Services Inc. 

Blockbuster Holdings Ireland 

Blockbuster International Spain Inc. 

Blockbuster Investments LLC 

Blockbuster Italia, S.p.A. 

Blockbuster NZ Limited 

Blockbuster Procurement LP 

Blockbuster UK Limited 

Blockbuster Uruguay Ltda. 

Blockbuster Video Danmark A/S 

Blockbuster Video Espana S.L. 

Blockbuster Video International Corporation(Chile) Ltda. 

Blockbuster Video Italy, Inc. 

CityvisionLimited 

Direcorp, S.A. de D.V. 

EntretenT a Domicilo, S. deR.L. 

Movielink, LLC 

Sercorp, S.A. de C.V. 

Trading Zone Inc. 

Xtra-Vision Limited