1

Filed 12/8/14 P. v. Golson CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VINCENT GOLSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A139004

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. SC076981)

Defendant Vincent Golson appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding 

him guilty of battery, domestic battery, and aggravated trespass. On appeal, he asks us to 

review the transcript of in camera proceedings held pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior 

Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) to determine whether they show the trial court 

abused its discretion in determining that no further police personnel records were subject 

to discovery. We shall affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND1

Defendant was charged with felony stalking of Jane Doe (Pen. Code,2§ 646.9, 

subd. (a), count one), misdemeanor battery upon Jane Doe, with whom he had had a 

dating relationship (§ 243, subd. (e)(1), count two), misdemeanor aggravated trespass 

(§ 602.5, subd. (b), count three), and misdemeanor battery (§ 242, count four). A jury 

found him not guilty on the felony stalking count and guilty on the three misdemeanor

 

1

The limited nature of the issue on appeal does not require us to recite the underlying 

facts. 

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

counts. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of one year for counts two 

and three, with a concurrent six-month sentence for count four. With credit for time 

served, defendant was released from custody. 

Before trial, defendant brought a Pitchess motion asking the trial court to examine 

the personnel records of the police officer who arrested and questioned him. He also 

sought any further exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 

83 (Brady).3 He contended the officer’s report deliberately distorted what defendant told 

the officer. Defendant sought discovery of any prior complaints against the officer 

involving, inter alia, dishonesty or deceit in the performance of his duty. In a 

supplemental declaration, defendant pointed out that he had received information that in 

2011 the officer had been charged with a misdemeanor, although the charges had been 

dismissed, and that the officer had been subject to disciplinary proceedings. Defendant 

sought discovery of the police report of the officer’s arrest, as well as information on any 

other complaints made against the officer. Pursuant to a court order, defendant received a 

copy of the police report. 

A hearing was held on defendant’s motion, and the trial court found there was a 

sufficient basis to review the officer’s personnel records for evidence of acts of 

dishonesty. The court also stated that if it came across any further material subject to 

disclosure under Brady, it would disclose that as well. After its in camera review of the 

records, the court found no further information was subject to disclosure pursuant to 

Pitchess or Brady. 

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant asks us to review the transcript of the in camera proceedings and 

independently determine if the trial court followed the proper procedures. 

The statutory scheme for Pitchess motions “is set forth in Evidence Code sections 

1043 through 1047 and Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7 and 832.8. When a defendant 

 

3

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of 

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or to punishment . . . .” (Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87.)
3

seeks discovery from a peace officer’s personnel records, he or she must ‘file a written 

motion with the appropriate court’ (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (a)) . . . . [¶] If the trial 

court concludes the defendant has fulfilled [the] prerequisites and made a showing of 

good cause, the custodian of records should bring to court all documents ‘potentially 

relevant’ to the defendant’s motion.” (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226 

(Mooc). The trial court then examines these documents in camera, and, subject to certain 

limitations, discloses to the defendant “ ‘such information [that] is relevant to the subject 

matter involved in the pending litigation.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. 

(a).) In conducting this in camera review, the trial court must make a record that is 

adequate for appellate review. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229; People v. Guevara

(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 62, 69.) To accomplish this, the court may either copy the 

documents if they are not voluminous and place them in a confidential file, prepare a 

sealed list of the documents it has reviewed, or “simply state for the record what 

documents it examined” and seal that transcript. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1229–

1230.) On appeal, we review the record of the documents examined by the trial court and 

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to disclose the contents 

of the personnel records. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330.) We may make 

our determination by reviewing a transcript of the in camera proceedings. (Herrera v. 

Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1159, 1163.) 

The record of the in camera proceedings does not indicate that the trial court 

copied the documents it reviewed, which it described as voluminous. However, in 

conducting its review, the trial court described the documents in sufficient detail to 

permit meaningful appellate review. (See People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 832–

833.) We have reviewed the transcript and conclude the trial court followed the proper 

procedures and that it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order further disclosure of 

the contents of the officer’s personnel file. 

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
4

_________________________

Rivera, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Ruvolo, P.J.

_________________________

Reardon, J.