IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-60193

Summary Calendar

FATIMA PRISSILA MORALES-DURAN; EVA LISDEY MORALES-DURAN,

Petitioners

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A208 453 302

BIA No. A208 453 306

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Fatima Prissila Morales-Duran and her derivative-beneficiary, Eva 

Lisdey Morales-Duran, natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review 

of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding the 

decision of the immigration judge (IJ) denying their application for asylum and 

withholding of removal. Morales contends her claims she was threatened with 

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 13, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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death by gang members in El Salvador if she did not pay them “rent” 

constitutes past persecution. In addition, she asserts she was persecuted on 

account of her status as a single working mother without a male figure in her 

household. Morales maintains she is unable to change the gang’s perception 

of her as a single working mother or her prior compliance with their extortion 

demands. She also claims she has shown a well-founded fear of future 

persecution based on past persecution and her knowledge that gang members 

in El Salvador retaliate against individuals who do not comply with their 

demands.

“We review factual findings of the BIA and IJ for substantial evidence, 

and questions of law de novo”. Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 

2007) (citation omitted); see also Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 

2009). An alien may be granted asylum if she “is unable or unwilling to return 

to [her] home country” because she has been persecuted “or [has] a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of” a protected status, including 

“membership in a particular social group”. Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 

344 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

A particular social group shares “a common immutable characteristic 

that [members] either cannot change or should not be required to change 

because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences”. 

Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, a particular social group 

is one that has “social visibility”, meaning “members of a society perceive those 

with the characteristic in question as members of a social group”, and 

“particularity”, meaning the group “can accurately be described in a manner 

sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in 

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question, as a discrete class of persons”. Id. at 519 (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted).

The BIA ruled Morales’ first proposed particular social group—

“unprotected women receiving threats from gangs who flee the country of El 

Salvador due to the danger to themselves and their children”—was 

impermissibly defined by the harm suffered by its victims. See In re A-M-E 

& J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007) (“[A] social group cannot be defined 

exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm”.). 

The BIA ruled Morales’ second proposed group—“unprotected women 

who are targeted by gangs”—was insufficiently particular and lacked social 

visibility. See Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 519 (setting forth elements of a 

particular social group). Although Morales asserts her status as a single 

working mother made her attractive to the gang members for extortion 

purposes, “a group’s recognition for asylum purposes is determined by the 

perception of the society in question, rather than by the perception of the

persecutor”. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (BIA 2014). 

Therefore, Morales has not shown the BIA erred in ruling she was not 

entitled to asylum. See Wang, 569 F.3d at 536; Zhang, 432 F.3d at 344. And, 

because she has not established her entitlement to asylum, Morales is also 

unable to satisfy the higher standard for showing she is entitled to withholding 

of removal. See Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d 653, 658–59 (5th Cir. 2012).

Morales also asserts she is entitled to reversal because the IJ improperly 

stated that Hernandez-Baena v. Gonzalez, 417 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2005), was a 

fifth circuit opinion, and cited it as binding authority for the proposition that 

death threats, without more, are insufficient to establish persecution. As 

discussed above, Morales has not established her membership in a particular 

social group under fifth circuit precedent. Accordingly, it is not necessary to 

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consider whether she established past persecution. Moreover, fifth circuit 

precedent holds persecution may not be based on “mere denigration, 

harassment, and threats”. Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 

2004). In short, the IJ’s misstatement does not compel relief. See Zhu, 493 

F.3d at 594.

In her final ground for relief, Morales contends the denial of relief 

violated her due-process rights. Because she has not established she is entitled 

to remain in the United States, she has not presented a valid Fifth Amendment 

claim. See Cantu-Delgadillo v. Holder, 584 F.3d 682, 687–88 (5th Cir. 2009). 

DENIED.

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