alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Yliyah Rephayah Ben YISRAYL, also known as Carl Watkins Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-2384

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 12, 2017

Filed: October 25, 2017

Allison Hart Behrens, Thomas Joseph Mehan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s, Office, Eastern District of Missouri, Saint Louis, MO, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Yliyah Rephayah Ben Yisrayl, Pro Se

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Yliyah Rephayah Ben Yisrayl appeals the district court’s1 order revoking his *582supervised release and imposing a 10-month sentence. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw. Ben Yisrayl has filed 3 pro se briefs challenging his criminal history category, and the administration of his initial sentence; and a motion seeking appointment of new counsel.

After careful review of the record, we conclude that the revocation Guidelines range was properly calculated using the criminal history category applicable at the time of initial sentencing, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a); United States v. Hendershot, 469 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 2006); that the administration of Ben Yisrayl’s original sentence is not properly on appeal, see United States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006); and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Ben Yisrayl, see United States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 744 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (standard of review); United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 943-44 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Todd, 521 F.3d 891, 897 (8th Cir. 2008),

Accordingly, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw, deny the motion for new counsel, and affirm.

1

. The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
From: Jones, Danielle

To: Cogliano, Gerain

Subject: Summary from the RMP Interagency Meeting

Date: Tuesday, February 16, 2016 2:55:08 PM

Attachments: RMP Interagency Meeting Summary v1.docx

Gerain,

Please use this version for the docket.

Thanks,

Danielle

Danielle Y. Jones

Policy Analyst

Office of Management and Budget

Phone: (202) 395-1741 | djones@omb.eop.gov
Attachment: RMP Interagency Meeting Summary v1.docx

RMP Interagency Meeting Summary

January 29, 2016

• EPA will remove the chemical quantities requirement from public disclosure, however, 

the EPA believes that the chemical name and SDS should be made available to the 

public.

• For after action reports, EPA will take public comment on the level of information 

provided in the reports.

• EPA will be seeking public comment on the three remaining items (chemical name, SDS, 

and LEPC contact information) under public disclosure. 

• EPA will work with DHS and other interested interagency representatives to develop 

solutions or potential options regarding the public disclosure public comments, prior to 

the final rule review by the interagency. EPA will also provide a rough timeline to the 

group.

• There is concern with the term feasibility, which is a unique concept under OSH Act and 

there is concern that there might be confusion. EPA agreed to seek comment on 

feasibility vs. practical.

• EPA stated that they would not be accepting STAA reports, in part due to lack of 

resources. 

• EPA’s rationale for excluding waste water treatment plants is that this sector has the 

lowest level of incidences. The wastewater treatment facilities has the highest rate of 

implementing IST out of the various NACIS codes.

• The third party audits is being resolved in the SBAR Panel process, with request for 

public comments.
# SPAR Group, Inc.

EXHIBIT 32.1

# Certification of Chief
Executive Officer Pursuant to
Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the quarterly
report on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended September 30, 2006 (this
report), of SPAR Group, Inc. (the registrant), the undersigned
hereby certifies that, to his knowledge:

1.       
          The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2.       
          The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.

| |                                                
| | -----------------------------------------------
| | /s/ Robert G. Brown                            
| |                                                
| | Robert G. Brown,                               
| | Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
| |                                                
| | November 14, 2006                              

# A signed original of
this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to SPAR Group, Inc. and
will be retained by SPAR Group, Inc., and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

Ex-3
**EXHIBIT
      23.1**





**CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**















We
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on
      Form
      S-8 (File No. 333-128488) previously filed by WPCS International Incorporated,
      of our report, dated June 28, 2006, except for the second paragraph of Note
      15,
      which is as of July 19, 2006, on our audits of the consolidated financial
      statements of WPCS International Incorporated and subsidiaries as of April
      30,
      2006 and 2005, and for the years then ended.











/s/
      J. H.
      COHN LLP







Roseland,
      New Jersey


July
      27,
      2006
Exhibit
      32





**CERTIFICATIONS
      UNDER SECTION 906**





Pursuant
      to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
      section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the
      undersigned officers of deltathree, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the
      "Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge, that:





The
      Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 2005 (the "Form 10-K") of the
      Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form
      10-K
      fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
      of operations of the Company.




Dated:
              March 29, 2007
            
            /s/
                Shimmy ZimelsShimmy
                Zimels, Chief Executive Officer
              (Principal
                Executive Officer and Principal Financial
                Officer)




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### IN RE: Franklin C. SMITH, Petitioner.

No. 17-1583

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 24, 2017

Decided: August 28, 2017

Franklin C. Smith, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Franklin C. Smith petitions for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to reveal the name of an employee who allegedly discriminated against Smith and terminated Smith’s disability benefits because Smith is a white male. Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988).

Smith presents no evidence that “there are no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,” such as a motion for discovery, to compel, or for issuance of a subpoena. *In re Braxton,*258 F.3d 250, 261 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (setting forth standard for granting writ of mandamus). Thus, the relief sought by Smith is not available by way of mandamus, and we deny his mandamus petition.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
#### Debra J. ERICKSON; Gary Vander Vorst, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of David V. Erickson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. J.C. BROMAC CORPORATION, DBA EagleRider, DBA EagleRider Inc., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-35288

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 7, 2017 * Seattle, Washington

Filed April 14, 2017

*532Thomas Henry Boyd, Esquire, Attorney, Aimee Dayhoff, Attorney, Winthrop *&*Weinstine PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Elizabeth L. Griffing, Esquire, Attorney, Axilon Law Group, PLLO, Helena, MT, T. Thomas Singer, Axilon Law Group, PLLO, Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: W. FLETCHER and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

1. The reference to $1 million in accident insurance in the agreement between J.C. BroMac Corporation, DBA EagleRider, DBA EagleRider Inc. (“EagleRider”) and Altria Consumer Engagement Services (“Altria”) was, at most, an offer to provide insurance. Since-there is no evidence that the offer was accepted by either Altria or David Erickson, it was not a binding contract. *See Chipman v. Northwest Healthcare Corp., Applied, Health Servs., Inc.,*373 Mont. 360, 317 P.3d 182, 185 (2014) (“Mutual consent consists of an offer and an acceptance of that offer.”).

2. Erickson accepted a different offer for accident insurance “upon the terms and conditions of the summary of coverage in the [Personal Accident Insurance/Personal Effects Coverage] brochure, a copy of which you acknowledge has been received by you.” The only brochure in the record refers to $100,000 in coverage, which amount EagleRider paid. Since there is no evidence of a brochure promising $1 million in coverage, EagleRider was entitled to summary judgment on Erickson’s estate’s claim for the higher amount.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Maureen D. Howley, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Managing Owner, Preferred Investment Solutions Corp. (the Managing
Owner), of Futures Strategic Trust (the Trust), hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Trusts Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Quarterly Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                                     
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Maureen D. Howley                                                                
|Maureen D. Howley Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer November 14, 2005
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 2, 2019

No. 04

- 19

- 00327

- CV

PLAINSCAPITAL BANK and Albert Chapa

,

Appellant s

v.

Andy HERNANDEZ

, Appellee

From the 229th Judicial District Court, Starr County, Texas

Trial Court No. DC

- 17

- 712

The Honorable Baldemar Gar za, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The Appellant ’ s Motion fo r Extension of T i me to F i le Brief is hereby GRANTED. The appella nt ’ s brief is due on or before August 1, 2019

.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 2nd day of July, 2019

.

___________________________________ K eith E. H ottle

, Clerk of Court
Exhibit
      32.1




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





The
      undersigned, Peter Mateja, Chief Executive Officer and Director, of Smart Energy
      Solutions, Inc. (the “Company”) and Edward Braniff, Chief Financial Officer of
      the Company, certify, under the standards set forth and solely for the purposes
      of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act
      of 2002, that, to the best of our knowledge, the Annual Report on Form 10-K
      of
      the Company for the year ended December 31, 2007 fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
      and information contained in that Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




Dated:
      March 31, 2008






/s/
      Peter
      Mateja


Peter
      Mateja


Chief
      Executive Officer and Director


(Principal
      Executive Officer)






/s/
      Edward Braniff


Edward
      Braniff


Chief
      Financial Officer


(Principal
      Financial Officer)




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




-
      34 -
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed September 29 , 2015.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 15

- 00748

- CV

IN RE RAFAEL OJEDA , Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS 151st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012

- 03779A



### MEMORANDUM OPINION
On September 4 , 2015, relator Rafael Ojeda filed a petition for writ of

m andamus in this court

. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 ( West 2004); see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this court to compel the Honorable Mike Engelhart, presiding judge of the 151st District Court of Harris County , to dismiss the garnishment action pending in the trial court based on a forum

selection clause

.2 On September 4, 2015, the same day relator filed his petition in this court, the trial court signed the final judgment in the garnishment action. Therefore, relator has an adequate remedy by appeal.
Accordingly, we deny relat or’s petition for writ of mandamus. We also deny relator’s motion for temporary relief and motion for expedited consideration of the motion for temporary relief.

PER CURIAM

Panel c onsists of Ch ief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher and Donovan.
Anthony AUSTIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D17-4875

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 18, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cesar Humberto ANGULO-FELIX, a.k.a. Cesar Angulo, a.k.a. Ceasar Humberto Angulo-Felix, a.k.a. Cesar H. Angulo-Felix, a.k.a. Ceasar Humberto Angulo-Feliz, a.k.a. Geronimo Arrielo Lopez, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10212

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 7, 2017 *

Filed April 11, 2017

Krissa Marie Lanham, USPX—Office of the US Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marc J. Victor, Marc J. Victor PC, Chandler, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: HUG, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Cesar Humberto Angulo-Felix appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his guilty-plea conviction and 63-month sentence for re-entry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Angulo-Felix’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel. We have provided Angulo-Felix the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Angulo-Felix waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Because the record discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the appeal waiver, we dismiss the appeal. *See United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Damarlo Jamon PERRY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4278

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 15, 2017

Decided: August 17, 2017

Mark Everette Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States Attorney, Robert A.J. Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Damarlo Jamón Perry appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). On appeal, Perry challenges the application of the base offense level in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2015), arguing that his predicate conviction for North Carolina conspiracy to commit armed robbery no longer qualifies as crime of violence following *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). We affirm.

Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and this court foreclose Perry’s argument. *See Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 886, 892, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017) (holding that Sentencing Guidelines, including residual clause that § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) cross-references, “are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause”); *United States v. Burns-Johnson,*864 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that North Carolina conviction for robbery with dangerous weapon categorically qualifies as violent felony under Armed Career Criminal Act’s force clause); *United States v. Mack,*855 F.3d 581, 585 (4th Cir. 2017) (concluding that conspiracies and attempts to commit enumerated crime qualify as crimes of violence). We therefore reject Perry’s argument that his conviction for North Carolina conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon is not a crime of violence under the force clause set forth in USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
EXHIBIT 15.1

February 14, 2008

PFF Bancorp, Inc.

Los
Angeles, California



|Re: | Registration Statement Nos. 333-138201, 333-120113, and 333-20337
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------

With
respect to the subject registration statements, we acknowledge our awareness of the use therein of our report dated February 14, 2008 related to our review of interim financial information.

Pursuant to Rule 436 under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Act), such report is not considered part of a registration statement prepared or certified by an independent
registered public accounting firm, or a report prepared or certified by an independent registered public accounting firm within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.

/s/ KPMG LLP

Los Angeles, California
Exhibit 31.2**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**I, John M. Hoskins, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Tennessee Valley Authority;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors: a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.Date:December 15, 2006       /s/ John M. Hoskins         John M. Hoskins    Interim Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice    President, Financial Services
#### Albert Kelley *et al.,*App’lts, *v.*Daniel J. Sprague *et al.,*Resp’ts.

*J. Nolle Hayes,*for app’lts; *Nathaniel Meyers,*for resp’ts.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Affirming 36 N. Y. State Rep., 445.