alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CertificationPursuant To18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.**

 

In connection with theAnnual Report of eCollege.com (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the periodending December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned,Oakleigh Thorne, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, andReid Simpson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each herebycertifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)          the Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|  /s/  OAKLEIGH THORNE |   |
|--------------------------------------|--------|
| Oakleigh Thorne                      |   |
| Chief Executive Officer              |   |
| March 16, 2006                  |   |
|                                 |   |
|                                 |   |
|  /s/  REID SIMPSON    |   |
| Reid Simpson                         |   |
| Chief Financial Officer              |   |
| March 16, 2006                  |   |

 

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-1923

NORMAN GATEWOOD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JACKIE JEFFRIES, Director of Human Resources, Carolina Panthers; PORSCHA 

PENN, Human Resources Assistant, Carolina Panthers; JERRY RICHARDSON, 

Owner, Carolina Panthers; BONNIE CREIGHTON, Human Resources Assistant, 

Carolina Panthers,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:18-cv-00021-MOC-DCK)

Submitted: December 18, 2018 Decided: December 20, 2018

Before AGEE, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Norman Gatewood, Appellant Pro Se. Charles Evans Johnson, ROBINSON 

BRADSHAW & HINSON, PA, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM: 

Norman Gatewood seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss his civil complaint alleging that Gatewood was terminated from his 

employment because of his race and color, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2012 & Supp. 2018). The district 

court dismissed Gatewood’s action without prejudice and without the opportunity to 

amend the complaint. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 

(2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-

46 (1949). Because it is possible that Gatewood could amend his complaint to cure the

defects identified by the district court, the court’s order is neither a final order nor an 

appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, 807 

F.3d 619, 623-25, 628-30 (4th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow Gatewood 

to file an amended complaint. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED AND REMANDED
#### Commonwealth *versus*Thomas Chace.

Doves are animals *feraz*natura, and cannot be the subject of larceny, unless when they are in the custody of the owner; as, for example, in a dove-house.

The defendant was indicted for stealing fourteen tame doves, the property of Benjamin Williams.

At the trial, before *Morton*J., it was proved, that Williams had dove-houses in which he reared doves, and that he used them for food ; that the doves mentioned in the indictment occupied these dove-houses, and were claimed by Williams as his property ; that he took care of them and fed them regularly, and that they would come to be fed when called. The evidence also tended to show, that the defendant shot the doves and used them for food, and that he did it *animo furandi.*

The judge instructed the jury, that if they believed the evidence. and that the doves were taken by the defendant with a felonious intent, they ought to find him guilty. The defendant’s counsel excepted to this instruction, on the ground that doves could not be the subject of larceny. The jury having found the defendant guilty, a motion was made for a new trial.

*Russell,*for the defendant,

cited *Wallis*v. *Mease,*3 Binney, 546 ; East’s P. C. *tit. Larceny ;*Russell on Crimes, *tit. Larceny.*

*Morton,*Attorney General, *contra,*

cited 4 Bl. Comm. 236 ; 3 Dane’s Abr. 25, 158, 161.

Parker C. J.

delivered the opinion of the Court. It is held in all the authorities, that doves are *ferce natures,*and as such are not subjects of larceny, except when in the care and custody of the owner ; as when in a dovecot or pigeon-house, or when in the nest before they are able to fly. If, when thus under the care of the owner, they are taken furtively, it is larceny

The reason of this principle is, that it is difficult to distinguish them from other fowl of the same species. They often take a flight and mix in large flocks with the doves of other persons, and are free tenants of the air, except when, impelled by hunger or habit, or the production or preservation of their young, they seek the shelter prepared for them by the owner. *16Perhaps when feeding on the grounds of the proprietor, or rest¡ng on ^arn or other buildings, ify killed by a stranger, the owner may have trespass, and if the purpose be to consume them as food, and they are killed or caught or carried away from the enclosure ofj the owner, the act would be larceny.

But in this case there is no evidence of the situation they were in when killed, whether on the flight, a mile from the grounds of the owner, or mingled with the doves of other persons, enjoying their natural liberty. Without such evidence the act of killing them, though for the purpose of using them as food, is not felonious. Therefore a new trial is granted.
**EXHIBIT 32.02**

 

**SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION**

 

Inconnection with this quarterly report of ML JWH Strategic Allocation Fund  L.P. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (this “Report”), I, Michael L. Pungello, VicePresident, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

1.This Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Date: May 15, 2006

 

 
|                                                    |                    |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| By                                                      | /s/ MICHAEL L. PUNGELLO |   |
| Michael L. Pungello                                     |
| Vice President, Chief  Financial Officer  and Treasurer |
| (Principal Financial  and Accounting Officer)           |
|                                                         |                         |  |  |

 

1

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
                    The Schedule contains summary financial 
                    information extracted from the financial
                    statements for Willowbridge Strategic Trust
                    and is qualified in its entirety by reference
                    to such financial statements
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>          
<CIK>               0001005006
<NAME>              Willowbridge Strategic Trust
<MULTIPLIER>        1

<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               Dec-31-1997

<PERIOD-START>                  Jan-1-1997

<PERIOD-END>                    Mar-31-1997

<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-Mos

<CASH>                          41,769,309

<SECURITIES>                    4,924,272

<RECEIVABLES>                   13,158

<ALLOWANCES>                    0

<INVENTORY>                     0

<CURRENT-ASSETS>                46,706,739

<PP&E>                          0

<DEPRECIATION>                  0

<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  46,706,739

<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           1,709,470

<BONDS>                         0

<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0

<PREFERRED>                     0

<COMMON>                        0

<OTHER-SE>                      44,997,269

<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    46,706,739

<SALES>                         0

<TOTAL-REVENUES>                7,565,827

<CGS>                           0

<TOTAL-COSTS>                   0

<OTHER-EXPENSES>                2,236,203

<LOSS-PROVISION>                0

<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0

<INCOME-PRETAX>                 0

<INCOME-TAX>                    0

<INCOME-CONTINUING>             0

<DISCONTINUED>                  0

<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0

<CHANGES>                       0

<NET-INCOME>                    5,329,624

<EPS-PRIMARY>                   118.73

<EPS-DILUTED>                   0

</TABLE>
#### Shaun ROSIERE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16144

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 3, 2017

Shaun Rosiere, Pro Se

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Shaun Rosiere appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for improper venue his action alleging viola*557tions of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Myers v. Bennett Law Offices,*238 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, *Thompson v. Paul,*547 F.3d 1055, 1057-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

Dismissal of Rosiere’s action was proper because the district court lacked jurisdiction over Rosiere’s FOIA complaint. *See*5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (the district court “in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction” to provide relief); *Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,*307 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting district court’s jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 31

          CERTIFICATION TO BE PROVIDED BY THE DEPOSITOR WITH FORM 10-K

      Re:   Fremont Home Loan Trust, Series 2006-3
            Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2006-3

      I, Robert McGinnis, certify that:

      l. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K, and all reports on Form 10-D
required to be filed in respect of the period included in the year covered by
this report in Form 10-K of Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-3 (the "Exchange Act
periodic reports");

      2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this report;

      3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by
this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

      4. Based on my knowledge and upon the annual compliance statement required
in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the
Exchange Act periodic reports, the Servicer has fulfilled each of its
obligations under the pooling and servicing agreement; and

      5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment
of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be
included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and
Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of
noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on
Form 10-K.

      In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Fremont
Investment & Loan and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.

                                        FINANCIAL ASSET SECURITIES CORP.

                                        By: /s/ Robert McGinnis
                                            ------------------------------------
                                        Name: Robert McGinnis
                                        Title: President
                                        Date: March 30, 2007
Exhibit 11.1

BRAUN CONSULTING, INC.  STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS  (IN THOUSANDS EXCEPT SHARE AND PER SHARE DATA)

|                                        |  | YEAR ENDED December 31, |           
|--------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------- | ----------
|
|
|Net loss                                |  | $                       | (11,216   
|                                        |  |                         |           
|Shares used in computing loss per share |  |                         | 17,201,179
|Loss per share(1)                       |  | $                       | (0.65     
|                                        |  |                         |           

---

---

QuickLinks
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the following Registration Statements:



| | (1) | Registration Statement (Form S-8, No. 333-83975) pertaining to the 1999 Employee Stock Purchase Plan and 1998 Stock Plan of drugstore.com, inc.;
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | Registration Statement (Form S-8, No. 333-58174) pertaining to 1998 Stock Plan of drugstore.com, inc.;
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (3) | Registration Statement (Form S-8, No. 333-85468) pertaining to the 1998 Stock Plan of drugstore.com, inc.;
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (4) | Registration Statement (Form S-3, No. 333-130097) and related prospectus of drugstore.com, inc.
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

of our reports dated March 13, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of drugstore.com, inc., drugstore.com, inc. managements assessment of the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of drugstore.com, inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2006.

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Seattle, Washington

March 15, 2007
#### Christopher Michael COBOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark DONALDSON, Ector County Sheriff, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-50072

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 26, 2017

*408Christopher Michael Cobos, Pro Se

Denis Carl Dennis, Kelly, Morgan, Dennis, Corzine *&*Hansen, P.C., Odessa, TX, for Defendant-Appellee

Before JONES, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Christopher Cobos, Texas prisoner # 2032199, moves for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*(“IFP”) to appeal the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. The district court denied Co-bos’s motion to proceed IFP, certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith. By moving in this court for IFP status, Cobos is challenging that certification. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

Cobos contends that the district court impermissibly denied him the opportunity to amend his complaint after a motion to dismiss had been filed. The court, however, gave Cobos the chance to present his best case; the court identified deficiencies in Cobos’s initial complaint, ordered him to file a more definite statement, then granted his motion to amend. *See Eason v. Thaler,*14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994). Cobos did not seek to amend again after the motion to dismiss had been submitted. Moreover, Cobos complains that he was not served with one of the court’s orders, which, he maintains, resulted in dismissal, but he does not explain how the ease would have turned out differently had he received proper notice.

In his motion, Cobos does not address the district court’s reasons for the certification decision, namely, that Cobos failed to state a claim for relief and that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202. Thus Cobos has abandoned his challenge to the certification decision. *See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

The appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because it is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir, R. 42.2. Cobos’s motions for permission to proceed IFP and for the appointment of counsel are DENIED. The dismissal of the complaint and the appeal both count as strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See Adepegba v. Hammons,*103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996). Cobos is WARNED that if he accumulates a third strike, he will not be allowed to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal while incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. *See*§ 1915(g).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir, R, 47,5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R, 47.5.4.
##### 



Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
RULE 13a-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
    This certification accompanies the Form 10-Q to which it relates, is not deemed filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing
of the Registrant under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether
made before or after the date of the Form 10-Q ), irrespective of any general incorporation language
contained in such filing.
 Date: August 5, 2005
    
    /s/ John L. HigginsJohn L. HigginsChief Financial Officer; Executive Vice
President, Finance and Corporate
Development
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-21-00072-CV 

 

IN RE S.L., RELATOR 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

May 17, 2021 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before PIRTLE and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 

Relator, S.L., filed a petition for writ of mandamus with this Court seeking to compel 

respondent, the Honorable Matt Martindale, to reinstate a suit affecting the parent-child 

relationship. Now pending before the Court is S.L.’s motion seeking to withdraw his 

petition and voluntarily dismiss this original proceeding. Without passing on the merits of 

the petition, we grant S.L.’s motion and dismiss the proceeding. Accordingly, our Order 

on Motion for Emergency Stay of May 3, 2021, is vacated.

Per Curiam
#### IN RE: Robert W. HUNT, M.D., a Medical Corporation, Debtor. Peli Popovich Hunt, Agent for Robert W. Hunt M.D. Medical Corporation & Trustee of 2007 Restated Robert & Peli Hunt Living Trust, Appellant, v. David M. Goodrich, Chapter 7 Trustee; United States Trustee, Los Angeles, Appellees.

No. 14-60029

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 5, 2017

*592Peli Popovich Hunt, Pro Se

David Gould, Esquire, Gould & Gould LLP, Calabasas, CA, for Appellee David M. Goodrich

Hatty Yip, Office of the U.S. Trustee, Los Angeles, CA, for Appellee United States Trustee

' Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, *See*Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Peli Popovich Hunt appeals pro se from a judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying the corporate debt- or’s claimed exemptions. We have jurisdiction under '28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo decisions of the BAP and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. *Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod),*611 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010).

To the extent Hunt is challenging the bankruptcy court’s order as the representative of a trust or the corporate debtor, the appeal is dismissed because Hunt, as a non-attorney, “has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than [herjself.” *C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States,*818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987).

To the extent Hunt is challenging the bankruptcy court’s order directly as an individual, the appeal is dismissed because Hunt is not a “person aggrieved” by the bankruptcy court’s order and, therefore, lacks standing to prosecute the appeal. *See Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.),*177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1999).

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.