alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Alberto LARA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-5874

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Filed July 03, 2017

Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Lexington, KY, Anthony J. Bracke, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Ft. Mitchell, KY, John Michael Pellettieri, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Candace C. Crouse, Piñales Stachler Young Burrell & Crouse, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendant-Appellant

BEFORE: ROGERS, SUTTON, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

COOK, Circuit Judge.

In a previous opinion, we held in abeyance the issue of whether defendant Jose Alberto Lara could be found jointly and severally liable for the proceeds of a drug conspiracy in which he had participated. *United States v. Lara,*679 Fed.Appx. 392, 396, 2017 WL 527912, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017). We did so because the Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari in a separate case to address “whether, under [21 U.S.C.] § 853, a defendant may be held jointly and severally liable for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime but that the defendant himself did not acquire.” *Honeycutt v. United States,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1626, 1630, 198 L.Ed.2d 73 (2017).

The Court now has resolved that question, holding that “[Congress] authorized the Government to confíscate assets only from the defendant who initially acquired the property and who bears responsibility for its dissipation.” *Id.*at 1634; *see also id.*at 1633-35 (rejecting the application of *Pinkerton v. United States,*328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), (i.e„ conspiracy liability) to § 853). Because the district court held Lara liable under § 853 for $162,211 — the sum of the drug proceeds attributed to the conspiracy as a whole — without making factual findings about what portion (if any) Lara “actually acquired” or whether he received “substitute property” derived from the proceeds, *see id.*at 1633-35, we VACATE the district court’s sentence with respect to Lara’s money-forfeiture judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment of the district court is otherwise AFFIRMED for the reasons given in our prior opinion.
**SPAR Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries**

 

EXHIBIT 32.2

**Certification of the Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to**

**Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the nine-month period ended September 30, 2009 (this “report”), of SPAR Group, Inc. (the “registrant”), the undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge:

1.         The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2.         The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant. 

 

 

|   | /s/ James R. SegretoJames R. SegretoChief Financial Officer, Treasurer andSecretaryNovember 16, 2009 |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

**A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to SPAR Group, Inc. and will be retained by SPAR Group, Inc., and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.**

 

 

Ex-4

 

----
UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549





FORM 10-Q/A

Amendment No. 2





(Mark One)

|x | QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
|- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For the quarter ended: June 30, 2008

or



| ̈ | TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
|- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For the transition period from  to

Commission File Number: 0-23885





FUTURES STRATEGIC TRUST

(Exact name of registrant as specified in its
charter)







|                                                               |  |                                     
|-------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ------------------------------------
|Delaware                                                       |  | 13-7075398                          
|(State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization) |  | (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)



|                                                |  |           
|----------------------------------------------- |  | ----------
|900 King Street, Suite 100, Rye Brook, New York |  | 10573     
|(Address of principal executive offices)        |  | (Zip Code)

(914) 307-7000

(Registrants telephone number, including area code)

N/A

(Former name, former address and former fiscal year, if changed since last report)





Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90
days.    Yes  x    No   ̈

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company. See definition of accelerated filer, large
accelerated filer and smaller reporting company in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act. (Check one):



|                        |  |   |  |                           |  |  
|----------------------- |  | - |  | ------------------------- |  | -
|Large accelerated filer |  |  ̈ |  | Accelerated filer         |  |  ̈
|                        |  |   | 
|Non-accelerated filer   |  | x |  | Smaller Reporting Company |  |  ̈

Indicate by check mark whether Registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the
Exchange Act).    Yes   ̈    No  x









---

FUTURES STRATEGIC TRUST





Explanatory Note

The Form 10-Q/A is being filed solely to correct the omission of certain language required under
the Certification in the Futures Strategic Trusts Form 10-Q previously filed on August 12, 2008 and amended on February 2, 2009, which are restated in their entirety herewith. Except for the foregoing amended information, no other
changes have been made to the Form 10-Q filed on August 12, 2008 and amended on February 2, 2009 by this amendment.



2
**CERTIFICATION**

5.                    Shumate Industries, Inc.’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based        on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,        to        Shumate Industries, Inc.’s auditors and the audit committee of the Shumate        Industries, Inc.’s board of directors:

a.    All        significant        deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal        control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely        affect        Shumate Industries, Inc.’s ability to record, process, summarize and report        financial information; and

b.    Any        fraud, whether or not        material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant        role in Shumate Industries, Inc.’s internal control over financial        reporting.

| March 28, 2006 | /s/ Matthew                  C.                  FlemmingMatthew                  C. FlemmingExecutive Vice President,                  Chief    Financial Officer, and Secretary(Principal Financial                  Officer) |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----
Bobbie Jean LOWE v. CITY OF MOSS POINT, Mississippi, a Municipal Corporation

2016-CT-01012-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Filed: February 20, 2018 Closed: May 10, 2018

Certiorari-Denied
#### FAUAA, Plaintiff v. ALAIPALELEI, Defendant

No. 9-1911

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Vaimanu”]

July 9, 1913

J. G. VENTER, *Senior Member;*J. L. DWYER, *Member;*and TUIASOSOPO, *Member*

DECISION

It is evident that open bare-faced perjury has been committed in this case by some of the witnesses, but the Court regrets that it is unable to fix with certainty the crime upon any particular individual.

Nevertheless, it is necessary for this Court to determine the ownership of the land “Vaimanu” and the testimony produced by both sides has been considered by the Court; and while irreconcilable contradictions in the evidence have hampered the Court, the final decision has been unanimously arrived at by all the members of the Court.

The case of Fauaa is not a strong one, but the fact is admitted .that for a great many years, the claim of Alaipalelei has been resisted by the name Fauaa, and it has been resisted even by the counsel for defendant, who has but lately experienced a change of heart. Fauaa and his family *274have planted many cultivations on . the land. The court Relieves that Alapa has planted little or nothing on the land;

The evidence produced by the defendant was self contra-, dictory in many important respects. Alaipalelei stated on oath that he cut copra from the trees belonging to the land; that he did not know who planted the trees. Later he claimed that he had made the cultivations, but the latter statement was palpably an afterthought.

Both Fauaa and Alaipalelei claim that the Missionary Kuki was permitted to go on the land many years ago, but each claims that his side gave the authority. In view of the proceedings at the meeting held in Aitulagi, where the two Sateles, Satele Uga and Satele Pi, pleaded with Alapa to give up the land and Alaipalelei finally agreed to allow the Missionary Kuki to remain, the Court is constrained to find that Kuki went on the land by the authority of the name Fauaa.

It therefore follows that after the death of Kuki and the retirement of Kuki’s family from the land, the ownership reverted to the name Fauaa.

Let a decree issue, therefore, vesting title to the land Vaimanu in the name Fauaa.

Costs are assessed at $50.00, of which $30.00 are to be paid by Alapa and $20.00 by Fauaa.
**EXHIBIT 32.01**

 

SECTION 1350CERTIFICATION

 

In connection with this quarterly report of ML Trend-Following FuturesFund L.P. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30,2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (this “Report”), I, JustinC. Ferri, Chief Executive Officer, President and Manager of Merrill LynchAlternative Investments LLC, the general partner of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.This Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

Date:August 13, 2010

 

 
| By:    | /s/  JUSTIN C. FERRI                            |   |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Justin  C. Ferri                                |   |
|   | Chief  Executive Officer, President and Manager |   |
|   | (Principal  Executive Officer)                  |   |

 

----
ex10-06.htm




Exhibit 10.06

















 




  





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5
#### SOLIAI, Plaintiff v. PALEPALE, Defendant

No. 9-1919

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [“Matai” title: “Tuanaitau”]

Date unknown

A. M. NOBLE, *President of the High Court*

This cause coming on to be heard and it appearing to the Court that the defendant, did on December 1st, 1919, file notice of his intentions to register himself under the “matai” name, Tuanaitau, to succeed the late Tuanaitau-Numela;

And it further appearing to the Court that on the 8th day of December, 1919, the plaintiff, Soliai, filed in the High Court of American Samoa an objection to the registration by the defendant, Palepale, of the “matai” name, Tuanaitau, which said objection was the only objection filed during the thirty days succeeding the posting of said notice by the defendant, Palepale as required by Section 45 of the *Codification*of the Regulations and Orders for the Government of American Samoa.

And it further appearing to the Court that the plaintiff and defendant have reached an amicable settlement of the matter in controversy, and it is agreed by both the plaintiff and defendant that the defendant shall register his name as Tuanaitau-Palepale in the Record of “Matai” Titles in the office of the Secretary of Native Affairs:—

It is therefore ordered, considered and adjudged by the Court, by and with the consent of the parties, plaintiff and *320defendant, that the said Palepale is entitled to register himself in the Record of “Matai” Titles in the Office of the Secretary of Native Affairs as Taunaitau-Palepale.

It is further ordered that the cost, $10.00, be equally divided between plaintiff and defendant.

Consented toby:

/s/ Soliai

/s/ Palepale
IIB 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6474 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2024 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources 

AN ACT 

To amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to expedite geothermal exploration and development in previously studied or developed areas. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 6474 RFS

1 SECTION 1. NEPA REVIEW. 

2 Section 390 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 

3 U.S.C. 15942) is amended— 

4 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘, or the 

5 Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 (30 U.S.C. 1001 et 

6 seq.) for the purpose of exploration or development 

7 of geothermal resources’’ after ‘‘or gas’’; and 

8 (2) in subsection (b)— 

9 (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘or gas’’ 

10 and inserting ‘‘, gas, or geothermal’’; and 

11 (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘or gas’’ 

12 and inserting ‘‘, gas, or geothermal’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 24, 

2024. 

Attest: KEVIN F. MCCUMBER, 

Clerk. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
#### Daniel Joseph BLOOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E.K. MCDANIEL; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15072

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 3, 2017

Daniel Joseph Bloor, Lovelock, NV, pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Joseph Bloor, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process violation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Andres v. Marshall,*867 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2017). We reverse and remand.

The district court screened and dismissed Bloor’s complaint on the basis that Bloor had not pursued his grievances beyond the first level as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. However, Bloor alleged in his complaint that defendants refused to respond to his grievance, and he argued in his motion for reconsideration that his attempt to file a second-level grievance was rejected for lack of documentation, which he could not provide because he attached it to his prior, unanswered grievance. Thus, the district court erred in concluding at this early stage of the proceedings, before defendants have appeared, that administrative remedies were available to Bloor. *See Albino v. Baca,*747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[Ojnly in rare cases will a district court be able to conclude from the face of the complaint that a prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies and that he is without a valid excuse.” (citation and internal quotation marks *459omitted)); *see also Jones v. Bock,*549 U.S. 199, 211-17, 127 S.Ct, 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense which defendants must raise and prove); *Sapp v. Kimbrell,*623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion is not required where administrative remedies are “effectively unavailable”). We reverse the judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

CERES MARINE TERMINALS, INC. AND AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1868-96-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON FEBRUARY 18, 1997 ANITA ARTIS

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION Robert A. Rapaport (Lynne M. Ferris; Knight, Dudley, Clarke & Dolph, P.L.C., on brief), for appellants. No brief or argument for appellee.

Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., (employer) appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission that denies it credit for benefits paid earlier pursuant to an award under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). We find that employer must be given credit for the dollar amounts previously paid, and we reverse the commission's award. The parties are fully conversant with the record in the cause, and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, no recitation of the facts is necessary. Employer paid benefits under the LHWCA for temporary total disability to Anita Artis for a compensable injury she suffered while in its employ. The Virginia Workers' Compensation

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Commission subsequently found a permanent partial disability, and awarded benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. See Code § 65.2-503. The commission refused to allow employer to offset this award by the dollar amount of benefits paid under the LHWCA, claiming that the two types of benefits are different and may not be credited against one another. We disagree. In Virginia Int'l Terminals, Inc. v. Moore , 22 Va. App. 396, 470 S.E.2d 574 (1996), we held: Subject to the approval of the commission, an employer is entitled to a credit for any "voluntary payment" it may have made to the employee. As defined by the statute, a payment is "voluntary" if it was not "due and payable" by "the terms of this title" when made. Thus, the disability payments employer paid claimant under the LHWCA were "voluntary" because when paid they were not "due and payable" under "the terms of" the Virginia Act. Therefore, the amounts paid under the LHWCA should have been deducted from employer's liability as determined by the commission. The statute makes no exception to its command, and its language directing that a credit be provided for "any" voluntary payments indicates an intent to provide a credit for all payments that fall within its classification of "voluntary."

Id. at 405, 470 S.E.2d at 578-79. The amounts paid by employer under the LHWCA should therefore be set off against "any future liability it may have to claimant for the injury received," regardless of the classification of the disability. Id. at 406,

470 S.E.2d at 579. We reverse and remand, instructing the commission to determine the dollar amount paid under the LHWCA and to credit- 3 - employer that amount against the commission's award. Reversed and remanded.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.04

         REPORT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS ON FINANCIAL STATEMENT SCHEDULE

To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of Homestore, Inc.:

     We have audited the consolidated financial statements of Homestore, Inc. as
of December 31, 2003, and for the year then ended and have issued our report
thereon dated March 10, 2004, (included elsewhere in this 2003 Annual Report on
Form 10-K). Our audit also included the financial statement schedule listed in
Item 15(a)(2) of this Form 10-K. This schedule is the responsibility of the
Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion based on our
audit.

     In our opinion, the financial statement schedule referred to above, when
considered in relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole,
presents fairly in all material respects the information set forth therein.

                                          /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Los Angeles, California
March 10, 2004
#### SANDERS *v.*CITY OF DETROIT, DEPARTMENT OF STREET RAILWAYS.

1. Carriers — Negligence—Evidence—Instructions.

Instruction that the law does not place upon a passenger of a common carrier the often impossible burden of pointing out by direct evidence the specific breach of duty by the carriers because the accident itself, together with the surrounding circumstances and legitimate inferences, may establish negligence *held,*proper.

2. Appeal and Ekrort — Instructions—Objections.

Objection to instructions, not properly raised at trial, will not be considered on appeal.

3. Same — Questions Not Argued.

An appellate court will not consider a question raised on appeal when no argument, factual or legal, was presented on that question by appellant.

Reeerences por Points in Headnotes

[1] 14 Am Jur 2d, Carriers § 1194.

[2, 3] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 545.

Appeal from Common Pleas Court of Detroit; Pernick (Joseph J.), J.

Submitted Division 1 May 14, 1968, at Detroit.

(Docket No. 3,455.)

Decided June 10, 1968.

Declaration by Ora L. Sanders against the City of Detroit, Department of Street Railways, a municipal corporation, for injuries sustained while plaintiff was a passenger on defendant’s bus. Ver-*647diet and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

*Dann, Rosenbaum, Bloom & Kaufman (Henry A. Krolik,*of counsel), for plaintiff.

*Manuel Zechman,*General Counsel, and *Michael F. Peters,*Attorney, for defendants.

Per Curiam.

The City of Detroit, Department of Street Railways, appeals a jury verdict of $750 in favor of Ora L. Sanders.. Mrs. Sanders suffered injuries when she sat on a pin or pin-like strand of metal imbedded in a seat on one of the defendant’s buses. "When observed after the accident the pin was sticking straight up about 2 inches • from the top surface of the seat. The thickest part of the seat’s cushion is 2-1/2 inches thick. Shortly before Mrs. Sanders boarded the bus it had completed a turn-around layover during which, the driver testified, he had inspected the seats and found no foreign object. Five or 6 passengers had boarded before Mrs. Sanders.

On appeal the defendant argues that an instruction to the jury, objected to prior to retirement of the jury to consider its verdict, was incorrect. The instruction was based on language used by the Court in *Durfey*v. *Milligan*(1933), 265 Mich 97, 100, and the giving of the instruction was not error. See, also, *Bolton*v. *City of Detroit*(1968), 10 Mich App 589. Another objection to the instructions urged on this appeal was not timely raised and will not be considered. Nor will we consider the question: “Did the trial court err in denying defendant-appellant’s motion for' a new trial?”, no argument whatsoever, factual or legal, having been stated in appel*648lant’s brief in support of its proposed “Yes” answer to that question.

Affirmed. Costs to appellee.

Levin, P. J., and Holbrook and Beer, JJ., concurred.