alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Irene Tawiah DAGHER; John Dagher, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee FOR SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES L.L.C., Trust 2007-NCI Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NCI; Ocwen Financial Corporation, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-11359 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 17, 2017

Irene Tawiah Dagher, Pro Se

John Dagher, Pro Se

Thomas F, Loose, Esq., Calvin Don Clayton, Esq., Attorney, Robert Thompson Mowrey, Locke Lord, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Defendants-Appellees

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiffs-Appellants Irene Tawiah Dagher and John Dagher appeal the district court’s final judgment dismissing their lawsuit against Defendants-Appellees Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsch”) and Ocwen Financial Corporation (“Ocwen”) on summary judgment. In brief, the Daghers were parties to an Adjustable Rate Balloon Note in the amount of $185,600.00, secured by a Deed of Trust covering certain real property. Deutsche was the mortgagee, and Ocwen was the mortgage servicer. The Daghers entered into a Modification Agreement in 2012 that required them to make a down payment *346and monthly payments thereafter. They made the down payment but failed to make any of the required monthly payments and therefore defaulted. Defendants-Appellees foreclosed on the property in early 2013.

The Daghers filed this lawsuit in state court alleging breach of contract, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming that Defendants-Appellees wrongfully foreclosed under the Modification Agreement. Following removal under diversity jurisdiction, Defendants-Appellants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they possessed the contractual authority to foreclose and had complied with the applicable law and. contractual provisions in doing so. The district court agreed. In a carefully written memorandum opinion and order, the court explained why Defendants-Appellees’ foreclosure was proper under the undisputed facts and applicable law and, as a result, why all of the Daghers’ claims must fail as a matter of law. It therefore dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

Based on our review of the summary judgment record, the applicable law,- the district court’s memorandum opinion and order, and the parties’ briefs on appeal, we conclude the district court correctly dismissed the Daghers’ baseless claims. -Accordingly, we affirm, essentially for the reasons set out by the district court.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Esse Osameh MAZAHERI, also known as Esse O. Mazaheri, also known as Esee Osameh Mazaheri, also known as Osameh Mazaheri, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50278 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 20, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, Jennifer Sheffield Freel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Philip J. Lynch, San Antonio, TX, Simon M. Azar-Farr, Esq., Simon Azar-Farr *&*Associates, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Esse Osameh Mazaheri appeals the sentence imposed following his jury conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 846. Ma-*300zaherí argues that the district court erred by enhancing his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(a) for his role as an organizer or leader. He additionally asserts that the district court erred in holding him accountable for more than 700 kilograms of marijuana.

The district court’s determination that a defendant is an organizer or leader under § 3Bl.l(a) is a factual determination that we review for clear error. *United States v. Cabrera,*288 F.3d 163, 173 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). In determining a defendant’s role in the offense, “a district court is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the facts, and these inferences are fact-findings reviewed for clear error.” *United States v. Caldwell,*448 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2006). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it “is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” *Id.,*A close examination of the record in this case, including the transcript of the trial, shows that there was sufficient evidence to support the district court’s leadership adjustment. Accordingly, the district court’s finding that Mazaheri was a leader or organizer for the purposes of § 3Bl.l(a) was not clearly erroneous.

We also review the district court’s determination regarding the quantity of drugs for clear error. *United States v. Schorovsky,*202 F.3d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 2000). In overruling Mazaheri’s objection to the drug quantity, the district court found that “[tjhere was substantial evidence at trial to substantiate that the amount between 700 kilograms to 1,000 kilograms of marijuana [was] being transported by Mr. Mazaheri as part of that conspiracy'to distribute that he was involved in.” Once again, a close examination of the record reveals that the district court’s finding regarding the quantity of marijuana was “plausible in light of the record as a whole.” *See Caldwell,*448 F.3d at 290. Accordingly, the district court’s finding that Mazaheri was accountable for at least 700 kilograms of marijuana was not clearly erroneous.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Ezra Adams, *qui tam, versus*Silas Moulton.

The *St.*1822, *c.*104-, [Revised Stat. c. 3, § 3,] requiring a collector of taxes to return to the selectmen, fifteen days before the first Monday in March, a list of persons from whom he shall have received payment of a State or county tax, intends that the list shall remain with the selectmen for their use, and not be taken away again by the collector.

It is not necessary that such list should be delivered to the selectmen at a meeting of the board ; a delivery to one of them is sufficient.

This was an action upon *St.*1822, c. 104, § 2, against a collector of taxes for the town of West Newbury for the year 1825, for not delivering to the selectmen, fifteen days before the first Monday in March, 1826, a list of all persons from whom he had within the year preceding received paymen *293of a State or county tax, or his original account of such payment.

*Nov. 6th.*

It was agreed that there was no meeting of the selectmen just fifteen days before the first Monday of March, 1826, and that the defendant did not return a list to them on that day ; but that he did present his tax books containing the names of all the tax debtors, for examination and inspection, at meetings of the selectmen on the 10th of January and 27th of Feb ruary, 1826, and at the time when they corrected their list of voters, which was fifteen days or more before the first Monday of March ; all which was sufficient and satisfactory to the selectmen in regard to making out their list of voters. The tax book was not left with the selectmen, but was taken away by the defendant, when the selectmen adjourned, by their permission

Marston, for the plaintiff,

referred to *Claflin*v. Cheney, 4 Pick. 118.

Gerrish, for the defendant.

The opinion of the Court was afterward drawn up by

Parker C. J.

We cannot, without exercising a dispensing power, excuse the defendant from the penalty sued for in this action. The statute peremptorily requires that a list of taxes paid within the year, specifying the time of payment, shall be delivered to the selectmen fifteen days before the first Monday in March. It has already been decided in 4 Pick. 118, that this time admits of no variation, for the reasons there given. It is said that there was no meeting of the selectmen on that day ; but the defendant should have delivered his list to the chairman or some other of that body, in order to excuse himself from the penalty. The list which he delivers should be for the use of the selectmen, and not his own tax bill exhib ited to them and taken away again for his own use. This statute being intended to give full force and effect to the amendment of the constitution respecting the right of suffrage, should be strictly enforced.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A24A1090. JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. RYALL.

Upon consideration of the Appellant’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal in the

above styled case, pursuant to Court of Appeals Rule 41 (g), it is ordered that the

motion is hereby GRANTED, and jurisdiction is released back to the trial court upon

receipt of this order.

Court of Appeals of the Stateof Georgia

Clerk’s Office,Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of theCourt of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

September 30, 2024

09/30/2024
#### Bobby C. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sam PETERSON, Police Officer; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15982

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

Bobby C. Richardson, Pro' Se

Danielle Kono Lewis, Esquire, Attorney, Gregg Anthony Thornton, Selman Breit-man LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Bobby C. Richardson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Peterson, Bloch, Harris, and Bidou because Richardson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether: (1) Harris lacked consent to enter Richardson’s residence; (2) Richardson’s arrests by defendants were not supported by probable cause; or (3) the force used on Richardson by defendants in connection with his arrests was not objectively reasonable. *See Georgia v. Randolph,*547 U.S. 103, 106, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (consent exception to warrant requirement); *Graham v. Connor,*490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (excessive force objective reasonableness standard); *Beier v. City of Lewi*
      *618
      *ston,*354 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (probable cause standard).

We do not consider arguments and allegations not specifically raised and argued in the opening brief, or matters raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 31.1   CERTIFICATIONS  I, MacAllister Smith, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Pipeline Data, Inc;  2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not  misleading  with respect to the period covered by this annual report  3. Based on my knowledge,  the financial  statements,  and other  financial information  included in this annual report fairly present in all material respects the financial  condition,  results of operations  and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;  4. The  registrants  other  certifying  officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal  control over financial reporting  (as defined in Exchange Act Rules  13a-15(f) and  15d-15(f))  for the registrant and have:  a)  Designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  procedures,  or caused  such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,  including its consolidated  subsidiaries,  is made  known to us by  others  within  those entities,  particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants  disclosure controls and procedures  and  presented  in  this  report  our  conclusions   about  the effectiveness of the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation (the Evaluation Date); and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial  reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially  affected,  or that is reasonably likely to materially  affect,  the  registrants  internal  control over financial reporting; and  5. The registrants other certifying  officers and I have disclosed,  based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial  reporting,  to the  registrants  auditors  and the audit  committee of  registrants  board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a) All significant  deficiencies  and material  weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely  affect the  registrants  ability to record,  process,  summarize and report financial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material,  that involves  management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants  internal control over financial reporting.  April 3, 2006  /s/ MacAllister SmithMacAllister SmithPresident   71
#### William Douglas HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX PETERSBURG; Eric Wilson, Warden; Maurice Danzey, Associate Warden; L. Humphrey, Recreation Supervisor; R. Spears, Education Supervisor; R. Hutchings, Associate Warden; D. DiCocco, Health Services Administrator; M. Reynolds, Director of Psychology; P. Hilletework, Mid-Level Practitioner; S. Harris, Legal Administrator; A. Lewis, Associate Warden; K. Kiddy, Unit A/B Manager, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-6144

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

William Douglas Hampton, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

■ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*289PER CURIAM:

William Douglas Hampton, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order dismissing his declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (2012) for failure to state a claim. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. *See*4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Hampton’s informal brief does not challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, Hampton has for-' feited appellate review of the court’s order. *See Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,*370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we deny Hampton’s motion for declaratory judgment and affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### TOOMATA, Plaintiff v. PEOPLE OF LEONE, Defendants

No. 5-1906

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Legaoa” near Leone]

May 4, 1906

Present: HON. E. W. GURR, *Chief District Judge;*HON. TULIFUA, *District Judge;*HON. LETXJLI, *District Judge*

The above-entitled cause having come on to be heard, and testimony having been taken on behalf of all parties concerned in the said cause, and upon due consideration of same,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the property in controversy LEGAOA is defined to be the flat land of the valley before the rise to the hills surrounding.

*143That the said land Legaoa is the property of Toomata by deed from Talamaivao.

That those persons who have improved portions of Legaoa by planting cocoanuts are entitled to compensation to the extent of the value of bearing cocoanuts.

That in view of the difficulty of ascertaining the amounts to be paid, the Court recommends that the land Legaoa be divided equally, the inland portion to be the property of Toomata and the seaward portion the property of the Le-one defendants, except Leoso.

That the Leone defendants, except Leoso, mutually partition the portion adjudged to them, but if they cannot do this, the Court, upon reference to it, will apportion the land amongst them after ascertaining the extent of their improvements.

That a survey be made of the land declared to be Legaoa, Toomata to pay one-half and the defendants, one-half.

That in subdivision of defendants’ land, defendants pay all costs and expenses, including survey.

That lands alienated are not included in this decision.

Costs to be paid $60, one-half by Toomata, one-half by defendants.
#### Edward Smith, Respondent, *v.*Henry Smith et al., Appellants.

(Argued April 17, 1872;

decided April 23, 1872.)

*Wm. H Yam Gott*for the appellant.

*John L. Hill*for the respondent.

Agree to affirm. No opinion.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
<Page>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 32.02

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION


In connection with this quarterly report of ML JWH Strategic Allocation Fund
L.P. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (this
"Report"), I, Michael L. Pungello, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and
Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. This Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: November 14, 2005
-----------------------

By /s/ MICHAEL L. PUNGELLO
   -----------------------
Michael L. Pungello
Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
and Treasurer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
EX-10.12



 Exhibit 10.12 
 Summary of Horace Mann Educators Corporation 
 Named Executive Officer
Annualized Salaries 
 The table below summarizes the annualized salaries of Horace Mann Educators
Corporation’s (the “Company”) Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer and the other three highest compensated Executive Officers, as defined in the Company’s Proxy Statement for the 2012 Annual Meeting of
Shareholders (collectively the “Named Executive Officers”). These salaries may be changed at any time at the discretion of the Compensation Committee and/or Board of Directors of the Company. These salaries do not include short-term and
long-term incentive compensation amounts, the Company’s contributions to defined contribution plans and the Company’s contributions to other employee benefit programs on behalf of these individuals. 

 

					
	 Named Executive Officer
	 	Annualized Salary	  	  
	 Peter H.
Heckman
President and Chief Executive Officer
	 	$650,000.00	  	 
	 Dwayne
D. Hallman
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
	 	$380,004.00	  	 
	 Stephen
P. Cardinal
Executive Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer
	 	$403,704.00	  	 
	 Thomas
C. Wilkinson
Executive Vice President, Property & Casualty
	 	$327,804.00	  	 
	 Paul D.
Andrews
Senior Vice President, Human Resources and
Administrative Operations
	 	$251,496.00	  	 

 Last revision date: April 1, 2012
#### Steve CRUMP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S. SANCHEZ, Captain; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-55961

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 4, 2017

Steve Crump, Lancaster, CA, pro se.

Christopher Findley, AGCA-Office of the Attorney General (San Diego), San Diego, CA, Defendant-Appellee.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*440MEMORANDUM **

Steve Crump, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Williams v. Paramo,*775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Crump did not properly exhaust his grievances to the final level of review or show that exhaustion was effectively unavailable. *See Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Griffin v. Arpaio,*557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] grievance [only] suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.”); *see also Sapp v. Kimbrell,*623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion is not required where administrative remedies are rendered “effectively unavailable”).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Crump’s motion to file his opening brief as nunc pro tunc (Docket Entry No. 3) is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.