alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Amendment to Employment Agreement  with Robert Baffi



 Exhibit 10.1 
 AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO 
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 

THIS AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (the “Amendment”) made as of May 24, 2012 (“Effective
Date”) by and between BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”) and Robert A. Baffi, Ph.D. (“Employee”). 

 

	1.	This Amendment No. 2 is intended to amend and modify that certain Amended and Restated Employment Agreement by and between the Company and Employee dated
January 1, 2009 and amended on May 8, 2012 (the “Agreement”). The Agreement, together with this Amendment, shall constitute a single agreement. Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Amendment shall have the
meaning ascribed to such terms in the Agreement. Except as expressly modified by this Amendment, the Agreement shall remaining full force and effect according to its terms. 


 

	2.	The defined term “Termination Compensation,” as provided in Section 7(c) of the Agreement, is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety by the
following definition: 

 Termination Compensation. For purposes of this Agreement, the term
“Termination Compensation” shall mean: (i) one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the Employee’s then current annual base salary which shall be payable in a lump sum within two weeks after separation of employment, conditioned
on Employee executing the Company’s standard form severance and release agreement, and shall be subject to customary withholding and other applicable payroll processes. Employee shall execute the Company’s standard form severance and
release agreement within sixty (60) days after the Employee’s termination. 
  

	3.	This Amendment No. 2 may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and
the same instrument. 

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have executed this Amendment as of the
date first written above. 
  

									
	 BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL INC.

 
	  		  	 EMPLOYEE

 

	By:	  	 /s/Jean-Jacques Bienaime
	  		  	By:	 	 /s/ Robert A. Baffi

	Name:	  	Jean-Jacques Bienaimé	  		  		 	Robert A. Baffi, Ph.D.
	Its:	  	Chief Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jose Leon GONZALEZ-LONGORIA, also known as Alfred Martinez, also known as Juan Vela, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50750 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 3, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jose Leon Gonzalez-Longoria, Pro Se

Before DENNIS, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jose Leon Gonzalez-Longoria, federal prisoner # 59761-079, moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. He seeks to challenge the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 8582(c)(2) motion in which he sought a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 782 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. We construe Gonzalez-Longoria’s motion to proceed IFP as a challenge to the court’s certification that his appeal was not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into his good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez-Longoria’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. *See United States v. Henderson,*636 F.3d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 2011). Contrary to Gonzalez-Longoria’s assertion, Amendment 782 did not lower his base offense level because his offense involved the equivalent of 200,000 kilograms of marijuana.

Because the appeal lacks arguable merit and is frivolous, Gonzalez-Longoria’s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED. *See Howard,*707 F.2d at 220. Because the merits of Gpnzalez-Longoria’s appeal are so intertwined with the certification decision as to constitute one issue, his appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 *&*n. 24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> BD
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999             DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999             MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         533,233                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                               46,508,853              46,070,172
<SECURITIES-RESALE>                                  0                       0
<SECURITIES-BORROWED>                                0                       0
<INSTRUMENTS-OWNED>                        288,513,454             178,087,357
<PP&E>                                               0                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             335,555,540             224,157,529
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0                       0
<PAYABLES>                                   5,948,658               8,938,652
<REPOS-SOLD>                                         0                       0
<SECURITIES-LOANED>                                  0                       0
<INSTRUMENTS-SOLD>                                   0                       0
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<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                             0                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                 329,606,882             215,218,877
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               335,555,540             224,157,529
<TRADING-REVENUE>                          (2,059,050)             (1,866,398)
<INTEREST-DIVIDENDS>                         3,896,459               3,135,549
<COMMISSIONS>                                6,560,715               4,402,229
<INVESTMENT-BANKING-REVENUES>                        0                       0
<FEE-REVENUE>                                        0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0                       0
<COMPENSATION>                                       0                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,723,306)             (3,133,078)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                 (4,723,306)             (3,133,078) 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0 
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0 
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,723,306)             (3,133,078) 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.21)                  (1.91)  
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.21)                  (1.91)  
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ruben GALVAN-SALAZAR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50112

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Helen H. Hong, Daniel Earl Zipp, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Sarah Rose Weinman, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ruben Galvan-Salazar appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 30-month custodial sentence and 3-year term of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Galvan-Salazar contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to provide a reasoned basis for exercising its discretion under *Kimbrough v. United States,*552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), to reject U.S.S.G. § 5Dl.l(c). His reliance on *Kimbrough*is misplaced. While section 5Dl.l(c) states that a district court should not ordinarily impose a term of supervised release if the defendant is a deportable alien, it also provides that supervised release may be appropriate in such cases if it will provide an added measure of deterrence. *See*U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5. The district court’s decision to impose supervised release on the basis of its finding that doing so would provide an added measure of deterrence in Galvan-Salazar’s case was, therefore, consistent with the Guidelines.

Galvan-Salazar next contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to account for the mitigating factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Galvan-Salazar’s criminal history and the need for deterrence. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Bing CHEN, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-70215

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

Filed October 3, 2017

Jisheng Li, Law Office of Jisheng Li, Honolulu, HI, for Petitioner.

Tracie Nicole Jones, Trial, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Bing Chen, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and review de novo claims of due process violations. *Singh v. Ashcroft,*367 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004). We deny the petition for review.

*511The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to show prejudice. *See id.*at 1188 (“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing of inadequate performance and prejudice.”); *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1043 n.3, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2010) (under REAL ID, even minor inconsistencies, when viewed in light of the total circumstances, may undermine credibility; an inconsistency no longer needs to go to the heart of a claim, but is of great weight when it does). In light of this determination, we need not address Chen’s contention regarding the BIA’s, consideration of his failure to address the merits of his claims for asylum and related relief in his motion to reopen.

We are not persuaded by Chen’s contention that the BIA, in noting that Chen had not addressed certain findings or provided corroborating evidence, was impermissibly requiring specific corroboration. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           1,703
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   43,560
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    229,249
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               311,137
<PP&E>                                         318,335
<DEPRECIATION>                                  37,505
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 797,341
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,956,996
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         6,180
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,970,070
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   797,341
<SALES>                                            345
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   348
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               458,120
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              62,408
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (520,180)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
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<NET-INCOME>                                 (520,180)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.08)
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</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6682 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6682

       To prohibit funding for the Government of Ukraine for the 
                  nationalization of strategic assets.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 7, 2023

  Mr. Mills (for himself and Mr. Hern) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To prohibit funding for the Government of Ukraine for the 
                  nationalization of strategic assets.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Prohibiting Nationalization of 
American Companies and Investments Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE FOR 
              THE NATIONALIZATION OF UNITED STATES ASSETS.

    No amounts appropriated or otherwise made available by a law 
enacted before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act, may 
be used by the Government of Ukraine for the nationalization, 
expropriation, forced liquidation, seizure, or imposition of any 
restrictions on shareholders rights to execute governance over, assets 
or property in Ukraine that is owned directly or indirectly by United 
States investors, including shareholder interests in any publicly 
traded company.
                                 <all>
```
MEMORANDUM

DATE: 7/27/15

TO: Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Do cket Id: OAR–2013-0602

FROM: Julie Rosenberg, EPA

SUBJECT: 4/22/15, REEOs Meeting Regarding Proposed Clean Power Plan for Existing

Power Plants

SUMMARY

A meeting was held between EPA and the attendees li sted below on 4/22/15 to discuss the proposed Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power P lants. The Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants was proposed on June 2, 2014.

ATTENDEES

OAR EPA Staff: Julie Rosenberg, Jean Lupinacci, Ann Bailey, Jonathan Passe, Julia Miller, Robyn DeYoung, Emma Zinsmeister, Stacy Angel and Jo e Bryson Doug Lewin – South-central Partnership for Energy E fficiency as a Resource SPEER Howard Geller – Southwest Energy Efficiency Program SWEEP Susan Stratton – Northwest Energy Efficiency Allian ce NEEA Sue Coakley –Northeast Energy Efficiency Program NE EP Mandy Mahoney and Jenna Zweig – Southern Energy Eff iciency Alliance SEEA Stacey Paradis – Midwest Energy Efficiency Alliance MEEA
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6359 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6359

 To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to remove the overtime 
     wages exemption for certain employees, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 9, 2023

  Mr. Van Drew (for himself and Mr. Takano) introduced the following 
    bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and the 
                               Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to remove the overtime 
     wages exemption for certain employees, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Guaranteeing Overtime for Truckers 
Act''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938.

    Section 13(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 
213(b)) is amended by striking paragraph (1).
                                 <all>
```
October 22, 2015

Stephen W. Kauffman

4569 Woodlawn Drive

Emmaus, PA 18049

Dear Mr. Kauffman:

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your petition for an exemption from 

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we can not process your 

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can Not Process Your Request

We received your June 22, 2015 exemption request filed in Docket No. FAA-2015-3350, but 

we are unable to process your request any further. Your petition does not comply with the

requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must 

send us all of the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief.

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

For more detailed information relating to submitting petitions for exemption, please visit 

http://aes.faa.gov/petition/index.html. This website helps the petitioner to meet Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) requirement outlines in § 11.81 and helps answer any 

questions you may have.
2

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must submit the requested information 

within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption at

least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further. If

you have any questions you may call the 333 Information Line (202) 267-2999.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brittany Newton

Program Analyst, Airmen and

 Airspace Rules Division

Enclosures
3
4
#### AGASIVA, Plaintiff v. LEULUA'I, AVEGALIO SUAFO’A, Defendants

No. 20-1917

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [“Matai” name: “Agasiva”]

December 7, 1921

SYDNEY D. HALL, *Associate Judge*

JUDGMENT

This case coming on to be heard before His Honor S. D. Hall, Associate Member of the High Court, and it appearing to the Court that the matters in controversy have been amicably settled between the two parties, plaintiffs and defendants.

It is therefore ordered, considered and adjudged that the action be dismissed.

It is further ordered, considered and adjudged that the defendants pay the cost of this action, to wit, $10.00.

The designating name of Samu should exist as the plaintiff in this action as the “Matai” name Agasiva is the cause of action.

/s/ Sydney D. Hall

Secretary of Native Affairs
acceleras1ex51_5152012.htm


 


Exhibit 5.1


 



Exhibit 5.1







Law Offices of Thomas E. Puzzo, PLLC


3823 44th Ave. NE


Seattle, Washington 98105


Tel:  (206) 522-2256 / Fax:  (206) 260-0111 / E-mail: tpuzzo@msn.com


 

 


Writer’s e-mail: tpuzzo@msn.com


Writer’s cell: (206) 412-6868







May 21, 2012







VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION







Securities and Exchange Commission


100 F Street, N.E.


Washington, DC 20549







Re: Accelera Innovations, Inc., a Delaware corporation;


       Registration Statement on Form S-1, as amended







Ladies and Gentlemen:







We have acted as counsel to Accelera Innovations, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), in connection with the registration statement on Form S-1, as amended (the “Registration Statement”), filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), with respect to (i) the registration, offer and sale of 5,000,000 shares of common stock, par value $0.0001 per share, of the Company, by the Company (the “Primary Offering”), and (ii) the registration, offer and resale of up to 4,456,880 shares of common stock, par value $0.0001 per share, of the Company, by certain selling stockholders of the Company (the “Stockholder Offering”).







We have examined the originals, photocopies, certified copies or other evidence of such records of the Company, certificates of officers of the Company and public officials, and other documents we have deemed relevant and necessary as a basis for the opinion hereinafter expressed.  In such examination, we have assumed the genuineness of all signatures, the authenticity of all documents submitted to us as certified copies or photocopies and the authenticity of the originals of such latter documents.







Based on our examination mentioned above, we are of the opinion that (i) the 5,000,000 shares of common stock being offered and sold by the Company pursuant to the Primary Offering are duly authorized and will be, when issued in the manner described in the Registration Statement, legally and validly issued, fully paid and non-assessable, and (ii) the 4,456,880 shares of common stock being sold by certain selling stockholders of the Company in the Stockholder Offering are duly authorized, legally and validly issued, fully paid and non-assessable.







We hereby consent to the filing of this opinion as Exhibit 5.1 to the Registration Statement and to the reference to our firm in the related Prospectus. In giving the foregoing consent, we do not admit that we are in the category of persons whose consent is required under Section 7 of the Act, or the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission.







Very truly yours,







/s/ Law Offices of Thomas E. Puzzo, PLLC