alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### AIA AMERICA, INC., FKA Alzheimer’s Institute of America, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant Michael J. Mullan, Ronald E. Sexton, Counterclaim Defendants v. ELI LILLY & COMPANY, Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendants-Appellees

2016-2094

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

August 10, 2017

Peter Buckley, Fox Rothschild, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

Deborah E. Fishman, Arnold *&*Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Palo Alto, CA, argued for all defendants-appellees. Defendant-ap-pellee Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. also represented by Katie Jeannine Lewis Scott.

Lawrence Scott Burwell, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Reston, VA, for defendant-appellee Eli Lilly *&*Company. Also represented by Charles E. Lipsey; Laura Pollard Masu-rovsicy, Washington, DC; Manisha A. De-sai, Eli Lilly and Company, Indianapolis, IN.

(Newman, Lourie, and Hughes, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### Harry Alphonso BOWLEG, Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Appellees

No. 17-5071

September Term, 2016

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed August 29, 2017

Harry Alphonso Bowleg, Nassau, BA, pro se.

R. Craig Lawrence, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Washington, DC, for Appellees.

BEFORE: Pillard and Wilkins, Circuit Judges, and Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief and appendix filed by appellant. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). Upon consideration of the foregoing and the motion for summary reversal and supplements thereto, the letter dated July 19, 2017, and the pleadings construed as requests for an appropriate order and appeal “de nova,” it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed October 21, 2016, be affirmed. The district court correctly determined the complaint is barred *525by res judicata and the statute of limitations. See Bowleg v. Department of Justice, 971 F.2d 765 (table) (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“Appellant’s claims related to the constitutionality -of his arrest, conviction and deportation are based on issues that were finally decided in prior actions, therefore those -claims are barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*.... [and his] challenges to the ... finding of deportability are barred by the statute of limitations.”) (italics in original and citations omitted). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining motions be dismissed as moot.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
**EXHIBIT 13.2**

----

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18      U.S.C. SECTION** **1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION** **906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the annual report      on Form 20-F of Wavecom SA (the “Company”) for the period ended      December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission      on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Chantal Bourgeat,      Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18      U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of his knowledge and belief:

|   | (1) | the Report fully complies          with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities          Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |   |                                                                                                                                                                   |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | (2)    | the information contained          in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial          condition and results of operations of the Company. |

Dated: April 7, 2005

|   | /s/ CHANTAL BOURGEAT |
|--------|----------------------|

|   | **Chantal Bourgeat,****Chief Financial Officer,****Wavecom SA** |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|

----
#### Devert C. FLOYD et al *v.*TOWN of MAYFLOWER, Arkansas, et al

74-78

511 S.W. 2d 490

Opinion delivered July 15, 1974

*Hartje & Hartje,*by: *Geo. F. Hartje Jr.,*for appellants.

*Bob Dawson,*for appellees.

CONLEY Byrd, Justice.

The town of Mayflower proceeded pursuant to Acts 1971, No. 298, to annex several hundred acres of land adjacent to the town. Appellants Devert C. Floyd, et al, brought this action in the chancery court to enjoin the action of the town and its officials. By an amendment appellants brought the county clerk and the county collector into the action on the theory that their acts in extending city taxes against appellants’ property amounted to a taking of private property without giving any *993compensation. Upon motion of the parties the chancellor transferred to the law docket that part of the action contesting the conduct of the election and the merits of the annexation but retained jurisdiction of that part of the complaint amounting to a collateral attack upon the annexation. When the collateral attack came on for trial in the chancery court, appellants proffered testimony to show that the city would be unable to furnish city services to the annexed area within three years as required by Acts 1971, No. 298. The chancellor sustained an objection to the proffered testimony on the theory that that matter had been transferred to the circuit court and dismissed the collateral attack for want of equity. For reversal appellants contend that Acts 1971, No. 298 is unconstitutional and that the chancellor should have heard their proffered testimony.

Acts 1971, No. 298 provides for annexation of territory by two-thirds vote of the governing body of a municipal corporation submitting the issue of annexation to the qualified electors living both in the city and the area to be annexed. The Act provides that any interested person may contest the annexation within 60 days after the election by filing a petition in the circuit court of the county. Appellants acknowledge that they had ample notice but here contend, without citing any authority, that the Act is unconstitutional because the burden of going forward with the proof is placed upon the objecting property owner. We find no merit in this contention.

Neither do we find merit in the contention that the chancellor should have heard the proffered proof because as we view the record the only matter to which the proof was directed had been transferred to the law docket. Consequently, appellants have no reason to here complain because on that issue they do not have a final decree or order from which to appeal that issue.

Affirmed.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-22-00013-CR

Valentin Torres Alvarez a/k/a Valentin Torres a/k/a Valentin Alvarez Torres

v.

The State of Texas

On Appeal from the

103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2017DCR2121

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

August 25, 2022
#### Alec Jaraun HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Assistant Warden Brian P. BLANCHARD, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Assistant Warden Jimmy Smith, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Warden Edward Smith, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Regional Director Gilbert Campuzano; Assistant Regional Director F. Fuster; et al, Defendants-Appellees

*407No. 14-51313

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 26, 2017

Alex JaRaun Howard, Pro Se

Christopher Lee Lindsey, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Law Enforcement Defense Division, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees

Before JONES, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Alex JaRaun Howard, Texas prisoner # 1684856, moves this court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in this interlocutory appeal of the magistrate judge’s denial of his request for appointed counsel. We must always be cognizant of our jurisdiction and must examine this issue sua sponte if necessary. *Mosley v. Cosby,*813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987).

We have jurisdiction to review only final decisions and specific types of interlocutory orders that are covered by the collateral order doctrine. *See*28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292; *Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.,*78 F.3d 920, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1996), Unless the parties have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), an order issued by a magistrate judge is typically not a final order directly appealable to this court. *Donaldson v. Ducote,*373 F.3d 622, 624-25 (5th Cir. 2004). Because Howard did not so consent, the magistrate judge’s denial of his IFP motion is not a final appealable order, and his IFP motion in this court is premature. *See id.*

The magistrate judge’s denial of Howard’s request for appointed counsel likewise is not a final appealable order. A district court’s order denying the appointment of counsel in a civil rights action may be appealed immediately. *Robbins v. Maggio,*750 F.2d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 1985). However, if a litigant seeks to challenge a magistrate judge’s denial of a request for counsel, he must first do so in the district court, unless the parties have consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. *See Fountain v. Rupert,*654 Fed.Appx. 195, 195 (5th Cir. 2016). Because Howard did not appeal the magistrate judge’s denial of his request for appointed counsel to the district court, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Howard’s interlocutory appeal from that order. *Id.*

Howard’s IFP motion is DENIED, and this appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

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UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11 - 7658

MARIA D. GARIBAY ,

Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. BEAUFORT COUNTY COURT SHERIFF; BIANCA HARRIS, Warden ,

Respondents

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. Terrence W. Boyle , District Judge. ( 5:10

- hc

- 2239

- BO )

Submitted : March 29, 2012 Decided: April 3, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Maria D. Garibay, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2

PER CURIAM:

Maria D. Garibay seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely her 28 U.S.C. § 225 4 (2006 ) petition . The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c )(1) ( A ) (200 6 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the dis trict court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85.

In h er informal brief, Garibay has faile d to address the district court’ s dispositive timeliness analysis
. Therefore, Garibay has forfeited appellate review of the district court ’ s ruling. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jesus Diaz CARDOZO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-10587 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 9, 2017

Suzanna Odette Etessam, Assistant U.S. Attorney, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Camille M. Knight, Burleson, Pate & Gibson, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

*354Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jesus Diaz Cardozo appeals the 27-month sentence imposed in connection with his conviction for illegal reentry following deportation. He argues that the district court plainly erred in applying the eight-level enhancement under former U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (2015). He contends that his prior conviction under Texas Penal Code (TPC) § 46.04 does not qualify as an aggravated felony because the Texas definitions of felony and firearm are broader than the definitions of those terms in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He concedes that this court rejected these arguments in the recent decision of *United States v. Castillo-Rivera,*853 F.3d 218,226 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc), *petition for cert, filed*(June 28, 2017) (No. 17-5054), and he raises the issue merely to preserve it for further review. The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance.

Summary affirmance is proper where, among other instances, “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” *Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,*406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). The summary procedure is generally reserved for cases in which the parties concede that the issues are foreclosed by circuit precedent. *See United States v. Lopez,*461 Fed.Appx. 372, 374 n.6 (5th Cir. 2012).

The motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
14270

#### KEELS v. CROSSWELL

(185 S. E., 39)

January, 1936.

*66
      *Mr. Prank K. Clarke,*for appellant. '

*Mr. Shepard K. Nash,*for respondent,

April 6, 1936.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Chief Justice Stabrer.

This action involves the construction of a deed. Under the authorities cited by him, especially *Clinkscales v. Clinkscales,*91 S. C., 59, 74 S. E., 121, *Egan v. Touchberry,*93 S. C., 569, 77 S. E., 706, and *Sandford v. Sandford,*106 S. C., 304, 91 S. E., 294, where the deeds construed were very similar to the one before us, Judge Greene was unquestionably correct in holding that a fee-simple estate was conveyed to D. W. Keels, which the grantor could not thereafter limit or cut down. The demurrer to defendant’s answer, therefore, was properly sustained. Let the decree be reported.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Messrs Justices Carter, Bonham, Baker and Fishburne concur.
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofDepomed, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, John W. Fara, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  The Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|        | Date: August 7, 2007    |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   |                    |   |
|   |                    |   |
|   | /s/ John W. Fara, Ph.D. |   |
|   | John W. Fara, Ph.D.     |   |
|   | President, Chairman and |   |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |   |

 

----
Craig R. ZOBEL, Appellant, v. Ann M. ZOBEL, Appellee.

No. 4D17-1866

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 17, 2018

Ralph T. White of Law Office of R.T. White, Palm Beach Gardens, for appellant.

Deanna V. Shuler of Deanna V. Shuler, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, and Kathryn M. Beamer of Kathryn M. Beamer, P.A., North Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

*Affirmed.*

Damoorgian, Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.
#### EQUILEASE COMPANY *v.*HATHCOCK.

1. Trial — Dismissal of Action — Dilatory Tactics — Abuse of Discretion.

Dismissal of action by court because plaintiff’s counsel did not appear at trial *held,*an abuse of discretion where plaintiff’s counsel, two days before trial was scheduled, had filed a written request for adjournment setting forth as one ground that he was scheduled to be in a circuit court on the same date, even though plaintiff had once before obtained an adjournment of trial without date, on his motion.

2. Costs — Dilatory Tactics.

No costs are awarded to plaintiff who is successful on appeal in having his case reinstated in the trial court after it was dismissed because of plaintiff’s attorney’s failure to appear at trial, where plaintiff was guilty of dilatory tactics before the trial date.

References for Points in Headnotes

[1] 24 Am Jur 2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit §§ 59, 64, 68.

[2] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 1009, 1013.

*725Appeal from Common Pleas Court of Detroit, Pernick (Joseph J.), J.

Submitted Division 1 June 6, 1968 at Detroit.

(Docket No. 4,870.)

Decided June 24, 1968.

Action by Equilease Company, division of Eltra Corporation, a foreign corporation, against Boyce Dale Hathcock for money due from defendant on a contract of guarantee. Action dismissed. Plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded for reinstatement and trial.

*Leo Papp,*for plaintiff.

*Kramer, Morris, Stark, Rowland <& Regan (Frederick B. Bellamy,*of counsel), for defendant.

Per Curiam.

May 1, 1967 action was commenced in common pleas court for the city of Detroit and defendant served thereafter with process. June 20, 1967 default judgment was entered. July 5, 1967 default judgment was set aside on defendant’s motion and thereafter the cause was set for trial on August 11,1967. August 10,1967 the court granted plaintiff’s motion for adjournment of trial without date. November 14, 1967 defendant filed a praecipe setting the matter for trial on November 27, 1967. November 25, 1967 plaintiff’s counsel filed a written request for adjournment setting forth as grounds therefor, *inter alia,*that he was scheduled to be in the Oakland county circuit court on November 27, 1967. "Without acting on this request and on November 27, 1967, the trial court dismissed the action for plaintiff’s nonappearanee on trial date. Plaintiff’s motions for reinstatement and for rehearing of the motion for reinstatement were denied.

*726On this record, we believe the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for reinstatement.

Reversed and remanded for reinstatement and trial, but without costs because of plaintiff’s dilatory tactics prior to trial date.

Quinn, P. J., and Fitzgerald and J. H. Gillis, JJ., concurred.
ex10-16.htm




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5
#### James Brackett et al., Appellants, *v.*George G. Wyman et al., Respondents.

(Argued September 22, 1871;

decided January term, 1872.)

Plaintiffs and defendants each had judgments against one John R. Wyman. Certain real estate of said Wyman was being sold at a foreclosure sale upon a mortgage, which was a prior lien to the judgment. Plaintiffs assigned to defendants their judgment, and agreed not to bid at the foreclosure sale, upon defendants executing to them an agreement to pay $600 in installments. Plaintiffs did not bid and the premises were purchased by defendants. Plaintiffs brought suit upon the agreement. *Held,*that plaintiffs’ agreement to abstain from bidding was unlawful as against public policy, and rendered the whole contract void.

*O. M. Benedict*for the appellants.

*Chwrles C. Judd*for the respondents.

Gray, C., reads for affirmance.

All concur. Judgment affirmed, with costs.