13

- 4177

Georges v. Peters



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

R ULINGS BY SUMMARY OR DER DO NOT HAVE PREC EDENTIAL EFFECT
. C ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J ANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S L OCAL R ULE 32.1.1. W HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE E ITHER THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE ( WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMA RY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNS EL
.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 27 th day of October , two thousand and fourteen

.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. K EARSE,

RICHARD C. WESLEY , DENNY CHIN ,

Circuit Judges

.

____________________________________________
FITZGERALD GEORGES , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,

- v. - No. 13

- 4177

BARBARA A. PETERS, P ETER GIARRIZZO, ELMSFORD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT , Defendant s

- Appellee s

.

____________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: BRYAN D. GLASS, Glass Krakower LLP, New York, NY.

### 2

FOR APPELLEE S : STEVEN C. STERN, Anthony F. Cardoso, Sokoloff Stern LLP, Carle Place, NY.

____________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ( Vincent L. Briccetti , J. ).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

.
Plaintiff

- Appellant Fitzgerald Georges br ought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981

and 1983 , and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 1 W ith
regard to Georges’ s Title VII race discrimination and First Amendment retaliation

claims , w e affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by t he district court in its

memorandum decision

. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Georges’ s retaliation claims under Ti tle
VII and § 1981 on an alternate ground. See Eichelberg v. Nat’ l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 57

F.3d 1179, 1186 n.6 (2d Cir. 1995)

. “In order to make out a prima facie case of retaliation,
a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence [1] particip ation in a
protected activity known to the defendant; [2] an employment action disadvantaging
the plaintiff; and [3] a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. , 248 F.3d 8 7, 94 (2d Cir.

1 “We review a district court’ s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inference s in that party’ s favor. ” Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc. , 643 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2011)

.

### 3

2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must establish but

- for causation to
prevail on a retaliation claim. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar , 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533

(2013).
Here, no reasonable jury could find that Georges had established a causal nexus
between the EEOC charge and his termination. We have held that “[w]here timing is
the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well

before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of

retaliation does not arise.” Slattery , 248 F.3d at 95. Prior to Georges filing his EEOC
charge, Appellees had written Georges multiple warning letters related to instances

where he had mishandled his job responsibilities, and his supervisor had notified
Georges o f her decision to recommend termination of his employment

. Georges cannot
establish a causal nexus between his EEOC charge and the Board of Education ’s

termination vote, an d therefore he has not made out a prima facie case of retaliation

. We have considered all of Georges’s contentions on this appeal and have found

them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED

.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk