The Honor able John D. Holschuh, Senior United States District J udg e for the Southern * District of Ohio, sitting by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0664n.06 F iled: Septem ber 5, 2006 No. 05-2151 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DEB ORAH SCOTT, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. T OT AL R E NA LC AR E , I NC
. , a f o re i gn corpor ation,
DAVI TA, I

NC., a for eig n corpor ation, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Before: G IBBO NS, ROGERS, Circ uit Jud ges; HOLSCHUH, District Judge. * ROGERS, Circ uit Jud ge. This i s a d i v er s ity action for

reta liatory

discharg e in violation of Michig an publi c policy and statutory

law. The plaintiff, Debor ah Scott, seeks r ever sal of the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt to the defendants, DaVita, I nc., S cott’s former employ er,
and To ta l Re na l Ca

re , Inc ., DaVi ta ’s c or

po rate pr e deces sor. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt i s aff irmed.No. 05-2151

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- 2 -

I.
On Marc h 26, 1996, Scott beg an wor king f or DaVita as a

social worke r. DaVita is a private, for- profit di aly sis clinic l ocate d in North Oakland, Michig an. S cott was ter minated on Fe bruar

y 5, 2004, alleg edly

in retaliation for

internal c omplaints to DaVita manag ement re lated to DaVita’ s inadequate staff

ing a nd rac ially

discriminatory

hiring prac tices.
Scott addresse d a letter to Reg ional Direc tor Martin Kona l, dated Jul y 8, 2003, complaining about var ious happen i n gs at Da Vi ta. Scott also enclosed a four- pag e letter

written by

co-w orker Marietta K

roll. Scott “ signe d and verifie d for acc urac y ” the letter by Kroll. Scott also “verif [i ed] po int s c ov e re d” in a

re c e nt m e e tin g wi th K on a l, Jane t Matsura (S c ott ’s the n- su

pe rv iso r) , a

nd Kr oll
. I n her letter to Konal, Scott complained about so-ca lled “cr itical issue[s] ,” such as a lack of

“ e no ug h sta ff

,” the hir ingof

ine xpe ri e nc e d s ta ff

, ma na g e me nt’ s c oe rc ion

of so me e mpl oy e e s to qu it the ir job s, and un sp e c if

ie d vio la tio ns of the e mpl oy e e ha nd bo ok and DaVi ta ’s “ va lue s. ” Th e se same
so rt s o f a lle g ati on s als o app e are d in Kr oll ’s le tte r, wh ic h w a s atta c he d to Sc ott ’s le tte r. Whil e discussing this letter in he r deposition, Scott emphasized DaVita’s ina dequate staffing
. I n N ov e mbe r o f

2 0 0 3 , S c o tt

m a d e a n a n ony mou s c omp la int

a bo ut D a Vi ta ’s sta ff

ingand so me oth e r p ra c tic e s to Mic hig an a uth or iti e s, bu t th e a

uth or iti e s d id n ot p ur su e Sc ott ’s c omp la int
. I n Dec ember

of 2 0 0 3 , S co t ts p o k e t o Ko n al an d ex p re s s edco n ce rn t h at Fa ci l i t y Ad m inistrator Ge ra ldo To dd , w ho a t the ti me w a s Sc ott ’s imm e diate su pe rv iso r, “ wa s te rm inatin g the wh iteNo. 05-2151

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- 3 - e mpl oy e e s a nd hir ing a ll bla c ks , and that he wa s fa vo ri ng the bla c k ra c e in g e nera l. ” Ko nal told Scott that he would revie w her complaint. Konal admitted in his de position that Todd had in f act been “ repla cing whites with blacks,” but Kona l was not tro u b l ed b y this because “the tea

m was predominantly

Cauca sian while the patients are 70 perc ent African America n. I thought that it was a positive thing f

or the unit to have a

better—a more diver se team.” Scott also broug ht up Todd’s alleg ed rac ial discrimination in a meeting in J anuar y of 2004 with People Service s Manag er Ma ry Nix on. Todd in his deposition denied any knowledg e of Scott’s
rac ial discrimination complaints.
I n a letter dated J anuar

y 28, 2004, addre ssed to Bob Schliche nmaier of Renal Ne twork 11, Scott accuse d colleague and U nit Secreta ry Kristin Clark of fa iling to provide important paper work in a tim e ly mann e r. Re na l Ne tw or k is an or g anizatio n tha t gathe rs inf or ma tio n on re na l c lin ic s in Mic hig an. I t is a

pr ivate , c oo pe rativ e a sso c ia tio n of cli ni cs and is not a pa rt of DaVi ta . Sc ott provided a

copy of her Renal Ne twork letter to Todd a nd others at Da

Vita.
Sc ott ’s le tte r t o Sc hli c he nma ie r s ta te d th a t Cla rk mis se d a Janu ary 12, 2 00 4, de a dli ne to complete r equire d data f

orms. Fur ther, Clark r equeste d an extended dea dline of January 16, but she missed that deadline too. A letter, dated J anuar y 28, stated t hat “we wil l need another ex tension for” Clark to do her w ork. The letter also stated that Scott a nd others wer e not at f

ault for the delay

but that Clark had f

ailed to re trieve the neede d information for the forms.
I n ear ly Fe bruar

y 2004, Todd saw the letter that Scott addre ssed t o Renal Network 11 for theNo. 05-2151

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- 4 - first time. He fax ed a c opy of it to Konal along wi t h a messag e that it contained untr uthful statements. Konal sa id in his deposition that he conside red Scott’s letter “unprof essional” a

nd that he thoug ht Scott’s letter

misrepre sented the c ompany . Konal and T odd discussed the letter . Todd made known to Konal his plan t o “g ive [ Scott] a wr itten warningfor that c onduct,” r efe rringto the letter.
On J anuar

y 29, 2004, Scott a

nd some of her

co-w orker s met with People Services Ma nag er Ma r y N ixo n . T h e me e ti n g ’ s a tt e n d e e s in c lu d e d N ixo n , Sc o tt , K r o ll , an d L in d a A ik e n . The employ ees c omplained that staff ing w as insufficie nt. Scott also complained that Todd wa s not
a pp ro a c ha ble , that mana g e me nt ha d tr e a te d so me e mpl oy e e s wi th “ fa vo ri tis m,” and

that Cla rk c ou ld not be depe nded on “to do any thing.” As noted above, at this mee ting Scott a lso broug ht up Todd’s alleg ed ra cial discrimination.
On Fe bruar

y 5, 20 0 4 , T o d d requested a mee ting with Scott. Acc ording to Todd’s documentation of the meeting , he met with Scott to “discuss a letter [she] had written on January 28, 20 04 ” to R e na l N e tw or

k 1 1 a s we ll a s so me me mor and a wr itt e n by Sc ott . T od d b ro ug ht a wi tne ss wi t h h i m , Marc ia Schweisthal, the Clinic Coordinator. Todd noted in his docume ntation for the
me e tin g tha

t “ [e]f fo rt s to fo c us on

the DaVi ta

va lue s v iol a tio ns such as I nte g ri ty , T e a m, Acc ountability , as we ll as Service E x cellenc e prove d unsucce ssful.” Ac cordingto Todd,
Th e se ssi on

qu ic kly dig re sse d to a

po int wh e re the DaVi ta

te a mmate me ntione d in the letter, Krist[ i] n Clark, Unit Secre tary , was a sked to join the discussion to clear up inconsistent comments made by [S cott]. At this point [ Scott] repe ated he r statement that Krist[i ]n i nformed her that all the re quested doc uments for the Rena l NetworkNo. 05-2151

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- 5 - wer e complete d. Krist[i ]n emphasiz ed that she made no such state ment to [ Scott] as we ll a s a sk e d wh y wi th a te a m of thr e e fu ll tim e c le ri c a l te a mmate s a nd on e pa rt tim e cler ical t ea m m at e she was sing led out by full name in [Scott’s] letter to the Rena l Networ k. Reg ardingthe completed documents, [S cott] stated to Krist[i] n, “You a re a lia r! ”
. . . [Sco tt] a

br up tly state d sh e fe lt that a ll thr e e te a mmate s ha d pla nn e d th is meeting in advanc e and was “ out to ge t her” . [S cott] st ated she would sue me if he r opinion proved cor

rec t. [Sco tt] th e n wa lke d ou t of the me e tin g and state d sh e wa s le a vin g the fa c ili ty fo r th e day . I

a sk e d [Sc ott ] not

to l e a ve the fa c ili ty

and to r e su me the me e tin g to br ingso me c los ur e . I a lso inf or me d [Sco tt] that if

sh e imm e diate ly

le ft the fa c ili ty for the d ay , I w o u ld v ie w th is a s jo b a b an d o n me n t o n h e r p art. [S c o tt ] st ated emphatica lly

she wa s having no part of the meeting and was leaving
. At this point Iag ain informed [Scott] that i f s h e l ef t the fa cility

Iwould view this as job abandonme nt and that I

would be forc ed to take appropr iate actions. [S cott] then for the first time abruptly

stated that she wa s sick with cold-l i k e s y mptoms and was leaving immediately
. Up to this point [S cott] not only appea red phy sically

healthy but also had not previously share d a desire to le ave the fa cility due to illness. Istated to [Sc ott ] that I wa s r e qu e sti ngthat sh e re ma in at N or th O a kla nd Di a ly sis fo r at le a st on e ho ur to co nc lud e the me e tin g ta sk s. F or a thi rd tim e , I inf or me d [Sc ott ] that if sh e le ft im med iate ly

Iwo uld vie w this a s jo b a

ba nd on me nt. [Sco tt] c on tin ue d to g ather her c oat and pe rsonal items and lef t the fac ility
. . . . I imm e diate ly c on ta c te d [and c on su lte d] my Re g ion a l Dir e c tor , Mar ty Ko na l, and my People Service s Manag er, Mary Nix on. . . . Following a promptly arr ang ed confe renc e ca ll with our DaVita L eg al Counselor, Steve Cooper, the dec ision was made to im me d iate ly

te r mi n a te D e b o r ah Sc o tt

d u e to jo b a

b an d o n me n t. A le tt er informing [S cott] of this decision wa s written by me and r eviewe d by Marty and Mary
. Ac co rd i n g t o t h e s wo rn d ec l ar at i o n o f S ch we i s t h al , s h e w i t n es s edt h e F eb ru ary 5 m ee t i n g. I t wa s “ Mr
. To dd ’s pr a c tic e ” to br ing a wi tne ss “ wh e n he me t w ithind ivi du a l e mpl oy e e s to dis c us s perf ormanc e im proveme nt or di sciplinary issues.” Schweisthal st ated that during the meeting Todd attempted to discuss with Scott “a letter she had sent to R en al Network 11 on DaV ita stationeryNo. 05-2151

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- 6 - blaming . . . U nit Secreta

ry Kris Clark for

the fa cility ’s fa ilure to provide certain information to the Ne tw or k in a tim e ly mann e r. ” To dd

a lso a tte mpt e d to br ingup a me mo b y

Sc ott on the same
su bje c t. T od d “ tr ie d to e xpla in” to S c ott tha t “ sh e sh ou ld h a ve sp ok en to him fi rs t [a bo ut t he se
ma tt e r s ], th a t s h e h a d

v io late d th e p r o p e r

c h a in o f c o mm an d , an d

th a t h e r a c ti o n s h a d

b e en
unacc eptably

disrespec tful to a co-w orker .”
Acc ording to Schweisthal, “Clark knocked on the door with a question for Mr. Todd, a

nd Mr. Todd asked he r to jo i n t h e m ee ting. Unf ortunately , the meetingthen bec ame e ven more
acr imonious.” Sc hweisthal stated that “ Scott accuse d Ms. Clark of lying,” and Todd a dmonished her f or making an off

ensive comment to a co-wor ker. I n Schweisthal’s telling “Scott then said, ‘T hat’ s it , I ’m do ne .’ Mr
. To dd re sp on de d that ‘w e are n’ t f ini sh e d. ’” Sc ott

be g an to le a ve and

“ sa id that she was g oing to file a g rieva nce a nd a lawsuit,” a ccor ding to Schwe isthal. Scott t hen said “ I ’m ill , I ’m g oin g ho me .” Ac c or din g to S c hw e istha l:
Mr. Todd cle arly

told Ms. Scott that if she l eft before he wa s finished with what he had to say

to her, he would consider he r to have abandone d her job. Ms. Scott lef t the fa cility

any way . Mr. Todd re peate d this two more ti mes as he followed her down the ha llw ay

to h e r o ff ic e . I fo llo we d the m dow n the ha llw ay . She c los e d th e do or in h i s fa ce . S h e c am e o u tap p ro x i m at el y t en m i n u t es l at er

an d l ef tt h e b u i l d i n g.
J ust before leaving , acc ording to Schweisthal’s conte mporane ous, h an d written ac count of the incident, Scott “told a teammate she wa s leaving for lunch.”
Acc ording to the decla

ration of Clark, she was present at the Fe bruar y 5 meeting involving To dd , Sc ott , a

nd Sc hw e istha l. C lark

state d th a t th e “ me e tin g wa s, in pa rt , a bo ut a le tte r M s. Sc ottNo. 05-2151

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- 7 - ha d w ri tte n to Ren a l Ne tw or k 11 ab ou t missi ng do c ume ntatio n for wh ic h she bla me d me. . . . [Sc ott ] called m e a l i ar . ” Acc ording to Clark, Scott denied ca lling Clark a liar, but was c ontradicte d by To dd , Sc hw e istha l, a

nd Cla rk , who e a c h “sa id Ye s y ou did ,” a c c or din g to C lark ’s c on te mpo ra ne ou s, handwr itten acc ount of the eve nt. Scott then announced, “ That’s it, I ’m done.” Be for e S cott left “Scott announce d that she wa s g oing to lunch.”
Sc ott ’s a c c ount o f t

he F e br ua ry 5 me e tin g dis a g re e s w iththe a c c ounts of To dd , Sc hw e istha l,
and Cla rk in s e ve ra l of

its de ta ils . Sc ott

state d th a t T od d cal led her int o a me e tin g to d isc us s de le g ati ng back to t

he se c re tari e s so me of

the wo rk loa d th a t ha d s hif te d to oth e rs . A c c or din g to Sc ott , s he wa s “ g e tti ngre a dy to l e a ve fo r t

he da y ” be c a us e sh e wa s il l. S c ott “ sa id I wa s g oin g to be lea ving e arly , and basica lly Iwas g etting r eady to leave,” but Todd “ca

me in and said, we ll, I ’d l i k e y o uj u s tt o t ak e am i n u t e, y o ukn o w, wo u l d y o ugrab y o u r c o ff

ee o r w h at ev er , i two n ’t t ak e l o n g, Iwant to talk to y ou.” S cott in her deposition related that Schweisthal wa s alrea dy in the meeting room when Scott and Todd a rrived, a nd that Clark ar

rived be fore the meetingbeg an.
I n Sco tt ’ s r e c o ll e ction, the meetingwas “ short-lived.” Todd be came “abusive ” and the others shot “ g lance s towards eac h other, kind of smili ng and snickering ” in a manner that Scott disl iked. Todd told Scott t hat she “ wasn’t a team play er.” Scott in her deposition attributed her la ck of “ team p l ay er ” s t at u s i nT o d d ’s ey es n o tt o h er co mp l ai n t s i n t h e R en al Ne t wo rk l et t er b u t t o h er “r es i s t i n g, y ou know, taking on all of these r esponsibiliti es, and y ou know, for c lerica l tasks and the f act that Iwas try ing to move f

orwa rd to allow the sec reta

ries to take the se sec reta

rial re sponsibili ties back, that that somehow I

was not a te am play er . . . .”No. 05-2151

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- 8 - Scott responded by

saying, “ y ou know, Ger aldo, I ’m sorry , y ou know I ’m sick, I ’m leaving and that’s it, y ou know.” She also said, “I ’m sick, I ’m g oing home, I have the rig ht to go home , and Iam not go i n g t o b e— I ’m n o t goingto sit here and be abused by y ou and I

g ot up and left.” Acc ording to Scott, Todd followed her w hile scre aming
. Scott told Todd t hat she would “ take a brief lunch hour a

nd Iwill come bac k, y ou k n o w, but Ihave to g o to the doctor.” Scott said in her depos it io n th a t s h e d id n o t r e me mb e r w h e th e r T o d d to ld h e r th a t s h e w o u ld b e f ir ed for “job abandonme nt” if she lef

t without permission. L ater in her deposition, S cott ag ree d with opposing counsel’s que stion that Todd told he r “that if y ou left, he w ould consider it an a ct of ter mination,” with the following response , “Ye ah, but I didn’t leave .” When a sked by opposing c ounsel whethe r she left, she said, “No. I just lef t f or my lunch hour, which is w hat he told me to do, and come ba ck, which is what I

did.”
Acc ording to Scott, she left the clinic and w ent to Coney I sland and then came back to the clinic about twenty

minutes later. She cla ims that she wrote Todd a note telling him how to re ach her a nd informing Todd that she “w as g oing to my doctor’s a

nd that’s what I

did.” S cott said in her deposition that sh e m i s s ed wo rk for the remainde r of F ebrua ry 5 and the f

ull day on Fe bruar

y 6,
c a lli ngin s ic k, bu t ha d n o id e a that sh e ha d be e n te rm inate d o n F e br ua ry 5. “ Ijus t c on tin

ue d to c a ll in sick,” she sa id. DaVita co-wor kers informed S cott via t elephone that her termination had bee n
announce d and that the c ompany website listed her

positio n as v aca

nt. Scott remarke d in her deposition that her memory of t he events surrounding the Februa ry 5 meeting is “kind of muddled.”
I n a letter

dated F ebrua

ry 5, 2004 and sent to Scott’s addre ss, Todd terminated Scott’sNo. 05-2151

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- 9 - employ ment with the clinic. The le tter re ads: “T h i s letter ser ves as of ficial notification of y our termination from DaVita North Oa kland Dialy sis facility eff ective immediate ly . The re asons cited for your termination are the result of unprof essional conduc t resulting in job aba ndonment on y our behalf .” Todd, in his deposition, t estified, “O nce I made the de cision to terminate De borah Scott, I confe rre d with o u r P eo p l e Service Manag er, my manag er, the leg al depa

rtment in DaVita just for clar ification. . . .” In his deposition, Konal expl ained that he , Todd, Nix on, and Cooper disc ussed the prope r re sponse to Scott’s decision to walk off the j ob. Everyone agr eed that Scott could be f ired for he r conduc t, and Nix on rec ommended that she be terminated. A ccor ding to Kona l, Todd made the ultimate decision to terminate Scott. Company rec ords s h o w t h at Ko n al , Ni x on, and DaVita Vice President Gre g Har tman administratively

approve d Scott’s termination for pa y roll purposes. Todd c reated a ter minati on repor t expl aining Scott’s te rmination as follows: “ [a] bandoned job, walked out duringperf ormanc e manag ement plan discussion.” K onal stat ed i n his deposition that “job abandonment” me ans “[l] eavingthe fa cility

without permission.” Konal also implied that t he clinic ha s never fired a ny employ ee othe r than Scott for “ job abandonment.” Nix on said in her deposition that the clinic has no policy perta ining to “job a

bandonment.”
Scott filed this s u i t fol lowing he r termination. He r complaint set for th three c ounts, eac h alleg ing r etaliatory

discharg e. Scott claimed in the c omplaint that by reta liating a g ains t her,No. 05-2151

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- 10 - defe ndants violated (1) Michig an’s Whistleblowers’ Protec tion Act, M i ch. C omp. L aws § 15.361 et seq. ; (2) Michig an public policy ; and (3) Michiga n’s El liott-L arse n Civil Rights Act ( EL CRA), Mich. Comp. L aws § 37.2101 et seq . The district court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of defendants and dismiss ed the case. Re g ard ingSc ott ’s wh ist le blo we r c la im, the dis tr ic t c ou rt ob se rv e d th a t th e Whis tle blo we rs ’ Protection Act (WPA) forbids employ ers from reta liating ag ainst employ ees for r eporting violations of l aw to a pub li c b o dy . Sc o tt a ll e g e d th a t D a V it a

f ir e d h e r in r e ta li a ti o nf

o r r e p o rti n g D a V ita ’s inadequate staff

ing, a mong othe r problems, to State authorities. The dist rict court held that Scott’s whistleblower c laim should be rejecte d beca use she had failed to produce evidenc e tendingto prove
a c a us a l c on ne c tio n bet ween he r t e rm inatio n a nd he r c omp la int s to the State . Sc ott ha d me re ly sh ow n th a t sh e wa s te rm inate d a ft e r he r c omp la int s, no t be c a us e of the m, w hic h is ins uf

fi c ie nt t o raise a g enuine dispute ove r ca

usation.
The district cour

t held that Scott’s public policy -base d claim could not proce ed bec ause the WPA i s t h e e xc l u s i v e c a

u s e o f a c t i o n g o v e r

n i n g e mp l o y e r r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t e mp l o y e e s f o r the ir repor ts of leg al violations to publi c bodies. Rea soning that Scott’s e x cl usive ca use of a ction lies with the WP A, t he dis trict court held that she m ay not bring a publi c poli cy -base d action g rounded in the Michig an Public Hea lth Code. Reg arding Scott’s EL CRA claim, the district court held that Scott “ca nnot establish a prima fac ie c a s e o f

r e t a l i a t i o nu n d e r ” E LC RA “ an d t h u s h e r r e t a l i a t i o nc l a i m s m u s tb e d i s m i s s e d
. ” InNo. 05-2151

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- 11 - particula r, Scott had fa iled to establish a ca usal conne ction b etwee n Scott’s complaints of rac ial discri m i n at i o n and her

termination. Scott’s whole ar g ument for suc h causation, the district court observe d, “re lied solely

on the proxim ity

in time between he r Nove mber 2003, De cembe r 2003, and J anuar y 2004 complaints about possible rac ial discrimination and her Fe bruar y 5, 2004 discharg e.” Reasoning that time-order , without more, is insufficient to cre ate a g enuine dispute ove r ca

usation, the district court dismissed the ca se.
Th is a pp e a l f oll ow e d. Sc ott

do e s n ot a

pp e a l th e di sm is sal o f h e r WPAc la im. Sc ott
c ha lle ng e s o nly

the dis mis sa l of

the pu bli c po lic y

and EL CRA c la ims . Wit

h r e sp e c t to the pu

bli c policy claim, in this appea l Scott challeng es i ts dismiss al onl y to the ex tent that the claim is based on her inter

nal complaints to her Da

Vita superior s.

II.
“This court revie ws the gra nt of summary

judgme nt de novo.” Ree ves v. Swift T ransp. Co., Inc. , 446 F.3d 637, 640 ( 6th Cir. 2006). “The judg ment soug ht s h al l b e rende red f orthwith if the pleading s, depositions, answers t o i nterrog atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the
a ff ida vit s, if any , sho w that the re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any ma te ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ingpa

rt y is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c)
.

A . The district cour

t properly dismiss ed Scott’s claim for reta liatory

discharg e in violation ofNo. 05-2151

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- 12 - Mich ig an p u

b li c p o li c y b e c a

u s e n o la w o r p o li c y te ll s M ic h ig an e mp lo y e r s th a t th e y must not
re ta liate a g a ins t e mpl oy e e s w ho re po rt le g a l vi olatio ns to t

he ir su pe rv iso rs . This court’s unpublished opinion in Cushman-Lagerstrom v. Citiz en s Insurance Co. of America , 7 2 F e d
. A p p x . 3 2 2 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) , i s o np o i n ti na l l r e s p e c t s an d i s p e r s u a s i v e . In Cushman-Lagerstrom , this co u rt reje cted the pla intiff’s ar g ument—advanc ed her e by Scott—that it is g ener ally contra

ry to Michiga

n public policy

to fire a n employ ee f

or re porting violations of the law to superior s. Compare id. at 328, with Appellant’s B r. at 24-26.
The Cushman-Lagerstrom court a ssumed that the plaintiff had reporte d actua l or impending Mi ch i gan I n s u ra n ce C o d e v i o l at i o n s b u tn ev er t h el es s wa s “n o tp er s u ad ed that Michig an has pr ovided a ‘public policy ’ ca

use of a ction for an employ ee who is discha rg ed for repor

ting violations of law to a superior .” Id. The court supplied two rea sons for this conclusion, both of which a pply to Scott’s
ana log ou s c la im. First, the Cushman-Lagerstrom court noted that the repor ting of Michig an Insuranc e Code violations to one’s superiors at work wa s not list ed among the rec og nized g rounds for public policy reta liatory

discharg e cla ims. Id. at 328-29. Clai m s o f retaliatory discharg e base d on Michig an pu bli c po lic y

may re ly on the fo llo wi ngthr e e g ro un ds on ly : (1) the e mploy ee is discha rg ed in violat ion of an e x plicit legislative state ment prohibiting discha

rg e of e mploy ees w ho act in ac corda nce w ith a s t atut ory

rig ht or duty , (2) the e mploy ee is discha rg ed for the failure or ref

usal to violate t he law in the course of employ

ment, [or] (3) the e mploy ee is discharge d fo r ex erc ising a rig ht c on fe rr e d b y

a we ll- e sta bli sh e d le g isl a tiv e e na c tme nt.No. 05-2151

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- 13 - Id. at 3 2 8 (q u o t i n g Ed

e lbe rg v . Le c o Co rp ., 599 N.W.2d 785, 786-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)). The Cushman-Lagerstrom court noted that the fac tual situation pres en t ed i n that case simply did not match any

of these thr ee public policy g rounds for a

claim. Id. That is true he re a s well. The f eder al regulations cited by Scott in her brief gove rn di aly sis clinics’ st aff ing and s anitation levels; they do not expl icitly

cre ate a duty or rig ht of employ ees to re port violations to thei r s u periors. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.2162(b)( 3) and § 405.2163(d) . J ust as the Cushman-Lagerstrom pla int if f’ s r e po rt s
o f Ins u ra n ce C o d e v i o l at i o n s d i d n o tm at ch t h e p u

b l i c p o l i cy

gro u n d s fo r are t al i at o ry d i s ch ar ge claim, neither

do Scott’s reports matc h them. Michig an publi c poli cy does not protec t Scott’s right to make such c omplaints to her employ er. Second, Cushman-Lagerstrom noted that no “contr olling or pe rsuasive Michig an ca se law” had “e x tended the public policy exception [ to at-will employ ment] t o discharg es in reta liat i o n for repor ting violations of law to sup er i o rs ” i n general. 72 F ed. Appx. at 328-29. That re mains true tod ay and re qu ir e s a ff

ir manc e of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.
I n draw ing this conc lusion, the Cushman-Lagerstrom court he ld inapplicable the two c ases
on which Scott pr incipally relies. Those two ca ses ar e W atassek v. M

ichigan Departme nt of Mental He alt h , 372 N.W.2d 617 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), and Meury v. Connie Kalitta Services/Ame rican International Airways, Inc ., No. 97-1877, 1999 U.S. App. L EXI S 21188 (6th Cir. May 20, 1999)

. Ap p el l an t ’s Br
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- 14 - W atassek he ld t hat Mi c hig an c omm on

law p ri or

to t he WPA’ s p a ssa g e c re a te d a pu bli c policy cause of ac tion for retaliatory discharg e where a n employ er f

ires an e mploy ee f

or re porting leg al violations to supervisors. See 372 N.W.2d at 621. Meury cur s o ri l y ad o p t ed the position of W atassek in this reg ard a s an alter native g round for

its de cision that an employ ee w ho had bee n fired for r eporting violations of federa l aviation reg ulations had a public policy -base d cause of ac tion for reta liatory

discharg e under

Michig an law. 1999 U.S. App. L EXI S 21188, at *4-*5. Cushman-Lagerstrom de mon str a te d th a t W atassek is unp e rs ua siv e and ha d b e e n e sse nti a lly reje cted in all re levant re spects in subsequent Michig an cour t case s.
The W atassek court r e a s o n e d

th a t the 1981 passag e of the Whis tleblowers’ Protection Act (“ WP A”) afte r the plaintiff’s 1976 ter mination meant that there must have e xiste d p ri or

the re to a c omm on law c ounte rp art

to t he WPA: c on se qu e ntl y , it he ld that a public policy

claim for disc harg e in re taliation for re porting viol at i o n s to a superior ( i.e., a c ommon law counter part to the WPA) was available in 1976. Id. at 620. The c o u rt wa s s ilent as to whether such a c ommon law claim survived the WP A’s passa g e, which e s s en t i al l y limit ed the r eac h of its holding to dischar g es o cc u rr i ng befor e the WPA’s passag e in 1981. Plaintiff’s dischar g e, on the other hand, occur

red in 2000, w ell afte r the pa ssag e of the WP A. Ther efor e, W atassek is not controlling. . . . We find more per suasive Covell v. Spe ngler , 141 Mich. App. 76, 366 N.W.2d 76, 79-80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) ( holding that no c o m m o n -l aw c ause of action for

a discharg e in retaliation for reporting violations exis ted before passag e of the WP A, which ther eaf

ter be came the exclusive reme dy for a n employ ee w hose employ ment is t e rm inate d in re ta liatio n f or re po rt ingan e mpl oy e r’ s v iol a tio n o f t he law) , a s w e ll a s Sh utt le wor th v . R iv e rsi de Os te op ath ic Ho sp ., 191 Mic h
. Ap p . 2 5, 477 N.W.2d 45 3, 45 4- 55 (M ic h. Ct. Ap p. 19 91 ) ( de c lin ingto f ind a c omm on law c ounte rp art

to the WPA). I ndeed, Shuttleworth specific ally criticized the W

atas s ek court’s approa ch, which i t v i ew ed as “nothing more than an attempt to give pr eena ctment eff ect to a statutory

rig ht by fabr icating a supposed pr ee x i sting c ommon-law rig ht wholly from t h e p ro v i sions of the subsequently enac ted statute.” Id. a t 4 5 5
. WeNo. 05-2151

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- 15 - there fore hold that Michiga n does not rec og nize a common law cause of action for an employ ee w ho has bee n discharg ed for repor ting violations of law to a superior.
72 Fe d. Appx. at 329-30 (footnote omitted). Cushman-Lagerstrom fu rt he r h e ld t hat Me ur y ’s cur sory alternative holding wa s also unpersua sive insofar a s it adopted the view of W atassek
. Id. at 329. Cushman-Lagerstrom thus he ld that “Michig an does not re cog nize a common law ca use of a ction fo r a n e mpl oy e e wh o h a s bee n disc ha rg e d for re po rt ing vio la tio ns of law t o a su pe ri or ” in g e ne ra l. Id. at 330.
Sc ott ’s pu bli c po lic y

c la im c ann ot b e dis tin g uis he d f ro m Cushman-Lagerstrom. Scott, like the plaintiff there, cites the unper suasive ca ses of W atassek and Me ur y , and no other s, to support her
asse rt i o n that her c ause of action is cog nizable. Appellant’s B r. at 24. Just as the Cushman-Lagerstrom plaintiff had br oug ht no cog nizable publ i c policy claim for r etaliatory discharg e, neither

has Scott done so.
There fore , the dist ri ct co u rt did not err whe n it dism issed Scott’s Michiga n public policy
c la im b a se d o n h e r i nte rn a l c omp la int s.
B . Scott’s E L CRA c laim pr esents no g enuinely disputed issue of mater ial fac t beca use Scott has not supplied sufficient Rule 56 evide nce to de monst ra t e a causal conne ction betwee n her r acia l discrimination complaints and her te rmination, as is require d to establish a prima fac ie ca se under EL CRA. Se e Ba rre tt v . Ki rtl an d Cm ty . Co ll. , 628 N.W.2d 63, 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).No. 05-2151

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- 16 - Th e e le me nts of

a pr ima fa c ie c a se un de r E L CRA are a s f oll ow s: (1) that the plaintiff eng ag ed in a pr otected a ctivity , (2) that this was known by the defe ndant, (3) that the defe ndant took an employ ment action adve rse to the plaintiff, and (4) th at there was a

causa l connec tion between the protec ted ac tivity and the adver se employ

ment action.
Id. Arguably , the first and second ele ments are met, respe ctively , beca use Scott complained a

bout alleg ed illeg al ra cial discrimination, and beca use Konal and N ix on (both of whom appr oved Todd’s termination of Scott) knewabout Scott’s complaints. The third el ement is met beca use Scott’s termination qualifies a s an adve rse e mploy ment action.
Ev e n a ssumin g , h ow e ve r, that the fi rs t, s e c on d, and thi rd pr ima fa c ie e le me nts are me t, S c ott has not sufficie ntly

established the f

ourth eleme nt, i.e., a causal connection betwee n her te rmination
an d her discr imination complaints. The Michiga n Supreme Court’s re cent opinion in G a r g v. Macom b County Community Mental He alth Service s is analog ous to this case and suppor ts the conclusion that Scott has not adequa tely est ab l i shed the re quired c ausal c onnection betwe en her termination and her rac ial discrimination complaints. See 696 N.W.2d 646, 660-61 (Mich. 2005).
I n Ga rg , the Michig an Sup re m e C o u rt held that the e mploy ee pla intiff had supplied insufficient e vidence to establish a ca usal conne ction betwee n her supe rvisor’s de nial of a promotion reque st and her f

iling of a n internal g rieva

nce. Id. The G ar

g p l ai n t i ff h ad filed a g rieva nce complaining that she had suf fer ed discrimination in e mploy ment on the basis of he r national orig in. Id. at 655. The Garg plaintiff’s super visor, Kent Cathcar

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- 17 - without investigation. Id. at 651. Cathcar t subsequently denied one of the Ga rg pla int if f’ s r e qu e sts for pr omotion. Id. at 651. The plaintiff filed other promotion r equests involvin g fo u r o ther supervisors. Id. at 651, 660. These other promoti on reque sts wer e denied as we ll. Id. These othe r four supe rvisors “ha d no knowledg e of pla intiff’s g rieva nce.” Id. The Michig an Supreme Court held on these facts t hat “a juror could not re asonably conclude that the re asons behind the denials within [the place of employ ment] were r elated to the g rieva nce,” be c a us e no e vid e nc e “ su g g e st[e d] any dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n th e pr omo tio n d e nia l th a t oc c ur re d w hil e plaintiff was in Cathca

rt’s cha in of command a

nd those denials involving supe rvisors who had no knowledg e of pla intiff’s g rieva nce.” Id. at 660. The supervisors who lacke d knowledg e of the Ga rg plaintiff’s g rieva

nce c onsequently

“could not have ‘re taliated’ aga inst plainti ff f or its filing.” Id. Moreove r, the Ga rg

pla int if f’ s q ua lif ic a tio ns ha d n ot “ c ha

ng e d in any me anin g fu l w ay

in t he tim e betwee n the [promotion] denial by Cathcar t and the denia ls by

the other supe rvisors.” Id.
Since the Ga rg plaintiff had been treate d the s ame by all supervisors, a

nd her qua lifications had not materially chang ed, the plaintiff had only one basis for a sserting that Cathcar t had re taliated ag ainst her f

or filing a g rievan ce : time-order , i.e., the g rieva nce pr ece ded Cathca

rt’s promotion denial. See id. at 660-61. B ut time-order is insuffi ci en t as a m atter of law to establish a c ausal
connec tion between an adve rse e mploy ment action and pr otected a ctivity
. Id. There fore , no juror could re asonably

find that Cathcar

t’s promotion denials wer e ca usally related to the g rieva

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usation is sue in this case. H ere , Scott’s termination involved three supervisors (K onal, Nixon, and Todd) and one company lawy er (Cooper) , all of whom ag ree d that Scott could be fi re d fo r job abandonment but only two of whom knewabout Scott’s rac ial dis c ri min a tio n c omp la int s. Ko na l and Ni xon a lon e kn e w a

bo ut S cot t’ s compla int s. Simi larl y , in Ga rg five super

visors denied the pla intiff’s re quests for pr omotion but onl y one, C at h ca rt, knew about the plaintiff’ s g rieva nce. Just as no evidenc e in Ga rg sug g ested a

ny distinction between the promotion denials by

Cathcar t and the fou r o t h er s upervisors, he re no e vidence sug g ests such a distinction between Kona l’s an d Ni x on’s position favoring termination and Todd’ s and Cooper’ s identical inclination. Just as the Ga rg su pe rv iso rs a ll tre a te d th e pla int if f t he same wa

y re g a rd le ss of whe ther they

knew a bout her g rieva n ce , h er e Konal, Nixon, Todd, and Cooper all ag ree d that Scott could be fire d for job aba ndonment reg ardle ss of whethe r they knew a bo u t her ra cial discrimination complaints. I n Ga rg , no jur o r could re asonably find that Cathcar

t’s denial of promotion had any

thing to do with the g rieva nce. L ikewise, in this case Todd’s and Cooper ’s ag ree ment that Scott could be fire d, despite not knowing abo u t her c omplaints, prevents any
re a so na ble inf e re nc e of a c a us a l c on ne c tio n b e tw e e n Sc ott ’s te rm inatio n a nd he r c omp la int s.
On e mig ht argue tha t Ga rg is disti ng uishable fr om this case by pointing out that in Ga rg
su c c e ssi ve su

pe rv iso rs de nie d p ro mot ion s a pp are ntl y without Ca thc art ’s inp ut, wh ile in t his c a se Scott’s superiors c onsulted eac h other. Kona l and Nixon, t he ar g ument could be made , might have reta liated ag ainst Scott for her complaints by convincing Todd and C ooper to fire Scott. But such
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- 19 - Konal or Nix on compromised Todd’s or C ooper’ s independe nt judgment. Nor has Scott produce d any Rule 56 evidenc e that would support such a n argument, such a s eli cited deposition testimony from Todd or Coope r that he was ambivalent about firing Scott be fore coming under pr essure from Konal or N ix on. Second, Todd’s pr eliminary decision to f ire Scott must have been ma de indepe ndent of a ny influence from Kona l or Nix on beca use Todd war

ned Scott that she could be terminated be for e he consulted Konal and Nix on. The re cord indicates, there fore , that Todd arr ived at his initial decision to te rminate Scott just as independe ntly as t h e f o ur Ga rg supervisors who de nied the plaintiff’ s promotion requests ar

rived at their dec isions. A n d t h e u ndisputed testimony of Kona l stated that To d d al so made the ultimate de cision to terminate Scott. On this recor d, Ga rg cannot be distinguished fr om this c as e o n the basis that Konal or Nix on unduly

influence d Todd or Cooper. Garg thus supports the co n clusion that Scott has not produced suf ficient Rule 56 evide nce of
causation to survive summary judgme nt. Scott has not e stablished a prima fac ie case for r etaliation under EL CRA.
III . For the fore g oing r easons, the district c ourt’s judg ment is affirme d.