* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

DEC 10 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

GLENDA G. KNIGHT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-7037

(D.C. No. CV-96-18-S)

(E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-

Claimant Glenda Knight appeals from the district court’s order affirming

the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for disability benefits and

supplemental security income. Claimant alleged disability from July 1992

due to a back injury, pain in her knees and foot, carpal tunnel syndrome, and

hypertension. In a decision which became the final decision of the Secretary,

the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that claimant had severe

impairments, but that her condition did not meet or equal the criteria of the

listings in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. Determining claimant not

disabled at step four of the five-step sequential process, see Williams v. Bowen,

844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), the ALJ concluded that claimant could

return to her past relevant work as a department manager, cashier, and sales clerk

for Wal-Mart, or as a home provider.

On appeal, claimant asserts that (1) the ALJ erred in determining that

claimant could return to her past relevant work without making the appropriate

findings; (2) the ALJ failed to give the proper consideration and weight to the

opinions of claimant’s treating physicians; and (3) the ALJ’s credibility

determination was not based on substantial evidence.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whether her

factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a
-3-

whole and whether she applied the correct legal standards. See Andrade v.

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1047 (10th Cir. 1993). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion. See Castellano v. Secretary of Health &

Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotation

omitted). “In addition to a lack of substantial evidence, the Secretary’s failure

to apply the correct legal standards, or to show us that she has done so, are also

grounds for reversal.” Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996).

Because we agree that the ALJ failed to make the necessary findings regarding

the requirements of claimant’s past relevant work, and in addition, failed to give

the proper weight and consideration to the opinions of claimant’s treating

physicians, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

When determining disability at step four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ

must first assess claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and then determine

whether claimant can perform her past relevant work in light of the limitations

found. See id. at 1023-25 (discussing the three phases of step four in detail). 

Here, the ALJ determined that claimant could stand and/or walk and/or sit six

hours in an eight-hour work day, lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds

frequently, and occasionally stoop, squat, kneel, crouch, and crawl. See

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17.
-4-

At the second phase of the step-four analysis, the ALJ must develop the

record with “‘factual information’” regarding the actual work demands of the

claimant’s past relevant work, and whether, given the claimant’s physical and/or

mental limitations, the claimant can meet those demands. See Winfrey, 92 F.3d

at 1024 (quoting SSR 82-62, Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. Rulings 1975-1982, at 812). 

Here, the ALJ merely stated that the work activities of claimant’s past relevant

work were not precluded by the limitations stated. The ALJ made no findings

regarding the actual work-activity demands of claimant’s past relevant work and

how claimant’s impairments would relate to those demands. Because we cannot

reweigh the evidence, see Castellano, 26 F.3d at 1028, or make factual

determinations on behalf of the ALJ, and because the ALJ’s lack of specific

findings here leaves us nothing to review, see Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1025, we must

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Having determined the need for a remand, we now consider claimant’s

challenges to the first phase of the step-four analysis, determination of claimant’s

RFC, and whether further correction on remand is needed. Claimant alleges that

the ALJ failed to consider or give the proper weight to the opinions of her

treating physicians. We agree.

In June 1979, claimant had surgical repairs of the bilateral chronic

subluxating patellae of both knees by Dr. George W. Carlson, an orthopedic
-5-

surgeon. When as late as 1986, claimant continued to have pain in her right knee,

Dr. Carlson determined that a joint replacement would be the only effective

treatment available.

In July 1992, claimant sustained a back injury in a work-related accident

at Wal-Mart. Dr. Carlson diagnosed a herniated disc at L5-S1. At the

recommendation of Dr. Nathan Bradley, a consultative orthopedic surgeon,

claimant decided against surgery and entered a work hardening program in Tulsa

in February 1993. In her report, the physical therapist in Tulsa stated that

claimant had attempted to relieve her pain through physical therapy, exercises,

electrical stimulation, and a TENS unit, all without success. She reported that

although claimant had a prescription for Darvocet, it did not help much. She had

also tried muscle relaxers, but gave up due to stomach irritation. Relying on an

intake interview, a job analysis, and a series of performance tests, the physical

therapist suggested work hardening with the goal that claimant could return to

work for Wal-Mart, but in a different position “since her previous job as

Department Manager required a lot of lifting, carrying, pushing and pulling.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 146.

Following her return from two weeks of work hardening in Tulsa, claimant

experienced a failed work attempt, and finally, on September 30, 1993, when she

had not significantly improved, Dr. Bradley performed a L5-S1 laminotomy and
-6-

diskectomy, left, and a L5-S1 TSRH instrumentation and fusion on claimant’s

back. Because claimant’s continuing knee problems were exacerbated by her

back rehabilitation regime, in February 1994, Dr. Bradley reported that claimant

was limited in her ability to work and remained temporarily totally disabled. He

referred her to Dr. David A. Flesher for evaluation and treatment of her knees.

Dr. Flesher agreed that claimant’s back rehabilitation program was

aggravating her knees. He concluded that claimant had “patellofemoral arthritis

of longstanding,” and absent a patellectomy in the event her symptoms worsened,

there was no surgical solution to her knee pain. Id. at 210. He also opined that

a patellectomy “would probably aggravate her spine problem at the present time.” 

Id. Dr. Flesher recommended medication and a change in her back rehabilitation

program.

In March 1994, claimant was evaluated by Dr. John W. Ellis for continued

pain in her right foot, the result of a stress fracture which had been treated by

Dr. Carlson in 1991. Dr. Ellis opined that claimant would need treatment for

early arthritis and swelling in the foot and suggested she not do a job where

prolonged standing or a lot of walking are required. He computed an eighteen

percent total permanent partial impairment as a result of claimant’s right

foot problem.
-7-

In April 1994, plaintiff was diagnosed by Dr. James P. Metcalf with carpal

tunnel syndrome in both hands and wrists. He recommended a complete workup

on her hands and opined that she was temporarily totally disabled. Claimant’s

surgery on her right hand, performed on September 12, 1994, by Dr. Carlos A.

Garcia-Moral, was successful in that claimant experienced a lessening of the

symptoms. At the time of the ALJ’s decision, she was awaiting surgery on the

left hand.

In April 1994, Dr. Bradley reported that claimant’s back problem was still

not improving. In an October 27, 1994 letter to claimant’s attorney, Dr. Bradley

stated that claimant was “markedly limited in activity in that she can sit, stand,

or walk for only about thirty minutes at a time and requires frequent changes of

position to allow her to get along with her pain.” Id. at 233. He concluded that

her back and leg pain in combination with her hand pain and numbness and her

knee problems render her “significantly disabled.” Id. He further opined that

claimant “is not a candidate to be gainfully employed at this time and has not

been since September 1992.” Id. He expressed uncertainty as to when and if

claimant would be able to return to work.

In determining that claimant was not disabled and capable of returning to

her past relevant work, the ALJ stated that “the evidence here shows that there

would be no reason she could not return to the kind of work she had done in the
-8-

past doing sales clerk work, cashier’s work, department manager or doing clerical

light duties.” Id. at 17. As the recitation of the medical evidence above

establishes, this statement completely disregards the opinions of her treating

physicians. The ALJ states that “claimant does take some pain medication which

appears to control her pain,” and “noted that [claimant] has had treatment other

than medication for the relief of pain all of which are shown by the records as

being successful.” Id. He does not, however, support these statements with any

medical evidence in the record. In fact, the record establishes that claimant had

tried numerous approaches to attempt to control her pain, including a TENS unit,

all without success.

The ALJ did not mention or discuss Dr. Flesher’s opinion regarding the

severity of claimant’s knee impairment, or Dr. Ellis’ opinion that the arthritis in

claimant’s foot precluded her from doing a job requiring prolonged standing or

a lot of walking. In discussing claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ stated

that “no EMG or nerve conduction studies had been performed.” Id. at 15. This

statement is included in a two-page August 4, 1994 report of Dr. Garcia-Moral

in which he recommended that these studies be performed. A September 6, 1994

report in which Dr. Garcia-Moral stated that the results of the “EMG and nerve

conduction velocity studies” showed “changes that were consistent with carpal

tunnel syndrome,” id. at 221, was not mentioned or discussed by the ALJ.
1 At this point we note that apparently at the request of the Secretary,

claimant was examined by Dr. M. Young Stokes, III, who rendered an opinion

included in the record. Any mention of this opinion is also absent from the ALJ’s

decision.

-9-

The ALJ is required to “evaluate every medical opinion” he receives,

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), and to “consider all relevant medical evidence of record

in reaching a conclusion as to disability,” Baker v. Bowen, 886 F.2d 289, 291

(10th Cir. 1989). A treating physician’s opinion about the nature and severity of

a claimant’s impairment will be given controlling weight if it is supported by

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other

substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2),

416.927(d)(2); Castellano, 26 F.3d at 1029.. Anything less is error which this

court has censured on numerous occasions. See e.g., Goatcher v. United States

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 52 F.3d 288, 289-90 (10th Cir. 1995); Frey v.

Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513-15 (10th Cir. 1987).

The glaring omission in the ALJ’s decision is any discussion of the opinion

of Dr. Bradley, claimant’s orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Bradley had been treating

claimant since shortly after her back injury in 1992. He is a specialist in the area

in which he was rendering his opinion, and his opinion is consistent with every

other physician either treating or examining claimant, and is consistent with

claimant’s reports of her symptoms.1
-10-

Accordingly, the ALJ’s disregard of the opinions of claimant’s treating

physicians is a legal error which must be corrected on remand. In addition, we

note that the ALJ’s disregard of the medical evidence in this case also affected his

evaluation of claimant’s credibility regarding her subjective complaints of pain,

see Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1021. This will also require reevaluation upon remand. 

Upon remand we do not dictate any result. Our remand “simply assures that the

correct legal standards are invoked in reaching a decision based on the facts of

this case.” Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1132 (10th Cir. 1988).

REVERSED and REMANDED to the district court with directions to

remand the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with this order

and judgment.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge