alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Nathan Smith *versus*Thomas Bowditch.

Where an attorney of this Court puts his name on the record as attorney to one of the parties in an action, notice given to him of the taking of a deposition will be sufficient, the party whom he represents being estopped by the record to allege that he appeared without authority.

Assumpsit. At the trial, the deposition of one Mansfield, offered by the defendant, was objected to on the ground that *143the taking of it was not duly notified to the plaintiff. It appeared that notice was given to Kilborn Whitman, esquire, as the plaintiff’s attorney. The action was removed to this Court by demurrer to the plea, with a reservation of the right to plead anew. The demurrer was signed by Whitman as attorney to the plaintiff, and the next day or next but one, and during the same term of the Court, the notice was served upon Whitman. There was no other evidence that he was the plaintiff’s attorney. *Morton*J. overruled the objection. A verdict was returned for the defendant.

*Oct.*21st.

*Oct. 22d.*

*K.*Whitman, in support of a motion for a new trial,

insisted that the deposition was taken without legal notice; that he could make affidavit that the plaintiff had never spoken to him concerning the action before he signed the demurrer, but that being acquainted with the plaintiff, he signed it as a mere formal thing, supposing there had been an agreement to bring the action up by demurrer.

*L. Williams,*for the defendant.

*Per Curiam.*

The signature of Whitman as attorney is a matter of record and cannot be disputed. The defendant had a right to look to the record ; and if the person whose name is there as attorney acted without authority, and the plaintiff is thereby injured, the remedy is by an action for damages.1

*Motion for new trial overruled.*

1

 See Revised Stat. c. 94, $ 16.
#### Yeghisabet GRIGORYAN, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72666

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 20, 2017

Artem M. Sarian, Esquire, Attorney, Sa-rian Law Group, APLC, Glendale, CA, Timothy Bo Stanton, Attorney, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC,.for Petitioner

Edward C. Durant, Attorney, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Yeghisabet Grigoryan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Avagyan v. Holder,*646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to. reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to show prejudice, where Grigoryan offered no new contentions or evidence regarding nexus to a protected ground, and therefore did not establish that prior counsels’ performance may have affected the outcome of his proceedings. *See Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft,*381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 2004) (to establish prejudice for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an alien must demonstrate that counsel’s performance may have affected the outcome of the proceedings).

The record does not support Grigoryan’s contention that the agency failed to consider arguments or provide sufficient reasoning. *See Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010).

' We lack jurisdiction to consider Grigor-yan’s contention that the agency abused its discretion in declining to reopen her case sua sponte. *See Ekimian v. I.N.S.,*303 F.3d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2002); *Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder,*633 F.3d 818, 823-824 (9th Cir. 2011); *cf. Bonilla v. Lynch,*840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016). Grigor-yan urges us to reconsider our holding in *Ekimian,*but a three-judge panel cannot *479overrule circuit precedent in the absence of an intervening decision from a higher court or en banc decision of this court. *See Avagyan v. Holder,*646 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2011).

We deny the request for EAJA fees as moot.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
SPAR Group, Inc.


                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1


              Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the quarterly  report on Form 10-Q for the three month period
ended June 30, 2004 (this "report"), of SPAR Group, Inc. (the "registrant"), the
undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge:

1. The report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2. The  information  contained in the report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.



                                 /s/ Robert G. Brown
                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                 Robert G. Brown
                                 Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer

                                  August 23, 2004

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to SPAR Group,  Inc.  and will be  retained  by SPAR Group,  Inc.,  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


                                      Ex-3
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6652 

To amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to require the collection of 

small business loan data related to LGBTQI-owned businesses. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 6, 2023 

Mr. TORRES of New York (for himself, Mr. ALLRED, Mrs. BEATTY, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Ms. BONAMICI, Ms. CASTOR of Florida, Ms. CHU, Ms. DAVIDS

of Kansas, Mr. EVANS, Mr. FOSTER, Mr. GARCI ́A of Illinois, Ms. GARCIA

of Texas, Mr. GOLDMAN of New York, Mr. GOTTHEIMER, Mr. GREEN of 

Texas, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mrs. HAYES, Ms. JAYAPAL, Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE, 

Mr. KIM of New Jersey, Ms. LEGER FERNANDEZ, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. 

MEEKS, Ms. MOORE of Wisconsin, Mr. NADLER, Mr. NICKEL, Ms. NORTON, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. POCAN, Ms. SALINAS, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mrs. 

SYKES, Mr. TAKANO, Ms. TITUS, Mr. TONKO, Ms. VELA ́ZQUEZ, and Ms. 

WILSON of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to require the 

collection of small business loan data related to 

LGBTQI-owned businesses. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘LGBTQI Business 

5 Equal Credit Enforcement and Investment Act’’. 

2 

•HR 6652 IH

1 SEC. 2. SMALL BUSINESS LOAN DATA COLLECTION. 

2 Section 704B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 

3 (15 U.S.C. 1691c–2) is amended— 

4 (1) by inserting ‘‘LGBTQI-owned,’’ after ‘‘mi5 nority-owned,’’ each place such term appears; 

6 (2) in subsection (e)(2)(G), by inserting ‘‘, sex7 ual orientation, gender identity, intersex status’’ 

8 after ‘‘sex’’; and 

9 (3) in subsection (h), by adding at the end the 

10 following: 

11 ‘‘(7) LGBTQI-OWNED BUSINESS.—The term 

12 ‘LGBTQI-owned business’ means a business— 

13 ‘‘(A) more than 50 percent of the owner14 ship or control of which is held by 1 or more 

15 individuals self-identifying as lesbian, gay, bi16 sexual, transgender, queer, or intersex; and 

17 ‘‘(B) more than 50 percent of the net prof18 it or loss of which accrues to 1 or more individ19 uals self-identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, 

20 transgender, queer, or intersex.’’. 

Æ
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**

 

The Board of Directors 

Ariba, Inc.:

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in theregistration statements (Nos. 333-107864, 333-61064, 333-73458, 333-81773, 333-89119, 333-95665, 333-33544, 333-46820, and 333-84916) on Form S-8 of Ariba, Inc. of our report dated October 22, 2003 except as to note 12, which is as of November 14,2003, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Ariba, Inc. and subsidiaries as of September 30, 2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated statements of operations and comprehensive loss, stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for eachof the years in the three-year period ended September 30, 2003, which report appears in the September 30, 2003 annual report on Form 10-K/A of Ariba, Inc. 

 

/s/    KPMG LLP 

 

Mountain View, California 

January 2, 2004
This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

No. 34 

Global Reinsurance Corporation of 

America, successor in interest to 

Constitution Reinsurance 

Corporation,

 Respondent,

 v.

Century Indemnity Company, 

successor in interest to CCI 

Insurance Company, successor in 

interest to Insurance Company of 

North America,

 Appellant.

Daryn E. Rush, for appellant.

David L. Pitchford, for respondent.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Certification of question by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, pursuant to section 500.27 of this

Court's Rules of Practice, accepted and the issues presented are

to be considered after briefing and argument. Chief Judge

DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein, Fahey and Garcia

concur.

Decided January 10, 2017
#### NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. GLAZER’S WHOLESALE DRUG COMPANY, Inc., Respondent.

No. 23135.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 28, 1966.

*1006Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Edith Nash, Atty., Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Elliott Moore, Atty. N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Emil Corenbleth, Dallas, Tex., for respondent.

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and JONES and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The National Labor Relations Board petitions for the enforcement of its order based upon a finding that respondent, Glazer’s Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., violated Section 8(a) (1) by unlawful and coercive interrogation of its employees and Section 8(a) (3) by the discharge of two of its employees because of their union activities. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Secs. 158(a) (1) and (a) (3). We have carefully reviewed the record and find that although the evidence concerning the alleged violations is in sharp conflict, the trial examiner exercised a valid credibility choice. The examiner’s conclusions that respondent coercively interrogated its employees and that it was unlawfully motivated in the discharge of two of its employees, which conclusions were adopted by the Board, are amply supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The petition is granted and the Board’s order is

Enforced.
<TABLE> <S> <C>
 
<ARTICLE>      5 
<LEGEND>       THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
               FROM THE ACCOMPANYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN
               ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000 
       
<S>                                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                JAN-2-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                   JAN-4-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                     APR-4-1998
<CASH>                                                 12,561
<SECURITIES>                                            8,752
<RECEIVABLES>                                           2,755
<ALLOWANCES>                                                0
<INVENTORY>                                             2,189
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       24,874
<PP&E>                                                  1,351
<DEPRECIATION>                                              0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                         28,765
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                   4,603
<BONDS>                                                     0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                       0
<PREFERRED>                                                 0
<COMMON>                                                    9
<OTHER-SE>                                             23,998
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                           28,765
<SALES>                                                 4,871
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                        4,871
<CGS>                                                   2,850
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                           2,850
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                        4,312
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                            0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                          0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                           253
<INCOME-TAX>                                                0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                       253
<DISCONTINUED>                                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                             0
<CHANGES>                                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                                              253
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                           $0.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                           $0.03

         

</TABLE>
#### Bridget Conklin, Resp’t, v. Wm. H. Tice, App’lt.

*Charles Haines,*for,resp’t; *A. H. Gleason,*for app’lt.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur, except Vann, J., dissenting.

Affirming 15 N. Y. State Rep., 835.
Exhibit 12.1  PANOLAM
INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL, INC. STATEMENT
REGARDING COMPUTATION OF RATIOS RATIO
OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES (in
thousands, except ratios)     Nine
  Months
  Ended
  September30, 2005
  
  Period
  October 1,
  2005 to
  December31, 2005
  
  Year
  Ended
  December31, 2006
  
  Year
  Ended
  December31, 2007Year EndedDecember 31,2003
  
  2004Net income
  (loss) before income taxes (benefit)
  
  $
  11,395
  
  $
  10,357
  
  $
  (1,559
  )
  $
  (2,584
  )
  $
  14,852
  
  $
  5,318Interest expense
  
  14,085
  
  14,688
  
  20,693
  
  6,918
  
  35,577
  
  34,891Interest portion
  of rent expense (1)
  
  507
  
  569
  
  412
  
  139
  
  1,300
  
  1,181Earnings
  available for fixed charges (2)
  
  25,987
  
  25,614
  
  19,546
  
  4,473
  
  51,729
  
  41,390Divided by:Fixed charges
  
  14,592
  
  15,257
  
  21,105
  
  7,057
  
  36,877
  
  36,072Ratio of
  earnings to fixed charges
  
  1.8x
  
  1.7x
  
  0.9x
  
  0.6x
  
  1.4x
  
  1.1x  
 (1)
  The interest portion of
  rent expense is assumed to be equal to 33.3% of rental expense for each of
  the respective periods.(2)
  The amounts of the
  deficiency in earnings available for fixed charges in which the ratio is less
  than one-to-one are $1,559 for the nine months ended September 30, 2005
  and $2,584 for the three months ended December 31, 2005.
----

Exhibit 13.2 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report ofMicromem Technologies Inc. (the ''Company'') on Form 20-F for the Fiscal YearEnded October 31, 2008 (the ''Report''), I, Dan Amadori, Chief Financial Officerof the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to§906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, based on my knowledge, that: 

(1) 

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) 

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

| Date: February 18, 2009 | /s/ Dan Amadori                           |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                    | Dan Amadori                                                                                                                                                                 |
|                    | Chief Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                     |
|                    | (Principal financial officer)                                                                                                                                               |

 

----
# Dziennik Urzędowy C 11A/2014

| | ISSN 1977-1002
  doi:10.3000/19771002.CA2014.011.pol |
| --- | --- |
| Dziennik Urzędowy
  Unii Europejskiej | C 11A |
| | |
| Wydanie polskie | Informacje i zawiadomienia | Tom 5715 stycznia 2014 |

ISSN 1977-1002

doi:10.3000/19771002.CA2014.011.pol

Dziennik Urzędowy

Unii Europejskiej

C 11A

Wydanie polskie

Informacje i zawiadomienia

Tom 5715 stycznia 2014

---

| Powiadomienie nr | Spis treśći | Strona |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | Sprostowania |
| 2014/C 011A/01 | Sprostowanie do ogłoszenia o naborze na stanowisko dyrektora wykonawczego Europejskiej Agencji Kolejowej we Francji (zatrudnienie na czas określony — grupa zaszeregowania AD 14) — COM/2014/10345 (Dz.U. C 6 A z 10.1.2014) | 1 |

Powiadomienie nr

Spis treśći

Strona

Sprostowania

2014/C 011A/01

Sprostowanie do ogłoszenia o naborze na stanowisko dyrektora wykonawczego Europejskiej Agencji Kolejowej we Francji (zatrudnienie na czas określony — grupa zaszeregowania AD 14) — COM/2014/10345 (Dz.U. C 6 A z 10.1.2014)

(Dz.U. C 6 A z 10.1.2014)

1

PRZEGLĄD DZIENNIKÓW URZĘDOWYCH SERII C A — KONKURSY

Poniżej znajduje się lista Dzienników Urzędowych serii C A opublikowanych w tym roku.

O ile nie wskazano inaczej, Dzienniki Urzędowe opublikowane zostały we wszystkich wersjach językowych.

| 5 | |
| --- | --- |
| 6 | |
| 11 | |

5

6

11

| PL | |
| --- | --- |

PL

---

Sprostowania

| 15.1.2014 | PL | Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej | CA 11/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2014

PL

Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej

CA 11/1

---

Sprostowanie do ogłoszenia o naborze na stanowisko dyrektora wykonawczego Europejskiej Agencji Kolejowej we Francji

(zatrudnienie na czas określony — grupa zaszeregowania AD 14)

COM/2014/10345

(
  Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej C 6 A z dnia 10 stycznia 2014 r.
  )

(2014/C 11 A/01)

Strona 4, „Procedura zgłaszania kandydatur”, akapit trzeci otrzymuje brzmienie:

„https://ec.europa.eu/dgs/human-resources/seniormanagementvacancies/”.

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric Michael HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10402

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 3, 2017

Jared Grimmer, Patrick Michael Walsh, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USLV—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Las Vegas, NV, William Ramsey Reed, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Elizabeth Olson White, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USRE—Office of the US Attorney-Reno, Reno, NV, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Wendi L. Overmyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Brenda Weksler, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellant -

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Eric Michael Harris appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges *567the 12-month term of supervised release imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Harris contends that he is not amenable to supervised release due to his inability to adhere to mental health treatment and medication, and consequently, the district court abused its discretion by imposing continued supervision as part of his supervised release revocation sentence. The 12-month term of supervised release is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the need to rehabilitate Harris and protect the public. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Harris’s argument that he is unamenable to supervision does not render the sentence substantively unreasonable. *See United States v. Hurt,*345 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A violation of the conditions of supervised release does not obviate the need for further supervision, but rather confirms the judgment that supervision was necessary.”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid*567ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlos Maurice SINCLAIR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4464

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: May 11, 2017

*174Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, First Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Carlos Sinclair pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). Sinclair appeals his sentence, arguing that it is substantively unreasonable. This court reviews a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Because Sinclair does not assert any procedural sentencing error, we review only the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, considering “the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [ (2012) ].” *United States v. Gomez-Jimenez,*750 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” *United States v. Louthian,*756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” *Id.*We conclude that Sinclair fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness accorded his below-Guidelines sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*