alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ted HAMILTON Plaintiff-Appellant v. James SINGLETON Defendant-Appellee Joan McClean; Johnny Godbolt; Stephen Glover Defendants

No. 15-3477

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 13, 2017

Filed: April 18, 2017

Ted Hamilton, Pro Se

Craig Lambert, North Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellant

John Myers, Clyde Burt Newell, Nicholas Rudolph Windle, Law Offices of C. Burt Newell, Hot Springs, AR, for Defendant-Appellee

Before SHEPHERD, MURPHY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Ted Hamilton—a former pretrial detainee at the Hempstead County Detention Center (HCDC)—claimed, inter alia, that Hemp-stead County Sheriff James Singleton was deliberately indifferent to his serious medi-

caí needs by releasing him from HCDC with a leg monitor one day prior to a scheduled surgery (release claim), and that Singleton was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by refusing to pay for his surgery after his release (refusal-to-pay claim). The district court1 adversely decided the refusal-to-pay claim in a decision addressing cross-motions for summary judgment, and the release claim was adversely decided by a jury. On appeal, Hamilton raises both of these claims, but his arguments address only the adverse summary judgment decision.

After careful review of the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we first decline to review the disposition of the release claim. See Eaddy v. Yancey, 317 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2003) (declining to review denial of motion for partial summary after full trial on merits). With regard to the refusal-to-pay claim, we conclude that Sheriff Singleton was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, because the claim was not based upon a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012) (grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo); Sisney v. Reisch, 674 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2012) (two-prong qualified immunity inquiry examines (1) if alleged facts make out violation of constitutional right, and (2) if constitutional right violated was clearly established at time of defendant’s alleged misconduct); see also Spirtas Co. v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 715 F.3d 667, 670-71 (8th Cir. 2013) (this court can affirm on any basis supported by record). The judgment is affirmed.

1

. The Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
#### BOWERS WHOLESALE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. NORGE SALES CORPORATION, Appellee (two cases).

Nos. 10587, 10588.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 2, 1966.

Decided Nov. 21, 1966.

George H. Bowers, Jr., and Luther W. White, III, Norfolk, Va. (Worthington, White & Harper, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellant.

Howard I. Legum, Norfolk, Va. (Charles W. Houchins, Chicago, 111., Fine, Fine, Legum, Schwan & Fine, Norfolk, Va., and Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters, Chicago, 111., on brief), for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, BOREMAN and BRYAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In these companion appeals Bowers Wholesale Corporation urges error in the refusal of the District Court to enjoin foreclosure by Norge Sales Corporation of a deed of trust it holds upon the business property of Bowers in Norfolk, Virginia. Restraint was prayed until *998the completion of trial of Bowers' antitrust action against Norge — the principal claim in No. 10,587 — so that Bowers could set off its anticipated judgment against any amount owing under the trust.

Pending the appeal one of the judges of this court enjoined the foreclosure on the ground that the terms of the trust were uncertain in several aspects, and that their meaning should be made plain before foreclosure. At argument we were informed that a decision in the antitrust action is expected soon from the District Court upon Norge’s motion for summary judgment already argued and .submitted.

In the circumstances we think it advisable to defer a ruling upon the present appeals until the determination of the antitrust action in the District Court, whether on the motion for summary .judgment or after trial. This deferment is not a holding that a mortgagor may set •off an unliquidated claim against his indebtedness. Nor is it a holding that Bowers or any other mortgagor is entitled to have a foreclosure stayed until the termination of a civil action brought by the mortgagor to recover damages from the mortgagee on a claim which may be separate and independent from the mortgage debt. The reason for our .action is the proximity of a decision in the antitrust case which would provide a more complete background for resolution of the injunction controversy now before us.

Meanwhile, the injunction against the foreclosure will be continued, but Norge will continue to be protected from loss by the bond required and given in connection with the injunction. Should the interest accruing upon the unpaid instalments of the trust note, after their maturity, exceed the principal of the existing bond, then on application the District Court may require Bowers to furnish a supplementary bond or bonds to •protect Norge until the antitrust suit is •concluded in the trial court and, if pursued, on appeal.

An order will issue accordingly.
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 150 (Friday, August 3, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 46554-46555]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-19028]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 7968]

Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Nicolai Fechin''

AGENCY: Department of State.

ACTION: Notice, correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On April 4, 2012, notice was published on page 20476 of the 
Federal Register (volume 77, number 65) of determinations made by the 
Department of State pertaining to the exhibition ``Nicolai Fechin.'' 
The referenced notice is corrected here to include additional objects 
as part of the exhibition. Notice is hereby given of the following 
determinations: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of 
October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 
of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 
1998 (112 Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), 
Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, and Delegation of 
Authority No. 236-3 of August 28, 2000, I hereby determine that the 
additional objects to be included in the exhibition ``Nicolai Fechin,'' 
imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, 
are of cultural significance. The additional objects are imported 
pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign owners or custodians. I 
also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at 
the Museum of Russian Art, Minneapolis, Minnesota, from on or about 
August 18, 2012, until on or about January 13, 2013, the Frye Art 
Museum, Seattle, Washington, from on or about February 2, 2013, until 
on or about April 7, 2013, and at possible additional exhibitions or 
venues yet to be determined, is in the national interest. I have 
ordered that Public Notice of these Determinations be published in the 
Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the additional objects, contact Paul W. Manning, Attorney-
Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State 
(telephone: 202-632-6469). The mailing address is U.S. Department of 
State, SA-5, L/PD, Fifth Floor (Suite 5H03), Washington, DC 20522-0505.

[[Page 46555]]

    Dated: July 30, 2012.
Ann Stock,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2012-19028 Filed 8-2-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM COHR INC.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED 9/30/98 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH 10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          12,826
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   13,456
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,284
<INVENTORY>                                      5,035
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                37,609
<PP&E>                                           5,889
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,902
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  46,419
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           14,838
<BONDS>                                            357
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           887
<OTHER-SE>                                      30,162
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    46,419
<SALES>                                         51,311
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                51,311
<CGS>                                           37,896
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   16,284
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,627
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   355
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  21
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (6,121)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,121)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.95)<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.95)
<FN>
<F1>FOR PURPOSES OF THIS EXHIBIT, PRIMARY MEANS BASIC.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. KEITH FRANCIS LAMB, Defendant - Appellant. No. 11-50082 D.C. No. 3:10-cr-01255-JAH-1
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 13, 2012 Pasadena, California Before: SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM, District Judge. ** Following his arrest for bringing in an illegal alien, appellant Keith Lamb (Lamb) signed a stipulation that allowe d for the release of the alien material 

# FILED
MAY 02 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALSPage 2 of 3 witness, but allowed the government to in troduce hearsay statements of the witness should Lamb decide to go to trial, which La mb subsequently did. The district court rejected Lamb’s argument that he was pe rmitted to introduce hearsay statements of the material witness. The district court also limited Lamb’s questioning of a government witness regarding the nature of the witness’s drug conviction. Lamb appeals these two rulings.

1. Because the stipulation unambiguously allowed only the government to introduce the material witness’s statemen ts, the district court did not err in rejecting Lamb’s argument to the contrary. See United States v. Molina , 596 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Stipulations freely and voluntarily entered into in criminal trials are as binding and enforceable as those entered into in civil actions. . . .”) (citation and alteration omitted).

2. The district court committed no plain error pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). See United States v. Jenkins , 633 F.3d 788, 803 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that an argument that was not raised in the district court is reviewed for plain error).Page 3 of 3 3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding further questioning regarding the government witness’s drug conviction. See United States v. Waters , 627 F.3d 345, 353 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended (explaining that it is entirely within the district court’s discretion whether to exclude evidence). AFFIRMED.
454 A.2d 171

#### Commonwealth v. Clutter, Appellant.

Submitted June 21, 1982.

Kevin Lee Sanders, for appellant; Ray Frank Gricar, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
# Official Journal C 375/2013

| | ISSN 1977-091X
  doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2013.375.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 375 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5620 December 2013 |

ISSN 1977-091X

doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2013.375.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 375

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5620 December 2013

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Council |
| 2013/C 375/01 | Statement relating to Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the European Regional Development Fund and on specific provisions concerning the investment for growth and jobs goal and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 | 1 |
| 2013/C 375/02 | Statements relating to Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013, laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 | 2 |

Notice No

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Council

2013/C 375/01

Statement relating to Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the European Regional Development Fund and on specific provisions concerning the investment for growth and jobs goal and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006

1

2013/C 375/02

Statements relating to Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013, laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006

2

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
#### TAAMU, Plaintiff v. TAITO, Defendant

No. 50-1918

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Taufusi”]

November 19, 1919

A. M. NOBLE, President; LEAANA and MOLIOO, *Associate Members of the High Court*

DECISION

This is an action to try title to that certain tract of land adjoining the lands of the United States Naval Station, A. D. Meredith and others, on which is situated a small building occupied as a restaurant; and which said action came on to be heard in the High Court of American Samoa on the 19th day of November 1919 before Judges A. M. Noble, Pres. Leaana and Molioo, Associate Members of the High Court.

On the date of trial S. Mailo asked permission of the Court to file his claim to the land in question, and no objection being offered by either plaintiff or defendant, the request was granted.

*315In the trial of this case there was no dispute as to the original ownership of the land, all claiming from the' same source, the sole question being whether the land in question had passed out of the hands of the “matai” Mailo, and if so, where lay the present “pule” in the lands.

From the evidence the Court holds as follows:—

(1). That the land now occupied by Taito, a portion of which land was leased by Taito to A. Forsythe on June 21st, 1919 is known as Taufusi and not Laloifi.

(2). That at some remote time, the exact date being unknown, the lands of the chief Mailo were divided among his “nofofanau”, that certain portion known as Taufusi being allotted to Alagata, the name Alagata then becoming the “pule” of the same.

(3). That Alagata later took the name Taamu, and the Mailo family wishing a talking chief, the Alagata was dropped and the name Taamu was taken in its stead, Taamu being a “tulafale”.

(4). That the names Taamu and Taito descended from Alagata.

(5). That the name Taamu being accepted by the Mailo family in place of Alagata, Taamu thereupon acquired the “pule” over the lands formerly held under the name Alagata, and that as Alagata held the “pule” over the land Taufusi, Taamu succeeding the name Alagata thereby became “pule” over the land Taufusi.

(6). Taito having descended from Alagata has his rights in the lands of Alagata, and that he now holds said land with permission of Taamu.

(7). That having gone on the land Taufusi and having made considerable improvements, he, Taito, is entitled to use and enjoy the same, but can do no act which would work an injury to the rights of Taamu, without Taamu’s consent.

(8). That the lease from Taito to A. Forsythe is valid only until the death of Taito, Taito not being able to *316encumber the land for a longer period than his natural life, without the consent of Taamu.
#### Margaret Ann HAUGHTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Megan J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General, US Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35674

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 16, 2017

Margaret Ann Haughton, Pro Se

James Edward Cox, Jr., Kelly A. Zus-man, Assistant U.S, Attorneys, DOJ-USAO, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Ap-pellee

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges,

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Margaret Ann Haughton appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her Title VII action alleging a retaliation claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles,*349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Haughton’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim because Haughton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was subjected to conduct that was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment. *See Ray v. Henderson,*217 F.3d 1234, 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (“To determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6591 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6591

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
    To amend section 8(a) of the Small Business Act to require the 
    Administrator of the Small Business Administration to regularly 
   reassess the asset and net worth thresholds for qualifying as an 
     economically disadvantaged individual, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Encouraging Success Act''.

SEC. 2. REGULAR REASSESSMENT OF THE THRESHOLDS FOR ECONOMICALLY 
              DISADVANTAGED INDIVIDUALS.

    (a) In General.--Section 8(a)(6) of the Small Business Act (15 
U.S.C. 637(a)(6)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
    ``(F)(i) Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
this subparagraph, and not less frequently than every 4 years 
thereafter, the Administrator shall assess and, if appropriate, revise 
the maximum value of asset and the maximum net worth an individual may 
have to qualify as an economically disadvantaged individual under 
subparagraph (A) to account for changes in the economy, including 
inflation and other factors as determined appropriate by the 
Administrator.
                    ``(ii) The Administrator shall make each covered 
                revision by issuing a rule after an opportunity for 
                public notice and comment.
                    ``(iii) To the extent practicable, the 
                Administrator shall coordinate the activities carried 
                out under clause (i) with the activities required under 
                section 1344(a)(2) of the Small Business Jobs Act of 
                2010 (15 U.S.C. 632 note).
                    ``(iv) In this subparagraph, the term `covered 
                revision' means a revision described in clause (i) that 
                the Administrator determines is appropriate pursuant to 
                an assessment under such clause.''.
    (b) Compliance With Cutgo.--No additional amounts are authorized to 
be appropriated to carry out this Act or the amendments made by this 
Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives February 28, 2024.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
118th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 6591

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

    To amend section 8(a) of the Small Business Act to require the 
    Administrator of the Small Business Administration to regularly 
   reassess the asset and net worth thresholds for qualifying as an 
     economically disadvantaged individual, and for other purposes.
```
#### Celia Lifshutz, Suing on Behalf of Community Water Service Company for Herself and Other Stockholders Similarly Situated, Appellant, *v.*John C. Adams et al., Defendants, and Gilbert W. Chapman et al., Defendants-Respondents.

Argued February 23, 1943;

decided April 8, 1943.

*709
      *Louis Boehm*and *Bernard D. Fischman*for appellant.

*Frank J. Berberich*and *Frank T. Cotter*for respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.