alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 12.2****CERTIFICATIONS**I, Dan Amadori, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Micromem TechnologiesInc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of,and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b. Designed such internal control over financial reporting, orcaused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under oursupervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability offinancial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for externalpurposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;  c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscalquarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting. 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors(or persons performing the equivalent functions): a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.   Date: February 28, 2006 /s/ Dan Amadori     Dan Amadori  Chief Financial Officer  (Principal financial officer)
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-2438

CHRISTOPHER LEE JOHNSON; VERONICA MOODY JOHNSON, Defendants & Third Party Plaintiffs - Appellants, versus EMERALD GREENS PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION BOARD OF DIRECTORS, jointly and severally and in their individual capacity, personally (immediate past and present members); MIKE LEWIS, President; RICHARD MATTHEWS; CRAIG POPPIN; MARK WILLIAMS; PETER NICHOLS; KATHY THOMAS; ANNE DEL CORE; DAVID THOMPSON, Third Party Defendants - Appellees, versus EMERALD GREENS PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff - Appellee, MARY E. COX, Movant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge. (CA-00-514-2) Submitted: April 18, 2002 Decided: May 14, 20022 Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Christopher Lee Johnson, Veronica Moody Johnson, Appellants Pro Se. Barry Randolph Koch, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Gerrit W. Benson, Michael Allen Inman, INMAN & STRICKLER, P.L.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia; Alexander William Stiles, WILLIAMS, MULLEN, CLARK & DOBBINS, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia; David C. Burton, WILLIAMS, MULLEN, CLARK & DOBBINS, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: Christopher Lee Johnson and Veronica Moody Johnson appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Emerald Greens Property Owners Association on the Johnsons’ cross-claims, granting summary judgment to the Board of Directors of the Emerald Greens Property Owners Association and to its individual members, denying the Johnsons’ motion for summary judgment, and remanding the remaining claims to state court. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Johnson v. Emerald Greens Prop. Owners Ass’n , No. CA-00-514-2 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 25, 2001 & entered Oct. 26, 2001; Oct. 30, 2001). We deny the Johnsons’ motions to stay review of the case and to consolidate the case with No. 02-1371, Johnson v. City of Chesapeake . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Order entered April 8, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-00201-CR

JESUS PATRICIO LOPEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F10-63646-V

ORDER

The State’s motion for extension of time to file its brief is GRANTED, and the time for 

the State to file its brief is extended to May 5, 2014.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6690 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6690

To amend the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act to authorize the 
 use of Commodity Credit Corporation funds for emergency assistance to 
   dairy producers in the case of livestock relocation and feed crop 
        losses due to natural disasters, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 7, 2023

Mr. Valadao (for himself and Mr. Duarte) introduced the following bill; 
           which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act to authorize the 
 use of Commodity Credit Corporation funds for emergency assistance to 
   dairy producers in the case of livestock relocation and feed crop 
        losses due to natural disasters, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FUNDING AUTHORITY FOR LIVESTOCK RELOCATION AND FEED CROP 
              LOSSES DUE TO NATURAL DISASTERS.

    Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act (15 
U.S.C. 714c) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
    ``(h) Provide emergency assistance to dairy and livestock producers 
for livestock relocation, shelter-in-place, and feed crop losses due to 
natural disasters.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Richard BEASON Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4369

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 31, 2017

Filed: August 7, 2017

Gail A. Hayworth, Clayton R. Mahaffey, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern *467District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

William Reynolds Biggs, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Anthony Dwayne Crenshaw, Pro Se

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, Richard Beason challenges the conviction and sentence the district court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to a drug charge, pursuant to a written plea agreement which included an appeal waiver. His counsel has moved to withdraw and submitted a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), raising the issue that the sentence was unreasonable. Beason has also filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing that the government violated his right to a speedy trial, that his sentence was improperly enhanced, and that there was an insufficient basis for his conspiracy conviction; and a motion for appointment of new counsel.

We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable, because our review of the record demonstrates that Beason entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, see Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997); the arguments fall within the scope of the waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver, see United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver.

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, deny the motion for new counsel, and dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-09-141-CV

IN RE RICHARD LEE BOWEN RELATOR

------------

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

The court has considered relator’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and

is of the opinion that the petition is moot because relator is no longer confined.

Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as moot.

Relator shall pay all costs of this original proceeding, for which let

execution issue.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.

DELIVERED: May 26, 2009
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001004990
<NAME> NCS Healthcare, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          23,779
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  146,540
<ALLOWANCES>                                    25,675
<INVENTORY>                                     38,632
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               197,780
<PP&E>                                          62,069
<DEPRECIATION>                                  25,619
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 532,692
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           58,031
<BONDS>                                        190,133
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           195
<OTHER-SE>                                     284,298
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   532,692
<SALES>                                        355,888
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               355,888
<CGS>                                          265,766
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  265,766
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,666
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,160
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 21,087
<INCOME-TAX>                                     9,068
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             12,019
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    12,019
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.64
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.63
        

</TABLE>
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6316 

AN ACT 

To amend title 40, United States Code, to establish an 

expiration date of certain committee resolutions with respect to leases or projects, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 6316 EH

1 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AUTHORIZATIONS. 

2 Section 3307 of title 40, United States Code, is 

3 amended by adding at the end the following: 

4 ‘‘(i) EXPIRATION OF COMMITTEE RESOLUTIONS.— 

5 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Unless a lease is awarded 

6 or a construction, alteration, repair, design, or ac7 quisition project is initiated not later than 5 years 

8 after the resolution approvals adopted by the Com9 mittee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the 

10 House of Representatives or the Committee on Envi11 ronment and Public Works of the Senate pursuant 

12 to subsection (a), such resolutions shall be deemed 

13 expired. 

14 ‘‘(2) APPLICATION.—This subsection shall only 

15 apply to resolutions approved after the date of en16 actment of this subsection.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives March 11, 

2024. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6316 

AN ACT 

To amend title 40, United States Code, to establish 

other purposes. tions with respect to leases or projects, and for an expiration date of certain committee resolu-
#### Julie HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-17360

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 9, 2017 *

Filed May 16, 2017

Dana W. Duncan, Esquire, Attorney, Duncan Disability Law, S.C., Nekoosa, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Bobbie J. Montoya, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USSAC — Office of the US Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Annabelle Yang, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: NELSON, TROTT, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P, 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Julie Harris appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Harris’s application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, Harris alleged disability due to fibromyal-gia, anxiety, and depression. We have ju-risdietion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Molina v. Astrue,*674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.

The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for finding that Harris’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible. First, the ALJ properly found that Harris’s statement that she was only able to walk twenty minutes before having to rest,' was contradicted by the medical evidence where no physician concluded that Harris had limitations consistent with disability, and examining physician Dr. John Simmonds concluded that Harris could walk or stand for six hours per day. *Burch v. Barnhart,*400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an ALJ may consider a lack of medical evidence supporting claimant’s allegations, but this factor cannot form the only basis for discounting subjective symptom testimony).

Second, the ALJ properly found that Harris’s statement that she used a computer to play games on a daily basis was inconsistent with her claim that her impairments limited her ability to use a computer. *Chaudhry v. Astrue,*688 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that when weighing credibility, an ALJ may consider a claimant’s daily activities).

Third, the ALJ properly found a specific inconsistency in testimony when at Harris’s hearing she stated that she did not use cocaine, but during her psychiatric evaluation Harris self-reported cocaine use and addiction. *Thomas v. Barnhart,*278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that claimant’s inconsistent statements about *339drug usage properly diminished her credibility).

Accordingly, the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons in finding that Harris was not entirely credible, and thus did not err in concluding that Harris was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
English language summary of the 2013 Plan - Stock Option Plan



 Exhibit 10.3 
 English Language Summary of the 2013 Plan-Stock Option Plan 
 Subscription of
Shares: Each executive may subscribe to the maximum number of shares granted under the plan, or to a portion thereof. The shares may be subscribed within 30 days after the company files its audited financial statements for the year 2012, subject
to the following conditions: 
 1) the executive has a current employment contract with the company or any of its affiliates, and
the executive has been continuously employed with the company since the date the option is granted. 
 2) the executive has not,
in the sole judgment of the company, committed any serious misconduct. 
 If the shares are not subscribed within the 30-day period, the option
is deemed waived and expires. 
 Notice: The executive shall indicate his/her intent to exercise the option within 5 days of the exercise
deadline. Such notice must also indicate the number of shares for which the option will be exercised. 
 Payment of the Shares: The
subscription of the shares should be paid in cash, promissory note and/or wire-transfer at the time of subscription. 
 Sales of subscribed
shares: The executive may sell the shares granted under the plan after they have been subscribed and paid for. The shares must be sold on the Santiago Stock Exchange and the sale price shall not be less than market value. The company in no way
guarantees the share price at the time of sale by the executive. 
 Expiration: The plan expires on the earlier of a) April 25, 2013
and b) the date the executive is no longer employed by the company or any of its affiliates. 
 Taxes and expenses: The executive is
responsible for all taxes and expenses related to the subscription and sale of the shares. The executive is responsible for complying with all applicable tax regulations and the company is exempt from all such liability. 

Termination and Transfer of Rights: The executive may only transfer his/her option rights in the event of his/her death, by means of a will or
through intestacy. In the case of the former, the executive’s heirs may immediately subscribe for and sell the shares granted under the plan. If the executive transfers his/her option rights in violation of these restrictions, the executive is
subject to a fine, up to the market value of the shares at the time of the violation. 
 Future Option Plans: Upon the expiration of the
option plan, the company is not obligated to provide an equivalent plan. 
 The plan also includes general provisions related to
confidentiality, dispute resolution, notices, domicile and counterparts.
#### CITY OF DETROIT *v.*CAUDILL.

Criminal Law — Driving in Violation of Ordinance — Record—Evidence.

Judgment of conviction for driving in violation of a city ordinance is affirmed where record discloses no prejudicial error and evidence is sufficient to support the finding of guilt by the trial judge.

Reference for Points in Headnote

5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 883; 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 323.

Appeal from Traffic and Ordinance Division of Recorder’s Court of Detroit; Kirwan (John R.), J.

Submitted Division 1 May 6, 1968, at Detroit.

(Docket No. 3,199.)

Decided May 31, 1968.

Martin Ray Caudill was convicted of driving in violation of a city of Detroit ordinance. Affirmed.

*568
      *Robert Reese,*Corporation Counsel, and *Robert D. McGlear,*Assistant Corporation Counsel, for plaintiff.

*Albert Green,*for defendant.

Per Curiam:.

Martin Ray Caudill was convicted by a judge of the traffic and ordinance division of Detroit recorder’s court of driving in violation of a City of Detroit ordinance. He was sentenced to pay a fine of $25 or to serve 5 days in the Detroit bouse of correction. He appeals.

An examination of the record discloses no prejudicial error and evidence sufficient to support the finding of guilt. The findings of the trial judge are not clearly erroneous. GrCR 1963, 517.1, 785.1(1).

Affirmed.

Levin, P. J. and Burns and Dalton, JJ., concurred.
#### Richard J. TRITZ; Irene C. Tritz, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America; Does, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56240

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 3, 2017

Richard J. Tritz, Mission Viejo, CA, Mission Viejo, CA, Mission Viejo, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Sherra Wong, Gretchen M. Wolfinger, Attorney, Joan I. Oppenheimer, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division/Appellate Section, Andrew Thomas Pribe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USLA— Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*481MEMORANDUM **

Richard J. Tritz and Irene C. Tritz (“taxpayers”) appeal pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in their tax refund action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Buffalow v. United States,*109 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1997). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because taxpayers failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they were entitled to a refund, as the settlement payment was not made on account of “physical injuries or physical sickness” and was therefore not excludable from taxpayers’ gross income. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2), (a) (exempting settlement payment based on physical injuries or physical sickness from taxation, but not treating emotional distress as a physical injury or physical sickness); *Rivera v. Baker West, Inc.,*430 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth framework for determining when settlement proceeds qualify for a § 104(a)(2) exclusion and explaining that, in analyzing a settlement agreement, the court first looks to the express language of the agreement).

The district court’s failure to rule on taxpayers’ motion to compel further discovery is not grounds for reversal because taxpayers failed to show how additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment. *See Margolis v. Ryan,*140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998) (standard of review).

We reject as meritless taxpayers’ contentions that the settlement agreement should be voided, and that their due process rights were violated.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.