1

Filed 9/7/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LEROY WALLACE III,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A149049

 (Solano County

 Super. Ct. No. FCR313484)

Defendant Leroy Wallace III seeks reversal of the judgment against him for 

possession of a baton or similar weapon in violation of Penal Code section 22210,

1 which 

the court entered after a negotiated disposition of his case. Officer Ambrose of the 

Fairfield Police Department found the baton in defendant’s vehicle after defendant was 

stopped by another officer for a traffic violation and then arrested at the scene by 

Ambrose as a suspect in a domestic violence incident. Defendant contends the trial court

erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence relating to the baton on the ground 

that it was obtained during an inventory search of his vehicle. The People do not defend 

the search as a valid inventory search or otherwise contend it was constitutionally 

permissible. Rather, they assert that we should affirm the judgment because police 

inevitably would have discovered the baton in the course of impounding the vehicle and 

taking an inventory of its contents. We conclude there is no substantial evidence either

that the evidence was obtained as the result of a valid inventory search or that the baton

inevitably would have been discovered. Therefore, we reverse the judgment.

 

1

 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2

BACKGROUND

In March 2015, the Solano County District Attorney filed an information charging 

defendant with possession of a baton in violation of section 22210, which prohibits 

possession of “any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a billy, 

blackjack, sandbag, sandclub, sap, or slingshot.” In June 2015, defendant moved under 

section 1538.5 to suppress evidence of the baton and other evidence relating to it. In 

November 2015, the court, a magistrate presiding, held a preliminary hearing at which 

the court also considered defendant’s motion.

At the hearing, the officer who arrested defendant, Michael Ambrose of the 

Fairfield Police Department, was the only person who testified. Officer Ambrose said

that at 9:47 a.m. on March 18, 2015, he heard defendant’s name broadcast over the police 

radio as someone stopped by another officer, Sergeant Reeves, in Fairfield for having 

“false tabs” on his vehicle. Ambrose knew defendant was wanted for a domestic 

violence incident that had occurred a night or two before. Ambrose went to the traffic 

stop and spoke to Reeves by Reeves’s own vehicle. The two then went up to defendant’s 

vehicle, removed defendant from the vehicle, placed him in handcuffs and searched his 

person. Asked what happened next, Ambrose said, “I then put [defendant] in the back of 

my vehicle, and went back and searched his vehicle.” 

In response to the prosecutor’s further questioning, Ambrose testified no one else 

was in defendant’s vehicle and no one was in the area to take custody of defendant’s 

vehicle. He further testified that the Fairfield Police Department had a policy that 

required officers to have a vehicle towed and inventoried when no one was present to 

take custody of it. Asked if this was the situation in defendant’s case, Ambrose replied, 

“In this case, the subject also had no license, . . . and Sergeant Reeves was citing him for 

that as well. So there was [sic] a couple of different reasons to get in and search his 

vehicle: One being inventory search, and one being incident to the arrest that I was 

making.” 

Ambrose also testified that the purpose of the department’s inventory search 

policy was “to ensure if there is [sic] any items of high value in the vehicle, that we are to 
3

note them—or, actually, take and put them into our custody for safekeeping, just so that 

when the vehicle is towed, it’s not going to possibly become missing. [¶] Or the 

defendant or the person who the vehicle is being towed is not going to be able to come 

back and say, ‘I had $1,000,000 in the trunk, and it’s missing now, so, therefore, the 

Fairfield Police Department owes me money.’ ” 

Ambrose then said he searched defendant’s vehicle after placing defendant in the 

back of the patrol car: “I went up to the vehicle. I started on the open driver’s side door 

that was still open from when I removed him. I started to go into the vehicle, and as I 

did, I noticed a red handle sticking up between the center console and the driver’s seat. 

[¶] I reached down and pulled out, from grabbing the handle that was exposed, about a 

24-inch long brown wooden baton with red tape on the end where the handle would be.” 

He saw the red handle of the baton when he “actually entered the vehicle.” Ambrose did 

not see any non-violent purpose for the baton, particularly in light of the red tape 

handgrip that prevented the baton from slipping when swung. He considered the baton to

be a deadly weapon based on his training and experience, and its presence in the vehicle 

was an additional basis for his arrest of defendant. After finding the baton, Ambrose

said, he continued to search the vehicle. He did not locate anything of value. 

Ambrose further testified that he was not sure if defendant’s vehicle was towed or 

not because he left with defendant while Reeves stayed behind with the vehicle. 

Ambrose said it was standard procedure to fill out a “California Highway Patrol 180 

Form” (CHP 180 form) if a vehicle was towed, and acknowledged that the form

contained a field in which one could inventory the items that were found in the towed

vehicle. However, he said, he had nothing to do with the traffic stop or anything to do 

with filling out such a form, if one was filled out. He also testified that he did not note in 

his own police report what kind of vehicle defendant was driving because “[t]he vehicle 

had nothing to do with why I was there.” 

After hearing argument, the court denied defendant’s suppression motion. It 

stated about Ambrose’s search of defendant’s vehicle, “This was not a search incident to 

an arrest; it was a search that [was] based upon the normal practice to once this individual 
4

was taken into custody on the serious charge of the violation of domestic violence, to 

inventory his car and his car be[ing] towed.

“Officer Ambrose was arresting him for the circumstances that he discovered once 

the object was seen, and it wasn’t his responsibility to tow the vehicle; it was to take 

[defendant] into custody. And what happened to the vehicle and the circumstances 

afterwards is not really known as a process as much as whether or not he had a basis to be 

where he was when he saw that object that he did; and therefore, the motion to suppress 

is denied.

“It was part of the community caretaking function when this person was placed 

under arrest, to inventory the vehicle and prepare it for towing so that the officer and the 

agency doesn’t incur any other liability.” 

Subsequently, defendant moved under sections 995 and 1538.5, subdivision (i) to 

set aside the information on the ground that his motion to suppress should have been 

granted. The People opposed the motion. After hearing argument, the trial court denied 

the motion “because of the inventory search.” The court explained further, “Officer 

Ambrose articulated the policy, articulated the reason. The defendant was the sole 

occupant of the car. He had no license. He was being arrested. The officer articulated 

the community caretaking policy, if you will. And you know, by denying the motion to 

suppress, the magistrate found that the officer’s conduct was subjectively non-pretextual. 

So there is substantial evidence in the record to support that finding by the magistrate.” 

The court continued, “And we don’t have evidence one way or the other as to whether or 

not the inventory search was actually performed, but the decision to conduct it on the car 

initially was reasonable. [¶] . . . And there’s no published case, that I’m aware of 

anyway, that requires that the CHP 180 form actually be filled out. I know it’s a standard 

practice, but that doesn’t mean without it an inventory search can’t be justified. [¶] So the 

995 motion is denied.” 

In May 2016, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant entered a no contest 

plea to the weapon charge and was convicted on that charge. He preserved his right to 

raise the denial of his suppression motion on appeal. 
5

The court subsequently sentenced defendant to three years in county jail pursuant 

to section 1170, subdivision (h). The court ordered that he serve six months in jail and be 

placed on mandatory supervision under section 1170, subdivision (h)(5) for the remainder 

of the time. The court also imposed various fees and fines. 

Defendant filed a timely appeal based on the court’s denial of his suppression 

motion. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends we must reverse the judgment because Officer Ambrose’s 

warrantless search of his vehicle violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable 

search and seizure. He argues the trial court erred in rejecting his suppression motion 

because there was no evidence that Ambrose’s search came within the “inventory search” 

exception to the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches. The People 

assert only that we should affirm the judgment because police inevitably would have 

discovered the baton, which defendant argues also is not supported by substantial 

evidence. We agree with defendant.

I.

Standard of Review

When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court determines the facts, selects 

the rule of law, and applies the rule to the facts “in order to determine whether the law as 

applied has been violated.” (People v. Gonzales (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 284.) “On 

appeal from a section 995 review of the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress, we 

review the determination of the magistrate at the preliminary hearing.” (People v. 

McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.) We review the magistrate’s resolution of 

the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard. (Gonzales, at 

p. 284.) We defer to the magistrate’s factual findings “when supported by substantial 

evidence, and view the record in the light most favorable to the challenged ruling.” 

(People v. Smith (2011) 190 Cal.App.4th 572, 576.) We may affirm the magistrate’s 

ruling if it “is correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case, even if the ruling 

was made for an incorrect reason.” (McDonald, at p. 529.) 
6

II.

There Is Not Substantial Evidence That Ambrose Conducted an Inventory Search.

Defendant argues there is not substantial evidence that Officer Ambrose’s search 

of the vehicle was a valid inventory search pursuant to standardized department 

procedures. We agree. 

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the California 

Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, including those conducted 

without warrants. Specifically, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated . . . .” (U.S. Const., 4th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; see People v.

Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125 (Williams).) “The United States Supreme Court has 

interpreted the Fourth Amendment as requiring state and federal courts to exclude 

evidence that government officials obtained in violation of the amendment’s protections. 

(Mapp [v. Ohio (1961)] 367 U.S. [643,] 655.) [¶] One of those protections is that a 

government official must obtain a warrant from a judicial officer before conducting a 

search or seizure.” (Williams, at p. 125.) 

“Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable ‘ “subject only to a few 

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” ’ ” (People v. Evans (2011) 

200 Cal.App.4th 735, 742.) These are “ ‘exceptional circumstances in which, on 

balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be 

contended that a magistrate’s warrant for search may be dispensed with.’ ” (Williams, 

supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 126.) “[T]he burden of proving the justification for the 

warrantless search or seizure lies squarely with the prosecution.” (People v. Johnson

(2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723.) 

Courts have recognized an exception to the warrant requirement when the police 

take “an inventory of the contents of a vehicle” in the course of impounding it (Williams,

supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 126), commonly referred to as an inventory search. (See South 

Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373–374 (Opperman).) Inventory searches 

are typically performed in the course of police impounding a vehicle “[i]n the interests of 
7

public safety and as part of . . . ‘community caretaking functions.’ ” (Id. at p. 368.) 

“When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine 

practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents. These procedures 

developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner’s property 

while it remains in police custody, [citation]; the protection [of] the police against claims 

or disputes over lost or stolen property, [citation]; and the protection of the police from 

potential danger.” (Id. at p. 369.) 

However, courts have “recognized the risk that police might use an inventory of 

this kind as a pretext for searching a vehicle for contraband or other evidence.” 

(Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 126.) A purported inventory search must not be a 

“pretext concealing an investigatory police motive” (Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at 

p. 376) or “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating 

evidence . . . . The individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that 

inventory searches are turned into ‘a purposeful and general means of discovering 

evidence of crime.’ ” (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4 (Wells).) In order to prevent

such pretext searches, police discretion in performing an inventory search must be 

“exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than 

suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 

375.) “[A] valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice.” 

(Williams, at p. 138 [citing Wells, at p. 4].) Further, “[t]he policy or practice governing 

inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory.” (Wells, at p. 4; Williams

at p. 126, quoting Wells.)

California courts have rejected claims of purported inventory searches where the 

evidence does not show the search was conducted in accordance with an established 

policy or practice governing such searches or indicates the search was conducted for 

another purpose. (See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 123, 138 [prosecution failed to 

meet burden of showing search was valid inventory search where prosecution failed to 

establish policy concerning search of closed containers and officers failed to complete 

inventory, questioning why need to inventory truck “mysteriously evaporate[d]” once
8

officers found drugs]; People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 782, 786–792

[rejecting prosecution’s inventory search justification despite existence of inventory 

search policy where officer admitted he did not personally fill out CHP 180 form and 

made impound decision to facilitate inventory search so he could search truck for 

narcotics-related evidence]); People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 743, fn. 5 

[search of air vents at impound yard not valid inventory search where not done pursuant 

to standardized inventory procedure and undisputedly done in effort to discover 

incriminating evidence].)

In Williams, the defendant, Williams, moved to suppress evidence of drugs that 

two deputies, Hunt and Oliver, found during a search of Williams’s truck that the 

deputies conducted after Hunt stopped Williams for making an illegal turn. (Williams, 

supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 124.) The drugs were contained inside closed leather bags on the 

front bench seat of Williams’s truck. (Id. at p. 123.) The record indicated that the 

sheriff’s department had a policy requiring deputies to inventory the contents of a vehicle 

before towing it, but there was no evidence the department had a policy about the opening 

of closed containers. (Id. at pp. 126–127.) Based on Wells, the court held that the 

prosecution was required to show that the deputies “were following some ‘standardized 

criteria’ or ‘established routine’ when they elected to open the containers [citation], and 

the record [there] fail[ed] to do so.” (Williams, at p. 127.) 

The primary issue in Williams was whether Williams’s motion to suppress was 

specific enough to afford the prosecution notice of the grounds for the motion. But the

court also elaborated on the prosecution’s failure to meet its burden of proof and the 

importance of requiring it to do so. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 138–139.) The 

facts of the case, the court wrote, “underscore forcefully the reason behind [the] rule [that 

a valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice]. Deputy Hunt

was surveilling defendant on suspicion of drug-related offenses and had called Deputy 

Oliver for assistance before defendant made the right turn without signaling. Deputy 

Hunt was likely looking for an opportunity to search defendant’s truck. If he and Oliver 

truly intended to take an inventory pursuant to a preexisting policy or practice rather than 
9

to search for drugs, why did they fail to complete the inventory? Why, when they found 

what they assumed to be drugs, did their need to inventory defendant’s truck mysteriously 

evaporate? Having found the drugs, the police still needed to tow the truck, but 

apparently they were no longer very concerned about following policy. The inference is 

strong that they were never very concerned about following policy; Hunt opened the 

leather bags, not because he wanted to take an inventory pursuant to a preexisting policy, 

but because he suspected defendant of drug possession and wanted an excuse to 

‘rummage[e]’ for evidence.” (Id. at p. 138.) 

Here, Ambrose testified it was standard police department policy for an officer to 

have a vehicle such as defendant’s towed and inventoried when no one was present to 

take custody of it, it was standard procedure to fill out a CHP 180 form if the vehicle was 

towed, and the CHP 180 form contained a field in which one could inventory the items 

that were found in the towed vehicle. However, Ambrose did not testify that he was 

complying with these policies when he searched defendant’s vehicle.

2

 He simply 

testified that after placing defendant in the police car, he searched defendant’s vehicle. 

He did not testify that either he or Sergeant Reeves, or the two of them jointly, had 

decided to have defendant’s vehicle towed before he searched it. He did not testify that 

either of them arranged to tow the vehicle. And he testified that he did not know whether 

the vehicle was in fact towed or whether a CHP 180 form was ever prepared. He 

admitted he did not fill out a CHP 180 form, and no such form was offered in evidence by 

the prosecution, suggesting that no policy-compliant inventory search was ever 

completed. Nor was evidence offered that Ambrose referred in his police report to his 

having conducted an inventory search of defendant’s vehicle or that his search had 

yielded nothing of value, even though the department’s inventory search policy required 

 

2 Asked whether the department’s policy of towing and inventorying unattended 

vehicles applied in this case, Ambrose did not respond directly, instead observing there 

were “a couple of different reasons to get in and search [defendant’s] vehicle: One being 

inventory search and one being incident to the arrest that I was making.” 
10

officers to note and take custody of any “items of value.”3 Finally, Ambrose testified that 

“[t]he vehicle had nothing to do with why I was there” and that he had “nothing to do 

with this traffic stop or anything to do with the CHP-180 [form], if there was one filled 

out.” 

On this record, there is no substantial evidence that Ambrose conducted an 

inventory search in accordance with standardized policies and procedures of the Fairfield 

Police Department. With no evidence that the officers had considered whether, or 

decided, to impound defendant’s vehicle, and if so the reasons for impoundment, the 

police’s “community caretaking functions” were not implicated.4 Given the absence of 

this evidence and, further, given Ambrose’s disclaimer of any responsibility for the 

vehicle, the traffic stop or the CHP 180 form, as well as the lack of evidence that he

referred in any way to his search in his police report, there is no basis for inferring that 

Ambrose’s search of defendant’s vehicle was undertaken for the purpose of preparing an 

inventory. As the United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court have 

stated, “[t]he policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to 

 

3

 He stated that, “to ensure if there is [sic] any items of high value in the vehicle, 

that we are to note them—or, actually, take and put them into our custody for 

safekeeping, just so that when the vehicle is towed, it’s not going to possibly become 

missing.” The People acknowledge that the policy required officers both to note and to 

take custody of any items of value. 

4 When an inventory search is conducted based on a decision to impound, the 

impoundment itself must be warranted. “Whether ‘impoundment is warranted under this 

community caretaking doctrine depends on the location of the vehicle and the police 

officers’ duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers or being a target for 

vandalism or theft.’ ” (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761; accord, 

People v. Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 787–789.) Here, Officer Ambrose did

not testify as to whether the car was located in a high crime area, illegally parked or 

otherwise posed a hazard to motorists or pedestrians. Nor did he indicate whether the 

department’s policy was to impound vehicles regardless of where they were located or 

how they were parked. This raises further questions about whether the prosecution met 

its burden of proof to establish that the decision to impound, if any, and an inventory 

search resulting from impoundment, were called for by department policy and 

constitutionally reasonable. 
11

produce an inventory.” (Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4; Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 

p. 126.) While it is possible that Ambrose conducted an inventory search of defendant’s 

vehicle, “a mere possibility is nothing more than speculation. Speculation is not 

substantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘ “To be sufficient, evidence must of course be 

substantial. It is such only if it ‘ “reasonably inspires confidence and is of ‘solid 

value.’ ” ’ By definition, ‘substantial evidence’ requires evidence and not mere 

speculation. In any given case, one ‘may speculate about any number of scenarios that 

may have occurred . . . . A reasonable inference, however, may not be based on suspicion 

alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess 

work. . . . A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than . . . a 

mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ramon (2009) 

175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851.) In short, the People did not present substantial evidence that 

Ambrose conducted an inventory search of defendant’s vehicle pursuant to standard 

department policy. 

III.

There Is No Substantial Evidence That Police Inevitably Would Have Discovered the 

Baton.

The People do not argue that Ambrose conducted an inventory search of 

defendant’s vehicle. Instead, they contend we should affirm the judgment because, as the 

prosecutor argued below in the alternative,5the police inevitably would have discovered 

the baton in the course of an inventory search conducted after defendant’s vehicle was 

towed. We conclude there is not substantial evidence to support the People’s contention.

“[E]vidence that has been illegally obtained need not always be suppressed . . . .” 

(Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 441.) “[T]he interest of society in deterring 

unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative 

 

5 The People contend that the magistrate ruled the baton inevitably would have 

been discovered when defendant’s vehicle was impounded. We disagree. Instead, as we 

have discussed, the magistrate concluded that Ambrose conducted a proper inventory 

search of the vehicle. 
12

evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, 

position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.” (Id. 

at p. 443.) Thus, such evidence may be admitted “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have 

been discovered by lawful means.” (Id. at p. 444.) 

“The prosecution must establish inevitable discovery without resort to speculation,

for ‘inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated 

historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.’ ” (People v. Superior 

Court (Corbett) (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 682, quoting Nix v. Williams, supra, 467 U.S. 

at p. 444, fn. 5.) Further, “[t]he inevitable discovery exception requires the court ‘ “to 

determine, viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search, what 

would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred.” ’ ” (People v. Hughston

(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072.) 

The People point out that defendant “does not contend that he would have 

maintained control over his vehicle after the stop, or that the vehicle would not have been 

impounded.” Further, “no one else was available to take the vehicle, so it is apparent that 

the car would have been towed and inventoried, and the baton would have been 

eventually found. The community caretaking function of keeping unlicensed drivers off 

the road, and of removing cars without drivers from the street, is clear.” After noting that 

the baton was visible inside defendant’s vehicle, the People conclude, “Thus, if Officer 

Ambrose had not detected the baton, personnel inventorying the car at the impound lot 

eventually would have.” The People also emphasize Ambrose’s testimony that 

department policy required officers to have a vehicle such as defendant’s towed and 

inventoried and to note and place in custody for safekeeping any items of high value 

found in a vehicle. 

The People’s inevitable discovery argument fails because it requires us to build 

speculative inference on top of speculative inference. (See People v. Raley (1992) 

2 Cal.4th 870, 890 [finding “these layers of inference far too speculative to support” a 

conviction].) First, as already discussed, the record is silent as to whether anyone even 
13

considered towing the vehicle. There is no indication that Ambrose discussed with 

Reeves or anyone else whether the vehicle met the department’s standardized criteria for 

a towing. Ambrose testified that there was no one in the area who could take custody of 

the vehicle, but this testimony is of little import if he had nothing to do with deciding 

whether to tow the vehicle, did not communicate his observations to anyone and left the 

scene before any decision about towing the vehicle was made. The record reveals 

nothing about the understanding of the officer apparently charged with this decision, 

Sergeant Reeves, of the department’s standardized criteria for towing and inventorying or 

of whether the vehicle met these criteria. Reeves did not testify, and the record is silent,

regarding the location of the vehicle at the time of defendant’s arrest; we do not know, for 

example, if it was on a highway or in front of defendant’s house. In light of this limited 

record, we can only speculate as to whether any decision was considered or made to tow 

defendant’s vehicle according to standard department policy, and if any such decision 

would have been reasonable. (See note 5, ante.) 

Second, there is no indication that the vehicle was actually towed. As we have 

discussed, Ambrose’s testimony indicates that he was unaware of any decision to tow the 

vehicle, that he had nothing to do with considering such a question, and that he did not

know whether or not the vehicle was ever towed. In light of this testimony, it would also 

be speculation to conclude the vehicle was actually towed.

It is possible that defendant’s vehicle was towed but, again, a mere possibility 

does not rise to the level of substantial evidence. (People v. Ramon, supra, 

175 Cal.App.4th at p. 851; see People v. Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 

[rejecting the People’s inevitable discovery argument when, other than an impound 

manager’s “oblique reference” to the usual practice of filling out a CHP 180 form, “there 

was no evidence presented regarding when, or whether, a separate inventory would have 

been conducted by police, or what the scope” of it would have been].) Therefore, we 

cannot affirm the trial court’s order based on the People’s inevitable discovery theory.

For the reasons we have stated, there is no substantial evidence to support the 

court’s denial of defendant’s suppression motion. The court should have granted the 
14

motion because the People failed to meet their burden of establishing that the search of 

defendant’s vehicle did not violate the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and 

the California Constitution. 

The court’s error “is by its nature prejudicial” in this circumstance, where 

defendant pled no contest after the court’s erroneous denial of his suppression motion. 

(People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 864, citing People v. Ruggles (1985) 

39 Cal.3d 1, 13.) Therefore, he must be allowed, if he so chooses, to withdraw his no 

contest plea.

In light of our conclusions, we do not need to, and do not, address the remainder 

of the parties’ arguments.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial 

court to (1) vacate the order denying defendant’s suppression motion and enter a new 

order granting the motion; (2) permit defendant to withdraw his no contest plea; (3) 

determine, if defendant does withdraw his plea, whether the People intend to retry the 

case; and (4) make such other orders as are necessary and appropriate.
15

STEWART, J.

We concur.

KLINE, P.J.

MILLER, J.

People v. Wallace (A149049)
16

Trial Court: Solano County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. E. Bradley Nelson

Counsel: 

Anna Dorn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, 

Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Masha A. Dabiza, Deputy Attorney General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.