United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 22-3247

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United States of America,

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Melchizedek Robin Hayes,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

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 Submitted: April 12, 2023

Filed: July 31, 2023

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Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Melchizedek Hayes pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a

prohibited person. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (9), 924(a)(2). He argues that the
district court*

 erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a

search of his home. We conclude that there was no error in admitting the evidence,

and affirm the judgment.

I.

Beginning in December 2020, Hayes’s stepfather, Michael Richards, became

concerned about Hayes’s mental health. Hayes exhibited paranoid behavior, began

to miss work, and eventually lost his job. In April 2021, Richards filed mental health

commitment papers after Hayes expressed an intent to commit suicide, but Hayes left

two mental health facilities without receiving treatment. On May 18, 2021, Hayes

expressed suicidal thoughts, stating that “I may as well just blow myself up.”

One day later, Richards, who lived across the street from Hayes, noticed that

the front door to Hayes’s house was open. Richards knew that Hayes had departed

the home and was not inside. He also knew from experience that it was unusual for

Hayes to leave his door open. Richards and another son entered the house, and found

three Molotov cocktails, glass bottles, gasoline, and rags under a sink in a bathroom.

Richards called 911 to report what he found, and explained that he believed

Hayes posed a danger to himself and others. Richards also told the dispatcher that his

family owned the house. When police officers arrived on the scene, Richards told

them that “[o]ur family lives across the road.” Richards then led the officers into the

house. Once inside, Richards directed the officers toward the bathroom where he had

discovered three Molotov cocktails, gasoline, bottles, and rags. An officer

photographed the items in the bathroom.

*The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable Mark A.

Roberts, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.

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The officers then asked Richards how he had access to the house. Richards

explained that he owned the property through his family business. Richards stated

that he entered the house to perform a “safety inspection” after Hayes made threats

to burn down the house and to kill family members.

Officers continued to look through the house, and an officer found another

Molotov cocktail in the kitchen. The officers seized the Molotov cocktails found in

the bathroom and kitchen. Investigators determined that all four items were explosive

devices. Under federal law, the term “firearm” includes “any destructive device,”

which includes explosive devices. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a). 

A grand jury charged Hayes with unlawful possession of a firearm. See id.

§§ 922(g)(1), (9), 924(a)(2). Hayes moved to suppress the evidence seized from his

house. The district court concluded that the officers did not violate the Fourth

Amendment, and denied the motion. Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea and

reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(a)(2). The district court sentenced Hayes to a term of twenty-six months’

imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. 

II.

Hayes argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence. We conclude that the search of Hayes’s house was permissible without a

warrant, because the police officers reasonably relied on the apparent authority of

Richards to consent to the search. Once the officers were present within the

residence, the seizure of evidence was lawful because the items taken were in plain

view.

Warrantless searches of a person’s home are generally prohibited under the

Fourth Amendment unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Illinois

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v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). One exception allows police officers to

search a home without a warrant if a third party who has common authority over the

premises consents to the search. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 

Common authority rests on mutual use of the property or joint access or control of the

premises. Id. at 171 n.7.

Whether or not a third party actually possessed common authority, a

warrantless search is justified “when an officer reasonably relies on a third party’s

demonstration of apparent authority.” United States v. Amratiel, 622 F.3d 914, 915

(8th Cir. 2010). Apparent authority exists if “the facts available to the officer at the

moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting

party had authority over the premises.” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (internal

quotations omitted).

Given the facts available to the officers, we conclude that it was reasonable to

believe that Richards had authority to consent to the search of Hayes’s house. It is

reasonable for police officers to “form their impressions from context,” and the

Fourth Amendment does not “require police to go behind appearances to verify third

party authority.” United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162, 1171 (8th Cir.

2008).

When the officers were dispatched to the residence, they received information

that Richards was the father of the resident, that the resident was experiencing a

mental health crisis for which he recently had been committed, and that Richards had

just entered the house and found “bomb-making material.” When officers arrived,

they saw Richards waiting outside the residence. Richards told the officers that he

lived across the street, and led them into the house without knocking or asking

permission of anyone inside. By these communications and actions, Richards implied

that he possessed common authority over the residence, and it was reasonable for the

officers to believe without further inquiry that Richards could consent to their entry.

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Once inside, Richards informed the officers that he owned the house through

his family company, and that he was allowing Hayes to live at the residence while the

stepson was unemployed. Richards’s other son told the officers that they were

concerned about Hayes’s mental health and welfare, because he had threatened to

destroy the house and to harm himself and family members. Richards also told the

officers that he entered the house through the unlocked door to perform a “safety

inspection.”

Hayes argues that it was unreasonable for the officers to believe that Richards

could consent to a search of the house based on his ownership of the property through

his family business. He asserts that further investigation would have established that

Richards was not an owner of the corporation, and that a landlord cannot give consent

to search a tenant’s property in any event. 

Insofar as discussions inside the residence are relevant to the reasonableness

of ongoing police activity in the house, we conclude that the facts continued to

support a reasonable belief that Richards had joint access or control over the

residence. Richards told officers that he owned the residence through a family

business, and that he allowed the unemployed Hayes, a stepson, to live at the house. 

Officers observed Richards exercise privileges that would be proper only for a person

with authority over the house, including entry on his own initiative for the purpose

of conducting a safety inspection. Under the totality of the circumstances, it was

reasonable for the officers to believe that the situation did not present a typical

landlord-tenant relationship. Rather, the officers reasonably could have concluded

that Richards had authority to consent to a search based on his purported ownership

of the property, see United States v. Brokaw, 985 F.2d 951, 954 (8th Cir. 1993), his

familial relationship with Hayes, see United States v. Weston, 443 F.3d 661, 668 (8th

Cir. 2006), and his unfettered entry into the house before and after officers arrived. 

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Officers may seize an effect without a warrant under the “plain view doctrine”

if they are lawfully present in a place to view the object, the incriminating character

of the object is immediately apparent, and the officers have a lawful right of access

to the object. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990). Once the officers

were lawfully present in Hayes’s house based on Richards’s apparent authority to

consent, the officers permissibly seized the Molotov cocktails as objects in plain view

in the bathroom and kitchen. See United States v. Varner, 481 F.3d 569, 572-73 (8th

Cir. 2007). Hayes suggests that even if the police officers were lawfully present in

his home, and the incriminating character of the explosive devices was immediately

apparent, the officers were required to obtain a warrant before making a seizure. But

“[w]here the elements of the plain view doctrine are met, the fact that the officers

could have left and obtained a warrant does not invalidate the justification for seizing

the property.” PPS, Inc. v. Faulkner County, 630 F.3d 1098, 1106 (8th Cir. 2011). 

The district court did not err when it concluded that the officers lawfully seized the

items from Hayes’s bathroom and kitchen.

For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying the motion to

suppress, and the judgment is affirmed.

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