alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Darwin Jesus MEJIA-GUERRA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-11134 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 31, 2017

*176Amber Michelle Grand, Attorney, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jessica Graf, Jason Douglas Hawkins, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, Christopher Allen Curtis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and CLEMENT and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Darwin Jesus Mejia-Guerra pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry into the United States after a prior removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). The district court sentenced him to 36 months of imprisonment.

Mejia-Guerra challenges the application of the 16-level crime of violence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based on his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. First, the district court did not err when it applied the modified categorical approach to his prior conviction, *See United States v. Uribe,*838 F.3d 667, 671 (6th Cir. 2016), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1359, 197 L.Ed.2d 542 (2017); *United States v. Conde-Castaneda,*753 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2014). Second, the Government satisfied its burden in showing the applicability of the § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) enhancement and, thus, the district court did not err in relying on the indictment. *See United States v. Torres-Diaz,*438 F.3d 529, 535 (5th Cir. 2006); *United States v. Herrera-Solorzano,*114 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1997).

Finally, Mejia-Guerra avers that the district court violated his due process rights by imposing a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum under § 1326(a). As he concedes, this issue is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 226-28, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R, 47.5.4.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 20-0340
STATE OF MONTANA,ex rel., TIMOTHY C. FOX, 

### NOV 2 3 2020 Bowen Greenwood Clerk of Supreme Court State of Montana Plaintiff and Appellee, ORDER v. PHILIP MORRIS,INC.,et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Philip Morris USA Inc., and other tobacco manufacturers, collectively Appellants, appealed the First Judicial District Court's June 25, 2020 final judgment in Cause No. BDV-1997-306. After a successful appellate mediation,the parties reached a settlement in principle and now stipulate to the entry ofan order remanding the case to the District Court for the parties to submit the terms of that settlement for entry ofa ConsentDecree. Appellants have agreed to the voluntary dismissal ofthe remainder ofthis appeal with prejudice. Pursuant to the stipulation ofthe parties, and for good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that this rnatter is REMANDED to the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County,for entry ofa Consent Decree. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to provide copies ofthis Order to all counsel ofrecord and to the Honorable Mike McMahon,presiding District Court Judge. DATED this aday ofNovember,2020. 11/23/2020

Case Number: DA 20-03402
#### XUNSE HAN, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-73636

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

Filed October 2, 2017

Maria Christina Florés, Attorney, Law Office of Maria Christina Flores, San Gabriel, CA, for Petitioner

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Kevin James Conway, Esquire, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Xunse Han, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Tor*495ture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act. *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on the inconsistency between Han’s testimony, declaration, and statements made during her asylum interview as to how many home church gatherings she attended in China, and her internally inconsistent testimony as to the length of her interrogation in detention. *See id.*at 1048 (adverse credibility finding reasonable under the totality of the circumstances).

In the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Han’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Han’s CAT claim also fails because it is based on the same testimony the agency found not credible, and Han does not point to any other evidence in the record that compels the conclusion that it is more likely than not she would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a. public official in China. *See id.*at 1156-57.

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand in light of the evidence Han submitted on appeal. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); *Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir, 2008) (“The BIA abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” (internal citation. and quotation marks omitted)).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Eugene FORTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERCED COUNTY; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-17236

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 **

OCTOBER 3, 2017

*555Eugene Forte, Modesto, CA, pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *555See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM *

Eugene Forte appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 action alleging various federal and state law claims stemming from his arrest and prosecution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Forte has failed to address in his opening brief the claims alleged in his complaint or the grounds for dismissal, and has therefore waived his challenge to the district court’s order. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (court does not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief); *Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle,*7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived).

We reject as unsupported by the record Forte’s contentions that the district court participated in fraud and was biased against him.

Forte’s motions for judicial notice (Docket Entry Nos. 9 and 11) are denied.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1


                              CONNETICS CORPORATION
                STATEMENTS RE: COMPUTATION OF NET LOSS PER SHARE
                    (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE AMOUNTS)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                  THREE MONTHS ENDED          NINE MONTHS ENDED
                                                                     SEPTEMBER 30,               SEPTEMBER 30,
                                                               -----------------------------------------------------
                                                                 1997           1996           1997           1996
                                                               --------       --------       --------       --------
<S>                                                            <C>            <C>            <C>            <C>

HISTORICAL
Weighted average shares of common stock outstanding              11,016          7,403         10,034          6,525
                                                               --------       --------       --------       --------
Total shares used in computing net loss per share                11,016          7,403         10,034          6,525
                                                               ========       ========       ========       ========





Net loss                                                       $ (6,679)      $ (5,259)      $(23,040)      $(12,475)
Convertible preferred stock, Series A preferred dividends           (29)             -           (110)             -
                                                               --------       --------       --------       --------
NET LOSS USED IN COMPUTING NET LOSS PER SHARE                  $ (6,708)      $ (5,259)      $(23,150)      $(12,475)
                                                               --------       --------       --------       --------

HISTORICAL NET LOSS PER SHARE                                  $  (0.61)      $  (0.71)      $  (2.31)      $  (1.91)
                                                               ========       ========       ========       ========
</TABLE>
#### Thomas John CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., and U.S. Security Associates, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1801

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017*

Decided July 26, 2017

Thomas John Carter, Pro Se

Craig R. Thorstenson, Attorney, Ford & Harrison LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees

Before Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, Michael S. Kanne, Circuit Judge, Ann Claire Williams, Circuit Judge

*

 This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and argument would not significantly aid the court. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Order

Thomas Carter contends that defendants violated legal requirements when security guards at a building where he was scheduled for an employment interview deemed his identification unsatisfactory and did not let him enter.

This is Carter’s third suit about the events of that day. See *Carter v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,*650 Fed.Appx. 896 (7th Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential disposition affirming the dismissal of an earlier suit). The district court dismissed Carter’s latest complaint as barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion (res *judicata).*Carter does not take issue with the district court’s evaluation or application of that doctrine’s elements. Instead he contends that because he paid a new filing fee and served the defendants with process in this new case he is entitled to a fresh decision on the merits. That contention misunderstands the law of preclusion, which limits to one the number of suits presenting the same claim. That Carter has filed a new suit under a new docket number is what brings the doctrine of preclusion into play; it is not an exception to that doctrine.

The district court’s order does not need elaboration, and its judgment is affirmed. Carter must understand that any further attempt to litigate claims arising from the events of April 24, 2014, will lead to financial and other penalties.
#### Daniel Morgan, Respondent, *v.*Sarah E. M. Hannas.

A guardian will not be allowed an extra compensation for services, although noi strictly within the line of his duties; as where the guardian is an attorney and counselor-at-law, he cannot charge for professional services rendered in the affairs of his ward, but is restricted to the statu*668tory allowance. Neither an order of a surrogate, before the services are rendered, directing the performance thereof, and fixing the extra compensation, nor an order ratifying and allowing it, will legalize the charge.

(Argued April 25, 1872;

decided April 30, 1872.)

Where annual rests in the accounts of an executor or other trustee are required by the special direction of a court, in order to charge the trustee with interest, or where required by a rule of court or by provision of statute, full commissions may be computed upon the amount, excluding re-investments of principal. H a guardian has made and filed his accounts annually, as required by statute (chap. 460, § 57, Laws of 1837), he may be allowed commissidns in full upon each account.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, affirming surrogate’s decree settling respondent’s accounts as guardian." The questions presented and the holdings appear above.

*M. H. Throop*for the appellant.

*Frcmois Kernczn*for the respondent.

Folger, J.,

reads opinion for reversal of judgment of Supreme Court and decree of surrogate, and that proceedings be remitted.

All concur, except Rapallo; J., not voting.

Judgment accordingly.
**EXHIBIT- 32.2**

 

MOSSIMO, INC.

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofMossimo, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31,2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the Report), I Edwin Lewis, Vice-Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer ofthe Company, certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that tothe best of my knowledge:

 

(1)              The Report, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit -32.2, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of theSecurities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)              The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition, results of operations, and cashflows of the Company.

 
| /s/    | Edwin Lewis                                   |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Edwin Lewis                                   |
|   | Vice-Chairman and Co-Chief Executive  Officer |
|   | May 13, 2005                                  |

 

A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTENSTATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 HASBEEN PROVIDED TO THE COMPANY AND WILL BE RETAINED BY THE COMPANY AND FURNISHEDTO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF UPON REQUEST.

 

THIS CERTIFICATION ACCOMPANIES THE FORM10-Q TO WHICH IT RELATES, IS NOT DEEMED FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION AND IS NOT TO BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO A FILING OF THECOMPANY UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 OR THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 (WHETHERMADE BEFORE OR AFTER THE DATE OF THE FORM 10-Q), IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY GENERALINCORPORATION LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN SUCH FILING.

 

----
#### Sarbpreet SINGH, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 16-60010 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 14, 2017

Stacy Tolchin, Law Offices of Stacy Tol-chin, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner

John W. Blakeley, Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/OIL, Washington, DC, Office of Immigration Litigation, Jason Lloyd Wisecup, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration. Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Sarbpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the denial of his most recent motion to reopen. In denying the motion, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) first determined that it was number-barred, untimely, and did not fit within any of the exceptions to the filing requirements. Second, the BIA declined to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen, asserting that it had considered the record in its entirety, it had considered Singh’s arguments, and Singh had not shown an exceptional situation warranting exercise of its discretion to reopen sua sponte. In support of this decision, the BIA cited *Matter of J-J-,*21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997).

Singh does not challenge the merits of the BIA’s first ruling. Instead, he contends that the BIA’s order contained only two sentences; the order did not show that the BIA had engaged in reasoned decision-making; and the order thus did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). He asks us to remand to require the BIA to provide additional reasons for its decision. Additionally, Singh contends that *Matter of V-X-,*26 I. & N. Dec. 147 (BIA 2013), constituted a fundamental change in the law warranting sua sponte reopening and that *Matter of V-X-*establishes that incorrect procedures and regulations were used in terminating his asylum, ordering his removal, and denying his applications for adjustment of status.

*300The APA does not apply to individual adjudications under the immigration laws. *See Ardestani v. INS,*502 U.S. 129, 133-34, 112 S.Ct. 515, 116 L.Ed.2d 496 (1991). Accordingly, we DENY Singh’s request for remand.

Regarding Singh’s argument that the BIA erred in denying his motion to reopen, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise its discretionary, sua sponte authority to reopen a case. *Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 246, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, even if we had jurisdiction, Singh has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion because his case does no turn on the legal error he alleges. *See Matter of G-D-,*22 I. *&*N. Dec 1132, 1135-36 (BIA 1999).

We DISMISS Singh’s petition for review.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          15,974
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   30,035
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     61,506
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               144,182
<PP&E>                                         992,802
<DEPRECIATION>                                 258,114
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,030,255
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,778,418
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        14,548
<OTHER-SE>                                  (1,459,751)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,030,255
<SALES>                                        101,946
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               101,946
<CGS>                                            3,981
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,597,851
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             112,241
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (1,608,146)
<INCOME-TAX>                                (1,608,146)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (1,608,146)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (1,608,146)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.12)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.12)
        

</TABLE>
ex4-1.htm



Exhibit 4.1



	
NUMBER


C***


 

	
 


altairnano


 

	
SHARES


***


 







 


	
ALTAIR NANOTECHNOLOGIES, INC.


INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE          CUSIP NO.   021373 20 4


Common Stock


	 
	
THIS CERTIFIES that                                                                                               Specimen


	
 


 


Is the owner of                                                                                                            Specimen


	 
	
FULLY PAID AND NON-ASSESSABLE SHARES OF THE COMMON STOCK, PAR VALUE OF $.001 PER SHARE OF


ALTAIR NANOTECHNOLOGIES, INC.


	  
	
transferable only on the books of the Corporation by the holder hereof in person or by Attorney upon surrender of this Certificate properly endorsed.  This Certificate is not valid until countersigned by the Transfer Agent and registered by the Registrar.


IN WITNESS HEREOF, the said Corporation has caused this Certificate to be signed by the facsimile signatures of its duly authorized officers and its Corporate seal to be hereunto affixed..





 



	
DATED:

	
COUNTERSIGNED AND REGISTERED


   REGISTRAR AND TRANSFER COMPANY


      TRANSFER AGENT AND REGISTRAT


 


 


BY


      AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE


 


	  
	
/s/

	
/s/


	
SECRETARY AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


 

	
INTERIM CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


	  	
[Corporate Seal]
**EXHIBIT 32.01**

SECTION 1350CERTIFICATION

In connection with thisquarterly report of ML Trend-Following Futures Fund L.P. (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the SecuritiesExchange Commission on the date hereof (this “Report”), I, Robert D. Ollwerther, Chief ExecutiveOfficer and President of Merrill Lynch Alternative Investments LLC, the generalpartner of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. This Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

2. The informationcontained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| Date: August 14, 2007                  |                      |
|----------------------------------------|---------------------------|
|                                   |                      |
| By                                     | /s/ ROBERT D.  OLLWERTHER |   |
| Robert D.  Ollwerther                  |                      |
| Chief Executive  Officer and President |                      |
| (Principal  Executive Officer)         |                      |
|                                        |                           |  |

 

----
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-18-0000916

07-DEC-2018

07:54 AM