alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Sean Luke GRISS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40083 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 9, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Sean Luke Griss, Pro Se

Before KING, SMITH, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Sean Luke Griss has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Griss has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with *364counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

We note, however, that there is a clerical error in the written judgment. As a special condition of supervised release, the district court orally ordered that Griss “shall participate in a drug treatment and alcohol abuse program as required” pursuant to the provisions of the Southern District of Texas. However, the written judgment includes outdated language stating that Griss “shall participate [in such treatment] as instructed and as deemed necessary by the probation officer.” At the time of Griss’s sentencing, the Southern District of Texas had modified the special condition to remove the “as deemed necessary” language, which had been found to be ambiguous. *See United States v. Franklin,*838 F.3d 564, 567-68 (5th Cir. 2016). The inclusion of the outdated phraseology in the judgment is an apparent clerical error. Accordingly, we REMAND for correction of the clerical error in the written judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36." See *United States v. Powell,*354 F.3d 362, 372 (5th Cir. 2003).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Peter Irons, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 672]

Spain, J.P

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Hoye, J.), rendered September 16, 2002, convicting defendant upon his *741plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.

Defendant was arraigned on July 12, 2002 on three misdemeanor informations and six felony complaints arising from his alleged possession and sale of cocaine on three separate occasions during October 2001 in the City of Schenectady, Schenectady County. Thereafter, he waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a superior court information charging him with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree in full satisfaction of the pending charges and waived his right to appeal. In accordance with the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a second felony offender to 21⁄2 to 5 years in prison.

Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to make a statutory speedy trial motion to dismiss the charges based upon the more than six-month delay between the filing of the criminal complaints and his arraignment. Inasmuch as the claimed ineffectiveness is not alleged to have impeded the voluntariness of his plea, it is encompassed by his waiver of the right to appeal *(see People v Lane 1*AD3d 801, 803 [2003]; *People v Bier,*307 AD2d 649, 650 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 618 [2003]; *People v Camp,*302 AD2d 629, 630 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 593 [2003]). Even if it were not, defendant is precluded from raising it by his failure to move to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction *(see People v Shaw,*306 AD2d 697, 698 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 645 [2003]; People v *Camp, supra*at 630). “Where, as here, no pretrial motion or motion to withdraw the plea or to vacate the conviction has been made to the trial court, this issue is properly raised through a CPL article 440 motion, not on direct appeal” *(People v Obert,*1 AD3d 631, 632 [2003] [citations omitted]; *see People v Hemingway,*306 AD2d 689, 690 [2003]).

Mugglin, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CONSTANTINA RAMIREZ MOTA, 

Petitioner, No. 07-71880

v. Agency No. 

M A79-540-706 ICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney

General of the United States, ORDER

Respondent. 

Filed December 8, 2008

Before: David R. Thompson and Kim McLane Wardlaw,

Circuit Judges, and Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge.*

ORDER

The parties having advised this court that they have

exhausted attempts to settle this case, and the court’s Circuit

Mediator having advised the court that mediation proceedings

have terminated, and the parties having requested that the

mandate now issue, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the mandate in this case

shall issue forthwith.

*The Honorable Barry T. Moskowitz, United States District Judge for

the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. 

16065
PRINTED FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS

BY THOMSON REUTERS/WEST—SAN FRANCISCO

The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted

© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West.
1

Sutton, Tia

From: Achanta, Chandana L. <Chandana_L._Achanta@omb.eop.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 29, 2015 2:02 PM

To: Spears, Matthew; Hengst, Benjamin; Sutton, Tia; Timothy.Mullins@dot.gov; 

'james.tamm@dot.gov' (james.tamm@dot.gov)

Cc: Whiteman, Chad

Subject: Summary of working interagency comments received under EO 12866 review of 

EPA/NHTSA HD NPRM

Attachments: Summary of Interagency Comments Received on EO 12866 Review of Draft Heavy Duty 

Vehicles NPRM.pdf

Follow Up Flag: Flag for follow up

Flag Status: Completed

Hi All, 

 Attached are follow-up EO 12866 interagency comments received on the draft joint EPA/NHTSA proposed rule, 

“Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Work Trucks -- 

Phase 2,” EPA RIN 2060-AS16 - NHTSA RIN 2127-AL52. These are subject to further policy review. 

Thanks 

Chandana
Exhibit 23.3 Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm The Board of Directors

StarCite, Inc.: We consent to incorporation by reference in the
registration statements (Nos. 333-160252, 333-34736, 333-76870,
333-76872 and 333-126808) on Form S-8, the registration statements (Nos. 333-162447 and
333-115702) on Form S-3 and the
registration statement (No. 333-162448) on Form S-4 of Internet Capital Group, Inc. and
subsidiaries of our report
dated March 19, 2010, with respect to the consolidated
balance sheets of StarCite, Inc. and subsidiaries as of
December 31, 2009 and 2008, and the related consolidated statements of operations,
stockholders equity and
comprehensive loss and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended
December 31, 2009, which report
appears in the December 31, 2009 annual report of Internet Capital Group, Inc., as amended,
on Form 10-K/A. /s/ KPMG LLP Philadelphia, PA

March 19, 2010
Exhibit
99








AGREEMENT
TO FURNISH DEBT INSTRUMENTS






Pursuant
to Instruction 3(b)(4)(iii) to Item 601 of Regulation S-K, the Company has not
included as an Exhibit any instrument with respect to long-term debt if the
total amount of debt authorized by such instrument does not exceed 10% of the
consolidated assets of the Company and its subsidiaries.  The Company
agrees, pursuant to this Instruction, to furnish a copy of any such instrument
to the Securities and Exchange Commission upon request of the
Commission.








Pennsylvania
      Commerce Bancorp, Inc./s/ Mark A.
      ZodyMark
      A. Zody,Chief
      Financial Officer
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#### AUMAVAE, MAGALEI & SATELE, Plaintiffs v. TOLOUMA of Iliili, Defendant

No. 4-1927

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Maota” consisting of parcels “Maota,” “Siasiaga” *&*“Toefisia”]

August 14, 1930

HARRY P. WOOD, *American Judge;*PELE, *District Judge;*and PULETU, *District Judge*

JUDGMENT

The issues in this case raised by the filing for registration of the land Maota by Tolouma of Leone and the objections to said registration by Aumavae of Leone, Magalei of Faleniu and Satele of Vailoa, having come on to be heard by this Court on said 30th and 31st days of July and 8th day of August, 1930.

And the proponent having appeared in person or by his attorney Teo and the objector Aumavae having appeared in person, and by his attorneys Atofau and Crossfield Hunkin, and the objector Magalei having appeared in person, and the objector Satele having appeared in person, and by his attorney Tuaolo of Pago Pago, and

It appearing by a judgment of this court made and entered in an action for the determination of title to land, wherein Atofau was the Plaintiff and Nuutofia and others *428were the Defendants, that the land Siasiaga belongs to the family of Salemeanai, and

It further appearing that the said objector Aumavae lays claim to the three parcels of land known as Maota, Siasiaga and Toefisia in the name of Aumavae personally and that the said Magalei lays claim only to the parcel designated in the map as Maota in the name of Soa, and that the said Satele lays claim to all of the three parcels designated as Maota included within the survey, in the name of Satele.

And it appearing to the court that the title of the parcel of land designated on the map filed by the proponent, called Siasiaga is in the family of Salemeanai and that the title to the parcels in the survey filed by the proponent named and designated Maota and Toefisia, are in the proponent,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED That the title of said land named and designated Siasiaga on the map filed for registration by Tolouma, is in the family of Salemeanai and that the title of the land named and designated on the said map filed by the proponent as Maota and Toefisia, is in the proponent Tolouma of Iliili.

The court costs in this case amounting to $60.00 will be paid as follows:

> Magalei ................................................................$10.00

> Satele .................................................................... 25.00

> Aumavae .............................................................. 25.00
#### NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. BRENNAN’S, INC., Respondent.

No. 22168.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 21, 1966.

Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Harold Shire, Atty., N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

C. Dale Stout, New Orleans, La., for respondent.

*1005ON PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF OPINION.

Before GEWIN and COLEMAN, Circuit Judges, and McRAE, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Upon petition for modification of our opinion the National Labor Relations Board does not seek a change in the result of our decision in this case. It is cbntended, however, that we have departed from the standard of review set forth in Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 478, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456; N.L.R.B. v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 405, 82 S.Ct. 853, 7 L.Ed.2d 829; and Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 707 (5 Cir. 1966) by use of the following language :

> “We must decide whether these facts carry with them an inference of unlawful intention so compelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the employer’s protestations of innocent purpose. We find that they do not. Based upon the term ‘so compelling,’ we conclude that if the employer’s conduct carries with it any other reasonable inference of a legitimate motive, the inference of illegality does not control. N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, supra [363 F.2d 130 (5 Cir. 1966)].”

While we disagree with the above interpretation of our language, in the interest of clarity we withdraw it and substitute the following:

> But in addition the record discloses other vital and important considerations in that LaFleur’s abusive language gave rise to significant business reasons and a legitimate business purpose which strongly support the action of the Brennan’s in removing LaFleur from the main dining room. Therefore we must decide whether the conduct of Brennan’s in reference to LaFleur carries with it an inference of unlawful intention which is so compelling that it constitutes substantial evidence of an unlawful motive and justifies the conclusion that Brennan’s was not motivated by legitimate business interests. See American Ship Building Co. v. N.L.R.B. [380 U.S. 300, 85 S.Ct. 955], 13 L.Ed.2d 855, 863-4 (1965). Upon a full review of the record we conclude that the above facts coupled with LaFleur’s self-serving declaration that Brennan’s was unlawfully motivated do not constitute substantial evidence to support the inference of anti-union animus necessary for a finding of a constructive discharge.

In all other respects the Petition for Modification is denied.
May 11, 2011 

Mr. Anthony Power 

Chief Executive Officer 

Emivest Aerospace Corporation 

1770 Skyplace Boulevard 

San Antonio, TX 78216 

Dear Mr. Power: 

We have received your April 25, 2011, correspondence withdrawing your December 2, 2010, 

petition on behalf of Emivest Aerospace Corporation for an exemption from § 21.123(g) of 

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). 

Your letter has been placed in the public docket (No. FAA-2010-1244). No further action 

will be taken on your petition. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda D. Courtney 

Manager, Aircraft and 

 Airport Rules Division
#### Mount Sinai Hospital of Queens, as Assignee of Josephine Brevogel, Respondent, v Hertz Corporation et al., Appellants.

[770 NYS2d 757]

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance contract, the defendants appeal from an or*524der of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (O’Connell, J.), entered May 23, 2003, which denied their motion to vacate a judgment of the same court entered January 9, 2003, upon their failure to appear or answer.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment entered upon its failure to appear or answer a complaint must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense *(see Manigat v Louis,*262 AD2d 289 [1999]). Generally, the determination whether to set aside a default is left to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court, the exercise of which will not be disturbed if there is support in the record *(see Gurreri v Village of Briarcliff Manor,*249 AD2d 508 [1998]; *MacMarty, Inc. v Scheller,*201 AD2d 706 [1994]). In the instant case, the defendants failed to present a reasonable excuse for their default and failed to establish a meritorious defense. Thus, their motion to vacate the judgment entered upon their failure to appear or answer the complaint was properly denied. Florio, J.P., Krausman, Luciano, Townes and Rivera, JJ, concur.
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02-17-00037-CV

VALERIE L. MCNALLY NOW KNOWN AS VALERIE JENKINS AND KELLY ALANA MCNALLY A/K/A KELLY ALANA WILKINS APPELLANTS

V. JOSEPH P. MCNALLY APPELLEE

---------- FROM COUNTY COURT AT LA W NO. 2 OF PARKER COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. CIV-14-0690

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellants Valerie L. McNa lly now known as Valerie Jenkins and Kelly Alana McNally a/k/a Kelly Alana Wilkins brou ght an appeal from the trial court’s December 20, 2016 “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Trad itional and No-Evidence

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 Motions for Summary Judgment and Deny ing Defendants’ Traditional and NoEvidence Motions for Summar y Judgment.” Upon our review of the record, we determined that the trial court’s December 20 order may not ha ve been final and appealable because it did not resolv e all claims against all parties. Therefore, on March 17, 2017, we sent the parties a letter expressing our concern that we lacked jurisdiction. In ou r letter, we stated that the December 20 order did not appear to be a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, and we asked the parties to file a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. Appellants responded to our letter by conceding that the December 20 order is not final or appealable and by expressing that counsel for appellee Joseph P. McNally ag rees that the order is not appealable. 2 We agree that the order is not a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, so we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (West Supp. 2016) (listing types of appealable interlocutory orders). PER CURIAM PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J .; WALKER and MEIER, JJ. DELIVERED: April 27, 2017

2 Appellants stated that when they file d their notice of appeal, they were unsure whether the De cember 20 order qualified as a final judgment and filed the notice of appeal “in an abundance of caution.”
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