alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
                    The Schedule contains summary financial 
                    information extracted from the financial
                    statements for Willowbridge Strategic Trust
                    and is qualified in its entirety by reference
                    to such financial statements
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>          
<CIK>               0001005006
<NAME>              Willowbridge Strategic Trust
<MULTIPLIER>        1

<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               Dec-31-1998

<PERIOD-START>                  Jan-1-1998

<PERIOD-END>                    Mar-31-1998

<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-Mos

<CASH>                          48,098,548

<SECURITIES>                    2,718,955

<RECEIVABLES>                   23,185

<ALLOWANCES>                    0

<INVENTORY>                     0

<CURRENT-ASSETS>                50,840,688

<PP&E>                          0

<DEPRECIATION>                  0

<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  50,840,688

<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           1,277,198

<BONDS>                         0

<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0

<PREFERRED>                     0

<COMMON>                        0

<OTHER-SE>                      49,563,490

<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    50,840,688

<SALES>                         0

<TOTAL-REVENUES>                865,319

<CGS>                           0

<TOTAL-COSTS>                   0

<OTHER-EXPENSES>                1,413,855

<LOSS-PROVISION>                0

<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0

<INCOME-PRETAX>                 0

<INCOME-TAX>                    0

<INCOME-CONTINUING>             0

<DISCONTINUED>                  0

<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0

<CHANGES>                       0

<NET-INCOME>                    (548,536)

<EPS-PRIMARY>                   (1.11)

<EPS-DILUTED>                   (1.11)

</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1




EXHIBIT 11
                      NCS HEALTHCARE, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
                    COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE
                  (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE INFORMATION)
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                Three Months Ended

                                                                     September 30,
                                                             -------------------------------
                                                                1997                 1996
                                                             -------------------------------

<S>                                                           <C>                   <C>    
Net income used in calculation of primary
    earnings per share                                        $ 3,632               $ 1,910
Add impact of assumed conversion of
   subordinated debentures                                        469                    71
                                                             -------------------------------
Net income used in calculation of fully
   diluted earnings per share                                 $ 4,101               $ 1,981
                                                             ===============================

Weighted average common shares outstanding                     18,354                12,407
Net effect of dilutive stock options                              243                   187
                                                             -------------------------------
Shares used in calculation of primary earnings
   per share                                                   18,597                12,594
Add impact of assumed conversion of
   subordinated debentures                                      2,025                   654
                                                             -------------------------------
Shares used in calculation of fully diluted
   earnings per share                                          20,622                13,248
                                                             ===============================


Primary net income per share                                 $   0.20              $   0.15
                                                             ===============================
Fully diluted net income per share-
   Note A                                                    $   0.20              $   0.15
                                                             ===============================
<FN>


NOTE A --         Fully dilutive net income per share has not been
                  presented in the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income
                  because the effect is either immaterial or anti-dilutive.
</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arturo CHAVEZ-MELGOZA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-50210

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 20, 2017

Jeffrey D. Hill, Assistant U.S. Attorney, US Department of Justice, Southern District of California, San Diego, CA, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Peter Ko, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Michael Marks, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Arturo Chavez-Melgoza appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 37-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for importation of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand for resentencing.

*472Chavez-Melgoza argues that the district court erred in denying a minor role reduction to his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), After Chavez-Melgoza was sentenced, the United States Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 794 (“the Amendment”), which amended the commentary to the minor role Guideline. The Amendment is retroactive to cases pending on direct appeal. *See United States v. Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d 519, 523 (9th Cir. 2016).

The Amendment clarified that, in assessing whether a defendant should receive a minor role adjustment, the court should compare him to the other participants in the crime, rather than to a hypothetical average participant. *See*U.S.S.G. App. C. Amend. 794; *Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d at 523. In addition, the Amendment clarified that “[t]he fact that a defendant performs an essential or indispensable role in the criminal activity is not determinative.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) (2015). Finally, the Amendment added a non-exhaustive list of factors that a court “should consider” in determining whether to apply a minor role reduction. *See id.*Because we cannot determine from the record whether the district court followed the guidance of the Amendment’s clarifying language and considered all of the now-relevant factors, we vacate Chavez-Melgoza’s sentence and remand for resentencing under the Amendment. *See Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d at 523-24.

For purposes of resentencing, we note that because Chavez-Melgoza is safety valve eligible, he is exempt from the statutory minimum term of supervised release. *See*U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 cmt. n.9.

VACATED and REMANDED for re-sentencing,

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Magdalena Bach, Resp’t, *v.*The New York Elevated R. R. Co. *et al.,*App’lts.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,*

*Filed May 15, 1891.)*

Railroad—Elevated—Parties—Life tenant.

Where the plaintiff in an action against an elevated railroad is a tenant for life or so long as she remains unmarried, the persons interested in the fee should be brought in so that there may be a complete determination of the matter at issue, and the proper award made as a condition of refusing an injunction.

Appeal from judgment of special term granting injunction and damages.

*S. B. Rogers,*for app’lts; *C. G. Bennett,*for resp’t.

Van Brunt, P. J.

This action was brought for an injunction and damages arising from a trespass committed by the erection of the defendants’ railroad in front of premises 360 Ninth avenue.

Upon the opening of the trial of the case and the proof of the title of the plaintiff it appeared that the only interest in the premises which the plaintiff had was that of a life tenant provided she so long unmarried. Objection was then taken to proceeding with the case because the proper parties were not before the court, *422which, objection was overruled and exception taken; and the court having ascertained the probable length of life of the plaintiff gave permanent damages upon that theory, not apparently regarding the contingency that the plaintiff might marry and thus terminate the estate.

We think in-cases of this description all the parties should be before the court so that there may be a complete determination of the matter at issue, and that the defendants in the first place should not be required to run all the risk of the death of the plaintiff prior to the anticipated time, and secondly in a case such as the one at bar should not be required to take the hazard of the plaintiff’s remarrying, because it is a well-established historical fact that women are never too old to re-marry; and, therefore, if any claim is made because of the age of the plaintiff that such contingency is not to be feared, common experience shows such claim to be ill-founded.

[• The only way in which there can be a complete determination of the rights of the parties to this action is to bring in those persons who represent the fee and then to apportion the damages in such way as may be equitable and satisfactory to the parties. Thus the defendants would acquire that which they-had paid for without the hazards to which attention has already been called.

We think, therefore, that the learned judge should have compelled the other parties interested in the fee to have been brought in so that the proper award, as a condition of refusing an injunction, might have been made.

The same question as to the trial by jury because the action was in the nature of an action for a nuisance as was raised in the case of *Sommer*v. *N. Y.*Elevated, decided herewith, is raised in this case, and the disposition of it there made disposes of that exception so far as this case is concerned.

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.

Daniels, J., concurs.
##### 



CERTIFICATION OF
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OF GASCO ENERGY, INC.
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Mark A. EricksonName:
    
    Mark A. EricksonDate:
    
    April 4, 2007




---



##### 



CERTIFICATION OF
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
OF GASCO ENERGY, INC.
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ W. King GrantName:
    
    W. King GrantDate:
    
    April 4, 2007
#### Demetrius L. GREEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ms. CAPERS, Jail Administrator; Mr. Brooks, Jail Guard; Ms. Elmore, Jail Guard, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-6502

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 22, 2017

Decided: June 27, 2017

Demetrius L. Green, Appellant Pro Se. Michelle Parsons Kelley, RICHARDSON PLOWDEN, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Demetrius L. Green seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting in part and rejecting in part the magistrate judge’s recommendation, granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and remanding the matter to the magistrate judge for further discovery. This court may exercise jurisdiction *701only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P, 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Green seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and deny as moot Green’s motion for extension of time to file an informal reply brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
[Civ. No. 3079.

First Appellate District, Division One.

December 4, 1919.]

#### FREDERICK WEAVERING, Respondent, v. FRED SCHNEIDER, Appellant.

HI Appeal—Order Appointing Deceiver—Stipulation of Parties Settling Differences—Dismissal of Appeal.—An appeal from an order appointing a receiver will be dismissed 'Where, upon the calling of the case in the appellate court, there is presented a certified copy of a stipulation of the parties filed in the superior court from an examination of which it appears that the appellant and respondent have agreed to an immediate sale by the receiver of all the property in his hands, and for a disposal of the proceeds of the sale and of all other property belonging to the copartnership existing between the parties to the action.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco- appointing a receiver. George H. Cabaniss, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

E. H. Wakeman for Appellant.

A. M. More, E. B. Mering and M. J. Gillespie for Respondent.

WOOD, J.,

*pro*tem.—This is an appeal from an order appointing a receiver. [1] Upon the calling of the case in this court there was presented a certified copy of a stipulation *588of the parties filed in. the superior court. It appears from an examination of this stipulation that the appellant and respondent have agreed to an immediate sale by the receiver of all the property in his hands, and for a disposal of the proceeds of the sale and of all other property belonging to the copartnership existing between the parties to the action. It follows that there is now no actual controversy between the parties.

It was held in *Nelson*v. *Nelson,*153 Cal. 204, [94 Pac. 880], that where an appeal no longer involves the determination of adversary rights, the questions presented would not be considered, even for the purpose of deciding who should pay costs on appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.

Kerrigan, J., and Waste, P. J., concurred.
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 23.01

                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

  We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-55828, 333-54886, 333-48582, 333-46252 and
333-84545) and on Form S-3 (No. 333-80419) of Homestore.com, Inc. of our
report dated March 16, 2001 relating to the financial statements of
Homestore.com, Inc. which appear in this Annual Report on Form 10-K. We also
consent to the incorporation by reference of our report dated March 16, 2001
relating to the financial statement schedule, which appears in this Annual
Report on Form 10-K.

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Century City, California
March 30, 2001
#### Keith K. LY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America; et al., Respondents.

No. 15-71833

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 24, 2017

Keith K. Ly, Pro Se

Anita J. Gay, Trial Attorney, Lena D. Watkins, Trial Attorney, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, Washington, DC, for Respondents

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Keith K. Ly, M.D., seeks review of the decision by the Administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) suspending Ly’s DEA Certificate of Registration and denying his application for renewal. We have jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 877. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. 21 U.S.C. § 877. We may set aside the Administrator’s decision only if it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or not in accordance with the law.” *Fry v. Drug Enforcement Agency,*353 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003): We deny Dr. Ly’s petition.

The DEA Administrator did not abuse her discretion by denying Dr. Ly’s motion to reopen.because Dr. Ly waived the opportunity for a hearing on his registration status. *See*21 C.F.R. § 1301.43; *see also Pincay v. Andrews,*389 F.3d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (ignorance of the rules or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute excusable neglect).

The Administrator did not abuse her discretion by suspending Dr. Ly’s Certificates of Registration and denying any renewal applications because the Administrator properly considered the statutory factors to determine whether registration was inconsistent with the public interest. *See*21 U.S.C. § 823(f); *Fry,*353 F.3d at 1043 (agency decision is not arbitrary and capricious if “based on a consideration of the relevant factors and there is no clear error of judgment” (citation omitted)). Contrary to Dr. Ly’s contentions, the Administrator’s imposition of this sanction did not violate Dr. Ly’s due process rights or implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. *See Hudson v. United States,*522 U.S. 93, 98-99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (Double Jeopardy clause only prohibits the imposition oj: multiple criminal punishments for the same offense); *Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States,*648 F.3d 708, 716 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing elements of a procedural due process claim).

We reject as unsupported by the record Dr. Ly’s contention that the Administrator was biased against him.

DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Miguel Angel FLORES-MENDEZ, a.k.a. Jose Manuel Garcia Pacheco, a.k.a. Migue, a.k.a. Miguel, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10107

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 18, 2017

Kevin Christopher Khasigian, Jill M. Thomas, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, US-SAC—Office of the US Attorney, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Michael Bradley Bigelow, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Miguel Angel Flores-Mendez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. *560§§ 841(a)(1) and 846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Flores-Mendez contends that his guilty plea was involuntary because the district court advised him that he “could” be removed from the United States as a result of his conviction rather than advising him that he “would” be removed. As a preliminary matter, this appeal is not subject to immediate dismissal under the appeal waiver provision of the plea agreement because the sole issue on appeal pertains to the voluntariness of his guilty plea and adequacy of the plea colloquy. *See United States v. Portillo-Cano,*192 F.3d 1246, 1249-60 (9th Cir. 1999).

Nevertheless, our precedent forecloses Flores-Mendez’s contention that due process requires district courts to advise a criminal defendant of the specific immigration consequences that he or she faces as a result of a guilty plea. *See United States v. Delgado-Ramos,*635 F,3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, the district court complied with the Rule 11 requirement to advise Flores-Mendez generally that he “may be removed from the United States, denied citizenship, and denied admission to the United States in the future” as a result of his conviction. Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(b)(l)(0); see *also id.,*advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment,

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Frank PHELAN, Appellant, v. Arthur T. PRASSE, Commissioner of Correction of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Alfred T. Rundle, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

No. 16049.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 2, 1966.

Decided Dec. 14, 1966.

Frank Phelan, pro se.

Michael J. Rotko, Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa. (Alan J. Davis, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellees.

Before SMITH, FREEDMAN and SEITZ, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is from the dismissal of a civil action in which the appellant, an inmate of a state correctional institution, sought to enjoin the enforcement of certain regulations. The jurisdiction of the court below was invoked under 42 U.S. C.A. § 1983. The claim for relief was based upon the allegation that the enforcement of the regulations deprived the appellant of rights secured by the Constitution. This allegation is clearly without merit. We find that the regulations are reasonable and their enforcement can in no way interfere with the appellant’s federal rights.

The judgment of the court below will be affirmed.