### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE N ove m be r 14, 200 5 S es sio n
JAME S KI LLI NGSW ORTH , ET AL 

### . v. TE D RUSSELL FORD, INC.

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Knox County No. 1-149-00 D ale C. Workm an, Jud ge

No. E2004-02597-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JANUARY 5, 2006

This appea l cente rs ar ound the Trial Court’s a war d of attorne y fee s to Pl aintiffs in this Tennessee Consumer Protection Act c ase. F ollowing r emand a fter the first ap p ea l , the Trial Court aw arde d attorney fee s of $2,000 for w ork per formed in pr epar ation for a nd the jury trial of this case, a nd an additional $4,500 in attorney fee s incurre d on the first appea l. Plainti ffs a ppeal c laiming the T rial Court’s awa

rd of $2,000 in fe es incurr ed at the trial court leve l was unre asonably low. Def

endant appea ls claiming the Trial Court er red in a war ding a ny

fee s incurre d on the appea l. We reve rse the

awa rd of f ees inc urre d on the appe al, and modify the Trial Court’s judgme nt to a war d $6,500 in fee s fo r w or k p e rf or me d a t th e Tria l Co urt le ve l.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed in Par t and Af fi rm ed in Par t as Modifi ed; Case R em anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., joined. C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., a sepa rate concur

ring and dissenting Opinion.

J . My ers Morton a nd Geor g e W. Morton, Knox ville, Tennesse e, for the Appellants James and Kathy Killingsworth.

J. Do ug la s O ve rb e y

a ndDa n R. Pilking ton , K no xvill e , T e nn e sse e , f or th e Ap pe lle e Te d Ru sse ll For d, I nc.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Thi s is the second a

ppeal in this Tennesse e Consumer Protec tion Act case . J ames a nd Kathy Killingsworth (“Plaintiffs”) purcha sed an SUV f rom Ted Russell For d, I nc. (“ Def endant” ). T h er ea ft er , P l ai n t i ffs b ro u gh tt h i s l aw s u i tal l egi n g De fe n d an tfa i l ed t o ad v i s e t h em ab o u td am age to the previously -unowne d SUV. Following a t ri al , a jury returne d a ver dict in favor of Plaintiffs for $2,500. See Killingswort h v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc

. , 104 S.W .3d 530, 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Plaintiffs then filed a post-trial motion seeking attorney fee s in the amount of $9,718, and discretionary

costs in the amount of $1,864. Id . a t 53 2. De fe nd a nt o pp os ed this mo tio n b e c a us e Plaintiffs did not s p ec i fi cally reque st attorney

fee s or costs in their complaint. The T rial Court

awa rded Plaintiffs a total of

$500 for both attorne y

fee s and costs. Plaintiffs appea led claiming the

awa rd of only $500 for attorney

fee s and costs wa s unrea sonably low. Id . at 534.

As rele vant to the cur

rent a ppeal, we held in the first appea l that Plaintiffs’ complaint was suff icient to put D efe ndant on notice that Plaintiffs w ere seeking all relief authorized under the Tenne ssee Co nsumer Protec tion Act (“TCPA”) , including attorney fee s and costs. Id . at 533-34. Wit h reg ard to the a mount of attorney fee s and costs aw arde d, we e x plained that such determinations

are a matter

of discre tion with the trial court and will not be disturbe d on appea l unless the evidenc e p reponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’s fac tual finding s in making the awa rd. Id. a t 5 3 4

. We then stated:

I n this state, the establishment of a r ea s o n able attorney ' s fee

is d et ermined in accor dance with Tennesse e Code of Prof essional Re sp on sib ili ty

DR2- 10 6 ( 20 02 ), wh ic h is a pa rt of Te nn . Su p. Ct. R. 8. DR2- 10 6 p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
(B ) ... F actor s to be considered as g uides in determining the

re a so na ble ne ss o f a

fe e inc lud e the fo llo wi ng :
(1) The time and labor r equire d, the novelty and diffic ulty

of the questions involved, and the skill re quisite to pe rform the leg al servic e prope rly

. (2) The likelihood, if appare nt to t h e cl i ent, that the

acc eptanc e of the particula r employ ment will preclude other employ ment by

the lawy er.
(3) The fee customarily

char g ed in the loca lityfor simi lar leg al servic es.
(4) The amount involved and the r esults obtained.P ri o r t o remand i ng t he case, we no t ed t hat t he T ri al C o urt ha d de t erm i ned t he jur y ’ s award of $ 2 , 5 0 0 was t he 1 equi val ent i n v al ue t o a pre- t r i al s et t l ement offer of r epai r s and an ext ended war r ant y mad e by D ef endan t , an offer wh i ch

w as re j ect ed by P l ai nt i f

f s

. Af t er r eac hi ng t hi s conc l us i on, t he T r i al Co ur t i ndi cat ed t hat P l ai nt i f f s coul d hav e s ave d t hems el ves over $11
, 00 0 i n a t t orn ey f ees had t hey si mp l y accept ed t he offer

. W e r ej ect ed t hi s conc l us i on, hol di ng t hat t he f act s p repo nd erat ed agai nst t he T ri al C o urt ’ s co ncl usi o n t hat t he jury ’ s m o net ary award was t he f unct i o nal eq ui val ent to D e fen d a n t’s p re -trial se ttl e m e n t o ff e r. K ill in g sw o rth , 104 S. W

. 3d a t 536.

-3- (5) The time limi tations imposed by the client or by

the circ umstances.
(6 ) T he na tur e a ndle ng th o f the pr of e ssi on a l r e la tio ns hip wi th the client.
(7) The experience , reputation, and abilityof the law y er or lawy ers pe rforming the se rvice s.
(8) Whether

the fe e is fixed or conting ent.

Wit h respe ct to the final fa ctor, our Supre me C o u rt h as opined that "[a]n attor n ey ' s fee should be g reater whe re it is conting ent than whe re i t i s fi x ed. " United Me d. [ Corp. of T enn. v. H ohenwald Bank & Trust C o. ], 703 S .W.2d at 136 [ (Tenn. 1986) ].

Kill ing swo rth , 104 S.W .3d at 534.

Be cause there was nothing in the rec ord i ndicating that the Trial Court had utiliz ed the above fa ct o rs when a rriving at its decision reg arding the awa rd of attorney

fee s and costs, we

re ma nd e d th e c a se to the Tria l Co urt. 1

On re mand, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a n aff idavit detailing the time spent in preparing the case for trial, at t rial, and on the appe al. Plaintiffs’ counse l further stated that all of the f

ees a nd expenses incurre d wer e re asonable and nec essary . The a ttorney fee s now soug ht by

Plaintiffs totaled $17,197.50, which included time spe nt on the first appe al. T h e d i s cr et ionary costs soug ht by Plaintiffs had risen to $2,448.35. Plaintiffs filed af fidavits from loca l attorney s to the eff ect that the attorney fee s inc u rr ed i n p rosec ution of this case a t trial and on appe al wer e re asonable and

n e c e s s ar y.

Def

endant r esponded to Plaintiffs’ aff idavits, claiming the amount of attorne y fee s soug ht by Plaintiffs were unrea sonable and excessive when considering the factors set forth in DR 2-106. De fenda nt likew ise filed aff idavits f rom local attorney s who opined that the reque sted fee s
wer e excessive a nd unrea sonable, a lthough these aff idavits d o n o t state wha t amount of fee s the aff iants believe w ould have be en re asonable. De fe n d ant also cla imed that, as a ma tter of law , attorney fee s incurre d on an appe al wer e not rec overa ble under the TCPA. Alternatively , Def endant arg ued that even if

attorney fee s for time spent on an a ppeal normally

could be r ecove red unde r the-4-

TCPA, Pl aintiffs we re not e ntitled to such an aw ar d b eca use they did not ask this C ourt to awa rd those fee s at any

time during the first appe al.
Following a hea

ring , the Trial Court re

jected D efe ndant’s ar g uments and awarde d Plaintiffs a total of $2,000 in attorney fee s for the time spent prepa ring the case for trial and for the tr ia l, a n a dd iti on a l $4 ,5 00 fo r the tim e sp e nt o n th e fi rs t app e a l, a nda tot a l o f $2 ,4 48.3 5 in discretionary costs. Plaintiffs filed t his second appe al, claiming the Trial Court er red in a war ding only $2,000 in attorney

fee s for wor

k perf ormed at the t rial court level. De fenda nt appea ls the awa rd of $4,500 in attorney

fee s incurre d during the first appe al. Def endant c laims that pursuant to the TCPA, attorney

fee s are not rec overa

ble for w ork per formed on a ppeal. Alternatively , Def endant claims that eve n if attorney fee s incurre d on appea l are rec overa ble under the TCPA, Plaintiffs are not entitled to their attorney fee s beca use t hey never

asked this Court to awar d those fee s during the first appe al. The a war d of $2,448.35 in discre tionary costs is not at issue in thi s appea l.

Discussion

The fa ctual finding s of the Tria l Court are a ccor ded a presumption of corr ectne ss, and we will not overturn those fac tual fi n d ings unle ss the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001). Wit h respe ct to leg al issues, our re view is conduc ted “unde r a pur e de novo standard of re view, ac cording no defe renc e to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” So uth e rn Con str uc tor s, In c . v . Lo ud

on Cou nty Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Th e po rt io n o f the TCP A auth or izin g a n a wa rdof a tto rn e y fe e s w he n th e re is a violation of the Act is Tenn. Code A nn. § 47-18-109( e). This section provides that “[u]pon a finding by the court that a provision of this part has be en violated, the c ourt may awa rd to the per son bring ing suc h action re asonable attorney ’s fe es and costs.” The first issue we a ddress is whethe r attorney fee s incurre d on an appe al ca n be re cover ed under this statutoryprovision.

I n arg uing that attorney

fee s incurre d on appea l cannot be r ecove red unde r the TCPA, De fe n d an t re l i es p ri m ar i l y o n t wo ca s es , t h e f i rs t b ei n g Leake v. Ai rport Toyota of Mem phis, Inc. , No. 02A01-9208- CV-0023, 1993 WL 360443 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p

. S ep t

. 14, 1993), no appl. perm. appeal filed . I n Leake , we a ffirme d a judg ment to the plaintiff for a vi o l at i o n of the TCPA. The plaintiff also re quested this Court to awar d attorney fee s incurre d on appea l. We stated:

Plaintiff has asked this court fo r an award of attorney ' s fee s and costs incur

red by him on appeal. Plaintif f asserts that T.C.A. § 47-18-109( a)( 3), su

pr a , authorizes attorney ' s fee s on ap p ea l or, alternatively , t h at at torney ' s fee s and costs should be aw arde d pu rs ua nt t o T .C. A. § 2 7- 1- 12 2 a s d a ma g e s f or a frivo lou s a

pp e a l. Def endant f ailed to file a

motion for a new trial, and on a ppeal, he has arg ued that the court' s awa rd of da mag es wa s err oneous bec ause the evidenc e does not support the jury ' s verdict. Esse ntially , defe ndant-5- has aske d the court to r eview and rew eig h the evidenc e to determine if it s up po rt s a fi nd ing of a vio la tio n of the Con su me r P ro te c tio n A c t. Under these c ircumstance s, we think it appropriate to tax defenda nt wi t h t h e c o s t s o n ap p ea l an d p l ai n t i ff 's ex p en s es , i n cl u d i n g at t o rn ey 's fee s rea sonably

inciden t t o this appeal. T.C.A. § 27-1- 122 (1980); see M cDonald v. O noh , 772 S.W .2d 913 (Tenn. A pp. 1989).

Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

irm th e tr ia l c ou rt ' s o rd e r andre ma ndto the trial court for a de termination of re asonable ex p enses and

a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s o n a pp e a l. C os ts a

re ta xedto d e fe nd a nt.

Leake , 1993 WL

360443, at *4.

De fe nd a nt a

rg ue s Leake supports its position that attorney fee s incurre d on an appe al

are not rec overa

ble under the TCPA. D efe ndant re ache s this conclusion because the Leake Court didn o t a w ar d a tt o r n e y

f e e s p u r s u a n t t o th e T CP A , b u t r a th e r a w ar d e d th e m u n d e r

th e f r iv olous appea l statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 1-122.

T h e s e c o n d p r i m ar y c a s e r e l i e d u p o n b y D e f e nd a nt i s Du Po nt Com mu nit y Cre dit Union v. City of Chattanooga , No. 03A01-9207- CV-68, 1993 WL 13032 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1993), no appl. perm. appeal filed . This opinion invol ved a pe tition t o rehe ar f iled by Dupont Com mun ity

Cr e dit Un ion c la imi ng it w a s e nti tle d to a tto rn e y fe e s in c ur

re d o n th e app e a l of

its

succe ssful in v e r s e c o ndemnation ca se broug ht ag ainst the City of Chattanoog a. We denied D uPont’s reque st based primarily on the lang uag e conta ined in the re levant eminent domain statute, stating as fo llo ws :

Th e pe rt ine nt C od e Se c tio n, T. C.A . 2 9- 16 -1 23 (b ), pr ov ide s:

(b) Addi t i o nally , the court rende ring a judg ment for the pla int if f in a pr oc e e din g br ou g ht un de r su bs e c tio n (a ) of thi s section, ... sha l l d et ermine a nd awa rd or a llow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgme nt or settlement such sum as will in the opinion of the court, ... re imburse such plaintiff for his reasona

ble costs, disbursements and expenses, including

re a so na ble a tto rn e y , a

pp raisa l, a nd e ng ine e ri ng fe e s, a c tua lly i n cu rr ed b ec au s e o f s u ch p ro ce ed i n g.

I t w ill be noted that the Statute pr ovides, "the court re ndering a judg ment for t h e plaintiff." This Court did not award a judgme nt for the Plaintiff, but mer ely aff irmed an a war d made by the Tri al Court. We thus conclude the L eg islature has not mandated attorne y fe e s o n a pp e a l.-6-

DuPont , 1993 WL

13032, at *1. But see Knox County v . Union Livestock Yard, Inc. , 59 S.W .3d 158, 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)( awa rding attorney fee s incurre d on appea l pursuant to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-17-812( b), a diff

ere nt section of the e minent domain sta t u t e co n taining substantially simil ar lang uag e to that containe d in § 29-16-123(b) ). De fe n d ant arg ues that the inver se conde mnation statute at issue in DuPont and the TCPA statute at issue in the pre sent ca se ar e similar enoug h for

us to c on c lud e that th e le g isl a tur e didno t inte nd fo r at torne y fe e s inc ur re d o n th e app e a l of

a TCP A claim to be re cover ed.

Whil e we believe D efe ndant’s interpr etations of Leake and DuPont certainly are plausible and De fenda nt’s pos i t i o n is well arg ued, we reje ct Def endant’ s position i n light of our Supreme Court’s more rece nt opinion in Fo rb e s v

. W ils on Cou nty Em e rg e nc

y Di str ic t 91 1 B oa rd , 966 S.W .2d 417 (Tenn. 1998)

. Forbes involved, int e r a lia , a cla im broug ht pursuant to the Tenne ssee Huma n Rights Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-21- 101 et seq. (“ TH RA ” ). W it h regard to whether at t o rney

fee s incurre d on appea l were rec overa ble under the THRA, the Supre me Court stated:

The p la in ti f f h a s a s k e d th is Co u r t t o a w ar d a tt o r n e y ' s fee s incurre d in this appeal. The r emedies provided by the THRA include "r easona ble" attorney ' s fee s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 21-3 06(a) (7) & -311. The pla intiff is the preva iling party in t h i s suit and is entitl ed to relief unde r the THRA. The THRA does not re q u i re that the plaintiff pre vail on all appellate issues befor e attorney ' s fee s may be

awa rded. Se e Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-21- 306 (providing that aff irmative ac tion ordere d under the THRA " may in cl u d e ... a
re a so na ble a tto rn e y ' s f

e e " ); see ge nerally Church of Scientology Flag Serv. O rg. v. City of Clearwat er , 2 F.3d 1509, 1513 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting "w ell-settled" law that plaintiff is pr evailing party if plaintiff has succ eeded on any

signific ant issue which a chieve s some of the benef it the parties soug ht in bri n gi n g suit). Accor dingly , the pla int if f' s att or ne y s ar e e nti tle d to r e a so na ble c omp e ns a tio n f

or the ir time spe nt in pursuing this a ppeal. The issue is remande d to the trial

c ou rt fo r a de te rm inatio n of a re a so na ble fe e fo r t he at torne y s'

se rv ic e s d ur ing the app e llate pr oc e ss.

Forbes , 966 S.W .2d at 422.

The THRA a nd the TC PA both contain sections setting forth the pur pose and intent of the re s p e c ti v e s tatu te s

. I n v e r y g e n e r a l te r ms , th e T H RA is in te n d e d to a s s u r e T e n n e s s e e has “appr opriate le g islation prohibiti ng discrimination in employ ment, public ac co m modations and housing....” See Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 -2 1- 10 1( a )( 2) . T he TCP A, on the oth e r h a nd , is int e nd e d “ to protec t consumers a nd leg itimate business enterprises from those who eng ag e in unf air or de ceptive acts or pr actice s in the conduct of a ny trade or commerc e in pa

rt or wholly

within this state.” See Te nn . Code An n. § 47- 18 -1 02 (2 ). Th e TCP A fu rthe r pr ov ide s tha t it s p ro vis ion s “ sh a ll b e lib e ra lly-7-

construed to promote” t he st atute’s purpose. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-102. Whil e the THRA and the T C P A ce rtainly

are aimed at r emedying va stlydiffer ent wrong s, they both are compre hensive leg islation int ended to pr otect the c itiz ens of Te nnessee . Both statutes a lso provide for a “re asonable ” attorne y ’s fe e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-306( a)( 7); Tenn. Code A nn. §47-18-109( e)( 1). Neither statute contains any

lang uag e to the ef

fec t that an awa

rd of attorney fee s is limited to fee s inc ur re d a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

le ve l. G ive n th at our

Sup re me Cou rt

ha s in te rp re te d th e TH RA to authorize an a war d of attorney fee s incurre d on appea l, we ca n find no compelling rea son whatsoeve r to i nte rp re t e sse nti a lly

ide nti c a l la ng ua g e c on ta ine d inthe TCP A a ny dif fe re ntl y . T he re fo re , w e ho ld that th e TCP A d oe s auth or ize a n a wa rdof a tto rn e y fe e s in c ur

re d o n a n a

pp e a l.

The ne x t issue is whether Plaintiffs actually wer e entitl ed to an aw ard of attorney fee s inc ur re d o n th e fi rs t app e a l. De fe nd a nt ar g ue s tha t th e ini tia l de c isi on a s to wh e the r t o a wa rdthe se pa rt ic ula r atto rn e y fe e s f ir st m us t be dir e c te d to thi s Co urt. B e c a us e Pla int if fs ne ve r re qu e ste d th is Court to awar d attorney

fee s incurre d on the first appea l, D efe ndant maintains that the Trial Court exceede d the scope of the re mand and e rre d when it awa rded a n additional $4,500 to Plainti ffs.

Chaill e v. W

arren , 635 S.W .2d 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)(“ Chaill e I ), involved the construction of a

will. On appea l the defe ndants claimed the y wer e en t itled to attorney fee s they inc ur re d d ur ing that app e a l. I n re so lvi ng thi s iss ue we state d that on re ma ndthe tr ia l c ou rt “ sh ou ld

c on sid e r w he the r a dd iti on al att orne y s f e e s sh ou ld b e a wa

rd e d to de fe nd a nts ' a tto rn e y s f or the ir service s reg arding this appeal a nd, if so, the amount of such f ee.” Id . at 703. This conclusion has been r eac hed in other c ases. See, e .g. , K ee l ey v. Mass ey , N o

. 0 2 A 0 1

- 9 3 0 7

- CH

- 0 0 1 5 9 , 1 9 9 4 WL 59556 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 28, 1994), no appl. perm. appeal filed

. T h e c as e o f W illiams v. W illiams , No. 01A01-9510- CH-00486, 1996 WL 355054 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1996), no ap pl. perm. appe al filed, involved a trial c ourt’s modification of a divorce decr ee reduc ing the husband’s alimony obligation. The wife r equeste d an aw ard of attorney fee s incurre d on the appe al. We stated:

As to w if e ' s re qu e st fo r atto rn e y ' s f

e e s, it i s th e op ini on of

thi s court that the issue be rema nded to the trial court. "[T]he trial court is the proper

forum for the determination of whether attorney [']s fees sh ou ld be a wa

rd e d a nd the ir a mou nt." C h a i lle v. W arren , 689 S

. W

. 2 d 1 7 3 , 1 8 0 (T en n

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 5 ) ( ci t i n g Fo lk v . F olk , 210 Tenn. 367, 379, 357 S.W .2d 828, 828-29 (1962) ). The de cision of whethe r to a llo w atto rn e y ' s f

e e s f or a n app e a l inc lud e s a

re vie w o f the abil ity to p a y , th e su c c e ss o f the app e a l, the g ood-fait h of the app e lla nt i n bring ing the appea l, the need for the pay ment, and any other pa rticular fac ts of the individual case

. Fo lk , 357 S.W .2d at 829.

W illiams , 1996 WL

355054, at *6.

After the opinion in Chaill e I

was iss ued and the case rema nded, anothe r appe al was taken a nd a sec ond opinion was rende red. See Chaill e v. W arren , 689 S.W .2d 173 (Tenn. Ct. App.-8-

1985) (“ Chaill e II

”). We a g ain addr essed the attorney fee issue but our co n cl usion was stated somewhat diff

ere ntly . More spe cifica lly , we state d:

We find no merit in appellants' contention t hat counsel for the plaintiffs is estopped to cl ai m additional attorney s fee s for the

s er v i ce s h e pe rf

o rm ed o n t h e fi rs t ap p ea l fr o m t h e tr i a l c o u r t 's construction of Mr

. W ar re n' s will, the sale of his prope rty , and the disbursement of the pr ocee ds to his heirs. I t would hav e been prema ture to re quest these f ees prior to the ap p eal, see Evans v. Evans , 558 S.W .2d 851, 854 (Tenn. A pp. 1977), t hus, the only proper time to reque st fee s for lega l service s perf ormed on a

ppeal would be on the re mand of the c ase. Se e Fo lk v . F olk , 210 Tenn. 367, 379, 357 S.W .2d 828, 828-29 (1962) and Sa lis bu ry v . Sali sb ur y , 657 S.W .2d 761, 771 (Tenn. A pp. 1983). Counsel for the plai n t i ff s cannot be faulted f or making his request for attorney s fee s at the prope r time....

Th e app e lla nts ne xt co nte ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt imp ro pe rl y
we nt b e y o n d t h e s c o p e o f t h i s C o u r t ' s r e m a n d o r d e r c o n t a i ne d in Chaill e v. W

arren , 635 S.W .2d 700 (Tenn. App. 1982) by awa rding

a tto rn e y s f

e e s to c ou ns e l f

or the pla int iffs. Th is ar g ume nt i s untenable f

or two re asons. Fir st, it i g nores the f act t hat the prope r time and place to re q u est attorney s fee s for ser vices pe rformed on appe al i s o n re mand in the trial court. Se e Fo lk v . F olk , 210 Tenn. 3 6 7 , 3 7 9 , 3 5 7 S. W. 2 d 8 2 8

- 2 9 ( 1 9 6 2 )

. Se c o n d , it f a il s to rec o g n iz e that the issue of plaintiffs' counsel' s entitlement to attorney s fee s for service s perf

ormed on the f

irst a ppeal wa s not addresse d by this Court in Chaill e v. W

arren , 6 35 S.W. 2d70 0 ( Te nn . A pp . 1 98 2) be c a us e it

wa s n ot a n is su e , a nd , th e re fo re , w a s not pa rt of the fi rs t app e a l in thi s
case

.
C h aille II, 689 S.W .2d at 178-79. A ir li n e Co n s tr u c ti o n , I n c

. v

. Tr i- S ta te S

p r in k le r Corp. , 807 S.W .2d 247, 269-70 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1990).

The a bove portion of Chaill e II does see m to sugg est that the prope r t ime and plac e to initi ate a

reque st for attorne y fee s incurre d on an appe al is on remand to the trial court. How ever , the s tatute at issue in Cha ill e provided that attorney fee s could be a war ded to “the attorney s for the

c o mp la in a n t a n d d e f

e n d a n t to b e p a id o u t o f th e c o mm o n f u n d , w h e r e th e p r o p e r ty is sold for partition ....” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-27-121. In Chaill e I , c ou ns e l f

or de fe nd a nts re qu e ste d this Cou rt to a wa rda tto rn e y

fe e s in c ur

re d o n a pp e a l, a nd , as se t forth ab ov e , we re ma nd e d this iss ue to the trial court to determine if a war ding fee s was appr opriate a nd, if so, the prope r amount. On

rema nd, pursuant to the statute, the tria l court aw arde d attorney fee s incurre d on appea l to counsel for plaintiffs a nd counsel for def en d an t s

. Be cause the statute at issue in Chaill e I andChaill e II allowed c ounsel for a ny

of the pa rties to be aw arde d attorney fee s, and beca

use we dire cted the trialSu r pr i s i n g l y , Pl ai n t i f f s do n ot r equ es t a t t or n ey f ee s i n cu r r ed on t h e pr es en t appe al a n d, t h er ef or e, w e n ee d n ot 2
del ve i nt o t hat i s s ue.

-9- court to c o n s id e r th e p r o p r ie ty o f a w ar d in g a tt o r n e y f e e s o n r e ma n d , w e c o n c lu d e d c o u nsel for plaintiffs wer e not estopped to se ek attorney fee s incurre d on appea l w hen the ca se wa s remande d, even thoug h only

the def endants a ffirma tively

made suc h a re quest in the firs t appea l. The point be ing , th e iss ue of

wh e the r t o a wa

rdfe e s in c ur

re d o n app e a l w a s d ir e c te d to thi s Co urt in the fi rs t instance.

We b e lie ve the mos t th a t pr op e rl y c a n b e g le a ne d f

ro m cas e s su c h a s Chaill e I , Chaill e II , and W il liams , su

pra , is that th e re are tim e s w he n it is a pp ro pr ia te fo r a

tr ia l c ou rt

to determine whether

to awar d attorney

fee s incurre d on appea l and, if so, in what amount. Howe ver, that de c isi on is m a de on ly a ft e r the re qu e st i s p re se nte d in iti a lly to the app e llate c ou rt

. Whe n a pa rt y asks the appe llate court to awa rd attorney fee s incurre d on appea l, there a re f our re sults which may

oc c ur : ( 1) the re qu e st f

or fe e s is de nie d; ( 2) the re qu e st f or fe e s is g rante d a ndthe app e llate c ou rt se ts the amount; (3) the r equest for fee s is gr anted a nd the ca se i s remande d to the trial court to dete rmine the a m o u n t o f f

e e s t o b e a w ar d e d ; a n d ( 4 ) t h e a t t o r n e y f e e i s s u e i s r e m a n d e d t o t h e tr ia l c ou rtto determine whether

fee s should be awa

rded a nd, if so, the appropriate amount. Reg ardle ss of which of these f our re sults ensues, there is one thing tha t all four have in common: the issue of whethe r to awar d attorney

fee s for an appea l w as posed initially to the appellate court a nd the appe llate court de c i d e d h o w t h a t i s s u e w o u l d b e r e s o l v e d

. W e a l s o n o t e t h e o b v i o u s p r o b l e m w i t h Pla int if fs ’ position t hat would aris e i n t h o s e cases that are not remande d by the appe llate court because the pla int if f d id n ot a sk

fo r atto rn e y

fee s o n a pp e a l a ndthe re e xists no oth e r r e a so n f or the app e llate
c ou rt to r e ma ndthe c a se to the tr ia l c ou rt

.
We h oldthat w he n a party is s e e kin g a tto rn e y

fe e s in c ur re d o n a n a

pp e a l, tha t r e qu e st,
abs e nt a ny

statut e or ru le dir e c tin g oth e rw ise , mu st b e dir e c te d fir st to the app e llate c ou rt in a tim e ly fa sh ion . T o th e e xten t th a t Chaill e II can fairly be re ad to hold that such a r equest must initiallybe made to the trial court on re mand, we r espec tfully disag ree with Chaill e II ’s holding. In the pre sent
case , at no time during the first appea l did Plaintiffs r equest a n awa rd of attorney

fee s incurre d on that appea l. A ccor dingly , we r ever se the Trial Court’s awa rd of $4,500 in attorne y

fee s to Pl aintiffs fo r f e e s in c ur re d o n th e fi rs t app e a l. See Up pe r Cu mb e rla nd

De v e lop me nt D ist ric t v . P uc k e tt , No. 2 M2002-02208-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 1666049, at * 15 (Te nn. Ct. App. J uly 21, 2004), no ap

pl. perm. appe al filed

(dete rmining tha t a re quest for f ees on a ppeal wa s moot when there was “ no
arg ume nt o r s pe c if

ic re qu e st f

or a n a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in c ur

re d o n a pp e a l.” ); Cf. Coo k e v ill e Gyne cology & Obstetrics, P.C. v. Southeastern Data Sy stems, Inc

. , 8 84 S.W. 2d45 8, 46 3 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1994)(“ Whil e attorney ' s fee s may be recove red by a pre vailing pa rty when attorney ' s fee s are provided for

by statute or by contra ct betwee n the parties, ... defe ndant did not present the issue of its entitl ement to attorne y ' s fee s in its issues or at oral a rg ument. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b) pr ovides in pa rt that ‘re view g ener ally will e x tend only to those issues presente d for r eview.’ Since the issue of attorne y ' s fee s, while ref err ed to in the brief

, was not pr esente d as an issue, w e dec line to consider that issue.”)( citations omitt ed in part).-10- The f inal issue befor e us is whether the Trial Court er

red w hen it awa

rded only $2,000 in a tt o r n e y

f e e s r e late d to th e p r e p ar a ti o n a n d ju r y trial o f th is c a s e

. Wh e n ma

k in g it s ru li n g , the Trial Court discussed the va rious fac tors in DR 2-106, su pr a . The Trial Court stated, int e r a lia :

This was not a diff

icult cas e. T he def

endant a dmitted the fac ts as the jury

found them and [that] di dn’t cha ng e throug hout the entire [case ]....

Th e Cou rt fi nd s tha t... [Pla int if

fs ’ la wy e rs ] are g oo d la wy e rs

. I think t h ey s pent too much time, way in excess of what wa s
nece ssary under the fac ts of this case. I t hink the case should have been r esolved a

whole lot sooner without g oing to tria l, except we want to take a shot at attorney ’s fees under the C onsumer Protec tion A c t , w e w a n t t o t ak e a s h o t a t p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s , m ak e s o m e m o n e y. That is what the Court finds the facts ar e whe n I ’m considering

awa rding this fee.

The Trial Court then determined that the s econd fac tor in DR 2-106 had no pr actica l ap p l i ca t i o n t o t h i s ca s e. W i t h re gar d t o t h e th i rd fa ct o r, t h e Tr i al C o u rt i n d i ca t ed t h at ev en t h o u gh Plaintiffs’ counsel a ccepted the c ase on a n hourly basis, the typical situation would involve a conting ency

fee or a f

ee ba sed solely

on what i s aw ar d ed b ythe trial court. The fourth fac tor inv olv e s th e a mou nt i nv olv e d a ndthe re su lts ob ta ine d. Ac c or din g to the Tria l Co urt, P la int if fs did

succe ed on their TCPA c laim, but the pertinent fac ts “ wer e stipulated befor e we started.” The Trial Court also pointed out that Pl aintiffs we re unsuc cessf ul on the ir claim that there was a knowing and wi llf ul v iol a tio n o f the TCP A, a nd were un succ e ssf ul o n th e ir

c la im f or pu nit ive da ma g e s. Discussing the six th and eig hth fac tors, the Trial Court stated:

The na ture a nd leng th of the profe ssional r elationship. That might af fec t what y ou’re awa

rded in fe e in this case

. The re ason for that is I un de rs ta nd wh a t I ha ve be e n told the fe e arr a ng e me nt is, the se clients wer e oblig ated to pay these law y ers a

sevente en thou s and dollar fe e for

g etting the m a twenty -five hund re d d o llar ver dict. I have been told their fee is a n hourly fee . That mig ht affe ct the natur e and leng th of the re lationship between c lient, and that is a fa ctor that I think I have to c onsider.

Wit h reg ard to the se venth fa ctor, the Trial Court stated that both of Plaintiffs’ attorne y s were qualified, c ompeten t , an d experience d, with a “g reat abilityand re putation.” Afte r discussing the pertinent fa ctors, the Trial Court awar ded $2,000 of the reque sted $9,718.

I t se e ms o ddthat th e Tria l Co urt consid e re d $ 4, 50 0 a re a so na ble fe e fo r the fi rs t appea l, but only $2,000 was rea sonable for taking the ca se all the way throug h a jury

trial. I t is a rar e
case when the rea sonable attorney fee s for taking a case throug h one leve l of appe al would be 225%P erm i ss i o n t o ap p eal t he d eci si o n of t hi s C o urt on t he f i rs t ap p eal was denied b y t he T enness ee S up rem e C o urt 3

o n M ay 5 , 20 0 3

. T hus, t he ap p el l at e co urt at t o rney f ees were not i ncreased d ue t o f ul l bri ef i ng and oral argument bef o re the T e n n e sse e S u p re m e C o u rt.
-11- of the re asonable trial court leve l attorney fee s, espec ially when there is a jury trial. I f an attorney 3

unrea sonably

prolong s a ca se in the hopes of hitting the jac kpot with puniti ve dama g es or the like, such conduct may

be a f actor to consider whe n awa

rding attorney

fee s. We are not, howe ver, w illing to hold that the possibil ity of re ceiving punitive damag es or the like is not a leg itimate fac tor to be considere d by

a plaintiff in ar

riving at a de cision as to whether t o ac ce p t a d efe ndant’s settlement offe r. I n any event, however , we think the Trial Court place d too much emphasis on that particular p o i n ti n t h i s p art i c u l ar

c a s e

. T h e r e a s o n f

o r t h i s i s t h a tD e f

e n d a n tn e v e r

m a d e a n y mo ne tar

y
se ttl e me nt o ff

e r w hic h, a s n ote d in the fi rs t app e a l, i s e xac tly wh a t it wa s g oin g to take to e ndthi s litigation prior to trial. Absent a monetary settlement offe r by Def endant, this litigation was destined to go to a jury reg ardle ss of whethe r Plaintiffs pursued a punitive damag es cla im, etc.

We conclude that the evidenc e does not pre ponderate a gai n st the Trial Court’s finding s and ultimate conc lusion that P laintiffs’ requested attorney fee s wer e ex cessive be cause too
muc h ti me wa s sp e nt b y

the a tto rn e y s. Ho we ve r, we do be lie ve that th e fa c ts p re po nd e rate a g a ins t the Trial Court’s holding t hat onl y $2,000 in fee s was a rea sonable a mount for work pe rformed at the trial court level. I n arriving at our dec ision, we find it p ar t icularly telling that the e x pert affi d av i t s s u b m i t t ed b y

De fe n d an t , al l b y

we l l q u al i fi ed at t o rn ey s , o p i n ed t h at t h e r eq u es t ed fees were excessive and unr easona

ble but neg lected to state the amount of fees Defendant’s aff iants believed would have bee n r e a s o n ab le

. A p p lyin g a ll th e r e le v a n t f a c to r s in D R2

- 1 0 6 inli g h t o f th e c le ar leg islative intent of the TCPA, we bel ieve a n appropriate fe e to awa rd Plaintiffs for their

attorney fee s at the trial court level is $6,500. The judg ment of the Trial Court is so modi fied.

Conclusion
The judg ment of the Trial Court is rever sed in part a nd aff irmed in part a s modified. This cause is remanded to the Tria l Court for collec tion of the costs below. Exercising our discretion, costs on appe al ar e taxed to the Appellee , Ted Russell For d I nc.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE