RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0067p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PAUL JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

IPX INTERNATIONAL EQUATORIAL GUINEA, S.A.,

Defendant-Appellee.

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No. 18-1405

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.

No. 5:17-cv-12483—John Corbett O’Meara, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: April 9, 2019

Before: BATCHELDER, McKEAGUE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Dean Elliott, DEAN ELLIOTT, PLC, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellant. 

Gaëtan Gerville-Réache, WARNER NORCROSS + JUDD LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for 

Appellee.

McKEAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER, J., joined,

and NALBANDIAN, J., joined in part and in the judgment. NALBANDIAN, J. (pp. 11–12), 

delivered a separate concurring opinion.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Paul Jones is a United States citizen who chose to make his 

money abroad. In good times, he was happy to invest, work, and live in Equatorial Guinea. But 

when business soured, he hoped the United States would sweeten the deal. That hope did not 

>
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 2

pan out. After Jones sued his employer in the Eastern District of Michigan, the district court 

dismissed his complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Jones now asks us to 

reverse that decision. We are unconvinced that there was a clear abuse of discretion. We 

AFFIRM.

I.

Paul Jones is a Michigan citizen who has worked overseas most of his professional life. 

He began working in Equatorial Guinea around 2007. In 2011, he started a company—IPX 

International Equatorial Guinea, S.A.—to provide telecommunication and internet services in 

Equatorial Guinea. As its name suggests, IPX International Equatorial Guinea, S.A. is 

incorporated in Equatorial Guinea and its principal place of business is in the country’s capital. 

Like many founders, Jones wore several hats at his company, including shareholder, director, 

and employee.

This case is about Jones’s role as an employee. Jones worked as a Director General 

under an annual contract. Each year, Jones negotiated and signed his contract in Equatorial 

Guinea. He then lived and worked there during the contract’s term.

Jones and his company both did quite well, but financial success could not sustain the 

relationship. IPX International decided in 2015 to open a subsidiary in the United States. Given 

his ties to Michigan, Jones urged the company to open the subsidiary there. IPX International 

agreed and sent Jones to Michigan to set up shop. That was supposed to take six months. Jones 

would then return to Equatorial Guinea. But after Jones arrived in Michigan, IPX International 

learned that he may have been stealing money and neglecting important business relationships. 

The company then suspended Jones so it could investigate.

For his part, Jones claims that the suspension was a pretext to divest him of his stock and 

that IPX International breached his employment contract. He thus sued for breach of contract in 

the Eastern District of Michigan. The district court found that the case should be tried in 

Equatorial Guinea and dismissed the complaint under forum non conveniens. Jones now appeals 

that decision.
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 3

II.

Forum non conveniens decisions are “committed to the sound discretion of the trial 

court.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). We thus review for “clear abuse 

of discretion.” Zions First Nat’l Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 629 F.3d 520, 523 

(6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Under that standard, we give “substantial deference” to the 

district court when it considers all relevant interests and balances those interests reasonably. 

Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257.

III.

Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a district court not to 

exercise its jurisdiction. Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 

2016) (quotation omitted). In the federal system, forum non conveniens has been largely 

replaced by a statutory scheme that allows district courts to dismiss or transfer cases when better 

forums are available. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). Forum non conveniens operates 

similarly to that statutory scheme, nonetheless it is distinct. It generally applies when the 

alternative forum is in a foreign country, rather than in a different district within the federal 

system. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) 

(quotations omitted).

When courts apply forum non conveniens, there are three considerations: (1) whether an 

adequate alternative forum is available; (2) whether a balance of private and public interests 

suggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or 

the court; and (3) the amount of deference to give the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Sometimes we 

call those considerations part of a three-step analysis. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 492. Other times 

we frame the first two considerations as steps and then separately address deference to the 

plaintiff’s choice of forum. See Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(citation omitted); Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 

Regardless of which framing is best, all three considerations matter here. We will address them 

in turn.
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 4

A. Alternative Forum

When a court declines to exercise jurisdiction under forum non conveniens, it is saying 

that the case should be tried elsewhere. That presupposes that an alternative forum exists, which 

requires another forum to be both available and adequate. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 

n.22. The question here, then, is whether Equatorial Guinea is an available and adequate forum.

An alternative forum is available if the defendant is amenable to process there. Id.; 

Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 494. IPX International submitted an affidavit stating that it is amenable to 

process in Equatorial Guinea. Jones concedes that point as well, stating that it is obvious. Thus, 

Equatorial Guinea is an available forum. 

The contentious issue is whether Equatorial Guinea is an adequate forum. A forum is 

adequate if it can remedy the alleged harm. Id. The alleged harm here is that IPX International 

did not pay Jones all it owed him under his employment contract. IPX International submits that 

Equatorial Guinea recognizes a cause of action to remedy that harm, which Jones does not 

dispute. So there is a remedy for the alleged harm.

Typically that would end the inquiry, but not here. Jones contends that suing in 

Equatorial Guinea is an inadequate remedy because the country’s judiciary is corrupt and 

because he faces risk of persecution. When a plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of another 

country’s legal system, we examine whether the differences between that legal system and ours 

“render the possible remedy so clearly inadequate that forcing a plaintiff to bring suit there 

would be unjust.” Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 495. In rare circumstances, those differences can 

include serious, non-legal obstacles like persecution, corruption, and political unrest. See Rustal 

Trading US, Inc. v. Makki, 17 F. App’x 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations 

omitted). 

Jones’s fear of corruption and persecution may be understandable, but the district court 

did not abuse its discretion when concluding that Equatorial Guinea is an adequate forum. 

Starting with Jones’s concern about corruption, “general allegations of corruption” do not 

support finding that an alternative forum is inadequate. Id. (citing El-Fadl v. Central Bank of 

Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Jones largely relies on Investment Climate 
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 5

Statements published by the U.S. Department of State. Admittedly, those Statements criticize 

the Equatorial Guinean judiciary. They say, for example, that the “judicial system is not 

independent” and that there is “[c]orruption throughout the government, including the 

judiciary[.]” Those are general allegations, however, that do not address the nuances of this 

case—particularly because the Statements focus on investment risks rather than employment 

disputes. Thus, they are not controlling.

But Jones also makes allegations that could be considered particularized. He, for 

example, notes that his business partner—who is the majority shareholder of IPX International—

is related to the President of Equatorial Guinea. And the President also serves as the Chief 

Magistrate of the judiciary. That may be a legitimate cause for concern, but it does not require 

finding that Equatorial Guinea is an inadequate forum. “It is not the business of our courts to 

assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign 

nation.” Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). 

For that reason, federal courts throughout the country consistently reject allegations of corruption 

in foreign judicial systems. See 14D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 3828 n.11 (4th ed. 2018) (collecting cases). We cannot fault the district court 

for doing the same.

We now turn to Jones’s fear of persecution. To warrant reversal, that fear needs to be 

“well founded.” Rustal Trading, 17 F. App’x at 335 (citation omitted). Jones again relies on the 

State Department Statements, which we said are too general to be controlling. But he also makes 

a particularized allegation that he will be falsely arrested and prosecuted. We do not take that 

concern lightly, but it is unsupported. Jones’s best piece of evidence seems to be an affidavit 

stating that his brother in law—who also works for IPX International—had his passport 

confiscated shortly after Jones’s suspension. But IPX International’s corporate attorney took the 

passport, not Equatorial Guinea. And nothing in the record suggests that the confiscation was 

unjustified. So even that evidence fails to show a well-founded fear that Equatorial Guinea will 

wrongly arrest and prosecute Jones.

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when finding that Equatorial Guinea 

is an available and adequate forum. 
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 6

B. Balance of Private and Public Interests

If an adequate alternative forum is available, then courts examine whether the plaintiff’s 

choice of forum is unnecessarily burdensome. Zions First, 629 F.3d at 523. To guide that 

analysis, courts look to the private and public interests that the Supreme Court listed in Gulf Oil 

Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Id. We will start with the private interests and then turn 

to the public interests.

1. Private Interests

In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court announced a non-exhaustive list of private interests to 

consider, including “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory 

process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; 

possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical 

problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” 330 U.S. at 508. Here, 

the district court held that those interests favor trying the case in Equatorial Guinea. In support, 

the district court found that most of the witnesses and key documents are in Equatorial Guinea 

and that the witnesses can be compelled to testify there. Those findings are supported by an 

affidavit1stating that six key witnesses live in Equatorial Guinea, four of those witnesses are 

unwilling to travel to the United States for this litigation, and the key documents are in 

Equatorial Guinea.

Jones raises several challenges on appeal. First, he asks us to weigh the interests 

differently. In support, he notes that some of the key witnesses previously traveled to the United 

States and that IPX International could compel them to travel here again. He also claims that 

IPX International should already possess some of the key documentary evidence, so production 

will not need to be compelled. Even if those factual allegations are true, Jones has not shown 

that the district court’s balancing was unreasonable. So we give substantial deference to the 

 

1

In passing, Jones challenges the adequacy of the affidavit claiming that it is “hearsay and marginally 

relevant.” We do not consider that here because Jones did not fully develop the argument and the Supreme Court 

has suggested that “affidavits describing the evidentiary problems” are sufficient. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 258–

59. 
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 7

district court’s determination that, on balance, the private interests favor trying the case in 

Equatorial Guinea. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257.

Second, Jones says that the district court failed to consider the cost of flying the key 

witnesses from Equatorial Guinea to the United States. He is correct, so the district court erred 

because the cost of attendance is a relevant interest. That said, the error is harmless. To use 

Jones’s words, “the flights are relatively expensive.” If anything, that favors trying the case in 

Equatorial Guinea. Not quite willing to go that far, Jones maintains that the overall cost “does 

not favor either party.” We will give Jones the benefit of the doubt. But if cost does not favor 

Jones’s position, then the district court’s failure to consider it does not warrant reversal. 

Finally, Jones argues that the district court ignored the practical problems of a trial in 

Equatorial Guinea. In support, he repeats his earlier arguments: the Equatorial Guinean judiciary 

is corrupt and he fears persecution. We already explained why those concerns are unpersuasive. 

See Section III.A.

2. Public Interests

Looking again to Gulf Oil, the public interests we consider include the administrative 

difficulties of litigation in congested centers instead of the suit’s place of origin, the burden of 

jury duty on citizens of communities with no relation to the case, the importance of trying the 

case in view and reach of others that may be affected, the local interest in having localized 

controversies decided at home, and the appropriateness of having trial at home with the law that 

governs the case. 330 U.S. at 508–09. The district court held that those factors favor trying the 

case in Equatorial Guinea. In support, the district court made two key findings. First, the court 

found that the case is local to Equatorial Guinea because that is where Jones started his 

relationship with IPX International, executed his employment contracts, and received 

performance evaluations. The court also noted that IPX International suspended Jones and 

ceased payments to him from Equatorial Guinea. Second, the court found that Equatorial 

Guinean law governs the case under the underlying employment contract’s choice-of-law 

provision. 
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 8

Jones challenges those findings on two grounds. Like with the private interests, he first 

asks us to rebalance the public interests. If we do so, Jones says we should find that the case is 

local to Michigan because he went there to open IPX International’s subsidiary and the dispute 

arose during that time. Fair enough, but it is not our role to rebalance the interests. Instead, 

Jones needs to show that the balancing below was unreasonable. He did not make that showing, 

so we give substantial deference to the district court’s determination. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 

257. 

Jones next contends that Michigan law governs the contract, thus the district court 

erroneously considered the burden of applying Equatorial Guinean law. We are unpersuaded. 

Jones relies on the employment contract’s choice-of-law provision, which provides that disputes 

will be decided “in accordance with the applicable provisions of the ‘Labor Law’ and state laws 

and regulations.”2 “Labor Law” is described earlier in the contract as “The Labor Law of 

Equatorial Guinea.” But Jones homes in on the reference to “state laws” and says, without 

citation or analysis, that must mean Michigan law governs because there are no states in 

Equatorial Guinea. Conflict of laws is a complicated doctrine, so that argument is far too 

skeletal for us to consider. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) 

(quotation omitted).

But even if Jones fully formed his argument, he still would not prevail. The public 

interests favor dismissal not just when a court has to apply foreign law, but also when the court 

“would be required to untangle problems in conflict of laws[.]” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251 

(quotation omitted) (emphasis added). A plain reading of the choice-of-law provision suggests 

Equatorial Guinean law governs. If somehow Michigan law applies instead, then there is a 

complicated conflict-of-laws problem that needs to be untangled. That, too, favors dismissing 

the case, so the district court did not abuse its discretion. 

 

2The record includes competing copies of the employment contract, one that is signed and one that is not. 

We rely on the signed copy.
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 9

C. Deference to Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

Finally, we consider whether the district court properly deferred to Jones’s choice of 

forum. “[T]he central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is 

convenient[.]” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256. Courts presume that plaintiffs choose convenient 

forums, so a plaintiff’s choice of forum is given deference. See Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 493.

Jones asserts that the district court did not give his choice of forum any deference. That 

goes too far. Here, the district court concluded that the private and public interests “strongly 

weigh” in favor of dismissal. In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court said that a plaintiff’s choice of 

forum should be disturbed only when the private and public interests balance “strongly in favor” 

of dismissal. 330 U.S. at 508. The district court could have been more explicit about deferring 

to Jones’s selection. But by looking at which direction the interests strongly weighed, the district 

court in effect applied the deference that Gulf Oil requires. 

Jones also argues that the district court should have given his choice of forum heightened 

deference because he is a United States citizen. Our caselaw supports that position in general. 

See Duha, 448 F.3d at 873–74 (reversing when the district court failed to indicate that it was 

giving heightened deference to a United States citizen’s choice of forum). But here, Jones faces 

two problems.

First, he did not request heightened deference below. In fact, he did not even cite Duha. 

Jones instead devoted just two sentences to deference. In the first, he noted that a plaintiff’s 

choice of forum is given deference. He explained, in the second, that because of that deference, 

dismissal would be proper only if the private and public interests balance “strongly in favor” of 

dismissal. As we said, the district court held that the interests “strongly weigh” in favor of 

dismissal. So the district court applied the precise amount of deference that Jones requested 

below. We cannot find a clear abuse of discretion because Jones now wishes he had asked for 

more. 

Even if Jones could expand his request for deference on appeal, we are unpersuaded that 

the district court erred. Forum non conveniens, as we mentioned, is largely intended to secure 

convenient trials, and we defer to a plaintiff’s choice of forum based on an assumption that the 
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 10

plaintiff will choose a convenient forum. That assumption is stronger when a plaintiff picks his 

home forum, so we give greater deference in those circumstances. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 493 

(citation omitted). We likewise defer less to a plaintiff who picks a foreign forum because the 

assumption is weaker. Id. Those assumptions and the corresponding levels of deference are 

helpful tools, not oppressive masters. When the facts plainly show that the assumptions do not 

hold true, then courts need not adhere blindly to the corresponding levels of deference. See id. 

(“Although descriptively accurate and useful in many cases, that is not an unyielding rule that 

district courts must apply with equal force in every situation.”).

Yet that is what Jones asks us to do here. Jones may be a United States citizen, but 

nearly everything else about this case suggests he did not select his home forum. Jones spent his 

professional life abroad and lived in Equatorial Guinea since 2007. In 2011, he formed his 

company in Equatorial Guinea to provide services there. Since then, he continually conducted 

business, signed contracts, and received payments in Equatorial Guinea. There is no evidence 

that he made similar investments of time or resources in the United States, other than coming 

here for a brief stint to advance his Equatorial Guinean company’s interests before again 

returning to Equatorial Guinea.

In short, there is strong evidence that Jones is not at home in the United States. So the 

assumption that a United States court is most convenient for him does not hold true. The district 

court thus acted within its discretion when it did not give heightened deference to his choice of 

forum. See id. at 494 (finding no abuse of discretion when a district court did not give 

heightened deference to a United States citizen domiciled elsewhere). 

IV.

In sum, Jones raises some legitimate concerns, but there was not a clear abuse of 

discretion. We affirm.
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 11

______________________________________________________

CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE JUDGMENT

______________________________________________________

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in judgment. 

Although I agree that the district court reached the correct outcome in dismissing this case on 

forum non conveniens grounds, I write separately because I believe that the district court 

overlooked an important step of the analysis. “Forum non conveniens dismissal involves a threestep analysis,” and the district court must begin by determining what deference it owes to the 

plaintiff’s forum choice. Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 828 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2016). 

Generally, American plaintiffs receive greater deference to their forum choice than foreign 

plaintiffs do. See, e.g., Zions First Nat’l Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 629 F.3d 

520, 525 (6th Cir. 2010); Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 873–74 (6th Cir. 2006). Once the 

district court resolves the deference question, it must determine whether the defendant has shown 

that there is an adequate alternative forum and that the plaintiff’s forum choice “is unnecessarily 

burdensome based on public and private interests.” Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 492. Although the 

district court addressed the latter two steps of the analysis, it gave no hint that it considered the 

first step: the level of deference to confer on Jones’s decision to litigate the dispute in Michigan.

Jones is entitled to at least some deference in his forum choice because he is an American 

citizen. The question, then, is how much and whether that deference outweighs other burdens on 

public and private interests. The district court did not answer that question, leaving us in a 

difficult position as we review its analysis. Indeed, in at least two published decisions, we have 

held that a district court’s failure to address deference may warrant vacating its order of 

dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. Zions, 629 F.3d at 525; Duha, 448 F.3d at 873–74.

But we need not reach that outcome here. Although the district court’s failure to address 

the level of deference it owed to Jones’s forum choice amounts to legal error, that error was 

harmless because “the record would compel the same result even under the correct legal 

standard.” Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 515 (6th Cir. 1998) (Boggs, J., concurring) 

(citing Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 637 (6th Cir. 1997)). For these reasons, I concur in 
No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 12

the majority’s opinion to the extent that it is not inconsistent with my own, and I concur in the 

judgment.