alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Marvin SPENCER Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-3435

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 7, 2017

Filed: September 12, 2017

Benjamin Bejar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Thomas More Hollenhorst, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marvin Spencer, Pro Se

Before COLLOTON, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Marvin Spencer was found guilty of robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of ammunition, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(g)(1), 924(c), and 1951. The district court1 sentenced Spencer to 257 months in prison. On appeal, counsel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the reasonableness of the *472sentence in a brief filed under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). In his pro se brief Spencer challenges the district court’s jurisdiction, counsel’s effectiveness, and his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction in light of *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

The evidence at trial showed that Spencer and an associate took $58,358.50 worth of jewelry from a Minnesota store, and that Spencer shot a store employee in the leg and fired additional shots in the air during the robbery. The evidence included eye-witness testimony, video surveillance footage, and Spencer’s admissions, which overwhelmingly supported the verdict. This court’s review .of the record shows that Spencer’s sentence was not unreasonable. *See United States v. Feemster,*572 F.3d 455, 460-61 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (standard of review). Spencer’s challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction based on alleged indictment defects is meritless, his claim of ineffective assistance is best deferred for collateral proceedings. *See United States v. Looking Cloud,*419 F.3d 781, 788-89 (8th Cir. 2005). His Johnson-based challenge to his section 924(c) conviction is foreclosed by *United States v. Prickett,*839 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam), *petition for cert. filed,*(U.S. Dec. 30, 2016) (No. 16-7373).

This court has reviewed the record independently under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and finds no non-frivolous issues.

The judgment is affirmed, counsel’s request to withdraw is granted, and Spencer’s pending pro se motions are denied as moot.

1

. The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
EXHIBIT 99.1

                                CERTIFICATION OF
                             CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                              OF GASCO ENERGY, INC.
                         PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350


         I, Mark  Erickson,  President  and  Chief  Executive  Officer  of Gasco
Energy,  Inc. (the "Company"),  hereby certify that the  accompanying  report on
Form 10K for the period ending  December 31, 2002 and filed with the  Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof  pursuant to Section  13(a) of the
Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 (the  "Report") by the Company  fully  complies
with the requirements of that section.

         I further certify that the  information  contained in the Report fairly
presents,  in all material  respects,  the financial  operations  and results of
operations of the Company.




                                   /s/ Mark Erickson
                                   ------------------
                            Name:  Mark Erickson
                            Date:  March 27, 2003
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.1

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing of the Annual Report of Liberty Self-Stor, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2004 (the
"Report") with the Securities and Exchange Commission, I, Richard M. Osborne,
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, C. Jean
Mihitsch, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

     1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
        15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and

     2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
        respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
        Company.

<Table>
<S>                                             <C>
                                                         By: /s/ Richard M. Osborne
                                                             Richard M. Osborne
                                                  Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Date: March 16, 2005                                               Officer

                                                          By: /s/ C. Jean Mihitsch
                                                              C. Jean Mihitsch
Date: March 16, 2005                                       Chief Financial Officer
</Table>

                                        36
#### Anthony Pierce GRIGSBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hector Daniel LUDI, Medical Doctor, Attending Staff Physician, individual and official capacity; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56355

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 4, 2017

Anthony Pierce Grigsby Norco, CA, for pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Anthony Pierce Grigsby appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to prosecute his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. *Omstead v. Dell, Inc.,*594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir, 2010). We vacate and remand.

Although the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Grigsby’s action for failure to prosecute, *see id.,*Grigs-by attached to his notice of appeal prison mail logs and a declaration indicating that Grigsby never received the district court’s February 19, 2015 or March 20, 2015 orders. Because the district court did not have the benefit of these documents, we vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand so the district court can permit Grigsby to file a response to the order to show cause.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 10.10
  
    
    
    A bi-weekly salary of $8,846.15 which equals $230,000 on an annualized basis.
    
    The variable target portion of your total compensation package is set at $100,000
for 2009. Shortly after you join us at ATG, you will be given a set of goals, which
will serve as the criteria for this incentive program.
    
    In concert with this employment offer, you will be granted 230,000 options to
acquire ATG common stock at the fair market value at close of market, on your start
date. These options vest quarterly over 4 years, with cliff vesting for the
1st year. Cliff Vesting means that after 1 year from your start date,
your options will vest 25%. Thereafter, your options will vest quarterly for the
remaining 3 years.
    
    You may elect to transition up to 100,000 of your options grant into ATG RSUs, at
a 2:1 ratio. ATG RSUs (Restricted Share Units) are full value shares of ATG stock
which vest 25% annually over 4 years, commencing on your start date with ATG. I have
enclosed a document which describes RSU from a structure and tax point of view.
      Sincerely,
    
    Agreed and Accepted:/s/ Nina McIntyrePatricia ONeill
    
    Nina McIntyreSenior Vice President, Human ResourcesArt Technology Group Inc.
    
    Start Date
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, David K. Spohr, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Futures Strategic Trust for the period July 1, 2009 to September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Quarterly Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |                                                          
|------------------ |  | ---------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ David K. Spohr
|Name:              |  | David K. Spohr                                           
|Title:             |  | Senior Vice President and Director of Fund Administration
|                   |  | (Principal Financial/Accounting Officer)                 
|                   |  | Kenmar Preferred Investments Corp.,                      
|                   |  | Managing Owner of                                        
|                   |  | Futures Strategic Trust                                  
|                   | 
|Date:              |  | November 12, 2009
#### A. B. JOHNSON vs. J. W. SKIPWORTH.

SUPREME COURT,

AUSTIN TERM, 1883.

*Venue.*— Where a suit was an action of debt upon a judgment the proper venue was the county of defendant’s residence.

*Lost Record*— Averment *need not be sworn to.*— The averment in a petition of destruc - tion of a judgment need not be sworn to.

*Same*— Statute *construed.*— Art. 4289 R. S. does not prohibit a party from setting up a lost or destroyed record and proving its contents as-at common law.

Appeal from Mitchell County.

*JP. M. Thurmond*for appellant.

*Martin k Kennedy, Jno. D. Templeton*for appellee.

Opinion by

Willie, C. J.

There was no error in overruling appellants demurrer to plaintiff’s petition. The suit was an action of debt upon a judgment and the *367proper venue was the county of the defendants, residence. Rev. Stats. Art. 1198.

It was a new suit and not a mere continuation of the former one as in case of *scire facias*and hence the authority of Perkins vs. Hume, 10 Tex. 50,is not applicable to it.

Nor was it requisite that the áverment of destruction of the judgment contained in the petition should be sworn to. This was a matter of evidence, and it was sufficient if the proof showed that the instrument was destroyed in order to let in evidence of its contents. 1 G-reenl. on Ev. Sec 84 and 509. Freeman on Judgments Sec. 407.

The depositions of Templeton were properly admitted. No objection to them can be considered here that were not taken in the district court. The two grounds offered for their exclusion below were : First. Because parol proof was not admissible to prove the contents of a destroyed judgment except in the court where the loss occurred. . Second. It did not appear that Templeten was the custodian of the records at the time of their destruction and hence his testimony was not the best evidence of their contents.

If, as we have shown, the district court of Mitchell county had jurisdiction of the cause, it was of course proper to prove all the facts necessary for a recovery in that court.

Art. 4289 of the Rev. Statutes was intended to furnish a rule by which a lost or destroyed record might be substituted, but not to prohibit a party from setting up such a record and proving its contents as at common law. It gave an additional remedy to what was already proved, but did not take away the former one.

We know of no rule of evidence which requires lost records to be proved by the person in whose custody they were at the time they were destroyed. Counsel do not furnish us any authority to that effect and the rules of evidence seem to admit of such proof by any one having knowledge of the fact. See Greenl. on Ev. Sec 509, and authorities cited.

Besides the depositions are not made part of the bill of exceptions, and as the statement of facts has been stricken from the record we have no means of knowing what proof was made by the testimony of the witness. Tnere is no error in the judgment and it is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT32.01**

 

SECTION 1350CERTIFICATION

 

In connection with thisquarterly report of ML Trend-Following Futures Fund L.P. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the SecuritiesExchange Commission on the date hereof (this “Report”), I, Paul Morton, ChiefExecutive Officer, President and Manager of Merrill Lynch AlternativeInvestments LLC, the general partner of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

 

1. This Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2. The informationcontained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:                                           |  November 14,  2008 |   |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------|
|                                            |                          |   |
| By                                              | /s/ PAUL MORTON               |   |
| Paul Morton                                     |                          |
| Chief Executive Officer  ,President and Manager |                          |
| (Principal Executive  Officer)                  |                          |
|                                                 |                               |        |  |

** **

----
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 36 (Wednesday, February 23, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 10280]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03811]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of Foreign Assets Control


Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions

AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) is publishing the names of one or more persons that have 
been placed on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 
Persons List (SDN List) based on OFAC's determination that one or more 
applicable legal criteria were satisfied. All property and interests in 
property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these persons are blocked, and 
U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions 
with them.

DATES: See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for effective date(s).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: OFAC: Andrea Gacki, Director, tel.: 
202-622-2490; Associate Director for Global Targeting, tel.: 202-622-
2420; Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.: 202-622-2480; Assistant 
Director for Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202-622-4855; or the Assistant 
Director for Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation, tel.: 202-622-2490.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Electronic Availability

    The Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and 
additional information concerning OFAC sanctions programs are available 
on OFAC's website (www.treasury.gov/ofac).

Notice of OFAC Action

    On February 17, 2022, OFAC determined that the property and 
interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of the following 
person are blocked under the relevant sanctions authority listed below.

Individual

    1. OROZCO RODRIGUEZ, Sergio Armando (a.k.a. ``CHOCHO''), Puerto 
Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico; DOB 16 Feb 1967; POB Guadalajara, Jalisco, 
Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. OORS670216HJCRDR04 
(Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-E.O.]. Sanctioned pursuant to 
section 1(b)(iii) of Executive Order 14059 of December 15, 2021, 
``Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit 
Drug Trade,'' for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or to have 
acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, 
CARTEL DE JALISCO NUEVA GENERACION (a.k.a. CJNG), a sanctioned person.

Andrea M. Gacki,
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the 
Treasury.
[FR Doc. 2022-03811 Filed 2-22-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-AL-P
July 1, 2015

Ms. Lacey A. Szekely

5600 Caleb Drive

Fallon, NV 89406

Dear Ms. Szekely :

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from

§ § 91.119 and 91.203(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why

we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can n o t Process Your Request

We entered your April 2, 2015

, exemption request into the public d ocket

(No. FAA− 2015

− 1256 ), but we are unable to process your request any further. The

information you sent does no t comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For

us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following :

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would

benefit the public as a whole.

 The reasons why the exemption would no t adversely affect safety or how the exemption

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you

seek an exemption.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your

petition for exemp tion at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do No t Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you

further. If you have any questions or require additional time , you may call (202) 267

- 9677.

Sincerely,

Brenda Robeson

P rogram Analyst

, A ircraft and

Airport Rules Division

Enclosure
#### George H. Fields, Respondent, *v.*Western Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant. Western Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant, *v.*George H. Fields, et al., Respondents.

Submitted May 24, 1943;

decided June 10, 1943.

Motion to amend remittitur granted. Return of remittitur requested and when returned it will be amended to provide that the judgments are affirmed with one bill of costs. (See 290 N. Y. 209.)
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Blaine Stacy KILLS BACK Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4352

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Filed: August 1, 2017

Benjamin Patterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Rapid City, SD, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Blaine Stacy Kills Back, Pro Se

Before GRUENDER, BOWMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Blaine Stacy Kills Back directly appeals the above-Guidelines-range sentence the district court1 imposed upon revoking his supervised release. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief arguing that the sentence is unreasonable.

After careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Kills Back. See United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 915-18 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review); United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 922-24 (8th Cir. 2006) (revocation sentence may be unreasonable if district court fails to consider relevant § 3553(a) factor, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant factor, or commits clear error of judgment). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm the judgment.

1

. The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of South Dakota.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Oscar REYNA-LOZANO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40086 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 19, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Kathryn Shephard, H. Michael Sokolow, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Oscar Reyna-Lozano appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry after deportation. He contends that the district court erred in increasing his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02. Reyna-Lozano argues, under *Mathis v. United States,*— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), that the Texas burglary statute is not divisible and that not every violation of § 30.02(a) qualifies as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii).

The Government has filed an opposed motion for summary affirmance asserting that Reyna-Lozano’s arguments are foreclosed by our recent decision in *United States v. Uribe,*838 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2016), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1359, 197 L.Ed.2d 542 (2017). In the alternative, the Government requests an extension of time in which to file a brief on the merits.

The Government is correct that *Uribe*forecloses Reyna-Lozano’s *Mathis*argument. *See Uribe,*838 F.3d at 669-71. Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cíe. R. 47,5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
ACCEPTED

04-15-00268-CV

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

11/23/2015 10:06:57 AM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 11/23/2015 10:06:57 AM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk