alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Martin Alonso CHAVEZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50698 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 18, 2017

*270Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Martin Alonso Chavez, Pro Se

Before KING, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Martin Alonso Chavez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Chavez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### LONG & REESE v. A. DENNIS.

COURT OF APPEALS,

AUSTIN TERM, 1881.

*TMitdlord’s TAenon Crops.*— A landlord’s lien on crops raised on the premises holds for one month after the same have been removed from the rented premises, and no longer.

*Same*— jVotlee *of I/len.*— One ivlio purchases cotton from the sub-tenant without the knowledge of where it was raised, or notice of the landlord’s lien, is not liable for the same.

Appeal from the County Court of Bell County.

Opinion by

Watts, J.

Appellees sued appellants May 2d, 1878, to recover $395.00, as *160rent for land. It is alleged in the petition that appellee rented the land to S. J. Davis for the year 1877, and Davis agreed to pay the-sum of $395.00 therefor. That the appellants assumed to pay appellee said amount, in an arrangement by whioh they were to get control of the cotton raised on the land and ship and have the same sold. And that they did get possession of and ship the cotton and sold it, but refused to pay the debt.

Appellants answered, denying that they had assumed the payment of the Davis debt, an d averred that they had agreed to take charge of the cotton and ship the same to Galveston, and have it sold, and pay the proceeds to appellee. That they had never received but seven bales of the cotton and that had been sold for $255.43.

The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the appellee for §395. Appellants bring this case before the court by appeal.

The evidence showed that this agreement between appellants and appellee (whatever may have been its terms) was made in December, 1877; also that appellants had purchased some cotton from subtenants raised on the land. Their purchases were made as early as August and September, 1877.

-The evidence shows that the appellants did not know at the time they purchased and received the cotton that the same was raised on the Dennis land. The court charged the jury in effect that appellants were liable to appellee for the cotton purchased from the subtenants. This was erroneous.. The land-lord’s lien holds for one month after the property has been removed from the rented premises and no longer.

If, as shown, the appellants purchased the cotton from the subtenants without the knowledge of where it was raised, or notice of appellee’s lien, they would not be liable to appellee for that cotton. The appellants were not chargeable with notice of the land-lord’s lien, when they did not know as a matter of fact where the cotton was grown at the time they jiurchased and paid a valuable consideration therefor. We cannot determine from the record whether the jury found that appellants had unconditionally assumed the payment of the debt, or whether their verdict was based upon the value of the cotton they purchased from the sub-tenants. In other words, it does not appear, from the record, but that the jury were influenced in finding their verdict by the erroneous charge of the court, with reference to the land-lord’s lien, &c.

The judgment ought to be reversed and the cause remanded.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                      25,663,571
<SECURITIES>                                55,489,226
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            81,404,342
<PP&E>                                       5,143,160
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,112,427
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              83,746,714
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       220,916
<OTHER-SE>                                  72,191,930
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                83,746,714
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               436,667
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             9,116,330
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (66,977)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (7,642,310)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (7,642,310)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.35)
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</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





The
      undersigned, Peter Mateja, Chief Executive Officer and Director, of Smart Energy
      Solutions, Inc., Inc. (the “Company”) and Edward Braniff, Chief Financial
      Officer of the Company, certify, under the standards set forth and solely for
      the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to their knowledge, the Annual Report on
      Form
      10-KSB/A of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2006 fully complies
      with
      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934 and information contained in that Form 10-KSB/A fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




Dated:
      October 30, 2007




/s/
                Peter MatejaPeter
                Mateja
              Chief
                Executive Officer and Director
              (Principal
                Executive Officer)




/s/
                Edward BraniffEdward
                Braniff
              Chief
                Financial Officer
              (Principal
                Financial Officer)




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




29
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**SHERDINA WILLIAMS,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 705 EAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 30th day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allo wance of Appeal is** 

DENIED

**.**
#### Eber BALAN-BARRERA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-73108

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 16, 2016 *

Filed November 22, 2016

Xavier Gonzales, Xavier Gonzales, Attorney at Law, PC, Las Vegas, NV, for Petitioner.

Kathryn McKinney, OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Eber Balan-Barrera, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1262. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Singh v. Holder,*771 F.3d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 2014). We grant the petition for review and remand.

Balan-Barrera moved to reopen so that he could pursue an I-601A provisional waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e). At that time, an individual who had been in removal proceedings was eligible for the waiver only if the agency had administratively closed proceedings, instead of entering a removal order. *See*8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4) (2013).

The BIA correctly noted that Balan-Barrera’s final order of removal rendered him ineligible for the waiver. However, the BIA abused its discretion in denying Ba-lan-Barrera’s motion to reopen because it appears not to have considered whether he was entitled to reopening as a matter of discretion. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); *Singh,*771 F.3d at 653 (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen on jurisdictional grounds was legal error, and thus an abuse of discretion, because it had authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)). We therefore grant the petition and. remand for further proceedings.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1287 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1287

 To amend the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996 to 
   extend the authorization of the South Carolina National Heritage 
                   Corridor, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 24, 2021

Mr. Clyburn (for himself, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Duncan, and 
 Mr. Rice of South Carolina) introduced the following bill; which was 
             referred to the Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996 to 
   extend the authorization of the South Carolina National Heritage 
                   Corridor, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA NATIONAL 
              HERITAGE CORRIDOR.

    Division II of the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 
1996 (Public Law 104-333) is amended--
            (1) in section 607, by striking ``2019'' and inserting 
        ``2031''; and
            (2) in section 608(a), by striking ``$17,000,000'' and 
        inserting ``$30,000,000''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Thedral R. HARDRIDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe PICCININI, JCDC Director; Mike Sharp, Sheriff; Matai Ware, JCDC CO; Ronnie Rahe, JCDC Lieutenant; Daniel McElroy, JCDC CO; Ryan Arnold, JCDC CO; Jen-I E. Pulos, JCDC CO; Akanuligo, JCDC CO; Hansen, JCDC CO; Cochran, JCDC Lieutenant; Brown, JCDC Lieutenant, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1331

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 26, 2017

Filed: July 31, 2017

Thedral R. Hardridge, Pro Se

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Inmate Thedral R. Hardridge appeals following the district court’s dismissal of his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Har-dridge raised constitutional claims based on two incidents on November 12, 2014, when officers allegedly used excessive force against him while he was held at the Jackson County Detention Center as a pretrial detainee. *See generally Smith v. Conway County, Ark,*759 F.3d 853, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2014). On initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court dismissed the claims against all defendants except for Lieutenants Ronnie Rahe and Brown, stating that Hardridge had not alleged that these nine defendants “were the individuals” who allegedly subjected him to excessive force and denied him subsequent medical care. The court later dismissed the claims against Rahe and Brown for lack of timely service under Federal. Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

Upon de novo review, we reverse the section 1916A dismissal as to five of the named defendants. Hardridge described the two incidents in detail in a narrative that was attached to the pro se complaint. He alleged that several officers were present with him in an attorney conference room and in a cell at the detention center, and that officers used excessive force against him during both incidents. Har-dridge said that he did not know the names of the officers but could identify them on sight. Reports of several officers attached to the complaint do not admit the use of excessive force, but show that defendants Akanuligo, Ware, Pulos, Arnold, and McElroy were the officers present at either the conference room or the cell during the times when Hardridge says that officers used excessive force. These attachments are part of the complaint for all purposes. *See*Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Liberally construing the complaint with its *455attachments together, *see Atkinson v. Bohn,*91 F.3d 1127, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), the complaint contains sufficient allegations that these five defendants violated Hardridge’s rights.

The complaint and attachments do not include sufficient allegations against defendants Piccinini, Sharp, Hansen, and Cochran, so the dismissal is affirmed as to those parties. There was no abuse of discretion in the dismissal without prejudice of defendants Rahe and Brown under Rule 4(m) for lack of service. *See Mack v. Dillon,*594 F.3d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 32 (Wednesday, February 16, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 8854]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03384]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute on Aging; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute on Aging Special Emphasis 
Panel; Program Project.
    Date: March 8, 2022.
    Time: 11:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institute on Aging, Gateway Building, 7201 
Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual Meeting).
    Contact Person: Dario Dieguez, Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, 
Scientific Review Branch, National Institutes of Health, National 
Institute on Aging, Bethesda, MD 20814, (301) 827-3101, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#9bfffae9f2f4b5fff2fefceefee1dbf5f2f3b5fcf4ed"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1f7b7e6d7670317b767a786a7a655f71767731787069">[email protected]</span></a>.

    This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the 
meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and 
funding cycle.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.866, Aging 
Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: February 11, 2022.
David W. Freeman,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2022-03384 Filed 2-15-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### Edward A. Greenspon, Appellant, *v.*E. R. Squibb & Sons, Respondent.

Argued April 20, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*774
      *Arthur Garfield Hays, Morris Shilensky, James R. Cherry*and *Harold Epstein*for appellant.

*Albert R. Connelly*and *George S. Collins*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Finch, J.
#### Frances Rivera et al., Appellants, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

[769 NYS2d 752]

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful death, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Eatterson, J.), dated July 12, 2002, as denied those branches of their motion which were for leave to conduct additional nonparty depositions of Thomas Galloway, Hazel Brett, and C. Smith and granted that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was for a protective order against certain additional document discovery.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying those branches of the motion which were for leave to conduct additional nonparty depositions of Thomas Galloway, Hazel Brett, and C. Smith and substituting therefor provisions granting those branches of the motion and providing that those depositions shall be held at a time and place to be set in a written notice at least 10 days prior to the depositions, to be provided by the plaintiffs to those witnesses, or at such time and place as the parties may agree; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs made a showing of materiality or necessity as to the nonparty witnesses whom they seek to depose, and accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted them leave to depose those witnesses *(see Zollner v City of New York,*204 AD2d 626, 627 [1994]).

As for the plaintiffs’ document discovery demands, the Supreme Court properly determined that the material requested was privileged under Public Health Law § 2805-m *(see Logue v Velez,*92 NY2d 13, 17 [1998]), or that the demands were over-broad *(see Cabrera v Allstate Indem. Co.,*288 AD2d 415 [2001]). Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Schmidt and Rivera, JJ., concur.
#### Tina DIAMOS, Plaintiff, and Aldon Louis Bolanos, former attorney for plaintiff Tina Diamos, Appellant, v. SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-15591

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

Filed October 3, 2017

Aldon Louis Bolanos, Sacramento, CA, Pro Se.

Jonathan D. Fink, Magdalena D. Kozins-ka, Esquire, Wright, Finlay *&*Zak, LLP, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Aldon Louis Bolanos, a former attorney who represented plaintiff Tina Diamos, appeals pro se from the district court’s order imposing sanctions on Bolanos. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. *Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist.,*768 F.3d 843, 859 (9th Cir. 2014) (discovery sanctions); *Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp.,*606 F.3d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 2010) (sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Bolanos in the amount of attorney’s fees and costs associated with cancelled depositions because Bolanos scheduled the depositions for dates when he knew he would be suspended from the practice of law and failed to disclose his suspension to the district court and opposing counsel in a timely manner. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1927 (explaining that an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa*503tiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) (“The court may impose an appropriate sanction—including the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (authorizing sanctions for failure to comply with court order); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) (authorizing sanctions for failure to appear at deposition).

The court’s May 12, 2017 order to show cause (Docket Entry No. 19) is discharged.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
#### Manuel ALDACO, Petitioner-Appellant v. Cheron NASH, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution Bastrop, Respondent-Appellee

No. 16-50347 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 13, 2017

Manuel Aldaco, Pro Se

Zachary Carl Richter, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Manuel Aldaco, former federal prisoner # 80147-080, appeals the dismissal without prejudice of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In his § 2241 petition, Aldaco claimed that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to properly credit him for time served, as ordered by the sentencing court, and he sought an immediate release to a residen*337tial reentry center or a community corrections center to serve his supervised release term.

During the pendency of this appeal, Al-daco was transferred to a lhalfway house, and he later was released from the BOP’s custody. The issues Aldaco has raised on appeal have thus been rendered moot by his release. *See Bailey v. Southerland,*821 F.2d 277, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1987). That he is serving a term of supervised release is of no moment. Aldaco did not seek a reduction of his supervised release term pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) in the district court. Further, he does not allude to any future adverse consequences that would give rise to a live case or controversy. *See id.*at 279.

Accordingly, the Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED as moot.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.