COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

December 8, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP739 Cir. Ct. No. 2003PA4PJ

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN RE THE PATERNITY OF K. M. S.:

MARATHON COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY AND 

HEATHER M. GUSTAFSON,

 PETITIONERS-RESPONDENTS,

 V.

STEVEN E. SCHULTZ,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Marathon County: 

JILL N. FALSTAD, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2019AP739

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Steven Schultz appeals an order denying his 

post-paternity action motions regarding child support. Schultz argues the circuit 

court erred by denying his request to invalidate an August 2007 temporary order 

and any child support and other obligations flowing from that order. We reject 

Schultz’s arguments and affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 In March 2003, Schultz was adjudicated as the father of 

Heather Gustafson’s then four-and-one-half-year-old child. Schultz and Gustafson 

were granted joint legal custody, but Gustafson had primary physical placement 

with reasonable periods of placement available to Schultz upon notice. Schultz 

was ordered to pay $175 per month in child support. In June 2003, the parties 

stipulated to a modified placement schedule that granted Schultz alternating weeks 

with the child and included grandparent visitation and placement. The stipulation 

specified that it did not affect child support. 

¶3 Schultz subsequently moved to revise child support. Based on the 

parties’ shared placement schedule, the circuit court reduced Schultz’s child 

support obligation to zero as of October 1, 2005. Schultz, however, remained 

responsible for any support arrears. 

¶4 In April 2007, Gustafson sought a change in custody and physical 

placement, averring that Schultz was in jail and had been “in and out of jail for the 

last few years.” Gustafson added that Schultz had not held a job in the past eight 

years and could not “physically/financially” take care of their daughter. Gustafson 

thus sought full custody, with placement for Schultz every other weekend upon his

release from jail. The parties were ordered to undergo mediation and, in the 

interim, Gustafson sought “temporary full custody.” 
No. 2019AP739

3

¶5 After an August 2, 2007 hearing at which both parties appeared in 

person, a court commissioner issued what was identified as a “Temporary Order 

from 8/2/07 Hearing,” under which Gustafson was given primary physical 

placement with Schultz having placement every other weekend and every Tuesday 

and Thursday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:45 p.m. Because Schultz was unemployed, 

the court commissioner imputed to him the minimum wage of $6.50 per hour or 

$1,127 per month of gross income. Based on that imputed income, Schultz was 

ordered to pay $192 per month in child support. Schultz was also ordered to pay 

$50 per month toward arrears. Both the child support and arrears payments 

became effective as of August 1, 2007.

¶6 Attempts at mediation reached an impasse when Schultz failed to 

comply with the mediation order by not viewing a required video. On 

February 29, 2008, the court commissioner issued a “Notice of Intent to Dismiss 

Custody/Placement Issue,” in which Schultz was advised that, the issues he raised 

regarding custody and physical placement were dismissed based on his failure to 

attend an impasse review hearing. That notice was returned as undeliverable 

because Schultz failed to keep the circuit court advised of his current address. 

¶7 In May 2008, the Marathon County Child Support Agency (“the 

Agency”) sought to enforce the August 2007 child support order by filing an order 

to show cause. When Schultz failed to appear for the scheduled hearing, the 

circuit court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. The warrant was later quashed 

and the court ultimately dismissed the contempt action in February 2009 because

Schultz was scheduled to be incarcerated until June of that year. However, the 

court acknowledged the existing order for $192 per month in current child support 

and $50 per month for arrears. 
No. 2019AP739

4

¶8 In March 2009, Schultz again petitioned to modify child support, 

arguing that his financial situation had drastically changed as a result of his 

incarceration. In June 2009, presumably following Schultz’s release from 

incarceration, Gustafson moved to modify placement, asserting that overnight 

visits with Schultz should stop because of his “unstable lifestyle.” 

¶9 At a hearing on Schultz’s petition, the circuit court informed the 

parties that because mediation had previously failed and the child’s placement was 

at issue, it was required to appoint a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to represent the 

child’s best interests. The court instructed the parties that unless they stipulated to 

the custody and placement issues, they were liable for the GAL fees. When 

Gustafson failed to make payment arrangements for her share of the GAL fees, she 

was warned that her claims regarding custody and placement would be dismissed 

if payment arrangements were not made within twenty days. From the record, it 

does not appear Gustafson made such arrangements. In August 2011, Schultz 

stipulated to increasing his child support from $192 to $251 per month. Schultz’s 

July 2012 motion to reduce child support was denied. 

¶10 Throughout this time, the Agency continued to enforce the child 

support orders via remedial contempt. Between July 2010 and March 2014, 

Schultz signed eleven orders acknowledging his obligation to pay child support, 

four of which specifically set forth the $192 per month due under the August 2007 

temporary order. 

¶11 The child turned eighteen in September 2016, thus ending Schultz’s 

obligation to pay new child support. In August 2016, Schultz asked the circuit 

court to forgive all child support, arrears, and interest, arguing he had equal 

custody of the child since 2009 and the Agency had been improperly collecting 
No. 2019AP739

5

child support imposed by a “temporary order that was dismissed.” It is unclear 

from the record before us whether there was a ruling on that request before Schultz 

moved the court for an order “reconciling the child support record,” again 

claiming the August 2007 temporary order had been vacated or otherwise rendered 

invalid. Schultz’s motions were denied, and this appeal follows.1 

DISCUSSION

¶12 As an initial matter, Schultz claims the underlying action was 

“procedurally flawed from the beginning,” asserting that the record does not 

reflect that he was timely served with Gustafson’s filings in the circuit court. 

Schultz, however, fails to adequately develop that argument. This court need not 

consider arguments that are unsupported by adequate factual and legal citations or 

are otherwise undeveloped. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 

N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). In any event, as the Agency points out (and which

Schultz does not dispute), Schultz did not raise that procedural challenge in the 

circuit court and, ultimately, he consented to the court’s jurisdiction. See Shadley 

v. Lloyds of London, 2009 WI App 165, ¶25, 322 Wis. 2d 189, 776 N.W.2d 838 

(holding that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the 

first time on appeal). For those reasons, we reject that challenge by Schultz. 

 

1

 The circuit court’s written order states: “For the reasons set forth by the court on the 

record, the court denies all of [Schultz]’s motions.” We note that the February 18, 2019 transcript 

of the court’s oral ruling is not part of the record on appeal. As the appellant, Schultz was 

responsible for ensuring that all relevant transcripts are in the record. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.11(4). However, the transcript is cited extensively in the Agency’s brief and is 

included in the appendices to both parties’ briefs. Because the contents of the transcript do not 

appear to be disputed, we accept the contents of the transcript as presented by the parties. 
No. 2019AP739

6

¶13 Schultz also claims the temporary order is invalid both because the 

court commissioner did not overtly find that there was a substantial change in 

circumstances and because there was no GAL appointed at the time the order was 

granted. Schultz again fails to dispute the Agency’s claim that these arguments 

were not raised in the circuit court. Generally, we do not consider issues raised for 

the first time on appeal. Id. We therefore decline to consider those challenges to 

the temporary order. 

¶14 Next, Schultz argues that the circuit court erred by denying his 

request to invalidate the August 2007 temporary order and any child support 

obligations flowing therefrom. Child support determinations rest within the circuit

court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed absent an erroneous exercise of 

that discretion. See Pergolski v. Pergolski, 143 Wis. 2d 166, 173-74, 420 N.W.2d 

414 (Ct. App. 1988). It is well established that “[w]hen reviewing a circuit court’s 

exercise of discretion, we affirm if the circuit court applied the proper law to the 

relevant facts of record and used a rational process to arrive at a reasonable 

result.” Ambrose v. Continental Ins. Co., 208 Wis. 2d 346, 350, 560 N.W.2d 309 

(Ct. App. 1997).

¶15 Here, Schultz fails to acknowledge this court’s standard of review or 

otherwise explain how he believes the circuit court erroneously exercised its 

discretion by denying his request for relief. Rather, Schultz asserts that the 

February 29, 2008 “Notice of Intent to Dismiss Custody/Placement Issue” should 

be interpreted as also voiding the terms of the temporary order. We are not 

persuaded. As the circuit court noted, the “Notice of Intent” informed Schultz in 

“plain language” that the issues of custody and physical placement raised by him 

were dismissed based on his failure to comply with the mediation order. The 
No. 2019AP739

7

notice did not address the child support obligations set forth in the temporary 

order. 

¶16 Further, the circuit court properly recognized that Schultz had 

several opportunities to contest the temporary order and that he “was on notice as 

to the issues raised as to custody, placement, and child support.” The court found:

 The record is clear after the August 2, 2007 hearing it took 

Mr. Schultz months to follow through on the most basic of 

requirements such as showing up to watch a[] [mediation]

orientation video. Ultimately, he missed court and did not 

advise the clerk of his whereabouts.

 Because Mr. Schultz did not pursue in person, in writing, 

or through an attorney contesting the order set forth 

following the August 2, 2007 hearing, that temporary 

hearing order became in effect the final order of the case. 

¶17 Moreover, Schultz’s own actions demonstrate that he believed he 

was still obligated to pay child support. As noted above, he signed eleven orders 

acknowledging his obligation to pay child support, including orders that 

specifically set forth the $192 per month due under the August 2007 order. He 

also moved to reduce child support, thus acknowledging his existing obligation. 

¶18 In denying Schultz’s motion, the circuit court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing and received bench briefs from the parties before pronouncing 

a detailed oral ruling. The court properly exercised its discretion by giving 

reasonable effect to all of the orders as a whole, noting that the record created a 

consistent and unambiguous obligation on the part of Schultz to provide relatively 

modest support for his child. We therefore affirm.
No. 2019AP739

8

By the Court.—Order affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.