alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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EXHIBIT 99.2

                           NATIONAL AUTO CREDIT, INC.
                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350
                 (SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

I, Robert V. Cuddihy, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of National Auto Credit,
Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Registrant"), in connection with the
Registrant's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended October 31,
2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), do hereby represent, warrant and certify pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

        (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

        (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.


/s/ Robert V. Cuddihy, Jr.
--------------------------------------------
Name: Robert V. Cuddihy, Jr.
Title: Chief Financial Officer

Date:  December 18, 2003












A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to National Auto Credit, Inc. and
will be retained by National Auto Credit, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

                                       40
#### In the Matter of Lenny Durio, Appellant, v New York State Division of Parole, Respondent.

[770 NYS2d 897]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Kavanagh, J.), entered March 27, 2003 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner’s request for parole release.

Since the September 2001 determination giving rise to this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner has reappeared before the Board of Parole and his request for parole release has again been denied. Given petitioner’s subsequent appearance before the Board, the instant matter is now moot and the appeal must be dismissed *(see Matter of Dunavin v Travis,*308 AD2d 641 [2003]). Furthermore, we are unpersuaded by petitioner’s assertion that this matter presents an exception to the mootness doctrine *(see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne,*50 NY2d 707, 714-715 [1980]).

We take this opportunity to observe that where appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual “will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,” whether his or her “release is not incompatible with- the welfare of society,” and whether release will “deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law” (Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]; *see Matter of Silmon v Travis,*95 NY2d 470, 476-477 [2000]; *Matter of Bramble v New York State Bd. of Parole,*307 AD2d 463 [2003]; *Matter of Lue-Shing v Pataki,*301 AD2d 827 [2003], *lv denied*99 NY2d 511 [2003]).

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Peters, Mugglin and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.
#### Lenin GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gina PICKETT, Correctional Counselor I; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56302

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

Filed October 5, 2017

Lenin Garcia, Corcoran, CA, pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Lenin Garcia appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to pay the filing fee after denying Garcia’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on the basis that Garcia has three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Washington v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t,*833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

*522The district court properly dismissed Garcia’s action because three of Garcia’s prior federal actions constitute strikes, and Garcia failed to pay the filing fee. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (precluding prisoner from proceeding IFP where prisoner has previously brought three or more actions or appeals that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); *Andrews v. King,*398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (defining “frivolous” as having no basis in law or fact).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Edward CROSBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 81-1037

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Unit A

July 16, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1981.

Dallas Legal Services Foundation, Inc., John G. Heike, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.

Martha Joe Stroud, Asst. U. S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., Nathan Kobin, Baltimore, for defendant-appellee.

Before GEE, RUBIN and RANDALL, Circuit Judges.

*778PER CURIAM:

After a four-year period of receiving Social Security disability benefits, Mr. Crosby was notified that improvement in his condition rendered him no longer disabled and that these benefits would be and were terminated. The court below found that the Secretary’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Agreeing, we affirm.

We note in passing Mr. Crosby’s argument that, to employ counsel’s phraseology, “the so-called burden of proof” should be upon the Secretary in termination cases such as this. We find no warrant for the view that the factual findings of the Secretary are to be tested by different standards in termination cases than in others. The command of the pertinent judicial review provision is general, draws no such distinctions: “The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .. .. ” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The phrase quoted by counsel from our decision in *Rivas v. Weinberger,*475 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1973), does not conflict in any manner pertinent here with that general rule. There we observed that “[o]nce evidence has been presented which supports a finding that a given condition exists it is presumed *in the absence of proof to the contrary*that the condition has remained unchanged.” *Id.*(emphasis added). Here there was substantial evidence supporting the Secretary’s finding that Mr. Crosby’s condition had sufficiently improved that he was no longer disabled. Insofar as traditional concepts of burden of proof, or of proceeding or of persuasion, figure in review of such appeals as this, governed by the substantial evidence rule, we agree with the view of the Sixth Circuit, expressed in *Myers v. Richardson,*471 F.2d 1265, 1268 (6th Cir. 1972):

> In a case in which benefits have been terminated, as in a case in which benefits have been denied, the burden of proving disability is on the claimant, not on the Secretary. *Watson v. Gardner,*246 F.Supp. 837, 838-839 (N.D.Ga.1965); *Maynard*v. *Celebrezze,*209 F.Supp. 523, 524 (S.D.W.Va.1962). Thus the claimant has the burden of proving that his disability did in fact, continue.1

AFFIRMED.

1

. Quoting from *Marker v. Finch,*322 F.Supp. 905, 909, 910 (D.Del.1971).
#### Albert Emmitt, App’lt, *v.*The Mayor, etc., of New York, Resp’t.

*(New York Superior Court, General Term,*

*Filed April 16, 1891.)*

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — AQUEDUCT COMMISSIONERS HAVE NO POWER TO SUSPEND INSPECTOR WITHOUT PAY.

While the aqueduct commissioners have power to discharge an inspector of masonry, they have no power to suspend him without pay, and salary accruing during such period of suspension may be recovered.

(Following *Mullen*v. *Mayor,*34 N. Y. State Rep., 913.) .

2. Same—Estoppel.

Where, however, such inspector, during a period of suspension, signs an agreement providing that in case of suspension his pay shall cease, he is thereby estopped from claiming pay during subsequent suspensions.

Exceptions ordered heard' at general term, in first instance, after direction by the court that the jury find a verdict in favor of the defendant

The action was brought to recover $1,360, with interest thereon, for salary alleged to be due the plaintiff as inspector of masonry on the new aqueduct during several periods of suspension.

It was claimed by appellant that the commissioners had no power to suspend him without pay. It appeared that on January 23, 1889, during a period of suspension, he signed an agreement reciting his appointment and providing in consideration thereof to faithfully discharge his duties, and that in case of discharge or suspension his pay should cease from the time of such suspension.

*Hatch & Warren,*for app’lt; *William H. Clark,*corporation counsel, for resp’t.

Per Curiam.

Since the trial in this action the main question of law raised by this appeal has been passed upon favorably to *356appellant’s contention by the general term of the supreme court, in *Mullen*v. *The*Mayor, *etc.,*34 N. Y. State Rep., 913. We have determined to accept this disposition of the question as correct for the purposes of this appeal. The agreement of January 23, 1889, raises a question which should be determined in favor of the respondent. The plaintiff, by his action in executing this agreement, which was not prohibited by law and did not relate to an illegal transaction, is estopped from claiming the invalidity of the agreement as to any period of suspension following its execution.

It follows that the defendant is liable only for compensation for such periods of suspension as preceded January 23, 1889.

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with •costs to abide the event

Sedgwick, Oh. J., Truax and Dugro, JJ., concur.
#### David CRAMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF AUBURN; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15234

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 24, 2017

David Cramer, Pro Se

Sean D. O’Dowd, Esquire, Attorney, Angelo, Kilday *&*Kilduff, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

David Cramer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with his arrest and prosecution for battery. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under *Heck v. Humphrey,*512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). *Whitaker v, Garcetti,*486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Cramer’s claims alleging false arrest and imprisonment as iieefc-barred because success on Cramer’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Cramer failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated. *See Heck,*512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); *see also Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park,*159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that *Heck*barred false arrest and false imprisonment claims under § 1983 until conviction was invalidated).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Wilmer Alfredo NAVARRO-DOBLADO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51344 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 26, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Judy Fulmer Madewell, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Maureen Scott Franco, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Wilmer Alfredo Navarro-Doblado appeals the 21-month term of imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea to illegally reentering the United States. He raises a single issue on appeal. He argues that the 21-month term of imprisonment imposed by the district court was greater than necessary to effectuate the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although Navarro-Doblado was given credit for time served and he has since been released from imprisonment, his' appeal is not moot because he is subject to a three-year term of supervised release which would not be “immune to modification by the district court” on remand. *See United States v. Lares-Meraz,*452 F.3d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 2006).

The Guidelines should be the “starting point and initial benchmark” in determining a defendant’s sentence. *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). A sentencing court may not, however, presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable. *Id.*at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586. Rather, the court must make an “individualized assessment” based *438on the facts presented, giving due consideration to all of the § 3553(a) factors. *Id.*at 49-50, 128 S.Ct. 586. “This necessarily means that the sentencing court is free to conclude that the applicable Guidelines range gives too much or too little weight to one or more factors, either as applied in a particular case or as a matter of policy.” *United States v. Williams,*517 F.3d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 2008).

Although the district court voiced concern about the treatment of prior offenses under the new Guidelines, it expressly acknowledged that the guideline range of six- to 12-months was applicable to Navarro-Doblado. The court also considered Navarro-Doblado’s arguments for a lower sentence, including the reason for his illegal reentry and his cooperation with authorities upon apprehension. The court’s determination that Navarro-Doblado’s criminal history should be given more weight than the mitigating factors advanced by him was not an abuse of discretion. *See Williams,*517 F.3d at 809; *see also United States v. Fraga,*704 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that sentencing judge did not abuse her discretion in giving appellant’s criminal history more weight than mitigating factors). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Wagner A. Monterroso DIVAS Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General of the United States Respondent

No. 17-1089

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 24, 2017

Filed: October 30, 2017

*587Chinedu I. Igbokwe, Eraeka J. Igbokwe, Banwo & Igbokwe Law Firm, Omaha, NE, for Petitioner

Andrea Gevas, Ashley Young Martin, Carl H. McIntyre, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Oil, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before WOLLMAN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Wagner A. Monterroso Divas challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals denial of withholding of removal. Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), this court denies the petition for review.

Divas argues that as a former pharmaceutical delivery driver, he is a member of a discrete social group in Guatemala. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). This court declines to reach that issue but addresses an alternative, independently sufficient reason the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled against him: he did not prove the persecution he claims to have suffered at the hands of gang members was attributable to the Guatemalan government. *See, e.g,, Menjivar v. Gonzales,*416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The BIA has adopted, and we have approved as reasonable, a definition of ‘persecution’ that requires a harm to be inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons or an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” (quotation and brackets omitted)).

The petition for review is denied.
Sue Donaldson DEAN v. STATE

CR-16-0131

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017 Reh. denied May 5, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### The People, Resp’ts, *v.*The Mutual Savings & Distribution Fund Association, App’lt.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and printing disbursements.
#### Roger SHULER, Carol Shuler, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Liberty DUKE, Christina Crow, Jinks Crow & Dickson, law firm, Rob Riley, Jay Murrill, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15853 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(August 23, 2017)

Roger Shuler, Pro Se

Carol Shuler, Pro Se

Before WILSON, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Pro see appellants, Roger and Carol Shuler (the Shulers), appeal the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on a failure to prosecute because the Shulers did not serve the complaint on the defendants within the proper timeframe. On appeal, the Shulers argue that the district court should have effectuated service for them because they received “partial” *in forma pauperis*(IFP) status. Alternatively, they argue that the court should have granted them an extension of time to serve the defendants.

We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to effect service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) for an abuse of discre*487tion. *Richardson v. Johnson,*598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “We affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” *Id.*(internal quotation marks omitted).

Without addressing the merits of the appeal, we reverse the district court’s dismissal because it should have effectuated service for the Shulers, who had IFP status. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3), the district court *must*order that service be made by either a United States marshal, a deputy marshal, or by any person specially appointed by the court when the litigant is *proceeding under IFP status.*

REVERSED.
**Exhibit 32.1**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002                          

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Atrisco Oil and Gas, L.L.C. (the “Registrant”) for the period ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Peter Sanchez, Chief Executive Officer of the registrant, certify, pursuant to 18            U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)     The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)     The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.

     Date: March 24, 2009
| By:    | /s/ Peter Sanchez       |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | Peter Sanchez           |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |

This certification accompanies this report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the registrant for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). Such certification will not be            deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the registrant specifically incorporates it by reference.
`EXHIBIT 32.1

                                   IDNA, INC.
                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350
                 (SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

I, James J. McNamara, Chief Executive Officer of iDNA, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the "Registrant"), in connection with the Registrant's Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended July 31, 2006, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), do hereby
represent, warrant and certify pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

        (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

        (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.


/s/ James J. McNamara
----------------------------------
Name:  James J. McNamara
Title: Chief Executive Officer
(principal executive officer)

Date:  September 18, 2006



















A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to iDNA, Inc. and will be retained by
iDNA, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.`
#### Manifee’s heirs *vs.*Hyneman &c.

December 20.

Error (o the Bath Circuit; Silas W. Robbias, Jwjg-e.

*Absent Defendants. Jurisdiction.*

Chanceby,

Case li)3,

If, in a biil against. an absent and a resident defendant, to bave a demand against tlio former satislied out ,of« debt due by the^latter to the I'ormer, it appear such debí bad been appropriated to another creditor beforo suit, and the chancellor had pot jurisdiciion ex-ooi't to subject the resident, no decree can be rendered against the absentee.

*Triplett*for plaintiff.

Judge Owsley

delivered the Opinion of the Court:

The debts owing by the resident defendants to the absent defendant, (to subject which to the satisfaction of the complainants demand this suit was brought.) *having boon*appropriated before the commencement of these suits by the absent defendant, to t':* payment of debts which’ he was owing to others, the court was undoubtedly correct in refusing to make any decree against the resident defendants; and as the cause is one over which the court could have entertained no jurisdiction, were it not for the allegation in the bill, charging the resident defendants with being indebted to the absent defendant, it follows, that as the complainants have failed to support the charge as to the resident defendants, which alone could have authorised the court to take cognizance of the cause, there can be no decree against the absent defendant.

’ The decree dismissing the complainant’s bill, is, therefore, correct, and must be ailjrmed, with cost.