alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jonathan Pierce BOOTHE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30161

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Helen J. Brunner, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mark Paul Parrent, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Thomas Merton Woods, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Brooks Holland, Attorney, Spokane, WA, for Defendant-Appellant

Jonathan Pierce Boothe, Pro Se

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jonathan Pierce Boothe appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his guilty-plea convictions and 72-month aggregate sentence for bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1344; aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1028A; and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Boothe’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Boothe the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Boothe waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 *454L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver, except that the waiver is invalid as to the restitution order because, at the time of the waiver, Boothe was not provided with any estimate of the restitution amount. *See United States v. Tsosie,*639 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, our independent review of the record discloses no arguable grounds for relief as to the restitution order. We accordingly affirm the restitution order. We dismiss the remainder of the appeal in light of the valid appeal waiver. *See United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2009).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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# ANNUAL RECLAIM AUDIT

PAGE 3 - 4 MARCH 2011



# Figure 3-1

NOx Emissions and Available RTCs

**0 5,000**  **10,000 15,000**  **20,000 25,000**  **30,000 35,000**  **40,000 45,000** 

**1989 1990**  **1991 1992**  **1993 1994**  **1995 1996**  **1997 1998**  **1999 2000**  **2001 2002**  **2003 2004**  **2005 2006**  **2007 2008**  **2009 2010**  **2011 2012**  **2013 2014**  **2015 2016**  **2017 2018**  **2019 2020** NOx (tons)



# Compliance Year Total RTC Supply Emissions



# Similar to Table 3-1 and Figure 3-1 for NOx, Table **3-2 presents aggregate annual SOx emissions data for each compliance year based o**  **n audited emissions, and Figure 3-2 compares these audited aggrega** **te annual SOx emissions with the aggregate annual SOx RTC supply. Fu**  **rthermore, after resolving outstanding issues related to two facilities’**  **Compliance Year 2008 SOx emissions, staff updated Table 3-2 to reflect a net decr** **ease in Compliance Year 2008’s aggregate SOx emissions of 47 tons. As shown in T**  **able 3-2 and Figure 3-2, RECLAIM facilities have not exceeded their SOx al**  **locations on an aggregate basis in any Compliance Year since program ince**  **ption. For Compliance Year 2009, SOx emissions were below total al**  **locations by 31%. Similar to NOx RTC leftovers, the SOx RTC leftovers fo**  **r the last two compliance years remains in excess of 20%. The data indicates that**  **RECLAIM met its programmatic SOx emission reduction goals and demonstra** **ted equivalency in SOx emission reductions compared to the subsumed command-a**  **nd-control rules and control measures. Based on updated emissions taken f** **rom audited data, annual SOx emissions have followed a general downward**  **trend, except for slight increases in Compliance Years 1997, 2005, and 2007 compa**  **red to their respective previous year.**
Daniel BRUNER, DOC# Y13297, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-4181

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 27, 2018.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and William L. Sharwell, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Elba Caridad Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
                    The Schedule contains summary financial
                    information extracted from the financial
                    statements for Prudential Securities Strategic
                    Trust and is qualified in its entirety by
                    reference to such financial statements
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<CIK>               0001005006
<NAME>              Prudential Securities Strategic Trust
<MULTIPLIER>        1

<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               Dec-31-2000

<PERIOD-START>                  Jan-1-2000

<PERIOD-END>                    Sep-30-2000

<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-Mos

<CASH>                          15,587,076

<SECURITIES>                    92,377

<RECEIVABLES>                   4,658

<ALLOWANCES>                    0

<INVENTORY>                     0

<CURRENT-ASSETS>                15,684,111

<PP&E>                          0

<DEPRECIATION>                  0

<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  15,684,111

<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           555,188

<BONDS>                         0

<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0

<PREFERRED>                     0

<COMMON>                        0

<OTHER-SE>                      15,128,923

<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    15,684,111

<SALES>                         0

<TOTAL-REVENUES>                (8,238,582)

<CGS>                           0

<TOTAL-COSTS>                   0

<OTHER-EXPENSES>                1,158,961

<LOSS-PROVISION>                0

<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0

<INCOME-PRETAX>                 0

<INCOME-TAX>                    0

<INCOME-CONTINUING>             0

<DISCONTINUED>                  0

<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0

<CHANGES>                       0

<NET-INCOME>                    (9,397,543)

<EPS-BASIC>                   (43.40)

<EPS-DILUTED>                   0

</TABLE>
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JAN 6 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
EDWARD DWAYNE ASHFORD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JOHN E. HAHN, Warden; R.E. HOLTON, Associate Warden; E. HANSEN, Captain; ROBERT WALKER, S.I.A.; R.J. ZAMPERELLI, Unit Manager,

Defendants-Appellees. No. 02-1078 (D.C. No. 01-Z-375) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , EBEL , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 The district court initially denied plaintiff’s complaint on the merits. We

reversed, however, and remanded for determination o f whether plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies as required by § 1997e(a). Ashford v. Hahn , No. 01-1264, 2001 WL 1285482 (10th Cir. Oct. 24, 2001). -2- Plaintiff Edward Dwayne Ashford appeals from the di strict court’s order dismissing his complaint, which he filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district court concluded that the complaint must be dismissed, because plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 1 Plaintiff argues that he did exhaust his remedies. “We review de novo the district court’s finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Jernigan v. Stuchell , 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). An inmate must properly complete the admini strative grievance process, from start to finish, in order to bring his civil rights claim in federal court. Id. Failure to comply with the rules established for th e administrative grievance process, including applicable deadlines, results in procedural default of the plaintiff’s claims. See Pozo v. McCaughtry , 286 F.3d 1022, 1023-24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 414 (2002). Having carefully considered the record, the briefs and the applicable law in light of the above-referenced standards, we conclud e that plaintiff has failed to show that the district court erred in dismissing his Bivens complaint. Accordingly,-3-

the judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED for substantially the same reasons articul ated in its order and judgment of dismissal dated February 6, 2002. All pending motions are DENIED.

Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour Circuit Judge
SAT Report

PMN Number: P-14-0804

SAT Date: 9/3/2014

Print Date: 2/3/2015

Related cases: CBI: Yes

Health related cases: 

Concern levels:

Type of Concern: Health Eco Comments

Level of Concern: 1-2 3

 Persistence Bioaccum Toxicity Comments

3 11

Exposure Based Review:

Health: No

Ecotox: Yes

Routes of exposure: Health: Drinking Water Inhalation 

Ecotox: All releases to water

Fate: ;

Keywords:

 Keywords: HYPERSENS (UNCERT); AQUATOX

Summary of Assessment:

 Fate:

Fate Summary: P-14-0804

FATE: 

Solid with MP = Dec. 1166 C (M)

S = 1.4 g/L at 25 C (M)

VP < 1.0E-6 torr at 25 C (E)

BP > 400 C (E)

H < 1.00E-8 (E)

POTW removal (%) = 0-90 via sorption

Time for complete ultimate aerobic biodeg > mo

Sorption to soils/sediments = moderate

PBT Potential: P3B1
*CEB FATE: Migration to ground water = moderate

 Health:

 Health Summary: Not absorbed from the skin, good absorption from the 

lung and GI tract (pchem). Uncertain concern for hypersensitivity based on the .

 Ecotox:

Test Organism Test 

Type

Test End 

Point

Predicted Measured Comments

fish 96-h LC50 34.6

daphnid 48-h LC50 19.4

green algal 96-h EC50 0.123

fish _ chronic value 3.5

daphnid _ chronic 

value

1.9

algal _ chronic 

value

0.042

.

Sewage Sludge 3-h EC50 _

Sewage Sludge _ Chronic 

Value

_

Ecotox Values Comments: Predictions are based on SARs for 

compounds and with MW adjustments; SAR chemical class = 

; solid with mp 

idneitfied as decomposes at 403.7 C (P); S = 1400 mg/L @ 20 C (P); effective concentrations 

based on 100% active ingredients and mean measured concentrations; hardness <150.0 mg/L as 

CaCO3; and TOC <2.0 mg/L;

Factors Values Comments

Assessment Factor 10

Concentration of Concern 

(ppb)

4

SARs 

SAR Class

Ecotox Category 

Ecotox Factors Comments: 
 

 SAT Chair: L Keifer 564-8916
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**OF GASCO ENERGY, INC. UNDER SECTION 906 OF**

**THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1350**

 

I, W. King Grant, Chief Executive Officer of Gasco Energy, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that the accompanying report on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2010 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

 

I further certify that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | /s/   W. King Grant   |
|--------|-----------------------|
|   | Name:   W. King Grant |
|   | Title:                | President   and Chief Executive Officer |
|   | Date:                 | March 2,   2011 |

 

----
#### Lewis et al. v. Minthorn.

1. Practice in Supreme Court: discrepancy between docketed title and record. This cause is docketed in this court as *Leíais v. Minthorn,*and is so entitled in the abstract and in the arguments of counsel, but the abstract does not reveal the existence of any such case, but seems to relate to a case of *Minthorn v, St. John, Sheriff,*a case not docketed in this court. In this state of the record, *held*that there was nothing to do but dismiss the case.

*Appeal from Mitchell Circuit Court.*

Saturday, October 22.

The papers filed in this case seem to show an action of replevin. It is stated that the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and that judgment was entered thereon, and that both parties appeal, the defendant perfecting his appeal first.

*L. M. Byce,*for appellant.

*F. F. Coffin,*for appellee.

Adams, Oh. J.

This case has been docketed in this court as *John Lewis et al. v. Joshua Minthorn.*The case is so entitled in the printed abstract, and in the arguments of counsel; but we are not able to discover from the abstract, or arguments of counsel, that such ease ever had any existence. The abstract of the petition purports fo show a case brought by Joshua Minthon against Robert T. St. John, sheriff; but no such case has ever been docketed in this court. If we should attempt to write an opinion, and make rulings upon the questions presented, it would be unintelligible as applied in the case docketed.

Not finding that a case of *John Lewis et al. v. Joshua Minthon*has ever been brought, tried or appealed, but has simply been docketed in this court, there is nothing that we can do but to dismiss such case.

Dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                             765
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 6,757
<PP&E>                                         559,988
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 566,745
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          288,710
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   566,745
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   11,303
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   (71)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 11,232
<INCOME-TAX>                                    11,232
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    11,232
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. William Robert WORRELS Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4423

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,

Submitted: April 13, 2017

Filed: April 27, 2017

Clifford R. Cronk, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Richard D. Westphal, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Davenport, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*556William Robert Worrels, Pro Se

Before RILEY, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

While William Worrels was serving a third term of federal supervised release, the district court1 revoked supervised release and sentenced him to serve 6 months in prison and 29 additional months of supervised release. Worrels appeals, and we affirm.

For reversal, Worrels first argues that the district court erred procedurally by-failing to calculate the revocation range in the guidelines. Because no objection was raised below, we review for plain error, see United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009), and we find none, see United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 2017) (plain error standard).' The record reflects that the district court considered the chapter 7 policy statements in the guidelines, which include the revocation ranges, before it imposed the sentence it determined was warranted. See United States v. Fleetwood, 794 F.3d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir. 2015) (sentencing error is prejudicial only if defendant proves reasonable probability that he would have received hghter sentence but for error); United States v. Hawkins, 375 F.3d 750, 751-52 (8th Cir. 2004) (district courts must consider advisory chapter 7 policy statements when sentencing a defendant whose supervised release has been revoked).

Worrels next argues that the supervised release portion of the revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable because the violations resulted from his struggles with drug addiction. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an additional 29 months of supervised release because the court considered valid sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (history and characteristics of defendant), (a)(2)(B) (need for sentence to deter criminal conduct); United States v. Merrival, 521 F.3d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 2008) (abuse of discretion review); United States v. Zoran, 682 F.3d 1060, 1064-65 (8th Cir. 2012) (where district court emphasized defendant’s repeated violation of conditions of supervision, court acted well within its discretion by imposing maximum term of supervised release); United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009) (district court has wide latitude to assign some § 3553(a) factors greater weight than others in determining appropriate sentence).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
#### In the Matter of Thomas K. Coyne, Appellant, against William Wilson, as Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of George L. Morris, Appellant, against William Wilson, as Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Otto C. Haas, Appellant, against William Wilson, as Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Andrew J. Maloney, Appellant, against William Wilson, as Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of James P. Dunn, Appellant, against William Wilson, as Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Charles O. Norstrand, Appellant, against William Wilson, as Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of John J. Ward, Appellant, against William Wilson, as Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Michael F. Moroney, Appellant, against William Wilson, as Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.

Submitted February 23, 1943;

decided March 4, 1943.

*659
      *Thomas D. Thacher, Corporation Counsel (Paxton Blair*and *Henry J. Shields*of counsel), for motion.

*George Gordon Battle*opposed.

Motion granted and appeals dismissed with costs and ten dollars costs of motion.
Nebraska Court of Appeals Memorandum Opinions

NOT Selected for Posting to Court Website

(released the week prior to May 24, 2022)

The following memorandum opinions were filed by the Nebraska Court of 

Appeals and can be viewed using SSCALES:

None Available

The above-listed memorandum opinions can be viewed online through the 

appellate court case search available by subscription through Nebraska.gov:

http://www.nebraska.gov/subscriber/.

Current subscribers to Nebraska.gov can search appellate court cases here:

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POINCIANA WEST NO. 2 219, LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2071

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

DECEMBER 14, 2017

ORDERED that the stipulated dismissal of appeal is recognized by the Court, and this appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida is hereby dismissed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2



                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-84987) of Voyager.net, Inc. of our report dated
February 10, 2000, except for Note 18, for which the date is March 12, 2000,
relating to the consolidated financial statements, which appear in this Form
10-K. We also consent to the use of our report dated February 10, 2000 relating
to the financial statement schedule which appears in this Form 10-K.


PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Grand Rapids, Michigan
March 27, 2000