F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v

.

F I D E L A N T O N I O M E

N D E Z , D efendant-Appellant

. No. 13-30170

D.C. No. 2:12-cr-06024-F VS-1

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of W a shing ton F r ed L . Van Sickle, Senior District J udg e , Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J une 4, 2014—Seattle, W ashing ton

F iled Aug ust 26, 2014

B efore: M. Marg a

ret McKeown and Paul J . W atford, Circuit J udg es, and B arbara J acobs Rothstein, Senior

D istrict J u dg e. *

Opinion by

J u dg e W atford

* T h e Ho n orab le B arb ara J aco bs Ro th stein
, Sen io r District J u d g e f o r th e U.S. District Co u r t f

o r t h e W estern District o f W ash in g to n , sittin g b y d esig n atio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M E

N D E Z 2

SUMMARY * *

Crim inal Law

Affirming the district court’s d e n ial of a motion to dismiss a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charg e under 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g ) (1), the panel held that under W ashing ton law, the defendant’s j uvenile adjudication of second-deg r ee unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Revised Code of W ashing ton § 9 .41.040(2)(a) – a n o f f e nse that, if committed by an a d

ult, is a felony punishable b y up to five
y ears in prison – constitute s a “conviction” o f “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex c e eding one y ear” and may therefore serve as a predicate for the § 9 2 2 ( g) ( 1 ) prosecution.

Observing that W ashing ton law treats juvenile adjudications as convictions o nce a defendant enters the adult criminal justice sy stem, the panel rejected the defendant’s contention that W ashing ton law establishes a g e n er al rule barring the treatment of juvenile adjud i c a t ions a s “convictions” of “crimes.”

* * T h is s u m

m ary co n stitu

tes n o p ar t o f t h e o p i n io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M E

N D E Z 3

COUNSEL

Diane E. Hehir (arg

ued), Assistant F ederal Public Defender, F ederal Defe n ders of Eastern W ashing ton and I d aho, Yakima, W ashing ton, for Defendant-Appellant.

Alex a nder C. Ekst r om (arg

ued), Assistant United States Attorney ; Michae l C

. O r

m s b y , United States Attorney
, United States Attorney ’s Office, Yakima, W ashing ton, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OP INION

W A TF ORD, Circuit J udg e:

I n 2007, a juvenile court adjudicated F idel Mendez g uilty

o f second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, i n violation o f Revised Code o f W ashing ton ( RCW ) § 9.41.040(2)(a). 1 That offense, if committed by an adult, is

a fe lony p unishable by up to five y e ars in prison. RCW §§ 9.41.040(2)(b), 9A.20.021(1)(c). I n 2012, after Mendez had b ecome an adult, a park rang er found him in possession of a shotg un. The f

ederal g o vernme n t c h a r g ed him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1), w hich makes it unlawful for

a person to posses s a firearm if he’s previously been

“ c onvicted in any court of, a c rime punishable by

1 Sectio n 9 .4 1 .0 4 0 (2 )(a) p ro v id es in relev an t part: “ A p erso n , w h eth er

an ad u lt o r j u v en ile, is g u ilty o f th e crim e o f u n l a w f u l p o ssessio n of a fi r e a r m i n th e seco n d d eg ree, i f th e p erso n

. . . o w n s, h as in h is o r h er p o ssessio n , o r h as in h is o r h er co n tro l an y f i r e a r m :

. . . If th e p erso n is

u n d er eig h teen y ears o f

ag e . . . .” RCW § 9 .4 1 .0 4 0 (2 )(a).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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imprisonment for a term ex ceeding one y ear.” 2 The i n d i c t m e n t a l l e g e d

— b a s e d o n t h e 2 0 0 7 j u v e n i l e adjudication—that M e ndez had been convicted of a such a crime.

Mendez moved to dismiss the charg e on the g round that, under W ashing ton law, his 2 007 juvenile adjudication does
not constitute a “conviction” of a “crime” for purposes o f § 9 22(g )(1). After the district court denied the motion, Mendez entered a conditional g uilty plea, reserving the rig ht
to challeng e on appeal whether his 2 007 juvenile a djudication
meets the statutor y d e finition of “ a crime punishable b y imprisonment for a term ex ceeding one y ear.”

Cong r ess has defined “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term e x ceeding one y ear” to ex clude certain offenses not relevan t h e re

. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). I t has also provided the following direction: “W hat constitutes a c o n viction o f such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceeding s we re held.” Id

. Cong r ess thus chose not to provide a uni f o r m answer, as a matter o f federal law, to the question wh e t h er a juvenile offense constitutes a “conviction” o f a “crime.” We must look instead to state law to determine whether Mendez ’s 2007 j u venile adjudication may serve as the predicate for his prosecution u nder § 922(g ) (1). See U nited States v. Valerio
, 441 F .3d 837, 839–40 (9th Cir. 2006).

2 Sectio n 9 2 2 (g )(1 ) p ro v id es in relev an t p art: “ It sh all b e u n law f u l f or

an y p erso n

—(1 ) w h o h as b e e n co n v icted in an y co u rt o f
, a crim e p u n ish ab le by im

p riso n m en t f o r a term ex ceed in g o n e y ear

. . . to sh ip or tran sp o rt in in te r s t a t e o r f o reig n co m

m erce, o r p o ssess in o r af f ectin g

co m m erce, an y

f irearm o r am m u n itio n . . . .” 1 8 U.S.C. § 9 22 (g )(1 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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N D E Z 5

At first b lush, Washing ton law seems to support Mendez

. Most of the statutes g overning juv e n ile offenders a re f ound in RCW Title 13, which contains the following p r o v i s ion: “An order of court adjudg ing a ch i l d a juvenile offender o r dependent under the p rovisions of this chapter shall in no case be deem e d a conviction of crime.” RCW § 13.04.240. Mendez arg ues th a t this provision reflects the State’s p olicy decision to place juvenile adjudications o n a different footing from adult c onvic t ions when assessing an individual’s criminal history

. That arg u ment finds further support i n the W a shing ton Supreme Court’s admonition that juveniles a re deemed to commit “violations” or “ offenses,” n o t “ crimes.” Monro e v

. Soliz
, 939 P.2d 205, 208 (W ash. 1997); In re Frederick

, 604 P.2d 953, 954 (W a sh. 1980).

W e must nonethele s s reject Mendez ’s position. W a shing ton courts have held that, d e s p ite its sweeping lang uag e, RCW § 13.04.240 is actually quite limited in scope: I t applies only when the defendant is still within the juvenile justice sy stem. B ecause the juvenile s y s t e m is f o cused on rehabilitation of the y outhful offender, § 13

. 0 4 .240 “ is properly concerned with preventin g an adjudication o f g u ilt from being considered a crime while one is still a juvenile, a s this approach furthers its rehabilitative purpose.” State v

. Johnson
, 76 P.3d 2 6 5
, 267 (W ash. Ct. App. 2003). After reaching adulthood, however, an individual who c ommits further crimes falls u nder the adult criminal justice sy stem, wh o s e p rimary purpose is punishment. Id. W ithin that
sy stem, § 13.04.240 has no effect, and juvenile adjudications
may therefore b e t reated a s convictions of crimes. I n Johnson
, for ex ample, the court held that an a dult defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication for assault with a deadly weapon rendered him inelig ible for sentencing u nder W ashingt o n’s Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative, which requires thatU N I T E D S T A T E S V

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the defendant have no prior “ convictions” for a violent

o f f e n s e wi t h i n t h e p r e c e d i n g t e n y e a r s

. R C W § 9.94A.660(1)(c). I n a ddition, W ashing ton’s S e n t e ncing Reform Act “unambig uously includes juvenile adjudications under Title 13 in the definition of criminal history ,” Johnson
, 76 P.3d at 268, a

nd “a l l o w s consideration of prior juvenile adjudications in sentencing an individual who is now an adult and has committe d a c r ime as an adult.” Id

. a t 267–68; see also RCW §§ 9.94A.030(9), 9.94A.525.

Once a n individual becomes an adult, W ashing ton law also allows juvenile adjudications to be used as predicate offenses for certain crimes. As it happens, one such crime is unlawful p o ssession of firearms, see RCW § 9.41.040, W a shing ton’s state-law analog ue to 1 8 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1). Among other thing s, § 9 .41.040 criminaliz es possession of a firearm by a defendant who has previ o u s l y been “convicted

. . . of any serious offense as defined in this chapter.” RCW § 9.41.040(1)(a). The statute ex pressly states that, “[ n] otwithstanding

. . . a

n y other provisions of law, as used in this chapter, a person has been ‘conv i c ted,’ whether in an adult court or adjudicated in a juvenile c ourt , at such time a s

a plea o f g uilty has been a cc e p t e d
, or a verdict of g uilty has b e e n f i l ed

. . . .” RCW § 9.41.040(3) (emphasis a dded ). B ased on that provision, W ashing ton courts h a v e held that juvenile adjudication s for a “serious offense” may serve a s the predicate for a § 9.41.040 prosecution. S e e S tate v

. W right , 946 P.2d 7 92, 794–95 (W ash. Ct. App. 1997); State

v. McKinley
, 929 P.2d 1145, 1148–50 ( W ash. Ct. App. 1997).

I n lig ht of this a

uthority
, w e cannot ag ree w ith Mendez ’s contention that W ashing ton law establishes a g enera l r ule b a rring the treatment of juvenile adjudications a s “convictions” of “crimes.” W h en the defendant is charg e d a sU N I T E D S T A T E S V

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an adult, a s Mendez was here, W ashing ton law imposes no such g eneral bar. T h a t f act disting uishes this case from U nited States v. W

alters
, 359 F .3d 340 (4th Cir. 2004), o n which Mendez relies. The provisions of Virg inia law at issue there established that, “as a g eneral rule,” Virg inia does not treat juvenile adjudications a s convictions
, even for individuals who h a ve since become adults. I d. a t 346. Ag ainst that backdrop, the F ourth Circuit found it irrelevant that Virg inia law permitted juvenile adjudications to be
t reated as convictions in certain limited circumstances. I d

. B ecause RCW § 13.04.240 d o es not apply to adult offenders, W a shing ton has no g eneral rule like the one es tablished b y Virg inia law. The specific circumstances in wh ich W a shing ton law treats juvenile a djudications as convictio n s

are the only g uideposts available to inform our assessment o f
state law, and they all point i n t he same direction—that W a shing ton law treats juvenile a djudications as c onvictions once a defendant enters the adult criminal justice sy stem.

Under W ashing ton law, we c onclude that Mendez ’s 2007 juvenile adjudication constitutes a “ conviction” of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex ceeding one y ear.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20), 922(g )(1). According ly
, the district
court properly denied his motion to dismiss t h e felon-inpossessi o n charg e. W e address Mendez ’s remaining contentions in an accompany ing memorandum disposition.

AF F IRMED.