alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jesse GREENBERG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lisa WALSH, Asst. Warden; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15764

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 27, 2017

Jesse Greenberg, Pro Se Charles William Lehman, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Clark G. Leslie, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGNY—rNevada Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, NY, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Jesse Greenberg appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations in connection with prison disciplinary proceedings and his confinement in disciplinary segregation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Greenberg’s due process claim regarding his time in disciplin*582ary segregation because Greenberg failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his segregation implicated a protected liberty interest. *See Sandin v. Conner,*515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only when a restraint imposés an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”).

The district court property granted summary judgment on Greenberg’s due process claim concerning his disciplinary proceedings because, even assuming a protected liberty interest, Greenberg failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his due process rights. *See Superintendent v. Hill,*472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (requirements of due process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports disciplinary decision); *Wolff v. McDonnell,*418 U.S. 539, 563-67, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings); *Koenig v. Vannelli,*971 F.2d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1992) (prison officials may limit an inmate’s efforts to defend himself if they have a legitimate penological reason).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
ex1011.htm


EXHIBIT 10.11





	 
Sultanate of Oman


Ministry of Tourism


Muscat


Minister’s Office

		
	





 


 


Ref: MOT/l/2/ 676/2012 Date:  9 May 2012


 


Mr. Frank J. Drohan


 


Managing Director,


 


Omagine LLC.


P.O. Box: 708 P.C: 115


 


Dear Mr. Drohan,


 


Re: Omagine Project


 


Before we proceed with your application for Integrated Tourism Complex ("ITC") designation and approval for the OMAGINE project, we hereby request you to provide us with the following in relation to the project:


 



	
(i)  

	
Evidence in the form of legally binding commitment letter from independent lenders of the project that adequate third party bank financing is sufficiently and available to finance the project (the "Commitment Letter") also with the Commitment Letter and specifying the details of project financing including the amount and term of the loan.








	
(ii)  

	
The total estimated cost of the project and the project's ratio of debt to equity specifying the cost of each components/ elements in the project.








	
(iii)  

	
A letter of undertaking from the promoters of the project, in the event that the project is executed by your company, the promoters will not sell, assign or transfer the project to a third party at any time before the completion of the project without the prior written approval of the Ministry,








	
 
(iv)   



	
 
A letter of undertaking from the promoters of the project that the project company entering into a development agreement with the Ministry will be a Joint Stock Company with the same shareholders as Omagine LLC.









 


The Ministry would enter into a development agreement for the project upon being satisfied that all the foregoing prerequisites have been validly provided.


 


We should be pleased to receive the foregoing letters and information within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter.








	 
Yours Sincerely,


 


 


 


 


 
/s/ Ahmed bin Nasser bin Hamed Al-Mahrizi


Ahmed bin Nasser bin Hamed Al-Mahrizi


Minister of Tourism
[Civ. No. 3069.

First Appellate District, Division One.

November 5, 1919.]

#### JOSEPHINE MARR, Appellant, v. MILO L. ROWELL et al., Defendants; MILO L. ROWELL, Respondent.

[l] Pleading—-Negligent Consteuction and Use of Fibe-escape— Liability op Both Owneb and Lessee.—An action for damages for personal injuries may be maintained against both the owner and the lessee of a building, the owner for the negligent construction of a fire-escape forming part of said building, and the lessee for the negligent use thereof, and the sustaining of a general demurrer to the complaint as to the owner, without leave to amend, on the theory that the premises, being in the possession of the lessee, the owner could not be liable, is erroneous.

*148APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. George E. Church, Judge.

Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Everts & Ewing and M. G. Gallaher for Appellant.

Geo. Cosgrave for Respondent.

KERRIGAN, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered after an order sustaining a general demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend.

[1] The action is for personal injuries, and was instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants Milo L. Rowell and H. S. "Whistler, the lessor and lessee respectively of certain premises in which the injury occurred. The court overruled the demurrer as to Whistler, the lessee, and sustained it as to Rowell, the owner, apparently on the erroneous theory that the premises, being in possession of the lessee, the owner thereof could not be liable.

From the complaint it appears that the plaintiff attempted to allege a cause of action against both the lessor and lessee of the building on the theory that each of them was responsible for the injury—the lessee for the negligent use, and the lessor for the negligent construction of a fire-escape forming part of said building. On this theory a cause of action may be maintained against both defendants. *(Rider*v. *Clark,*132 Cal. 382, [64 Pac. 564]; *Kalis*v. *Shattuck,*69 Cal. 593, 597, [58 Am. Rep. 568, 11 Pac. 346].) And the most that can be said against this complaint is that it imperfectly alleges a cause of action against the lessor, for which reason, no doubt, he might have specially demurred; but containing, as it does in the last analysis, we think, sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against said defendant, the court was in error in sustaining his general demurrer. *(Shaake*v. *Eagle,*135 Cal. 472, [63 Pac. 1025, 67 Pac. 759]; *Payne*v. *Baehr,*153 Cal. 447, [95 Pac. 895]; *Robertson*v. *Burrell,*110 Cal. 579, [42 Pac. 1086]; *Norton*v. *Bassett,*158 Cal. 427, [111 Pac. 253].)

The judgment is reversed.

Richards, J., and Beasly, P. J., *pro tern.,*concurred.

*149A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on January 2, 1920.

All the Justices, except Wilbur, J., concurred.
EXHIBIT 10

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-11728) pertaining to
the Employees Stock Options Plan, Founders Warrants and other Warrants of Wavecom S.A., of our report dated February 18, 2002, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Wavecom,
included in its Annual Report (Form 20-F) for the year ended December 31, 2001, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

ERNST &
YOUNG Audit

Represented
by John Mackey

Paris,
France
June 25, 2002

---

QuickLinks
Exhibit 31(b)

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, George A. Troutman, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this
quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Pinnacle Data Systems, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other
certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any
change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants
other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

Date: November 14, 2007



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ George A. Troutman 
|Chief Financial Officer
MACK A. MOTON

,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON

OFFENDER REVIEW

,

Respondent.

___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITI ON THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 4614

Opinion filed February 1, 2017.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

-- Original Jurisdiction

.

Mack A. Moton, pro se , Petitioner.

Rana Wallace, General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review,

Tallahassee

, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED.

LEWIS, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT

TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002


In connection with the Annual Report on
Form 10-K/A of Art Technology Group, Inc. (the
Company) for the period ended December 31,
2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned,
Robert D. Burke, the President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| |                                                                                                                                                                 
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) the Report fully complies with the
    requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
    Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
|
| | (2) the information contained in the Report
    fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
    condition and results of operations of the Company.



| |                                          
| | -----------------------------------------
| | /s/ ROBERT D. BURKE                      
| |                                          
| | Robert D. Burke                          
| | President and Chief Executive
    Officer
| | (principal executive officer)            

Date: July 12, 2004

82
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 02-4413

DOUGLAS L. JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill.

Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CR-01-677)

Submitted: May 19, 2003

Decided: November 4, 2003

Before WILKINSON and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., United States Attorney, Jane B. Taylor,

Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for

Appellant. Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON,

L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Rehearing granted, February 4, 2004
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

The United States appeals the eighty-four-month sentence imposed

upon Douglas Johnson pursuant to his conviction for possession with

intent to distribute in excess of fifty grams of crack cocaine. We

vacate and remand. 

At sentencing, the district court granted the United States’ motion

for downward departure based on Johnson’s substantial assistance to

the government. The United States contends that the district court

departed downward from Johnson’s original guideline range of 135-

168 months. The United States further argues that the court instead

should have departed downward from 240 months, the minimum sentence to which Johnson was statutorily subject and the sentence that

became Johnson’s guideline sentence pursuant to U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 5G1.1(b) (2002). 

Our review of the sentencing transcript reveals that, although the

district court initially determined that it would depart downward from

the original guideline range, the court subsequently corrected itself

and stated on at least two occasions that its starting point for the

departure was 240 months. However, under the procedure endorsed

in United States v. Pillow, 191 F.3d 403, 406-07 (4th Cir. 1999), the

departure from 240 months to eighty-four months was unwarranted.

Pillow specifically stated that when the district court departs below a

statutory minimum sentence that becomes the guideline sentence pursuant to USSG § 5G1.1(b), the defendant remains subject to a statutory minimum sentence: the lowest sentence possible under the

original guideline range. 191 F.3d at 407. In the subject case, then,

Johnson should have received a sentence of not less than 135 months.

We accordingly vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in

accordance with Pillow. 

2 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON 3
#### William Ketcham, Respondent, *v.*William T. Troxell, Appellant.

(Argued May 27, 1872;

decided June 4, 1872.)

*678Plaintiff, induced by false representations of defendant as to the amount of business done by him, and that it was a profitable business, purchased of defendant the fixtures, furniture and good-will of an oyster and ice-cream saloon, and took a lease of the premises. For a portion of the purchase-money plaintiff gave his note, payable in two years, secured by a mortgage upon the property purchased. At the end of a year, plaintiff, discovering that the business was a losing one, and being unable to pay the rent due, entered into an agreement by which he was to have eight days time to sell out, and in case he failed, the note and mortgage should be considered due, and defendant could take possession of the mortgaged property, sell it, and pay the balance due on the purchase, and the rent. Plaintiff failing to sell, defendant took the property and sold it for just sufficient to pay the amount of plaintiff’s indebtedness. In an action by the latter for the *fraud,—Meld,*that the subsequent acts in affirmance of the contract were no defence, and that the proper measure of damages was the difference in value between the property and business as it was, and as it would have been if as represented.

*D. P. Ba/ma/rd*for the appellant.

*J. T. Marean*for the respondent.

Gkovek, J.,

reads opinion for affirmance.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
From: Higgins, Cortney <Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 15, 2014 12:48 PM
To: Shine, Brenda
Cc: Gillis, Thomas; Thundiyil, Karen; Lassiter, Penny Subject: RE: Petroleum Refinery RTR--- Interagency Comments under EO12866--- Supporting Memoranda

Hi Brenda,

Attached are some comments on the Risk Assessment.

Regards, Cortney

<< RTR_PetRef_EO12866Interagencycomments.pdf >>
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________ No. 1D 18

- 1386

_____________________________ L A D ON M. G REEN , Petitioner ,

v.
S TATE OF F LORIDA , Respondent

.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

— Origi nal Jurisdiction

.

May 18, 2018

P ER C URIAM

. D ENIED

. W ETHERELL , R AY , and O STERHAUS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

______________________ _______2 Ladon M. Green, pro se , Petitioner

. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Respondent

.
#### IN RE: Nancy Ann HOWELL, Debtor, Nancy Ann Howell, Appellant, v. Law Offices of Andrew S. Bisom; Eisenberg Law Firm, Appellees.

No. 17-55027

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 5, 2017

*471Nancy Ann Howell, Lake Forest, CA, pro se.

Andrew S. Bisom, Esquire, the Bisom Law Group, Irvine, CA, Mark W. Eisen-berg, Eisenberg Law Firm, APC, North Palm Beach, FL, for Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Chapter 7 debtor Nancy Ann Howell appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders granting appellees’ motion to reopen Howell’s bankruptcy case and motion for retroactive relief from the automatic stay. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, giving no deference to the district court’s determinations. *In re Mantz,*343 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellees’ motion to reopen because such relief was necessary in the interests of justice. *See Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc.,*452 F.3d 1097, 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth standard of review and noting that Fed. R. Civ. P, 60(b)(6) is to be “used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice ..,. ” (citation and internal quotations omitted)).

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellees retroactive relief from the automatic stay because it properly balanced the equities and concluded that appellees would suffer prejudice and irreparable injury. *See*11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (court can grant relief from automatic stay “for cause”); *Nat’l Envtl. Waste Corp. v. City of Riverside (In re Nat’l Envtl. Waste Corp.),*129 F.3d 1052, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1997) (courts should “bal-anee[] the equities” on a case by case basis in granting retroactive stay relief); *see also In re Fjeldsted,*293 B.R. 12, 25 (9th Cir. BAP 2003) (though a bankruptcy court may consider multiple factors, such as prejudice and irreparable injury, in deciding to grant retroactive stay relief, “[i]n any given case, one factor may so outweigh the others as to be dispositive”).

We reject as meritless Howell’s contentions that appellees’ motion to reopeii was untimely pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P, 9024 and that it was improper for appel-lees to submit to this court a copy of the district court decision.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.