Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Parentage of : ) No

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- I ) ADELE CONLEY RUGH, ) ) Child, ) ) MICHELLE CONLEY , ) ) Respondent, ) ) DIVISION ONE and ) ) CHRISTOPHER RUGH , ) ) UN PUBLISHED OPINION Appellant

. ) )
M ANN , C. J

. — Christopher Rugh appeals the trial court’s order affirming two arbitration decisions interpreting the parenting plan betw een Rugh and Michelle Conley

. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion, w e affirm.
FACTS Conley and Rugh were dating when Conley gave b irth to their daughter, Adele , in May 2015. Conley and Rugh ended their romantic relationship when Ad ele was approximately six months old. T he trial court entered a second amended parenting planN o. 81810

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- on April 19, 2019. The plan provides that Adele resides primarily with Conley and has
scheduled visit ation with Rugh

. 1 In 2019 , Conley moved for clarification of the plan

. The trial court denied the motion, finding “petitioner’s grievances are requests for substantive changes or grounds for contempt, subject to a motion to modify or enforce, or to appoint an arbitrator.” Both parties appealed, and this court a ffirmed the trial court in all respects in an unpublished decision

. 2
A fter additional issues arose between the parties, the trial court appointed an
arbitrator to resolve disputes. The parties first filed for arbitration concerning phone
contact between Rugh and Adele

. The parenting plan states : The parents shall have similar access to contact with the child, at reasonable times and for reasonable durations. There shall not be more than one telephone call/FaceTime / Skype per day to the child while she is in visitation with the other parent, unless requested by the child. Rugh argued that the language entitled him to a scheduled nightly call with Adele , whereas Conley contended that the plan caps the calls at on ce a day but did not
mandate them.
The arbitrator issued his decision on March 19, 2020. The arbitrator determined
that the parenting plan did not mandate daily calls, and acted as a “cap, not a floor.”
The arbitrator determined that “reasonable times and for reasonable durations,” entitled each parent to a weekly scheduled phone call with Adele . The arbitrator noted that this issue will likely lessen over time because as Adele ages she will be able to contact the

1 Adele is scheduled to visit Rugh every other Wednesday after school until Sunday evening, and during the alternate weeks, Wednesday after sch ool until Friday morning. 2 In re Parentage of Rugh , No. 79195

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- I ( Wash. Ct. App. June 22, 2020) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/791958.pdf

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- non - residenti al parent if she wishes. After unsuccessfully seeking reconsider ation , Rugh appealed the arbitration decision to King County Superior Court

. The parties next sought arbitration concerning summer vacation s

. The parenting plan provides that Adele alternates summer weeks between the parents with exchanges occurring on Friday mornings. The pla n states that until Adele is six years old , each parent may take two non

- consecutive one

- week vacations with her

. After Adele is six years old, the plan allows each parent to take three one

- week vacations, two of which may be con secutive. After Adele turns eight , each parent may take four, one

- week vacations with her and the weeks may be consecut ive. Adele was younger than six at
the time of the arbitration. Rugh contended that the plan allowed him to schedule his time in one

- week
blocks and that h e could tack those weeks onto his existing residential weeks , p roviding
him with three weeks uninterrupted with Adele . Conley contended that the language in the plan limits vacations to one

- week per iods while A dele is under six

. The arbitrator issued a disposition order on July 6, 2020 , finding
2. Until Adele reaches the age of 8 years old, the first week of a parent’s requested vacation time must be congruent with that par ent’s regular residential week. If a parent is scheduling o nly one week of vacation, the vacation week simply replaces what would otherwise have been that parent’s regular residential week with the child. If the parent is scheduling multiple vacations over the summer, the first week of each vacation block must be congruent with that parent’s regular vacation week.
3. Under Age 6

. Until Adele is 6 years old, a parent may not schedule more than one vacation week consecutively. Consistent with rule 2 above, parental vacation weeks at this age replace a parent’s no rmal residential weeks and shall not be scheduled over the other parent’s residential time.N o. 81810

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- 4. Between Ages 6 and 8

. Once Adele is 6 years old, a parent may schedule two of his/her allowed vacation weeks consecutively PROVIDED THAT neither parent may inc lude the final full week of the summer in their scheduled vacation time as doing so could result in the parent getting an unequal amount of residential time over the summer. In compliance with rule number 2 above, a two

- week vacation must commence with a parent’s regular residential week. Immediately following a parent’s two

week vacation block, the other parent shall receive the following two weeks of residential time and then the alternating week schedule shall resume. If there is only one week remaini ng in the summer after a two

week vacation, then the non

- vacationing parent receives only the remaining week.
5. Age 8 and Over

. Once Adele is 8 years old, each parent shall choose any 4 weeks of the summer the parent wishes (with scheduling priority gra nted as set forth in the paragraph). Once both parents have chosen their 4 vacation weeks, the remaining weeks shall be awarded on an alternating basis. The parent who did not have priority for the year shall receive the first available non

- vacation week

. In the event that there are an odd number of non

- vacation weeks, the excess week shall go to the non - priority parent. Rugh a lso a ppealed the second arbitrator’s decision to the superior court

. O n August 20, 2020, the trial court affirmed both arb itration decisions . The court
issued an oral and written decision. The court found that the arbitrat or acted within his authority in clarifying “reasonable times for reasonable duration,” along with the provision that limited to contact to no more than once a day

. The court found that the
arb itrator acted within his authorit y in clarifying A dele ’s vacation times based on her

age. The court concluded that the arbitrator’s decision was “well

- reasoned” and after de novo review, the court adopted and confirmed the ruling. The court incorporated its oral ruling by reference. Rugh appeals the trial court ’s order.N o. 81810

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- ANALYSIS We review the trial court’s decisions on par enting issues for a manifest abuse of
discretion. Kirshenbaum v. Kirshenbaum , 84 Wn. App. 798, 804, 929 P.2d 1204 (1997).
The court abuses its discretion if it exercises its discretion based on untenable grounds
or for untenable reasons. Kirshenbaum , 84 Wn. App. at 804.
A. Arbitration or Modification Rugh first argues that the trial court erred in affirming the arbitrator ’s decisions, because Conley should have presented these issues in a motion to modify the parenting plan instead of arbitration . We disagree. “A permanent parenting plan may be changed by agreement, by petition to modify, and by temporary order.” In re Marriage of Holmes , 128 W n . App. 727, 734, 117 P.3d 370 (2005). To modify the plan, the court must find a substantial change in
circumstances. Kirshenbaum , 84 Wn. App. at 807

. A modification occurs when “a party’s rights are either extended beyond or reduced from those originally intended in
the decree.” In re Marriage of Christel & Blanchard , 101 W n . App. 13, 22, 1 P.3d 600 (2000)

. A clarification , on the other hand, is “merely a definition of the rights which have already been given and those rights may be completely spelled out if necessary.”
Christel , 101 W n . App. at 22 ( quoting Rivard v. Rivard , 75 W n .2d 415, 418, 451 P.2d 677 (1969) )

. The d ecisions here were properly brought through arbitration, rather than
motions t o modify , because these issues related to the implementation of the parenting plan and the existing party’ s rights. These arbitration actions fit within the definition of clarification. The arbitrator was not determining the telephone provisions or vacat ionN o. 81810

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- times, but merely helping the parties understand the provisions that the trial court set
out. The parenting plan provides that when the parents “have disagreements about shared decisions or about what parts of this parenting plan mean,” the parents w ill resolve these disputes through arbitration. The parents must use the court designated

processe s to resolve issues concerning implementation of the plan. RCW 26.09.184(4)(b). A rbitration was the proper avenue to resolve the issues of phone
contact an d summer vacation.
In Kirshenbaum , the court held that authorizing a n arbitrator to suspend visitation rights was proper because the suspended parent still has the right to have the court review of the arbitrator’s decision. 84 Wn. App. at 804. This co urt determined that because the court retained the final and binding authority about termination of parental rights, the court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the arbitrator to temporarily suspend visitation. Kirshenbaum , 84 Wn. App. at 807

. Si milar to Kirshenbaum , the arbitrator had the authority to interpret the parenting plan because the aggrieved parent, Rugh, had the opportunity to appeal to superior
court for de novo review of these decisions. Rugh did exercise that right, and the trial

c ourt affirmed the arbitrator’s decisions. Ultimately, Rugh cannot demonstrate why these issues with the interpretation of the parenting plan should have been brought as motions to modify. 3

3 On reply, Rugh contends that because the judge who denied the motion for cla rification called the issues “substa nt ive changes ,” they should have been brought as motions for modification. He ignores that the judge pointed to arbitration as a remedy, which is the designated dispute resolution in the parenting plan.N o. 81810

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- B. Right to Parent Rugh also contends that the arbitrator’s decisi ons on telephone contact and
vacation times took substantial, constitutional rights to parent away from him

. We disagree. It is well established that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. In re Welfare of D.E ., 196 Wn. 2d 92, 102, 469 P.3d 1163 (2020)

. The Washington Supreme Court has rejected the argument that provisions of a parenting plan can viola te one parent’ s fundamental rights. In King v. King , 162 Wn.2d 378, 385

- 86, 174 P.3d 659 (20 07), the court held: The entry of a parenting plan effectuating the legislative purpose of continued parental involvement in the children’s lives does not equate to an action where the State is seeking to terminate any and all parental rights and parental involvement with the children, severing the parent

- child relationship permanently.

. . . a dissolution proceeding is fundamentally different from termination or dependency proceedings. The dissolution proceeding is a private civil dispute initiated by pr ivate parties to resolve their legal rights vis

- à

- vis each other and their children. When children are involved in the marriage, entry of a parenting plan is a statutory requirement. RCW 26.09.050(1). Entry of such a parenting plan does not terminate th e parental rights of either parent, but rather allocates or divides parental rights and responsibilities in such a way that they can be exercised by parents no l onger joined in marriage. Even where a parenting plan results in a child spending substantiall y more, or even all, of the child’ s time with one parent rather than the other, both parents remain parents and retain substantial rights, including the right to seek future modification of the parenting plan. See RCW 26.09.260. As such, the parenting pl an divides parental roles and responsibilities, rather than terminating the rights of either parent. The cases that Rugh relies on to support his argument are inapplicable. Under the clear holding by our Supreme Court, a parenting plan does not terminat e or take away one parent’s right by dividing the child’s time. Rugh’s argument fails

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- C. Independent Findings Rugh argues finally that the trial court erred by not entering findings of fact and conclusions of law when affirming the arbitration orders , cl aiming that the court did not conduct its own analysis. We disagree. The court expressly stated that it conducted a de novo review, and issued oral and written rulings. The court adopted the arbitrator’s findings and incorporated its oral rulings in its written decision. Rugh fails to cite authority requiring the trial court to make independent findings of fact

. D. Attorney Fees on Appeal Conley requests fees under RAP 18.1, for intransigence, and under RCW 26.09.140. Conley contends that Rugh’s appea l was frivolous, and he engaged in intransigence

. The trial court denied Conley’s request for attorney fees, finding no intransigence. We also decline to award attorney fees on appeal.
Affirm ed

.

WE CONCUR: