alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 21


                SUBSIDIARIES OF PACIFIC GATEWAY EXCHANGE, INC.


                                                      Jurisdiction of
     Name                                               Organization
     ----                                             ---------------


Pacific Gateway Exchange (U.K.) Limited............   United Kingdom
Pacific Gateway Exchange (Cyprus) Limited..........   Republic of Cyprus
Pacific Gateway Exchange New Zealand Limited.......   New Zealand

----------------------
Pursuant to Item 601(b)(21)(ii) of Regulation S-K, names of particular
subsidiaries have been omitted as the unnamed subsidiaries, considered in the
aggregate as a single subsidiary, would not constitute a "significant
subsidiary" (as defined in Rule 1-02 (w) of Regulation S-K) as of March 31,
1997.
#### ETHOX CHEMICALS LLC, James Tanner, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. COCA-COLA COMPANY, Defendant-Cross-Appellant

2016-1786

2016-1845

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

April 10, 2017

Philip L. Hirschhorn, Buchanan Inger-soll *&*Rooney PC, New York, NY, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by Erin M. Dunston, Alexandria, VA.

John' D. Garretson, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Kansas City, MO, argued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also represented by Basil Trent Webb, Angela Dawn Mitchell, Christine A. Guastello.

(Wallach, Clevenger, and Schall, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
Exhibit 15.1




CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-11894, 333-13268, 333-13378, 333-105473, 333-144823, 333-144825, 333-160330 and 333-170676) and Form F-3 (No. 333-172268) of our reports dated March 10, 2011, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of AudioCodes Ltd. for the year ended December 31, 2010, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of AudioCodes Ltd. included in this Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2010, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.





Tel Aviv, Israel

/s/ KOST, FORER, GABBAY AND KASIERERKOST, FORER, GABBAY AND KASIERERMarch 10, 2011

A member of Ernst & Young Global
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 16, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50467

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TRINI JOHN HERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. MO-03-CR-20-ALL 

--------------------

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Trini John Hernandez (“Hernandez”), appeals the district

court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing

him to 11 months’ imprisonment. Hernandez contends that the

district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the

evidence obtained by police officers. A district court may

revoke a term of supervised release upon a finding, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated a

condition of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 
No. 03-50467

-2-

The district court’s revocation of supervised release is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Grandlund, 71

F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1995). 

Hernandez has failed to demonstrate that his case is

factually distinguishable from United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d

854, 857-59 (5th Cir. 1992)(absent a showing of harassment by

police, the exclusionary rule does not apply to revocation of

supervised release hearings). Hernandez’s statements, although

made without the benefit of Miranda warnings following his

arrest, were disclaimers of ownership of the “daytimer” at issue

here and not in any way inculpatory. Hernandez’s supervised

release was revoked on the basis of tangible evidence found

pursuant to the search of the vehicle, which includes the

daytimer and its contents, specifically Hernandez’s social

security card and the pawn ticket bearing his name and birthdate. 

Because these items were seized incident to a lawful Fourth

Amendment search following his arrest, there is no basis for

distinguishing Montez from Hernandez’s case. Consequently, the

decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. FAUMUINA, TAUFI, LUTALI et al, Respondents

No. 4-1905

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: On Aunu’u Island]

August 9, 1905

C. B. T. MOORE, Commander, U.S. Navy, *President of the High Court*

Under the Ordinance to regulate the acquisition of land by the Government for Public Uses.

JUDGMENT

This cause having been commenced by the Government of the United States of America for the object of obtaining the land hereinafter described for Public Uses for the said Government under and by virtue of the Ordinance No. 20-1900, being the Ordinance to regulate the acquisition of land by the Government, for Public Uses, and under the provisions of said Regulation due and proper notice having been given to the above-named Respondents through the *120Registrar of Titles, and the Registrar of Titles, by his report to .this Court bearing the 6th day of July, 1905, having informed the Court that a satisfactory adjustment of the acceptance and tenders having been made and recommended that the Government be declared the proprietor of the said land at and for the consideration hereinafter stated to be paid by the said Government. IT IS NOW HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS; to wit:—

> 1. That the Government of the United States of America is, and the same is hereby declared to be, the proprietor of ALL that piece or parcel of land situate in the Island of Aunuu, County of Saole, District of Falelima East, Tutuila, starting at a concrete block marked U.S.G.L. sunk in the ground at a point distant one hundred and eighty-one feet from the stand of the light bearing North 86°46' East Magnetic from the stand; thence to the brow of the bluff North 22 °0' East Magnetic, forty feet; then beginning at the said concrete block, thence running one hundred and seventy-six feet South 79° 2 5' West Magnetic to a concrete block marked U.S.G.L. sunk in the ground; thence one hundred and seventy feet South 79° 06' West Magnetic to a concrete block marked U.S.G.L. sunk in the ground; thence seventy-three feet North 20°39' West Magnetic to the brow of the bluff, comprising in all Forty-five Hundredths (45/100) of an acre (be the same a little more or less).

> 2. That the said Government shall pay in consideration of the release of all claims and demands of the said Respondents to said land the sum of Seventy-five Dollars ($75.00), and shall pay Costs of High Court, Registrar, Attorney and Recording, amounting to Forty-five Dollars ($45.00); the total consideration to be paid by the *121Government being One Hundred and Twenty Dollars ($120).

> 3. The Registrar of Titles is hereby instructed to draw up a transfer of said land and to issue a Certificate of Title to said land in favor of the said Government.

Given under my hand and the Seal of the Court on this 9th day of August, 1905.
Denied; and Opinion Filed May 18, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-15-00592-CV

No. 05-15-00597-CV 

No. 05-15-00594-CV 

No. 05-15-00596-CV 

No. 05-15-00595-CV

IN RE ELVIN OMAR VASQUEZ, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 204th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F10-35051-Q, F10-35055-Q, F10-35052-Q, F10-35054-Q, F10-35053-Q

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Lang, Fillmore, and Brown

Opinion by Justice Lang

Relator filed this petition for writ of mandamus requesting that the Court order the trial court 

to rule on and grant his “motion to strike void orders” concerning the disposition of the funds in his 

inmate trust account. The petition does not include the certification, required by rule 52.3(j) of the 

rules of appellate procedure, that the person filing the petition has reviewed the petition and 

concluded that every factual statement in the petition is supported by competent evidence included 

in the appendix or record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(j). The motion also does not include a docket 

sheet or other form or proof that the trial court has not ruled on relator’s motion. See TEX. R. APP. P.

52.3(k)(1)(A) (necessary contents of petition for writ of mandamus include certified or sworn copy 

of any order complained of, or any other document showing matter complained of).
–2–

Because the parties in an original proceeding before this Court assemble their own record, 

see TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(j), (k), the Court strictly enforces the requirements of rule 52 to ensure the 

integrity of the mandamus record. See, e.g., In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2008, orig. proceeding) (finding affidavit insufficient to authenticate record because it did not state 

affiant had “personal knowledge the copy of the order in the appendix is a correct copy of the 

original.”). We must do so whether a party is represented by counsel or not. Barnes v. State, 832 

S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (Although claims 

pleaded in pro se inmate petitions should be liberally construed, same procedural standards apply to 

inmates as to other litigants.) 

Because relator’s petition does not comply with rule 52, he has not demonstrated that he is 

entitled to relief. We deny the petition. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8.

150592F.P05

/Douglas S. Lang/

DOUGLAS S. LANG

JUSTICE
1 ... S ee Te x. R. App . P. 47. 4. 

## COURT OF APPEALS SEC OND DISTRICTOFTEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 2 - 09 - 14 1- CV I N R E R I CH AR D L E E B OW E N R E L AT OR

----- ----- -- OR I GI NALP R OCE E DI NG

----- ----- -- 

### M E M ORANDU M OP I NI ON 1

----- ----- -- The c our t has con si der ed r el at or ’ s pet i t i on f or w r i t of ha bea s cor pus an d i s of t he opi ni on t hatt he pet i t i on i s m oot bec aus e r el at or i s no l onge rco nf i ned . A c c o rding l y , rel a to r’ s p e ti ti o n for w ri t o f h a b e a s c o rpu s i s d i sm i ss e d as m o o t. R el at or shal l pay al l cost s of t hi s or i gi nal pr oceedi ng, f or w h ic h l et execut i on i ssue.
P E R CU R I AM PA N EL: L I V I N G STO N , W A LKER, an d M EI ER, JJ. DEL I VERE D: M a y 26, 2009
#### Rosalyn Danger et al., Appellants, *v.*Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Respondent.

Argued January 14, 1943;

decided March 4, 1943.

*602
      *Lawrence Kovalsky, David Goldstein*and *Irving M. Berry*for appellants.

*Eugene T. O’Neill*for respondent.

Judgments reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event, on the ground that the question as to the nature of the indisposition suffered by the insured in 1937 was one of fact for the jury. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
#### Collins O. NYABWA, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Judge Sharon KELLER; Judge Lawrence E. Myers; Judge Bert Richardson; Judge Kevin Yeary; Judge Cheryl L. Johnson; Judge Michael Keasler; Judge Barbara Hervey; Judge Elsa Alcala; Judge David Newell, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-50048 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 26, 2017

*427Collins 0. Nyabwa, Pro Se

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and CLEMENT and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Collins 0. Nyabwa, former Texas prisoner # 1729106, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against nine judges on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals alleging that they violated his due process rights by delaying action on his legal claims. He sought $5 million in damages. In response to Nyab-wa’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because he sought only money damages from defendants who are immune from such suits.

On appeal, Nyabwa contends that the defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity because they are elected and should therefore be considered politicians. He alleges that, because the defendants are subject to political influence, their actions or inactions (1) are taken outside of a judicial capacity and (2) occur in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. He admits that he can find no precedent from this court supporting his argument.

As to claims for money damages, judges are generally entitled to absolute immunity for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. *Mireles v. Waco,*502 U.S. 9, 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991); *Boyd v. Biggers,*31 F.3d 279, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1994). Although Nyabwa correctly cites to the two instances in which a judge is not protected by absolute immunity, his argument that the judge’s elected status renders those exceptions applicable lacks merit. We join our sister circuits in rejecting the proposition that state judges are not entitled to absolute immunity simply because they are elected. *See Goldstein v. Galvin,*719 F.3d 16, 29 *&*n.3 (1st Cir. 2013); *Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Decker,*631 F.3d 89, 98 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011); *Tobin for Governor v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections,*268 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 2001); *Brown v. Griesenauer,*970 F.2d 431, 439 (8th Cir. 1992).

In his complaint, Nyabwa challenged the defendants’ actions or inactions in them judicial capacities. Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity from Nyabwa’s claims for damages. *See Boyd,*31 F.3d at 284-85. The district court therefore properly dismissed Nyabwa’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6635 

To prohibit the Department of Health and Human Services from treating 

pregnancy as an illness for purposes of approving abortion drugs. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 6, 2023 

Mrs. MILLER of Illinois (for herself, Mr. MOORE of Alabama, Mr. LAMALFA, 

and Ms. BOEBERT) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Department of Health and Human Services 

from treating pregnancy as an illness for purposes of 

approving abortion drugs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Pregnancy Is Not an 

5 Illness Act of 2023’’. 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6635 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST TREATING PREGNANCY AS 

2 ILLNESS FOR PURPOSES OF APPROVING 

3 ABORTION DRUGS. 

4 (a) PROHIBITION.—The Department of Health and 

5 Human Services, including the Food and Drug Adminis6 tration, shall not treat pregnancy as an illness for pur7 poses of— 

8 (1) approving any abortion drug under section 

9 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 

10 (21 U.S.C. 355); or 

11 (2) imposing or maintaining any risk evaluation 

12 and mitigation strategy for an abortion drug under 

13 section 505–1 of such Act (21 U.S.C. 355–1). 

14 (b) NULLIFICATION OF APPROVALS IN EFFECT.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Any prohibited approval of 

16 an abortion drug is hereby nullified. 

17 (2) PROHIBITED APPROVAL DEFINED.—In this 

18 subsection, the term ‘‘prohibited approval of an 

19 abortion drug’’— 

20 (A) means any approval of an abortion 

21 drug under section 505 of the Federal Food, 

22 Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355) that 

23 relied in whole or in part on the treatment of 

24 pregnancy as illness; and 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6635 IH

1 (B) includes the approval of mifepristone 

2 in effect under such section 505 on the day be3 fore the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 11

– 0389

Filed April 20 , 2012

WILLIE HALL , Appellant ,

vs.

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD , Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J.

Ovrom , Judge.

On further review, appellant alleges the district court erred in assessing court costs

. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

Benjamin G. Humphrey, Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard R. Autry, Des Moines, for appellee.2

APPEL , Justice. The Employment Appeal Board (Board) denied Willie Hall’s application for unemployment insura nce benefits. Hall filed a petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the decision of the Board and assessed costs against Hall. The court of appeals affirmed. We grant further review, but limit our consideration to the question of the v alidity of the judgment as it relates to court costs. See Hills Bank & Trust Co. v.

Converse , 772 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Iowa 2009) (stating we have the discretion to limit our review to any issue raised on appeal). The court of appeals decision is the final d ecision with respect to the other issues raised on appeal. See State v. Johnson , 784 N.W.2d 192, 193 n.1 (Iowa 2010). Iowa Code section 96.15(2) (2011) provides, “An individual claiming benefits shall not be charged fees of any kind in any proceeding u nder this chapter . . . by a court or an officer of the court.” “ Fees” include

court costs. Cobb v. Emp’t Appeal Bd. , 506 N.W.2d 445 , 448 (Iowa 1993); Geiken v. Lutheran Home for the Aged Ass’n , 468 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Iowa 1991). We accordingly reverse th e district court judgment by removing the requirement that Hall pay court costs.

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
#### Herman Audie BALLARD, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 23653.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 21, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 27, 1966.

H. M. Ray, U. S. Atty., E. Grady Jolly, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Oxford, Miss., for appellee.

Before JONES, WISDOM and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

After a hearing, the district court denied the appellant’s motion under 28 U.S. C.A. § 2255. It was claimed that the appellant had been coerced and threatened into waiving counsel and entering a plea of guilty. He contends that drugs were administered to him while in the hospital which deprived him of the ability to make a voluntary waiver and plea. The issues were fully considered and properly decided by the district court. Its order is

Affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-20078 Conference Calendar

VINOD K. AGGARWAL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES; JANET RENO, U.S. Attorney General; AMERICAN CONSUL, in New Delhi, India, Individually and His Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-96-CV-1255

- - - - - - - - - - August 15, 1997 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Vinod K. Aggarwal appeals from the district court's grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In his complaint, Aggarwal sought review of a consular officer’s denial of visa applications for his wife and children. "[D]ecisions of United States consuls on visa matters are nonreviewable by theNo. 97-20078 -2-
courts." Centeno v. Shultz , 817 F.2d 1212, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1987); see Kleindienst v. Mandel , 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). Aggarwal has not raised on appeal the argument asserted in the district court that he was entitled to relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Therefore, this issue has been abandoned. See Evans v. City of Marlin, Tex. , 986 F.2d 104, 106 n.1 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 99.2      Press Release



PRESS RELEASE
May 23, 2003

                                For further information contact:
                                David M. Bradley
                                Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
                                North Central Bancshares, Inc.
                                825 Central Avenue
                                Fort Dodge, Iowa 50501
                                515-576-7531


                NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC. DECLARES DIVIDEND

David M. Bradley, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of North
Central Bancshares, Inc. (the "Company") announced today that the Company
declared a regular quarterly cash dividend of $0.21 per share on the Company's
common stock for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2003. The dividend will be
payable to all stockholders of record as of June 16, 2003 and will be paid on
July 7, 2003.

North Central Bancshares, Inc. serves north central and southeastern Iowa at 9
full service locations in Fort Dodge, Nevada, Ames, Burlington, Mount Pleasant,
Perry and Ankeny, Iowa through its wholly-owned subsidiary, First Federal
Savings Bank of Iowa, headquartered in Fort Dodge, Iowa. The Bank recently
announced plans to open a new branch office in Clive, Iowa this year. The Bank's
deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Company's
stock is traded on The Nasdaq National Market under the symbol "FFFD".