alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6591 

AN ACT 

To amend section 8(a) of the Small Business Act to require 

the Administrator of the Small Business Administration 

to regularly reassess the asset and net worth thresholds 

for qualifying as an economically disadvantaged individual, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 6591 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Encouraging Success 

3 Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. REGULAR REASSESSMENT OF THE THRESHOLDS 

5 FOR ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED INDI6 VIDUALS. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 8(a)(6) of the Small Busi8 ness Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)(6)) is amended by adding at 

9 the end the following new subparagraph: 

10 ‘‘(F)(i) Not later than 1 year after the date of the 

11 enactment of this subparagraph, and not less frequently 

12 than every 4 years thereafter, the Administrator shall as13 sess and, if appropriate, revise the maximum value of 

14 asset and the maximum net worth an individual may have 

15 to qualify as an economically disadvantaged individual 

16 under subparagraph (A) to account for changes in the 

17 economy, including inflation and other factors as deter18 mined appropriate by the Administrator. 

19 ‘‘(ii) The Administrator shall make each 

20 covered revision by issuing a rule after an op21 portunity for public notice and comment. 

22 ‘‘(iii) To the extent practicable, the Admin23 istrator shall coordinate the activities carried 

24 out under clause (i) with the activities required 

25 under section 1344(a)(2) of the Small Business 

26 Jobs Act of 2010 (15 U.S.C. 632 note). 
3 

•HR 6591 EH

1 ‘‘(iv) In this subparagraph, the term ‘cov2 ered revision’ means a revision described in 

3 clause (i) that the Administrator determines is 

4 appropriate pursuant to an assessment under 

5 such clause.’’. 

6 (b) COMPLIANCE WITH CUTGO.—No additional 

7 amounts are authorized to be appropriated to carry out 

8 this Act or the amendments made by this Act. 

Passed the House of Representatives February 28, 

2024. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6591 

AN ACT 

To amend section 8(a) of the Small Business Act 

other purposes. an economically disadvantaged individual, and for asset and net worth thresholds for qualifying as ness Administration to regularly reassess the to require the Administrator of the Small Busi-
Lynn BUFFALOW and Linda Benefield, personal representative of the Estate of Gregory Buffalow v. GUARDIAN PEST SERVICES, INC., John A. Knox, and Carey J. Bloodworth

2160472

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 4, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
EXHIBIT 23.2

NOTICE REGARDING CONSENT OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Section 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), provides that if any part of a registration statement (at the time
such part becomes effective) contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any
person acquiring a security pursuant to that registration statement (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition such person knew of such untruth or omission) may sue, among others, every
accountant who has consented to be named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation that is used in connection
with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report or valuation which purports to have been prepared or certified by the accountant.

This
Form 10-K/A is incorporated by reference into our Registration Statements on Form S-8 with file numbers 333-84411,
333-39904, 333-59282, 333-71470, and 333-91794 (collectively, the "Registration Statements"). For purposes of determining any liability under the
Securities Act with respect to the Registration Statements, the filing of our Form 10-K/A is deemed to be a new registration statement for each Registration Statement.

On
May 3, 2002, we dismissed Arthur Andersen LLP as our independent auditor and appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to replace Andersen. In response to our attempts to obtain
Andersen's consent to the incorporation by reference of Andersen's audit report in our registration statements, Andersen has informed us that its policy is not to provide such consent when Andersen no
longer employs the engagement partner or manager for the requesting company. Both the engagement partner and manager for the Liberate audit are no longer with Andersen. As a result, we have been
unable to obtain Andersen's written consent to the incorporation by reference into the Registration Statements of its audit report with respect to our financial statements as of May 31, 2001
and 2000 and for the years then ended. Under these circumstances, Rule 437a under the Securities Act permits us to file this Form 10-K/A without a written consent from
Andersen. As a result, however, Andersen will not have any liability under Section 11(a) of the Securities Act for any untrue statements of a material fact contained in the financial statements
audited by Andersen or any omissions of a material fact required to be stated therein. Accordingly, you would be unable to assert a claim against Andersen under Section 11(a) of the Securities
Act for any purchases of securities under (a) the Registration Statements (except for our Form S-8 with file number 333-91794) made on or after the date of
this Form 10-K/A, or (b) under our Form S-8 with file number 333-91794, as of its effective date, July 2, 2002.

---

QuickLinks
#### Joel P. ALCARMEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., fka Washington Mutual Bank; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-17147

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 5, 2017

Joel P. Alearmen, Hayward, CA, pro se.

Joseph E. Addiego, III, Esquire, Litigation Counsel, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Joel P. Alearmen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging various federal and state law claims related to foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of res judicata. *Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp,*297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

*474The district court, properly dismissed Al-carmen’s action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Alcarmen’s claims were raised, or could have been raised, in prior actions between the parties or their privies, and those prior actions resulted in final judgments on the merits. *See*Tahoe-*Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,*322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of res judicata under federal law); *Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara,*604 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth elements of res judicata under California law).

We do not consider Alcarmen’s discovery rule argument because it was raised for the first time on appeal. *See Solis v. Matheson,*563 F.3d 425, 437 (9th Cir. 2009) (arguments made for the first time on appeal and supported by facts not before the district court are waived).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IB 

Union Calendar No. 350 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6421 

[Report No. 118–424] 

To prohibit the Secretary of Energy from enforcing energy efficiency 

standards applicable to manufactured housing, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 15, 2023 

Mr. BUCSHON (for himself, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mrs. CAMMACK, Mrs. 

LESKO, Mr. CARTER of Georgia, Mrs. MILLER-MEEKS, Mr. BAIRD, Mr. 

DUNN of Florida, Mr. MOOLENAAR, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, Mr. GOODEN of 

Texas, and Mr. YAKYM) introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

MARCH 12, 2024 

Additional sponsors: Mr. BIGGS, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. BALDERSON, Mr. PALMER, 

Mr. JAMES, Mrs. HINSON, Mr. VALADAO, Mr. NORMAN, and Mr. JORDAN

MARCH 12, 2024 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 

and ordered to be printed 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6421 RH

A BILL 

To prohibit the Secretary of Energy from enforcing energy 

efficiency standards applicable to manufactured housing, 

and for other purposes. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6421 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Affordable Housing 

5 Over Mandating Efficiency Standards Act’’ or the ‘‘Af6 fordable HOMES Act’’. 

7 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH STANDARDS 

8 FOR MANUFACTURED HOUSING. 

9 (a) REPEAL.— 

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Energy Independence 

11 and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17071) is 

12 amended by striking section 413. 

13 (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con14 tents in section 1(b) of the Energy Independence 

15 and Security Act of 2007 is amended by striking the 

16 item relating to section 413. 

17 (b) NO FORCE OR EFFECT.—The final rule titled 

18 ‘‘Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation 

19 Standards for Manufactured Housing’’ published by the 

20 Department of Energy in the Federal Register on May 

21 31, 2022 (87 Fed. Reg. 32728), shall have no force or 

22 effect. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
Union Calendar No. 350 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6421 

[Report No. 118–424] 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Secretary of Energy from enforcing 

factured housing, and for other purposes. energy efficiency standards applicable to manuMARCH 12, 2024 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Overton Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

RONALD RIDDICK, S/K/A RONALD J. RIDDICK MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0714-97-1 JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER FEBRUARY 3, 1998 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE Russell I. Townsend, Jr., Judge

Steven F. Shames (Shames & Byrum, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the
evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant's bench trial
conviction for concealment of goods valued at $200 or more, in
violation of Code § 18.2-103. We note that appellant has failed
to comply with Rule 5A:20; however, we have examined the record
and find that the evidence is sufficient to support the

conviction. See Cephas v. Commonwealth , 211 Va. 726, 180 S.E.2d

345 (1971).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
#### Sophia Rallis et al., Respondents, v City of New York, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 736]

*526In an action, inter alia, to recover for damage to property, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Flug, J.), dated March 11, 2003, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class action certification pursuant to CPLR article 9.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is denied.

The plaintiffs, who are purportedly residents of and/or homeowners in a certain area of Flushing, Queens, commenced the instant action against the defendant City of New York to recover for damage to property “as well as other damages including diminution of property value and deprivation of use of portions of their residences” allegedly sustained when rainstorms occurring on September 3, 2000, and August 13, 2001, resulted in flooding to the area. According to the plaintiffs, the damage was caused by the City’s negligence in failing to properly design, install, maintain, and operate its sewer and water drainage systems. The plaintiffs moved for class action certification pursuant to CPLR article 9. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion. We reverse.

The plaintiffs had the burden of establishing compliance with the statutory requirements for class action certification under CPLR 901 and 902 *(see Ackerman v Price Waterhouse,*252 AD2d 179, 191 [1998]; *Canavan v Chase Manhattan Bank,*234 AD2d 493, 494 [1996]; *Hoerger v Board of Educ.,*98 AD2d 274, 281-282 [1983]). General or conclusory allegations in the pleadings or affidavits are insufficient to sustain this burden *(see Yonkers Contr. Co. v Romano Enters. of N.Y.,*304 AD2d 657, 658-659 [2003]; *Weitzenberg v Nassau County Dept,.of Recreation & Parks,*249 AD2d 538, 539 [1998]; *Canavan v Chase Manhattan Bank, supra).*“A class action certification must be founded upon an evidentiary basis” *(Yonkers Contr. Co. v Romano Enters. of N.Y., supra*at 658).

The general and conclusory allegations in the affirmation of the plaintiffs’ counsel and the exhibits attached thereto were insufficient to sustain the plaintiffs’ burden *(see Yonkers Contr. Co. v Romano Enters. of N.Y., supra; Weitzenberg v Nassau County Dept. of Recreation & Parks, supra).*Thus, the plaintiffs’ motion for class action certification should have been denied. Florio, J.P., Smith, Luciano and Rivera, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eulogia BARBERENA, also known as La Coca, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-3797

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 24, 2017

Filed: May 2, 2017

Mikaela Jo Shotwell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Eulogia Barberena, Pro Se

Before RILEY, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

After Eulogia Barberena pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, the district court1 sentenced her to 87 months in prison, in accordance with the parties’ Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) written plea agreement, in which Barberena waived the right to challenge her conviction and sentence with certain exceptions. On appeal, counsel has moved to withdraw, and in a brief filed under Anders v. California, 386 U.S, 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel argues (1) Barberena’s plea was involuntary, because she did not understand or appreciate the proceedings or the plea agreement, since she did not understand English and has a limited education; and (2) the sentence is unreasonable, because it was based on the plea agreement.

Barberena’s challenge to the validity of her guilty plea is not properly before the court, because she did not move to withdraw her guilty plea below. See United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010). In addition, we will enforce the appeal waiver as to her sentencing challenge, because our review of the record (which, among other things, confirms the presence of an interpreter at the plea and sentencing hearings) demonstrates that Barberena entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily; the argument falls within the scope of the appeal waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en bane). Having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues for appeal falling outside the scope of the appeal waiver.

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable John A, Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
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#### IN RE: AFFINITY LABS OF TEXAS, LLC, Appellant

2016-1756

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 17, 2017

Ryan Michael Schultz, Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis, MN, argued for appellant. Also represented by William Manske.

Robert McBride, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Of*1018fice, Alexandria, VA, argued for intervenor Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by Nathan K. Kelley, Joseph Matal, Scott Weid-ENFELLER, BRIAN RACILLA.

(Prost, Chief Judge, Mayer and Moore, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel VOICAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-3063

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted September 20, 2017

Decided September 21, 2017

Rajnath P. Laud, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Daniel S. Voican, Pro Se

Before MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge, ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge, DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

ORDER

Daniel Voican pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and one count of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and was sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release. His written plea agreement included 'express waivers of his rights to appeal his conviction and sentence. He nonetheless filed a notice of appeal. His appellate counsel now seeks to withdraw under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493*456(1967), because she believes that any appeal would be frivolous. We gave Voican an opportunity to respond to counsel’s motion, *see*Cir. R. 61(b), but he has not done so. Counsel’s *Anders*brief is facially adequate, so we limit our review of the record to the potential issues that counsel discusses. *See United States v. Cano-Rodriguez, 552*F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2009).

Counsel first considers whether Voican could argue that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Counsel informs us, however, that Voican did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court and does not wish to do so on appeal. A challenge to the plea therefore should neither be raised on appeal nor explored in an *Anders*submission. *See United States v. Knox,*287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel next evaluates whether a challenge to the sentence would provide a basis for appeal. Counsel notes that Voican explicitly waived his right to appeal his sentence, but potentially could argue that (1) the court relied on an impermissible factor such as race when sentencing him; (2) his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; or (3) his waiver was involuntary. *See Jones v. United States,*167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999). But counsel correctly concludes that there is no evidence in the record that the court relied on any impermissible factors when sentencing Voican and that his sentence of 42 months’ imprisonment falls far below the statutory maximum of 22 years’ imprisonment, *see*18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1028A(a)(1). Regarding a challenge to the voluntariness of the waiver, counsel accurately states that, when a plea agreement and guilty plea are voluntary, the attendant waivers of the defendants’ rights are also voluntary. *See United States v. Wenger,*58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1996). Because Voican does not wish to challenge the voluntariness of his plea, it would be frivolous to contest his waiver of the right to appeal the sentence.

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.
454 A.2d 153

#### Commonwealth v. Gordon, Appellant.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 22, 1983.

Submitted October 19, 1981.

Roland J. Atkins, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.

Judgment of sentence is affirmed.
- 1 -

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

OMAR CALDERON,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-20-00139-CR

Appeal from the

450th District Court

of Travis County, Texas

(TC# D-1-DC-20-904007)

O R D E R

The Court received and filed the supplemental clerk’s record which was requested by this 

Court’s order dated August 7, 2020. The supplemental clerk’s record now includes an order by the 

trial court, dated September 10, 2020, finding good cause to allow appointed counsel to withdraw 

from representing Appellant and permitting attorney Keith S. Hampton, retained counsel, to 

substitute as new counsel. The appeal is therefore reinstated. 

Additionally, the Court hereby GRANTS both motions pending in this Court filed by 

attorney Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez, namely, the Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Appellate 

Counsel and Substitution of Counsel, filed on June 15, 2020, and the Second Motion for Leave to 

Withdraw as Appellate Counsel and Substitution of Counsel, filed on July 22, 2020.

The Appellant’s brief is due October 12, 2020.
- 2 -

IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of September 2020.

PER CURIAM

Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
#### Pierce T. Wetter, Appellant, *v.*Robert Moses, Individually and as Commissioner of Parks of the City of New York, Respondent.

Argued April 5, 1943;

decided April 22, 1943.

*Thomas D. Thacher, Corporation Counsel (Jeremiah M. Evarts*of counsel), for motion.

*William B. Roulstone*opposed.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs, and ten dollars costs of motion.