alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### AUG 20 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY F. AVALLONE,

Appellant,

v. ANNE DILLON GRAHAM,

Appellee. No. 96-2208 (D.C. No. CIV-93-1580-JC) (D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Anthony F. Avallone appeals from a district court o rder affirming the bankruptcy court’s imposition of sanctions against him. Our jurisdiction arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). The standard of review generally appli cable to a bankruptcy court’s sanctions order is abuse of discretion, see Udall v. FDIC (In re Nursery Land Dev., Inc.) , 91 F.3d 1414, 1415 (10th Cir. 1996). Mr. Avallone, as counsel for debtor Curtis C. Graham, filed a complaint in bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of alimony provisions. The bankruptcy court held that the state court had conc urrent jurisdiction over the dischargeability issue, and the state court subsequ ently ruled that the alimony provisions were not dischargeable. The bankruptcy court, on motion by defendant and counterclaimant Anne Dillon Graham, ruled that the state order was res judicataon the dischargeability issue. The bankruptcy cou rt ruled for defendant on her counterclaim for sanctions, imposing sanctio ns against Mr. Avallone in the amount of $3,150.00. Mr. Avallone appealed to the district court, and Ms . Graham filed a crossappeal. The magistrate judge issued his proposed f indings and recommendation to reject both parties’ arguments and affirm the ba nkruptcy court order in toto
. After objections, the district court adopted the ma gistrate judge’s findings and recommendation as an order of the court. Mr. Avall one now appeals to this court,-3-

challenging the bankruptcy court’s award of sanctio ns and contending that he was denied the required notice regarding the impositionof sanctions. After careful review of the record on appeal, toget her with the parties’ briefs and appendices, we conclude that the distric t court correctly decided that the bankruptcy court’s sanctions order should be af firmed. Therefore, for substantially the same reasons as contained in the findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge, dated July 3, 1996, adopte d by the district court in its order dated August 2, 1996, the judgment of the Uni ted States District Court for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge
NO. 03-16-00276-CV

____________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

AUSTIN, TEXAS

____________________________________________________________

TAYLOR HOUSING AUTHORITY,

A MUNICIPAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,

Appellant

vs.

STEVE A. SHORTS, MALLARD RUN HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, and

TAYLOR SUNSET HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, 

Appellees

 

On appeal from the 368th Judicial District Court

of Williamson County, Texas

Cause No. 15-0021-C277

____________________________________________________________

APPELLANT TAYLOR HOUSING AUTHORITY’S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO

EXTEND TIME FOR FILING APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

COME NOW, TAYLOR HOUSING AUTHORITY, a Municipal Housing

Authority, Appellant, and file this Motion to Extend Time for

Filing Appellant’s Reply Brief, and in support thereof would

respectfully show unto the Court the following:

1. Appellant’s deadline for filing its reply brief is

September 13, 2016. 

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR

FILING APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF PAGE 1

ACCEPTED

03-16-00276-CV

12613029

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

9/9/2016 11:50:01 AM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 9/9/2016 11:50:01 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
2. Appellant’s request an additional three (3) days in

which to file its reply brief.

3. Appellant has not previously requested any extensions

regarding this item and no extensions have been granted. 

4. As such, Appellant seeks this court, pursuant to TRAP

10.5(b) and 38.6(d), a three day extension of time to file

Appellant’s reply brief or September 16, 2016. 

Respectfully submitted,

DIETZ & JARRARD, P.C.

106 Fannin Ave. East

Round Rock, Texas 78664

Telephone (512) 244-9314

Facsimile (512) 244-3766

 By:__/s/ R. Mark Dietz______

R. Mark Dietz

 State Bar No. 05857200

rmdietz@lawdietz.com

 Douglas G. Cornwell

 State Bar No. 24009024

Dgcornwell@lawdietz.com

Ted W. Hejl

Mark J. Schroeder

PO Box 192 

 Taylor, Texas 76574

ted@hejllawfirm.com

mark@hejllawfirm.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

TAYLOR HOUSING AUTHORITY

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR

FILING APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF PAGE 2
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

This is to certify that on September 8, 2016, the

undersigned counsel for Appellants contacted counsel for

Appellees, Patrick J. Fitzgerald, to confer with regard to

this motion. Appellees’ counsel stated that Appellees will

not oppose this motion.

_/s/ Douglas G. Cornwell_________

Douglas G. Cornwell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on this day a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Appellant Taylor Housing Authority’s

Motion to Extend Time for Filing Appellant’s Reply Brief has

been served via eservice to counsel listed below, on this the

9th day of September, 2016:

Steve Skarnulis Via Eservice

Thomas J. Turner

Patrick J. Fitzgerald

CAIN & SKARNULIS PLLC

400 W. 15th St., Suite 900

Austin, Texas 78701

skarnulis@cstrial.com

tturner@cstrial.com

Pfitzgerald@cstrial.com

_/s/ Douglas G. Cornwell__________

Douglas G. Cornwell

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR

FILING APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF PAGE 3
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Blanca L. AVILA-RESENDIZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50201

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 20, 2017

Sherri Walker Hobson, Benjamin Holley, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Office of the US Attorney, San Dié-go, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Serena Premjee, Sarah Rose Weinman, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Blanca L. Avila-Resendiz appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 84-month concurrent sentences and 5-year concurrent terms of supervised release imposed following her guilty-plea convictions for importation of methamphetamine and importation of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

Avila-Resendiz contends that the district court misinterpreted the amended minor role Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, and relied on superseded precedent to deny the minor role adjustment. To the contrary, the record reflects that the court properly considered and applied all of the factors enumerated in the amended commentary to the minor role Guideline. *See*U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C); *United States v. Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d 519, 523 (9th Cir. 2016). Moreover, Avila-Resendiz has not shown that the district court relied on *United States v. Hurtado,*760 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2014), or our precedent more generally, in a manner that is inconsistent with the amended minor role Guideline. *See Quintero-Leyva,*823 F.3d at 523 (because the factors listed in the amended Guideline are non-exhaustive, the court “may also, consider other reasons for granting or denying a minor role reduction”). Therefore, the district court did not err in imposing the custodial sentence.

Avila-Resendiz also contends that the district court plainly erred by imposing a five-year term of supervised release. The district court erroneously stated the statutory term for supervised release as “three [years] up to life.” *See*U.S.S.G. *551§ 5C1.2 cmt. n.9 (if defendant is safety valve eligible, she is exempt from the statutory minimum term of supervised release). Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for re-sentencing as to the supervised release term. *See United States v. Munoz-Camarena,*631 F.3d 1028, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2011).

REVERSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Rivers *et al. v.*Key *et al.*

No. 13433.

September 25, 1940.

Rehearing denied October 15, 1940.

JDuckwobth, Justice.

In order to maintain the action it is essential that the plaintiffs show that they have title or an interest in the land constituting the subject-matter of the suit. For making this necessary showing they rely entirely upon their exhibit F, which is nothing more than an offer, and is binding upon no one unless accepted. Under the ruling in *Rivers*v. *Key,*189 *Ga.*832 (7 S. E. 2d, 732), the judgment on the demurrer is the law of the ease; and since the amendment offered fails to allege a cause of action by making the essential averment of plaintiff’s title to the property involved, it fails to meet the terms of the order sustaining the demurrer, and the judgment striking the amendment on objection is not erroneous. It is obvious that the allegations of the amendment seeking a recovery of rent failed to state a cause of action, since the petition shows that the plaintiffs have no title to the premises on which the rent is claimed. Nor was it error to disallow the application of plaintiffs to make an additional party defendant, since no valid suit was pending.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*853
      *G. B. Walker*and *H. E. Edwards,*for plaintiffs.

*W. H. Lewis*and *James A. Branch,*for defendants.
#### Mary Clemens, Resp’t, *v.*The Society of Good Fellows, App’lt.

Appeal from a judgment entered upon a decision made at a term where the cause was tried without a jury.

*S. M. Lindsley,*for app’lt; *C. Morschauser,*for resp’t.

Dykman, J.

This action is based upon a certificate issued to the plaintiff by the defendant upon the life of Patrick Durnin.

The trial was before a judge without a jury, and he has found all the facts in favor of the plaintiff which entitle her to a recovery, and the findings are supported by the evidence.

There axe no questions of law involved and the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Barnard, P. J., and Pratt, J., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements contained in the body of the accompanying Form 10-K of
Muzak Holdings LLC and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001085320
<NAME>                        MUZAK HOLDINGS LLC
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                               2,275
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       42,886
<ALLOWANCES>                                         3,683
<INVENTORY>                                         12,283
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    56,065
<PP&E>                                             113,474
<DEPRECIATION>                                     (18,424)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     497,315
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               91,318
<BONDS>                                            159,214
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            73,421
<OTHER-SE>                                         (30,353)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       497,315
<SALES>                                            130,016
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   130,016
<CGS>                                               48,319
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       48,319
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    77,789
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     1,185
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 (29,394)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (26,651)
<INCOME-TAX>                                          (439)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                (26,212)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
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<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (26,212)
<EPS-BASIC>                                              0
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</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-2033

ROBERT TILSON MORLEY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,

Broughton Hospital; H. DAVID BRUTON, M.D.,

Secretary; SETH P. HUNT, JR.; MICHAEL ORNDOFF,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

KEVIN KILBRIDE, M.D.; RANDALL LAY, M.D., each

in his official and individual capacity,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Max O. Cogburn,

Magistrate Judge. (CA-00-250-1-C)

Submitted: December 16, 2002 Decided: December 19, 2002

Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

Robert Tilson Morley, Appellant Pro Se. Donna B. Wojcik, NORTH

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Morgantown, North Carolina; Dorothy

Powers, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Robert Tilson Morley appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to Defendants in his employment

discrimination action. We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. See Morley v. North Carolina Dep’t of Human Res.,

No. CA-00-250-1-C (W.D.N.C. July 31, 2002). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Mary H. Leach, Respondent, *v.*Town of Eastchester, Appellant.

Argued January 21, 1943;

decided March 4, 1943.

*620
      *George J. Conway*and *George A. Garvey*for appellant.

*Ralph A. McClelland*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Dissenting: Lehman, Ch. J.
Exhibit



                                            
                                            





Ex 10-4-11


TEGNA INC.
DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN
RULES FOR POST-2004 DEFERRALS
Restated as of January 1, 2005


Amendment No. 10


TEGNA Inc. hereby amends the TEGNA Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan, Rules for Post-2004 Deferrals, restated as of January 1, 2005, as amended (the “Plan”), effective December 1, 2018, as follows:


1.Section 2.6(b) is amended by deleting the last four sentences of such section and replacing them with the following: 
Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, effective July 31, 2018, the TEGNA Inc. and Cars.com Inc. stock funds shall be eliminated as investment options under the Plan. 
2.Section 2.8 is amended by deleting the last four sentences of such Section.
3.Section 2.9(h) is amended by deleting the last two sentences of such Section. 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, TEGNA Inc. has caused this Amendment to be executed by its duly authorized officer as of November 16, 2018.


    
	
			
	 
	 
	TEGNA Inc.

	 
	 
	 

	 
	By:
	/s/ Jeffrey Newman

	 
	Name:
	Jeffrey Newman

	 
	Title:
	Senior Vice President/Human Resources
**Exhibit 31.02****CERTIFICATION**     I, Lewis R. Belote, III, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Homestore, Inc.; and     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report.Date: April 27, 2006                 /S/ LEWIS R. BELOTE, III   Lewis R. Belote, III  *Chief Financial Officer*
#### Gregory L. GRIFFITH, Plaintiff-Appellant v. O’REILLY AUTOMOTIVE STORES, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-31132 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 17, 2017

David Anthony Binegar, Binegar Christian, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Michael J. Vondenstein, Esq., Natasha Z. Wilson, Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Lar-mann & Papale, L.L.P., Metairie, LA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the pertinent portions of the record. The magistrate judge’s'thorough opinion examined all of the alleged fact issues proffered by the plaintiff and found them either unsupported by the record or insufficient to prove Title VII discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. We And no reversible *347error of fact or law and AFFIRM the judgment.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R: 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jorge Alejandro LOPEZ-PONCE, also known as Gerardo Anaya Gonzalez, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40030 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Ernest Gonzalez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Plano, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jorge Alejandro Lopez-Ponce, Pro Se

Before KING, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Jorge Alejandro Lopez-Ponce has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011), Lopez-Ponce has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6215 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6215

 To prohibit Federal funds from being made available for the Justice40 
             Initiative or for the American Climate Corps.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 3, 2023

Mr. Good of Virginia (for himself, Mr. Ogles, Mrs. Miller of Illinois, 
 Mr. Higgins of Louisiana, Mr. Bishop of North Carolina, Mr. Weber of 
Texas, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Norman, Mr. Mooney, Mr. Clyde, Mr. Biggs, Mr. 
 Jackson of Texas, Mr. Gosar, Mr. Cloud, Mrs. Lesko, Mr. Donalds, Mr. 
Nehls, Mr. Crane, Mr. Gooden of Texas, and Mr. Burlison) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
   Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Natural Resources, 
 Education and the Workforce, and Oversight and Accountability, for a 
 period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit Federal funds from being made available for the Justice40 
             Initiative or for the American Climate Corps.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No American Climate Corps Act''.

SEC. 2. AMERICAN CLIMATE CORPS AND JUSTICE40 INITIATIVE FUNDING 
              PROHIBITION.

    No Federal funds may be used for--
            (1) the Justice40 Initiative (as described in Executive 
        Order 14008 (86 Fed. Reg. 7619, relating to tackling the 
        climate crisis)); or
            (2) the American Climate Corps (as described in the fact 
        sheet published by the White House on September 20, 2023, 
        relating to the American Climate Corps).
                                 <all>
```
#### Lydia L. Querze, Appellant, *v.*Raoul Querze, Respondent.

Submitted June 14, 1943;

decided June 18, 1943.

Motion to reargue motion to amend remittitur denied. (See 290 N. Y. 13, 765.)
#### STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE *v.*ALAN SPIRER

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 46 Conn. App. 450 (AC 15852), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that General Statutes § 51-91a should be applied to attorneys *960convicted of felonies in federal courts or other states’ courts?

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15853.

*Wesley W. Horton,*in support of the petition.

*Daniel B. Horwitch,*statewide bar counsel, in opposition.

Decided January 8, 1998

*“2.*In light of the judiciary’s power over the practice of law, does the application of § 51-91a in this case violate the separation of powers doctrine?

“3. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that Practice Book §§ 28B and 28B.1 do not provide guidance for the disposition of this case.”

NORCOTT, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.