alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32





Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


as Adopted Pursuant to


Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Farmers & Merchants Bancorp (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, Kent A. Steinwert, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Stephen W. Haley, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) under the Securities Exchange act of 1934 and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





March 10, 2010





/s/ Kent A. SteinwertKent A. SteinwertPresident & Chief Executive Officer/s/ Stephen W. HaleyStephen W. HaleyExecutive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Douglas BEER, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-30159 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 19, 2017

Camille Ann Domingue, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rebecca Louise Hudsmith, Esq., Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Middle & Western Districts of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Douglas Beer appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to possession of child pornography of a minor not yet 12 years of age. He contends that the district court’s statements at the sentencing hearing indicate that it plainly erred in concluding that it did not have the discretion to disagree with the U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 enhancements and impose a downward variance based on the mitigating facts and circumstances in his case. Beer maintains that a downward variance was warranted because he had no criminal history, his offense was passive possession, and he had attempted to overcome his addictions to pornography and alcohol by attending individual and group counseling.

As Beer concedes, he did not raise this argument in the district court and, therefore, review is limited to plain error. *See United States v. Garcia-Perez,*779 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2015). To demonstrate plain error, Beer must establish a clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights. *See Puckett v. United States,*566 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). If he makes such a showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. *See id.*

The record indicates that the district court did not fail to recognize that it had the discretion to vary from the guidelines range. The district court considered Beer’s lengthy sentencing memorandum, his let*400ter to the Court, the letters written in his support, the Presentence Report, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Based on that information, the district court made an individualized assessment of his case and determined that a sentence slightly below the advisory guidelines range would be appropriate under the circumstances. Therefore, the record reflects that the district court did not fail to recognize that it had the discretion to vary from the guidelines range and did not commit reversiblé plain error when it sentenced Beer to a slight downward variance of 57 months of imprisonment. *See United States v. Clay,*787 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2015); *United States v. Robinson,*741 F.3d 588, 601 (5th Cir. 2014).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlton ANDERSON, a.k.a. Carlton Shamar Anderson, a.k.a. Carlton Jhamr Anderson, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-14756 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(August 15, 2017)

*528Michelle Lee Schieber, U.S. Attorneys Office, Macon, GA, Michael J. Moore, U.S. Attorney, Crawford Seals, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Columbus, GA, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Leigh Ann Webster, Strickland Webster, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant

Carlton Anderson, Pro Se

Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Carlton Anderson appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr, Anderson argues that the district court erred because it failed to evaluate his claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. After careful review, we affirm.

We review a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. *See United States v. Brehm,*442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). A court abuses its discretion if the denial is arbitrary or unreasonable, *see id.*(citation omitted), or if it applies an incorrect standard. *See United States v. Izquierdo,*448 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). A defendant carries the burden to establish that withdrawal of a guilty plea is appropriate. *See id.*(citation omitted).

Our review of the record gives us no basis to reverse. Mr. Anderson simply failed to establish that he raised an ineffective assistance of legal counsel claim in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although Mr. Anderson previously attempted to raise an ineffective assistance of legal counsel claim through a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255—a motion which the district court denied as premature—Mr. Anderson did not pursue this claim in his subsequent motion to withdraw his plea or at the hearing on that motion. Indeed, the record shows that Mr. Anderson focused his efforts in the motion and at the hearing on attempting to show “a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal,” Fed. R. Grim. P. 11(d)(2)(B), which was the focus of the district court’s inquiry to determine whether the plea could be withdrawn. *See United States v. Buckles,*843 F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988) (outlining relevant factors).

The district court never ruled that it could not consider an ineffectiveness claim in deciding whether to allow the withdrawal of Mr. Anderson’s guilty plea. And, as we have explained before, this Court “will not generally consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on .direct appeal where the district court did not entertain nor develop a factual record.” *United States v. Bender,*290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jaime Eduardo PEREZ-SOLIS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40844 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 12, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jaime Eduardo Perez-Solis, Pro Se

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

*281PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jaime Eduardo Perez-Solis has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed briefs in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Perez-Solis has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s briefs and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir, R. 47.5.4.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should

not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in

5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 29, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-60089

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PETER HALAT, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Mississippi

(USDC No. 2:96-cr-030)

_________________________________________________________

Before REAVLEY, HIGGINBOTHAM and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*1
We dismiss the appeal for the following reason:

In Defendant’s direct appeal, this Court held that “Halat waived his right to 

appeal his sentence in exchange for the government’s agreement not to 

appeal a sentence imposed below the guideline range.” United States v. 

Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 871 (5th Cir. 1999). This waiver applies to a 

collateral attack on the sentence. In United States v. Baty, the Court 

explained, “We think that a defendant’s waiver of her right to appeal 

deserves and, indeed, requires the special attention of the district court. 

When a defendant waives her right to appeal, she gives up the very 

valuable right to correct a district court’s unknown and unannounced 

sentence.” 980 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1992). The transcript reveals that the

district court paid the requisite special attention. Defendant’s counsel, Mr.

Chasnoff, stated, “There will be no appeal of the final sentence given by this

Court...” (emphasis added). The bottom line is that the record from the district

court unambiguously establishes that Defendant chose to forsake all avenues of

appeal of his sentence.

Dismissed.
Exhibit 31(a)

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Michael R. Sayre, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this
quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Pinnacle Data Systems, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other
certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)), for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any
change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting); and

5. The registrants
other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

Date: August 11, 2006



|                       
|-----------------------
|                       
|/s/ Michael R. Sayre   
|Chief Executive Officer
#### Jeffery Jerome FUSSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Darrell VANNOY, Deputy Warden of Security, Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-30808

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 23, 2017

Jeffery Jerome Fussell, Pro Se

James Garrison Evans, Assistant Attorney General, Louisiana Department of Justice, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jeffery Jerome Fussell, Louisiana prisoner # 103973, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissing his civil rights complaint. By seeking leave to proceed IFP in this court, Fussell is challenging the district court’s certification that this appeal is not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

As his sole issue on appeal, Fussell argues that the district court’s grant of summary judgment should be reversed because his court appointed attorneys were ineffective in presenting his claim that Vannoy had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by keeping him in extended lockdown since he was placed there in 1989. However; there is no constitutional right to an attorney in a civil rights case. *Sanchez v. United States Postal Serv.,*785 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986). Any deficient conduct by Fussell’s attorneys does not constitute a basis for invalidating the district court’s judgment. *See id.*

Fussell has not shown that he will raise a legal point on appeal that is arguable on its merits. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

Our dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See Adepegba v. Hammons,*103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996). At *213the time Fussell filed the instant notice of appeal and motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal, he had accumulated at least two strikes based on dismissals as frivolous of previously filed interlocutory appeals in civil rights cases. *See Fussell v. Stalder,*No. 95-30840, 81 F.3d 156, 1996 WL 101560, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 29, 1996) (unpublished); *Fussell v. Stalder,*No. 95-30942, 81 F.3d 156, 1996 WL 101564, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 29, 1996) (unpublished). Because Fussell now has accumulated at least three strikes for purposes of § 1915(g) he is barred from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained iñ any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. *See*§ 1915(g).

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) BAR IMPOSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Fourth Amendment to the Executive Officer Performance-Based Compensation Plan



 Exhibit 10.1 
 FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
 M.D.C. HOLDINGS, INC. 

AMENDED EXECUTIVE OFFICER PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION PLAN 

The stockholders of M.D.C. Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) on April 29, 2008 approved the Amended Executive Officer
Performance-Base Compensation Plan (the “Plan”). The Plan was amended by the First Amendment effective as of January 1, 2008, by the Second Amendment effective as of June 1, 2011, and by the Third Amendment effective as of
January 1, 2012. All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have a meaning ascribed to them in the Plan, as amended. This Fourth Amendment to the Plan, upon stockholder approval of the amendment, will be effective as of
January 1, 2012 (the “Effective Date”). 
 RECITAL 

Subject to stockholder approval, the Compensation Committee (the “Committee”) of M.D.C. Holdings, Inc. hereby amends Paragraphs
C and D of Article III of the Plan to read in their entirety as follows: 
 AMENDMENTS 

C. If the Performance Goal for fiscal year 2012 is achieved, each of the Covered Employees shall receive, in accordance
with the terms of this Plan, no more than $3,500,000. 
 D. For 2012 and thereafter, only the Performance Goal
in Paragraph A.(ii) of Article III shall apply. For 2012 and thereafter, the Adjusted Pre-Tax Return on Stockholders’ Equity Goal in Paragraph A.(i) of Article III shall not apply and shall be deemed deleted from the Plan. 

This Fourth Amendment, following approval of the stockholders, has been executed on the date set forth below, to be effective as of the
Effective Date set forth above. 
  

			
	M.D.C. HOLDINGS, INC.
		
	By:	 	/s/ Michael Touff
		
	Its:	 	Senior Vice President
		
	Date:	 	May 21, 2012
Figure 93. Consumption of petroleum and other liquids by sector, 1990-2040 (million barrels per day)

Residentia

l and 

Commerci

al Industrial

Transport

ation

Electric 

Power Total

1990 1.23 4.25 10.88 0.57 16.93

1991 1.21 4.14 10.75 0.53 16.62

1992 1.20 4.44 10.93 0.43 17.01

1993 1.18 4.35 11.17 0.49 17.20

1994 1.17 4.58 11.43 0.47 17.64

1995 1.13 4.51 11.57 0.33 17.54

1996 1.21 4.74 11.84 0.36 18.16

1997 1.16 4.87 11.99 0.41 18.43

1998 1.08 4.76 12.32 0.57 18.73

1999 1.19 4.94 12.67 0.53 19.32

2000 1.28 4.80 12.94 0.50 19.53

2001 1.26 4.78 12.85 0.56 19.45

2002 1.19 4.83 13.09 0.42 19.54

2003 1.28 4.80 13.23 0.53 19.83

2004 1.27 5.13 13.72 0.53 20.65

2005 1.23 5.00 13.89 0.54 20.66

2006 1.05 5.21 14.16 0.28 20.71

2007 1.08 5.08 14.32 0.29 20.75

2008 1.10 4.55 13.78 0.20 19.63

2009 1.08 4.25 13.38 0.18 18.89

2010 1.06 4.48 13.57 0.17 19.29

2011 1.06 4.43 13.63 0.13 19.25

2012 1.01 4.39 13.45 0.09 18.94 5% 23%

2013 1.05 4.50 13.44 0.09 19.09

2014 1.04 4.56 13.54 0.09 19.24

2015 1.05 4.80 13.62 0.09 19.55

2016 1.04 4.92 13.65 0.09 19.70

2017 1.03 5.01 13.68 0.08 19.80

2018 1.02 5.09 13.68 0.08 19.87

2019 1.01 5.17 13.68 0.08 19.94

2020 1.01 5.20 13.65 0.08 19.93

2021 1.00 5.21 13.59 0.08 19.88

2022 0.99 5.24 13.53 0.08 19.85

2023 0.99 5.25 13.46 0.08 19.77

2024 0.98 5.26 13.38 0.08 19.70

2025 0.97 5.25 13.29 0.08 19.60

2026 0.97 5.23 13.20 0.08 19.48

2027 0.96 5.20 13.13 0.08 19.37

2028 0.96 5.19 13.06 0.08 19.28

2029 0.95 5.17 12.99 0.08 19.20

2012 Percentages
2030 0.95 5.16 12.95 0.08 19.14

2031 0.94 5.15 12.92 0.08 19.09

2032 0.94 5.14 12.88 0.08 19.04

2033 0.94 5.12 12.86 0.08 19.00

2034 0.93 5.12 12.85 0.08 18.98

2035 0.93 5.11 12.84 0.08 18.97

2036 0.92 5.11 12.84 0.08 18.96

2037 0.92 5.11 12.85 0.08 18.97

2038 0.92 5.11 12.88 0.08 18.99

2039 0.92 5.11 12.91 0.08 19.02

2040 0.91 5.10 12.95 0.08 19.05
arrels per day)

71% 0% 100%

2012 Percentages
**EXHIBIT - 32.3**

 

MOSSIMO,INC.

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO

SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofMossimo, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter periodended June 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon the date hereof (the Report), I Vicken Festekjian, Chief Financial Officerof the Company, certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, That tothe best of my knowledge:

 

(1)              The Report, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit -32.3, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of theSecurities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)              The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition, results of operations, and cashflows of the Company.

 
| /s/    | Vicken Festekjian       |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   | Vicken Festekjian       |
|   | Chief Financial Officer |
|   | August 11, 2005    |

 

A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTENSTATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 HASBEEN PROVIDED TO THE COMPANY AND WILL BE RETAINED BY THE COMPANY AND FURNISHEDTO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF UPON REQUEST.

 

THIS CERTIFICATION ACCOMPANIES THE FORM 10-QTO WHICH IT RELATES, IS NOT DEEMED FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION AND IS NOT TO BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO A FILING OF THECOMPANY UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 OR THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 (WHETHERMADE BEFORE OR AFTER THE DATE OF THE FORM 10-Q), IRRESPECTIVE OF ANYGENERAL INCORPORATION LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN SUCH FILING.

 

----