alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.1

 

FIVE STAR QUALITY CARE, INC.

 

Summary of Director Compensation

 

The following is a summary of the currently effective compensation of the Directors of Five Star Quality Care, Inc. (the “Company”) for services as directors, which is subject to modification at any time by the Board of Directors.

 

·                  Each Independent Director receives an annual fee of $35,000, plus a fee of $750 for each meeting attended.  Up to two $750 fees are payable if a board meeting and one or more board committee meetings are held on the same date.

 

·                  The chairpersons of our quality of care committee, audit committee, compensation committee and nominating and governance committee receive an additional annual fee of $15,000, $15,000, $5,000 and $5,000, respectively.

 

·                  Each Director receives a grant of 7,500 shares of the Company’s common stock on the date of the first board meeting following each annual meeting of shareholders (or, for Directors who are first elected or appointed at other times, on the day of the first board meeting attended).

 

·                  The Company generally reimburses all Directors for travel expenses incurred in connection with their duties as Directors and for out of pocket costs incurred from their attending certain continuing education programs.
#### Dwayne Lamont BURGESS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. RAYA; et al., Defendants-Appellees, and P. Morales; et al., Defendants.

No. 15-17462

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 26, 2017

*484Dwayne Lamont Burgess, Pro Se

Thomas S. Patterson, Esquire, Supervisory Attorney, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument.

*484*See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2),

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Dwayne Lamont Burgess appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Hooper v. County of San Diego,*629 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Burgess’ First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims because a judgment in Burgess’ favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary proceedings. *See Heck v. Humphrey,*512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”); *see also Edwards v. Balisok,*520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (extending *Heck*to disciplinary proceedings).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Burgess’ excessive force claim as Heck-barred to the extent that Burgess alleged that defendants used pepper spray for a purpose other than to regain control. *See Heck,*512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364; *see also Clement v. Gomez,*298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (force is not excessive when “applied in a good faith effort to restore discipline and order and not maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”).

However, to the extent that Burgess alleged that he was exposed to pepper spray for a prolonged period of time despite alerting defendants to his health issues, *Heck*does not bar Burgess’ claims. *See Smith v. City of Hemet,*394 F.3d 689, 696-98 (9th Cir. 2005) (claim not barred by *Heck*if the alleged use of excessive force occurred after the conduct on which the conviction was based). Because the district court relied only on *Heck*in dismissing this claim, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings on this claim only.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
PACIFIC COAST APPAREL COMPANY, INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                        (14,113)
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   65,658
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    350,940
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               441,349
<PP&E>                                          74,148
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 552,163
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          695,280
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     5,453,798
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   552,163
<SALES>                                      3,385,399
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                        1,925,971
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,650,570
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (11,836)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              64,726
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (179,306)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (180,106)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (180,106)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 99

      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
                TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of AutoTradeCenter.com Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB for the period ending March 31, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Roger
L. Butterwick, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ ROGER L. BUTTERWICK
--------------------------------
Roger L. Butterwick,
Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer
#### Felincia PHANG; Hendrick Liauw, Petitioners, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-71846

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 **

OCTOBER 2, 2017

David M. Haghighi, Law Offices of David M. Haghighi, APC, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

Michael Christopher Heyse, Trial, Oil, U.S. Department Of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N. R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P, 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM *

Felincia Phang and Hendrick Liauw, natives and citizens of Indonesia, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1262. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010), and we deny the petition for review. .

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed over two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing a motion to reopen, *see 8*C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); *Najmabadi,*597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**Exhibit 35.1**

**SERVICER      COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)**

**First      Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-FA7**

|         |                                                   |                                 |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
|         | First                    Horizon Home Loan Corporation |
|    |                                              |                            |
|              | By:                                          | /s/ Kim                  Yowell |
|         | Date:                    03/01/07                      |
|         | Name:                  Kim Yowell                      |
|         | Title:                    SVP, Servicing Manager       |

|         |                                                         |                                       |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|         | First                      Tennessee Mortgage Services, Inc. |
|    |                                                    |                                  |
|              | By:                                                | /s/ Terry                    L. McCoy |
|         | Date:                      03/01/07                          |
|         | Name:                      Terry L. McCoy                    |
|         | Title:                        Vice President                 |

----
Amendment to the Master Loan Agreement



 Exhibit 10.2 
 Amendment No. RI0475F 
 AMENDMENT 

TO THE 

MASTER LOAN AGREEMENT 
 THIS AMENDMENT is entered into as of April 30, 2012, between FARM CREDIT SERVICES OF AMERICA, FLCA (“FLCA”), FARM CREDIT SERVICES OF AMERICA, PCA (“PCA”) and ABE
FAIRMONT, LLC, Fairmont, Nebraska (the “Company”). 
 BACKGROUND 

FLCA, PCA and the Company are parties to a Master Loan Agreement dated April 7, 2011 (such agreement, as previously amended, is
hereinafter referred to as the “MLA”). Hereinafter, the term “Farm Credit” shall mean FLCA, PCA or both, as applicable in the context. Farm Credit and the Company now desire to amend the MLA. For that reason, and for valuable
consideration (the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged), Farm Credit and the Company agree as follows: 
 1.
Section 10(H) of the MLA is hereby amended and restated to read as follows: 
 SECTION 10. Negative Covenants.
Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by Agent (as that term is defined in Section 2 of the MLA), while this agreement is in effect the Company will not: 
 (H) Capital Expenditures. During fiscal years 2012 and 2013 of the Company combined, expend, in the aggregate, no more than $8,300,000.00 and in subsequent fiscal years expend no more than
$600,000.00 for the acquisition of fixed or capital assets (including all obligations under capitalized leases authorized under the terms of this agreement, but excluding obligations under operating leases). 

2. Except as set forth in this amendment, the MLA, including all amendments thereto, shall continue in full force and effect as written. 

(SIGNATURES ON FOLLOWING PAGE) 









			
	Amendment RI0475F to Master Loan Agreement RI0475D	  	
	ABE FAIRMONT, LLC	  	
	Fairmont, Nebraska	  	

  

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this amendment to be executed by
their duly authorized officers as of the date shown above. 
  

									
	 FARM CREDIT SERVICES
 OF AMERICA, FLCA
	 		 	 ABE FAIRMONT, LLC
     By ADVANCED BIOENERGY, LLC,
     its sole
member

					
	By:	 	/s/ Kathryn Frahm	 		 	By:	 	/s/ Richard Peterson
	Title:	 	VP Commercial Lender	 		 	Title:	 	CEO/CFO

  

			
	 FARM CREDIT SERVICES
 OF AMERICA, PCA

		
	By:	 	/s/ Kathryn Frahm
	Title:	 	VP Commerical Lender


  
 -2-
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6646 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the order in which 

the business credits are taken into account by corporations. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 6, 2023 

Mr. STEUBE (for himself and Mr. BUCHANAN) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify 

the order in which the business credits are taken into 

account by corporations. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. MODIFICATION OF ORDER IN WHICH CORPORA4 TIONS TAKE BUSINESS CREDITS INTO AC5 COUNT. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 38(c)(6)(E) of the Inter7 nal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding ‘‘and’’ 

8 at the end of clause (i), by striking clauses (ii) and (iii), 

9 and by adding at the end the following new clause: 

2 

•HR 6646 IH

1 ‘‘(ii) paragraphs (2) and (4) shall not 

2 apply.’’. 

3 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

4 this section shall apply to taxable years ending after the 

5 date of the enactment of this Act with respect to credits 

6 arising in taxable years ending before, on, or after such 

7 date. 

Æ
#### Tobias Jamie YOUNG, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6345

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 5, 2017

Decided: October 31, 2017

David Bernard Hargett, HARGETT LAW, PLC, Glen Allen, Virginia, for Appellant. Benjamin Hyman Katz, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Tobias Jamie Young seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 . U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Young has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond SALAZAR, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10097

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 3, 2017

• Philip Kopczynski, J. Douglas Wilson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, Plaintiff-Appellee

Galia Amram, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDCA—Federal Public Defenders Office (San Francisco), San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*566MEMORANDUM **

Raymond Salazar, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order affirming the magistrate judge’s denial of his motion for early termination of probation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Salazar contends that the magistrate judge erred by applying an incorrect legal standard in denying his motion for early termination. Specifically, he asserts that the magistrate judge incorrectly required that he demonstrate “exceptionally good behavior” as a prerequisite to early termination. The government responds that Salazar’s claim is barred by the appeal waiver contained in the parties’ plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver and instead affirm on the merits. *See United States v. Jacobo Castillo,*496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The magistrate- judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Salazar’s motion. *See United States v. Nixon,*839 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing denial of request to modify conditions of probation for abuse of discretion). Contrary to Salazar’s contention, the record reflects that the magistrate judge applied the correct legal standard when she considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and determined that Salazar’s mere compliance with the conditions of probation, without more, did not warrant early termination. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3564(c).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Relmon H. DAVIS, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GIBSON; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56933

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 16, 2016 *

Filed November 21, 2016

Relmon H. Davis, III, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Relmon H. Davis, III, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his application to proceed in forma pauperis in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis. *Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust,*821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987). We reverse and remand.

The district court denied Davis’ motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis *942without first providing Davis leave to amend the complaint or addressing whether amendment of the complaint would be futile. *See Rodriguez v. Steck,*795 F.3d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2015) (order) (explaining that “a district court’s denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis is an abuse of discretion unless the district court first provides a plaintiff leave to amend the complaint or finds that amendment would be futile”). It is not absolutely clear that the deficiencies in the complaint regarding whether the prison library staff interfered with Davis’ ability to file a habeas appeal could not be cured by amendment. *See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr.,*66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect ... a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”); *see also Silva v. Di Vittorio,*658 F.3d 1090, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing requirements for an aecess-to-court claim premised on prison officials’ alleged interference, as opposed to failure to affirmatively assist, with any prisoner lawsuit), overruled on other grounds as stated by *Richey v. Dahne,*807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

All outstanding motions and requests are denied.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Richard Lamar PATTERSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 23180.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 3, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 4, 1966.

Frank B. Stow, Gainesville, Ga., for appellant.

Charles B. Lewis, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Charles L. Goodson, U. S. Atty., Thomas K. McWhorter, Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee.

Before RIVES, BELL, and THORN-BERRY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered after a jury verdict of guilty on a four count indictment charging appellant with having violated the internal revenue laws relating to illicit distilled spirits. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5179(a); 5205(a) (2); 5601(a) (1), (4); 5604(a) (1); and 5686.

 The record demonstrates a sufficiency of evidence to warrant the conviction; no illegal search; and no error in admitting a prior felony conviction, after appellant testified, for purposes of impeachment.

Affirmed.
- 6

-

QUESTION: The definition of ignitable liquids excludes aqueous solutions containing less than

24 percent alcohol by volume (4OCFR 261.21(a) (l)). How does the Agency define "aqueous'?

ANSWER: EPA does not define “aqueous” in the regulation, no r does it give guidance in any

preamble. As a rule

- of

- thumb, any solution which is greater than 60

- 70 percent water should be

considered “aqueous.” Conversely, any solution which contains less than 60 percent water is

nonaqueous.

SOURCE: Jim Poppiti

BOOZ~ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC. FAXBACK

12142
#### Manqueen Corporation, Respondent, *v.*Lucy B. Krause et al., Appellants.

Argued April 12, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*817
      *Jonas J. Shapiro, Lawrence S. Greenbaum*and *Karl W. Kirchwey*for appellants.

*Samuel Komoroff*and *Samuel Lawrence Brennglass*for respondent.

Order affirmed, with costs, and question certified answered in the negative. No opinion.

Concur: Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Lehman, Ch. J., and Finch, J.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA F OURTH D ISTRICT

TRACY SALTER , Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee.

No. 4D 2 3

- 980

[ July 20, 2023 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.8 0 0 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seven teenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Michael A. Usan

, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13

- 008021

- CF

- 10A

.
Tracy Salter, Sneads , pro se

.
No appearance required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.
Affirmed

.

K LINGENSMITH , C.J.

, M AY and C ONNER , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.