UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 95-5867

WILLIAM SHEROD, III,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Joseph H. Young, Senior District Judge.

(CR-94-310-L)

Submitted: March 27, 1997

Decided: April 9, 1997

Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Joseph R. Conte, BOND, CONTE & NORMAN, Washington, D.C.,

for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Raymond

A. Bonner, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland,

for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

William Sherod appeals his criminal conviction for being a felon

in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1)

(1994). Sherod raises only one issue on appeal. He contends that the

evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he was in possession

of the firearms in question.

Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government, as we must, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942),

there was sufficient evidence to show that Sherod had constructive

possession of the firearms. "`[T]o establish constructive possession

the government must produce evidence showing ownership, dominion, or control over . . . the vehicle in which the contraband is concealed.'" United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107 (4th Cir. 1992)

(quoting United States v. Ferg, 504 F.2d 914, 916-17 (5th Cir. 1974)

(ellipsis added)); see also United States v. Perez, 897 F.2d 751, 754

(5th Cir. 1990) (noting constructive possession"may be shown by

dominion over the vehicle in which the item is located"). The testimony at trial positively identified Sherod as the driver of the vehicle

in the trunk of which the police discovered firearms. That identification followed a three-mile car chase which ended when Sherod

crashed the rental car into a telephone pole and escaped on foot.

Additional evidence, including his beeper and the rental agreement

found in the car, cemented his identity as the individual who fled on

foot after wrecking the car. Furthermore, his phone call to a witness

stating that he had guns added to the already sufficient quantum of

evidence. Sherod, therefore, as an authorized driver of the rental car

possessed a quasi-ownership interest in the car, and as its driver exercised extensive dominion and control over the car. This evidence was

sufficient to establish constructive possession of its contents.

Sherod suggests that because other people had access to the car, the

Government failed to prove he was in possession of the weapons. In

support of that contention, he cites United States v. Wright, 24 F.3d

732, 735 (5th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that mere dominion over

the vehicle cannot establish constructive possession of its contents. As

an initial matter, the Government need not exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168,

 2
1173 (4th Cir. 1989). In addition, Wright is factually distinguishable.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that it was not the defendant, the driver,

who exercised dominion and control over the car. Rather, it was the

passenger and owner. In Wright, the defendant exercised only temporary control over the car as the driver, but did not have control over

the glove box where the gun was found because his passenger was in

possession of the key to the glove box. Further, Wright did not own

the car. The Fifth Circuit suggested that there would have been no

error in finding constructive possession if those factors had been

absent. Wright, 24 F.3d at 735. In this case, they are completely

absent and there was no error in concluding that there was sufficient

evidence to support a finding of constructive possession.

In addition, Sherod cites United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724

(D.C. Cir. 1991), for the proposition that the Government must prove

that he knew to a practical certainty that there were firearms in the

trunk. This case is exceptionally unhelpful. Not only did the Government fail to show that the defendant in Powell exerted any dominion

or control over the firearm in the case, the District of Columbia Circuit Court was considering whether the defendant's association with

the firearm constituted use under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994). The

court in that case was not called on to consider the boundaries of constructive possession. Here, Sherod exerted dominion and control over

the weapons and § 924(c) is not at issue.

Finally, Sherod urges the court to apply Blue , 957 F.2d at 108, as

supporting his position. In Blue, we noted that a mere shoulder dip by

a passenger in another person's car was not sufficient to establish possession of the firearm under the passenger's seat. Id. The case, while

providing a definition of constructive possession, id. at 107, does not

benefit Sherod for one unavoidable reason. Sherod was not the passenger in this car. He exerted complete dominion and control over the

car in which the firearms were found and therefore over the firearms

themselves. As with the other cases he cites, Blue does not advance

his argument. Sherod's contention that there was insufficient evidence

to convict him is without merit. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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