alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip WHITEHURST, a/k/a L’il Phil, a/k/a Lil Phil, a/k/a Philip Whitehurst, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7702

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

Phillip Whitehurst, Appellant Pro Se.

Jonathan Falk Lenzner, INVESTIGATIVE GROUP INTERNATIONAL, Washington, D.C., Arun G. Rao, Thomas Martin Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Ap-pellee.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding ■ precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Phillip Whitehurst seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying him 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) relief. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner sat*272isfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1695.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Whitehurst has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny Whitehurst’s motion for appointment of counsel, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. .

*DISMISSED*
EXHIBIT 12.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Ron Black, certify that:

1.

I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 on Form 20-F/A of Wavecom SA;

2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.

The company's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have:

(a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)

[Paragraph omitted in accordance with SEC transition instructions contained in SEC Release 34-47986]

(c)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(d)

Disclosed in this report any change in the company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.

The company's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company's auditors and the audit committee of the company's Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the company's internal control over financial reporting.



|Date: November  8, 2005 |  | /s/
        RON BLACK                         
|----------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------
|                        |  | Ron Black,
Chief Executive Officer,
Wavecom SA
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHANNA M. IMMELT,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

DEE SHARP, in her official capacity as

Program Director; TAMBRA MCCOWAN,

in her official capacity as Professional

Licensing Manager,

Defendants

- Appellees,

and

STATE OF WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING REAL

ESTATE APPRAISER PROGRAM,

Defendant. No. 22

- 35249

D.C. No. 3:20

- cv

- 05617

- BHS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 21, 2023 * *

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 21 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEA LS2

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Jo hanna Immelt appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment

in her action alleging due process violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo, see, e.g., Holz v. Nenana City Public School Dist.

,

347 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the individual state

officials

. Any c laims against the officials , sued in their official capacitie s and

seeking money damages, were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst

State School & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 101

- 02 (1984).

Any c laims against the officials , sued in their official capacities and seeking

prospective injunctive reli ef, were also barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

because Immelt did not establish that the state regulations at issue were

unconstitutional, or otherwise conflicted with federal authority. Id.

The district court properly determined that the officials were entitled to

qualified immunity for any claims against them in their individual capacity

,

because Immelt failed to establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Ashcroft v.

al

- Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (qualified immunity shields sta te officials from

money damages unless plaintiff shows, among other things, that the official

violated a constitutional right).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Immelt’s motion to3

reconsider, because Immelt failed to establish any colorable basis for

reconsideration. See, e.g., Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 940, 945 (9th Cir.

2003) (motion for recons ideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual

circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered

evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the

controlling law; it may not be used to raise arg uments or present evidence for the

first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation).

AFFIRMED.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6438 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend expensing of 

environmental remediation costs. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 15, 2023 

Ms. SHERRILL (for herself and Mr. TURNER) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend 

expensing of environmental remediation costs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Brownfields Redevelop5 ment Tax Incentive Reauthorization Act of 2023’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF EXPENSING OF ENVIRONMENTAL 

7 REMEDIATION COSTS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 198(h) of the Internal 

9 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ‘‘incurred 


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•HR 6438 IH

1 after December 31, 2011’’ and inserting the following: 

2 ‘‘incurred— 

3 ‘‘(1) after December 31, 2011, and before Jan4 uary 1, 2023, or 

5 ‘‘(2) after December 31, 2026.’’. 

6 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

7 subsection (a) shall apply to expenditures paid or incurred 

8 after December 31, 2022. 

Æ 


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<Page>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 31.01

                     RULE 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) CERTIFICATIONS

I, Robert M. Alderman, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of ML JWH Strategic Allocation Fund
L.P.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

   a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
   disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
   ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
   consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
   entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
   prepared;

   b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
   procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
   effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
   period covered by this report based on such evaluation;

   c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
   over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
   fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
   materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
   reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

   a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
   operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
   likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
   summarize and report financial information; and

   b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
   employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
   over financial reporting.


Date: August 12, 2005

By /s/ ROBERT M. ALDERMAN
   ----------------------
Robert M. Alderman
Chief Executive Officer, President and Manager
(Principal Executive Officer)
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6546 

To amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to allow certain activities 

to be carried out with regard to certain fish held in captivity or a 

controlled environment. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 1, 2023 

Mr. BENTZ introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to allow 

certain activities to be carried out with regard to certain 

fish held in captivity or a controlled environment. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FISH HELD IN CAPTIVITY OR CONTROLLED EN4 VIRONMENT. 

5 Section 9(b) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 

6 (16 U.S.C. 1538(b)) is amended by adding at the end the 

7 following: 

8 ‘‘(3) FISH HELD IN CAPTIVITY OR CONTROLLED EN9 VIRONMENT.— 


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2 

•HR 6546 IH

1 ‘‘(A) EXCEPTION.—The provisions of sub2 section (a)(1) and section 7(a)(2) do not apply to— 

3 ‘‘(i) a fish legally held in captivity or in a 

4 controlled environment in a manner that main5 tains physical separation of such fish from any 

6 wild population of the same species on the date 

7 of the enactment of this paragraph; or 

8 ‘‘(ii) progeny of a fish described in clause 

9 (i) legally held in the manner described in 

10 clause (i), 

11 until such time as any such fish or progeny is inten12 tionally released from such captivity or controlled 

13 environment to live in the wild. 

14 ‘‘(B) REQUIREMENT.— 

15 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—A person that holds a 

16 fish or progeny described in subparagraph (A) 

17 shall be able to demonstrate to the Secretary 

18 that such fish or progeny qualifies as a fish or 

19 progeny described in subparagraph (A). 

20 ‘‘(ii) FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENT.—A 

21 person that holds a fish or progeny described in 

22 subparagraph (A) may fulfill the demonstration 

23 requirement described in clause (i) through 


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•HR 6546 IH

1 compliance with the applicable provisions of the 

2 Convention.’’. 

Æ 


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#### Bryant Keith BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Do WILLIAMS, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16847

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 18, 2017

Bryant Keith Brown, Pro Se

Jennifer J. Nygaard, Esquire, Attorney, AGCA—Office of the Attorney General, Oakland, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument'. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Bryant Keith Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Brown failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant acted with deliberate indifference by denying Brown’s requests for alternative restraints. *See id.*at 1058-60 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 99.4

               CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of ePHONE Telecom, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2002, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Charlie Rodriguez, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

1.       To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Report fully complies with
         the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and
         Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       To the best of my knowledge and belief, the information
         contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
         financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

\s\ Charlie Rodriguez
------------------------
Charlie Rodriguez
Chief Financial Officer

April 15, 2003
Exhibit 10.3


 


May 22, 2012


 


Cloud Star Corporation


Formerly Accend Media


P.O. Box 4906


Mission Viejo, CA 92690


 


RE: LOCK-UP AGREEMENT


 


Gentlemen:


 


The undersigned, a director and security holder of Cloud Star Corporation,
formerly known as Accend Media) a Nevada corporation ((the "Company"), understands that the Company is the process of
building its business and infrastructure. This lock up agreement adds a level of protection to new investors, to prevent the undersigned
from liquidating his stock holdings and adversely affecting the market of the stock.


 


The undersigned is the record owner of 1,000,000 shares of the common
stock of Cloud Star, par value $0.001 per share (the "Shares), and understands that some of their Shares may be eligible for
sale under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, subject to certain limitations included in said Rule.


 


It is further agreed that:


 


3.The undersigned will not sell
any of their shares of the common stock owned by the undersigned, directly or indirectly, until May 23, 2013.


 


4.The undersigned acknowledges
that Globex Transfer, LLC, 780 Deltona Blvd., Suite 202, Deltona, FL 32725, the authorized transfer agent for the Company, has
been advised of the restrictions described herein and that any attempts by the undersigned to violate said restriction may result
in legal action(s) by the Company. The undersigned further agrees, upon the request of the Company, that in addition to any other
restrictions reflecting that the Shares have not been registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, may be placed on
individual certificates issued.


 


THIS LOCK-UP AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS PRINCIPLES THEREOF.


 


Sincerely,


 


/s/ Scott J. Gerardi


Scott J. Gerardi


 


cc: Globex Transfer, LLC
#### Eugene DAVIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON, WARDEN, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15-17083

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 16, 2017 * San Francisco, California

Filed October 18, 2017

Jason F. Carr, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, for Petitioner-Appellant

Heidi Parry Stern, AGNV—Office of the Nevada Attorney General (Las Vegas) Las Vegas, NV, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: TALLMAN and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable David A, Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Nevada state prisoner Eugene Davis appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first degree kidnapping and attempted murder. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

1. The district court properly held that none of Davis’ ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims met the “substantial” standard required to excuse procedural default. *See Martinez v. Ryan,*566 U.S. 1, 16, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). While Davis’ trial and appellate counsel’s representation was far from ideal, their conduct fell “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” *Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). *See Evitts v. Lucey,*469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); *Harrington v, Richter,*562 U.S. 86, 106, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); *Elmore v. Sinclair,*799 F.3d 1238, 1251 (9th Cir. 2015). Davis cannot overcome the high bar established in *Strickland*and the district court properly denied relief,

2. The Nevada Supreme Court reasonably determined that even though defense counsel at trial engaged in little, if any, investigation, his representation of Davis was not ineffective. We apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments” regarding the scope of investigation and presume “that counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than sheer neglect.” *Strickland,*466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; *Harrington,*562 U.S. at 109, 131 S.Ct. 770. Under the doubly deferential standard of AEDPA and *Strickland,*we cannot conclude that the state courts were objectively unreasonable in rejecting *643the contention that Davis’ counsel was ineffective in his investigation of the case.

AFFIRMED.

***

 xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.