alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, the undersigned, Richard N. Snyder, Chief Executive Officer ofForgent Networks, Inc. (the “Company”), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

1.                                       The quarterlyreport on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended October 31,2008 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended, and

 

2.                                       The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|   | /s/ RICHARD N. SNYDER   |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | Richard N. Snyder       |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |
|   | December 15, 2008  |

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to ForgentNetworks, Inc. and will be retained by Forgent Networks, Inc. andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.  The foregoing certification isbeing furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not beingfiled as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

 

----
#### Antonio Alejandro GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWN CORK & SEAL CO., INC., PENSION ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-35939

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 16, 2016 *

Filed November 21, 2016

Antonio Alejandro Gutierrez, Pro Se.

James Barrett, Attorney, Ater Wynne LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appel-lee.

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Antonio Alejandro Gutierrez appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging violations of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) relating to his eligibility for pension benefits and requests for plan documents. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010), We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, *Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP,*534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Gutierrez’s claim that defendant failed to furnish plan documents because Gutierrez failed to allege facts sufficient to show a violation of ERISA. *See*29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a), 1024(b)(4) (requiring plan administrator to furnish to a plan participant, upon written request, a copy of the latest updated summary plan description).

Dismissal of Gutierrez’s claim regarding his eligibility for benefits was proper because Gutierrez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant violated ERISA by determining that he was ineligible for partial benefits. *See Wilhelm v. Rotman,*680 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (exhibits attached to the complaint may be considered to decide whether dis*935missal is proper); *Bance v. Alaska Carpenters Ret Plan,*829 F.2d 820, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1987) (“ERISA set forth mandatory mínimums by way of alternative formulas under which a qualifying plan must provide for vesting to occur.”); *Hernandez v. S. Nev. Culinary & Bartenders Pension Tr.,*662 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1981) (“ERISA’s minimum vesting provisions require only that, once an employee-participant satisfies his pension plan’s length of service requirement, his right to receive his vested pension benefits mature on his reaching the normal retirement age contained in the plan.”).

AFFIRMED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 99.1      Press Release






PRESS RELEASE
May 24, 2002                 For further information contact:
                                   David M. Bradley
                                   Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer
                                   North Central Bancshares, Inc.
                                   825 Central Avenue
                                   Fort Dodge, Iowa 50501
                                   515-576-7531

         NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC. DECLARES DIVIDEND

David M. Bradley, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of North
Central Bancshares, Inc. (the "Company") announced today that the Company
declared a regular quarterly cash dividend of $0.18 per share on the Company's
common stock for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2002. The dividend will be
payable to all stockholders of record as of June 17, 2002 and will be paid on
July 5, 2002.

North Central Bancshares, Inc. serves north central and southeastern Iowa at 9
full service locations in Fort Dodge, Nevada, Ames, Burlington, Mount Pleasant,
Perry and Ankeny, Iowa through its wholly-owned subsidiary, First Federal
Savings Bank of Iowa, headquartered in Fort Dodge, Iowa. The Bank's deposits are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Company's stock is
traded on The Nasdaq National Market under the symbol "FFFD".
Exhibit 13.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of Commtouch  Software Ltd. (the "Company")
on Form  20-F  for the  period  ending  December  31,  2003 as  filed  with  the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), we, Gideon
Mantel and Devyani Patel, Chief Executive Officer and VP Finance of the Company,
respectively,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/s/ Gideon Mantel                            /s/ Devyani Patel
Gideon Mantel                                Devyani Patel
Chief Executive Officer                      V.P. Finance
June 18, 2004                                June 18, 2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


This  certificate  is provided  solely  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  1350,  as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, and is not deemed a
part of the report or filed for any reason whatsoever. A signed original of this
written  statement  required  by  Section  906 has been  provided  to  Commtouch
Software  Ltd. and will be retained by Commtouch  Software Ltd. and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE ROBERT WORLEY, § § No. 393, 2018 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 1206000145 A & B (N) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. § Submitted: October 22, 2018 Decided: January 7, 2019

Before VAUGHN , SEITZ , and TRAYNOR , Justices.

ORDER

After careful consideration of the a ppellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, we conclude that the S uperior Court’s order of July 3, 2018, summarily dismissi ng the appellant’s second motion for postconviction relief, should be affirmed. * The Superior Court did not err in concluding that the appellant’s motion did not satisfy the pleading requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2) and thus was procedurally barred. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the S uperior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT: /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Justice

* 2018 WL 3302806 (Del. Super. Ct. July 3, 2018).
| Subsidiary Name                                    | State or Country of      Incorporation |
|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
|                                               |                                   |
| Invisinet,      Inc.                               | Delaware                               |
| Taian      AGS Pipeline Construction Co. Ltd       | China                                  |
| WPCS      Asia Limited                             | China                                  |
| WPCS      Australia Pty Ltd                        | Australia                              |
| WPCS      International – Auburn, Inc.       | California                             |
| WPCS      International – Brendale, Pty Ltd. | Australia                              |
| WPCS      International – Brisbane, Pty Ltd. | Australia                              |
| WPCS      International – Hartford, Inc.     | Connecticut                            |
| WPCS      International – Houston, Inc.      | Texas                                  |
| WPCS      International – Lakewood, Inc.     | New      Jersey                        |
| WPCS      International – Portland, Inc.     | Oregon                                 |
| WPCS      International – Sacramento, Inc.   | California                             |
| WPCS      International – Sarasota, Inc.     | Florida                                |
| WPCS      International – Seattle, Inc.      | Washington                             |
| WPCS      International – St. Louis, Inc.    | Missouri                               |
| WPCS      International – Suisun City, Inc.  | California                             |
| WPCS      International – Trenton, Inc.      | New      Jersey                        |
# Europeiska unionens C 34/2014

| | ISSN 1977-1061
  doi:10.3000/19771061.C_2014.034.swe |
| --- | --- |
| Europeiska unionens
  officiella tidning | C 34 |
| | |
| Svensk utgåva | Meddelanden och upplysningar | 57 årgången5 februari 2014 |

ISSN 1977-1061

doi:10.3000/19771061.C_2014.034.swe

Europeiska unionens

officiella tidning

C 34

Svensk utgåva

Meddelanden och upplysningar

57 årgången5 februari 2014

---

| Informationsnummer | Innehållsförteckning | Sida |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | V   Yttranden |
| | ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN |
| | Europaparlamentet |
| 2014/C 034/01 | Beslut | 1 |

Informationsnummer

Innehållsförteckning

Sida

V   Yttranden

ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN

Europaparlamentet

2014/C 034/01

Beslut

1

| SV | |
| --- | --- |

SV

---

V Yttranden

ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN

Europaparlamentet

| 5.2.2014 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 34/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.2.2014

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 34/1

---

BESLUT

2014/C 34/01

EUROPAPARLAMENTETS GENERALSEKRETERARE HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT

med beaktande av rådets förordning (EEG, Euratom, EKSG) nr 259/68 (1), ändrad genom rådets förordning (EG, Euratom) nr 723/2004 (2) och senast ändrad genom Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU, Euratom) nr 1080/2010 av den 24 november 2010 om ändring av tjänsteföreskrifterna för tjänstemän i Europeiska gemenskaperna och anställningsvillkoren för övriga anställda vid Europeiska gemenskaperna (3), särskilt artikel 30,

med beaktande av presidiets beslut av den 3 maj 2004 om delegering av befogenheter för tillsättningsmyndigheten och den myndighet som bemyndigats att ingå anställningsavtal, senast ändrat av presidiet den 4 maj 2009,

med beaktande av att Europaparlamentets förteckningar över godkända sökande från följande uttagningsprov löper ut den 31 december 2013:

PE/99/S, PE/109/S, AD/4/08, AD/1/10, PE/103/S, PE/104/S, PE/106/S, PE/107/S, PE/117/S, PE/118/S, PE/124/S, AST/5/08, PE/119/S, PE/96/S, PE/110/S, PE/121/S,

med beaktande av att den partssammansatta kommittén har ombetts att avge ett yttrande inom 15 arbetsdagar i enlighet med artikel 10a i tjänsteföreskrifterna.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

Giltighetstiden för förteckningarna över godkända sökande från uttagningsprov

AD/4/08, AD/1/10, PE/103/S, PE/104/S, PE/106/S, PE/107/S, PE/117/S, PE/118/S, PE/124/S, PE/96/S, PE/110/S, PE/121/S

förlängs till och med den 31 december 2014.

Artikel 2

Giltighetstiden för förteckningarna över godkända sökande från uttagningsprov

PE/99/S, PE/109/S, AST/5/08, PE/119/S

förlängs inte.

Luxemburg den 20 december 2013.

Klaus WELLE

Generalsekreterare

---

(1)  EGT L 56, 4.3.1968, s. 1 (svensk specialutgåva: Område 01 Volym 1 s. 39).

1

(2)  EUT L 124, 27.4.2004, s. 1.

2

(3)  EUT L 311, 26.11.2010, s. 1.

3

---
#### ESTATE of Zinaida BARY, Deceased, Woldemar A. Bary, Executor, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee. Woldemar A. BARY and Nina Bary, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

Nos. 46, 47, Dockets 30474, 30475.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Nov. 1, 1966.

Decided Nov. 17, 1966.

*845Eugene A. Wolkoff, New York City (Parnell J. T. Callahan, New York City, on the brief), for petitioners-appellants.

Robert H. Solomon, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Mitchell Rogovin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, David 0. Walter, Washington, D. C., Attys., on the brief), for respondent-appellee.

Before FRIENDLY, SMITH and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

We agree with the opinion of the Tax Court, 24 CCH Tax Ct.Mem. 1790 (1965), that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue properly determined income tax deficiencies against the estate of Zinaida Bary of $15,207.23 and against her son Woldemar A. Bary and his wife, Nina, of $27,494. Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proving that when Zinaida died in 1940, there was any value at all attributable to the sole asset in her estate, a claim against the Soviet Union for confiscation of her assets there in 1918-1919. In the absence of any expert testimony as to the monetary worth of the claim, the Commissioner’s finding of zero value, affirmed by the Tax Court, must be accepted. Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223, 228, 51 S.Ct. 413, 75 L.Ed. 991 (1931).

 Of course, no estate tax was payable since the estate’s sole asset had no value in 1940. However, zero basis having been established, subsequent payment of $124,913.46 of the claim in 1959, pursuant to an award of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, resulted in income to Zinaida’s estate. Helvering v. Roth, 115 F.2d 239, 241 (2d Cir. 1940). As the Tax Court correctly held, this was ordinary income since collection of the claim was not a sale or exchange of a capital asset. Graham v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 304 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1962). Disposition of the appeal by Zinaida’s estate determines Woldemar and Nina Bary’s appeal. The income distributed by the estate to Woldemar as sole beneficiary (and credited against the estate’s income tax) retained its character as ordinary income; therefore, he and his wife, having filed a joint return, musalso pay tax at the ordinary income rate.

Affirmed.
#### Jimmy C. MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stephen BARTTLET, Sheriff; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-35695

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 5, 2017

Jimmy C. Moore, Pro Se

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Jimmy C. Moore, an Idaho state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C, § 1983 *600action alleging various constitutional violations arising out of the mishandling of his legal documents. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Hamilton v. Brown,*630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Moore’s action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. *See Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); *see also Lewis v. Casey,*618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); *Hudson v. Palmer,*468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); *see also*Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Moore’s amended complaint without further leave to amend. *See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,*707 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moore’s motions for reconsideration because Moore failed to state any grounds warranting relief. *See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,*5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Adan VEGA-SALAZAR, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41670 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 9, 2017

Amy Howell Alaniz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marjorie A, Meyers, Federal Public Defender, John Moreno Parras, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before BARKSDALE, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Adan Vega-Salazar pleaded guilty to one count of importing 500 *grams*or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(2); and 18 U.S.C. § 2. His written judgment, however, describes the nature of his offense as “[i]mporting 500 *361
      *kilograms*or more” of cocaine. (Emphasis added.)

For his sole issue on appeal, Vega-Salazar requests his judgment be corrected. As the Government concedes, the judgment contains a non-harmless clerical error.

Accordingly, we affirm and remand to the district court for correction of the clerical error. *See*Fed. R. Crim. P. 36; *United States v. Powell,*364 F.3d 362, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2003); *United States v. Sapp,*439 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1971).

AFFIRMED and REMANDED with instruction.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bryon WELTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4513

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 21, 2017

Filed: July 27, 2017

Cynthia Jean Hyde, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Springfield, MO, Christina Leigh Scofield, U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Bryon Welton, Pro Se

Before COLLOTON, MURPHY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Federal prisoner Byron Welton appeals the district court’s1 order committing him *450under 18 U.S.C. § 4245 for hospitalization and mental health treatment. During the pendency of this appeal, however, the district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the commitment petition and to transfer Welton, citing a report that Welton had recovered and was ready for discharge. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

1

. The Honorable Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable David P. Rush, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
#### National Bondholders Corporation *v.*Parris *et al.*

No. 13254.

June 14, 1940.

Gbice, Justice.

1. A recital in a conveyance that the deed is made subject to a specified loan against the property is not an agreement to assume and pay the encumbrance. There must be words importing a promise to pay the debt, in order to render the grantee personally liable. *Alsobrook*v. *Taylor,*181 *Ga.*10 (6) (181 S. E. 182). The result is not different because the conveyance, after reciting that it is made subject to the loan, adds the words, “which is a part of the above consideration.”

2. As under the above ruling the general demurrer was properly sustained as to the only defendants residing in the County of DeKalb, where the suit was brought, it was properly dismissed as to the non-resident defendant. *Moore*v. *Atlanta Joint Stock Land Bank,*176 *Ga.*697 (4) (168 S. E. 558). *Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices conow.*

*514
      *John 8. Matthews,*for plaintiff.

*Julias A. McCurdy Jr., Carl B. Copeland,*and *O’Glen Ray,*fot defendants.