alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: Clay Houchin <chouchin@techag.com>

To: <dpr12001@cdpr.ca.gov>

Date: 5/18/2012 3:00 PM

Subject: Proposed Non

- Fumigant VOC Regulations

Linda Irokawa

- Otani

05/18/12

Regulation Coordinator

Department of Pesticide Regulation

1001 I Street, P.O. Box 4015

Sacramento, CA 95812

- 4015

RE: Proposed Non

- Fumigant VOC Regulations

Dear Ms Irokawa

- Otani:

My name is Clayton Houchin and I am the General Manager for the

Buttonwillow Warehouse Company in Buttonwillow, California. We are a fourth

generation family owned crop protection and fertilizer retailer. In addition

to the retail crop protection business, the family farms over 10,000 acres

in Kern County. The reason for this letter, is that I find two main

problems with your propose d VOC regulations for Non

- Fumigant products.

The first problem I see with the regulations is that other low VOC

formulations

- particularly for oxyfluorfen and chlorpyrifos

- are not

adequate alternatives. My company has over 20 years of experience worki ng

with oxyfluorfen (brand name Goal) and chlorpyrifos (brand name Lorsban 4E).

In the case of the low VOC oxyfluorfen, it does not compare with the

regulator formulation 1 s ability to burn

- down hard to control weeds. In

order for the l ow VOC oxyfluorfen to get similar performance, a grower must

add expensive tank mix partners like

- Rely (inconsistent supply) or Treevix

(requires expensive adjuvant/water conditioner package). These tank mixes

will add between $18 to $40/acre to the cost of the spray. Other alternative

like glyphosate suffer from herbicide resistance and paraquat is a

restricted use pesticide exposing workers to unnecessary danger.

In terms of chlorpyrifos, I have worked with the low VOC formulation for the

last 3 years and the performance is inferior to the regular 4EC

formulations. The result is that the grower must use higher rates of the low

VOC formulation resulting in additional cost per acre as well as most actual

pesticide being applied in the state.

Finally, I feel that the administrative burden that these regulations push

upon our business and our people will add costs to our business. Examples of

burden : 1.) providing written information on the VOC regulations 2.)

tracking the intended use period 3.) providi ng written recommendations and

4.) maintaining records for two years. We will in turn be forced to pass

these costs on to our grower customers.

In summary, the regulators will unnecessarily increase the already high

production costs for California f armers. We need Goal 2XL in our summer post

emergent weed control programs and we need Lorsban 4E or similar EC

formulations for effective in

- season control of aphid and plant bug. The

elimination of these formulations will result in significant cost incr eases

and decreased pest control. This decreased control could even result inadditional trips across the field with a tractor and sprayer and increased

pesticide use in our state.

Please reconsider your proposed VOC regulations.

Sincerely,

Clayton Houchin,

General Manager, Buttonwillow Warehouse Company

661

- 764

- 5234
#### Lacey Kurt PAIGE Plaintiff-Appellant v. Unknown TABER, Correctional Officer, et al. Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-3801

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 26, 2017

Filed: October 27, 2017

Lacey Kurt Paige, Pro Se

Eileen Ruppe Krispin, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office, Saint Louis, MO, for Defendants-Appellees

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Missouri inmate Lacey Paige appeals the district court’s1 adverse judgment entered upon a jury verdict in his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action. He argues that the district court improperly overruled his objections to a defense witness’s testimony, held the jury instruction conference before the defense presented its evidence, and prevented him from calling a witness.

After careful review of the trial record, we conclude: (i) the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Paige’s objections to testimony by the defense witness that was not contrary to the witness’s pretrial affidavit and was based on the witness’s general knowledge and knowledge acquired through his review of records prepared in ordinary course of business, see Allied Sys., Ltd, v. Teamsters Auto. Transp. Chauffeurs, 304 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2002); (ii) the court did not commit plain error with regard to the timing of the instruction conference, see Lighting & Power Servs. v. Roberts, 354 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 2004) (standard of review) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 51; and (iii) the court did not prevent Paige from calling a witness, but rather reasonably exercised its discretion in enforcing an agreement regarding the order in which witnesses subject to time constraints would be called, see Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 812 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm.

1

. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
#### Melinda Gabriella VALENZUELA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IBRAHIM, Unknown; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16051

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 18, 2017

*509Melinda Gabriella Valenzuela, Pro Se

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Arizona state prisoner Melinda Gabriella Valenzuela appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action following an order denying her application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), *Washington v. L.A. Cty. Sheriffs Dep’t,*833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016), and for an abuse of discretion its denial of leave to proceed IFP, *O’Loughlin v. Doe,*920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion, in denying Valenzuela leave to proceed IFP because Valenzuela failed to plausibly allege that she was “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time she lodged the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); *Andrews v. Cervantes,*493 F.3d 1047, 1054-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g)).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

LEOPOLDO ARTEAGA-REYNA, a.k.a.

Leopoldo Reyna Arteaga,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-10661

D.C. No. 4:13-cr-01290-RCC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Linda R. Reade, District Judge, Presiding**

Submitted November 18, 2014*** 

Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Leopoldo Arteaga-Reyna appeals the district court’s imposition of a 41-

month sentence following his guilty plea to reentry after deportation, in violation

FILED

DEC 02 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 

** The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief United States District Judge for

the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

 *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

Arteaga-Reyna contends that the district court erred in applying a 16-level

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because his prior conviction

under California Penal Code § 211 is not a crime of violence. Arteaga-Reyna’s

argument is foreclosed. See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 687 F.3d 1213, 1214-

16 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 958 (2013). 

Arteaga-Reyna also alleges that his 41-month sentence is substantively

unreasonable in light of his history and characteristics. We review the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Autery,

555 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2009). There is an abuse of discretion when the

district court “makes an error of law, when it rests its decision on clearly erroneous

findings of fact, or when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the

district court committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Ressam, 679

F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). We find no abuse of discretion in this case because the 41-month

sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing

factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 51 (2007). 

AFFIRMED.

2 13-10661
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Mary R. Chisholm, Deceased. Estate of Lewis S. Smith et al., Appellants; State Tax Commission, Respondent.

Argued April 8, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*845
      *Francis Dean*for appellants.

*Mortimer M. Kassell*and *Paul Newman*for respondent.

Order affirmed, without costs; no opinion.

Concur, Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Finch, J.
#### Mariano Fanti, Appellant, *v.*Travelers Insurance Company, Respondent.

Argued April 8, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*783
      *Harry P. Albert*for appellant.

*John G.*Donovan, *William J. Moran*and *Louis P. Galli*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Finch, J.
#### Billy Ray JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1787

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 24, 2017

Decided: August 28, 2017

Billy Ray Jackson, Appellant Pro Se. Kathleen Carole Buckner, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland; Vickie Elaine LeDuc, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*651PER CURIAM:

Billy Ray Jackson appeals the magistrate judge’s order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of Jackson’s claim for disability insurance benefits.* On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. *See*4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Jackson’s informal briefs do not challenge the basis for the magistrate judge’s disposition, Jackson has forfeited appellate review of the magistrate, judge’s order. *See Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,*370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

*

 The parties consented to a final disposition by the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2012).
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 40 (Tuesday, March 1, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 11494]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04227]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[License No. 05/05-0312]


Freeport Financial SBIC Fund, L.P.; Surrender of License of Small 
Business Investment Company

    Pursuant to the authority granted to the United States Small 
Business Administration under the Small Business Investment Act of 
1958, as amended, under Section 309 of the Act and Section 107.1900 of 
the Small Business Administration Rules and Regulations (13 CFR 
107.1900) to function as a small business investment company under the 
Small Business Investment Company License No. 05/05-0312 issued to 
Freeport Financial SBIC Fund, L.P. said license is hereby declared null 
and void.

    United States Small Business Administration.
Bailey DeVries,
Associate Administrator, Office of Investment and Innovation.
[FR Doc. 2022-04227 Filed 2-28-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAGAB MOHAMED REZEK,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 11-71497

Agency No. A078-014-621

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued December 10, 2014

Submitted March 24, 2015

Pasadena, California

Before: PREGERSON, NOONAN, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

Ragab Mohamed Rezek, a native and citizen of Egypt, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) final order dismissing his appeal of an

immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his asylum application as time-barred. The IJ

found that Rezek failed to establish extraordinary circumstances for filing his

FILED

MAR 26 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
asylum application approximately 16 months after the one-year deadline. But the

IJ did grant Rezek’s request for withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition to review the asylum application as

time-barred under the one-year rule.

The BIA did not err in determining that Rezek did not qualify for the

extraordinary circumstances exception to the one-year bar under the circumstances

of this case. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Neither Rezek’s pending adjustment

application nor his reliance on his wife’s representation that she could help him

remain in the United States qualified for the exception. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5). 

Further, Rezek’s pursuit of adjustment of status was not directly related to his

failure to meet the filing deadline as he could have pursued asylum and adjustment

of status concurrently. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158; 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5). Rezek does

not provide any authority to support his claim that an applicant’s pursuit of another

form of relief can excuse an untimely asylum application. This lack of authority is

more glaring in this case, where the applicant was statutorily ineligible for that

alternative form of relief. 

PETITION DENIED.

2
Exhibit 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. section1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Fona, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael Friess,
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),
as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



BY(Signature)                         /s/ Michael Friess
(Name and Title)                      Michael Friess, Chairman of the Board,
                                      President and Chief Executive Officer

(Date)                                May 9, 2011







                                       14
<PAGE>

                                 EXHIBIT 10.21


                        TANNING TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION
                               November 1, 1999



To:    Bipin Agarwal

From:  Larry Tanning

Re:    Five Quarter Compensation Plan


    As we have discussed, Tanning has developed a compensation plan for certain
senior executives for the five-quarter period beginning October 1, 1999 and
ending December 31, 1999.  Your cash compensation for the period will be an
annual rate of $192,500 ($8,020.83 on  a semi-monthly basis).

    Your existing employment and related agreements with Tanning (including
provisions relating to non-competition, etc.) will remain in full force and
effect except to the extent related to cash compensation matters.  As to all
matters relating to cash compensation, including cash incentive compensation and
bonus arrangements, the cash compensation described above will govern, effective
October 1, 1999.

    We are extremely excited about our company's future, and look forward to
more success together. Please indicate your agreement with the provisions of
this memorandum by signing below.

                                          Very truly yours,

                                          TANNING TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

                                          By:  /s/ Larry G. Tanning



AGREED AND ACCEPTED

By:  /s/ Bipin Agarwal
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Ronald J. Ivans,
Chief Financial Officer of the managing owner, Prudential Securities Futures Management Inc. (the Managing Owner), of Prudential Securities Strategic Trust (the Trust), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Trusts Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Quarterly
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                           |  |  |  | 
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | 
|/s/ Ronald J. Ivans                                                        |  |  |  | 
|                                                                           |  |  |  | 
|Ronald J. Ivans Chief Financial Officer of the Managing Owner May 14, 2004 |  |
<PAGE>
                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.1
                                THIRD AMENDMENT
                                    TO THE
                      AMENDED AND RESTATED BORROWING AGREEMENT


   THIS THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDED AND RESTATED BORROWING AGREEMENT (the 
"Amendment") dated as of January 31, 1997, is between SPS TRANSACTION SERVICES, 
INC. ("Borrower") and DEAN WITTER, DISCOVER & CO. ("Lender").

   WHEREAS, Borrower and Lender are parties to an Amended and Restated 
Borrowing Agreement, dated as of September 1, 1995, a First Amendment to the 
Amended and Restated Borrowing Agreement, dated as of May 6, 1996, and a Second 
Amendment to the Amended and Restated Borrowing Agreement, dated as of 
September 30, 1996 (collectively, the "Borrowing Agreement"), pursuant to which 
Lender has made certain loans to the Borrower; and

   WHEREAS, the Borrower and Lender desire to further amend the Borrowing 
Agreement.

   NOW THEREFORE, the Borrowing Agreement is amended as follows:

   1.  Each capitalized term used in this Amendment (and not otherwise defined 
       herein) shall have the same meaning as set forth in the Borrowing       
       Agreement.

   2.  Section 2.01(a) of the Borrowing Agreement is hereby amended in its   
       entirety and henceforth shall read as follows:

         (a) Revolving Loan Commitment.  Subject to the terms and conditions of 
       this Borrowing Agreement and relying upon representations, warranties   
       and covenants of Borrower set forth herein, Lender shall make loans (all 
       such loans made pursuant to this Section 2.01(a) being referred to      
       herein  collectively as the "Loans") to Borrower at any time and from   
       time to time prior to the Commitment Termination Date, in an aggregate  
       principal amount not exceeding at any one time outstanding             
       $1,250,000,000 (the "Commitment").  Prior to the Commitment Termination 
       Date, Lender shall have no obligation to make advances to the extent any 
       requested advance would cause the principal amount outstanding under the 
       Revolving Notes to exceed the Commitment, provided, that Lender may 
       elect (but shall not be obligated) from time to time to make advances in 
       excess of the Commitment.

   3.  Except as provided herein, the terms and conditions of the Borrowing    
       Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.


   IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be duly 
executed as of the date first written above.

SPS TRANSACTION SERVICES, INC.                    DEAN WITTER, DISCOVER & CO.

By:  Thomas M. Goldstein                          By:  Birendra Kumar

Title:  Vice President - Finance                  Title: Treasurer