In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3291

WALTER V. LOVE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JP CULLEN & SONS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:12 –cv-00689-NJ — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2014 — DECIDED MARCH 9, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and MANION, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. In February 2008, Walter V. Love 

was dismissed from the construction site on which he 

worked after a physical altercation with another site worker. 

JP Cullen & Sons, Inc. was the general contractor responsible 

for the project. Cullen employed a subcontractor—Eugene

Matthews, Inc.—who employed a second subcontractor—

Union Contracting, Inc.—which in turn employed Love. 
2 No. 13-3291

Love brought a Title VII action against Cullen, alleging that 

his job site dismissal was racially motivated. Since Cullen 

was not Love’s direct employer, Love needed to demonstrate 

that Cullen could still be held liable under Title VII as his indirect employer. The district court concluded that Love 

failed to demonstrate such a relationship, and therefore 

granted summary judgment in favor of Cullen in September 

2013. We now affirm.

I. Background

J.P. Cullen & Sons, Inc. was the general contractor on the 

Milwaukee city hall renovation project (“city hall project”), 

which spanned from September 2005 through December 

2008. One condition of Cullen’s contract with the city was its 

compliance with the city’s residency preference program, 

which required that a given percentage of all hours worked 

on certain city contracts be allocated to unemployed residents of a specified area. In order to ensure compliance with 

the residency program, Cullen selected a recruiting firm to 

aid in hiring. 

One of Cullen’s subcontractors on the renovation project 

was Eugene Matthews, Inc. (“EMI), which, under the terms 

of its contract with Cullen, was permitted to select its own 

subcontractors within certain parameters (for instance, Cullen required its subcontractors to hire union workers). One 

of EMI’s subcontractors was Union Contracting, Inc. 

(“UCI”), which hired Walter V. Love to work on the city hall

project. Love was hired by UCI as a foreman in June 2007,

and his duties included shipping and receiving, managing 

laborers, and ensuring that necessary materials were on site 

and properly staged. Love expected to continue working for 

UCI after completion of the city hall project. 
No. 13-3291 3

UCI, which had no contractual relationship with Cullen, 

paid Love’s salary and provided all other benefits. UCI also 

set Love’s hours. Scott Henninger, the job superintendent for 

UCI, received general work instructions from Cullen and 

passed those instructions on to Love. Cullen only gave specific directions about how to carry out assignments if it reviewed a finished product and found it unsatisfactory; under those circumstances, Cullen would communicate instructions for further work to a UCI supervisor.

Cullen’s contract with EMI also required that EMI furnish all labor, materials, equipment, and services necessary 

to complete its work. However, Cullen did make a few bulk 

purchases of materials that it provided to EMI. Cullen also 

controlled physical access to the project site. It further required all subcontractor employees to attend periodic safety 

training meetings. However, Cullen provided no additional 

training or instruction. Most relevant to this appeal, in the 

event of “serious incidents” involving threats to workplace 

safety or worker productivity, Cullen retained the right to 

investigate alleged misconduct by its subcontractors’ employees, to discipline them if necessary, and to permanently 

remove them from the job site. Cullen admits that it reserved

the final decision regarding the continued presence of any 

worker on the project site. 

On February 28, 2008, Love, who is African-American, 

was involved in an altercation with Arthur Mahan, another

African-American employee of a different subcontractor. 

The facts of the altercation are disputed in this appeal. Love 

claims that Mahan confronted him and that Love attempted 

to verbally diffuse the situation. Cullen contends that Love 
4 No. 13-3291

may have pulled a knife1 during the altercation and enlisted 

other site workers as “enforcers” to seek revenge on Mahan 

after the quarrel concluded. As a result of the altercation, 

Cullen’s superintendent, Don Berendsen, ordered both Mahan and Love permanently removed from the job site, even 

though Berendsen supposedly concluded that Mahan was 

the instigator. Berendsen apparently initially concluded that 

only Mahan should be removed, and that Love should be 

suspended from the job site for one day. However, Mahan’s 

employer—Artega Construction—evidently became upset 

by this decision and demanded that Love also be removed 

from the job site. Berendsen agreed and ordered both Mahan 

and Love permanently removed.

Henninger, UCI’s superintendent, attempted to persuade 

Berendsen to reinstate Love, but Berendsen refused. Love 

contends that Berendsen threatened to end the contract with 

UCI if Love was not removed. After his removal, Love was 

unable to secure further employment with UCI, which had 

no other pending projects to which it could assign him. According to Love, there was another physical altercation between two Caucasian workers at the city hall project site that

was similar to the Love-Mahan argument, but resulted in no 

significant disciplinary action against either worker.

While Love’s primary claim of racial discrimination derives from Cullen’s removal of Love from the project site, 

Love also alleges several other instances of disparate treat1 Love contends that Cullen’s superintendent concluded that Mahan had 

lied about the knife, and that Love had a cellular phone in his hand instead. However, the particular details of the altercation are ultimately 

irrelevant to our determination of whether Cullen was Love’s indirect 

employer for Title VII purposes.

 
No. 13-3291 5

ment on account of race that occurred prior to his dismissal. 

For example, Love notes that in November or December 

2007, a Caucasian worker hung a noose at the construction 

site, which remained in place for two weeks despite numerous complaints to Cullen from African-American workers on 

the job site. Love also contends that Caucasian workers in 

the lunch area provided by Cullen routinely used the “N”

word to describe their African-American coworkers. Love 

reported this behavior to Cullen’s mason foreman, but Cullen made no attempt to stop the behavior. Love further contends that minority workers were repeatedly passed over for 

Cullen’s “Partner of the Month” award. 

Love filed suit in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin, alleging that Cullen discriminated and retaliated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e et seq. Both parties consented to the entry of final 

judgment by a magistrate judge. Cullen moved for summary 

judgment on the ground that it was not Love’s employer for 

Title VII purposes. Although the district court recognized 

that a defendant who is not a direct employer may nevertheless be subject to Title VII liability if the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant functioned as a de facto or indirect 

employer, the court found that Love failed to make the requisite demonstration. The court ultimately concluded that 

“indirect employer liability depends on the amount of control a putative Title VII defendant exerts over the plaintiff’s 

employment.” Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 

862, 865 (E.D. Wis. 2013). The court conducted a careful 

analysis of the nature and extent of the control that Cullen

exercised over Love’s employment and determined that, 

based on the undisputed evidence in the record, Cullen was 
6 No. 13-3291

not Love’s employer for Title VII purposes. The district court 

subsequently granted summary judgment to Cullen. Love 

appeals. 

II. Discussion

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Stable Inv. P’ship v. Vilsack, 775 F.3d 910, 915 (7th 

Cir. 2015). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the 

court must construe all facts and inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Foskett v. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., 518 F.3d 

518, 522 (7th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate 

when no genuine issue of material fact exists such that no 

reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. Hedberg v. Ind, 

Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1995).

This appeal does not concern the merits of Love’s racial 

discrimination claims. Rather, we analyze whether Cullen—

who was not Love’s direct employer—nevertheless exercised 

sufficient control over Love in the workplace such that Cullen is a proper defendant under Title VII. For reasons we articulate below, we conclude that Cullen exercised insufficient control over Love, such that no reasonable jury could 

conclude that Cullen was Love’s indirect employer under 

Title VII.

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 

any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII defines “employer” as “a 

person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
No. 13-3291 7

fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 

twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 

calendar year, and any agent of such a person,” 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e(b), while an “employee” is defined broadly, as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

In order to bring a Title VII claim against Cullen, Love 

must prove the existence of an employer–employee relationship. Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377, 

380 (7th Cir. 1991). It is undisputed that Love was not a direct employee of Cullen; rather, Love was an employee of 

UCI, a subcontractor of EMI, which was a subcontractor of 

Cullen. However, a plaintiff may have multiple employers 

for the purpose of Title VII liability. See Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 

526 F.3d 1074, 1088 (7th Cir. 2008). It is also well established 

in this circuit that a plaintiff can, under certain limited circumstances, bring a claim against a defendant who is not his 

direct employer. See EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 169 (7th 

Cir. 1995).

The district court stated that “the standard for determining when an entity is a de facto [or indirect] employer is unsettled” in this circuit. Love, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 865. The district court identified two allegedly distinct tests that we have

applied to determine whether a defendant can be deemed an 

indirect employer. The first is a five-factor test, developed in 

Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 950 F.2d 

at 378–79. That test balances five factors relevant to an employer–employee relationship: (1) the extent of the employer’s control and supervision over the employee; (2) the kind 

of occupation and nature of skill required, including whether skills were acquired on the job; (3) the employer’s responsibility for the costs of operation; (4) the method and form of 
8 No. 13-3291

payment and benefits; and (5) the length of the job commitment. Id.

The district court also articulated a second test, which 

considers the amount of control exerted by the alleged de 

facto employer, see EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d at 169, with a 

particular emphasis on the “economic realities” of the employment relationship. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1088. Indeed, the 

parties also treat the “economic realities” inquiry and the 

Knight five-factor analysis as competing standards. However, the five-factor Knight test and the “economic realities” 

test are not two independent, mutually exclusive inquiries. 

Rather, the Knight test is merely a more structured analysis 

of whether the putative employer exercised sufficient control, and whether the “economic realities” are such that the 

putative employer can be held liable under Title VII.

In Knight itself, we conceptualized the five factors as an 

operationalization of the “economic realities” test:

[I]n reaching this conclusion [that plaintiff was 

an independent contractor rather than an employee], the court correctly recognized the use 

of the “economic realities” test which involves 

the application of the general principles of 

agency to the facts. Of several factors to be 

considered, the employer’s right to control is 

the most important when determining whether 

an individual is an employee or an independent contractor.

Knight, 950 F.2d at 378–79 (citations omitted). The Knight

court went on to recite the five factors relied upon by the 

district court, id., to which subsequent decisions have cited 
No. 13-3291 9

as helpful in resolving whether an entity constitutes an employer for Title VII purposes. See e.g., Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d

249, 263 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Heinemeier v. Chemetco, Inc., 

246 F.3d 1078, 1082 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[w]hen 

facing questions regarding the employer–employee relationship under Title VII ... we ‘look to the ‘economic realities’ of 

the relationship and the degree of control the employer exercises’” (citing Knight, 950 F.2d at 378–80, and articulating the 

five Knight factors)).

Furthermore, the five-factor Knight test and the “economic realities” inquiry are not substantively incompatible. The 

“economic realities” test purports to examine the amount of 

control that a de facto employer had over a plaintiff, while 

also considering the financial underpinnings of the relationship. The Knight five-factor analysis also examines the issue 

of control, by asking who provided the relevant materials 

and instructions to the plaintiff, as well as the financial parameters of the employment arrangement, by inquiring 

about form of payment and benefits. Thus, the five Knight

factors are simply a more detailed application of the economic and control considerations present in the “economic 

realities” test. We therefore proceed by examining each 

Knight factor to determine both how much control Cullen 

exerted over Love, and also what the economic realities of 

their relationship were, in order to determine whether Cullen may be liable under Title VII.

The first of the five Knight factors examines the extent to 

which the putative employer controlled or supervised the 

alleged employee, including whether the employer provided 

direction with respect to scheduling and performance of the 

work. Knight, 950 F.2d at 378. As we noted in Knight, the 
10 No. 13-3291

employer’s right to control is the “most important” consideration in ascertaining the existence of an employer–

employee relationship. Id. In Alexander v. Rush North Shore 

Medical Center, we observed in our application of the “control factor” that “[i]f an employer has the right to control and 

direct the work of an individual, not only as to the result to be 

achieved, but also as to the details by which that result is achieved, 

an employer/employee relationship is likely to exist.” 101 

F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Here, Love 

generally received instructions directly from UCI. If Cullen

reviewed a finished product and found it unsatisfactory,

Cullen would communicate any further instructions to a 

UCI supervisor. This minimal supervision is essentially limited to “the result to be achieved,” which militates against a 

finding of control.

However, our control analysis is further informed by this 

court’s opinion in EEOC v. Illinois, where we emphasized 

that, when control is examined, “the key powers are, naturally, those of hiring and firing.” 69 F.3d at 171. Although

EEOC dealt specifically with a claim brought under the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), it also considered the standard for establishing an employer–employee

relationship under Title VII. The EEOC court noted that if a 

defendant “pull[ed] the strings in the background ... a point 

would soon be reached at which the [defendant] was the de 

facto employer and the [direct employers] merely its 

agents.” Id. at 171–72. 

Love argues that Cullen controlled his hiring because 

Cullen required its subcontractors to hire union workers. 

Cullen’s contract with the City of Milwaukee required that 

Cullen abide by the residency preference program, and in 
No. 13-3291 11

order to ensure compliance, Cullen selected a recruiting firm 

to assist with the hiring of subcontractors. However, there is 

no evidence that Cullen had any specific involvement in 

Love’s hiring—UCI hired its own employees, including 

Love. 

Yet the question of Love’s firing is a closer one. One of 

the crucial powers that Cullen retained with respect to Love 

was the ability to remove him permanently from the work 

site, which, in this case, essentially amounted to a termination of Love’s employment with UCI. Cullen admits that it 

retained the final decision regarding the continued presence 

of any worker on the project site if that individual presented 

a threat to workplace safety or worker productivity or wellbeing. Here, Cullen ordered Love’s permanent removal from 

the job site, over the objection of Love’s direct supervisor, 

UCI superintendent Henninger, who asked Cullen to keep 

Love on the project. Love even asserts that Cullen threatened 

to end UCI’s contract if Henninger did not comply with 

Love’s removal. Because UCI had no other jobs to which it 

could assign Love at the time, Love argues that his removal 

from the project rendered him effectively unemployed.

However, the record lacks any evidence that Cullen attempted to jeopardize Love’s continued employment with 

UCI or his placement on other UCI projects. The fact that no 

other UCI projects were available when Cullen dismissed 

Love from the city hall project was wholly unrelated to Cullen’s actions. And while it is true that Cullen had the ability 

to unilaterally remove Love from the job site without the 

consent of UCI, it is still true that Cullen did not directly hire

Cullen, did not set his hours, and did not directly supervise 

his work. Therefore, Cullen’s workplace control over Love—
12 No. 13-3291

or lack thereof—weighs in favor of finding that Cullen is not 

Love’s indirect employer under Title VII.

The second factor in evaluating an indirect employment 

relationship is the type of occupation and nature of the skills 

required for the position in question, “including whether 

skills are obtained in the workplace.” Knight, 950 F.2d at 378. 

Cullen required the employees of all subcontractors to attend periodic safety training meetings, but this was the only 

instruction Cullen provided; any other training was provided to Love by UCI. We conclude that this safety training 

alone is insufficient to weigh in favor of an employer–

employee relationship here. It is expected that a general contractor will provide broad safety instructions to anyone 

working on its construction site. This small amount of control is not what we had in mind in Knight when we articulated this factor. In Knight, the district court previously concluded that while the plaintiff obtained training from her putative employer, because the plaintiff was free to leave the 

company at any time and use her skills elsewhere, this 

weighed in favor of finding that the company was not the 

plaintiff’s employer under Title VII. Id. at 379. We agreed 

with the district court’s analysis, concluding that “it was her 

application of those skills that mattered” in determining 

whether an employer–employee relationship existed. Id. at 

380. Here, Love obtained minimal instruction from Cullen in 

the form of safety trainings, and he was very likely able to 

use the information that he learned from these trainings on 

other construction jobs. Thus, Cullen’s safety trainings do 
No. 13-3291 13

not weigh in favor of finding that Cullen was Love’s indirect 

or de facto employer under Title VII.2

The third Knight factor relates to whether the putative 

employer was responsible for the costs of operation, including the costs of “equipment, supplies, fees, licenses, workplace, and maintenance of operations.” Id. at 378. Cullen’s 

contract with EMI required that EMI—not Cullen—furnish 

all labor, materials, equipment, and services necessary to 

complete its work. (Presumably, EMI provided these materials to UCI, which in turn provided them to Love.) Because it 

was EMI—rather than Cullen—that ultimately provided materials to Love, this factor also weighs against finding an

employer–employee relationship between Cullen and Love.3

The fourth factor, which considers whether the putative 

employer was responsible for providing payment and benefits, Knight 950 F.2d at 378–79, also cuts against Love’s position. Love received all paychecks and W–2s directly from 

UCI, not Cullen. There is no indication that Cullen ever paid 

2 Our conclusion is consistent with the understanding of more than one

district court in this circuit. See, e.g., Fly v. Walsh Constr. Co., No. 3:10-CV126, 2011 WL 6152193, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 12, 2011); see also EEOC v. 

Foster Wheeler Constr., Inc., No. 98-C-1601, 1999 WL 515524, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 

July 14, 1999) (noting that “[s]ome subcontractor employees may have 

attended [Foster Wheeler]’s new hire orientation,” but finding this fact 

did not rise to the level of establishing an employment relationship).

3 Love notes that Cullen made a few bulk materials purchases, which it 

then provided to EMI. EMI, however, was one step removed from Love 

in the contractor–subcontractor chain (EMI hired UCI, which in turn 

hired Love). However, to hold that Cullen’s actions of providing materials to EMI had the effect of creating an employer–employee relationship 

with Love would seem to over-exaggerate the significance of those actions as they relate to Cullen’s relationship with Love.

 
14 No. 13-3291

Love for his work, or that Cullen provided Love any other 

benefits of employment, such as insurance or vacation time. 

Still, Love argues that Cullen effectively dictated his wages, 

which weighs in favor of an employer–employee relationship. See e.g., Heinemeier, 246 F.3d at 1083. Love argues this, 

however, by emphasizing that Cullen required all subcontractors to hire union workers, whose wages are controlled

by the union. This is ultimately irrelevant. In EEOC, we concluded that fixing a minimum salary for teachers “is after all 

not much different from fixing a minimum wage for private 

as well as public employees, and no one supposes that the 

federal government is the indirect employer of all the workers covered by the federal minimum-wage law.” 69 F.3d at 

171. Therefore, we conclude that the payment and benefits 

factor also weighs against finding that Cullen is Love’s indirect employer. In other words, the “economic realities” of 

Cullen’s relationship with Love were not such that we 

should regard Cullen as Love’s de facto employer under Title VII.

The final Knight factor, which examines the length of the 

employee’s job commitment and/or the expectations of the 

parties, 950 F.2d at 379, also weighs against Love’s argument 

that Cullen is his indirect employer. Love worked on the city 

hall project from June 2007 until February 2008, or roughly 

eight months. It is undisputed that Love intended to remain 

employed with UCI—not Cullen—after the city hall project 

was completed. The record reveals no expectation on the 

part of Cullen that Love would continue working on Cullen’s projects, nor does it reveal that Love expected the same.

Given these expectations, we cannot conclude that this factor 

weighs in favor of an employer–employee relationship here.
No. 13-3291 15

Based on our application of the five-factor test, Love cannot demonstrate that Cullen “so far controlled [his] employment relationship that it was appropriate to regard [Cullen] as [his] de facto or indirect employer.” EEOC v. Illinois, 

69 F.3d at 169. Although we have previously held that a 

plaintiff can survive summary judgment even when not all 

factors support him, see e.g., Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d at 264, 

Love’s case is distinct in that none of the factors assessing 

Cullen’s level of control weigh in Love’s favor. In Worth, we

held that an issue of material fact existed with respect to 

whether the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, 

even when some of our control analysis cut in favor of finding no employment relationship. Id. We explained that although plaintiff set her own schedule and did not receive 

health insurance, sick leave, or vacation time, id. at 263–64, 

she could nevertheless be deemed defendant’s employee because “[defendants] controlled all of Worth’s work actions 

by setting her hours, assigning her projects and approving 

her work. ... Defendants provided all the costs of operation 

for Worth’s work, and Tyer and Worth discussed the possibility of being promoted.” Id. at 264 (citations omitted). Here, 

none of these considerations support Love’s argument. Cullen did not set Love’s hours, did not assign or directly supervise his projects, and did not have the ability to promote 

or demote Love, aside from its ability to remove Love from 

the job site for safety reasons. Additionally, the control factors lacking in Worth are also absent here for Love—such as 

the fact that Cullen did not provide Love with health insurance, sick leave, or vacation time. On these facts, a reasonable jury could not find that Cullen exercised sufficient control over Love to be considered his indirect employer under 
16 No. 13-3291

Title VII, and we therefore find that the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment in favor of Cullen was appropriate.

Finally, in addition to his arguments about control, Love

contends that an issue of fact remains as to whether Cullen 

was his indirect employer because Cullen “directed the discriminatory act, practice, or policy of which [Love] is complaining.” Worth, 276 F.3d at 260. Indeed, cases from this circuit have stated that an entity other than the direct employer 

“may be considered an employer under Title VII ... if the 

[entity] ‘directed the discriminatory act, practice, or policy of 

which the employee is complaining.’” Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 

1088. Exclusive of other considerations, it initially appears

that Love makes a colorable argument that Cullen directed 

the allegedly discriminatory act, as it was Cullen that made 

the decision to remove Love from the city hall project, over 

the objection of Love’s direct employer UCI. 

However, two problems arise with Love’s argument. 

First, the “discriminatory act,” that Love complains of is—

for Title VII purposes—his firing, which he claims is synonymous with his dismissal from the city hall project job site. 

However, in assessing Cullen’s level of control over Love, 

we determined that Cullen’s dismissal of Love from the city 

hall project was qualitatively different from the termination 

of Love’s employment relationship with UCI. In fact, we 

concluded above that, on the record before us, Cullen had no 

effect on Love’s continued employment with UCI, even if 

UCI happened not to have any jobs to which it could assign 

Love after his city hall project dismissal. Therefore, in assessing whether Cullen “directed the discriminatory act,” we 

first question that Love’s dismissal from the city hall project 
No. 13-3291 17

can be properly characterized a “discriminatory act” under 

Title VII.

Second, evidence that a de facto employer “directed the 

discriminatory act” is not—without more—enough to establish a de facto employer–employee relationship under Title 

VII. In Tamayo v. Blagojevich, we considered whether the putative employer “directed the discriminatory act,” but concluded that the de facto employer—the Illinois Department 

of Revenue (“IDOR”)—exercised sufficient control over the 

plaintiff such that it was a proper defendant under Title VII.

526 F.3d at 1089. We cited to evidence in the plaintiff’s complaint alleging that IDOR controlled the plaintiff’s compensation, which was especially relevant given that the plaintiff’s suit was based on an alleged gender-based disparity in 

pay. Here, while Cullen’s involvement in Love’s dismissal 

from the city hall project is certainly relevant to their relationship, it is not enough to overcome our analysis under the 

Knight factors, which shows that Cullen—in the aggregate—

exercised very little control over Love in the course of their 

relationship. For these reasons, this final consideration does 

not alter our conclusion that Cullen exercised insufficient 

control over Love, and that Cullen is not liable as an indirect 

employer under Title VII.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court.