[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12840

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

In re: ELIZABETH RICHERT, 

Debtor.

______________________________________________

ELIZABETH RICHERT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus

KATHLEEN WHITE MURPHY, 

THOMAS WHITE, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12840

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-20779-RNS,

Bkcy No. 1:22-bk-16713-RAM

____________________

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Elizabeth Richert seeks the protections of federal 

bankruptcy law from a variety of creditors. On appeal, the district 

court affirmed several orders entered by the bankruptcy court. 

Now, Richert argues here that the bankruptcy court erred in 

granting a creditor’s extension of time to respond, in converting 

her bankruptcy proceeding, and in allowing one of the claims 

against her. We lack jurisdiction to hear the first of these appeals, 

and we affirm the other orders.

I

In August 2022, Richert filed a petition for Chapter 13 

bankruptcy in the Southern District of Florida. But the roots of this 

dispute go back much further. Among the creditors who sought to 

enforce claims against Richert in the bankruptcy proceeding were 

Kathleen White Murphy and Thomas White. Their claims arose 

from a long-running—and highly litigious—family feud, centered 

on the proceeds of a property and trust in Illinois. Murphy and 

White submitted to the bankruptcy court memorandum opinions 

and orders from the Northern District of Illinois addressing

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Richert’s conduct as trustee. They sought to enforce that court’s

award of monetary damages and attorney’s fees against Richert for 

her breach of fiduciary duty, which the court found “involved 

reprehensible conduct and was committed with an evil mind.”

Richert’s bankruptcy did not proceed smoothly. The 

bankruptcy court entered an order that directed her to file a 

Chapter 13 plan, make five monthly payments, provide documents 

verifying her claimed interest in various properties, file amended 

schedules, and appear for a required bankruptcy examination. 

Richert, however, filed a plan that relied on selling the property in 

dispute in the Illinois case, as well as on trust income for which she 

had provided no proof other than documents so heavily redacted 

that they provided no information for the bankruptcy court. 

Moreover, she failed to respond to material questions during her 

bankruptcy examination—including about the source of her 

asserted income—and she admitted that the schedules she had filed 

were inaccurate.

As a result of Richert’s lack of compliance, the bankruptcy 

court involuntarily converted Richert’s proceedings from Chapter 

13 to Chapter 7, at Murphy’s and White’s request. The court also 

denied Richert’s motions to reconsider and to reconvert. The 

bankruptcy court eventually overruled Richert’s objection to 

Murphy’s and White’s claim and held that the claim was “valid and 

allowed.”

In the midst of this bankruptcy proceeding, Jeffrey Jacobson

entered the fray. He filed a proof of claim for the legal services he 

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performed representing Richert in the Northern District of Illinois 

litigation. Richert objected to Jacobson’s claim. When Jacobson 

failed to respond to the objection before the thirty-day deadline, 

Richert moved to strike his claim. Jacobson then requested an 

extension of time to respond, because he had not yet obtained 

counsel and was absorbed with family health issues. The 

bankruptcy court found that Jacobson’s failure to respond was the 

result of excusable neglect and caused no prejudice to Richert. The 

court, therefore, granted the extension. 

Richert appealed these decisions to the district court. The 

district court affirmed the conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 

7, the denial of the motions to reconsider and to reconvert the 

proceeding, and the allowance of Murphy’s and White’s claim. 

Additionally, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction to 

review the extension of time granted to Jacobson.

II

We are obliged to sua sponte consider our jurisdiction, 

which we review de novo. Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141, 1143 

(11th Cir. 2023). The issue of jurisdiction “cannot be waived” and 

cannot be “conferred upon the court by the parties.” Univ. of S. 

Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)

(quotation omitted). 

When we hear appeals from district courts’ review of 

bankruptcy proceedings, we review “factual findings for clear 

error, and the district court’s determinations of law” de novo.

Englander v. Mills (In re Englander), 95 F.3d 1028, 1030 (11th Cir. 

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1996). We review denials of rehearing only for abuse of discretion. 

Kellogg v. Schreiber (In re Kellogg), 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 

1999).

III

Because it concerns the power of the courts to hear a claim, 

we must first assure ourselves of our jurisdiction. The distinction 

between “interlocutory” and “final” orders is critical here. This 

Court has no jurisdiction over the former. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. 

Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 39 (2020); see also Slobodinsky v. 

Salkin (In re Saber), 264 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001). A 

bankruptcy order is “final” when it “ends the litigation on the 

merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute its 

judgment.” In re Saber, 264 F.3d at 1324 (quotation omitted). 

“In the bankruptcy context, however, finality is not limited 

to the last order that concludes an entire bankruptcy case.” United 

States v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. (In re Hillsborough Holdings 

Corp.), 116 F.3d 1391, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). To avoid appeals that 

overturn decisions on which months or years of bankruptcy actions

were based, Congress permits review of orders that resolve “a 

‘proceeding’—even if it does not resolve the entire case.” Al 

Zawawi v. Diss (In re Al Zawawi), 97 F.4th 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 

2024). Such orders involve (1) “a discrete procedural sequence, 

including notice and a hearing,” and (2) occur “before and apart 

from the proceedings on the merits of creditors’ claims.” Id. at 1251 

(quoting Ritzen, 589 U.S. at 43). 

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The bankruptcy court’s decision to grant Jacobson 

additional time to respond is interlocutory. It does not dispose of 

any “claim” or “proceeding.” See Barben v. Donovan (In re Donovan), 

532 F.3d 1134, 1137 (11th Cir. 2008). Even though disallowing 

Jacobson’s request for an extension may have resulted in the denial 

of his claim, that does not make the court’s decision to grant the 

extension a final order. An extension, instead, is an order that 

“merely preserves the status quo.” Smith v. First Nat’l Bank of Albany 

(In re Smith), 735 F.2d 459, 461 (11th Cir. 1984). Far from ending 

any portion of the litigation, the order permitted a claim to 

continue to consideration of the merits. As a result, we lack 

jurisdiction to hear the appeal of this order. 

In contrast, we have jurisdiction to hear Richert’s appeal of 

the bankruptcy court’s decision to convert the proceeding. 

Converting her bankruptcy from one conducted under Chapter 13 

to one conducted under Chapter 7 was a “discrete procedural 

sequence.” Ritzen, 589 U.S. at 43. Indeed, the bankruptcy code 

requires “notice and a hearing” before a proceeding is converted. 

11 U.S.C. § 1307(c); Ritzen, 589 U.S. at 43. Moreover, the form that 

a bankruptcy proceeding takes is “before and apart” from the 

merits, as it regards control over the debtor’s assets during the 

pendency of the proceeding and what assets are shielded from 

creditors. Ritzen, 589 U.S. at 43; see also Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 871 

F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2017). This conclusion is “in accordance 

with all other courts of which we are aware that have considered 

the issue.” Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 770 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). 

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The same is true for Richert’s appeal of the order allowing 

Murphy’s and White’s claim. Allowed claims are those approved 

by the court to take part in the distribution of the debtor’s estate. 

11 U.S.C. § 726; see also Ziino v. Baker, 613 F.3d 1326, 1328 (11th Cir. 

2010). The order held that the claim was “valid and allowed in its 

entirety.” Allowing a bankruptcy claim, therefore, leaves little “for 

the court to do but execute the judgment.” In re Al Zawari, 97 F.4th 

at 1250 (quotation omitted). 

IV

We now turn to the merits where we have jurisdiction. 

First, Richert argues that the bankruptcy court erred when it 

converted her case to a Chapter 7 proceeding. Second, she contests 

the bankruptcy court’s allowance of Murphy’s and White’s claim, 

which she argues violated her constitutional rights. We disagree

and therefore affirm both orders.

A.

A bankruptcy court may convert a proceeding to one 

conducted under Chapter 7 “for cause.” 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). 

Although courts are not limited to the statute’s “nonexclusive” list, 

expressly enumerated causes include “unreasonable delay by the 

debtor that is prejudicial to creditors,” “failure to file a plan timely,” 

and “denial of confirmation of a plan.” Marrama v. Citizens Bank of 

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 373 (2007); 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1), (3), 

(5). 

Here, Richert argues that the bankruptcy court erred in 

converting her proceeding based on her alleged bad conduct and 

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lack of sufficient assets to fund a Chapter 13 plan. The record 

shows that she consistently failed to comply with bankruptcy court 

orders or to substantiate her claimed income and assets. She 

redacted (without approval) nearly all the content of the 

documents she submitted to verify her interests in various 

properties and trusts, failed to respond to pertinent questions at the

bankruptcy examination ordered by the court, and filed admittedly 

“inaccurate” and “incomplete” amended schedules. Additionally, 

the court in the related Illinois litigation found that she had 

previously violated her fiduciary duties with “reprehensible 

conduct” that “was committed with an evil mind.”1 The 

bankruptcy court could rely on a finding of bad faith conduct to

support its decision to convert the proceeding. See Marrama, 549 

U.S. at 367–72. These factors more than sufficiently justify the 

bankruptcy court’s decision to convert Richert’s proceeding. See 

also Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 

719 F.3d 1253, 1261–66 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Richert’s primary argument appears to be based on 

preclusion. She argues that a judgment from the related litigation 

in Illinois bound the bankruptcy court to recognize Richert’s 

1 Although Richert contested some of these factors before the district court, 

she does not meaningfully challenge them here on appeal. But in any event, 

her arguments are incorrect. The debtor’s failure to comply with court orders, 

provide accurate schedules, and to verify assets required to fund a Chapter 13 

plan are relevant bases for finding “good cause” to convert. See 11 U.S.C. § 

1307(c); see also Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 

719 F.3d 1253, 1261–63 (11th Cir. 2013).

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claimed ownership of certain property in Illinois when considering 

whether she had sufficient assets to proceed under the Chapter 13 

plan. Although there is substantial reason to doubt Richert’s 

characterization of the Illinois decision and whether res judicata 

applies, we need not reach the merits of this argument here. “To 

obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on 

multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that 

every stated ground for the judgment against [her] is incorrect.” 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 

2014). The bankruptcy court converted the proceeding because of 

the deficiency of Richert’s verified assets, her failures to comply 

with court orders, and her demonstrated bad faith. Her record of 

non-compliance and bad faith sufficed to support the conversion 

regardless of the status of the assets tied to the Illinois litigation. 

See In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1261–66. For similar reasons, the 

bankruptcy court did not err in denying Richert’s motions to 

reconsider this order and to reconvert the proceeding back to 

Chapter 13. 2

2 Richert also contends that she does not fall under the definition of “debtor” 

for purposes of Chapter 7 because she still qualifies as a debtor under Chapter 

13. She offers no support for this assertion. The statute merely requires that 

the bankrupt individual qualify as a “debtor” under Chapter 7 in order for the 

proceeding to be converted. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(g). Chapter 7, however, 

contains no requirement that the individual not qualify as a debtor under a 

separate chapter. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b). 

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B.

Richert’s appeal of the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow

Murphy’s and White’s claim fairs no better. She asserts that this 

decision “violated” her “constitutional rights to equal protection 

and due process” and her “right to access to the courts.” Richert 

provides no further explanation and cites no authority. This 

conclusory and unsubstantiated argument is insufficient to 

preserve this issue on appeal. “We have long held that an appellant 

abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to 

it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting 

arguments and authority.” Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. Because she 

“does not otherwise develop the argument in” her briefs, Richert’s 

bare assertion that the bankruptcy court’s handling of Murphy’s 

and White’s claim violated her constitutional rights has been

abandoned. FTC v. Simple Health Plans LLC, 58 F.4th 1322, 1330 

(11th Cir. 2023).

* * *

We DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction Richert’s appeal of the 

order extending time to respond, and we AFFIRM the conversion 

of the proceeding to Chapter 7 and the allowance of Murphy’s and 

White’s claim.

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