Opinion issued November 19, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 14
- 00484
- CR NO. 01
- 14
- 00485
- CR 1

——————————— CORBIK REECE , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee
On Appeal from the 174 t h District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se Nos. 13 3 8724 & 1338725

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Corbik Reece, proceeding pro se and incarcerated, pleaded guilty
to two counts of the first

- degree felony offense of aggravated robbery with a

1 Appellate cause no. 01

- 1 4

- 00 484

- C R ; trial court cause n o. 1338724

. Appellate cause no. 01

- 14

- 00 485

- C R ; trial court cause no. 1338725

.2

deadly weapon on June 17, 2013, without an agreed recommendation from the State as to punishment

. See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § § 29.03(a)(2) , (b) (West Supp. 2014). The trial court initi ally certified, on June 17, 2013, that both of these

cases were not plea

- bargained cases, and Reece had the right of appeal. At sentencing, however, Reec e enter ed into an agreed plea bargain in exchange for the State dismissing two charges and recommendin g twenty years’ confinement as to punishment . On May 1 , 2014, i n accordance with the terms of Reece’s plea bargain with the State, the trial court assessed appellant’s punishment as a
concurrent sentence of twenty years ’ confinement, but the judgments of convictions stated that no permission to appeal was granted

. Reece timely file d a pro se notice of appeal in each case, contending that t h e trial court had granted him permission to appeal

. After abatement, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered amended certifications stating that these were plea

- bargained cases, and that Reece had no right of appeal.
We dismiss both appeal s for want of jurisdiction

. B ACKGROUND On April 25 , 2012, Reece was indicted twice by a grand jury for the first

– degree felony offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon , both charges arising from a single incident that o ccurr ed on February 28, 2012 , but involving two different complainants. Reece was indicted for aggravated robbery with a3

deadly weapon against Magdalena Llamas in the first underlying trial court cause number 1338724 , and a gainst Marco Morones in the second underlying trial court cause number 1338725

. See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. §§ 29.03(a)(2), (b)

. With Marco Sapien appointed as his trial counsel, Reece pleaded guilty to both charges on June 17, 2013, without an agreed recommendation as to punishment. The clerk’s record in each case contains plea admonishment papers indicating that Reece waived his right to have the court reporter record his plea

. The trial court’s certifications, signed on June 17, 2013, stated that both of these cases were not plea

- bargained cases, and that Reece had the right of appeal. After Reece failed to appear for sentencing , Sapien was permitted to withdr a w as his counsel, and the State charged Reece with bond jumping in both cases. Reece was later arrested and Randolph Roll was appointed as his new trial counsel on October 9, 2013. On May 1, 2014, the trial court signed judgments of convictions in both cases, indicating that Reece had pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and was assessed a concurrent sentence of twenty years’ confinement in accordance with his plea bargain, and that no permissi on to appeal was granted. On May 28, 2014, Reece timely filed a pro se notice of appeal
in each case. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.2(a)(1). After th e se appeals were assigned to this Court, the Clerk of this Court reviewed the notices of appeals and the clerk’ s records, which did not contain any4

new certifications of the rights of appeal by the trial court, as required when the judgments were entered, or written orders relieving Roll as Reece’s counsel. See
T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2( a)(2), 37.1

. Thus, th is Court abated these cases for the trial court to determine whether Roll still represented Reece and to make findings of fact to resolve the inconsistencies between the certifications and the judgments

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(f), 34.5(c), 37.1. A. The Aba tement Hearing On October 30, 2014, t he trial court held an abatement hearing with Reece , appearing via video conference , confirming to the trial judge that he w ish ed to appeal these cases, but stat ing that it was up to Roll if he wanted to withdraw as
app ellate counsel

. Roll stated that he had not been representing Reece on appeal, had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, and did not want to be Reece’s appellate counsel. The trial court permitted Roll to put the following recitation of what he recalled had occurred at Reece’s sentencing hearing before he pleaded guilty. 2
Roll recalled that he was Reece’s third trial counsel and was appointed a fter Reece had pleaded guilty and t he case was set for a pre

- sentencing investigation (“PSI”) hearing. Roll sta ted that Reece had a co

- defendant, his brother, who was sentenced by the trial court to twenty years’ confinement before Reece’s sentencing date

.

2 There was no reporter’s record of the sentencing hearing filed in either appeal.5

Roll recited that Reece , who was out on bond awaiting the PSI sentencing hear ing , did not show up at sentenci ng after he heard that his brother received a twenty

- year sentence, and the trial court allowed Reece’s trial counsel to withdr a w and appointed Roll as counsel. Roll stated that he spoke to Reece, and when his family came to court, the trial court allowed the family to speak with Reece in the “courtroom face

- to

- face with no glass between them.” Reece’s family convinced him to accept the offer of twenty years , and he “did waive his right to appeal.” After Roll’s recitation was complete, the trial court st ated it s recommendation that Reece “intelligently waived [his] right to appeal this case.”
B. The Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Following the abatement hearing, the trial court adopted the State’s proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order on November 7, 201 4. After noting that it had reviewed the official court records in the case s , and after consideration of the evidence and the parties ’ arguments, the trial court issu ed the following findings and conclusions : 1. As a result of a single incident, the Defendant was charged with two offenses. In Cause No. 1338724, the defendant was indicted for aggravated robbery of Magdalena Llamas. In Cause No.[ ]1338725, the Defendant was indicted for the aggravated robbery of Marco Morones. 2. The Defendant was set for jury trial on June 17, 2013.
3. On June 17, 2013, the Defendant, his attorney, and an attorney representing the State executed a “Waiver of Constitutional6 Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial Confession.” In this document, the defendant judicially confessed to committing the aggravated robbery of Magd[a]lena Llamas and Marco Morones. The State made no recommendation as to what sentence the Defendant should receive, other than the sentence should be based o n the results of a pre

- sentence investigation report. 4. At that time, there was no agreed plea. A sentencing hearing was set for August 29, 2013. It was agreed that at this hearing the court would determine an appropriate sentence based on a pre - sentence investigation report. Had this agreement been fulfilled, the Defendant would have had a limited right of appeal. 5. On July 18, 2013[,] a hearing was held for a co

- defendant, Akilleon Laran Chase. Akilleon Laran Chase is the brother of the Defendant. I se ntenced Akilleon Laran Chase to 20 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

- Institutional Division.
6. The Defendant did not appear at his court date on August 29, 2013[,] and his attorney, Marco Sapien[,] withdrew as his attorney of record.
7. On Aug ust 30, 201 3[ , ] the State charged the Defendant in Cause Number 1399766 and 1399767 with bond jumping.
8. On October 2, 2013, the Defendant was arrested.
9. On October 9, 2013[,] Randolph Roll was appointed to represent the Defendant.
10. Randolph Roll reset the case 8 times to determine how the Defendant wanted to proceed. The Defendant had the following options:

a. Withdraw his plea and proceed to trial[;]7 b. Persist in his plea of guilty and allow the Court to determine the proper punishment based on the pre - sentence investigation report and a hearing where both the state and defense could call live witnesses[;] c. Enter into an agreed plea with the state.
11. The Defendant chose to enter into an agreed plea with the state. The defendant’s plea of guilty was ma de in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss the t wo bail jumping charges and for a term of imprisonment for 20 years.
12. A plea bargain occurs when a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment does not exceed the punishme nt recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2 [a] (2).
13. The statement in the defendant’s plea paperwork indicating that his plea was “WOAR”

— without a recommendation from the prosecutor

— was not changed at the time the Defendant entered into an agreed plea with the state but the change was dictated to the court reporter.
14. The Defendant does not have the right to appeal when he agrees to a plea bargain with the state.
15. The Defendant entered into a plea bargain with th e state and does not have the right to appeal.
16. The Court does not grant the appellant permission to appeal. On January 6 , 2015, the trial clerk filed the supplemental clerk’s record s in each case in this Court containing Roll’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record , filed in the trial court, and the trial court’s findings, conclusions, and order, but no
amended certification s w ere included. After this Court abated for amended8

certification s , the trial court signed amended certifications on Februar y 13, 2015, stating that these were plea

- bargained cases, and that Reece had no right of appeal in either case

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d). DISCUSSION Although Reece did not file any brief, his pro se form notice of appeal in each case appears to contend that either he was granted permission to appeal by the trial court or matters were raised by written motion by the defendant and ruled upon before trial. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2). A. S tandard of R e view An appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that the defendant has the right of appeal has not been m ade part of the record. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2 (d) ; see Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

. The rules also provide that an amended trial court’s certification of the defendant’s right of appeal correcting a defect or omission may be filed in the appellate court.
See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(f), 34.5(c), 37.1. The trial court’s amended certification , signed on February 13, 2015, included in the clerk’s record in each case, states t hat these are plea

- bargained cases and that Reec e has no right of appeal. See T EX
. R.
A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d). In a plea

- bargain case

— where a defendant pleaded guilty and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant

— as here, a defendant may only appeal those matters9

that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial or after getting the trial court ’s permission to appeal. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN
. § 44.02 (West Supp. 2014); T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2).
W e give almost t otal deference to a trial court’ s determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, particularly if the findin gs of fact are based on credibility and demeanor. Miller v. State , 393 S.W.3d 255, 262

– 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Manzi v. State , 88 S.W.3d 240, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that deferential standard of review applies even when trial court’ s factual determination in guilty plea case wa s based solely upon affidavits). When the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, we consider, in the light mo st favorable to the trial court’ s ruling, whether the record supports th ose findings. Miller , 393 S.W.3d at 263 (citation omitted)

. We review legal rulings de novo unless the trial c ourt’ s findings that are supported by the record are dispositive. Id.
B. Analysis As noted above, w hen the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, as here, we consider, in the light mo st favorable to the trial court’ s ruling, whether the record supports those findings. Miller , 393 S.W.3d at 263 . Here, t he clerk’s record in each case contains a plea information sheet, waiver of constitutional rights, agreement to stipulate, and judicial confession indicating that Reece pleaded10

guilty to the charged offenses without an agreed recommendation as to punishmen t. The clerk’s records also contain Sapien’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record, wh ich indicated that Reece had failed to appear for the PSI hearing, and that motion was granted. The records also contain several case reset forms in which Roll was l isted as Reece’s trial counsel, two charges of bail jumping were added, and the State’s offer of twenty years’ confinement was listed. In addition, t he judgments of conviction reflect that the trial court accepted the plea

- bargain agreement s because each j udgment assessed Reece’s punishment at twenty years’ confinement. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2). Thus, the records support the trial court’s findings of fact that Reece entered into agreement s with the State to recommend twenty years’ confinement in exc hange for the State dismissing the two bail jumping charges , and we must defer to those findings of historical fact. See Miller , 393 S.W.3d at 263 . Also, the records support the trial court’s amended certifications that these are plea

- bargained cases and the trial court did not give its permission to appeal in either case , and we must defer to those findings

. See id. ; see Dears , 154 S.W.3d at 615.
T o the extent Reece ’s pro se notice s of appeal contends that his plea was involuntary, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the voluntariness of a guilty plea may not be contested on direct appeal following a plea

- bargain agreement. See Woods v. State , 108 S.W.3d 314, 316 & n.6 (Tex. Crim. App.11

2003); Cooper v. State , 45 S.W.3d 77, 81, 83 (Tex. C rim. App. 2001). And, to the extent that Reece’s pro se notice s of appeal contend that he is permitted to challenge ruling s on pretrial motions, a review of the clerk’s record in each case does not show any written rulings on motions that were adverse to Reece. Because appellant has no right of appeal in th ese plea

- bargain ed case s , we must dismiss th e s e appeal s without further action

. See Menefee v. State , 287 S.W.3d 9, 12 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Chavez v. State , 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ( “A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea

- bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.” ); see also Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for Thirteenth Judicial Dist. , 159 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining purpose of certification requirements is to resolve cases that have no right of appeal qu ickly without expense of appointing appellate couns el , preparing reporter’s record or preparing appellate brief). CONCLUSION Accordingly, we dismiss th e s e appeal s for want of jurisdiction. See T EX
. R.
A PP
. P. 43.2(f). We dismiss a ll pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Bland

. Do not publish. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2 (b).