# Επίσημη Εφημερίδα C 347/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0901
  doi:10.3000/19770901.C_2013.347.ell |
| --- | --- |
| Επίσημη Εφημερίδα
  της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347 |
| | |
| Έκδοση στην ελληνική γλώσσα | Ανακοινώσεις και Πληροφορίες | 56ό έτος28 Νοεμβρίου 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0901

doi:10.3000/19770901.C_2013.347.ell

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα

της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347

Έκδοση στην ελληνική γλώσσα

Ανακοινώσεις και Πληροφορίες

56ό έτος28 Νοεμβρίου 2013

---

| Ανακοίνωση αριθ | Περιεχόμενα | Σελίδα |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Ανακοινώσεις |
| | ΑΝΑΚΟΙΝΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ |
| | Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή |
| 2013/C 347/01 | Έγκριση κρατικών ενισχύσεων στο πλαίσιο των διατάξεων των άρθρων 107 και 108 της ΣΛΕΕ — Περιπτώσεις όπου η Επιτροπή δεν προβάλλει αντίρρηση (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2013/C 347/02 | Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με την οδηγία 2003/122/Ευρατόμ του Συμβουλίου, για τον έλεγχο των κλειστών πηγών ραδιενέργειας και των ένθετων πηγών, και με τον κανονισμό (Ευρατόμ) αριθ. 1493/93 του Συμβουλίου για τις αποστολές ραδιενεργών ουσιών μεταξύ κρατών μελών | 2 |
| 2013/C 347/03 | Μη διατύπωση αντιρρήσεων σχετικά με κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση (Υπόθεση COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings) (
  1
  ) | 3 |

Ανακοίνωση αριθ

Περιεχόμενα

Σελίδα

II   Ανακοινώσεις

ΑΝΑΚΟΙΝΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

2013/C 347/01

Έγκριση κρατικών ενισχύσεων στο πλαίσιο των διατάξεων των άρθρων 107 και 108 της ΣΛΕΕ — Περιπτώσεις όπου η Επιτροπή δεν προβάλλει αντίρρηση (
  1
  )

1

1

2013/C 347/02

Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με την οδηγία 2003/122/Ευρατόμ του Συμβουλίου, για τον έλεγχο των κλειστών πηγών ραδιενέργειας και των ένθετων πηγών, και με τον κανονισμό (Ευρατόμ) αριθ. 1493/93 του Συμβουλίου για τις αποστολές ραδιενεργών ουσιών μεταξύ κρατών μελών

2

2013/C 347/03

Μη διατύπωση αντιρρήσεων σχετικά με κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση (Υπόθεση COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings) (
  1
  )

1

3

| | IV   Πληροφορίες |
| --- | --- |
| | ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΠΡΟΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΑ ΟΡΓΑΝΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ |
| | Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή |
| 2013/C 347/04 | Ισοτιμίες του ευρώ | 4 |
| 2013/C 347/05 | Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με τα τρέχοντα επιτόκια ανάκτησης και τα επιτόκια αναφοράς/προεξόφλησης κρατικών ενισχύσεων για τα 28 κράτη μέλη που ισχύουν από την 1η Δεκεμβρίου 2013[Δημοσιεύεται σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 10 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 794/2004 της Επιτροπής, της 21ης Απριλίου 2004 (ΕΕ L 140 της 30.4.2004, σ. 1)] | 5 |
| | Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο |
| 2013/C 347/06 | Ειδική έκθεση αριθ. 10/2013 Κοινή γεωργική πολιτική: Σχεδιάστηκε και υλοποιήθηκε ορθά η ειδική στήριξη που χορηγείται βάσει του άρθρου 68 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 73/2009 του Συμβουλίου; | 6 |
| | ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟ ΧΩΡΟ |
| | Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ |
| 2013/C 347/07 | Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για μη προβολή αντιρρήσεων | 7 |
| 2013/C 347/08 | Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για την περάτωση υφιστάμενης υπόθεσης χορήγησης ενίσχυσης, συνεπεία της αποδοχής εκ μέρους κράτους ΕΖΕΣ των προταθέντων κατάλληλων μέτρων | 8 |
| 2013/C 347/09 | Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για μη προβολή αντιρρήσεων | 9 |
| 2013/C 347/10 | Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για μη προβολή αντιρρήσεων | 10 |
| 2013/C 347/11 | Πρόσκληση για την υποβολή παρατηρήσεων κατ’ εφαρμογή του άρθρου 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου όσον αφορά εικαζόμενη χορήγηση κρατικής ενίσχυσης για τη χρηματοδότηση της ανάπτυξης ευρυζωνικών υπηρεσιών σε αγροτικές περιοχές της Ισλανδίας | 11 |

IV   Πληροφορίες

ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΠΡΟΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΑ ΟΡΓΑΝΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

2013/C 347/04

Ισοτιμίες του ευρώ

4

2013/C 347/05

Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με τα τρέχοντα επιτόκια ανάκτησης και τα επιτόκια αναφοράς/προεξόφλησης κρατικών ενισχύσεων για τα 28 κράτη μέλη που ισχύουν από την 1η Δεκεμβρίου 2013[Δημοσιεύεται σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 10 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 794/2004 της Επιτροπής, της 21ης Απριλίου 2004 (ΕΕ L 140 της 30.4.2004, σ. 1)]

[Δημοσιεύεται σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 10 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 794/2004 της Επιτροπής, της 21ης Απριλίου 2004 (ΕΕ L 140 της 30.4.2004, σ. 1)]

5

Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο

2013/C 347/06

Ειδική έκθεση αριθ. 10/2013 Κοινή γεωργική πολιτική: Σχεδιάστηκε και υλοποιήθηκε ορθά η ειδική στήριξη που χορηγείται βάσει του άρθρου 68 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 73/2009 του Συμβουλίου;

6

ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟ ΧΩΡΟ

Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ

2013/C 347/07

Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για μη προβολή αντιρρήσεων

7

2013/C 347/08

Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για την περάτωση υφιστάμενης υπόθεσης χορήγησης ενίσχυσης, συνεπεία της αποδοχής εκ μέρους κράτους ΕΖΕΣ των προταθέντων κατάλληλων μέτρων

8

2013/C 347/09

Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για μη προβολή αντιρρήσεων

9

2013/C 347/10

Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για μη προβολή αντιρρήσεων

10

2013/C 347/11

Πρόσκληση για την υποβολή παρατηρήσεων κατ’ εφαρμογή του άρθρου 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου όσον αφορά εικαζόμενη χορήγηση κρατικής ενίσχυσης για τη χρηματοδότηση της ανάπτυξης ευρυζωνικών υπηρεσιών σε αγροτικές περιοχές της Ισλανδίας

11

| | V   Γνωστοποιήσεις |
| --- | --- |
| | ΔΙΟΙΚΗΤΙΚΕΣ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ |
| | Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή |
| 2013/C 347/12 | Πρόσκληση υποβολής προτάσεων βάσει του σχεδίου υλοποίησης της Κοινής επιχείρησης Κυψέλες καυσίμου και υδρογόνου | 31 |
| | ΔΙΚΑΙΟΔΟΤΙΚΕΣ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ |
| | ΕΖΕΣ-Δικαστήριο |
| 2013/C 347/13 | Προσφυγή που ασκήθηκε, στις 16 Αυγούστου 2013, εκ μέρους της Konkurrenten.no AS κατά της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ (Υπόθεση E-19/13) | 32 |
| | ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ ΠΟΥ ΑΦΟΡΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΦΑΡΜΟΓΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ |
| | Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή |
| 2013/C 347/14 | Προηγούμενη γνωστοποίηση συγκέντρωσης (Υπόθεση COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV) — Υπόθεση υποψήφια για απλοποιημένη διαδικασία (
  1
  ) | 34 |

V   Γνωστοποιήσεις

ΔΙΟΙΚΗΤΙΚΕΣ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

2013/C 347/12

Πρόσκληση υποβολής προτάσεων βάσει του σχεδίου υλοποίησης της Κοινής επιχείρησης Κυψέλες καυσίμου και υδρογόνου

31

ΔΙΚΑΙΟΔΟΤΙΚΕΣ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ

ΕΖΕΣ-Δικαστήριο

2013/C 347/13

Προσφυγή που ασκήθηκε, στις 16 Αυγούστου 2013, εκ μέρους της Konkurrenten.no AS κατά της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ (Υπόθεση E-19/13)

32

ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ ΠΟΥ ΑΦΟΡΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΦΑΡΜΟΓΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

2013/C 347/14

Προηγούμενη γνωστοποίηση συγκέντρωσης (Υπόθεση COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV) — Υπόθεση υποψήφια για απλοποιημένη διαδικασία (
  1
  )

1

34

| | Διορθωτικά |
| --- | --- |
| 2013/C 347/15 | Διορθωτικό στις επίσημες αργίες για το 2013: Κράτη ΕΟΧ ΕΖΕΣ και θεσμικά όργανα ΕΟΧ (ΕΕ C 42 της 14.2.2013) | 35 |

Διορθωτικά

2013/C 347/15

Διορθωτικό στις επίσημες αργίες για το 2013: Κράτη ΕΟΧ ΕΖΕΣ και θεσμικά όργανα ΕΟΧ (ΕΕ C 42 της 14.2.2013)

35

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ |

---

(1)   Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ

1

| EL | |
| --- | --- |

EL

---

II Ανακοινώσεις

ΑΝΑΚΟΙΝΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/1

---

Έγκριση κρατικών ενισχύσεων στο πλαίσιο των διατάξεων των άρθρων 107 και 108 της ΣΛΕΕ

Περιπτώσεις όπου η Επιτροπή δεν προβάλλει αντίρρηση

(Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ)

2013/C 347/01

| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης | 22.10.2013 |
| --- | --- |
| Αριθμός αναφοράς κρατικής ενίσχυσης | SA.36775 (13/N) |
| Κράτος μέλος | Ισπανία |
| Περιφέρεια | Pais Vasco | Μικτές περιφέρειες |
| Τίτλος (ή/και όνομα του δικαιούχου) | Ayudas a la reestructuración y relanzamiento de empresas en crisis/PYME/BIDERATU |
| Νομική βάση | Borrador de Decreto XXX/2013 por el que se establecen ayudas destinadas a la reestructuración y relanzamiento de empresas en crisis |
| Είδος μέτρου | Καθεστώς | — |
| Στόχος | Αναδιάρθρωση προβληματικών επιχειρήσεων, ΜΜΕ |
| Είδος ενίσχυσης | Επιστρεπτέα επιχορήγηση |
| Προϋπολογισμός | | Συνολικός προϋπολογισμός: 18 EUR (σε εκατ.) |

Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης

22.10.2013

Αριθμός αναφοράς κρατικής ενίσχυσης

SA.36775 (13/N)

Κράτος μέλος

Ισπανία

Περιφέρεια

Pais Vasco

Μικτές περιφέρειες

Τίτλος (ή/και όνομα του δικαιούχου)

Ayudas a la reestructuración y relanzamiento de empresas en crisis/PYME/BIDERATU

Νομική βάση

Borrador de Decreto XXX/2013 por el que se establecen ayudas destinadas a la reestructuración y relanzamiento de empresas en crisis

Είδος μέτρου

Καθεστώς

—

Στόχος

Αναδιάρθρωση προβληματικών επιχειρήσεων, ΜΜΕ

Είδος ενίσχυσης

Επιστρεπτέα επιχορήγηση

Προϋπολογισμός

Συνολικός προϋπολογισμός: 18 EUR (σε εκατ.)

| | Ετήσιος προϋπολογισμός: 6 EUR (σε εκατ.) |
| --- | --- |

Ετήσιος προϋπολογισμός: 6 EUR (σε εκατ.)

Ένταση

50 %

Διάρκεια

μέχρι τις 31.12.2015

Κλάδοι της οικονομίας

Μεταποίηση

Όνομα και διεύθυνση της χορηγούσας αρχής

| Dpto. de Desarrollo Económico y Competitividad Gobierno Vasco |
| --- |
| C/ Donostia-San Sebastián, 1 |
| 01010 Vitoria Gasteiz |
| ESPAÑA |

Dpto. de Desarrollo Económico y Competitividad Gobierno Vasco

C/ Donostia-San Sebastián, 1

01010 Vitoria Gasteiz

ESPAÑA

Λοιπές πληροφορίες

—

Το κείμενο της απόφασης στην (στις) αυθεντική(-ές) γλώσσα(-ες), χωρίς τα εμπιστευτικά στοιχεία, είναι διαθέσιμο στη διεύθυνση:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm

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| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/2

---

Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με την οδηγία 2003/122/Ευρατόμ του Συμβουλίου, για τον έλεγχο των κλειστών πηγών ραδιενέργειας και των ένθετων πηγών, και με τον κανονισμό (Ευρατόμ) αριθ. 1493/93 του Συμβουλίου για τις αποστολές ραδιενεργών ουσιών μεταξύ κρατών μελών

2013/C 347/02

Δυνάμει του άρθρου 13 της οδηγίας 2003/122/Ευρατόμ του Συμβουλίου και του άρθρου 8 του κανονισμού (Ευρατόμ) αριθ. 1493/93 του Συμβουλίου, τα κράτη μέλη διαβιβάζουν στην Επιτροπή το όνομα ή τα ονόματα και τη διεύθυνση ή τις διευθύνσεις των αρμοδίων αρχών και κάθε απαραίτητη πληροφορία για την ταχεία επικοινωνία με τις αρχές αυτές.

Τα κράτη μέλη διαβιβάζουν στην Επιτροπή οιεσδήποτε αλλαγές όσον αφορά τα στοιχεία αυτά.

Η Επιτροπή ανακοινώνει τις εν λόγω πληροφορίες και τις τυχόν αλλαγές σε όλες τις αρμόδιες αρχές στην Κοινότητα και τις δημοσιεύει στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

Κατωτέρω παρατίθενται η αρμόδια αρχή της Κροατίας και όλες οι απαραίτητες πληροφορίες για την ταχεία επικοινωνία με την εν λόγω αρχή.

Αρμόδια αρχή της Κροατίας κατά την οδηγία 2003/122/Ευρατόμ του Συμβουλίου, για τον έλεγχο των κλειστών πηγών ραδιενέργειας και των ένθετων πηγών και στον κανονισμό (Ευρατόμ) αριθ. 1493/93 του Συμβουλίου για τις αποστολές ραδιενεργών ουσιών μεταξύ κρατών μελών

ΚΡΟΑΤΙΑ

| State Office for Radiological and Nuclear Safety |
| --- |
| Frankopanska 11 |
| HR-10000 Zagreb |
| Τηλ. +385 14881770 |
| Φαξ +385 14881780 |
| http://www.dzrns.hr |

State Office for Radiological and Nuclear Safety

Frankopanska 11

HR-10000 Zagreb

Τηλ. +385 14881770

Φαξ +385 14881780

http://www.dzrns.hr

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| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/3

---

Μη διατύπωση αντιρρήσεων σχετικά με κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση

(Υπόθεση COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings)

(Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ)

2013/C 347/03

Στις 18 Νοεμβρίου 2013, η Επιτροπή αποφάσισε να μη διατυπώσει αντιρρήσεις σχετικά με την ανωτέρω κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση και να την χαρακτηρίσει συμβιβάσιμη με την κοινή αγορά. Η απόφαση αυτή βασίζεται στο άρθρο 6 παράγραφος 1 στοιχείο β) του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 139/2004 του Συμβουλίου. Το πλήρες κείμενο της απόφασης διατίθεται μόνον στα αγγλική και θα δημοσιοποιηθεί χωρίς τα επιχειρηματικά απόρρητα στοιχεία τα οποία ενδέχεται να περιέχει. Θα διατίθεται:

| — | από τη σχετική με τις συγκεντρώσεις ενότητα του δικτυακού τόπου για τον ανταγωνισμό της Επιτροπής (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Ο δικτυακός αυτός τόπος παρέχει διάφορα μέσα που βοηθούν στον εντοπισμό μεμονωμένων αποφάσεων για συγκεντρώσεις όπως ευρετήρια επιχειρήσεων, αριθμών υποθέσεων, και ημερομηνιών και τομεακά ευρετήρια· |
| --- | --- |

—

από τη σχετική με τις συγκεντρώσεις ενότητα του δικτυακού τόπου για τον ανταγωνισμό της Επιτροπής (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Ο δικτυακός αυτός τόπος παρέχει διάφορα μέσα που βοηθούν στον εντοπισμό μεμονωμένων αποφάσεων για συγκεντρώσεις όπως ευρετήρια επιχειρήσεων, αριθμών υποθέσεων, και ημερομηνιών και τομεακά ευρετήρια·

| — | σε ηλεκτρονική μορφή στον δικτυακό τόπο EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) με αριθμό εγγράφου 32013M7067. Ο δικτυακός τόπος EUR-Lex αποτελεί την επιγραμμική πρόσβαση στην ευρωπαϊκή νομοθεσία. |
| --- | --- |

—

σε ηλεκτρονική μορφή στον δικτυακό τόπο EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) με αριθμό εγγράφου 32013M7067. Ο δικτυακός τόπος EUR-Lex αποτελεί την επιγραμμική πρόσβαση στην ευρωπαϊκή νομοθεσία.

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IV Πληροφορίες

ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΠΡΟΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΑ ΟΡΓΑΝΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/4

---

Ισοτιμίες του ευρώ (1)

27 Νοεμβρίου 2013

2013/C 347/04

1 ευρώ =

| | Νομισματική μονάδα | Ισοτιμία |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | δολάριο ΗΠΑ | 1,3596 |
| JPY | ιαπωνικό γιεν | 138,43 |
| DKK | δανική κορόνα | 7,4586 |
| GBP | λίρα στερλίνα | 0,83405 |
| SEK | σουηδική κορόνα | 8,9100 |
| CHF | ελβετικό φράγκο | 1,2305 |
| ISK | ισλανδική κορόνα | |
| NOK | νορβηγική κορόνα | 8,2530 |
| BGN | βουλγαρικό λεβ | 1,9558 |
| CZK | τσεχική κορόνα | 27,341 |
| HUF | ουγγρικό φιορίνι | 299,08 |
| LTL | λιθουανικό λίτας | 3,4528 |
| LVL | λετονικό λατς | 0,7029 |
| PLN | πολωνικό ζλότι | 4,2036 |
| RON | ρουμανικό λέου | 4,4376 |
| TRY | τουρκική λίρα | 2,7499 |
| AUD | δολάριο Αυστραλίας | 1,4952 |
| CAD | δολάριο Καναδά | 1,4382 |
| HKD | δολάριο Χονγκ Κονγκ | 10,5406 |
| NZD | δολάριο Νέας Ζηλανδίας | 1,6638 |
| SGD | δολάριο Σιγκαπούρης | 1,7056 |
| KRW | ουόν Νότιας Κορέας | 1 447,24 |
| ZAR | νοτιοαφρικανικό ραντ | 13,8377 |
| CNY | κινεζικό ρενμινπί γιουάν | 8,2839 |
| HRK | κροατική κούνα | 7,6433 |
| IDR | ρουπία Ινδονησίας | 16 038,43 |
| MYR | μαλαισιανό ρινγκίτ | 4,3922 |
| PHP | πέσο Φιλιππινών | 59,378 |
| RUB | ρωσικό ρούβλι | 44,8979 |
| THB | ταϊλανδικό μπατ | 43,670 |
| BRL | ρεάλ Βραζιλίας | 3,1311 |
| MXN | πέσο Μεξικού | 17,8203 |
| INR | ινδική ρουπία | 84,5060 |

Νομισματική μονάδα

Ισοτιμία

USD

δολάριο ΗΠΑ

1,3596

JPY

ιαπωνικό γιεν

138,43

DKK

δανική κορόνα

7,4586

GBP

λίρα στερλίνα

0,83405

SEK

σουηδική κορόνα

8,9100

CHF

ελβετικό φράγκο

1,2305

ISK

ισλανδική κορόνα

NOK

νορβηγική κορόνα

8,2530

BGN

βουλγαρικό λεβ

1,9558

CZK

τσεχική κορόνα

27,341

HUF

ουγγρικό φιορίνι

299,08

LTL

λιθουανικό λίτας

3,4528

LVL

λετονικό λατς

0,7029

PLN

πολωνικό ζλότι

4,2036

RON

ρουμανικό λέου

4,4376

TRY

τουρκική λίρα

2,7499

AUD

δολάριο Αυστραλίας

1,4952

CAD

δολάριο Καναδά

1,4382

HKD

δολάριο Χονγκ Κονγκ

10,5406

NZD

δολάριο Νέας Ζηλανδίας

1,6638

SGD

δολάριο Σιγκαπούρης

1,7056

KRW

ουόν Νότιας Κορέας

1 447,24

ZAR

νοτιοαφρικανικό ραντ

13,8377

CNY

κινεζικό ρενμινπί γιουάν

8,2839

HRK

κροατική κούνα

7,6433

IDR

ρουπία Ινδονησίας

16 038,43

MYR

μαλαισιανό ρινγκίτ

4,3922

PHP

πέσο Φιλιππινών

59,378

RUB

ρωσικό ρούβλι

44,8979

THB

ταϊλανδικό μπατ

43,670

BRL

ρεάλ Βραζιλίας

3,1311

MXN

πέσο Μεξικού

17,8203

INR

ινδική ρουπία

84,5060

---

(1)  Πηγή: Ισοτιμίες αναφοράς που δημοσιεύονται από την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα.

---

| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/5

---

Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με τα τρέχοντα επιτόκια ανάκτησης και τα επιτόκια αναφοράς/προεξόφλησης κρατικών ενισχύσεων για τα 28 κράτη μέλη που ισχύουν από την 1η Δεκεμβρίου 2013

[Δημοσιεύεται σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 10 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 794/2004 της Επιτροπής, της 21ης Απριλίου 2004 (ΕΕ L 140 της 30.4.2004, σ. 1)]

2013/C 347/05

Τα βασικά επιτόκια υπολογιζόμενα σύμφωνα με την ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με την αναθεώρηση της μεθόδου καθορισμού των επιτοκίων αναφοράς και προεξόφλησης (ΕΕ C 14 της 19.1.2008, σ. 6). Ανάλογα με τη χρήση του επιτοκίου αναφοράς, πρέπει να προστεθούν τα κατάλληλα περιθώρια όπως ορίζεται στην εν λόγω ανακοίνωση. Όσον αφορά το επιτόκιο προεξόφλησης, αυτό σημαίνει ότι πρέπει να προστεθεί περιθώριο 100 μονάδων βάσης. Ο κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 271/2008 της Επιτροπής, της 30ης Ιανουαρίου 2008, για τροποποίηση του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 794/2004, προβλέπει ότι, εκτός εάν προβλέπεται διαφορετικά με ειδική απόφαση, το επιτόκιο ανάκτησης υπολογίζεται επίσης προσθέτοντας 100 μονάδες βάσης στο βασικό επιτόκιο.

Τα τροποποιημένα ποσοστά αναγράφονται με έντονους χαρακτήρες.

Ο προηγούμενος πίνακας δημοσιεύθηκε στην ΕΕ C 310 της 25.10.2013, σ. 6.

| Από | Έως | AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU | IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | UK |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1.12.2013 | 31.12.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,10 | 0,56 | 0,75 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 3,83 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,79 | 0,56 | 0,75 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 4,37 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |
| 1.11.2013 | 30.11.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,10 | 0,56 | 0,75 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 3,83 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,79 | 0,56 | 0,91 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 4,37 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |
| 1.10.2013 | 31.10.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,30 | 0,56 | 0,75 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 4,62 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 | 0,56 | 0,91 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 5,20 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |
| 1.8.2013 | 30.9.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,30 | 0,56 | 0,88 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 4,62 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,25 | 0,56 | 0,91 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 5,20 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |
| 1.7.2013 | 31.7.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,30 | 0,56 | 0,88 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 4,62 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,08 | 0,56 | 1,10 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 5,20 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |

Από

Έως

AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES

FI

FR

HR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

1.12.2013

31.12.2013

0,56

0,56

1,10

0,56

0,75

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

3,83

0,56

0,56

0,79

0,56

0,75

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

4,37

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

1.11.2013

30.11.2013

0,56

0,56

1,10

0,56

0,75

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

3,83

0,56

0,56

0,79

0,56

0,91

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

4,37

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

1.10.2013

31.10.2013

0,56

0,56

1,30

0,56

0,75

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

4,62

0,56

0,56

0,99

0,56

0,91

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

5,20

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

1.8.2013

30.9.2013

0,56

0,56

1,30

0,56

0,88

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

4,62

0,56

0,56

1,25

0,56

0,91

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

5,20

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

1.7.2013

31.7.2013

0,56

0,56

1,30

0,56

0,88

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

4,62

0,56

0,56

1,08

0,56

1,10

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

5,20

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

---

Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο

| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/6

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Ειδική έκθεση αριθ. 10/2013 «Κοινή γεωργική πολιτική: Σχεδιάστηκε και υλοποιήθηκε ορθά η ειδική στήριξη που χορηγείται βάσει του άρθρου 68 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 73/2009 του Συμβουλίου;»

2013/C 347/06

Το Ευρωπαϊκό Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο σας πληροφορεί ότι μόλις δημοσιεύθηκε η ειδική έκθεσή του αριθ. 10/2013 με τίτλο «Κοινή γεωργική πολιτική: Σχεδιάστηκε και υλοποιήθηκε ορθά η ειδική στήριξη που χορηγείται βάσει του άρθρου 68 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 73/2009 του Συμβουλίου;».

Η έκθεση είναι διαθέσιμη, είτε για ανάγνωση είτε για τηλεφόρτωση, στον ιστότοπο του Ευρωπαϊκού Ελεγκτικού Συνεδρίου: http://eca.europa.eu

Η έκθεση, σε έντυπη μορφή, διατίθεται δωρεάν κατόπιν αίτησης προς το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο:

| European Court of Auditors |
| --- |
| Unit ‘Audit: Production of Reports’ |
| 12, rue Alcide de Gasperi |
| 1615 Luxembourg |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| Τηλ. +352 4398-1 |
| E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu |

European Court of Auditors

Unit ‘Audit: Production of Reports’

12, rue Alcide de Gasperi

1615 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

Τηλ. +352 4398-1

E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu

ή με τη συμπλήρωση του ηλεκτρονικού εντύπου παραγγελίας στο EU-Bookshop.

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ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟ ΧΩΡΟ

Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ

| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/7

---

Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για μη προβολή αντιρρήσεων

2013/C 347/07

Η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ δεν προβάλλει αντιρρήσεις όσον αφορά το ακόλουθο μέτρο κρατικής ενίσχυσης:

| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης | : | 11 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Αριθμός υπόθεσης | : | 74137 |
| Αριθμός απόφασης | : | 319/13/COL |
| Κράτος ΕΖΕΣ | : | Νορβηγία |
| Τίτλος (και/ή ονομασία του δικαιούχου) | : | NCE Maritime Innovation Cluster (Συνεργατικός σχηματισμός θαλάσσιας καινοτομίας) |
| Νομική βάση | : | Άρθρο 61 παράγραφος 3 στοιχείο γ) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ |
| Είδος του μέτρου | : | Ατομική ενίσχυση για τη λειτουργία του συνεργατικού σχηματισμού (Cluster) |
| Στόχος | : | Προώθηση της καινοτομίας |
| Μορφή της ενίσχυσης | : | Επιχορήγηση |
| Προϋπολογισμός | : | Συνολικός προϋπολογισμός: 60 εκατ. ΝΟΚ |
| Διάρκεια | : | Μέχρι τον Ιούλιο του 2016 |
| Κλάδοι της οικονομίας | : | Θαλάσσια καινοτομία |
| Όνομα και διεύθυνση της χορηγούσας αρχής | : | Innovation Norway |
| PO Box 448 |
| Sentrum, Akersgata 13 |
| 0104 Oslo |
| NORWAY |

Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης

:

11 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013

Αριθμός υπόθεσης

:

74137

Αριθμός απόφασης

:

319/13/COL

Κράτος ΕΖΕΣ

:

Νορβηγία

Τίτλος (και/ή ονομασία του δικαιούχου)

:

NCE Maritime Innovation Cluster (Συνεργατικός σχηματισμός θαλάσσιας καινοτομίας)

Νομική βάση

:

Άρθρο 61 παράγραφος 3 στοιχείο γ) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ

Είδος του μέτρου

:

Ατομική ενίσχυση για τη λειτουργία του συνεργατικού σχηματισμού (Cluster)

Στόχος

:

Προώθηση της καινοτομίας

Μορφή της ενίσχυσης

:

Επιχορήγηση

Προϋπολογισμός

:

Συνολικός προϋπολογισμός: 60 εκατ. ΝΟΚ

Διάρκεια

:

Μέχρι τον Ιούλιο του 2016

Κλάδοι της οικονομίας

:

Θαλάσσια καινοτομία

Όνομα και διεύθυνση της χορηγούσας αρχής

:

Innovation Norway

PO Box 448

Sentrum, Akersgata 13

0104 Oslo

NORWAY

Το αυθεντικό κείμενο της απόφασης, από το οποίο έχουν αφαιρεθεί όλα τα εμπιστευτικά στοιχεία, δημοσιεύεται στον δικτυακό τόπο της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/8

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Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για την περάτωση υφιστάμενης υπόθεσης χορήγησης ενίσχυσης, συνεπεία της αποδοχής εκ μέρους κράτους ΕΖΕΣ των προταθέντων κατάλληλων μέτρων

2013/C 347/08

Η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ έχει προτείνει κατάλληλα μέτρα, που έγιναν δεκτά από την Ισλανδία, για το ακόλουθο μέτρο κρατικής ενίσχυσης:

| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης | : | 11 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Αριθμός υπόθεσης | : | 70476 |
| Αριθμός απόφασης | : | 318/13/COL |
| Κράτος ΕΖΕΣ | : | Ισλανδία |
| Τίτλος | : | Χρηματοδότηση του εθνικού ραδιοτηλεοπτικού οργανισμού της Ισλανδίας Ríkisútvarpið (RÚV) |
| Νομική βάση | : | Νόμος αριθ. 23/2013, σχετικά με τον εθνικό ραδιοτηλεοπτικό οργανισμό της Ισλανδίας, που είναι δημόσιος φορέας ενημέρωσης, νόμος αριθ. 38/2011, νόμος περί των μέσων ενημέρωσης και νόμος αριθ. 90/2003 περί του φόρου εισοδήματος |
| Στόχος | : | μ.δ. |
| Μορφή της ενίσχυσης | : | Άμεσες πληρωμές από το Δημόσιο Ταμείο για τη χρηματοδότηση του δημόσιου ραδιοτηλεοπτικού οργανισμού στην Ισλανδία |
| Κλάδοι της οικονομίας | : | Ραδιοφωνία και τηλεόραση |
| Άλλες πληροφορίες | : | Η Αρχή θεωρεί ότι οι αλλαγές του νομοθετικού και κανονιστικού πλαισίου του RÚV είναι συμβατές με τα κατάλληλα μέτρα που πρότεινε η Αρχή στην απόφασή της αριθ. 38/11/COL και ως εκ τούτου καθιστούν τη χρηματοδότηση του RÚV συμβατή με τη λειτουργία της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ. Πάνω σ’ αυτήν τη βάση, η Αρχή καταλήγει στο συμπέρασμα ότι δεν υπάρχουν λόγοι ώστε να δοθεί συνέχεια στο ζήτημα και αποφάσισε, συνεπώς, να περατώσει την υπόθεση. |

Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης

:

11 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013

Αριθμός υπόθεσης

:

70476

Αριθμός απόφασης

:

318/13/COL

Κράτος ΕΖΕΣ

:

Ισλανδία

Τίτλος

:

Χρηματοδότηση του εθνικού ραδιοτηλεοπτικού οργανισμού της Ισλανδίας Ríkisútvarpið (RÚV)

Νομική βάση

:

Νόμος αριθ. 23/2013, σχετικά με τον εθνικό ραδιοτηλεοπτικό οργανισμό της Ισλανδίας, που είναι δημόσιος φορέας ενημέρωσης, νόμος αριθ. 38/2011, νόμος περί των μέσων ενημέρωσης και νόμος αριθ. 90/2003 περί του φόρου εισοδήματος

Στόχος

:

μ.δ.

Μορφή της ενίσχυσης

:

Άμεσες πληρωμές από το Δημόσιο Ταμείο για τη χρηματοδότηση του δημόσιου ραδιοτηλεοπτικού οργανισμού στην Ισλανδία

Κλάδοι της οικονομίας

:

Ραδιοφωνία και τηλεόραση

Άλλες πληροφορίες

:

Η Αρχή θεωρεί ότι οι αλλαγές του νομοθετικού και κανονιστικού πλαισίου του RÚV είναι συμβατές με τα κατάλληλα μέτρα που πρότεινε η Αρχή στην απόφασή της αριθ. 38/11/COL και ως εκ τούτου καθιστούν τη χρηματοδότηση του RÚV συμβατή με τη λειτουργία της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ. Πάνω σ’ αυτήν τη βάση, η Αρχή καταλήγει στο συμπέρασμα ότι δεν υπάρχουν λόγοι ώστε να δοθεί συνέχεια στο ζήτημα και αποφάσισε, συνεπώς, να περατώσει την υπόθεση.

Το αυθεντικό κείμενο της απόφασης, από το οποίο έχουν αφαιρεθεί όλα τα εμπιστευτικά στοιχεία, δημοσιεύεται στον δικτυακό τόπο της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/9

---

Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για μη προβολή αντιρρήσεων

2013/C 347/09

Η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ δεν εγείρει αντιρρήσεις για το ακόλουθο μέτρο κρατικής ενίσχυσης:

| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης | : | 25 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Αριθμός υπόθεσης | : | 74289 |
| Αριθμός απόφασης | : | 355/13/COL |
| Κράτος ΕΖΕΣ | : | Νορβηγία |
| Είδος μέτρου | : | Κοινοποιηθέν νορβηγικό πρόγραμμα ενισχύσεων όσον αφορά την αποζημίωση για το κόστος των έμμεσων εκπομπών, το οποίο έχει αξιολογηθεί βάσει του άρθρου 61 παράγραφος 3 στοιχείο γ) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ |
| Στόχος | : | Προστασία του περιβάλλοντος |
| Μορφή της ενίσχυσης | : | Επιχορήγηση |
| Ποσό της ενίσχυσης | : | Περίπου 2 840 εκατ. ΝΟΚ για την περίοδο 2013-2020 |
| Οικονομικοί κλάδοι | : | Διάφορες ενεργοβόρες βιομηχανίες |
| Ονομασία και διεύθυνση της χορηγούσας αρχής | : | Norwegian Environment Agency |
| PO Box 5672 Sluppen |
| 7485 Trondheim |
| NORWAY |

Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης

:

25 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013

Αριθμός υπόθεσης

:

74289

Αριθμός απόφασης

:

355/13/COL

Κράτος ΕΖΕΣ

:

Νορβηγία

Είδος μέτρου

:

Κοινοποιηθέν νορβηγικό πρόγραμμα ενισχύσεων όσον αφορά την αποζημίωση για το κόστος των έμμεσων εκπομπών, το οποίο έχει αξιολογηθεί βάσει του άρθρου 61 παράγραφος 3 στοιχείο γ) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ

Στόχος

:

Προστασία του περιβάλλοντος

Μορφή της ενίσχυσης

:

Επιχορήγηση

Ποσό της ενίσχυσης

:

Περίπου 2 840 εκατ. ΝΟΚ για την περίοδο 2013-2020

Οικονομικοί κλάδοι

:

Διάφορες ενεργοβόρες βιομηχανίες

Ονομασία και διεύθυνση της χορηγούσας αρχής

:

Norwegian Environment Agency

PO Box 5672 Sluppen

7485 Trondheim

NORWAY

Το αυθεντικό κείμενο της απόφασης, από το οποίο έχουν αφαιρεθεί όλες οι εμπιστευτικές πληροφορίες, δημοσιεύεται στον δικτυακό τόπο της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/10

---

Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για μη προβολή αντιρρήσεων

2013/C 347/10

Η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ δεν προβάλλει αντιρρήσεις όσον αφορά το ακόλουθο μέτρο κρατικής ενίσχυσης:

| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης | : | 11 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Αριθμός υπόθεσης | : | 74138 |
| Αριθμός απόφασης | : | 320/13/COL |
| Κράτος ΕΖΕΣ | : | Νορβηγία |
| Τίτλος (και/ή ονομασία του δικαιούχου) | : | Καινοτομικός συνεργατικός σχηματισμός μηχανικής των συστημάτων NCE (Systems Engineering Innovation Cluster) |
| Νομική βάση | : | Άρθρο 61 παράγραφος 3 στοιχείο γ) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ |
| Είδος του μέτρου | : | Ατομική ενίσχυση για τον συντονισμό του συνεργατικού σχηματισμού |
| Στόχος | : | Προώθηση της καινοτομίας |
| Μορφή της ενίσχυσης | : | Επιχορήγηση |
| Προϋπολογισμός | : | Συνολικός προϋπολογισμός: 50 εκατ. ΝΟΚ |
| Διάρκεια | : | Μέχρι τον Ιούλιο του 2016 |
| Κλάδοι της οικονομίας | : | Υποθαλάσσιος και θαλάσσιος τομέας, τομείς αυτοκινήτων, αεροσκαφών, άμυνας και αεροδιαστημικής |
| Όνομα και διεύθυνση της χορηγούσας αρχής | : | Innovation Norway |
| PO Box 448, Sentrum |
| Akersgata 13 |
| 0104 Oslo |
| NORWAY |

Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης

:

11 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013

Αριθμός υπόθεσης

:

74138

Αριθμός απόφασης

:

320/13/COL

Κράτος ΕΖΕΣ

:

Νορβηγία

Τίτλος (και/ή ονομασία του δικαιούχου)

:

Καινοτομικός συνεργατικός σχηματισμός μηχανικής των συστημάτων NCE (Systems Engineering Innovation Cluster)

Νομική βάση

:

Άρθρο 61 παράγραφος 3 στοιχείο γ) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ

Είδος του μέτρου

:

Ατομική ενίσχυση για τον συντονισμό του συνεργατικού σχηματισμού

Στόχος

:

Προώθηση της καινοτομίας

Μορφή της ενίσχυσης

:

Επιχορήγηση

Προϋπολογισμός

:

Συνολικός προϋπολογισμός: 50 εκατ. ΝΟΚ

Διάρκεια

:

Μέχρι τον Ιούλιο του 2016

Κλάδοι της οικονομίας

:

Υποθαλάσσιος και θαλάσσιος τομέας, τομείς αυτοκινήτων, αεροσκαφών, άμυνας και αεροδιαστημικής

Όνομα και διεύθυνση της χορηγούσας αρχής

:

Innovation Norway

PO Box 448, Sentrum

Akersgata 13

0104 Oslo

NORWAY

Το αυθεντικό κείμενο της απόφασης, από το οποίο έχουν αφαιρεθεί όλα τα εμπιστευτικά στοιχεία, δημοσιεύεται στον δικτυακό τόπο της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/11

---

Πρόσκληση για την υποβολή παρατηρήσεων κατ’ εφαρμογή του άρθρου 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου όσον αφορά εικαζόμενη χορήγηση κρατικής ενίσχυσης για τη χρηματοδότηση της ανάπτυξης ευρυζωνικών υπηρεσιών σε αγροτικές περιοχές της Ισλανδίας

2013/C 347/11

Με την απόφαση αριθ. 302/13/COL, της 10ης Ιουλίου 2013, που αναδημοσιεύεται στην αυθεντική γλώσσα του κειμένου στις σελίδες που ακολουθούν την παρούσα περίληψη, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ κίνησε τη διαδικασία που προβλέπεται στο άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου. Οι ισλανδικές αρχές ενημερώθηκαν μέσω αντιγράφου της απόφασης.

Με την παρούσα ανακοίνωση, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ καλεί τα κράτη της ΕΖΕΣ, τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ και τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη να υποβάλουν τις παρατηρήσεις τους σχετικά με το εν λόγω μέτρο, εντός ενός μηνός από την ημερομηνία δημοσίευσης της παρούσας ανακοίνωσης, στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Οι παρατηρήσεις αυτές θα κοινοποιηθούν στις ισλανδικές αρχές. Το ενδιαφερόμενο μέρος που υποβάλλει τις παρατηρήσεις μπορεί, με έγγραφο αίτημά του, να ζητήσει να μην αποκαλυφθεί η ταυτότητά του, αναφέροντας τους σχετικούς λόγους.

ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

Διαδικασία

Τον Φεβρουάριο του 2011, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ (εφεξής «η Αρχή») έλαβε καταγγελία σχετικά με εικαζόμενη παράνομη κρατική ενίσχυση που χορηγήθηκε στην επιχείρηση τηλεπικοινωνιών Síminn, για την ανάπτυξη ευρυζωνικών δικτύων σε αγροτικές περιοχές της Ισλανδίας. Η Αρχή έστειλε εν συνεχεία δύο αιτήσεις παροχής πληροφοριών στις οποίες οι ισλανδικές αρχές απάντησαν. Η Αρχή έλαβε περαιτέρω πληροφορίες από τον καταγγέλλοντα τον Μάιο του 2012 και τον Μάιο του 2013.

Περιγραφή του μέτρου

Στις αρχές του 2007, οι ισλανδικές αρχές, μέσω του Ταμείου Τηλεπικοινωνιών (εφεξής «το Ταμείο») (1), προέβησαν σε χαρτογράφηση και ανάλυση της σημερινής και μελλοντικής ευρυζωνικής κάλυψης στις αγροτικές περιοχές της Ισλανδίας. Βάσει αυτού καταρτίστηκε κατάλογος 1 118 κτιρίων όπου θεωρήθηκε απίθανο οι ιδιωτικοί φορείς να αναπτύξουν υπηρεσίες με τους όρους της αγοράς στο προσεχές μέλλον. Το Φεβρουάριο του 2008, οι ισλανδικές αρχές δημοσίευσαν πρόσκληση υποβολής προτάσεων για την ανάπτυξη ευρυζωνικών υπηρεσιών στα προσδιορισθέντα κτίρια. Η προσφορά της Síminn θεωρήθηκε η πλέον κατάλληλη και οι ισλανδικές αρχές άρχισαν διαπραγματεύσεις με την εταιρεία. Το πεδίο του έργου επεκτάθηκε στη συνέχεια για να συμπεριλάβει 670 επιπλέον κτίρια.

Η συμφωνία μεταξύ του Ταμείου και της Síminn ολοκληρώθηκε τον Φεβρουάριο του 2009. Η περίοδος αντιστάθμισης και ανάπτυξης των δικτύων αυξήθηκε σε σύγκριση με την προσφορά της Síminn, λόγω της επέκτασης του πεδίου εφαρμογής του έργου. Επιπλέον, οι πληρωμές αναπροσαρμόστηκαν με βάση τη συναλλαγματική ισοτιμία με ξένο νόμισμα, αντί του γενικού δείκτη τιμών καταναλωτή, όπως είχε αρχικά προβλεφθεί. Το δίκτυο έπρεπε να κατασκευαστεί, έτσι ώστε να καταστεί δυνατή η πρόσβαση σε επίπεδο χονδρικής σε άλλους παρόχους υπηρεσιών Διαδικτύου («ISP»). Το έργο ήταν ουδέτερο από τεχνολογική άποψη, και, όπως αποδείχθηκε, το 55 % των κτιρίων είχαν συνδεθεί με το UMTS, το 41 % με το ADSL και το 4 % με δορυφορικές υπηρεσίες/Wi-Fi.

Ωστόσο, σύμφωνα με σημείωμα του Ταμείου, όσον αφορά τις συνδέσεις μέσω UMTS, Wi-Fi και δορυφόρου, το δίκτυο επιτρέπει πρόσβαση μόνο σε μεταπώληση και όχι πρόσβαση χονδρικής. Ο καταγγέλλων έχει επίσης εγείρει αντιρρήσεις κατά του βαθμού πρόσβασης στο δίκτυο ADSL που παρέχεται σε άλλους ISP.

Παρατηρήσεις των ισλανδικών αρχών

Οι ισλανδικές αρχές θεωρούν ότι οι συνεισφορές που συνδέονται με τη συμφωνία με τη Síminn δεν αποτελούν κρατική ενίσχυση, κατ' αρχάς, επειδή δεν πληρούνται οι προϋποθέσεις του άρθρου 61 παράγραφος 1 της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ. Επιπλέον, οι ισλανδικές αρχές είναι της γνώμης ότι η συνεισφορά αυτή μπορεί να χαρακτηριστεί ως χρηματοδότηση δημόσιας υπηρεσίας και ότι πληρούνται τα κριτήρια της «μεθόδου Altmark». Σε περίπτωση που η Αρχή θεωρήσει ότι το μέτρο αποτελεί κρατική ενίσχυση, η εν λόγω ενίσχυση θα μπορούσε να θεωρηθεί συμβατή με το άρθρο 61 παράγραφος 3 της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ, λαμβανομένων υπόψη των στόχων του μέτρου, μεταξύ των οποίων περιλαμβάνεται και η αύξηση της δημόσιας ευρυζωνικής πρόσβασης σε ενισχυόμενες περιοχές. Ενίσχυση του είδους αυτού πρέπει επίσης να θεωρηθεί ότι αποτελεί τη χρηματοδότηση υπηρεσιών γενικού οικονομικού συμφέροντος (ΥΓΟΣ), βλ. κατευθυντήριες γραμμές της Αρχής για τα ευρυζωνικά δίκτυα (2).

Η παρουσία κρατικής ενίσχυσης

Πλεονεκτήματα που συνιστούν χορήγηση κρατικών πόρων σε επιχείρηση

Δεδομένου ότι το Ταμείο έχει ιδρυθεί δια νόμου και ανήκει στο ισλανδικό κράτος το οποίο κατανέμει τους πόρους στο Ταμείο μέσω του ετήσιου κρατικού προϋπολογισμού, το μέτρο φαίνεται να χρηματοδοτείται με κρατικούς πόρους. Επιπλέον, η Síminn είναι ο μεγαλύτερος τηλεπικοινωνιακός φορέας της Ισλανδίας. Οπότε, κάθε ενίσχυση που προβλέπεται στη συμφωνία έχει χορηγηθεί σε επιχείρηση.

Επιπλέον, η δημόσια χρηματοδότηση του έργου έχει παράσχει στη Síminn οικονομικό πλεονέκτημα που κανονικά θα έπρεπε να καλυφθεί από τον προϋπολογισμό της. Αν και μια διαδικασία διαγωνισμού συντελεί στη μείωση του ποσού της απαιτούμενης οικονομικής ενίσχυσης, τίθεται το ερώτημα εάν η αντιστάθμιση για τα πρόσθετα κτίρια καθορίστηκε με διαγωνισμό ή εάν όντως προσδιορίστηκε αφού είχε επιλεγεί η προσφορά της Síminn. Ως εκ τούτου, η προκαταρκτική εκτίμηση της Αρχής δείχνει ότι δεν μπορεί να αποκλειστεί οικονομικό πλεονέκτημα.

Δεδομένου ότι η Síminn είναι ο μόνος δικαιούχος των κρατικών πόρων, η Αρχή διατυπώνει την προκαταρκτική άποψη ότι το μέτρο είναι επιλεκτικό.

Στρέβλωση του ανταγωνισμού και επιπτώσεις στις συναλλαγές μεταξύ των συμβαλλόμενων μερών

Η συμμετοχή των πολιτών στην προσπάθεια για την ανάπτυξη υποδομής με σκοπό την παροχή υπηρεσιών ηλεκτρονικών επικοινωνιών ενισχύει τη θέση του επιλεγμένου προμηθευτή του δικτύου σε σχέση με τους ανταγωνιστές του. Γενικά, οι αγορές υπηρεσιών ηλεκτρονικών επικοινωνιών είναι ανοικτές στο εμπόριο και τον ανταγωνισμό μεταξύ επιχειρήσεων και παρόχων υπηρεσιών σε ολόκληρο τον ΕΟΧ. Ως εκ τούτου, στην προκαταρκτική ανάλυση της Αρχής, το μέτρο απειλεί να στρεβλώσει τον ανταγωνισμό και να επηρεάσει τις συναλλαγές εντός του ΕΟΧ.

Χρηματοδότηση δημόσιας υπηρεσίας και η μέθοδος Altmark

Η απόφαση Altmark περιελάμβανε τέσσερις βασικές προϋποθέσεις που πρέπει να πληρούνται ούτως ώστε μια αντιστάθμιση για την παροχή δημόσιας υπηρεσίας να μη συνιστά κρατική ενίσχυση, λόγω ελλείψεως πλεονεκτήματος (3). Η Αρχή θεωρεί προκαταρκτικά ότι η παροχή επαρκούς ευρυζωνικής κάλυψης σε περιοχές όπου η λειτουργία της αγοράς είναι ατελής, θα μπορούσε να χαρακτηριστεί ως ΥΓΟΣ και ότι η Síminn φαίνεται να έχει λάβει σαφή εντολή που της ανατέθηκε με σύμβαση. Ωστόσο, η συμπερίληψη των πρόσθετων κτιρίων και οι επακόλουθες μεταβολές στη σύμβαση μετά την περάτωση της διαδικασίας του διαγωνισμού μπορεί να δημιουργήσει προβλήματα σε σχέση με τα υπόλοιπα κριτήρια Altmark. Ως εκ τούτου, σ’ αυτό το στάδιο, η Αρχή δεν μπορεί να συναγάγει το συμπέρασμα ότι πληρούνται οι προϋποθέσεις για τα κριτήρια Altmark.

Συμβατότητα της ενίσχυσης

Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 61 παράγραφος 3 στοιχείο γ) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ, «οι ενισχύσεις για την προώθηση της ανάπτυξης ορισμένων οικονομικών δραστηριοτήτων ή οικονομικών περιοχών» δύνανται να θεωρηθούν ότι συμβιβάζονται με τη λειτουργία της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ, εφόσον δεν αλλοιώνουν τους όρους των συναλλαγών και του ανταγωνισμού στον ΕΟΧ κατά τρόπο που αντίκειται στο κοινό συμφέρον. Η Αρχή εξέτασε τη συμβατότητα του μέτρου βάσει των αρχών του κριτηρίου εξισορρόπησης και ορισμένων από τις αρχές των κατευθυντηρίων γραμμών της Αρχής για τα ευρυζωνικά δίκτυα.

Η προκαταρκτική άποψη της Αρχής είναι ότι η στήριξη για την ανάπτυξη ευρυζωνικών δικτύων σε αγροτικές περιοχές και σε περιοχές της Ισλανδίας που δεν καλύπτονται επαρκώς φαίνεται να εξυπηρετεί συγκεκριμένους στόχους κοινού συμφέροντος, αποτελεί το κατάλληλο μέσο για την επίτευξη των στόχων που έχουν καθοριστεί και παρέχει επενδυτικό κίνητρο στον επιλεγμένο προμηθευτή.

Ωστόσο, λόγω της έκτασης των τροποποιήσεων της σύμβασης, η διαδικασία ανάθεσης δημόσιων συμβάσεων μπορεί να μην συνίσταται σε ανοικτό και άνευ διακρίσεων διαγωνισμό, κατά την έννοια των κατευθυντήριων γραμμών της Αρχής για τα ευρυζωνικά δίκτυα. Η Αρχή έχει επίσης αμφιβολίες ως προς το κατά πόσο η Síminn έχει υποχρεωθεί; να παρέχει επαρκή πρόσβαση σε επίπεδο χονδρικής στα τμήματα UMTS και ADSL του δικτύου. Η έλλειψη επαρκούς υποχρέωσης πρόσβασης σε επίπεδο χονδρικής θα δώσει στη Síminn οικονομικά και ανταγωνιστικά πλεονεκτήματα. Ως εκ τούτου, το μέτρο δεν φαίνεται να συμβιβάζεται με τις αρχές της αναλογικότητας και του περιορισμού της στρέβλωσης του ανταγωνισμού βάσει του κριτηρίου εξισορρόπησης.

Συνεπώς, έπειτα από την προκαταρκτική εκτίμησή της, η Αρχή έχει αμφιβολίες για το κατά πόσο η χρηματοδότηση της ανάπτυξης ευρυζωνικών υπηρεσιών σε αγροτικές περιοχές της Ισλανδίας, μπορούν να θεωρηθούν συμβιβάσιμες με το άρθρο 61 παράγραφος 3 στοιχείο γ) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ.

Συμπέρασμα

Βάσει των ανωτέρω παρατηρήσεων, η Αρχή αποφάσισε να κινήσει την επίσημη διαδικασία έρευνας σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου όσον αφορά τη χρηματοδότηση της ανάπτυξης ευρυζωνικών υπηρεσιών σε αγροτικές περιοχές της Ισλανδίας. Τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη καλούνται να υποβάλουν τις παρατηρήσεις τους μέσα σε ένα μήνα από τη δημοσίευση της παρούσας ανακοίνωσης στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 14 του πρωτοκόλλου 3, ο αποδέκτης κάθε παράνομης ενίσχυσης ενδέχεται να κληθεί να την επιστρέψει.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 302/13/COL

of 10 July 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential State aid granted to Síminn for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I and Article 4(4) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 2 February 2011 (Event No 585458), Og fjarskipti ehf. (Vodafone Iceland) lodged a complaint with the EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’) concerning alleged unlawful State aid granted to Síminn for the roll-out of broadband networks in rural areas of Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 2 February 2011 (Event No 585458), Og fjarskipti ehf. (Vodafone Iceland) lodged a complaint with the EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’) concerning alleged unlawful State aid granted to Síminn for the roll-out of broadband networks in rural areas of Iceland.

| (2) | By letter dated 1 April 2011 (Event No 590838), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letters dated 28 April 2011 (Event No 596157) and 17 May 2011 (Event No 598419) and e-mail dated 31 May 2011 (Event No 599981), the Icelandic authorities requested extensions to the deadline to reply. By letter dated 22 June 2011 (Event No 601861), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By letter dated 1 April 2011 (Event No 590838), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letters dated 28 April 2011 (Event No 596157) and 17 May 2011 (Event No 598419) and e-mail dated 31 May 2011 (Event No 599981), the Icelandic authorities requested extensions to the deadline to reply. By letter dated 22 June 2011 (Event No 601861), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information.

| (3) | By e-mail dated 2 October 2011 (Event No 614576), the Authority received an inquiry by an interested party containing relevant new information. By letter dated 17 November 2011 (Event No 613338), the Authority acknowledged receipt of the inquiry and informed the interested party that it was free to either provide the Authority with additional information or lodge a formal complaint with the Authority. The Authority received more information from the interested party by e-mails dated 19 November 2011 (Event No 615746 and Event No 615747). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By e-mail dated 2 October 2011 (Event No 614576), the Authority received an inquiry by an interested party containing relevant new information. By letter dated 17 November 2011 (Event No 613338), the Authority acknowledged receipt of the inquiry and informed the interested party that it was free to either provide the Authority with additional information or lodge a formal complaint with the Authority. The Authority received more information from the interested party by e-mails dated 19 November 2011 (Event No 615746 and Event No 615747).

| (4) | By e-mail dated 23 May 2012 (Event No 657203), the Authority received further information from the complainant. By letter dated 8 January 2013 (Event No 657178), the Authority, after assessing the new information provided by the complainant, requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter dated 11 March 2013 (Event No 665601), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

By e-mail dated 23 May 2012 (Event No 657203), the Authority received further information from the complainant. By letter dated 8 January 2013 (Event No 657178), the Authority, after assessing the new information provided by the complainant, requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter dated 11 March 2013 (Event No 665601), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information.

| (5) | Finally, the Authority received further information from the complainant by letter dated 10 May 2013 (Event No 672303). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Finally, the Authority received further information from the complainant by letter dated 10 May 2013 (Event No 672303).

2.   The complaint

| (6) | The complainant, Og fjarskipti ehf. (Vodafone), is a company that is active on the electronic communications market and provides fixed telephony, mobile and data services in Iceland. The complainant is currently the second largest operator in Iceland following the incumbent Skipti hf. and its subsidiaries Síminn and Míla. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The complainant, Og fjarskipti ehf. (Vodafone), is a company that is active on the electronic communications market and provides fixed telephony, mobile and data services in Iceland. The complainant is currently the second largest operator in Iceland following the incumbent Skipti hf. and its subsidiaries Síminn and Míla.

| (7) | According to the complaint, unlawful State aid was granted by the Telecommunications Fund (‘the Fund’) to Síminn through an agreement entered into between the two parties for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland (‘the Agreement’). The complainant maintains that the tender procedure was flawed, since significant changes were effected in the final Agreement between Síminn and the Fund, from the original tender documents published by the State Trading Centre (‘the STC’). The complainant maintains that these changes were at the behest of Síminn and were highly favourable to the company. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

According to the complaint, unlawful State aid was granted by the Telecommunications Fund (‘the Fund’) to Síminn through an agreement entered into between the two parties for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland (‘the Agreement’). The complainant maintains that the tender procedure was flawed, since significant changes were effected in the final Agreement between Síminn and the Fund, from the original tender documents published by the State Trading Centre (‘the STC’). The complainant maintains that these changes were at the behest of Síminn and were highly favourable to the company.

| (8) | According to the complaint, the following fundamental changes were implemented in the final Agreement between the Fund and Síminn. Firstly, the scope of the project was increased significantly to include a total of 1 788 locations instead of the 1 118 locations that were defined in the tender documents. Secondly, the roll-out period was extended from 12 months to 18 months and provisions concerning penalties for breach of the roll-out period were changed significantly. Thirdly, the payment to Síminn was increased from ISK 375 million to ISK 606 million and the indexation of the payment was based on foreign currency indexation instead of the general consumer price index as stipulated in the tender documents. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

According to the complaint, the following fundamental changes were implemented in the final Agreement between the Fund and Síminn. Firstly, the scope of the project was increased significantly to include a total of 1 788 locations instead of the 1 118 locations that were defined in the tender documents. Secondly, the roll-out period was extended from 12 months to 18 months and provisions concerning penalties for breach of the roll-out period were changed significantly. Thirdly, the payment to Síminn was increased from ISK 375 million to ISK 606 million and the indexation of the payment was based on foreign currency indexation instead of the general consumer price index as stipulated in the tender documents.

| (9) | Furthermore, the complainant maintains that the access mandated by the final Agreement was confined to resale access as opposed to the wholesale access originally prescribed in the tender document (4). The complainant claims to have repeatedly requested wholesale access to the network without success (5). According to the complaint, this has led to an unacceptable distortion of competition and has given Síminn a significant first mover advantage on the relevant market. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Furthermore, the complainant maintains that the access mandated by the final Agreement was confined to resale access as opposed to the wholesale access originally prescribed in the tender document (4). The complainant claims to have repeatedly requested wholesale access to the network without success (5). According to the complaint, this has led to an unacceptable distortion of competition and has given Síminn a significant first mover advantage on the relevant market.

| (10) | As regards further grounds of the complaint, the complainant is of the view that all the conditions for the measure to involve State aid under the first paragraph of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. Furthermore, the complainant maintains that the alleged aid measure does not qualify for any of the relevant exemptions and therefore must be considered as being incompatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As regards further grounds of the complaint, the complainant is of the view that all the conditions for the measure to involve State aid under the first paragraph of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. Furthermore, the complainant maintains that the alleged aid measure does not qualify for any of the relevant exemptions and therefore must be considered as being incompatible with the EEA Agreement.

3.   Description of the measure

3.1.   
  Background

3.1.1.   The role of the Telecommunications Fund

| (11) | The Fund was established by Act No 132/2005, and its role, as established by statute, is to promote development in the field of telecommunications in Iceland as described in the official Telecommunications Strategy (‘the Strategy’) approved by Althingi (6). Article 2 of this act states that the Fund is established to oversee the allocation of funds to projects pertaining to the roll-out of electronic communications infrastructure, thus increasing security and competitiveness of the society in the field of electronic communications and other projects entailed in the Strategy, provided that such projects are not likely to be executed on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The Fund was established by Act No 132/2005, and its role, as established by statute, is to promote development in the field of telecommunications in Iceland as described in the official Telecommunications Strategy (‘the Strategy’) approved by Althingi (6). Article 2 of this act states that the Fund is established to oversee the allocation of funds to projects pertaining to the roll-out of electronic communications infrastructure, thus increasing security and competitiveness of the society in the field of electronic communications and other projects entailed in the Strategy, provided that such projects are not likely to be executed on market terms.

| (12) | The Fund is financed by a statutory contribution from the Treasury. The Fund is administered by the Ministry of the Interior, which appoints the members of the Fund’s board for a five-year term. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Fund is financed by a statutory contribution from the Treasury. The Fund is administered by the Ministry of the Interior, which appoints the members of the Fund’s board for a five-year term.

| (13) | The Fund has worked on four key priorities stipulated in the Strategy, of which the roll-out of broadband services was the last one to be implemented. According to the Icelandic authorities, an open tender procedure was used in all of the projects. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The Fund has worked on four key priorities stipulated in the Strategy, of which the roll-out of broadband services was the last one to be implemented. According to the Icelandic authorities, an open tender procedure was used in all of the projects.

3.1.2.   The mapping and coverage analysis

| (14) | In early 2007, the Fund hired a branch of the Farmer’s Association to verify census information in rural areas, especially the most rural ones (7). This work resulted in a comprehensive and current overview of buildings that could potentially form part of the project. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In early 2007, the Fund hired a branch of the Farmer’s Association to verify census information in rural areas, especially the most rural ones (7). This work resulted in a comprehensive and current overview of buildings that could potentially form part of the project.

| (15) | In February 2007, the Fund called for information on current market areas from broadband service providers (8) as a first step in mapping current and future broadband coverage. The aim of this exercise was to identify market failures, by distinguishing between ‘grey’, ‘black’ and ‘white’ areas in remote regions in Iceland (9). A public advertisement, placed in the newspaper Morgunblaðið, called for information on all current broadband service areas (i.e. areas that had a continuously available (not dial-up) Internet access of at least 512 kb/s for a reasonable fixed monthly price), as well as planned areas (not yet serviced) that would be functional by June 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In February 2007, the Fund called for information on current market areas from broadband service providers (8) as a first step in mapping current and future broadband coverage. The aim of this exercise was to identify market failures, by distinguishing between ‘grey’, ‘black’ and ‘white’ areas in remote regions in Iceland (9). A public advertisement, placed in the newspaper Morgunblaðið, called for information on all current broadband service areas (i.e. areas that had a continuously available (not dial-up) Internet access of at least 512 kb/s for a reasonable fixed monthly price), as well as planned areas (not yet serviced) that would be functional by June 2008.

| (16) | The Fund received information on market areas in various forms from several broadband service providers and individuals (10). With the coverage areas in place, the next step was to input GPS coordinates for all residences outside known areas of ADSL coverage. The resulting multi-layered map of residences outside of all current and planned (total) broadband coverage areas was sent to the participating broadband service providers for a further detailed review. This led to considerable updates to the map made on the basis of the service providers’ comparisons of the map with their customer databases. After this work was completed, the Fund sent to each of the 78 municipalities in Icelanda list of buildings outside of service areas and a print-out of the updated broadband coverage map for that municipality. Each municipality then reviewed the ‘white’ areas on the map for missing buildings, or for buildings which did not qualify for the project. In order for a building to qualify, it had to be an official permanent year-round residence and/or place of work of at least one person. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Fund received information on market areas in various forms from several broadband service providers and individuals (10). With the coverage areas in place, the next step was to input GPS coordinates for all residences outside known areas of ADSL coverage. The resulting multi-layered map of residences outside of all current and planned (total) broadband coverage areas was sent to the participating broadband service providers for a further detailed review. This led to considerable updates to the map made on the basis of the service providers’ comparisons of the map with their customer databases. After this work was completed, the Fund sent to each of the 78 municipalities in Icelanda list of buildings outside of service areas and a print-out of the updated broadband coverage map for that municipality. Each municipality then reviewed the ‘white’ areas on the map for missing buildings, or for buildings which did not qualify for the project. In order for a building to qualify, it had to be an official permanent year-round residence and/or place of work of at least one person.

| (17) | The Fund’s mapping and coverage analysis resulted in a precise list of buildings to be included in the project. The initial scope of the project was 1 118‘white’ buildings, which were individually identified by their GPS coordinates. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The Fund’s mapping and coverage analysis resulted in a precise list of buildings to be included in the project. The initial scope of the project was 1 118‘white’ buildings, which were individually identified by their GPS coordinates.

3.1.3.   The tender procedure and selection of the successful bidder

| (18) | In February 2008, the STC, on behalf of the Fund, published a call for tender for the project ‘Háhraðanettengingar til allra landsmanna’. This project consisted of the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas where the Icelandic authorities had identified a market failure, on the basis that it was deemed unlikely that private operators would roll out services in those areas on market terms. The project covered the 1 118‘white’ buildings identified by the Fund in its research. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In February 2008, the STC, on behalf of the Fund, published a call for tender for the project ‘Háhraðanettengingar til allra landsmanna’. This project consisted of the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas where the Icelandic authorities had identified a market failure, on the basis that it was deemed unlikely that private operators would roll out services in those areas on market terms. The project covered the 1 118‘white’ buildings identified by the Fund in its research.

| (19) | Following the publication of the tender, the STC engaged in several discussions with interested bidders, resulting in a prolongation of the deadline to submit tenders until 4 September 2008. Five tenders were received by the STC, which varied in terms of price and the technical solutions proposed. Síminn submitted two tender offers: the lowest-priced tender in the amount of ISK 378 million and the highest (for the highest average download speed offered) in the amount of ISK 5 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Following the publication of the tender, the STC engaged in several discussions with interested bidders, resulting in a prolongation of the deadline to submit tenders until 4 September 2008. Five tenders were received by the STC, which varied in terms of price and the technical solutions proposed. Síminn submitted two tender offers: the lowest-priced tender in the amount of ISK 378 million and the highest (for the highest average download speed offered) in the amount of ISK 5 billion.

| (20) | According to the tender description, the purpose of the award criteria used was to identify the most economically advantageous tender. Four evaluation criteria were used: (i) total price (50 %); (ii) build-out speed (15 %); (iii) download speed (25 %); and (iv) 2G GSM (optional) (10 %) (11). The STC received four valid offers (and one invalid offer) by 4 September 2008. The offers received were as follows:










  Bidders, tender — 14 121 | ISK | Project time | Avg. Mb/s | GSM | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Total price | Months | Downl. speed | Optional | Points |
| Síminn hf. | 379 000 000 kr. | 12 | 6 | Yes | 95 |
| NordiskMobileIslandehf | 974 864 503 kr. | 12 | 3 | Yes | NA |
| Vodafone | 1 858 339 001 kr. | 15 | 6,2 | Yes | 52 |
| Vodafone | 2 256 549 333 kr. | 17 | 6,5 | Yes | 49 |
| Síminn hf. | 5 000 000 000 kr. | 22 | 12 | Yes | 39 |

(20)

According to the tender description, the purpose of the award criteria used was to identify the most economically advantageous tender. Four evaluation criteria were used: (i) total price (50 %); (ii) build-out speed (15 %); (iii) download speed (25 %); and (iv) 2G GSM (optional) (10 %) (11). The STC received four valid offers (and one invalid offer) by 4 September 2008. The offers received were as follows:

Bidders, tender — 14 121

ISK

Project time

Avg. Mb/s

GSM

Total price

Months

Downl. speed

Optional

Points

Síminn hf.

379 000 000 kr.

12

6

Yes

95

NordiskMobileIslandehf

974 864 503 kr.

12

3

Yes

NA

Vodafone

1 858 339 001 kr.

15

6,2

Yes

52

Vodafone

2 256 549 333 kr.

17

6,5

Yes

49

Síminn hf.

5 000 000 000 kr.

22

12

Yes

39

| (21) | As the first offer from Síminn received the highest number of points (95 points) under the above-mentioned criteria, the STC entered into negotiations with Síminn (12). Furthermore, the STC requested that Siminn participate in several explanatory meetings; such meetings being standard procedure after the opening of a tender. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As the first offer from Síminn received the highest number of points (95 points) under the above-mentioned criteria, the STC entered into negotiations with Síminn (12). Furthermore, the STC requested that Siminn participate in several explanatory meetings; such meetings being standard procedure after the opening of a tender.

3.1.4.   The expansion of the roll out area

| (22) | In early December 2008, the Post and Telecom Administration in Iceland (‘the PTA’) received a request from a service provider, Wireless Broadband Systems (‘WBS’), asking to be deregistered as a telecommunications provider in Iceland. WBS had previously participated in the Fund’s mapping and coverage analysis and had informed the STC of its coverage plans during the period leading up to the STC’s call for tender. The departure of WBS from the market and the subsequent withdrawal of its coverage plans resulted in a substantial change to the list of buildings which neither had, nor would receive, broadband coverage in the near future on market terms. When the service provider's planned coverage area was withdrawn from the total cumulative coverage map, 670 additional ‘white’ buildings appeared, spread across the country. These buildings were considered by the Fund to become part of the scope of the new telecommunications policy. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

In early December 2008, the Post and Telecom Administration in Iceland (‘the PTA’) received a request from a service provider, Wireless Broadband Systems (‘WBS’), asking to be deregistered as a telecommunications provider in Iceland. WBS had previously participated in the Fund’s mapping and coverage analysis and had informed the STC of its coverage plans during the period leading up to the STC’s call for tender. The departure of WBS from the market and the subsequent withdrawal of its coverage plans resulted in a substantial change to the list of buildings which neither had, nor would receive, broadband coverage in the near future on market terms. When the service provider's planned coverage area was withdrawn from the total cumulative coverage map, 670 additional ‘white’ buildings appeared, spread across the country. These buildings were considered by the Fund to become part of the scope of the new telecommunications policy.

| (23) | The Fund requested information from the STC on whether it was possible to increase the scope of the project as part of the ongoing tender procedure. The STC responded on 7 January 2009, taking the view that a certain amount of expansion could fit within the tender and that such an expansion was in line with the regulatory framework on public procurement. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The Fund requested information from the STC on whether it was possible to increase the scope of the project as part of the ongoing tender procedure. The STC responded on 7 January 2009, taking the view that a certain amount of expansion could fit within the tender and that such an expansion was in line with the regulatory framework on public procurement.

| (24) | To establish that existing or new providers had no intentions of increasing their service areas by including any of the 670 additional ‘white’ buildings, the Fund requested that the STC call out again for any plans to offer services for these 670 buildings. On 23 January 2009, the STC published an announcement in the newspaper Morgunblaðið seeking information from market players on roll-out plans for broadband services in additional areas not previously included in the tender (13). According to the Icelandic authorities, this was in line with the previous methodology used by STC when it made its initial call for information on service areas. By inviting information via an advertisement, the request for information was not exclusive to those service providers that had previously handed in their tender offers but was intended to reach all service providers. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

To establish that existing or new providers had no intentions of increasing their service areas by including any of the 670 additional ‘white’ buildings, the Fund requested that the STC call out again for any plans to offer services for these 670 buildings. On 23 January 2009, the STC published an announcement in the newspaper Morgunblaðið seeking information from market players on roll-out plans for broadband services in additional areas not previously included in the tender (13). According to the Icelandic authorities, this was in line with the previous methodology used by STC when it made its initial call for information on service areas. By inviting information via an advertisement, the request for information was not exclusive to those service providers that had previously handed in their tender offers but was intended to reach all service providers.

| (25) | The STC did not receive any additional or new plans for servicing the 670 identified buildings. The STC subsequently took the decision to consider these additional buildings as falling within the scope of the project. It therefore sought to revise the contractual agreement being negotiated with Síminn so as to include the additional buildings. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The STC did not receive any additional or new plans for servicing the 670 identified buildings. The STC subsequently took the decision to consider these additional buildings as falling within the scope of the project. It therefore sought to revise the contractual agreement being negotiated with Síminn so as to include the additional buildings.

3.2.   
  The Agreement between the Telecommunications Fund and Síminn

3.2.1.   General

| (26) | On 25 February 2009, the Fund (the purchaser) and Síminn (the seller) entered into an agreement concerning the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland. According to the Agreement, the seller was to build out a high-speed network and broadband services in areas which previously did not have access to such services. The network and the service was to extend to all homes where at least one person was registered and had residence all year round, and to businesses which were operational all year round. The Agreement covered a total of 1 788 buildings: the 1 118 buildings originally identified in the tender documents, plus the additional 670 buildings added during the course of the negotiations. After the completion of the roll-out, the Agreement provided that the seller would be the owner of the network. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

On 25 February 2009, the Fund (the purchaser) and Síminn (the seller) entered into an agreement concerning the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland. According to the Agreement, the seller was to build out a high-speed network and broadband services in areas which previously did not have access to such services. The network and the service was to extend to all homes where at least one person was registered and had residence all year round, and to businesses which were operational all year round. The Agreement covered a total of 1 788 buildings: the 1 118 buildings originally identified in the tender documents, plus the additional 670 buildings added during the course of the negotiations. After the completion of the roll-out, the Agreement provided that the seller would be the owner of the network.

3.2.2.   The contract period and the contract amount

| (27) | According to Article 4 of the Agreement, the contract period extends from the date of signature until 1 March 2014. If both parties agreed, the period could be extended for up to two years. However, according to Article 10 of the Agreement, the period for the construction of the network formally commenced on 1 March 2009 and lasted until 1 March 2011. The Fund allowed for an extended roll-out period (18 months) because of the increase in the scope of the project. The Fund agreed to this on the condition that the roll-out for at least 1 118 buildings would be finished in the first 12 months in accordance with the tender offer from Síminn. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

According to Article 4 of the Agreement, the contract period extends from the date of signature until 1 March 2014. If both parties agreed, the period could be extended for up to two years. However, according to Article 10 of the Agreement, the period for the construction of the network formally commenced on 1 March 2009 and lasted until 1 March 2011. The Fund allowed for an extended roll-out period (18 months) because of the increase in the scope of the project. The Fund agreed to this on the condition that the roll-out for at least 1 118 buildings would be finished in the first 12 months in accordance with the tender offer from Síminn.

| (28) | For the roll-out of the network and the service, the purchaser was to pay a total of ISK 606 128 801. The price for the increase in scope of 670 buildings was agreed upon, on the basis of the average unit price offered initially by Síminn, multiplied by the number of new buildings. Therefore, the payment to Síminn increased from ISK 379 million to ISK 606 million. The purchaser was to pay 70 % of the total amount to the seller at the signing of the Agreement, a further 20 % once the network had become operational and the final 10 % after a three-month trial period had passed. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the roll-out of the network and the service, the purchaser was to pay a total of ISK 606 128 801. The price for the increase in scope of 670 buildings was agreed upon, on the basis of the average unit price offered initially by Síminn, multiplied by the number of new buildings. Therefore, the payment to Síminn increased from ISK 379 million to ISK 606 million. The purchaser was to pay 70 % of the total amount to the seller at the signing of the Agreement, a further 20 % once the network had become operational and the final 10 % after a three-month trial period had passed.

| (29) | The payments were indexed on the basis of the exchange rate with a foreign currency instead of the general consumer price index, as was originally intended. This choice of indexation was, according to the Icelandic authorities, the result of the unusual economic conditions, and of the uncertainty resulting from the financial crisis. The foreign currency used was the Danish krone (DKK) as it stood on 3 September 2008 (DKK 1 = ISK 16,513). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The payments were indexed on the basis of the exchange rate with a foreign currency instead of the general consumer price index, as was originally intended. This choice of indexation was, according to the Icelandic authorities, the result of the unusual economic conditions, and of the uncertainty resulting from the financial crisis. The foreign currency used was the Danish krone (DKK) as it stood on 3 September 2008 (DKK 1 = ISK 16,513).

3.2.3.   Technical requirements

| (30) | According to Article 2.1 of the tender description, the project was technologically neutral and there were no particular specifications on how the network should be constructed or which technological solution should be used (14). |
| --- | --- |

(30)

According to Article 2.1 of the tender description, the project was technologically neutral and there were no particular specifications on how the network should be constructed or which technological solution should be used (14).

| (31) | In addition to providing high-speed Internet access to buildings, the bidders were also encouraged to provide mobile voice services (2G GSM) (15). This service was to fulfil the criteria set out in the PTA’s telecommunications plan (Icelandic: fjarskiptaáætlun) for 2005-2010 which included voice services, roaming possibilities and the provision of user equipment at favourable prices. The provision of mobile 2G GSM services accounted for 10 points in the tender criteria. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

In addition to providing high-speed Internet access to buildings, the bidders were also encouraged to provide mobile voice services (2G GSM) (15). This service was to fulfil the criteria set out in the PTA’s telecommunications plan (Icelandic: fjarskiptaáætlun) for 2005-2010 which included voice services, roaming possibilities and the provision of user equipment at favourable prices. The provision of mobile 2G GSM services accounted for 10 points in the tender criteria.

| (32) | The technical solution offered by Síminn was based on four different technologies: ADSL (16), UMTS (17), Wi-Fi (18), and satellite. As it turned out, after construction of the network was completed, 55 % of buildings were connected with UMTS (3G fixed wireless), 41 % with ADSL and 4 % with satellite/Wi-Fi. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The technical solution offered by Síminn was based on four different technologies: ADSL (16), UMTS (17), Wi-Fi (18), and satellite. As it turned out, after construction of the network was completed, 55 % of buildings were connected with UMTS (3G fixed wireless), 41 % with ADSL and 4 % with satellite/Wi-Fi.

3.2.4.   Access requirements

| (33) | According to Article 2.2.13 of Annex I to the Agreement, the network was to be constructed so as to allow for access by other ISPs on a wholesale basis. Those ISPs should be able to buy on request the basic service from Síminn at wholesale prices, and should be permitted to deliver services over the network to their retail customers. Access was to be granted by convenient means (such as through access to the broadband remote access server (‘BRAS’)). All ISPs were to be granted equal service and equal access to the network, irrespective of their connection to the seller. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

According to Article 2.2.13 of Annex I to the Agreement, the network was to be constructed so as to allow for access by other ISPs on a wholesale basis. Those ISPs should be able to buy on request the basic service from Síminn at wholesale prices, and should be permitted to deliver services over the network to their retail customers. Access was to be granted by convenient means (such as through access to the broadband remote access server (‘BRAS’)). All ISPs were to be granted equal service and equal access to the network, irrespective of their connection to the seller.

| (34) | In Annex II to the Agreement, entitled ‘Enquiries and answers 1-22 during the tender period, new location lists, clarifications to the tender documents and minutes of the tender presentation’, there are further clarifications concerning access requirements. With regard to wholesale access, four options are outlined. They are as follows (19): | Option 1: The seller (Síminn) sets up an xDSL connection for users and delivers bitstream to purchasers behind the DSLAM equipment. Purchasers (the ISPs) handle the trunk line connection from the DSLAM via ATM and/or IP network to the service centre. This gives purchasers greater control over the quality of the service they sell, but it requires a substantial investment on their part. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(34)

In Annex II to the Agreement, entitled ‘Enquiries and answers 1-22 during the tender period, new location lists, clarifications to the tender documents and minutes of the tender presentation’, there are further clarifications concerning access requirements. With regard to wholesale access, four options are outlined. They are as follows (19):

Option 1: The seller (Síminn) sets up an xDSL connection for users and delivers bitstream to purchasers behind the DSLAM equipment. Purchasers (the ISPs) handle the trunk line connection from the DSLAM via ATM and/or IP network to the service centre. This gives purchasers greater control over the quality of the service they sell, but it requires a substantial investment on their part.

| | Option 2: The seller provides an xDSL connection from an ATM/IP network over a trunk line connection from the DSLAM. In this instance, the purchaser can control the quality of the transmission on the ATM network to a certain degree. Purchasers operate their own BRAS and can therefore control the technological variables of the equipment and maintain information on users. |
| --- | --- |

Option 2: The seller provides an xDSL connection from an ATM/IP network over a trunk line connection from the DSLAM. In this instance, the purchaser can control the quality of the transmission on the ATM network to a certain degree. Purchasers operate their own BRAS and can therefore control the technological variables of the equipment and maintain information on users.

| | Option 3: In this instance, bitstream is delivered to the purchaser via an IP network operated by the seller, who also operates the DSLAM and is responsible for the quality of the service. It is conceivable that the purchaser could negotiate for various quality terms for his customers. |
| --- | --- |

Option 3: In this instance, bitstream is delivered to the purchaser via an IP network operated by the seller, who also operates the DSLAM and is responsible for the quality of the service. It is conceivable that the purchaser could negotiate for various quality terms for his customers.

| | Option 4: This is a typical example of Internet subscription resale. The Internet connection that the seller sells to the purchaser is the same as that which it sells to his own retail customers. The purchaser operates no part of the network and is only responsible for selling the service unchanged. It does, however, have the option of sending its customers a single invoice for all services provided via high-speed connection. |
| --- | --- |

Option 4: This is a typical example of Internet subscription resale. The Internet connection that the seller sells to the purchaser is the same as that which it sells to his own retail customers. The purchaser operates no part of the network and is only responsible for selling the service unchanged. It does, however, have the option of sending its customers a single invoice for all services provided via high-speed connection.

| (35) | According to Annex II to the Agreement, Síminn is free to offer options 1-4, but is obliged to at least offer option 3 in all instances where ADSL technology is used in the project (20). Furthermore, it is expressly stated that Síminn must follow the PTA’s decisions and rules in this regard (21). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

According to Annex II to the Agreement, Síminn is free to offer options 1-4, but is obliged to at least offer option 3 in all instances where ADSL technology is used in the project (20). Furthermore, it is expressly stated that Síminn must follow the PTA’s decisions and rules in this regard (21).

| (36) | Where UMTS technology is used in the project, Síminn is only obliged to follow option 4 (22). That option entails the supply of user equipment and installation by Síminn in all instances, regardless of who the retailer is. Síminn is also obliged to handle customer and maintenance services. According to the Icelandic authorities, the main reason for this arrangement is that Síminn claims that it is necessary for it to have full access and control of the UMTS network end-to-end, including all the user equipment, in order to guarantee that the quality and service level are in line with the tender documents. Conversely, the Fund allowed for open access to be excluded with regard to satellite and Wi-Fi connections, on the grounds that it would be very difficult and impractical to implement such access (23). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Where UMTS technology is used in the project, Síminn is only obliged to follow option 4 (22). That option entails the supply of user equipment and installation by Síminn in all instances, regardless of who the retailer is. Síminn is also obliged to handle customer and maintenance services. According to the Icelandic authorities, the main reason for this arrangement is that Síminn claims that it is necessary for it to have full access and control of the UMTS network end-to-end, including all the user equipment, in order to guarantee that the quality and service level are in line with the tender documents. Conversely, the Fund allowed for open access to be excluded with regard to satellite and Wi-Fi connections, on the grounds that it would be very difficult and impractical to implement such access (23).

| (37) | In Annex 10 to the Agreement, there are standardised resale agreements (Icelandic: endursölusamningar) between Síminn and ISP resellers for the resale of UMTS-high-speed services and ADSL services. For option 4, these standard agreements include standard minimum discounts based on speed, as follows (24): | UMTS 1 Mb/s = 10 % |
| --- | --- | --- |

(37)

In Annex 10 to the Agreement, there are standardised resale agreements (Icelandic: endursölusamningar) between Síminn and ISP resellers for the resale of UMTS-high-speed services and ADSL services. For option 4, these standard agreements include standard minimum discounts based on speed, as follows (24):

UMTS 1 Mb/s = 10 %

| | UMTS 2 Mb/s = 7,5 % |
| --- | --- |

UMTS 2 Mb/s = 7,5 %

| | UMTS > 2 Mb/s = 5 % |
| --- | --- |

UMTS > 2 Mb/s = 5 %

| (38) | For ADSL, the following minimum discounts apply in respect of option 4 access: | ADSL 1 000 = 5 % |
| --- | --- | --- |

(38)

For ADSL, the following minimum discounts apply in respect of option 4 access:

ADSL 1 000 = 5 %

| | ADSL 2 000 = 5 % |
| --- | --- |

ADSL 2 000 = 5 %

| | ADSL 4 000/8 000 = 7,5 % |
| --- | --- |

ADSL 4 000/8 000 = 7,5 %

| | ADSL 6 000/12 000 = 10 % |
| --- | --- |

ADSL 6 000/12 000 = 10 %

As regards wholesale access to ADSL according to options 1-3, the ISP reseller/retailer would receive a minimum discount of 35 % from Síminn’s retail price. According to the Icelandic authorities, this discount was determined in line with the PTA Decision No 8/2008.

| (39) | According to a note from the Fund dated 14 August 2009, concerning the organisation of access options in the Agreement, there is only resale access available with regard to UMTS connections. Such connections do not benefit from more infrastructure-based wholesale access options. According to the Fund, the above discounts should therefore apply if another ISP wants resale access to Síminn’s network. The Authority has not yet received detailed information regarding the underlying methodology used to calculate the UMTS resale discounts set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

According to a note from the Fund dated 14 August 2009, concerning the organisation of access options in the Agreement, there is only resale access available with regard to UMTS connections. Such connections do not benefit from more infrastructure-based wholesale access options. According to the Fund, the above discounts should therefore apply if another ISP wants resale access to Síminn’s network. The Authority has not yet received detailed information regarding the underlying methodology used to calculate the UMTS resale discounts set out above.

4.   Comments by the Icelandic authorities

| (40) | The Icelandic authorities do not consider the payments made to Síminn, under the terms of the Agreement, to involve State aid, as they take the view that the conditions of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not met. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities are of the view that these payments can be characterised as the funding of a public service, that the four cumulative criteria of the ‘Altmark test’ are fulfilled, and that the measure for that reason does not constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Icelandic authorities do not consider the payments made to Síminn, under the terms of the Agreement, to involve State aid, as they take the view that the conditions of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not met. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities are of the view that these payments can be characterised as the funding of a public service, that the four cumulative criteria of the ‘Altmark test’ are fulfilled, and that the measure for that reason does not constitute State aid.

| (41) | The Icelandic authorities emphasise that a broadband service is in general a service of general economic interest (25). The Icelandic authorities note that they contacted private operators and published an advertisement in order to establish whether any market investor was willing to invest in the infrastructure. Since no one declared any interest in providing the service, the Icelandic authorities concluded that these areas did indeed suffer from a market failure and would not get high-speed Internet connections without the assistance from the Fund. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The Icelandic authorities emphasise that a broadband service is in general a service of general economic interest (25). The Icelandic authorities note that they contacted private operators and published an advertisement in order to establish whether any market investor was willing to invest in the infrastructure. Since no one declared any interest in providing the service, the Icelandic authorities concluded that these areas did indeed suffer from a market failure and would not get high-speed Internet connections without the assistance from the Fund.

| (42) | According to the Icelandic authorities, the nature and scope of the service were clearly defined in the tender process and the subsequent Agreement with Síminn (i.e. to install an infrastructure to enable certain buildings to gain a high-speed Internet connection). The Icelandic authorities state that Síminn, in this particular instance, was formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of this obligation, which was clearly defined by means of an open tender procedure for a defined service (despite technological neutrality). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

According to the Icelandic authorities, the nature and scope of the service were clearly defined in the tender process and the subsequent Agreement with Síminn (i.e. to install an infrastructure to enable certain buildings to gain a high-speed Internet connection). The Icelandic authorities state that Síminn, in this particular instance, was formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of this obligation, which was clearly defined by means of an open tender procedure for a defined service (despite technological neutrality).

| (43) | When the planned coverage area of WBS was withdrawn from the cumulative coverage map, 670 additional ‘white’ buildings appeared. When the Fund requested that the STC call out again for plans to offer services for these 670 buildings, this was done by means of an advertisement and not by direct contact exclusively with those few service providers that had previously handed in their tender offers. This was the method used when initially calling for information on service areas. The Icelandic authorities emphasise that bilateral communications with the parties which had submitted previous tenders were held to be inadequate. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

When the planned coverage area of WBS was withdrawn from the cumulative coverage map, 670 additional ‘white’ buildings appeared. When the Fund requested that the STC call out again for plans to offer services for these 670 buildings, this was done by means of an advertisement and not by direct contact exclusively with those few service providers that had previously handed in their tender offers. This was the method used when initially calling for information on service areas. The Icelandic authorities emphasise that bilateral communications with the parties which had submitted previous tenders were held to be inadequate.

| (44) | The Icelandic authorities note, further, that open access terms were available to third parties for a number of months in advance of the commencement of sales in the project. They state that, when sales began in each section, the Fund informed the inhabitants that Síminn was not the exclusive retailer and that all other retailers could sell Internet services to people living/working in the area. Furthermore, according to the Icelandic authorities, Síminn offers third-party (roaming) access to its 2G GSM voice services, while no wholesale access to 3G voice services is provided for by the tender documents or by the Agreement, since the project in question does not concern the provision of 3G voice services. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Icelandic authorities note, further, that open access terms were available to third parties for a number of months in advance of the commencement of sales in the project. They state that, when sales began in each section, the Fund informed the inhabitants that Síminn was not the exclusive retailer and that all other retailers could sell Internet services to people living/working in the area. Furthermore, according to the Icelandic authorities, Síminn offers third-party (roaming) access to its 2G GSM voice services, while no wholesale access to 3G voice services is provided for by the tender documents or by the Agreement, since the project in question does not concern the provision of 3G voice services.

| (45) | Finally, if the Authority were to consider the measure to constitute State aid, the Icelandic authorities have expressed the view that such aid could be considered compatible with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, having regard to the objectives of the measure, including the objective to increase public broadband access in assisted areas. In this regard, the Icelandic authorities have also invited the Authority to assess whether such aid should be considered to constitute the financing of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI’). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Finally, if the Authority were to consider the measure to constitute State aid, the Icelandic authorities have expressed the view that such aid could be considered compatible with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, having regard to the objectives of the measure, including the objective to increase public broadband access in assisted areas. In this regard, the Icelandic authorities have also invited the Authority to assess whether such aid should be considered to constitute the financing of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI’).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (46) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (47) | In the following chapters, the State funding of the abovementioned project will be assessed with respect to these criteria. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

In the following chapters, the State funding of the abovementioned project will be assessed with respect to these criteria.

1.1.   
  State resources

| (48) | According to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, a measure must be granted by the State or through State resources in order to constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

According to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, a measure must be granted by the State or through State resources in order to constitute State aid.

| (49) | The State, for the purpose of Article 61(1), covers all bodies of the State administration, from the central government to the city level or the lowest administrative level as well as public undertakings and bodies (26). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The State, for the purpose of Article 61(1), covers all bodies of the State administration, from the central government to the city level or the lowest administrative level as well as public undertakings and bodies (26).

| (50) | The Fund is, as described above, established by law and owned by the Icelandic State which allocates resources to the Fund through the annual State budget. Therefore, the first criterion of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Fund is, as described above, established by law and owned by the Icelandic State which allocates resources to the Fund through the annual State budget. Therefore, the first criterion of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Undertaking

| (51) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an advantage upon an undertaking. Undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (27). Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (28). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an advantage upon an undertaking. Undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (27). Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (28).

| (52) | Síminn is Iceland’s biggest telecoms operator, offering services such as mobile, fixed telephone, Internet and TV services on the Icelandic market. It is thus clear that any aid involved in the Agreement between Síminn and the Fund has been conferred upon an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Síminn is Iceland’s biggest telecoms operator, offering services such as mobile, fixed telephone, Internet and TV services on the Icelandic market. It is thus clear that any aid involved in the Agreement between Síminn and the Fund has been conferred upon an undertaking.

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (53) | Firstly, the aid measure must confer on the beneficiary undertaking advantages that relieve it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. In the present case, the financing of the project by public authorities has provided an economic advantage to the selected supplier of the network that would normally be covered by its budget, and has allowed the selected operator to provide a broadband network on conditions not otherwise available on the market. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that the financial support has enabled Síminn, as the successful bidder, to conduct its commercial activities in respect of the network under conditions which would not otherwise have existed in the absence of the measure (29). |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Firstly, the aid measure must confer on the beneficiary undertaking advantages that relieve it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. In the present case, the financing of the project by public authorities has provided an economic advantage to the selected supplier of the network that would normally be covered by its budget, and has allowed the selected operator to provide a broadband network on conditions not otherwise available on the market. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that the financial support has enabled Síminn, as the successful bidder, to conduct its commercial activities in respect of the network under conditions which would not otherwise have existed in the absence of the measure (29).

| (54) | Although a competitive tender procedure tends to reduce the amount of financial support required and avoid excessive profits, the aid will also allow the operator to offer end-to-end services prima facie at lower prices than if it had had to bear all costs itself and thus attract more customers than under normal market conditions. The selected operator will also acquire ownership of the network, as well as other tangible and intangible assets with State funds (e.g. equipment, customer relations), even after the lifetime of the projects. In view of the above, it is clear that an economic advantage will be granted to the selected operator (30). Furthermore, it is not clear that the compensation for the 670 additional buildings was established through a competitive tender, as the compensation method for this part of the project is unclear, or whether it was in fact determined after Síminn’s bid was chosen. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Although a competitive tender procedure tends to reduce the amount of financial support required and avoid excessive profits, the aid will also allow the operator to offer end-to-end services prima facie at lower prices than if it had had to bear all costs itself and thus attract more customers than under normal market conditions. The selected operator will also acquire ownership of the network, as well as other tangible and intangible assets with State funds (e.g. equipment, customer relations), even after the lifetime of the projects. In view of the above, it is clear that an economic advantage will be granted to the selected operator (30). Furthermore, it is not clear that the compensation for the 670 additional buildings was established through a competitive tender, as the compensation method for this part of the project is unclear, or whether it was in fact determined after Síminn’s bid was chosen.

| (55) | The preliminary assessment of the Authority thus shows that an economic advantage cannot be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The preliminary assessment of the Authority thus shows that an economic advantage cannot be excluded.

| (56) | Secondly, the aid measure must be selective, in that it must favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. Public funding of the broadband network in rural areas of Iceland was granted to Síminn, as the successful tenderer. Since Síminn is the only recipient of the State funds, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the measure is selective (31). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Secondly, the aid measure must be selective, in that it must favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. Public funding of the broadband network in rural areas of Iceland was granted to Síminn, as the successful tenderer. Since Síminn is the only recipient of the State funds, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the measure is selective (31).

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between contracting parties

| (57) | The measure must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The measure must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (58) | According to settled case-law, the mere fact that a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, is considered to be sufficient in order to conclude that the measure is likely to affect trade between contracting parties and distort competition between undertakings established in other EEA States (32). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

According to settled case-law, the mere fact that a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, is considered to be sufficient in order to conclude that the measure is likely to affect trade between contracting parties and distort competition between undertakings established in other EEA States (32).

| (59) | Public involvement in deploying infrastructure to provide electronic communications services alters existing market conditions by strengthening the position of the selected supplier of the network in relation to its competitors. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Public involvement in deploying infrastructure to provide electronic communications services alters existing market conditions by strengthening the position of the selected supplier of the network in relation to its competitors.

| (60) | The beneficiary of the measure will be active in deploying a broadband network infrastructure in a market which can be entered directly or through financial involvement by participants from other EEA States. In general, the markets for electronic communications services (including the wholesale and the retail broadband markets) are open to trade and competition between operators and service providers across the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The beneficiary of the measure will be active in deploying a broadband network infrastructure in a market which can be entered directly or through financial involvement by participants from other EEA States. In general, the markets for electronic communications services (including the wholesale and the retail broadband markets) are open to trade and competition between operators and service providers across the EEA.

| (61) | Therefore, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the measure threatens to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA (33). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Therefore, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the measure threatens to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA (33).

1.5.   
  Funding of a public service and the Altmark test

| (62) | The Icelandic authorities take the view that the contribution can be characterised as funding of a public service; that the four cumulative criteria of the ‘Altmark test’ are fulfilled, and that the measure, for that reason, does not constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Icelandic authorities take the view that the contribution can be characterised as funding of a public service; that the four cumulative criteria of the ‘Altmark test’ are fulfilled, and that the measure, for that reason, does not constitute State aid.

| (63) | The Court of Justice’s judgment in Altmark provided clarification regarding the conditions under which public service compensation does not constitute State aid, owing to the absence of any advantage (34). However, for such compensation to escape qualification as State aid in a particular case, four main conditions, commonly referred to as the Altmark criteria, must be satisfied (35). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Court of Justice’s judgment in Altmark provided clarification regarding the conditions under which public service compensation does not constitute State aid, owing to the absence of any advantage (34). However, for such compensation to escape qualification as State aid in a particular case, four main conditions, commonly referred to as the Altmark criteria, must be satisfied (35).

| (64) | The four conditions are as follows: (i) the beneficiary of a State-funding mechanism for an SGEI must be formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of an SGEI, the obligations of which must be clearly defined; (ii) the parameters for calculating the compensation must be established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over competing undertakings; (iii) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the SGEI, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; and (iv) where the beneficiary is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation granted must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical well-run undertaking would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The four conditions are as follows: (i) the beneficiary of a State-funding mechanism for an SGEI must be formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of an SGEI, the obligations of which must be clearly defined; (ii) the parameters for calculating the compensation must be established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over competing undertakings; (iii) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the SGEI, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; and (iv) where the beneficiary is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation granted must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical well-run undertaking would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| (65) | The EEA EFTA States have, in general, a wide discretion concerning the identification of a service as an SGEI, while following the relevant case-law which sets out the general principles to be respected (36). The provision of adequate broadband coverage to all citizens in areas where no other operators are providing, or will provide, such services in the near future could well be characterised as an SGEI (37). Furthermore, Síminn seems to have been given a clear mandate assigned by way of a contract, which, according to the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, can be seen as a required entrustment act (38). |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The EEA EFTA States have, in general, a wide discretion concerning the identification of a service as an SGEI, while following the relevant case-law which sets out the general principles to be respected (36). The provision of adequate broadband coverage to all citizens in areas where no other operators are providing, or will provide, such services in the near future could well be characterised as an SGEI (37). Furthermore, Síminn seems to have been given a clear mandate assigned by way of a contract, which, according to the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, can be seen as a required entrustment act (38).

| (66) | However, the fact that the compensation for the 670 buildings that were added to the project after the withdrawal of WBS from the market was decided on after Síminn had won the tender appears to raise problems in relation to the rest of the Altmark criteria. The parameters for calculation of the compensation for the additional units do not seem to have been established in an objective and transparent manner beforehand. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

However, the fact that the compensation for the 670 buildings that were added to the project after the withdrawal of WBS from the market was decided on after Síminn had won the tender appears to raise problems in relation to the rest of the Altmark criteria. The parameters for calculation of the compensation for the additional units do not seem to have been established in an objective and transparent manner beforehand.

| (67) | Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have not sufficiently explained why the payments were indexed to the Danish krone, as it stood on 3 September 2008, and what effect this arrangement had on the overall compensation to Síminn. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have not sufficiently explained why the payments were indexed to the Danish krone, as it stood on 3 September 2008, and what effect this arrangement had on the overall compensation to Síminn.

| (68) | The public procurement rules do allow for some changes to the contract through subsequent negotiations (39). However, the magnitude of the extension to the scope and compensation does cause the Authority to doubt whether the parameters for calculation of the compensation can be said to have been determined through a public procurement procedure. Furthermore, the Authority has not received information allowing it to conclude that this part of the compensation did not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs related to the additional buildings. When a project increases in scope, so may the chance that economies of scale may reduce the unit costs. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The public procurement rules do allow for some changes to the contract through subsequent negotiations (39). However, the magnitude of the extension to the scope and compensation does cause the Authority to doubt whether the parameters for calculation of the compensation can be said to have been determined through a public procurement procedure. Furthermore, the Authority has not received information allowing it to conclude that this part of the compensation did not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs related to the additional buildings. When a project increases in scope, so may the chance that economies of scale may reduce the unit costs.

| (69) | Finally, even though Síminn was chosen as a service provider in accordance with a public tender, only the compensation for the first 1 118 buildings was based on the public procurement process. The compensation for the additional 670 buildings was determined after Síminn had won the tender. Moreover, the Authority has not received information indicating that the Icelandic authorities have conducted a benchmarking exercise, with a typical well-run and adequately-equipped undertaking, concerning the costs likely to be incurred in constructing and operating the broadband network for the additional buildings. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Finally, even though Síminn was chosen as a service provider in accordance with a public tender, only the compensation for the first 1 118 buildings was based on the public procurement process. The compensation for the additional 670 buildings was determined after Síminn had won the tender. Moreover, the Authority has not received information indicating that the Icelandic authorities have conducted a benchmarking exercise, with a typical well-run and adequately-equipped undertaking, concerning the costs likely to be incurred in constructing and operating the broadband network for the additional buildings.

| (70) | Hence, at this stage, the Authority cannot conclude that all of the Altmark criteria are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Hence, at this stage, the Authority cannot conclude that all of the Altmark criteria are fulfilled.

1.6.   
  Conclusion with regard to the presence of State aid

| (71) | With reference to the above considerations, the Authority cannot, at this stage and based on its preliminary assessment, exclude that the measure under assessment includes elements of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Under the conditions referred to above, it is thus necessary to consider whether the measure can be found to be compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

With reference to the above considerations, the Authority cannot, at this stage and based on its preliminary assessment, exclude that the measure under assessment includes elements of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Under the conditions referred to above, it is thus necessary to consider whether the measure can be found to be compatible with the internal market.

2.   Compatibility assessment

2.1.   
  Introduction

| (72) | Support measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) or Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement and are necessary, proportional and do not cause undue distortion of competition. The Icelandic authorities argue that any aid involved in the Agreement between the Fund and Síminn is compatible with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Support measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) or Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement and are necessary, proportional and do not cause undue distortion of competition. The Icelandic authorities argue that any aid involved in the Agreement between the Fund and Síminn is compatible with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement.

| (73) | On the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, ‘aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas’ may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EEA to the extent that is considered to be contrary to the common interest. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

On the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, ‘aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas’ may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EEA to the extent that is considered to be contrary to the common interest.

| (74) | The Authority’s recently published Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (‘the 2013 Broadband Guidelines’) (40) contain a detailed interpretation of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement in this sector. The previous Guidelines on the application of State aid rules to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (‘the 2010 Broadband Guidelines’) were first adopted on 3 February 2010, and were therefore not in effect at the time at which Síminn and the Fund entered into the Agreement. However, the 2010 Broadband Guidelines were based on the existing decision-making practice of the European Commission (41). The Authority will therefore assess the Agreement in the light of the fundamental principles concerning State aid to broadband infrastructure which are outlined in the 2010 Broadband Guidelines, and of the decisional practice that existed at the time of the signing of the Agreement and which has continued in more recent cases. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Authority’s recently published Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (‘the 2013 Broadband Guidelines’) (40) contain a detailed interpretation of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement in this sector. The previous Guidelines on the application of State aid rules to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (‘the 2010 Broadband Guidelines’) were first adopted on 3 February 2010, and were therefore not in effect at the time at which Síminn and the Fund entered into the Agreement. However, the 2010 Broadband Guidelines were based on the existing decision-making practice of the European Commission (41). The Authority will therefore assess the Agreement in the light of the fundamental principles concerning State aid to broadband infrastructure which are outlined in the 2010 Broadband Guidelines, and of the decisional practice that existed at the time of the signing of the Agreement and which has continued in more recent cases.

2.2.   
  The balancing test and the Broadband Guidelines/decisional practice

| (75) | In assessing whether an aid measure can be found to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potential negative side effects, such as distortions of trade and competition. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

In assessing whether an aid measure can be found to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potential negative side effects, such as distortions of trade and competition.

| (76) | In applying this balancing test, the Authority will assess the following questions (42):






  (a) | Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address a market failure or other objective? |
| --- | --- | --- |

(76)

In applying this balancing test, the Authority will assess the following questions (42):

(a)

Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address a market failure or other objective?

| (b) | Is the aid well designed to deliver the objective of common interest? In particular:






  (i) | Is State aid an appropriate policy instrument, i.e. are there other, better-placed instruments? |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

Is the aid well designed to deliver the objective of common interest? In particular:

(i)

Is State aid an appropriate policy instrument, i.e. are there other, better-placed instruments?

| (ii) | Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of undertakings? |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of undertakings?

| (iii) | Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid? |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid?

| (c) | Are the distortions of competition and the effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive? |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Are the distortions of competition and the effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive?

2.2.1.   Objective of common interest

| (77) | Broadband connectivity is a key component for the development, adoption and use of information and communication technologies in the economy and in society. The project appears to target only ‘white’ areas (43). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Broadband connectivity is a key component for the development, adoption and use of information and communication technologies in the economy and in society. The project appears to target only ‘white’ areas (43).

| (78) | The Authority considers support for broadband network deployment in rural and underserved ‘white’ areas as promoting territorial social and economic cohesion and addressing market failures (44). Moreover, the roll-out of a broadband network contributes to reducing the ‘digital divide’ that sets apart areas or regions within a country where affordable and competitive broadband services are on offer and areas where such services are not (45). It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that the aid pursues genuine cohesion and economic development objectives, which are considered to be well-defined objectives of common interest. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority considers support for broadband network deployment in rural and underserved ‘white’ areas as promoting territorial social and economic cohesion and addressing market failures (44). Moreover, the roll-out of a broadband network contributes to reducing the ‘digital divide’ that sets apart areas or regions within a country where affordable and competitive broadband services are on offer and areas where such services are not (45). It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that the aid pursues genuine cohesion and economic development objectives, which are considered to be well-defined objectives of common interest.

2.2.2.   Design of the measure and the need to limit distortion of competition

2.2.2.1.   Is aid the appropriate instrument?

| (79) | The Authority has not received information on whether the Icelandic authorities considered any alternatives to public financing of the broadband network in order to address the market failure. However, the Authority, as well as the Commission, has previously examined the use of grants or tax incentives to end users, as well as the possibility of using ex ante regulation (46). These measures have been found unlikely to lead to sufficient investments for the provision of broadband services to underserved areas. Hence, in situations such as the case at hand, there seems to be no alternative to granting public funding to overcome the lack of broadband connectivity. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority has not received information on whether the Icelandic authorities considered any alternatives to public financing of the broadband network in order to address the market failure. However, the Authority, as well as the Commission, has previously examined the use of grants or tax incentives to end users, as well as the possibility of using ex ante regulation (46). These measures have been found unlikely to lead to sufficient investments for the provision of broadband services to underserved areas. Hence, in situations such as the case at hand, there seems to be no alternative to granting public funding to overcome the lack of broadband connectivity.

| (80) | It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that public funding for the provision of broadband services is an appropriate instrument to achieve the set objectives. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that public funding for the provision of broadband services is an appropriate instrument to achieve the set objectives.

2.2.2.2.   Does the aid have an incentive effect?

| (81) | The public consultation conducted by the Icelandic authorities showed that it was unlikely that a broadband network covering the unserviced buildings would be provided by the market in the near future. By providing financial support to the roll-out of the network, the bidders to the public tender changed their investment decisions. Thus, the Authority’s preliminary view is that the aid provided an investment incentive. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The public consultation conducted by the Icelandic authorities showed that it was unlikely that a broadband network covering the unserviced buildings would be provided by the market in the near future. By providing financial support to the roll-out of the network, the bidders to the public tender changed their investment decisions. Thus, the Authority’s preliminary view is that the aid provided an investment incentive.

2.2.2.3.   Proportionality of the aid and limitation of distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (82) | The Icelandic authorities carried out a detailed mapping and coverage analysis in 2007. Hence, the competitive conditions and structure prevailing in the given area were analysed and all stakeholders affected by the relevant measure were consulted (47). Against this background, the Authority’s preliminary view is that the mapping and coverage analysis contributed to minimising potential distortions of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Icelandic authorities carried out a detailed mapping and coverage analysis in 2007. Hence, the competitive conditions and structure prevailing in the given area were analysed and all stakeholders affected by the relevant measure were consulted (47). Against this background, the Authority’s preliminary view is that the mapping and coverage analysis contributed to minimising potential distortions of competition.

| (83) | The withdrawal of WBS from the market resulted in a substantial change to the list of buildings that neither had, nor would, receive broadband coverage in the near future on market terms. Subsequently, the Icelandic authorities called out again for plans to offer services to the buildings originally covered by the plans of WBS. This was done by way of a newspaper advertisement which, according to the Icelandic authorities, was in line with previous communication with the market. This method of communication allowed all service providers to alert the Icelandic authorities of any roll-out plans in the area. It is thus the Authority’s preliminary opinion that the newspaper advertisement appears to have been an adequate method for communication in this situation. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The withdrawal of WBS from the market resulted in a substantial change to the list of buildings that neither had, nor would, receive broadband coverage in the near future on market terms. Subsequently, the Icelandic authorities called out again for plans to offer services to the buildings originally covered by the plans of WBS. This was done by way of a newspaper advertisement which, according to the Icelandic authorities, was in line with previous communication with the market. This method of communication allowed all service providers to alert the Icelandic authorities of any roll-out plans in the area. It is thus the Authority’s preliminary opinion that the newspaper advertisement appears to have been an adequate method for communication in this situation.

| (84) | It follows from the 2010 Broadband Guidelines that the open tender approach ensures that there is transparency for all investors wishing to bid, as well as minimising the potential State aid advantage and reducing the selective nature of the measure. The use of open tenders to promote these objectives in broadband deployment has been recognised by the Commission in decisional practice predating the contract under assessment (48). |
| --- | --- |

(84)

It follows from the 2010 Broadband Guidelines that the open tender approach ensures that there is transparency for all investors wishing to bid, as well as minimising the potential State aid advantage and reducing the selective nature of the measure. The use of open tenders to promote these objectives in broadband deployment has been recognised by the Commission in decisional practice predating the contract under assessment (48).

| (85) | As emphasised by both the 2010 Broadband Guidelines and the fundamental principles of EEA public procurement law, equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders is an indispensable condition for an open tender. The Icelandic authorities conducted a public procurement procedure in order to choose the provider of the broadband network and subsequent services. After the conclusion of the aforementioned tender procedure, WBS withdrew from the market. This resulted in an increase in the amount of buildings in need of broadband services. As a consequence, changes to the contract with the chosen supplier were made concerning its scope, compensation and the roll-out period. Changes were also made concerning the indexation of the total payments (49). The complainant claims that, due to changes made to the contract after the supplier was selected, the tender procedure does not meet the essential requirements of equal and non-discriminatory treatment. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

As emphasised by both the 2010 Broadband Guidelines and the fundamental principles of EEA public procurement law, equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders is an indispensable condition for an open tender. The Icelandic authorities conducted a public procurement procedure in order to choose the provider of the broadband network and subsequent services. After the conclusion of the aforementioned tender procedure, WBS withdrew from the market. This resulted in an increase in the amount of buildings in need of broadband services. As a consequence, changes to the contract with the chosen supplier were made concerning its scope, compensation and the roll-out period. Changes were also made concerning the indexation of the total payments (49). The complainant claims that, due to changes made to the contract after the supplier was selected, the tender procedure does not meet the essential requirements of equal and non-discriminatory treatment.

| (86) | The Authority would like to underline that, even though the Public Procurement Directive does not apply to the procurement of broadband networks and services (50), the procurement is still subject to the fundamental principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment (51). |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority would like to underline that, even though the Public Procurement Directive does not apply to the procurement of broadband networks and services (50), the procurement is still subject to the fundamental principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment (51).

| (87) | The complainant argues that other bidders did not get the chance to submit offers for the additional buildings and that the increase in locations does not necessarily entail a corresponding increase in costs and the roll-out period. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The complainant argues that other bidders did not get the chance to submit offers for the additional buildings and that the increase in locations does not necessarily entail a corresponding increase in costs and the roll-out period.

| (88) | The Authority recognises that the alterations made to the draft contract included in the tender documents are significant and may constitute infringements of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination amongst bidders. As mentioned in Section II.1.5 above, the public procurement rules do allow for some changes to the contract through negotiations to take place after the supplier has been selected. However, due to the considerable extent of the changes to both the scope, compensation and roll-out period, the Authority has doubts whether the procurement process can be seen as an open tender within the meaning of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The Authority recognises that the alterations made to the draft contract included in the tender documents are significant and may constitute infringements of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination amongst bidders. As mentioned in Section II.1.5 above, the public procurement rules do allow for some changes to the contract through negotiations to take place after the supplier has been selected. However, due to the considerable extent of the changes to both the scope, compensation and roll-out period, the Authority has doubts whether the procurement process can be seen as an open tender within the meaning of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

| (89) | Nevertheless, the price paid to Síminn after the expansion of the scope was still significantly lower than the price offered by the other bidders (52), and the price estimated by the Fund in advance. The changes may therefore have been justifiable due to the discrepancy between the prices. However, considering that the purpose of conducting a tender process is to achieve the lowest price for the community, the Authority cannot at this stage exclude that these changes to the contract are incompatible with the principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

Nevertheless, the price paid to Síminn after the expansion of the scope was still significantly lower than the price offered by the other bidders (52), and the price estimated by the Fund in advance. The changes may therefore have been justifiable due to the discrepancy between the prices. However, considering that the purpose of conducting a tender process is to achieve the lowest price for the community, the Authority cannot at this stage exclude that these changes to the contract are incompatible with the principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders.

| (90) | Moreover, with regard to the switch from consumer price indexation to foreign currency indexation, the complainant claims that this has resulted in a further increase in payment to Síminn due to the devaluation of the ISK following the financial crisis. The Icelandic authorities have not sufficiently explained the reasons behind this change, nor why they decided to apply the exchange rate of 3 September 2008 and what effect this had on the final payments to Síminn. They are hereby invited to do so. The assessment of this information is necessary in order to conclude whether these changes to the final contract entailed the granting of State aid and, if so, whether the aid can be seen as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Moreover, with regard to the switch from consumer price indexation to foreign currency indexation, the complainant claims that this has resulted in a further increase in payment to Síminn due to the devaluation of the ISK following the financial crisis. The Icelandic authorities have not sufficiently explained the reasons behind this change, nor why they decided to apply the exchange rate of 3 September 2008 and what effect this had on the final payments to Síminn. They are hereby invited to do so. The assessment of this information is necessary in order to conclude whether these changes to the final contract entailed the granting of State aid and, if so, whether the aid can be seen as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (91) | Mandating effective third-party wholesale access to a subsidised broadband infrastructure is a necessary component of any State measure funding the construction of a new broadband infrastructure. In particular, wholesale access enables third-party operators to compete with the selected bidder (e.g. when the latter is also present at the retail level), thereby strengthening choice and competition in the areas concerned by the measure, while at the same time avoiding the creation of regional service monopolies (53). Furthermore, granting effective wholesale access to competitors minimises the distortions of competition that follow from any State aid measure. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Mandating effective third-party wholesale access to a subsidised broadband infrastructure is a necessary component of any State measure funding the construction of a new broadband infrastructure. In particular, wholesale access enables third-party operators to compete with the selected bidder (e.g. when the latter is also present at the retail level), thereby strengthening choice and competition in the areas concerned by the measure, while at the same time avoiding the creation of regional service monopolies (53). Furthermore, granting effective wholesale access to competitors minimises the distortions of competition that follow from any State aid measure.

| (92) | The importance of granting effective third-party wholesale access to subsidised networks has been emphasised by Commission practice which predates the contract under assessment (54). |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The importance of granting effective third-party wholesale access to subsidised networks has been emphasised by Commission practice which predates the contract under assessment (54).

| (93) | The 2013 Broadband Guidelines have recently emphasised that wholesale access obligations imposed on a subsidised network should be aligned with the portfolio of access obligations laid down under the sectoral regulation rules. However, in principle, subsidised companies should provide a wider range of wholesale access products than those mandated by national regulatory authorities (‘NRAs’) under sectoral regulation, since the aid beneficiary is using not just its own resources, but also taxpayers' money to deploy its own infrastructure. Such wholesale access should be granted as early as possible before starting network operation (55). |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The 2013 Broadband Guidelines have recently emphasised that wholesale access obligations imposed on a subsidised network should be aligned with the portfolio of access obligations laid down under the sectoral regulation rules. However, in principle, subsidised companies should provide a wider range of wholesale access products than those mandated by national regulatory authorities (‘NRAs’) under sectoral regulation, since the aid beneficiary is using not just its own resources, but also taxpayers' money to deploy its own infrastructure. Such wholesale access should be granted as early as possible before starting network operation (55).

| (94) | Following its 2008 analysis of the market for wholesale broadband access, the Icelandic NRA, the PTA, required Síminn (as the firm designated with significant market power) to comply with all fair and reasonable requests by other electronic communications undertakings for open access to specialised network infrastructure related to copper local loops at the wholesale level, including the possibility of having bitstream services delivered at various points along the network (56). It was specified therein that Síminn shall, inter alia, respond to reasonable and appropriate requests for access to options 1, 2, 3 and 4 as defined in paragraph 34 above. This PTA Decision was cited in the tender description. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

Following its 2008 analysis of the market for wholesale broadband access, the Icelandic NRA, the PTA, required Síminn (as the firm designated with significant market power) to comply with all fair and reasonable requests by other electronic communications undertakings for open access to specialised network infrastructure related to copper local loops at the wholesale level, including the possibility of having bitstream services delivered at various points along the network (56). It was specified therein that Síminn shall, inter alia, respond to reasonable and appropriate requests for access to options 1, 2, 3 and 4 as defined in paragraph 34 above. This PTA Decision was cited in the tender description.

| (95) | Indeed, the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications seeks to facilitate competition through new entrants becoming progressively more reliant on their own infrastructure over time where it is efficient for them to do so (57). Regulation that promotes efficient investment in companies’ own infrastructure is considered more conducive to promoting effective and self-sustaining competition. This has led to a regulatory approach in electronic communications markets whereby, in the presence of significant market power, multiple access products at different levels of the network hierarchy are simultaneously available to alternative operators. Such differentiated access options accommodate differing levels of network roll-out of the alternative providers. As noted by the European Regulators’ Group (‘ERG’, now known as the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications or ‘BEREC’), this ‘ladder of investment’ approach to regulation is a well-established principle in the present regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (58). |
| --- | --- |

(95)

Indeed, the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications seeks to facilitate competition through new entrants becoming progressively more reliant on their own infrastructure over time where it is efficient for them to do so (57). Regulation that promotes efficient investment in companies’ own infrastructure is considered more conducive to promoting effective and self-sustaining competition. This has led to a regulatory approach in electronic communications markets whereby, in the presence of significant market power, multiple access products at different levels of the network hierarchy are simultaneously available to alternative operators. Such differentiated access options accommodate differing levels of network roll-out of the alternative providers. As noted by the European Regulators’ Group (‘ERG’, now known as the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications or ‘BEREC’), this ‘ladder of investment’ approach to regulation is a well-established principle in the present regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (58).

| (96) | In addition to the established regulatory practice on effective wholesale access to broadband services, State aid decisions have also involved a dynamic approach to the range of access options which have been required. For example, in the 2006/2007 decisions concerning investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the-home broadband network (59), wholesale access was to be granted at both the passive (60) and active (61) layers of the network. Furthermore, in a 2010 decision concerning the deployment of very high-speed broadband networks in France (62), wholesale access was to be required on all levels of the subsidised infrastructure. Since the support was granted for the passive infrastructure of the network (e.g. ducts, dark fibre), access to the passive level of the network was to be facilitated as already foreseen in a decision taken by the French NRA, ARCEP, in 2010 (63). However, an active access product was also to be provided to any third party with a reasonable demand for such a product (64). The demand was considered reasonable if the following three conditions were fulfilled: (i) the access-seeker provides a coherent business plan which justifies the activation of the network; and (ii) the access-seeker shows that it does not have the financial means to install its active equipment; and (iii) no active access product is already offered in the same geographic area by a private operator at equivalent prices to those of more densely populated areas (65). |
| --- | --- |

(96)

In addition to the established regulatory practice on effective wholesale access to broadband services, State aid decisions have also involved a dynamic approach to the range of access options which have been required. For example, in the 2006/2007 decisions concerning investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the-home broadband network (59), wholesale access was to be granted at both the passive (60) and active (61) layers of the network. Furthermore, in a 2010 decision concerning the deployment of very high-speed broadband networks in France (62), wholesale access was to be required on all levels of the subsidised infrastructure. Since the support was granted for the passive infrastructure of the network (e.g. ducts, dark fibre), access to the passive level of the network was to be facilitated as already foreseen in a decision taken by the French NRA, ARCEP, in 2010 (63). However, an active access product was also to be provided to any third party with a reasonable demand for such a product (64). The demand was considered reasonable if the following three conditions were fulfilled: (i) the access-seeker provides a coherent business plan which justifies the activation of the network; and (ii) the access-seeker shows that it does not have the financial means to install its active equipment; and (iii) no active access product is already offered in the same geographic area by a private operator at equivalent prices to those of more densely populated areas (65).

| (97) | While the above examples predominantly refer to wholesale Internet access to fixed-line networks, it is not clear to the Authority why a similar dynamic access approach would not also be applicable in the case of wholesale Internet access to networks using mobile access technologies. For example, where NRAs have identified significant market power in the wholesale market for mobile access and call origination services in a regulatory context, a range of different access remedies have been facilitated in recognition of the differing levels of network roll-out of market participants. In its 2007 finding of dominance in the wholesale mobile access and call origination market in Iceland, the PTA observed that, given the diversity of the mobile phone market and the various needs of the parties that might conceivably seek access, all forms of wholesale access that may reasonably be granted and that can promote competition in the retail market should fall within the scope of the access obligation (66). In this respect, Síminn was required to comply with all reasonable and appropriate requests for access to: (i) national roaming (67); (ii) co-location and joint utilisation (68); (iii) mobile virtual network operator (‘MVNO’) access (69) and (iv) resale (70). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

While the above examples predominantly refer to wholesale Internet access to fixed-line networks, it is not clear to the Authority why a similar dynamic access approach would not also be applicable in the case of wholesale Internet access to networks using mobile access technologies. For example, where NRAs have identified significant market power in the wholesale market for mobile access and call origination services in a regulatory context, a range of different access remedies have been facilitated in recognition of the differing levels of network roll-out of market participants. In its 2007 finding of dominance in the wholesale mobile access and call origination market in Iceland, the PTA observed that, given the diversity of the mobile phone market and the various needs of the parties that might conceivably seek access, all forms of wholesale access that may reasonably be granted and that can promote competition in the retail market should fall within the scope of the access obligation (66). In this respect, Síminn was required to comply with all reasonable and appropriate requests for access to: (i) national roaming (67); (ii) co-location and joint utilisation (68); (iii) mobile virtual network operator (‘MVNO’) access (69) and (iv) resale (70).

| (98) | It follows from Article 2.1 of the tender description, which is marked as Annex I to the Agreement, that the project under assessment was technologically neutral. In accordance with this principle, Síminn deployed the publicly funded network using ADSL, UMTS, satellite and Wi-Fi technology (71). Thus, to avoid potential distortions of competition in electronic communications markets where State aid is involved, it appears that third-party operators should be generally granted effective wholesale access in a technology-neutral manner and reasonably adapted to their respective access needs. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

It follows from Article 2.1 of the tender description, which is marked as Annex I to the Agreement, that the project under assessment was technologically neutral. In accordance with this principle, Síminn deployed the publicly funded network using ADSL, UMTS, satellite and Wi-Fi technology (71). Thus, to avoid potential distortions of competition in electronic communications markets where State aid is involved, it appears that third-party operators should be generally granted effective wholesale access in a technology-neutral manner and reasonably adapted to their respective access needs.

| (99) | According to Annex II to the Agreement, the seller is free to offer options 1-4, but is only obliged to offer option 3 in all instances where ADSL broadband technology is used in the project (see paragraph 34 above) (72). At the same time, however, it is stipulated in the Agreement that wholesale access to ADSL-based services should be granted on the same terms as prescribed by the PTA’s 2008 decision concerning wholesale broadband access, which obliged Síminn to provide options 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, this obligation to provide all four options was not entirely clear from the tender documents and the subsequent Agreement, given that they only expressly noted an obligation to offer option 3. Furthermore, the PTA’s 2008 wholesale broadband access decision is potentially subject to change and would not therefore appear an adequate substitute for a clear specification of the access obligations in the actual tender documents and subsequent Agreement itself. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

According to Annex II to the Agreement, the seller is free to offer options 1-4, but is only obliged to offer option 3 in all instances where ADSL broadband technology is used in the project (see paragraph 34 above) (72). At the same time, however, it is stipulated in the Agreement that wholesale access to ADSL-based services should be granted on the same terms as prescribed by the PTA’s 2008 decision concerning wholesale broadband access, which obliged Síminn to provide options 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, this obligation to provide all four options was not entirely clear from the tender documents and the subsequent Agreement, given that they only expressly noted an obligation to offer option 3. Furthermore, the PTA’s 2008 wholesale broadband access decision is potentially subject to change and would not therefore appear an adequate substitute for a clear specification of the access obligations in the actual tender documents and subsequent Agreement itself.

| (100) | Furthermore, in the instances where UMTS technology is used to deliver broadband services as part of the project, the seller is only required to follow an option 4/resale-based form of access (73). According to the Icelandic authorities, the main reason for this arrangement is that the seller claims that it is necessary for it to have full access and control of the UMTS network end-to-end (see paragraph 36 above). Option 4 is based on the definition of basic services set out in Chapter 2.2.9 of the tender documents, which describes a traditional Internet resale service whereby the reseller does not operate any part of the network. Furthermore, according to this description, Síminn supplies the user equipment and installation in all instances regardless of who the retailer is, and also handles the customer and maintenance services. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

Furthermore, in the instances where UMTS technology is used to deliver broadband services as part of the project, the seller is only required to follow an option 4/resale-based form of access (73). According to the Icelandic authorities, the main reason for this arrangement is that the seller claims that it is necessary for it to have full access and control of the UMTS network end-to-end (see paragraph 36 above). Option 4 is based on the definition of basic services set out in Chapter 2.2.9 of the tender documents, which describes a traditional Internet resale service whereby the reseller does not operate any part of the network. Furthermore, according to this description, Síminn supplies the user equipment and installation in all instances regardless of who the retailer is, and also handles the customer and maintenance services.

| (101) | The contract/tender documents thereby oblige the seller to provide limited wholesale access to the ADSL network (i.e. option 3), and only resale access to the UMTS/3G network (74). Furthermore, based on the latest information received from the complainant, it appears that such access to the UMTS/3G network has not yet been agreed between Síminn and the complainant (75). As noted in paragraphs 37 and 39 above, standardised resale agreements, including standard resale discounts for both ADSL and UMTS technology, were included in Annex 10 to the Agreement. However, the Authority has not yet received full details regarding the precise underlying methodology used to calculate all of these resale discounts and cannot therefore come to a concrete view at this stage on the extent to which this access pricing would replicate competitive market conditions or contribute to avoiding anticompetitive pricing by the seller. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The contract/tender documents thereby oblige the seller to provide limited wholesale access to the ADSL network (i.e. option 3), and only resale access to the UMTS/3G network (74). Furthermore, based on the latest information received from the complainant, it appears that such access to the UMTS/3G network has not yet been agreed between Síminn and the complainant (75). As noted in paragraphs 37 and 39 above, standardised resale agreements, including standard resale discounts for both ADSL and UMTS technology, were included in Annex 10 to the Agreement. However, the Authority has not yet received full details regarding the precise underlying methodology used to calculate all of these resale discounts and cannot therefore come to a concrete view at this stage on the extent to which this access pricing would replicate competitive market conditions or contribute to avoiding anticompetitive pricing by the seller.

| (102) | Furthermore, the Authority has not yet received fully comprehensive information on all of the access-related correspondence between the affected parties to date and thus cannot come to a view regarding the reasonableness of any such access requests or refusals at this time. While, as noted above, it is claimed that Síminn requires full access and control of the UMTS network in order to guarantee the specified quality and service levels, it has not been explained precisely why it is necessary for Síminn to control the entire value chain, and why greater involvement from third-party access seekers’ own systems/infrastructure is not feasible in this regard. In the absence of any clear justification in this respect, the lack of a defined wholesale access obligation which allows for different levels of involvement of the access-seeker’s own infrastructure in relation to the UMTS network would appear to give Síminn a competitive and commercial advantage in respect of this part of the network. This could allow Síminn to establish the initial relationship with the end user and thereby build up a customer base and take market shares without having to compete effectively with third-party operators. This is because, under a resale-only access obligation, third-party operators would be limited in terms of the extent to which they could differentiate their services (for example, in terms of price and product features/functionality) from that of Síminn. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

Furthermore, the Authority has not yet received fully comprehensive information on all of the access-related correspondence between the affected parties to date and thus cannot come to a view regarding the reasonableness of any such access requests or refusals at this time. While, as noted above, it is claimed that Síminn requires full access and control of the UMTS network in order to guarantee the specified quality and service levels, it has not been explained precisely why it is necessary for Síminn to control the entire value chain, and why greater involvement from third-party access seekers’ own systems/infrastructure is not feasible in this regard. In the absence of any clear justification in this respect, the lack of a defined wholesale access obligation which allows for different levels of involvement of the access-seeker’s own infrastructure in relation to the UMTS network would appear to give Síminn a competitive and commercial advantage in respect of this part of the network. This could allow Síminn to establish the initial relationship with the end user and thereby build up a customer base and take market shares without having to compete effectively with third-party operators. This is because, under a resale-only access obligation, third-party operators would be limited in terms of the extent to which they could differentiate their services (for example, in terms of price and product features/functionality) from that of Síminn.

| (103) | In addition, the apparently limited nature of the wholesale access options formally prescribed for the ADSL-based broadband services in receipt of State support may also have restricted the extent to which third-party operators could meaningfully differentiate their offering relative to Síminn’s retail offering (76). According to the complainant, it took years to get satisfactory wholesale access to the ADSL service rolled out under the Agreement. While, as noted above, the Authority has not yet received fully comprehensive information on all of the access-related correspondence to date, the Authority cannot exclude that Síminn has been granted a first-mover advantage in relation to a significant part of the publicly-funded broadband infrastructure. If this is the case, this would in turn result in economic and competitive advantages for Síminn, which does not seem to be in line with the principles of proportionality and limitation of the distortion of competition under the balancing test. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

In addition, the apparently limited nature of the wholesale access options formally prescribed for the ADSL-based broadband services in receipt of State support may also have restricted the extent to which third-party operators could meaningfully differentiate their offering relative to Síminn’s retail offering (76). According to the complainant, it took years to get satisfactory wholesale access to the ADSL service rolled out under the Agreement. While, as noted above, the Authority has not yet received fully comprehensive information on all of the access-related correspondence to date, the Authority cannot exclude that Síminn has been granted a first-mover advantage in relation to a significant part of the publicly-funded broadband infrastructure. If this is the case, this would in turn result in economic and competitive advantages for Síminn, which does not seem to be in line with the principles of proportionality and limitation of the distortion of competition under the balancing test.

| (104) | This view is supported by the Mediaset case, where the European Courts found that a subsidy granted to consumers who purchased a terrestrial digital TV-decoder created an economic advantage for terrestrial broadcasters, in comparison to satellite broadcasters. The Courts observed that ‘building up an audience is a crucial part of the business for broadcasters of TV programmes [...] the aid measure at issue created an incentive for consumers to switch from the analogue to the digital terrestrial mode, while limiting the costs that digital terrestrial TV broadcasters had to bear, enabling those same broadcasters to consolidate their existing position on the market — as compared with the position of new competitors — in terms of brand image and customer retention’ (77). |
| --- | --- |

(104)

This view is supported by the Mediaset case, where the European Courts found that a subsidy granted to consumers who purchased a terrestrial digital TV-decoder created an economic advantage for terrestrial broadcasters, in comparison to satellite broadcasters. The Courts observed that ‘building up an audience is a crucial part of the business for broadcasters of TV programmes [...] the aid measure at issue created an incentive for consumers to switch from the analogue to the digital terrestrial mode, while limiting the costs that digital terrestrial TV broadcasters had to bear, enabling those same broadcasters to consolidate their existing position on the market — as compared with the position of new competitors — in terms of brand image and customer retention’ (77).

2.3.   
  Conclusion with regard to the balancing test and the compatibility of the measure

| (105) | After having assessed the measure under the relevant criteria of the balancing test, the Authority’s preliminary conclusion is that it cannot exclude that the lack of a clear and effective wholesale access obligation with clearly defined pricing principles gave the network operator a disproportionate advantage that may cause distortions of competition. Hence, the Authority is, at this stage, not able to conclude that the aid to Síminn is compatible with the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

After having assessed the measure under the relevant criteria of the balancing test, the Authority’s preliminary conclusion is that it cannot exclude that the lack of a clear and effective wholesale access obligation with clearly defined pricing principles gave the network operator a disproportionate advantage that may cause distortions of competition. Hence, the Authority is, at this stage, not able to conclude that the aid to Síminn is compatible with the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (106) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘[t]he EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until th[e] procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘[t]he EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until th[e] procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (107) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the aid measures to the Authority. Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have, by tendering out and financing the broadband network, put those measures into effect before the Authority has adopted a final decision. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of any aid involved might therefore be unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the aid measures to the Authority. Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have, by tendering out and financing the broadband network, put those measures into effect before the Authority has adopted a final decision. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of any aid involved might therefore be unlawful.

4.   Opening of the formal investigation

| (108) | Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Icelandic authorities, the Authority, after carrying out the preliminarily assessment, takes the view that the contract between Síminn and the Fund concerning for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland appears to involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Icelandic authorities, the Authority, after carrying out the preliminarily assessment, takes the view that the contract between Síminn and the Fund concerning for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland appears to involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement.

| (109) | Given these doubts and the potential impact of State aid on the investments of private operators, it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

Given these doubts and the potential impact of State aid on the investments of private operators, it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure.

| (110) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute aid. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute aid.

| (111) | The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the project on relevant markets. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the project on relevant markets.

| (112) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (113) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted already to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted already to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

| (114) | Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication, |
| --- | --- |

(114)

Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The contract between Síminn and the Telecommunications Fund concerning for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland appears to involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is initiated regarding the aid referred to in Article 1.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide, within one month from notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the measures under the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English-language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 10 July 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sverrir Haukur GUNNLAUGSSON

College Member

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(1)  Το Ταμείο Τηλεπικοινωνιών έχει συσταθεί για να επιβλέπει την κατανομή των δημόσιων πόρων σε έργα που αφορούν την ανάπτυξη υποδομής ηλεκτρονικών επικοινωνιών στην Ισλανδία.

1

(2)  Οι κατευθυντήριες γραμμές της Αρχής σχετικά με την εφαρμογή των κανόνων για τις κρατικές ενισχύσεις όσον αφορά την ταχεία ανάπτυξη ευρυζωνικών δικτύων. Η πρώτη εκδοχή των κατευθυντηρίων γραμμών εγκρίθηκε αφού ετέθη σε ισχύ η συμφωνία μεταξύ της Síminn και του Ταμείου Τηλεπικοινωνιών, και κατά συνέπεια δεν εφαρμόζονταν εκείνη την περίοδο. Ωστόσο, οι κατευθυντήριες γραμμές βασίζονταν στην υφιστάμενη πρακτική λήψης αποφάσεων της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής.

2

(3)  Υπόθεση C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH και Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, Συλλογή 2003 σ. I-7747.

3

(4)  As further described in paragraph 34 below, the tender documents initially set out a range of possible access options where ADSL infrastructure (see footnote 13 for a definition of this technology) is used for delivery of the broadband services in question. These ranged from more resale-based options (where the access seeker relies significantly on the host operator’s systems/infrastructure) to more infrastructure-based options (where the access seeker relies to varying degrees on its own systems/infrastructure), albeit not clearly mandating all of these access options as will be discussed further below. In the case of any services delivered via UMTS (see footnote 14 for a definition of this technology), the tender documents only proposed a resale-based access option.

4

(5)  The Authority has received similar allegations from an interested party that also claims to have unsuccessfully tried to obtain wholesale access to Síminn’s network (Event No 614576).

5

(6)  See Act No 132/2005 on the Telecommunication Fund of 20 December 2005.

6

(7)  They did so by comparing the official legal residence information to information from municipalities, their own databases of farmers and by asking local people with up-to-date knowledge, and in some instances even calling particular homes or neighbours’ homes, when in doubt.

7

(8)  Also referred to interchangeably herein as ‘service providers’, ‘Internet service providers’, or ‘ISPs’.

8

(9)  ‘Black areas’ are those in which there are or there will be in the near future at least two basic broadband networks of different operators and broadband services are provided under competitive conditions. ‘Grey areas’ are areas in which one network operator is present and another network is unlikely to be developed in the near future. ‘White areas’ are areas in which there is no broadband infrastructure and where such infrastructure is unlikely to be developed in the near future. For further clarification, see the Authority’s Guidelines on the rapid deployment of broadband networks, available online at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-IV—Application-of-state-aid-rules-in-relation-to-rapid-deployment-of-broadband-networks.pdf

9

(10)  The Fund provided free of charge technical assistance for all the service providers that did not have the technical capability to provide accurate shape-files that could be used in ARCis-GIS applications.

10

(11)  The provision of access to voice services was optional for potential bidders in respect of buildings that would not receive this service on market terms and was confined to the provision of 2G GSM voice services only. 2G refers to second generation mobile technology, while GSM (global system for mobile communications) refers to the standard on which it is based.

11

(12)  See letter from the Icelandic authorities to the Authority, dated 22 June 2011 (Event No 601861).

12

(13)  According to the Icelandic authorities, the publication of the announcement also took account of the provisions of Act No 84/2007 on Public Procurement, in order to ensure the equal treatment of companies during public procurement. The Act implements into Icelandic legislation the act referred to at point 2 of Annex XVI to the EEA Agreement, Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ L 245, 7.9.2006, p. 22 and EEA Supplement No 44, 7.9.2006, p. 18). The STC advertises all their projects/tenders in this particular section of the newspaper concerned.

13

(14)  The description of the technical requirements of the project are found in the tender description, which is marked as Annex I to the Agreement. The Annexes form part of the Agreement and are binding upon the parties.

14

(15)  See Article 1.2.3.1 of Annex I to the Agreement and footnote 8 of this Decision.

15

(16)  ADSL stands for asymmetric digital subscriber line. Digital subscriber line (DSL) technologies use traditional (fixed) copper telephony networks to deliver digital broadband signals.

16

(17)  UMTS stands for universal mobile telecommunications system which refers to third generation (3G) mobile technology that can deliver higher capacity data/broadband services than under second generation (2G) mobile technology. 3G can be used for applications such as mobile voice telephony, SMS and mobile Internet access services, as well as for fixed wireless Internet access.

17

(18)  Wi-Fi refers to the use of local radio links for the transmission of voice and data communications to individual homes or business premises.

18

(19)  Taken from the English version of the PTA’s analysis of market 12, available online at: http://www.pfs.is/upload/files/Market%2012%20%20Annex%20A%20%20Analysis-%20of%20market.Public.pdf

19

(20)  This represents 41 % of the whole project.

20

(21)  In Annex II to the Agreement, reference is made to PTA Decision No 8/2008 of 18 April 2008, on the designation of undertakings with significant market power and imposition of obligations in the market for wholesale broadband access (market 12) (see also footnote 53 below). Furthermore, pursuant to the PTA Decision No 26/2007, Mila, a company associated with Siminn, was designated with significant market power in the market for wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to metallic loops and sub-loops for the purpose of providing broadband and voice services. Mila is consequently subject to a range of wholesale access obligations, such as an obligation to comply with reasonable requests for unbundled wholesale access to local loops, including the copper lines and related services. However, due, inter alia, to the economics of providing broadband services via unbundled local loops in remote rural areas, a material demand for this wholesale access service may nevertheless be unlikely.

21

(22)  This represents 55 % of the whole project.

22

(23)  This represents 4 % of the whole project.

23

(24)  These are discounts off Síminn’s retail price.

24

(25)  They refer, in this regard, to Commission Decision N 196/10 Establishment of a Sustainable Infrastructure Permitting Estonia-wide Broadband Internet Connection (EstWin project) (not yet published).

25

Establishment of a Sustainable Infrastructure Permitting Estonia-wide Broadband Internet Connection

(26)  See the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s Decision No 55/05/COL to close the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the sale of 1 744 rental apartments in Oslo (Norway), Section II.3, p. 19 with further references, OJ L 324, 23.11.2006, p. 11 and EEA Supplement No 56, 23.11.2006, p. 1.

26

(27)  Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraphs 21-23 and Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2008] Ct. Rep. 61, paragraph 78.

27

Höfner and Elser

Macroton

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  Case C-222/04 Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 108.

28

Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA

(29)  See EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL on the rapid deployment of a Next Generation Access network in rural areas of the municipality of Tromsø, Section II.1.2, and Commission Decision SA.33063 — Italy — Trentino NGA (OJ C 323, 24.10.2012, p. 6), paragraph 77.

29

Trentino NGA

(30)  Commission Decision N 14/08 — United Kingdom, Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach (OJ C 150, 17.6.2008, p. 3), paragraph 37.

30

Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach

(31)  See EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL, cited above, footnote 26.

31

(32)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] Ct. Rep. 76, paragraph 59; Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paragraph 11.

32

The Government of Norway

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris

Commission

(33)  See EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL and Commission Decision SA.33063 — Italy — Trentino NGA.

33

Trentino NGA.

(34)  Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-7747.

34

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH

(35)  See paragraphs 87 to 93 of the Judgment.

35

(36)  See the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest (not yet published), available online at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI—Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf

36

(37)  As expressed by the Commission previously in the area of access to broadband services, for instance in Commission Decision N 381/04 Pyrénées-Atlantiques (OJ C 162, 2.7.2005, p. 5). See also paragraph 49 of the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, and paragraph 22 of the Authority’s 2010 Guidelines on the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of broadband networks. The Authority will address the relevance of these guidelines in Section II.2.1 of this Decision.

37

Pyrénées-Atlantiques

(38)  See paragraph 52 of the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest.

38

(39)  See for example Article 33(3)(a) of Directive 2004/18/EC. The provision states that: ‘In the case of works procurement, contracting authorities may award contracts by a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice in the following cases: in the case of an additional work not included in the project initially but considered essential and must, through unforeseen circumstances, be carried out by the same bidder, provided that such work cannot be technically or economically separated from the main contract without great inconvenience to the contracting authorities. The same applies if an additional work is necessary in order to finish an agreed work. The aggregate value of contracts awarded for additional work may not exceed 50 % of the amount of the original contract amount.’ The Directive does not apply to the procedure at hand, as procurements concerning the construction of telecommunication networks are exempted (see Article 13), but its fundamental principles still do (see Section II.2.2.2.3 below). The Authority is in doubt whether all the criteria of Article 33(3)(a) are fulfilled.

39

(40)  This latest set of Broadband Guidelines was adopted by the Authority on 20 February 2013 (not yet published), available online at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-IV—Application-of-state-aid-rules-in-relation-to-rapid-deployment-of-broadband-networks.pdf

40

(41)  See paragraph 5 of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

41

(42)  See for example Commission Decisions C 35/2005 Broadband development Appingedam (OJ L 86, 27.3.2007, p. 1), and N 14/08 Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach.

42

Broadband development Appingedam

Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach

(43)  See definition in footnote 3.

43

(44)  See paragraphs 39-40 of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

44

(45)  See for example EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL, Section 3.2.1.2.

45

(46)  See for example EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL and Commission Decision N 14/08 Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach, paragraphs 54-55.

46

Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach

(47)  Paragraph 49(a) of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

47

(48)  See for instance Commission Decision N 508/08 — United Kingdom, Provision of Remote Broadband Services in Northern Ireland (OJ C 18, 24.1.2009, p. 1), Commission Decision N 475/07 — Ireland, National Broadband Scheme (NBS) (OJ C 282, 24.11.2007, p. 3) and Commission Decision N 157/06 — United Kingdom, South Yorkshire Digital region Broadband Project (OJ C 80, 13.4.2007, p. 2).

48

Provision of Remote Broadband Services in Northern Ireland

National Broadband Scheme (NBS)

South Yorkshire Digital region Broadband Project

(49)  The changes are explained in further detail in Section I.3.1.4 of this Decision.

49

(50)  Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 13.

50

(51)  The Court of Justice of the European Union has confirmed in its case-law that the internal market rules of the Treaty apply also to contracts outside the scope of the procurement directives, as long as the contract is of interest to economic operators located in other Member States. See, for example, Cases C-324/98 Telaustria, [2000] ECR I-10745, paragraph 60, C-231/03 Coname, [2005] ECR I-07287, paragraph 16, and C-458/03 Parking Brixen, [2005] ECR I-08585, paragraph 46. See also the Commission interpretative communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives, OJ C 179, 1.8.2006, p. 2.

51

Telaustria

Coname

Parking Brixen

(52)  See the table in Section I.3.1.3.

52

(53)  Paragraph 49(f) of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

53

(54)  See Commission Decisions C 53/2006 Investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the home (FttH) network (OJ L 247, 16.9.2008, p. 27), paragraph 96, and N 14/08 United Kingdom, Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach, paragraph 57(c), and N 475/07 — Ireland, National Broadband Scheme (‘NBS’), paragraph 45(e).

54

Investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the home (FttH) network

United Kingdom, Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach

Ireland, National Broadband Scheme

(55)  Paragraph 77(g) of the 2013 Broadband Guidelines.

55

(56)  PTA Decision No 8/2008 (see footnote 18 above).

56

(57)  See, for example, Article 8(5)(c) of Act referred to at point 5cl of Annex XI to the EEA Agreement (Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33)) (OJ L 116, 22.4.2004, p. 60 and EEA Supplement No 20, 22.4.2004, p. 14), as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulations Directive) (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37) (not yet incorporated into the EEA Agreement) and Act referred to at point 5cl of Annex XI to the EEA Agreement (Regulation (EC) No 544/2009 (OJ L 167, 29.6.2009, p. 12); OJ L 334, 17.12.2009, p. 4 and EEA Supplement No 68, 17.12.2009, p. 4) which notes one of the objectives of the regulatory framework as the promotion, where appropriate, of infrastructure-based competition.

57

(58)  ERG 06(33), Revised ERG Common Position on the Approach to Appropriate Remedies in the ECNS Regulatory Framework, May 2006.

58

(59)  See footnote 51 above and Commission Decision (C(2007) 6072 final) on case C 53/06 (ex N 262/05, ex CP 127/2004), Investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the home (FttH) network.

59

Investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the home (FttH) network

(60)  Passive network access refers to access to the passive network without any electronic equipment (i.e. physical network elements such as ducts, fibre, cabinets, etc.).

60

(61)  Active access refers to access to the activated network (i.e. whereby the systems or technical components necessary to operate the network are in place, such as switches, routers or splitters).

61

(62)  Commission Decision N 330/10 — France — Programme national «Très Haut Débit» — Volet B.

62

Programme national «Très Haut Débit» — Volet B

(63)  This included the availability of an offer to connect the access-seekers’ own networks, to connect different parts of the network and to connect to the end consumer.

63

(64)  In this regard, this form of network activity was not being funded by the programme, but access to active wholesale products was nonetheless required where there was a reasonable demand for such products.

64

(65)  See Decision referred to in footnote 59, paragraph 24.

65

(66)  The PTA, in its Decision on the designation of undertaking with significant market power and imposition of obligations in the market for access and call origination on public mobile phone networks (market 15), and Analysis of the wholesale market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks (market 15), 5 February 2007.

66

(67)  ‘National roaming’ refers to an agreement among mobile network infrastructure operators to use each other’s networks to provide services in geographic areas where they do not yet have coverage.

67

(68)  This refers to an obligation on Síminn to offer other mobile network operators the ability to physically locate their equipment on, or to jointly utilise existing land or mobile infrastructure (such as cable ducts, buildings and structures, or masts).

68

(69)  ‘Mobile virtual network operator’ (MVNO) refers to a provider of mobile services which does not have its own spectrum resources and may or may not own mobile network infrastructure, depending on the particular business model pursued and the extent to which they rely on the facilities provided by the host mobile network. According to the PTA’s definition in its 2007 decision, in cases involving pure virtual network access, the virtual network operator controls the system that is necessary for interconnection and roaming in other operators’ networks but does not own a distribution system (i.e. the wireless part of the mobile phone network).

69

(70)  A reseller typically has neither mobile spectrum nor network infrastructure, but has the direct customer relationship and may handle, inter alia, customer billing, marketing and sales of the service to end user under an independent brand name. According to the PTA’s definition in its 2007 decision, the reseller does not own any independent mobile network infrastructure and purchases virtually all support services at the wholesale level.

70

(71)  As previously noted, 55 % of buildings were connected with UMTS (3G fixed wireless), 41 % with ADSL and 4 % with satellite/Wi-Fi.

71

(72)  According to the information provided by the Icelandic authorities, wholesale access was to be effective from 2008 to 2014 and the parties to the contract can add up to two years to its term depending on market developments and other factors (see paragraph 27 above).

72

(73)  Reference is made to Chapter 3.2.4 of Section I for a description of Options 1-4.

73

(74)  The Fund, in its note dated 14 August 2009, confirms that only resale access is available with regard to UMTS connections.

74

(75)  As regards voice services, and as further noted in footnote 8 above, the Icelandic authorities state that access to voice services in this project was confined to the provision of 2G GSM to a few identified buildings only and that Síminn offers third-party 2G (roaming) access in this regard.

75

(76)  It appears from the tender documents and from the Agreement that only option 3 was clearly mandated, although the PTA’s 2008 wholesale broadband access decision may have provided some further support for third-party requests for access to the more infrastructure-based wholesale options 1 and 2.

76

(77)  Case T-177/07 Mediaset SpA v European Commission [2010] ECR II-02341, paragraph 62, upheld by Case C-403/10 Mediaset SpA v European Commission (not yet published), paragraph 64.

77

Mediaset SpA

European Commission

Mediaset SpA

European Commission

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V Γνωστοποιήσεις

ΔΙΟΙΚΗΤΙΚΕΣ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/31 |
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28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/31

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Πρόσκληση υποβολής προτάσεων βάσει του σχεδίου υλοποίησης της Κοινής επιχείρησης «Κυψέλες καυσίμου και υδρογόνου»

2013/C 347/12

Με την παρούσα αναγγέλλεται πρόσκληση υποβολής προτάσεων βάσει του ετήσιου σχεδίου υλοποίησης 2013 της Κοινής επιχείρησης «Κυψέλες καυσίμου και υδρογόνου» (ΚΕ ΚΚΥ).

Οι ενδιαφερόμενοι καλούνται να υποβάλουν προτάσεις για την εξής πρόσκληση: FCH-JU-2013-2

Τα στοιχεία σχετικά με την πρόσκληση, που περιλαμβάνουν προθεσμίες και προϋπολογισμό, περιέχονται στο κείμενο της πρόσκλησης, το οποίο δημοσιεύεται στον εξής δικτυακό τόπο:

http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/page/fp7_calls

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ΔΙΚΑΙΟΔΟΤΙΚΕΣ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ

ΕΖΕΣ-Δικαστήριο

| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/32 |
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28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/32

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Προσφυγή που ασκήθηκε, στις 16 Αυγούστου 2013, εκ μέρους της Konkurrenten.no AS κατά της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ

(Υπόθεση E-19/13)

2013/C 347/13

Στις 16 Αυγούστου 2013, η Konkurrenten.no AS εκπροσωπούμενη από τον Jon Midthjell, δικηγόρο, Advokatfirmaet Midthjell AS, Grev Wedels plass 5, 0151 Όσλο, Νορβηγία, άσκησε προσφυγή κατά της εποπτεύουσας αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ ενώπιον του Δικαστηρίου ΕΖΕΣ.

Οι προσφεύγουσες εταιρείες ζητούν από το Δικαστήριο ΕΖΕΣ:

| 1) | Να ακυρώσει την απόφαση της ΕΑΕ αριθ. 519/12/COL της 19ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012 (AS Oslo Sporveier και AS Sporveisbussene), και να καταδικάσει την καθής και τους τυχόν παρεμβαίνοντες στα δικαστικά έξοδα. |
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1)

Να ακυρώσει την απόφαση της ΕΑΕ αριθ. 519/12/COL της 19ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012 (AS Oslo Sporveier και AS Sporveisbussene), και να καταδικάσει την καθής και τους τυχόν παρεμβαίνοντες στα δικαστικά έξοδα.

| 2) | Να ακυρώσει την απόφαση της ΕΑΕ αριθ. 181/13/COL της 8ης Μαΐου 2013 (Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS, Oslo Vognselskap AS και Unibuss AS), και να καταδικάσει την καθής και τους τυχόν παρεμβαίνοντες στα δικαστικά έξοδα. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Να ακυρώσει την απόφαση της ΕΑΕ αριθ. 181/13/COL της 8ης Μαΐου 2013 (Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS, Oslo Vognselskap AS και Unibuss AS), και να καταδικάσει την καθής και τους τυχόν παρεμβαίνοντες στα δικαστικά έξοδα.

| 3) | Να καταδικάσει την ΕΑΕ (και τους τυχόν παρεμβαίνοντες) στα δικαστικά έξοδα. |
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3)

Να καταδικάσει την ΕΑΕ (και τους τυχόν παρεμβαίνοντες) στα δικαστικά έξοδα.

Νομικά και πραγματικά περιστατικά και νομική θεμελίωση:

| — | Η προσφεύγουσα, Konkurrenten.no AS, είναι ιδιωτική επιχείρηση που ασκεί δραστηριότητες στην αγορά λεωφορείων εξπρές μεταξύ των κεντρικών και των νότιων περιφερειών της Νορβηγίας. |
| --- | --- |

—

Η προσφεύγουσα, Konkurrenten.no AS, είναι ιδιωτική επιχείρηση που ασκεί δραστηριότητες στην αγορά λεωφορείων εξπρές μεταξύ των κεντρικών και των νότιων περιφερειών της Νορβηγίας.

| — | Η προσφεύγουσα υπέβαλε καταγγελία κρατικής ενίσχυσης στην ΕΑΕ στις 11 Αυγούστου 2006, και δεύτερη καταγγελία στις 8 Σεπτεμβρίου 2011 όσον αφορά την ενίσχυση στην AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

—

Η προσφεύγουσα υπέβαλε καταγγελία κρατικής ενίσχυσης στην ΕΑΕ στις 11 Αυγούστου 2006, και δεύτερη καταγγελία στις 8 Σεπτεμβρίου 2011 όσον αφορά την ενίσχυση στην AS Oslo Sporveier.

| — | Η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ περάτωσε την υπόθεση όσον αφορά την πρώτη καταγγελία χωρίς επίσημη έρευνα στις 21 Ιουνίου 2010. Η απόφαση αυτή ακυρώθηκε από το Δικαστήριο της ΕΖΕΣ στις 22 Αυγούστου 2011 στην υπόθεση E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no AS κατά ΕΑΕ [2011] EFTA Court Reports 266. |
| --- | --- |

—

Η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ περάτωσε την υπόθεση όσον αφορά την πρώτη καταγγελία χωρίς επίσημη έρευνα στις 21 Ιουνίου 2010. Η απόφαση αυτή ακυρώθηκε από το Δικαστήριο της ΕΖΕΣ στις 22 Αυγούστου 2011 στην υπόθεση E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no AS κατά ΕΑΕ [2011] EFTA Court Reports 266.

| — | Η απόφαση της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ της 28ης Μαρτίου 2012 για την έναρξη της επίσημης έρευνας σχετικά με τα ενδεχόμενα μέτρα ενίσχυσης στις εταιρείες Oslo Sporveier και AS Sporveisbussene δημοσιεύθηκε στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και στο συμπλήρωμα για τον ΕΟΧ, στις 5 Ιουλίου 2012. |
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—

Η απόφαση της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ της 28ης Μαρτίου 2012 για την έναρξη της επίσημης έρευνας σχετικά με τα ενδεχόμενα μέτρα ενίσχυσης στις εταιρείες Oslo Sporveier και AS Sporveisbussene δημοσιεύθηκε στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και στο συμπλήρωμα για τον ΕΟΧ, στις 5 Ιουλίου 2012.

| — | Με απόφαση της 19ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ περάτωσε την επίσημη διαδικασία έρευνας σχετικά με την ενδεχόμενα ενίσχυση στην AS Oslo Sporveier και AS Sporveisbussene. Στις 8 Μαΐου 2013, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ έλαβε απόφαση σχετικά με την εικαζόμενη ενίσχυση στις Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS, Oslo Vognselskap AS και Unibuss AS. Καμία από αυτές τις αποφάσεις δεν έχει ακόμη δημοσιευθεί στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ή στο συμπλήρωμα για τον ΕΟΧ. |
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—

Με απόφαση της 19ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ περάτωσε την επίσημη διαδικασία έρευνας σχετικά με την ενδεχόμενα ενίσχυση στην AS Oslo Sporveier και AS Sporveisbussene. Στις 8 Μαΐου 2013, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ έλαβε απόφαση σχετικά με την εικαζόμενη ενίσχυση στις Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS, Oslo Vognselskap AS και Unibuss AS. Καμία από αυτές τις αποφάσεις δεν έχει ακόμη δημοσιευθεί στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ή στο συμπλήρωμα για τον ΕΟΧ.

| — | Με την παρούσα δράση η προσφεύγουσα επιδιώκει την ακύρωση και των δύο αποφάσεων. |
| --- | --- |

—

Με την παρούσα δράση η προσφεύγουσα επιδιώκει την ακύρωση και των δύο αποφάσεων.

Η προσφεύγουσα ισχυρίζεται, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ:

| | Όσον αφορά την πρώτη απόφαση (της 19ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012):






  — | χαρακτήρισε παράνομα μια εισφορά κεφαλαίου εν μέρει ως υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση και εν μέρει ως μη υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση και χαρακτήρισε ετήσια κατ’ αποκοπή αντιστάθμιση ως υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση· και |
| --- | --- | --- |

Όσον αφορά την πρώτη απόφαση (της 19ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012):

—

χαρακτήρισε παράνομα μια εισφορά κεφαλαίου εν μέρει ως υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση και εν μέρει ως μη υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση και χαρακτήρισε ετήσια κατ’ αποκοπή αντιστάθμιση ως υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση· και

| — | παρέβη το άρθρο 61 της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ όσον αφορά τη χρήση συλλογικών εισφορών για να επιτύχει συσσωρευμένες αρνητικές φορολογικές καταστάσεις. |
| --- | --- |

—

παρέβη το άρθρο 61 της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ όσον αφορά τη χρήση συλλογικών εισφορών για να επιτύχει συσσωρευμένες αρνητικές φορολογικές καταστάσεις.

| | Όσον αφορά τη δεύτερη απόφαση (της 8ης Μαΐου 2013):






  — | παρέβη το καθήκον της να κινήσει επίσημη διαδικασία έρευνας με αθέμιτο χαρακτηρισμό των συναλλαγών ως υφιστάμενες ενισχύσεις και αθέμιτο χαρακτηρισμό των βραχυπρόθεσμων δανείων ρευστών διαθεσίμων και συμβάσεων που συνάπτονται χωρίς ανταγωνισμό, ως μη υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση· και |
| --- | --- | --- |

Όσον αφορά τη δεύτερη απόφαση (της 8ης Μαΐου 2013):

—

παρέβη το καθήκον της να κινήσει επίσημη διαδικασία έρευνας με αθέμιτο χαρακτηρισμό των συναλλαγών ως υφιστάμενες ενισχύσεις και αθέμιτο χαρακτηρισμό των βραχυπρόθεσμων δανείων ρευστών διαθεσίμων και συμβάσεων που συνάπτονται χωρίς ανταγωνισμό, ως μη υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση· και

| — | παρέβη το καθήκον της να κινήσει επίσημη διαδικασία έρευνας για εγγυήσεις που χορηγήθηκαν χωρίς να επιβληθούν ασφάλιστρα και για μακροπρόθεσμα δάνεια δημόσιων υποδομών στην AS Oslo Sporveier με τους όρους που ισχύουν για τον ίδιο τον δήμο, με αθέμιτο χαρακτηρισμό των μέτρων ως υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση. |
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—

παρέβη το καθήκον της να κινήσει επίσημη διαδικασία έρευνας για εγγυήσεις που χορηγήθηκαν χωρίς να επιβληθούν ασφάλιστρα και για μακροπρόθεσμα δάνεια δημόσιων υποδομών στην AS Oslo Sporveier με τους όρους που ισχύουν για τον ίδιο τον δήμο, με αθέμιτο χαρακτηρισμό των μέτρων ως υφιστάμενη ενίσχυση.

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ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ ΠΟΥ ΑΦΟΡΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΦΑΡΜΟΓΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/34 |
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28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/34

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Προηγούμενη γνωστοποίηση συγκέντρωσης

(Υπόθεση COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV)

Υπόθεση υποψήφια για απλοποιημένη διαδικασία

(Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ)

2013/C 347/14

| 1. | Στις 19 Νοεμβρίου 2013, η Επιτροπή έλαβε γνωστοποίηση μιας σχεδιαζόμενης συγκέντρωσης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 139/2004 του Συμβουλίου (1) με την οποία οι επιχειρήσεις Rheinmetall AG («Rheinmetall», Γερμανία) και Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen GmbH («Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen», Γερμανία) αποκτούν κατά την έννοια του άρθρου 3 παράγραφος 1 στοιχείο β) του κοινοτικού κανονισμού συγκεντρώσεων κοινό έλεγχο της Rheinmetall International Engineering GmbH («Rheinmetall International Engineering», Γερμανία) με αγορά μετοχώνσε νεοσυσταθείσα εταιρεία που αποτελεί κοινή επιχείρηση. |
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1.

Στις 19 Νοεμβρίου 2013, η Επιτροπή έλαβε γνωστοποίηση μιας σχεδιαζόμενης συγκέντρωσης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 139/2004 του Συμβουλίου (1) με την οποία οι επιχειρήσεις Rheinmetall AG («Rheinmetall», Γερμανία) και Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen GmbH («Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen», Γερμανία) αποκτούν κατά την έννοια του άρθρου 3 παράγραφος 1 στοιχείο β) του κοινοτικού κανονισμού συγκεντρώσεων κοινό έλεγχο της Rheinmetall International Engineering GmbH («Rheinmetall International Engineering», Γερμανία) με αγορά μετοχώνσε νεοσυσταθείσα εταιρεία που αποτελεί κοινή επιχείρηση.

| 2. | Οι επιχειρηματικές δραστηριότητες των εν λόγω επιχειρήσεων είναι:






  — | για την Rheinmetall: δραστηριοποιείται στην παραγωγή στοιχείων αυτοκινήτων και αμυντικών συστημάτων παγκοσμίως· |
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2.

Οι επιχειρηματικές δραστηριότητες των εν λόγω επιχειρήσεων είναι:

—

για την Rheinmetall: δραστηριοποιείται στην παραγωγή στοιχείων αυτοκινήτων και αμυντικών συστημάτων παγκοσμίως·

| — | για την Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen: δραστηριοποιείται στην παροχή υπηρεσιών πολιτικού μηχανικού, υπηρεσιών συμβάσεων προμηθειών και κατασκευαστικών υπηρεσιών με έμφαση στην έρευνα πετρελαίου και φυσικού αερίου, καθώς και σε βιομηχανικές γραμμές παραγωγής παγκοσμίως· |
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—

για την Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen: δραστηριοποιείται στην παροχή υπηρεσιών πολιτικού μηχανικού, υπηρεσιών συμβάσεων προμηθειών και κατασκευαστικών υπηρεσιών με έμφαση στην έρευνα πετρελαίου και φυσικού αερίου, καθώς και σε βιομηχανικές γραμμές παραγωγής παγκοσμίως·

| — | για την Rheinmetall International Engineering: η κοινή επιχείρηση θα αναλάβει σημαντικό μέρος των δραστηριοτήτων της Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen στον τομέα της παροχής υπηρεσιών πολιτικού μηχανικού, υπηρεσιών συμβάσεων προμηθειών και κατασκευαστικών υπηρεσιών, ενώ θα επεκταθεί και στην παροχή υπηρεσιών του είδους αυτού στον αμυντικό τομέα. |
| --- | --- |

—

για την Rheinmetall International Engineering: η κοινή επιχείρηση θα αναλάβει σημαντικό μέρος των δραστηριοτήτων της Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen στον τομέα της παροχής υπηρεσιών πολιτικού μηχανικού, υπηρεσιών συμβάσεων προμηθειών και κατασκευαστικών υπηρεσιών, ενώ θα επεκταθεί και στην παροχή υπηρεσιών του είδους αυτού στον αμυντικό τομέα.

| 3. | Κατόπιν προκαταρκτικής εξέτασης, η Επιτροπή διαπιστώνει ότι η γνωστοποιηθείσα πράξη θα μπορούσε να εμπίπτει στο πεδίο εφαρμογής του κοινοτικού κανονισμού συγκεντρώσεων. Εντούτοις, επιφυλάσσεται να λάβει τελική απόφαση επί του σημείου αυτού. Σύμφωνα με την ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με μια απλοποιημένη διαδικασία αντιμετώπισης ορισμένων συγκεντρώσεων βάσει του κοινοτικού κανονισμού συγκεντρώσεων (2) σημειώνεται ότι η παρούσα υπόθεση είναι υποψήφια για να αντιμετωπιστεί βάσει της διαδικασίας που προβλέπεται στην ανακοίνωση. |
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3.

Κατόπιν προκαταρκτικής εξέτασης, η Επιτροπή διαπιστώνει ότι η γνωστοποιηθείσα πράξη θα μπορούσε να εμπίπτει στο πεδίο εφαρμογής του κοινοτικού κανονισμού συγκεντρώσεων. Εντούτοις, επιφυλάσσεται να λάβει τελική απόφαση επί του σημείου αυτού. Σύμφωνα με την ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με μια απλοποιημένη διαδικασία αντιμετώπισης ορισμένων συγκεντρώσεων βάσει του κοινοτικού κανονισμού συγκεντρώσεων (2) σημειώνεται ότι η παρούσα υπόθεση είναι υποψήφια για να αντιμετωπιστεί βάσει της διαδικασίας που προβλέπεται στην ανακοίνωση.

| 4. | Η Επιτροπή καλεί τους ενδιαφερόμενους τρίτους να υποβάλουν στην Επιτροπή ενδεχόμενες παρατηρήσεις για τη σχεδιαζόμενη συγκέντρωση.
  Οι παρατηρήσεις πρέπει να φθάσουν στην Επιτροπή το αργότερο εντός δέκα ημερών από την ημερομηνία της παρούσας δημοσίευσης, με την ένδειξη COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV. Οι παρατηρήσεις μπορούν να σταλούν στην Επιτροπή με φαξ (+32 22964301), ηλεκτρονικά στην COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ή ταχυδρομικά στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση:





  Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή |
| --- | --- |
| ΓΔ Ανταγωνισμού |
| Μητρώο Συγχωνεύσεων |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Η Επιτροπή καλεί τους ενδιαφερόμενους τρίτους να υποβάλουν στην Επιτροπή ενδεχόμενες παρατηρήσεις για τη σχεδιαζόμενη συγκέντρωση.

Οι παρατηρήσεις πρέπει να φθάσουν στην Επιτροπή το αργότερο εντός δέκα ημερών από την ημερομηνία της παρούσας δημοσίευσης, με την ένδειξη COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV. Οι παρατηρήσεις μπορούν να σταλούν στην Επιτροπή με φαξ (+32 22964301), ηλεκτρονικά στην COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ή ταχυδρομικά στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση:

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

ΓΔ Ανταγωνισμού

Μητρώο Συγχωνεύσεων

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  ΕΕ L 24 της 29.1.2004, σ. 1 («Κοινοτικός κανονισμός συγκεντρώσεων»).

(2)  ΕΕ C 56 της 5.3.2005, σ. 32 («Ανακοίνωση σχετικά με απλοποιημένη διαδικασία»).

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Διορθωτικά

| 28.11.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 347/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 347/35

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Διορθωτικό στις επίσημες αργίες για το 2013: Κράτη ΕΟΧ ΕΖΕΣ και θεσμικά όργανα ΕΟΧ

(
  Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης C 42 της 14ης Φεβρουαρίου 2013
  )

2013/C 347/15

Ο παρών κατάλογος αντικαθιστά και ακυρώνει τον κατάλογο που δημοσιεύθηκε στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα C 42 της 14ης Φεβρουαρίου 2013, σ. 6 και στο συμπλήρωμα ΕΟΧ αριθ. 10 της 14ης Φεβρουαρίου 2013, σ. 5.

Επίσημες αργίες για το 2013: Κράτη ΕΟΧ/ΕΖΕΣ και θεσμικά όργανα ΕΟΧ

| | Ισλανδία | Λιχτενστάιν | Νορβηγία | Εποπτεύουσα αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ | Δικαστήριο της ΕΖΕΣ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 Ιανουαρίου | X | X | X | X | X |
| 2 Ιανουαρίου | | X | | X | |
| 3 Ιανουαρίου | | | | X | |
| 6 Ιανουαρίου | | X | | | |
| 2 Φεβρουαρίου | | X | | | |
| 12 Φεβρουαρίου | | X | | | |
| 19 Μαρτίου | | X | | | |
| 28 Μαρτίου | X | | X | | |
| 29 Μαρτίου | X | X | X | X | |
| 1 Απριλίου | X | X | X | X | X |
| 25 Απριλίου | X | | | | |
| 1 Μαΐου | X | X | X | X | X |
| 9 Μαΐου | X | X | X | X | X |
| 10 Μαΐου | | | | X | |
| 17 Μαΐου | | | X | | |
| 20 Μαΐου | X | X | X | X | X |
| 30 Μαΐου | | X | | | |
| 17 Ιουνίου | X | | | | |
| 24 Ιουνίου | | | | | X |
| 5 Αυγούστου | X | | | | |
| 15 Αυγούστου | | X | | | X |
| 8 Σεπτεμβρίου | | X | | | |
| 1 Νοεμβρίου | | X | | X | X |
| 8 Δεκεμβρίου | | X | | | |
| 23 Δεκεμβρίου | | | | X | |
| 24 Δεκεμβρίου | X | | | X | |
| 25 Δεκεμβρίου | X | X | X | X | X |
| 26 Δεκεμβρίου | X | X | X | X | X |
| 27 Δεκεμβρίου | | | | X | |
| 30 Δεκεμβρίου | | | | X | |
| 31 Δεκεμβρίου | X | X | | X | |

Ισλανδία

Λιχτενστάιν

Νορβηγία

Εποπτεύουσα αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ

Δικαστήριο της ΕΖΕΣ

1 Ιανουαρίου

X

X

X

X

X

2 Ιανουαρίου

X

X

3 Ιανουαρίου

X

6 Ιανουαρίου

X

2 Φεβρουαρίου

X

12 Φεβρουαρίου

X

19 Μαρτίου

X

28 Μαρτίου

X

X

29 Μαρτίου

X

X

X

X

1 Απριλίου

X

X

X

X

X

25 Απριλίου

X

1 Μαΐου

X

X

X

X

X

9 Μαΐου

X

X

X

X

X

10 Μαΐου

X

17 Μαΐου

X

20 Μαΐου

X

X

X

X

X

30 Μαΐου

X

17 Ιουνίου

X

24 Ιουνίου

X

5 Αυγούστου

X

15 Αυγούστου

X

X

8 Σεπτεμβρίου

X

1 Νοεμβρίου

X

X

X

8 Δεκεμβρίου

X

23 Δεκεμβρίου

X

24 Δεκεμβρίου

X

X

25 Δεκεμβρίου

X

X

X

X

X

26 Δεκεμβρίου

X

X

X

X

X

27 Δεκεμβρίου

X

30 Δεκεμβρίου

X

31 Δεκεμβρίου

X

X

X

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