alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### William White *et ux. versus*Ebenezer Willis.

*Oct. 22d*

*A-*widow is dowable of a lot of wild land which was used by her husband in connexion with his dwellinghouse and cultivated land.

*Writ of dower.*

The tenant pleads, that the land in which dower is demanded is a lot of wild swamp land and wholly in a state of nature, *jé*ling no annual profits or income and incapable of cultivation, and is not now, and was not during the coverture of the wife with Nathan Warren, her former husband, adjoining to, parcel of, or connected with, any other estate of Warren.

The demandants reply, that Warren, during the coverture, was seised in fee of a dwelling-house and a lot of land adjoining, containing thirty acres, the same then and ever since being wholly improved land, and under cultivation, of which the wife has been endowed; that Warren, during the coverture, was likewise seised in fee of the demanded premises, containing eleven acres of wild swamp land, this lot affording wood, timber and materials suitable for fire-bote, house-bote and fencebote for the wife for her necessary fuel and for the necessary repairs of such part of the dwellinghouse, and of the fences on such part of the land, as were assigned to her as her dower; the same lot having been used by Warren for the same purposes ; that this lot is within one mile of the dwellinghouse and cultivated land, and is the only lot of wood and timber that was owned and used by Warren, during the coverture, for the purposes before mentioned.

The tenant makes a rejoinder, to which there is a general demurrer.

The question was upon the sufficiency of the replication.

Stevens, for the demandants,

cited *Conner*v. Shepherd, 15 Mass. R. 167 ; *St.*1783, c. 40, § 3.

*Wood,*for the tenant,

said that if the demandants were entitled to dower in the woodlot, it should be assigned as incident to her dower in the cultivated land; that she may now take her fire-bote, &c. as appurtenant to her dower already assigned, and her remedy is not by a writ of dower. 2 Bl. Com. 35.

*150*Per Curiam.*

The plea sets forth a good bar, but the replication avoids it, by saying that the woodland was used as an appendage to the dwellinghouse and cultivated land for the purposes of procuring fuel and timber for repairs. We know of no authority for the suggestion, that the dowress has a right to take fire-bote, &c. without an assignment of her dower in the woodlot. This case is distinguished from those heretofore decided respecting dower. The Court have limited the dis-allowance of dower to wild land, which is not used with the homestead or with cultivated land.1

1

 See Revised Stat. *c.*60, § 12; *Webb*v. Townsend, 1 Pick. 21.

In order to entitle a tenant in dower to take fire-wood, there must be a house upon the land where it is assigned to her as dower. *Fuller*v. Wason, 7 N. Hampsh. R. 341. Such tenant can use the wood only in such house Ibid.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Saul ANCHONDO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50517 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 18, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, ■ U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee Saul Anchondo, Pro Se

Before KING, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Saul Anchondo has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Anchondo has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review.1*257Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R, 47.5.4.

1

. Counsel contends that a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel exists but recognizes that a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the appropriate method for raising this claim. We agree with the latter assessment and therefore decline to consider the claim without prejudice to collateral review, *See United States*v. *Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).
#### IN RE: Dennis Adrian VAZQUEZ, Debtor. Dennis Adrian Vazquez, Appellant, v. AAA Blueprint & Digital Reprographics, a California Corporation, Appellee.

No. 14-60003

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 4, 2017

Dennis Adrian Vazquez, Temecula, CA, pro se.

Mark W. Huston, Silverstein & Huston, Orange, CA, for Appellee.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

MEMORANDUM **

Chapter 7 debtor Dennis Adrian Vazquez appeals pro se from the judgment *465of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment excepting from discharge Vazquez’s debt to AAA Blueprint & Digital Reprographics. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions, and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Bo*yajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian),*564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment because the findings in the state court action satisfied the elements for “willful and malicious injury” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and California law precludes relitigation of issues decided in a prior proceeding. *See Diamond v. Kolcum (In re Diamond),*285 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In determining whether a party should be estopped from relitigating an issue decided in a prior state court action, the bankruptcy court must look to that state’s law of collateral estoppel.”); *Lucido v. Superior Court,*51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1990) (setting forth elements of issue preclusion under California law); *see also Ormsby v. First Am. Title Co. of Nev. (In re Ormsby),*591 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth requirements for non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6))..

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening’ brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
AD Economic Evaluation

Docket No. FAA-2012-0216 Directorate ID: 2010-SW-025-AD

Helicopter Model: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A Helicopters

Number of Helicopters (U.S. Operators): 20 Helicopters in the US Registry.

Reason: The actions are intended to prevent failure of the tail rotor pylon or other tail rotor components, which 

could lead to the loss of control of the helicopter.

Costs:

Parts per Helicopter $339,080

Labor per Helicopter

(1 x $85/work-hour for the 

inspection)

(120 x $85/work-hour for the 

replacement)

$85 per inspection

$10,200

Other (Explain) We are assuming 85 inspections per year on each 

helicopter and assuming replacement of the T/R pylon 

and installation of a doubler on each helicopter.

Total Cost per Helicopter $356,505/inspection and replacement

Total US Fleet Cost $$7,130,100 for the U.S. fleet.

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action?” Yes ( ) No ()

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant? Yes ( ) Explain Below No ()

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities?

Yes ( ) No ()

Project Engineer: Nicholas Faust
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Kenneth A. Shewer,
Chief Executive Officer of the managing owner as of October 1, 2004, Preferred Investment Solutions Corp., of Futures Strategic Trust (the Trust), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Trusts Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Quarterly
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                                                                                             |  |  |  | 
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | 
|/s/ Kenneth A. Shewer                                                                                                                        |  | 
|Kenneth A. Shewer Chief Executive Officer of Preferred Investment Solutions Corp.,the managing owner as of October 1, 2004 November 15, 2004 |  |
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Carvell Seman ENGLAND Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4553

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: August 10, 2017

Filed: August 11, 2017

Ajay J. Alexander, Shawn Wehde, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Iowa, Sioux City, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Carvell Seman England, Pro Se

Before COLLOTON, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

While Carvell Seman England was serving a third term of federal supervised release, the district court1 revoked supervised release and sentenced him to 18 months in prison and no additional supervised release. On appeal, England challenges the revocation sentence as substantively unreasonable. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

Although the sentence is above the advisory range contained in the Guidelines Chapter 7 policy statements, it is well within statutory limits. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (maximum revocation prison term is five years if underlying offense is Class A felony; three years if. underlying offense is Class B felony). The district court thoroughly explained its reasons for varying upward, including England’s history of repeated violations, his failure to appear at the original revocation hearing, and the need to adequately deter him from further criminal conduct despite imposing no further term of supervised release. *See id.*(before revoking supervised release and imposing sentence, court must consider specified factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including history and characteristics of defendant, and need to deter criminal conduct); *United States v. Growden,*663 F.3d *177982, 984 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (court acted well within broad discretion in imposing above-Guidelines revocation sentence where it considered appropriate § 3553(a) factors, sufficiently explained reasoning for variance, and imposed sentence within statutory limits).

The judgment is affirmed, and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

1

. The Honorable Leonard T, Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
5/16/20122003AQMP - 2010 STATIONARY BASELINE EMISSIONSWITH GROWH- SOX AND PM10 BY MAJOR SOURCE CATEGORY (T/D)Road DustSOx PM10 SOx PM10 PM10 SOx PM10010 Electric Utilities 0.29 0.99 0.29 0.99020 Cogeneration 0.01 0.67 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.69030 Oil and Gas Production (Combustion) 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.17040 Petroleum Refining (Combustion) 0.00 2.42 0.00 2.42050 Manufacturing and Industrial 0.12 1.61 0.37 1.04 0.49 2.65052 Food and Agricultural Processing 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.19060 Service and Commercial 0.55 0.89 0.20 0.23 0.74 1.11099 Other (Fuel Combustion) 0.20 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.33110 Sewage Treatment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00120 Landfills 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.20130 Incinerators 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11199 Other (Waste Disposal) 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14210 Laundering 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00220 Degreasing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00230 Coatings and Related Process Solvents 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06240 Printing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00250 Sealants & Adhesives 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00299 Other (Cleaning and Surface Coatings) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00310 Oil and Gas Production 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03320 Petroleum Refining 4.50 0.79 4.50 0.79330 Petroleum Marketing 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05399 Other (Petroleum Production and Marketing) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00410 Chemical 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50420 Food and Agriculture 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23430 Mineral Processes 0.01 2.72 0.00 1.35 0.01 4.07440Metal Processes0 051 320 000 000 051 32Point Area Total StationarySumNameMSC440MetalProcesses0.051.320.000.000.051.32450 Wood and Paper 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.03 0.00 1.11460 Glass and Related Products 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27470 Electronics 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00499 Other (Industrial Processes) 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.18NOX/SOX Reclaim 12.03 12.03Total Emissions (T/D) 181414018.817.6Annual Average inventory.Rounds off may introduce slight discrepancies in totals.G:\AIR-3\Permit Programs\NSR Info\District NSR Rulemaking\By Districts\South Coast\Rule 1315\TSD support Docs\Excel Spreadsheets\2003 Plan with Growth
#### Edward J. Fitzgerald et al., as Executors of Annie Fitzgerald, Deceased, Appellants, *v.*Title Guarantee and Trust Company, Respondent.

Submitted June 7, 1943;

decided June 18, 1943.

Motion to amend remittitur granted. Return of remittitur requested, and when returned it will be amended to provide as follows: ‘ ‘ Judgment affirmed without costs and with leave to the plaintiff to serve an amended complaint within twenty days after the service of the order of the Supreme Court making "the order of the Court of Appeals the order of the Supreme Court, with notice of entry thereof.” (See 290 N. Y. 376.)
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

April 28, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 130037 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 130037 COA: 265300 Wayne CC: 04-012859 DEONTA DESHAWN BUTLER, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 25, 2005 order of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

d0424 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

April 28, 2006

Clerk
**EXHIBIT 32.01**

 

**SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION**

 

Inconnection with this quarterly report of ML JWH Strategic Allocation Fund  L.P. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (this “Report”), I, Robert M. Alderman, ChiefExecutive Officer, President and Manager of the Company, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

1.This Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Date: May 15, 2006

 
|                                            |                   |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| By                                              | /s/ ROBERT M. ALDERMAN |   |
| Robert M. Alderman                              |
| Chief Executive  Officer, President and Manager |
| (Principal Executive  Officer)                  |
|                                                 |                        |  |  |

 

1

----
#### GEORGETOWN RAIL EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee v. HOLLAND L.P., Defendant-Appellant

2016-2297

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

August 16, 2017

Dana M. Herberholz, Attorney, Christopher Cuneo, Senior Attorney, Jamie K. Ellsworth, Esq., Attorney, Parsons Behle *&*Latimer, Boise, ID, C. Kevin Speirs, Parsons Behle *&*Latimer, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Daniel J. Schwartz, Kathryn Ann Feier-eisel, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Chicago, IL, Lauren J. Frank, Attorney, Timothy E, Grimsrud, Attorney, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Reyna, Schall, and Wallach, Circuit Judges.

SUA SPONTE

ORDER

Per Curiam.

Upon consideration of this court’s show cause order of August 1, 2017, and the joint response submitted by the parties on August 15, 2017,

It Is Ordered That:

*577The opinion issued under seal on August 1, 2017 is hereby unsealed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-7544

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

SEBASTIAN GOMEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.

(CR-96-806)

Submitted: January 18, 2001 Decided: January 30, 2001

Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion.

Sebastian Gomez, Appellant Pro Se. Marshall Prince, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Sebastian Gomez appeals the district court’s order denying his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea and habeas relief under 28

U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record and

the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the decision to deny Gomez’s motion to withdraw

his guilty plea on the reasoning of the district court. United

States v. Gomez, No. CR-96-806 (D.S.C. filed Oct. 11, 2000; entered

Oct. 12, 2000). To the extent that Gomez raised additional claims

sounding in habeas, we also rely on the reasoning of the district

court in denying a certificate of appealability as to those claims

and dismissing the appeal in relevant part. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YUAN CHUN XIAO, Petitioner,
v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent. No. 09-73476 Agency No. A099-365-073
MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 6, 2013 ** Seattle, Washington Before: SCHROEDER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ, District Judge. *** Yuan Chun Xiao, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of a 

# FILED
DEC 03 2013 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.decision by an immigration judge (IJ) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, a nd relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility determination on the basis of the IJ’s conclusory demea nor characterization. Although adverse credibility determinations are entitled to “ahealthy measure of deference,” the IJ may not base an adverse credibility dete rmination on a generalized assertion about demeanor; rather, the IJ should refer to “specific instances in the record that support [his] conclusion . . . .” Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034, 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Arulampalam v. Ashcroft , 353 F.3d 679, 686 (9th Cir. 2003). The IJ’s unsupported assertion that Xiao bega n to stutter when he “got off script” is contradicted by record evidence, including the IJ’s own observation that throughout the entirety of his testimony, Xiao exhibited a repetitive pattern of speech suggestive of an impediment. Moreover, the IJ’s apparent frustrati on with Xiao, and in particular, with Xiao’s manner of speech, calls into que stion the IJ’s summary dismissal of petitioner’s explanations of perceived incons istencies. The agency must consider a petitioner’s explanation of any inconsiste ncies in determining credibility, because “[t]o ignore a petitioner’s explanation for a perceived inconsistency . . . would be to make a credibility determination on less than the total circumstances in
2contravention of the REAL ID Act’s text.” Shrestha , 590 F.3d at 1044; see also Soto-Olarte v. Holder , 555 F.3d 1089, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, we remand to the BIA for proper consideration of whether substantial evidence supports the IJ’s a dverse credibility determination, including, if necessary, a remand to the IJ for further consideration of Xiao’s asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims. Petition GRANTED and REMANDED.

3