alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FIRST UNION (LOGO)

First Union National Bank
NC1075
Structured Products Servicing
8739 Research Drive, URP4
Charlotte, NC  28288-1075



OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE

Reference is hereby made to that certain  Pooling and Servicing  Agreement dated
as of May 1, 1999 by and among First Union Commercial Mortgage Securities,  Inc.
as Depositor,  First Union  National Bank as Master  Servicer,  ORIX Real Estate
Capital Markets, LLC as Special Servicer,  and Norwest Bank Minnesota,  National
Association  as  Trustee,  with  respect  to  Commercial  Mortgage  Pass-Through
Certificates,  Series 1999-C2 (the  "Agreement").  Capitalized terms used herein
not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

Pursuant  to Section  3.13 of this  Agreement,  Timothy  S. Ryan and  Timothy E.
Steward, Vice Presidents of the Master Servicer, do hereby certify that:

1.   A review of the  activities of the Master  Servicer  during the period from
     May 24,  1999  through  December  31,  1999 and of  performance  under  the
     Agreement during such period has been made under our supervision; and

2.   To the best of our knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has
     fulfilled all its obligations  under the Agreement in all material respects
     throughout the period May 24, 1999 through December 31, 1999; and

3.   The Master  Servicer has  received no notice  regarding  qualification,  or
     challenging the status of any portion of the Trust Fund as a REMIC from the
     Internal Revenue Service or any other governmental agency or body.

IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the undersigned  have executed this  Certificate as of the
10th day of March, 2000.

Timothy S. Ryan, Vice President
First Union National Bank

Timothy E. Steward, Vice President
First Union National Bank
#### Santiago SOTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jack GARNER, Presiding Commissioner, CDC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16519

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 16, 2016 *

Filed November 21, 2016

*961Santiago Soto, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGULA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Santiago Soto appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations in connection with the denial of parole. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. *Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,*707 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

To the extent that Soto challenged the denial of parole, such a claim must be brought in a habeas petition because success on the claim would necessarily mean immediate release or a shorter duration of incarceration. *See Wilkinson v. Dotson,*544 U.S. 74, 79, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (explaining that § 1983 action is proper only if success would not “necessarily have meant immediate release or a shorter period of incarceration”).

The district court properly dismissed Soto’s procedural, due process claim because the allegations in Soto’s complaint show that he received adequate process, as he “was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” *Swarthout v. Cooke,*562 U.S. 216, 220, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011).

The district court properly dismissed Soto’s claim for equitable relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause because it duplicates the allegations and prayer for relief in *Gilman v. Brown,*No. Civ. 2:05-cv-00830-MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal.), alleging that Proposition 9 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. *See Pride v. Correa,*719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] district court may dismiss those portions of the complaint which duplicate the class action’s allegations and prayer for relief.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint without granting leave to amend because amendment would be futile. *See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# CHECK LIST #1

PRE

- FLIGHT:

1. AR EA CLEAR OF WIRES, POLES, TREES

_____

2. s UAS HARDWARE INSPECTION

_____

3. PROPS TIGHT

_____

4. BATTERY VOLTAGES 100%

_____

5. RC SWITCH POSITIONS

_____

6. FLIGHT MODE SELECTED

_____

7. TELEMETRY DISPLAYED

_____

8. GPS LOCK

_____

9. CAMERA ENABLED

_____

10. AREA “CLEAR” FOR LAUNCH

_____

11. WIND DIRECTION NOTED

_____

12. TIMER RESET

_____

13. TIMER ALARM SET

_____



### IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKE OFF:

1. TEST STICK INPUTS, sUAS REACTION

_____

2. EXIT “INNER CIRCLE” AND SWITCH FROM “NORMAL/STABLE ” MODE

TO FLIGHT MODE MISSION SPECIFIC

_____

3. TEST “FAIL SAFE” MODE (RTL, RETURN TO LAUNCH)

_____

4. CANCEL “FAIL SAFE” AND LAND A IRCRAFT

_____

TESTING FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS COMPLETE, READY TO LAUNCH MISSION

# CHECK LIST #2

PRE

- LANDING CHECK LIST:

1. LANDING ZONE “CLEAR” OF HAZARDS

_____

2. SELECT “NORMAL/STABLE” FLIGHT MODE

_____

3. WIND CHECK

_____

4. STABLE APPROACH AND LAND

_____



### POST LANDING CHECK LIST:

1. THROTTLE STICK DOWN/ZERO POWER

_____

2. DISCONNECT sUAS FLIGHT BATTERY

_____

3. POWER OFF RC CONTROLLER

_____

4. SECURE sUAS TO A SAFE LOCATION

_____

5. sUA S HARDWARE INSPECTION

_____



### EMERGENCY OR SUSPECTED HAZARD:

IMMEDIATELY LAND sUAS AT SAFEST AND CLOSEST GROUND LOCATION IN THE EVENT:

! MANNED AIRCRAFT IS HEARD OR SEEN IN VICINITY OF FLIGHT.

! THERE IS A PUBLIC GATHERING WITHIN ESTABLISHED SAFETY BOUNDRY WANTING

TO OBSERVE FLIGHT.

! PILOT IS BEING DISTRACTED FROM FOCUSING ON FLIGHT AND SAFETY

.

! SUDDEN CHANGE / INCREASE IN VEHICULAR TRAFFIC IN VICINITY OF FLIGHT.

! BIRDS ENTER INTO PROXIMITY OF FLIGHT.

! ANY SUDDEN UNSAFE EVENT THAT CAN CAUSE COLLISION/DISTRACTION/INTERUPPTION

OF CONTROL
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher Michael EMTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30364

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 4, 2017 * Seattle, Washington

Filed April 19, 2017

Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Tim Tatarka, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Davina T. Chen, Attorney, Law Office of Davina T. Chen, Glendale, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: KOZINSKI and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,** Chief District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

1.Evidence is admissible if the officers lawfully searched the area where the evidence was found and had probable cause to believe it was associated with criminal activity. See United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the officers had probable cause to believe the firearm was incriminating because they knew Emter was on probation, found Em-ter near where the gun was located and found the gun in a bin with men’s clothing. The district court did not err in denying Emter’s motion to suppress.

2. A district court has discretion to reject a defendant’s proposed jury instruction when “other instructions given in their entirety cover the defense theory.” United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011). A “mere presence” instruction is not required when the government’s case rests on “more than just a defendant’s presence.” Iff (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the government’s case against Emter rested on more than his mere presence and the Ninth Circuit’s model instruction for possession did not prevent Emter from arguing his defense theory, the district court did not err in rejecting Emter’s alternate instructions as confusing or inapplicable.

3. There’s no evidence that the district court misunderstood its discretion to depart from the sentencing guidelines, which the court expressly described as “advisory.” Nor is there evidence that the court misunderstood the role of the Bureau of Prisons. The district court adequately considered all the evidence and arguments presented, and Emter’s sentence was reasonable.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Johnson v. Gorczyk, No. S1404-00 CnC (Norton, J., July 6, 2005)

[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is un official. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying data included in the Vermont trial cou rt opinion database is not guaranteed.]

STATE OF VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT Chittenden County, ss.: Docket No. S1404-00 CnC

JOHNSON

v.

GORCZYK

ENTRY

Prisoner seeks relief through V.R.C.P. Rule 75 fro m a Department of Corrections disciplinary action taken against him w hile he was incarcerated. Convicted of kidnaping and murder in 1990, Prisoner is currently serving a 60-year sentence in a Virginia corrections facility. On May 19, 2000, after losing his prison job, Prisoner became visibly upset and agitated toward a prison counselor. Following a report and hearing, Prisoner was ordered into segregation for 15 days f or violating the facility’s disciplinary code. Five months later, Prisoner fil ed this motion.This court originally dismissed Prisoner’s complai nt for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction because Prisoner had lo ng since been released from segregation. Prisoner appealed, and the Vermo nt Supreme Court remanded for a fuller consideration of any negative consequences flowing from the action. On remand, Corrections has filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has not responded to this moti on in any manner.

Corrections argues that Prisoner has suffered no a dverse effects from his disciplinary action. The evidence shows the fo llowing:

$ Prisoner did not lose any automatic good time cred it under 28 V.S.A. § 811(a).

$ The disciplinary action was not registered on Pris oner’s “permanent
record.”

$ The parole board will not be told of this incident when petitioner becomes eligible for parole in 2033.

$ There has been no change to Prisoner’s custody lev el.

$ There is no evidence that the inmates or correctio ns officers consider
Prisoner to be a “troublemaker” as a result of this incident.

$ Prisoner lost some discretionary good time credit under 28 V.S.A. § 811(b) because he could not participate in a rehabi litative program while he was in segregation.

With the exception of the last fact, the evidence shows no negative consequences as a result of this disciplinary actio n. As to the exception, the law is clear that Prisoner has no liberty interest in such discretionary credit, and no due process right to review. Conway v. Gorc zyk , 171 Vt. 374, 379 (2000). This means that the only “lasting” negativ e effect from Prisoner’s disciplinary action was the loss of a few discretio nary credits to which Rule75 provides no right of relief. This leads the cou rt to the same conclusion

as before. Prisoner has no right of review or reli ef as a matter of law.

Based on the foregoing, the Department of Correcti ons’ Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted. Case is Dismissed.

Dated at Burlington, Vermont________________, 2005

.

________________________ Judge
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Arthur C. Wiener, Chief Executive Officer of Galey & Lord, Inc. (the Company), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 28, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Quarterly Report), fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                        
|--------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Arthur C. Wiener                                    
|Arthur C. Wiener Chief Executive Officer August 12, 2003



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Derrick D. HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee

No. 15-1872

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 1, 2017

Filed: June 16, 2017

Derrick D. Howard, Pro Se

Thomas J. Fritzlen, Jr., Martin *&*Leigh, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant-Appellee

Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. '

PER CURIAM.

Derrick D. Howard appeals following the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment in this diversity action. Viewing the record in a light most favorable to Mr. Howard, with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, we conclude that summary judgment was warranted. See Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012) (de novo review). We affirm the judgment of the district court, see 8th Cir. R. 47B; and we deny Mr. Howard’s motion for remand. .

1

. The Honorable Henry E. Aulrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
ex10-15.htm




Exhibit 10.15














 


 




  





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6
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Maureen D. Howley, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Managing Owner, Preferred Investment Solutions Corp. (the Managing
Owner), of Futures Strategic Trust (the Trust), hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Trusts Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Quarterly
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Maureen D. Howley                            
|Maureen D. Howley                                
|Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|August 12, 2005
#### Michael Lynn STEWART, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6047

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 31, 2017

Michael Lynn Stewart, Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin Hyman Katz, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Lynn Stewart seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Stewart that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation.

*95The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. *Wright v. Collins,*766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); *see also Thomas v. Arn,*474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Stewart has waived appellate review by failing to file objections. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
```

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 168 (Tuesday, August 30, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 53881]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-22024]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Agenda and Notice of Public Meeting of the Texas Advisory 
Committee

    Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of the rules and 
regulations of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (Commission), and 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), that a meeting of the Texas 
Advisory Committee (Committee) to the Commission will convene on 
Thursday, September 15, 2011, at 1:30 p.m. and adjourn at approximately 
4:30 p.m. at the Fretz Park Branch Library, 6990 Belt Line Road, 
Dallas, TX 75234. The purpose of the meeting is for the Committee to 
discuss its past work on human trafficking and future Committee 
activity.
    Members of the public are entitled to submit written comments. The 
comments must be received in the Western Regional Office by October 14, 
2011. The mailing address is Western Regional Office, U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights, 300 N. Los Angeles St., Suite 2010, Los Angeles, CA 
90012. Persons wishing to e-mail their comments may do so to 
atrevino@usccr.gov. Persons that desire additional information should 
contact Angelica Trevino, Administrative Assistant, Western Regional 
Office, at (213) 894-3437.
    Hearing-impaired persons who will attend the meeting and require 
the services of a sign language interpreter should contact the Regional 
Office at least ten (10) working days before the scheduled date of the 
meeting.
    Records generated from this meeting may be inspected and reproduced 
at the Western Regional Office, as they become available, both before 
and after the meeting. Persons interested in the work of this advisory 
committee are advised to go to the Commission's Web site, http://www.usccr.gov, or to contact the Western Regional Office at the above 
e-mail or street address.
    The meeting will be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the 
rules and regulations of the Commission and FACA.

    Dated in Washington, DC, August, 24, 2011.
Peter Minarik,
Acting Chief, Regional Programs Coordination Unit.
[FR Doc. 2011-22024 Filed 8-29-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6335-01-P
```
#### John E. MURPHY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Alvin M. KELLEY et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 6768.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Oct. 4, 1966.

Decided Oct. 28, 1966.

Arthur Gottlieb, Boston, Mass., with whom Gottlieb, Cooke & Gottlieb, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellant.

Edward F. Harrington, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Paul F. Markham, U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellees.

Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, WOODBURY*, Senior Judge, and Mc-ENTEE, Circuit Judge.

*

 Sitting by designation.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

PER CURIAM.

The judgment is affirmed on the opinion of the District Court, D. Mass., 259 F.Supp. 914, decided April 29, 1966.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Mac MCCORCLE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10617

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 14, 2017

Peter Stuart Levitt, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USLV—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Las Vegas, NV, Elizabeth Olson White, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USRE—Office of the US Attorney-Reno, Reno, NV, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Mark Elbert, Esquire, Attorney, Half Moon Bay, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R, App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

William Mac McCorcle appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges conditions of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). We dismiss.

McCorcle contends that the district court erred in imposing special conditions of supervised release requiring him to at*638tend gambling addiction treatment and prohibiting him from gambling or entering any gambling establishment for one year. The government argues that this appeal should be dismissed based on the appeal waiver contained in the parties’ plea agreement. Reviewing de novo, see *United States v. Harris,*628 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011), we dismiss. Contrary to McCor-cle’s contentions, the challenged conditions are constitutional because they are reasonably related to the goals of protecting the public and rehabilitation, and involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1), (2); *see also United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 2009). Retaining the remainder of the condition, we construe special condition of supervision number 3 as only barring McCorcle from entering or frequenting establishments whose primary purpose is providing legal or illegal gambling activities. *See United States v. Gnirke,*775 F.3d 1155, 1166 (9th Cir. 2015) (adopting a limiting construction of a supervised release condition that was consistent with the district court’s intent but avoided unconstitutional overbreadth). So construed, McCorcle’s sentence is not illegal and we dismiss pursuant to the valid appeal waiver. *See Watson,*582 F.3d 988.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate, for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.