COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Bumgardner 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

VIRGINIA DIANE McCOMBS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1163-97-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 JANUARY 27, 1998 

MICHAEL ALLEN McCOMBS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Michael P. McWeeny, Judge 

 Glenn C. Lewis (Daniel G. Dannenbaum; The 

Lewis Law Firm, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Joseph A. Condo (Sean P. Kelly; Condo & 

Masterman, P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 On appeal from the decree granting Virginia Diane McCombs 

and Michael Allen McCombs a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, Ms. 

McCombs contends that the trial court erred: (1) in determining 

the amount of spousal support; (2) in calculating Dr. McCombs' 

earning capacity; and (3) in ordering Ms. McCombs to pay one-half 

of the expenses associated with the marital home pending its 

sale. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

 In addition, both parties have requested an award of 

attorney's fees. Having reviewed the record and considered the 

arguments, we order that the parties bear their respective legal 

costs associated with this appeal. 
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 I. 

 Dr. and Ms. McCombs were married on July 4, 1984 and 

separated on May 31, 1995. On September 25, 1996, the trial 

court granted Ms. McCombs a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on 

grounds of adultery and desertion. 

 Dr. McCombs is an orthodontist. He practiced for fifteen 

years prior to the parties' marriage and continued to practice 

throughout the marriage. Ms. McCombs completed two years of 

college, has limited experience in sales and marketing, and is 

currently part-owner of a company named Some Kind of Wonderful, 

Inc. She suffers from physical and emotional conditions. At the 

time of the hearing, Dr. McCombs was fifty-four years of age, and 

Ms. McCombs was forty-nine. 

 The trial court conducted an ore tenus hearing on the issues 

of equitable distribution and spousal support. Before presenting 

evidence, the parties submitted a stipulation setting forth their 

agreed division of marital and separate assets. The stipulation 

reserved valuation and disposition of the marital residence for 

determination by the trial court. 

 The testimony revealed that the parties had enjoyed an 

"extraordinary standard of living." Ms. McCombs received $20,000 

each month to run the household and the parties traveled 

"extensively and extravagantly." Ms. McCombs tendered expert 

testimony that Dr. McCombs' monthly income was $51,554. This 

amount included unearned income and income imputed to Dr. McCombs 
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for business expenses relating to continuing education, meals, 

entertainment and promotional items. Dr. McCombs testified that 

his net monthly income was $20,000. He presented expert 

testimony that his income was steadily declining and that he 

needed to discharge his debts within the next five years. 

 On May 2, 1997, the trial court entered a final order, nunc

pro tunc to April 11, 1997, incorporating the decree of divorce 

and its opinion letter of August 1, 1996. The order awarded Ms. 

McCombs $10,000 per month in spousal support and a one-half 

interest in the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. 

 It divided the remainder of the parties' property in accordance 

with their stipulation. 

 II. 

 Ms. McCombs contends that the trial court erred in its award 

of spousal support. We disagree. 

 A spouse's entitlement to support and the amount of a 

support award are matters lying within the sound discretion of 

the trial court. Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. 21, 27, 341 

S.E.2d 208, 211 (1986). Any such award "will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless it is clear that some injustice has been done." 

Id. In calculating the amount of spousal support, the trial 

court must consider the factors set forth in Code § 20-107.1. 

Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va. App. 472, 483, 375 S.E.2d 387, 394 

(1988). However, "[t]his does not mean that the trial court is 

required to quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or 
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consideration it has given to each of the statutory factors." 

Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 

(1986). 

 Ms. McCombs argues that the award is insufficient to 

maintain the standard of living to which she was accustomed 

during the marriage. When a party to a divorce suit establishes 

an entitlement to support, the law imposes upon the party liable 

for that support a duty to maintain the dependent party according 

to the parties' marital lifestyle. Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 

558, 573-74, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992). However, this 

obligation is tempered by the financial ability of the breaching 

spouse and by consideration of all of the factors of Code 

§ 20-107.1. See Gamble, 14 Va. App. at 573-74, 421 S.E.2d at 

644; Theismann v. Theismann, 22 Va. App. 557, 573, 471 S.E.2d 

809, 816, aff'd en banc, 23 Va. App. 697, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996). 

 The trial court concluded that the parties' extraordinary 

lifestyle, upon which Ms. McCombs based her standard of living, 

"was maintained part through income, part through creative use of 

the tax laws, and part through the incurring of debt." The trial 

court considered the parties' stipulated division of assets and 

their relative needs and abilities in determining the amount of 

the award. After considering all of the relevant factors, the 

trial court determined that an award of $10,000 per month 

afforded Ms. McCombs an appropriate standard of living. See

Theismann, 22 Va. App. at 573, 471 S.E.2d at 816 (finding that 
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award permitted spouse to address "everyday needs"). The record 

supports this determination. Accordingly, the trial court's 

determination of support does not constitute an abuse of 

discretion. 

 Ms. McCombs argues that the trial court erred in calculating 

Dr. McCombs' "earning capacity." Code § 20-107.1(1) requires the 

trial court to consider the earning capacity of the parties in 

determining the amount of the support award. 

 Dr. McCombs received his professional license prior to the 

parties' marriage, worked three-and-one-half to four days per 

week, and received substantial business perquisites. However, 

the trial court found the parties' expert testimony regarding Dr. 

McCombs' income unpersuasive. The trial court decided that it 

would consider his present earnings, "neither inflated for 

phantom cash flow nor diminished by projections into the future." 

 It is clear from the record that the trial court properly 

considered the statutory factors before making the award of 

spousal support. Ample evidence supports the award. Finding no 

abuse of discretion or manifest injustice, we affirm the award. 

 III. 

 The trial court ordered the sale of the marital residence, 

with any net proceeds to be divided equally by the parties. The 

court ordered that if the sale failed to produce a net surplus, 

Dr. McCombs should pay any deficiency. The trial court ordered 

that during the pendency of the sale, the parties would share 
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equally in the payment of the mortgage and repairs. It granted 

Ms. McCombs sole use and occupancy of the home. 

 Ms. McCombs contends that because Dr. McCombs has greater 

resources from which to pay the expenses of the marital 

residence, the trial court erred in ordering her to share in 

those expenses. 

 In appropriate circumstances, sharing costs pending the sale 

of a marital residence provides the trial court an effective tool 

to ensure responsible action. Cf. Code § 8.01-31; Gaynor v. 

Hird, 15 Va. App. 379, 424 S.E.2d 240 (1992). By ordering shared 

costs, the trial court may avoid a situation in which the 

occupying spouse is less willing to pursue, and assist in, the 

timely disposition of the marital residence. Although, in such 

circumstances, a party's recalcitrance may be challenged and 

punished through the court processes, Code § 20-107.3(K), the 

costs of such proceedings include the inefficient allocation of 

judicial resources, an escalation in the cost of litigation and 

exacerbation of the parties' adversarial relationship. 

 Ms. McCombs' sharing of the costs necessary to maintain the 

home pending its sale is fair. She enjoys the exclusive 

possession of the residence and has an equal interest in any net 

gain that may result from the sale. We perceive no error in 

requiring her to pay one-half of the mortgage and necessary 

repairs. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
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 Affirmed.