alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          36,829
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         265,437
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                75,895
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     80,638
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                      1,527,642
<ALLOWANCE>                                     25,738
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,204,160
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,582,132
<SHORT-TERM>                                    22,589
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             68,034
<LONG-TERM>                                    289,870
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       127,515
<OTHER-SE>                                     114,064
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               2,204,160
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 47,577
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                7,045
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 1,942
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                56,564
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              22,634
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              31,313
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           25,251
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    2,200
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 479
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 30,908
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,076
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       6,762
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,762
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .18
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                     43,371
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                25,738
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    3,666
<RECOVERIES>                                       325
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               24,597
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            24,597
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Winston D. FOSTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-15856 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(March 10, 2017)

Jeffrey Tharp, Robert G. Davies, U.S, Attorney’s Office, Pensacola, FL, Christopher. P. Canova, U-S. Attorney’s Office, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Randall Scott Lockhart, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Pensacola, FL, Winston D. Foster, Coleman, FL, Randolph Patterson Murrell, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Richard M. Summa, appointed counsel for Winston D. Foster in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from *990further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Foster’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6619 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6619

  To prohibit the Department of Justice from bringing a civil action 
against a State under section 9 or 10 of the Act of March 3, 1899, for 
       certain border security measures, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 6, 2023

    Mr. Cloud (for himself, Mr. Allen, Mr. Babin, Mr. Brecheen, Mr. 
  Burgess, Mr. Collins, Mr. Crenshaw, Mr. DesJarlais, Mr. Duncan, Mr. 
  Good of Virginia, Mr. Gooden of Texas, Mr. LaMalfa, Mrs. Lesko, Mr. 
Mooney, Mr. Norman, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Rouzer, Mr. Roy, Ms. Van Duyne, 
Mr. Weber of Texas, Mrs. McClain, Ms. Greene of Georgia, Mr. Ogles, Mr. 
    Davidson, and Mr. Fry) introduced the following bill; which was 
referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and in 
    addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
  of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
                               concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To prohibit the Department of Justice from bringing a civil action 
against a State under section 9 or 10 of the Act of March 3, 1899, for 
       certain border security measures, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Preventing Aliens Through Rivers Or 
Land Act'' or the ``PATROL Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTAIN BORDER SECURITY 
              MEASURES.

    (a) In General.--The Attorney General may not bring or maintain a 
civil action (including an action that is pending on the date of 
enactment of this Act) under section 9 or 10 of the Act of March 3, 
1899 (33 U.S.C. 401; 403), against a State for any measure undertaken 
by the State to build, construct, erect, or otherwise install a barrier 
along the international border of the State for the purpose of--
            (1) preventing aliens from entering the State in violation 
        of the immigration laws; or
            (2) protecting the territory of the State.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Alien.--The term ``alien'' has the meaning given such 
        term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
        U.S.C. 1101).
            (2) Barrier.--The term ``barrier'' means any physical 
        structure intended to secure the border, including a wall, 
        fence, or floating buoy.
            (3) Immigration laws.--The term ``immigration laws'' has 
        the meaning given such term in section 101 of the Immigration 
        and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
                                 <all>
```
#### Anna Cutts and Others *versus*John Haskins.

The death of one of several demandants in a real action pending the suit abates the writ; and the fact being suggested on the record by the surviving demand-ants, the tenant has no occasion to plead it; but in such case the tenant is not entitled to costs.

The verdict in this case having been set aside, (1) the cause was again tried, at the last November term in this county, before *Parker,*J., and a verdict again returned for the tenant, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the evidence reported by the judge; and subject also to a right reserved by the tenant to show that the writ was abated by the death of *Anna Cutts,*one of the demandants in this writ of right, since the commencement of the suit, which fact had been seasonably suggested on the record by the counsel for the demandants.

And now at this term, *Gorham,*of counsel for the tenant, moved the Court that the writ should abate; and he cited the case of *Oxnard Sf Al.*vs. *Proprietors of the Kennebeck Purchase.*(2) At common law, the death of one demandant abates the writ, although after summons and severance. (3) And where matter appears on record, which shows the writ abated, as here, it need not be pleaded. (4) Indeed, it were an absurdity to plead a fact in abatement which is already on the record at the suggestion of the demandants themselves.

(1)

 Vide vol. ix. p. 547.

(2)

**10 *Mass. Rep.*179.

(3)

*Com. Dig., Abatement,*H, 33. —10 *Co.*134.

(4)

*Com. Dig., Abatement,*L, 4. — 1 *Mod. Rep.*4, 5.

*Per Curiam.*

The writ is abated by the death suggested.

Tne tenant then moved for costs.

The motion was overruled, on the ground that the abatement was caused by the act of God. (a)

(a)

**[By the statute of 1826, c. 70, it is provided that, in case of the death, marriage, or other disability of any demandant in any real action, or in any process for partition of lands, the suit or process shall not abate; but the heir, or such other persons as would, in case the action or process were abated, be entitled to commence the like action or process, either alone, or jointly with the former demandant or petitioner, may, on motion, be permitted to prosecute the suit accordingly, alone or jointly with others, as the case may require. And if the heirs, &e., do not come in to pros ecute, the other demandants may proceed for their portions; and if any tenant die after the commencement of the suit, any real action may be prosecuted against surviving tenants for so much as they claim.]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Company's
consolidated financial statements for the twenty four weeks ended September 9,
l997 included in this report on Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000 <F1>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-25-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-09-1997
<CASH>                                          46,600
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  146,900
<ALLOWANCES>                                     5,800
<INVENTORY>                                     65,200
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               301,700
<PP&E>                                       1,261,100
<DEPRECIATION>                                 586,300
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,148,200
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          197,700
<BONDS>                                          1,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           200
<OTHER-SE>                                     588,500
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,148,200
<SALES>                                        759,900
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               759,900
<CGS>                                          433,200
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  433,200
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   500
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 27,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                    10,800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             16,200
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    16,200
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.80
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Footnote to electronic filing only:  as presented, 
data is rounded to the nearest $100 except for per
share data.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Michael W. JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN—USP I, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15-11808 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(March 30, 2017)

William Mallory Kent, Law Office Of William M. Kent, Jacksonville, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant

Roberta Josephina Bodnar, U.S. Attorney’s Office—FLM, Ocala, FL, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Respondent-Appellee

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Johnson appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We apply our recent decision in *McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc.,*No. 12-14989, 851 F.3d 1076, 2017 WL 977029 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2017) (en banc), to his appeal. Because Johnson had an opportunity to challenge his sentence enhancement in a motion to vacate, we affirm the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Johnson is a federal prisoner sentenced in the Western District of Missouri. Johnson challenged the enhancement of his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act in his first motion to vacate, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied his motion on the merits and the Eighth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. During the course of his collateral pro-, ceedings, the Supreme Court decided *Begay v. United States,*553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), and Johnson was transferred to a facility in the Middle District of Florida. Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, against the warden of his prison. He argued that in the light of *Begay,*the motion to vacate was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The district court dismissed Johnson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus because Johnson did not meet the requirements of *Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium,*738 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013).

This Court recently overruled its precedent in *Bryant*and held that “a change in caselaw does not make a motion to vacate a prisoner’s sentence ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’ ” *McCarthan,*851 F.3d at 1080*838(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)). Because Johnson had “an opportunity to challenge his sentence enhancement,” and in fact did so, “his remedy was not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his sentence, regardless of any later change in caselaw.” *Id.*We AFFIRM the dismissal of Johnson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
#### Lincoln D. FINLEY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James FISCHER, Officer APD; Michael Agosta, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15073

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 20, 2017

Lincoln D. Finley, Jr., Pro Se

Alan M. Cohen, Office of the City Attorney for the City of Alameda, Alameda, CA, Clifford F. Campbell, Jarvis Fay Doporto & Qibson, LLP, Oakland, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Lincoln D. Finley, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims pertaining to his arrest and prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under *Heck v. Humphrey,*512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). *Whitaker v. Garcetti,*486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Finley’s claims alleging a false arrest and detention without probable cause as *Heck-*barred because success on Finley’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, and Finley failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated. *See Heck,*512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”). We treat the dismissal of these claims as being without prejudice. *See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa,*49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissals under *Heck*are without prejudice).

Finley’s request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 3) is denied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Nicholas Bertini et al., Respondents, *v.*John R. Murray, Doing Business under the Name of John R. Murray & Son, et al., Defendants, and Knickerbocker Ice Co., et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Argued March 8, 1943;

decided April 22, 1943.

*758
      *Frank A. F. Severance*and *Theodore J. Miller*for Knickerbocker Ice Company and another, appellants.

*Nathan Friedman, Irving J. W. Marx*and *Leslie Handler*for Rubel Corporation, appellant.

*Irving Lemov*for plaintiffs and respondents.

*Crawford W. Hawkins*for John R. Murray et al., defendants.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________ No. 96-10938

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

versus
JAIME RAMOS DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

______________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth

(4:92-CR-155-Y)

______________________________________________

September 8, 1997 Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM: * Having reviewed the briefs and the pertinent parts of the record, the judgment is AFFIRMED
.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 38 (Friday, February 25, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 10772]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03970]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security


Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory Committee; Notice 
of Partially Closed Meeting

    The Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory Committee will 
meet March 15, 2022, at 10:00 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, via 
teleconference. The Committee advises the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Export Administration on implementation of the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR) and provides for continuing review to 
update the EAR as needed.

Agenda

Public Session

1. Opening remarks by the Chairman
2. Opening remarks by the Bureau of Industry and Security
3. Presentation of papers or comments by the Public
4. Regulations Update
5. Working Group Reports
6. Automated Export System Update

Closed Session

7. Discussion of matters determined to be exempt from the provisions 
relating to public meetings found in 5 U.S.C. App. 10(a)(1) and 
10(a)(3).

    The open session will be accessible via teleconference to 
participants on a first come, first serve basis. To join the 
conference, submit inquiries to Ms. Yvette Springer at 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#065f7063727263285576746f6861637446646f752862696528616970"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="603916051414054e331012090e070512200209134e040f034e070f16">[email protected]</span></a>, no later than March 8, 2022.
    To the extent that time permits, members of the public may present 
oral statements to the Committee. The public may submit written 
statements at any time before or after the meeting. However, to 
facilitate the distribution of public presentation materials to the 
Committee members, the Committee suggests that presenters forward the 
public presentation materials prior to the meeting to Ms. Springer via 
email.
    The Assistant Secretary for Administration, with the concurrence of 
the delegate of the General Counsel, formally determined on February 
14, 2022, pursuant to Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. app. 10(d)), that the portion of the meeting 
dealing with pre-decisional changes to the Commerce Control List and 
the U.S. export control policies shall be exempt from the provisions 
relating to public meetings found in 5 U.S.C. app. 10(a)(1) and 
10(a)(3). The remaining portions of the meeting will be open to the 
public.
    For more information, contact Yvette Springer via email.

Yvette Springer,
Committee Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2022-03970 Filed 2-24-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-JT-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
**JMK** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 18
- 0187 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. WESLEY SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellee’s unopposed late
- filed motion for a 3 0
- day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is granted an extension of time to and including Octob er 4 , 2020 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief. No further extensions will be granted.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 8 2020

09/08/2020

Case Number: DA 18-0187
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1090 

CAF 14-00216 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, VALENTINO, WHALEN, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF ANNA H. MORGAN, 

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES W. PETERSON, JR., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

--------------------------------------------- 

IN THE MATTER OF JAMES W. PETERSON, JR., 

PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V

 

ANNA H. MORGAN, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

 

MARY R. HUMPHREY, NEW HARTFORD, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT AND

PETITIONER-APPELLANT. 

PAUL A. NORTON, CLINTON, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT AND RESPONDENTRESPONDENT. 

PAUL SKAVINA, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, ROME.

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Oneida County (Julia M.

Brouillette, R.), entered December 19, 2013 in proceedings pursuant to

Family Court Act article 6. The order, among other things, awarded

Anna H. Morgan sole legal custody of the subject child. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: On appeal from an order of custody and visitation

entered following a hearing pursuant to Family Court Act article 6,

respondent-petitioner father contends that Family Court erred in

vacating a prior order of custody and visitation entered upon the

consent of the parties and in conducting a de novo hearing. We reject

that contention. It is well established that a court retains inherent

authority to vacate its own order in the interest of justice, even

when entered on consent (see Matter of Chomik v Sypniak, 70 AD3d 1336,

1336-1337). “Indeed, the court’s power to [vacate an order in the

interest of justice] is inherent and ‘does not depend upon any

statute’ ” (Ruben v American & Foreign Ins. Co., 185 AD2d 63, 67; see

Matter of Delfin A., 123 AD2d 318, 320). Here, petitioner-respondent

mother had the right to the assistance of counsel in this custody

proceeding (see § 262 [a] [v]; Matter of Kristin R.H. v Robert E.H.,
-2- 1090 

CAF 14-00216 

48 AD3d 1278, 1279), and the conceded failure on the part of the court

to advise her of that right was a sufficient basis for vacating the

resulting order in the interest of justice (see generally Delfin A.,

123 AD2d at 319-320). 

Entered: October 9, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court