alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23.01





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS





We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference
in the Registration Statements on Form S-8  (Nos. 333-72192, 333-58510, 333-55828, 333-54886, 333-48582, 333-46252 and 333-84545) and on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-72746, 333-61410, and 333-80419) of Homestore.com, Inc. of our reports dated April 1,
2002, relating to the financial statements and financial statement schedule of Homestore.com, Inc. which appear in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.





/s/    PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP





Century City, California


April 1, 2002
#### Richard C. Dougherty, Appellant, v William Penn Life Insurance Company of New York, Respondent.

[769 NYS2d 905]

*470In an action to recover damages for a violation of General Business Law § 349, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (O’Connell, J.), entered August 13, 2002, which granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs *(see Randazzo v Gerber Life Ins. Co.,*3 AD3d 485 [2004] [decided herewith]). Smith, J.P., Luciano, H. Miller and Townes, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James King, Appellant

[769 NYS2d 884]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Solomon, J.), rendered September 29, 2000, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to a term of 20 years, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490 [1987]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury’s determinations concerning identification and credibility. The People presented identification testimony by two witnesses, the victim and a store clerk, both of whom had ample opportunity *325to view defendant, and an accomplice who also testified against defendant.

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur— Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Williams and Friedman, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6578

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES ARTHUR JUDD,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00119-BO-1; 5:19-cv-00088-BO)

Submitted: January 17, 2023 Decided: January 20, 2023

Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Arthur Judd, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6578 Doc: 5 Filed: 01/20/2023 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

James Arthur Judd seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 

759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that 

the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Judd has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the 

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6578 Doc: 5 Filed: 01/20/2023 Pg: 2 of 2
#### Seungjin KIM, Appellant v. PRESIDENT OF the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Appellees

No. 16-5331

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed On: July 7, 2017

Seungjin Kim, Republic of, Korea, pro se.

R. Craig, Lawrence, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Washington, DC, for Appellees.

BEFORE: Tatel, Brown, and Wilkins, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by appellant. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). Upon consideration of the foregoing and the motion for release, it is

ORDERED that the motion for release be denied. It is

FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed October 7, 2016, be affirmed as modified to reflect a dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Appellant did not provide a short and plain statement of his claims showing that he was entitled to relief.

*518Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed- to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
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ACCEPTED

12-14-00143-CR

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

7/27/2015 12:00:00 AM

CATHY LUSK

CLERK

 FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 7/25/2015 8:23:01 AM CATHY S. LUSK Clerk
Kenny SILVA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-4286

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 9, 2018.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and David B. Falstad, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jason M. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and BLACK and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Roberto HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-50076

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Jean-Claude Andre, Timothy James Searight, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, DOJ— Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

James H. Locklin, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDCA — Federal Public Defender’s Office (Los Angeles), Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

**The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Roberto Hernandez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 120-month sentence and 5-year term of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Hernandez contends that the district court procedurally erred by comparing him to a codefendant who, unlike Hernandez, was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence, and by relying on unsupported facts in conducting that comparison. The district court properly considered the sentence imposed on Hernandez’s codefendant, taking into account the sentence the codefendant would have received in the absence of the mandatory minimum. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Moreover, in light of the undisputed facts contained in the presentence report, the district court’s findings regarding Hernandez’s role in the drug conspiracy were not clearly erroneous. *See United States v. Ameline,*409 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (court may rely on undisputed facts in presentence report at sentencing).

Hernandez also contends that the district court erred by failing to explain its imposition of a five-year term of supervised release. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors when selecting the sentence, and the court’s reasons for imposing the supervised release term are apparent from the record. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Eddie A. PENNYPACKER; Jonathan Blake Lewis, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. The CITY OF PEARL, MISSISSIPPI; Mayor Brad Rogers, Individually; Melvin Myers, Individually, also known as Scooter, Defendants-Appellants

No. 16-60688

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 12, 2017

Robert Nicholas Norris, Louis Hanner Watson, Jr., Esq., Watson & Norris, P.L.L.C., Jackson, MS, for Plaintiffs-Ap-pellees

Gary Erwin Friedman, Esq., Gregory Todd Butler, Esq., Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., Jackson, MS, for Defendants-Appellants

Before JONES, CLEMENT, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiffs Eddie A. Pennypacker and Jonathan Blake Lewis brought a complaint arising out of their terminations from the Pearl Municipal Golf Course. They allege that they were fired for reporting their supervisor Melvin “Scooter” Myers’s misuse of city resources to Mayor Brad Rogers. According to plaintiffs, Mayor Rogers terminated them after holding a hearing, and then the City of Pearl’s seven-member Board of Aldermen sustained the terminations.

Plaintiffs asserted claims under federal and state law, including a claim for First Amendment retaliation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In so ruling, the district court did not address the individual defendants’ request for qualified immunity; nor did it identify any of the material factual issues that it found to be in dispute.

The City of Pearl, Mayor Rogers, and Myers appeal the district court’s denial of summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim for First Amendment retaliation brought under § 1983. Based on our review of the briefs, the record, the applicable law, and the arguments of counsel, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of summary judgment on plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiffs concede that Mayor Rogers and Myers were not the final decision-makers responsible for their terminations. It is not clearly established in this circuit whether these individual defendants may be held personally liable for First Amendment retaliation under § 1983. *See Culbertson v. Lykos,*790 F.3d 608, 627 (5th Cir. 2015); *Johnson v. Louisiana,*369 F.3d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[OJnly final decision-makers may be held liable for First Amendment retaliation employment discrimination under § 1983.”). Accordingly, we GRANT summary judgment based on qualified immunity in favor of Mayor Rogers and Myers. We further DISMISS the appeal brought by the City of Pearl for lack of pendent appellate jurisdiction. *See McKee v. City of Rockwall,*877 F.2d 409, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1989).

*333On remand, Judge Wingate is directed to deliver this case to the Chief Judge of the Southern District of Mississippi for reassignment. *See In re State of Miss.,*No. 16-60610 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2016).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernesto CASILLAS-PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50109

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Helen H. Hong, Nicole Ries Fox, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Ryan A. Sausedo, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Michael Marks, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ernesto Casillas-Perez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 41-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Casillas-Perez contends that the district court procedurally erred by basing his sentence on the erroneous belief that he was on supervised release at the time of the offense. We review for plain error, see *United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude there was none. Contrary to Casillas-Perez’s contention, the court’s mention of his breach of the court’s trust does not reflect that the court believed that he was on supervised release. In any event, Casil-las-Perez has not shown that any error affected his substantial rights. *See United States v. Dallman,*533 F.3d 755, 761-62 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### SHERYL SHEEHAN *v.*ALAN BALASIC

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15818.

*Stuart Bear*and *James K. Filan, Jr.,*in support of the petition.

Decided November 6, 1997

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 46 Conn. App. 327 (AC 16281), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the twenty-four month term of the unallocated alimony and support provision was not modifiable?”
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Chromcraft Revington, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 28, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael
E. Thomas, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of
          the Company.





/s/ Michael E. Thomas
------------------------
Michael E. Thomas
Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
August 7, 2003


     This certification is furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
document or for any other purpose.
#### Dewey Keith VENABLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Captain Travis MCCOY; Sargent Larry R. Collins; C/O S. Stephens; L. Vitatoe; Correctional Officer Bentley; Correctional Officer Deel; Walter Swiney; Steven Franklin; Sgt. Eric Miller, Defendants-Appellees, and Warden Randall Mathena; Correctional Officer James C. Mullins, Defendants.

No. 17-6043

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

*286Dewey Keith Venable, Appellant Pro Se. Jeremy Brandon O’Quinn, O’QUINN LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Wise, Virginia; Nancy Hull Davidson, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia; Rosalie Fes-sier, TIMBERLAKE, SMITH, THOMAS & MOSES, PC, Staunton, Virginia, for Ap-pellees.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Dewey Keith Venable appeals the district court’s judgment, following a bench trial, denying his Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Venable also appeals the district court’s interlocutory rulings dismissing or granting partial summary judgment in favor of certain Defendants on his § 1983 claims.

On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. *See*4th Cir. R. 34(b); *Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,*370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). We have reviewed the district court’s rulings on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in light of the arguments Venable raises and have found no reversible error. We therefore affirm these rulings for the reasons stated by the district court. *See Venable v. McCoy,*No. 7:14-cv-00295-PMS (W.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2015 & Jul. 6, 2016).

Venable also makes several conclusory claims of error during the bench trial, but the record does not contain a trial transcript. An appellant has the burden of including in the record on appeal a transcript of all parts of the proceedings material to the issues raised on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); 4th Cir. R. 10(c). An appellant proceeding on appeal in forma pauper-is is entitled to transcripts at government expense only in certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (2012). Venable has not produced a transcript and fails to make the requisite showing to qualify for the production of a transcript at government expense. Thus, Venable has waived review of the issues on appeal that depend upon the transcript to show error. *See generally*Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2); *Keller v. Prince George’s Cty.,*827 F.2d 952, 954 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987). No trial error appears on the record before us.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Venable’s motions for a transcript at government expense, for appointment of counsel, and to move the ease forward. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in *287the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Charles BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WARFIELD & ROHR, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1324

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

Charles Bailey, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Jay Swerdlin, Parker Engle Thoeni, SHAWE & ROSENTHAL, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Charles Bailey appeals the district court’s order dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. *See*4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Bailey’s informal brief does not challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, Bailey has forfeited appellate review of the court’s order. See *Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,*370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented *285in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*