No. 83-63 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1983 

JEFFERY STEVENS, et al, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

-vsCITY OF MISSOULA, et al., 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable James B. Wheelis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellants: 

Deirdre Boggs, Flissoula, Montana (argued) 

For Respondents: 

Mae Nan Ellingson, Deputy City Atty., Missoula, 

Montana (argued) 

Milodragovich, Dale is Dye, E4issoulat Montana 

- --*- --- 

Submitted: June 10, 1983 

Decided: August 4, 1983 

Filed: Ft UG 4 1983 
Mr. Justice Frank R. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This is an appeal from an order of the Fourth Judicial 

District Court, Missoula County, Montana, wherein injunctive 

and declatory relief was denied to plaintiffs who challenged 

the validity of Special Improvement District No. 470 (SID 

470). 

SID 470 was created by the City of Missoula, acting 

through its City Council, to expand off-street parking in 

downtown Missoula. SID 470 evolved from parking studies and 

plans developed by the Missoula Parking Commission and 

evaluated by the Missoula Redevelopment Agency. Plaintiffs 

own properties which lie within the boundaries of SID 470 and 

are subject to special assessment levies for the parking 

facilities to be constructed. 

On February 2, 1981 the Missoula Parking Commission 

presented a proposed parking plan to the Missoula City 

Council during its regular meeting. The plan included two 

proposals for downtown, off-street parking improvements. The 

first proposal, sometimes referred to as alternative or phase 

one, called for the addition of 223 parking spaces on three 

separate surface lots. Alternative or phase two provided for 

113 parking spaces on two surface lots and a 400-space 

parking garage on a third site. Both proposals entailed 

acquisition of the same parcels of land. Financing for the 

improvements included special assessment levies within a 

special improvement district, the suggested area for which 

was smaller than, and completely enveloped by, a 500-acre 

Urban Renewal District created in 1978. Financing also 

included revenues from parking facilities, a pledge of tax 

increment money from the Missoula Redevelopment Agency, which 

administers the Urban Renewal District, and possibly a 

"matching funds" grant from the federal Economic Development 
Administration (EDA) . Alternative two was presented as being 

contingent on a grant of monies from the EDA. It was also 

the alternative preferred by various city officials in later 

discussions and meetings with property owners, including some 

of the instant plaintiffs. 

At that same meeting, the Missoula City Council passed 

Resolution No. 4107, entitled "A Resolution of Intention to 

Create Special Improvement District Number 470 for the 

Purpose of Providing Off-Street Parking Improvements." The 

resolution essentially adopted the proposals offered by the 

Parking Commission. 

Pursuant to section 7-12-4104, MCA, the resolution 

contained a legal description of the area to be included in 

the special improvement district (Section 11) and an 

explanation of the general character of the improvements, 

stated in the alternative (Section 111) . 

Sections IV and V provided as follows: 

SECTION IV 

"Approximate Estimated Cost of Improvement. That 

the approximate estimated cost to be assessed 

against property within District Number 470 for 

making the off-street parking improvements 

described in Section I11 is as follows: 

1. $1,386,000.00, such amount to pay for all 

improvements enumerated in alternative number 

1; or 

2. $1,900,000.00 for alternative number 2, of 

this amount $1,300,000.00 shall be used for 

the acquisition of two surface lots and 

installation of 113 parking spaces and 

$600,000.00 shall be used as matching funds 

for an EDA Grant of $1,300,000.00 to construct 

the parking garage. 

SECTION V 

"Determination of Alternative to be Adopted and Cost 

to be Assessed. In no event shall the costs to be 

assessed within Special Improvement District Number 

470 exceed $1,900,000.00. In the event the City of 

Missoula's EDA Grant application to partially fund 

the construction of a parking garage is denied, the 

City will pursue alternative Number 1 at a cost of 

$1,386,000.00 to be assessed pursuant to the 

provisions of this Resolution." 
Additionally, section VII included a finding by the City 

Council that the parking improvements are "of more than local 

ordinary benefit" as they would specially benefit each lot or 

parcel located within the contemplated boundaries of SID 470. 

All but two of the instant plaintiffs filed written 

protests against the proposed district. Many spoke in 

opposition at the March 2, 1981 public hearing. 

Nevertheless, on March 16, 1981 the City Council adopted 

Resolution No. 4123, creating SID 470. Again, the general 

character of the improvements to be made was framed in the 

alternative. 

On August 23, 1982 plaintiffs filed suit against the 

above-named defendants, respondents herein, alleging, inter 

alia: (1) they were denied proper notice of the proposal and 

its cost because the resolution of intent for SID 470 was 

misleading in that it set forth the number of proposed 

parking spaces and the costs in the alternative; 

(2) benefits, if any, to be derived from provision of 

additional metered parking spaces were of a general 

government nature, rather than any special benefit to 

property within the boundaries of SID 470 and (3) the 

defendants arbitrarily and mistakenly included various 

properties within the proposed SID boundaries that cannot be 

specially benefited thereby and arbitrarily and mistakenly 

excluded other properties that may be specially benefited 

thereby. 

The parties stipulated that a preliminary injunction 

would not be necessary and that the proceeding should be 

expedited. The matter went to trial on September 20, 1982. 

Several plaintiffs and various persons involved with the 

development or implementation of SID 470, testified. 

Final judgment, together with an opinion and order 

denying plaintiffs all relief, was entered October 12, 1982. 
The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration 

or new trial by opinion and amended order, and this appeal 

followed. 

F7e affirm. 

Three issues are presented for review: 

1. Whether Resolutions No. 4107 and No. 4123 provided 

adequate notice of the nature and cost of the actual 

improvements to be made in SID 470? 

2. Whether the District Court properly upheld the City 

Council's determination as to what properties would be 

specially benefited by SID 470? 

3. Whether plaintiffs1 suit filed seventeen months 

after creation of SID 470 was subject to bar under the 

equitable doctrine of laches? 

Plaintiffs contend that, because of their alternative 

structure, Resolutions No. 4107 and 4123 were unclear and 

ambiguous and failed to provide sufficient notice of the 

nature and cost of the improvements. This contention lacks 

merit. 

The primary purpose of a resolution of intention is to 

apprise property owners of the cost and nature of a proposed 

improvement so as to allow the property owner to determine 

whether he will acquiesce in or protest the proposition. 

Evans v. City of Helena (1921), 60 Mont. 577, 589, 199 P. 

445, 447. The resolutions at issue fulfill that purpose. 

Testimony from plaintiffs confirms that they fully understood 

the nature of the improvement options. Nor were they misled 

by the alternative form of the SID. 

Plaintiffs being fully informed of the SID proposals, 

the argument against alternative descriptions becomes only 

technical. We conclude that section 7-12-4104, MCA, does not 

preclude use of the alternative form. Section 7-12-4104, 

MCA, provides: 
"Resolution of intention to create special 

improvement district. (1) Before creating any 

special improvement district for the purpose of 

making any of the improvements or acquiring any 

private property for any purpose authorized by this 

part, the city council shall pass a resolution of 

intention to do so, 

" (2) The resolution shall designate the number of 

such district, describe the boundaries thereof, and 

state therein the general character of the 

improvement or improvements which are to be made 

and an approximate estimate of the cost thereof. 

When any improvement is to be made in paving, the 

city or town council may in describing the general 

character of the same describe several kinds of 

paving. " 

The 1972 Montana Constitution specifically provides that 

the powers of incorporated cities shall be liberally 

construed. We recognized that mandate in Tipco Co-op, Inc. 

v. City of Billings (1982), Mont . , 642 P.2d 1074, 

39 St.Rep. 600, which involved the powers of a home rule 

municipality. A local government with general powers is 

entitled to the same liberal construction. 

The fact that the statute expressly provides for use of 

alternatives for different paving materials does not mean 

that paving materials are the only proposals that may be 

proposed in the alternative. The rule of negative 

implication should not apply to language which may clearly 

comprehend many different instances, some of which are 

mentioned by way of example. Johnson v. General Motors Corp. 

(1976), 199 Kan. 720, 433 P.2d 585, 589. 

Plaintiffs also challenge the City Council's 

determination of special benefit and creation of district 

boundaries. The well established rule is that the City's 

judgment is conclusive absent proof of fraud or mistakes 

which preclude the exercise of sound judgment. Schumacher v. 

City of Bozeman (1977), 174 Mont. 519, 526, 571 P.2d 1135, 

1139. Neither this Court nor the trial court should 

substitute its judgment for a rational determination of the 

City. 
Boundary lines should be drawn in such a way that the 

improvement brings a benefit to the included properties and 

that the benefit is substantially more intense than that 

which is realized by the properties outside of the district 

boundaries. 2 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, S14.24, p. 

14-46. The fact that outside property derives some general 

benefit should not affect the special benefit afforded the 

district properties. Moreover, since properties within the 

district will Sear the cost of the improvements in proportion 

to the special benefit received, it would be very difficult 

to say that borderline properties have been unfairly burdened 

by their inclusion in the District. Thus greater scrutiny 

should not be required of such SIDs though they may be 

extended in nature. 

Since plaintiffs' case is disposed of on its merits, it 

is unnecessary to reach the laches issue. 

The judgment of the Distri rt is affirmed. 

We concur: 

 DO Chief Justice