[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. Shabazz, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1055.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-1055

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. SHABAZZ, APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Shabazz, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1055.] 

Appeal dismissed as improvidently accepted. 

(No. 2014-0941—Submitted June 24, 2015—Decided March 17, 2016.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 100021, 2014-Ohio-1828. 

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{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 

accepted. 

 O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

 O’DONNELL, J., dissents with an opinion in which KENNEDY, J., joins. 

 FRENCH, J., dissents. 

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O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 2} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to resolve this case 

by declaring that it was improvidently accepted. This is a serious case involving 

the death of an innocent father of two children that presents significant issues 

regarding the use of circumstantial evidence, the reasonable inferences that may be 

drawn by a factfinder, and the proper role of an appellate court reviewing such 

evidence. In my view, two judges of the appellate court abused their discretion by 

substituting their judgment for that of the jury and by drawing their own inferences 

from the circumstantial evidence. By reversing based on the sufficiency of the 

evidence, the appellate court precluded further proceedings on the felonies of which 

Shabazz had been convicted by a jury. 

{¶ 3} The state presented two propositions of law: 

An appellate court, when reviewing a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, is required to draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the State’s case and may not adopt the 

defense’s inferences to reverse a conviction. 

An accomplice may be convicted of felony murder where the 

victim’s death was a proximate result of the underlying felony. The 

accomplice does not need to know that the principal had a firearm 

that was the actual cause of the victim’s death. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 4} In the early morning hours of February 19, 2012, Derrell Shabazz, 

Dajhon Walker, and Otis Johnson entered Tavo Martini Loft, a Cleveland bar and 

lounge. The security cameras at Tavo recorded activity at various areas of the bar’s 

interior but did not record audio. The recording shows that security personnel 
January Term, 2016 

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patted down all three men as they entered the bar and shows that at that time, 

Shabazz was wearing glasses. 

{¶ 5} Ivor Anderson testified that he and Antwon Shannon went to Tavo 

that evening to meet up with their friend, Eunique Worley. Shortly before 2:00 

a.m., Anderson and Shannon were standing on the dance floor talking when Robert 

Steel, an acquaintance of Shabazz’s, spilled champagne on Anderson. Anderson 

testified that he told Steel at that time, “You’re doing too much,” meaning Steel 

should have been more respectful of the people around him and not been dancing 

with a drink. Anderson then testified that he saw Steel go over and whisper to 

Johnson and Shabazz, and he watched the men for about ten minutes because he 

felt they were plotting against him. 

{¶ 6} In the minutes following the incident between Anderson and Steel, 

the security footage shows that as Steel, Johnson, and Shabazz stood in a circle on 

the dance floor, Walker joined them and hugged Shabazz, and the group formed a 

tighter circle. The members of the group spoke to each other and to an unidentified 

fifth man and other bar patrons; they also continued to look over in the direction of 

Anderson and Shannon on numerous occasions as they spoke. Shabazz removed 

his glasses and placed them in his pants pocket. The footage then shows that Steel 

gestured in the direction of Anderson and Shannon on two occasions, prompting 

Shabazz, Walker, and the fifth man to look that way. At different times, Walker 

and Steel each held a champagne bottle by the neck; Steel held a bottle for over five 

minutes without taking a drink and cradled the bottle with his hand wrapped around 

its base and the body of the bottle running up the inside of his forearm. The men 

in the group then positioned themselves so that Steel was close to Anderson, 

Johnson was behind Steel, Shabazz and Walker were a few feet behind Steel, and 

the fifth man was behind and slightly to the left of Steel. 

{¶ 7} Steel then began dancing and suddenly crouched down, stepped 

sideways, turned in the direction of Anderson, and swung the champagne bottle he 
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was holding, striking Anderson on the head while Shabazz, Walker, Johnson, and 

the fifth man watched. The bottle glanced off Anderson and hit Worley on the 

forehead. Anderson and Steel began fighting and fell to the ground, and an 

unidentified female jumped on Anderson. The fifth man joined the fight, and 

Johnson hit him. Shannon moved toward the group of people grappling on the floor 

and leaned over. At that point, Shabazz and Walker pursued Shannon, and Walker 

punched him. 

{¶ 8} Shabazz walked around the group fighting on the floor. Walker, who 

was also moving around the group, pursued Shannon and struck him with a 

champagne bottle. Shannon moved away from Walker, but Shabazz then joined 

Walker and both men hit at Shannon. Walker, who then was standing to the left of 

the pillar, made a movement with his right hand toward his waistband, walked 

through the fight, and disappeared behind the pillar. 

{¶ 9} Johnson and Shabazz went out of view of the video toward the near 

side of the dance floor. Then Shabazz reappeared, walked across the dance floor 

toward the fight, and struck Anderson. Johnson also reappeared and rejoined the 

fight, which moved to the left of the pillar. At that point, Shannon was bent over 

at the waist. The camera recorded a muzzle flash from behind the pillar—the shot 

from Walker striking Shannon in the back. At the moment the shot was fired, 

Shabazz was on the dance floor near the front of the pillar and displayed no reaction 

to the gunshot. 

{¶ 10} The video then shows particulate matter falling from the ceiling and 

the crowd beginning to run. Shabazz turned and walked across the dance floor 

away from the fight. Walker reappeared, running from behind the pillar onto the 

dance floor and fumbling with the waistband of his pants. Shabazz moved toward 

Walker, reached up with his right hand and patted Walker on the chest. Shabazz 

then reached up with his left hand, placed it on the back of Walker’s right shoulder, 

and slightly pushed Walker forward as both men headed toward the exit. 
January Term, 2016 

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{¶ 11} Shannon died from the gunshot wound. 

{¶ 12} A Cuyahoga County Grand Jury jointly indicted Shabazz, Walker, 

and Johnson for aggravated murder, felony murder based on the predicate offense 

of felonious assault, and three counts of felonious assault of Shannon: one alleging 

knowingly causing serious physical harm, a second, alleging use of a champagne 

bottle as a deadly weapon, and a third, alleging use of a firearm as a deadly weapon. 

Each of these counts had accompanying firearm specifications except for the count 

of felonious assault alleging use of a champagne bottle as a deadly weapon. The 

indictment also contained one count of felonious assault of Anderson alleging use 

of a champagne bottle as a deadly weapon and two counts of felonious assault of 

Worley. The grand jury further indicted Shabazz for having a weapon while under 

disability. 

{¶ 13} Prior to trial, Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of felonious 

assault, and the trial court placed him on community control. 

{¶ 14} Shabazz and Walker proceeded to a joint trial after which the trial 

court found Shabazz guilty of having a weapon while under disability and a jury 

found him guilty of the remaining counts except for the two counts of felonious 

assault of Worley, but the jury found him not guilty of the firearm specifications.1

 

The court sentenced him to 20 years to life in prison for aggravated murder to be 

served concurrently with a term of nine months for having a weapon while under a 

disability, and merged the other counts involving Shannon into the aggravated 

murder conviction. The court also sentenced him to two years in prison for the 

 

1

 The trial court’s sentencing entry is silent regarding the specifications, and the record does not 

contain the verdict forms. However, the transcript indicates that the jury found Shabazz not guilty 

of the specifications accompanying the felony murder and felonious assault counts. Regarding the 

specifications accompanying the aggravated murder count, the transcript indicates that the court 

read into the record two contradictory sets of verdict forms—one set finding Shabazz guilty and one 

set finding him not guilty of those specifications. However, it appears the set of forms relaying 

findings of guilt for those specifications actually relate to Walker, not Shabazz. 
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felonious assault of Anderson to be served consecutively to the other counts for a 

total of 22 years to life in prison. 

{¶ 15} Shabazz appealed to the Eighth Distinct Court of Appeals, and in a 

two to one decision, the court concluded the state had presented insufficient 

evidence to convict Shabazz as an accomplice to the aggravated murder. It vacated 

that conviction based on a lack of evidence of prior calculation and design, finding 

that it was “not unusual for a group to stand together and converse while in a 

nightclub.” 2014-Ohio-1828 at ¶ 28. The appellate court also vacated the 

convictions for felony murder, felonious assault with a firearm, felonious assault 

by knowingly causing serious physical harm, and having a weapon while under 

disability on the grounds that insufficient evidence existed to show that Shabazz 

knew that Walker had a gun. However, it affirmed the two convictions for 

felonious assault with a champagne bottle but determined they could not be 

predicate offenses for the felony murder because the grand jury had “expressly 

indicted [Shabazz] for using a firearm” and, in any event, those crimes were not the 

proximate cause of Shannon’s death because Shannon “continued to help Anderson 

after being hit, and security footage of Anderson outside of the club after the fight 

shows he is physically ready to continue fighting.” Id. at ¶ 36. The court held that 

its decision to vacate some of Shabazz’s convictions rendered his claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct moot, rendered his challenge to the jury instructions and 

the manifest weight of the evidence moot, and supported the conclusion that his 

ineffective assistance of counsel argument lacked merit. The appellate court then 

remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. 

Positions of the Parties 

{¶ 16} The state asserts that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury 

verdict with regard to Shabazz. It contends that the court of appeals fundamentally 

misconstrued its role in reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge and 

instead of showing deference to the jury’s verdict, failed to consider the entirety of 
January Term, 2016 

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the state’s evidence and erroneously drew all contested inferences in favor of 

Shabazz. The state also complains that the court of appeals erroneously refused to 

consider each of the counts of felonious assault in analyzing the felony murder 

count and added a new requirement to the felony murder statute: the state must 

prove that Shabazz committed a felony that was the actual cause, not merely the 

proximate cause, of Shannon’s death. 

{¶ 17} Shabazz maintains that the court of appeals properly vacated his 

convictions rather than deferring to unreasonable and unsubstantiated inferences 

advanced by the state. He also contends that the court correctly held that without 

proof that he knew that Walker possessed a firearm, the state could not prove that 

his actions met the proximate cause element for felony murder. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶ 18} This is a case about circumstantial evidence, which is defined as 

“proof of facts or circumstances by direct evidence from which [the factfinder] may 

reasonably infer other related or connected facts that naturally and logically follow 

according to the common experience of people.” Ohio Jury Instructions, CR 

Section 409.01(4) (Rev. Aug. 17, 2011). “Circumstantial evidence and direct 

evidence inherently possess the same probative value,” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio 

St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus, and it is within 

the province of the factfinder to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence 

presented. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.E.2d 560 

(1979). Moreover, this court has “ ‘long held that circumstantial evidence is 

sufficient to sustain a conviction if that evidence would convince the average mind 

of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio 

St.3d 101, 2005-Ohio-6046, 837 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 75, quoting State v. Heinish, 50 

Ohio St.3d 231, 238, 553 N.E.2d 1026 (1990). 

{¶ 19} In reviewing a claim regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the test 

is
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whether after viewing the probative evidence and inferences 

reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Emphasis added.) State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 247, 714 N.E.2d 867 

(1999). 

{¶ 20} The flaw in the appellate court’s opinion is that it substituted its 

judgment for that of the jury. It drew inferences from the evidence that differed 

from the inferences drawn by the jury from that same evidence. We have 

previously explained: 

Where reasonable minds can reach different conclusions upon 

conflicting evidence, determination as to what occurred is a question 

for the trier of fact. It is not the function of an appellate court to 

substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder. 

(Emphasis added.) Jenks at 279. Thus, the appellate court clearly erred and should 

have applied the reasonable inferences drawn by the jury from the evidence 

presented by the state and should have accepted the jury’s conclusion that Shabazz 

acted in concert with Walker. 

{¶ 21} Shabazz’s culpability is premised on aiding or abetting. 

To support a conviction for complicity by aiding or abetting 

pursuant to R.C. 2923.02(A)(2), the evidence must show that the 

defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, 
January Term, 2016 

9

advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and 

that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal. 

 

State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus. When an 

individual acts to aid or abet a principal in the commission of an offense, the 

individual and principal are equally guilty and the individual is prosecuted and 

punished as if he were a principal offender. See R.C. 2923.03(F). 

{¶ 22} In this case, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Shabazz 

aided and abetted in a scheme designed to implement a calculated decision to kill 

Anderson, which resulted in Shannon’s death, and for the jury to disregard any 

inference that the conversations between and among Steel, Johnson, Walker, and 

Shabazz were innocent. We have explained: 

Where evidence adduced at trial reveals the presence of 

sufficient time and opportunity for the planning of an act of 

homicide to constitute prior calculation, and the circumstances 

surrounding the homicide show a scheme designed to implement the 

calculated decision to kill, a finding by the trier of fact of prior 

calculation and design is justified. 

State v. Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 381 N.E.2d 190, paragraph three of the syllabus. 

Moreover, “ ‘[p]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from [the 

defendant’s] presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is 

committed.’ ” Johnson at 245, quoting State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34, 273 

N.E.2d 884 (4th Dist.1971). 

{¶ 23} Here, the inferences drawn by the jury are wholly supported and 

patently reasonable. Shabazz and Walker came to Tavo together, and after the 

spilled drink incident, they had a conversation with Steel and Johnson during which 
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members of the foursome gestured and repeatedly looked in Anderson’s direction. 

Anderson feared they were plotting against him. Walker and Steel held champagne 

bottles, and Steel cradled his bottle in a way that suggests he was attempting to 

conceal it. Shabazz removed his glasses—an action from which the jury could 

reasonably infer he intended to be part of the attack. 

{¶ 24} The evidence shows that before Steel tried to hit Anderson with the 

champagne bottle, Shabazz, Walker, and Johnson positioned themselves to screen 

out his act so others would not see and then joined the attack. When Walker shot 

Shannon, “[h]e was not responding to an immediate threat against his person or 

instinctively reacting to an event.” 2014-Ohio-1828, ¶ 85 (Gallagher, J., 

dissenting). Instead, he had removed himself from the fight and moved behind a 

pillar where he could not be seen by the cameras. He fired in the direction of 

Anderson, who was on the floor to the left of the pillar, but struck Shannon, who 

was also to the left of the pillar. Shabazz did not react to the gunshot, but rather 

walked across the dance floor away from the fight, patted Walker on the chest, and 

placed his left hand on Walker’s shoulder as they both moved toward the exit. 

{¶ 25} This evidence demonstrates that Shabazz was complicit in the 

aggravated murder through his actions in planning and participating in an attack in 

which champagne bottles were used as deadly weapons. As the dissenting judge in 

the appellate court aptly observed, “The fact that the murder actually involved a 

handgun, rather than a champagne bottle, does not diminish the criminal intent 

established by the conduct prior to the shooting.” 2014-Ohio-1828, ¶ 83 

(Gallagher, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the jury could have reasonably inferred 

from Shabazz’s lack of reaction to the gun shot and his interaction with Walker 

after the shooting, while Walker was fumbling with the waistband of his pants, that 

Shabazz knew that Walker had a firearm. 

{¶ 26} His criminal liability is not changed by the fact that Walker killed 

Shannon instead of Anderson. The doctrine of transferred intent applies and 
January Term, 2016 

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Shabazz’s culpability in Shannon’s death is the same as if the attack had resulted 

in Anderson’s death. State v. Solomon, 66 Ohio St.2d 214, 421 N.E.2d 139 (1981), 

paragraph one of the syllabus (“If one purposely causes the death of another and 

the death is the result of a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to 

kill someone other than the victim, the offender is guilty of aggravated murder in 

violation of R.C. 2903.01(A)”). 

{¶ 27} Viewing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found all the essential elements of aggravated murder, felonious assault with a 

firearm, felonious assault based on knowingly causing serious physical harm, 

felony murder predicated on either of those two felonious assaults, and having a 

weapon while under disability beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶ 28} Moreover, because the indictment did not specify which felonious 

assault was the predicate offense for the felony murder count, the jury could also 

have found Shabazz guilty of felony murder based on either felonious assault count 

involving the use of a champagne bottle as a deadly weapon if the commission of 

the offense proximately resulted in Shannon’s death. R.C. 2903.02(B). The court 

of appeals erroneously concluded otherwise, evidently based on the mistaken belief 

that the firearm specification accompanying the felony murder count was an 

element of that crime instead of a sentence enhancement. See State v. Dean, __ 

Ohio St.3d __, 2015-Ohio-4347, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 219 (stating that firearm 

specifications are sentence enhancements). 

{¶ 29} As the dissent in the court of appeals recognized: 

Shabazz knowingly participated in the felonious assault of Anderson 

and Shannon with [champagne] bottles used as deadly weapons. 

Death was a foreseeable consequence of either of those felonious 
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assault charges, and the attacks on both victims culminated in the 

murder of Shannon. 

2014-Ohio-1828, ¶ 74 (Gallagher, J., dissenting). Thus, sufficient evidence also 

supports the conviction for felony murder to the extent that it was predicated on 

either conviction for felonious assault with a champagne bottle. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 30} In this case, the state presented sufficient evidence to support 

Shabazz’s convictions for aggravated murder and felony murder, felonious assault, 

and having a weapon while under disability. The two appellate court judges here 

failed to construe all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the state and instead improperly substituted their view of the evidence 

and drew their own inferences from the evidence instead of deferring to those drawn 

by the jury. This is patently erroneous and results in a gross miscarriage of justice 

in this instance. 

{¶ 31} For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s decision to dismiss 

this appeal as having been improvidently accepted. 

{¶ 32} Instead, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, which 

vacated the convictions for aggravated murder, felony murder, felonious assault 

with a firearm, felonious assault by knowingly causing serious physical harm, and 

having a weapon while under disability, and I would remand the cause to the court 

of appeals to consider the assignments of error that it found were moot. The 

dissenting opinion applied the correct legal analysis and in my view properly 

adjudicated the assignments of error. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 
January Term, 2016 

13 

 Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Christopher D. Schroeder and Anna M. Faraglia, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, 

for appellant. 

 Reuben J. Sheperd, for appellee. 

Repper, Pagan, Cook, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, urging affirmance for 

amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys. 

_________________________