alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Company's
consolidated financial statements for the twelve weeks ended June 20, 2000
included in this report on Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000  <F1>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-28-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-29-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-20-2000
<CASH>                                          13,400
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  265,200
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,700
<INVENTORY>                                     94,900
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               487,400
<PP&E>                                       1,624,600
<DEPRECIATION>                                 723,300
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,323,400
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          806,200
<BONDS>                                        151,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           400
<OTHER-SE>                                     650,500
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,323,400
<SALES>                                        599,600
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               599,600
<CGS>                                          319,800
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  319,800
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   400
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              15,800
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 19,200
<INCOME-TAX>                                     8,100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,900
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,900
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.27
<FN>
<F1>Footnote to electronic filing only:  as presented,
data is rounded to the nearest $100 except for per
share data.
</FN>


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>        5
<LEGEND>
               This schedule contains summary financial information
               extracted from the financial statements contained in the
               Company's Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March
               31, 2000 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
               such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

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<PERIOD-START>                              MAR-31-2000        JAN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                JUN-30-2000        JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           10,718             10,718
<SECURITIES>                                     39,227             39,227
<RECEIVABLES>                                    74,456             74,456
<ALLOWANCES>                                    (21,582)           (21,582)
<INVENTORY>                                      39,440             39,440
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                147,963            147,963
<PP&E>                                           15,147             15,147
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  167,809            167,809
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            57,849             57,849
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EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Kenneth A. Shewer, Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Managing Owner, Preferred Investment Solutions Corp. (the Managing Owner), of Futures
Strategic Trust (the Trust), hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Trusts Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Quarterly
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                          
|--------------------------
|/s/ Kenneth A. Shewer     
|Kenneth A. Shewer         
|Co-Chief Executive Officer
|August 12, 2005
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6421 

To prohibit the Secretary of Energy from enforcing energy efficiency 

standards applicable to manufactured housing, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 15, 2023 

Mr. BUCSHON (for himself, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mrs. CAMMACK, Mrs. 

LESKO, Mr. CARTER of Georgia, Mrs. MILLER-MEEKS, Mr. BAIRD, Mr. 

DUNN of Florida, Mr. MOOLENAAR, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, Mr. GOODEN of 

Texas, and Mr. YAKYM) introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Secretary of Energy from enforcing energy 

efficiency standards applicable to manufactured housing, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Affordable Housing 

5 Over Mandating Efficiency Standards Act’’ or the ‘‘Af6 fordable HOMES Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6421 IH

1 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH STANDARDS 

2 FOR MANUFACTURED HOUSING. 

3 (a) REPEAL.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Energy Independence 

5 and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17071) is 

6 amended by striking section 413. 

7 (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con8 tents in section 1(b) of the Energy Independence 

9 and Security Act of 2007 is amended by striking the 

10 item relating to section 413. 

11 (b) NO FORCE OR EFFECT.—The final rule titled 

12 ‘‘Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation 

13 Standards for Manufactured Housing’’ published by the 

14 Department of Energy in the Federal Register on May 

15 31, 2022 (87 Fed. Reg. 32728), shall have no force or 

16 effect. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
Exhibit 10.30

 

ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT

 

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, ADCARE PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC, an Ohio limited liability company (“Assignor”) hereby transfers and assigns unto GL NURSING, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company (“Assignee”), all of Assignor’s right, title and interest in and to that certain Purchase and Sale Agreement effective as of January 17, 2012 (the “Agreement”), relating to that certain skilled nursing facility commonly known as Golden Years Manor and located at 1010 Barnes Street, Lonoke, Arkansas 72086 (the “Facility”). Assignee hereby assumes all obligations of Assignor under the Agreement.

 

On or before the Closing (as defined in the Agreement), Assignee agrees to reimburse Assignor for the Deposit and the extension fee in the amount of $250,000.00 and for all out-of-pocket costs relating to the Facility advanced by Assignor.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Assignor and Assignee have caused this Assignment of Purchase and Sale Agreement to be duly executed and delivered as of the 9th day of May, 2012.

 

	
ASSIGNOR:
    	
 
    	
ASSIGNEE:
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
ADCARE   PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC
    	
 
    	
GL   NURSING, LLC
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
By:
    	
/s/   Boyd P. Gentry
    	
 
    	
By:
    	
/s/   Christopher F. Brogdon
    
	
 
    	
Boyd   P. Gentry, Manager
    	
 
    	
 
    	
Christopher   F. Brogdon, Manager
#### James Madison MCCAULEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6112

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 10, 2017

Decided: May 19, 2017

James Madison McCauley, Appellant Pro Se. Virginia Bidwell Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. .

PER CURIAM:

James Madison McCauley seeks to appeal the district court’s orders accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition and denying his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-*221pealability. 28 • U.S.C, § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012), When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that McCauley has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appeala-bility, deny leave • to proceed in forma pauperis, deny McCauley’s motion for appointment of counsel, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Presidential Documents

Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 37 / Thursday, February 24, 2022 / Presidential Documents 10681 

Notice of February 22, 2022 

Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to 

Libya 

On February 25, 2011, by Executive Order 13566, the President declared 

a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary 

threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the actions of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, his government, and 

close associates, which took extreme measures against the people of Libya, 

including by using weapons of war, mercenaries, and wanton violence against 

unarmed civilians. In addition, there was a serious risk that Libyan state 

assets would be misappropriated by Qadhafi, members of his government, 

members of his family, or his close associates if those assets were not 

protected. The foregoing circumstances, the prolonged attacks, and the increased numbers of Libyans seeking refuge in other countries from the 

attacks caused a deterioration in the security of Libya and posed a serious 

risk to its stability. 

On April 19, 2016, the President signed Executive Order 13726, which 

expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 

13566. The President found that the ongoing violence in Libya, including 

attacks by armed groups against Libyan state facilities, foreign missions 

in Libya, and critical infrastructure, as well as human rights abuses, violations 

of the arms embargo imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1970 (2011), and misappropriation of Libya’s natural resources threaten the 

peace, security, stability, sovereignty, democratic transition, and territorial 

integrity of Libya, and thereby constitute an unusual and extraordinary 

threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. 

The situation in Libya continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary 

threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, 

and measures are needed to protect against the diversion of assets or other 

abuses by members of Qadhafi’s family, their associates, and other persons 

hindering Libyan national reconciliation. 

For this reason, the national emergency declared on February 25, 2011, 

and expanded on April 19, 2016, must continue in effect beyond February 

25, 2022. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national 

emergency declared in Executive Order 13566. 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with FR PREZDOC3
10682 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 37 / Thursday, February 24, 2022 / Presidential Documents 

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to 

the Congress. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

February 22, 2022. [FR Doc. 2022–04104 

Filed 2–23–22; 11:15 am] 

Billing code 3395–F2–P 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with FR PREZDOC3BIDEN.EPS</GPH>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (A) THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1997 (UNAUDITED) AND FOR THE NINE MONTHS
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997 (UNAUDITED) AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH (B) FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          16,485
<SECURITIES>                                     1,500
<RECEIVABLES>                                   23,741
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,447
<INVENTORY>                                     10,486
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                58,954
<PP&E>                                          12,924
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,153
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  75,167
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21,088
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           887
<OTHER-SE>                                      52,212
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    75,167
<SALES>                                         75,197
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                75,197
<CGS>                                           61,589
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   61,589
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                20,420
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 4,328
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  63
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (14,484)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,075)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (11,409)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (11,409)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.77)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.77)
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Faber Enrique Bermudez ARCINEGAS, Defendant-Appellant.*

No. 15-2333-cr

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

April 24, 2017

FOR APPELLANT: Faber Enrique Bermudez Arcinegas, pro se, Philipsburg, PA.

FOR APPELLEE: David C. James, Ti-ana A. Demás, Douglas M. Pravda, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.

*

 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform to the caption above,

SUMMARY ORDER

Faber Enrique Bermudez Arcinegas (“Bermudez”) appeals pro se from the District Court’s July 1, 2015 order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Section 3582(c)(2) provides that a sentencing court may reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment if it was based on a guidelines range subsequently lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission. We review de novo “the determination of whether the defendant’s sentence was based on a sentencing range that was sub*66sequently lowered” and whether he was eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

The District Court properly denied Ber-mudez’s motion. A district court may not reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) if a retroactive amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(a)(2)(B), (d); see also United States v. Martinez, 572 F.3d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2009). Bermudez sought a modification based on Amendment 782, which reduced the base offense levels for most drug offenses under § 2D1.1 and § 2D1.11 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. But Bermudez’s guidelines range was based on the money laundering guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, not on § 2D1.1 or § 2D1.11. Accordingly, Amendment 782 did not lower his applicable guidelines range, and the District Court did not err in denying his motion. See United States v. Mock, 612 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2010).

We have considered Bermudez’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the ordér of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
#### William J. WHITSITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HEDY HOLMES STAFFING SERVICES; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-17375

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 14, 2016 *

Filed December 22, 2016

William J. Whitsitt, Pro Se

Gilberto Gutierrez, Counsel, San Joaquin County, Stockton, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

William J. Whitsitt appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his action alleging claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,*382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); *Barren v. tiarrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). We may affirm on any *1005ground supported by the record. *Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Polaris Pictures Corp.,*159 F.3d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Whitsitt’s- ADEA claims against San Joaquin County Work Net and Sansome because Whitsitt failed to allege facts sufficient to show that either defendant can be held liable under the ADEA. *See*29 U.S.C. § 623 (ADEA applies to employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations); *Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc.,*991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the purpose of the “agent” provision in the ADEA was to incorporate responde-at superior liability, and that individual defendants cannot be held liable for damages under the ADEA).

Dismissal of Whitsitt’s ADEA claims against Hedy Holmes Staffing Services was proper because the record reflects that although Whitsitt filed a notice of charge, he failed to wait 60 days before filing this action. *See*29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (“No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section [of the ADEA] until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.”); *Forester v. Chertoff,*500 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 2007) (under § 626(d), private employees must file a charge with the EEOC before filing suit).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Whitsitt’s state law claims in the absence of any cognizable federal claims. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims upon the dismissal of the federal claims); *Tritchler v. County of Lake,*358 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review).

Contrary to Whitsitt’s contention that he was labeled a vexatious litigant, the record does not indicate that a vexatious litigant order has been entered against him.

We reject as without merit Whitsitt’s contentions regarding bias.

Whitsitt’s requests, set forth in his opening brief, are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and 112 not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.