alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The City of Burlington v. Dankwardt.

1. Cities and Towns: power to prohibit peddling meat. Section 456 of the Code, conferring on cities arid towns the power to establish and regulate markets, does not confer the power to prohibit by ordinance the peddling of meat on the streets; — not, at least, until the city or town has established a meat-market; and not then, unless it be as a regulation of the market.

*Ayipedl from Des Moines District Gourt*— Hon. Charles H. Phelps, Judge.

Wednesday, October 26.

Action upon an information, in which the defendant was accused of the crime of peddling meats in violation of an ordinance of the city. A demurrer to the information was sustained, and the plaintiff appeals.

*John J. Seerley*and *Hedge dh Blythe,*for apjiellant.

*P. Henry Smyth db Son,*for appellee.

Adams, Ch. J.

Section J56 of the Code provides that “cities shall have power * * * to establish and regulate markets.” Under the statute, presumably, the city council of the city of Burlington passed an ordinance providing that “ any person who shall sell or ex.pose for sale in any square, street, alley or sidewalk of the city of Burlington, or-in any place in said city except a room or shop properly prepared for such business, any beef, veal, mutton, pork or other article of butcher’s meat, in quantities less than one-quarter of the carcass of an animal, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” The information was filed under this ordinance.

The power given by statute is to establish and regulate markets. The city cannot go beyond the power thus given. Now, an ordinance which is designed merely to prevent peddling meats does not appear to us to be an ordinance *171to establish and regulate markets. It seems to be an ordinance designed to favor private butcher shops in the city, if there are any. But it does not establish such shops. It may be that the inhabitants of Burlington have no means of buying meat except from street peddlers. ¥e do not think that the city council can interfere with such occupation until it has established a meat-market; and not then, unless it may be as a regulation of the market. To sustain the plaintiff,' we should be obliged to hold that the design of the statute was to give the power to regulate the mode of selling meat in the absence of specific markets, but, in our opinion, we' should not be justified in so doing.

In the view which we have taken, the authorities cited by' the appellant are not applicable. We think that the demurrer was properly sustained.

Affirmed.
#### EVIDEO OWNERS, Mauro DiDomenico, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated, Douglas Buerger, Craig Linden, Realvirt LLC, Paul Barous, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee

2016-2149

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Decided: March 13, 2017

Patrick Richard Delaney, Ditthavong *&*Steiner, P.C., Alexandria, VA, argued for plaintiffs-appellants.

Nicolas Riley, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by Mark R. Freeman, Benjamin C. Mizer; Nathan Kelley, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA.

Before Moore, O’malley, and Hughes, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

For the reasons articulated in the decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims, we *affirm.*We order Appellants to show cause within fifteen days why sanctions should not be imposed for a frivolous appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

AFFIRMED

*1005Costs

Costs to Appellee.
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# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

May 24, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00112

- CV

John CLARK

, Appellant

v.

Maria Elzbieta CLARK

, Appellee

From the 438th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019

- CI

- 20250

Honorable David A. Canales , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The clerk’s record was originally due May 19, 2022, but was not filed. On May 20, 2022, the district clerk filed a notification of late record, stating the clerk’s record was not filed because appellant had failed to pay or make arrange ments to pay the clerk’s fee for preparing the record and appellant was not entitled to appeal without paying the fee.

We therefore order appellant provide written proof to this court indicating either (1) the clerk’s fee has been paid or arrangements have been made to pay the clerk’s fee; or (2) appellant is entitled to appeal without paying the clerk’s fee by June 3, 2022

. If appellant fails to respond within the time provided, this appeal will be dismissed for want of prosecution. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 37.3(b).

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 24th day of May, 2022

.

___________________________________ M ichael A. C ruz
, Clerk of Court
#### Chase Carmen HUNTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael D. RILEY, individually, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Insurance for West Virginia, and in his official capacity as a Committee Member of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners; West Virginia Offices of the Insurance Commissioner, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 16-2260

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 27, 2017

Chase Carmen Hunter, Appellant Pro Se. Greg S. Foster, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia; Kristen V. Hammond, Kelly Caswell Morgan, BAILEY & WYANT, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.

. Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit,

PER CURIAM:

Chase Carmen Hunter seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting in part and denying in part the Respondents’ motion to dismiss Hunter’s civil action. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Hunter seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6508 

To require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to 

ensure that flexible fuel vehicles may use certain gram per mile carbon 

dioxide values for purposes of determining fleet average carbon dioxide 

standards for certain vehicles. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 29, 2023 

Mrs. MILLER-MEEKS (for herself, Ms. CRAIG, Mrs. HINSON, Mr. FEENSTRA, 

Mr. VAN ORDEN, Mr. FINSTAD, Mr. FLOOD, and Mr. NUNN of Iowa) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to ensure that flexible fuel vehicles may 

use certain gram per mile carbon dioxide values for purposes of determining fleet average carbon dioxide standards for certain vehicles. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Flex Fuel Fairness 

5 Act of 2023’’. 

2 

•HR 6508 IH

1 SEC. 2. FINDING. 

2 Congress finds that the Greenhouse gases, Regulated 

3 Emissions, and Energy use in Technologies (GREET) 

4 model developed by Argonne National Laboratory finds 

5 that E85 fuel made with average corn starch ethanol re6 duces greenhouse gas emissions by 31 percent per mile 

7 traveled as compared to gasoline with no ethanol. 

8 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 

9 In this Act: 

10 (1) ADMINISTRATOR.—The term ‘‘Adminis11 trator’’ means the Administrator of the Environ12 mental Protection Agency. 

13 (2) FLEXIBLE FUEL VEHICLE.—The term 

14 ‘‘flexible fuel vehicle’’ has the meaning given the 

15 term in section 86.1803–01 of title 40, Code of Fed16 eral Regulations (as in effect on the date of enact17 ment of this Act). 

18 (3) MANUFACTURER.—The term ‘‘manufac19 turer’’ has the meaning given the term in section 

20 216 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7550). 

21 SEC. 4. FLEXIBLE FUEL VEHICLE COMPLIANCE VALUE. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the 

23 date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall re24 vise section 86.1818–12 of title 40, Code of Federal Regu25 lations, to ensure that, for purposes of determining fleet 

26 average CO2 standards under that section, manufacturers 

3 

•HR 6508 IH

1 may use a gram per mile CO2 value for flexible fuel vehi2 cles that is 31 percent lower than the gram per mile CO2

3 value for the same vehicle make and model that is not 

4 a flexible fuel vehicle. 

5 (b) FURTHER ADJUSTMENT.—The Administrator 

6 may, by regulation, apply a larger percentage reduction 

7 in the gram per mile CO2 value for flexible fuel vehicles 

8 than the percentage described in subsection (a) if the Ad9 ministrator determines that the larger percentage reduc10 tion is appropriate based on a version of the Greenhouse 

11 gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy use in Tech12 nologies (GREET) model developed by Argonne National 

13 Laboratory after the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ
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EXHIBIT 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Liberate Technologies (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending May 31, 2002 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mitchell E. Kertzman, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|/s/ MITCHELL E. KERTZMANMitchell E. Kertzman Chief Executive OfficerAugust 8, 2002 |  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 

---

QuickLinks
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02
- 14
- 00383
- CR

RUDOLF HILBURN, JR. APPELLANT

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM CRIMINAL DISTRI CT COURT NO. 2 OF TA RRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 1352 567D

---------- 

### MEMORAN DUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal from a plea

- bargained conviction
for felony driving while intoxicated

. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial

court ’s certification of the right of appeal states that this “is a plea

- ba rgain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d)

.

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 We notified appellant that unless he filed a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we w ould dismiss it. A lthough appellant filed a response , it does not sho w grounds for continuing the appeal

. Accordingly , we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d), 43.2(f); Chavez v. State , 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
PER CURIAM PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.
DO NOT P UBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 29, 2014
---

Exhibit 13.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Micromem Technologies
Inc. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the Fiscal Year Ended October 31, 2014
(the Report), I, Dan Amadori, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, based on my knowledge, that:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of
      section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
  and                                  
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
      of the Company.

|Date: February 27, 2015 | /s/ Dan Amadori              
|----------------------- | -----------------------------
|                        | Dan Amadori                  
|                        | Chief Financial Officer      
|                        | (Principal financial officer)

---
Exhibit 31.2
                                                                    ------------

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Robert P. Orlando, certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K
        of Switchboard Incorporated; and

     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
        of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
        the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
        statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered
        by this report.


Dated: April 9, 2004                   By: /s/ Robert P. Orlando
                                           ---------------------
                                           Robert P. Orlando
                                           Chief Financial Officer
                                           (principal financial officer)
#### Suite 1700 Corp., Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v Inouye & Ogden, Respondent.

[771 NYS2d 2]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Paula Oman-sky, J.), entered August 21, 2002, which denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action for a declaration under the parties’ license agreement and granted *387defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and for summary judgment on its counterclaim for attorneys’ fees, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, defendant’s cross motion denied and plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on its first cause of action granted, and it is declared that, pursuant to the parties’ license agreement, defendant may designate the two additional optioned offices only from the five existing windowed offices designated on the floor plan attached to the licensing agreement.

Plaintiff entered into an agreement to sublet or license 5 of 10 existing windowed offices from defendant, which holds the lease for half of the seventeenth floor of 90 Park Avenue. The license agreement attaches and refers to the floor plan of the demised premises and provides that, in the event that plaintiff, which was granted sole and exclusive use and possession of the five offices specifically designated on such floor plan, required additional space, it had “the right to license up to a total of two (2) additional private offices within the Demised Premises.” While the agreement further provides that defendant “shall in its sole discretion determine which private office or offices shall be licensed,” such discretion was clearly limited within the meaning of the Agreement to the five additional existing windowed offices on the floor as reflected in the attached floor plan of the demised premises.

In finding that the term “in its sole discretion” affords defendant broad latitude in furnishing the additional office space circumscribed only by the bounds of the demised premises, and rejecting plaintiffs interpretation of the term “which office or offices” as requiring the office or offices to be chosen from those existing offices designated on the floor plan, the IAS court placed undue emphasis on a single phrase “sole discretion,” undervalued the term “which,” and rendered the attachment of and referral to the floor plan in the parties’ license agreement meaningless. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Andrias, Rosenberger and Friedman, JJ.