ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS GREG ABBOTT



### September 2, 2008

The Honorable Jeri Yenne Brazoria County Criminal District Attorney 111 East Locust, Suite 408A Angleton, Texas 77515

Dear Ms. Yenne: Opinion No. GA-0660 Re: Whether amunicipal courtmayhearcompliance applications filed under section 822.042(c) of the Health and Safety Code and appeals ofdangerousdog determinations under section 822.0421 (b) ofthe same code (RQ-0685-GA)

You ask several questions about a municipal court's authority to hear compliance applications filed under section 822.042(c) ofthe Health and Safety Code and appeals ofdangerousdog determinations under section 822.0421 (b) ofthe same code. 1 

### In particular, you ask: 1. Does amunicipal courthavejurisdictionto hear dangerous dog determination appeals [under Health and Safety Code section 822.0421 (b)] and compliance hearings [under section 822.042(c)]

... as setforth in Chapter 822, SubchapterD ofthe Texas Health and Safety Code? 2. If a dog owner chooses to appeal the dangerous dog determination to the municipal court in Lake Jackson, Texas, can the city refuse to hear the appeal claiming no competent jurisdiction? 3. Once the dog owner files his/her notice ofappeal in municipal court, may the city refer the appeal to another court, 

### i. 

### e. [,] justice court or county court? Is the municipal court obligated to hear the appeal as requested by the dog owner?

ISee LetterfromHonorable JeriVenne, BrazoriaCounty CriminalDistrictAttorney, to Honorable GregAbbott, Attorney General of Texas, at 3 (Mar. 4, 2008) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov) [hereinafter Request Letter]. See generally Brief from Sherri Russell, Lake Jackson City Attorney, to Nancy Fuller, Chair, Opinion Committee, Attorney General ofTexas, at 1-2 (Mar. 31,2008) [hereinafter Lake Jackson Brief].The Honorable Jeri Yenne

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4. Does the dog owner get to choose the location ofappeal, 

### i.e. [,] municipal court, justice court, county court? Or is the citizen requiredto file notice ofappeal atthe location as setforth inthe dangerous dog determination notice or any other notice of hearing pertaining to a dangerous dog? Request Letter, 

### supra note 1, at 3. You refer to hearings under section 822.042(c) as "compliance hearings" andto hearings under section 822.0421 (b) as "dangerous dog determination appeals," and we adopt that terminology in this opinion. 

### Id. Chapter 822, subchapterD (sections 822.041 through 822.047) of the Health and Safety Code regulates dangerous-dog owners. 

### See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 822, subch. D (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008). Section 822.041 (2) defines the term "dangerous dog" to be a dog that: (A) makes an unprovoked attack on a person that causes bodily injury and occurs in a place other than an enclosure in which the dog was being kept and that was reasonably certainto preventthe dog from leaving the enclosure on its own; or (B) commits unprovoked acts in a place other than an enclosure in which the dog was being kept and that was reasonably certain to prevent the dog from leaving the enclosure on its own and those acts cause a person to reasonably believe that the dog will attack and cause bodily injury to that person. 

### Id § 822.041(2) (Vernon 2003); 

### see also id § 822.041(3) (defining "dog"). Section 822.042(a) requires the owner of the dog, upon learning that the dog is dangerous, to comply with four requirements: (1) register the dog with the animal control authority; (2) restrain the dog at all times; (3) obtain liability insurance covetage or show financial responsibility in a specified amount; and (4) comply with applicable municipal or county regulations. 2 

### See id § 822.042(a); 

### see also ide § 822.041(5) (defining "owner"). Under section 822.042(c), "[i]f, on application ofany person, a justice court, county court, or municipal court finds, after notice and hearing

... , that the owner of a dangerous dog has failed to comply" withthese fourrequirements, "the court shall orderthe animal control authority to seize the dog

.... " 

### Id § 822.042(c). An owner's failure to comply may lead to the dog's destruction and criminal prosecution ofthe owner for a Class C misdemeanor or, ifthe owner is a repeat offender, a Class B misdemeanor. 

### See id §§ 822.042(b), (e), .045.

2A county or municipality may adopt additional requirements or restrictions pertaining to dangerous dogs so long as the requirements orrestrictions are notbreed-specific and are more stringentthanthe statutoryrestrictions. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 822.047 (Vernon 2003). Because your questions expressly involve compliance hearings and dangerous-dog-determination appeals under chapter 822, subchapter D ofthe Health and Safety Code,we do not consider the impact ofany city charter provisions or city ordinances that may be relevant.The Honorable Jeri Yenne

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A person learns that he or she is the owner ofa dangerous dog in one ofthree ways; relevant to your question is the circumstance inwhich "the owneris informedbythe animal control authority thatthe dog is a dangerous dog under section 822.0421." Id. § 822.042(g)(3). Section 822.0421 (to which section 822.042(g)(3) refers) authorizes ananimal control authorityto investigate areportthat a dog has made unprovoked attacks or committed unprovoked threatening acts outside ofa secure

.enclosure and, after receiving witnesses' sworn statements, to determine whether the dog is dangerous, and to notify the owner of the determination. See 

### ide § 822.0421(a); see also 

### id § 822.041(2) (defining "dangerous dog"). Under section 822.0421(b), the owner may appeal the animal control authority's determinationwithin fifteen days "to ajustice, county, ormunicipal court ofcompetentjurisdiction." Id § 822.0421 (b). You tell us that your office has received a question from the Lake Jackson City Attorney about the Lake Jackson Municipal Court's jurisdiction to hear, in particular, a dangerous-dogdetermination appeal under section 822.0421 (b). See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. The City Attorney is concerned that the municipal court, which is not a court ofrecord, is not a court of "competentjurisdiction" for purposes of section 822.0421(b). See 

### id As you explain the City Attorney's argument, she "maintains that the matter must be 'criminal in nature' before the municipal court hasjurisdiction [and that the municipal court therefore does not havejurisdiction over dangerous-dog-determination appeals] because the authority does not come from the general statutes governing municipal courts." Id. Althoughyou do not detail the reasons for your questions about a municipal court's jurisdiction over compliance hearings under section 822.042(c), we assume they similarly stem from the fact that the Lake Jackson Municipal Court is not a court of record and does not, under general statutes, havejurisdiction over matters that are not criminal in nature. The Legislature has provided for the creation ofmunicipal courts by statute in accordance withthe Legislature's constitutional authorityto establish "suchothercourts" as necessary. See TEX. CaNST. art. V, § 1 (vestingjudicial powerin "one Supreme Court, in one CourtofCriminal Appeals, in Courts ofAppeals, in District Courts, in County Courts, in Commissioners Courts, in Courts of Justices ofthe Peace, and in such other courts as may be provided by law" (emphasis added)); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Ope No. DM-427 (1996) at 2 (stating that "municipal courts are not constitutionally created courts but rather exist only by virtue ofthe [L]egislature's constitutional powerto 'establish such other courts as itmay deem necessary'" (quoting TEX. CaNST. art. V, 

### § 1)). The Legislature has providedfor the creation oftwo kinds ofmunicipal courts: municipal courts and municipal courts ofrecord. See TEX. GaV'T CaDE ANN. §§ 29.002 (Vernon 2004) (creating a municipal courtineachmunicipality), 30.00003(a) (permitting amunicipal governingbodyto create, in addition to the municipal court created under section 29.002, a municipal court ofrecord ifthe governing body determines that the creation is necessary to more efficiently dispose of cases). Because your questions relate specifically to a municipal courtthat is not a court ofrecord, we limit our response to such courts, and we use the term "municipal court" generally to refer only to municipal courts, established under**G~vernment** Code chapter 29, that are not courts ofrecord. Before we examine a municipal court's jurisdiction in relation to your questions, we summarize generaljurisdictional principles. The term "jurisdiction" "refers to a court's authorityThe Honorable Jeri Yenne

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to adjudicate a case." Reiss 

### v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d439, 443 (Tex. 2003) (citingDubaiPetroleum Co. 

### v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000)); In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181, 185 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing Reiss, 118 S.W.3d at 443). Whether a court hasjurisdiction is a question oflaw. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife 

### v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,226 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n 

### v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849,855 (Tex. 2002)) (subject-matterjurisdiction); BMCSoftware Belgium 

### v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d789, 794 (Tex. 2002) (citing Hotel Partners 

### v. Craig, 993 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994,writ denied)) (personaljurisdiction). Courts considering civil matters have stated thatjurisdiction comprises two components: subject-matterjurisdiction andpersonaljurisdiction over aparty. See CSR Ltd. 

### v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996); Fed. Underwriters Exch. 

### v. Pugh, 174 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1943); see also Ace Ins. Co. v.' Zurich Amer. Ins. Co., 59 S.W.3d 424,428 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (defining subject-matterjurisdiction andpersonaljurisdiction (quoting UnitedStates 

### v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984)). Subject-matterjurisdiction "refers to the court's powerto hear a particular type ofsuit" and "exists by operation oflaw only." CSR Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 594; Fed. Underwriters Exch., 174 S.W.2d at 600. Subject-matterjurisdiction comprises both subject-matter and territorial components. See Lange 

### v. State, 639 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), superseded by rule on other grounds as statedby Volosen 

### v. State, 227 S.W.3d 77,81 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Estrada 

### v. State, 148 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 2004, no pet.). Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, "concerns the court's power to bind a particular person or party" and "can be conferred by consent or waiver." CSR Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 594; Fed. Underwriters Exch., 174 S.W.2d at 600; see also Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199,200 (Tex. 1985) (setting out the two elements ofpersonaljurisdiction: (1) the defendant must be amenable to the court'sjurisdiction, and (2) the plaintiffmust invoke thatjurisdiction by valid service ofprocess). Government Code chapter 29, which concerns municipal courts generally, provides such courts with "exclusive originaljurisdiction within the municipality's territorial limits and property owned by the municipality located in the municipality's extraterritorialjurisdiction in all criminal cases that" arise undermunicipal ordinances andthat are punishable by a fine notto exceed a certain amount. TEX. GOV'TCODEANN. § 29.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008); accordTEx.CODECRIM.PROC. ANN. art. 4.14(a) (Vernon 2005); cf

### TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. 

### § 30.00005(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (stating that a municipal court ofrecord "has thejurisdictionprovided by general law for municipal courts"). A municipal court also has "concurrentjurisdiction ,with thejustice court ofa precinct in which the municipality is located" in certain other criminal cases "arising under state law that arise within the municipality's territorial limits or property owned by the municipality located in the municipality's extraterritorial jurisdiction" and that are punishable by fine and sanctions not consisting ofconfinementinj ail orimprisonment. TEX. GOV'TCODEANN. §29.003 (b)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 2008); accordTEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.14(b) (Vernon2005); cf

### TEx. GOV'TCODE ANN. § 30.00005(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (stating that a municipal court of record "has the jurisdictionprovidedby general lawfor municipal courts"); id 

### § 30.00005(c) (allowing amunicipal governing body to provide a municipal court ofrecord withjurisdiction concurrent with ajustice court in any precinct in which the municipality is located in certain.criminal cases). Nothing inThe Honorable Jeri Yenne

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GovernmentCode chapter29 authorizes amunicipal courtto exercisejurisdictionovercivil matters. See generally ide §§ 29.001-.105 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2008). We now consider a municipal court's jurisdiction under Health and Safety Code sections 822.042(c) and 822.0421(b). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 822.042(c), .0421(b) (Vernon 2003). Because section 822.042(c) pertains to a compliancehearing bya "municipal court" while section 822.0421 (b) pertains to an appeal ofa dangerous-dog determination to "a municipal court ofcompetentjurisdiction," we analyze the two statutes separately. 

### Id I. Whether a Municipal Court Has Jurisdiction to ConsiderApplications Alleging That a Dangerous-Dog Owner has Failed to Comply With Statutory Requirements or to Hear Appeals of an Animal Control Authority's Determination That a Dog is Dangerous A. A municipal court'sjurisdictionunderHealth and Safety Code section 822.042(c) You first question a municipal court's authority under section 822.042(c) to hear an applicationthatadangerous-dog ownerhas failedto complywith section 822.042(a)'srequirements

.

.SeeRequest Letter, supra note 1, at 3. Section 822.042(c) expressly lists a "municipal court" as a court that may adjudicate an application alleging that a dangerous-dog owner has failed to comply withthe statutoryrequirements setforth in section 822.042(a) or (b). TEX. HEALTH& SAFETYCODE ANN. 

### § 822.042(c) (Vernon2003); see also id 

### § 822.042(a)-(b) (setting outrequirements withwhich dangerous-dog ownermustcomply andproviding thata dangerous-dog ownerwho does notcomply must deliver the dog to the animal control authority within thirty days). A municipal court that is not a court ofrecord is still a municipal court. 3
Your question appears to suggest, however, that section 822.042(c) is insufficient by itself to grantto a municipal courtjurisdiction over noncriminal compliance hearings. In those instances where a compliance hearing is not a criminal matter, therefore, we understand your question to suggest that a municipal court lacksjurisdiction to adjudicate compliance hearings. 4 But see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODEANN. 

### § 822.045 (Vernon 2003) (stating that a person who fails to comply with section 822.042 commits a criminal offense). Such a compliance hearing-which is initiatedby an "application from any person"-is not criminal in nature. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODEANN. 

### § 822.042(c) (Vernon 2003); see Timmons V. Pecorino, 977 S.W.2d 603, 604-05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Price, J., concurring in denial of leave to file writ ofmandamus); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Ope No. GA-0316 (2005) at 4 (stating that nonconsent-towhearings "are clearlynotcriminal matters" because they "are not designedto secure

3you do not ask whether the term "municipal court" in section 822.042(c) encompasses municipal courts of record. See generally Request Letter, supra note 1. 4For a similar argument regarding section 822.0421 (b), see generally Lake Jackson Brief, supra note 1.The Honorable Jeri Yenne

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a conviction and punishment" and are not initiated by a complaint "but

... by written request from the person whose vehicle has been towed"). For several reasons, we conclude that section 822.042(c) provides a municipal court jurisdiction to conduct dangerous-dog compliance hearings where the court also has territorial and personaljurisdiction. The court'sjurisdictionisthus cumulative of thejurisdictionthatGovernment Code chapter 29 provides municipal courts. First, the Legislature has constitutional authority to create municipal courts and to provide them withjurisdiction. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (vestingjudicialpower in "such othercourts as may be provided by law"). Nothing requires the Legislature to provide jurisdiction only in the acts establishing a particular court. Thus, thejurisdiction ofa municipal court can be established in a statute outside ofGovernment Code chapter 29, and the Legislature has, in fact, done so in at least one other instance. See 

### TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 682.011(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (authorizing a person whom a hearing officer has determined violated a municipal vehicle parking or stopping ordinance to appeal the determination to a municipal court). Second, in construing a statute, we must presume that the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective. See TEX. GOV'T CODEANN. 

### § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 2005). "[W]e give effect to all its words and, ifpossible, do not treat any statutory language as mere surplusage." State 

### v.**Shumake~** 199 S.W.3d 279, 287 (Tex. 2006) (citing Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. 

### v. FunctionalRestoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d393, 402 (Tex. 2000)); see also In re Mo. Pac. R.R., 998 S.W.2d 212,216 (Tex. 1999) (stating that a court does not "lightly presume that the**Legi~lature** may have done a useless act"). To conclude that section 822.042(c) does not provide**j~risdiction** to municipal courts to conduct compliance hearings-when no other statute does so-renders ineffective section 822.042(c)'s express reference to a municipal court. Moreover, section 822.042(c) cannot be said to refer only to municipal courts of record, which may have some civil jurisdiction under Government Code chapter 30 to hear cases regarding the enforcement of "municipal ordinances enacted under Subchapter A, Chapter 214, Local Government Code ['Municipal Regulation of Housing and Other Structures'], or Subchapter E, Chapter 683, Transportation Code ['Junked Vehicles: PublicNuisance; Abatement']." TEX. GOV'TCODEANN. § 30.00005(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Thus, even ifa municipal court ofrecordhas been granted authority to hear civil cases under Government Code chapter 30, that authority cannot extend to proceedings under Health and Safety Code chapter 822, subchapter D. A municipal court ofrecord consequently hasjurisdiction over compliance hearings only ifsection 822.042(c) supplies it. And finally, this office suggested in 2005 that chapter 822 provides an "isolated grant[] of authority to municipal courts to conducthearings for aparticularpurpose." Tex. Att'y Gen. Ope No. GA-0316 (2005) at 5. Analogously, in 1998 four members ofthe Texas Court ofCriminal Appeals suggested that sections 822.002 and 822.003 ofthe Health and Safety Code, which authorize "[a] justice court, county court, ormunicipal court" to orderthe seizure and destruction ofa dog that has caused death or serious bodily injury to a person, "may well conferjurisdiction upon" municipal courts "for this specific type of action." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 822.002(a), .003(d)-(e) (Vernon 2003); Timmons, 977 S.W.2d at 604 n.3.The Honorable Jeri Yenne

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In sum, section 822.042(c) provides a municipal court that is not a court ofrecord with jurisdiction over compliance hearings held under that subsection. Whether a municipal court also has territorial and personaljurisdiction is a question oflaw that thetrial court must resolve in light ofthe particular facts. See BMCSoftware Belgium, 83 S.W.3d at 794; LeBlanc 

### v. Kyle, 28 S.W.3d 99, 100-01 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (weighing conflicting allegations regarding the defendant's contactwiththe area overwhichthe courthadjurisdiction); accordC-LocRetention Sys. 

### v. Hendrix, 993 S.W.2d473, 476 (Tex. App.-Houston [14thDist.] 1999, no pet.); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Ope No. GA-0446 (2006) at 18 ("Questions offact are not appropriate to the opinion process."). 

### B. A municipal court's jurisdiction under Health and Safety Code section 822.0421(b) We next**con~ider** a municipal court's jurisdiction under section 822.0421(b) to hear an appeal ofan animal control authority's determinationthataparticulardog is dangerous. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 3. You do not specify whether the animal control authority is a municipal animal control office, a county animal·control office, or a county sheriff. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETYCODEANN. 

### § 822.041(1) (Vernon 2003) (defining "animal control authority"). We assume that you refer to a dangerous-dog determination made by a municipal animal control office under section 822.0421(a). See ide § 822.0421 (a) (allowing an animal control authority to investigate a report that and to determine whether a particular dog is dangerous). Section 822.0421 (b) allows the ownerofa dog that an animal control agencyhas determined is dangerous to appeal that determination "to ajustice, county, or municipal court ofcompetent jurisdiction." Id. § 822.0421 (b). The Lake Jackson attorney, you indicate, equates the phrase "municipal court of competent jurisdiction" for purposes of Health and Safety Code section 822.0421 (b) with a municipal court ofrecord. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. Texas courts have indicated that a dangerous-dog appeal under section 822.0421 (b) is not a criminal proceeding. See In re Loban, 243 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. App.-.Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (stating that a municipal court ofrecord's "affirmance" ofthe municipal animal control officer's dangerous-dog determination "is not a criminal action"); Timmons, 977 S.W.2d at 604 (Price, J., concurring in denial ofapplication for writ ofmandamus) (stating that a courtorderunderHealth and Safety Code sections 822.001-.004 requiring the destructionofadog causingthe deathofor serious bodilyinjury to a person is "in no way ... considered 'criminal"'). Nothing in chapter 822 defines the term "court ofcompetentjurisdiction" for purposes of section 822.0421 (b), but we note that the phrase applies tojustice and county courts as well as to municipal courts: "An owner ... may appeal

... to a justice, county, or municipal court of competentjurisdiction." 

### TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 

### § 822.0421(b) (Vernon 2003). The phrase '" court ofcompetentjurisdiction'

... usually

... refer[s] to subject-matterjurisdiction." Ace Ins. Co. V. Zurich Amer. Ins. Co., 59 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (quoting UnitedStates 

### v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822,828 (1984)); see Foreness 

### v. Hexamer, '971 S.W.2d 525, 529, 531 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. denied) (stating that "[a] 'court ofcompetent jurisdiction' is one with subject-matterjurisdiction" to issue ajudgment in a case); State V. Hall,The Honorable Jeri Yenne

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829 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (for purposes ofCode ofCriminal Procedure article 12.05, "acourt ofcompetentjurisdictionis a courtwithjurisdiction to try the case" (citing Exparte Ward, 560 S.W.2d 660, 664 (Tex. Crim.**App~** 1978)). As we stated above however, subject-matter jurisdiction has both a subject-matter and a geographic component. See supra page 4. And in this case, we believe thephrase "courtofcompetentjurisdiction" in section 822.0421 (b) refers to a court withterritorialjurisdictioninthe matter. 5 This ascribes meaningto thephrase while effectuatingthe legislative intent, clear from the statute's plain language, to permit municipal courts to consider appeals ofdangerous-dog determinations. In sum, section 822.0421 (b) provides a municipal court withjurisdiction over an appeal of amunicipal animal control office's dangerous-dog determination. As we statedabove, the municipal court also must have territorialjurisdiction. See supra page 4. 

### II. Whether a Municipal Court May Refuse to Hear or May Refer an Appeal ofa Dangerous-Dog Determination Made Under Section 822.0421(a) We answer your second and third questions together. You ask second whether, ifa dog owner chooses to appeal an animal control authority's determination that the owner's dog is dangerous to the Lake Jackson municipal court, the city may refuse to hear the appeal claiming that it does not have competentjurisdiction. Request Letter, supra note 1, at 3. And you ask third whether, once adog ownerfiles a "notice ofappeal [ofadangerous-dog determination] inmunicipal court," the "city [may] referthe appeal" to ajustice courtorcounty courtor, conversely, whetherthe municipal court is obligated to hear the appeal. Request Letter, supra note 1, at 3. 

### By "refer," we understand you to ask whether the municipal court may transfer the appeal to a county orjustice court. Given our answer to your first question, we conclude that the municipal court may not, on the grounds ofa lack of subject-matterjurisdiction, refuse to hear an appeal ofa dangerous-dog determination by a municipal animal control authority ifthe court hasjurisdiction overthe relevant territory. See supra. A municipal courtthat has territorialjurisdiction over an appeal filed with the court must hear the appeal. Conversely, a municipal court may determine that it does not have territorialjurisdiction in the matter and may refuse to hear the appeal on that basis. A municipal court may not, however, transfer a dangerous-dog-determination appeal to a justice or county court. State statutes do not provide for such a transfer. 6 See generally TEX.

5The dog owner, by filing an appeal with the municipal court, would submit to the municipal court's personal jurisdiction. Cf Von Briesen, Purtell, & Roper, S.C. v. French, 78 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. dism'd w.o.j .) (stating that in Texas once a party has filed an answer or otherwise appeared in a case, it is subject to the court's personaljurisdiction). 6The appellant in Allison v. State, a 2002 decision ofthe First District Court ofAppeals, contended that "a municipal court has no authority to transfer a case to the nearestjustice ofthe peace." Allison v. State, 2002 WL 31388717, *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. refd) (not designated for publication). The court declined (continued

...)The Honorable Jeri Yenne

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HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 822, subch. D (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008). By comparison, Government Code section 74.121(a) generally authorizes "[t]he judges of constitutional county courts, statutory county courts,justice courts, and small claims courts in a county [to] transfer cases to and from the dockets oftheir respective courts." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.121(a) (Vernon 2005). Bynotincluding municipal courts, section 74.121 (a) suggests that a municipal courtmaynot transfer cases to county orjustice courts. In addition, various statutes allow certain municipalities with more than one municipal courtto adopt ordinances permitting the transfer ofcases betweenthe municipal courts. See id §§ 29.101(d)(2), .102(d)(2), .103(d)(2) (Vernon 2004) (pertaining to a municipality ofmore than 250,000; a municipality of 130,001 to 285,000; and the City ofEI Paso). Butno statuterecognizes atransfer betweenamunicipal courtand a countyorjustice court. Because the Legislature has not provided for the possibility oftransferring dangerous-dog-determination appeals between a municipal court and ajustice or county court, a municipal court may not transfer the appeal and is obligated to hear it (assuming the court has territorialjurisdiction). III. Whether, in Filing an Appeal ofa Dangerous-Dog Determination, the Dog OwnerMay Choose Between Justice Court, County Court, or Municipal Court Fourthand finally, you askwhethera dog ownermay chooseto file an appeal ofa dangerousdog determination in a county court, justice court, Qr municipal court. Request Letter, supra note 1, at 3. Or, you ask, mustthe dog owner file the appeal "atthe location as set forth in the dangerous dog determination notice or any other.notice ofhearing pertaining to a dangerous dog." 

### Id. In connection withthis question, you have furnished a copy ofa "Notice to Owner ofDangerous Dog" form. 7 The Notice, which bears the letterhead ofthe City ofLake Jackson Police Department, informs a dog owner that the City ofLake Jackson Animal Control Division has investigated an alleged occurrence involving a particular dog and has determined that the dog is dangerous. See Notice, supra note 8, at 1. The Notice further informs the dog owner that he or she has "15 days from the date ofthis notice to appeal the determination that you own a dangerous dog to the City of Lake Jackson Municipal Court." 

### Id at 1-2. Section 822.0421 (b) on its face allows a dog ownerto appeal a dangerous-dog determination to a county,justice, ormunicipal courtwith "competentjurisdiction"-whichwe have equated with territorialjurisdiction. See 

### TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 822.0421(b) (Vernon 2003). A municipality may not, by order ofits animal control authority or otherwise, limitthe courts to which a dog owner may appeal where the Legislature has provided, without limitation, that more than one court has subject-matterjurisdiction. Rather, the dog owner may choose to file the appeal in any county,justice, or municipal court that has subject-matter, including territorial, jurisdiction.

6(

...continued) to consider the issue because the appellant "failed to support his argument on this issue with legal authority or with references to the record." Id This is the only case we. fmd that mentions the issue. 7Facsimile from Brazoria County Criminal DistrictAttorney's Office (May 9, 2008) (on file with the Opinion Committee) [hereinafter "Notice"].

### The Honorable Jeri Yenne

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SUMMARY A municipal court established under Government Code chapter 29 has jurisdiction under Health and Safety Code section 822.042(c) over a compliance application filed under that section if the court also has territorial and personal jurisdiction. Such a municipal court also has jurisdiction under Health and Safety Code section 822.0421(b) over an appeal of a municipal animal control authority's dangerous-dog determination made under section 822.0421 (a) ifthe court also has territorialjurisdiction. The phrase "court ofcompetentjurisdiction" in section 822.0421 (b) refers to a court with territorialjurisdiction over the matter. A municipal court may not, on the grounds of a lack of subject-matterjurisdiction, refuse to hear an appeal ofa dangerousdog determinationby amunicipal animal control authorityif the court has territorialjurisdiction. The court may, however, determine that it does not have territorial jurisdiction. A dog owner may file an appeal of a municipal animal control authority's dangerous-dog determination with any municipal court, justice court, or county court-all ofwhichhavejurisdictionunder section 822.042(c)-that also has territorialjurisdiction. A municipal court may not transfer a dangerous-dog-determination to a county orjustice court and is obligated to hear the appeal. A municipality may not, by order ofits animal control authority orotherwise, dictatethe courtto which adog owner may appeal a dangerous-dog determination ifmore than one court has subject-matter, including territorial, jurisdiction.

KENT C. SULLIVAN First Assistant Attorney General ANDREW WEBER Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel NANCY S. FULLER Chair, Opinion Committee Kymberly K. Oltrogge Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee