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Filed 1/21/15 In re N.M. CA1/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

In re N.M., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

R.M., 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA 

COUNTY, 

 Respondent; 

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES 

AGENCY, 

 Real Party in Interest. 

 A143244 

 (Alameda County 

 Super. Ct. No. HJ11016291) 

I. 

INTRODUCTION

 By a petition for extraordinary writ, R.M. (Father) challenges an order made after 

an 18-month permanency review hearing terminating family reunification services and 

setting a permanency plan hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261

for his six-year-old daughter N.M. (the minor). The hearing is set for January 26, 2015. 

Father contends: (1) the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the Agency) failed to 

make reasonable efforts to provide him family reunifications services during his 

 1

 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
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incarceration; and (2) the court erred in failing to extend reunification services. We deny 

Father’s petition. 

II. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The parties have set out the details of the these proceedings at considerable length. 

We recite the facts and procedural history in abbreviated form, leaving out all 

nonessential facts with respect to the minor’s mother, who is not a party to this writ 

petition. 

 The then-three-year-old minor was made a dependent of the juvenile court after 

her parents tried to flee on foot from a stolen vehicle following a police pursuit that ended 

in a collision. Both parents were arrested for parole and probation violations, stealing a 

car, and for being in possession of a firearm. The minor’s parents had prior criminal 

histories and substance abuse issues. They also had a history of leaving the minor with 

multiple caretakers without making formal plans. At the contested 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing on January 18, 2013, the court took jurisdiction over the 

minor and found Father to be the minor’s presumed father. The court ordered that both 

parents receive reunification services. 

 The Agency’s “Status Review Report” prepared for the six-month review hearing 

indicated that Father was in minimal compliance with his case plan because he was 

incarcerated. Although Santa Rita Jail, where Father was incarcerated at the time, offered 

many programs, Father had to be isolated from other inmates because he was a former 

gang member. As a result, he was not able to participate in any of the programs available 

at the facility. The court received the Agency’s report into evidence, found that 

reasonable services had been provided by the Agency, and extended family reunification 

services to the parents. 

 At the 12-month report and review hearing, the Agency recommended that 

Father’s reunification services be terminated and that a permanent planning hearing be 

set. At the contested hearing, the Agency’s social worker testified that after Father left 

Santa Rita Jail, he was transferred to three different facilities. The social worker admitted 
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she had not yet had an opportunity to contact the counselor at Father’s current facility to 

determine whether there were programs that could help him engage in his case plan. The 

court decided not to follow the Agency’s recommendation to terminate Father’s 

reunification services, and instead extended reunification services to Father, finding he 

had not received reasonable reunification services. However, the court found that 

reasonable services had been provided to the minor’s mother and terminated her 

reunification services. 

 Commencing on March 6, 2014, the court heard argument on the matter of 

visitation between the minor and Father, who was still incarcerated. Over Father’s 

objection, the court found that visitation between the minor and Father would be 

detrimental based on the minor’s “age (5), the distance the child will have to travel for 

these visits (approx 6 hours of travel time) and the uncertain amount of visitation time 

available.” 

 At the 18-month report and review hearing, the Agency recommended that 

Father’s reunification services be terminated and that a permanency planning hearing be 

set. The permanent plan for the minor was continued placement with her maternal aunt 

and uncle, who were willing to become her legal guardians. The Agency’s report 

indicated Father was in partial compliance with his case plan. While incarcerated, Father 

had participated in the programs that were offered. However, Father had not participated 

in an inpatient substance abuse program or domestic violence counseling, which were 

two critical components of his case plan, because these programs were not available at 

the facility where he was incarcerated. 

 Father testified at the contested 18-month review hearing held on September 23, 

2014. He had just been released from prison on July 23, 2014. He testified that he 

participated in the following programs while incarcerated: mental health services, a 

parenting class that he was able to complete, and drug testing. Father also testified that 

he completed a 12-week anger management class, even though it was not a part of his 

case plan. Father testified that he did not want to enter an inpatient substance abuse 

treatment program because doing so would “hinder [his] opportunity to be able to work 
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and create a foundation,” which he believed was necessary “to get [his] daughter back.” 

Father also admitted he had not started a domestic violence program because he had “a 

lot on [his] plate.” 

 The court issued its decision on October 2, 2014, observing Father is “articulate, 

he’s intelligent, and he is sincere about wanting to reunify with his daughter.” However, 

the court pointed out that Father “was just released from prison 71 days ago. He just 

started working on his case plan to deal with the domestic violence and the substance 

abuse problems . . . .” The court decided not to extend services to the statutory 24-month 

maximum, which was only 31 days later. The court indicated “there has just not been 

enough time for the father to satisfy his requirements before the 24-month review.” The 

court terminated reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for 

January 26, 2015. 

 Father then filed this writ petition, seeking to set aside the orders made at the 

contested 18-month review hearing and requesting a stay of the upcoming permanent 

planning hearing. The Agency has filed opposition to Father’s petition. 

III. 

DISCUSSION

A. Reasonable Reunification Services Were Provided to Father 

Father contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that 

the Agency provided him reasonable reunification services during his incarceration. 

 Section 361.5 governs the provision of reunification services. Regarding 

incarcerated parents, it states in relevant part: “If the parent or guardian is incarcerated 

[or] institutionalized, . . . the court shall order reasonable services unless the court 

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the 

child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) “In determining the content of reasonable services, the 

court shall consider the particular barriers to an incarcerated . . . parent’s access to those 

court-mandated services and ability to maintain contact with his or her child, and shall 

document this information in the child’s case plan.” (Ibid.) “An incarcerated parent may 

be required to attend counseling, parenting classes, or vocational training programs as 
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part of the reunification service plan if actual access to these services is provided.” 

(Ibid.) 

 This court reviews the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable reunification 

services were provided or offered to a parent under the substantial evidence standard. 

(Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010 (Mark N.).) Thus, we view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Agency. (Ibid.) “[The Agency] ‘must 

make a good faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan. 

[Citation.] “[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the 

problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those 

problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service 

plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved 

difficult . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The standard is not whether the services provided 

were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were 

reasonable under the circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 

687, 697.) 

 Here, the Agency identified the problems leading to the minor’s dependency, 

including Father’s criminal background and chronic substance abuse, and the Agency 

devised a case plan to remedy these problems, which included inpatient drug treatment, 

counseling, parenting education, and domestic violence classes. 

Of the services that were available to Father while incarcerated, Father had 

participated in random drug tests, which were all clean. Father also enrolled in 

counseling and completed coursework in anger management. The social worker also sent 

parenting workbooks to Father, which he completed and returned to the social worker 

while incarcerated. Father testified that while he was incarcerated he completed a 

parenting course, mental health evaluation, anger management class, therapy and drug 

testing. Prior to Father’s release, the social worker sent Father information on a domestic 

violence program, substance abuse programs, as well as the contact information for a 

case manager at the drug court who might be able to help in finding suitable programs. 
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 While Father took advantage of the limited services offered to him in prison, and 

he should be commended for doing so, his lengthy incarceration prevented him from 

addressing many of the serious problems that led to the minor’s dependency. He faults 

the Agency for failing to “assist him in finding ways to meet his case plan” while he was 

in custody. However, courts have recognized that incarceration limits the reunification 

services that social workers can offer because the social services agency has no control 

over the services available within a custodial facility. (See Mark N., supra, 60 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1013; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1111 [social 

worker could do no more for incarcerated mother than contact her by letter and telephone 

and explain “the types of programs she could search for in prison”].) The programs 

available to state prisoners are typically what the prison provides. All a social worker can 

reasonably do is to learn what programs are available where an incarcerated parent is 

housed, and encourage the parent to take advantage of them. (Mark N., supra, at 

p. 1013.) The social worker in this case fulfilled her obligation by sending Father 

numerous letters setting out all of the services that were available to him at the prison and 

encouraging him to take advantage of them. 

 In attempting to pinpoint exactly what additional steps the Agency’s social worker 

could have taken to assist Father in complying with his court-ordered reunification plan 

during his lengthy period of incarceration, Father complains he was not provided 

visitation with the minor. He claims his ability to reunify with the minor was hampered 

because “visitation was not given even one chance in 22 months of incarceration . . . .” 

To the extent Father implies the Agency was legally obligated to arrange visitation 

between him and the minor, he is mistaken. Under section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), the 

Agency may offer visitation for an incarcerated parent “where appropriate.” After a 

contested hearing, the trial court held visitation was not appropriate because of the 

minor’s “age (5), the distance the child will have to travel for these visits (approx 6 hours 

of travel time) and the uncertain amount of visitation time available.” In light of the 

court’s findings, which were never timely challenged, Father made a good faith attempt 

to forge a relationship with the minor through sending her letters. Given Father’s place 
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of incarceration, this was the best the Agency could do. (See In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 

Cal.App.4th 1399, 1407, fn. 8 [“limiting contact to letters and telephone calls may well 

be appropriate where the parent is incarcerated some distance from where the minor 

resides”].)

 Following Father’s release from custody on July 23, 2014, more opportunities 

were available to fulfill the requirements of Father’s case plan, although by this time the 

statutory period for reunification was clearly running out. The social worker contacted 

Father’s parole agent and explained the requirements of Father’s case plan to him. The 

social worker and Father’s parole agent discussed appropriate programs that would help 

Father complete his case plan. Therapeutic visitation with the minor was initiated and 

was going well. The Agency provided Father with referrals for residential programs to 

address his drug addiction and referrals for parenting classes, but as Father acknowledged 

during his testimony at the 18-month hearing, he had not yet availed himself of those 

programs. 

When this record is reviewed, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that the reunification services the Agency provided to Father were reasonable 

given the circumstances. In reviewing an almost-identical case, the court in Fabian L. v. 

Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018, held: “Father’s case plan was the best it 

could be given his location and the length of his prison sentence. Father, not [the 

Agency], created these circumstances. He engaged in criminal activity . . . knowing he 

had a child to provide for and protect.” (Id. at p. 1032.) 

B. Extension of Reunification Services 

 Father next complains the juvenile court’s refusal to extend services beyond the 

18-month review hearing was an abuse of discretion. He argues he “was not given 

reasonable services in the beginning of this case as found by the court . . . . Extending 

service[s] to the 24 month mark will put father that much closer to him being able to have 

his daughter come home.” 

 The juvenile court may extend reunification services beyond 18 months from the 

date of initial removal, to “a maximum time period not to exceed 24 months after the date 
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the child was originally removed from physical custody of his or her parent . . . if it is 

shown . . . that the permanent plan for the child is that he or she will be returned and 

safely maintained in the home within the extended time period. The court shall extend 

the time period only if it finds that . . . there is a substantial probability that the child will 

be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent . . . within the extended time 

period, or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or guardian.” 

(§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4).) 

 The statutory scheme also contemplates the extension of services at an 18-month 

review hearing for up to 24 months to accommodate some incarcerated parents. (§ 361.5, 

subd. (a)(4).) Such an extension depends on several findings, including “clear and 

convincing evidence that the best interests of the child would be met by the provision of 

additional reunification services to . . . a parent recently discharged from incarceration, 

institutionalization, or the custody of the United States Department of Homeland 

Security” who is “making significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe home 

for the child’s return . . . .” (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) However, section 366.22 specifies that 

the permanency review hearing may not be held more than 24 months after the date the 

child was originally removed from the parents’ custody. (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) 

 As was recently pointed out in San Joaquin Human Services Agency v. Superior 

Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 215, 223, these two statutes have a common requirement. 

“[P]ursuant to sections 361.5, subdivision (a)(4) and 366.22, subdivision (b), 

reunification services could be extended only if the juvenile court found a substantial 

probability the minor would be returned and safely maintained in the home within the 

extended time period.” (Id. at p. 223, italics omitted.) No such finding was made in this 

case, and for good reason. 

 As the trial court noted, extending reunification services to the Father to the 24-

month deadline would only give him an additional 31 days of services. The court found 

because Father “essentially just start[ed] to deal with [his substance abuse and domestic 

violence] issues” approximately 21 months after he started receiving reunification 

services, there was “not a substantial probability that [the minor] would be returned to 
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[Father] by the 24-month hearing date.” On this record, the court’s denial of an extension 

of reunification services was fully supported by the evidence. 

IV. 

DISPOSITION 

 The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. The request for a stay is denied. 

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3), this opinion is made final 

forthwith. 
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 _________________________ 

 RUVOLO, P. J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

REARDON, J. 

_________________________ 

RIVERA, J.