alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 24

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY

         Each of the undersigned officers and/or directors of Too, Inc., a
Delaware corporation (the "Company"), hereby appoints Michael W. Rayden and Kent
A. Kleeberger as his or her true and lawful attorneys-in-fact, or any of them
individually with power to act without the other, as his or her true and lawful
attorney-in-fact, in his or her name and on his or her behalf, and in any and
all capacities stated below, to sign and to cause to be filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for
the fiscal year ended January 29, 2000, and any and all amendments thereto,
hereby granting unto said attorneys, and to each of them, full power and
authority to do and perform in the name and on behalf of the undersigned, in any
and all such capacities, every act and thing whatsoever necessary to be done in
and about the premises as fully as each of the undersigned could or might do in
person, hereby granting to each such attorney full power of substitution and
revocation, and hereby ratifying all that any such attorney or his substitute
may do by virtue hereof.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Power of
Attorney in counterparts if necessary, effective as of April 18, 2000.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
Signature                                                     Title

<S>                                                           <C>
/S/ MICHAEL W. RAYDEN                                         Chairman, President, Chief Executive Officer
-------------------------------------------------             and a Director
Michael W. Rayden                                             (Principal Executive Officer)


/S/ KENT A. KLEEBERGER                                        Vice President, Chief Financial Officer,
-------------------------------------------------             Secretary, and Treasurer
Kent A. Kleeberger                                            (Principal Accounting and Financial Officer)


/S/ NANCY J. KRAMER                                           Director
-------------------------------------------------
Nancy J. Kramer


/S/ DAVID A. KRINSKY                                          Director
-------------------------------------------------
David A. Krinsky


/S/ JAMES U. MCNEAL                                           Director
-------------------------------------------------
James U. McNeal


/S/ PHILIP A. MALLOTT                                         Director
-------------------------------------------------
Philip A. Mallott


/S/ KENNETH JAMES STROTTMAN                                   Director
-------------------------------------------------
Kenneth James Strottman
</TABLE>
#### Leon Sanders, Appellant, *v.*Favorable Realty Corporation, Respondent.

Argued January 11, 1943;

decided February 25, 1943.

*592
      *Alfred Sobol*for appellant.

*Alexander E. Rosenthal*and *Irving Segal*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
#### A. Edward EZOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Reva G. GOETZ; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55801

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

October 4, 2017

A. Edward Ezor, Pasadena, CA, pro se.

Jeffrey Squire, Law Office of Jeffrey Squire, Santa Barbara, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

**The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

A. Edward Ezor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from probate proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine. *Noel v. Hall,*341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine oyer Ezor’s claims against defendants Goetz, Aldrich, Hitching, and the Estate of H. Walter Croskey because these claims amounted to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior, final state court judgment. *See*
      *443
      *id.*at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under *Rooker-Feldman*when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”); *Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam,*334 F.3d 895, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2003) (due process claim against state court judge for bias was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision, and thus beyond the federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction). Contrary to Ezor’s contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine does not apply because Ezor did not allege any facts showing that he was prevented from presenting his claims in state court. *See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,*359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) *(Rooker-Feldman*doctrine does not apply if extrinsic fraud prevented a party from presenting his claim in state court).

We reject as unsupported by the record Ezor’s contentions that Magistrate Judge Rosenberg was biased and should have been disqualified.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Ezor’s request to strike the answering brief, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.

. Ezor’s motion for an order to interplead disputed funds (Docket Entry No. 11) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
ex10-2_051412.htm


 


EXHIBIT 10.2







[Letterhead of BCB Community Bank]







May 10, 2012







Thomas Coughlin, Chief Operating Officer


BCB Community Bank


104-110 Avenue C


Bayonne, NJ 07002








	
  

	
RE:

	
BCB COMMUNITY BANK/THOMAS







COUGHLIN/EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT







Dear Tom:







Pursuant to the vote of the Board of Directors ("Board") of BCB Community Bank ("BCB") at last night's Board meeting, please be advised that the Board, pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Employment Agreement between BCB Community Bank and Thomas Coughlin, dated as of July 6, 2010 ("Agreement"), has elected not to extend the term of the Agreement, and hereby gives you written notice of its non-renewal of the Agreement.







Thank you.








	  	
Very truly yours,


	  	  
	  	
/s/ John J. Brogan, Esq.


	  	  
	  	
JOHN J. BROGAN, ESQ.


	  	
GENERAL COUNSEL


	  	
BCB COMMUNITY BANK

















INTER-OFFICE DELIVERY


JBrogan/server/Executive Agreements.Letter to Tom Coughlin.5.10.12
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. William J. Maloney, Respondent, against Mark Graves et al., Constituting the State Tax Commission, Appellants.

Submitted January 18, 1943;

decided February 25, 1943.

Motion for reargument, stay and return of remittitur denied with ten • dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 289 N. Y. 178.)
Jacqueline TEODORO, Appellant, v. Emilio TEODORO, Appellee.

No. 3D17-830

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed June 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 28, 2018

John J. Anastasio (Stuart), for appellant.

David L. Margolesky, Miami, for appellee.

Before, EMAS, SCALES and LUCK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See**Watt v. Watt*, 966 So.2d 455, 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ("Shared parental responsibility assumes that the parties can come to agreement on the welfare of their children. Where the parties cannot and will not come to agreement, the trial court can determine that such an impasse constitutes a substantial change in circumstance, requiring modification of the final judgment in the best interest of the children. Because competent substantial evidence supports the trial court's determinations in this case, we affirm the final judgment of modification.").
#### In the Matter of Bernice Young, Appellant, against J. Wellington Roe, Respondent.

Argued April 19, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*824
      *John H. Mariano and Milton W. Deutsch*for appellant.

*Michael H. Grae*and *Jesse D. Berman*for respondent.

Order affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Finch, J.
Steven Duatell RICE v. STATE

CR-15-1480

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017 Reh. denied May 12, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
**Exhibit31.1**

CERTIFICATION

I, Richard Falcone, certify that:

1.       I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of Tasker Capital Corp.;

2.       Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.       Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.       The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:

(a)      designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)      [Intentionally omitted in accordance with SEC Release No. 33-8392]

(c)      evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(d)      disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.       The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions);

(a)      all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)      any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting.

 
| October 26, 2006         |
|--------------------------|
|                     |
| /s/ Richard  Falcone     |   |
| Richard Falcone          |
| Chief Executive  Officer |

 

----
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNRYGENERAL OF TEXAE 

AUSTIN 

Eonorable Ben 0. Oneal, Prerddrnt 

Mate Board of Bduoation 

Auetin, Tsxae 

bar sirr 

whiah you ask t 

above oaptioned 

a, Vernont8 knaotawa 

hereby @a,, 

olausb”* l 

You are interslrted in ths.inte p tati n ot the 

.provfdea rurther, that suoh fiu&r hfgh aohoel 

textbook8 shell be fumiahad trsr only to suah eahool 6tstenM 

aa maintain junior high 8ohool orgenieations, a& oertified 

by the proper oohool authoritierr to the State Board of 

Eduoation. *
Xonorabls Ben Oq Oneel, Prtmidont, Page 8 

Yo u l 8k wðer under the sbotr p u0wa seotion the 

Board of Eauostion nay adopt textbooks to be wed ror inrtruotlon 

In grades abots the junior hi&h sob001 levels. ~This sootion 

s~th~rtiee the SaOptf0S 0r tsttbooke o&y r0r junior high 

eohools. 'PO hold that it applieo to other sohools would be 

oontrery to the plain w0Mieg of th Statute. xt 18 ntdrsrt 

that grsdes above the junior h&h sohool lore18 would not bs 

per@ or the junior hii@ sahoolr It r0iiotte thitt yocr question 

must be SWJWS~a in the iM@QtiVS. 39 ‘hX. fW. 1%X. 

You also ask whether textbooks may ba sdoptrd fer 

eaes 

r 

seven, eight, and nine in sohoola not hsvb orgnniwd 

War hQh sahools. It 18 Our opfnlon that ual.ess 8junior 

high school is aUslnistretltsly sst up aaa operated as mob, 

8eo0lon 8 or Artlolo INMa has no appllortlon. It it Is ao 

#et up and Opttrated, than SOOtiOn a would apply to the adoption of tartbooks. JY it is not, t&on thr adoption of textbooks would be goreanad by other statutory provislons. See 

Artiolre 2813; pB44, SS44a, Ssotloa I+ 

/ 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

December 23, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 137426(14) Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137426 

 COA: 287977 

Washtenaw CC: 05-001189-FH 

DAVID KIRCHER,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s November 5, 

2008 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously. 

1215 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

December 23, 2008 

 Clerk
#### Julia G. JEDINY and John Jediny, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK and 71 Vesey Corp., doing business as Barclay Cafe, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 60, Docket 30463.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Oct. 6, 1966.

Decided Oct. 28, 1966.

*524Eric J. Byrne, New York City (J. Lee Rankin, Corporation Counsel of City of New York, and Seymour B. Quel, New York City, of counsel), for appellant, City of New York.

Isidor Stroll, New York City, for appellant, 71 Vesey Corp.

Alan Leonard Levy, New York City, for appellees.

Before SMITH, HAYS and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendants, City of New York and 71 Vesey Corp., appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding plaintiffs $20,000. Each defendant claims that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

This negligence action arose when the plaintiff Julia G. Jediny fell on an icy sidewalk sustaining a fracture of the ankle. The accident occurred when Mrs. Jediny, walking with two companions along a path that had been shovelled by an employee of 71 Vesey Corp., caught her heel in a hole in the sidewalk that had been concealed by a layer of ice.

Defendant, City of New York, contends that photographs introduced in evidence prove that the hole in the sidewalk was a trivial defect, too insubstantial to provide a basis for imposition of liability under New York law. See Beltz v. City of Yonkers, 148 N.Y. 67, 42 N.E. 401 (1895). However, the jury had before it not only the photographs, which are not conclusive, but also the testimony of witnesses describing the depression as a triangular hole at least ten inches along each side and four inches deep. There was thus ample ground for the jury to find that the hole was a major defect. Liability was properly imposed since by permitting the defect to exist the City had “neglected and failed to keep its public thoroughfares * * * in a condition reasonably safe for pedestrians.” Loughran v. City of New York, 298 N.Y. 320, 322, 83 N.E.2d 136, 137 (1948).

The City’s second contention, that there had been a series of such heavy snowfalls that it could not be held negligent in failing to clear the sidewalk of snow, is irrelevant since no effort was made to establish liability for failure to clear away the snow. The City’s liability is predicated entirely on the existence of the hole in the sidewalk.

71 Vesey Corp. contends that there is no evidence showing that it negligently contributed to the hazard which caused Mrs. Jediny’s injury. It is conceded that an employee of 71 Vesey Corp. had cleared a path early on the day the accident occurred, and there was evidence that this path led directly across the concealed hole. The jury was therefore justified in finding 71 Vesey Corp. had created a dangerous condition by its affirmative act; under New York law *525this is sufficient to establish liability. Green v. Murray M. Rosenberg, Inc., 186 Misc. 79, 50 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Sup.Ct.1944), aff’d mem., 269 App.Div. 819, 56 N.Y.S.2d 205 (App.Div. 1st Dept.), aff’d mem., 295 N.Y. 584, 64 N.E.2d 286 (1945).

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Alfonso HINAJOSA, also known as Alfonso Hinojosa, III, Alonso Honojosa, also known as Total-Out-Kast, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51314 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 9, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee Alfonso Hinajosa, Pro Se

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Alfonso Hinajosa, federal prisoner # 16411-380, moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. He seeks to challenge the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion in which he sought a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 782 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. We construe Hinajosa’s motion to proceed IFP as a challenge to the court’s certification that his appeal was not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into his good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and *363therefore not frivolous).” *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We review the denial of § 3582(c)(2) relief for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Henderson,*636 F.3d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 2011). Amendment 782, made retroactively applicable by Amendment 788, lowered the base offense levels in § 2D1.1(c) by two levels and has the effect of lowering Hinajosa’s total offense level to 25. With a total offense level of 25 and a Criminal History Category of V, Hinajosa faced an amended guidelines range of 100-125 months in prison. The district court sentenced Hinajosa to 80 months in prison, below the minimum of the amended guidelines range, based on the inadequacy of Hinajosa’s criminal history category. The district court therefore could not further reduce Hinajosa’s term of imprisonment because Hinajosa had not received a downward departure pursuant to a government motion to reflect his substantial assistance to authorities. *See*U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), (B), comment. (n.1(A)); *United States v. Leatch,*858 F.3d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 2017).

The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Hinajosa’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. *See Henderson,*636 F.3d at 717. Because the appeal lacks arguable merit and is therefore frivolous, Hinajosa’s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED. *See Howard,*707 F.2d at 220. Because the merits of Hinajosa’s appeal are so intertwined with the certification decision as to constitute one issue, his appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 & n. 24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Joseph Bernard FOWLER, also known as Eugene Bernard Fowler, also known as Joe Fowler, also known as Eugene Fowler, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mr. NFN WHITFIELD; Oliver Bell, Chairman of Texas Board of Corrections; Jamie Baker, Warden; Joe Milbern, Assistant Warden; Anthony Martinez, Captain; Alfreda Carreon, Captain; Sandra Tyra, Grievance Investigator II; B. Parker, Regional Director/Assistant, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-10465 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 18, 2017

Joseph Bernard Fowler, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

*393PER CURIAM: *

Joseph Bernard Fowler, Texas prisoner # 1812422, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights lawsuit as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. *See*28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). Although his brief repeats some of his allegations in the district court, he fails to-address the basis for the district court’s dismissal of his claims. We liberally construe pro se briefs, but “even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them.” *Mapes v. Bishop,*541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008). Fowler’s failure to point to any error in the district court’s ruling is in practical effect the same as if the judgment had not been appealed. *See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal as frivolous. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

The dismissal in the district court and our dismissal on appeal each count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See Adepegba v. Hammons,*103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court also dismissed Fowler’s complaints as frivolous in *Fowler v. Exec. Dir. of Pardons and Paroles,*No. 2:05-cv-00235 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2016), and *Fowler v. Exec. Dir. of Pardons and Paroles,*No. 2:05-cv-00249 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2016). Because he has accumulated at least three strikes under § 1915(g), Fowler is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. *See*§ 1915(g).

We deny Fowler’s motions for appointment of counsel, *see Ulmer v. Chancellor,*691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982), and his “omnibus motion questioning the court,” *see Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist.,*44 F.3d 362, 368 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995).

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS DENIED; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) BAR IMPOSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.