alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Patrick T. MAJOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IMORTGAGE.COM. INC., its Successors and/or Assigns; Does, 1-25 Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56016

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*424Submitted May 24, 2017*

Filed June 6, 2017

Patrick T. Major, Pro Se

Gregory Alan Davis, Esquire, Attorney, Squire, Sanders *&*Dempsey, LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Patrick T. Major appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action seeking declaratory relief under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); *Exp. Grp. v. Reef Indus., Inc.,*54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995) (motion to vacate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Major’s action as untimely because Major did not exercise his right of rescission under TILA within three years of when he consummated the loan transaction. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); *Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank,*523 U.S. 410, 412-13, 419, 118 S.Ct. 1408, 140 L.Ed.2d 566 (1998) (explaining that “§ 1635(f) completely extinguishes the right of rescission at the end of the 3-year period”).

The district court properly denied Major’s motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) because Major failed to establish grounds warranting relief. *See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa,*559 U.S. 260, 270-71, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010) (explaining that a judgment is not void “simply because it is or may have been erroneous,” rather, “Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard” (citations omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Regional Administrator, EPA Region 3

Mail Code 3RAOO

1650 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA

Subject: Certification of Classification as a Priority III Emergency Episode Plan Region

Qo%

Dear Mlsh:

DDOE submitted a letter to you on August 25, 2008, to address the requirements of Section 110(a)(2)(A)-

(M) ofthe Clean Air Act relevant to the PM2.5 national ambient air quality standards. A chart wasenclosed to identify those “infrastructure” requirements that we believe are already contained in theannual PM2.5 SIP revisions that have been submitted to but not yet approved by EPA. Included was

certification that Section 1 10(a)(2)(G), which addresses the significant harm levels and procedures for

state emergency episode plans established by EPA in 40 CFR Part 51.150, is in the SIP.

The requirement for a state to submit an emergency episode plan is based on a priority regionclassification. For PM2.5, the classification scheme that EPA is planning to propose would require a state

with a 24-hour PM2.5 concentration above 140.5 jiglm3 (using the most recent three years of data) to

develop an emergency episode plan. States that do not meet this threshold would be classified as PriorityIII and would not be required to develop an emergency episode plan for PM2.5.

PM2.5 monitors in the District show that PM2.5 concentration levels the past three years have been well

below the 140.5 jtg!m3 threshold (please see attached). EPA has determined that the District of Columbia

is a Class III Priority Area, and is not required to adopt an Emergency Episode Plan for PM2.5.Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at (202) 535-2600 or

Cecily Beall, Associate Director of the Air Quality Division, at (202) 535-2626.

Sincerely,

&47L1 R:EcEIVED

George S. Hawkins ‘$ r

Director

i

cc: Judith Katz, Director, Air Protection Division, EPA Region 3 Xl (3APIIO) Christina Fernandez, Air Quality Planning Branch, EPA Region 3

Cecily Beall, Associate Director, Air Quality Division, DDOE

Attachment (1)

51 N Street N.E., 6th Floor, Washington, DC 20002 (202) 535-2600 FAX (202) 535-2881
PM2.5 Monitoring Data in ug/m 3for the Past Three Years

(98tIPercentile for the Year)

Monitor 2005 2006 2007

River Terrace 36.2 35 32.8

Haines Point 36.4 33 28.7

McMiIlan 34.4 33.2 32.4

i::::]::::

DLsTRIc1’DFnRTMFNT 51 N Sheet, NE, 5th Fl., Washington, DC 20002 Phone: (202) 535-2250 Facsimile: (202)481-3771

OF TIlE ERO\MENT
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FE BRUARY 26, 2013

NO. 03

- 12

- 00585

- CV

S. M. M. and K. A. M., Appellant s

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 425TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PE MBERTON AND FIELD

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being

considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there wa s no error in the trial court’s

judgment: IT IS THEREFORE considered, adjudged and ordered that the judgment of the trial

court is in all things affirmed. It FURTHER appearing to the Court that appellant s have filed an

affidavit of inability to pay costs , it is FURTHER ordered that no costs of appeal be assessed

against appellant s ; and that this decision be certified below for observance.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

January 29, 2010 

y0125 

Order 

 

January 29, 2010 

138762(29) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 138762 

 COA: 288056 

Wayne CC: 04-006941 

PAUL ANTHONY DAVIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s October 26, 

2009 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
cc: Hon. Steve L. Dobrescu, District Judge Sears Law Firm, Ltd. Attorney General/Carson City White Pine County District Attorney White Pine County Clerk Matthew C. Bistline

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A 

### e
SkyPark Helicopters LLC. :i'l^:\}Jj.[^'Ol\ 

1608 West 2225 South - ' - ' tii/JIO! S 

Woods Cross, UT 84087 

--: .> iq AS : 33 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Docket Management System 

1200 New Jersey Ave, SE. 

West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140 

Washington, DC 20590 

July 13, 2011 

To Whom it May Concern, 

SkyPark Helicopters LLC. would like to petition for exemption in accordance with the 

FAA's requirements established under 14 CFR § 11.61-11.101 to allow our programs to 

be combined under the part 135 operation. 

(a) SkyPark Helicopters LLC. is located at 1608 West 2225 South, Woods Cross, UT 

84087. The phone number is (801) 824-9699. The email address is 

hiflhvelQcityaviatiQn@gmail.com. 

(b) SkyPark Helicopters LLC. wishes to seek exemption for section 14 CFR § part 120. 

The company would specifically like to request their 14 CFR part 135 to be exempt 

from establishing a separate drug/alcohol testing program from the already 

established part 91 program. 

(c) SkyPark Helicopters LLC. wishes to have the drug and alcohol testing program 

established for part 135 to be sufficient for part 91 work as well. The company 

would like one testing program for part 135 and part 91. 

(d) Tnts request would be a benefit to the public because SkyPark Heiicopters LLC. 

feels that the public would like to know that there is one great drug and alcohol 

testing program in effect. The public would know that we take pride in ensuring our 

pilots and staff members are drug and alcohol-free, it would be less assuring to the 

public to know that two drug and alcohol testing programs were in effect and that 

certain people were on certain programs. It would raise the question about whether 

or not the programs were equal. 

(e) Granting this exemption would allow SkyPark Helicopters LLC. to focus on the 

upkeep of one great drug and alcohol testing program. All pilots and staff members 

would be held accountable for the same safety and drug/alcohol-free standards. 

There would be no opportunities for any person to deviate from the established 

program. 

(f) SkyPark Helicopters LLC. seeks an exemption from regulation 14 CFR part 120, 

which states that each part 119 certificate holder with the authority to operate under 
parts 121 or 135, and air tour operators as defined in §91.147, must establish a drug 

and alcohol testing program. When a company conducts both part 135 operations 

and part 91 air tours, separate testing programs are required. SkyPark Helicopters 

LLC. requests an exemption to this and would like one testing program for parts 

135 and 91. 

(g) SkyPark Helicopters LLC. has no additional arguments. 

(h) SkyPark Helicopters LLC. does not wish for these exemption privileges to be valid 

outside of the Unites States at this time. 

Please feel free to contact SkyPark Helicopters LLC. with any additional questions. 

Thank you, 

Daniel Perry 

Owner 

SkyPark Helicopters LLC. 

LI-824-9699
FILED

September 28, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) For Publication

)

Appellee, ) Filed:

)

v. ) Madison County

)

DENNIS KEITH and ) Hon. Whit LaFon, 

TIMOTHY COLLINS ) Judge

) 

Appellants. ) No. 02-S-01-9604-CC-00035

DISSENTING OPINION

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s judgment that

the search warrant was properly supported by affidavit. In my

view, an “affidavit” which does not show on its face that it was

sworn to is no affidavit at all. Rather, it is merely an unsworn

writing.

The State attempts to correct this deficiency by

submitting proof that the supporting affidavit had been sworn. But

the fact remains that at the time of the search, the search warrant

was not “supported by affidavit” as required by Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-6-103 (1997), nor “supported by oath or affirmation” as

required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

If the occupant of the subject property had inspected the warrant

as it was being executed, he could have rightfully refused to allow

the search. The constitutional right to so refuse an unreasonable
2

search should not be later extinguished simply because the State

corrected its mistake after the fact.

The rule the majority promulgates today is closely akin

to the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule: as long as

law enforcement officers act honestly and reasonably, then the

fruits of their search will be admitted into evidence even though

the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. United

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed.2d 677

(1984). We have not yet addressed the good faith exception in

Tennessee, and I am wary of even the slightest, albeit oblique,

movement in that direction.

Therefore, I would follow Commonwealth v. Dozier, 366

N.E.2d 1270 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977). In that case, a statute

required that the affidavit supporting the search warrant be sworn

before a justice, special justice, clerk, or assistant clerk.

Because the jurat was unsigned, the seized evidence was held

properly suppressed. Id. at 1270. 

In conclusion, this Court once stated:

The use of printed forms has

made the procurement of a search

warrant the merest formality,

considering the fundamental

constitutional right which the

search invades. Certainly, this

Court can do no less than to require

that the few blank spaces be filled

in, and the other details of the

formality be carried out with care

and precision.

 
3

Everett v. State, 182 Tenn. 22, 28, 184 S.W.2d 43, 45 (1944)

(finding an affidavit deficient because the month was omitted from

the date of the alleged offense). Because I adhere to this

principle, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s

decision. I would find it necessary to suppress the evidence

seized pursuant to this defective search warrant. 

 _______________________________

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
The financial data schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted
from the December 31, 1999 balance  sheet and income  statement and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS

<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               Dec-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                   Jan-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                    Dec-31-1999
<CASH>                                              298,331
<SECURITIES>                                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       641,299
<ALLOWANCES>                                          4,836
<INVENTORY>                                               0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    934,794
<PP&E>                                              266,750
<DEPRECIATION>                                      111,666
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    1,510,236
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               450,905
<BONDS>                                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                               0
<COMMON>                                             66,275
<OTHER-SE>                                          991,591
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      1,510,236
<SALES>                                           2,283,533
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  2,283,533
<CGS>                                             1,531,924
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     1,531,924
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  1,008,012
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   (4,857)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (251,546)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        (35,980)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                (215,566)
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (215,566)
<EPS-BASIC>                                           (0.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (0.03)



</TABLE>
1

Kelly, Shaheerah

From: Kelly, Shaheerah

Sent: Monday, January 12, 2015 11:14 AM

To: dmallory@resolutenergy.com

Cc: Rios, Gerardo; Patrick Flynn; Kelly, Shaheerah

Subject: NHPA Compliance for McElmo Creek Unit PSD Permit Application

Dwight, 

Under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), EPA must take into account the effects of

its undertaking (e.g. the issuance of a PSD permit) on historic properties and afford the public an opportunity to 

comment before the agency may issue the PSD permit. Consultation is required for all undertakings that have 

the potential to affect historic properties. 

In order for the EPA to initiate the NHPA process pursuant to 36 CFR 800.3, we need your assessment of 

whether historic properties exist within the source’s area of potential effects. The assessment must include the 

information delineated in 36 CFR 800.4 and 800.5. In general, the assessment must identify the area of potential 

effects and the historic properties potentially affected by the undertaking, assess the undertaking’s effects on 

these properties, and, if needed, seek ways to avoid, minimize or mitigate any adverse effects on historic 

properties. This information is needed so that we can continue processing your PSD permit application. 

Additionally, we must complete the NHPA process prior to issuance of the final PSD permit. 

Please contact me as soon as possible regarding this matter. 

************************************ 

Shaheerah Kelly 

Permits Office, Air Division (AIR-3) 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9 

San Francisco, CA 94105 

Phone: 415-947-4156 

Fax: 415-947-3579 

Email: kelly.shaheerah@epa.gov
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AND STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR CORPAS INVESTMENTS, INC. A DEVELOPMENT
STAGE COMPANY, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         936,721
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                15,500
<PP&E>                                          99,612
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,110,216
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,719,134
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,600
<OTHER-SE>                                    (812,918)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,110,216
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               810,235
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              (1,317)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (808,918)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.09)


</TABLE>
[772 NYS2d 768]

#### In the Matter of Alan E. Fielitz, an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee of the Eighth Judicial District, Petitioner.

Fourth Department,

December 31, 2003

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Vincent L. Scarsella, Deputy Chief Counsel, Eighth Judicial District Grievance Committee,*Buffalo, for petitioner.

*Alan E. Fielitz,*Hamburg, respondent pro se.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

*75Respondent was admitted to the practice of law by this Court on February 20, 1979, and maintains an office for the practice of law in Hamburg. The Grievance Committee filed a petition charging respondent with acts of misconduct arising from his representation of a client in a matrimonial matter. Respondent filed an answer admitting the material allegations of the petition and appeared before this Court and submitted matters in mitigation.

Respondent admits that he prepared and mailed to opposing counsel fictitious income tax returns purporting to be returns prepared by his client knowing that the returns would be filed. He failed to disclose to the court, opposing counsel or his client that he falsified the returns and he made misrepresentations to his client to conceal that fact. His misconduct delayed the disposition of his client’s matter and subjected his client to potential sanctions for contempt of court.

We conclude that respondent violated the following Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

> DR 1-102 (a) (4) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [4])—engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;

> DR 1-102 (a) (5) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [5])—engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and

> DR 1-102 (a) (7) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [7])—engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness as a lawyer.

We have considered that respondent realized no profit as a result of his misconduct. Respondent, however, has submitted no genuine mitigating factors for consideration by this Court. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent should be suspended for one year and until further order of the Court.

Pine, J.P., Hurlbutt, Kehoe and Hayes, JJ., concur.

Order of suspension entered.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6218 

To provide for an overtime pay exception for protective services. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 3, 2023 

Mr. KEAN of New Jersey introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To provide for an overtime pay exception for protective 

services. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. OVERTIME PAY EXCEPTION FOR PROTECTIVE 

4 SERVICES. 

5 (a) COVERED EMPLOYEE DEFINED.—In this section, 

6 the term ‘‘covered employee’’ means any Diplomatic Secu7 rity special agent who performs protective services for an 

8 individual or event protected by the Diplomatic Service. 

9 (b) EXCEPTION TO THE LIMITATION ON PREMIUM

10 PAY FOR PROTECTIVE SERVICES.—Notwithstanding any 

11 other provision of law, and only to the extent that an apVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:26 Nov 11, 2023 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H6218.IH H6218

pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6218 IH

1 propriation is provided specifically in an appropriations 

2 Act for premium pay for a given calendar year in excess 

3 of the annual equivalent of the limitation on the rate of 

4 pay contained in section 5547(a) of title 5, United States 

5 Code, any covered employee may receive premium pay for 

6 overtime performed while conducting protective security 

7 functions. 

8 (c) TREATMENT OF ADDITIONAL PAY.—If subsection 

9 (b) results in the payment of additional premium pay to 

10 a covered employee of a type that is normally creditable 

11 as basic pay for retirement or any other purpose, that ad12 ditional pay may not— 

13 (1) be considered to be basic pay of the covered 

14 employee for any purpose; or 

15 (2) be used in computing a lump-sum payment 

16 to the covered employee for accumulated and ac17 crued annual leave. 

18 (d) AGGREGATE LIMIT.—With respect to the applica19 tion of section 5307 of title 5, United States Code, the 

20 payment of any additional premium pay to a covered em21 ployee as a result of subsection (b) shall not be counted 

22 as part of the aggregate compensation of the covered em23 ployee. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB