Filed 8/5/14 P. v. Ento CA2/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

MARK D. ENTO, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B249450 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. MA057919) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed. 

Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II, 

Steven E. Mercer, and Alene M. Games, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 

______________________________ 
2 

Appellant Mark D. Ento challenges his jury conviction of aggravated mayhem. 

He argues there was insufficient evidence the victim, Jessica Carranza, was permanently 

disfigured. We disagree and affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 

 On November 7, 2012, appellant accused Carranza, with whom he had two 

children, of infidelity. During the ensuing argument, he hit, kicked, and choked her, and 

he burned her with a hot iron. Carranza sustained burns to her left forearm and shoulder, 

and to her right wrist. She was treated at a hospital, given pain medication, and released 

within hours. She wore a bandage on her wrist for several days and had to change the 

bandages on her left arm and shoulder every day for two weeks. She was advised to see a 

specialist but did not do so. Photographs of the burns before the treatment and on the day 

after the attack were introduced at appellant’s trial in May 2013. Carranza showed the 

jury her scars and testified they had not changed in appearance “for a couple of months.” 

Appellant was convicted of aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205, count 1),1

corporal injury to child’s parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a), count 2), and torture (§ 206, count 3), 

as charged. As to counts 1 and 3, the jury found true allegations that appellant used a 

dangerous or deadly weapon, an iron. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)2 As to count 2, it found an 

alleged prior conviction under section 273.5 to be true. Appellant was sentenced to life 

in prison on count 1, and to consecutive terms of one year on the weapon enhancement 

for that count and four years on count 2. The sentence on count 3 and the enhancement 

for that count were stayed. 

This appeal followed. 

 1

 Subsequent references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. 

2

 Appellant was acquitted on count 4, dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), 

and the weapon enhancements on counts 2 and 4 were dismissed. 
3 

DISCUSSION 

 Appellant argues that aggravated mayhem requires injury of “a very serious and 

permanent nature,” and that the evidence is insufficient to support such an injury. “‘In 

reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts 

ourselves. Rather, we “examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is 

reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’” (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 198, 210.) 

Section 205 provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of aggravated mayhem 

when he or she unlawfully, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 

physical or psychological well-being of another person, intentionally causes permanent 

disability or disfigurement of another human being or deprives a human being of a limb, 

organ, or member of his or her body.” The disfigurement required for mayhem, whether 

aggravated (§ 205) or simple (§ 203),3

 must be permanent. (People v. Newby (2008) 167 

Cal.App.4th 1341, 1347.) The difference between the two kinds of mayhem is not in the 

type of disfigurement but in the intent with which it is inflicted, as aggravated mayhem 

requires a specific intent to cause the injury. (Ibid.) 

Appellant downplays the severity of Carranza’s injuries, suggesting they could not 

have been serious since she was released from the hospital within hours. The argument 

that section 205 requires a disfigurement resulting from “a very serious” injury is based 

on a misreading of People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999. There, the court rejected 

the engrafting of a “serious bodily injury” requirement onto the definition of simple 

mayhem in section 203. (Id. at p. 1010.) While the court recognized the existence of a 

 3

 Section 203 provides: “Every person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a 

human being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or 

cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of 

mayhem.” 
4 

common law requirement of permanent disfigurement under that section, it did not 

address how permanency may be established. (See ibid.) 

 Appellant suggests the permanent nature of a disfigurement may be established 

only through “medical or other expert witness testimony.” But expert testimony is not 

required on matters within the jury’s common experience, and it is not essential to 

establish the permanence of scars. (See Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); People v. 

McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 425–426; Sherman v. Frank (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 278, 

285.) Along the same lines, appellant argues Carranza’s testimony that her scars had 

remained unchanged for a couple of months was insufficient to establish that they would 

not improve in the future. “A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence 

rather than . . . a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.”’ [Citations.]’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1416–1417.) The jury 

could reasonably infer that Carranza’s scars would not improve any further. Such an 

inference is not speculative, based as it is on the visibility of the scars six months later 

and on her testimony that their appearance had not changed in months. 

Courts consistently have concluded that scars visible months after the injury may 

be considered permanent. (See People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1572 

[possible cosmetic alleviation does not preclude finding of permanent disfigurement];

People v. Keenan (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 26, 36, fn. 6 [cigarette burn scars remaining on 

victim’s breasts after three and one-half months “assume[d]” to be permanent]; Goodman 

v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 621, 623, 625 [scar observed on victim’s face at 

trial “probably permanent”].) Appellant quarrels with the formulation of the appellate 

court’s conclusion in People v. Keenan, arguing that, in effect, it created a “presumption 

of permanence” that reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof. The argument is 

inapposite because, here, the jury was properly instructed as to the prosecution’s burden 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged offenses. Thus, 

appellant cannot show that his conviction was based on a mandatory presumption rather 

than on a permissible inference. (See People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 131.) 
5 

To the extent appellant claims a violation of his due process rights, that claim fails 

for the same reasons. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.) 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 EPSTEIN, P. J. 

We concur: 

WILLHITE, J. 

EDMON, J.* 

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.