# Službeni list C 147/2014

| | ISSN 1977-1088 |
| --- | --- |
| Službeni list
  Europske unije | C 147 |
| | |
| Hrvatsko izdanje | Informacije i objave | 5716. svibnja 2014. |

ISSN 1977-1088

Službeni list

Europske unije

C 147

Hrvatsko izdanje

Informacije i objave

5716. svibnja 2014.

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| Obavijest br. | Sadržaj | Stranica |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Informacije |
| | INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE AGENCIES |
| | Europska komisija |
| 2014/C 147/01 | Pokretanje postupka (Predmet M.7000 – Liberty Global/Ziggo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2014/C 147/02 | Neprotivljenje prijavljenoj koncentraciji (Predmet M.7145 – Veolia Environnement/Dalkia International) (
  1
  ) | 2 |

Obavijest br.

Sadržaj

Stranica

II   Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE AGENCIES

Europska komisija

2014/C 147/01

Pokretanje postupka (Predmet M.7000 – Liberty Global/Ziggo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2014/C 147/02

Neprotivljenje prijavljenoj koncentraciji (Predmet M.7145 – Veolia Environnement/Dalkia International) (
  1
  )

1

2

| | IV   Obavijesti |
| --- | --- |
| | OBAVIJESTI INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Europska komisija |
| 2014/C 147/03 | Tečajna lista eura | 3 |
| 2014/C 147/04 | Mišljenje Savjetodavnog odbora o ograničavajućim sporazumima i vladajućem položaju Sastanak od 17. veljače 2014. o preliminarnom nacrtu odluke koja se odnosi na Predmet C.39398 Visa MIF – Izvjestiteljica: Malta | 4 |
| 2014/C 147/05 | Završno izvješće službenika za usmene rasprave – Visa MIF (AT.39398) | 5 |
| 2014/C 147/06 | Sažetak odluke Komisije od 26. veljače 2014. – Povezan s postupkom na temelju članka 101. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije i članka 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u (Predmet AT.39398 Visa MIF) (priopćeno pod brojem dokumenta C(2014)1199 završna verzija) | 7 |

IV   Obavijesti

OBAVIJESTI INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE

Europska komisija

2014/C 147/03

Tečajna lista eura

3

2014/C 147/04

Mišljenje Savjetodavnog odbora o ograničavajućim sporazumima i vladajućem položaju Sastanak od 17. veljače 2014. o preliminarnom nacrtu odluke koja se odnosi na Predmet C.39398 Visa MIF – Izvjestiteljica: Malta

4

2014/C 147/05

Završno izvješće službenika za usmene rasprave – Visa MIF (AT.39398)

5

2014/C 147/06

Sažetak odluke Komisije od 26. veljače 2014. – Povezan s postupkom na temelju članka 101. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije i članka 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u (Predmet AT.39398 Visa MIF) (priopćeno pod brojem dokumenta C(2014)1199 završna verzija)

(priopćeno pod brojem dokumenta C(2014)1199 završna verzija)

7

| | V   Objave |
| --- | --- |
| | POSTUPCI U VEZI S PROVEDBOM POLITIKE TRŽIŠNOG NATJECANJA |
| | Europska komisija |
| 2014/C 147/07 | Državne potpore – Republika Latvija – Državna potpora br. SA.36612 (2014/C) (ex 2013/NN) - neprijavljena potpora koju je Latvija dodijelila bankama Citadele i Parex – Poziv na podnošenje primjedaba u skladu s člankom 108. stavkom 2. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije (
  1
  ) | 11 |

V   Objave

POSTUPCI U VEZI S PROVEDBOM POLITIKE TRŽIŠNOG NATJECANJA

Europska komisija

2014/C 147/07

Državne potpore – Republika Latvija – Državna potpora br. SA.36612 (2014/C) (ex 2013/NN) - neprijavljena potpora koju je Latvija dodijelila bankama Citadele i Parex – Poziv na podnošenje primjedaba u skladu s člankom 108. stavkom 2. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije (
  1
  )

1

11

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Tekst značajan za EGP |

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(1)   Tekst značajan za EGP

1

| HR | |
| --- | --- |

HR

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II Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE AGENCIES

Europska komisija

| 16.5.2014 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 147/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 147/1

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Pokretanje postupka

(Predmet M.7000 – Liberty Global/Ziggo)

(Tekst značajan za EGP)

2014/C 147/01

Dana 8. svibnja 2014. Komisija je odlučila pokrenuti postupak u navedenom predmetu nakon što je utvrdila da prijavljena koncentracija potiče ozbiljne sumnje povezane sa svojom sukladnosti s unutarnjim tržištem. Pokretanjem postupka otvara se druga faza istrage povezane s prijavljenom koncentracijom kojom se ne dovodi u pitanje konačna odluka o predmetu. Odluka se temelji na članku 6. stavku 1. točki (c) Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (1).

Komisija poziva zainteresirane treće osobe da joj podnesu očitovanja o predloženoj koncentraciji.

Kako bi Komisija za vrijeme postupka u potpunosti uzela u obzir očitovanja, treba ih dostaviti Komisiji najkasnije 15 dana od datuma ove objave. Očitovanja se mogu poslati Komisiji telefaksom (+32 22964301) ili poštom, pri čemu je potrebno naznačiti referentni broj. M.7000 – Liberty Global/Ziggo, na sljedeću adresu:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  SL L 24, 29.1.2004., str. 1. („Uredba o koncentracijama”).

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| 16.5.2014 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 147/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 147/2

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Neprotivljenje prijavljenoj koncentraciji

(Predmet M.7145 – Veolia Environnement/Dalkia International)

(Tekst značajan za EGP)

2014/C 147/02

Dana 7. svibnja 2014. Komisija je donijela odluku da se ne protivi prethodno spomenutoj prijavljenoj koncentraciji te je ocijenila da je ona sukladna s unutarnjim tržištem. Odluka se temelji na članku 6. stavku 1. točki (b) Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (1). Puni tekst odluke dostupan je samo na engleskom jeziku, a objavit će se nakon što se iz njega uklone sve moguće poslovne tajne. Odluka će biti dostupna:

| — | na internetskoj stranici Komisije posvećenoj tržišnom natjecanju, u odjeljku za koncentracije (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Odluke o spajanju mogu se pretraživati na različite načine, među ostalim po trgovačkom društvu, broju predmeta, datumu i sektoru, |
| --- | --- |

—

na internetskoj stranici Komisije posvećenoj tržišnom natjecanju, u odjeljku za koncentracije (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Odluke o spajanju mogu se pretraživati na različite načine, među ostalim po trgovačkom društvu, broju predmeta, datumu i sektoru,

| — | u elektroničkom obliku na internetskoj stranici EUR-Lexa (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) pod brojem dokumenta 32014M7145. EUR-Lex omogućuje mrežni pristup europskom zakonodavstvu. |
| --- | --- |

—

u elektroničkom obliku na internetskoj stranici EUR-Lexa (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) pod brojem dokumenta 32014M7145. EUR-Lex omogućuje mrežni pristup europskom zakonodavstvu.

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(1)  SL L 24, 29.1.2004., str. 1.

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IV Obavijesti

OBAVIJESTI INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE

Europska komisija

| 16.5.2014 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 147/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 147/3

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Tečajna lista eura (1)

15. svibanj 2014.

2014/C 147/03

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Tečaj |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | američki dolar | 1,3659 |
| JPY | japanski jen | 139,17 |
| DKK | danska kruna | 7,4644 |
| GBP | funta sterlinga | 0,81520 |
| SEK | švedska kruna | 8,9740 |
| CHF | švicarski franak | 1,2227 |
| ISK | islandska kruna | |
| NOK | norveška kruna | 8,1050 |
| BGN | bugarski lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | češka kruna | 27,440 |
| HUF | mađarska forinta | 303,62 |
| LTL | litavski litas | 3,4528 |
| PLN | poljski zlot | 4,1792 |
| RON | rumunjski novi leu | 4,4328 |
| TRY | turska lira | 2,8466 |
| AUD | australski dolar | 1,4589 |
| CAD | kanadski dolar | 1,4845 |
| HKD | hongkonški dolar | 10,5882 |
| NZD | novozelandski dolar | 1,5786 |
| SGD | singapurski dolar | 1,7108 |
| KRW | južnokorejski von | 1 401,78 |
| ZAR | južnoafrički rand | 14,1337 |
| CNY | kineski renminbi-juan | 8,5090 |
| HRK | hrvatska kuna | 7,5910 |
| IDR | indonezijska rupija | 15 599,43 |
| MYR | malezijski ringit | 4,4064 |
| PHP | filipinski pezo | 59,797 |
| RUB | ruski rubalj | 47,4450 |
| THB | tajlandski baht | 44,333 |
| BRL | brazilski real | 3,0197 |
| MXN | meksički pezo | 17,6440 |
| INR | indijska rupija | 80,9842 |

Valuta

Tečaj

USD

američki dolar

1,3659

JPY

japanski jen

139,17

DKK

danska kruna

7,4644

GBP

funta sterlinga

0,81520

SEK

švedska kruna

8,9740

CHF

švicarski franak

1,2227

ISK

islandska kruna

NOK

norveška kruna

8,1050

BGN

bugarski lev

1,9558

CZK

češka kruna

27,440

HUF

mađarska forinta

303,62

LTL

litavski litas

3,4528

PLN

poljski zlot

4,1792

RON

rumunjski novi leu

4,4328

TRY

turska lira

2,8466

AUD

australski dolar

1,4589

CAD

kanadski dolar

1,4845

HKD

hongkonški dolar

10,5882

NZD

novozelandski dolar

1,5786

SGD

singapurski dolar

1,7108

KRW

južnokorejski von

1 401,78

ZAR

južnoafrički rand

14,1337

CNY

kineski renminbi-juan

8,5090

HRK

hrvatska kuna

7,5910

IDR

indonezijska rupija

15 599,43

MYR

malezijski ringit

4,4064

PHP

filipinski pezo

59,797

RUB

ruski rubalj

47,4450

THB

tajlandski baht

44,333

BRL

brazilski real

3,0197

MXN

meksički pezo

17,6440

INR

indijska rupija

80,9842

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(1)  Izvor: referentna tečajna lista koju objavljuje ESB.

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| 16.5.2014 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 147/4 |
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16.5.2014

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 147/4

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Mišljenje Savjetodavnog odbora o ograničavajućim sporazumima i vladajućem položaju Sastanak od 17. veljače 2014. o preliminarnom nacrtu odluke koja se odnosi na Predmet C.39398 Visa MIF

Izvjestiteljica: Malta

2014/C 147/04

| 1. | Savjetodavni odbor dijeli zabrinutost Komisije izraženu u nacrtu odluke koja mu je priopćena 5. veljače 2014. u skladu s člankom 101. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije („UFEU”) i člankom 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Savjetodavni odbor dijeli zabrinutost Komisije izraženu u nacrtu odluke koja mu je priopćena 5. veljače 2014. u skladu s člankom 101. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije („UFEU”) i člankom 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u.

| 2. | Savjetodavni odbor slaže se s Komisijom da se postupak povezan s poduzećem Visa Europe može zaključiti odlukom u skladu s člankom 9. stavkom 1. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Savjetodavni odbor slaže se s Komisijom da se postupak povezan s poduzećem Visa Europe može zaključiti odlukom u skladu s člankom 9. stavkom 1. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003.

| 3. | Savjetodavni odbor slaže se s Komisijom da su obveze koje je predložilo poduzeće Visa Europe prikladne, potrebne i razmjerne te bi za to poduzeće morale postati pravno obvezujuće. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Savjetodavni odbor slaže se s Komisijom da su obveze koje je predložilo poduzeće Visa Europe prikladne, potrebne i razmjerne te bi za to poduzeće morale postati pravno obvezujuće.

| 4. | Savjetodavni odbor slaže se s Komisijom da, s obzirom na obveze koje je ponudilo poduzeće Visa Europe, više nema osnove za djelovanje Komisije protiv poduzeća Visa Europe, ne dovodeći u pitanje članak 9. stavak 2. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Savjetodavni odbor slaže se s Komisijom da, s obzirom na obveze koje je ponudilo poduzeće Visa Europe, više nema osnove za djelovanje Komisije protiv poduzeća Visa Europe, ne dovodeći u pitanje članak 9. stavak 2. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003.

| 5. | Savjetodavni odbor zahtijeva da Komisija uzme u obzir sva ostala pitanja koja su bila predmet rasprave. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Savjetodavni odbor zahtijeva da Komisija uzme u obzir sva ostala pitanja koja su bila predmet rasprave.

| 6. | Savjetodavni odbor preporučuje da se njegovo mišljenje objavi u Službenom listu Europske unije. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Savjetodavni odbor preporučuje da se njegovo mišljenje objavi u Službenom listu Europske unije.

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| 16.5.2014 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 147/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 147/5

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Završno izvješće službenika za usmene rasprave (1)

Visa MIF (AT.39398)

2014/C 147/05

Uvod

| 1. | Nacrt odluke u skladu s člankom 9. stavkom 1. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 1/2003 (2) upućen je poduzeću Visa Europe Limited („Visa Europe”) i odnosi se na dio postupka u predmetu AT.39398 – Visa MIF. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Nacrt odluke u skladu s člankom 9. stavkom 1. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 1/2003 (2) upućen je poduzeću Visa Europe Limited („Visa Europe”) i odnosi se na dio postupka u predmetu AT.39398 – Visa MIF.

| 2. | Dana 6. ožujka 2008., nakon ispitnog postupka po službenoj dužnosti otvorenog 28. studenoga 2006., Komisija je pokrenula postupak u odnosu na utvrđivanje „višestrano dogovorenih naknada za razmjenu” („višestrane međubankovne naknade”) koje se automatski primjenjuju na prekogranične transakcije i u određenim slučajevima na transakcije na domaćim prodajnim mjestima koje se provode na području Europskog gospodarskog prostora (EGP) uporabom platnih kartica VISA. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dana 6. ožujka 2008., nakon ispitnog postupka po službenoj dužnosti otvorenog 28. studenoga 2006., Komisija je pokrenula postupak u odnosu na utvrđivanje „višestrano dogovorenih naknada za razmjenu” („višestrane međubankovne naknade”) koje se automatski primjenjuju na prekogranične transakcije i u određenim slučajevima na transakcije na domaćim prodajnim mjestima koje se provode na području Europskog gospodarskog prostora (EGP) uporabom platnih kartica VISA.

| 3. | Nakon prve obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama 2009. Komisija je 8. prosinca 2010. donijela prvu odluku u skladu s člankom 9. stavkom 1. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003 kojom se poduzeće Visa Europe obvezuje na određene obveze povezane s unutarregionalnim i nekim domaćim višestranim međubankovnim naknadama koje se primjenjuju na transakcije potrošačkim debitnim karticama s trenutačnom naplatom (3). Komisija je nastavila ispitni postupak koji se odnosi na višestrane međubankovne naknade za potrošačke kreditne kartice. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nakon prve obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama 2009. Komisija je 8. prosinca 2010. donijela prvu odluku u skladu s člankom 9. stavkom 1. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003 kojom se poduzeće Visa Europe obvezuje na određene obveze povezane s unutarregionalnim i nekim domaćim višestranim međubankovnim naknadama koje se primjenjuju na transakcije potrošačkim debitnim karticama s trenutačnom naplatom (3). Komisija je nastavila ispitni postupak koji se odnosi na višestrane međubankovne naknade za potrošačke kreditne kartice.

| 4. | Komisija je 31. srpnja 2012. poduzeću Visa Europe priopćila dodatnu obavijest o utvrđenim činjenicama u kojoj je izrazila preliminarno stajalište da se utvrđivanje sustava višestranih međubankovnih naknada i određenih povezanih pravila od strane Vise u pogledu transakcija koje se provode uporabom potrošačkih kreditnih kartica VISA, kada trgovac ima sjedište na području EGP-a, ne može izuzeti od zabrane utvrđene člankom 101. stavkom 1. UFEU-a i člankom 53. stavkom 1. Sporazuma o EGP-u. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Komisija je 31. srpnja 2012. poduzeću Visa Europe priopćila dodatnu obavijest o utvrđenim činjenicama u kojoj je izrazila preliminarno stajalište da se utvrđivanje sustava višestranih međubankovnih naknada i određenih povezanih pravila od strane Vise u pogledu transakcija koje se provode uporabom potrošačkih kreditnih kartica VISA, kada trgovac ima sjedište na području EGP-a, ne može izuzeti od zabrane utvrđene člankom 101. stavkom 1. UFEU-a i člankom 53. stavkom 1. Sporazuma o EGP-u.

Pristup spisu

| 5. | U kolovozu 2012. poduzeću Visa Europe dopušten je pristup spisu s pomoću odgovarajućeg DVD-a. Poduzeće je zahtijevalo daljnji pristup: 1. rezultatima ankete u kojoj su sudjelovale banke prihvatiteljice, a koju je 2010. provela Komisija („anketa banaka prihvatiteljica”), i 2. dokumentima koji se odnose na studiju koju je Komisija provela 2008. o „troškovima i koristima za trgovce povezanim s prihvaćanjem različitih načina plaćanja” („studija o troškovima”). |
| --- | --- |

5.

U kolovozu 2012. poduzeću Visa Europe dopušten je pristup spisu s pomoću odgovarajućeg DVD-a. Poduzeće je zahtijevalo daljnji pristup: 1. rezultatima ankete u kojoj su sudjelovale banke prihvatiteljice, a koju je 2010. provela Komisija („anketa banaka prihvatiteljica”), i 2. dokumentima koji se odnose na studiju koju je Komisija provela 2008. o „troškovima i koristima za trgovce povezanim s prihvaćanjem različitih načina plaćanja” („studija o troškovima”).

Pristup podacima ankete banaka prihvatiteljica u podatkovnoj sobi

| 6. | Kao odgovor na zahtjev poduzeća Visa Europe, Glavna uprava za tržišno natjecanje predložila je uspostavu odvojenih podatkovnih soba u kojima bi vanjski pravni savjetnici poduzeća Visa Europe imali pristup samo anonimnim kvalitativnim podacima koje su dale banke prihvatiteljice u okviru ankete banaka prihvatiteljica, a njegovi vanjski ekonomski savjetnici imali bi pristup samo kvantitativnim podacima. U skladu s time su vanjski pravni savjetnici poduzeća Visa Europe u siječnju 2013. dobili pristup dijelu podataka banaka prihvatiteljica o „prekograničnom prihvaćanju”. |
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6.

Kao odgovor na zahtjev poduzeća Visa Europe, Glavna uprava za tržišno natjecanje predložila je uspostavu odvojenih podatkovnih soba u kojima bi vanjski pravni savjetnici poduzeća Visa Europe imali pristup samo anonimnim kvalitativnim podacima koje su dale banke prihvatiteljice u okviru ankete banaka prihvatiteljica, a njegovi vanjski ekonomski savjetnici imali bi pristup samo kvantitativnim podacima. U skladu s time su vanjski pravni savjetnici poduzeća Visa Europe u siječnju 2013. dobili pristup dijelu podataka banaka prihvatiteljica o „prekograničnom prihvaćanju”.

| 7. | Međutim, kada je riječ o ostatku podataka banaka prihvatiteljica, poduzeće Visa Europe nije se složilo s Glavnom upravom za tržišno natjecanje u pogledu određenih pravila kojima se uređuju uvjeti pristupa podatkovnoj sobi te je u skladu s člankom 7. Odluke 2011/695/EU predmet uputilo meni. Poduzeće Visa Europe posebno me zatražilo: (a) da se njegovim vanjskim savjetnicima otkrije iz koje je zemlje svaka banka koja je sudjelovala u anketi banaka prihvatiteljica te (b) da se izmijeni pravilo prema kojemu vanjski pravni i ekonomski savjetnici imaju pravo pristupa samo kvalitativnim odnosno kvantitativnim podacima. |
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7.

Međutim, kada je riječ o ostatku podataka banaka prihvatiteljica, poduzeće Visa Europe nije se složilo s Glavnom upravom za tržišno natjecanje u pogledu određenih pravila kojima se uređuju uvjeti pristupa podatkovnoj sobi te je u skladu s člankom 7. Odluke 2011/695/EU predmet uputilo meni. Poduzeće Visa Europe posebno me zatražilo: (a) da se njegovim vanjskim savjetnicima otkrije iz koje je zemlje svaka banka koja je sudjelovala u anketi banaka prihvatiteljica te (b) da se izmijeni pravilo prema kojemu vanjski pravni i ekonomski savjetnici imaju pravo pristupa samo kvalitativnim odnosno kvantitativnim podacima.

| 8. | Zahtjev (a) sam odbio jer postoji ozbiljna opasnost da se davanjem informacija o matičnoj zemlji otkrije identitet banaka koje su sudjelovale u anketi. Isto tako, poduzeće Visa Europe nije dokazalo da su podaci o matičnoj zemlji tih banaka neophodni za ostvarivanje njegova prava na obranu. Kada je riječ o zahtjevu (b), zaključio sam da vanjskim pravnim i ekonomskim savjetnicima poduzeća Visa Europe treba omogućiti pristup svim podacima u podatkovnoj sobi jer se čini da predložena ograničenja pristupa u danim okolnostima nisu opravdana kako bi se sačuvali povjerljivi podaci te, s druge strane, s gledišta prava na obranu poduzeća Visa Europe važno je da se ekonomski i pravni savjetnici mogu međusobno savjetovati o dokumentima kojima imaju pristup. |
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8.

Zahtjev (a) sam odbio jer postoji ozbiljna opasnost da se davanjem informacija o matičnoj zemlji otkrije identitet banaka koje su sudjelovale u anketi. Isto tako, poduzeće Visa Europe nije dokazalo da su podaci o matičnoj zemlji tih banaka neophodni za ostvarivanje njegova prava na obranu. Kada je riječ o zahtjevu (b), zaključio sam da vanjskim pravnim i ekonomskim savjetnicima poduzeća Visa Europe treba omogućiti pristup svim podacima u podatkovnoj sobi jer se čini da predložena ograničenja pristupa u danim okolnostima nisu opravdana kako bi se sačuvali povjerljivi podaci te, s druge strane, s gledišta prava na obranu poduzeća Visa Europe važno je da se ekonomski i pravni savjetnici mogu međusobno savjetovati o dokumentima kojima imaju pristup.

Pristup dokumentima studije o troškovima

| 9. | Glavna uprava za tržišno natjecanje odbila je pravo pristupa dokumentima studije o troškovima jer smatra da ti dokumenti nisu dio spisa Komisije, da nisu upotrijebljeni niti se na njih upućuje u dodatnoj obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama te da ne sadržavaju oslobađajuće dokaze. Međutim, budući da su se natječajne specifikacije studije o troškovima odnosile na postupak protiv poduzeća Visa Europe te uzimajući u obzir definiciju u stavku 8. Obavijesti o pristupu spisu (4), zaključio sam da su dokumenti iz te studije dio spisa Komisije. Međutim, uočio sam da se poduzeću Visa Europe ne mora omogućiti pristup svim dokumentima. Korespondencija između Komisije i njezinih ugovaratelja o ocjeni rada ugovaratelja i financijskim aspektima studije, korespondencija o internim raspravama između Komisije i njezinih stručnjaka te ostali dokumenti preliminarne prirode čine interne (nedostupne (5)) dokumente. |
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9.

Glavna uprava za tržišno natjecanje odbila je pravo pristupa dokumentima studije o troškovima jer smatra da ti dokumenti nisu dio spisa Komisije, da nisu upotrijebljeni niti se na njih upućuje u dodatnoj obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama te da ne sadržavaju oslobađajuće dokaze. Međutim, budući da su se natječajne specifikacije studije o troškovima odnosile na postupak protiv poduzeća Visa Europe te uzimajući u obzir definiciju u stavku 8. Obavijesti o pristupu spisu (4), zaključio sam da su dokumenti iz te studije dio spisa Komisije. Međutim, uočio sam da se poduzeću Visa Europe ne mora omogućiti pristup svim dokumentima. Korespondencija između Komisije i njezinih ugovaratelja o ocjeni rada ugovaratelja i financijskim aspektima studije, korespondencija o internim raspravama između Komisije i njezinih stručnjaka te ostali dokumenti preliminarne prirode čine interne (nedostupne (5)) dokumente.

Rok za odgovor na dodatnu obavijest o utvrđenim činjenicama

| 10. | Poduzeće Visa Europe odgovorilo je na dijelove obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama u veljači 2013., pri čemu je Glavna uprava za tržišno natjecanje produžila početno razdoblje od 12 tjedana u kojemu se morao podnijeti odgovor. |
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10.

Poduzeće Visa Europe odgovorilo je na dijelove obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama u veljači 2013., pri čemu je Glavna uprava za tržišno natjecanje produžila početno razdoblje od 12 tjedana u kojemu se morao podnijeti odgovor.

Obveze

| 11. | Poduzeće Visa Europe podnijelo je 10. svibnja 2013. prijedlog za preuzimanje obveza kako bi otklonilo zabrinutost Komisije. Komisija je 14. lipnja 2013. objavila obavijest u skladu s člankom 27. stavkom 4. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003 (6) i primila odgovore od 17 zainteresiranih trećih strana. Poduzeće Visa Europe podnijelo je izmijenjeni prijedlog za preuzimanje obveza u studenome 2013. |
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11.

Poduzeće Visa Europe podnijelo je 10. svibnja 2013. prijedlog za preuzimanje obveza kako bi otklonilo zabrinutost Komisije. Komisija je 14. lipnja 2013. objavila obavijest u skladu s člankom 27. stavkom 4. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003 (6) i primila odgovore od 17 zainteresiranih trećih strana. Poduzeće Visa Europe podnijelo je izmijenjeni prijedlog za preuzimanje obveza u studenome 2013.

| 12. | Nacrtom odluke Komisije ponuđene su obveze za poduzeće Visa Europe obvezujuće u razdoblju od četiri godine. U toj se odluci u biti zaključuje da više nema osnove za mjere u pogledu višestranih međubankovnih naknada koje je odredilo poduzeće Visa Europe, a koje se odnose na transakcije provedene na području EGP-a uporabom potrošačkih platnih kartica VISA te poštujući pravila poduzeća Visa Europe o prekograničnom prihvaćanju kartica. |
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12.

Nacrtom odluke Komisije ponuđene su obveze za poduzeće Visa Europe obvezujuće u razdoblju od četiri godine. U toj se odluci u biti zaključuje da više nema osnove za mjere u pogledu višestranih međubankovnih naknada koje je odredilo poduzeće Visa Europe, a koje se odnose na transakcije provedene na području EGP-a uporabom potrošačkih platnih kartica VISA te poštujući pravila poduzeća Visa Europe o prekograničnom prihvaćanju kartica.

| 13. | Ni od koje strane nisam primio ni zahtjev ni pritužbu u pogledu postupka povezanog s predloženim obvezama (7). |
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13.

Ni od koje strane nisam primio ni zahtjev ni pritužbu u pogledu postupka povezanog s predloženim obvezama (7).

| 14. | S obzirom na sve navedeno smatram da je svim stranama omogućeno djelotvorno ostvarenje njihovih postupovnih prava. |
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14.

S obzirom na sve navedeno smatram da je svim stranama omogućeno djelotvorno ostvarenje njihovih postupovnih prava.

Bruxelles, 19. veljače 2014.

Wouter WILS

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(1)  U skladu s člancima 16. i 17. Odluke 2011/695/EU predsjednika Europske komisije od 13. listopada 2011. o funkciji i opisu posla službenika za usmene rasprave u određenim postupcima tržišnog natjecanja (SL L 275, 20.10.2011., str. 29.) („Odluka 2011/695/EU”).

1

(2)  Uredba Vijeća (EZ) br. 1/2003 od 16. prosinca 2002. o provedbi pravila o tržišnom natjecanju koja su propisana člancima 81. i 82. Ugovora (SL L 1 4.1.2003., str. 1.).

2

(3)  Pogledajte moje završno izvješće od 26. studenoga 2010. (SL C 79, 12.3.2011., str. 6.).

3

(4)  Obavijest Komisije o pravilima uvida u spis Komisije u predmetima koji se vode u skladu s člancima 81. i 82. Ugovora o EZ-u, člancima 53., 54. i 57. Sporazuma o EGP-u i Uredbom Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (SL C 325, 22.12.2005., str. 7.).

4

(5)  Obavijest o pristupu spisu, stavak 12.

5

(6)  Komunikacija Komisije objavljena u skladu s člankom 27. stavkom 4. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 1/2003 u predmetu AT.39398 – Visa MIF (SL C 168, 14.6.2013., str. 22.).

6

(7)  U skladu s člankom 15. stavkom 1. Odluke 2011/695/EU, stranke u postupku koje nude preuzimanje obveza u skladu s člankom 9. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003 mogu se obratiti službeniku za usmene rasprave u svakoj fazi postupka kako bi osigurale djelotvorno ostvarenje svojih postupovnih prava.

7

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| 16.5.2014 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 147/7 |
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16.5.2014

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 147/7

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Sažetak odluke Komisije

od 26. veljače 2014.

Povezan s postupkom na temelju članka 101. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije i članka 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u

(Predmet AT.39398 Visa MIF)

(priopćeno pod brojem dokumenta C(2014)1199 završna verzija)

(Vjerodostojan je SAMO TEKST NA ENGLESKOM JEZIKU)

2014/C 147/06

Komisija je 26. veljače 2014. donijela odluku povezanu s postupkom na temelju članka 101. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije i članka 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u. U skladu s odredbama članka 30. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 1/2003 (1)

  , Komisija u ovom sažetku objavljuje imena stranaka i glavni sadržaj odluke, uključujući sve izrečene kazne, uzimajući u obzir zakoniti interes poduzetnika da štite svoje poslovne tajne.

| (1) | Ovaj predmet odnosi se na utvrđivanje višestranih međubankovnih naknada („VMB”) koje je poduzeće Visa Europe Limited („Visa Europe”) utvrdilo za regionalne transakcije, određene domaće transakcije na prodajnom mjestu („POS”) (2) i POS transakcije s potrošačkim kreditnim i debitnim Visa karticama izdanima u državama izvan EGP-a koje se nalaze unutar područja Visa Europe (3) te na pravila povezana s prekograničnim prihvaćanjem. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ovaj predmet odnosi se na utvrđivanje višestranih međubankovnih naknada („VMB”) koje je poduzeće Visa Europe Limited („Visa Europe”) utvrdilo za regionalne transakcije, određene domaće transakcije na prodajnom mjestu („POS”) (2) i POS transakcije s potrošačkim kreditnim i debitnim Visa karticama izdanima u državama izvan EGP-a koje se nalaze unutar područja Visa Europe (3) te na pravila povezana s prekograničnim prihvaćanjem.

1.   PRELIMINARNA PITANJA POVEZANA S TRŽIŠNIM NATJECANJEM

| (2) | Komisija je u svojoj Obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama od 3. travnja 2009. („Obavijest o utvrđenim činjenicama”) donijela privremeni zaključak da je utvrđivanjem višestranih međubankovnih naknada poduzeće Visa Europe prekršilo članak 101. Ugovora i članak 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u. |
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(2)

Komisija je u svojoj Obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama od 3. travnja 2009. („Obavijest o utvrđenim činjenicama”) donijela privremeni zaključak da je utvrđivanjem višestranih međubankovnih naknada poduzeće Visa Europe prekršilo članak 101. Ugovora i članak 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u.

| (3) | Komisija je 8. prosinca 2010. donijela odluku u skladu s člankom 9. Uredbe br. 1/2003 („Odluka o obvezama povezanima s debitnim karticama”). Tom Odlukom Komisija je pravno obvezala poduzeće Visa Europe da tijekom četiri godine i. ponderirane prosječne višestrane međubankovne naknade za transakcije s debitnim karticama obuhvaćene postupkom ograniči na 0,20 % i ii. zadrži i/ili uvede brojne promjene pravila unutar svoje mreže. |
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(3)

Komisija je 8. prosinca 2010. donijela odluku u skladu s člankom 9. Uredbe br. 1/2003 („Odluka o obvezama povezanima s debitnim karticama”). Tom Odlukom Komisija je pravno obvezala poduzeće Visa Europe da tijekom četiri godine i. ponderirane prosječne višestrane međubankovne naknade za transakcije s debitnim karticama obuhvaćene postupkom ograniči na 0,20 % i ii. zadrži i/ili uvede brojne promjene pravila unutar svoje mreže.

| (4) | Komisija je u Dodatnoj obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama od 31. srpnja 2012. („Dodatna obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama”) preoblikovala i dodatno razradila svoje prigovore u pogledu višestranih međubankovnih naknada („VMN”) za transakcije s kreditnim karticama. Proširila je i područje primjene postupka na izravnu primjenu međuregionalnih (ili međunarodnih) višestranih međubankovnih naknada na trgovce s poslovnim nastanom u EGP-u i donijela preliminarno stajalište da se pravilima poduzeća Visa Europe o prekograničnom prihvaćanju krši članak 101. Ugovora i članak 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u. |
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(4)

Komisija je u Dodatnoj obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama od 31. srpnja 2012. („Dodatna obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama”) preoblikovala i dodatno razradila svoje prigovore u pogledu višestranih međubankovnih naknada („VMN”) za transakcije s kreditnim karticama. Proširila je i područje primjene postupka na izravnu primjenu međuregionalnih (ili međunarodnih) višestranih međubankovnih naknada na trgovce s poslovnim nastanom u EGP-u i donijela preliminarno stajalište da se pravilima poduzeća Visa Europe o prekograničnom prihvaćanju krši članak 101. Ugovora i članak 53. Sporazuma o EGP-u.

| (5) | Za svaku transakciju izvršenu kartičnim plaćanjem na prodajnom mjestu banka trgovca („prihvatitelj”) plaća banci vlasnika kartice („izdavatelj”) naknadu za razmjenu. Kad vlasnik kartice pri kupnji robe ili usluga od trgovca upotrijebi karticu, trgovac ustvari plaća naknadu svojem prihvatitelju. Prihvatitelj zadržava dio te naknade (marža prihvatitelja), dio pripada izdavatelju (višestrana međubankovna naknada), a mali dio pripada upravitelju sustava (u ovom slučaju poduzeće Visa). U praksi je veliki dio naknade koja se zaračunava trgovcima određen višestranim međubankovnim naknadama. |
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(5)

Za svaku transakciju izvršenu kartičnim plaćanjem na prodajnom mjestu banka trgovca („prihvatitelj”) plaća banci vlasnika kartice („izdavatelj”) naknadu za razmjenu. Kad vlasnik kartice pri kupnji robe ili usluga od trgovca upotrijebi karticu, trgovac ustvari plaća naknadu svojem prihvatitelju. Prihvatitelj zadržava dio te naknade (marža prihvatitelja), dio pripada izdavatelju (višestrana međubankovna naknada), a mali dio pripada upravitelju sustava (u ovom slučaju poduzeće Visa). U praksi je veliki dio naknade koja se zaračunava trgovcima određen višestranim međubankovnim naknadama.

| (6) | U preliminarnoj ocjeni izražena je zabrinutost da je cilj i učinak višestranih međubankovnih naknada znatno ograničenje tržišnog natjecanja na tržištima prihvatitelja na štetu trgovaca, a neizravno i njihovih klijenata. Čini se da se višestranim međubankovnim naknadama, stvaranjem važnog elementa troška za sve prihvatitelje, umjetno povećava osnova na kojoj prihvatitelji određuju naknade koje se primjenjuju na trgovce. Prema preliminarnoj ocjeni Komisije višestrane međubankovne naknade poduzeća Visa Europe nisu objektivno potrebne. Ograničavajući učinak na tržištima prihvatitelja dodatno je ojačan učinkom višestranih međubankovnih naknada na tržišta mreža i izdavatelja kao i drugim mrežnim pravilima i praksama, posebice pravilom o prihvaćanju svih kartica (HACR), pravilom o nediskriminaciji, praksom izjednačavanja naknada (4) i segmentacijom tržištâ prihvatitelja uzrokovanom pravilima kojima se ograničava prekogranično prihvaćanje (5). Nadalje je u Obavijest i Dodatnoj obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama navedeno da višestrane međubankovne naknadne ne ispunjavaju uvjete za izuzeće u skladu s člankom 101. stavkom 3. Ugovora u kojem je riječ o povećanju učinkovitosti pri čemu se potrošačima omogućuje pravedan udio u koristi koja iz toga proizlazi. |
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(6)

U preliminarnoj ocjeni izražena je zabrinutost da je cilj i učinak višestranih međubankovnih naknada znatno ograničenje tržišnog natjecanja na tržištima prihvatitelja na štetu trgovaca, a neizravno i njihovih klijenata. Čini se da se višestranim međubankovnim naknadama, stvaranjem važnog elementa troška za sve prihvatitelje, umjetno povećava osnova na kojoj prihvatitelji određuju naknade koje se primjenjuju na trgovce. Prema preliminarnoj ocjeni Komisije višestrane međubankovne naknade poduzeća Visa Europe nisu objektivno potrebne. Ograničavajući učinak na tržištima prihvatitelja dodatno je ojačan učinkom višestranih međubankovnih naknada na tržišta mreža i izdavatelja kao i drugim mrežnim pravilima i praksama, posebice pravilom o prihvaćanju svih kartica (HACR), pravilom o nediskriminaciji, praksom izjednačavanja naknada (4) i segmentacijom tržištâ prihvatitelja uzrokovanom pravilima kojima se ograničava prekogranično prihvaćanje (5). Nadalje je u Obavijest i Dodatnoj obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama navedeno da višestrane međubankovne naknadne ne ispunjavaju uvjete za izuzeće u skladu s člankom 101. stavkom 3. Ugovora u kojem je riječ o povećanju učinkovitosti pri čemu se potrošačima omogućuje pravedan udio u koristi koja iz toga proizlazi.

| (7) | Za prekogranične prihvatitelje u sustavu Visa Europe vrijedi pravilo da se primjenjuju višestrane međubankovne naknade koje se primjenjuju u zemlji transakcije. U skladu s tim pravilom prekogranični prihvatitelji moraju primjenjivati kao zadane naknade višestrane međubankovne naknade specifične za pojedinu zemlju, intraragionalne ili registrirane domaće višestrane međubankovne naknade. Izdavatelji i prihvatitelji u zemlji transakcije koji su članovi sustava Visa i prekogranični prihvatitelji mogu odstupiti od domaćih višestranih međubankovnih naknada ili višestranih međubankovnih naknada specifičnih za pojedinu zemlju sklapanjem dvostranih sporazuma koji obuhvaćaju niže naknade za razmjenu ili ih ukidaju. Međutim, prekogranični prihvatitelji mogu se naći u nepovoljnom položaju ako žele sklopiti dvostrani sporazum te vrste jer vjerojatno neće imati snažne veze s domaćim izdavateljima. U zemljama u kojima postoje znatni dvostrani sporazumi koji obuhvaćaju domaće prihvatitelje, za prekogranične prihvatitelje obično vrijede veće domaće višestrane međubankovne naknade specifične za pojedinu zemlju, intraragionalne ili registrirane domaće višestrane međubankovne naknade. To se pravilo smatra i teritorijalnim i cjenovnim ograničenjem prema cilju i učinku, što prihvatitelje u zemljama u kojima su višestrane međubankovne naknade niže onemogućuje u pružanju usluga u drugim zemljama po cijenama koje odražavaju njihove niske višestrane međubankovne naknade. U svjetlu ostvarenja unutarnjeg tržišta plaćanja to je vrlo ozbiljno ograničenje koje se čini neopravdano. Takva umjetna podjela tržišta prihvatitelja šteti potrošačima jer su trgovci za usluge prihvaćanja prisiljeni plaćati više cijene. Stoga je Komisija u Dodatnoj obavijest o utvrđenim činjenicama došla do preliminarnog zaključka da je cilj i sadržaj ovog pravila održavanje segmentacije nacionalnih tržišta ograničavanjem ulaska i tržišnog natjecanja prekograničnih prihvatitelja. |
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(7)

Za prekogranične prihvatitelje u sustavu Visa Europe vrijedi pravilo da se primjenjuju višestrane međubankovne naknade koje se primjenjuju u zemlji transakcije. U skladu s tim pravilom prekogranični prihvatitelji moraju primjenjivati kao zadane naknade višestrane međubankovne naknade specifične za pojedinu zemlju, intraragionalne ili registrirane domaće višestrane međubankovne naknade. Izdavatelji i prihvatitelji u zemlji transakcije koji su članovi sustava Visa i prekogranični prihvatitelji mogu odstupiti od domaćih višestranih međubankovnih naknada ili višestranih međubankovnih naknada specifičnih za pojedinu zemlju sklapanjem dvostranih sporazuma koji obuhvaćaju niže naknade za razmjenu ili ih ukidaju. Međutim, prekogranični prihvatitelji mogu se naći u nepovoljnom položaju ako žele sklopiti dvostrani sporazum te vrste jer vjerojatno neće imati snažne veze s domaćim izdavateljima. U zemljama u kojima postoje znatni dvostrani sporazumi koji obuhvaćaju domaće prihvatitelje, za prekogranične prihvatitelje obično vrijede veće domaće višestrane međubankovne naknade specifične za pojedinu zemlju, intraragionalne ili registrirane domaće višestrane međubankovne naknade. To se pravilo smatra i teritorijalnim i cjenovnim ograničenjem prema cilju i učinku, što prihvatitelje u zemljama u kojima su višestrane međubankovne naknade niže onemogućuje u pružanju usluga u drugim zemljama po cijenama koje odražavaju njihove niske višestrane međubankovne naknade. U svjetlu ostvarenja unutarnjeg tržišta plaćanja to je vrlo ozbiljno ograničenje koje se čini neopravdano. Takva umjetna podjela tržišta prihvatitelja šteti potrošačima jer su trgovci za usluge prihvaćanja prisiljeni plaćati više cijene. Stoga je Komisija u Dodatnoj obavijest o utvrđenim činjenicama došla do preliminarnog zaključka da je cilj i sadržaj ovog pravila održavanje segmentacije nacionalnih tržišta ograničavanjem ulaska i tržišnog natjecanja prekograničnih prihvatitelja.

2.   ODLUKA O PREUZIMANJU OBVEZA

| (8) | Poduzeće Visa Europe ponudilo je 10. svibnja 2013. preuzimanje obveza na temelju članka 9. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003 kojima se obvezuje otkloniti sumnju u narušavanje tržišnog natjecanja iz preliminarne ocjene Komisije. |
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(8)

Poduzeće Visa Europe ponudilo je 10. svibnja 2013. preuzimanje obveza na temelju članka 9. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003 kojima se obvezuje otkloniti sumnju u narušavanje tržišnog natjecanja iz preliminarne ocjene Komisije.

| (9) | Dana 14. lipnja 2013. u Službenom listu Europske unije objavljena je obavijest u skladu s člankom 27. stavkom 4. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003. koja je sadržavala sažetak predmeta i predloženih obveza te poziv zainteresiranim trećim stranama da očitovanja o obvezama dostave u roku od mjesec dana od objave. Komisija je 30. kolovoza 2013. obavijestila poduzeće Visa Europe o primjedbama primljenima od zainteresiranih trećih strana nakon objavljivanja obavijesti. Poduzeće Visa Europe dostavilo je izmijenjene obveze 5. studenoga 2013. |
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(9)

Dana 14. lipnja 2013. u Službenom listu Europske unije objavljena je obavijest u skladu s člankom 27. stavkom 4. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003. koja je sadržavala sažetak predmeta i predloženih obveza te poziv zainteresiranim trećim stranama da očitovanja o obvezama dostave u roku od mjesec dana od objave. Komisija je 30. kolovoza 2013. obavijestila poduzeće Visa Europe o primjedbama primljenima od zainteresiranih trećih strana nakon objavljivanja obavijesti. Poduzeće Visa Europe dostavilo je izmijenjene obveze 5. studenoga 2013.

| (10) | Komisija je 26. veljače 2014. na temelju članka 9. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003 donijela odluku da izmijenjene obveze postaju obvezujuće za poduzeće Visa Europe u razdoblju od četiri godine. Glavni sadržaj obveza sažeto je prikazan u nastavku:






  (a) | Poduzeće Visa Europe obvezuje se da će dva mjeseca nakon službene obavijesti o odluci o preuzimanju obveza upućene poduzeću Visa Europe svoje godišnje ponderirane prosječne višestrane međubankovne naknade unutar EGP-a za transakcije s potrošačkim kreditnim karticama ograničiti na 0,3 %; |
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(10)

Komisija je 26. veljače 2014. na temelju članka 9. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1/2003 donijela odluku da izmijenjene obveze postaju obvezujuće za poduzeće Visa Europe u razdoblju od četiri godine. Glavni sadržaj obveza sažeto je prikazan u nastavku:

(a)

Poduzeće Visa Europe obvezuje se da će dva mjeseca nakon službene obavijesti o odluci o preuzimanju obveza upućene poduzeću Visa Europe svoje godišnje ponderirane prosječne višestrane međubankovne naknade unutar EGP-a za transakcije s potrošačkim kreditnim karticama ograničiti na 0,3 %;

| (b) | Ograničenje će dvije godine nakon službene obavijesti o odluci o preuzimanju obveza vrijediti i u svim državama EGP-a u kojima poduzeće Visa Europe izravno utvrđuje posebne višestrane međubankovne naknade za domaće transakcije s potrošačkim kreditnim karticama i u onim državama EGP-a u kojima se na domaće transakcije primjenjuju višestrane međubankovne naknade unutar EGP-a jer druge višestrane međubankovne naknade ne postoje. |
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(b)

Ograničenje će dvije godine nakon službene obavijesti o odluci o preuzimanju obveza vrijediti i u svim državama EGP-a u kojima poduzeće Visa Europe izravno utvrđuje posebne višestrane međubankovne naknade za domaće transakcije s potrošačkim kreditnim karticama i u onim državama EGP-a u kojima se na domaće transakcije primjenjuju višestrane međubankovne naknade unutar EGP-a jer druge višestrane međubankovne naknade ne postoje.

| (c) | Poduzeće Visa Europe također se obvezuje da će od 1. siječnja 2015.:






  — | ograničenje višestranih međubankovnih naknada za transakcije s kreditnim karticama na 0,3 % vrijediti za sve višestrane međubankovne naknade koje poduzeće Visa Europe utvrđuje za transakcije s trgovcima s poslovnim nastanom unutar EGP-a koje su provedene potrošačkim kreditnim karticama Visa izdanima u državama koje ne pripadaju EGP-u, ali pripadaju sustavu Visa Europe (6), te |
| --- | --- | --- |

(c)

Poduzeće Visa Europe također se obvezuje da će od 1. siječnja 2015.:

—

ograničenje višestranih međubankovnih naknada za transakcije s kreditnim karticama na 0,3 % vrijediti za sve višestrane međubankovne naknade koje poduzeće Visa Europe utvrđuje za transakcije s trgovcima s poslovnim nastanom unutar EGP-a koje su provedene potrošačkim kreditnim karticama Visa izdanima u državama koje ne pripadaju EGP-u, ali pripadaju sustavu Visa Europe (6), te

| — | ograničenje višestrane međubankovne naknade za transakcije s debitnim karticama na 0,2 % vrijediti i za sve višestrane međubankovne naknade koje poduzeće Visa Europe utvrđuje za transakcije s trgovcima s poslovnim nastanom unutar EGP-a koje su provedene potrošačkim debitnim karticama Visa izdanima u državama koje ne pripadaju EGP-u, ali pripadaju sustavu Visa Europe. |
| --- | --- |

—

ograničenje višestrane međubankovne naknade za transakcije s debitnim karticama na 0,2 % vrijediti i za sve višestrane međubankovne naknade koje poduzeće Visa Europe utvrđuje za transakcije s trgovcima s poslovnim nastanom unutar EGP-a koje su provedene potrošačkim debitnim karticama Visa izdanima u državama koje ne pripadaju EGP-u, ali pripadaju sustavu Visa Europe.

| (d) | Poduzeće Visa Europe obvezuje se da će od 1. siječnja 2015. izmijeniti svoja pravila o prekograničnom prihvaćanju kako bi prekograničnim prihvatiteljima omogućila da ponude domaću debitnu višestranu međubankovnu naknadu ili domaću kreditnu višestranu međubankovnu naknadu koje se primjenjuju u odnosu na lokaciju trgovca ili višestranu međubankovnu naknadu od 0,2 % za potrošačke transakcije s debitnim karticama i 0,3 % za transakcije s kreditnim karticama, podložno određenim uvjetima. |
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(d)

Poduzeće Visa Europe obvezuje se da će od 1. siječnja 2015. izmijeniti svoja pravila o prekograničnom prihvaćanju kako bi prekograničnim prihvatiteljima omogućila da ponude domaću debitnu višestranu međubankovnu naknadu ili domaću kreditnu višestranu međubankovnu naknadu koje se primjenjuju u odnosu na lokaciju trgovca ili višestranu međubankovnu naknadu od 0,2 % za potrošačke transakcije s debitnim karticama i 0,3 % za transakcije s kreditnim karticama, podložno određenim uvjetima.

| (e) | Poduzeće Visa Europe obvezuje se da će provesti daljnje mjere za povećanje transparentnosti. Poduzeće Visa Europe osobito se obvezuje da će:






  — | uvesti pravilo kojim će se od prihvatitelja zahtijevati da trgovcima ponude naknadu koja će se izračunavati na temelju načela „višestrana međubankovna naknada plus plus” (prihvatitelji moraju, ako se to od njih traži, u ugovorima i računima jasno raščlaniti višestranu međubankovnu naknadu na tri sastavnice, odnosno višestranu međubankovnu naknadu, sve druge naknade koje se upotrebljavaju u platnom sustavu i naknadu za prihvatitelja). Poduzeće Visa Europe zahtijevat će od prihvatitelja da to pravilo provedu u roku od 12 mjeseci od službene obavijesti o odluci o preuzimanju obveza dostavljenoj poduzeću Visa Europe za sve nove sporazume i u roku od 18 mjeseci za sve postojeće ugovore; |
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(e)

Poduzeće Visa Europe obvezuje se da će provesti daljnje mjere za povećanje transparentnosti. Poduzeće Visa Europe osobito se obvezuje da će:

—

uvesti pravilo kojim će se od prihvatitelja zahtijevati da trgovcima ponude naknadu koja će se izračunavati na temelju načela „višestrana međubankovna naknada plus plus” (prihvatitelji moraju, ako se to od njih traži, u ugovorima i računima jasno raščlaniti višestranu međubankovnu naknadu na tri sastavnice, odnosno višestranu međubankovnu naknadu, sve druge naknade koje se upotrebljavaju u platnom sustavu i naknadu za prihvatitelja). Poduzeće Visa Europe zahtijevat će od prihvatitelja da to pravilo provedu u roku od 12 mjeseci od službene obavijesti o odluci o preuzimanju obveza dostavljenoj poduzeću Visa Europe za sve nove sporazume i u roku od 18 mjeseci za sve postojeće ugovore;

| — | uvesti pojednostavnjenu strukturu višestranih međubankovnih naknada za višestrane međubankovne naknade koje utvrđuje poduzeće Visa Europe radi smanjenja broja kategorija naknada za barem 25 %, što će pridonijeti transparentnosti i omogućiti uspoređivanje naknada. |
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—

uvesti pojednostavnjenu strukturu višestranih međubankovnih naknada za višestrane međubankovne naknade koje utvrđuje poduzeće Visa Europe radi smanjenja broja kategorija naknada za barem 25 %, što će pridonijeti transparentnosti i omogućiti uspoređivanje naknada.

| (11) | Poduzeće Visa Europe imenovat će povjerenika za nadzor koji će pratiti poštovanje obveza koje je poduzeće preuzelo. Komisija ima pravo odobriti ili odbiti predloženog povjerenika prije njegova imenovanja. |
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(11)

Poduzeće Visa Europe imenovat će povjerenika za nadzor koji će pratiti poštovanje obveza koje je poduzeće preuzelo. Komisija ima pravo odobriti ili odbiti predloženog povjerenika prije njegova imenovanja.

| (12) | Obveze će vrijediti četiri godine od datuma obavijesti o odluci o preuzimanju obveza koja je dostavljena poduzeću Visa Europe. |
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(12)

Obveze će vrijediti četiri godine od datuma obavijesti o odluci o preuzimanju obveza koja je dostavljena poduzeću Visa Europe.

| (13) | Ograničenja ponderiranih prosječnih višestranih međubankovnih naknada predviđena u okviru obveza ocijenjena su na temelju testa neutralnosti trgovca. U Odluci je utvrđeno da su obveze prikladne i potrebne za uklanjanje zabrinutosti utvrđenih u Obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama i Dodatnoj obavijest o utvrđenim činjenicama te da nisu nesrazmjerne. |
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(13)

Ograničenja ponderiranih prosječnih višestranih međubankovnih naknada predviđena u okviru obveza ocijenjena su na temelju testa neutralnosti trgovca. U Odluci je utvrđeno da su obveze prikladne i potrebne za uklanjanje zabrinutosti utvrđenih u Obavijesti o utvrđenim činjenicama i Dodatnoj obavijest o utvrđenim činjenicama te da nisu nesrazmjerne.

| (14) | Savjetodavni odbor za pitanja ograničavajućih djelovanja i vladajućih položaja izdao je pozitivno mišljenje o donošenju Odluke 17. veljače 2014. Službenik za usmene rasprave izdao je svoje završno izvješće 19. veljače 2014. |
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(14)

Savjetodavni odbor za pitanja ograničavajućih djelovanja i vladajućih položaja izdao je pozitivno mišljenje o donošenju Odluke 17. veljače 2014. Službenik za usmene rasprave izdao je svoje završno izvješće 19. veljače 2014.

| (15) | Odlukom je okončan postupak u pogledu višestranih međubankovnih naknada poduzeća Visa Europe za transakcije s kreditnim karticama unutar EGP-a, višestranih međubankovnih naknada koje je utvrdilo poduzeće Visa Europe za domaće transakcije s kreditnim karticama, višestranih međubankovnih naknada za transakcije s debitnim i kreditnim karticama Visa izdanima u državama koje ne pripadaju EGP-u, ali pripadaju sustavu Visa Europe, međunarodnih višestranih međubankovnih naknada i pravila poduzeća Visa Europe o višestranim međubankovnim naknadama primjenjivima u slučaju prekograničnog prihvaćanja. |
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(15)

Odlukom je okončan postupak u pogledu višestranih međubankovnih naknada poduzeća Visa Europe za transakcije s kreditnim karticama unutar EGP-a, višestranih međubankovnih naknada koje je utvrdilo poduzeće Visa Europe za domaće transakcije s kreditnim karticama, višestranih međubankovnih naknada za transakcije s debitnim i kreditnim karticama Visa izdanima u državama koje ne pripadaju EGP-u, ali pripadaju sustavu Visa Europe, međunarodnih višestranih međubankovnih naknada i pravila poduzeća Visa Europe o višestranim međubankovnim naknadama primjenjivima u slučaju prekograničnog prihvaćanja.

| (16) | Odluka se međutim ne odnosi na višestrane međubankovne naknade koje su utvrdila poduzeća Visa Inc. i Visa International Service Association koje Komisija nastavlja istraživati. |
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(16)

Odluka se međutim ne odnosi na višestrane međubankovne naknade koje su utvrdila poduzeća Visa Inc. i Visa International Service Association koje Komisija nastavlja istraživati.

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(1)  SL L 1, 4.1.2003., str. 1.

(2)  Trenutačno u Belgiji, Mađarskoj, na Islandu, u Irskoj, Italiji, Luksemburgu, na Malti, u Nizozemskoj, Latviji i Švedskoj.

(3)  Transakcije provedene s trgovcima koji imaju poslovni nastan u EGP-u upotrebom Visa potrošačkih kartica izdanih u državama koje ne pripadaju EGP-u, ali se nalaze unutar područja Visa Europe. Područje Visa Europe sastoji se od EGP-a, Andore, Farskih otoka, Grenlanda, Izraela, Monaka, San Marina, otočja Svalbard i otoka Jan Mayen, Švicarske, Turske i Grada Vatikana.

(4)  Pravilo o prihvaćanju svih kartica (HACR) pravilo je u okviru sustava Visa kojim se trgovci koji su sklopili ugovore o prihvaćanju plaćanja karticama određenog kartičara (primjerice VISA, VISA Electron ili V PAY) obvezuju na prihvaćanje svih ispravno predstavljenih kartica tog kartičara, bez diskriminacije i neovisno o identitetu banke izdavateljice ili vrsti kartice. Pravilo o nediskriminaciji pravilo je u okviru sustava Visa kojim se trgovci sprječavaju u uvođenju dodatnih naknada za transakcije izvršene platnim karticama VISA, VISA Electron ili VPAY osim ako nacionalno zakonodavstvo izričito nalaže da se trgovcima dopusti uvođenje dodatnih naknada. Izjednačavanje naknada praksa je prihvatitelja da trgovcima zaračunavaju iste naknade za prihvaćenje različitih platnih kartica iz istog programa plaćanja (primjerice kreditna ili debitna kartica VISA) ili platnih kartica koje pripadaju različitim programima kreditnog plaćanja (primjerice kreditne kartice VISA i MasterCard). U svojoj preliminarnoj ocjeni Komisija je utvrdila da se tim pravilima i praksama umanjuje sposobnost trgovaca da ograniče zajedničko ostvarivanje tržišne snage članova sustava Visa Europe s pomoću višestranih međubankovnih naknada, čime se jačaju negativni učinci tih naknada na tržišno natjecanje.

(5)  Prekogranično prihvaćanje aktivnost je prihvatitelja čiji je cilj pronaženje trgovaca koji bi prihvaćali platne kartice i koji imaju poslovni nastan u državi EGP-a različitoj od one u kojoj prihvatitelj ima poslovni nastan.

(6)  Područje Visa Europe obuhvaća EGP, Andoru, Farske otoke, Grenland, Izrael, Monako, San Marino, otočje Svalbard i otok Jan Mayen, Švicarsku, Tursku i Grad Vatikan.

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V Objave

POSTUPCI U VEZI S PROVEDBOM POLITIKE TRŽIŠNOG NATJECANJA

Europska komisija

| 16.5.2014 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 147/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 147/11

---

DRŽAVNE POTPORE – REPUBLIKA LATVIJA

Državna potpora br. SA.36612 (2014/C) (ex 2013/NN) - neprijavljena potpora koju je Latvija dodijelila bankama Citadele i Parex

Poziv na podnošenje primjedaba u skladu s člankom 108. stavkom 2. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije

(Tekst značajan za EGP)

2014/C 147/07

Dopisom od 16. travnja 2014. koji je sastavljen na izvornom jeziku na stranicama u nastavku ovog sažetka, Komisija je obavijestila Republiku Latviju da je odlučila pokrenuti postupak utvrđen člankom 108. stavkom 2. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije u vezi s prethodno navedenom potporom.

Zainteresirane strane mogu u roku od deset dana od dana objave ovog sažetka i dopisa u nastavku podnijeti primjedbe o sustavu u vezi s kojim Komisija pokreće postupak, na sljedeću adresu:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Faks: +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Faks: +32 22961242

Republika Latvija bit će obaviještena o tim primjedbama. Povjerljivo postupanje s identitetom zainteresirane strane koja podnosi primjedbe može se zatražiti u pisanom obliku, navodeći razloge zahtjeva.

TEKST SAŽETKA

Postupak

| 1. | Dana 15. rujna 2010. (1) Komisija je odobrila plan restrukturiranja banke AS Parex. Tim je planom restrukturiranja predviđeno razdvajanje banke AS Parex na banku AS Citadele i AS Revertu (2). Komisija je 10. kolovoza 2012. odobrila izmjene triju obveza sadržanih u odluci o odobrenju plana restrukturiranja (3). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dana 15. rujna 2010. (1) Komisija je odobrila plan restrukturiranja banke AS Parex. Tim je planom restrukturiranja predviđeno razdvajanje banke AS Parex na banku AS Citadele i AS Revertu (2). Komisija je 10. kolovoza 2012. odobrila izmjene triju obveza sadržanih u odluci o odobrenju plana restrukturiranja (3).

| 2. | Komisija je od tada, u kontekstu praćenja odobrenog plana restrukturiranja i povezanih obveza, utvrdila da je Latvija dodijelila potpore koje nadilaze mjere potpore koje je Komisija već odobrila. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Komisija je od tada, u kontekstu praćenja odobrenog plana restrukturiranja i povezanih obveza, utvrdila da je Latvija dodijelila potpore koje nadilaze mjere potpore koje je Komisija već odobrila.

Opis mjera

| 3. | Iz dokumenata koje je Komisija primila proizlazi da je Latvija provela sljedeće mjere bez da je prije toga obavijestila Komisiju:






  i. | Latvija je 22. svibnja 2009. banci AS Parex dodijelila podređeni zajam, koji se kvalificira kao kapital kategorije 2., s dospijećem od sedam godina, čime se premašuje maksimalno dospijeće od pet godina koje odobrava Komisija u skladu s pravilima o državnim potporama; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Iz dokumenata koje je Komisija primila proizlazi da je Latvija provela sljedeće mjere bez da je prije toga obavijestila Komisiju:

i.

Latvija je 22. svibnja 2009. banci AS Parex dodijelila podređeni zajam, koji se kvalificira kao kapital kategorije 2., s dospijećem od sedam godina, čime se premašuje maksimalno dospijeće od pet godina koje odobrava Komisija u skladu s pravilima o državnim potporama;

| ii. | Latvija je 27. lipnja 2013. banci AS Citadele dodijelila dodatno 18-mjesečno produljenje roka dospijeća na preostali iznos istog podređenog zajma; |
| --- | --- |

ii.

Latvija je 27. lipnja 2013. banci AS Citadele dodijelila dodatno 18-mjesečno produljenje roka dospijeća na preostali iznos istog podređenog zajma;

| iii. | od 2011. Latvija AS Reverti pruža potporu za likvidnost iznad najvećeg dopuštenog iznosa koji je Komisija odobrila u svojoj Odluci od 15. rujna 2010. |
| --- | --- |

iii.

od 2011. Latvija AS Reverti pruža potporu za likvidnost iznad najvećeg dopuštenog iznosa koji je Komisija odobrila u svojoj Odluci od 15. rujna 2010.

| 4. | Povrh toga se pokazalo da Latvija nije uspjela ispuniti svoje obveze u pogledu napuštanja djelatnosti upravljanja imovinom banke AS Citadele u predviđenim rokovima. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Povrh toga se pokazalo da Latvija nije uspjela ispuniti svoje obveze u pogledu napuštanja djelatnosti upravljanja imovinom banke AS Citadele u predviđenim rokovima.

Procjena mjera

| 5. | Banka AS Parex, a zatim i banka AS Citadele te AS Reverta, primale su sredstva od Latvije uz sredstva potpore koja je odobrila Komisija u skladu s pravilima o državnim potporama. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Banka AS Parex, a zatim i banka AS Citadele te AS Reverta, primale su sredstva od Latvije uz sredstva potpore koja je odobrila Komisija u skladu s pravilima o državnim potporama.

| 6. | S obzirom na činjenicu da:






  i. | i početno sedmogodišnje dospijeće i produljeni rok dospijeća za podređeni dug te povećanje potpore za likvidnost jasno predstavljaju dodatne prednosti u odnosu na odobrene mjere potpore te su stoga dodatne potpore (svi ostali kriteriji iz članka 107. stavka 1. Ugovora još uvijek su na snazi); i |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.

S obzirom na činjenicu da:

i.

i početno sedmogodišnje dospijeće i produljeni rok dospijeća za podređeni dug te povećanje potpore za likvidnost jasno predstavljaju dodatne prednosti u odnosu na odobrene mjere potpore te su stoga dodatne potpore (svi ostali kriteriji iz članka 107. stavka 1. Ugovora još uvijek su na snazi); i

| ii. | Komisija nije obaviještena o tim dodatnim mjerama potpore, Komisija smatra da te tri mjere predstavljaju nezakonite potpore. |
| --- | --- |

ii.

Komisija nije obaviještena o tim dodatnim mjerama potpore, Komisija smatra da te tri mjere predstavljaju nezakonite potpore.

| 7. | Komisija je na temelju trenutačno dostupnih podataka uočila da Latvija nije iznijela argumente kojima dokazuje sukladnost potpora koje proizlaze iz prvobitnog sedmogodišnjeg dospijeća za podređene zajmove i dodatnog 18-mjesečnog produljenja dospijeća za podređeni dug. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Komisija je na temelju trenutačno dostupnih podataka uočila da Latvija nije iznijela argumente kojima dokazuje sukladnost potpora koje proizlaze iz prvobitnog sedmogodišnjeg dospijeća za podređene zajmove i dodatnog 18-mjesečnog produljenja dospijeća za podređeni dug.

| 8. | Komisija je uočila i da Latvija nije iznijela argumente kojima dokazuje sukladnost potpora koje proizlaze iz dodatne potpore za likvidnost dodijeljene AS Reverti. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Komisija je uočila i da Latvija nije iznijela argumente kojima dokazuje sukladnost potpora koje proizlaze iz dodatne potpore za likvidnost dodijeljene AS Reverti.

| 9. | Latvija je potvrdila da djelatnost upravljanja imovinom nije prekinuta u predviđenom roku. To predstavlja kršenje uvjeta konačne odluke o pomoći banci Parex te stoga i zloporabu dodijeljene potpore. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Latvija je potvrdila da djelatnost upravljanja imovinom nije prekinuta u predviđenom roku. To predstavlja kršenje uvjeta konačne odluke o pomoći banci Parex te stoga i zloporabu dodijeljene potpore.

| 10. | Komisija zaključuje da, u pogledu nezakonite, prethodno opisane potpore, postoje sumnje u sukladnost s unutarnjim tržištem na temelju podataka kojima trenutačno raspolaže. Komisija je stoga odlučila pokrenuti službeni istražni postupak u skladu s člankom 13. stavkom 1. i člankom 4. stavkom 4. Uredbe (EZ) br. 659/1999. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Komisija zaključuje da, u pogledu nezakonite, prethodno opisane potpore, postoje sumnje u sukladnost s unutarnjim tržištem na temelju podataka kojima trenutačno raspolaže. Komisija je stoga odlučila pokrenuti službeni istražni postupak u skladu s člankom 13. stavkom 1. i člankom 4. stavkom 4. Uredbe (EZ) br. 659/1999.

| 11. | Nadalje, Komisija je zaključila da kršenje obveze u pogledu napuštanja djelatnosti upravljanja imovinom predstavlja zloporabu potpore. Komisija je stoga odlučila pokrenuti službeni istražni postupak i zbog zloporabe potpore u skladu s člankom 16. Uredbe (EZ) br. 659/1999. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Nadalje, Komisija je zaključila da kršenje obveze u pogledu napuštanja djelatnosti upravljanja imovinom predstavlja zloporabu potpore. Komisija je stoga odlučila pokrenuti službeni istražni postupak i zbog zloporabe potpore u skladu s člankom 16. Uredbe (EZ) br. 659/1999.

U skladu s člankom 14. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 659/1999, od primatelja se može zahtijevati povrat svake nezakonite potpore.

TEKST DOPISA

‘The Commission wishes to inform Latvia that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the aid referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“the Treaty”).

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 10 November 2008 Latvia notified to the Commission a package of State aid measures in favour of AS Parex banka (“Parex banka”), designed to support the stability of the financial system. The Commission approved those measures on 24 November 2008 (4) (“first rescue Decision”) based on Latvia’s commitment to submit a restructuring plan for Parex banka within six months. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 10 November 2008 Latvia notified to the Commission a package of State aid measures in favour of AS Parex banka (“Parex banka”), designed to support the stability of the financial system. The Commission approved those measures on 24 November 2008 (4) (“first rescue Decision”) based on Latvia’s commitment to submit a restructuring plan for Parex banka within six months.

| (2) | Following requests from Latvia, the Commission approved two sets of changes to the aid measures concerning Parex banka, the first on 11 February 2009 (5) (“second rescue Decision”) and the second on 11 May 2009 (6) (“third rescue Decision”). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Following requests from Latvia, the Commission approved two sets of changes to the aid measures concerning Parex banka, the first on 11 February 2009 (5) (“second rescue Decision”) and the second on 11 May 2009 (6) (“third rescue Decision”).

| (3) | On 11 May 2009 Latvia notified a restructuring plan for Parex banka. By decision of 29 June 2009 (7) the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the notified restructuring measures constituted State aid to Parex banka and expressed its doubts that such aid could be found compatible. As a result the Commission decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty and required Latvia to provide information needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 11 May 2009 Latvia notified a restructuring plan for Parex banka. By decision of 29 June 2009 (7) the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the notified restructuring measures constituted State aid to Parex banka and expressed its doubts that such aid could be found compatible. As a result the Commission decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty and required Latvia to provide information needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid.

| (4) | Between 11 May 2009 and 15 September 2010, several information exchanges and discussions occurred between Latvia and the Commission concerning the restructuring plan for Parex banka. Latvia provided information and clarifications on several occasions throughout the investigation procedure, and the restructuring plan of Parex banka was also updated six times. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Between 11 May 2009 and 15 September 2010, several information exchanges and discussions occurred between Latvia and the Commission concerning the restructuring plan for Parex banka. Latvia provided information and clarifications on several occasions throughout the investigation procedure, and the restructuring plan of Parex banka was also updated six times.

| (5) | On 1 August 2010, some assets of Parex banka were transferred to a newly established so-called “good bank” named AS Citadele banka (“Citadele”), in line with the restructuring plan. The restructuring plan envisaged a split of Parex banka into Citadele, which would take over all core assets and some non-core assets (8), and a so-called “bad bank” (“Reverta” (9)) which kept the remaining non-core and non-performing assets. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 1 August 2010, some assets of Parex banka were transferred to a newly established so-called “good bank” named AS Citadele banka (“Citadele”), in line with the restructuring plan. The restructuring plan envisaged a split of Parex banka into Citadele, which would take over all core assets and some non-core assets (8), and a so-called “bad bank” (“Reverta” (9)) which kept the remaining non-core and non-performing assets.

| (6) | By decision of 15 September 2010 (10) (“the Parex Final Decision”), the Commission approved the restructuring plan of Parex banka, based on a commitment paper submitted by the Latvian authorities on 3 September 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

By decision of 15 September 2010 (10) (“the Parex Final Decision”), the Commission approved the restructuring plan of Parex banka, based on a commitment paper submitted by the Latvian authorities on 3 September 2010.

| (7) | On 10 August 2012, at the request of the Latvian authorities, the Commission approved amendments to three commitments included in the Parex Final Decision (“the Amendment Decision”) (11). Those amendments: 1) extended the disposal deadline for the CIS loans (12) until 31 December 2014; 2) increased the limit of minimum capital adequacy requirements allowed for Citadele at the level of the bank and the group before the asset remuneration described in the Parex Final Decision would be triggered; and 3) allowed carry-over of previous years’ unused caps on lending, whilst respecting market share caps. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 10 August 2012, at the request of the Latvian authorities, the Commission approved amendments to three commitments included in the Parex Final Decision (“the Amendment Decision”) (11). Those amendments: 1) extended the disposal deadline for the CIS loans (12) until 31 December 2014; 2) increased the limit of minimum capital adequacy requirements allowed for Citadele at the level of the bank and the group before the asset remuneration described in the Parex Final Decision would be triggered; and 3) allowed carry-over of previous years’ unused caps on lending, whilst respecting market share caps.

| (8) | On 1 October 2013 Latvia notified a requested for a further amendment of the Parex Final Decision, asking for the postponement of the divestment deadline for one of the divisions of Citadele, the Wealth Management Business (13). While analysing Latvia’s submissions in support of that amendment request, the Commission identified aid that had been granted by Latvia over and beyond the aid measures already approved by the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

On 1 October 2013 Latvia notified a requested for a further amendment of the Parex Final Decision, asking for the postponement of the divestment deadline for one of the divisions of Citadele, the Wealth Management Business (13). While analysing Latvia’s submissions in support of that amendment request, the Commission identified aid that had been granted by Latvia over and beyond the aid measures already approved by the Commission.

| (9) | Between [...] (14) and 4 March 2014, several information exchanges have taken place between Latvia and the Commission with regard to the additional aid measures. Latvia submitted information and documents on 30 October 2013, 31 January 2014 and 4 March 2014 (including a revised restructuring plan of Parex banka). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Between [...] (14) and 4 March 2014, several information exchanges have taken place between Latvia and the Commission with regard to the additional aid measures. Latvia submitted information and documents on 30 October 2013, 31 January 2014 and 4 March 2014 (including a revised restructuring plan of Parex banka).

| (10) | Since 11 November 2013, the Commission has also received monthly updates regarding Latvia’s progress in selling Citadele, a process it began in October 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Since 11 November 2013, the Commission has also received monthly updates regarding Latvia’s progress in selling Citadele, a process it began in October 2013.

| (11) | The Latvian authorities have informed the Commission that for reasons of urgency they exceptionally accept that this Decision is adopted in the English language. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The Latvian authorities have informed the Commission that for reasons of urgency they exceptionally accept that this Decision is adopted in the English language.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The undertaking concerned

| (12) | Parex banka was the second-largest bank in Latvia with total assets of LVL 3,4 billion (EUR 4,9 billion) as of 31 December 2008. It was partially nationalised in November 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Parex banka was the second-largest bank in Latvia with total assets of LVL 3,4 billion (EUR 4,9 billion) as of 31 December 2008. It was partially nationalised in November 2008.

| (13) | In April 2009, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) acquired 25 % of the share capital of Parex banka plus one share. Following the split of Parex banka into a good bank and a bad bank in 2010 along with subsequent changes in the shareholding structure, the shareholders of Citadele are now Latvia (75 %) and the EBRD (25 %), while the shareholders of Reverta are Latvia (84,15 %), the EBRD (12,74 %) and others (3,11 %). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In April 2009, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) acquired 25 % of the share capital of Parex banka plus one share. Following the split of Parex banka into a good bank and a bad bank in 2010 along with subsequent changes in the shareholding structure, the shareholders of Citadele are now Latvia (75 %) and the EBRD (25 %), while the shareholders of Reverta are Latvia (84,15 %), the EBRD (12,74 %) and others (3,11 %).

| (14) | A detailed description of Parex banka up to the time of the Parex Final Decision can be found in recitals 11 to 15 of that decision. Parex banka was authorised to receive a series of aid measures (including liquidity support, guarantees and recapitalisation and asset relief measures) which are specified in the Parex Final Decision. Those measures were approved by the Commission in the first, second and third rescue Decisions (the “Rescue Decisions”) and the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

A detailed description of Parex banka up to the time of the Parex Final Decision can be found in recitals 11 to 15 of that decision. Parex banka was authorised to receive a series of aid measures (including liquidity support, guarantees and recapitalisation and asset relief measures) which are specified in the Parex Final Decision. Those measures were approved by the Commission in the first, second and third rescue Decisions (the “Rescue Decisions”) and the Parex Final Decision.

2.2.   The aid measures approved for Citadele and Reverta

| (15) | The restructuring plan approved by the Commission with the Parex Final Decision provided that the rescue aid previously approved by the Commission was to be extended over the restructuring period and split between Citadele and Reverta. The Parex Final Decision also approved additional restructuring aid for Reverta and Citadele. It also laid down a utilisation mechanism for the aid which had been provisionally approved through the Rescue Decisions after Parex banka was split, in regard to: |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The restructuring plan approved by the Commission with the Parex Final Decision provided that the rescue aid previously approved by the Commission was to be extended over the restructuring period and split between Citadele and Reverta. The Parex Final Decision also approved additional restructuring aid for Reverta and Citadele. It also laid down a utilisation mechanism for the aid which had been provisionally approved through the Rescue Decisions after Parex banka was split, in regard to:

| a) | liquidity support in the form of State deposits for both Citadele and Reverta (15); |
| --- | --- |

a)

liquidity support in the form of State deposits for both Citadele and Reverta (15);

| b) | State guarantees on liabilities of Citadele and Reverta (16); |
| --- | --- |

b)

State guarantees on liabilities of Citadele and Reverta (16);

| c) | a State recapitalisation for Reverta and Citadele (17); and |
| --- | --- |

c)

a State recapitalisation for Reverta and Citadele (17); and

| d) | an asset relief measure for Citadele (18). |
| --- | --- |

d)

an asset relief measure for Citadele (18).

2.3.   The commitments given by Latvia in the Parex Final Decision and the Amendment Decision

| (16) | In order to enable the Commission to find the restructuring aid compatible with the internal market Latvia provided commitments to ensure full implementation of the restructuring plan and limit distortions of competition that result from the restructuring aid (“the commitments”). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

In order to enable the Commission to find the restructuring aid compatible with the internal market Latvia provided commitments to ensure full implementation of the restructuring plan and limit distortions of competition that result from the restructuring aid (“the commitments”).

| (17) | The main commitments regarding Citadele are described in recitals 73 to 83 of the Parex Final Decision. They include: a commitment to divest the CIS loans; a commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business within fixed deadlines (one which applied to divestment by Citadele itself and another which applied to divestment under the control of a Divestment Trustee); the preservation of viability, marketability and competitiveness; a hold-separate obligation in relation to the Wealth Management Business; a commitment to sell Citadele within a fixed deadline; caps on new lending and deposits in the Baltic countries; caps on the deposits in the German and Swedish branches; no increase in the number of branches; remuneration in respect of the asset relief measure; an acquisition ban; and a ban on making new CIS loans. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The main commitments regarding Citadele are described in recitals 73 to 83 of the Parex Final Decision. They include: a commitment to divest the CIS loans; a commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business within fixed deadlines (one which applied to divestment by Citadele itself and another which applied to divestment under the control of a Divestment Trustee); the preservation of viability, marketability and competitiveness; a hold-separate obligation in relation to the Wealth Management Business; a commitment to sell Citadele within a fixed deadline; caps on new lending and deposits in the Baltic countries; caps on the deposits in the German and Swedish branches; no increase in the number of branches; remuneration in respect of the asset relief measure; an acquisition ban; and a ban on making new CIS loans.

| (18) | The main commitments regarding Reverta are described in recitals 84 to 87 of the Parex Final Decision. They include commitments that there would be no new activities; there would be a wind-down or divestment of activities; and a cap on the total amount of capital that would be provided by Latvia in whatever form. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The main commitments regarding Reverta are described in recitals 84 to 87 of the Parex Final Decision. They include commitments that there would be no new activities; there would be a wind-down or divestment of activities; and a cap on the total amount of capital that would be provided by Latvia in whatever form.

| (19) | Recitals 88 to 93 of the Parex Final Decision describe the commitments jointly applying to Reverta and Citadele. They provide for: a dividend and coupon ban; a ban on any reference to State support in advertising; a separation between Citadele and Reverta; and the appointment of Monitoring and Divestiture Trustees. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Recitals 88 to 93 of the Parex Final Decision describe the commitments jointly applying to Reverta and Citadele. They provide for: a dividend and coupon ban; a ban on any reference to State support in advertising; a separation between Citadele and Reverta; and the appointment of Monitoring and Divestiture Trustees.

| (20) | As recalled in recital 16, the Commission subsequently amended three of the commitments applicable to Citadele under the Parex Final Decision. That approval was based on new commitments undertaken by Latvia and Citadele to compensate for any distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

As recalled in recital 16, the Commission subsequently amended three of the commitments applicable to Citadele under the Parex Final Decision. That approval was based on new commitments undertaken by Latvia and Citadele to compensate for any distortion of competition.

2.4.   The additional measures implemented by Latvia for Parex banka, Citadele and Reverta

| (21) | Based on the report submitted on 29 August 2013 by the Monitoring Trustee (19) and based on documents and information submitted by Latvia since October 2013, it appears that Latvia has put into effect the following measures without prior notification to the Commission:






  (i) | on 22 May 2009, Latvia granted to Parex banka a subordinated loan of LVL 50,27 million (qualifying as Tier 2 capital) with a maturity of seven years (i.e. until 21 May 2016). The duration of that subordinated loan exceeds the maximum five-year maturity set in first rescue Decision and confirmed in the Parex Final Decision; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(21)

Based on the report submitted on 29 August 2013 by the Monitoring Trustee (19) and based on documents and information submitted by Latvia since October 2013, it appears that Latvia has put into effect the following measures without prior notification to the Commission:

(i)

on 22 May 2009, Latvia granted to Parex banka a subordinated loan of LVL 50,27 million (qualifying as Tier 2 capital) with a maturity of seven years (i.e. until 21 May 2016). The duration of that subordinated loan exceeds the maximum five-year maturity set in first rescue Decision and confirmed in the Parex Final Decision;

| (ii) | on 27 June 2013, Latvia granted Citadele an additional 18-month extension of the maturity for an amount of LVL 37 million of subordinated debt (out of the total of LVL 45 million held by Latvia at that time) (20). Table 1 gives an overview of the subordinated debt maturity changes, as of 31 December 2013. Latvia did not notify the extension of the maturity of that subordinated debt to the Commission;

  Table 1










  Issuer | Principal (LVL million) | Maturity approved by the Parex Final Decision | Maturity date throughout the restructuring period | Extended Maturity (granted in 2013) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| LPA (21) | 7,87 | May 2014 (five years starting from 2009) | 8.8.2016 | — |
| LPA | 37,34 | 21.5.2016 | 20.12.2017 |
| [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total | 50,27 | | | |

(ii)

on 27 June 2013, Latvia granted Citadele an additional 18-month extension of the maturity for an amount of LVL 37 million of subordinated debt (out of the total of LVL 45 million held by Latvia at that time) (20). Table 1 gives an overview of the subordinated debt maturity changes, as of 31 December 2013. Latvia did not notify the extension of the maturity of that subordinated debt to the Commission;

Table 1

Issuer

Principal (LVL million)

Maturity approved by the Parex Final Decision

Maturity date throughout the restructuring period

Extended Maturity (granted in 2013)

LPA (21)

7,87

May 2014 (five years starting from 2009)

8.8.2016

—

LPA

37,34

21.5.2016

20.12.2017

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total

50,27

| (iii) | in addition, since 2011 Latvia has provided Reverta with liquidity support in excess of the maximum limit set and approved by the Commission in the Parex Final Decision, both for the base case and for the worst case scenario (presented in Table 2 (22)). The actual amounts of liquidity support from which Reverta has benefited were communicated by the Latvian authorities through the revised restructuring plan submitted in January 2014 and are reflected in Table 3: |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

in addition, since 2011 Latvia has provided Reverta with liquidity support in excess of the maximum limit set and approved by the Commission in the Parex Final Decision, both for the base case and for the worst case scenario (presented in Table 2 (22)). The actual amounts of liquidity support from which Reverta has benefited were communicated by the Latvian authorities through the revised restructuring plan submitted in January 2014 and are reflected in Table 3:

Table 2

Liquidity caps for Reverta as reflected in the Parex Final Decision

| LVL million | 1.8.10 | 31.12.10 | 31.12.11 | 31.12.12 | 31.12.13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Base case | 458 | 446 | 419 | 349 | 315 |
| Best case | 458 | 446 | 419 | 356 | 322 |
| Worst case | 458 | 446 | 419 | 344 | 307 |

LVL million

1.8.10

31.12.10

31.12.11

31.12.12

31.12.13

Base case

458

446

419

349

315

Best case

458

446

419

356

322

Worst case

458

446

419

344

307

Table 3

Actual amounts of liquidity from which Reverta has benefited

| Outstanding of liquidity support |
| --- |
| | 1.8.10 | 31.12.10 | 31.12.11 | 31.12.12 | 31.12.13 |
| LVL million | 446,32 | 446,32 | 427,82 | 384,86 | 362,52 |

Outstanding of liquidity support

1.8.10

31.12.10

31.12.11

31.12.12

31.12.13

LVL million

446,32

446,32

427,82

384,86

362,52

In light of those developments and findings, the Commission has asked Latvia to provide additional information and explanations.

| (22) | Latvia has confirmed through the submissions set out in recital 9 that those additional measures have already been put into effect. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Latvia has confirmed through the submissions set out in recital 9 that those additional measures have already been put into effect.

2.5.   The breach of the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele

| (23) | Latvia has failed to comply with its commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele by 30 June 2013 without a Divestiture Trustee, or by 31 December 2013 with a Divestiture Trustee, which was recorded in the Parex Final Decision (23). Therefore that commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business by those deadlines has been breached. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Latvia has failed to comply with its commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele by 30 June 2013 without a Divestiture Trustee, or by 31 December 2013 with a Divestiture Trustee, which was recorded in the Parex Final Decision (23). Therefore that commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business by those deadlines has been breached.

3.   POSITION OF THE LATVIAN AUTHORITIES

3.1.   On the un-notified maturity extensions of the subordinated debt

| (24) | In its submissions of information regarding the un-notified aid which are mentioned in recital 9, as well as in the revised restructuring plan, the Latvian authorities submit that the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions. In consequence, Latvia considers that the longer maturity of the subordinated debt does not entail un-notified State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In its submissions of information regarding the un-notified aid which are mentioned in recital 9, as well as in the revised restructuring plan, the Latvian authorities submit that the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions. In consequence, Latvia considers that the longer maturity of the subordinated debt does not entail un-notified State aid.

| (25) | More specifically, Latvia expresses the view that:






  (i) | the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions, as it was expressly referred to in the restructuring plan and the reports of the Monitoring Trustee; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(25)

More specifically, Latvia expresses the view that:

(i)

the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions, as it was expressly referred to in the restructuring plan and the reports of the Monitoring Trustee;

| (ii) | according to the final version of the restructuring plan, it was not planned that the subordinated debt would be fully repaid by 2017. In addition, the restructuring plan assumed when determining the eligible capital for calculating capital adequacy that the maturity of the subordinated financing would be extended to avoid suffering from a 20 % amortisation rate starting from the fifth year and until maturity; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

according to the final version of the restructuring plan, it was not planned that the subordinated debt would be fully repaid by 2017. In addition, the restructuring plan assumed when determining the eligible capital for calculating capital adequacy that the maturity of the subordinated financing would be extended to avoid suffering from a 20 % amortisation rate starting from the fifth year and until maturity;

| (iii) | in line with those provisions, the Parex Final Decision provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt (24); |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

in line with those provisions, the Parex Final Decision provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt (24);

| (26) | Moreover, Latvia has argued that the payment by Citadele of interest rates in excess of market conditions allays any State aid concerns that could exist. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Moreover, Latvia has argued that the payment by Citadele of interest rates in excess of market conditions allays any State aid concerns that could exist.

| (27) | Finally, Latvia notes that discussions [...] are currently being held [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Finally, Latvia notes that discussions [...] are currently being held [...].

3.2.   Regarding the un-notified liquidity support granted to Reverta

| (28) | Latvia explained that it provided Reverta with liquidity in excess of the support limits in the Parex Final Decision because the deposits from the State were not transformed into capital support by capitalising the principal of State treasury deposits to the extent that had been envisaged in that Decision. That transformation did not occur because after Reverta’s banking licence had been revoked the relevant Latvian legislation no longer required statutory capital to be maintained. The Parex Final Decision had mentioned capitalising LVL [40-110] million of principal in the base case, whereas in fact only LVL 12,4 million of principal was capitalised. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Latvia explained that it provided Reverta with liquidity in excess of the support limits in the Parex Final Decision because the deposits from the State were not transformed into capital support by capitalising the principal of State treasury deposits to the extent that had been envisaged in that Decision. That transformation did not occur because after Reverta’s banking licence had been revoked the relevant Latvian legislation no longer required statutory capital to be maintained. The Parex Final Decision had mentioned capitalising LVL [40-110] million of principal in the base case, whereas in fact only LVL 12,4 million of principal was capitalised.

| (29) | Latvia argues that capitalising less principal benefitted the State because:






  (iv) | Latvia receives interest on liquidity aid but has no income from capital aid; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(29)

Latvia argues that capitalising less principal benefitted the State because:

(iv)

Latvia receives interest on liquidity aid but has no income from capital aid;

| (v) | Latvia remains a senior secured creditor rather than junior equity holder, which ensures higher recoverability of funds in case of insolvency or liquidation, given that the State Treasury will have priority towards proceeds collectable within the insolvency process; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

Latvia remains a senior secured creditor rather than junior equity holder, which ensures higher recoverability of funds in case of insolvency or liquidation, given that the State Treasury will have priority towards proceeds collectable within the insolvency process;

| (vi) | the capital invested as Tier 1 will not be recovered by the State (25); and |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

the capital invested as Tier 1 will not be recovered by the State (25); and

| (vii) | there is more burden-sharing by legacy minority stakeholders as a result of interest payments by Reverta to the State. |
| --- | --- |

(vii)

there is more burden-sharing by legacy minority stakeholders as a result of interest payments by Reverta to the State.

3.3.   Regarding the breach of the commitment for Wealth Management Business divestment

| (30) | Latvia states that the return of Citadele as a stand-alone entity to the private sector would have been put at risk if Citadele had divested the Wealth Management Business by 30 June 2013 as foreseen in the restructuring plan of 2010 or, in any event before Latvia had divested its stake in Citadele. Latvia claims that Citadele without the Wealth Management Business has no viable business model. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Latvia states that the return of Citadele as a stand-alone entity to the private sector would have been put at risk if Citadele had divested the Wealth Management Business by 30 June 2013 as foreseen in the restructuring plan of 2010 or, in any event before Latvia had divested its stake in Citadele. Latvia claims that Citadele without the Wealth Management Business has no viable business model.

| (31) | The Latvia has therefore requested the Commission to amend the Parex Final Decision in order to allow Citadele to retain the Wealth Management Business until after the entire bank passes to the private sector. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Latvia has therefore requested the Commission to amend the Parex Final Decision in order to allow Citadele to retain the Wealth Management Business until after the entire bank passes to the private sector.

| (32) | Such a request was first made in August 2012 in discussions between Latvia and the Commission before the Amendment Decision was taken. During those discussions the Latvian authorities ultimately decided not to request an extended deadline for divesting the Wealth Management Business. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Such a request was first made in August 2012 in discussions between Latvia and the Commission before the Amendment Decision was taken. During those discussions the Latvian authorities ultimately decided not to request an extended deadline for divesting the Wealth Management Business.

4.   ASSESSMENT

| (33) | Pursuant to Article 13(1) in conjunction with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (26) the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if it finds that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market of an unlawful aid measure (27). |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Pursuant to Article 13(1) in conjunction with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (26) the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if it finds that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market of an unlawful aid measure (27).

4.1.   Existence of unlawful aid

| (34) | Article 107(1) of the Treaty provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Article 107(1) of the Treaty provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.

| (35) | As described in recital 21, Parex banka and subsequently Citadele and Reverta have obtained measures from Latvia in addition to the aid measures examined in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

As described in recital 21, Parex banka and subsequently Citadele and Reverta have obtained measures from Latvia in addition to the aid measures examined in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision.

| (36) | With regard to the subordinated debt, the fact that such a measure contains State aid was established in the first rescue Decision, when the Commission approved the issuance of subordinated debt with five years maturity as a compatible aid measure. The Commission decided at that time that a market economy investor would not have granted subordinated debt with a five-year maturity (28). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

With regard to the subordinated debt, the fact that such a measure contains State aid was established in the first rescue Decision, when the Commission approved the issuance of subordinated debt with five years maturity as a compatible aid measure. The Commission decided at that time that a market economy investor would not have granted subordinated debt with a five-year maturity (28).

| (37) | The measure which was in fact granted by Latvia in favour of Parex banka was identical with the measure approved by the Commission except for the fact that it had a longer maturity. As such, the measure which was in fact granted would also be State aid unless the longer maturity eliminated any advantage to Parex banka. However, subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity would give the borrower a greater advantage since the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended. When the subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity was granted, it would have been even less likely for a market economy investor to grant the subordinated debt under those extended terms than it would for it to have done so for five years. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represented an additional advantage for Parex banka compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The measure which was in fact granted by Latvia in favour of Parex banka was identical with the measure approved by the Commission except for the fact that it had a longer maturity. As such, the measure which was in fact granted would also be State aid unless the longer maturity eliminated any advantage to Parex banka. However, subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity would give the borrower a greater advantage since the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended. When the subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity was granted, it would have been even less likely for a market economy investor to grant the subordinated debt under those extended terms than it would for it to have done so for five years. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represented an additional advantage for Parex banka compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision.

| (38) | The maturity of the subordinated debt was later further extended by an additional 18 months. As the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended, a market economy investor would not have granted the subordinated debt under those extended terms in the absence of any countervailing payment fully offsetting the investor’s increased risk. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represents an additional advantage for Citadele compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The maturity of the subordinated debt was later further extended by an additional 18 months. As the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended, a market economy investor would not have granted the subordinated debt under those extended terms in the absence of any countervailing payment fully offsetting the investor’s increased risk. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represents an additional advantage for Citadele compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision.

| (39) | Latvia justifies granting subordinated loans with a longer maturity than approved by claiming that the Commission had been informed of a possible maturity extension through the restructuring plan and submissions of the Monitoring Trustee. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Latvia justifies granting subordinated loans with a longer maturity than approved by claiming that the Commission had been informed of a possible maturity extension through the restructuring plan and submissions of the Monitoring Trustee.

| (40) | The Commission does not accept that argument. The possible need to extend the maturity of the subordinated loan was only incidentally mentioned, for information, by the Monitoring Trustee in previous monitoring reports (e.g. that of 30 June 2012) as an option under consideration by Latvian authorities. A mention of the possibility that additional aid may be granted by a Member State does not constitute or substitute for a formal notification of aid measures, within the meaning of Article 108(3) of the Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Commission does not accept that argument. The possible need to extend the maturity of the subordinated loan was only incidentally mentioned, for information, by the Monitoring Trustee in previous monitoring reports (e.g. that of 30 June 2012) as an option under consideration by Latvian authorities. A mention of the possibility that additional aid may be granted by a Member State does not constitute or substitute for a formal notification of aid measures, within the meaning of Article 108(3) of the Treaty.

| (41) | Latvia also contends that the recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision explicitly provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Latvia also contends that the recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision explicitly provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt.

| (42) | The Commission does not share that interpretation. Recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision refers to the subordinated loans by legacy shareholders in Parex, and not to the subordinated loans granted by Latvia. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Commission does not share that interpretation. Recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision refers to the subordinated loans by legacy shareholders in Parex, and not to the subordinated loans granted by Latvia.

| (43) | With regard to the liquidity support granted to Reverta
  , it was initially approved as part of the compatible State aid measures approved in the first rescue Decision, in the form of State deposits. At that time, the Commission noted that Parex banka lacked liquid collateral and that Latvia had deposited the funds, taking into account the bank’s liquidity needs, when no market investor was willing to provide liquidity in view of the fragile situation of Parex banka (29).
  Following the Parex Final Decision (and the split in a good and a bad bank) the liquidity aid was subsequently transferred to Citadele and Reverta. The former has already repaid in full its share of the liquidity support, whereas the latter had to limit the amounts of liquidity support it received, as set out in recital 21(iii). However, the amount of liquidity support actually granted to Reverta exceeds even the worst case scenario level approved within the Parex Final Decision. That additional liquidity support provides a supplementary advantage for Reverta compared to the aid approved by the Rescue Decisions and Parex Final Decision. None of the other features of the liquidity support apart from its quantity have been altered and so the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

With regard to the liquidity support granted to Reverta
  , it was initially approved as part of the compatible State aid measures approved in the first rescue Decision, in the form of State deposits. At that time, the Commission noted that Parex banka lacked liquid collateral and that Latvia had deposited the funds, taking into account the bank’s liquidity needs, when no market investor was willing to provide liquidity in view of the fragile situation of Parex banka (29).

Following the Parex Final Decision (and the split in a good and a bad bank) the liquidity aid was subsequently transferred to Citadele and Reverta. The former has already repaid in full its share of the liquidity support, whereas the latter had to limit the amounts of liquidity support it received, as set out in recital 21(iii). However, the amount of liquidity support actually granted to Reverta exceeds even the worst case scenario level approved within the Parex Final Decision. That additional liquidity support provides a supplementary advantage for Reverta compared to the aid approved by the Rescue Decisions and Parex Final Decision. None of the other features of the liquidity support apart from its quantity have been altered and so the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes State aid.

| (44) | None of those three additional measures (the seven-year subordinated loan; the 18-month extension; and the additional liquidity support) had been notified to the Commission. Latvia has therefore not complied with the standstill obligation under Article 108 of the Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

None of those three additional measures (the seven-year subordinated loan; the 18-month extension; and the additional liquidity support) had been notified to the Commission. Latvia has therefore not complied with the standstill obligation under Article 108 of the Treaty.

| (45) | Based on the facts that:






  — | both the longer initial maturity and the extended maturity of the subordinated debt and the increased liquidity support clearly represent additional advantages compared to the approved aid measures, and therefore are additional aid (as all of the other criteria under Article 107(1) of the Treaty are still in place), and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Based on the facts that:

—

both the longer initial maturity and the extended maturity of the subordinated debt and the increased liquidity support clearly represent additional advantages compared to the approved aid measures, and therefore are additional aid (as all of the other criteria under Article 107(1) of the Treaty are still in place), and

| — | the absence of any notification to the Commission for those additional aid measures,
  the Commission therefore considers that the measures described in recital 21 represent unlawful aid. |
| --- | --- |

—

the absence of any notification to the Commission for those additional aid measures,

the Commission therefore considers that the measures described in recital 21 represent unlawful aid.

4.2.   Compatibility of the aid

4.2.1.   The subordinated loans with extended maturity

| (46) | In line with the 2008 Banking Communication (30) which was in force when the subordinated loan was initially granted and when it was subsequently extended, in order for aid to be compatible, it had to comply with several conditions:






  — | appropriateness (to be well targeted to its objective, e.g. to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy, and take the most appropriate form for that purpose to remedy the disturbance), |
| --- | --- | --- |

(46)

In line with the 2008 Banking Communication (30) which was in force when the subordinated loan was initially granted and when it was subsequently extended, in order for aid to be compatible, it had to comply with several conditions:

—

appropriateness (to be well targeted to its objective, e.g. to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy, and take the most appropriate form for that purpose to remedy the disturbance),

| — | necessity (to be necessary to achieve the objective, and remain at the minimum necessary to do that), |
| --- | --- |

—

necessity (to be necessary to achieve the objective, and remain at the minimum necessary to do that),

| — | proportionality (the positive effects of the aid must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measures’ objectives). |
| --- | --- |

—

proportionality (the positive effects of the aid must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measures’ objectives).

| (47) | The objective of granting a subordinated loan qualifying as Tier 2 capital to Parex banka was to enable it to continue to satisfy the capital adequacy ratio and to ensure that it is sufficiently capitalised so as to better withstand potential losses, in order to avoid a serious disturbance in the Latvian economy. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The objective of granting a subordinated loan qualifying as Tier 2 capital to Parex banka was to enable it to continue to satisfy the capital adequacy ratio and to ensure that it is sufficiently capitalised so as to better withstand potential losses, in order to avoid a serious disturbance in the Latvian economy.

| (48) | In the first rescue Decision, the Commission noted that the subordinated debt for Parex banka was limited to the minimum necessary in scope and time. Among other elements, the limitation to the minimum necessary was based on the commitment of the Latvian authorities to grant subordinated debt with a maximum maturity of five years. In that regard, the Commission noted in that decision that the minimum maturity for the subordinated debt to qualify as Tier 2 capital under Latvian legislation was five years. The aid measure was therefore qualified as compatible. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In the first rescue Decision, the Commission noted that the subordinated debt for Parex banka was limited to the minimum necessary in scope and time. Among other elements, the limitation to the minimum necessary was based on the commitment of the Latvian authorities to grant subordinated debt with a maximum maturity of five years. In that regard, the Commission noted in that decision that the minimum maturity for the subordinated debt to qualify as Tier 2 capital under Latvian legislation was five years. The aid measure was therefore qualified as compatible.

| (49) | The second and third rescue Decisions, the Parex Final Decision and the Amendment Decision did not alter the assessment of the first rescue Decision in that respect, concerning the limitation to the minimum necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The second and third rescue Decisions, the Parex Final Decision and the Amendment Decision did not alter the assessment of the first rescue Decision in that respect, concerning the limitation to the minimum necessary.

| (50) | The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the extended maturity of the subordinated loans. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the extended maturity of the subordinated loans.

| (51) | Therefore, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the subordinated debt issued with a maturity of seven years instead of five years as initially approved cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensured limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Therefore, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the subordinated debt issued with a maturity of seven years instead of five years as initially approved cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensured limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility.

| (52) | Equally, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the additional prolongation of the subordinated debt maturity by 18 months cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensures limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Equally, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the additional prolongation of the subordinated debt maturity by 18 months cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensures limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility.

| (53) | The Commission invites Latvia and any interested parties to present it with additional elements relevant to whether the seven-year duration of the subordinated loan and its subsequent extension by 18 months constitutes aid which was limited to the minimum necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Commission invites Latvia and any interested parties to present it with additional elements relevant to whether the seven-year duration of the subordinated loan and its subsequent extension by 18 months constitutes aid which was limited to the minimum necessary.

4.2.2.   The liquidity support measure

| (54) | The assessment of the restructuring plan in the Parex Final Decision was based on assumptions presented at that time regarding the expected inflows of liquidity into Reverta which would allow it to start repaying the liquidity support granted in the form of State deposits, up to a certain level (31). |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The assessment of the restructuring plan in the Parex Final Decision was based on assumptions presented at that time regarding the expected inflows of liquidity into Reverta which would allow it to start repaying the liquidity support granted in the form of State deposits, up to a certain level (31).

| (55) | The amounts expected to remain unpaid, as described in the Parex Final Decision, ranged from LVL [...] million (the base case scenario) to LVL [...] million (the worst case scenario). As explained in recital 21, the actual amounts from which Reverta has benefited have constantly exceeded those laid out in the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The amounts expected to remain unpaid, as described in the Parex Final Decision, ranged from LVL [...] million (the base case scenario) to LVL [...] million (the worst case scenario). As explained in recital 21, the actual amounts from which Reverta has benefited have constantly exceeded those laid out in the Parex Final Decision.

| (56) | The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the additional liquidity support. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the additional liquidity support.

| (57) | In view of this, and considering also the fact that the revised restructuring plan presented by Latvia includes numerous other adjustments compared to the plan approved through the Parex Final Decision, the Commission is not in the position at this time to qualify the additional liquidity support as compatible with the internal market. A more in-depth assessment of the impact the revised levels of liquidity support will have to be carried out, taking into account the revised restructuring plan in its entirety. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In view of this, and considering also the fact that the revised restructuring plan presented by Latvia includes numerous other adjustments compared to the plan approved through the Parex Final Decision, the Commission is not in the position at this time to qualify the additional liquidity support as compatible with the internal market. A more in-depth assessment of the impact the revised levels of liquidity support will have to be carried out, taking into account the revised restructuring plan in its entirety.

4.3.   The breach of the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business

| (58) | Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if aid is misused, i.e. if the beneficiary used aid in contravention of a decision taken pursuant to Article 7(3) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if aid is misused, i.e. if the beneficiary used aid in contravention of a decision taken pursuant to Article 7(3) of that Regulation.

| (59) | In the Parex Final Decision (32) Latvia committed that Citadele would divest the Wealth Management Business by certain deadlines. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

In the Parex Final Decision (32) Latvia committed that Citadele would divest the Wealth Management Business by certain deadlines.

| (60) | Latvia confirmed that the Wealth Management Business has not been divested within the agreed deadlines. This constitutes a breach of the terms of the Parex Final Decision and hence a misuse of the aid granted. The Commission invites Latvia and interested parties to comment on that conclusion and to present any elements which would allow the Commission to consider whether aid obtained by Citadele could be considered compatible with the internal market if the Wealth Management Business were not to be divested separately from Citadele. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Latvia confirmed that the Wealth Management Business has not been divested within the agreed deadlines. This constitutes a breach of the terms of the Parex Final Decision and hence a misuse of the aid granted. The Commission invites Latvia and interested parties to comment on that conclusion and to present any elements which would allow the Commission to consider whether aid obtained by Citadele could be considered compatible with the internal market if the Wealth Management Business were not to be divested separately from Citadele.

5.   CONCLUSION

The Commission concludes, in regard to the unlawful aid described in recital 21, that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market based on the information available at this time. The Commission therefore has decided to open a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Articles 13(1) and 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.

Moreover, the Commission concludes that the breach of commitment described in recital 23 constitutes misuse of aid. The Commission therefore has decided to open a formal investigation procedure also for misuse of aid pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requests Latvia to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the measures (in particular the compatibility of the un-notified aid), within ten working days of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns Latvia that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within ten working days of the date of such publication.’

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(1)  Odluka Komisije C 26/2009, SL L 163, 23.6.2011., str. 28.

1

(2)  Nakon razdvajanja 1. kolovoza 2010. loša je banka prvotno zadržala ime „Parex banka”, no od svibnja 2012. registrirana je pod imenom „AS Reverta”.

2

(3)  Odluka Komisije SA.34747, SL C 273, 21.9.2013., str. 1.

3

(4)  Commission Decision NN 68/2008, OJ C 147, 27.6.2009, p. 1.

4

(5)  Commission Decision NN 3/2009, OJ C 147, 27.6.2009, p. 2.

5

(6)  Commission Decision N 189/2009, OJ C 176, 29.7.2009, p. 3.

6

(7)  Commission Decision C 26/2009 (ex N 189/2009), OJ C 239, 6.10.2009, p. 11.

7

(8)  In particular, performing loans to borrowers located in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Lithuanian subsidiary, branches in Sweden and Germany and the wealth management business, with the latter including the Swiss subsidiary.

8

(9)  The bad bank initially kept the name of Parex banka after the split that took place on 1 August 2010, but has been registered since May 2012 under the corporate name “AS Reverta”.

9

(10)  Commission Decision C 26/2009, OJ L 163, 23.6.2011, p. 28.

10

(11)  Commission Decision SA.34747, OJ C 273, 21.9.2013, p. 1.

11

(12)  Meaning loans to borrowers located in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

12

(13)  The Wealth Management Business consists of the private capital management sector of Citadele, asset management subsidiaries and AP Anlage & Privatbank AG, Switzerland.

13

(14)  Confidential information.

14

(15)  Recitals 55-57 of the Parex Final Decision.

15

(16)  Recitals 58-61 of the Parex Final Decision.

16

(17)  Recitals 62-68 of the Parex Final Decision.

17

(18)  Recitals 69-70 of the Parex Final Decision.

18

(19)  The Monitoring Trustee was appointed through a Mandate signed by Reverta, Citadele and the Latvian authorities on 28 February 2011. The Monitoring Trustee has submitted bi-annual monitoring reports covering the preceding semester, starting with the one ending 31 December 2010.

19

(20)  Following the split of Parex banka, Citadele was established on 1 August 2010. The Parex Final Decision approved the transfer to Citadele of all of the subordinated loans previously granted to Parex banka. No Tier 2 capital was provided to Parex banka by Latvia at the time of the split or could have been provided by Latvia after the split.

20

On 3 September 2009 the EBRD agreed to refinance part of the subordinated loan previously granted by Latvia to Parex banka. As of 31 December 2009 the subordinated loans granted by Latvia to Parex banka amounted to LVL 37 million, while the subordinated loan granted by the EBRD amounted to LVL 13 million.

At the time of the split Latvia took over LVL 8 million out of the LVL 13 million subordinated loan held by the EBRD. As of 1 August 2010, the total amount of subordinated loans held by Latvia was LVL 45 million (with different maturities), while that held by the EBRD was LVL 5 million.

(21)  The Latvian Privatisation Agency, owned by Latvia.

21

(22)  That information is contained in Table 6 of the Parex Final Decision.

22

(23)  See recital 73 of the Parex Final Decision.

23

(24)  In that respect, Latvia points to recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision.

24

(25)  Recital 49 of the Parex Final Decision.

25

(26)  OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

26

(27)  Under Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, unlawful aid means new aid put into effect in contravention of Article 108(3) of the Treaty — i.e. without notification to the Commission of aid measures before they are put into effect.

27

(28)  Recital 40 of the first rescue Decision.

28

(29)  Recital 41 of the first rescue Decision.

29

(30)  Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis OJ C 270, 25.10.2008.

30

(31)  Recital 55 of the Parex Final Decision.

31

(32)  See recital 73 of the Parex Final Decision.

32

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