alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The State v. Payson.

1. Seduction.: evidence: “keeping company” with another man. In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the prosecuting witness had frequently been seen going home with another man was not material, — not even to contradict her testimony that she had never “kepi, company” with any other man than the defendant.

2. -: EVIDENCE OF PRIOR UNCHASTITY: QUESTION FOR JURY. Ill such case it was for the jury to weigh the evidence as to the prior chastity of the prosecuting witness, and this court cannot disturb their finding in that regard.

*Appeal from Carroll District Court.*

Saturday, March 19.

Indictment charging that the defendant seduced one Din? Granhoff. Trial by jury. Yerdict, guilty, and judgment. The defendant appeals.

*Bowen di Cloud*and *McDuffie d¡*Howard, for appellant.

*A. J. Baher, Attorney -general,*for the State.

Seevers, J.

1. Seduction.: evidence: “keeping company” with another man. The defendant sought to prove by one Jacobson that he frequently saw a person other than th.e defendant going home with her. We are unable to see the : ° *°*materiality of this evidence. Counsel, however, " ’ ’ say that the prosecutrix denied that any one kept company with her other than the defendant, and therefore the refusal of the court to admit the evidence was prejudicial error. But this, we think, cannot be so. Merely going home with the prosecutrix, without more, certainly cannot be regarded as a material circumstance. The prosecutrix may have understood “keeping company” as something materially different from walking home with a gentleman. Besides this, the evidence in relation to “keeping company” was elicited on cross-examination.

A small portion of the fifth instruction is singled out, and is said to be erroneous. We think the instruction is in no respect objectionable. We deem it unnecessary to set it out

*543
      2. -: EVIDENCE OF PRIOR UNCHASTITY: QUESTION FOR JURY. It is also said that the evidence does not sustain the verdict for the reason that it appears that the prosecutrix was not of chaste character. There is some evidence which tends to establish that she was not of chaste , , . , , character. It, however, is not so clear and cen . tam as to warrant us m disturbing tlie verdict This question was fairly submitted to the jury, and we cannot see that there is any prejudicial error in the record.

Affirmed.
J

- A13005

- 20
2020 PA Super 236

C OMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ,

Appellee

v.

TIMOTHY OLIVER BARR II ,

Appellant :
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2347 E DA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered A ugust 2 , 2019 i n the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 39

- CR

- 0000279

- 2019

BE FORE: BENDER P. J. E. , LAZARUS , J. and STRASSBURGER , J. *

CONCURRING OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2020

I join the Majority in its entirety, and a gree “ the odor of marijuana

does not per se establish probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a

vehicle[,]” thus requiring remand of this matter for the trial court to consider

that factor, along with any other factors, in its probable cause anal ysis.

I write separately to note my discontent with the Commonwealth’s

reliance on the “high

- crime area” factor in support of a finding of probable

cause. I believe that t he status of the neighborhood at issue as a “high

crime area” should not be relev ant to the probable cause determination.

People who live in poor areas that are riddled with crime do not have fewer

constitutional rights than people who have the means to live in “nice”

neighborhoods.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.J

- A13005

- 20

- 2

-

President Judge Emeritus Bender and Judge Lazarus joi n in this

concurring opinion.
#### John Randolph, Respondent, *v.*Royce Haulage Corporation, Appellant.

Argued May 20, 1943;

decided June 18, 1943.

*918
      *William, C. Morris*and *Edward M. Fuller*for appellant.

*Alfred Weisstein, Samuel Weissiem*and *Harry Zeitlan*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ.
1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________ N O
. 09
- 21
- 00 412
- CR

__________________ TREVEON SHELLDRICK POOLE , A ppellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A ppellee

________________________________________________________________ __ On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 20
- 02
- 01852
- CR

__________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION A grand jury indicted Appellant Treveon Shelldrick Poole ( “ Appellant” or

“ Poole ”) for aggravated robbery , and the indictment also alleged that during the
commission of the offense or immediate flight therefrom Poole used or exhibited a deadly weapon, namely a firearm

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03 ( a )(2). Poole pleaded “not guilty , ” but the jury found Poole guilty as charged in the indictment

. After hearing evidence at the punishment phase of the trial , t he jury assessed punishment at fifty years of confinement. Poole filed a notice of appeal.2 On appeal, Appellant’s court

- appointed attorney filed a brief stating that he has reviewed the case and, based on his professional evaluation of the record and applicable law, there are no arguable grounds for reversal. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 7 38 (1967); High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). We granted an extension of time for Poole to file a pro se brief, and we received no response from Poole

. Upon receiving an Anders brief, this Court must conduct a full examination
of the re cord of all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly
frivolous. Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders , 386 U.S. at 744). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 827

- 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for
reversible error but fo und none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”) Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re

- brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) . We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1

1 Poole may challenge our decision in this case by filing a petition for discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.3 AFFIRMED.

_________________________ LEANNE JOHNSON Justice
Submitted on August 23 , 2022 Opinion Delivered August 2 4 , 2022 Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 99.4  Press Release



PRESS RELEASE
March 31, 2000

                              For further information contact:
                              David M. Bradley
                              Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
                              North Central Bancshares, Inc.
                              825 Central Avenue
                              Fort Dodge, Iowa 50501
                              515-576-7531

                    NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC. ANNOUNCES
                            STOCK REPURCHASE PROGRAM

Fort Dodge, Iowa, March 31, 2000 - North Central Bancshares, Inc. (Nasdaq:
"FFFD") (the "Company"), the holding company for First Federal Savings Bank of
Iowa, announced that it will commence a stock repurchase program beginning on or
about April 25, 2000.  The program authorizes the Company to repurchase up to
5.0% or 102,862 shares of its 2,057,242 outstanding shares of common stock
during the next twelve months.  The repurchases will be made from time to time,
in open market transactions, at the discretion of management.

North Central Bancshares, Inc., with over $367 million in assets, is the holding
company for First Federal Savings Bank of Iowa, a federally chartered stock
savings bank.  First Federal is a community-oriented institution serving Iowa
through 8 full service locations in Fort Dodge, Nevada, Ames, Perry, Burlington
and Mt. Pleasant, Iowa.  First Federal's deposits are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                DEC-31-2000
<CASH>                                           59,802
<SECURITIES>                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     1,176
<ALLOWANCES>                                       (185)
<INVENTORY>                                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 66,861
<PP&E>                                           45,557
<DEPRECIATION>                                   (7,178)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  106,835
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            41,025
<BONDS>                                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                           0
<COMMON>                                        145,931
<OTHER-SE>                                      (90,812)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    106,835
<SALES>                                          34,263
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 34,263
<CGS>                                            33,494
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   102,527
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (1,609)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (66,956)
<INCOME-TAX>                                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (66,956)
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       0
<CHANGES>                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (66,956)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (2.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (2.14)



</TABLE>
#### LEOSO, Plaintiff v. E. RIPLEY (NERI), Defendant

No. 25-1918

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Fusi”]

Date unknown

A. M. NOBLE and MOLIOO, *Judges of the High Court of American Samoa*

JUDGMENT

This cause coming on to be heard before their Honors A. M. Noble and Molioo, on the 13th day of February, 1919, and being heard upon the following issue; “Is the plaintiff, Leoso, the owner and entitled to the possession of the land, “FUSI”, set out and described in the complaint”; and the Court having answered the said issue, “NO”.

*300It is therefore ordered, considered and adjudged by the Court that the plaintiff take nothing by this action.

It is further ordered, considered and adjudged by the Court, that the costs of this action, viz.; $20.00 be paid by the plaintiff, Leoso.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6422 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6422

To amend title 5, United States Code, to limit the number of local wage 
        areas allowable within a General Schedule pay locality.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 15, 2023

Mr. Cartwright introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
               Committee on Oversight and Accountability

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 5, United States Code, to limit the number of local wage 
        areas allowable within a General Schedule pay locality.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Locality Pay Equity Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. LIMITING THE NUMBER OF LOCAL WAGE AREAS DEFINED WITHIN A 
              GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY LOCALITY.

    (a) Local Wage Area Limitation.--Section 5343(a) of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1)(B)(i), by striking ``(but such'' and 
        all that follows through ``are employed)'';
            (2) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' after the 
        semicolon;
            (3) in paragraph (5), by striking the period after 
        ``Islands'' and inserting ``; and''; and
            (4) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(6) the Office of Personnel Management shall define not 
        more than 1 local wage area within a pay locality, except that 
        this paragraph shall not apply to the pay locality designated 
        as `Rest of United States'.''.
    (b) General Schedule Pay Locality Defined.--Section 5342(a) of 
title 5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (2)(C), by striking ``and'' after the 
        semicolon;
            (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period after 
        ``employee'' and inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(4) `pay locality' has the meaning given that term under 
        section 5302.''.

SEC. 3. REGULATIONS.

    The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe 
any regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act, 
including regulations to ensure that the enactment of this Act shall 
not have the effect of reducing any rate of basic pay payable to any 
individual who is serving as a prevailing rate employee (as defined 
under section 5342(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code).

SEC. 4. APPLICABILITY.

    The amendments made by this Act shall apply on and after the first 
day of the first full pay period beginning at least 180 days after the 
date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

MIGUEL PEREZ, III, a/k/a, ) MIGUEL ANGEL PEREZ, DOC #P90128, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-4679 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed September 16, 2020. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Declan Mansfield and Kimberly Campbell, Judges. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Miguel Perez, III, pro se. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SILBERMAN, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. San Juan HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10003

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 16, 2016 *

Filed November 21, 2016

Robert Lally Miskell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Serra Marie Tsethlikai, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU—Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Mark F. Willimann, The Law Office of Mark F. Willimann, LLC, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

San Juan Hernandez appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3682(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.

Hernandez contends that the district court failed to explain adequately its denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. We agree. The district court’s order does hot address or explain its rejection of the arguments presented in either Hernandez’s motion for a sentence reduction or probation’s recommendation that the district court grant a sentence reduction. Accordingly, we vacate and remand. *See United States v. Trujillo,*713 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2013) (district court must provide some explanation for rejecting a defendant’s non-frivolous arguments).

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Chandra Belton et al., Appellants, v Liberty Lines Transit, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[769 NYS2d 885]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Bertram Katz, J.), entered on or about September 5, 2002, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, the motion to dismiss denied and plaintiff directed to submit to a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing within 30 days of service of a copy of this order, with notice of entry. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered November 18, 2002, which, insofar as appeal-able, denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to renew, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as academic, in view of the foregoing.

Although the general rule is that an action may not be commenced against a New York municipality unless the plaintiff has complied with the municipality’s timely demand for a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing, we have held that where such hearing has been indefinitely postponed and defendant never served a subsequent demand, a motion to dismiss based upon a plaintiffs failure to appear for the hearing may be denied *(Ruiz v New York City Hous. Auth.,*216 AD2d 258 [1995] [dismissal denied “insofar as based on plaintiffs failure to appear for a physical examination, where the date for such examination had been postponed indefinitely and defendant never attempted to secure its right thereto by serving plaintiff with another demand therefor”]; *compare Best v City of New York,*97 AD2d 389 [1983], *affd*61 NY2d 847 [1984] [dismissal upheld where action commenced after plaintiff’s repeated rescheduling and failure to appear at section 50-h hearing]; *see also Ramos v New York City Hous. Auth.,*256 AD2d 195 [1998]). Denial of the motion to dismiss was appropriate here. The record before us *335reveals that Westchester County, the owner of the bus on which plaintiff Chandra Belton was a passenger when she was injured, timely served a demand for a section 50-h hearing, that plaintiffs were granted a single adjournment, but no subsequent date was set, and that defendants never sought to reschedule the hearing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Saxe, Rosenberger, Williams and Gonzalez, JJ.
ex10-6.htm


Exhibit 10.6


 



AMENDMENT TO AMENDED PAYMENT


SCHEDULE BETWEEN ANTHUS LIFE CORP AND STAKOOL, INC












Due to typographical errors, the following changes in the Amended Payment Schedule have been made (All Other Terms and Conditions Remain the Same):







Paragraph 2 of The Amended Payment Schedule currently reads:







2.           Preferred Shares







All of the Issued and Outstanding Preferred Shares, currently held in an Escrow Account, and to the Company’s understanding, with an attorney in Oregon, shall be returned to the Company following the 3/15/2012 payment of $30,000.  The $30,000 will be held in escrow with Sharon Mitchell until the Preferred Shares are sent and received to and by Sharon Mitchell.







THIS AMENDMENT CHANGES PARAGRAPH 2 TO READ AS FOLLOWS:







2.           PREFERRED SHARES







All of the Issued and Outstanding Preferred Shares, currently held in an Escrow Account, and to the Company’s understanding, with Eric Glatte, attorney in Oregon, shall be delivered to Sharon Mitchell in exchange of the 3/15/2012 payment of $30,000.  The $30,000 will be wired to the attorney’s escrow account and Eric Glatte shall Federal Express the Preferred Shares to Sharon Mitchell to hold in escrow until all payments have been made.







Paragraph 3(b) of the Amended Payment Schedule currently reads:


 


3.           CEDE SHARES AND ENDER’S NOTE


 


 


 (b) The 20 million note held by Richard Charbit in the name of Ender will be returned to Peter Hellwig as soon as possible following the execution of this Agreement.


 







THIS AMENDMENT CHANGES PARAGRAPH 3(b) TO READ AS FOLLOWS:


 


3.           CEDE SHARES AND ENDER’S NOTE


 


 


 (b) The 20 million shares held by Richard Charbit in the name of Ender will be returned to the Company as soon as possible following the execution of this Agreement.


 


Signed this _____ day of January 2012, by Peter Hellwig and Kyle Gotshalk.













	
/s/ Peter Hellwig

	
 /s/ Kyle Gotshalk


	
Peter Hellwig

	
 Kyle Gotshalk
State of Vermont 

Superior Court — Environmental Division 

====================================================================== 

E N T R Y R E G A R D I N G M O T I O N 

====================================================================== 

In re Cote Site Plan Approval Docket No. 52-4-10 Vtec

(Appeal of DRB Decision on Cote Site Plan) 

Title: Motion to Quash Subpoena (Filing No. 15) 

Filed: October 24, 2012 

Filed By: Town of St. Albans, Vincent A. Paradis, Esq. 

Response: November 5, 2012, by Appellant John E. Maslar, 

X Granted __ Denied ___ Other 

 On or about October 18, 2012, Attorney Vincent Paradis was served with a subpoena 

requiring his appearance, presumably to serve as a trial witness, at the merits hearing in this 

matter scheduled for November 27, 2012. The subpoena was requested by Mr. Leo Bilodeau, 

one of the Appellants in this matter. The Environmental Division did not issue the subpoena 

and it is otherwise unknown to the Court who issued the subpoena as the signatory line is not 

legible. 

 This matter is limited to the issues raised in this appeal of site plan approval granted by 

the Town of St. Albans to Janet Cote on March 16, 2010. Attorney Paradis represents the Town 

of St. Albans. In his motion to quash the subpoena, Attorney Paradis states that all information 

acquired by him relating to this matter has been during the course of his representation of the 

Town. Any testimony of Attorney Paradis relating to the matter before the Court would be 

subject to the Attorney/Client privilege or otherwise protected from disclosure. Thus, pursuant 

to V.R.C.P. Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iii), Attorney Paradis’ timely motion to quash is GRANTED. 

Attorney Paradis is not required to appear and testify in this matter. 

 Attorney Paradis’ motion also requests that the Town’s costs and reasonable attorney 

fees be awarded. Although V.R.C.P. 45(c) allows a court to enforce a party’s duty of avoiding 

the imposition of undue burdens or expenses, we decline to order reimbursement of costs and 

attorney fees at this time. 

___________________________________________ November 7, 2012____ 

 Thomas G. Walsh, Judge Date 
====================================================================== 

Date copies sent to: ____________ Clerk's Initials _______ 

Copies sent to: 

 Appellant Leo Bilodeau 

 Appellant John E. Maslar 

 Appellant Jerome Franklin 

 Attorney Vincent A. Paradis for Interested Person Town of St. Albans 

 Attorney Cynthia L. Broadfoot for Appellee Janet Cote