alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Houmam KOUAICI, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.

No. 16-3761

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 6, 2017

Filed: July 11, 2017

Houmam Kouaici, Pro Se

Surell Brady, Trial Attorney, Kimberly A. Burdge, Trial Attorney, Karen Yolanda Drummond, Tracie Nicole Jones, Trial Attorney, Carl H. McIntyre, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Moroccan citizen Houmam Kouaici petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from the decision of an immigration judge who denied him asylum and withholding of removal. This court lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Kouaici’s asylum application was untimely filed. *See Cambara-Cambara v. Lynch,*837 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2016). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of withholding of removal on the ground that Kouaici failed to establish that he would be subject to future persecution in Morocco based on a protected ground. *See Fesehaye v. Holder,*607 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir. 2010). The petition is therefore denied. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATE



As required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, (as amended by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002), I certify that:



(1)        The Annual Report of VirTra Systems, Inc. for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)        The information contained in that Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







/s/ J David Rogers

chief financial officer

April 13, 2007
#### *Alexander vs.*Reed & Myers.

June 1.

Error to the Bath Circuit; Silas W. Robbins, Judge.

*Non-joinder. Mis-joinder, Abatement. Feme covert.*

Forcible entry and detainer. Case 87.

statement of e acts.

Instructions for non suit because non aen^busband”

That a feme not^uilt T sued®ill foroible entry and detainer is non’suit; °r plaintiff may recover a-fie^proves M guilty.

*Query*— May ll()t 0. I0J116 covert whose husband had abandoned her amMhe state, be sued a'Me°entr0r"/ and detainer *i*

Judge Mills

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

John Alexander, the appellant, issued his warrant 0f forcible entry and detainer against Peter Reed and Susanna Myers, which came by a traverse into the circuit court. On the trial it was proved that Susanna Myers was married, but that her husband bad forsaken her some twelve or fifteen years since, and now resided in the state of Indiana, and that Peter Reed lived with her in a supposed state of adultery, and in the language of the neighborhood, was said rather to live with her, than she with him, and that she lived near the premises in contest, and Peter Reed and two of her sons, who were minors, and acted under her direction, committed the fores:» ble entry complained of in the warrant.

The court below, on the motion of the appellees, instructed the jury as in case of a non suit, because ^ jjugband of the said Susanna was not joined in the warrant, and this presents the question for our revision.

The decision of the circuit court cannot be sustainedj for if it be admitted that Susanna Myers could not be convicted of the force unless her husband was joined, or that he ought to have been sued’ alone for the force, which she had committed, it does not follow that in this case, which is evidently founded in tort, the plaintiff must be turned.cntirely 0Uj- 0f court, and that Peter Reed could not have been convicted. For in all civil cases in tort merely, if the plaintiff joins defendants not guilty, or brings his action against those of whom he cannot recover, he may recover against others who are • i i ii v rightful!}' SUCu.

But it cannot be admitted that the motion ought bave prevailed as to Susanna Myers. For if it be conceded that she could not be removed from the land, until her husband who resided in another state cou^ be reached, (which seems absurd,) the matter *on*which she relied was matter of abatement only.

*247In this action as in others, coverture of A defendant *Sc*other matters in abatement must be so pleaded, and after issue joined on, the traverse cannot be enquired into.

*Triplett*for plaintiff) *Mayes*for defendants.

Taking this proceeding as a civil action for a tort, It must be set out at the proper hour by plea in abatement, 1 Chitt. 437, and according to the decision of this court, in the case of Jones vs. Overton, 4 Bibb, 334, after issue is made by a traverse of the inquisition, an enquiry into matters which operate in abatement only are excluded.

The judgment must, therefore, be reversed with costs, and the verdict be set aside and the cause be remanded, for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6248 

To require Amtrak to report to Congress information on Amtrak compliance 

with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 with respect to trains 

and stations. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 6, 2023 

Mr. MOLINARO (for himself, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. NEHLS, Ms. NORTON, Mr. 

PAPPAS, Mr. CARSON, and Mrs. GONZA ́LEZ-COLO ́N) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To require Amtrak to report to Congress information on 

Amtrak compliance with the Americans with Disabilities 

Act of 1990 with respect to trains and stations. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Think Differently 

5 Transportation Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REPORT ON AMTRAK ADA COMPLIANCE. 

7 Section 24315(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, 

8 is amended— 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6248 IH

1 (1) in subparagraph (B) by striking ‘‘and’’ at 

2 the end; 

3 (2) in subparagraph (C) by striking the period 

4 at the end and inserting a semicolon; and 

5 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(D) shall include an action plan for bring7 ing Amtrak rail cars and Amtrak-served sta8 tions that are not in compliance with the Amer9 icans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 

10 12101 et seq.) into compliance with such Act as 

11 required by the settlement agreement entered 

12 into in 2020 between Amtrak and the Depart13 ment of Justice, as applicable; and 

14 ‘‘(E) shall include a status report on— 

15 ‘‘(i) Amtrak-served stations for which 

16 Amtrak is solely responsible for compliance 

17 with such Act based on an assessment car18 ried out by Amtrak, including a timeline 

19 for any required compliance with such Act 

20 consistent with the terms of the agreement 

21 described in subparagraph (D); 

22 ‘‘(ii) Amtrak-served stations for which 

23 Amtrak has a shared responsibility for 

24 compliance with such Act based on an as25 sessment carried out by Amtrak, including 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•HR 6248 IH

1 a timeline for any required compliance 

2 with such Act for the portions of the sta3 tion for which Amtrak is the responsible 

4 party consistent with the terms of the 

5 agreement described in subparagraph (D), 

6 and who is responsible for compliance with 

7 such Act for the other portions of the Am8 trak-served station where Amtrak is not 

9 the responsible party and the timeline for 

10 compliance where Amtrak is not the re11 sponsible party; and 

12 ‘‘(iii) the status of compliance with 

13 such Act for all Amtrak-served stations for 

14 which Amtrak is not the responsible party, 

15 nor is responsible for a portion of the sta16 tion, and the entity or entities that have 

17 responsibility for compliance with such 

18 Act, based on an assessment carried out by 

19 Amtrak.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### The RINEHART OIL NEWS COMPANY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 23416.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 23, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 21, 1966.

Richard A. Freling, Robert B. Ward, Dallas, Tex., for appellant, Jenkens, Anson, Spradley & Gilchrist, Dallas, Tex., of counsel.

Richard M. Roberts, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Atty., Mitchell Rogovin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Richard P. Milloy, Atty., I. R. S., Gilbert E. Andrews, Jr., Howard M. Koff, Richard C. Pugh, Nicholas McGrath, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and JONES and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this Petition for Review of a Decision of the Tax Court of the United States, the Petitioner contends the decision of the Tax Court- is clearly erroneous as not being supported by any substantial evidence on the record as a whole.

We have carefully considered the record and conclude that the Tax Court correctly determined that no part of the sale price paid by Rinehart to Five Star Oil Reports, Inc. was paid in return for covenants by four of its stockholders not to compete. We affirm the decision upon the unpublished Findings of Fact and Opinion of the Tax Court. See Prentice-Hall, 65-177, Memo.T.C. 1965 p. 1027.
#### Rosemeyere DIAS-FARIA, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 16-60337 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 1, 2017

Kevin Michael Crabtree, Esq., Law Office of Robert L. Léwis, Oakland, CA, for Petitioner

James Adelbert Hurley, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

*446Before BARKSDALE, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Rosemeyere Dias-Faria, a native and citizen of Brazil, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision not to exercise its *sua sponte*authority to reopen her removal proceeding. In support, Dias claims: (1) the administrative record before the BIA was incomplete; (2) the BIA erred by not considering that the motion to reopen was unopposed; (3) it improperly found she was not diligent in waiting 13 years to file the motion; and (4) it misidentified the relief sought.

This court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to exercise its *sua sponte*authority to reopen. *Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 246, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2004) (relying on *Heckler v. Chaney,*470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). And, to the extent we would have jurisdiction to review legal or constitutional claims, Dias raises none.

As another basis for relief, Dias claims the BIA should have construed her brief as seeking equitable tolling of the period for filing a statutory motion to reopen. But, she did not exhaust this claim before the BIA. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider it. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(d)(1); *Roy v. Ashcroft,*389 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 2004).

DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### TAUANUU, Plaintiff v. LEI, SALEAPAGA and PALAITA, Defendants

No. 16-1902

High Court of American Samoa Criminal Jurisdiction, Appellate Division

April 18, 1902

Present: U. SEBREE, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commandant U.S. Naval Station, Tutuila, *President of the High Court;*W. W. KIMBALL, Commander, U.S. Navy, Commanding U.S.S. Abarenda, *Member;*J. L. JAYNE, Lieutenant, U.S.N., *Member*

*622DECISION

After maturely considering the evidence given before the District Court, and after listening to argument on the part of the Appellant, the Appellate Court confirms and upholds the rule laid down in the majority decision rendered in the lower court, as to the use of the word “ipu” in kava-drinking ceremonies in American Samoa; to wit:—

> “The Court, therefore, lays down the rule that the word ‘ipu’ is not confined strictly to Tuimanua and his people, but can be used in connection with the giving of kava to other chiefs.

> “As between Tuimanua and his people, of Manua, the Manua custom of designating the kava of a Manua chief or tulafale by ‘taumafa’, may prevail, but as between Tuimanua and high officials of the Government, such as the Commandant, his representative, the Chief Justice and Secretary of Native Affairs, it is no wrong inflicted upon Tuimanua to give the ‘ipu’ to these officials coupled with their names; nor is it wrong to do likewise with distinguished chiefs from other islands.

> “In giving kava to Tuimanua, the word ‘ipu’ alone is used, but when once that word ‘ipu’ is conjoined with another name it is no longer Tuimanua’s ‘ipu’, but the ‘ipu’ of the intended recipient; hence no wrong is done towards Tuimanua, nor has any breach of Manua customs been committed.”

2. The Appellate Court confirms and upholds the decision of the District Court of November 1, 1901, No. 18-1901, that Lei, Saleapaga and Palaita are not guilty of any breach of Manuan law or custom.

3. The amount of money ordered by the Court to be paid as costs, by Palaita, is remitted.
<PAGE>
 
Exhibit 99.2 Press Release


PRESS RELEASE


January 30, 1998            For further information contact:
                            David M. Bradley
                            Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer
                            North Central Bancshares, Inc.
                            825 Central Avenue
                            Fort Dodge, Iowa 50501
                            515-576-7531


                   NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC. COMPLETES
                     ACQUISITION OF VALLEY FINANCIAL CORP

Fort Dodge, Iowa, January 30, 1998...North Central Bancshares, Inc.
(NASDAQ/NMS:FFFD) has announced today the successful completion of the
acquisition of Valley Financial Corp. and the merger of Valley Savings Bank,
FSB, Burlington, Iowa, Valley Financial's wholly owned subsidiary, with and into
First Federal Savings Bank of Fort Dodge, the wholly owned subsidiary of North
Central, both of which will be effective as of the close of business today. The
shareholders of Valley Financial received $525.00 in cash for each share of
Valley Financial common stock held. The total consideration amounted to
$14,726,250.00. The branch offices of Valley Savings Bank will continue to
operate as Valley Savings Bank, a division of First Federal. The addition of
Valley Savings Bank's three banking offices will increase the number of First
Federal's banking offices to a total of seven in southeastern and north central
Iowa.

Mr. David M. Bradley, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive
Officer of both North Central and First Federal, commented, "In addition to
representing our first acquisition to enhance our franchise, the acquisition of
Valley Financial effectively deploys some of the capital raised in our second
step conversion completed in 1996. We are confident that the transaction will
enhance shareholder value and provide long-term benefits for our customers and
the communities that First Federal and Valley Savings Bank serve."

As a result of the acquisition, North Central will have in excess of $300
million in assets and $240 million in deposits.

North Central Bancshares, Inc., through its wholly owned subsidiary, First
Federal Savings Bank of Fort Dodge, headquartered in Fort Dodge, Iowa now serves
north central Iowa at four full service locations in Fort Dodge, Nevada and
Ames, Iowa and southeastern Iowa at three full service locations in Burlington
and Mount Pleasant, Iowa, which will operate as Valley Savings Bank branches.
First Federal's deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. The Company's stock is traded on The Nasdaq National Market under
the symbol "FFFD."
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Sergio Alonso VILLA-GRANADOS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51348 Cons w/ 16-51365 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 21, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Sergio Alonso Villa-Granados, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Sergio Alonso Villa-Granados has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Villa-Granados has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected there*405in. We concur with' counsel’s assessment that the appeals present no nonfrivolous issues for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEALS ARE DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gary Lynn SANDERS Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4507

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 19, 2017

Filed: July 24, 2017

Cameron C. McCree, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Edward O. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Arkansas, Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Gary Lynn Sanders, Pro Se

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and’ BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, Gary Sanders challenges the sentence the district court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to drug charges, pursuant to a written plea agreement. His counsel has moved to withdraw and submitted a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, *48087 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), raising the issue that the government breached the plea agreement by not agreeing to a sentence below the statutory minimum, and therefore invalidated the appeal waiver; and that the sentence was unreasonable.

We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable, because our review of the record demonstrates that the government did not breach the plea agreement, as it did not promise to move for a sentence below the statutory minimum, see United States v. Kelly, 18 F.3d 612, 615, 617 (8th Cir. 1994); Sanders entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, see Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997); the argument falls within the scope of the waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver, see United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver.

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion, and we dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
Exhibit 10.1


 


Amendment
to Supplemental Agreement to Exclusive Business Cooperation Agreement  


 


This Amendment to Supplemental
Agreement to Exclusive Business Cooperation Agreement (“this Amendment”) is made and entered into by and between
the following Parties on May 14, 2012 in Xin Mi City, the People’s Republic of China (“China” or “PRC”):


 


		Party A:	Zhengzhou Annec Industrial Co. Ltd.



		Address:	Quliang Technology Industry Zone, Xinmin City, Henan Province, P. R. China



 


		Party B:	Annec (Beijing) Engineering Technology Co., Ltd.



		Address:	Room 808, No. 248, Guang An Men Avenue, Xicheng District, Beijing



 


Each of Party A and
Party B shall be hereinafter referred to as a “Party” respectively, and as the “Parties” collectively.


 


Whereas,


 


The Parties entered into a Supplemental
Agreement to Exclusive Business Cooperation Agreement (“Supplemental Agreement”) on January 16, 2011;


 


Now, therefore, through
mutual discussion, the Parties have reached the following Amendment to Supplemental Agreement:


 


Both Parties agree to amend Article
2.2 and 2.3 of the Supplemental Agreement as follows:


Party B will pay Party A the
Annual Service Fee stipulated in the Supplemental Agreement when it is requested to pay such Annual Service Fee by Party A.


 


This Amendment only supersedes
Article 2.2 and 2.3 of the Supplemental Agreement and will not affect all the other stipulations in the Supplemental Agreement.


 


[The Remainder of
this page is intentionally left blank]


 



    	 



    	 



    

 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
the Parties have caused their authorized representatives to execute this Amendment to Supplemental Agreement to Exclusive Business
Cooperation Agreement as of the date first above written.


  





	Party A: Zhengzhou Annec Industrial Co. Ltd.
	 
	By:	 	 
	 
	Name:
	 
	Title
	 
	Party B: Annec (Beijing) Engineering Technology Co., Ltd.
	 
	By:	 	 
	 
	Name:
	 
	Title




 











    	2
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Diamond Lynell COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-3384

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 22, 2017

Filed: May 26, 2017

Chad G. Gardner, The Law Office of Chad G. Gardner, PC, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Diamond Lynell Cooper, Sandstone, MN, pro se.

Bruce A. Rhoades, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, for appellee.

Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Diamond Cooper directly appeals, the sentence the district court1 imposed’ after he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agree*411ment containing an appeal waiver, to drug, money laundering, and firearm offenses. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), questioning whether Cooper’s guilty plea was voluntary, whether the court imposed a reasonable sentence, and whether counsel was effective.

First, we decline to consider Cooper’s ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal. *See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 4*49 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2006) (ineffective-assistance claims are usually best litigated in collateral proceedings, where the record can be properly developed). We further conclude that Cooper’s involuntary-plea claim is not cognizable on direct appeal because he did not move below to withdraw his guilty plea. *See United States v. Foy,*617 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (8th Cir. 2010) (the claim that defendant’s plea was unknowing or involuntary is not cognizable on direct appeal where defendant failed to move in district court to withdraw his guilty plea).

As to Cooper’s challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence, we conclude that the appeal waiver is valid, applicable, and enforceable. *See United States v. Scott,*627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir, 2010) (de novo review of the validity and applicability of appeal waiver); *United States v. Andis,*333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (appeal waiver will be enforced if appeal falls within scope of waiver, defendant knowingly and .voluntarily entered into plea agreement and waiver, and enforcing waiver would not result in miscarriage of justice).

In addition, we have independently reviewed the record, pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. *75,*109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal, and we grant counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.