SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2940-14T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DARNELL STOVALL,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________

Submitted October 25, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Messano and Guadagno.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, 

Indictment No. 07-09-0125.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Alan I. Smith, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (KeriLeigh Schaefer, Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

February 23, 2017
2 A-2940-14T3

Defendant Darnell Stovall appeals from the January 6, 2015 

Law Division order denying his petition for post-conviction 

relief (PCR), raising three points:

POINT I

THE ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE MATTER REMANDED FOR 

AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE DEFENDANT MADE 

A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

POINT II

THE ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT VIOLATED 

DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 

TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

POINT III

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS 

GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO STATE V. SLATER.

[1]

We have considered these arguments in light of the record and 

applicable law and we affirm.

On December 14, 2006, defendant and two others, Quemere 

McClendon and Paul Lewis, were driven to the home of Keith 

Mason, intending to rob Mason of marijuana. McClendon was 

carrying a loaded handgun. Defendant also had a handgun, but 

claimed it was not loaded.

 

1 198 N.J. 145 (2009).
3 A-2940-14T3

McClendon entered Mason's home first, followed by defendant 

and Lewis. Mason's two-year-old son was in the home when the 

three entered. Mason and McClendon began "tussling" and 

McClendon shot Mason in the chest, killing him. The three fled, 

leaving Mason's son alone with his father's body.

A grand jury sitting in Monmouth County, returned an 

indictment charging defendant with first-degree felony murder, 

(count fourteen); first-degree murder, (count fifteen); firstdegree armed robbery, (count thirteen); second-degree conspiracy 

to commit armed burglary and armed robbery, (count ten); seconddegree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, (count 

eleven); second-degree burglary, (count twelve); and thirddegree endangering the welfare of a child, (count sixteen).

On March 19, 2009, defendant appeared before Judge Anthony 

J. Mellaci, Jr., and pled guilty to counts ten, eleven, twelve,

thirteen, and sixteen pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement

which required defendant to cooperate and testify truthfully in 

the trial of his co-defendants. In return, the State agreed to 

dismiss the two murder counts and recommend an eighteen-year 

sentence on the armed robbery count.

Before defendant was sentenced, Judge Mellaci vacated 

defendant's guilty plea for failing to comply with provisions of 

his plea agreement. On May 2, 2011, a grand jury returned an 
4 A-2940-14T3

indictment charging defendant with first-degree witness 

tampering.

On May 12, 2011, defendant appeared before Judge Mellaci

and pled guilty pursuant to a revised plea agreement to counts 

ten (robbery conspiracy), fourteen (amended from felony murder 

to aggravated manslaughter), and sixteen (endangering). The 

State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, including the 

witness tampering indictment and recommended a twenty-two year 

sentence subject to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), and the 

No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

After Judge Mellaci sentenced defendant in accordance with 

the revised plea agreement, defendant appealed his sentence. 

We heard the appeal at our Excessive Sentence Oral Argument 

panel and affirmed defendant's sentence.

Defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. Counsel was

assigned and filed a memorandum of law in support of the 

petition. Judge Mellaci heard oral argument on January 6, 2015, 

and denied the petition without a hearing.

Defendant now claims, as he did before Judge Mellaci, that 

plea counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him that his 

sentence would be subject to the Graves Act or NERA, and he 

should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to 

trial.
5 A-2940-14T3

Judge Mellaci rejected defendant's claim that his plea 

counsel was ineffective for not spending enough time with him, 

noting that the same attorney represented defendant for almost 

four years, from his first arraignment in November 2007, through 

his first guilty plea in March 2009, for his second guilty plea 

in May 2011, and for his sentence in August 2011. During this 

time, counsel met with defendant on "multiple occasions in an 

attempt to resolve this matter."

Judge Mellaci read from the transcript of defendant's first 

guilty plea where defendant acknowledged that plea counsel 

explained the charges, the plea proceedings, and defendant 

understood them and was satisfied with counsel's representation. 

Judge Mellaci specifically explained to defendant that his 

sentence may be subject to NERA and the Graves Act.

Judge Mellaci then read from the transcript of defendant's 

second guilty plea, including defendant's acknowledgement that 

he understood the implications of the Graves Act and NERA on his 

sentence:

THE COURT: So, you understand that normally 

on a second degree conspiracy such as this, I 

could put you in jail for up to ten years and 

order up to five years minimum parole 

ineligibility. Do you understand?

DEFENDANT: Yes.
6 A-2940-14T3

THE COURT: In addition, because this is a 

conspiracy to commit an armed robbery and/or 

burglary, you're subject to the No Early 

Release Act, where you would have to serve 

. . . 85 percent of your maximum sentence. Do 

you understand?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: So, you would have to serve minimum 

approximately of eight years, six months and 

two days. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: On Count 14 as amended to 

aggravated manslaughter, do you understand 

you're exposed to up to 30 years in jail, where 

. . . you would would have to do up to half 

that time as minimum parole ineligibility 

under the Graves Act? Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And under the No Early Release 

Act, you would have to serve 85 percent of 

that time. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: So, if I were to give you a 30-

year sentence and we figure in 85 percent, 

your exposure would be approximately 25 years, 

six months and two days. Do you understand 

that?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

defendant must satisfy the two-part test established by the 

Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. 

Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme 
7 A-2940-14T3

Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). Defendant must 

show that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that the 

deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, supra, 

466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. There 

is a "'strong presumption' that [defense] counsel exercised 

'reasonable professional judgment' and 'sound trial strategy' in 

fulfilling his [or her] responsibilities." State v. Hess, 207 

N.J. 123, 147 (2011) (citing Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689-

90, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95).

We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without 

an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. State v. 

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). An evidentiary hearing is 

required only when a defendant establishes a prima facie case in 

support of PCR, the court determines that there are disputed 

issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of the 

existing record, and the court determines that an evidentiary 

hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted. R. 3:22-

10(b). A prima facie case is established when a defendant 

demonstrates "a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, 

viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the 

defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." Ibid.

The transcript of defendant's plea allocution completely 

contradicts defendant's claim that he did not understand his
8 A-2940-14T3

sentence because plea counsel failed to explain the Graves Act 

or NERA. Defendant has not satisfied either prong of 

Strickland, and Judge Mellaci correctly denied his petition 

without a hearing.

Defendant's argument that Judge Mellaci erred in denying 

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea lacks sufficient merit to 

warrant further discussion in our opinion, Rule 2:11-3(e)(2), 

and we affirm substantially for the reasons stated in Judge 

Mellaci's comprehensive oral decision.

Affirmed.