alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Stephen Somoza, Appellant, v Samuel J. Pechnik et al., Respondents. (Action No. 1.) Samuel J. Pechnik et al., Appellants, v Maxloger Corp. et al., Respondents. (Action No. 2.) (And Another Action.)

[772 NYS2d 2]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy Friedman, J.), entered on or about October 29, 2002, which denied plaintiff Somoza’s motion for partial summary judgment in Action No. 1, and granted the Pechnik plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in Action No. 2 with enforcement stayed pending determination in Action No. 1, unanimously modified, on the law, to vacate the stay in Action No. 2, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

There are several issues of fact in Action No. 1 regarding the stock purchase agreement, the consulting agreement and the promissory notes signed by Somoza, justifying denial of that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. However, the pendency of that action did not warrant a stay of the execution of judgment in Action No. 2, since Somoza’s claims for a setoff are not inextricably intertwined with or inseparable from the issues involved in Action No. 1 *(Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo v Mendes Jr. Intl. Co.,*249 AD2d 137 [1998]). A stay of one action pending the outcome of another is appropriate only where the decision in one will determine all the questions in the other, and where the judgment in one trial will dispose of the controversy in both actions; this requires a complete identity of parties, cause of action and the judgment sought *(Pierre Assoc. v Citizens Cas. Co. of N.Y.,*32 AD2d 495, 497 [1969]). Here, the two actions arise from discrete agreements for the sale of two separate businesses, and the contracting parties are not identical. Concur—Tom, J.P., Williams, Marlow and Gonzalez, JJ.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 18, 2021

No. 04-21-00489-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellant

v.

Ruben ELIZONDO,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 15, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 657461

Honorable Melissa Vara, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant Ruben Elizondo retained Trey Porter to represent him at trial. According to 

counsel, Appellant has not retained him for appeal, and counsel has moved to withdraw.

Counsel’s motion does not fully comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Specifically, the motion does not contain the following required information:

• the dates for the current deadlines and settings in the case,

• Appellant’s last known address and telephone number,

• a statement that a copy of the motion was delivered to Appellant in person, or by 

certified and first-class mail, and

• a statement that Appellant was notified in writing of the right to object to the motion 

to withdraw. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5(a), (b); Rivera v. State, 130 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

2004, no pet.). 

Counsel’s motion is DENIED without prejudice to refiling a motion that fully complies 

with the Rules. 
_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 18th day of November, 2021.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
#### Roger Earl COLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Frank PERRY, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6260

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 31, 2017

Roger Earl Coley, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Roger Earl Coley seeks to appeal the district court’s order construing his action as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition and dismissing it without prejudice. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

*86Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on January 18, 2017. Coley’s notice of appeal was deposited in the prison’s internal mailing system at the earliest on February 22, 2017. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 4(c); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). Because Coley failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arnold Russell THREET, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6328

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 25, 2017

Arnold Russell Threet, Appellant Pro Se. Bonnie S. Greenberg, James Thomas Wallner, Assistant United States Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*249PER CURIAM:

Arnold Russell Threet seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both thai the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Threet has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6481 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6481

   To amend the Mineral Leasing Act to require the Secretary of the 
  Interior to reimburse the fee for an expression of interest if the 
    expression of interest becomes inactive, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 28, 2023

 Ms. Hageman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Mineral Leasing Act to require the Secretary of the 
  Interior to reimburse the fee for an expression of interest if the 
    expression of interest becomes inactive, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TERM AND FEE REIMBURSEMENT.

    Section 17(q) of the Mineral Leasing Act (30 U.S.C. 226(q)) is 
amended--
            (1) in the heading, by striking ``Fee for'';
            (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``nonrefundable''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(3) Term.--An expression of interest submitted under this 
        section shall remain active for a term of not less than 5 
        years.
            ``(4) Inactive status.--If an expression of interest 
        becomes inactive, the Secretary shall refund the fee for the 
        expression of interest to the person that submitted the 
        expression of interest.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Israel BEN-LEVI, a/k/a Danny L. Loren, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kelli HARRIS; Jackie Parker, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-6283

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

Israel Ben-Levi, Appellant Pro Se. Kimberly D. Grande, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Israel Ben-Levi appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-l to 2000cc-5 (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Ben-Levi v. Harris,*No. 5:15-ct-03125-BO (E.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Josette D. Simmons, Appellant. Actors Reps of New York, Inc., Respondent; Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[770 NYS2d 912]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed December 16, 2002, which denied claimant’s application to reopen a previous decision denying her application for unemployment insurance benefits.

Following an initial determination finding that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because her employment was terminated due to misconduct and charging her with a recoverable overpayment of benefits, claimant requested a hearing at which she failed to appear. Thereafter, a default decision was issued sustaining the initial determination. Claimant’s subsequent request, months later, to *827reopen the hearing was denied and this appeal ensued. Contrary to claimant’s assertion, we find no abuse of discretion by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board in denying her application to reopen *(see Matter of Sorge [Commissioner of Labor],*268 AD2d 668 [2000]; *Matter of Trincere [Sweeney],*235 AD2d 904 [1997]). Although informed twice by the Department of Labor that she needed to request a reopening in writing, claimant chose to ignore such advice. Furthermore, the merits of her denial for unemployment insurance benefits are not properly before this Court.

Mercure, J.P., Peters, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Robert BAGGOTT, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11449 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 2, 2017

*307Leigha Amy Simonton, Assistant U.S. Attorney, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Leigh Warren Davis, Bedford, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and' COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Robert Baggott appeals the 188-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine. Baggott argues that the district court clearly erred in calculating the drug quantity attributable to him because (1) two of his suppliers were incarcerated during some of the time he participated in the conspiracy and (2) there was no evidence to support the extrapolation of drug purity from the samples of methamphetamine seized at the time of his arrest.

We review the district court’s determination of the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant, which is a factual finding, for clear error. *United States v. Betancourt,*422 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2005). The incarceration records purporting to show that the sources of Baggott’s methamphetamine were incarcerated at relevant periods and the interview excerpt from one of the sources are insufficient to show that the district court’s drug quantity determination, which was amply supported by reliable information in the presentence report, was clearly erroneous. *See Betancourt,*422 F.3d at 248. We also reject Baggott’s contention that the court erred by extrapolating the drug purity from the samples seized when he was arrested. *See United States v. Rodriguez,*666 F.3d 944, 947 (5th Cir. 2012).

The district court’s findings regarding the drug quantity attributable to Baggott, as well as the purity level, were “plausible in light of the record as a whole.” *Betancourt,*422 F.3d at 246. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          60,537
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                    61
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    263,535
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          89,219
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            88,671
<LOANS>                                      1,397,998
<ALLOWANCE>                                     10,436
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,917,241
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,523,934
<SHORT-TERM>                                    80,300
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             27,644
<LONG-TERM>                                    136,692
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        14,668
<OTHER-SE>                                     134,003
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               1,917,241
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 27,356
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                1,440
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 4,850
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                33,646
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              12,348
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              15,596
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           18,050
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    1,125
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               1,060
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 17,184
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,644
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       4,644
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,413
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.31
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.31
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.70
<LOANS-NON>                                      7,661
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                 1,168
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                10,478
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    1,205
<RECOVERIES>                                        38
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               10,436
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            10,436
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
#### Jesus NAVARRETE-JURADO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-73108

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 3, 2017

Jesus Navarrete-Jurado, Tacoma, WA, pro se.

*425OIL, Edward Earl Wiggers, Esquire, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jesus Navarrete-Jurado, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture and thus is not entitled to relief from his administrative removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for sub-’ stantial evidence the IJ’s factual findings, *Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch,*828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016), and we review de novo whether the statutory right to counsel was violated, *Mendoza-Mazariegos v. Mukasey,*509 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007). We deny the petition for review.

We reject the government’s contention that the court does not have jurisdiction over this petition for review. *See Martinez v. Sessions,*863 F.3d 1155, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2017).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Navarrete-Jurado failed to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution in El Salvador on account of a protected ground. *See Zetino v. Holder,*622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s conclusion that Navarrete-Jurado failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture by the Mexican government, or with, its consent or acquiescence. *See Andrade-Garcia,*828 F.3d at 836-37.

We reject Navarrete-Jurado’s contention that the agency denied his right to counsel. *See Tawadrus v. Ashcroft,*364 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining requirements for waiver of right to counsel). Navarrete-Jurado’s contentions that there were other errors by the agency are not supported by the record.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Nahun Huberto ALMENDAREZ-VILLAFRANCA, also known as Nahun Almendarez, also known as Nahun Huberto Almendarez Villafranca, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-20612 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 17, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern *357District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Nahun Huberto. Almendarez-Villafranca, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Nahun Huberto Almendarez-Villafranca has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Almendarez-Villafranca has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused- from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cib. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 6, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50682

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JULIO HERNANDEZ-REYES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

UDC No. EP-00-CR-1505-ALL-DB 

--------------------

Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Julio Hernandez-Reyes was convicted, pursuant to a plea of

guilty, of attempting to illegally reenter the United States in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Counsel appointed to represent

Hernandez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief as

required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Hernandez

has received a copy of counsel’s brief and has filed a response. 

Hernandez challenges his indictment and conviction on the

ground that he had not “entered” or been “found in” the United

States. He further argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
No. 03-50682

-2-

failing to investigate the facts of his case and challenge his

indictment and conviction on that same ground. Hernandez also

argues that counsel appointed to represent him on appeal was

ineffective for failing to raise this same argument on direct

appeal. 

In this case, the record was sufficiently developed for us to

review Hernandez’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Our

independent review of the brief, the record, and Hernandez’

response discloses that there is no nonfrivolous issue for appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED,

counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6516 

To reauthorize the Director of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 

to support Holocaust education programs, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 30, 2023 

Mr. CARTER of Georgia (for himself, Ms. MANNING, Ms. STEFANIK, Ms. 

WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. 

FITZPATRICK, and Mr. MOOLENAAR) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the Director of the United States Holocaust 

Memorial Museum to support Holocaust education programs, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Never Again Education 

5 Reauthorization Act of 2023’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION. 

7 Section 4(a) of the Never Again Education Act (Pub8 lic Law 116–141) is amended by striking ‘‘each of the 4 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6516 IH

1 succeeding fiscal years’’ and inserting ‘‘each succeeding 

2 fiscal year through fiscal year 2030’’. 

Æ 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS