alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

NOTICE OF CORRECTION

DATE: February 17, 2022

CASE OF: IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO RULE 4

- 13.4 OF THE

RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT RELATING TO

ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR

DOCKET NO.: SC 21

- 187

OPINION FILED: February 10

, 202 2

ATTENTION: ALL PUBLISHERS

THE FOLLOWING CORRECTION HAS BEEN MADE IN THE

ABOVE OPINION:

On page 1

, last line, “ LL.M.” was changed to LL.B.”

SIGNED: OPINION CLERK
05/05/201 0 16:1 4 FA X 202493514 2 FA A * DM S iaOOI/00 3

U.S . DEPARTMEN T O F1 RANSPORTATIO N

OFFIC E O FHEARING S FEDERA L AVIATIO N ADMINISTRATIO N

FEDKRA L AVIATIO N ADMINISTRATION , Complainant , vs . AIRTRA N AIRWAYS , INC . Respondent . FA A Docke t No . CP10SO000 2 Judg e BenMn

SUPPLEMENTA L INFORMATIO N I N SUPPOR T O F MOTIO N FO RDECISIO N O N TH E PLEADING S

O RI N TH E ALTERNATIVE . MOTIO N FO RHEARIN G O N SANCTIO N ONL Y c ^

Complainant , b y an dthroug h th e undersigne dcounsel , pursuan t t o §13.218(0(5 ) of th e Rule s o f

Practic e (1 4 C.F.R . 13.218(f)(5)) , hereb y files Supplemental infomxatio n ii i support

o f it s Motio n for

Decisio n o n th e Pleading s o r i n th e alternative , Motio n for

Hearin g o n Sanctio n Only serve dthi s date . I n further support o f th e motion , Complainan t

state s th e following : On pag e 4 o f

th e Complainant' s Motion , Complainan t state s tha i th e Tabl e o f Penaltie s establishe s fo

r fligh t an ddut y tim e violation s th e appropriat e sanctio n i s a Moderate Civi l Penalty . Th e citatio n fo r thi s assertio n ca

n b e foundin Exhibi t

2 attache d t o th e Motio n a

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CERTinCAT E O FSERVIC E I hereb y certif

y that acop y o f

th e foregoin g Supplemental Informatio n in Suppor t o f Motio n fo

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w Judg e Offic e o f Hearings , M'2 0 1200 Ne w Jerse y Avenue , S E Eas t Buildin g Groun dFloo r RoomE l 2-32 0 Washington , D C 2059 0 (FAX ) (202 ) 366-753 6 an d Stephe n J . Kolski , Esq . Executiv e Vic e Presiden t

Corporat e Affair s AirTra n Airways , Inc . 995 5 AirTran Blvd . Orhindo , F

L 3282 7 (FAX ) (407 ) 318-590 1 andth e original andon e cop y vi aFederal Expres s to Hearin g Docke t

Cler k FAA , AGC-430 , Suit e 2W100 0 Wilbur Wright Buildin g 80 0 Independenc e Avenue , S W Washington , D C 2059 1

APf i 3 0 201 0 Date d
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6125
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JEROME KAMILLE PARKS, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge. (CR-94-66-7, CA-96-308-R) Submitted: May 15, 1997 Decided: May 29, 1997 Before RUSSELL, HALL, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jerome Kamille Parks, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Jack Bondurant, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion andfind no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Parks , Nos. CR-94-66-7; CA-96-308-R (W.D. Va. Dec. 12, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
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</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT - 31.1**

 

MOSSIMO, INC.

 

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER

 

I, MossimoGiannulli, Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer of the registrant, certifythat:

 

1.     I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Mossimo, Inc.;

 

2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

 

3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.     The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant andhave:

 

(a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant is made known to usby others, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;

 

(b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonable likely to affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and

 

5.     The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal controls over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

 

(a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.

 
| /s/ MOSSIMO GIANNULLI                   |   |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|
| Mossimo Giannulli                       |
| Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer |
| November 14, 2005                  |

 

----
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U. S. C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Form 10-KSB of Accufacts Pre-Employment
Screening Inc. (the "Company") for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 (the
"Report"), Philip Luizzo. , Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of
the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) to my knowledge, the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
    13(a) or 15(d) of he Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Philip Luizzo
----------------------------
Philip Luizzo
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President

April 2, 2004


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Accufacts Pre-Employment
Screening, Inc. and will be retained by Accufacts Pre-Employment Screening and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




                                     PAGE 24
<PAGE>
#### Sukhwinder SINGH, AKA Bobby Singh, AKA Sukwinder Bobby Singh, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-73417

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 16, 2017

Sukhwinder Singh, Pro Se

Victor Matthew Lawrence, I, Esquire, Assistant Director, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

*327Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Sukhwinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Najmabadi v.*Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to provide sufficient evidence of a material change in circumstances in India to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); *see also Toufighi v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish materially changed country conditions).

We do not consider the materials attached to Singh’s opening brief that are not part of the administrative record, *see Fisher v. INS,*79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (our review is limited to the administrative record), and we lack jurisdiction to consider Singh’s arguments as to evidence or claims for relief that he did not present to the BIA in his motion to reopen, *see Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner must exhaust issues or claims in administrative proceedings below).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**EXHIBIT- 31.3**

 

MOSSIMO, INC.

 

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

 

I, VickenFestekjian, Chief Financial Officer of the registrant, certify that:

 

1.                   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Mossimo,Inc.;

 

2.                   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

 

3.                   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.                   The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a)              Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant is made known to usby others, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;

 

(b)             Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c)              Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonable likely to affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.                   The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal controls over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

 

(a)              All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b)             Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.

 
| /s/ VICKEN FESTEKJIAN   |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
| Vicken Festekjian       |
| Chief Financial Officer |
| May 13, 2005            |

 

----
#### Steven K. YOUNG; Susan Krpata-Young, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES INC., Defendant, and Green Tree Servicing, LLC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35202

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 14, 2016 *

Filed December 22, 2016

Steven K. Young, Pro Se

Susan Krpata-Young, Pro Se

William G. Fig, Laurie Rebecca Hager, Attorneys, Sussman Shank LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*1008MEMORANDUM **

Steven K. Young and Susan Krpata-Young appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Doe v. Abbott Labs.,*571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred the Youngs’ TILA claim for rescission because the Youngs failed to allege facts sufficient to show that they delivered a timely notice of rescission. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (a borrower’s right to rescind a transaction expires three years after “the date of consummation of the transaction”); *Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower exercises her right of rescission by notifying the creditor of her intention to rescind, whether or not the borrower has filed an action in court).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Youngs’ action without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. *See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court can dismiss without leave to amend where amendment would be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Luz Amelia PENA, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 16-60082 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 6, 2017

Alicia Jeanine Triche, Triche Immigration Law, Memphis, TN, for Petitioner

Alexander Jacob Lutz, Office of Immigration Litigation, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Assistant Director, Tiffany L. Walters, Esq., Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

*241PER CURIAM: *

Luz Amelia Pena, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding the denial of her motion to reopen removal proceedings. Pena challenges the BIA’s determination that she failed to show a material change in country conditions.

Pena entered the United States in 2003 without admission, parole, or inspection, and an immigration judge (I J) ordered her removed. When Pena reentered the United States in 2013, the Department of Homeland Security reinstated the prior removal order, but released her under an order of supervision. Pena moved to reopen her removal proceeding based on a material change in country conditions under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii). She sought to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied the motion, and the BIA dismissed her appeal.

We review the BIA’s decision under “a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard” and will uphold the BIA’s decision “as long as it is not capricious, racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational approach.” *Ojeda-Calderon v. Holder,*726 F.3d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 2013). “[W]e may not overturn the BIA’s factual findings unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” *Id.*at 672-73; *see*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

We have reviewed the briefs and the record. Pena fails to show that the BIA’s determination that country conditions in El Salvador have not materially changed constituted an abuse of discretion. *See Ojeda-Calderon,*726 F.3d at 672. Accordingly, Pena’s motion to reopen was subject to the 90-day time limit in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), which expired in 2003, and we DENY the petition for review, *see Ojeda-Calderon,*726 F.3d at 672.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Scott METCALF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Olivia CRAVEN, Executive Director of the Idaho Comm of Pardons and Parole; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-35087

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 20, 2017

Scott Metcalf, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Scott Metcalf appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Belanus v. Clark,*796 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); *Watison v. Carter,*668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. *Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc.,*143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.

Dismissal of Metcalfs action was proper because Metcalf failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief on the basis that his sentences were not properly calculated. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

Metcalfs motion for appointment of counsel, filed on May 13, 2016, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.