alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### George L. Baldwin, Respondent, *v.*John Dorsay Bald et al., Appellants.

(Argued September 27, 1871;

decided January term, 1872.)

Upon the dissolution of a co-partnership between plaintiff and defendants, the parties entered into a written agreement, by which the former assigned all his interest in the firm property to the latter, and all claims against the firm or defendants individually, in consideration of receiving certain designated stocks, notes and securities, etc., and of the agreement upon the part of defendants to assume and pay the partnership debts by another agreement executed at the same time as alleged by plaintiff, as an inducement for him to execute the first. Defendants agreed to allow plaintiff any correct charges which had not been credited to him on the books of the firm and to give him credit therefor. In an action to recover the amount of such charges not credited, it appearing that at the time of the dissolution plaintiff’s account showed a large indebtedness on his part to the firm. *Held,*that the presumption was that stocks, notes, etc., received by plaintiff were given him upon the basis that the amounts thereof were found due him upon settlement of all their business, including his individual account as it then appeared upon the books, and the agreement to allow charges not credited thereon was not simply to credit them in a settled account, but to pay them.

Upon the trial, plaintiff was allowed to prove what was said *674and done prior to the execution of the agreement to allow the balance of his account. *Held,*no error, as it was evident from the pleadings that the object of the question was not to vary anything contained therein, but to show the circumstances which induced the execution of it.

*B. F. Dunning*for the appellants.

*Francis Byrne*for the respondent.

*Lott, Oh. G.,*reads for affirmance.

All concur, except Eael, C., dissenting. Judgment affirmed with costs.
#### Jang Hee Lee et al., Respondents, v Sung Whun Oh et al., Appellants.

[771 NYS2d 134]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dollard, J.), dated May 20, 2002, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

A landowner “must act as a reasonable [person] in maintaining his [or her] property in a reasonably safe condition in view *474of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk” *(Basso v Miller,*40 NY2d 233, 241 [1976]; *see Peralta v Henriquez,*100 NY2d 139, 144 [2003]). The scope of the duty varies with the foreseeability of the potential harm *(see Tagle v Jakob,*97 NY2d 165, 168 [2001]). There is, however, no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous *(see Cupo v Karfunkel,*1 AD3d 48 [2003]).

The approximately three-meter-wide by one-meter-deep empty, artificial cement pond upon which the plaintiff Jang Hee Lee tripped and fell was not, as a matter of law, an inherently dangerous condition and was readily observable by the reasonable use of one’s senses *(see Gibbons v Lido & Point Lookout Fire Dist,*293 AD2d 646, 647 [2002]; *Simmons v Sam’s E.,*293 AD2d 596, 597 [2002]; *Plessias v Scalia Home for Funerals,*271 AD2d 423 [2000]). The accident occurred at approximately 1:00 p.m. on a clear day when the cement pond was plainly visible. Jang Hee Lee previously visited the premises on approximately 15 prior occasions and therefore was aware of the pond’s existence and precise location *(see Tagle v Jakob, supra; Czorniewy v Mosera,*298 AD2d 352 [2002]; *Germain v Hegedus,*289 AD2d 443 [2001]).

Moreover, even if the report of the plaintiffs’ expert was in admissible form *(see Washington v City of Yonkers,*293 AD2d 741, 742 [2002]), the provisions of the Administrative Code of City of New York upon which he relied, i.e., Administrative Code of City of New York §§ 27-127 and 27-128, are nonspecific and reflect only the general duty to maintain premises in a safe condition *(see Ahmad v City of New York,*298 AD2d 473, 474 [2002]; *Dixon v Nur-Hom Realty Corp.,*254 AD2d 66, 67 [1998]). The appellants therefore did *not*breach a duty to the plaintiffs, and in opposition to the motion the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Goldstein, J.P., Adams, Townes and Crane, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

OF QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q

OF PINNACLE DATA SYSTEMS, INC.

FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2010

The undersigned is the Chief Executive Officer of Pinnacle Data Systems, Inc. (the Issuer). This certification is made
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This certification accompanies the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Issuer for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2010.

I, John D. Bair, certify that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010, fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Issuer.

This certification is executed as of July 30, 2010.



|                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------
|/s/ John D. Bair                                 
|Name: John D. Bair Title:
Chief Executive Officer
cc: Hon. Steve L. Dobrescu, District Judge 

Sears Law Firm, Ltd. 

Attorney General/Carson City 

White Pine County District Attorney 

White Pine County Clerk 

Matthew C. Bistline 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A e
#### IN RE: Barry M. GOULD, Debtor. Barry M. Gould, Appellant, v. Red Hill Enterprises, Appellee.

No. 14-60059

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

FILED OCTOBER 4, 2017

Barry M. Gould, Australia, pro se.

James Charles Bastían, Jr., Special Counsel, Melissa Lowe, Shulman Hodges & Bastían LLP, Irvine, CA, for Appellee.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

MEMORANDUM **

Chapter 7 debtor Barry M. Gould appeals pro se from the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment excepting from discharge Gould’s debt to Red Hill Enterprises (“Red Hill”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions, and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. *Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian),*564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

Summary judgment was proper because the jury’s findings in the state court action satisfied the elements for “willful and malicious injury” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and California law precludes relitigation of issues decided in a prior proceeding. *See Diamond v. Kolmm (In re Diamond),*285 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In determining whether a party should be es-topped from relitigating an issue decided in a prior state court action, the bankrupts cy court must look to that state’s law of collateral estoppel.”); *Lucido v. Superior Court,*51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1990) (setting forth elements of issue preclusion under California law); *see also Ormsby v. First Am. Title Co. of Nev. (In re Ormsby),*591 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth requirements for non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6)).

Because Gould’s debt to Red Hill is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), we need not reach whether the debt is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

AFFIRMED.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
#### Christie L. REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Virginia A. PHILLIPS, an individual; The United States District Court Central District of California Eastern Division, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55116

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed June 5, 2017

Christie L. Reed, Pro Se

Jonathan B. Klinck, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USLA—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Ap-pellees

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Christie L. Reed appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action under *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,*403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging various constitutional, statutory, and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Scholastic Entm’t, Inc. v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc.,*336 *411F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (sua sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); *Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,*813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (sua sponte dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Reed’s claims against Judge Phillips because they are barred by judicial immunity. *See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nev.,*828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that “[j Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages in them judicial acts” and judicial immunity for federal officers “extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief’); *see also Mireles v. Waco,*502 U.S. 9, 10-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam) (the only exceptions to judicial immunity are if the actions were not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity or if there is a complete absence of jurisdiction). Contrary to Reed’s contentions, Judge Phillips did not act in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

The district court properly dismissed Reed’s claims against defendant the United States District Court, Central District of California, Eastern Division, because the United States may not be sued without an express waiver of its sovereign immunity. *See Jachetta v. United States,*653 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2011).

We reject as without merit Reed’s contentions that Judge Fitzgerald should be disqualified, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the instant case, and that the dismissal of this action violated due process and equal protection.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
14277

#### EVANS v. ADAMS *ET AL.*

*(185 S.*E., *57)*

August, 1935.

*224
      *Messrs. Gregory & Gregory*and *A. M. Sapp,*for appellant,

*Messrs. W. P. Robinson*and *Charles B. Elliott,*for respondents,

April 8, 1936.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Bonham.

The able and well-stated decree of Judge Gaston, who heard this case on Circuit, makes ft unnecessary for this Court to do more than adopt the circuit decree as the judgment of this Court. Let it be reported.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Ci-iiee Justice Stabler and Messrs. Justices Carter, Baker and FishburnE concur.
FINALREPORT00Preparedby:MitsubishiChemicalMedienceCorporationJanuary28,201410020030040050060070080090010001101200130014001500160017001800190020002100220c230024002500260027002800290300Appendix13100320Appendix2()3300340Appendix303500360Appendix403700380Appendix539004000410.42043004400450046004700480049
Melton JACKSON, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-2233

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 16, 2018

Melton Jackson, Jr., in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and LUCK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

OF QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q

OF PINNACLE DATA SYSTEMS, INC.

FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 2010

The undersigned is the Chief Financial Officer of Pinnacle Data Systems, Inc. (the Issuer). This certification is made
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This certification accompanies the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Issuer for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2010.

I, Nicholas J. Tomashot, certify that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010, fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Issuer.

This certification is executed as of April 30, 2010.



|                                                         
|---------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Nicholas J. Tomashot                                 
|Name: Nicholas J. Tomashot
Title: Chief Financial Officer
R.D. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2160658

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### Tracey Terrell GRADY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Susan WHITE, Superintendent, Alexander Correctional Institution; Dula, Officer; Butler, Officer; Maynor, Captain; Hamilton, Captain; Shilling, R.N., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-7724

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 24, 2017

Tracey Terrell Grady, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Tracey Terrell Grady seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l) (2012). This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Because Grady may be able to remedy the deficiencies identified by the district court by filing an amended complaint stating sufficient facts to support his claims, we conclude that the order Grady seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. *Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc.,*807 F.3d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2015); *Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392,*10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow Grady to file an amended complaint. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and ar*156gument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED AND REMANDED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Riley Rene VALLEJO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-40869 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 21, 2017

John Richard Berry, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S- Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Riley Rene Vallejo, Pro Se

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Riley Rene Vallejo has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2011). Vallejo has filed a response. The record is not sufficiently *179developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of Vallejo’s claim of ineffective assistance related to his mental health issues; we therefore decline to consider the claim without prejudice to collateral review, *See United States v. Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Vallejo’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review; we further determine that Vallejo’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel present no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *179published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir, R, 47.5.4.
#### * Joseph Coombs and Jerusha his Wife *versus*Robert Williams.

In the trial of an action, upon a promise to a feme sole, brought by her husband and herself after marriage, it is not competent for the defendant to prove the illegality of the marriage; such matter being wholly in abatement

Assumpsit on a promissory note made by the defendants to the said *Jerusha*when sole, and the plaintiffs aver their intermarriage since the date of the note. At the trial on the general issue, before *Putnam,*J., the defendant offered to prove that the said *Joseph*had a former wife living when he married the said *Jerusha.*The judge rejected the evidence; and the question being brought before the whole Court, they were of opinion with the judge at the trial; the matter offered to be proved being wholly in abatement, *(a)*

(a)

*Scanlon*vs. *Wright, Suff. March T.*1833, Mss
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6383 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6383

  To prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from implementing or 
                  enforcing a remain in Texas policy.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 13, 2023

Mr. Jackson of Texas (for himself, Mr. Pfluger, Mr. Ellzey, Mr. Babin, 
Mr. Fallon, Mr. Norman, Mr. Luttrell, Mr. Crenshaw, Mr. Weber of Texas, 
Ms. Van Duyne, Mr. Arrington, Mr. Gooden of Texas, Mr. Nehls, Mr. Self, 
  Mr. Sessions, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Duncan, Mr. McCaul, Mr. Williams of 
Texas, Mr. Moran, Ms. Granger, Mr. Tony Gonzales of Texas, Mr. Roy, Mr. 
 Biggs, Mr. Cloud, Mr. Carter of Texas, Ms. De La Cruz, Mr. Hunt, and 
  Mr. Guest) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from implementing or 
                  enforcing a remain in Texas policy.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FROM 
              IMPLEMENTING OR ENFORCING A REMAIN IN TEXAS POLICY.

    (a) Prohibition.--No Federal funds may be used by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to implement or enforce a remain in Texas policy.
    (b) Remain in Texas Policy Defined.--In this section, the term 
``remain in Texas policy'' means a policy that requires any alien to 
remain in the State of Texas after such alien is released or paroled by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services into the United States.
                                 <all>
```
## CHLORINATED OLEFIN PRODUCTION PROCESS C24-28 Olefin (20000 kg/batch) Cl2 (40000 kg/batch) NaOH / H20 HCl (20000 kg/batch) WASTE CPAR (7.2 kg/batch) Cl2 (7229 kg/batch) STABILIZER (400 kg/batch) CPAR (1 MM kg/yr) 32% HCl EPOXIDIZED SOYBEAN OIL

12.5% BLEACH

CPAR (0.2 MM kg/yr) CPAR (0.7 MM kg/yr) CPAR (0.1 MM kg/yr)
RELEASE POINT BYPRODUCTGAS RECOVERY CHLORINATION REACTION INCINERATION CPAR STORAGE

BLEACH STORAGE CPAR STORAGE TRUCK SALES (0.8 MM kg/yr) TOTE SALES (0.2 MM kg/yr)
BLEACH SALES ACID CARBON TREATMENT

ACID SALES CARBON WASTE LANDFILL (3 kg/batch)

X 2

1

PRODUCT SOLD FOR RUBBER PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING (0.7MM kg/yr) PRODUCT SOLD FOR LUBRICANT PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING (0.3 MM kg/yr)
Exhibit 32.2



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the annual report of Blockbuster Inc.
(the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Larry J. Zine, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | 1. |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: March 15, 2004



/s/ LARRY J. ZINELarry J. ZineExecutive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and
Chief Administrative Officer




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Blockbuster Inc. and will be retained by Blockbuster Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.