alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
                                                                 Exhibit 10.44


June 30, 2000


Mr. Phil Vachon
Senior Vice President, Worldwide Sales
Liberate Technologies
c/o   2 Circle Star Way
      San Carlos, CA 94070


                              EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

Dear Phil:

     This letter will confirm our agreement that if and when you decide to
reduce your role at Liberate, you agree to notify and discuss with me the
transition date, and we agree that you will be guaranteed continued
employment as Worldwide Major Accounts Specialist for a period of 18 months
or other mutually agreed upon period from the transition date. Your base
salary for this position will be $100,000 per year.

     Please signify your agreement to the foregoing terms by signing below
and returning this letter to me.

                              Very truly yours,

                              /s/ Mitchell E. Kertzman
                              -------------------------------------
                              Mitchell E. Kertzman,
                              President and Chief Executive Officer


Acknowledged and agreed:

/s/ Phil Vachon
-------------------------
Phil Vachon
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William L. CURTIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-1363

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

*269Submitted June 20, 2017 *

Decided June 22, 2017

Amanda A. Robertson, Attorney, James M. Cutchin, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Benton, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

William L. Curtis, Pro Se

Before William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge Joel M. Flaum, Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge

*

 This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and argument would not significantly aid the court. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Order

After the Sentencing Commission reduced the Guidelines range for crack-cocaine offenses, and made those changes retroactive, William Curtis asked the district judge in 2009 to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Curtis’s sentence (imposed in 2001) was 327 months, and his new range was 240 to 262 months. The district judge declined to reduce Curtis’s sentence, stating that his crime, criminal history, and associated conduct, such as the use of a minor in a drug business, were very serious and would have justified a life sentence, if the statutes and original Guidelines had permitted it. We affirmed that decision on appeal, stating that the district judge’s authority to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) does not entitle a defendant to a favorable exercise of discretion. It is enough if the judge takes the application seriously and provides a reasoned, and reasonable, explanation for sticking with the sentence originally imposed. *United States v. Curtis,*355 Fed.Appx. 965 (7th Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential decision).

After our decision, the Sentencing Commission reduced the Guidelines ranges for most drugs and made the new drug table retroactive. Curtis’s revised “range” is exactly 240 months, set by the statutory minimum for his offenses. He filed a new application under § 3582(c)(2). The district judge again denied it, for the same reasons he had denied Curtis’s first application. The judge stated that he continues to believe that 327 months is the lowest appropriate sentence.

Only two things have changed since our 2009 decision: the Sentencing Commission again reduced the Guidelines range for cocaine offenses, and Curtis has been found guilty of two infractions against prison rules (interfering with security devices and possession of a forbidden cell phone). If the judge had the discretion to stick with a 327-month sentence in 2009, he had discretion to do so in 2017 as well. For the reasons given in our order of 2009, the district judge’s latest decision is

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-159947, 333-142810, 333-117437, 333-107864, 333-84916, 333-73458, 333-61064, 333-46820, 333-33544, 333-95665, 333-89119, and 333-81773) ofAriba, Inc. of our reports dated November 25, 2009, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Ariba, Inc. and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Ariba, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form10-K) for the year ended September 30, 2009. 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 

November 25, 2009
---

Exhibit 13.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Micromem Technologies
Inc. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the Fiscal Year Ended October 31, 2015
(the Report), I, Dan Amadori, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, based on my knowledge, that:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of
      section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
  and                                  
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
      of the Company.

|Date: March 14, 2016 | /s/
      Dan Amadori        
|-------------------- | -----------------------------
|                     | Dan Amadori                  
|                     | Chief Financial Officer      
|                     | (Principal financial officer)

---
OFFlCEOFTHEATTORNEYGENERALOFTEXAS 

AUSTIN 

Qauu,C.MANN 

*- .#mIUC 

Honorable Ceail H. &to 

County Attorney 

Flailey County 

liuleehbe , Taxa 

Dear Sir: 

pant out iul opfnlcm 

loaal newpaper, to 

to hxatlon. 

ou requeet the opinion 

era1 Mi~tory auU 

ate8 0r herba, to 

thl.8 eonnQotion you 

ppearing in four 

serves ara aubfoet 

t have 8onsernod the taxabllitjr 

rve8 end owned br prlvato 

shed in Texas and all other JarJrte has, rmder ths Constitution 

either the property 0r the 

a, or the property of any federal 

in suah Stats. Thie principle ot th8 

ferment to date taxation 18 too well 

iSUW8iOll of the at+horitles, and it 

the general ruls. ?ro Tex hr. p. 2%. 

bg Artlole 'PlSQ, Subout of abundant 

caution, artirnd this existing princlp1.b or taxation by prevldin% 

that 'all property, whether real or personal, beloxqging ex8losively 
Eon. Ceoil Ii. Tate, me 8 

t0 this &Ate, or 8Ey politioal 8~bdiViSi0n thereof, or the United 

Statea* Is exempt rrom taxation. 

TrU8ting this 8ati8!‘aOtOrily aIItier8 yOUr inquiry, We are 

Yours very truly 

ATTOBNE'Y GEHERAL OF TEXAS
#### Primagency, Inc., Respondent, v V-Formation, Inc., Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 901]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered October 17, 2003, which denied defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Appeal from judgment, same court and Justice, entered April 16, 2003, which awarded plaintiff, upon default, the sum of $200,000, plus interest, costs and disbursements, unanimously dismissed, without costs.

Defendant’s principal failed, on three occasions, to appear for scheduled deposition, despite warnings from the court that such failure would jeopardize defendant’s pleadings. Defendant has failed to demonstrate anything resembling a reasonable excuse for its default, which is a requisite for vacatur *(Ortiz v Santiago,*303 AD2d 1, 6 [2003]; *see also Rudes v Magna Stables Co.,*277 AD2d 63, 64 [2000]). Rather, the record suggests that defendant’s failure to cooperate was aptly characterized by the Supreme Court Justice as “petulant” and “arrogant.”

We have considered defendant’s other arguments and find them to be unavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Williams, Marlow and Gonzalez, JJ.
Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Amir Uziel, President, Chief Executive Officer, and Director of
Datigen.com,  Inc. (the "Company") certifies,  under the standards set forth and
solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  that, to his knowledge,  the Annual Report on
Form 10-KSB of the Company for the year ended  December 31, 2004 fully  complies
with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act
of 1934 and information  contained in that Form 10-KSB fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  April 11, 2005


/s/ Amir Uziel
--------------
Amir Uziel
President, Chief Executive Officer, and Director

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

                                       23
OFFICE OFTHE ATTORNEY GENERALOFTEXAS 

-0.m AUSTIN 

-- 

W! 

ma. c. 3. dltis, Jr. 

COUAtf Atto?aef 

Oatesrille, Texa8' 

Dear SLrt 

request the opfnio 

queatioa. Your 

ed a oertltiaato 

Ie 

t. 

uuoh en exeaption authorized 

PO00 3.c.s. whersla it is proind person is entitled to an ex2Q80, Vlrnoa~s Civil~tatutes, provideat 

Wmrg per6oa who is nwmt than rlxty years 

old or who ir blind or deaf or dumb, or is piarone3tl.y disabled, or v&o has lost oae hand or 

toot shill bo tmtitled%o vote tithout belag 

rer;&sd to pay 8 poll tax, if he has obtain&I 

his csrtiiioata of axaanption frcxa the couaty tax 

collector when thr 8ane ls rerpiced by the ptorialoru oi thi.8 tit14.* 
Eon. C. 3. .il+le, Jr., page 2. 

Thle c,u%stllon was pas~fnl upon by the $ourt of Civil 

nppgals of Pex:~ in the aaQ4 of I:oCamiak VS. Jester, 115 s.%. 

298, wherein the court helu: 

“The court erred in holding the vote of 3, D, 

zllkingtoa zit the as box uslid, & la fnlllag to 

deduot the same from the votes cast ilt 8ald box 

against prohibition. This votsr did not ha~o ;a 

~~l$“~* 31 wa8 42 pears old. &a cl&nd to 

T 

t iron payment of a ~011 tax by reason or 

be- b iod, or at least disabled. Ths statute 

exemgta thase imm the papent of a ,311 t& who 

sre permmeatly diaob cd or blind, Gen. Iawe 

1905, p. 521, a* 11, f8 This toter ke?t a wld 

drink stand cnt RI. Sic t~atiiledr ‘I walted on 

my trade and custozere fitymr, * Emnever a OUBto;psr would osll for any aert6l.n drink ‘T w%lU 

~1~0 tt to hi& and ?fhaa he would kind ze the 

nonby f vlould’ &Ye hlrr back the Oha~u. I wuld 

?ut ny soda water bottles in the lee bax and 

assort thm aUt tpyeelt.’ EIe Oould Walt on his 

austorsrs, get the right artic1e oalled for, and 

make hiB Qwn Ohua@. se #a8 not blind, nor parIraaeatly dlrsbled, withia the mmalnir~ of the eleot1on law, Aots Leg, 1905, p* 521, 523, 0. 3.3. 

98 6 and I21 Bl&ani vr Clubi (Tex. Civ. AFT.) 65 

3s ET* 59s.r 

Therefore, you tire rfHpsatlully sdvlssd that lt is 

the o&~lon 4r this departmeat that tan ladilriduul who is 

blind in on8 e e, but has good vialon in the other, 1s not 

blind WSthln t IT 6 mf%ilfly af i&i019 2960, VWAOA’fi ~1~11 

statutes and is not sntIttled to Y poll tax %xen$iion under 

said ;,rt~cls due to bllndnessr 

AS rscueeted by 

1%~ 31 OUT &At081 X08. f 

ou 

0- 941, 

we aro aaalosing hsrewlth capO-2434 and O-&Xi. 

Trusting that the foregoing satisractorlly dispose8 

of your lnqdry, we r8mul.n 

Ywrr wry truly
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alberto GARCIA-JIMENEZ, a.k.a. Nelih Alexis Miranda, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10169

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Lauren G. LaBuff, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU — Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Ricardo Bours, Ricardo Bours Attorney at Law, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alberto Garcia-Jimenez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 46-month sentence imposed upon remand following his guilty-plea conviction for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.,

Garcia-Jimenez contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to explain the sentence adequately, and by relying on unsupported facts regarding a prior conviction. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court sufficiently explained its determination to depart upwards under the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 and impose an above-Guidelines sentence. *See United States v. Carty,*620 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Moreover, Garcia-Jimenez has not shown that the district court relied on any clearly erroneous fact. *See United States v. Christensen,*732 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 2013).

Garcia-Jimenez also contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Garcia-Jimenez’s sentence. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Garcia-Jimenez’s serious criminal history. *See Gall,*652 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection  with the Annual Report of  Innovative  Financial  Resources,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending September 30, 2002, as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Brad L.  Curtsinger,  Chief  Executive  Officer  of the  Company,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

     (1) the Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.



                     /s/ Brad L. Curtsinger
                     ----------------------------------
                     Brad L. Curtsinger
                     Chief Executive Officer (or the equivalent thereof)
                     December 11, 2002
Patricia BLACKMON v. STATE

CR-14-0317

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 26, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6395 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6395

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
    To amend the Energy Act of 2020 to require the Secretary of the 
   Interior to include the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 
 consultations regarding designations of critical minerals, elements, 
                       substances, and materials.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Recognizing the Importance of 
Critical Minerals in Healthcare Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. REQUIRED CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
              SERVICES.

    Paragraphs (4)(C) and (5)(A) of section 7002(c) of the Energy Act 
of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606(c)(4)(C) and (5)(A)) are each amended by 
inserting ``Health and Human Services,'' after ``Agriculture,''.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 3, 2024.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
118th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 6395

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

    To amend the Energy Act of 2020 to require the Secretary of the 
   Interior to include the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 
 consultations regarding designations of critical minerals, elements, 
                       substances, and materials.
```
<PAGE>   1
                                                                Exhibit 10.2

                              AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO
                             EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
                             --------------------


     This Amendment No. 2 (this "Amendment") is made and entered into as of the
1st day of January, 1997 by and between First Enterprise Financial Group, Inc.,
an Illinois corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Company") and Thomas
G. Parker (hereinafter referred to as "Employee").

     WHEREAS, the parties previously entered into an Employment Agreement dated
as of December 31, 1994, as amended by Amendment No. 1 to Employment Agreement
dated as of December 31, 1994 (the "Agreement");

     WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend the Agreement as hereinafter set
forth.

     NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained herein,
and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which
is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:

     1. Paragraph 4(b) of the Agreement is hereby amended and restated in its
entirety as follows:

      "an annual incentive compensation award in an amount equal to one

      percent (1%) of the consolidated pretax net income of the Company

      ("Annual Incentive Compensation Award").  The Annual Incentive

      Compensation Award shall be: (i) computed without regard to

      Employee's annual incentive compensation payable hereunder and

      without regard to any annual incentive compensation payable to

      each other employee of the Company who receives a percentage of

      the consolidated pretax net income of the Company pursuant to an

      individual employment contract, (ii) determined by the firm of

      independent accountants then in the employ of the 

<PAGE>   2

      Company; and (iii) paid within thirty (30) days after the determination 

      of such Annual Incentive Compensation Award;"

     2. The Agreement as amended hereby is ratified, approved and confirmed in
all respects.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment No. 2
the day and year first above written.

                                           FIRST ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL GROUP,
                                           INC., an Illinois corporation


                                           By:
                                              -------------------------------
                                           Its:
                                               ------------------------------




                                           ----------------------------------
                                           Thomas G. Parker
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

November 29, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 129285 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 129285 

 COA: 259423 
 Wayne CC: 95-001717-FY

MARTIN EDWARD HALL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 24, 2005 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

d1121 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

November 29, 2005 

Clerk