alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### PEOPLE *v.*TIMOTHY JACKSON. PEOPLE *v.*TILLMAN.

Criminal Law — Arrest—Search and Seizure — Armed Robbery.

Arrest of defendants was proper and evidence obtained by request by officers that defendants empty their pockets was admissible as subject of proper search where record disclosed that defendants closely resembled description given police of perpetrators of armed robbery about 3 miles away a few minutes before the arrest (CLS 1961, § 750.529).

References for Points in Headnote

5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest §§ 44, 45; 47 Am Jur, Searches and Seizures §53,

Appeal from Macomb; Spier (James E.), J.

Submitted Division 2 May 15, 1968, at Detroit.

(Docket Nos. 3,411, 3,412.)

Decided June 3, 1968.

Timothy Jackson and Andrew Tillman were convicted of robbery armed. Defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

*Frank J. Kelley,*Attorney General, *Robert A. Derengoski,*Solicitor General, *George N. Parris,*Prosecuting Attorney, and *Max D. McCulloch,*Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

*Norman L. Zemke,*for defendants on appeal.

Per Curiam.

An armed robbery* of a gasoline station attendant took place at about 3:30 a.m. at *63112 Mile road and Yan Dyke in the city of Warren on September 6, 1966. A few minutes thereafter a car carrying 3 persons, 2 of which satisfied the description of the perpetrators of the armed robbery, was stopped by the police at Dodge and Yan Dyke, one block south of 9 Mile road.

Defendants raised 3 issues on appeal from their, conviction of robbery armed:

(1) Was there probable cause for their arrest?

(2) Was the search and seizure of their automobile while defendants were in custody proper?

(3) Was evidence surrendered by one of the defendants while in custody pursuant to an officer’s request to empty his pockets admissible in evidence ?

The record discloses that the two men picked up in the automobile and arrested closely resembled the description given to the police of the two men who-perpetrated the armed robbery. The fruits of the search of the automobile after arrest while defendants were in custody were not introduced into evidence. The lighter given up by one of the defendants to one of the police officers when requested to empty his pockets was introduced into evidence and was connected to the crime as being owned by the-victim of the armed robbery. It was the subject of a proper search.

We find that the arrest was proper and legal. We find no prejudicial error. Affirmed.

T. Gr. Kavanagh, P. J., and Holbrook and Beer, JJ., concurred.

*

 CLS 1961, § 750.529 (Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 28.797).
Exh 10.2 First Amendment to Parkway at Oak Hill PSA






Exhibit 10.2


FIRST AMENDMENT TO PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT


THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT (the “First Amendment”) is dated effective as of the 2 day of March, 2012, and is to be and become part of that certain Purchase and Sale Agreement between WELLS VAF-PARKWAY AT OAK HILL, LLC, as Seller therein, and ROROSA, INC., as Purchaser therein, dated as of March 12, 2012, (the “Agreement”) for the purchase and sale of certain property (the “Property”) containing all that tract or parcel of real property located in Austin, Texas and as more particularly described in the Agreement.


WITNESSETH


WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to adjust the Purchase Price as more particularly set forth herein; 
    
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, One and No/100ths Dollar ($1.00) in hand paid and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the undersigned hereby agree as follows:


1.     All terms used herein with an initial capital letter and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the Agreement.


2.    The Purchase Price described in Section 2.4 of the Agreement is hereby reduced to Thirty One Million Three Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($31,300,000).


3.    The brokerage commission due to Buyer's Broker set forth in Section 10.1 of the Agreement is hereby reduced by Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000).


4.    This First Amendment may be executed in several counterparts, each of which shall constitute an original and all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.  Facsimile signatures shall be considered binding and original signatures.
    
EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN, all other terms, covenants, conditions and obligations of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect, and are hereby ratified and confirmed by the parties.




[SIGNATURES CONTAINED ON FOLLOWING PAGE]




    

1






IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this First Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement to be executed as of the date set forth above.




	
		
	SELLER:










Date: _April 2  , 2012




	Wells VAF - Parkway at Oak Hill, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company


By:Wells Mid-Horizon Value-Added Fund I, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, its sole member


By:Wells Investment Management Company, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, its manager


By: /s/ Douglas P. Williams  
Name: Douglas P. Williams  
Title: Senior Vice President  





	PURCHASER:










Date: _April 2  , 2012
	RORASA, INC., a Texas corporation




By: /s/ Jorge L. Sevilla                    
      JORGE L. SEVILLA, President





















2
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





The
      undersigned, Walter R. Keisch, Chief Financial Officer of DSL.net, Inc. (the
      “Company”), in connection with the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
      year ended December 31, 2005 and filed on this date (the “Report”), hereby
      certifies that the Report (i) fully complies with the requirements of Section
      13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (ii)
      fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
      of operations of the Company for the period covered by the Report.











By: */s/
      Walter R. Keisch*


Walter
      R.
      Keisch


Chief
      Financial Officer


Date:
      March 31, 2006





The
      foregoing certification is being provided pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter
      63
      of Title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and is not to be deemed a part of the Annual Report
      on Form 10-K of the registrant, nor is it to be deemed to be filed by the
      registrant for
      purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
      “Exchange Act”), or otherwise subject to the liability of that Section. The
      foregoing certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference
      into
      any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act,
      except to the extent that the registrant specifically incorporates it by
      reference.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronday L. TINKER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-3576

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017

Decided October 24, 2017

Lovita Morris King, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Fort Wayne, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Ronday Tinker, Pro Se

Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge, DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

ORDER

Ronday Tinker was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 84 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the guidelines range for his offense. Although his plea agreement contained a broad appeal waiver, Tinker appealed. His appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw. *See Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). We invited Tinker to comment on counsel’s motion, but he has not responded. *See*Cir R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects counsel discusses. *See United States v. Bey,*748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); *United States v. Wagner,*103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel first tells us that he has consulted with Tinker, and that Tinker does not wish to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, we do not discuss the voluntariness of the plea or the adequacy of Tinker’s plea colloquy. *See United States v. Konczak,*683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); *United States v. Knox,*287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel then considers whether Tinker could challenge his sentence, but rightly concludes that this challenge would be foreclosed by the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. In it, Tinker expressly waived his right “to appeal or to contest [his] conviction and all components of [his] sentence or the manner in which [his] conviction or [his] sentence was determined or imposed, to any Court on any ground other than a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.... ” Because the guilty plea stands, so does the waiver. *See United States v. Zitt,*714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013). Further, the district court did not rely on any impermissible factors in sentencing, and Tinker’s 84-month sentence *554was within the ten-year statutory maximum. *See United States v. Smith,*759 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2014); *United States v. Bownes,*405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005). It follows that Tinker cannot raise any non-frivolous arguments about his conviction or sentence that are not foreclosed by the waiver.

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS, the appeal.
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Department of Commerce Economic Development Administration
 AGENCY: Economic Development Administration, Department of Commerce.
 ACTION: Notice and opportunity for public comment.
 SUMMARY: The Economic Development Administration (EDA) has received petitions for certification of eligibility to apply for Trade Adjustment Assistance from the firms listed below. Accordingly, EDA has initiated investigations to determine whether increased imports into the United States of articles like or directly competitive with those produced by each of the firms contributed importantly to the total or partial separation of the firms' workers, or threat thereof, and to a decrease in sales or production of each petitioning firm.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:  List of Petitions Received by EDA for Certification of Eligibility To Apply for Trade Adjustment Assistance
[1/20/2022 through 2/11/2022]
Firm name
Firm address
Date
                             accepted for 
                             investigation
Product(s)Davis Drapery & Interiors, Inc
629 Distributors Row, Harahan, LA 70123
1/21/2022
The firm manufactures window coverings, including blinds, shades, and curtains.Midstates, Inc
4820 Capital Avenue NE, Aberdeen, SD 57401
1/26/2022
The firm manufactures printed paper products.Pavilion USA, LLC
16200 NW 49th Avenue, Miami Gardens, FL 33014
2/4/2022
The firm manufactures metal furniture for use outdoors.Palmetto Plating Company, Inc
510 Saco Lowell Road, Easley, SC 29640
2/8/2022
The firm applies protective coatings and finishes to metal parts.Cooper Enterprises, Inc
89 Curtis Drive, Shelby, OH 44875
2/11/2022
The firm manufactures miscellaneous wooden parts and assemblies.
 Any party having a substantial interest in these proceedings may request a public hearing on the matter. A written request for a hearing must be submitted to the Trade Adjustment Assistance Division, Room 71030, Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230, no later than ten (10) calendar days following publication of this notice. These petitions are received pursuant to section 251 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. Please follow the requirements set forth in EDA's regulations at 13 CFR 315.8 for procedures to request a public hearing. The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance official number and title for the program under which these petitions are submitted is 11.313, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms. Bryan Borlik, Director.


[FR Doc. 2022-03635 Filed 2-18-22; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3510-WH-P
#### Jerome WANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steven Mark FREI, Attorney; Sickles, Frei & Mims, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1148

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 25, 2017

*160Jerome Want, Appellant Pro Se. Laurie Kirkland, BLANKINGSHIP & KEITH, PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jerome Want seeks to appeal the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion to compel one of the defendants to answer interrogatories. After Want filed his notice of appeal, the district court granted summary judgment and closed the case.

This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). When a notice of appeal is premature, the entry of final judgment can cure the resulting jurisdictional defect under the doctrine of cumulative finality but only if the order being appealed could have been certified for intermediate appeal under Rule 54(b). *In re Bryson,*406 F.3d 284, 287-89 (4th Cir. 2005); *Equip. Fin. Grp. v. Traverse Computer Brokers,*973 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992).

The order Want seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Further, because the district court could not have certified for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b) the order denying Want’s motion to compel, the cumulative finality doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### EVIE’S CATERING, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee

2016-2342

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 17, 2017

J. Jay Carroll, Halverson Northwest Law Group PC, Yakima, WA, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

Christopher L. Harlow, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by Benjamin C, Mizer, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Steven J. Gillingham.

(Prost, Chief Judge, Mayer and Moore, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
**Exhibit
      23.02**











CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM








We
      hereby
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
      Form
      S-3 (No. 333-12064) and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-88513, 333-39016, 333-75230,
      333-89886 and 333-110131) of DSL.net, Inc. of our reports dated March 22, 2005,
      except for Note 3, as to which the date is March 31, 2006, relating to the
      financial statements and the financial statement schedule which appears in
      this
      Form 10-K. We also consent to the reference to us under the heading “Selected
      Financial Data” in this Form 10-K.







*/s/
      PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP*


Stamford,
      CT


March
      31,
      2006
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6193 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to waive the fee for a housing 

loan guaranteed by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs for certain veterans 

with a service-connected disability who applied for such loan before 

receiving a disability rating from the Secretary. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 2, 2023 

Mr. LEVIN (for himself and Mr. MOYLAN) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to waive the fee 

for a housing loan guaranteed by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs for certain veterans with a service-connected disability who applied for such loan before receiving a disability rating from the Secretary. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Veterans Assistance 

5 for Loan Origination Relief Act’’ or the ‘‘VALOR Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6193 IH

1 SEC. 2. WAIVER OF HOUSING LOAN FEE FOR CERTAIN VET2 ERANS WITH A SERVICE-CONNECTED DIS3 ABILITY WHO APPLIED FOR SUCH LOAN BE4 FORE RECEIVING A DISABILITY RATING. 

5 (a) WAIVER.—Subsection (c)(2)(A) of section 3729 

6 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking 

7 ‘‘rating’’ and inserting ‘‘examination or review, as defined 

8 by the Secretary,’’. 

9 (b) REFUND TO VETERAN.—The Secretary of Vet10 erans Affairs shall refund any fee collected under such sec11 tion before the date of the enactment of this Act from 

12 a veteran— 

13 (1) who requests such a refund; and 

14 (2) whom the Secretary determines, pursuant to 

15 evidence submitted by the veteran, would have been 

16 eligible for a waiver of such fee pursuant to the 

17 amendment made by subsection (a) if the veteran 

18 obtained the housing loan after such date. 

19 (c) FUNDING FEE REFUND.—The Secretary may pay 

20 to a lender, loan servicer, or loan holder the amount of 

21 a fee refunded under subsection (b) if the loan for which 

22 such fee was collected was active on the date on which 

23 the refund was provided. The Secretary shall require that 

24 any amount paid under this subsection shall be applied 

25 to the loan as a principal balance reduction. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-1340

HOLLY JEAN NOLAN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ROBERT WILKIE, Secretary for Department of Veteran Affairs; CHRIS 

SUNUNU, Governor of New Hampshire; PETER HUTCHINS, PLLC, Attorney; 

PHIL SCOTT, Governor of Vermont; BERNIE SANDERS, US Senator; JEANNE 

SHAHEEN, US Senator; PATRICK LEAHY, US Senator; COMMITTEE ON 

TEMPORARY SHELTER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (1:19-cv-00063-MR-WCM)

Submitted: August 20, 2019 Decided: August 22, 2019

Before FLOYD and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Holly Jean Nolan, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Holly Jean Nolan seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing her 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint without prejudice. This court may exercise jurisdiction 

only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral 

orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). Because it is possible that Nolan could cure the 

defects in her complaint through amendment, the order she seeks to appeal is neither a 

final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See Goode v. Cent. Va. 

Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623-25, 628-30 (4th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with 

instructions to allow Nolan to file an amended complaint. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED AND REMANDED
#### Arlen Porter SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEEFE COMMISSARY NETWORK, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35996

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 3, 2017

Arlen Porter Smith, Umatilla, OR, pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

MEMORANDUM **

Arlen Porter Smith, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his diversity action arising from the loss of his legal materials and intellectual property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Naffe v. Frey,*789 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Smith failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the amount in controversy was satisfied. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (requirements for diversity jurisdiction); *Naffe,*789 F.3d at 1139-40 (while the amount claimed on the face of the complaint generally controls, dismissal is warranted if it appears “to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 'We treat the dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as being without prejudice. *See Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc.,*377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004).

AFFIRMED.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See.*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).