alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6488 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend certain tax benefits 

related to empowerment zones to the District of Columbia. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 28, 2023 

Ms. NORTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend 

certain tax benefits related to empowerment zones to 

the District of Columbia. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TREATED AS EM4 POWERMENT ZONE. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1391(b)(2) of the Internal 

6 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end 

7 the following: ‘‘There shall be treated as an empowerment 

8 zone designated under this section so much of the District 

9 of Columbia as would result in the largest area within such 

10 District meeting the eligibility requirements for designaVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:34 Dec 04, 2023 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H6488.IH H6488

ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6488 IH

1 tion under section 1391. Deemed treatment under the pre2 ceding sentence shall not be taken into account in deter3 mining the number of empowerment zones which may be 

4 designated under this section.’’. 

5 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

6 this section shall apply to periods beginning after Decem7 ber 31, 2023. 

Æ 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

Certifications Pursuant to Section 302 

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002****

 

I, James R. Lavelle, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this report onForm 10-Q of Cotelligent, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others with those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusion about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. Theregistrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors: 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: August 12, 2005
#### Rubin Rurie WEEKS, Petitioner-Appellant v. State of MISSISSIPPI; Mississippi Department of Corrections, Respondents-Appellees

No. 16-60196

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 8, 2017

Rubin Rurie Weeks, Pro Se

James M. Hood, III, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, for Respondent-Appellee State of Mississippi

Lesley G. Miller, Special Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, for Respondent-Appellee Mississippi Department of Corrections

Before OWEN, ELROD, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Rubin Rurie Weeks, Missouri prisoner # 184303 and Mississippi prisoner # 71164, is currently serving a concurrent sentence of life imprisonment and thirty years of imprisonment based on guilty plea convictions of kidnapping and rape. He is presently incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional Center in Charleston, Missouri. He is also subject to a detainer lodged by the Mississippi Department of Corrections, requesting his return to Mississippi following his release from Missouri custody.

Weeks moves for a certificate of appeal-ability (COA) to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. He also moves for appointment of counsel. Although the district court construed Weeks’s petition as arising under § 2254, a § 2241 petition is the proper vehicle for challenging the Mississippi detainer at issue. *See Saucier v. Warden,*No. 94-41050, 1995 WL 71331, *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27,1995); *see also*5th Cir. R. 47.5.3 (decisions issued before January 1, 1996, are precedent). Further, because Weeks is challenging a document issued by the Mississippi Department of Corrections and not a document issued by a state court, a COA is unnecessary in this case, and we deny it for that reason. *See Saucier,*1995 WL 71331 at 1; *cf. Stringer v, Williams,*161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1998).

*298A § 2241 petition must be filed in the district where the prisoner is incarcerated. *Pack v. Yusuff,*218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000). Weeks is incarcerated in Charleston, Missouri, which is in the Western District of Missouri. Thus, the district court in the Southern District of Mississippi, where Weeks filed his § 2241 petition, did not have jurisdiction to consider it. *See Pack,*218 F.3d at 451; *see also Hutson v. Scott,*No. 95-20600, 1996 WL 783407, *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 30,1995); 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3.

Although the district court dismissed Weeks’s § 2241 petition as an unauthorized successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal on the alternative basis that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. *See United States v. Early,*27 F.3d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1994). Weeks’s motions for a COA and appointment of counsel are DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 13, 2020

No. 04-19-00815-CR

Chace WILKINSON,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 6087

Honorable Kirsten Cohoon, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The clerk’s record was due on March 6, 2020. After we granted the Kendall County 

District Clerk’s first motion for extension of time to file the clerk’s record, the record was due on 

April 6, 2020. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(c). After the extended due date, the district clerk filed a 

second request for an extension of time to file the record until May 6, 2020.

The clerk’s request is GRANTED. The clerk’s record is due to be filed with this court by 

May 6, 2020. See id.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 13th day of April, 2020.

___________________________________

Michael A. Cruz,

Clerk of Court
#### Jamaal John Thomas GARRETT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-16709-A

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed 03/27/2017

R. Brian Tanner, Edward J. Tarver, U.S. Attorney’s Office, SAVANNAH, GA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: MARCUS, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

This appeal is ALLOWED TO PROCEED.

Petitioner-Appellant Jamaal John Thomas Garrett appeals *from*the district court’s August 9, 2016 judgment denying his motion to vacate his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Mr. Garrett’s notice of appeal, which he did not date but which was mailed to the district court on October 17, 2016, was untimely on its face to appeal from the district court’s judgment *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) *&*(c)(1). However, Mr. Garrett suggested in his notice of appeal that he did not receive any notice about his case from the district court until September 15, which was more than 21 days after judgment was entered. We therefore remanded this case to the dis-. trict court, for the limited purpose of determining whether Mr. Garrett filed his notice of appeal within 14 days of receiving *813notice of the judgment, such that he might be eligible for a reopening of his time to appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6). *See*Fed R. App. P. 4(a)(6); *Sanders v. United States,*113 F.3d 184, 186-87 (11th Cir. 1997).

On remand, the court found that Mr. Garrett received notice of the judgment on September 15, and that he placed his notice of appeal in the prison mailing system on October 9. It is true that this interval was more than 14 days, and that Mr. Garrett is therefore not eligible for a reopening of his time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(6). *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). However, if Mr. Garrett deposited his notice of appeal in the prison mailing system on October 9, then his appeal was timely from the district court’s August 9 judgment, without any need to reopen the appeal period. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) & (c); *United States v. Glover,*686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, based upon the district court’s findings on limited remand, this appeal is timely, and we have jurisdiction to consider it. The appeal may therefore proceed.
#### Thomas D. Taylor et al., Respondents, *v.*Russell C. Root et al., Appellants.

An order of General Term in an equity action, sending the case back to the referee before whom it was tried to decide upon the question of costs, cannot be reviewed in this court.

Costs in an equity action are in the discretion of the court, and the exercise of this discretion cannot be reviewed.

(Argued January 8, 1872;

decided May term, 1872.)

This was an action for an accounting. It was four times tried. Upon the final trial the referee reported in favor of defendants for $945.30, besides costs. From the judgment entered thereon plaintiffs appealed. An order was made by the General Term sending it back to, the referee to hear and determine, upon the question of costs, upon the matter and evidence contained in the printed case; appellants to pay the present General Term costs and costs of the last trial before the referee. The parties appeared before the referee in pursuance' of the order; he reported that neither of the parties should recover costs against the other. Upon the hearing of the appeal, the judgment was modified to conform to the referee’s report. Defendants thereupon appealed to this court. *Held,*that the order sending the case back was not reviewable; it was a mere matter of practice, over which the General Term had jurisdiction; it deprived the defendants of no substantial right, as it gave a hearing *de novo.*The case was to be treated here as if the referee- had decided in the first instance that neither party should recover costs. This was a matter of discretion, and not appealable.'

*688
      *John H. Reynolds*for the appellants.

*J. B. Staples*for the respondents.

Earl, CL, reads for affirmance.

Leonard, 0., not sitting.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed, without costs to either party upon appeal.
454 A.2d 154

#### Commonwealth v. Long, Appellant.

Submitted January 14, 1981.

Richard A. Peterson, for appel*593lant; Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before CERCONE, P.J., SPAETH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.

The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.
Robert PATTERSON v. STATE

CR-16-0078

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Reh. denied.
Scott Allison DAMASIEWICZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D16-3164

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed February 20, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-84411,
333-39904, 333-59282, 333-71470, 333-91794) of Liberate Technologies of our report dated June 24, 2002, except for Note 19 and except for
the matters disclosed under the heading restatement in Note 3 and Note 10 as to which the date is September 12, 2003, relating to the financial statements and financial statement
schedule, which appears in this amendment.



San
Jose, California
September 12, 2003

---

QuickLinks
#### PEOPLE *v.*YATES.

Criminal Law — Procedure—Due Process — Plea of Guilty — Right op Appeal — Advice of Right — Court Rule.

Trial court is not required l>y court rule to advise a criminal defendant of Ms rights of appellate review at the time it accepts his plea of guilty (GCR 1963, 785.3[2]).

Reference for Points in I-Ieadnote

21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 487.

Appeal from Wayne, Gilmore (Horace W.), J.

Submitted Division 1 October 8, 1968, at Detroit.

(Docket No. 3,980.)

Decided October 22, 1968.

Russell Yates was convicted on plea of guilty of second-degree murder. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

*Frank J. Kelley,*Attorney General, *Robert A. Derengoski,*Solicitor General, *William L. Cahalan,*Prosecuting Attorney, *Samuel J. Torino,*Chief Appellate Lawyer, and *Walter Gibbs,*Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

*Tom Downs,*for defendant on appeal.

Per Curiam.

On February 6, 1967, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of second-degree murder. *

Although defendant concedes that the trial court fully explained his appellate rights immediately af*624ter the imposition of the sentence, he contends that GCR 1963, 785.3(2) required the court to advise him of his appellate rights at the time of the acceptance of the plea.

GCR 1963, 785.3(2) contains no such authority. See *People*v. *Dunn*(1968), 380 Mich 693, 700.

Affirmed.

J. H. Gillis, P. J., and R. B. Burns and Kelley, JJ., concurred.

*

 CL 1948, § 750.317 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.549).
EX 10.43-ARC NYRR 3.31.2012




PROMISSORY NOTE
$40,000,000.00    March 30, 2012 
    New York, New York


FOR VALUE RECEIVED, NEW YORK RECOVERY OPERATING PARTNERSHIP, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership (the “Borrower”), hereby promises to pay to Capital One, National Association (the “Lender”), in accordance with the Credit Agreement referred to below, the principal sum of FORTY MILLION DOLLARS (or such lesser amount as shall equal the aggregate unpaid principal amount of the Loans made by the Lender to Borrower under the Credit Agreement), in lawful money of the United States of America and in immediately available funds, on the dates and in the principal amounts provided in the Credit Agreement, and to pay interest on the unpaid principal amount of each such Loan, at such office, in like money and funds, for the period commencing on the date of such Loan until such Loan shall be paid in full, at the rates per annum and on the dates provided in the Credit Agreement.
This Note is one of the Notes referred to in the Credit Agreement dated as of March 30, 2012 (as modified and supplemented and in effect from time to time, the “Credit Agreement”) among Borrower, the lenders party thereto (including the Lender) and Capital One, National Association, as Administrative Agent, and evidences Loans made by the Lender thereunder.  Terms used but not defined in this Note have the respective meanings assigned to them in the Credit Agreement.
The Credit Agreement provides for the acceleration of the maturity of this Note upon the occurrence of certain events and for prepayments of Loans upon the terms and conditions specified therein.
Should the indebtedness represented by this Note or any part thereof be collected at law or in equity, or in bankruptcy, receivership or any other court proceeding (whether at the trial or appellate level), or should this Note be placed in the hands of attorneys for collection upon default, Borrower agrees to pay, in addition to the principal, interest and other sums due and payable hereon, all costs of collecting or attempting to collect this Note, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and disbursements.
All parties to this Note, whether principal, surety, guarantor or endorser, hereby waive presentment for payment, demand (except as set forth in the Credit Agreement), protest, notice of protest and notice of dishonor. 
Except as permitted by Section 10.04 of the Credit Agreement, this Note may not be assigned by the Lender.





In the event that this Note is transferred by the Lender to another party, Borrower shall not be required to recognize such transfer until Borrower has been sent a notice of the transfer of this Note by the transferor and the transferee.
This Note may only be amended by an instrument in writing executed by Borrower and the Lender.
This Note shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the law of the State of New York.
NEW YORK RECOVERY OPERATING PARTNERSHIP, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership


		
	By:
	American Realty Capital New York Recovery REIT, Inc., a Maryland corporation,  
its general partner 




		
	By:
	                         
Name: 
Title:
#### B. Indiviglio & Sons, a Copartnership, Composed of Benjamin Indiviglio et al., Appellants, *v.*Louis J. Miccio et al., Defendants, and Anderson Brick *&*Supply Co., Inc., Defendant-Respondent.

Submitted March 8, 1943;

decided April 8, 1943.

Motion for reargument denied with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 289 N. Y. 772.)
MEMORANDUM

From: Office of Air Qual ity Planning and Standards U.S. Environmental Protection Agency To: EGU NSPS Docket (EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495) Date: August, 2015 Subject: Meetings with Outside Groups

The EPA had meeting/conference calls with the follow ing outside group s to discuss their comments on the EGU GHG NSPS proposal(s).

General Electric (GE)

2/20/2015 2/27/2015 3/20/2015 3/25/2015

Siemens:

12/11/2015

American Petroleum Institute (API)

1/27/2014 2/19/2015

Nothing outside the scope of the submitted comments was discussed.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

               STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
               SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

         The undersigned, Robert C. White, is the President and Chief Executive
Officer and Principal Executive and Financial Officer of Wake Forest Bancshares,
Inc. (the "Company"). This statement is being furnished in connection with the
filing by the Company of the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year
ended September 30, 2005 (the "Report").

      By execution of this statement, I certify that:

      A)    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or
            78o(d)) and

      B)    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company as of the dates and for the periods covered by the
            Report.

      This statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so
that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not intended that
this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended.

      A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



DATE:  DECEMBER 21, 2005                        /S/ ROBERT C. WHITE
                                                -------------------------------
                                                ROBERT C. WHITE

                                                PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
                                                OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE
                                                AND FINANCIAL OFFICER
#### Michael Andrew BIGLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

Nos. 14-71160

14-71161

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 14, 2016 *

Filed December 22, 2016

Michael Andrew Bigley, Pro Se

Regina S. Moriarty, Attorney, Robert R. Di Trolio, Esquire, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division/Appellate Section, Washington, DC, Robert R. Di Trolio, Esquire, Clerk, U.S. Tax Court, Washington, DC, William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Michael Andrew Bigley appeals pro se from the Tax Court’s summary judgment in his action challenging the Internal Revenue Service’s determination to proceed with proposed collection actions for tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We review de novo. *Miller v. Comm’r,*310 F.3d 640, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

The Tax Court properly determined that the IRS did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the proposed levy actions because the settlement officer verified that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met, considered issues raised by Bigley at the hearing, and balanced the need to collect taxes with the intrusiveness any collection action would have on Bigley. *See*26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(3) (setting forth matters an appeals officer must consider in making a determination to sustain a proposed levy action); *see also Fargo v. Comm’r,*447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006) (reviewing Commissioner’s actions for an abuse of *993discretion). Moreover, the Tax Court properly concluded that Bigley was not entitled to challenge his underlying tax liability during his Collection Due Process hearing because he was sent a statutory notice of deficiency. *See*26 U.S.C. § 6830(c)(2)(B).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Brian BURGGRAF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4909

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 2, 2018

Brian Burggraf, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.