alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 10.6
 CONNETICS CORPORATION
 NON-QUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT
  I.
    
    NOTICE OF STOCK OPTION GRANT
 Stefan Weiss3160 Porter DrivePalo Alto, CA 94304Date of Grant
    
    July 11, 2005Vesting Commencement Date
    
    July 1, 2005Exercise Price per Share
    
    $17.93Total Number of Shares of CommonStock Subject to the Option (the Shares)
    
    20,000 SharesTotal Exercise Price
    
    $358,600.00Type of Option:
    
    Nonstatutory Stock OptionTerm/Expiration Date:
    
    July 11, 2015
 Vesting Schedule
 1/8 of the Shares subject to the Option shall vest six months after the Vesting Commencement
Date, and 1/48 of the Shares subject to the Option shall vest each month thereafter, subject to the
Optionee continuing to be a Service Provider on such dates.
 Termination Period  (3) three months (12) twelve
months
 1




---



##### 



II.
    
    AGREEMENT
 Grant of Option
    Exercise of Option
 Right to Exercise
 Method of Exercise
  2




---



##### 



Method of Payment
     Non-Transferability of Option
 No Obligation to Exercise Option
 No Obligation to Continue Business Relationship
 Term of Option
 Tax Consequences
 Exercising the Option
 3




---



##### 



Disposition of Shares
 No Rights as Stockholder until Exercise
 Adjustments Upon Changes in Capitalization, Dissolution, Merger or Asset Sale
 Changes in Capitalization provided, however
 Dissolution or Liquidation
 Merger or Asset Sale
 4




---



##### 



provided, however
 Entire Agreement; Governing Law
 NO GUARANTEE OF CONTINUED SERVICE
 5




---



##### 



III.
    
    DEFINITIONS
 Applicable Laws
 Board
 Code
 Common Stock
 Corporation
 Consultant
 Director
 Disability
 Employee
 Exchange Act
 Fair Market Value
 The Wall Street Journal
  6




---



##### 



The Wall Street Journal
  Officer
 Parent
 Service Provider
 Subsidiary
 7




---



##### 



OPTIONEE:
    
    CONNETICS CORPORATION/s/ Stefan Weiss

Signature
    
    /s/ Thomas G. Wiggans

By:  Thomas G. WiggansStefan Weiss

Print Name
    
    Chief Executive Officer

TitleResidence Address
 8
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM JUNE 30,
1998 AND 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                          46,449
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                 5,419
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    986,303
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                           1,778
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                             1,793
<LOANS>                                      1,877,718
<ALLOWANCE>                                     25,551
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,007,845
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,748,440
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          1,017,427
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           162
<OTHER-SE>                                     241,816
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               3,007,845
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 35,293
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               14,837
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                50,130
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              19,691
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              12,480
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           17,959
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    1,020
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 283
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 13,209
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,564
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,327
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.29
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.28
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.18
<LOANS-NON>                                     13,968
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                10,598
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                26,002
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    1,476
<RECOVERIES>                                         5
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               25,551
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            25,551
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
454 A.2d 158

#### Medleycott, Appellants v. Harris, Esq., et al.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 4, 1983.

Argued May 5, 1981.

Gary Green, for appellants; Frederick Smith, for appellees.

Before CERCONE, P.J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.

The order of the lower court is affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.

CAVANAUGH, J., filed a memorandum concurring and dissenting statement.
#### Virginia Ann CALDWELL-GRANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-16919

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 16, 2017 *

Filed May 18, 2017

Mark Ross Caldwell, Mark Caldwell, P.C., Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Leisa Wolf, Esquire, SSA — Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Ap-pellee

Before: D.W. NELSON, TROTT, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Virginia Caldwell-Grant appeals from the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, and we affirm. *See Ghanim v. Colvin,*763 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014).

The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not err in finding, at step five of the sequential evaluation process, that Caldwell-Grant had transferable work skills. The parties agree that at the time of the ALJ’s decision, Caldwell-Grant was limited to light work and was of advanced age with a high school education, and therefore would be considered not disabled under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, or “grids,” if she had transferable skills. *See*20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, 202-06 & 202.07. The vocational expert’s testimony satisfied the Commissioner’s burden of establishing specific work skills — stock checking, merchandise cataloging, and inventory marking — that Caldwell-Grant had acquired from her past semi-skilled work as a stock clerk. *See Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,*807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015); *Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,*554 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2009). These transferable skills enable Caldwell-Grant to perform jobs as an order filler, layaway clerk, and lost-and-found clerk. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Caldwell-Grant’s skills were transferable to a significant range of semi-skilled work that she could perform, given her age, education, work experiénce, and residual functional capacity. *See*20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, 202.00(c) (providing that work skills must be readily transferable to a significant range of jobs); *cf. Lounsburry v. Barnhart,*468 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that transferability of skills to only one occupation was insufficient). We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This Disposition Is Not Appropriate for Publication and Is Not Precedent Except as Provided By Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
|   | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods covered by the Report. |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| November 4, 2010 | /s/ Jane M. Funk                      |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Dated            | Jane M. Funk                          |
|             | Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer |

----
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-11125

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Crystal Ann Reed, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:23-CR-129-3

______________________________

Before Wiener, Ho, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

The attorney appointed to represent Crystal Ann Reed has moved for 

leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Reed has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the 

relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 4, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-11125 Document: 40-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/04/2024
No. 23-11125

2

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate 

review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is 

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and 

the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

Case: 23-11125 Document: 40-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/04/2024
#### Bob BEJARANO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kathleen ALLISON, Warden, Warden at CSATF/Corcoran State Prison; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16676

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*472Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 5, 2017

Bob Bejarano, Represa, CA, pro se.

Erin R. Doering, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Bob Bejarano, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected him to a contraband watch in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Williams v.*Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because appellant admits that he did not exhaust administrative remedies, and he failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. *See Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires “proper exhaustion ..., which means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Sapp v. Kimbrell,*623 F.3d 813, 823-24, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing limited circumstances under which exhaustion may be effectively unavailable).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**EXHIBIT - 32.1**

 

MOSSIMO,INC.

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO

SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofMossimo, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2006,as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (theReport), I Mossimo Giannulli, Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer of theCompany, certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best ofmy knowledge:

 

(1)            The Report, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit -32.1, fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)            The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 
| /s/    | Mossimo Giannulli                       |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Mossimo Giannulli                       |
|   | Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer |
|   | May 19, 2006                            |

 

A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTENSTATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 HAS BEENPROVIDED TO THE COMPANY AND WILL BE RETAINED BY THE COMPANY AND FURNISHED TOTHE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF UPON REQUEST.

 

THIS CERTIFICATION ACCOMPANIES THE FORM10-Q TO WHICH IT RELATES, IS NOT DEEMED FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION AND IS NOT TO BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO A FILING OF THECOMPANY UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 OR THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 (WHETHERMADE BEFORE OR AFTER THE DATE OF THE FORM 10-Q), IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY GENERALINCORPORATION LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN SUCH FILING.

 

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eulalio MORENO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-20571 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 25, 2017

Jason B. Smith, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Eulalio Moreno, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Eulalio Moreno, federal prisoner # 16060-179, was convicted in 2004 of possession of counterfeit United States currency and possession of a firearm by a felon convicted of three or more previous violent felonies. He has appealed the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion for release pending decision in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 case. As a general rule, an order issued by a magistrate judge is not a final order appealable to this court. *See Donaldson v. Ducote,*373 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2004); *see also Colburn v. Bunge Towing, Inc.,*883 F.2d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 1989). A party who wishes to challenge a ruling by a magistrate judge must object or otherwise challenge the ruling before the district court. *Gregg v. Linder,*349 F.3d 860, 862 (5th Cir. 2003). Moreno did not seek review in the district court of the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion for release pending decision. Because the magistrate judge’s order is not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and may not be appealed directly to this court, we lack jurisdiction to address this appeal. *See Donaldson,*373 F.3d at 624. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED. Moreno’s motion for release pending disposition in the district court is DENIED AS MOOT.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Detrick Ivre DOTSON, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11508 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 20, 2017

Brian W. McKay, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Detrick Ivre Dotson, Pro Se

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Detrick Ivre Dotson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and was sentenced to forty-two months of imprisonment. He appeals his sentence, arguing that, in light of *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), the district court erred in determining that his prior Texas conviction for aggravated robbery was a crime of violence for purposes of the sentencing guidelines. After Dotson filed his opening brief, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in *Beckles v. United States,*— U.S.-, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), in which the Court held that *Johnson*does not apply to the sentencing guidelines. *See Beckles,*137 S.Ct. at 890. The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance in light of *Bedeles.*Summary affirmance is proper where, among other things, “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” *Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,*406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

The motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 19-3186

___________________________ Robert Lee Johnson, Jr. lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v. Dexter Payne, Director, ADC; Rory Griffin, Medical Director, ADC; Ronald Stukey, Doctor, Randall L. Williams Unit (Originally named as Stukey)

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees Ayman Alshami, Cardiologist, Jefferson Regional Medical Center (Originally named as Alshami) lllllllllllllllllllll

Defendant Patti Conley, Health Care Administrator, Randall L. Williams Unit (Originally named as Conley); Gaylon Lay, Warden, Randall L. Williams Unit

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

____________ Submitted: April 28, 2020 Filed: May 1, 2020 [Unpublished]

____________Before BENTON, WOLLMAN, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Arkansas inmate Robert Lee Johnson, Jr. appeals following the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment. Johnson offers no valid basis for reversal, and we find none. See Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018) (reviewing de novo grant of summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences, without resorting to speculation, in nonmoving party’s favor); see also Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1053 (7th Cir. 2019) (court may, in its discretion, appoint expert witness when expert’s specialized knowledge will assist court in understanding evidence or deciding facts at issue); Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006) (reviewing for abuse of discretion denial of appointment of counsel in civil case; listing criteria). The judgment is affirmed, see 8th Cir. R. 47B, and Johnson’s pending motion for appointment of counsel is denied as moot.

______________________________

1 The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Beth M. Deere, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. -2-
#### CRONOS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. EXPEDIA, INC., Priceline.com Incorporated, NKA Priceline Group Inc., Priceline.com LLC, Travelocity.com LP, Defendants-Appellees

2016-2528

2016-2529

2016-2530

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Decided: August 17, 2017

Brian David Ledahl, Russ August & Kabat, Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by Paul Anthony Kroeger, Larry C. Russ.

Nathaniel St. Clair, II, Jackson Walker, LLP, Dallas, TX, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by John Martin Jackson, Matthew C. Acosta, Robert P. Latham.

Before O’Malley, Reyna, and Taranto, Circuit Judges.

O’Malley, Circuit Judge.

Cronos Technologies, LLC (“Cronos”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment that Appellees do not infringe U.S. Patent No. 5,664,110 (“the 110 patent”) either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. *See Cronos*
      *507
      *Techs., LLC v. Expedia, Inc.,*Nos. 13-1538- LPS, 13-1541-LPS, 13-1544-LPS, 2016 WL 4385834, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107479 (D. Del. Aug. 15, 2016); *Cronos Techs., LLC v. Expedia, Inc. (Claim Construction),*Nos. 13-1538-LPS, 13-1541-LPS, 13-1544-LPS, 2016 WL 3982309, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95768 (D. Del. July 22, 2016). Cronos also appeals the district court’s construction of: (1) “item code” and “identifying code”; and (2) the user-input terms.

After fully reviewing and considering the ’110 patent and the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the district court correctly construed the terms “item code” and “identifying code,” within the context of the ’110 patent, to be distinct from “user-discernable information” such that item codes and identifying codes do not contain any user-discernable information. *See Claim Construction,*2016 WL 3982309, at *5-7, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95768, at *14-21; *see also, e.g.,*’110 patent, col. 8,II. 15-27; col. 12, II. 39-49; col. 14, II. 56-58; col. 16, II. 30-42. The district court also correctly construed the user-input terms. *See Claim Construction,*2016 WL 3982309, at *7-8, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95768, at *21-23.

Because the construction of “item code” and “identifying code” require that the codes contain no user-discernable information, no reasonable jury could find that Appellees’ accused products infringe the ’110 patent under Cronos’s theory, which relies on the use of search parameters containing user-discernable information. Similarly, no reasonable jury could find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because the 110 patent specifically excludes user-discernable information from being contained within item codes and identifying codes. Cronos’s doctrine of equivalents theory relying on item codes and identifying codes that *do*contain user-discernable information within them would vitiate the 110 patent’s requirement, as expressed in the claim construction, that the codes do not contain user-discernable information.

For the foregoing reasons, and those expressed in more detail in the district court’s orders, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED