Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B

Appellate Court 

Caption

JACOB SZAFRANSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KARLA DUNSTON, 

Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket Nos. 1-12-2975, 1-14-1539 cons.

Filed June 12, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CH-29654; the 

Hon. Sophia H. Hall, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, LLP, of Chicago (Brian A. Schroeder, of 

counsel), for appellant.

K&L Gates, LLP, of Chicago (Abram I. Moore, Molly K. McGinley, 

and Sara E. Fletcher, of counsel), for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE LIU delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Harris dissented, with opinion.
- 2 - 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 This is the second appeal in a case that requires us to settle the dispute over who is entitled 

to control the disposition of cryopreserved pre-embryos created jointly by the parties. 

¶ 2 In 2010, plaintiff, Jacob Szafranski, and defendant, Karla Dunston, entered into an 

agreement to undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF) together for the purpose of creating 

pre-embryos. Karla had been diagnosed with lymphoma and was expected to suffer ovarian 

failure and infertility as a result of her chemotherapy treatment. During the IVF procedure, 

Jacob and Karla agreed to fertilize all of the eggs that were retrieved. Jacob deposited his 

sperm for the IVF and three viable pre-embryos were created and frozen. After their 

relationship ended, the parties disagreed over whether Karla could use the pre-embryos. Jacob 

sued to enjoin Karla from using them, and Karla filed a counterclaim seeking sole custody and 

control over the pre-embryos. Following a hearing on the parties’ motions for summary 

judgment, the circuit court awarded Karla sole custody and control of the pre-embryos and the 

right to use them to have children. 

¶ 3 In its ruling, the circuit court explained that Karla was entitled to use the pre-embryos 

because her interests prevailed over Jacob’s competing interests. Jacob appealed the ruling and 

this court issued an opinion in Szafranski v. Dunston, 2013 IL App (1st) 122975 (Szafranski I). 

Following an extensive survey of Illinois law and that of other jurisdictions involving similar 

disputes, we held that disputes over the disposition of pre-embryos created with one party’s

sperm and the other party’s ova should be settled by: (1) honoring any advance agreement 

entered into by the parties, and (2) weighing the parties’ relative interests in using or not using 

the pre-embryos in the event there is no such agreement. Id. ¶¶ 40, 42. We reversed, and 

remanded the cause with directions to apply this hybrid approach to resolve the dispute and to 

allow the parties to conduct additional discovery under this approach. 

¶ 4 On remand, the circuit court held a two-day trial, after which it entered judgment in favor 

of Karla. The court found that Jacob and Karla had an oral contract allowing Karla to use the 

pre-embryos without Jacob’s consent, and rejected Jacob’s assertion that the medical informed 

consent document signed by the parties modified or contradicted their oral contract. 

Alternatively, the court ruled in favor of Karla under the balancing-of-interests test. Karla was 

awarded sole custody and control of the pre-embryos. Jacob now appeals from that judgment. 

¶ 5 We affirm the circuit court’s judgment. The evidence at trial supported the circuit court’s 

finding that the parties formed an oral contract on March 24, wherein they agreed to create 

pre-embryos that Karla could use to have a biological child. We also agree that the parties did 

not modify this contract when they signed the medical informed consent document on March 

25. Finally, we cannot say that the court erred in finding that Karla’s interests prevail over 

Jacob’s interests in this dispute, based on evidence in the record that the pre-embryos represent 

Karla’s last and only opportunity to have a biological child with her own eggs.

¶ 6 BACKGROUND 

¶ 7 Jacob and Karla first met in 2001. Jacob is a firefighter, paramedic, and registered nurse. 

Karla is a physician who practices emergency medicine. The two began dating in November 

2009, around the time that Jacob and his prior girlfriend, Ashley, ended their two-year 

relationship. Neither Jacob nor Karla expected their relationship to result in marriage. Karla 
- 3 - 

testified that their relationship had no long-term prospects; Jacob agreed that he doubted their 

relationship when they were together, noting that they had problems and would fight. 

¶ 8 In mid-March of 2010, Karla was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Her 

oncologist recommended that she undergo chemotherapy, but told Karla that she would “most 

likely” lose her fertility as a result of the treatment. Karla was “devastated” and considered this 

news to be “just as bad as learning that [she] had cancer.” She “thought about how much [she] 

wanted to be a mother” and “immediately thought about [her] father,” who died when she was 

five years old, and “about how [she] wanted to have a grandchild *** with part of him.” When 

Karla told Jacob how important it was for her to have children, Jacob “was very supportive.”

¶ 9 Karla subsequently met with a fertility specialist “at [her] hospital,” who confirmed the 

oncologist’s belief that she would likely lose her fertility. The specialist recommended that 

Karla consult with Dr. Ralph Kazer, a fertility specialist with the Northwestern Medical 

Faculty Foundation (Northwestern). Karla testified that, by this time, her tumor was causing 

her “a lot of pain.” Her oncologist insisted that she start chemotherapy immediately. However, 

Karla postponed her chemotherapy treatment to explore IVF because of “how much [she] 

wanted to be a mother and have a biological child.”

¶ 10 Karla met with Dr. Kazer on March 24, 2010. During this meeting, Dr. Kazer told Karla 

that she would likely lose her fertility during chemotherapy. Dr. Kazer then discussed options 

for having a biological child in the future, including freezing her eggs or creating embryos to 

be frozen. He also informed Karla about the option of using an anonymous sperm donor and 

even provided her with a list of sperm banks. Karla testified that she was “nervous” about 

using an anonymous sperm donor. 

¶ 11 After their meeting, Karla called Jacob and told him about her options. Jacob was at work 

and took his cell phone into the bathroom to talk. Karla told Jacob that the plan was to retrieve 

a large number of eggs, fertilize a portion, and then freeze the resulting pre-embryos while she 

underwent her chemotherapy treatment. Karla asked if he would “be willing to provide sperm 

to make pre-embryos with her.” He responded “yes,” telling Karla that he wanted to help her 

have a child. 

¶ 12 The next day, on March 25, 2010, Jacob and Karla met with the staff at Northwestern, 

including Dr. Kazer, nurses, a financial counselor, and a psychologist, Dr. Susan Klock. 

During this appointment, Jacob deposited sperm to be frozen and used for the IVF procedure. 

¶ 13 At their March 25 meeting with Dr. Kazer, Jacob and Karla signed the Northwestern 

“Informed Consent for Assisted Reproduction” (the Informed Consent). The 21-page 

Informed Consent contains seven sections, the majority of which explain the procedures and 

risks for IVF treatments to the mother and to the potential offspring. A section on page seven 

requires the parties to designate the number of eggs they wanted fertilized; in this section is a 

handwritten reference indicating the parties’ initial plan to “split” the retrieved eggs so that 

half would be fertilized and the other half would be frozen. This directive, however, was not 

initialed by the parties. 

¶ 14 The Informed Consent provides that “[p]atients/couples who have frozen embryos must 

remain in contact with NMFF on at least an annual basis in order to inform NMFF of their 

wishes as well as to pay fees associated with the storage of their embryos.”

¶ 15 Pages 11 and 12 of the Informed Consent then explain Northwestern’s legal rights and 

obligations as follows: 
- 4 - 

“Because of the possibility of you and/or your partner’s separation, divorce, death or 

mental incapacitation, it is important, if you choose to cryopreserve your embryos, for 

you to decide what should be done with any of your cryopreserved embryos that remain 

in the laboratory in such an eventuality. Since this is a rapidly evolving field, both 

medically and legally, the clinic cannot guarantee what the available or acceptable 

avenues for disposition will be at any future date. At the present time, the options are: 

 1) discarding the cryopreserved embryos 

 2) donating the cryopreserved embryos for approved research studies. 

 3) donating the cryopreserved embryos to another couple in order to attempt 

pregnancy. 

Embryos are understood to be your property, with rights of survivorship. No use can be 

made of these embryos without the consent of both partners (if applicable). 

 a) In the event of divorce or dissolution of the marriage or partnership, NMFF will 

abide by the terms of the court decree or settlement agreement regarding the ownership 

and/or other rights to the embryos. 

 b) In the event of the death or legal incapacitation of one partner, the other partner 

will retain decision-making authority regarding the embryos. 

 c) In the event both partners die or are legally incapacitated, or if a surviving 

partner dies or is legally incapacitated while the embryos are still stored at NMFF, the 

embryos shall become the sole and exclusive property of NMFF. In this event, I/we 

elect to: (please select and initial your choice). Note: both the patient and the partner 

must agree on disposition; as with other decisions relating to IVF, you are encouraged 

to discuss this issue.”

Below this paragraph, Karla and Jacob initialed the space next to the option to “[d]onate the 

embryos to another couple.”

¶ 16 Included on page 17 of the Informed Consent is an additional legal disclaimer: 

“The law regarding IVF, embryo cryopreservation, subsequent embryo thaw and

use, and parent-child status of any resulting child(ren) is, or may be, unsettled in the 

state in which either the patient, spouse, partner, or any current or future donor lives, or 

in Illinois, the state in which the NMFF Program is located. NMFF does not provide 

legal advice, and you should not rely on NMFF to give you any legal advice. You 

should consider consulting with a lawyer who is experienced in the areas of 

reproductive law and embryo cryopreservation as well as the disposition of embryos, 

including any questions or concerns about the present or future status of your embryos, 

your individual or joint access to them, your individual or joint parental status as to any 

resulting child, or about any other aspect of this consent and agreement.”

¶ 17 The last page of the Informed Consent contains the signatures of Jacob, Karla, and Dr. 

Kazer and the date of March 25, 2010. Above their signatures is the following provision: 

“After your questions have been answered to your satisfaction, please sign your names 

below to indicate that you have had adequate time to review the information contained 

in this consent form and that you are ready to begin your upcoming IVF treatment 

cycle.”

¶ 18 Later that day, following their appointment at Northwestern, Jacob and Karla met with 

Nidhi Desai, an attorney, to discuss the IVF procedure and their options for the pre-embryos. 
- 5 - 

Desai presented the couple with two possible arrangements: a co-parenting agreement or a 

sperm donor agreement. Desai explained that, under a co-parenting agreement, Jacob would be 

involved in any resulting child’s life as a co-parent, including sharing financial responsibility. 

She also explained that, under a sperm donor agreement, Jacob would have no obligations and 

would be waiving his parental rights. Desai informed the parties that if they wanted to use a 

sperm donor agreement, each party would require independent legal representation and they 

would have to hire an additional attorney for this purpose. Desai did not present Jacob and 

Karla with any draft agreements during their initial consult; rather, they were supposed to call 

her afterwards to tell her which arrangement they had chosen. 

¶ 19 On March 29, 2010, Desai received an e-mail from Karla stating that the couple had opted 

to proceed under a co-parenting agreement. Desai prepared and e-mailed Karla a document 

entitled “Co-Parent Agreement” later the same day. This proposed agreement was never 

signed. 

¶ 20 On April 6, 2010, the parties went together to Northwestern, where Karla underwent the 

egg retrieval procedure and Jacob made his second deposit of sperm. Following the procedure, 

Dr. Kazer informed them that he had retrieved fewer eggs than originally anticipated and 

advised them that they would have a better chance of having a biological child if they fertilized 

all eight. Karla asked Jacob, “[W]hat should we do?” Jacob indicated to her that they should 

fertilize all of the eggs with his sperm. Ultimately, only three eggs were successfully fertilized. 

¶ 21 The next day, Karla began her chemotherapy treatment. Jacob attended her first 

appointment and, initially, was “a hundred percent supportive.” Subsequently, however, he 

stopped returning her phone calls and text messages. In May, after Karla’s second 

chemotherapy cycle, Jacob ended their relationship in a text message. Karla responded with an 

inquiry about the pre-embryos, but received no response. 

¶ 22 On June 14, 2010, Jacob sent Karla an e-mail for the first time after ending their 

relationship. In his e-mail, he stated: “I still have many questions to ask myself along with all 

the things I’d like to ask you. So with that being said I feel I should tell you what has been 

going on in my mind and life over these past few months in attempt to bring closure to what has 

happened between us so far.” He acknowledged that there were differences that he could not 

reconcile and even though Karla was unaware of these issues, he knew they ultimately “could 

not be together.” He also admitted in the e-mail that he had concealed from her his true feelings 

and reservations about their relationship while simultaneously seeking a way to end it that 

would leave her “in a position to move on intact despite the loss of [their] relationship.” In a 

paragraph describing his concerns about their separation and their pre-embryos, he wrote: 

“When you asked me if I would be the donor for your emergent egg harvesting I 

still have no reservations in my answer. If you desired to have the possibility of having 

‘a’ child in the future and I could be of help to you, I’d do it all over again. But now that 

we’ve already gone through with everything I wonder if you in asking me were doing 

so out of a longing to have ‘my’ child instead. The two are very different things, things 

neither you nor I were clear upon, because we never discussed our thoughts and 

feelings when given such choices. Karla I rather desired you to have a child of your 

own in the future with the return of your health, not for us to have a child when that 

time comes. I know now that there isn’t a possibility of a future for us together and that 

our relationship has faltered. I wonder if you would’ve rather gone with a random 

donor in knowing this, a question that my indecision has robbed you of, even in spite of 
- 6 - 

my assumed generosity and caring actions. I’m sorry for this and I hope you can 

forgive me even after everything I’ve put you through. Now in the after math [sic] of 

that decision I’m faced with even more compounding issues all stemming from my fear 

of the truth. Karla do you still wish to keep the embryo’s [sic] after all of this? Do you 

desire the potential to have ‘a’ child in the future or ‘my’ child, because if your choice 

is the ladder [sic] I won’t be there? I had no intention of being there. I ask myself, 

would you have asked someone instead of me if I had said no, or would you have even 

gone through with it at all? It’s far too late to be saying this, but you and I both know we 

never had the needed time to make such a decision and rather hastily went about things 

due to your health.”

¶ 23 Jacob also expressed concern about the reaction he had received from his friends and 

family when discussing the fact that he had participated in the IVF process with Karla: 

“I never imagined that what I’m saying to you right now would be so expansive and 

reaching in my life Karla. My time with you has worked its way into every part of my 

being with everything and everyone I know. Since I stopped returning your text’s [sic] 

and calls I looked for council [sic] from just about everyone I could, and have been met 

with mixed feelings to say the least. Some of my friends and family feel I’ve made a 

grave mistake and did something that is unnatural and that I should not go through 

with. Others feel the same as I do and believe I did what was best given the 

circumstances and acted with the utmost of intentions. However, I never imaged [sic] 

that my choice would be one that would forever push me away from those people I’ve 

been so close to in my life. *** I know that I must make a choice in this and choose to 

leave it up to you ultimately to decide Karla.”

¶ 24 Finally, he acknowledged a fear of being rebuked or rejected for having helped Karla: 

“I just am afraid that this will be something that haunts me for the rest of my life and 

that once I do find someone who I’m ready to love and have a family with they will 

reject me on the basis that I could potentially have a child of my own in the world with 

another women [sic], that I know nothing about and neither of which have I ever loved. 

The thought of a child being a mutually desired choice in the shared life and 

relationship of two loving adults is something very fundamental and non-negotiable to 

some people. I just wonder if my future happiness in life will be tethered to the women 

[sic] I cared for years ago and the child I never knew.”

¶ 25 On September 6, 2010, Jacob sent Karla another e-mail, announcing that he could not let 

her use the pre-embryos and that he wanted them to be donated to science or research. In her 

e-mail back to Jacob that same day, Karla responded: “Those embryos mean everything to me 

and I will fight this to the bitter end.” On September 10, 2010, Jacob sent Karla an e-mail, 

telling her that “if [she] could put together all the documents that [he] would need to sign over 

the embryos [he’ll] do it.” He also asked her to “mail all correspondence” to a different address 

and to refrain from replying to his e-mail message because “other people routinely access [his] 

email and will ultimately make this a harder decision for [him] to make.”

¶ 26 Karla contacted Desai about drafting a sperm donor agreement, and Desai told her that 

Jacob would need to sign a waiver and obtain separate legal representation. Desai 

recommended an attorney for Jacob. The attorney later informed Desai that she and Jacob did 

not connect for a time, but when they did, Jacob said he “did not want to move forward with the 

arrangement.”
- 7 - 

¶ 27 Jacob subsequently hired an attorney, Kurt Mueller, who sent a document entitled “Sperm 

Donation and Confidentiality Agreement” to Karla’s attorney on April 29, 2011. The proposed 

agreement granted Karla full custody of the pre-embryos and required, among other things, 

that Jacob’s identity as the sperm donor remain confidential. Jacob, however, later discharged 

Mueller and sent his own “proposed anonymous embryo donation and confidentiality 

agreement” which also included a provision granting Karla full custody of the pre-embryos. 

Karla testified that she would have signed Jacob’s proposed agreement, but Northwestern 

indicated that it would not abide by its terms. 

¶ 28 On August 22, 2011, Jacob filed the underlying lawsuit against Karla.1

¶ 29 The Trial 

¶ 30 The trial evidence included the in-court testimony of Jacob and Karla and the deposition 

testimony of Dr. Kazer, Nidhi Desai, and Ashley Harris, Jacob’s former girlfriend. Among the 

documents admitted into evidence were the following: the Informed Consent dated March 25, 

2010; the draft Co-Parent Agreement prepared by Desai on March 29, 2010; and the e-mails 

between Jacob and Karla, along with the attachments to the e-mails. 

¶ 31 Jacob’s Testimony

¶ 32 Jacob testified that he responded “yes” when Karla asked him on March 24 if he would 

“would be willing to provide sperm to make pre[-embryos] with her.” He admitted telling 

Karla that he wanted to help her have a child, and acknowledged that the purpose of providing 

his sperm was to help her have a biological child. He agreed that they never discussed any 

limitations on her future use of the pre-embryos. In fact, the thought of placing limitations on 

Karla’s use of the pre-embryos “never crossed [his] mind.”

¶ 33 As for the Informed Consent, Jacob acknowledged that the purpose of the document was 

“[p]artly” to protect Northwestern from committing a crime in the event it touched him, 

conducted tests on him, or disclosed his medical information. He nonetheless understood the 

Informed Consent as requiring both his and Karla’s approval prior to any use of the 

pre-embryos. He admitted that he never communicated this understanding to Karla. 

¶ 34 Jacob testified that, during their March 25 meeting, Dr. Kazer told the couple that any use 

of the pre-embryos would require the consent of both individuals because they were not 

married; however, he acknowledged that Dr. Kazer never asked the parties to agree what 

should happen to the pre-embryos in the event of their separation. Instead, Dr. Kazer 

encouraged them to go see an attorney to resolve that issue and indicated that Northwestern 

would abide by an agreement, prepared by an attorney, regarding custody of the pre-embryos. 

¶ 35 Jacob acknowledged that despite the couple’s initial plan to fertilize some of Karla’s eggs 

and to cryopreserve the rest of them, he agreed that Karla should fertilize all eight eggs after 

Dr. Kazer indicated that there would be a better chance of creating viable pre-embryos if all the 

eggs were fertilized. Jacob knew that these were likely the last viable eggs Karla would ever 

have because of the anticipated effects of her chemotherapy treatment. 

 

1Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, the medical practice that issued the Informed Consent 

and had initial responsibility for the clinical storage of the cryopreserved embryos, is not a party in this 

lawsuit. 
- 8 - 

¶ 36 Jacob agreed that, during the meeting with Desai, no one ever identified any circumstances 

under which Karla would not be able to use the pre-embryos. However, he explained that he 

did not voice any such limitations because he “wasn’t asked” and assumed that his prior 

approval was required under the terms of the Informed Consent. Jacob denied ever agreeing to 

sign the draft Co-Parent Agreement that Karla emailed to him. He testified that at most, he 

merely told Karla that he had been “meaning to” sign it. He did not express any concerns or 

disagreements with the document’s terms, but indicated only that the couple would need to go 

over the document and talk about it. He testified that he never agreed to any term in the draft 

agreement that would give Karla sole control over the disposition of the pre-embryos in the 

event of their separation; in fact, he believed that it contradicted what Desai told him his rights 

would be as a co-parent and also what he agreed to in the Informed Consent. 

¶ 37 Karla’s Testimony

¶ 38 Karla testified that she believed, on March 24, that she and Jacob had reached an agreement 

that “Jacob was providing sperm to create embryos so [she could] have a biological child after 

[her] cancer treatment.” She noted that Jacob agreed to donate his sperm “[w]ithout hesitation” 

and had expressed no doubt whatsoever about creating the pre-embryos. Karla testified that 

she was “relieved and so happy and so thankful” that Jacob had agreed to help her have 

biologically related children. Karla also testified that it was her understanding that she and 

Jacob “always agreed that he was doing this to help [her] create embryos to have a biological 

child with no other attachment.” She believed that she had his consent to use the pre-embryos 

at a later date, noting, “that’s why I fertilized all eight [eggs].” Had she known that Jacob 

harbored doubts or concerns, she “would have gone against Dr. Kazer’s suggestion and *** 

frozen some eggs” in order “to make sure that there was no risk of [her] being able to have a 

biological child after [her] cancer treatment.”

¶ 39 Karla does not remember discussing the disputed provision in the Informed Consent 

regarding the use of the pre-embryos when meeting with Dr. Kazer on March 25. Karla 

testified that she uses informed consent forms in her own medical practice and believes they 

are “given to a patient to describe a procedure, to discuss the risks and benefits of doing the 

procedure, and to get permission for a hospital and doctor to do a procedure.” She also testified 

that the couple had “already agreed that [Jacob] was going to donate his sperm to create 

embryos”; no one asked them about this agreement; they were told “on several occasions” that 

day about the need to document their wishes with an attorney; and she had no opportunity to 

modify the provision. 

¶ 40 Karla acknowledged that she never asked to modify the Informed Consent so as to indicate 

her specific understanding that she had sole authority over the pre-embryos, but explained why 

she did not do so. First, she was “very familiar with informed consents *** [and] knew that this 

wasn’t something that you modify or write in what a patient wishes.” Second, it was her 

understanding that she and Jacob would be documenting their wishes through an attorney as 

opposed to in the informed consent. And lastly, she and Jacob “agreed that he was donating the 

sperm for one reason and one reason only, for [her] to have biological children after [her] 

cancer treatment.” She testified that “there was really no need to ask for that term to be put into 

a form” in light of their oral agreement and understanding of the purpose of the IVF.

¶ 41 With respect to the March 25 consultation with Desai, Karla testified that “every 

discussion that [the couple] had including the discussion with Nidhi Desai [was] that Jacob 
- 9 - 

was doing this for [her] to have a biological child, and no other conditions, no other terms were 

ever mentioned.” Although Karla sent Desai the e-mail requesting the co-parenting agreement, 

she did not review the draft Co-Parent agreement that Desai sent to her upon her receipt of the 

document. Karla explained that during this time, she was experiencing great pain, difficulty 

with breathing and eating, undergoing injections and ultrasound exams for the IVF, and 

managing her fears about her mortgage, student loans, and bills in light of the fact that she 

would probably not be working for almost a year: “So that’s where all my time was spent. 

That’s why I was stressed and that’s what I was going through at the time.”

¶ 42 Karla testified that when she asked Jacob, following the retrieval, whether they should 

fertilize all eight eggs with his sperm, she remembers this moment specifically because “[i]t 

was a big deal *** we were fertilizing all eight, and I knew that it was my–the only way that I 

would be able to have biological children.” She testified that Jacob “never once” mentioned 

any problems when he told her to fertilize all eight eggs. 

¶ 43 At one point, following her first chemotherapy treatment, she and Jacob went to a 

pharmacy to pick up some prescriptions. While Jacob was paying for the prescriptions, she 

asked him if he had read the Co-Parent Agreement and if he was going to sign it. She recalled 

Jacob telling her “yes” and she felt “relieved.” At that time, Karla “thought [Jacob] was so 

amazing” and that he “was this angel that was put in [her] life to help [her] through this.”

¶ 44 Dr. Ralph Kazer’s Testimony 

¶ 45 Dr. Kazer testified that he does not remember the meeting with Jacob and Karla on March 

25, but that it is “highly likely” that he pointed out the consent provision to them during their 

meeting. Dr. Kazer testified that Northwestern has used a version of the Informed Consent 

since the IVF program started in the early 1990s. It has been updated and revised over the 

years, and the version signed by Jacob and Karla was current as of December 2009. 

¶ 46 According to Dr. Kazer, the purpose of a medical informed consent document is “to 

provide a vehicle for systematically explaining to a patient who is considering a particular 

treatment the nature of the treatment, the potential advantages of the treatment, the potential 

disadvantages of the treatment, and the particular consequences of the treatment in order that 

the patient can make an informed decision about whether or not undergoing this particular kind 

of therapy is appropriate for him or her.” He agreed that the Informed Consent does not 

necessarily serve to document the parties’ wishes with respect to disposition of the 

pre-embryos. As he explained: “[W]e don’t feel that it would be appropriate to go to that 

individual level of detail in a standard consent form. Every couple is likely to handle this in a 

different way and we feel that it’s more appropriate for them to get legal counsel to document 

their specific desires about disposition, and in particular, if they ultimately split up.”

¶ 47 Dr. Kazer testified that a couple could modify the Informed Consent “in principle” if they 

“changed [their] mind about something.” In this particular case, however, Jacob and Karla 

would not have been permitted to modify the consent provision at issue if they disagreed with 

it. Dr. Kazer would have told them that “this is the only consent form that they can sign; that 

they can’t modify it, and if they had some sort of agreement between the two of them about the 

disposition of their embryos in the future, that they needed to get an attorney and document it 

in a separate document.” Finally, Dr. Kazer noted that this has “never happened to [him] in 

[his] career.”
- 10 - 

¶ 48 Nidhi Desai’s Testimony

¶ 49 Nidhi Desai specializes in adoption and reproductive technology law. Desai met with 

Jacob and Karla on March 25, 2010 for about an hour, and discussed “the emergency IVF” and 

“different options with respect to the [pre-]embryos.” She also discussed with them the options 

for a co-parenting agreement or a sperm donation agreement. Desai explained the difference 

between these two arrangements, and told them that if they opted for a sperm donation 

agreement, she could not represent both parties and one of them would be required to obtain 

“separate legal representation.” Desai testified that, according to her notes from the March 25 

meeting (which were admitted into evidence at trial), she informed the parties that if she was 

going to represent both of them, “there has to be an understanding that [they are] 

co-parenting.”

¶ 50 Desai advised the parties that the disposition of the embryos was “one of the points we 

need to decide” and that Jacob and Karla “need[ed] to think about what they want.” She did not 

recall whether Karla indicated that the couple had an agreement to allow Karla to use the 

pre-embryos without Jacob’s prior consent. She explained, however, that following their 

meeting, she “had concluded that for purposes of the draft [agreement] [she] would say that if 

they weren’t together Karla would control their disposition.”

¶ 51 Desai also testified that she did not see the Informed Consent during the meeting. She has, 

however, seen the “generic” medical consent forms used by Northwestern many times and 

believes that “part of the reason that Northwestern has these [co-parenting or sperm donor] 

agreements entered into is because the agreement would supersede the consent.” In her 

opinion, the Informed Consent that Jacob and Karla signed was a vehicle for Northwestern to 

“protect themselves and say ‘look we’re not going to do anything unless we have some sort of 

direction from one of the parties.’ ” Desai acknowledged that she was not at Northwestern with 

the parties when they signed the Informed Consent, but her understanding of the document was 

“based on [her] conversations with their reproductive endocrinology department over the 

years.”

¶ 52 Desai testified that Jacob and Karla did not “formally” enter into an agreement during the 

meeting. Instead, “[t]here was discussion as to what might happen,” which led Desai to 

“prepare[ ] a draft so they could read through it to see if it accurately reflect[ed] their 

understanding.” She recalled that during their meeting, Jacob expressed that he wanted to help 

Karla have children and that she would be able to use the pre-embryos upon their separation: 

“Q. And Jacob told you at the meeting that Karla should be able to use the 

pre-embryos if they split up? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. And the parties said that if they split up they wanted Jacob to become a sperm 

donor, correct? 

 A. Yes. After discussing all the possibilities, yes. That was the conclusion that I 

came to.”

¶ 53 Subsequently, on March 29, Desai received an e-mail from Karla, indicating that the 

couple “decided that they’re not going to go the sperm donor route *** [and were] going to go 

the co-parenting route.” In preparing the draft Co-Parent Agreement, Desai included a 

provision stating as follows: “Should the Intended Parents separate, Karla will control the 

disposition of the pre-embryos.” Desai testified that this language had been added to the draft 
- 11 - 

agreement “[b]ecause it was something that we had, you know, discussed.” When asked 

whether Jacob agreed that Karla would have sole control of the pre-embryos upon their 

separation, Desai responded: 

“I don’t know if he used those words, but that was the direction I thought they were 

going in. Yes. And that’s why I put it in this way. Sometimes I will say in the event the 

intended parents separate the embryo shall be thawed thereby destroying their viability 

or they shall be donated to medical science. So this is the direction I thought they were 

going in based on the meeting. But of course the agreement was not signed ***.”

¶ 54 Later, Karla asked Desai for a sperm donor agreement. Desai advised Karla that she would 

require a waiver and that Jacob would require separate legal representation. She gave Karla the 

name of an attorney for Jacob. That attorney later told Desai that Jacob “wasn’t going to be 

moving forward with the sperm donation agreement.”

¶ 55 Ashley Harris’s Testimony

¶ 56 Ashley Harris testified that she and Jacob were in a dating relationship from September 

2007 to December 2012, with “a separation period for maybe five months or so” from late 

2009 until April or May of 2010. She had not been aware, during their separation, that Jacob 

“was with someone else,” i.e., Karla. A few weeks after re-kindling their relationship, Jacob 

told Ashley “[t]hat he donated his sperm” to help Karla create pre-embryos with her eggs. 

Ashley recalled that when she learned about the pre-embryos, she “wasn’t happy about it.” 

Although she “never specially asked,” she “just assumed” that Karla would want to use the 

pre-embryos at some point. She gave Jacob an ultimatum: 

“Immediately when I found out, I told him I didn’t want to be with him if they had gone 

through with it. So I said that he would have to tell her if he wanted a relationship with 

me that she could not use [the pre-embryos].”

According to Ashley, that was when Jacob “realized that [neither Ashley] nor any woman 

would want to be with somebody who had embryos with someone else.”

¶ 57 Ashley further testified that she and Jacob did not discuss much more about the 

pre-embryos “besides the fact that [Karla] couldn’t use them and that he had to go through the 

motions of that if he wanted a relationship with me.” She was aware that Jacob and Karla were 

still having some communications. On one occasion, Jacob showed her the June 14, 2010 

e-mail that he sent to Karla, which stated in part the following: 

“Karla, I’ve told Ashley about us. And in hearing so, she can’t even bear the thought of 

what I did for you. While Ashley and I were separated while you and I were together, 

she still cared deeply for me. In talking with her, I found out that as a direct result of 

what has happened between you and I, she could never even consider being with me 

nor loving me if we were to go ahead and have a child either as donor or by 

co-parenting.”

¶ 58 Ashley testified that she later discovered a draft sperm donor agreement when she accessed 

Jacob’s e-mails. She also noticed an e-mail to Karla dated September 10, 2010, in which he 

wrote “Please mail any correspondence to the below address and don’t reply to this message 

because other people routinely access my e-mail and will ultimately make this a harder 

decision for me to make.” The address that Jacob listed was that of a male friend. Ashley later 
- 12 - 

“confronted [Jacob] about it and asked him why [he and Karla] had drafted something [she] 

didn’t know about.”

¶ 59 Ashley and Jacob ended their relationship in December 2012. According to Ashley, the 

decision to end their relationship had nothing to do with Jacob’s lawsuit or the pre-embryos. 

¶ 60 The Circuit Court’s Ruling

¶ 61 Following a two-day trial, on May 16, 2014, the circuit court entered a written order 

awarding Karla sole custody and control of the pre-embryos. First, the court found that the 

parties entered into an enforceable oral agreement on March 24, 2010 which “contains the 

offer and acceptance and meeting of the minds regarding the disposition of the embryos *** 

[and] represents the intent of the parties, at that time, that Karla need not obtain Jacob’s 

consent to use the embryos to attempt to have a child.” Second, it found that the March 25, 

2010 Informed Consent “specifically contemplates that another agreement between the parties 

may govern the future disposition of the embryos” because “[t]he form states Northwestern 

will abide by any agreement reached between the parties.” The court ruled that the parties’ 

“previous oral agreement *** is not contradicted or modified by any language in the Informed 

Consent, or by anything else that happened between the parties.”

¶ 62 Despite finding that the parties’ interests and rights in the pre-embryos were controlled by 

their March 24 oral agreement, which allowed Karla to use the pre-embryos without Jacob’s 

consent, the circuit court also considered the evidence under the balancing-of-interests 

analysis, presumably to provide a complete factual and legal framework for this court’s benefit 

on review. The court held that Karla’s interests in using the pre-embryos outweighed Jacob’s 

interests in preventing their use. Specifically, the court found that “Karla’s desire to have a 

biological child in the face of the impossibility of having one without using the embryos, 

outweighs Jacob’s privacy concerns, which are now moot, and his speculative concern that he 

might not find love with a woman because he unhesitatingly agreed to help give Karla her last 

opportunity to fulfill her wish to have a biological child.”

¶ 63 Jacob filed a notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to Illinois 

Supreme Court Rules 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and 303 (eff. May 30, 2008). 

¶ 64 ANALYSIS 

¶ 65 As previously noted, this case presents the question of who is entitled to determine the 

disposition of the pre-embryos that the parties created jointly with their sperm and eggs.2 In 

Szafranski I, we held that the dispute should be settled, first, by honoring any advance 

agreement between the parties regarding the disposition of the pre-embryos. Alternatively, in 

the absence of such an agreement, the circuit court should resolve the issue weighing the 

parties’ relative interests in using or not using the pre-embryos. Szafranski I, 2013 IL App (1st) 

122975, ¶¶ 40, 42. On remand, the circuit court considered the evidence adduced at the trial 

and ultimately concluded that Karla was entitled to the sole control over the pre-embryos under 

both tests. 

¶ 66 March 24, 2010 Oral Agreement 

 

2

For consistency purposes, we adopt the parties’ use of the term “pre-embryo” to describe a 

fertilized egg prior to implantation. In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 835 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
- 13 - 

¶ 67 An oral agreement is binding where there is an offer, an acceptance, and a meeting of the 

minds as to the terms of the agreement. Bruzas v. Richardson, 408 Ill. App. 3d 98, 105 (2011). 

To be enforceable, the material terms of a contract must also be definite and certain. Id. “The 

terms of a contract will be found to be definite and certain *** if a court is able to ascertain 

what the parties agreed to, using proper rules of construction and applicable principles of 

equity.” Id. The parties’ intent in forming an oral contract and the terms of the contract are 

questions of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Prignano v. Prignano, 405 Ill. App. 3d 

801, 810 (2010); Hedlund & Hanley, LLC v. Board of Trustees of Community College District 

No. 508, 376 Ill. App. 3d 200, 205 (2007). 

¶ 68 The standard of review for resolving the parties’ competing interpretations of their 

agreement of March 24 is highly deferential. “Ordinarily, the intent of the parties to an oral 

contract is a question to be determined by the trier of fact.” Ceres Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Scrap 

Processing, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 133, 141 (1986). “A reviewing court must not set aside such a 

finding unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. See also Edward M. 

Cohon & Associates, Ltd. v. First National Bank of Highland Park, 249 Ill. App. 3d 929, 941 

(1993) (“A trial court’s construction of an oral agreement between the parties will be followed 

unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence and an opposite conclusion is clearly 

warranted.”); Goldenberg v. Bazell, 219 Ill. App. 3d 672, 679 (1991) (upholding the trial 

court’s ruling that an oral contract existed where it was not against manifest weight of the 

evidence). A trial court’s conclusion is against the manifest weight of the evidence when an 

opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not 

based on evidence. Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 252 (2002). We will not substitute our 

judgment for that of the circuit court, and “[w]here several reasonable inferences are possible, 

those conclusions drawn by the trial court must prevail.” Rankin v. Hojka, 42 Ill. App. 3d 440, 

446 (1976). 

¶ 69 At the outset, we emphasize that Jacob concedes that a contract was formed on March 24; 

as such, no dispute exists as to the existence of the parties’ oral contract. The sole dispute stems 

from a disagreement over the scope of their agreement. Under the circumstances, we will not 

disturb the circuit court’s finding that the parties entered into an oral contract on March 24 

regarding the creation of pre-embryos with Jacob’s sperm and Karla’s eggs. We find nothing in 

the record to suggest that the circuit court erred in this finding. 

¶ 70 As we turn to the scope of the parties’ oral contract, we note that several facts are not in 

dispute. Significantly, Jacob does not challenge the finding that an oral contract was created on 

March 24 when Karla asked him if he would be willing to donate his sperm to create 

pre-embryos with her, and he manifested his acceptance of Karla’s offer by responding “yes.”3

The parties both acknowledge that Jacob agreed to donate his sperm after Karla told him that 

she would likely become infertile after her chemotherapy treatment. Both parties further 

acknowledged, through trial testimony, that the purpose of the oral contract was for Jacob to 

provide his sperm to fertilize Karla’s eggs so that she could preserve her ability to have a 

biologically related child of her own in the future, after her chemotherapy treatment ended. 

 

3

In his opening brief, Jacob characterizes the March 24 understanding as an “oral contract” but 

later, in his reply brief, refers to it exclusively as an “oral agreement.” We find no relevance in the 

different choice of words as both parties acknowledge that they entered into an oral contract on March 

24, 2010. 
- 14 - 

Finally, it is undisputed that the parties knew that the pre-embryos would have to be 

cryopreserved for later use and that they would not be transferred to Karla for implantation, at 

the earliest, until after she finished her chemotherapy treatment. 

¶ 71 Here, after the circuit court found that the parties formed an oral contract on March 24, it 

next had to resolve the question of whether the parties, when forming this contract, intended 

for Karla to use the pre-embryos to have a child–presumably at some later time after her 

medical treatment ended–without obtaining Jacob’s consent. According to Jacob, he never 

agreed, on March 24, that Karla could use the pre-embryos without his consent. Conversely, 

Karla contends that their agreement did not include any limitation on her use of the 

pre-embryos and that the parties intended for Karla to use them, without condition, to have a 

biological child. 

¶ 72 On remand, the circuit court was asked to determine whether the parties had any advance 

agreement regarding Karla’s right to use the pre-embryos. Following its consideration of the 

trial evidence, the court concluded that Jacob had agreed to donate sperm specifically for the 

purpose of allowing Karla to later have a child of her own and that the parties intended for 

Karla to use any resulting pre-embryos without Jacob’s consent. In reaching its decision, the 

court found the following evidence dispositive of the parties’ intent at the time their contract 

was formed: (1) neither party expected to continue their relationship in the long run; (2) neither 

discussed or signed the Co-Parent Agreement and, thus, did not modify their March 24 oral 

contract; and (3) Jacob told Karla, in his June 14, 2010 e-mail, that he wanted Karla to have a 

child of her own and that he would leave it to her to decide whether to use the pre-embryos. 

¶ 73 On appeal, Jacob contends that the circuit court erred in finding that the March 24 oral 

contract “contains the offer and acceptance and meeting of the minds [between Jacob and 

Karla] regarding the disposition of the embryos.” He specifically takes issue with the court’s 

finding that the agreement “represents the intent of the parties, at that time, that Karla need not 

obtain Jacob’s consent to use the embryos to attempt to have a child.” Jacob argues that, at the 

time the contract was formed, he agreed only to donate sperm for Karla’s IVF procedure so that 

she could attempt to have a biologically related child later, no more and no less. He maintains 

that he and Karla “never even discussed or contemplated” the issue of how the pre-embryos 

would be used or disposed of following the IVF and cryopreservation. In sum, he argues that 

“[c]onsent to create pre-embryos is not consent to their possible use at some unknown time in 

the future.”

¶ 74 We must determine whether the circuit court properly found that the parties intended, 

under the March 24 oral contract, to allow Karla to use the pre-embryos without such a 

limitation. Stated differently, was Karla’s right to use the pre-embryos for implantation 

without Jacob’s consent an additional “benefit” separate and independent from the parties’ 

agreement to create pre-embryos and one which the parties had not bargained for or 

contemplated when they mutually agreed to create the pre-embryos in the first place? Our 

review of the evidence is deferential, and even if this court “might have reached a different 

conclusion had it been the fact finder,” we will not disturb the trial court’s judgment unless it is 

“unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.” Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 214-15 

(1995). 

¶ 75 According to Jacob’s own testimony, he never communicated a desire to have any say in 

Karla’s future disposition of the pre-embryos; his only concern was to help her take the 

necessary steps to preserve her ability to create pre-embryos for that purpose. “The principal 
- 15 - 

objective in construing a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.” 

Village of South Elgin v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 348 Ill. App. 3d 929, 941 (2004). 

Such “ ‘[i]ntent’ refers to objective manifestations of intent in the words of the contract and the 

actions of the parties; it does not encompass one party’s secret, undisclosed intentions or 

purely subjective understandings of which the other party is unaware.” Id. “When a contract is 

ambiguous or silent on a disputed issue, a court may, in order to determine the intent of the 

parties at the time of contracting, consider the contemporaneous or subsequent acts of the 

parties to the contract.” Vole, Inc. v. Georgacopoulos, 181 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1021 (1989). 

¶ 76 Jacob suggests that the parties could not have reached an agreement to allow Karla to use 

the pre-embryos without his consent because the issue never entered his mind at the time he 

agreed to donate his sperm to help Karla create the pre-embryos. Jacob also argues that 

because the March 24 contract is silent on the issue of whether Karla has an unlimited and 

unqualified right to use the pre-embryos, it cannot be construed to reflect the parties’ mutual 

assent or intent to grant Karla such a right. Instead of conceding the possibility that the lack of 

such thought suggests that he never initially intended to limit Karla’s use of the pre-embryos, 

Jacob instead asserts that the court should honor the parties’ silence regarding any limitations. 

Specifically, he argues that the March 24 oral contract should be construed as an agreement 

confined solely to the donation of sperm and use of that sperm for the creation of pre-embryos. 

Under his proposed interpretation, the use of the couple’s pre-embryos would be subject to his 

control and consent, even though it is clear that neither party expected him to use the 

pre-embryos at any time. 

¶ 77 In response to Jacob’s argument, Karla points out that he has ignored the “overwhelming” 

evidence that they “agreed, understood and intended that the very purpose of their agreement 

was to provide Karla with the ability to have her own biological child in the future with the 

return of her health.” (Emphases in original.) Karla argues that Jacob now seeks to add a term 

to their oral contract that was not previously included or bargained for: namely, a right to 

withhold consent for transfer of the pre-embryos that would prevent Karla from using them to 

have a child. 

¶ 78 The record reveals several instances where Jacob could have voiced his alleged desire 

about wanting a right to consent to Karla’s use of the pre-embryos and, nevertheless, remained 

silent on the issue. The first instance was on March 24, the day he agreed to donate his sperm. 

Jacob testified that he did not inform Karla that his agreement to create pre-embryos was 

contingent on a right to withhold consent to her subsequent use of the pre-embryos. On March 

25, the very next day, Jacob told Dr. Klock that he wanted to help Karla have a child, but again 

failed to mention any reservation about her use of any resulting pre-embryos. Desai also 

recalled Jacob telling her he wanted Karla to use the pre-embryos to have a child and that she 

could use them in the event of their separation. On April 6, when Karla asked Jacob if she 

should fertilize all eight of her eggs, he agreed that she should, as opposed to reserving and 

cryopreserving some of the eggs–likely her last “fertile” ones–for insemination at some future 

date. Finally, even in the midst of their dispute over the pre-embryos, Jacob indicated, in his 

June 14 e-mail to Karla, that his consent to her use was unconditional: 

“When you asked me if I would be the donor for your emergent egg harvesting, I still 

have no reservations in my answer. If you desired to have the possibility of having a 

child in the future and I could be of help to you, I’d do it all over again.”
- 16 - 

¶ 79 Jacob’s contention also presupposes that Karla understood, on March 24, that he could 

have validly “withheld” consent or asserted a veto over her use of the pre-embryos under any 

circumstance that had not been expressly agreed upon by the parties. The circuit court rejected 

this assertion following its consideration of the evidence in the record, and we find no reason to 

disturb its findings. Under Jacob’s reasoning, any unexpressed contingency related to the 

storage or use of the cryopreserved pre-embryos would be subject to Jacob’s prior consent 

simply because he and Karla did not discuss it when they decided to undergo IVF. For 

example, he could challenge Karla’s right to use the pre-embryos because they never agreed to 

a duration term (e.g., an expiration period for use of the pre-embryos), a marital status 

condition (e.g., so long as neither of them was engaged or married at the time Karla sought to 

transfer the pre-embryos), or a transferee limitation (e.g., if Karla required the transfer of the 

pre-embryos to a gestational surrogate instead of to herself). This proposition would allow 

Jacob to limit Karla’s use of the pre-embryos each time a previously unidentified circumstance 

or contingency arose, essentially undermining the irrefutable purpose of the IVF and 

pre-embryo creation. 

¶ 80 Because “great weight should be given to the principal apparent purpose and intention of 

the parties at the time of contracting” (Vole, Inc., 181 Ill. App. 3d at 1020), we see no error in 

the circuit court’s finding that the parties intended to allow Karla to use the pre-embryos 

without limitation when they formed the March 24 contract. After considering the testimony 

and evidence presented at trial, the circuit court concluded that the parties understood that the 

purpose of creating the pre-embryos was to preserve Karla’s ostensibly last opportunity to 

have a biological child in the future, without conditions. “It is well settled that it is within the 

province of a trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be accorded 

their testimony, and to resolve inconsistencies and conflicts.” Goldenberg, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 

678. Here, the circuit court had the opportunity to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility 

of the witnesses at trial, and to resolve any inconsistencies and conflicts in the record. “Where 

the testimony of a witness is neither contradicted, either by positive testimony or by 

circumstances, nor inherently improbable, and the witness has not been impeached, that 

testimony cannot be disregarded by the trier of fact.” Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 215. 

¶ 81 We further find that the relief Jacob seeks–essentially, incorporating a limitation into the 

oral contract–would change the fundamental essence of the parties’ oral contract. “[A] court 

cannot alter, change or modify the existing terms of a contract or add new terms or conditions 

to which the parties do not appear to have assented, write into the contract something which the 

parties have omitted or take away something which the parties have included.” Gallagher v. 

Lenart, 367 Ill. App. 3d 293, 301 (2006), aff’d, 226 Ill. 2d 208 (2007) (citing 12A Ill. L. and 

Prac. Contracts § 233 (1983)). Jacob is seeking the addition of a new term that neither party 

agreed to. 

¶ 82 At trial, both Jacob and Karla testified that they never discussed whether Jacob’s consent 

would be needed to use the pre-embryos; Jacob himself admitted that the thought of placing 

limitations on Karla’s use of the pre-embryos “never crossed [his] mind.” A trier of fact could 

reasonably infer from this evidence–Jacob’s failure to express any reservation as to the 

creation or use of the pre-embryos–that he never intended to limit Karla’s use of the 

pre-embryos. 

¶ 83 “A presumption exists against provisions that easily could have been included in the 

contract but were not.” Id. Had Jacob wanted to preserve his ability to later veto Karla’s use of 
- 17 - 

the pre-embryos, the time for expressing that condition was when he accepted Karla’s offer. 

All he would have been required to say is: yes, he would donate his sperm, but that he wanted 

Karla to seek his consent before attempting to use any resulting pre-embryos to have a child. 

Jacob, however, remained silent on this issue, did not express any reservations to creating the 

pre-embryos, and told Karla that he wanted to help her have a child. Jacob had several 

additional opportunities to express his intent to impose a limitation, i.e., his veto authority, 

over Karla’s use of the pre-embryos, but kept silent that purported intention. Instead, he 

continually asserted only an interest in helping Karla become a mother to genetic offspring. All 

of this suggests, as the circuit court found, that the parties never intended to limit Karla’s 

ability to use the pre-embryos to have a child. Under the circumstances, we find it contrary to 

the evidence that Karla would have given Jacob an arbitrary veto power over her dream of 

having a biological child. 

¶ 84 Lastly, Jacob takes issue with the court’s consideration of evidence that he asserts was 

“irrelevant” to the determination of whether the parties contemplated that Jacob’s consent was 

required for use of the pre-embryos. Specifically, he argues that it is irrelevant that: (i) he and 

Karla did not plan on being together in the future; (ii) he never told Karla his consent was 

required to use the pre-embryos; and (iii) he “supposedly” left it up to Karla to decide what to 

do with the pre-embryos in his email dated June 14, 2010 (“I know that I must make a choice in 

this and choose to leave it up to you ultimately to decide Karla.”). 

¶ 85 It is not apparent from Jacob’s argument whether he is challenging the admissibility of the 

evidence or merely asserting that it offered no probative value at trial. Any challenge to the 

admissibility of the evidence has been forfeited because he made no objections to the evidence 

at trial. See Young v. Alden Gardens of Waterford, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 131887, ¶ 71 

(Failure to raise or renew an objection during the trial “results in forfeiture of the ability to 

challenge the trial court’s consideration of that evidence.”). Furthermore, “[e]videntiary 

rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reserved absent an 

abuse of that discretion.” Williams v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 121901, ¶ 43 (citing 

People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001)). Reversal of an evidentiary ruling is only 

appropriate if the ruling was “fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable 

person would take the same view.” Id. Here, we find no error or abuse of discretion. 

Alternatively, if Jacob is asserting that the court should not have considered the evidence 

because it offered no probative value, this argument lacks merit. The trial judge is in “the best 

position to evaluate the relevance of the evidence” (Holston v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. 

Francis, 165 Ill. 2d 150, 176 (1995)), and can properly discern the parties’ intent in an oral 

agreement from the circumstances surrounding the formation of a contract or from the conduct 

of the parties subsequent to its formation. Anastaplo v. Radford, 14 Ill. 2d 526, 537 (1958). 

¶ 86 The circuit court’s judgment will not be vacated unless it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not 

based on evidence. Eychaner, 202 Ill. 2d at 252. Because the circuit court’s judgment was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence, we conclude that the court properly ruled that 

Karla is entitled to use the pre-embryos to have a child, without limitation. 

¶ 87 March 25, 2010 Informed Consent 

¶ 88 The next issue is the legal effect of the Informed Consent that the parties signed on March 

25. The Informed Consent states, in relevant part: “Embryos are understood to be your 

property, with rights of survivorship. No use can be made of these embryos without the consent 
- 18 - 

of both partners (if applicable).” The parties each impart a different meaning to the language of 

this provision. 

¶ 89 The circuit court found that this provision did not contradict or modify the terms of the 

March 24 oral contract between the parties. Specifically, it stated as follows:

“Where two parties are involved, the form states that both must consent to the use 

of the embryos. The form, however, specifically contemplates that another agreement 

between the parties may govern the future disposition of the embryos. A provision 

encourages the parties to seek an attorney to advise them on concerns about the future 

status or disposition of the embryos. The form states Northwestern will abide by any 

agreement reached between the parties. In this case, Karla and Jacob have a previous 

oral agreement which is not contradicted or modified by any language in the Informed 

Consent, or by anything else that happened between the parties. 

Accordingly, this Court finds that the consent language in Northwestern’s 

Informed Consent does not apply to Karla and Jacob under the facts in this case, and 

the March 24, 2010 oral agreement stands uncontradicted.”

¶ 90 Jacob contends that the circuit court erred in finding that this provision did not contradict or 

modify the parties’ oral contract of March 24. According to him, the Informed Consent 

represents a binding written agreement that limits his and Karla’s rights to use the 

pre-embryos. He argues that by signing the Informed Consent on March 25, he, Karla, and 

Northwestern agreed that any use of the pre-embryos is subject to both Jacob’s and Karla’s 

prior consent. 

¶ 91 Karla argues that she never agreed to limit her right to use the pre-embryos when she 

signed the Informed Consent on March 25. She further argues that the Informed Consent is not 

a “dispositional” agreement because it does not provide for a specific disposition of the 

pre-embryos in the event of the parties’ separation. She points out that the informed consents 

that have been considered by other jurisdictions in disputed embryo lawsuits are 

distinguishable from this one because they involved dispositional agreements that “specifically 

contemplate the circumstances in which the parties find themselves.”

¶ 92 Initially, we must address Karla’s argument that Jacob is barred from seeking relief under 

the Informed Consent because he failed to plead an action to enforce it in his complaint and, in 

fact, expressly disavowed a contractual relationship between the parties. In his complaint, 

Jacob alleged that the parties “consented individually to a battery of medical tests in the 

process of the creation of said Pre-Embryos, free of any contractual agreement concerning the 

future use, custodial ownership and or final disposition of said Pre-Embryos.” (Emphasis 

added.) In her pretrial memorandum, Karla mentioned Jacob’s failure to bring a claim for 

enforcement of the Informed Consent. However, she never filed a motion objecting to his 

pleading at any time before, during or after the trial. 735 ILCS 5/2-615(a) (West 2012) (noting 

that “[a]ll objections to pleadings shall be raised by motion”); see also 735 ILCS 5/2-612(c) 

(West 2012) (“[a]ll defects in pleadings, either in form or substance, not objected to in the trial 

court are waived”). Under the circumstances, she has forfeited her objection to Jacob’s failure 

to state a claim based on the Informed Consent. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615(a) (West 2012). 

¶ 93 Turning to the merits of the dispute, we must consider two separate issues: (1) whether the 

Informed Consent constitutes an “advance agreement” under Szafranski I; and (2) whether its 

terms contradicted or modified the dispositional agreement reached by the parties on March 

24. 
- 19 - 

¶ 94 While the circuit court did not directly reach the issue of whether the Informed Consent 

constituted an advance agreement as to disposition of pre-embryos under Szafranski I, it did 

find that “the consent language in Northwestern’s Informed Consent does not apply to Karla 

and Jacob under the facts in this case.” In doing so, the court found that the Informed Consent

also required Northwestern to “abide by any agreement reached between the parties” and that 

Karla and Jacob had reached an agreement on March 24 that did not conflict with the Informed 

Consent. Accordingly, under the terms of the Informed Consent, any use of the pre-embryos 

would be governed by the parties’ March 24 contract. This conclusion is supported by the 

evidence. It is undisputed that Jacob and Karla entered into an enforceable contract on March 

24, the day before they signed the Informed Consent. It is also undisputed that neither of the 

parties contemplated a limitation on Karla’s use of the pre-embryos at any time prior to their 

separation. Absent evidence of any other agreement between the parties, the March 24 contract 

is controlling. 

¶ 95 We further agree with the circuit court that the terms of the Informed Consent in this case 

neither modified nor contradicted the parties’ oral agreement of March 24. The construction of 

a contract presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 

2d 208, 219 (2007). “In order to construe the legal nature of the writing, it is necessary to 

consider it in the light of the circumstances under which it was created.” Whitelaw v. Brady, 3 

Ill. 2d 583, 586 (1954). “The primary objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the 

intent of the parties.” Gallagher, 226 Ill. 2d at 232. A contract must be construed as a whole, 

viewing each part in light of the others. Id. at 233. “The intent of the parties is not to be 

gathered from detached portions of a contract or from any clause or provision standing by 

itself.” Id. See also A. Epstein & Sons International, Inc. v. Eppstein Uhen Architects, Inc., 408 

Ill. App. 3d 714, 720 (2011) (“An instrument’s legal effect is not ‘to be determined by the label 

which it bears or the technical terms it contains.’ [Citation.] Rather, it is the intention of the 

parties that governs.” (quoting Bonde v. Weber, 6 Ill. 2d 365, 377 (1955))).

¶ 96 The Informed Consent in this case contemplated the parties reaching a separate agreement 

as to disposition and did not contain any language that would override the parties’ prior 

agreement. The Informed Consent simply provided that Northwestern would refrain from 

taking any action with the pre-embryos unless the parties both consented to such action. 

Significantly, the provision requiring both parties to consent to use of the pre-embryos does not 

bar a situation in which the parties have reached an advance agreement–oral or 

written–concerning disposition. The Informed Consent merely advised the parties that 

Northwestern had no legal right to use or dispose of the pre-embryos in any manner that either 

Jacob or Karla would find objectionable. In other words, Northwestern was legally prohibited 

from doing anything with the pre-embryos (so long as the cryopreservation fee was paid every 

year) unless there was evidence of consent to such action from both Jacob and Karla. The 

circuit court concluded that the parties mutually consented to a disposition by the latter: the 

court found that the parties entered into an enforceable oral contract whereby Jacob would 

donate sperm for Karla to create a pre-embryo so that Karla, at her sole discretion and without 

limitation, could use the pre-embryos to become the mother of a child who shared her DNA. 

¶ 97 Our opinion in Szafranski I emphasized the importance of honoring advance agreements 

between IVF participants. Central to our holding in that case was the idea that advance 

agreements allow parties to settle their rights and obligations before an issue over rights or 

obligations arise. Here, the parties have reached a binding oral contract concerning the use of 
- 20 - 

pre-embryos that, unless modified or contradicted, remained in full force and effect. See 

Schwinder v. Austin Bank of Chicago, 348 Ill. App. 3d 461, 469 (2004) (noting that a 

“modified contract is regarded as creating a new single contract consisting of so many of the 

terms of the prior contract as the parties have not agreed to change, in addition to the new terms 

on which they have agreed”). We find no language in the Informed Consent that would 

override Jacob and Karla’s prior oral contract wherein the parties consented to Karla using the 

pre-embryos at her discretion to have a biological child. Therefore, in accordance with 

Szafranski I, we hold that the March 24 oral agreement is controlling as to disposition. 

¶ 98 We disagree with Jacob’s argument that the language of the Informed Consent, and 

specifically the consent provision, sets forth the parties’ intended disposition in the case of 

their separation and thus modifies their prior agreement. When viewed in the context of the 

entire Informed Consent, it is clear that the consent provision merely sets forth Northwestern’s 

policy as to its patients. The Informed Consent initially advises patients that “it is important 

*** for you to decide what should be done with any of your cryopreserved embryos” in the 

event of separation. (Emphasis added.) It then contains the following form language: 

“Embryos are understood to be your property, with rights of survivorship. No use can be made 

of these embryos without the consent of both partners (if applicable).” Immediately thereafter, 

the Informed Consent identifies three events that would require a decision as to disposition: (1) 

divorce or dissolution of the marriage or partnership; (2) death or legal incapacitation of one 

partner; and (3) death or legal incapacitation of both partners. With respect to those situations, 

the Informed Consent provides what will happen to the pre-embryos. In the first situation, 

Northwestern will abide by the terms of a court decree or settlement agreement. In the second 

situation, the other partner becomes the sole decision-maker regarding the pre-embryos. 

Finally, in the third situation, the pre-embryos become the property of Northwestern. 

Significantly, the Informed Consent does not state what will happen to pre-embryos in the 

event an unmarried couple separates. 

¶ 99 Jacob urges this court to construe the consent provision as an expression of the parties’ 

intent that neither of them could use the pre-embryos without the other’s consent in the event 

of separation. Under his proposed reading, the preprinted boilerplate inserted by Northwestern 

into the consent provision would govern the disposition of the pre-embryos such that Jacob 

could withhold his consent to Karla’s use at any time. This interpretation would run directly 

contrary to the language giving Jacob and Karla–not Northwestern–the right to decide the fate 

of their pre-embryos. Contrary to Jacob’s argument, the lack of any dispositional option in this 

provision is not evidence of an advance agreement to “reserve” his consent to the future use of 

the pre-embryos. Instead, it is evidence of the absence of any agreement in the Informed 

Consent regarding disposition upon the couple’s separation.

¶ 100 Jacob’s proposed reading of the consent provision also fails to consider that Northwestern 

has not specified what will happen in the event an unmarried couple separates. Northwestern 

specifically addressed how the couple’s pre-embryos will be disposed of in three different 

situations–divorce, death of one partner, and death of both partners–but, significantly, it did 

not address how their pre-embryos would be treated in the event that they separated. This can 

mean only one thing: that neither the couple nor Northwestern, in executing the Informed 

Consent, considered what would happen to the pre-embryos in that event. There is no doubt 

that Northwestern was aware of the possibility that an unmarried couple might separate; it 

expressly stated in the Informed Consent that it was important for the couple to decide what 
- 21 - 

would happen in that situation. It nonetheless remained silent as to what would happen to the 

couple’s pre-embryos if they separated, choosing instead to address what would happen in 

other specific situations. Under the circumstances, we can only interpret this as a purposeful 

omission. 

¶ 101 Finally, Jacob’s interpretation of the consent provision is inconsistent with the language of 

the consent provision itself. The consent provision begins with a statement written in the 

passive voice: “Embryos are understood to be your property, with rights of survivorship.” 

From the start, it is clear that the provision is phrased to state Northwestern’s policy with 

respect to its patients; that is, Northwestern understands that the embryos are “your,” i.e., Jacob 

and Karla’s, property. The consent provision serves as a mandate, not an option for election: 

“No use can be made of these embryos without the consent of both partners (if applicable).” If 

this provision was intended to be an expression of the parties’ dispositional intent, it would 

contain language more reflective of a choice (for example, in the event of our separation, “we” 

elect that neither party can use the pre-embryos without the other party’s express consent). In 

another provision of the Informed Consent the couple may elect a dispositional option from 

three choices in the event they both die or become legally incapacitated. There, the provision 

states, “I/we elect to: (please select and initial your choice),” and sets forth three dispositional 

options: thawing and discarding the embryos, donating the embryos for research, or donating 

the embryos to another couple. The disputed provision contains no such elective language or 

dispositional options. Given the language and context in which it appears, it cannot be fairly 

read as representative of the parties’ specific intent concerning disposition of the pre-embryos 

in the event of separation. 

¶ 102 We do not believe that the Informed Consent is ambiguous on the question of disposition in 

the event of the parties’ separation–there is no set disposition. However, even assuming 

arguendo that the document is ambiguous, we find that the extrinsic evidence also supports our 

interpretation that the parties never intended to be bound to a particular disposition in signing 

the document. See Cambridge Engineering, Inc. v. Mercury Partners 90 BI, Inc., 378 Ill. App. 

3d 437, 450-51 (2007) (court found language in an employment agreement unambiguous, but 

noted that even if the language was ambiguous, parol evidence supported its interpretation). 

When the language of a contract is susceptible to more than one meaning, and thus ambiguous, 

a court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent. Gallagher, 226 Ill. 2d at 

233. The intended meaning of ambiguous contract language may be derived from the 

circumstances surrounding the formation of a contract or from the conduct of the parties 

subsequent to its formation. Village of Northbrook v. Village of Glenview, 88 Ill. App. 3d 288, 

293 (1980). 

¶ 103 Here, the evidence suggested that the parties were told that they would both need to 

consent to any use of the pre-embryos because they were not married. Jacob, however, agreed 

that Dr. Kazer did not ask Karla or him what should happen to the pre-embryos in the event of 

their separation. He, in fact, agreed that Dr. Kazer encouraged them to consult with an attorney 

to resolve that particular issue. Dr. Kazer also confirmed that the Informed Consent does not 

necessarily document the parties’ wishes with respect to disposition of the pre-embryos. He 

testified that it is “more appropriate” for a couple “to get legal counsel to document their 

specific desires about disposition, and in particular, if they ultimately split up.” (Emphasis 

added.) Ultimately, neither the plain language of the Informed Consent nor the related extrinsic 
- 22 - 

evidence suggests that the parties agreed upon a particular disposition in the event of their 

separation. 

¶ 104 To rule in Jacob’s favor, this court would have to find that the March 25 Informed Consent 

constituted (1) a modification of the March 24 oral contract, or (2) evidence that Jacob never 

relinquished an implied right to veto Karla’s use of the pre-embryos when he entered the oral 

contract. As discussed, these propositions are defeated by the language used in the Informed 

Consent and the evidence presented at trial showing that any limitation on Karla’s use of the 

pre-embryos “never crossed [his] mind.” We therefore agree with the circuit court that the 

Informed Consent neither contradicted nor modified the parties’ March 24 oral contract.

¶ 105 We acknowledge that, in a number of cases from other jurisdictions, courts have found a 

couple’s dispositional intent to have been expressed in an IVF-related agreement: Kass v. 

Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); 

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. 

App. 2006); In re Marriage of Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). We note that, while it is not 

the case here, a medical informed consent could, under particular circumstances, represent an 

“advance agreement” that reflects a couple’s intended disposition of the pre-embryos. See 

Szafranski I, 2013 IL App (1st) 122975, ¶ 40. As discussed below, however, we find these 

cases distinguishable. 

¶ 106 In Kass, a case decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, a husband and wife who 

underwent IVF procedures signed four consent forms, one of which contained a section 

entitled “ ‘Disposition of Pre-Zygotes.’ ” Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176. This section provided in 

pertinent part: “ ‘Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any purpose 

without the written consent of both of us ***. In the event of divorce, we understand that legal 

ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be 

released as directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id.

The consent form allowed the couple to choose a preprinted option for disposition, and 

included a provision requiring the parties to specify its desired disposition “ ‘[i]n the event that 

[they] no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are unable to make a decision regarding the 

disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes.’ ” Id. The parties initialed the preprinted option 

to allow the “ ‘frozen pre-zygotes [to] be examined by the IVF Program for biological studies 

and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research investigation as determined by 

the IVF Program.’ ” Id. at 177. 

¶ 107 Later, during divorce proceedings, the wife sought sole custody of the pre-zygotes so she 

could use them for implantation. Id. The husband objected and asked the court to enforce the 

informed consent according to its terms, i.e., to donate the frozen pre-zygotes for IVF research. 

Id. The trial court awarded the wife custody of the pre-zygotes, but the appellate court later 

reversed, a plurality finding that the informed consent should control because it represented the 

couple’s agreement regarding disposition under the circumstances. Id. The Court of Appeals of 

New York upheld the appellate court’s ruling, finding that the parties had indicated their 

dispositional intent in their signed consents. Id. at 180. The court noted that “neither party 

disputes that [the consents] are an expression of their own intent regarding disposition of their 

pre-zygotes” and that neither “contest[ed] the legality of those agreements, or that they were 

freely and knowingly made.” Id. Notably, the court also observed: 

“The conclusion that emerges most strikingly from reviewing these consents as a 

whole is that appellant and respondent intended that disposition of the pre-zygotes was 
- 23 - 

to be their joint decision. *** Words of shared understanding–‘we,’ ‘us’ and 

‘our’–permeate the pages.” Id. at 181. 

¶ 108 The facts here are distinguishable. Unlike the informed consents that were at issue in Kass, 

the Informed Consent in this case provided no opportunity for Karla and Jacob to specify their 

choice on the disposition of the frozen pre-embryos in the event of their separation. Also, 

unlike the parties in Kass, Karla and Jacob dispute the legal effect of the Informed Consent and 

the impact, if any, that it had on their March 24 oral contract. We find Kass to be inapplicable.

¶ 109 In Marriage of Dahl, a case decided by the Court of Appeals of Oregon, a husband and 

wife reached an agreement on all matters in their marital dissolution action except for the 

disposition of six frozen pre-embryos created with the husband’s sperm and the wife’s eggs. 

Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d at 836. When undergoing IVF, the parties had signed an 

“Embryology Laboratory Specimen Storage Agreement” that set forth the terms for the storage 

of their pre-embryos. Id. The agreement allowed the couple to make their own choice 

regarding disposition, and provided that if the parties could not agree on a disposition, they 

would “ ‘designate the following [spouse] or other representative to have the sole and 

exclusive right to authorize and direct [the clinic] to transfer or dispose of the Embryos.’ ” 

Below this paragraph was a space provided which contained the wife’s printed name and the 

initials of her and her husband, indicating their approval of the disposition provision. Id. 

¶ 110 During the dissolution proceedings, the wife opposed donating the pre-embryos to another 

woman; the husband, on the other hand, wanted the pre-embryos donated to someone who was 

trying to conceive. Id. at 837. The trial court found that the terms of the storage agreement 

should control. Id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Oregon agreed that the storage 

agreement “evinced the parties’ intent” that the wife would decide the disposition of the 

pre-embryos in the event the parties could not agree on a disposition. Id. at 841. The court 

pointed out the fact that “the parties [had been] given choices when they entered the agreement 

on possible disposition of the embryos.” Id.

¶ 111 Marriage of Dahl ultimately bears more resemblance to Kass than to this case. The 

agreement in Marriage of Dahl, similar to the agreement in Kass, allowed the parties to 

affirmatively designate their dispositional intent in the event that there was a disagreement as 

to disposition. As we noted above in the context of our discussion of Kass, the Informed 

Consent in this case contains absolutely no place where the parties could have indicated a 

disposition in the event of their separation. This is important because Northwestern expressly 

states in the Informed Consent that it is the parties who should decide what is to happen to the 

pre-embryos in the event of their separation. We do not find Marriage of Dahl analogous to 

this case. 

¶ 112 In Roman, a case before the Court of Appeals of Texas, a husband and wife, in the process 

of divorce, reached an agreement on the distribution of their marital property, except for who 

would get frozen embryos created with the husband’s sperm and the wife’s eggs. Roman, 193 

S.W.3d at 43. The couple had executed a document prior to IVF entitled “ ‘Informed Consent 

for Cryopreservation of Embryos’ ” wherein they “chose to discard the embryos in case of 

divorce.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 42. A provision of the informed consent “allowed the 

parties to withdraw their consent to the disposition of the embryos.” Id. On appeal, however, 

the parties did not dispute that they did not withdraw their consent to the disposition when they 

filed for divorce. Id. at 52. 
- 24 - 

¶ 113 At trial, the husband sought to enforce the informed consent, specifically the term that 

provided for disposal of the frozen pre-embryos in the case of divorce. Id. at 43. The wife, on 

the other hand, wanted the pre-embryos implanted so that she could have a biological child. Id.

A doctor involved in the couple’s IVF procedure testified during the proceedings that “the 

purpose of the cryopreservation form was to determine the parties’ desires for the disposition 

of their embryos upon certain events such as divorce or death.” Id. at 53. The trial court 

awarded the remaining three frozen pre-embryos to the wife as part of a “just and right” 

division of community property. Id. at 43. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 

lower court should have enforced the informed consent provision requiring the frozen embryos 

to be discarded in the event of the parties’ divorce. Id. at 54-55. 

¶ 114 Roman, like the prior cases, is distinguishable in that the informed consent there allowed 

the parties to specify a disposition in the event of divorce. Furthermore, unlike here, the 

physician testified that the purpose of the informed consent was to establish the parties’ 

dispositional intent in the event of divorce. Here, Dr. Kazer testified that the Informed Consent 

did not necessarily document the parties’ wishes with respect to disposition of the pre-embryos 

and that it is “more appropriate” for a couple to have an attorney document their dispositional 

intent in the event that they split up. We find Roman distinguishable. 

¶ 115 The final case where a court has found a couple’s dispositional intent to have been 

expressed in an IVF-related agreement is Litowitz, a case decided by the Supreme Court of 

Washington. In Litowitz, a husband and wife disputed the proper disposition of pre-embryos 

created with the husband’s sperm and a third-party donor’s eggs. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 262, 264. 

During dissolution proceedings, the husband indicated that he wanted the frozen pre-embryos 

put up for adoption; the wife, however, wanted to implant the pre-embryos in a surrogate and 

bring them to term. Id. at 264. At the time of IVF, the couple entered into a contract with the 

IVF facility, entitled “consent and authorization for preembryo cryopreservation,” which 

provided in part “that any decision regarding the disposition of [the couple’s] pre-embryos will 

be made by mutual consent. In the event [the couple is] unable to reach a mutual decision 

regarding the disposition of our pre-embryos, [the couple] must petition to a Court of 

competent jurisdiction for instructions concerning the appropriate disposition of [the couple’s] 

pre-embryos.” Id. at 263. The parties chose to have their pre-embryos thawed and not allowed 

to undergo further development in the event the pre-embryos had been cryopreserved for over 

five years. Id. at 263-64. They agreed that their choice would be “ ‘binding upon [them] until 

such time as it [was] changed, in writing, by [their] joint direction.’ ” Id. at 264. 

¶ 116 The trial court awarded the pre-embryos to the husband based on the “ ‘best interest of the 

child.’ ” Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the contracts signed by the couple “did 

not require [the husband] to continue with their family plan to have another child and that [the 

husband’s] right not to procreate compelled the court to award the preembryos to him.” Id. at 

265. The Supreme Court of Washington ultimately concluded that it was “appropriate for the 

courts to determine disposition of the preembryos under the cryopreservation contract” given 

that the parties had “not reached a mutual decision regarding disposition.” Id. at 268. The court 

then turned to the cryopreservation contract and noted that more than five years had passed 

since the cryopreservation contract was signed by the parties. Id. at 268-69. The court held that 

if the remaining pre-embryos still existed, “they would be a proper subject for consideration by 

the court under the cryopreservation contract”; however, if the pre-embryos had been 
- 25 - 

destroyed, the issue would now be moot. Id. at 269. The court could not “reach that 

determination” in light of the limited record before it. Id. at 270. 

¶ 117 We find the instant case distinguishable from the foregoing cases that we referenced in 

Szafranski I, all of which involved the court’s enforcement of a specific, chosen disposition. 

Litowitz and the foregoing cases share one salient feature: they all involve married couples 

who signed forms allowing them to determine the disposition of their pre-embryos. Each of 

those cases are similar in that they all involved explicit language regarding the intended 

disposition of the pre-embryos in the event of a specific event. In other words, the consent 

forms in those decisions allowed the facilities to execute the pre-selected dispositional option 

without further consultation with the disputing parties. 

¶ 118 Jacob would have us interpret the boilerplate language used by Northwestern as an 

expression of the parties’ dispositional intent. It cannot be disputed, however, that the 

Informed Consent lacks any direction or expression of a “choice” concerning disposition of the 

pre-embryos in the event of the parties’ separation. Rather than informing Northwestern of the 

parties’ election of either donation, disposal, or transfer upon the couple’s separation, the 

Informed Consent simply prevents Northwestern from disposing of the pre-embryos in any 

manner without the parties’ consent. The March 24 agreement is evidence of that consent.

¶ 119 Because we agree with the circuit court’s finding that the Informed Consent neither 

contradicts nor modifies the March 24 oral agreement, we find no basis to reverse the circuit 

court’s ruling that Karla is entitled to control and custody of the pre-embryos. 

¶ 120 March 29, 2010 Draft Co-Parent Agreement 

¶ 121 For purposes of preserving her arguments on appeal, Karla contends that the circuit court 

erred in failing to enforce the Co-Parent Agreement that Desai drafted for the parties on March 

29, specifically, the provision granting Karla full custody and control of the pre-embryos. 

Jacob argues that the Co-Parent Agreement is unenforceable because he and Karla never 

discussed the draft document and neither party signed it. He further argues that the agreement 

is unenforceable under the statute of frauds since it cannot be performed within one year. 

¶ 122 Because we find that the March 24 oral contract sets forth the parties’ agreed upon 

disposition that Karla had the right to use the pre-embryos without Jacob’s consent and that the 

Informed Consent did not contradict or modify this right, we need not determine the 

enforceability of the Co-Parent Agreement. 

¶ 123 Balancing of the Interests 

¶ 124 In Szafranski I, we held that if the parties did not have an advance agreement concerning 

the disposition of the pre-embryos, the circuit court must then weigh the parties’ relative 

interests with respect to the pre-embryos. In reaching its judgment, the circuit court decided 

that while it did not need to address the parties’ arguments under a balancing-of-the-interests 

approach, it would do so for the benefit of providing a complete record on appeal. The circuit 

court considered the evidence at trial and found that “Karla’s desire to have a biological child, 

in the face of the impossibility of having one without using the embryos, outweighs Jacob’s 

privacy concerns, which are now moot, and his speculative concern that he might not find 

love.” We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that Karla is entitled to control of the 

pre-embryos under this test. 
- 26 - 

¶ 125 Although Jacob requests that we review the circuit court’s ruling on that issue under a 

de novo standard of review, we decline to do so. Questions of law are reviewed de novo while 

factual issues are reviewed under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. Samour, Inc. v. 

Board of Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 530, 542 (2007). Here, the evidence considered 

by the circuit court in balancing the parties’ interests was entirely factual in nature; the court 

conducted a fact-intensive inquiry into each party’s interest in using or preventing the use of 

the pre-embryos. Therefore, we will reverse only if the judgment is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. Goldenberg, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 679. 

¶ 126 In reviewing the interests of the parties, we observe that many of Jacob’s cited concerns 

were risks that both parties faced and knowingly accepted in agreeing to undergo IVF. Jacob 

testified that he does not want Karla to use the pre-embryos primarily because of the impact it 

would have on his other relationships. He testified that he has lost a love interest–undoubtedly 

referring to Ashley–because of the situation with Karla; that “a lot of people” think of him 

differently now; and that he is worried that no one will want to have a relationship with him 

knowing that he has fathered a child with Karla through IVF. Jacob feels as if he is being 

forced to have a child; he testified that he does not “want to be a father like this” and contends 

that he should not be forced to procreate with a woman whom he does not love. 

¶ 127 Karla, on the other hand, cannot have a biological child without using the pre-embryos. She 

suffered ovarian failure as a result of her chemotherapy treatment and cannot have a biological 

child without using the pre-embryos. Karla testified that she was “devastated” upon learning 

that she would lose her fertility and thought about how she wants to have a child “with part of” 

her father, who passed away when she was five years old. She maintains that she does not 

expect Jacob to support any child born from the pre-embryos. Before and throughout the IVF 

process, Karla relied on Jacob’s willingness to help her have a child. Following the retrieval, 

she relied on Jacob’s assent to fertilize all of her remaining eggs with his sperm, thereby 

foregoing the possibility of using an anonymous sperm donor. 

¶ 128 Having considered the testimony presented and the evidence under seal, we cannot say the 

circuit court’s ruling, that Karla’s interest in using the pre-embryos outweighs any interest 

Jacob has in preventing their use, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. At the heart 

of the evidence is an irrefutable fact: the sole purpose for using Jacob’s sperm to fertilize 

Karla’s last viable eggs was to preserve her ability to have a biological child in the future at 

some point after her chemotherapy treatment ended. The parties both recognized this when 

they agreed to create the pre-embryos together. 

¶ 129 We concur in the circuit court’s ruling that Karla’s interest in using the pre-embryos is 

paramount given her inability to have a biological child by any other means. See Reber v. 

Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (balancing of the interests favored wife where 

the pre-embryos were her only opportunity to have a biological child); see also Davis v. Davis, 

842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that the balance of interests would be more likely to 

favor wife “if she could not achieve parenthood by any other reasonable means”). Although 

Karla has other options for becoming a parent, there is no evidence that she could have a 

biological child other than by using the pre-embryos. We decline to make a judicial 

determination that alternative methods of parenthood offer Karla an acceptable substitute to 

biological parenthood. 

¶ 130 We also find no reason to disturb the circuit court’s determination that Jacob’s concern 

about not finding love in the future is “speculative.” Moreover, his privacy concern is largely 
- 27 - 

moot now as a result of the very public nature of this case. The record lacks evidence from 

which a trier of fact may reasonably infer that Jacob’s act–agreeing to help a friend threatened 

with infertility save her last chance to have a biological child–would be considered 

irreconcilable or repugnant by all future romantic prospects. It seems that Jacob’s regrets about 

his role in creating the pre-embryos developed roots at the same time that some of his friends 

and family members voiced their disapproval. This was evident from Jacob’s and Ashley’s 

testimony, which revealed the strain on their relationship that resulted from Karla’s desire to 

use the pre-embryos. In his effort to save this relationship, he had to conceal his subsequent 

attempts to resolve the dispute. We do not discount this evidence in any way. However, 

without diminishing Jacob’s valid concern that some may hold him in a negative light for 

agreeing to donate his sperm to a woman he never intended to marry and with whom he had no 

future, we will not give weight to the judgments of those who have no direct interest in this 

controversy. 

¶ 131 Our opinion should not be read to minimize Jacob’s concerns about becoming the 

biological father of a child born under these circumstances. We recognize the far-reaching 

consequences of the decision that Jacob made, in a short amount of time and under exigent 

circumstances, when he agreed to assist Karla in her IVF procedure. Jacob’s lack of hesitation 

in agreeing to help her create the pre-embryos was noteworthy and uncommonly selfless, so 

much so that Karla herself stated, even after the dispute arose, that she believed Jacob to be 

“this angel that was put in [her] life to help [her] through this.” Jacob’s interests in not using 

the pre-embryos and keeping them frozen, indefinitely, are valid and not insubstantial. Under 

the unique circumstances in this case, however, Karla’s interests in using the pre-embryos to 

have a biologically related child–given her ovarian failure and inability to create any more 

pre-embryos with her own eggs, prevail over Jacob’s interests in not using them.

¶ 132 Finally, we must acknowledge the remaining elephant in the room–Jacob’s concern that he 

could be financially responsible for any child resulting from the pre-embryos. This issue has 

not been squarely presented for our disposition, and because we cannot render an advisory 

opinion, we make no findings on the matter. We note only that this decision should not be 

construed as a ruling on Jacob’s legal status under any applicable parentage or child support 

statutes. We see no basis in the record why Jacob would be precluded from seeking a legal 

declaration of his parental status. See 750 ILCS 40/3(b) (West 2012) (“The donor of semen 

provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the 

donor’s wife shall be treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby 

conceived.”)

¶ 133 Jacob’s Constitutional Claims

¶ 134 Jacob has renewed his arguments from the previous appeal so as to preserve them for 

further review. This includes his argument that he has a right not to be a parent under both the 

United States and Illinois Constitutions. To recall, Jacob maintains that “[t]he placement of the 

pre-embryo inside the woman’s body is equivalent to the act of intercourse.” He argues that 

while “IVF and pre-embryo cryopreservation are scientific and technological marvels[,] *** 

their splendor should not bedazzle the courts into overlooking th[is] basic equivalence.” We 

find no reason to depart from the holding in our prior decision or to question the reasoning 

contained therein. We thus reaffirm our prior ruling that there is “no constitutional obstacle to 

honoring an agreement regarding the disposition of pre-embryos, and where there has been no 
- 28 - 

advance agreement regarding the disposition of pre-embryos, then to balance the parties’ 

interests in the event of a dispute.” Szafranski I, 2013 IL App (1st) 122975, ¶ 44. 

¶ 135 Promissory Estoppel 

¶ 136 As a final matter, Karla has argued that, whether there was a contract or not, Jacob should 

be estopped from preventing her use of the pre-embryos. She argues that this court did not 

previously rule on whether promissory estoppel could be applied in the absence of an 

enforceable contract between the parties and that “there is nothing preventing [her] from 

relying upon this theory.” In Szafranski I, we adopted a hybrid contract approach for resolving 

disputes over the disposition of pre-embryos. Under this approach, “ ‘[a]greements between 

progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be 

presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.’ ” Id. ¶ 40 (quoting 

Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998)). 

¶ 137 Our adherence to the contract approach necessarily precludes us from reaching the merits 

of a promissory estoppel claim. That is not to suggest, however, that factual considerations 

relevant to promissory estoppel may not be considered by a court in a dispute over the 

disposition of pre-embryos. To the contrary, we believe that where there has been no advance 

agreement between the parties, such considerations may be weighed by the court in 

determining the parties’ respective interests in using or not using the pre-embryos. See id. ¶ 42. 

We merely decline to expand our previous ruling to resolve the present dispute under a theory 

of promissory estoppel based on the facts and circumstances in this case. 

¶ 138 CONCLUSION 

¶ 139 For the reasons stated, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook County granting 

defendant, Karla Dunston, sole custody and control of the disputed pre-embryos. 

¶ 140 Affirmed. 

¶ 141 JUSTICE HARRIS, dissenting. 

¶ 142 The majority’s ruling affirms the trial court’s determination that Karla and Jacob had an 

enforceable oral agreement, formed on March 24, 2010, to allow Karla to use the pre-embryos 

without qualification. The manifest weight of the evidence is contrary, therefore I do not agree 

that the parties entered into such an oral agreement and I respectfully dissent. 

¶ 143 “The principles of contract state that in order for a valid contract to be formed, an ‘offer 

must be so definite as to its material terms or require such definite terms in the acceptance that 

the promises and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain.’ ” 

Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever, 144 Ill. 2d 24, 29 (1991) (quoting 1 Samuel 

Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts §§ 38 to 48 (3d ed. 1957), and 1 Arthur Linton 

Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§ 95 to 100 (1963)). Therefore, one element “essential to the 

formation of a contract is a manifestation of agreement or mutual assent by the parties” to its 

material terms. Trittipo v. O’Brien, 204 Ill. App. 3d 662, 672 (1990). It follows that the failure 

of the parties to agree upon a material term indicates a lack of mutual assent and requires a 

finding here that no enforceable oral contract exists between the parties allowing Karla the 

exclusive use of the pre-embryos without qualification. 
- 29 - 

¶ 144 When parties agree to the process of in vitro fertilization, one material consideration is the 

disposition of the frozen pre-embryos in the event the parties are no longer together. As we 

discussed in our opinion in Szafranski v. Dunston, 2013 IL App (1st) 122975, ¶ 41 (Szafranski 

I), the nature of the in vitro fertilization process requires “serious discussions between the 

parties prior to participating in in vitro fertilization regarding their desires, intentions, and 

concerns.” Accordingly, the American Medical Association (AMA) has advised that the 

parties should be in agreement regarding “ ‘the disposition of frozen pre-embryos in the event 

of divorce or other changes in circumstances. Advance agreements can help ensure that the 

gamete providers undergo IVF and pre-embryo freezing after a full contemplation of the 

consequences ***.’ AMA Code of Medical Ethics Op. 2.141 (June 1994).” Id. In so stating, the 

AMA views the subject of pre-embryo disposition not only as significant to the in vitro

fertilization process, but also as a separate concern the parties need to address. 

¶ 145 Karla and Jacob testified that on March 24, 2010, they had a conversation wherein Karla 

made known her desire to have biological children and Jacob agreed to provide sperm for the 

in vitro fertilization procedure. They also agreed that they never discussed the disposition of 

the frozen pre-embryos if their relationship were to end. The parties agreed that they made the 

determination to proceed with the in vitro fertilization without much serious discussion of their 

desires, intentions, or concerns. Notwithstanding, the majority on appeal affirms the trial 

court’s finding that on March 24, 2010, the parties agreed to allow Karla use of the 

pre-embryos without qualification. 

¶ 146 Karla argues that since Jacob never placed limitations on her use of the pre-embryos, it was 

her understanding that he agreed to let her use them to have a biological child, without 

qualification. Jacob, however, argues that his silence on the subject of disposition merely 

reflected the fact that they never brought up or discussed the issue, and he testified that the 

subject did not even cross his mind at the time. All the testimonial evidence shows that on 

March 24, there was no meeting of the minds regarding the disposition of the frozen 

pre-embryos if the relationship were to end. See Trittipo, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 672 (“[w]hen it 

appears that the language used or the terms proposed are understood differently by the parties, 

there is no meeting of the minds and no contract exists between the parties”). The trial court’s 

finding that an enforceable contract on the disposition of the pre-embryos existed between 

Karla and Jacob, stemming from their March 24 conversation, is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. 

¶ 147 The trial court and the majority on appeal find persuasive Karla’s contention that by 

agreeing to donate his sperm to create embryos so that she may have biological children, Jacob 

agreed to Karla’s unconditional use of the embryos for that purpose in the future. However, as 

discussed above, the question of disposition of the frozen pre-embryos is a material and 

distinct one from the decision to undergo in vitro fertilization. Since there is no evidence that 

Karla and Jacob agreed on that essential term when they agreed to utilize the procedure on 

March 24, there can be no enforceable contract regarding the disposition of the frozen 

pre-embryos. 

¶ 148 The trial court and the majority on appeal also found that Karla prevails when applying the 

balancing of interests approach. However, this approach is not applicable here. We held in 

Szafranski I that courts are to apply the contractual approach to resolve disputes over the 

disposition of pre-embryos, and in the event the parties did not have an advance agreement 

regarding disposition, courts should apply the balancing interests approach. Szafranski I, 2013 
- 30 - 

IL App (1st) 122975, ¶ 42. However, that decision did not consider the effects of a consent 

form signed by the parties which expressly provides for mutual control over disposition of the 

embryos, as we have here. In fact, when discussing the balancing interests approach as applied 

by other jurisdictions, we noted that “none of these courts have awarded one party the right to 

implant pre-embryos in the face of a prior agreement stating that both parties’ consents were 

required to make use of the pre-embryos.” Id. ¶ 37. We acknowledged the parties’ arguments, 

including Jacob’s contention that the informed consent expressed their intent that the embryos 

not be used without both of their consents. We noted that the parties did not have the 

opportunity to present evidence in support of their positions in light of the contractual 

approach, and remanded the cause to the trial court “to apply the contractual approach to any

facts previously adduced and to any facts the parties wish to present on remand.” Id. ¶ 50. 

¶ 149 Upon consideration of the evidence presented by the parties on remand, including the 

signed consent form, I find that the informed consent controls here. The trial court found, and 

the majority agreed, that the consent form was not determinative of the issue because it 

contemplated that the parties would form a separate agreement as to the disposition of the 

pre-embryos. Working under the assumption that the parties agreed Karla should have 

unqualified control over the disposition, the trial court determined such an agreement took 

precedence over the informed consent. I, however, do not agree that the parties came to a prior 

oral agreement as to the disposition of the pre-embryos because no circumstantial or direct 

evidence supports that finding. 

¶ 150 Furthermore, Karla testified that in signing the informed consent she agreed to its terms. 

She also agreed to its terms as a matter of law because “a party to an agreement is charged with 

knowledge of and assent to the agreement signed.” Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 

135, 150 (2006). Karla thus agreed to the provision of the informed consent stating that “no use 

can be made of the embryos without the consent of both partners (if applicable).” Therefore, I 

believe the informed consent, signed by Karla and Jacob on March 25, 2010, one day after their 

conversation, controls. According to the plain and clear language of the informed consent, 

evidencing the intent of the parties, “[n]o use can be made of these embryos without the 

consent of both partners (if applicable).” Jacob does not give his consent for Karla to use the 

embryos. It follows that at this time, “[n]o use can be made of these embryos.”

¶ 151 The facts presented before us are indeed unfortunate, and I am mindful of the distressing 

position Karla would face in light of the determination in this dissent. However, I believe it is 

the obligation of this court to resolve the issue before us based on relevant, time-tested legal 

principles rather than standing contract law on its head because of genuine and understandable 

sympathy for the predicament of one of the parties. It is especially important in cases where the 

parties are contemplating issues with significant implications, such as creating and bringing a 

child into the world, that they make their intentions regarding material concerns clearly known 

and courts make a determination based on the parties’ clear intent rather than on evidence of 

intent that is nonexistent. For all the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent.