NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 22a0448n.06
Case No. 2 2

- 5206 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GARY ACCORD , individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. ANDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants, COCKE COUNTY, T ENNESSEE , Defendant

- Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
OPINION

B efore : SILER , NALBANDIAN, and READLER Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN , Circuit Judge. About two years after Gary Accord ’s plea bargain , he and putative class members filed suit against all 95 Tennessee counties

. Accord alleged that widespread

- county use of invalid charging instrumen ts led to void arrests , prosecutions , and judgments. The district court dismissed 94 counties from the suit for lack of standing, leaving only Cocke County. Having whittled the case down, the court considered the County ’s argument that Accord’s suit was untimely under T ennessee’s two applicable one - year statutes of limitations. The court agreed and dismissed his suit, holding that Accord’s allegedly void judgment did not negate the statute s of limitations and that he cannot bring a direct constitutio nal challenge on top of his § 1983 claim. For the same reasons, we AFFIRM.No. 22

- 5206, Accord v. Anderson County, et al.

Page 2 of 10 I. On June 29, 2018, a h ighway p atrolman stopped Gary Accord in Cocke County , Tennessee for driving with “no headlight.” ( R. 98

- 1 , Accord Citation , at 1 ) But the stop didn’t end with a blown headlight

. Accord admit t ed to taking the opioid “ H ydrocodone” earlier that day , and he did “poorly” on the patrolman’s drug test. ( I d. ) As a result, the patrolman arrested Accord for d riving under the i nfluence and transported h im to c ounty jail

. Rather than obtaining a n arrest warrant , the patrolman filed a complaint

- affidavit called the

“ Uniform Citation Form/Affidavit of Complaint

. ” ( R. 1 , Original Complaint, a t 8 ¶ 6. ) And t he
State later prosecuted Accord using th at same form

. O n December 3 , 2018, Accord and the County struck a plea deal. Under the terms, t he County’s General Sessions Court reduced Accord’s DUI charge to reckless endangerment and
sentenced him to 11 months and 29 days in jail , with a suspended sen tence. About two years later, o n February 1, 2021, Accord fil ed a class action complain t under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all 95 Tennessee count ies

— Cocke County included. Accord allege d that the official s from the General Sessions Court of Cocke County had not used a proper charging instrumen t or prepared and signed a n arrest warrant

. H e argue d that his charging f orm d id not provide formal notice of an offense or compl y with Tennessee ’s criminal procedural rules

. And he reason ed that the f

orm invalidat es his criminal proceedings

. Accord alleged that his experience was not unusual. He contended, on behalf of a class, that every General Sessions Court in T ennessee fail s to use proper charging instruments

— a practice he says violate s the United States Constitution, as well as Tennessee law

. He laterNo. 22

- 5206, Accord v. Anderson County, et al.

Page 3 of 10 amended his complaint , still alleg ing Fourth, Sixth , and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a state

- law claim for false light invasion of privacy. With 95 counties joined to the class action suit, the district court ruled on a slew of motions. Most relevant among them, the court dismissed 94 of the counties for lack of standing. Only Cocke
Co unty remained. The court then granted the County’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion with prejudice. The court

reason ed that the applicable statute of limitation s barred Accord’s claims. And the court rejected Accord’s argument that he could assert direct constitutional claims along with his § 1983 claims

. Because the statute of limitations barred the suit, the court decline d to consider the County’s other bases for dismissa l

. Accord timely appealed

. II. We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo

. Kenjoh Outdoor, LLC v. Marchbanks , 23 F.4th 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2022)

. He re, the court based its dismissal on Tennessee’s statute s of limitations. W hen t he complaint’s allegations make out a time

- barred claim , “ dismissing the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp. , 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012)

. More g enerally, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion , the complaint
must “ contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ( citation and quotation marks omitted)

. A facially plausible claim allows courts “to draw the reasonable inference that the d efendant is liable for t he misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). And “ we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to ” Accord, “ accept [ ing ] all well

- pleaded allegations ” as true and drawing allNo. 22

- 5206, Accord v. Anderson County, et al.

Page 4 of 10 reasonable inferences in his favor. Keene G rp., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati , 998 F.3d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 2021)

. III. We first address whether Tennessee’s two applicable one - year statute s of limitations barred Accord’s § 1983 and state

- law claim s. They did. T he d istrict c ourt correctly held that the statute s of limitations barred each of his c laim s . Accord’s federal claims are subject to a one

- year statute of limitations. For § 1983 claims ,
we appl y the statute of limitations in the state “ where the cause of action origi nated

. ” Hall v. Spencer County , 583 F.3d 930, 933 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Owens v. Okure , 488 U.S. 235, 249

– 50 (1989)). Tennessee law provides a one - year time limit for actions brought under federal civil rights
statutes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 8

- 3

- 104 ( a ) (1)(B)

. Accord’s state

- tort claim also face s a one - year statute of limitations

. The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act provides that “ the action must be commenced w ithin twelve (12) months after the cause of action arises. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29

- 20

- 305(b). So Tennessee law require d Accord to bring his federal and state claim s within one year. That much is straightforward. T he harder question is when the clock started ticking

. Although state law provides the appropriate limitations period for § 1983 claims , federal law determines when that time starts to accrue. Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)

. C laim s normally accrue “when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Jordan v. Blount County , 885 F.3d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted)

. Under what some call our discovery rule , time starts for § 1983 claim s when a “ plaintiff discovers, or in the ex ercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, both his injury and the responsible party.” Hall , 583 F.3d at 933 (citationNo. 22

- 5206, Accord v. Anderson County, et al.

Page 5 of 10 omitted). Under an objective standard, w e must ask , “ [ W ] hat event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her rights [ ? ] ” Roberson v. Tennessee , 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005) ( quot ation omitted)

. Tennessee tort claims accrue similarly . Time starts “when the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should know that an injury has been sustained as a result of wrongful or tortious conduct by the defendant.” Gibson v. Trant , 58 S.W.3d 103, 117 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting John Kohl & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing , 977 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn. 1998)).
T he statutes of limitations bar Accord’s claims. W e have two dates to choose from : Accord ’s arrest on June 29, 2018 , and his plea deal on December 3, 2018

. Yet i t doesn’t matter
which one we choose

. Accord did not sue until February 1, 2021

— more than two years after his plea deal. So, even under his best

- case scenario, he filed over a year too late. Thus, Tennessee law bars his federal and state

- law claims. Accord , not surprisingly, resists this conclusion. H e asserts that the County never had subject

- matter jurisdiction over hi s case because he never received a proper charging instrument

. And that faulty instrument led t o a wrongful prosecution and due process violat ions. Although
t hese look like merits arguments , what Accord contends is that statute s of limitations don ’ t apply to void

- ab

- initio cases , like his

. 1 He reasons that the limitations only bar an action when a prosecution b egins

. So, the argument goes, because he had a void prosecution , the clock never started ticking

. Accord leaves

1 A void

- ab

- initio judgment includes one that is “rendered in violation of due process.” World

Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). A court would make such judgment “without legal authority,” which creat es a legal nullity that has no effect. In re Hamilton , 540 F.3d 367, 373

– 74 (6th Cir. 2008).No. 22

- 5206, Accord v. Anderson County, et al.

Page 6 of 10 us with two options: either we allow plaintiffs with allegedly void ar rest warrants and prosecutions to bring § 1983 claims forever, or we treat the claims like we normally do, accruing time from the day plaintiffs discover their injur ies . We choose the latter. A nd for good reason. The logic of applying Accord’s void

- ab

- i nitio argument to the § 1983 context is fundamentally flawed. His voi d

- ab

- initio argument is , at its core , a procedural

- due

- process challenge. H e says that his “void” prosecution stems from a lack of due process

— that he didn’t get adequate notice. He then asks us to disregard the statute of limitations because of his due

process violation. But we decline to carve an exception out from the statute

- of

- limitations requirement simply because a party alleges a due

- process deficiency. Such deficiencies are a feature, not a bug, of many § 1983 claim s . To even proceed on a procedural

- due

- process claim , parties must generally allege what Accord did : that a wrongful
process led to an invalid result. See Wedgewood Ltd. P’ship I v. Twp. o f Liberty , 610 F.3d 340, 349 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring parties to prove that the state did not afford “ adequate procedural rights ” before depriving them of a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment ’s Due Proce ss Clause ). So logically applying Accord’s “void ab init i o” argument would require us to apply a statute

- of

- limitations exception to other procedural

- due

- process claims

. But w e’ve never identified such a broad exception to procedural

- due

- process cases un der § 1983. And we decline to do so now.
P arties alleging procedural

- due

- process errors must still meet the statute of limitations.
See , e.g. , McNamara v. City of Rittman , 473 F.3d 633, 63 8

– 3 9 (6th Cir. 2007) (barring procedural

due

- process claims against a city’s past violations ) ; Printup v. Dir., Ohio Dep ’ t of Job & Fam.No. 22

- 5206, Accord v. Anderson County, et al.

Page 7 of 10 Servs. , 654 F. App ’ x 781, 78 7

– 8 8 (6th Cir. 2016) (affirming that the statute of limitations barred

a procedural

- due

- process claim )

. And our general discovery rule still applies to such actions. Accord responds with several lines of cases, but all prove inapposite. To be sure, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held in some situations that void judgments are not subject to statutes of limitations. Tur ner v. Turner determined that a mother whose parental rights had been terminated was not barred by the “reasonable time” filing requirement in Tennessee Rule 60.02. 473 S.W.3d 257, 268 (Tenn. 2015)

. The mother sought to challenge the original judgment as void eight years after it had been rendered. Id. at 264. The c ourt, following the majority of federal courts applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, held that “the reasonable time filing requirement does not apply to motions seeking relief from void judgments.” Id. at 278. Similarly,
in Edwards v. Allen , the c ourt held that a declaratory challenge to property

- use reclassification was not subject to a statute of limitations whe n the plaintiffs contended that the original reclassification was void ab initio. 216 S.W.3d 278, 292

– 93 (Tenn. 2007)

. And nearly all of Accord’s other cases stand for s imilar notion s . 2 But they don’t help his case

.

2 See S. Tacoma Way, LLC v. State , 233 P.3d 871 , 873

– 74 ( Wash. 2010) (voiding a property sale that violated statutory requirements) ; In re Sale of Real Est. by La ckawanna C n ty. Tax Claim Bureau , 255 A.3d 619, 634 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021) (voiding a judicial sale of property because a court of common pleas lacked jurisdiction); Autin v. Goetz , 524 S.W.3d 617, 629 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (noting that parties can challenge the enforcement of void protective orders that a court enters without subject matter jurisdiction) ; Poffenberger v. Goldstein , 776 A.2d 1037, 1042

– 43 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (quieting title because the recording of a deed did not provide adequate notice); I n re Adoption of Hatcher , 16 S.W.3d 792, 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing an attack on an adoption order entered by a court that lack ed subject matter jurisdiction) ; People ex rel. Vill. of Northbrook v. City of Highland Park , 342 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ill. App. 1976) ( concluding that the statute of limitations does not bar attacks on void annexation s of land) ; Paul v. L

. A

. C n ty. Flood Control Dist. , 37 Cal. App. 3d 265, 268, 27 5

– 7 6 (1974) (quieting title on a property that had a defective tax deed) ; Allen v. Hussey , 225 P.2d 674 , 68 4

– 8 5 ( Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (voiding an airport lease created in violation of a trust created by a statute)

.No. 22

- 5206, Accord v. Anderson County, et al.

Page 8 of 10 These courts allow parties to invalidate the void thing itself

. And Accord doesn’t want that

. Instead , he brings a § 1983 claim seeking monetary damages for a past injury. He does n ’ t seek to set aside a prior judgment as void per se. So his case is, as we discuss above, like any other civil rights suit seeking monetary damages. It would be a different matter if Accord was seekin g to invalidate or vacate his criminal conviction or perhaps even his plea agreement (though t hose challenge s would likely be more appropriate in state court). 3 True, Accord ’s damages claim hinges in large part on establishing that the process that led
to his conviction was flawed

— something that would overlap with what he would have to show to set aside the judgment entirely. But overlap isn’t enough. His claim is not for a void judgment. It’s for damages

. And Accord fails to cite any case that recog nizes the statute

- of

- limitations exception that he argues for here.

3 Accord relies on many state

- criminal

- law cases that use the void

- ab

- initio doctrine to invalidate prior judgments or dismiss cases . See State v. Ferrante , 269 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Tenn. 2008) (barring Tennessee from prosecuting a defendant because of a void charging instrument) ; State v. Campbell , 641 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tenn. 1982) (denying a defendant’s motion t o dismiss a prosecution because Tennessee “cure [ d ] all defects emanating from the first arrest and charging procedure” by “obtain[ing] an indictment or presentment”) ; State v. Shell , 512 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016) (dismissing charges because an affidavit of complaint “did not evolve into an arrest warrant ” and did not “ commence the prosecution”) ; State v. Wilson , 6 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (affirming a dismissal of an invalid warrant) ; State v. Morgan , 598 S.W.2d 796, 79 7

– 98 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) (reversing a defendant’s conviction because of a void warrant) ; Myers v. State , 577 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (voiding a judgment because a city judge had no jurisdiction to entertain a defendant’s plea) ; State v. Grieco , No. E2015

– 01110

– CCA

– R3

– CD , 2017 WL 956345, at * 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2017) ( barring Tennessee from prosecuting a defendant because of a void charging instrument ) ; State v. Floyd , No. E2016

- 00260

- CCA

- R3

- CD, 2016 WL 4547370, at *2 (Tenn. Crim . App. Aug. 31, 2016) (reversing a DUI conviction because a county criminal court did not have jurisdiction from an invalid arrest warrant) ; Rivas v. McAllister , No. E2015

– 01506

– CCA

– R3

– HC, 2016 WL 853317, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2016) (denying a de fendant’s petition for habeas relief after finding his judgment valid) ; State v. Gastineau , No. W2004

- 02428

- CCA

- R3

- CD, 2005 WL 3447678, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2005) (requiring a warrant or citation to provide notice of a law violation before a co urt can find a defendant guilty)

.No. 22

- 5206, Accord v. Anderson County, et al.

Page 9 of 10 He last challenges the district court for relying on cases that don’t involve jurisdiction al challenges or void

- ab

- initio prosecutions. That critique is unavailing

. P recedent makes at least one thing clear: A state’s limitations period applies to all § 1983 case s within that state

. S ee Wallace , 549 U.S. at 387

. And the same limits appl y to his state

- law clai m . Seeing that Accord’s
void

- ab

- initio argument does not negate the l imitations on his claims , we hold his suit time

- barred

. IV. We next address whether Accord can bring a direct constitutional challenge against a municipality because he can no longer raise his time

- barred Monell claim

. He cannot. B inding precedent limits him to a § 1983 claim , even if h e can ’t succeed on the claim. Put simply, parties can no longer bring a direct constitutional action where § 1983 applies.
See , e.g. , Smith v. Kentucky , 36 F.4th 671, 674 (6th Cir. 2022) ; Demery v. City of Youngstown , 818 F.2d 1257, 1263 n.6 (6th Cir. 1987) (Guy, J., concurring)

. Indeed § 1983 provides the only

recourse for constitutional claims against a munic ipality like Cocke County

. See , e.g. , Warthman v. Genoa Twp. Bd. of Trustees , 549 F.3d 1055, 1062 (6th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that had an employee “sought relief pursuant to the Due Process Clause, she would have been required to do so through the vehicle of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim”) ; Thomas v. Shipka , 818 F.2d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 1987) , vacated on other grounds , 872 F.2d 772 (1989). Otherwise, allowing Accord to imply a cause of action directly under the Constitution would “circumvent the applicable limitations period .

. . .” Smith , 36 F.4th at 676 (citing Thomas , 818 F.2d at 500). C ongress already provided the s tatutory recourse of “ equal effectiveness through which [ Accord ] could have vindicated [ his ] constitutional rights. ” Thomas , 818 F.2d at 500. And recognizing “a second direct constitutional claim with a different statute of limitations would runNo. 22

- 5206, Accord v. Anderson County, et al.

Page 10 of 10 contrary to the intent of the Supreme Court’s mandate” that each state select one statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims. Id. at 504 (citing Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) ). Our recent case, Smith v. Kentucky , confirms that § 1983 provide d Accord an exclusive chance at relief. 36 F.4th at 675

– 76 . There, the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs ’ § 1983 claim, so they resorted to seeking an implied action directly under the Constitution. Id. at 675. We rejected the argumen t then, just as we do now. Id. Accord had a year to bring a Monell claim , which he didn’t do . He missed his chance at his exclusive remedy. And Accord does not

— and
cannot

— cite one case that allows parties to choose between a Monell claim and a direct

c onstitutional challenge.
V. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of the County’s motion to dismiss.