alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lavonta JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6322

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 25, 2017

Lavonta Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Melissa Louise Rikard, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lavonta Jones seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will "not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner, satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Jones has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### ITUTUA, Plaintiff v. TUPUSE, Defendant

No. 3-1918

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [“Matai” title: “Salavea”]

November 26, 1919

A. M. NOBLE, *President of the High Court;*MOLIOO and LEAANA, *Associate Members*

JUDGMENT

This cause coming on to be heard before the High Court of American Samoa on the 26th day of November, 1919, before Judges A. M. Noble, President of the High Court, and Molioo and Leaana, Associate Members, and it appearing to the Court that at a former hearing of said cause on November 14th, 1919 the defendant was adjudged to be ineligible to register a “matai” title in American Samoa on account of non-residence, Section 46 of the *Codification,*and the cause was, on motion of defendant, consented to by plaintiff, continued until November 26th, 1919, in order that the true members of the Salavea family could hold a meeting to decide upon a holder of the title;

And it further appearing to the Court upon said cause coming on to be heard on the 26th day of November 1919, that all the members of the Salavea family had agreed that one of said family, to-wit, Muaguta, should register the *317“matai” name Salavea and hold the said title, with the exception of the plaintiff, Itutua;

It is therefore ordered, considered and adjudged by the Court, it being admitted by plaintiff that Muaguta is a true member of the Salavea family and that all the members of said family, himself excepted, desired the said Muaguta to hold the “matai” name Salavea, that the said Muaguta is entitled to register himself in the office of the Secretary of Native Affairs as SALAVEA-MUAGUTA.

It is further ordered, considered and adjudged by the Court that the costs of said action, to-wit, $30.00, be paid $15.00 by plaintiff and $15.00 by defendant.
#### David Belmonte TOVAR, Petitioner, *v.*IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 20885.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Nov. 30, 1966.

David C. Marcus, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

*1007Manuel L. Real, U. S. Atty., Dzintra I. Janavs, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., Steve Suffin, Atty. I.N.S., San Francisco, Cal., Joseph Sureck, Reg. Atty. I.N.S., San Pedro, Cal., Nicholas Katzenbaeh, Atty. Gen. of U. S., Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Civ. Div., Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before HAMLEY and ELY, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

A special inquiry officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service determined that David Belmonte Tovar is deportable under section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1964). However, the special inquiry officer then granted Tovar’s application for suspension of deportation under section 244(a) (2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (2) (1964). In granting this application, the officer first determined that Tovar was eligible for such relief and then exercised administrative discretion in granting it. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), held that the special inquiry officer erred in determining that Tovar was eligible for suspension of deportation, and on that ground denied the application for suspension of deportation. Tovar petitions this court to review the Board order.

Tovar was not eligible for such relief unless he was a person of good moral character within the meaning of section 244(a) (2). The special inquiry officer determined that Tovar was a person of good moral character notwithstanding the fact that he is a registered sex offender under section 647, subd. 5 of the Penal Code of the State of California, and was three times (1955, 1957, 1962), arrested by police officers patrolling public restrooms, and each time convicted for “vagrancy, lewd,” in violation of section 647, subd. 5.

 On this review, Tovar argues that the Board is without authority to review the special inquiry officer’s determination that Tovar is a person of good moral character and that, if the Board does have such authority, it reached an erroneous conclusion as to that matter.

We find no merit in either of these contentions, and therefore

Affirm.
Exhibit 99.2      Press Release


PRESS RELEASE
August 29, 2003

                                 For further information contact:
                                 David M. Bradley
                                 Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
                                 North Central Bancshares, Inc.
                                 825 Central Avenue
                                 Fort Dodge, Iowa 50501
                                 515-576-7531


                NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC. DECLARES DIVIDEND

David M. Bradley, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of North
Central Bancshares, Inc. (the "Company") announced today that the Company
declared a regular quarterly cash dividend of $0.21 per share on the Company's
common stock for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2003. The dividend will
be payable to all stockholders of record as of September 16, 2003 and will be
paid on October 7, 2003.

North Central Bancshares, Inc. serves north central and southeastern Iowa at 10
full service locations in Fort Dodge, Nevada, Ames, Burlington, Mount Pleasant,
Perry and Ankeny, Iowa through its wholly-owned subsidiary, First Federal
Savings Bank of Iowa, headquartered in Fort Dodge, Iowa. The Bank recently
opened its tenth branch office in Clive, Iowa. The Bank's deposits are insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Company's stock is traded on
The Nasdaq National Market under the symbol "FFFD".
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          21,626
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           1,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                44,900
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     12,921
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           104,078
<LOANS>                                        217,309
<ALLOWANCE>                                      3,799
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 437,961
<DEPOSITS>                                     373,220
<SHORT-TERM>                                    18,030
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,162
<LONG-TERM>                                      3,399
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        33,978
<OTHER-SE>                                       6,962
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 437,961
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  5,699
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,393
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 8,092
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               2,967
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<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  4,323
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,272
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         435
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       837
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .18
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                   10.62
<LOANS-NON>                                        823
<LOANS-PAST>                                       456
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 3,833
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      344
<RECOVERIES>                                        57
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                3,799
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<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
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</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**Certification of Chief Financial Officer pursuant to Rule** **13a-14(a) under the**

**Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended**

I, Reid Simpson, certify that: 

1.I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of eCollege.com; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2003 in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 

5.The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

b)any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: June 20, 2005 

| /s/ Reid Simpson   

Reid SimpsonChief Financial Officer

(principal financial officer) |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Todd MCGATHEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2480

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed December 6, 2017.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Hadda Forman, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[770 NYS2d 762]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed June 3, 2003, which, inter alia, ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

Claimant was employed by a temporary employment agency and was assigned to work in a physical therapist’s office as an office assistant. Claimant expressed concern to the employment agency and the client that she was not qualified to fulfill some of the insurance and billing requirements that the job required, and claimant accepted the position based upon assurances by the employer that training would be provided. Claimant resigned after approximately three weeks because she felt that she was not qualified for the job and the training promised by the employer was not forthcoming. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, denied claimant’s application for benefits upon the ground that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause. This appeal ensued.

*643Whether a claimant has good cause for leaving employment is a factual question for the Board to resolve *(see Matter of Luta [Commissioner of Labor],*305 AD2d 786, 787 [2003]). Here, neither the employment agency nor the client complained about claimant’s job performance, and the record establishes that continuing work was available. Inasmuch as “general dissatisfaction with working conditions, including the employer’s training procedures,” does not constitute good cause for leaving employment, substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision *(Matter of Chiofalo [Commissioner of Labor],*256 AD2d 687, 687 [1998]). Furthermore, notwithstanding claimant’s proffered excuse, there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that claimant made a willful false statement to obtain benefits when she indicated on her application for benefits that her employment ended due to lack of work, a statement which claimant knew to be false *(see e.g. Matter of Henrikson [Commissioner of Labor],*308 AD2d 654 [2003]).

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Mugglin, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. New York Trust Company, Appellant, against Mark Graves et al., Constituting the State Tax Commission, Respondents.

Argued April 14, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*787
      *Alfred A. Cook, Chester Rohrlich, Leo B. Kagan*and *Bernard Soman*for appellant.

*Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General (Henry S. Manley*and *Wendell P. Brown*of counsel), for respondents.

Order affirmed, without costs; no opinion.

Concur: Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Lehman, Ch. J., and Finch, J.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22
- 6578

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. JAMES ARTHUR JUDD , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. Terrence W. Boyle , District Judge. ( 5:18

- cr - 00119

- BO

- 1 ; 5:19

- cv - 00088

- BO )

Submitted : January 17, 2023 Decided: January 20, 2023

Before KING and THACKER , Circuit Judges , and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
James Arthur Judd , Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-6578 Doc: 5 Filed: 01/20/2023 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: James Arthur Judd seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 225 5 motion . The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)( B ). A certificate of appealability will n ot issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists c ould find the distr ict court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis , 137 S. Ct. 759, 773

- 74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruli ng is debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000))

. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Judd has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ad equately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED USCA4 Appeal: 22-6578 Doc: 5 Filed: 01/20/2023 Pg: 2 of 2
---

Exhibit 13.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Micromem Technologies
Inc. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the Fiscal Year Ended October 31, 2010
(the Report), I, Joseph Fuda, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, based on my knowledge, that:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                    
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.

|                        |                              
|----------------------- | -----------------------------
|Date: February 28, 2011 | /s/ Joseph Fuda              
|                        | Joseph Fuda                  
|                        | Chief Executive Officer      
|                        | (Principal executive officer)

---
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Annual Report of MDU Communications International, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2010, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 21, 2010 (the “Report”),
I, Carmen Ragusa, Jr., Vice President of Finance of the Company, hereby certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge: (1) the Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.




/s/  CARMEN
      RAGUSA, JR.Carmen
      Ragusa, Jr.Vice
      President of FinanceMDU
      Communications International, Inc.December
      21, 2010Totowa,
      New Jersey





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
and will be retained by MDU Communications International, Inc. and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.