SUMMARY

March 7, 2019

2019COA30

No. 16CA0750, People v. Gonzales — Evidence — Requirement 

of Authentication or Identification — Audio Recordings

In a case involving the submission of a voicemail as evidence, 

the division addresses the standards for authenticating an audio 

recording under CRE 901 and declines to follow People v. Baca, 

2015 COA 153, to the extent that it purports to establish an 

exclusive rule for the authentication of a voice recording. 

The division concludes that CRE 901, which governs the 

authentication of evidence in Colorado courts, requires a flexible, 

factual inquiry to determine under the facts of each case whether a 

reasonable jury could determine that the proffered evidence is what 

its proponent claims. The division states that, in making this 

determination, the trial court necessarily has broad discretion to 

consider a variety of factors and circumstances and must consider 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
all relevant circumstances that bear on whether a recording is what 

it purports to be.

Applying this analysis, the division concludes that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the contested 

voicemail.

The division also concludes that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in admitting a photograph of the defendant’s bare 

torso and arms that showed the defendant’s tattoos. 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA30

Court of Appeals No. 16CA0750

City and County of Denver District Court No. 15CR20002

Honorable Sheila A. Rappaport, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Daniel J. Gonzales,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE BERGER

Tow, J., concurs

Taubman, J., specially concurs

Announced March 7, 2019

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Melissa D. Allen, Assistant Attorney 

General, Colleen R. Wort, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Karen N. Taylor, Deputy State 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1

¶ 1 This case addresses the standards for authenticating an audio 

recording under CRE 901. Defendant, Daniel J. Gonzales, appeals 

his convictions for first degree murder with intent and after 

deliberation, first degree felony murder, abuse of a corpse, stalking,

arson, burglary, and aggravated robbery. He claims that the trial

court did not comply with the authentication rules prescribed by a 

division of this court in People v. Baca, 2015 COA 153, when it 

admitted a voicemail purportedly left by Gonzales for his murder 

victim. 

¶ 2 We reject Gonzales’s claim because, to the extent Baca

purports to establish an exclusive rule for the authentication of a 

voice recording, we decline to follow it. We also conclude that when 

the flexible principles of authentication set forth in CRE 901 are 

applied, the voicemail was properly authenticated. Finally, we

conclude that the trial court properly admitted a photograph 

depicting him shirtless, which exhibited two tattoos on his arms. 

Having rejected all of Gonzales’s claims on appeal, we affirm.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 The evidence admitted at trial, particularly the full confession 

Gonzales made to the police, established the following facts. 
2

Gonzales grew up down the street from the victim and from a young 

age was sexually attracted to the victim. When he was about 

eighteen, Gonzales and a friend broke into the victim’s house. The 

friend stole a TV and a VCR while Gonzales hunted for clues in the 

house that the victim was gay. Gonzales also stole some of the 

victim’s clothing.

¶ 4 Gonzales eventually moved away from the victim’s

neighborhood, but his interest in the victim did not disappear. 

Years later, Gonzales returned to the victim’s house, breaking in 

through the back door. After gaining entry, Gonzales grabbed a 

large knife from the kitchen and waited a substantial period of time

for the victim to return. When he did, Gonzales repeatedly stabbed 

him in the neck, killing him. Gonzales then sexually assaulted the 

victim’s dead body and attempted, unsuccessfully, to set the house 

on fire to destroy the evidence. Gonzales fled the scene with a 

credit card, debit card, and cash that he had taken from the 

victim’s wallet. He was arrested a short time later in Florida. 

¶ 5 At trial, the prosecution presented a video recording of 

Gonzales’s confession, as well as other evidence. The jury convicted 

Gonzales of all charges, the court sentenced him to life in prison 
3

without the possibility of parole plus forty-eight years, and he now 

appeals.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Admitted 

the Voicemail

¶ 6 Gonzales first argues that the trial court erred in admitting a 

voicemail allegedly left by Gonzales for the victim because the 

prosecution did not properly authenticate the recording of the 

voicemail under the test set out in Baca, ¶ 30.

¶ 7 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 

discretion. Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57, ¶ 13. A trial court abuses 

its discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or 

unfair, or if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law. 

People v. Hard, 2014 COA 132, ¶ 22. 

A. Additional Factual Background

¶ 8 After the police completed their crime scene analysis, the 

victim’s sister went to the house to put the victim’s affairs in order. 

She found a microcassette audiotape along with documents related 

to an earlier burglary of the victim’s house. On the tape, a man 

says that he has the victim’s pajamas and jeans. He also says that 

he is going to return those items to the victim, but not the other 
4

items that were stolen. The sister listened to the tape and, 

recognizing its value, gave it to the police. 

¶ 9 At trial, one of the detectives who had interviewed Gonzales 

after his arrest testified that he had also watched the video of that 

interview and had compared Gonzales’s voice in the interview to the 

voice on the tape. The detective testified that the voice on the tape 

sounded like Gonzales’s voice. On that basis, the prosecutor 

argued that the tape recording had been properly authenticated. 

Gonzales objected to the admission of the tape recording of the

voicemail on authentication grounds, but the trial court overruled

the objection.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 In Baca, a division of this court held that 

[i]f no witness with independent knowledge of 

the content of the [recording] can verify the 

accuracy of the recorded conversation, the 

proponent must instead present a witness who 

can verify the reliability of the recording 

process, by establishing the factors laid out in 

Alonzi: the competency of the recorder, the 

reliability of the recording system, the absence 

of any tampering with the recording, and the 

identification of the speakers.
5

Baca, ¶ 30 (citing Alonzi v. People, 198 Colo. 160, 163, 597 P.2d 

560, 562 (1979)). In so doing, the division appears to have 

established an exclusive rule, regardless of the factual 

circumstances presented, to authenticate an audio recording.1 

¶ 11 In devising its exclusive test for the authentication of an audio 

recording, the division relied on the Colorado Supreme Court’s 

Alonzi decision (and other authorities) that predated the supreme

court’s adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Baca, ¶¶ 26-28, 

30.

¶ 12 The Attorney General argues that Baca was wrongly decided 

and is inconsistent with the language and underlying purpose of 

CRE 901. To the extent that Baca holds that the only way an audio 

 ——————————————————————— 1 In People in Interest of M.V., 2018 COA 163, a different division of 

this court relied, in part, on People v. Baca, 2015 COA 153, to 

determine whether a video recording was authentic. 
6

recording can be authenticated is to meet one of the two

alternatives stated in Baca,2 we agree with the Attorney General.3

1. CRE 901 Does Not Prescribe Exclusive Tests for the 

Authentication of Evidence; Instead, CRE 901 Requires Trial 

Courts to Consider All the Circumstances Surrounding the 

Evidence

¶ 13 “The burden to authenticate ‘is not high — only a prima facie 

showing is required,’ and ‘a district court’s role is to serve as a 

gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has offered a 

satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find 

that the evidence is authentic.’” People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, 

 ——————————————————————— 2 Even if Baca’s holding is tethered to its specific facts — a jailhouse 

telephone recording offered by a defendant in a criminal case — it 

may be too broad. As the present case well illustrates, there will be 

innumerable factual situations that are impossible to anticipate in 

which the Baca test may prove too rigid. We cannot exclude the 

possibility that there will exist some factual circumstances that 

would provide sufficient authentication of a jailhouse recording 

without meeting the requirements of Baca. 3 Our holding creates a division split on this question. Unless and 

until the supreme court resolves the division conflict, the district 

courts may choose which of the conflicting decisions of the court of 

appeals to follow. See C.A.R. 35(e) (“Opinions designated for official 

publication must be followed as precedent by all lower court judges 

in the state of Colorado.”); see also People v. Valdez, 2014 COA 125, 

¶ 27 (stating that when the law is unsettled, in this case because of 

a split among divisions of the court of appeals, the trial court’s 

alleged error with respect to the law cannot constitute plain error).
7

¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 

2014)).

¶ 14 CRE 901, not common law decisions that predate the adoption 

of the Colorado Rules of Evidence, governs the authentication of 

evidence in Colorado courts. See People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 

374-75 (Colo. 2007) (The Colorado Rules of Evidence “govern the 

admissibility of expert testimony”; prior to the adoption of these 

rules, “admissibility of expert testimony was governed by common 

law.”). 

¶ 15 There is only one rule stated in CRE 901. “The requirement of 

authentication or identification as a condition precedent to 

admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding 

that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” CRE 

901(a). The balance of CRE 901 is a series of “illustrations,” not 

black-letter rules. Subsection (b) explicitly states that the examples 

given are “[b]y way of illustration only, and not by way of 

limitation.”

¶ 16 Notably, one such illustration states that “[i]dentification of a 

voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic 

transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice 
8

at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged 

speaker” is consistent with the authentication requirements in CRE 

901(a). CRE 901(b)(5). In our view, this illustration does not 

establish that a voice recording can always be authenticated by a 

voice identification alone.4 But this illustration, along with the 

others included in CRE 901(b), does demonstrate that the relevant 

considerations in authenticating a voice recording are not limited to 

those set out in Baca.

¶ 17 The Baca division relied heavily on a decision by the Colorado 

Supreme Court that predated the adoption of the Colorado Rules of 

Evidence. Baca, ¶¶ 26-27, 29 (citing Alonzi, 198 Colo. at 163, 597 

P.2d at 562). Alonzi, in turn, “note[d] with approval the test set out 

in United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1977),” which is 

similar to the test established in Baca. 198 Colo. at 163, 597 P.2d 

at 562. But, in a portion of Biggins not quoted by the supreme 

court in Alonzi (and not noted by the Baca division), the Fifth 

Circuit also stated, “[i]f the trial judge independently determines 

 ——————————————————————— 4 As we read Baca, for purposes of its first alternate authentication 

method, the identification of a voice alone is insufficient to 

authenticate a recording. 
9

that the recording accurately reproduces the auditory evidence, 

however, his discretion to admit the evidence is not to be sacrificed 

to a formalistic adherence to the standard we establish.” 551 F.2d 

at 67.

¶ 18 Moreover, there is a real question whether the portion of Alonzi

relied on by the Baca division was dictum. As stated by the 

supreme court, the precise question presented in Alonzi was 

whether the proponent of an audio recording was required to prove 

a chain of custody. Alonzi, 198 Colo. at 163, 597 P.2d at 562. The

supreme court held that a chain of custody was not always

required. Id. Having definitively answered the question raised by 

the appellant, the court nevertheless addressed other matters not

necessary to its decision. Id.

¶ 19 Even if the supreme court’s statements in Alonzi regarding the 

required methods to authenticate an electronic recording constitute 

a holding of the court, and not dictum, the source of authority for 

both Alonzi and the Colorado Rules of Evidence is the same — the 

Colorado Supreme Court. See Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21; Forma Sci., 

Inc. v. BioSera, Inc., 960 P.2d 108, 116 (Colo. 1998) (“The Colorado 

Rules of Evidence were adopted under this court’s rule-making 
10

powers articulated in the Colorado Constitution.”). When the 

Colorado Supreme Court exercises its constitutional authority and 

adopts a rule of procedure or evidence that conflicts with an earlier 

opinion of that court, the later precedent or rule controls, not the 

former. See Ramirez, 155 P.3d at 374-75.

¶ 20 Neither the language of CRE 901 nor its underlying purpose 

supports the prescription of two exclusive methods to authenticate 

a voice recording. As noted above, CRE 901 does not set forth any 

categorical or exclusive rules. To the contrary, the very structure of 

CRE 901 eschews such categorical rules. As a division of this court 

stated in Glover, ¶ 25 (quoting Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 639 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012)), in the context of authenticating records

from Facebook or another social networking website, “jurisdictions 

across the country have recognized that electronic evidence may be 

authenticated in a number of different ways consistent with Federal 

Rule 901 and its various state analogs.” 

¶ 21 We agree that CRE 901 contemplates a flexible, factual inquiry 

to determine under the facts of each case whether a reasonable jury 

could determine that the proffered evidence “is what its proponent 

claims.” Glover, ¶ 12. In making this determination, the trial court 
11

necessarily has broad discretion to consider a variety of factors and 

circumstances.

¶ 22 In some cases, under some circumstances, particularly when 

there is a colorable claim that a recording has been altered, the 

factors discussed in Baca may be highly pertinent to the 

authenticity determination. In other cases, the factors identified by 

Baca may be inapplicable or unnecessary. 

¶ 23 The deficiencies of such a categorical rule are illustrated by 

the facts in State v. Smith, 540 P.2d 424 (Wash. 1975). In that 

murder case, the victim took the precaution of carrying a tape 

recorder with him while keeping an appointment with the murderer. 

Id. at 426. During the victim’s autopsy, the authorities found the 

tape recording. Id. Despite the fact that the recording did not 

satisfy categorical common law rules for authentication similar to 

those adopted in Baca, the Washington Supreme Court held that 

the recording was admissible on the basis of scientific testimony 

and other evidence corroborating its accuracy and completeness. 

Id. at 429.

¶ 24 Or, take the hypothetical situation where a serial killer keeps 

an oral diary of his activities. After the killer’s arrest, the police find 
12

the oral diary in his residence. No recording equipment is found in 

the house. A police detective who has interviewed the killer testifies 

that the voice on the tape is that of the defendant. As we read

Baca, the diary would be inadmissible even though, under the

circumstances, the recording would be highly probative and reliable 

evidence of the crimes. 

¶ 25 Other courts, applying their versions of Fed. R. Evid. 901,

have rejected the common law standards typified by Alonzi, Biggins,

and Baca in favor of a more flexible approach.5 For example, the 

Michigan Supreme Court concluded that Michigan’s adoption of 

Fed. R. Evid. 901 abrogated the more specific common law 

reliability of recording process factors, in favor of a more flexible 

approach. People v. Berkey, 467 N.W.2d 6, 10-12 (Mich. 1991); see 

also Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65, 68-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) 

(en banc) (same, applying Texas equivalent of CRE 901); State v. 

 ——————————————————————— 5 When the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the Colorado Rules of 

Evidence, CRE 901 was substantively identical to Fed. R. Evid. 901. 

Thus, interpretations of Fed. R. Evid. 901 are highly persuasive in 

our interpretation of CRE 901. See People v. Short, 2018 COA 47, 

¶ 41. In 2011, many of the Federal Rules of Evidence were 

rewritten in more contemporary language, but no substantive 

changes were intended. Fed. R. Evid. 901 advisory committee’s 

note to 2011 amendments.
13

Jackson, 54 P.3d 739, 742-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)

(acknowledging reliability of recording process factors but holding 

that those factors are not the exclusive determinants of 

authenticity).

¶ 26 As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “[p]rivate use of recording 

equipment has become widespread,” and therefore specific factors 

relating to the reliability of the recording process “should be applied 

in a practical light to assure the reliability of the recorded material,”

rather than in a “mechanical or wooden” manner. United States v. 

O’Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1420 (8th Cir. 1988). The same court 

noted that recordings discovered by the police should not “be 

subject to the same requirements [that courts] apply when a 

government agent or informant initiates a conversation knowing 

that it is to be recorded.” Id.; see also Angleton, 971 S.W.2d at 68 

(“[T]he government does not have to prove when, where, how, and 

by whom tape recordings were made, when those recordings were 

recovered from the defendant or an alleged co-defendant, were not 

created as a result of government involvement, were not tampered 

with, and the defendant is identified as a speaker on the tape.”).
14

¶ 27 Similarly, authoritative treatises addressing Fed. R. Evid. 901

have recognized that the rule establishes flexible procedures for 

determining the authenticity of an electronic recording. See, e.g., 8 

Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 901:5,

Westlaw (8th ed. database updated Nov. 2018) (“The specific 

requirements for authentication of sound recordings vary depending 

upon the circumstances.”); 5 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 

Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 9:14, Westlaw (4th ed. database 

updated July 2018) (“[M]ost courts refuse to be pinned down to the 

[common law] approach and favor greater flexibility in assessing 

authenticity of recorded evidence.”); 31 Charles A. Wright & Victor 

J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 7110, Westlaw (1st ed. 

database updated Nov. 2018) (“[I]n the case of telephone 

communications the trier of fact undoubtedly is familiar with the 

device and well aware of the potential for problems, thus alleviating 

the need for a detailed foundation.”).6

 ——————————————————————— 6 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 216 n.29, Westlaw 

(7th ed. database updated June 2016), describes strict rules similar 

to the ones adopted in Baca, but then refers to People v. Sangster, 8 

N.E.3d 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) “[f]or an example of a more relaxed 

foundation.” McCormick then contrasts the approach in Sangster 

with the approach in People v. Baca, 2015 COA 153. 
15

¶ 28 The Alonzi court was legitimately concerned about falsification 

of electronic recordings. See Alonzi, 198 Colo. at 163-64, 597 P.2d 

at 562. There is no question that the alteration of electronic 

recordings, whether audio or video, is more of a risk today than 

when Alonzi was decided in 1979. See Bruce E. Koenig & Douglas 

S. Lacey, Forensic Authentication of Digital Audio and Video Files, in 

Handbook of Digital Forensics of Multimedia Data and Devices 133 

(Anthony T. S. Ho & Shujun Li eds., 2015).

¶ 29 Developments in computer technology and software enable 

almost any owner of a personal computer with the necessary

knowledge and software to falsely edit recordings. Id. But, the fact 

that the falsification of electronic recordings is always possible does 

not, in our view, justify restrictive rules of authentication that must 

be applied in every case when there is no colorable claim of 

alteration. See People v. Sangster, 8 N.E.3d 1116, 1127 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2014) (“[N]either at trial nor before [the appellate court] did 

Sangster make a colorable claim that the recording was other than 

authentic or accurate.”).
16

¶ 30 Thus, the trial court must consider all relevant circumstances 

that bear on whether a recording is what it purports to be.7 When a 

plausible claim of falsification is made by a party opposing the 

introduction of a recording, the court may and usually should apply 

additional scrutiny (including, when appropriate, the Baca factors)

to make the preliminary determination entrusted to the trial court: 

Could a reasonable jury determine that the thing offered into 

evidence is what it purports to be?

2. Application

¶ 31 Applying this flexible approach of CRE 901 to the voicemail in 

this case, we conclude that the trial court properly made a 

preliminary finding that it was what it purported to be. There was 

no claim by Gonzales that the recording was falsified or 

manipulated in any way. The recording was found in the decedent’s 

house by his sister after the premises were released to her by the 

police. A police officer who interrogated Gonzales at length testified 

that Gonzales’s voice was heard on the voicemail. These 

uncontested facts were sufficient to support a CRE 901 finding that 

 ——————————————————————— 7 CRE 104 provides that in making preliminary determinations such 

as authenticity, the court is not bound by the rules of evidence. 
17

the voicemail was what the prosecutor purported it to be — a 

voicemail left by Gonzales for the victim. The ultimate 

determinations of whether the voicemail was authentic and the 

weight, if any, to be given to it were exclusively for the jury to 

determine. See People in Interest of A.C.E-D., 2018 COA 157, ¶ 43; 

Glover, ¶ 13.

¶ 32 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the voicemail. 

III. The Trial Court Correctly Admitted the Photograph of 

Gonzales’s Tattoos 

¶ 33 In his only other contention of error, Gonzales argues that the 

trial court abused its discretion in admitting a photograph showing 

Gonzales’s tattoos because it was both irrelevant and highly 

prejudicial. We disagree on both fronts. 

¶ 34 All relevant evidence is admissible unless prohibited by 

constitution, statute, or court rule. CRE 402; Kaufman v. People, 

202 P.3d 542, 552 (Colo. 2009). Evidence is relevant if it makes the 

existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable. CRE 

401. But, even relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” 
18

CRE 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has “some undue 

tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly an 

emotional basis, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, 

retribution, or horror.” People v. Cardenas, 2014 COA 35, ¶ 52 

(quoting People v. Fasy, 813 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo. App. 1991)).

¶ 35 The photograph at issue shows Gonzales shirtless with two 

tattoos on his inner forearms clearly visible. The tattoo on one arm 

says “CHUBBY,” and the tattoo on the other says “CHASER.” No 

other tattoos are visible in the photograph. 

¶ 36 “Evidence of a defendant’s tattoos may be relevant to that 

defendant’s intent and motive.” Id. at ¶ 51. The photograph was 

relevant to prove Gonzales’s motive. Gonzales said during his police 

interview that he was attracted to heavyset men. The photograph

corroborates that statement and supports the prosecution’s theory 

that Gonzales targeted the victim because his body type was

consistent with Gonzales’s preferred body type.

¶ 37 Gonzales argues that the photograph was highly prejudicial 

because from it the jury could have inferred that Gonzales chased 

chubby men with the intention of doing them harm, rather than 

because he was sexually attracted to them. But once relevance is 
19

established, the inferences drawn from that evidence are solely for 

the jury to draw, not an appellate court. See People v. Summit, 132 

P.3d 320, 324 (Colo. 2006). Under CRE 403, an appellate court 

assumes the maximum probative value of relevant evidence and the 

minimum prejudicial value. People v. Gibbens, 905 P.2d 604, 607 

(Colo. 1995). Applying that rule here, the trial court acted well 

within its discretion in admitting the photograph. Gonzales 

admitted both that he was he was attracted to larger men and that 

he killed a person who fit that physical description. On these facts, 

the jury was entitled to consider the probative value of the tattoos.8 

IV. Conclusion

¶ 38 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW concurs.

JUDGE TAUBMAN specially concurs.

 ——————————————————————— 8 Gonzales also claims that it was unnecessary for the jury to see 

his bare torso. But Gonzales does not explain, and we cannot 

discern, how the image of his bare torso might incite such “bias, 

sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror” that it would 

render the admission of this evidence improper or prejudicial. 

People v. Cardenas, 2014 COA 35, ¶ 52 (quoting People v. Fasy, 813 

P.2d 797, 800 (Colo. App. 1991)).
20

JUDGE TAUBMAN, specially concurring.

¶ 39 Although the majority declines to follow People v. Baca, 2015 

COA 153, 378 P.3d 780, “to the extent Baca purports to establish 

an exclusive rule for the authentication of a voice recording,” I do 

not share that interpretation. Supra ¶ 2. As a member of the Baca

division, I agreed with its analysis, and I still do. I also agree with 

much of the majority’s analysis in this case and its conclusion that 

the microcassette recording that appeared to have the voice of 

defendant, Daniel J. Gonzales, was properly admitted.

¶ 40 While some language in Baca suggests that the division 

intended to establish an exclusive rule for the authentication of 

voice recordings, the Baca division acknowledged that CRE 901(a) 

sets forth a broad standard for the authentication of evidence, 

including voice recordings. In Baca, the division held that to 

authenticate a voice recording, a witness had to show independent 

knowledge of the content of a telephone call or an ability to verify 

the accuracy of the recording process. That test was especially 

appropriate under the facts in that case, which involved the 

admissibility of a telephone conversation between a jail inmate and 

his mother. In those circumstances, undoubtedly, many inmates 
21

made telephone calls, thereby making it necessary to ensure the 

identity of the callers to authenticate the phone conversation.

¶ 41 Here, in contrast, the court was concerned with the 

admissibility of a microcassette recording found by the victim’s 

sister in the victim’s home. In that situation, there was a reduced 

likelihood of improper authentication of Gonzales’s voice.

¶ 42 Accordingly, because I agree that the results in both Baca and 

this case were correct, I specially concur.