alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Robert COTTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-17111 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(August 16, 2017)

*541Holly Lynn Gershow, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, Kevin C. Frein, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Gerald Bettman, Law Offices of Gerald S. Bettman, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

James Cotter appeals the revocation of his supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), for possessing child pornography. Cotter argues that there is insufficient evidence that he violated the conditions of his supervised release and that the district court clearly erred when it found that the recantation of his confession was not credible. We affirm.

We review a ruling that a defendant violated the terms of his supervised release for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Copeland,*20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir. 1994). Credibility determinations are the province of the fact finder who personally observes the witnesses and is in a better position than a reviewing court to assess their credibility. *United States v. Ramirez-Chilel,*289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Cotter’s supervised release. The district court was entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence that, on October 14, 2014, while on supervised release, Cotter knowingly possessed child pornography and that he admitted that, on March 17, 2016, he accessed the internet using a cell phone and a tablet device to download child pornography. Circumstantial evidence supports the inference that Cotter had access to and used a secure digital memory card to obtain child pornography. And the district court did not clearly err when it discredited Cotter’s recantation of his earlier confession, The district court was entitled to find that Cotter’s admissions about viewing images of males but not females were credible. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeffrey Grant PRYSOCK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7153

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 24, 2017

Decided: April 27, 2017

Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Leesa Washington, Assistant United States Attorney, Green-ville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*240PER CURIAM:

Jeffrey Grant Prysock seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion and denying his motion for reconsideration. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We halve independently reviewed the record and conclude that Prysock has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

Certifications Pursuant to Section 302 

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 

 

I, James R.Lavelle, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q/A ofCotelligent, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others with those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusion about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. Theregistrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors: 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: September 21, 2005
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Karen F. Kelly, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 910]

Mugglin, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County (Scarano, Jr., J.), rendered August 31, 2001, convicting defendant upon her plea of guilty of the crime of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

Defendant was charged in a six-count indictment with various drug-related crimes. In full satisfaction of the indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to the first count, after it was amended and reduced, of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. As part of the plea agreement, defendant agreed to waive her right to appeal and to be sentenced to 2 Vs to 7 years in prison. County Court imposed the agreed-upon sentence and recommended, at defendant’s request, that she be afforded entry into the ASAT and CASAT programs for substance abuse. Defendant now appeals.

Initially, defendant’s challenge to the factual sufficiency of the plea allocution is precluded by her waiver of the right to appeal as well as her failure to move to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment of conviction *(see People v Wehrle,*308 AD2d 660, 661 [2003]). Inasmuch as defendant did not make any statements inconsistent with her guilt which negated an essential element of the crime, the exception to the preservation rule is inapplicable *(see People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 666 [1988]; *People v Cabezas,*307 AD2d 594, 595 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 618 [2003]). Likewise, defendant’s challenge to the severity of the sentence is also encompassed by her voluntary waiver of the *790right to appeal *(see People v Anderson,*304 AD2d 975, 976 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 578 [2003]; *People v Samuels,*304 AD2d 913 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 586 [2003]).

Peters, J.P., Spain, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
#### McDaniel vs. McGowen.

November 10.

Error to the Bath County Court.

*Master and Apprentice. Parties. County Court.*

StJMMART. Case 4.

The poceeding in the county court for the release of an apprentice must be in his name, not his father’s.

*Triplett*for plaintiff in error.'

Judge Ovvslex

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

It was irregular for the county court, upon the motion of M’Gowen, without his son being a party, to make an order releasing his son from his apprenticeship to M’Daniel. The act of assembly of this country gives jurisdiction in such cases to the county court, but requires the application to be made by the apprentice*, it is not intended to say that a father cannot, on behalf of his infant son, prosecute such a proceeding, but it is designed to say, that if he does so, the proceedings must be carried on in the name of the apprentice and not in the name of the father.

The order of the county court must, therefore, be reversed with cost.

*

2 Dig. L. K. Title, Muster and apprentice 381, 1 Littell’s *L.*K. 677.
Dolan Chemical Laboratory 4001 Bixby Road Groveport, OH 43125 T: 614-836-4221, Audinet 210-4221 F: 614-836-4168, Audinet 210-4168 http://aepenv/labs 

### Water Analysis

Location: Mountaineer Plant Report Date: 3/28/2012

Sample Number:121097-001 Date Collected:03/07/2012 07:30 Date Received:3/7/2012 

## 1st Stage Feed

Units Parameter Result RL Analysis By Analysis Date/TimeMethod MDL Data Qual ug/L Arsenic, As 25.1 0.1 DPC EPA 200.8 0.03 03/20/2012 13:58 ug/L Beryllium, Be < 0.100 0.5 DAM EPA 200.7 0.1 03/19/2012 14:54 U ug/L Selenium, Se 353 0.5 DPC EPA 200.8 0.1 03/20/2012 13:58 mg/L Aluminum, Al 0.260 0.01 DAM EPA 200.7 0.002 03/19/2012 14:55 mg/L Boron, B 110 0.01 DAM EPA 200.7 0.002 03/19/2012 14:54 mg/L Iron, Fe 0.459 0.01 DAM EPA 200.7 0.002 03/19/2012 14:54 mg/L Total Kjeldahl Nitrogen, TKN as N 4.01 0.5 DPC EPA 351.2 0.1 03/21/2012 mg/L Nitrate-Nitrite, NO3-NO2, as N 13.5 0.2 DMM SM20 4500NO3 H 0.04 03/08/2012 08:00 mg/L Phosphorus, Total, P 0.252 0.05 DPC EPA 365.4 0.01 03/21/2012 mg/L Sulfate, SO4 5720 600 KLG EPA 300.1 100 03/14/2012



### Sample Number:121097-002 Date Collected:03/07/2012 07:30 Date Received:3/7/2012 

### 2nd Stage Feed

Units Parameter Result RL Analysis ByAnalysis Date/TimeMethod MDL Data Qual ug/L Selenium, Se 11.5 0.5 DPC EPA 200.8 0.1 03/20/2012 14:03



### Sample Number:121097-003 Date Collected:03/07/2012 07:35 Date Received:3/7/2012 

### Bioreactor Effluent

Units Parameter Result RL Analysis ByAnalysis Date/TimeMethod MDL Data Qual ug/L Arsenic, As 1.63 0.1 DPC EPA 200.8 0.03 03/20/2012 14:08 ug/L Beryllium, Be < 0.100 0.5 DAM EPA 200.7 0.1 03/19/2012 15:02 U ug/L Selenium, Se 2.27 0.5 DPC EPA 200.8 0.1 03/20/2012 14:08 mg/L Aluminum, Al 0.945 0.01 DAM EPA 200.7 0.002 03/19/2012 15:02 mg/L Boron, B 112 0.01 DAM EPA 200.7 0.002 03/19/2012 15:02 mg/L Iron, Fe 3.36 0.01 DAM EPA 200.7 0.002 03/19/2012 15:02 mg/L Total Kjeldahl Nitrogen, TKN as N < 0.100 0.5 DPC EPA 351.2 0.1 03/21/2012 U mg/L Nitrate-Nitrite, NO3-NO2, as N < 0.0400 0.2 DMM SM20 4500NO3 H 0.04 03/08/2012 08:00 U mg/L Phosphorus, Total, P 0.140 0.05 DPC EPA 365.4 0.01 03/21/2012 mg/L Sulfate, SO4 5900 600 KLG EPA 300.1 100 03/14/2012

Mountaineer Plant, 121097 Page 1 of 2THIS TEST REPORT RELATES ONLY TO THE ITEMS TESTED AND SHALL NOT BE REPRODUCED EXCEPT IN FULL WITHOUT WRITTEN

APPROVAL OF THE LABORATORY. ALL TEST RESULTS MEET ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACCREDITING AUTHORITY, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. U: Analyte was analyzed and not detected at or above adjusted Method Detection Limit J: Analyte was positively identified, though the quantitation was below Reporting Limit.

Brian Snyder, Chemist II Email bssnyder@aep.com Tel. 614-836-4224
Fax 614-836-4168 Audinet 210-4224

Mountaineer Plant, 121097 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In
connection with the quarterly report of CannaPowder, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the period ended
September 30, 2019 (the “Report”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Oded
Gilboa, CFO of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:



1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
and



2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.



|/s/
    Oded Gilboa                                                                                                                   | 
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 
|Oded
                                    Gilboa,
        Chief
        Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) | 



Dated:
April 21, 2020



A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to CannaPowder, Inc. and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6223 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to remove a requirement 

for payment settlement entities to file returns relating to certain participating payees. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 3, 2023 

Mr. PERRY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to remove 

a requirement for payment settlement entities to file 

returns relating to certain participating payees. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘1099K Elimination 

5 Act of 2023’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6223 IH

1 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT FOR RETURNS RELAT2 ING TO PAYMENTS MADE IN SETTLEMENT OF 

3 PAYMENT CARD AND THIRD PARTY NET4 WORK TRANSACTIONS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subpart B of part III of sub6 chapter A of chapter 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 

7 1986 is amended by striking section 6050W (and by strik8 ing the item relating to such section in the table of sec9 tions for such subpart). 

10 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 

11 (1) Section 3406(b)(3) of such Code is amend12 ed by inserting ‘‘or’’ at the end of subparagraph 

13 (D), by striking the ‘‘, or’’ at the end of subpara14 graph (E) and inserting a period, and by striking 

15 subparagraph (F). 

16 (2) Section 6724(d) of such Code is amended— 

17 (A) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking clause 

18 (xxiii), and 

19 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking subpara20 graph (FF). 

21 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

22 this section shall apply to returns for calendar years begin23 ning after the date of the enactment of this section. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
#### Carlos Gilbert LAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLANDON; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16102

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 4, 2017

Carlos Gilbert Law, Vacaville, CA, pro se.

Newton Oldfather, Esquire, San Francisco City Attorney’s Office, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Carlos Gilbert Law appeals pro se from the district *441court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from his detention in San Francisco County Jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *Hamilton v. Brown,*630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). We vacate and remand.

Law does not challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his failure-to-protect claim, and thus he has waived any challenge to summary judgment on that claim. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”).

Law alleged that defendant Blandón “willfully and knowingly denied [Law] medical care concerning rape injuries” and that as a result of Blandon’s actions, Law suffered pain and bleeding. *See Lolli v. County of Orange,*351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003) (pretrial detainee’s claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than under the Eighth Amendment, but same standards apply); *id.*at 419 (“A defendant is liable for denying needed medical care only if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *cf. Castro v. County of Los Angeles,*833 F.3d 1060, 1067-71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (elements of Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainee failure-to-protect claim). The district court did not address these allegations. We vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to consider them in the first instance, and to determine whether leave to amend would be appropriate.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 1 7

- 10073 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 3:14−cr−00408−WKW−TFM−6

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v ersus

WAYNE CLYDE TERRY Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________ (October 3, 2017)
Before HULL , JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Carly B. Wilkins , appointed counsel for Wayne Clyde Terry in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the

Case: 17-10073 Date Filed: 10/03/2017 Page: 1 of 22 appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is
GRANTED , and Terry ’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED

.

Case: 17-10073 Date Filed: 10/03/2017 Page: 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE COMPANY'S JUNE 30, 1998 REPORT ON FORM
10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                       4,140,490
<SECURITIES>                                         0
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<FN>
PER SHARE DATA HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED TO REFLECT A ONE-FOR-FIVE REVERSE SPLIT OF THE
COMPANY'S OUTSTANDING COMMON STOCK WHICH WAS EFFECTED ON MAY 13, 1998.
</FN>
        




</TABLE>
Scott CHERY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-3941

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 26, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

*Affirmed.*
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of Central Freight Lines, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Jeffrey A. Hale, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

      (3)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (4)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.



                                                  /s/ Jeffrey A. Hale
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  Jeffrey A. Hale
                                                  Chief Financial Officer
                                                  March 29, 2004