1

GLD-002 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-3346

___________

NICHOLAS J. QUEEN,

Appellant

v.

DONALD ROMINE, Warden

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(M.D. Pa. No. 3-98-cv-02074)

District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy

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Submitted for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 4, 2012

Before: FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 16, 2012)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Nicholas J. Queen, a federal prisoner, appeals the District Court’s denial of his 

motion for relief brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). We will summarily affirm. 

See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
2

In 1994, Queen was sentenced to 562 months’ incarceration for his involvement in 

a series of bank robberies and related offenses. In 1998, Queen challenged the execution 

of his sentence by filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In 2000, the 

District Court denied his petition. Since then, Queen has repeatedly sought relief from 

this Court and the District Court to no avail. As we write for the benefit of the parties 

alone, we need not repeat that history here. See Queen v. Dodrill, C.A. No. 04-1212, slip. 

op. at 2-5 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2004); Queen v. Romine, C.A. No. 05-4564, slip. op. at 2 (3d 

Cir. Nov. 17, 2005). Most recently, Queen filed a Rule 60(b) motion on January 30, 

2012, alleging that federal prison officials have failed to properly credit the time served 

toward his federal sentence and, therefore, have violated the Privacy Act. The District 

Court denied his motion by order entered August 1, 2012. Queen timely appealed.1

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Generally, we 

review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion, but we 

review de novo whether Queen’s motion is more appropriately considered a second or 

successive motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

 

Pridgen v. Shannon

To the extent Queen reasserts his claim that his federal sentence has not been 

properly credited or recorded, we reiterate that Queen has been given full credit toward 

his federal sentence. 

, 

380 F.3d 721, 725 (3d Cir. 2004).

Queen v. Romine

 1 On August 24, 2012, this Court advised the parties that this matter would be considered 

for possible summary action and granted the parties twenty-one days to submit written 

argument. Queen timely responded, requesting a full review of his case.

, C.A. No. 02-2872, slip. op. at 2 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 
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2002). No relief is due.2

 Moreover, though Queen brings his motion for relief under 

Rule 60(b), as he has presented this claim numerous times before, it is more appropriately 

considered an unauthorized second or successive motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 526 (2005); Pridgen

Queen also appears to claim that records pertaining to his federal custody have not 

been properly maintained, in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(e)(5) 

(requiring agencies to maintain accurate records), (g)(1)(C) (authorizing civil action 

against agency for failure to properly maintain records). Queen offers no evidentiary 

support for this claim. Further, Queen’s reliance on 

, 380 F.3d at 727. Therefore, the 

District Court properly denied Queen’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, 959 

F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1992), is misplaced. In Sellers, the circuit court examined the 

circumstances under which the courts will recognize a civil action resulting in an award 

of money damages. Id.

For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 

Court

at 312. It is not relevant in the context of a habeas petition.

 2 Queen makes an oblique reference to Lono v. Fenton, 581 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1978). 

Lono interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 5003 to condition transfer of a state prisoner to a federal 

prison upon a showing that the federal system would provide specialized treatment 

unavailable in the state system. It is no longer good law in the Seventh Circuit and was 

never found persuasive by this Court. Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 480 (1981) 

(“[N]othing in [§ 5003(a)] can be fairly read as requiring that some kind of ‘treatment’ 

must be furnished to every state prisoner transferred to a federal facility.”); Beshaw v. 

Fenton, 635 F.2d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 1980) (rejecting Lono).