SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1349 

KA 13-01615 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

REGINALD BOYKINS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS., SYRACUSE (JOHN A. CIRANDO OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

VALERIE G. GARDNER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PENN YAN (DAVID MASHEWSKE OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Yates County Court (W. Patrick

Falvey, J.), rendered June 10, 2013. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a controlled

substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled

substance in the third degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him,

upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a controlled substance

in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1]), and criminal sale of a

controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.39 [1]). Defendant

contends that County Court deprived him of his constitutional right to

a fair trial by failing to excuse a prospective juror who did not

unequivocally assure the court of her impartiality. “ ‘By failing to

raise that challenge in the trial court . . . , defendant failed to

preserve it for our review’ ” (People v Irvin, 111 AD3d 1294, 1295, lv

denied 24 NY3d 1044, reconsideration denied 26 NY3d 930). “In any

event, ‘even if defendant had challenged [that] prospective juror[] .

. . and his challenge[] had merit, [it] nevertheless would not be

properly before us because he failed to exhaust his peremptory

challenges prior to the completion of jury selection’ ” (id.). We

reject defendant’s related contention that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s alleged failure to

challenge the prospective juror inasmuch as defendant has “failed to

show the absence of a strategic explanation” for defense counsel’s

decision not to challenge that juror (id. at 1296 [internal quotation

marks omitted]). The record does not support defendant’s further

contention that he was denied his right to a jury trial by 12 jurors. 

Defendant asserts that there were less than 12 jurors present during

the trial on a certain day, but the trial minutes establish that the
-2- 1349 

KA 13-01615 

Court Clerk stated that “[a]ll Jurors [were] accounted for.” 

We reject defendant’s further contention that reversal is

required based upon a Rosario violation. “ ‘Reversal based upon a

Rosario violation is necessary only when a defendant demonstrates that

he has been substantially prejudiced’ ” (People v Walters, 124 AD3d

1321, 1323, lv denied 25 NY3d 1209), and defendant has not made such a

showing here (see id.). 

By making only a general motion for a trial order of dismissal,

defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the

evidence is not legally sufficient to support his conviction (see

People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19). In any event, we conclude that the

conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence (see People v

Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Contrary to defendant’s further

contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the

crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342,

349), we further conclude that the verdict is not against the weight

of the evidence (see Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that,

in sentencing him, the court “penalized him for exercising his right

to a jury trial” (People v Campbell, 118 AD3d 1464, 1466, lv denied 24

NY3d 959, reconsideration denied 24 NY3d 1218). “In any event, [t]he

mere fact that a sentence imposed after trial is greater than that

offered in connection with plea negotiations is not proof that

defendant was punished for asserting his right to a trial” (id.

[internal quotation marks omitted]). 

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the sentence is not unduly

harsh or severe. “The court properly exercised its discretion when it

adjudicated defendant a persistent felony offender and sentenced him

accordingly” (People v Mason, 277 AD2d 170, 170, lv denied 96 NY2d

785). We have examined defendant’s remaining contention and conclude

that it lacks merit.

Entered: December 31, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court