“Prior to the setting of ora l arg ument, t h e C ourt shall revie w the re cord and briefs and 1 consider all

err ors assig ned. The Court may enter an orde r desig nat i n g t h o se issues it wishes addre ssed at ora l arg ument.” Te nn. Sup. Ct . R. 12.2.



### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 12, 200 3 S es sio n H eard a t M em

phi s
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RIC HAR D O DOM , a/k /a OTIS SM ITH

Aut om at icApp e al fr omth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 91-07049 Chris Cr aft, Jud ge

No. W2000-02301-SC- DDT-DD - F iled May 21, 2004

Th e de fe nd a nt, Ric ha

rd Od om, wa s c on vic te d of fe lon y mur de r a nd se nte nc e d to de a th in 19 92

. Th is Court affirmed the convic tion on direct appe al but rema nded the c ase f or a ne w sentenc ing proc e e d in g

. St a te v

. O d o m, 9 2 8 S. W. 2 d 1 8 , 2 1 , 3 3 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6 )

. A f te r th e n e w sentenc ing proce eding , a jury

ag ain imposed the death sentence afte r finding th at the evide nce of one ag g ravating c ircumstance , i.e., the defe ndant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, the statutory elements of w hich involved the use of vi o l ence to the per son, outweig hed evide nce of mitigating circ umstances be y ond a re asonable doubt. See Tenn. C o d e An n. § 39-13-204( i)(2) (1991). The Court of Criminal Appeals af firmed the se ntence

. After the appe al was automatically dockete d in this C ourt, see T enn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 206 (1991),
we e ntere d an orde r spec ify ing f ive issues for or al ar g ument. We now hold as follows: (1) the tria l 1 court c ommitt ed re versible e rror by apply ing a

1998 amendment to Te nnessee Code Annotated section 39-13- 204(c) and allow in g th ein tro d u c ti o no f e v id e n c ereg arding the fa cts and c ircumstance s of the de fendant’s prior f el o n ies to support the ag g ravating c ircumstance in Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( i)(2); (2) the trial court did not err i n ad m i t t i ng photogr aphs of the vic ti mi n t h i s c a s e b u td i d e rr i n a d m i t t i n g p h o t o g r ap h s o f t h e v i c t i mo f

a p r i o r f e l o n y o f fe ns e committed by

the def endant; (3) the trial court did not err in d en y i n g t h e defe ndant’s motion for continuance to complete psy chiatric or neuropsy cholog ical testi ng ; (4) the de ath sentenc e wa s not invalid based on the f

ailure of the indictment t o ch ar g e the a g g ravating c ircumstance ; and (5) the issue of whe ther the death penalty was e x cessive, a

rbitrar y , or disproportionate in this ca se under the mandatory

provisions of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-206(c )(1) (A)- (D) ne ed not be
a dd re sse d at th is time

. We ag re e wi th the Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls’ c on c lus ion s with re sp e c t to the re ma ini ng iss ue s a ndha ve inc lud e d the re le va nt po rt ion s of that op ini on in the app e nd ix to thisAs n ot ed above, t hi s Co ur t un ani mo us l y af f i r med t he co nv i cti o n on di r ect appeal but r emanded for r e2

se n te n c ing b e c a u se the trial c o u rt e rr e d b y e x c lud ing m iti g a tio n e v id e n c e o ff e re d b y the d e fe n s e a n d b y re fus ing to ins tru c t t h e ju ry o n no n -statu to ry m iti g a ting fac to rs

. S e e S ta te v

. O d o m , 9 2 8 S .W .2 d 1 8 , 3 2 (T e n n . 1 9 9 6 ). A m a jo rity

o f th e C o u rt a lso c o n c lud e d th a t th e e v id e n c e d id n o t su p p o rt tw o o f th re e a g g ra v a ting c irc u m sta n c e s fo u n d b y the ju ry. Id. at 26

- 2 7 (And ers o n, C

. J. , and D row o t a, J. , dis sent i ng).
-2- opinion. Accor dingly , we reve rse the judg ment of the Court of Criminal Appea ls and remand for
re -s en t en ci n g.
Te nn. C ode Ann . § 39 -1 3- 20 6( a) (1 ); Judg m e nt of t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Re ve r se d

E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., and J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J J ., joined. W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J ., filed a dissenting opinion.

Rob e rt C. B ro ok s, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe llant, Ric ha

rdOd om.

M i ch ae l E

. M o o re , S o l i ci t o r Ge n er al ; M ar k E

. Da v i d s o n , As s i s t an t At t o rn ey Ge n er al ; W i l l i a m L. Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Phillip Gerald Ha rris and Amy Weirich, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Th e de fe nd a nt, Ric ha

rd Od om, wa s c on vic te d of fi rs t de g re e mur de r andse nte nc e d to de a th for r aping and kil ling seventy -seve n-y ear -old Mina Ethel J ohnson in 1991 in Memphis, Tennessee. 2 Th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at th e re -s e nte nc ing pr oc e e din g is s umm ari zeda s f oll ow s.
Prosecution’s Evidenc e On May 10, 1991, Mina Ethel J ohnson’s body was found on the back se at floorboa rd of he r car in a par king g ara g e in Memphis, Tenne ssee. The victim’s lowe r body had been left exposed, and she wa s bleeding from her anus and va g ina. Ther e wer e multipl e stab wounds in the victim’s back and two bloody

hand prints on her

hips.

Se rg e a nt R on nie Mc Willi a ms o f the Me mph is Po lic e De pa rt me nt t e sti fi e d th a t f

ing e rp ri nts found in the victim’s car led t o Odom’s arrest on May 13, 1991. A sea rch r evea led that Odom was in pos se ssi on of a “ larg e kn if e ,” wh ic h he ke pt und e r his sh irt. Od om i nit ia lly tol d o ff ic e rs that hi s name wa s “Otis Smit h” and that he had be en imprisoned in Mississi ppi for a mur der that occur red in 1978. Odom confe ssed that he intende d to steal the victim’s purse and forc ed her into the back seat of he r vehic le. When the victim said, “What are y ou doing, son,” Odom replied, “ I ’ll g ive y ou y our damn son.” O dom admitted that he ra ped the victim a n d that the victim told him that she “neve r had se x with a m an before.” Odom admitted that the kni fe office rs found in his possessionT he d efend ant pleade d gui l t y t o t hi s o f fense i n 19 7 8 and recei ved a l i fe sent ence. A f t er f i l i ng a s uccessf

ul 3
p e tit io n fo r w rit o f ha b e a s c o rp u s in fe d e ra l d istric t co u rt, the d e fen d a n t wa s re trie d a n d a g a in c o n v ic te d in 1 9 9 8

. -3- wa s th e kn if

e he us e d to sta

b th e vic tim . H e didno t r e c a ll h ow ma ny tim e s he sta bb e d th e vic tim

. Odom said that he found no mone y in the victim’s wallet or purse, and that he lef t the victim in her
c ar a nd fl e d. Mc Willi a ms te sti fi e d that the de fe nd a nt wa s “ op e n” a nd “ kin d of br a g g ing a

lit tle bit about the situation.”
Dr. Jerry Fr ancisc o, who per formed an autopsy on the victim, testified that the victim bled to d e a th f ro m a sta b w ou ndto the ri g ht v e ntric le of he r h e art . T he vic tim

a lso ha d s ta

b w ou nd s to her liver and rig ht lung a nd two defe nsive wounds to her right hand. The victim suffere d tear s to the posterior pa

rt of her vag ina, which we re c aused by a traumatic eve nt such as attempted pe netration, and sperm was found in her vag ina. Dr. Franc isco testified that the injuries we re inflicte d while the vic tim wa s a liv e , th a t th e wo un ds wo uldno t ha ve c aus e d in stant de a th, a nd that th e wo un ds wo uld have c aused immediate pain.

J ohn Sulli van, a family friend, te stified that Mina Ethel J ohnson was a “ shy , g entee l” woman wh o h a d n e ve r m arrie d o r h a d c hil dr e n a nd wh o wa s c apa ble of ma na g ing he r o wn a ff a ir s. L ou ise L ong , the victim’s sister, testified that the victim wa s retire d from her job a s secr etary at an insura nce company and wa s ac t ive in her c hurch. She te stified that the victim had broke n her f oot and was g oi n g t o the doctor w hen she w as killed. L ong also stated that she missed the vic tim because she no longe r had “ any

family at all to g o to.”

I n addition to the evidence reg arding this o ff en s e, the prosecution pre sented e vidence reg arding the fa cts of the de fendant’s two prior violent fe lony convictions to support the ag g ravating circ umstance it re lied upon to se ek the death penalty

. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(2) (prior convictions for f

elony offe nses whose statutory elements involved violence to a person)

. The prior fe lon y c on vic tio ns inc lud e d a

19 92 ro bb e ry

c on vic tio n inShe lby

Cou nty , Te nn e sse e , a nda 19 98 fi rs t de g re e mur de r c on vic tio n b a se d o n e ve nts that oc c ur re d in1978 in Ra nk in Cou nty , M iss iss ipp i, when the de fendant was seve nteen y ear s old.

Wit h reg ard to the 1992 r obbery conviction, t he prosecution prese nted the testimony of the victim, L illian Hammond. Hammond tes t ified that on May 8, 1991, she wa s approa ched by the def e n d a n t o u ts id e o f

h e r o f f ic e a t S h e lb y

St a te Co mmu n ity

Co ll e g e inM e mp h is , T e n n e s s e e

. T he defe ndant demande d Hammond’s purse and threatened to kill or harm Hammond if she made any noise. Hammond testified that the defe ndant made vulga r sexual c omments and said, “I want y ou.” The de fendant gr abbed H ammond’s arm and cause d her to fa ll to the gr ound. He took Hammond’s purse a nd ran a way

. Wit h reg ard to the 1998 first deg ree murder conviction, the prosecution presente d evidenc e th a t th e d e f

e n d a n t k il le d th e v ic ti m, M ar y Re b e c c a Ro b e r ts , o n M a y 4 , 1 9 7 8

. T e rr i Ro b e r ts , the 3 victim’s daug hter, testified that her pa rents owne d a drive -in theate r i n Pearl, Mississippi, and lived in a trailer

next t o the theate r.-4-

A police of

fice r, Erne st Si mmons, t est ified that he w as ca lled to the Roberts’ tra iler and dis c ov e re d th e bo dy of Mary Re be c c a Rob e rt s sl ump e d ina

re c lin e r. Th e vic tim

wa s c ov e re d in blood and had g unshot w ounds to he r fac e. The re cliner a ppare ntly had bee n moved some nine fe et fr om the wa ll a ndpla c e d d ir e c tly in fr on t of the do or

. Tw o kniv e s andbu lle t c a sin g s w e refo un d in the trailer

. A bloody hand towel a nd a “sta inless steel Army mess-kit knife” a lso were found in the trailer; the knife blade was be nt at “a 90 de g ree ang le.” The re w ere bloodstains in the trailer and at the drive -i n w he re a

sa fe wa s k e pt. Simm on s te sti fi e d th a t th e mur de r w e apo n w a s a .2 2 c a lib e r b olt action rifle that require d reloa ding be tween shots.

Ac c or din g to S imm on s, the po lic e la te r q ue sti on e d th e de fe nd a nt, the n s e ve nte e n, wh o to ld of fi c e rs that he we nt t o the tr a ile r be c aus e he wa s o we d mo ne y . Wh e n Ro be rt s trie d to hit him wi th a flowe r pot, the def

endant hit her

and cha sed her

to a bedr oom. The def

endant then sta

bbed the victim with a knife and f

orce d her to lea ve her

trailer and open a safe at the drive -in from whic h he took $255 and t wo guns. The defendant told police officer s that he and the vi ctim returne d to the tr a ile r an d th a t he “ sat he r d ow n” in a re c lin e r. Whe n Ro be rt s p le a de d f or he r l if e , th e de fe nd a nt t old her, “ Shut up. I ’m try ing to think.” The defe ndant claim ed t h at t he victim was shot when she g rabbe d the barre l o f t h e g un he wa s holding. The defe ndant admitted, howeve r, that he shot the victim a s ec o n d time because he “ was sca red” and “w anted to make sure she was de ad.” T he de fe nd a nt a lso a dmi tte d th a t he thr e w o ne of the g un s in to a

sw a mp andhid the oth e r g un a ndso me of the mon ey . Simm ons testified that the def endant “ showed no re morse” and had bee n “extraordinarily

calm” w hen he g ave his stateme nt to police.

Dr. Ge org e Sturg is, who perf ormed the autopsy , testified that Roberts had a fata l gunshot wound to her le ft ey e, a f atal g unshot wound to t h e ri gh t s i de of he r for ehea d, and a c ritical stab wound in her c hest that had penetr ated her left lung. The g unshot to the victim’s fore head ha d been fire d from close rang e. Dr . Sturgis also testified that the victim suffere d lace rations and punc ture wounds to her ne ck and c hest, as we ll as bruises to her ne ck that sug g ested stra ng ulation.
An assistant attorney

g ener al testified that the de fendant had shown no remorse during the trial in 1998, and that the def endant e x hibited an attitude as if it “wa s somewhat of a g ame.” The prosec utor also testified that she saw no indication that the defe ndant was suf fering f rom any mental illness.

Def ense Evide nce

T h e d ef en d an tp re s en t ed s ev er al wi t n es s es i n m i t i gat i o n a t t h e r e -s en t en ci n g p ro ce ed i n g. Gloria Shettles J ohnson, a private investigator who assists attorney s with c apital case s, testified that she obtained c hildhood recor ds, cond u cted interviews, and pr epar ed a soc ial history that included the following information.

The de fendant was born on Aug ust 13, 1960, in Mis sissippi . His pare nts had marrie d when the father wa s eig hteen and the m other was fiftee n. The defendant had an olde r sister and a y oung er sister. The de fe n d an t wa s often lef t in day car e for day s at a time. The de fendant’s fathe r dra nk-5-

heavily , and his mother di d not take care of t he children. The defendant’s pare nts g ave him up for adoption when he was two a nd a half; he never ag ain saw his mother and had only a brie f enc ounter with his father at the ag e of thirtee n.
Acc ording to J ohnson, the defe ndant was a dopt ed b y J immyand Shirley Odom in 1963. Although Jimm y

Odom was very “stern” and “loud,” he was not phy sically abusive. About one y ear afte r the adoption, howeve r, the Odoms divorce d and Shirley Odom marrie d Marvin Br uce. B ruce was “crue l to the children.” He sexuallyabused the defe ndant and his step-br other a nd threatened to kill t hem if they

told any one. B ruce put hot sauce on the defe ndant’s food and also put hot sauce direc tly in the defe ndant’s mouth whene ver the defe nd an t asked for food. B ruce also berated the defe ndant into his teens for be d wetting on a re g ular basis. The defe ndant suffe red f rom fre quent episodes of slee p-wa lking; on one occa sion, he urinated in the ref rig erator while sleep- walking , and
on sever al occ asions, he urinated in a ca r. At ag e twelve , the def

endant be g an a pattern of delinquent behavior and running away

from home. A t a g e th irte e n , th e d e f e n d a n t w a s c h ar g e d w ith la r c e n y in th e ju v e n il e s y s te m a n d was instit utionaliz ed at the Columbia Training School. A ps y cholog ist at t he instituti on diag nosed the defe ndant as schizoid and determined that he wa s “incorrigible,” “brain damag ed,” and “not fit for society at ag e thirtee n.” At ag e fifte en, a psy cholog ist conducted a nother evaluation and found that the def end ant was “destined” to spe nd his life in insti tutions. At age six teen, the de fendant was rele ased into t h e community on supervised juve nile parole . At ag e seve nteen, the de fendant
mur de re d M ary

Re be c c a Rob e rt s.

J ohnson testified t hat one of the de fendant’s adoptive brothe rs, L arry Odom, had a c riminal
rec ord and ha d serve d ten y ear s in prison. J ohnson was unable to verify whether a sec ond adoptive brother, Jimm y

Odom, had a rec ord. J ohnson acknow ledg ed, howeve r, that others who ha d g rown up under the dominion and control of Marvin Bruc e had not c ommitt ed murde r.

J ohnson further

testified that the def

endant ha d earned a c o rr es p o n d ence par aleg al deg ree while in prison and had sc ored be tween 90 and 100% in sever al ar eas of the law. While imprisoned fo r the Mis sis sip pi mur de r o f Ma ry Re be c c a Rob e rt s, the de fe nd a nt’ s be ha vio r wa s g oo d e no ug h to be tra nsfer

red to a county jail where he wa s a cook an d wa s el ev ated to “trustee” status. J ohnson
conce ded that the defe ndant had be en able to acc omplish t hese thing s despite the 1974 psy cholog ical report that he was “ brain da mag ed.”

D r

. D e n n i s E ar l S c h m i d t , a n e u r o p h ar m a c o l o g i s t , t e s t i f i e d t h a th e , D r

. S t e v e n P au l R o s s b y, and Dr . Be njamin J ohnson visited the defe ndant in prison in 1999 to pe rform a court-order ed spinal tap. Dr. S chmidt later analy zed samples of the de fendant’s spinal fluid by using “ high- perf

ormanc e liquid chromatog raphy ,” and he testified that the test reve aled the defe ndant had only about half the
no rm a l le ve l of

se ro ton in. He fu rthe r e xpla ine d th a t th e le ve l of se ro ton in fo un d in th e sp ina l c olu mn is directly indicative of se rotonin function in the bra in.-6-

Dr. Rossby , a molecula

r neur obiologist, testified that Dr. Schmidt’s test results indicated that the defendant’s serotonin level was “seve rely , extremely abnorma l” and the lowest level eve r see n a t hi s la b. Citi ng stu die s c on du c te d in F inl a nd a nd Swe de n, Dr . Ro ssb y e xpla ine d th a t lo w s e ro ton in levels ar e very

strong ly linked to “impulsive behaviors[,] i nclud[ing] unrestraine d ag g ression, violence, [and] rag e.” Al though D r. Rossby stated that low ser otonin levels could cause a pe rson to e xhibi t lo w se lf

-c on tr ol of imp uls e s, he e xpla ine d tha t “w hate ve r i mpu lse s th a t arere le a se d b y thi s l o w s e l f

- c o n tr o l d e p e n d s u p o n t h e i n d i v i d u a l , d e p e n d s o n t h e i r b i r t h , d e p e n d s o n t h e i rh e r e d i t y, depends on the ir ea

rly childhood experience s.” He testified that the victim’s use of the word “ son” may have “ serve d as a trig g er to re l ea s e t h e rag e that [the defe ndant] felt toward his mother or mother fig ures . . . .”

Dr. Rossby conce ded that low serotonin levels have also been associated wi t h nonviolent behavior s such as e ating disorders a nd g ambling a ddiction. I n addition, he admitted that there wer e no stu die s c on c lus ive ly

lin kin g low se ro ton in l e ve ls t o v iol e nt be ha vio r a nd that he c ou ld n ot s ta te that the def

endant’ s low serotonin level c aused him to commit the murder of Mina Ethel J ohnson. Although the defe ndant had no pr oblems controlling impulsive ra g e while in prison, Dr . Ro s sby stated that the ab i l i t y to control impulses is not t ested a s often in the structur ed envir onment of prison.

Prosecution’s Rebuttal Evidenc e

I n rebuttal, the pr osecution pre sented the testimony of Dr. John Hutson, a clinical psy cholog ist. Althou gh Dr

. Hutson testified that he wa s quite impressed with Dr. Rossby ’s testimonyas a whole, he opined t hat based upon the cur rent scie ntific understa nding of the role of serotonin, i t cannot re ally

be said “ that serotonin causes anything.” I n addition, Dr. Hutson testified that he wa s not awar e of any literature stating that there is a causa l relationship betwee n serotonin, vio le nt b e ha vio r, ob e sit y , d e pr e ssi on , s uic ide , o r o the r a bn orma l be ha vio rs

. At the conc lusion of the sentenc ing pr ocee ding, the jury determined that the evidenc e of the single ag g ravating c ircums t ance outweig hed the e vidence of mitigating c ircumstance s bey ond a
rea sonable doubt and se ntence d the defe ndant to de ath for the felony murder of Mina Ethel J ohnson. Af te r the Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls a ff

ir me d th e se nte nc e , th e c ase w a s d oc ke te d auto ma tic a lly befor e this Court.I n 1998 , T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 39- 13

- 20 4(c) was amended t o add t he fol l owi ng l ang uag e: 4

I n a l l ca s es wh er e t he s t at e r el i es upon t he agg r ava t i ng f act or t hat t he defendan t was prev i ous l y conv i ct ed of one (1 ) o r m ore fel oni es , ot her t han t he pres ent ch ar ge,
w h o se sta tuto ry e le m e n ts in v o lve th e u se o f v io le n c e to the p e rs o n , eith e r p a rty sh a ll b e p erm i t t ed t o i nt rod uce evi d ence co ncerni ng t he f act s and ci rc u m st ances of t he p ri o r convi ct i o n. Such evi d ence shal l not b e co nst rued t o po se a danger o f creat i ng
u n f ai r pr ej u di ce , c o n f

u s i n g t h e i s s u es , or mi s l ea di n g t h e j u r y a n d s h al l n ot be

su b je c t t o e x c lus io n o n the gr o u n d th a t th e p ro b a tive va lue o f suc h e v id e n c e is

o ut weighed b y prejud i ce t o ei t her part y

. Such evi d ence sh a ll b e used b y t he jur y i n de t erm i ni ng t he wei ght t o be acco rded t he aggravat i ng f act o r.

1998 T en n

. Pub. Act s , c h

. 915, § 1 ( ef fec t i v e M ay 7, 1998)

. T h e s t at u t e al s o w as a men ded i n 1998 t o e x pr es s l y a l l ow vi ct i m i m p act t est i m o ny

. See 19 9 8 T enn. P ub

. A ct s, ch. 9 1 6 , § 1

. T he am end m ent i n chap t er 91 6 do es not represent
a change i n t he l aw. See Stat e v. C art er, 11 4 S.W

. 3 d 89 5 , 90 7 (T enn. 20 0 3 ). O ur present anal y si s co ncerns o nl y t he

a m e n d m e n t i n c h a p te r 9 1 5

. -7- Ana lys is

Evidence of Prior F elony Convictions

The first issue raised by the defe ndant is that the trial court improperly ap p l i ed a 1998 statutory amendment to Te nnessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204( c). The 1998 amendment 4 allows the pr os e c uti on to p ro ve the fa c ts a nd c ir c ums ta nc e s of the tw o prior fe lon ie s re lie d up on to establish the ag g ravating circ umstance in T ennesse e Code Annotated section 39-13-204( i)(2), i.e ., that the defe ndant had a prior c onviction for a f elony whose statutory

elements include d the use of violence to the pe rson.
The de fendant arg ues that the 1998 a mendment w as i napplicable beca use the off

ense w as committed in 1 9 91. The de fendant arg ues that the e rror allowed the pr osecution to rely on ina dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e un de rl y ing his 19 92 c on vic tio n f or ro bb e ry a nd his 19 98 c on vic tio n f or fi rs t d egr ee m u rd eran d t h att h e e rr o r r eq u i re s a n ew s en t en ci n g p ro ce ed i n g.
The State a

rg ues that the 1998 a mendment is a proce dural statute that was prope rly applied retroac tively

to the defe ndant’s 1991 off ense. The State asserts that even if the 1998 amendment cannot be applied retroa ctively , the evidenc e underlying the defe ndant’s two prior violent fe lonies based o n events in 1978 and 1991 w as admissible to rebut the de fendant’s mitigation evidenc e. F ina lly , th e State c on te nd s th a t if the e vid e nc e wa s n ot a dmi ssi ble , th e e rr or wa s h arm le ss. Applicability of 1998 Stat utory Amendm ent We beg in our ana ly sis by

revie wing the lang uag e of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39- 13-204(c ) as it was w orded in 1991 at the time of the off ense in this case :T en n e s s e e Cod e An n ot a t e d s e c t i on 39

- 11

- 11 2 ( 20 03 ) pr ov i de s : “ W h e n e v e r a n y pe n a l s t a t u t e or pen al 5
le g islativ e a c t o f t h e sta te is re p e a le d o r am e n d e d b y a su b se q u e n t le g islativ e a c t, a n y o ff e n se , a s d e fine d b y the sta tute
or a ct bei ng r epeal ed or amended, co mm i t t ed whi l e su ch s t at ut e o r act was i n f ul l force an d ef

fect s hal l be pros ecu t ed

u n d e r th e a c t o r sta tute in e ff e c t at the ti m e o f t h e c o m m issio n o f t h e o ff e n se .”
-8- I n the sentenc ing proce eding , evidenc e may be prese nted as t o any matter that the c ourt dee ms r elevant to the punishment and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circ ums t an ce s of the crime; the defendant’s char acte r, bac kg round history , and phy sical condition; any

evidenc e tending to establish or rebut the ag g ravating circ umstances e numerated in subsectio n( i) ; a n d any evidenc e tending to establish or rebut a ny

mitigating fac tors. Any

such evide nce w hich the court deems t o have pr obative value on the issue of punishment
m ay b e received r eg ardle ss of its admissibi lityunder the rules of
e vid e nc e ; pr ov ide d, that the de fe nd a nt i s a c c or de d a fair op po rtun ity to rebut any

hear say statements so admitted.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(c ) (1991) (empha sis added).
When this pre-1998 ver sion of the statute wa s applied to capital sente ncing proce eding s at which the State r elied on t h e “p ri o r violent felony ” ag g ravating c ircumstancein Tennesse e Code An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 04 (i )( 2) , th is C ou rt c on sis te ntl y

he ld that it wa s “no t app ro pria te to a dmi t evidenc e re g arding specific fac ts of the crime re s u l t i n g in the previous convic tion, when the
c on vic tio n o n it s f

a c e sh ow s th a t it

inv olv e d v iol e nc e or the thr e a t of vio le nc e to the pe rs on .” State
v. Big bee, 885 S.W .2d 797, 811 (Tenn. 1994) ; see a lso St ate v. Stout, 46 S.W .3d 689, 701 (Tenn. 20 01 ). I n c on tr a st, the 19 98 a me nd me nt n ow ma nd a te s tha t su c h e vid e nc e is a dmi ssi ble a ndmus t be conside red in de termining the weig ht of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-204(i)( 2).

The thre shold question of whether the trial court com m i t t ed err or in applying the 1998 amendment r etroa ctively

in this cas e wa s rec ently resolved in State v. Power s, 101 S.W .3d 383 (Tenn. 2003) . I n Powers, we unanimously held that a tria l co u rt erred by apply ing the 1998 amendment in a c ase w here the offe nse occ urre d “bef ore the eff

ective date of the amendment.” I d. at 400. We relied upon State v. Smit h, 893 S.W .2d 908, 919 (Tenn. 1994), in which this Court had held that t he trial court properly instructed the jury on pre- 1989 provisions of the ca pital sentencing statute wher e the of

fense had bee n committed beforethe ena ctment of the statutory provisions. The Court expl ained in Smith that Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-11-112 and the principles 5 ag ainst the retr oactive application of statutes indicated that the leg islature did not intend f or the 1989 amendments to be a

pplied retroa ctively

to offenses o cc u rr ing be fore the ef fec tive date of

the amendments. 893 S.W.2d at 919.

Our de cision in Powers was c onsistent not onlywith Smi th b u t a lso numerous other de cisions tha t h a v e h e ld th a t c ap it a l s e n te n c in g p r o c e e d in g s mu s t b e c o n d u c te d in a c c o r d a n c e with the statutory law in ef fec t at the time t h e o ffe nse wa s committed. See State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2dT h e se a n d o the r a rg u m e n ts p re se n tly e x p re sse d b y the d isse n t we re no t o ff e re d in P o w e rs it se lf. 6

In d e e d , t h e d isse n t cite s n o c rim ina l ca se s a p p lying a n e x c e p tio n to th e r u le tha t statu te s a re p re su m e d to a p p ly 7
p ro sp e c tive ly un le ss th e y a re p ro c e d u ra l o r re m e d ia l i n na tur e

. -9- 726, 731-32 (Te nn. 1998) (“ heinous, atroc ious or cruel” ag g ravating circumstance ); State v. Bush, 942 S.W .2d 489, 50 5 -0 7 (Tenn. 1997) (“he inous, atrocious or c ruel” ag g ravating c ircumstance ); State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W

. 2 d 1 6 1 , 174 (Tenn. 1994) (non-statutory mitigating circ umstances) ; State v. Ca zes , 87 5 S.W. 2d 25 3, 26 7 (T e nn

. 19 94 ) ( bu rd e n o f p ro of a nd“ he ino us , atr oc iou s o r c ru e l” ag g ravating c ircumstance ); State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W .2d 75, 82 (Tenn. 1994) (b u rd en of proof). As we c lear ly said in Smit h, “a criminal offe nder must be sentenced pursuant to the statute in eff ect at the time of the of

fense .” 893 S.W.2d at 919.

I n the fa ce of

this strong pre cede nt, the dissent describe s Powers as “ unpersua sive” a nd
arg ue s th a t th e de c isi on is dis tin g uis ha ble fr om ou r prior de c isi on s. We se e no jus tif ic a tio n f or thi s 6 Court to radica lly

depart from the g uiding principle of sta re de c isi s by overr uling Power s more than one y ear afte r its relea se.

Ra the r tha n fol low Pow e rs a nd ou r co ntr oll ing de c isi on s, thedis se nt a do pts theState ’s ma in arg ument that the trial court properly applied the 1998 statutory amendment afte r determining that it was proce dural in nature and not substantive. Although the distinction betwee n substantive and proce dural law has bee n rec og nized by the courts of t his state, we have not applied this distinction in capital sente ncing

. Hutchison, 898 S.W .2d at 176. Moreove r, we continue to re ject the State’ s 7 arg ument in the prese nt capital ca se for sever al re asons.

F ir st, a s we e mph a size d in Brimm e r, statut e s a repr e su me d to op e rate pr os pe c tiv e ly un le ss the leg islature has indicated a contra ry intention. 876 S.W .2d at 82. Although the State arg ues that the 1998 amendme nt to Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( c) is mer ely proce dural a nd may be applied r etroa ctively , the plain lang uag e of the 1998 amendment doe s not include a retroa cti v ity

c la u s e o r a n y o th e r s tatu to r y lan g u a g e th a t i n d ic a te s a le g is lati v e in te n t f

o r the
am en d m en tt o b e ap p l i ed re tro ac t i v el y

. I n s u m , h ad t h e l egi s l at u re i n t en d ed t o d ep ar tfr o mt h e l o n gestablished rule that statutes are presumed to a pply prospec tively , it could have so indicated.
Second, t h e 1998 amendment to Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( c) is not simplya proc edura l ch an ge to ca pital sentencing laws. The 1998 amendment direc tly impacts an
a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e that is “ mor e qu a lit a tiv e ly pe rs ua siv e a ndob

je c tiv e ly re lia ble than o the rs ” the p rosecution may

rely upon to seek the de ath pena lty , i.e., the def endant’ s prior violent felony convictions under T ennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-13-204(i)( 2). State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 23 8, 26 1 (T e nn . 199 3) . Mor e ov e r, by pr ov idi ng that “ [s]uc h e vid e nc e sh a ll n ot b e c on str ue d to po se a dang er of

cre ating unfair pr ejudice, c onfusing the issues, or misleading the jury and shall not be subject to exclusion on the gr o u n d t h at t h e probative value of such evide nce is outwe ighe d by prejudice to either pa

rty ,” the 19 9 8 am en d m ent removes the rig ht of the def endant to invoke the exerci s e o f t h e trial judg e’s discr etion on the issue of a dmissibi lity . Simi larly , by providing thatG i ve n that t he 1 9 9 8 am en d m en t ch an ge s the n ature a nd the a m o un t o f e vid en ce t ha t m ay b e u sed t o estab l i sh 8

a n a g g ra v a ting c irc u m sta n c e , m a n d a te s tha t t h e e v id e n c e b e c o n sid e re d b y the ju ry, a n d re m o v e s the trial c o u rt’s t r adi t i on al di s cr et i on i n det er mi n i n g t h e admi s s i bi l i t y of ev i den ce , we di s ag r ee wi t h t h e di s s en t ’ s con cl u s i on t h at t h e 1998

a m e n d m e n t “d o e s n o thin g o the r th a n a lter the m e tho d b y w h ic h the ju ry w e igh s” a n a g g ra v a ting c irc u m sta n c e

.

W e di s ag r ee w i t h t h e di s s en t ’ s a s s er t i on t h at e x pos t f ac t o pr ov i s i ons are not i mpl i ca t ed bec au s e t h e 1998 9

am end m ent a f

fect ed the sent ence b ut no t the co nvi ct i o n. Fir st , a c ap i t al tr i al is a b i f urcat ed p roce ed i ng i n whi ch t he jur y f i rs t de t erm i nes a defend ant ’ s gui l t or i nno cence and t hen, fo l l o wi ng a s ep arat e sent enci ng p roce ed i ng, d et erm i nes t he ap p rop ri at e p uni shment. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 39

- 1 3

- 2 0 6

. See M o nge v. C al i fo rni a, 52 4 U

. S. 72 1 , 73 2 (19 9 8 ) ( st at i ng t hat t he s ent enc i ng p has e o f a capi t al t r i al i s “ i n man y r es pect s a c ont i nu at i on of t he t r i al on g ui l t or i nn ocenc e of ca pi t al murder ”)

. Second, t her e i s l i t t l e o r no j us t i f i cat i on t o s uppo r t a h ol di ng t hat t he r et r oact i ve appl i cat i on of a s t at ut e t hat di r ect l y di s advan t age s a def endan t i n a sen t enc i ng p r oceedi ng t hat d et er mi nes a s ent enc e o f l i fe or t he ul t i mat e s ent enc e
o f de at h do es not vi o l at e ex p o st f act o pro vi si o ns. See S t at e v . G uzek, 86 P

. 3 d 11 0 6 , 11 1 8 (O r. 20 0 4 ) ( reject i ng t he argum ent t hat t he ex p o st f act o pro hi b i t i o n do es not ap p l y t o l aws t hat af fect pe nal t y
- p hase pro ceed i ngs)

. -10- “[s] uch evidence shall be used by the j ury in determining the weig ht to be accor ded the a g g ravating fac tor,” the 1998 amendment re quires the jury to consider as substantive evide nce the circ umstances of a prior conviction in determining the we ight of the (i)( 2) ag g ravating c ircumstance

. 8
Finally , the retroactive a

pplication of a statute in a criminal ca se also raises the implication of violating constitutional prohibiti ons ag ainst ex post fac to laws. An ex post facto violation under article I , s ec t i on 11 of the Te nnessee Constit ution occurs whe never a law ( 1) “pr ovides for the inflictio n o f punishment upon a per son for a n act done which, whe n it was committed, was innocent,” (2) “ag g ravates a crime or make s it gre ater than when it wa s committed,” (3) “ chang es punishment or inflicts a g reater punishment t han the law annexed to the cr ime when it was committed,” (4) “ chang es the rule s of evidenc e and r ece ives (sic) le ss or differ ent t estimony than was
re qu ir e d a t the tim e of the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e in or de r t o c on vic t th e of fe nd e r, ” a nd(5 ) “ in relation to the offense or its conseque n ce s , al t ers the situation of a person to his disadvantag e.” Miller v. State, 584 S.W .2d 758, 761 (Tenn. 1979) (c iting State v. Rowe, 116 N .J . 48, 181 A. 706, 709-10 (1935)

.
I n our view, the ap plication of the 1998 amendment violated article I , section 11 of the Tenne ssee Constitution. Unli ke the statute at the time of the 1991 offen s e, the 1998 amendme nt mandated the admission of differ ent and additional evidence unde rly ing the defe ndant’s violent felonies a nd require d that the evidenc e be c onsidered by the jury in w eig hing a critica l ag g ravating
c ir c ums ta nc e re lie d u po n to se e k th e pe na lty of de a th. Ad dit ion a lly , the 19 98 a me nd me nt a ndits

9 conseque nces a ffe cted the c api t al s entence proc eeding to the disadvantag e of the defe ndant. See Miller, 584 S.W .2d at 761. There fore , the 1998 amendment fits w ithin categ ories four and five of Miller. I d.

The State’s r eliance on State v. Pike, 978 S.W .2d 904 (Tenn. 1998) , is unpersuasive. T he issue in Pike involved the retroa ctive application of an ame nded proc edura l rule that simply g ave an e qu a l nu mbe r of pe re mpt ory c ha lle ng e s to bo th the de fe nd a nt a ndtheState . T he a me nd e d r ule did not disadvantag e the de fendant and did not fall i nto any of the other

ex post fac to prohibitions under article I , section 11 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. See Pike, 978 S.W.2d at 926-27 (appendix).In a d d iti o n to e m p h a siz ing the fac ts o f t h e p rio r fe lo n y, t h e p ro se c u tio n in B igb e e a lso a rg u e d , i n p a rt: 10

T here was no b o d y ther e

. . . t o ask fo r mercy fo r [ t he vi ct i m of t he p ri o r offense],

no ne o f her chi l d ren, none of her fam i l y

. N o b o d y was t here when she was s ho t t he first t im e to a sk fo r m e rc y fo r h e r lif e . T h e re w a s n o b o d y th e re fro m h e r fa m ily to
a sk fo r m e rc y w h e n sh e w a s sh o t t h e se c o n d ti m e

. . . . [Y ]ou can’ t escap e t he f act t hat [t he d efend ant ] has ki l l ed t wo co m p l et el y i nno cent h u m a n b e ing s, ne v e r t o se e the ir fam ili e s a g a in, n e v e r a ff o rd e d the o p p o rtu n ity to ask f o r mercy. W ere [s i c] not t al ki ng ab o ut o ne l i fe, l ad i es and gent l em en. W e’ re t alking a b o ut t w o l i ve s.

. . . .
W e ha v e go t t w o p e o p le th a t ar e d e a d b e c a u se o f wh a t [the d e fen d a n t] d id

. . . . (c o n tinu e d ...)
-11- I n sum, our decision in Powers rec og nized that the 1998 amendment was not to be applied to case s occur

ring befor e its eff

ective date. Powers, 101 S.W .3d at 400. Our de cision was base d on and consistent with our prior decisions as to the l aw applicable to capital sentencing hearings, the well-e stablished principle that statutes a re pr esumed to oper ate p ro s p ec t ively , and the pr ohibition of laws that violate e x post facto pr ovisions. Acc ording ly , we adhere to our decision in Powers and
re la te d d e c isi on s a ndc on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inapp lying the 19 98 a me nd me nt.

Ha rm le ss E rro r A na ly sis

Our c onclusion that the t rial court erre d in apply ing the 1998 amendment to Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( c) doe s not end our analy sis of t his issue. I nstead, we must determine whether the trial court’s adm i s sion of evidenc e underly ing the defe ndant’s prior violent f elony ag g ravating ci rc u mstance se t forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-204(i)( 2) wa s reve rsible er

ror. Power s, 101 S.W .3d at 401.

Pr ior t o th e 19 98 a me nd me nt, thi s Co urt ha d c on sis te ntl y he ld that it

wa s impr op e r t o introduce e vidence reg arding the fa cts and c ircumstan c e s u n d e rly in g a p rio r v io le n t f elony conviction being used to e stablish the ag g ravating c ircumstance in Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-13- 204(i)(2) wher e the prior conviction on its fac e invol ved viol ence to the person. B igbe e, 885 S.W.2d at 812.

I n Big bee, the prosec ution introduced the fa cts underlying the defe ndant’s prior conviction for f irst deg ree murder, e mphasized that the prior f i rs t d egre e murde r involved a vic tim who had been shot thre e times, stressed that the vi ctim had four children, a

rg ued that the jury

should consider that th e de fe nd a nt h a d c omm itt e d tw o kill ing s, a ndsu g g e ste d th a t th e de a th pe na lty wa s a pp ro pria te be c a us e t h e d e f

e n d a n t a l r e a d y h a d r e c e i v e d a l i f e s e n t e n c e f

o r t h e p r i o r m u r d e r

. I d

. a t 81 0. Th is Court remande d for a

new se ntencing proce eding after c o n c lu d in g that the inadmissible evidence and the prosec utorial arg ument improperly enhanc ed the ag g ravating c ircumstance bey ond its statutory lang uag e and a ffe cted the jury ’s determination to the prejudice of the def endant. I d. at 812. 10(

. . . con t i n u ed) 10
T w o p eo p l e that are d ea d

. S ev en ch i l d ren t ha t are l eft wit ho ut p are nts.

885 S. W

. 2d a t 810.
-12- Our re cent de cisions have e mphasized, however , that not every violation of the rule inB igbee require s a new sentenc ing hearing. I n State v. Stout, 46 S.W .3d 689, 701 (Tenn. 2001) , for instanc e, the prosec ution relied on the a g g ravating c ircumstance set forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 39-13- 204(i)(2) and pre sented testimony from the victim of an espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry committed by the defendant. I n holding that the error did not aff ect the jury ’s verdict, we observed that the prosec ution used the evidenc e to establish a separate ag g ravating c ircumstance , i.e., that the murder w as committed to avoid, interfe re w ith, or preve nt a lawf ul arre st or prosec ution. 46 S.W .3d
a t 701; se e a lso Te nn . Code An n. § 39- 13 -2 04 (i )( 6) (2 00 3)

. We al so no te d th a t th e pr os e c uti on did not e laborate on or emphasize the underlying fac ts to bolster or enhanc e its re lian ce o n t h e p ri or violent f elony ag g ravating circ umstance. I n short, we he ld that the case was distinguisha ble from our dec ision in Bigbe e and that the err or wa s harmless. 46 S.W .3d at 701-02; see a lso Powers, 101 S.W .3d at 401 (holding that err or wa s harmless in part because the e videnc e u n d er ly ing the defe ndant’s prior felonies was used to e stablish a separ ate ag g ravating circ umstance in Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( i)(6))

. Simi larly , in State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W .3d 913 (Tenn. 2000) , the prosec ution relied on the de fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio ns fo r e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

a nda tte mpt e d f

ir st d e gree murd e r t o establish the prior violent fe lony ag g ravating c ircumstance under T e n n e s s ee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( i)(2) and introduced e vidence to show that the two prior off enses involved a

shooting that
o c c u rr e d s h o r t l y b e f

o r e t h e f i r s t d e g r e e m u r d e r f

o r w h i c h t h e d e f

e n d a n t f a c e d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d at 916. We concluded that the err or wa s harmless bec ause the evidenc e had been introduc ed to re but the defe ndant’s conte ntion that he was not involved in the prior fe lonies and beca use the prose cutor’s r eliance on the underly ing fac ts was not as egr eg ious as i n Big bee. I d. at 917.

Wit h these princ iples in mind, we turn to the prese nt case . The prose cu t i on introduced de ta ile d e vid e nc e re g ard ing the de fe nd a nt’ s 1 99 2 co nv ic tio n for ro bb e ry . F or

e xamp le , th e vic tim , L illian Hammond, testified that the defendant demanded her purse and threatene d to kill or harm her if sh e ma de a ny

no ise . H a mmo ndte sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt mad e vu lga r s e xua l c omm e nts , g rabbe d her a

rm, and took her

purse. The prose cution also introduced e x tensive and g raphic proof r eg arding the def endant’ s 1998 fi rs t de g re e mur de r c on vic tio n, du ri ng wh ic h h e sh ot andsta bb e d th e vic tim , M ary

Re be c c a Rob e rt s, in 1978 in Ra nkin County , Mississ ippi. First, the State introduce d the def endant’ s admission that he hit Roberts, cut her

with a knife, and forc ed her to open a sa fe from which he took $255 and two g uns. Next, the State proved that althoug h the def endant c laimed that Roberts wa s first shot when she g rabbe d the bar

rel of his g un , he admitted that he shot the vic tim a second time bec ause he “wa nted to make sure she wa s d ead.” The prose cution then introduce d evidenc e, including-13-

p h o t o g r ap h s o f t h e v i c t i m , t o e s t ab l i s h t h a t R o b e r t s h a d s u f f e r e d f a t a l g u n s h o t w o u n d s t o h e r l e f te ye and for ehea d and a stab wound to he r left lung. Finally , the prosec ution pr esente d testimony that the de fe nd a nt s ho we d n o r e mor se fo r the kil lin g of Rob e rt s.

I n o ur vie w, the imp ro pe rl y

a dmi tte d e vid e nc e is s tr iki ng ly sim ila r t o th a t in B ig be e . In b oth Big bee and this case, the pr osecution i ntroduce d the details of a pr ior first deg ree murder c ommitt ed by the de fe nd a nt. B ig be e , 8 85 S.W. 2da t 80 2. I nd e e d, the natur e a nde xten t of the i na dmi ssi ble eviden ce i n this case wa s even more g raphic and deta iled than that in Big bee. Mor eover , the improperly

admitted evidenc e in this case was substantially more pre judicial than the prior f

elonies in the case s in which we he ld that the err or did not aff ect the jury ’s verdict. See Power s, 101 S.W .3d at 400-01 (prior convictions for three ag g ravated assaults and a robbery ); see also Stout, 46 S.W .3d at 702 (prior

conviction for e specia lly ag g ravated robbery ); Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d at 916 (prior convictions for e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

and attempted f

irst deg ree murder)

.
I n addition, this case is identical to Bigbe e in that the prosecution relied he avily in closing arg ument on the fa cts underlying the defe ndant’s prior felony convictions to e nhance the ef fec t of thi s a g g ra vatin g c ir c u m s t an c e

. In d e e d, there c or d is re ple te wi th the pr os e c uti on ’s re pe a te d e mph a sis in a rg ume nt o n th e fa c ts u nd e rl y ing the prior c on vic tio n. F or

ins ta nc e :

I t w a sn ’t e no ug h f or that ki lle r t o h a ve take n T e rri Ro be rt s’ mother fr om her whe n she wa s seventee n y ear s old –

. . . . Did h e c ar e a t a ll ab o u t M in a E th e l Jo h n s o n ? Ab o u t R e b ecc a R o b erts? About L illian Hammond? About the lives that he destroy ed? Not for a

minute.

You heard t es timonythat on May 4 [si c], 1978, Rebecc a th Roberts was f

ound dead in he r trailer. Yo u saw the pic tures. You hear d Detec tive Simm ons talk to y ou about t h e investi g ation. You hear d Dr. Sturg is talk to y ou about the autopsy that he performed.

This is wha t w a s le ft

of B e c ky Rob e rt s. Th e y

want y ou to ignor e all of t h i s ; to ignor e the f acts, to ig nore the evidenc e, to put y our common sense away , and to fe el sorry for this vicious killer, who laug hingly

display ed Be cky Roberts for the whole world to see

–

. . . .-14- T wo fa m i l i es l o s tl o v e o n es ath i s v i ci o u s [ , ] ca l cu l at i n g, ma n ip u lati v e h a n d s

. L il li a n H a mm o n d w a s r o b b e d

. Sc ar e d o u t of h e r m i n d , e m o t i o n a l l y h ar m e d

. Y o u h e ar d h e r t e s t i f y. The prose cution place d particula r empha sis on the gr aphic e vidence underlying the 19 78 mur de r:
And when D etec tive Simm ons and the other officers found B ecky Rob e rt s, th e c ha ir

wa s p ull e d rig ht u p to the do or , s o th a t th e fi rs t thi ng y ou ’dse e wa s h is h a nd iw or k, the wo rk

of his vic iou s, ma nip ulativ e ha nd s.

. . . . Going to a woman’ s trailer be cause her husband owes y ou m o n e y, s t ab b i n g h e r

w i t h a k n i f e u n t i l t h e b l a d e b e n d s t o a n i n e t ydeg ree ang le, and then f

orcing her to the sink wher e y ou wash her up, g e t he r c le a ne d u p s o y ou c a n w a lk h e r o ve r t o th e sa fe , s ome thi rty y ards a way , all the time she’s dripping blood, dripping blood, dripp ing blo od ; ma

kin g he r o pe n th e sa fe , g e t th e mon e y ou t, w a lk h erb ac k t h i rt y y ar d s t o h er h o m e, s i t h er i n a ch ai r, an d s h e’ s b eggi n g, she’s plea ding w ith y ou, “Please don’t shoot me, please don’t shoot me, I wo n ’t t ell any

body it’s y ou; I ’ll tell them it’s somebody else. I ’ll make up a

name.”

S i m i l ar l y:

I t wa s n ’ t e n o u g h f o r th is c o ld , v io le n t, man ip u lati v e, c a lc ulatin g kil le r –

. . . to wa lk Ms. Rob e rt s b a c k to thetr a ile r andjus t leave her. H e had g otten the money . He r oug hed her u p

. He hurt her. H e stabbe d her. N o. No. He shot her. He shot her in the head. Yo u s a w the pic tur e , lad ie s and g e ntl e me n. Yo u h e ardDr . Stur g is t e ll y ou about the two bullets that went int o her head, ba sically forming an X. One went one w ay and one w ent the other

. Whydid y ou shoot her, Mr

. Co ld -violent-manipulative killer? “B eca use I wanted to make sure she was de ad. I wanted to make sure she wa s dead.”

I mpulse? I mpulse, ladies and g entlemen? No way

. Pla nn e d o ut, tho ug ht o ut. Ev e n in t he e ndwh e n [Ro be rt s] was ther e in the c h ai r blee ding to de ath, ag ain, alone in he r home,-15- he’s still manipulating the sc ene. He ’s still controlling the environment. He pulls the chair out and puts her on display , just li ke y ou would mount a trophy on y our mantle. A notc h in his belt.

Yet anothe r example:

Stabbing a woman to g ain control over her, clea ning he r up, walking her thirty

y ards, f orcing her to ope n a saf

e, wa lking he r bac k
a no the r thirty

y ard s, se tti ng he r i n a

c ha ir a nd te lli ng he r to sh ut up so I can think while sh e i s p l ea d ing f or her life is not impuls e . . . . That’s c old, manipulative violence that ended in the de ath of B ecky Rob e rt s.

. . . .
You hear d the testimony of the murder of Be cky Roberts. Of the violent, ug ly , horrific manner in which she died. H er e y e wa s shot out. Two bul lets formed an X in her brain. I t appea red she had bee n strag g led [sic] . The trailer was torn apar t, blood every wher e. The re’ s blo odba c k inthe be dro om , a ndthe re ’s blo odin the liv ing ro om. I mpulse?

Finally , in concluding the ar g ument, the prosec ution ag ain emphasized the de tailed fa c ts u nd e rl y ing the prior c on vic tio ns :

The c rime y ou hear d and saw is: “He stood over me whe n I was on the g roun d. He ha d h is h a ndins ide he rea ndhe ma de se xua lly abusive c omments to me.” That’s what [ Hammond] said.

. . . .
L ook at Ms. Roberts. L ook at how she died. L ook at why she died. R ichar d Odom said she died be cause she knew him, and he didn’t want to g et caug ht. I sn’t that sad. B ut what weig ht should y ou g ive it?
You know that y ou’re dealing with an offe nder, a person, who

. . . did thi s fo r pe rs on a l g a in a nd dis play e d he r. I t is a rea so na ble in fer ence to dr a w th a t h e d is p lay e d[R o b e r ts ’ ] b o d y f o r th e n e xtT h e St at e’ s al t er n at i v e ar g u men t wa s t h at t h e def en dan t w ai v ed t h e i s s u e for f ai l i n g t o obj ec t t o t h e admi s s i on 11

o f t he evi d ence. T he t ri al co urt , ho wever, had rul ed t hat t he evi d ence was ad m i ss i b l e p ri o r t o t ri al ; t hus, t he d efend ant h a s n o t w a ive d the issu e b y failing to o b je c t c o n te m p o ra n e o u sly w ith the a d m issio n o f the e v id e n c e in t h e p ro se c u tio n ’s

c a se -in-c h ie f.
-16-

person to see . I t is a rea sonabl e infe renc e that he a lone would have had re ason to have draw n that chair out nine fee t from the wall. Why
wa s th a t do ne ? Why wa s tha t done ? Th a t g ive s y ou a n in sig ht i nto him . T hat g ive s y ou a n in sig ht i nto who the r e a l Ric ha rdOd om i s

. . . .

Wit h the re cord r eplete w ith these and other examples of its reliance on the impr oper evidenc e, the State’s arg ument on appea l that the evidenc e and a rg uments were proper

to rebut the defe ndant’s mitigating e vidence is not persuasive. First, the a rg ument is dubious because the 11 eviden ce wa s p resented in the prosec ution’s case -in-chie f whe n there was no mitigating e vidence to rebut. Second, the nature and extent of the evide nce pr esente d by the prosec ution demonstrates that it was no t p re sented for the sole purpose of re butting mitigating e vidence . I ndeed, the prosec ution presented an overw helming amount of evidenc e that included the victim’s testimony reg arding the def

endant’ s 1992 robbery , the def endant’ s first deg ree murder of Rebec ca Robe rts, the de fe nd a nt’ s st a te me nts , th e natur e a ndma nn e r of the Rob e rt s killi ng , the app e aranc e of the Rob e rt s crime sc ene, inc l u d i n g a p h o togr aph of the victim, and the details of the a utopsy . Finally , the pros ec u t i o n ’s arg uments as re lated abovewent fa r bey ond a leg itimate or rea soned ef fort to re but mitigating fac tors an d

in s te a d e n h an c e d th eo n ly a g g r avating circ umstance by including the extensive fa c ts andde ta ils of

the un de rl y ing fe lon ie s.
Ac c or din g ly , th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s e rr on e ou s a pp lic a tio n o f the 19 98 a me nd me nt l e d d ir e c tly to the prosec ution’s introduction of detailed and g raphic evidenc e of prior violent fe lonies committed by the defendant. The law as it existed at the time of the off ense pr ohibited such evidenc e. Moreove r, the prosec ution he avily relied upon the inadmissible e vidence underlying the def endant’ s prior fe lon ie s in arg uin g that the jury sh ou ld imp os e the de a th pe na lty fo r the de fe nd ant ’s o ffe ns e in this case. In short, under the se circ umstances, a s in Big bee, w e conc lude that the er ror a ffe cted the ver dict. See B igbe e, 885 S.W.2d at 812. We there fore rema nd for a new se ntencing proce eding to be conduc ted in acc ordanc e with the law a s it ex isted at the time of the of fense

. Admissibil ity

of Photogr aphs

The defen d a n t n e xt a

r g u e s th a t th e tria l c o u r t c o mm itte d r e v e r s ib le e rr o r b y a ll o w in g the pr os e c uti on to i ntr od uc e ph oto g ra ph s o f the vic tim

in this c a se , M ina

Ethe l John so n, a s w e ll a s a photogr aph of the victim of the 1978 first deg ree murder c ommitt ed in Mississi ppi, Mary Rebec ca R o b e r t s

. T h e d e f

e n d a n tar g u e s t h a tt h e p r o b a t i v e v a l u e o f t h e p h o t o g r ap h s w a s s u b s t a n t i a lly outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice.-17-

The State a

rg ues that the photogr aphs of J ohnson wer e rele vant to show the position of her bo dy , th e loc a tio n o f the of fe ns e , a ndthenatur e of

thede fe nd a nt’ s a c tio ns in c omm it tin g thi s offe nse. Simil arly , the State arg ues that the photog raph of Roberts showed the de fendant’s conduct in the 1978 first deg ree murder of fense and re butted the def endant’ s contention that his actions wer e impulsi ve.
At a re -sentenc ing he aring , both the State and the de fendant are entitled to offer evidenc e relating to the c ircumstance s of the crime. State v. Tea g ue, 680 S.W.2d 785, 787-88 (Tenn. 1984). A trial co u rt is affor ded broa d discretion in determining whe ther to admit photog raphs of the dece ased in a murder prosec ution. See State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 810-11 (appendix) (Tenn. 20 00 ). Th e de c isi on to a dmi t ph oto g ra ph s w ill be reve rse d on ly if thetr ia l c ou rt

ha s a bu se d it s discretion. State v. Vann, 976 S.W .2d 93, 103 (Tenn. 1998)

. At the time of this offense , Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( c) state d in part that evidence may

be pre sented in a c apital sentenc ing pr ocee ding a s to “any matter that the c ourt deems re levant to th e p u n i s hment and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circ umstances of

the crime . . . .” The statute furthe r provided that “[a]ny such evidenc e which the
c ou rt de e ms t o h a ve pr ob a tiv e va lue on th e is su e of pu nis hme nt m a y

be re c e ive d r e g ard le ss o f i ts admissibili ty

under the rules of e vidence . . . .” I d.

I n apply ing the se principles, w e ag ree with the Court of Criminal Appea ls that the trial court did not abuse its discretion i n admi tting the two photog raphs of J ohnson. The first photog raph, which wa s three- by -five inc hes in size, showed the vi ctim in the back seat floorboard of her c ar and the multiple stab wounds and bleeding she suffe red. The second photog raph, w hich was a lso threeby -five inc hes in size, showed the victim on the floorboa rd with her he ad fa cing the re ar of the ca r and a r olled up chec k in her hand. I n sum, the photogr aphs we re r eleva nt for the pr osecution to show the “nature a nd circ umstances” of the c rime, i.e., the position of t he victim’s body , the location of the offe nse, the d efendant’s a ctions, and the injuries suff ere d by the victim. Moreover , the ph oto g ra ph s w e re no t un fair ly

pr e jud ic ia l to the de fe nd a nt. We disag ree , howeve r, with th e Court of Criminal Appea ls’ conclusion that the trial c ourt properly admitted the photog raph of the victim of the first deg ree murder in Mississippi. As we have discussed, the trial co u rt admitted the under ly ing f acts a nd circ umstances of the def endant’ s prior felonies ba sed on its errone ous retroa ctive application of the 1998 amendme nt to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( c). B eca use th e p h o t o g raph of

the victim was intertwined w ith the ina dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e re g ard ing the fa c ts andc ircum st a nc e s o f the prior fi rs t de g re e mur de r, it follows that its admissi on was im p ro p er u n der the law applica ble to this case. See Big bee, 885 S.W .2d at 811-12.

Moreove r, althoug h the State ar g ues that the photog raph was properly admitted to r ebut the mitigating evidenc e, we note once more that it was introduce d during the State’s ca se-in-c hief a nd not during the State’s re buttal. The trial court’s fi n d ing that the photogr aph showe d that the defe ndant’s killing of

Roberts was “ methodical” o r otherw ise nec essary to rebut the mitigatingT he com pl ex and lengt hy ch r onol ogy of ev ent s i s f

ul l y an d accu r at el y s et fort h i n t he C our t of Cri mi nal 12
A p p eal s’ op i ni o n, whi ch i s at t ached as an ap p end i x t o t hi s d eci si o n.

-18- evidenc e wa s not supported bythe re cord. Instead, the photog raph, w hich shows the victim’s body slumped over in a r ecliner and the wounds suffe red by the victim, wa s of minimal probative value for pur poses o f s en t encing . Acc ording ly , we hold that the tria l court abuse d its discretion by allowing the admission of the photog raph of the victim of the prior of fense

. Continuance

Th e de fe nd a nt n e xt ar g ue s that th e tr ia l c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

re fu sin g to g rant a continuance to allow psy chiatric and neur opsy cholog ical eva luations and that the trial court’s ruling violated h i s rig hts to due proce ss and ef fec tive counsel unde r the United States and Tenne ssee Con sti tut ion s. Se e U. S. Co ns t. ame nd . V I , X I V; Te nn . Cons t. art . I , § § 8 , 9 , 1 7. Th e State maintains that the trial court properly ref used to g rant a

continuance fr o m its scheduled date of September 27, 1999.

The trial c ourt’s denia l of a continuance will be reve rsed only if it appear s that the trial court abused its discre tion to the pr ejudice of the defe ndant. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1995). An a

buse of di s cr et i on require s a showing that the denial of a continuanc e denie d the defe ndant a f

air trial or that the re sult of t h e t ri al would have be en diffe rent. I d.; see a lso St ate v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 524 (appendix) (Tenn. 1997). More over, a defe ndant who asserts that the de nia l of a c on tin uanc e c on sti tut e s a de nia l of du e pr oc e ss o r the ri g ht t o c ou ns e l mu st e sta bli sh actua l prejudice . See Morris v. Sl appy , 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983).

The trial c ourt’s written or der de ny ing the continuance ref lects as fol lows. The re

12

se nte nc ing pr oc e e din g wa s f ir st se t for Janu ary of 19 97 bu t w a s c on tin ue d inDe c e mbe r o f 1 99 6 in part be cause the def

ense r equeste d additional time to find a mitigation expert. M ore tha n a y ear later, in J anuary and Februa

ry of 1998, the defense filed an ex parte reque st for a mitig ation specia list and a psy cholog ist. The trial court g rante d funds for the mitigation expert but denied funds fo r a psy cholog ist unti l the defe nse made a particularized showing of nee d. After sever al hea ring s in 1998 to determine the status of the proc eedings , t h e re-sente ncing hearing w as delay ed until after the de fe nd a nt w a s r e -t

ri e d a ndc on vic te d inJuly of 19 98 of the fi rs t de g re e mur de r i n M iss iss ipp i.

In N o v e m b e r

o f 1 9 9 8 , t h e t r i a l c o u r t s e tt h e r e

- s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g f o r M a y 1 0 , 1 9 9 9

. In Marc h of 1999 – two months before the hea ring – defe nse counse l moved for a continuance on the g round that t he defenda nt’s mitigation ex pert had not completed he r investig ation. The trial c ourt g rante d the motion over the prose cution’s objection and se t the re- sentenc ing f or S eptember 27, 1999. I n April of 1999, the t rial court gr anted the de fendant’s motion for a psy chiatric evaluation by Dr. Willi am D. Ke nner.-19-

On September

14, 1999, the def

endant f iled an ex parte motion reque sting that the de fendant underg o a neur opsy cholog ical eva luation by Dr. Pamela

Auble and r equesting a continuanc e so that the eva luation could be conduc ted on Novembe r 1, 1999. Althoug h Dr. Auble ’s evaluation was reque sted so that Dr. Ke nner c ould complete his psy chiatric examination, the tria l c ourt denied the motion because Dr. Auble ’s eva luation was sche duled to take plac e af ter the date of the r esentenc ing pr ocee ding. T he trial c ourt also denied a continuance

. On S ep t em b er1 6 , 1 9 9 9 , t h e t ri al co u rt en t er ed an ex p ar t e o rd erau t h o ri z i n g a neuropsy cholog ical eva luation of the def endant by Dr. Alison Kirk. How ever , on September 22, 19 99 , i. e ., fi ve day s be fo re the sc he du le d r e -s e nte nc ing , th e de fe ns e so ug ht a c on tin ua nc e be c aus e Dr. Kirk ha d determined she lac ked sufficie nt f orensic experience to c onduct the eva luation. The motion was accompa nied by an affidavit from Dr. Kenner asserting that he could not work on the defe ndant’s ca se unless a ne uropsy cholog ical eva luation was complete d. After fi nding that the defe nse had not de monstrated that the de fendant had a menta l illness or defec t that would be used in miti g ation, the trial court denied the c ontinuance.
On September

23, 1999, the def

endant f iled an ex parte motion reque sting funds f or Dr. Kenne r to trave l to Memphis to t estify . The mo t i o n as s er ted that Dr. K enner had examined the defe ndant for 2.5 hour s and had r eviewe d the def endant’ s rec ords for 7.5 hours. Although the trial court authorized the funds, the defense later m oved to continue the re-se ntencing proce eding on the basis that Dr. Kenne r ref

used to te stify unless a neuropsy cholog ical evaluation was completed. The trial court of

fer ed to compel Dr. Kenne r t o attend the trial, but the defe nse dec lined. The trial c ourt then denied a

continuance

. After s e tt in g f o r thth e ab o v e c h r o n o lo g y a n d f in d in g s , th e tr

ia l c o u r t’ s w r itte n o r d er conclude d, in p ar t , t h at d efe nse counse l “have been g iven more tha n enoug h time to prepar e a mitigation def

ense” and that the period of time was “much more than suf ficient to have prepa

red any mitigation def

ense, no matter how involved, intricate or c omplex .” The trial court f urther c on c lu d e d:

Th is Cou rt ha s do ne e ve rythi ng in its po we r to a llo w the de fe nd a nt t o p ro d u ce ev er y

b i to f p ro o f h e c o u l d m u s t eri n h i s re -s en t en c i n g, allowing m any

continuance s over a

period of two y ear s and eig ht months from t h e first re-sente ncing hearing se t . . . and has a llowed funds fo r n u m erous ex perts . . . . To ha ve permitted y et another continuance to conduct last m inute exploratory examinations, for which no basis had be en s h o wn in the rec ord, at the la st minut e . . . would h av e bee n in this C ourt’s opinion ext reme ly improper and
wo uldbe a

g ro ss a bu se of the jud ic ia l pr oc e ss.
After revie wing the re cord and the trial court’s finding s, we fully ag ree wi t h t h e C o urt of Cr imi na l App e a ls’ c on c lus ion that the tria l cou rt ’s re fu sa l to c on tin ue the pr oc e e din g fr om the date
o f Se p te mb e r 2 7 , 1 9 9 9 , w a s n o t ar b it r ar y , u n r e a s o n ab le , o r a n ab u s e o f d is c r e ti o n

. Moreove r, we a g re e w i t h t h e C o u r t o f C ri m i n a l A p p e a l s ’ c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t c o m p l e t e l y f

a i le d toW e have al so o b ser ved t hat dis t ri ct at t o rney s are requi red t o noti f y a de fend ant of t hei r i nt ent t o s eek t he 13
d eat h pe nal t y no l ess than t hi rt y d ays b ef o re t ri al p urs uant to R ul e 1 2

. 3 (b) o f t he T enness ee R ul es of C ri m i nal P roce d ure
a n d tha t t h is no tice sa tisf ie s the re q u ire m e n ts o f d u e p ro c e ss. S ta te v. D e lli n g e r, 7 9 S .W .3 d a t 4 6 7

. -20- de mon str a te that th e fi nd ing s o r te sti mon y of Dr . K e nn e r o r D r. Au ble wo uldha ve be e n f a vo ra ble to the defe nse. I n short, the def endant ha s failed to establish that the trial court a bused its discretion be c aus e the re is n o in dic a tio n th a t he wa s d e nie d a fair tr ia l or that the re su lt o f the pr oc e e din g wo uld ha ve be e n d if

fe re nt h a d a

c on tin ua nc e be e n g rante d. Ac c or din g ly , th e de fe nd a nt is not e nti tle d to relief on this iss ue.
Sufficienc y of Indictment

Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t hi s d e a th s e nte nc e is i nv a lidbe c aus e the ind ic tme nt faile d to char g e the ag g ravating circumstance which distinguished this ca pital first deg ree murder f

rom a noncapital f irst deg ree murder. T he def endant, c iting Appr endi v. New J erse y , arg ues that the Fifth a nd Six th Amendments requir e that “any fac t ( other than prior conviction) that increase s the maxi mum penalty for a crime must be c harg ed in an indictment, submitted to a jury , and p ro v en b ey ond a
rea sonable doubt.” A pprendi v. Ne w J erse y , 530 U.S. 466, 476 ( 2000); see a lso Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).

I n State v. Holton, 126 S.W .3d 845 (Ten n

. 2 0 0 4 ), we rec ently explained that “Appre ndi applies only

to enhanc ement fa ctors used to impose a sentence above the statutory maxi mum” and that “the de ath pena lty

is within t he statutory

rang e of punishment pre scribed f or first degr ee mur der by the Tenne ssee Gene ral Asse mbly . . . .” Holton, 126 S.W.3d at 863 (citing State v. De llinger , 79 S.W .3d 4 5 8 , 466-67 (Te nn. 2002)). We also e mphasized that Tennessee ’s ca pital sentencing proce dures r equire that a jury , not a judge, make the finding s reg arding the pre sence of ag g ravating circ umstances a nd that the findi ng s must be made be y ond a re asonable doubt. Holton, 126 S.W .3d at 864; see a lso Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(f) (1) ( 2003). 13

I n s ho rt , w e ha ve re

je c te d th e arg ume nts raise d b y the de fe nd a nt, a ndwe ha ve c le arl y he ld that Tenne ssee’ s capital sente ncing scheme does not requir e that ag g ravating c ircumst an ce s be inc lud e d ina n in dic tme nt. Th e de fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nts arewi tho ut m e ri t.

Conclusion

After revie wing the re cord and applicabl e au t h o ri t y , we now hold a s follows: (1) the trial court c ommitt ed re versible e rror by retroa ctively ap p l y i n g a 1998 ame ndment to Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( c) and allowing the introduction of extensive evidenc e re g arding the fa c ts andc ir c ums ta nc e s of the de fe nd a nt’ s prior fe lon ie s to su pp ort the a g g ravatin g c ir c ums ta nc e in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-204(i)( 2); (2) the trial cour t d i d n ot err in a dmitti ng photogr aphs of the victim in this case but did err in admitting photogra phs of t he victim of a f

elony offe nse committed in 1978 by the def endant; (3) the trial court did not err in deny ing the defe ndant’s motion for continuance to complete psy chiatric or neuropsy cholog ical testing; (4) the death se ntence-21-

was not invalid based on the failure of the indictment to char g e the ag g ravating c ircumstance ; and (5 ) the iss ue of wh e the r the de a th pe na lty wa s e xce ssi ve , a rb itr ary , o r d isp ro po rt ion a te in this c a se under the mandatory provisions of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-206( c)( 1)(A) -(D) need
no t be a dd re sse d at th is t ime . We a g re e wi th the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp eal s’ c on c lus ion s w ith respe ct to the re maining issues and have inc luded the re levant portions of t h at opi nion in the
app e nd ix to this op ini on . A c c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e thejud g me nt of the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls
a ndre ma ndthe c a se to the tr ia l c ou rt fo r r e -s e nte nc ing . Co sts of the app e a l aretaxedto the State of Tenne ssee.

__________________________________ E. RILEY AN DE RSO N, JUSTI CE