alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Stephanie TASHIRO-TOWNLEY; Scott C. Townley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP., as Trustee FOR the CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWL, INC. ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-10; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-35590

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 5, 2017

*470Stephanie Tashiro-Townley, Maple Valley, WA, pro se.

Scott C. Townley, Covington, WA, pro se.

John Eugene Glowney, Stoel Rives LLP, Seattle, WA, Neeru Jindal, Yu Mo-handesi LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Stephanie Tashiro-Townley and Scott C. Townley appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their diversity action related to their claim under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *Knievel v. ESPN,*393 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed appellants’ action because appellants failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants engaged in an unfair or deceptive act that caused appellants’ injury. *See Bavand v. OneWest Bank,*196 Wash.App. 813, 385 P.3d 233, 247-48 (2016) (setting forth elements for challenges under the WCPA); *see also*Wash Rev. Code. § 61.24.30(4) (setting forth shortened notice requirements for a trustee’s sale conducted after a federal bankruptcy stay is lifted); *Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc.,*175 Wash.2d 83, 285 P.3d 34, 62 (2012) (en banc) (explaining that “the mere fact MERS is listed on the deed of trust as a beneficiary is not itself an actionable injury”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants leave to file a second amended complaint because amendment would be futile. *See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be futile).

We reject as without merit appellants’ contentions regarding equal protection and due process.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 986 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999             SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998             OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999             SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                        (43,315)               (176,929)
<SECURITIES>                                  (31,691)               (413,671)
<RECEIVABLES>                                  (3,557)                (21,298)
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (380)                 (2,329)
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,551                  12,575
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (50,936)               (329,859)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       (2)                    (16)
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**EXHIBIT - 32.2**

MOSSIMO, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofMossimo, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2006,as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (theReport), I Edwin Lewis, Vice-Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer of theCompany, certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best ofmy knowledge:

(1)              The Report, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit -32.1, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)              The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.
| /s/    | Edwin Lewis                                   |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Edwin Lewis                                   |
|   | Vice-Chairman  and Co-Chief Executive Officer |
|   | August 14, 2006                               |

 

A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTENSTATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 HAS BEENPROVIDED TO THE COMPANY AND WILL BE RETAINED BY THE COMPANY AND FURNISHED TOTHE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF UPON REQUEST.

THIS CERTIFICATION ACCOMPANIES THE FORM10-Q TO WHICH IT RELATES, IS NOT DEEMED FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION AND IS NOT TO BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO A FILING OF THECOMPANY UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 OR THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 (WHETHERMADE BEFORE OR AFTER THE DATE OF THE FORM 10-Q), IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY GENERALINCORPORATION LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN SUCH FILING.

----
Exhibit 4.63

  

  

  

  Addendum No. l

      to the Memorandum of Agreement dated 4th July 2018

       (the “MOA”)

      in respect of “AISLING” (the Vessel”)

      between

      VLGC BETA OWNING LTD. of Marshall Islands (the “Sellers”)

      and

      GLOBAL MERIDIAN HOLDINGS LIMITED of Bermuda (the “Original Buyers”)

  __________________________________

  
    
      	

            	1.	
              The Original Buyers hereby nominate:-

            


    

  

  MERIDIAN 10 LIMITED (the “Buyers”)

  Registered Office: Canon’s Court, 22 Victoria Street, Hamilton. HM 12, Bermuda

  as the final buyers to complete the purchase and delivery of the Vessel
      as per the MOA and the Buyers hereby accept the nomination.

  
    
      	

            	2.	
              The Sellers hereby agree to the above nomination.

            


    

  

  
    
      	

            	3.	
              The Buyers hereby assume all the right s and obligations of the Original Buyers under the MOA.

            


    

  

  
    
      	

            	4.	
              The Original Buyers hereby guarantee the due and punctual performance of theBuyers’ obligations under the MOA.

            


    

  

  
    
      	

            	5.	
              Except as otherwise provided herein, all other terms and conditions of the MOA shall remain unchanged and in full force.

            


    

  

  
    
      	

            	6.	
              This Addendum No. l shall be governed by and construed in accordance with English law and Clause 16 (Law and Arbitration) of the MOA shall apply
                  to this Addendum No. 1 as if set out herein if full (mutatis mutandis).

            


    

  

  
    
      	

            	7.	
              This Addendum No. 1 may be entered into in any counterparts which when taken together shall constitute one and the same instrument.

            


    

  

       Date: 16th July 2018

  	/s/ Georgios A. Kaklamanos	 	/s/ Phillip Anderson 

        
	
          For and on behalf of

        	 	
          For and on behalf of

        
	
          the Sellers

        	 	
          the Original Buyers

        
	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	/s/ Phillip Anderson 

        	 	 
	
          For and on behalf of

        	 	 
	
          the Buyers
#### In the Matter of Julius S., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 883]

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Harold Lynch, J.), entered on or about September 24, 2002, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon a fact-finding determination that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree and attempted assault in the third degree, and placed him with the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of up to 12 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly determined that the victim was sufficiently familiar with appellant, a fellow student whom the victim had frequently encountered and occasionally greeted, so that the identifications at issue here were confirmatory and therefore exempt from the notice and hearing requirements of CPL article 710 *(see People v Rodriguez,*79 NY2d 445 [1992]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the record *(see People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]). The record also supports the court’s alternate finding that there was an independent source for the identifications. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Williams and Friedman, JJ.
#### FALESAU and MAGAULI, Plaintiffs v. TUITELE, Defendant

No. 19-1918

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Legaoa”]

Date unknown

A. STRONACH, *President of the High Court*

FINAL JUDGMENT

Under the terms of the Deed to the land in controversy, from TALAMAIVAO, as construed by the High Court, in *Toomata v. People of Leone,*1 A.S.R. 142 (1906), the title to the land in controversy, a portion of the land “LEGAOA”, is vested in TOOMATA, now known as TUITELE, TALI and AMELIA VA. The portion of the land “LEGAOA”, which was given by this deed to AMELIA VA alone was by the High Court, in said case, awarded to the people of Leone.

*299The plaintiffs in this case have no standing in Court, at the present time, as their mother, AMELIA VA, is still living and has not conveyed her interest in said land to them.

The Judgment of the High Court is that the title to the land in controversy is vested in TOOMATA, now known as TUITELE, TALI and AMELIA VA, as tenants in common, each of these persons having an equal interest in the same.

The costs of this case are assessed at Twenty ($20.00) Dollars, of which Ten ($10.00) Dollars is to be paid by the plaintiffs and Ten ($10.00) Dollars by the defendants.
#### Matter of Village of Westfield, Appellant, *v.*Milo R. Maltbie et al., Constituting the Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Respondents.

Argued May 24, 1943;

decided June 18, 1943.

*878
      *Albert R. Connelly*and *George S. Collins*for appellant.

*Gay H. Brown*and *George H. Kenny*for respondent.

Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6471 

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to prohibit contributions and donations by foreign nationals in connection with State or 

local ballot initiatives or referenda and recall elections. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 21, 2023 

Ms. PORTER (for herself, Mr. GALLAGHER, Ms. SEWELL, Mr. CISCOMANI, Mr. 

KILMER, Mr. LAMALFA, Mrs. TORRES of California, Mr. DUARTE, and 

Mrs. KIM of California) introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on House Administration 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to 

prohibit contributions and donations by foreign nationals 

in connection with State or local ballot initiatives or 

referenda and recall elections. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Foreign Inter5 ference in Ballot Measures Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6471 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CONTRIBUTIONS AND DONATIONS 

2 BY FOREIGN NATIONALS IN CONNECTION 

3 WITH BALLOT INITIATIVES AND REFERENDA 

4 AND RECALL ELECTIONS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 319(a)(1)(A) of the Fed6 eral Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 

7 30121(a)(1)(A)) is amended by striking ‘‘election;’’ and 

8 inserting the following: ‘‘election, including a State or local 

9 ballot initiative or referendum or recall election;’’. 

10 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

11 this Act shall apply with respect to elections held in 2024 

12 or any succeeding year. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
**EXHIBIT 12.2****CERTIFICATIONS**I, Dan Amadori, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F, as amended by this Form20-F/A, of Micromem Technologies Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of,and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b. Paragraph omitted in accordance with SEC transitioninstructions contained in SEC release 34-47986;  c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscalquarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting. 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors(or persons performing the equivalent functions): a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.        Date: June 23, 2006 /s/ Dan Amadori   Dan Amadori   Chief Financial Officer
##### 



Exhibit 99.6 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Brookfield Properties Corporation
(the Company) on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2003, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, Richard B. Clark, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company. By:
    /s/ Richard B. ClarkRichard B. ClarkMay 18, 2004
    
    President and Chief Executive Officer
#### Richard Paul WARD, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 20903.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Nov. 8, 1966.

Lynn R. Eastman, Lakewood, Cal., for appellant.

Manuel L. Real, U. S. Atty., Robert L. Brosio, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chief, Crim. Div., Roger A. Browning, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before HAMLEY and ELY, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

 Richard Paul Ward was tried by a jury and convicted on three counts of an indictment charging violations of the narcotics laws of the United States. He appeals, contending that: (1) he had ineffective representation by counsel at his trial because his counsel was denied adequate time to prepare for trial; (2) there was prejudicial misconduct by the deputy United States Attorney who attempted to put into evidence, as an exhibit, marijuana which was not connected with any of the charges against Ward; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.

*570Ward was represented by counsel at the argument in this court. We accordingly deny Ward’s motion for an order directing that the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, who has custody of Ward, produce him in court at the time of argument.

We have examined each of the arguments advanced on behalf of Ward on this appeal and find all of them to be without merit. The judgment of conviction is therefore

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Karen B. OLSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30022

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted August 4, 2016 Anchorage, Alaska

Filed May 15, 2017

Retta-Rae Randall, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Jo Ann Farrington, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee

Glenda Kerry, Esquire, Attorney, Law Office of Glenda J. Kerry, Girdwood, AK, for Defendant-Appellant

*318Before: FISHER, PAEZ and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Karen Olson appeals her convictions for making false statements to the United States Department of Agriculture Rural Development Program (USDA) under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 and misprision of felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4. She argues the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and that the district court erred in failing to provide her requested jury instructions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Olson knowingly submitted inflated equipment valuations to the USDA in November 2008 to influence the USDA to subordinate its lien interest in those assets. *See United States v. Nevils,*598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (standard of review). The government offered evidence that the equipment was overvalued, and that Olson knew in November 2008 the earlier values submitted to the USDA were inaccurate in light of Beus’ decision to lease old equipment rather than buy new equipment.

2. Substantial evidence also supports Olson’s conviction for misprision of felony. *See id,*A rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Olson knew Beus submitted false statements to the USDA in his scheme to misappropriate grant funds, but nonetheless Olson hid Beus’ wrongdoing in November 2008 by adopting his overvaluation of equipment.1

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Olson’s false statement instruction. *See United States v. Lloyd,*807 F.3d 1128, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2015) (standard of review). Olson’s proposed instruction on the false statement count could have misled the jury. *See United States v. Keyser,*704 F.3d 631, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] defendant ... is not entitled to an instruction in a particular form.”). In light of the district court’s general instruction that the jury’s verdict must be unanimous, the court also permissibly rejected Olson’s specific unanimity instruction. *See Jeffries v. Blodgett,*5 F.3d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir. 1993) (“With regard to juror unanimity, a general unanimity instruction will normally suffice...,”).

4.Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Olson’s misprision of felony instruction, which also contained a specific unanimity instruction. The court’s general instruction that the jury’s verdict be unanimous sufficed. *See id.*

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. In a concurrently filed opinion, we conclude sufficient evidence also supports a finding that Olson knew Beus' conduct constituted a felony.