alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Amendment to Warrant Agreement



 Exhibit 4.2(B) 
 AMENDMENT TO WARRANT AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment to Warrant Agreement (the
“Agreement”) is made as of December 5, 2005 by and between Silicon Valley Bank (“Holder) and OncoMed Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Company”) 
 RECITALS 
 A. Company and Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”) executed a
Warrant to Purchase Stock, dated October 14, 2005, together with all schedules and exhibits thereto (the “Warrant Agreement”). Pursuant to the terms and conditions in the Warrant Agreement, SVB transferred its interest in the Warrant
Agreement to SVB Financial Group (formerly Silicon Valley Bancshares). 
 B Company has requested that Holder extend the
Equipment Availability End Date and correspondingly, the number of Shares available to Holder to purchase shall be increased. 

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
 1. Effective upon the extension of the Equipment Availability End Date by the First Amendment to Loan and Security Agreement between the Company and Holder to November 30, 2006, the Number of Shares
available for issuance upon exercise of the Warrant to Purchase Stock shall be increased from 60,000 shares to 70,048 shares of Series A Preferred Stock. 
 2. LEGAL EFFECT; INTERPRETATION. This Agreement amends certain terms of the Warrant Agreement. Company confirms that, except as amended by this Agreement, the Warrant Agreement remain in full force
and effect. Unless otherwise defined, all terms capitalized in this Agreement shall have the meanings assigned in the Warrant Agreement, except Equipment Availability End Date which shall be as defined in the Loan and Security Agreement, as amended
by the First Amendment to Loan and Security Agreement. This Agreement, together with the Warrant Agreement, constitutes the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all prior agreements and
negotiations. 
 3. COUNTERPARTS. This Agreement may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of which shall be
deemed an original, and all of which shall constitute one and the same instrument. 
 4. TIME OF ESSENCE. Time is of the
essence for the performance of all obligations set forth in this Agreement. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed
this Agreement as of the date first written above. 
  

									
	COMPANY:	 		 	HOLDER:
			
	ONCOMED PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.	 		 	SILICON VALLEY BANK
					
	By:	 	 /s/    James N.
Woody        
	 		 	By:	 	 /s/    Christopher
Wagner        

	Name:	 	 JAMES N. WOODY
	 		 	Name:	 	 Christopher Wagner

	Title:	 	 CEO
	 		 	Title:	 	 Sr Rel Mgr

		 	12-22-05
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Postal Service

# AGENCY:

                        Postal ServiceTM.                    

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

# DATES:

*Date of required notice:*                         February 10, 2022.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sean Robinson, 202-268-8405.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The United States Postal Service® hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on January 28, 2022, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a                     *USPS Request to Add Priority Mail Contract 735 to Competitive Product List.*                     Documents are available at                     *www.prc.gov,*                     Docket Nos. MC2022-38, CP2022-45.                

Sean Robinson,

Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.

[FR Doc. 2022-02751 Filed 2-9-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
Timothy Brian GREER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-2130

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 16, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
From: Lydia W egman/RTP/USEPA/US To: Heidi King <hking@omb.eop.gov>, dmancini@omb.eop.gov Cc: Bridgid Curry/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Marta Montoro/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Joseph
- J Dougherty/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Scott Jenkins/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Tricia Crabtree/RTP/USEPA/US@E Date: 01/22/2010 10:33 PM Subject: Fw: Updated version of the NO2 final notice 

### Here's the track changes version.
#### In the Matter of Madeline Corr, Respondent, v Stephen Corr, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 649]

In a support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the former husband appeals from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Balkin, J.), dated February 10, 2003, which denied his objections to so much of an order of the same court (Watson, H.E.), dated December 5, 2002, as, after a hearing, denied his application for a downward modification of payments to the former wife for upkeep of the marital home.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The appellant’s contention that the Hearing Examiner applied the incorrect standard in denying his application for a downward modification of his spousal maintenance obligation is unpreserved for appellate review as that issue was not raised in his objections to the hearing examiner’s determination (see Matter *of Elia v Elia,*299 AD2d 358 [2002]). In any event, the appellant failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances warranting downward modification *(see Burke v Burke,*265 AD2d 285 [1999]; *Klapper v Klapper,*204 AD2d 518 [1994]).

The appellant’s remaining contentions either are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Altman, J.P., Cozier, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.
#### JOHN N. LINK, COUNTY JUDGE, &c., vs. R. K. MURPHY.

SUPREME COURT,

TYLER TERM, 1883.

*Bond for hire of a County Convict*— Limitation. Tile maxim of *nullum tcmpus occurrit regi*cannot be invoked by a county in a suit on a bond for the hire of a county convict. The statute of limitations of four years will bar an action brought upon such bond, if tliat period has elapsed from the maturity of the bond to the time o instituting- the suit.

Appeal from Anderson County.

TP". *0. Heeves*for appellant.

*T. J. Williams*for appellee.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

This suit was brought by John N. Link, county junge of Anderson county, upon a bond executed by R. K. Murphy and A. J. Wylie under the provisions of Arts. 1876 and 3604, Revised Statutes. The last payments, under the provisions of the bond, became due on the 18th day of May 1878, and this was shown by the petition. The appellees pleaded the statute of limitations of four years. This plea was sustained by the caurt, and the cause was dismissed. A motion *574for new trial being-overruled, the county judge appeals, and the ruling of the court upon this plea is the only assignment of error.

Did the court err in sustaining the plea ? It is urged with ab lity and plausibility by the county attorney who represents the appellant that the maxim *nullum tempus occurret r&gi*applies to suits for or by a county, and that therefore the court below erred in sustaining- the plea.

We have examined this subject very closly, and from the investigation given it, we have concluded that in a case like the one at bar, this plea cannot be interposed. The case cited by appellant is not, we think, directly in point. In that case,Colemau vs. Thurmond, 56 Tex. 515, the title to land was involved, and the court holds that as the statute of ten years imitations could not be pleaded against the state, the county being a part, or subdivision of the state, it cannot be pleaded against the eounty. The case in hand is a suit for a certain amount of money due by bond, and to which the state has no claim whatever, it being the property of the county.. To such a claim, can the statute be a bar ? While the reasoning in the case of Coleman vs. Thurmond might apply to this case, we do not believe that it was the intention of the court that it should. Cor we of the opinion, notwithstanding the want of harmony in the authorities upon this subject, that the great weight is in favor of the plea. City of Galveston vs. Menard, 23 Tex. 408; 10 Barb. 155; Angel on Highways p. 403 § 324; Armstrong vs. Dallas, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 568; 8 Ohio 258; 9 Shep. (Me.) 445; 2 Dillon Munic. Crop. § 637, 638.

It being conceded that four years from the maturity of bond had expired, and the defendants having the right to plead limitation, we are of the opinion that the court did not err in sustaining the plea and dismissing the suit. The judgment is affirmed.
(1)
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of StemCells, Inc.;(2)
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;(3)
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
quarterly report;(4)
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
    
 (5)
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
    /s/ Rodney K. B. Young

Rodney K. B. YoungChief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (a)
    
    the Form 10-K of the Registrant for the Period Ended December 31, 2007, filed
on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; and(b)
    
    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
   /s/ Freddy MaldonadoFreddy MaldonadoChief Financial Officer
March 16, 2009
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 31 (Tuesday, February 15, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8584-8585]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03291]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meeting

TIME AND DATE: Thursday, February 17, 2022 at 11:00 a.m.

PLACE: 1050 First Street NE, Washington, DC. (This meeting will be a 
virtual meeting).

STATUS: This meeting will be closed to the public.

[[Page 8585]]


MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Audit conducted pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 
30111(b).
* * * * *

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Judith Ingram, Press Officer. 
Telephone: (202) 694-1220.
    Authority: Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b.

Laura E. Sinram,
Acting Secretary and Clerk of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2022-03291 Filed 2-11-22; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6715-01-P
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 97-40552

Summary Calendar

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DEWAYNE GRAYER,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6-96-CR-46-1

_________________________________________________________________

December 4, 1997

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

DeWayne Grayer appeals his sentence for possession with intent

to distribute and distribution of cocaine base pursuant to 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He argues that the district court attributed

an incorrect quantity of drugs to him by erroneously adopting the

facts as stated in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and

failing to resolve factual issues. He further argues that the

district court erroneously increased his offense level for the

possession of a firearm.
-2-

The district court did not err as to the quantity of drugs

attributable to Grayer. See United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d

929, 943 (5th Cir. 1994). The firearms enhancement is similarly

not erroneous. See United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 350

(5th Cir. 1993).

A F F I R M E D.
Ri ck Sco t t G ove rn or jenn i fer ellTo l l

Lt

. Gov e rno r 

# Florida Department of Environmental Protection Marjory Stoneman Douglas Building

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard T a llahas see, Florida 32399
- 3000 H ersc h el T. Vi nydrd I r Secret;n)' May 20, 2011 r- !oJ ,......., 

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- ;n ( _::::J 1 :::;­ :;0 -'"**-~** :1"1**~J** f'l c:: -c Ms, Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming e- N l ) -j**:~** -- Regional Administrator -J**~** ! (.**-~** -.' ! f1**c~** U.s. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4 \J 0, I' .... C r :.1::

- --;**.-,.~.** 61 Forsyth Street, SW -11 r il C n W**-"7~~** r

. ! Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3104**;::; ~~**  .-J N .-; 17! (':: 

## '" 00 '\:; Dear Ms. Fleming: Governor Rick Scott asked me to respond to an April 25, 2011 letter from Franklin Hill, Director of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Region 4 Superfund Division, soliciting the state of Florida's support for EPA to add the Continental Cleaners site, 798 NW 62nd Street, Miami, Florida, to the National Priorities List (NPL). Based on the site's high levels of chlorinated volatile organic compounds in groundwater, the site's proximity to public water supply wells, and the responsible party's unwillingness and inability to conduct cleanup, the state of Florida supports EPA's proposal to list the Continental Cleaners site on the NPL. We appreciate EPA's assistance in assessing and cleaning up contaminated sites in Florida. If you have any questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Mr. Jorge Caspary, Director of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) Division of Waste Management, at (850) 245-8697.



### r 1SinCerelY" / / \ •

### V7**'** 

### I
-I 

# -'7

. 1

. rschel T. VinY'Y"d Jr. Secretary

cc : large Caspary, Director, Division of Waste Management, DEP Kevin Claridge, Acting Director, Southeast District, DEP Wilbur Mayorga, Section Chief, Pollution Control Division, Miami-Dade County Department of Environmental Resource Management

WW\ \ /

. dcp.s ICllc. 11

. LI S
NO. 07-06-0330-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

AUGUST 15, 2006

______________________________

LEMUEL MATTHEW SHELTON, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;

NO. B14964-0305; HONORABLE ED SELF, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Lemuel Matthew Shelton was convicted of driving while intoxicated and

sentenced to five years confinement and a $2,500 fine, suspended in favor of community

supervision. On February 6, 2006, the trial court granted the State’s motion to revoke

community supervision and imposed the original sentence. On July 27, 2006, appellant
2

filed a pro se document indicating he had expressed to his appointed counsel, Laurie Key,

an intent to appeal the judgment revoking community supervision. He maintains an appeal

bond of $20,000 was posted and that he was later arrested for failing to prosecute the

appeal. The Hale County District Clerk confirmed by letter that an appeal bond had been

posted on February 6, 2006. The District Clerk also noted that on April 4, 2006, appellant

was in her office and had expressed an intent to appeal his revocation, but did not file any

documents. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

A defendant must file a written notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within 30

days after the date sentence is imposed. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(c) & 26.2(a)(1). The

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a fifteen-day window in which to file the notice

of appeal if it is accompanied by a motion for extension of time. Tex. R. App. P. 26.3. This

Court is without jurisdiction to address the merits of an appeal and can take no action other

than to dismiss the appeal if it is not timely perfected. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d

208, 210 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998). Appellant’s intent to appeal expressed in the document filed

on July 27, 2006, is untimely and does not invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.

Appellant may be entitled to an out-of-time appeal by filing a post-conviction writ of

habeas corpus returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, § 3 (Vernon 2005). See also Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369, 374

(Tex.Cr.App. 1988) (holding that counsel has a duty to perfect an appeal whether appointed

or retained).
3

Accordingly, we dismiss the purported appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Don H. Reavis

 Justice

Do not publish.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the balance
sheet and statement of operations found on pages 3 and 4 of the Company's form
10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         117,350
<SECURITIES>                                 2,451,241
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,620,852
<PP&E>                                         126,413
<DEPRECIATION>                                (62,289)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,702,896
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           60,536
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           373
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,749,185
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,702,896
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  532,286
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (470,212)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (470,212)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (470,212)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.09)




</TABLE>
#### Arthur WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. William MORRISON, Transportation Officer-Beto Unit; Rutillio Callabero, Transportation Officer-Beto Unit, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-41407

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 31, 2017

Arthur Williams, Pro Se

Heather Kriscenski Rhea, Office of the Attorney General, Law Enforcement Defense Division, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellee

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Arthur Williams, Texas prisoner # 1036680, has applied for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in this appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendant William Morrison and its dismissal of Williams’s civil rights complaint. By moving this court for leave to proceed IFP, Williams is challenging the determination that his appeal was not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). A motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal “must *297be directed solely to the trial court’s reasons for the certification decision.” *Id.*Our inquiry into good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Williams has failed to brief the legal merits of the district court’s certification decision and has, therefore, abandoned any challenge to it that he could have raised. *See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987); *Yohey v. Collins, 985*F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Even with proper briefing, Williams’s appeal is frivolous, as the summary judgment evidence established that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the claim that was the basis of the instant suit. *See Cowart v. Erwin,*837 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2016).

The motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2; *Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 & n.24.

The dismissal of Williams’s appeal as frivolous counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See Adepegba v. Hammons,*103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Williams is WARNED that receiving two more strikes will preclude him from proceeding in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he “is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” § 1915(g).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.