* United States District Judge for the Western District of

Texas, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 19, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

Revised September 5, 2003

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________________

No. 02-10500

__________________________

OSCAR D. WILLIAMS, JR; ET AL,

Plaintiffs,

THOMAS GENE BROWN, CECIL JACKSON; L.B. BRUMLEY

Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,

versus

KAUFMAN COUNTY; ROBERT HARRIS, Kaufman County Sheriff,

Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.

___________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

___________________________________________________

Before WIENER and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges, and FURGESON, District

Judge.*

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellants Thomas Gene Brown, Cecil Jackson and L.B.

Brumley (collectively “plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s

denial of their unlawful detention, invasion of privacy, and oral

harassment claims in their § 1983 suit against Sheriff Robert

Harris (“Harris”) and Kaufman County, Texas (“the County”),
1 According to the district court, the Kaufman County

Sheriff’s department considers the execution of a narcotics

warrant a “hazardous entry,” where weapons are likely to be

present. Additionally, in a March 1994 search of the Club,

2

(collectively, “defendants”). Defendants cross-appeal the district

court’s judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claims for illegal

strip search, municipal liability against the county, nominal and

punitive damages against Harris in his personal capacity, and state

constitutional declarative relief. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In April of 1995, Sheriff Harris obtained a search warrant,

based on information he received from a confidential informant, for

a night club called the “Classic Club” in Terrell, Texas (the

“Club”). The affidavit used to secure the warrant identified five

individuals suspected of dealing crack cocaine, none of whom are

the plaintiffs here, and included as suspects “all other person or

persons whose names, identities, and descriptions are unknown to

the affiant.” The warrant itself, however, only authorized the

police to “enter the suspected place described in [the affidavit]

and to there search for the personal property described...and to

seize same and to arrest and bring before [the magistrate] each

suspected party named in [the affidavit].”

At about 9:45 p.m. the same day, Harris led a contingent of

approximately forty (40) officers to the Club to execute the

“hazardous” warrant.1 Although some individuals were able to run
police found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a concealed .25

caliber pistol. After this search, Harris apparently received an

anonymous telephone call threatening to kill him if he returned

to the Club. Harris also testified that an officer had been shot

at previously while attempting to execute a warrant at the Club. 

3

away, and others outside the premises allegedly hurled bottles and

rocks at the officers, the law enforcement personnel were able to

secure the outer perimeter of the search area, which included the

Club’s building and parking lot, and the entire city block up to

the roadway. On entering the Club, the officers noticed drugs on

the floors and tables.

Plaintiffs Cecil Jackson and L.B. Brumley were inside the

Club; plaintiff Thomas Gene Brown was outside, but when he

repeatedly attempted to gain admittance, an officer arrested him

and took him inside to be searched. The police detained

approximately 100 people, including plaintiffs, inside the Club for

about three hours. During that time, officers conducted a pat-down

search, strip search, and warrants check on each individual there.

Although strip searches were not part of any written policy

concerning the execution of hazardous warrants, Harris testified

that it was his standard policy to conduct a strip search on each

person within the search area, with or without individualized

probable cause. Also, pursuant to this “policy,” the officers

rehandcuffed plaintiffs (and all other detainees) and continued to

detain them after the strip searches until the entire search of the

Club and all occupants had been completed. Brumley got
2Plaintiff brought a variety of other claims, such as

excessive force, civil conspiracy, assault and battery, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress, but all were

rejected on summary judgment and have not been appealed to us. 

4

obstreperous after he was strip searched and was arrested for

disorderly conduct.

Three years later, 17 individuals brought suit under § 1983,

claiming that Harris and the County violated their Fourth Amendment

rights by engaging in an illegal strip search, unlawful detention

and oral harassment.2 Four plaintiffs were dismissed, and 10

others settled their claims. The three remaining plaintiffs

(plaintiffs-appellants herein) unsuccessfully attempted to amend

their complaint, in part to include an invasion-of-privacy claim.

At the summary judgment stage, the district court granted

summary judgment in favor of defendants on (1) the unlawful

detention claims of those plaintiffs inside the Club when the

premises were secured; (2) plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claims;

and (3) plaintiffs’ verbal harassment claims. The court denied

defendants’ summary judgment motion on (1) plaintiffs’ illegal

strip search claim; (2) the unlawful detention claims of plaintiffs

who were not originally in the Club, but were brought in only after

the premises were secured; and (3) plaintiffs’ policy claims

against Kaufman County.

After conducting a bench trial, the district court concluded

that (1) Harris had conducted an unconstitutional strip search of

plaintiffs, and he is not entitled to qualified immunity because
3The district court dismissed the unlawful detention claims

of all of the Group 1 plaintiffs, who consisted of those inside

the Club when the premises were secured by police, but allowed to

go to trial the detention claims of the Group 2 plaintiffs, who

consisted of those outside of the Club when the premises were

secured. Plaintiff Thomas Gene Brown was outside the Club when

the premises were secured, and therefore should have been named

in Group 2. When the court described the different groups of

plaintiffs, however, it placed Brown in Group 1. As the court

subsequently addressed Brown’s unlawful detention claim at trial,

the implied inclusion of his name in Group 1 at the summary

judgment stage appears to have been an inadvertent and harmless

mistake.

4 The court also directed the parties to attempt to resolve

the attorneys’ fees issues themselves. 

5

the rule of law prohibiting these searches was clearly established

at the time, making Harris’s conduct objectively unreasonable; (2)

Harris is entitled to qualified immunity on Brown’s illegal

detention claim, the only detention claim surviving summary

judgment;3 and (3) Kaufman County is liable for Harris’s conduct

because Harris is a policymaker whose actions (specifically, his

orally established policy of conducting strip searches irrespective

of the absence of reasonable suspicion) had been the moving force

behind the violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 

Based on these rulings, the court awarded each plaintiff

“nominal damages” of $100, and punitive damages of $15,000 against

Harris in his individual capacity. The court also awarded

plaintiffs declaratory relief, decreeing that Harris and the County

had violated plaintiffs’ rights under Article I, section 9 of the

Texas Constitution. The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim for

injunctive relief.4 Both plaintiffs and defendants timely filed
5 Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1994).

6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322-23 (1986).

7 Harper, 21 F.3d at 600.

8 Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1994).

6

notices of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de

novo.

5 Summary judgment is only proper if there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.6 To determine whether there are any

material factual issues, we consult the applicable substantive law

to define which issues are material, and then consider the evidence

relevant to those issues in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.7 

We review the district court’s bench trial conclusions of law

de novo, and findings of fact for clear error. Finally, we review

punitive damages awards for abuse of discretion only.8

B. Parties’ Contentions

Because the district court addressed plaintiffs’ claims at

both the summary judgment and trial stages of the litigation, and

because the parties appeal different aspects of the judgments

rendered, we briefly summarize the parties’ contentions on appeal
7

in the interest of clarity.

Plaintiffs make four claims (1) Harris supervised an unlawful

detention, which was objectively unreasonable, pretermitting

qualified immunity; (2) Harris’s search method amounted to an

invasion of plaintiffs’ privacy; (3) the officers use of racial

epithets violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights; and (4) the

County is liable for the constitutional violations caused by

Harris’s conduct. In short, plaintiffs contest essentially all of

the district court’s summary judgment holdings adverse to them. 

For their part, defendants argue that (1) within the context

of executing a hazardous search warrant, it was proper for the

officers under Harris’s command to conduct strip searches; but even

if plaintiffs’ rights were violated, Harris deserves qualified

immunity; (2) Harris acted reasonably in detaining plaintiffs until

the completion of the entire search of the Club; but even if Harris

acted unlawfully, he is entitled to qualified immunity; (3) the

district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims of invasion of

privacy for their failure to plead such claims; (4) the district

court properly denied plaintiffs’ claims of oral harassment because

plaintiffs failed to plead an equal protection claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment; (5) the district court erred in assessing

nominal (insisting that $100 per plaintiff is not nominal) and

punitive damages; (6) the district court erred in finding that

defendants violated the Texas Constitution; and (7) the County is

not liable for conduct that does not amount to a constitutional
9 536 U.S. 730 (2002).

10 Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Serv.,

299 F.3d 395, 408-09 (5th Cir. 2002).

11 The district court outlined a three step inquiry,

examining (1) whether a constitutional right was violated, (2)

whether that right was clearly established, and (3) whether the

officers engaged in objectively unreasonable conduct. The

district court, however, unnecessarily decoupled the clearly

established/objective unreasonableness test of the Supreme Court. 

That is, if a right is clearly established enough to impart fair

warning to officers, then their conduct in violating that right

cannot be objectively reasonable.

12 Hope, 536 U.S. at 736 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001).

8

violation.

C. Qualified Immunity Standard

To prevail in a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff must overcome an

officer’s defense of qualified immunity. Last term, in Hope v.

Pelzer, the Supreme Court rendered its most recent articulation of

this standard,9 which we subsequently adopted.10 To determine

whether relief is appropriate, the court must undertake a two-step

analysis.11 First, the court must evaluate whether a “plaintiff’s

allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.”12 We

address this inquiry in greater detail in connection with each of

the contested constitutional claims. 

Second, if a constitutional violation is found to have

occurred, the court must determine whether the defendant’s actions

violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
13 Id. at 739 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)).

14 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)).

15 Id. at 740 (relying on its reasoning and holding in

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)).

16 Id. (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269). According to the

Hope court, Lanier explained “that the ‘fair warning’ requirement

is identical under § 242 and the qualified immunity standard.” 

Hope, 536 U.S. at 740.

17 Id. at 741.

9

which a reasonable person would have known.”13 The Hope Court

reiterated the standard for a constitutional right to be clearly

established:

[I]ts contours “must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right. This is not to say that an

official action is protected by qualified immunity unless

the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful....but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”14

In Hope, the Court clarified that the factual situation from which

the pre-existing constitutional right developed does not have to be

“fundamentally similar” to the one before a court when addressing

qualified immunity.15 Rather, qualified immunity can be overcome

as long as “‘prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the

conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights.’”16 The Court

concluded that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct

violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”17

The appropriate inquiry, therefore, is “whether the state of
18 Id. The Hope Court addressed Alabama’s practice of

handcuffing inmates to a “hitching post” as a disciplinary

remedy. The Court concluded that prior precedent, an Alabama

regulation and a DOJ warning all sufficed to give prison

officials fair warning that their hitching post practice violated

the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 741-46. In particular, the

precedent it relied on already prohibited (1) handcuffing inmates

to fences for long periods of time, and (2) physical punishment

that occurred after a prisoner had terminated his resistance to

authority. Id. at 742-43.

19 444 U.S. 85, 88 (1979).

20 Id. at 92.

10

the law [at the time of the violation] gave [defendants] fair

warning that their alleged treatment of [plaintiffs] was

unconstitutional.”18

D. Unlawful Strip Search

1. Whether Harris’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment

On appeal, defendants argue that, within the context of

executing a hazardous search warrant, it was proper for Harris to

conduct strip searches of plaintiffs. In Ybarra v. Illinois, the

Supreme Court addressed the search of a bar patron, which occurred

during the execution of a search warrant that authorized police to

search the Aurora Tavern and a bartender named “Greg” for heroin

and other contraband.19 The Court accepted that police had a valid

warrant to search the premises, but concluded that “it gave them no

authority whatever to invade the constitutional protections

possessed individually by the tavern’s customers.”20 Reasoning

further, the Court stated:

“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others independently
21 Id. at 91 (emphasis added).

22 Id. at 92-93.

23 Id. at 94 (emphasis added).

11

suspected of criminal activity does not, without more,

give rise to probable cause to search that

person....Where the standard is probable cause, a search

or seizure of a person must be supported by probable

cause particularized with respect to that person. This

requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply

pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists

probable cause to search or seize another or to search

the premises where the person may happen to be.21

The Court also concluded that even the initial frisk of the

patron, Ybarra, much less his subsequent search, was unjustified.22

Although Terry v. Ohio created an exception to the probable cause

requirement, allowing police officers to protect themselves by

conducting a patdown of a suspect, the Ybarra court held that

“[t]he ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a

frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion

directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person

happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is

taking place.”23

Here, the district court concluded, relying primarily on

Ybarra, that Harris’s strip search of plaintiffs violated their

Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Harris and the County contend

that the violent history of the Club created exigent circumstances,

which threatened officer safety and thus justified the strip search

of the plaintiffs. In contrast to Ybarra, they argue, the exigent
24 As Ybarra held, “[n]othing in Terry can be understood to

allow...any search whatever for anything but weapons.” 444 U.S.

at 93-94. The Court also stated that “a law enforcement officer,

for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find

weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the

possession of the person he has accosted.” Id. at 93.

12

circumstances in this case presented a situation in which there was

“more” than plaintiffs’ “mere propinquity to others independently

suspected of criminal activity.” 

Although the discrete facts of this case differ from Ybarra,

those differences are not sufficient to create a meaningful

distinction. Ybarra squarely held that in premises searches like

this one, police must have either articulable reasonable suspicion

to frisk an individual or probable cause to search him. The record

evidence, in particular Harris’s own testimony, reflects that, visà-vis the plaintiffs, the police lacked even reasonable suspicion.

None of the plaintiffs was named in the warrant, and Harris offered

no reasonable belief that the plaintiffs in particular were armed

or engaged in criminal activity. Even if, based solely on the

Club’s history, it had been reasonable for Harris to suspect that

plaintiffs were armed or carrying drugs, searching them would still

have been unlawful: Ybarra reiterated that the Terry-style search

is limited to a frisk for weapons.

24 Harris’s officers frisked the

plaintiffs, but found no evidence of weapons, drugs or contraband

to ripen into the probable cause required for a full-blown search.

Harris testified that the officers conducting the search had no

individualized probable cause as to any of the plaintiffs.
25 The district court also found that Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520 (1979) justifies strip searches on the reasonable

suspicion that an individual is concealing weapons or contraband. 

Bell, however, dealt with pre-trial detainees who were awaiting

trial on serious federal charges. Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767

F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining Bell’s holding). Thus,

the intrusiveness/law enforcement interests balance was more

heavily in favor of law enforcement than the one conducted here,

in which the police lacked both articulable reasonable suspicion

and probable cause of wrong-doing to conduct any type of search.

13

Instead, he stated only that there was “probable cause to believe

that everyone in there may have had drugs on them.” Finally, as

the district court reasonably explained, the intrusiveness of the

search outweighed the legitimate law enforcement interests in

protection and safety, because the officers had already handcuffed

and patted down the plaintiffs before forcing them to undergo strip

searches.25

Neither of the other two potential justifications for the

strip search —— arrest or identity in a warrant —— mitigate the

unlawfulness of the search. First, although two of the plaintiffs,

Brumley and Brown, were arrested that evening, neither of the

arrests justified strip searches under the applicable law. Brumley

was arrested for disorderly conduct after he was strip searched;

thus his post hoc arrest could not have justified the search.

Brown was arrested before the search, but for attempting to enter

the Club (claiming he owned it) in spite of an officer’s order to

leave the area. 

We have allowed strip searches in custodial situations but,

consistently, not when the suspect has committed only a minor
26 Watt v. Richardson Police Dep’t, 849 F.2d 195, 199 (5th

Cir. 1988) Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57.

14

offense and there exists no reasonable suspicion that he might

possess weapons or contraband.26 Although Brown was attempting to

enter a Club in which drugs were found, defendants offer no

evidence for suspecting that he possessed weapons or contraband.

Indeed, Harris admitted that he had no probable cause toward Brown;

the arresting officer testified that he had no suspicion that Brown

was carrying weapons; and prior to the strip search the officers

took everything out of Brown’s pockets, revealing no weapons or

drugs, and thereby dispelling any suspicion of illegal activity.

As a result, the subsequent strip search, after reasonable

suspicion had failed to mature into probable cause, was

unreasonably intrusive.

Second, the affidavit that Harris filed to obtain the warrant

was insufficient to justify a strip search of plaintiffs. The

affidavit submitted for the warrant included as suspects “all other

person or persons whose names, identities, and descriptions are

unknown to the affiant.” The warrant itself only authorized the

police to “enter the suspected place described in [the affidavit]

and to there search for the personal property described...and to

seize same and to arrest and bring before [the magistrate] each

suspected party named in [the affidavit]” (emphasis added). None

of the plaintiffs was named as a suspect in the affidavit.

Furthermore, as Ybarra confirmed, because the Fourth Amendment
27 444 U.S. at 92, n.4.

28 849 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1988).

29 Kaufman only argues on appeal that the strip search was

constitutional, and does not raise the qualified immunity issue.

15

requires particularity, “‘open-ended’ or ‘general’ warrants are

constitutionally prohibited.”27 To construe this warrant as

authorizing a general search of any person found in the Club would

sanction exactly the type of general warrant that the Constitution

forbids.

In sum, the strip search of the plaintiffs was unlawful

because Harris lacked probable cause toward each of them. 

2. Whether the law was “clearly established”

The district court concluded that “no reasonable officer could

have believed that conducting a strip search in these

circumstances, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, was

objectively reasonable.” The court noted that both Ybarra and Watt

v. Richardson Police Department28 clearly established that strip

searches conducted without individualized reasonable suspicion or

probable cause are unlawful. On appeal, Harris contends that

reasonable officers could have disagreed about the legality of the

strip search because of the hazardous conditions surrounding the

execution of the search warrant.29

Hope instructs that once it is clear that a constitutional

violation has occurred, courts must examine whether the state of

the law at the time gave the defendants fair warning that their
30 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91.

16

behavior toward the plaintiffs was unlawful. In this case, we

agree with the district court that Ybarra and our case law on strip

searches provided fair warning to Harris that his conduct was

unlawful. Ybarra addressed a situation substantially similar to

the one here, and explicitly held that officers must have

reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk or individualized probable

cause to conduct a lawful search. Even accepting that there were

aspects of this warrant’s search that made it more hazardous than

the one conducted in Ybarra, or made it more likely that multiple

persons would be in possession of drugs, none of these extenuating

circumstances created probable cause or reasonable suspicion

“particularized with respect to [plaintiffs].”30 And even if

hazardous circumstances had given rise to reasonable suspicion that

plaintiffs, by being present, might have possessed weapons or

contraband, Harris should have known that his officers were limited

to a patdown of each plaintiff. Thus, to the extent this case

differs factually from Ybarra, it still fits comfortably under the

general rule promulgated by the Supreme Court in that case.

Indeed, Harris’s declaration that “we did have probable cause to

believe that everyone in [the Club] may have had drugs on them”

demonstrates his unjustified disregard or deliberate ignorance of

the rule articulated by the Ybarra court.

In addition, our prohibition of strip searches in other
31 767 F.2d at 156 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

559 (1979)).

32 Id. at 156-57 (emphasis added).

33 849 F.2d at 197, 199.

17

contexts presented more than fair warning at the time that the

strip searches at issue here were illegal. In Stewart v. Lubbock

County, we employed the test articulated in Bell v. Wolfish,

balancing law enforcement interests in the search against the level

of invasion of personal rights caused by the search.31 We concluded

that the strip search policy at issue there violated the Fourth

Amendment because it applied to minor offenders about whom the

police had no reasonable suspicion of possessing weapons or

contraband.32 Similarly, in Watt v. Richardson Police Department,

we recognized that even though strip searches of inmates were often

allowed to maintain institutional security, when an arrestee’s

offense is minor, his criminal history innocuous or ancient, and

his personal characteristics at odds with reasonable fears about

prison security, the strip search is illegal.33 

Unlike both Stewart and Watt, this case concerns individuals

outside the prison context, thus individuals toward whom the police

had even less individualized reasonable suspicion or probable cause

—— none, to be precise. Thus, if any law enforcement interest

existed at all, it concerned only officer safety, not prison

security. After handcuffing and patting down the plaintiffs here,

however, even this law enforcement interest ceased to exist. On
34In both of those cases, there was no allegation that the

privacy of the suspect was compromised. Here, however,

plaintiffs alleged that they were not afforded the requisite

privacy, and the district court found that the searches were

conducted “in an atmosphere of questionable privacy.” 

18

appeal, Harris and the County repeatedly encant the hazardous

conditions of the search, yet Harris admits that he had no

individualized probable cause that any of the plaintiffs had

weapons, drugs or contraband. Furthermore, even though Brown was

arrested before he was strip searched, he was arrested because he

interfered with the duties of a public servant, not because of any

probable cause or reasonable suspicion related to drugs or weapons.

To the extent the police were legitimately worried about their

safety in regard to Brown or any other individuals before or during

the searches, those concerns surely evanesced once the officers

handcuffed and patted down the plaintiffs. At that point, the law

enforcement interests were substantially less significant than

those in either Stewart or Watt. Finally, weighed against this

interest, the invasion of personal rights caused by the strip

searches here are at least if not more intrusive than in either

Stewart or Watt.

34 In short, Stewart and Watt also provided fair

warning to Harris that law enforcement interests in safety did not

justify the extreme intrusiveness of strip searches especially once

the plaintiffs were handcuffed and patted down.

In sum, Ybarra, Stewart and Watt dispel any doubt that the law

was clearly established by the night of the raid in April, 1995,
19

that strip searching individuals, about whom the police had no

individualized probable cause of weapon or drug possession, was

unlawful. This in turn precludes Harris’s entitlement to qualified

immunity.

E. Unlawful Detention

1. Whether Harris’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment

The district court rejected Brumley’s and Jackson’s unlawful

detention claims at summary judgment and rejected Brown’s claim

after the bench trial, all on qualified immunity grounds. The

court concluded that despite its reservations about the length of

detention, under Michigan v. Summers it was not objectively

unreasonable for the officers to detain all those present in the

Club, including plaintiffs, until completion of the search.

Although Brown was not on the premises when the search began, the

court nonetheless also concluded that his detention was not

objectively unreasonable, inasmuch as Brown had voluntarily come

within the search perimeter by insisting on entering the Club,

despite warnings to leave the area.

On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the court erred in granting

summary judgment against Brumley and Jackson, and judgment against

Brown, on their detention claims. Plaintiffs contend that there

was no justifiable reason to detain plaintiffs after they were

strip searched and cleared of outstanding warrants. Their

continued, re-handcuffed detention, they argue, was not the least
35 Plaintiffs also assert that they were detained for three

hours after completion of the strip search. This assertion is

contradicted by the district court’s factual finding and record

testimony that they entire search of the Club lasted only about

three hours. 

36 452 U.S. 692, 699-701 (1981).

37 Id. at 700.

38 Id. at 699-700.

39 Id. at 699.

40 Id. at 700.

20

intrusive method available to the police, and thus constituted

unlawful detention.35

In Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court reiterated the

approach by which a seizure must be analyzed.36 There is a “general

rule that every arrest, and every seizure having the essential

attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is

supported by probable cause.”37 This rule is tempered, however, by

the “ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth

Amendment.”38 Thus, some seizures, even though longer than

momentary, “constitute such limited intrusions on the personal

security of those detained and are justified by such substantial

law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than

probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for

suspecting criminal activity.”39 Such intrusions are “not confined

to the momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk

for weapons,” as was involved in Terry v. Ohio.

40
41 Id. at 700-01.

42 Id. at 701-02.

43 Id. at 702.

21

For determining whether a seizure falls into this exception

to the general rule, the Court set out a familiar balancing test,

which weighed the character of the intrusion against the character

of the justification.41 In Summers, the Court addressed whether

police who were about to execute a warrant to search a house acted

permissibly when they detained an individual who was emerging from

the house and who turned out to be the owner, while they conducted

the search. The Court found the intrusion substantially less

invasive than an arrest because (1) the police conducted the search

pursuant to a valid warrant, which already authorized a

substantial, and arguably more intrusive, invasion of privacy of

the detainee’s home; (2) the officers were unlikely to prolong the

detention to gain more information because they were primarily

seeking information from the search itself; and (3) the detention

was inside the detainee’s home instead of the police station,

thereby minimizing the public stigma associated with the event.42

In comparison, the character of the justification is measured

by both law enforcement interests and the nature of the articulable

facts supporting the detention.43 The Court identified three law

enforcement interests, all of which supported the detention at

issue: (1) preventing the flight of the suspect; (2) minimizing the
44 Id. at 702-03.

45 Id. at 703-04.

46 Id. at 704-05.

47 161 F.3d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1998).

22

risk of harm to the police; and (3) facilitating the orderly

completion of the search by having the occupant of the premises

present.44 Furthermore, the existence of the valid search warrant,

issued by a neutral magistrate to search a home for criminal

activity, established probable cause that someone in the home was

committing a crime, which in turn provided justification for

detaining the home’s occupant.45 The Court concluded:

If the evidence that a citizen’s residence is harboring

contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer

that an invasion of the citizen’s privacy is justified,

it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen

to remain while officers of the law execute a valid

warrant to search his home. Thus, for Fourth Amendment

purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband

founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the

limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises

while a proper search is conducted.46

In Heitschmidt v. City of Houston, we limited Summers to its

facts. We concluded that Summers only holds that “police have

limited authority to detain the occupant of a house without

probable cause while the premises is searched, when the detention

is neither prolonged nor unduly intrusive, and when police are

executing a validly executed search warrant for contraband.”47 

Heitschmidt involved a police search of a house in which the

occupant, Heitschmidt, had little known connection at the time of
48 Id. at 838. Heitschmidt was living with Anne Fucaluro,

who operated a prostitution ring. Fucaluro was arrested and

police obtained a warrant to search the house, but Heitschmidt

was not a target of the investigation, nor did police have

suspicion before the search that he was involved in any wrongdoing. Id. at 835.

49 Id. at 838.

50 Id. In particular, we noted that there was no evidence

that Heitschmidt was involved in the prostitution ring they were

investigating, or that he would use a weapon. Id.

51 Id. at 838-39.

52 Id. The Summers Court had specifically stated that it

did “not decide whether the same result [i.e. permissible

detention] would be justified if the search warrant merely

23

the search to the criminal activity for which the search warrant

was procured.48 Although the police had a warrant to search the

house, we reasoned that the intrusiveness of the detention was

substantial because Heitschmidt was allegedly handcuffed on the

street, pushed into the trunk of a car, and then detained for over

four hours without a bathroom break.49 In comparison, we found the

justifications for detention unpersuasive, because there was little

evidence Heitschmidt would flee, or that such restraint was

required for police protection.50 We reasoned further that a search

warrant is a weaker basis for detention when police know the

occupant’s identity and have no reasonable basis for suspecting

that that person is engaged in criminal activity.51 Finally, in

contrast to Summers, we noted that the search warrant was for

evidence of the other house occupant’s prostitution ring, not

specifically for contraband.52 On the basis of this analysis, we
authorized a search for evidence.” 452 U.S. at 705, n.20.

53 Heitschmidt, 161 F.3d at 839.

24

concluded that Heitschmidt had adequately alleged a violation of

his Fourth Amendment rights, and that the right alleged was clearly

established. We therefore held the officers’ conduct to be

objectively unreasonable.53 

In this case, Harris and the County argue that the detention

was reasonable. The County avers that the plaintiffs were allowed

to move around and use the bathroom after their individual

searches, and that the three hour detention was reasonable because

there were 100 people on the premises. Defendants also argue that

the violent history of the Club, and Harris’s fear that those

released early would return with firearms to harm the officers,

justified the lengthy detention.

There is no question that the seizure of plaintiffs had many

of the essential attributes of an arrest. We therefore must

determine whether the law enforcement interests outweighed

plaintiffs’ interest against intrusion as articulated in Summers

and Heitschmidt. We begin by noting that some factual details of

this case distinguish it from our narrow interpretation of Summers

(1) Plaintiffs were customers at a public commercial establishment,

not occupants of a residence; and (2) plaintiffs were subjected to

unlawful, unduly intrusive strip searches during the warrant-
54 Summers ultimately held that the authority to detain

occupants of premises was only permissible “while a proper search

is conducted.” 452 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added). Although Harris

had a valid warrant to search the premises, we have already

concluded that the strip search of plaintiffs was both improper

and illegal, and exceeded the scope of that warrant. 

55 Because Brown’s nephew owned the Club, he apparently had

an interest in finding out what was happening at the Club. But

this interest did not necessarily include remaining at the Club

while the search was conducted. He had not been at the Club that

evening, and was brought inside after the police had begun the

raid. Thus, his possible reasons for being there are not the

same as the house owner in Summers or Heitschmidt. 

25

authorized search of the premises.54 

Furthermore, when we apply the full Summers balancing test, we

confirm that the extended detention of plaintiffs was indeed

unlawful. The intrusiveness of the detention was much greater than

in Summers. Although Harris had a valid warrant to search the

Club, he went well beyond the limits of that warrant, conducting

highly intrusive strip searches of plaintiffs, about whom he had

neither individualized reasonable suspicion nor probable cause.

After failing to uncover contraband or weapons on the person of

plaintiffs, Harris nevertheless detained them and kept them

handcuffed for the remainder of the three-hour search. Because

this was a public establishment and not a private residence,

moreover, plaintiffs had no reason to remain at the Club during the

search.55 The illegal strip searches of plaintiffs and all other

occupants added to the prolongation of the detention and

demonstrated Harris’s intent to gain more information than he was

authorized to retrieve. Last, the public stigma associated with the
26

detention was greater than in either Summers or Heitschmidt,

because the detention lasted three hours in a public venue, not in

the obscurity of a residence.

On the opposite side of the scale are the law enforcement

interests and articulable facts supporting plaintiffs’ detention.

The proffered law enforcement interests in preventing flight and

maintaining safety here are questionable. Once the premises had

been secured and the officers had strip-searched and warrantchecked the plaintiffs, uncovering no evidence to create probable

cause, there was no need to prevent their flight and no

identifiable fear that, if released, plaintiffs would return to

inflict harm. 

In addition, there are no articulable facts that provide valid

support for the extended detention of plaintiffs. Although Harris

had a warrant to search the Club, and on that basis, had general,

non-specific probable cause that persons known or unknown might be

committing crimes in the Club, the warrant only permitted the

search of the premises and the five individuals named in the

affidavit. Because the warrant named specific individuals and did

not explicitly allow the more general search requested in Harris’s

affidavit, the judicially-prescribed justification for the extended

detention of plaintiffs was far less substantial than in Summers.

Once the police had patted down, strip searched, and conducted a

warrants check, moreover, the police surely had no articulable and

individualized suspicion to justify further detention of the
27

plaintiffs. 

Neither Brumley’s arrest for disorderly conduct during the

period of the detention nor Brown’s arrest for interfering with the

duties of a public servant alters our conclusion that the extended

detention was unlawful. Brumley’s arrest for disorderly conduct

occurred after the search and after a period, subsequent to the

search, during which Brumley was handcuffed and forced to lie facedown on the ground outside the Club. We cannot conclude that his

further detention was permissible on the basis of the arrest,

because such a conclusion would effectively allow the police to

create a potential threat to their safety through unconstitutional,

provocative conduct, and then rely on that manufactured threat to

perpetrate additional constitutional violations. Furthermore,

although Brown had shown a willingness to ignore police orders, he

had only sought admittance because of his family relationship to

the Club’s owner. Thus, his arrest had nothing to do with the

search of the Club. He was not present at the Club when the raid

began, and the officer who arrested him testified that he had no

probable cause to believe that Brown was carrying a weapon. In

fact, his “arrest” lasted only for the duration of the search and

he was never booked or incarcerated. 

Harris and the County nevertheless persist in urging that the

detention of plaintiffs was necessary for an orderly completion of

the search of the Club, and was reasonable both because of the

number of persons present at the Club and because of Harris’s fear
56 The ultimate standard of reasonableness in the Fourth

Amendment and the fact-specific character of these cases dissuade

us from attempting to decide exactly what would have been a

permissible period of detention had the police conducted a lawful

search. In other contexts, we have held that when an officer

pats down a person whom he reasonably suspects is carrying a

weapon, and finds nothing, the officer may not further detain the

individual, because his suspicion “has evaporated and no longer

justifies further detention.” United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d

431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993). Similarly, it is well-established in

this Circuit that a detention should end as soon as the

underlying justification for the stop is served, for instance by

running a computer check that comes back negative; any further

detention becomes an unreasonable seizure because it is

unsupported by probable cause. United States v. Dortch, 199

F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 1999). 

28

that those released would return armed. We are aware of the

circumstances that the police believed they were actually facing

when they executed their search warrant. The history of violence

and drug use certainly gave Harris reason to worry about the safety

of his officers. The nature of the search and the number of

persons present also made the search of the Club factually distinct

from the average search of small groups or a single person in a

less volatile venue. Given the number of persons inside the Club,

detention of plaintiffs for as long as reasonably required for the

police to search the premises and to search and arrest the

individuals named in the warrant may have been permissible.56 What

occurred, however, was a detention that lasted much longer than

necessary specifically because of the pervasive and protracted

illegal strip searching that occurred. We cannot credit an

argument that such a lengthy detention, including the time that

elapsed both before and after plaintiffs were strip searched, was
57 Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, n.21.

29

justifiable simply because the police elected to strip search

scores of other Club customers. 

In sum, the exception carved out in Summers, and shaped in

Heitschmidt, is inapplicable here. Because the law enforcement

interest proffered does not justify such lengthy, public intrusions

on plaintiffs, we hold the prolonged detention of plaintiffs to be

unlawful. 

2. Whether the law was “clearly established”

Although we hold today that the prolonged detention of

plaintiffs was unlawful, we nonetheless agree with the district

court that qualified immunity shields Harris from liability. Even

though Summers does not sanction Harris’s conduct, neither did it

establish a clear rule warning defendants that such conduct was

illegal. The Court only hinted that “[a]lthough special

circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, might lead to a

different conclusion in an unusual case, we are persuaded that this

routine detention of residents of a house while it was being

searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant is not such a

case.”57 Furthermore, Heitschmidt, which clarifies our views

regarding these types of detentions, was not decided until after

Harris’s search of the Club.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the illegal strip

search of plaintiffs corrupted the legality of their detention by
30

extending it unnecessarily. Still, the objective unreasonableness

of Harris’s conduct in ordering a strip search of plaintiffs does

not automatically make his conduct in unduly detaining plaintiffs

for the duration of the search objectively unreasonable in and of

itself. Whereas Ybarra established the clear rule that any full

search of plaintiffs required individualized probable cause,

Summers allows a seizure without probable cause when the proper

balance is struck between law enforcement and personal security

interests. Thus, Summers left the state of the law more ambiguous

as to what constituted an unlawful detention in a premises search

like the one here. In other words, under the law as it existed in

April, 1995, Harris had fair warning that his generalized law

enforcement safety interests did not justify strip searching

plaintiffs; the law was less clear about whether these same

interests were sufficient to permit detention of plaintiffs until

the completion of the otherwise unlawful search. We agree with the

district court’s grant of qualified immunity on plaintiffs’

unlawful detention claims.

F. Invasion of Privacy

The district court rejected plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy

claim on summary judgment because the then-current pleading before

the court, the original complaint, did not state this claim. The

magistrate judge had —— in his words —— “unfiled” plaintiffs’

amended complaint (which included the privacy claim) for failure to
58 See Moore v. Cornwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir.

1999)(holding that a strip search of a male prisoner by a female

officer in the absence of emergency circumstances constitutes a

claim that “could entitle [plaintiff] to relief for a Fourth

Amendment violation.”).

31

follow procedural rules, and then rejected plaintiffs’ second

attempt to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs never objected to or

sought review of these rulings. On appeal, plaintiffs still do not

contest the magistrate judge’s decision to reject their amended

complaints, and instead argue that the Fourth Amendment claim

pleaded in the original complaint includes the claim against

invasion of privacy.

To the extent that plaintiffs’ claim of invasion of privacy

rests on the Fourth Amendment, it fails because it is redundant to

their illegal strip search claim. Even assuming that the

plaintiffs could establish that strip searches were not conducted

in the privacy normally required (now a contested issue of fact),

this transgression is inseparable from the illegal strip search

violation itself. By finding the strip searches themselves

unlawful, there is no need to address a particular aspect of

searches that is potentially unlawful as well.58 If, perhaps,

defendants were within their constitutional authority to strip

search plaintiffs to begin with, but impermissibly conducted the

strip search in a public area, then plaintiffs may have had a

privacy-oriented Fourth Amendment claim. But those are not the

facts before us today. To the extent plaintiffs purport to make a
59 They cite Johnson v. Morel, which describes plaintiff’s

claim of oral racial harassment as an equal protection claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment. 876 F.2d 477, 478 (5th Cir.

1989).

32

separate invasion of privacy claim, it was not included in their

original complaint, and they do not appeal the rejection of their

attempts to amend that complaint. Thus, it is unnecessary for us

to address such a claim.

G. Use of Racial Epithets

The district court held that plaintiffs’ oral harassment claim

was insufficient because plaintiffs failed to make an equal

protection claim or even refer to the Fourteenth Amendment in their

pleadings. The court also concluded that even if plaintiffs had

adequately pleaded an equal protection claim, the law was not

clearly established that, in the instant context, racial slurs

alone are actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal,

plaintiffs argue that the racial slurs allegedly used by the police

violate the Fourth Amendment, because the Fourth Amendment embraces

all elements of a search and seizure. To support their assertion

that oral racial harassment violates the Fourth Amendment, however,

plaintiffs rely on precedent prohibiting racial insults and

discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.59 Plaintiffs attempt

to explain, with little justification, that although the

prohibition against oral harassment based on race occurred in the

context of the Equal Protection clause, the same prohibition is
60 See Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 706 (5th Cir. 1999)

(holding that “an officer’s use of a racial epithet, without

harassment or some other conduct that deprives the victim of

established rights, does not amount to an equal protection

violation”).

33

part of the Fourth Amendment and thus applies to police conduct. 

We agree with the district court that use of racial epithets

deserves our strongest condemnation. None would dispute that this

form of harassment is highly reprehensible, even more so if it

occurred in conjunction with the already invasive and humiliating

strip searches. 

Nevertheless, as appalling as such behavior would be, here it

would only aggravate a seizure that we have already concluded was

unlawful. Thus, whether the use of racial epithets alone amounts

to a separate and independent constitutional violation under the

Fourth Amendment is a question we need not reach because it is not

before us today. We have impliedly held that racial epithets that

accompany harassment or a violation of established rights may

amount to a separate equal protection violation.60 In this case,

however, for whatever reason, plaintiffs chose not to make an equal

protection claim. 

H. Municipal Liability

At the summary judgment stage, the district court concluded

that Harris’s strip search and detention of plaintiffs was the

official policy, practice and custom of the County because Harris

was the final policymaker in law enforcement. After trial, the
61 Colle v. Brazos County, 981 F.2d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 1993)

(citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658

(1978) and Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817-18 (1985)).

62 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).

63 Colle, 981 F.2d at 244 (citing Turner v. Upton County,

915 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1990)).

34

court also concluded that (1) plaintiffs suffered an injury as a

result of this policy, and (2) the policy was adopted with “callous

and deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those

affected.” On appeal, plaintiffs maintain that, as Harris was the

official policymaker for the County, his role makes the County

liable for the strip search and detention that Harris initiated and

pursued with respect to plaintiffs.

The law is well-established that a municipality such as the

County can be held liable for its policies and customs that

engender constitutional deprivation, but that it cannot be held

liable for the actions of its non-policy-making employees under a

theory of respondeat superior.

61 In Webster v. City of Houston, we

concluded that an official policy consists of, among other things,

“[a] policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is

officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking

officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated

policy-making authority.”62 We have also held that sheriffs in

Texas are final policymakers in the area of law enforcement. 63

Therefore, it is clear that the County can be held liable for

Harris’s intentional conduct, to the extent it constitutes the
64 See Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).

65 See id. 404-05 (1997) (“the conclusion that the action

taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized

decisionmaker itself violates federal law will also determine

that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury

of which the plaintiff complains”). The district court did not

need to determine whether Harris’s conduct also amounted to

deliberate indifference, because that element must be shown only

when there is a claim that the municipality’s facially lawful

action caused an employee to inflict the injury, not when the

municipality (through its policymaker) has directly caused the

injury, as has occurred here. Thus, it is unnecessary to examine

the deliberate indifference issue to establish liability in this

instance. See id. at 406-07 (reiterating that a “plaintiff

seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a

facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a

plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that the municipal action was

taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious

consequences”) (citation omitted).

35

“moving force” behind the alleged injury.64 

Harris testified that he is the final policymaker for law

enforcement matters in the County. Harris and others have

testified as well that both the strip search and lengthy detention

of the plaintiffs were conducted according to the Sheriff

Department’s unwritten policy for executing “hazardous” warrants.

As a result, Harris’s actions as policymaker were undeniably the

moving force behind, and the direct cause of, the violation of

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, thereby establishing the

County’s municipal liability.65 Finally, we note that the County

has not expressly contested its municipal liability, but rather

argued only that it is not liable for actions that do not amount to

constitutional violations, a truism that none contests.

I. Damages
66 Louisiana Acorn Fair Housing v. LeBlanc, 211 F.3d 298,

302 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 976

(5th Cir. 1983)).

36

The district court rejected plaintiffs’ request for

compensatory damages because it found that plaintiffs had failed to

prove a specific and discernable injury to their respective

emotional states. Nevertheless, the court awarded plaintiffs

nominal damages of $100 per plaintiff, and punitive damages of

$15,000 per plaintiff against Harris in his individual capacity.

Finding that Harris’s conduct “simply cannot be tolerated in a

civilized society,” the court concluded that punitive damages were

an appropriate punishment.

On appeal, Harris argues that: (1) nominal damages should have

been one dollar; (2) punitive damages were inappropriate because

Harris lacked evil intent or reckless and callous indifference when

carrying out the strip search and detention; and (3) even if

punitive damages were permissible, the district court’s award was

excessive. Plaintiffs do not contest the rejection of their

compensatory damages claim.

1. Nominal Damages

The law is well-established in this Circuit that plaintiffs

may recover nominal damages when their constitutional rights have

been violated but they are unable to prove actual injury.66 The

district court relied on the definition of nominal damages from

Black’s Law Dictionary which equates such damages with a “trifling
67 Black’s Law Dictionary, 396 (7th ed. 1999).

68 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978).

69 In the commercial context, we have awarded $2000 in

nominal damages and cited as guidance state courts that have

awarded between $500 and $5000 in nominal damages for commercial

disputes. See Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d

1488, 1491 (5th Cir. 1990).

70 LeBlanc, 211 F.3d at 303.

37

sum.”67 The court stated that it considered $100 to be nominal

“[g]iven the value of today’s dollar.” 

In Cary v. Piphus, the Supreme Court recognized the ability of

courts to award “a nominal sum of money” when a violation of one’s

rights does not result in actual injury, and awarded nominal

damages of one dollar.68 The Court did not indicate, however, that

in 1978 one dollar was the outer limit of such damages. Although

$100 is obviously greater than one dollar, this amount is certainly

not out of line with nominal damages that we have awarded in the

commercial state law context.69 We agree with the district court

(and regret), moreover, that today $100 is an insignificant sum,

and thus see no need to disturb that court’s conclusion. Further,

the court’s assessment of the situation is not clearly erroneous,

much less an abuse of discretion.

2. Punitive Damages

Just as nominal damages are allowed without proof of injury,

“a punitive award may stand in the absence of actual damages where

there has been a constitutional violation.”70 But punitive damages
71 Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1994)

(citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)) (emphasis added).

72 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999)

(citing Smith, 461 U.S. at 37, n.6, 41).

38

may be awarded only when the defendant’s conduct “is ‘motivated by

evil intent’ or demonstrates ‘reckless or callous indifference’ to

a person’s constitutional rights.”71 The latter standard requires

“recklessness in its subjective form,” i.e. “a ‘subjective

consciousness’ of a risk of injury or illegality and a ‘criminal

indifference to civil obligations.’”72 The district court held that

Harris demonstrated a reckless indifference; Harris insists that he

acted in good faith.

The record provides more than enough evidence from which to

conclude that Harris acted with reckless indifference toward the

constitutional rights of plaintiffs. Although Harris told the

court that he believed that he had probable cause to suspect that

everyone in the Club had some connection to drugs, it was wellestablished at the time of this search that Harris needed

individualized probable cause to search each of the plaintiffs and

the ninety-plus other individuals at the Club who were not named in

the warrant. Not only did Harris lack particularized probable

cause when entering the Club, none materialized vis-à-vis the

plaintiffs after a patdown. Without any probable cause or

articulable reasonable suspicion after a patdown, Harris simply had

no legal authority to conduct a strip search. Moreover, the
73 See United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1304 (5th

Cir. 1990)(recognizing and applying Ybarra, but distinguishing

the facts of the case from its holding).

39

magistrate who issued the search warrant gave Harris only enough

authority to search the premises and the five individuals named in

the warrant, not all others in the Club as requested in Harris’s

affidavit. We conclude that ignoring the limited scope of search

authorized by the warrant, and disregarding the Fourth Amendment

rights of plaintiffs as long-established by the Supreme Court and

recognized by this Court,73 constitutes reckless indifference to

such rights. In addition, in light of the testimony detailing the

atmosphere of questionable privacy during the strip searches and

the use of racial slurs, we cannot fault the district court’s

ruling that Harris was not acting in legal good faith. Even though

Harris is no longer Sheriff, punitive damages not only punish him

for his conduct; they serve as instructive warnings to his

successors. 

Harris nevertheless contends that, even if punitive damages

are appropriate, the damages awarded by the district court were

excessive. To determine whether punitive damages are excessive,

the Supreme Court requires consideration of three factors (1) the

degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, which

receives the heaviest weight; (2) the disparity between the harm

suffered (compensatory damages) and the punitive damages award; and

(3) the possible criminal and civil sanctions for comparable
74 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 580, 583

(1996).

75 Id. at 582-83 (citation and internal quotation marked

omitted). The Supreme Court’s recent revisit of the Gore factors

in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell

does not alter our conclusion here. __ U.S. __, 123 S.Ct. 1513

(2003). Campbell reviewed jury-awarded compensatory damages of

$1 million and punitive damages of $145 million; and although the

Court stated that extreme ratios should be presumptively invalid,

it focused primarily on the constitutionality of punitive damages

vis-a-vis compensatory damages awarded by juries. See id. at

1521, 1524. As the instant case concerns (1) the ratio between

punitive and nominal damages, (2) awarded by a judge rather than

a jury, (3) in much smaller dollar amounts of punitive damage

awards —— $100 nominal damages and $15,000 punitive damages per

plaintiff —— Campbell’s discussion of the proper ratio between

punitive and compensatory damages is inapposite to our

consideration today.

40

misconduct.74

As outlined above, the degree of reprehensibility of Harris’s

conduct is high because he perpetrated extremely invasive searches

on innocent individuals without specific probable cause or

reasonable suspicion, in contravention of the warrant itself and

clear precedent. Second, we agree with the district court that

although the disparity between compensatory damages and punitive

damages here is great, such disparity deserves less weight in §

1983 suits like this one. The Supreme Court has counseled that

this factor does not impose a mathematical formula for

constitutional proportionality, but instead only embodies “a

general concern of reasonableness.”75 Because actions seeking

vindication of constitutional rights are more likely to result only

in nominal damages, strict proportionality would defeat the ability
76 The third factor, what comparable criminal and civil

sanctions would have been for Harris, is not easily applicable to

this type of constitutional violation, because there is no

readily identifiable law imposing civil or criminal penalties on

law enforcement officers for such violations.

77 Our research has revealed relatively few other cases

addressing the amount of punitive damages awarded in the context

of civil rights actions. The Second Circuit concluded that

$10,000 in punitive damages when only nominal damages were

awarded “approaches the limits of what we would deem consistent

with constitutional constraints.” Provost v. City of Newburgh,

262 F.3d 146, 164 (2nd Cir. 2001). In a case concerning the

illegal strip search of a prisoner, the Seventh Circuit reduced a

jury-decided punitive damages award of $15,000 to $6,000. 

McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (7th Cir. 1984). 

For the illegal strip search of high school students, the New

Mexico Supreme Court approved punitive damages awards of $62,500

to one plaintiff and $37,500 to the other plaintiff, but also

awarded compensatory damages of $50,000 to each. Kennedy v.

Dexter Consol. Sch., 10 P.3d 115, 118, 125-126 (N.M. 2000). 

Although $15,000 may be slightly higher in this case than in

cases decided by other circuits, two factors convince us that the

amount is nonetheless reasonable: (1) the discretion given to the

trial court to make these decisions, and (2) the necessarily

unscientific balancing of the factors laid out in Gore which

supports our deferential posture to the district court on this

matter. 

41

to award punitive damages at all.76 Based on our review of the case

law and our deference to the district court’s discretion on this

matter, we conclude that $15,000 per plaintiff is not unreasonable

in light of the violations that took place.77 

J. Declaratory Relief

Finally, Harris and the County contend that they did not

violate Article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, which

mirrors the language of the Fourth Amendment. Both parties

acknowledge that this constitutional provision is interpreted as

congruent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the Texas
78 State v. Wagner, 821 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991).

42

Court of Appeals has held that “our article I, section 9 provides

at least as much protection as the Fourth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.”78 Thus, based on our earlier conclusions that

Harris and the County violated the Fourth Amendment, we also

conclude that the declaratory relief granted to plaintiffs is

appropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court

are, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.