alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Michael McGrinder, Respondent, against John F. Sullivan et al., Appellants. State Industrial Board, Respondent.

Argued January 5, 1943;

decided March 4, 1943.

*Floyd Coursen*and *Harry Wareham*for appellants.

*William Doblin*for claimant, respondent.

*12
      *Per Curiam.*

An employer and his insurance carrier appeal from an order of the Appellate Division which (1) reversed a determination of the State Industrial Board dismissing a claim made under the Workmen’s Compensation Law and (2) remitted the matter to the Board for a decision to the contrary. ■

The claimant was employed as a bartender in premises at Lexington avenue and 121st street, Manhattan, city of New York. The hours of his employment were from 5 p. m. to 4 a. m. He stated his case as follows: “ A customer came in, and he started an argument, and there was a lady in the back and I told him to keep quiet, but he wouldn’t do it, and he was using filthy language, so I had to put him out, and when I put him out he says, ‘ I will see you again.’ I didn’t think anything more about it, and I closed the door at 3:15, and when I went to 125th street he met me up there, and he wanted to shake hands with me, with his left hand, and he smashed me in the left eye with his right hand.” When the claimant was thus assaulted, he was waiting to take a street car to his home.

The parties are agreed that the injury arose “ out of ” the employment. (Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 2, subd. 7.) The Board found that the injury did not arise “ in the course of his employment.” (§ 2, subd. 4.) The Appellate Division reversed this finding for the reason that the quarrel outside the bar room was merely a continuation of the quarrel begun within.

We are not free to adopt this conclusion of the Appellate Division. The question was whether continuity of cause was so combined with continuity in time and space that the quarrel from origin to ending should be taken to be one. *(Matter of Field*v. *Charmette Knitted Fabric Co.,*245 N. Y. 139.) The negative answer given by the Board was an act of judgment upon a debatable matter of fact. The Appellate Division was without power to direct the Board to decide the other way as matter of law. (Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 20; *Matter of Dubinsky*v. *Kofsky,*266 N. Y. 631; *Matter of Daus*v. *Gunderman & Sons, Inc.,*283 N. Y. 459.)

*13The order of the Appellate Division should he reversed and the determination of the State Industrial Board reinstated, without costs.

Lehman, Ch. J., Loughban, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ., concur.

Ordered accordingly.
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th e Regiona l Counsel , AWP- 7 Western-Pacifi c Regio n Federa l Aviatio nAdministratio n P.O
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. - 2 -
#### Charles D. Coolidge *versus*Moses Poor and Another.

When a commission merchant, residing and transacting his business in this state, has occasion to sue his correspondent, living in another state, for the balance of his account, the cause of action is considered as arising in this state.

This was *assumpsit,*to recover the balance of the plaintiff’s account for moneys advanced and paid by him for the use of the defendants; who pleaded certain laws of the state of *Maryland,*for the relief of insolvent debtors, in bar of the action; and the issue was, whether the cause of action accrued in *Baltimore,*in that state.

On the trial of this issue before *Jackson,*J., it appeared that, at the time of the transactions between the parties upon which this action was founded, and ever since, the plaintiff was a merchant residing and doing business at *Boston,*and the defendants were merchants residing and doing business at *Baltimore.*

The plaintiff, from time to time, advanced and paid money in *Massachusetts,*by order and for the use of the defendants; and there sold and disposed of merchandise and other effects consigned and remitted to him by the defendants, the proceeds of which were passed to their credit; and for the balance of his account of all these negotiations, the present action was brought. * There was no special agreement, nor other circumstance, to distinguish this from other common negotiations between two merchants, residing in different places.

The judge directed the jury in favor of the plaintiff, and a verdict being so returned, the defendants moved for a new trial, on account of the said direction.

*Shaw,*for the defendants,

argued that the contract declared on was made with reference to the laws of *Maryland.*The money was paid on drafts made at *Baltimore.*Money is to be demanded and received from debtors at the place of their residence; and the plaintiff, as well as the defendants, must have intended and expected that the balance now sued for was to be paid on the plaintiff’s draft on the defendants, at *Baltimore.*Such is the usual manner of transacting business among merchants, and there was no evidence of any other intention in this case. The plaintiff could have had no remedy in view, but the laws of the country where his debtors dwell. (1)

*J. T. Austin,*for the plaintiff,

cited and relied on the case of *Bradford &f Al.*vs. *Farrand.*(2)

(1)

13 *Mass. Rep.*1, *Blanchard,*vs. *Russell*

(2)

*Ibid.*18.

*382*Per Curiam.*

The single question, in this case, is whether, when a commission merchant, residing and transacting his business in this state, shall have occasion to sue his correspondent, living in another stale, for the balance of his account, the cause of action shall be said to have arisen here, or in such other state ; and we are all of opinion the cause of action arises here, and that judgment, in this ease, be entered upon the verdict, *(a)*

(a)

**Vide *Tappan*vs. *Poor & Al.,*ante, 419
#### Hisako KAWAMURA and Kazutaka Kawamura v. Paul K. KIEVER, Appellant.

No. 15798.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued Oct. 21, 1966.

Decided Oct. 31, 1966.

*319Marshall Selikoff, Newark, N. J., (Jung, Selikoff & Rathman, Newark, N. J., on the brief), for appellant.

Lowell F. Curran, Jr., Princeton, N. J., (Smith, Stratton, Wise & Heher, Princeton, N. J., William L. Boyan, Trenton, N. J., on the brief), for appellees.

Before MARIS, McLAUGHLIN and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

The plaintiffs, husband and wife, were injured in an accident in which the automobile which the husband, Kazutaka Kawamura, was driving and in which the wife, Hisako Kawamura, was riding as a passenger was in a collision with an automobile being driven by the defendant. At the trial of their suit for damages in the District Court the jury rendered a verdict of $25,000.00 for the husband plaintiff and $20,000.00 for the wife plaintiff. A motion for a new trial as to the husband’s claim only and on the question of liability alone, was denied and the defendant appealed from the judgment in favor of the husband and from the order denying a new trial as to him.

The defendant urges here as he did in his motion for a new trial that the verdict in favor of the husband plaintiff was against the weight of the evidence, which, the defendant argues, indicates that the husband was guilty of contributory negligence and that the verdict was the result of passion, partiality, prejudice or mistake. Our examination of the record in the light of these contentions, however, satisfies us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial on these grounds. Nor do we think the trial judge erred, as the defendant asserts, in giving certain instructions to the jury and in failing to give others, with respect to the laws of New Jersey governing the operation of motor vehicles.

The judgment and order of the district court will be affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Michael Jay HAWLEY, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41038 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 21, 2017

Alan Reeve Jackson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mary Ann Cozby, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Traci Lynne Kenner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas., Tyler, TX, Plaintiff-Appellee

Michael Jay Hawley, Pro Se

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Michael Jay Hawley, federal prisoner # 15687-078, was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He appeals the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a reduction of sentence. Hawley argues that he is entitled to a reduction under Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782 and contends that the district court should have applied the offense level agreed upon in the plea agreement. He also asserts that the district court offered insufficient reasons for denying the motion.

Hawley is ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was sentenced below the amended guidelines range of imprisonment. *See*U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), p.s.; *United States v. Doublin,*572 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 2009). The district court was not required to provide reasons for its denial of the § 3582(c)(2) motion. *See United States v. Evans,*587 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 2009).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Symbol Name Material Weight Piece Cost 

(Total)

V Supplier Assembled Coolant Tubes 1 ### 0.2640 lb 1 V Coolant T-Joint 1 $0.27 0.1320 lb

2 V Coolant T-Joint-Clamp 1 PA66 GF30 $0.14 0.0657 lb

2 V Coolant T-Joint -inner 1 PA66 GF30 $0.14 0.0663 lb

3 V Coolant T-Joint -inner 1 PA66 GF30 $0.14 0.0663 lb

1 V Coolant T-Joint 1 $0.27 0.1320 lb

2 V Coolant T-Joint-Clamp 1 PA66 GF30 $0.14 0.0657 lb

2 V Coolant T-Joint -inner 1 PA66 GF30 $0.14 0.0663 lb

3 V Coolant T-Joint -inner 1 PA66 GF30 $0.14 0.0663 lb

0 V Coolant Pump Asm, PEB 1 Commodity Pricing $22.00 0.8768 lb

1 V Coolant Pump, PEB 1 Commodity Pricing $22.00 0.5807 lb

1 V Bracket, PEB, Coolant Pump 1 $0.00 0.2961 lb

0 V Bolt, Pump, Heater Core 1 Commodity Pricing $0.04 0.0170 lb

0 V Coolant Tube, To PEB Asm. 1 $1.76 0.5832 lb

1 V Coolant Tube, To PEB 1 $0.72 0.4700 lb

2 V Coolant Tube, To PEB 1 SBR - fiber reinfoirced $0.72 0.4700 lb

1 V Sheath, Coolant Tube to PEB 1 Commodity Pricing $0.60 0.0406 lb

1 V Hose Clamp, Medium 2 $0.22 0.0363 lb

0 V Coolant Tube, To PEB Pump, Asm 1 $0.91 0.3416 lb

1 V Coolant Tube, to PEB Pump 1 $0.40 0.2873 lb

2 V Coolant Tube, to PEB Pump-Material 1 SBR - fiber reinfoirced $0.40 0.2873 lb

1 V Sheath, Coolant Tube to PEB Pump 1 Commodity Pricing $0.29 0.0180 lb

1 V Hose Clamp, Medium 1 $0.22 0.0363 lb

0 V Coolant Tube, From PEB, Asm. 1 $0.74 0.2634 lb

1 V Coolant Tube, From PEB 1 $0.33 0.2160 lb

2 V Coolant Tube, From PEB-Material 1 $0.33 0.2160 lb

1 V Sheath, Coolant Tube to PEB 1 Commodity Pricing $0.19 0.0111 lb

1 V Hose Clamp, Medium 1 $0.22 0.0363 lb

0 V T-joint, Coolant, Small 1 $0.08 0.0370 lb

1 V T-joint, Coolant, Small-Molded 1 PA66 GF30 $0.08 0.0370 lb

0 V Hose Clamp, Medium 2 $0.22 0.0363 lb

0 V Coolant Pump Asm, Heater Core 1 Commodity Pricing $21.00 0.7713 lb

0 V Bolt, Pump, PEB 1 Commodity Pricing $0.04 0.0320 lb

0 V Coolant Tube, From Thermostat, Asm 1 $0.97 0.3478 lb

1 V Coolant Tube, From Thermostat 1 $0.41 0.2671 lb

2 V Coolant Tube, From Thermostat-Material 1 SBR Fiber reinforced $0.41 0.2671 lb

1 V Hose Clamp, Medium 2 $0.22 0.0363 lb
1 V Tie-strap, w/ C-tube Clip

1 Commodity Pricing $0.12 0.0081 lb

0 V Coolant Tube, From Line to Pump Asm.1 $0.71 0.2514 lb

1 V Coolant Tube, From Line to Pump1 $0.27 0.1788 lb

2 V Coolant Tube, From Line to Pump-Material1 SBR Fiber reinforced $0.27 0.1788 lb

1 V Hose Clamp, Medium2 $0.22 0.0363 lb
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Luis RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-50328

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted August 7, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed August 16, 2017

L. Ashley Aull, Michael Anthony Brown, Kimberly Denise Jaimez, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, DOJ—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

*340Georgina Wakefield, Jonathan D. Libby, Esquire, Deputy Federal Public Defender, FPDGA—Federal Public Defender’s Office (Los Angeles), Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

The officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the driver of the car in which Rodriguez was riding of breaking the law, and they therefore had a “reasonable suspicion” sufficient to lawfully stop the vehicle. *See*Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 5200, 4456(c), 11715; *see also Helen v. N. Carolina,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014). The officers lawfully asked Rodriguez to step out of the car for the duration of the stop. *See Pennsylvania v. Mimms,*434 U.S. 106, 110-111 & n.6, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). Rodriguez dropped drugs as he exited. When the officers found the drugs, they had probable cause to arrest him, and the subsequent search of the car in which he had been a passenger was lawful. *See United States v. Pinela-Hernandez,*262 F.3d 974, 977-79 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court properly denied Rodriguez’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the car and the statements he made after his arrest. *See id.*

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### James L. MACKLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew HOLLINGSWORTH, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16034

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 4, 2017

Andrew R. Stilwell, Patel Stilwell, LLP, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert A. Bleicher, Esquire, Carr, McClellan, Ingersoll, Thompson & Horn a *439Professional Law Corporation, Burlin-game, CA, Elizabeth Holt Andrews, Esquire, Jan T. Chilton, Severson *&*Werson APC, San Francisco, CA, Kerry W. Fra-nich, Severson & Werson, Irvine, CA, Matthew B. Learned, Esquire, McCarthy & Holthus LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R, App. P. 34(a)(2). Macklin’s request for oral argument, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.

MEMORANDUM **

James L. Macklin appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s order denying a motion to vacate a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). *Exp. Group v. Reef Indus., Inc.,*54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995). We affirm.

The district court properly denied Mack-lin’s motion to vacate its order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) because Macklin failed to demonstrate that the district court “lacked jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” *United States v. Berke,*170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999).

To the extent Macklin seeks relief from the bankruptcy court’s judgment in a separate proceeding, such relief is outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, the bankruptcy court entered an order denying Macklin’s request for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and Macklin unsuccessfully appealed that order. *See Macklin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co.,*No. 16-15366 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2016).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### In the Matter of Manfred Bernier, Petitioner, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[770 NYS2d 903]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Chemung County) to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

Petitioner challenges a determination finding him guilty of violating the prison disciplinary rules that prohibit fighting, violent conduct and interference with an employee. The misbehavior report relates that while an inmate was being escorted to the common area, petitioner suddenly kicked the inmate in the chest. As a result of the incident, the day surgery program was delayed approximately 10 minutes. The Hearing Officer did not credit petitioner’s assertion that he only engaged in a playful gesture, especially in light of the testimony of the inmate involved. We find that the misbehavior report, written by the correction officer who witnessed the event, together with the use-of-force memorandum and testimony at the hearing, provide substantial evidence to support the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Winbush v Ricks,*306 AD2d 601 [2003]).

Turning to petitioner’s procedural claims, we note that his allegation that he was not provided with various documents was refuted by testimony from the employee assistant who stated that, although petitioner refused to sign the receipt form, he was nevertheless provided with the requested material. In view of the foregoing, and given petitioner’s failure to demonstrate any prejudice from any alleged deficiencies, we are unpersuaded by petitioner’s assertion of inadequate employee assistance *(see Matter of Garcia v Selsky,*237 AD2d 826 [1997]). Furthermore, we find that the hearing was timely completed and petitioner was informed of the reason for the hearing extension *(see*7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [b]). In any event, petitioner alleges no prejudice resulting from the delay *(see Matter of Matos v Goord,*293 AD2d 855 [2002]). Petitioner’s remaining contentions have been reviewed and found to be without merit.

*804Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Spain, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 36 (Wednesday, February 23, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 10214]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03858]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE: February 25, 2022; 10:30 a.m.

PLACE: This meeting will be held by video-conference only.

STATUS: This meeting will be closed to the public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Discussion of West Coast Marine Terminal 
Operator Agreement (WCMTOA).

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: William Cody, Secretary, (202) 
523-5725.

William Cody,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-03858 Filed 2-18-22; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6730-02-P
#### Anna Dowd, Appellant, *v.*City of Buffalo, Respondent.

Argued May 21, 1943;

decided June 18, 1943.

*896
      *George M. Raikin*for appellant.

*Andrew P. Ronan, Corporation Counsel (Forbes F. Dougherty*of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, without costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Thacher, JJ. Dissenting: Loughran and Desmond, JJ.