Filed: October 24, 2001 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 98-4049(L) (CR-96-458-WMN)

United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus Allen Jett, a/k/a Al, et al., Defendants - Appellants.

O R D E R

The court grants Appellants’ motion to allow filing of transcript of oral arguments, grants panel rehearing, denies rehearing en banc, and amends its opinion filed September 18, 2001, as follows: On page 5, first paragraph, line 2 -- the name “Antoine Marshall” is cut from line 2 and inserted into line 5 after the

name “Allen Jett” -- “Appellants Allen Jett, Antoine Marshall, and Rodney Montgomery ....”- 2 -

On page 25, first full paragraph, line 1 -- the name “Marshall” is inserted af t e r t he name “Jett” -- “Jett, Marshall, and Montgomery ....” On page 26, first paragraph, lines 2-4 -- the first and second sentences on the page are re-written as follows: “We also conclude that Montgomery’s sentence of 292 months and Marshall’s sentence of 264 months affected their substantial rights. Montgomery and Marshall were convi c t ed only of the drug trafficking count, and accordingly were each subject to a statutory maximum penalty of 240 months.” The rest of the paragraph remains the same. Entered at the direction of Judge Wilkins, with the c o n c urrence of Judge Widener and Judge Luttig. For the Court

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

C l e r kUNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4049 ALLEN JETT, a/k/a Al, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4213 DARNELL MICHAEL JONES, a/k/a Mookie, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4288 JERRY ANTONIO WILLIAMS, a/k/a Black Jerry, Defendant-Appellant.UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. No. 98-4307 WARR EN DEVO N HI L L , a/k/a Red Do g, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. No. 98-4319 AN TO I NE DE PAU LMA RSH AL L , a /k/ a Chi m Ch im, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. No. 98-4331 ALANVI

NC EN T CH APM AN , a

/k/ a Wal li, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. No. 98-4332 JOHNL EV IB EN TO N, a/k/ a L e vi, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. 2UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. No. 98-4351 RODNEY MON TGOMERY, a/k/a B oonie, a/k/a B lack, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. No. 99-4019 VI CTO R U

ND ERWO OD , a

/k/ a L itt le Vic, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. Appea ls from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Mary

land, at B altimore. Wil liam M. Nickerson, D istrict J udg e. (CR-96-458-WMN) Argued: April 3, 2001 Dec ided: September 18, 2001 B e fo re WI DENE R, WI L KI NS, and LUT TI G, Cir c uit

Judg e s.

_________________________________________________________________ Affir med in part, dismissed in part, and va cate d and re manded in par t by unpublished opinion. J udg e Wilkins wrote the opinion, in which J udg e Widener a

nd J udg e L

uttig joined.

_________________________________________________________________ 3CO UN SEL

ARG UED: Ar c ang e lo M ic ha e l T umi ne lli , B a lti mor e , M ary land ; William Scott L ittle, STARK & L I TTL E, Ba ltimore, Maryland; Stephen Clay ton Gordon, F EDERAL

PUBL I C DEFEN DER' S OFF I CE, Raleig h, North Carolina; F red Warr en B ennett, B ENNETT & NATHA NS, Gree nbelt, Maryland; Thomas Turne r Ruffin, Jr., W ashington, D.C., for

Appellants. Jamie M. Benne tt, Assist ant United States Attorney , Ba ltimore, Maryland, for A ppellee. O N B RI E F: Na nc y M. Coh e n, To ws on , M ary land , f or Ap pe lla nt Je tt; Da

vid P. Henning er, LAW OFF I CES OF DAVI D P. HENNI NGER, B el Air, Marylan d, for

App ell antHi ll ; G eorge A. Dub oi s, FEDE RA LP UBL I C DEFEN DER' S OFF I CE, Raleig h, North Carolina, f or Appe llant Mo ntg ome ry ; Will iam B . Purp ur a , B a lti mor e , M ary land , f or Ap pe llant C ha pma n; D avid R. So lom on , B a lti mor e , M ary land , f or Ap pe ll an tU n d e r

w o o d

. Lyn n e A

. B at t a g l i a , U n i t e d S t at e s A t t o r

n e y, Ba ltimore, Maryland, for A ppellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not bindingprec edent in this circuit. See L ocal Rule 36(c ).

_________________________________________________________________ OP IN ION WI L KI NS, Circuit J udg e: F oll ow inga

le ng thy tr ia l, A pp e lla nts 1 wer e convic ted of va rious crimes in conne ction with their participation in a massive narc otics operation in Baltimore, Mar yland. Appellants now r aise numer ous challeng es to their convic tions and sentence s. Wi th the exception of Ap pe lla nt Je rr y Willi ams' (" J. Willi ams" ) c la im o f i ne ff e c tiv e a ssi stance of counse l, which we dismiss, we re ject Appe llants' c halleng es

_________________________________________________________________ 1 Ap pe lla nts are Al le n Jett, D arn e ll M ic ha e l Jone s, Jer ry Anton io Wi lliams, W arr en De von Hill, Antoine Depaul Ma rshall, Alan Vinc ent Chapman, John L evi B enton, Rodney Montgome ry , and Victor Under

wood. 4to t

he ir c onvic tio ns . We fu

rt he r c on c lud e tha

t App e lla nts Da rn e ll J ones (" D. J ones" ), Warre n Hill, and Victor Unde rwo od have fa ile d to de mon str ate pla in e rr or wi th r e sp e c t to the ir

c ha lleng es under

Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Howe ver, b e c a u s e J

. W i l l i am s an d

Ap p e l l an t s A l l e nJ e t t , A n t o i n e M ar s h a l l , an d R o dn e y Mo ntg ome ry

have de mon str ate d p la in e rr or un de r A pp re nd i, a nd be c a us e United States v. Cotton, 2001 W L901259 (4th Cir. Aug . 10, 2001), compels us to notice the e rror , we va cate those Appellants' sentenc es an d re m an d fo r r es en t en ci n g. I. Be g inning in the late 1980s, Anthony J ones (" A. J ones" ) oper ated an incr easing ly

larg e and violent dr

ugdistribution ring (" the J ones org anization") in e ast Ba ltimore, Maryland. Duringpart of the period re le va nt t o th is a

pp e a l, M on tg ome ry

su pp lie d th e or g anizatio n w ith heroin a nd coca ine. Marsha ll and others re packa g ed the c ocaine for street- level sale s. Marshall also tra nsported coc aine f

rom NewYork to Ba ltimore. As a mea ns of protec ting the or g anization and fosteringa re putation as one to be fe are d and re specte d, A. J ones eng ag ed in or dire cted acts of violenc e ag ainst others. F or example, in the fall of 1994, A

. Jone s and D. Jone s sh ot K e ithWes tmo re land to d e ath b e c a

us e Wes tmoreland w as suspec ted of providinginformation to law enf orce ment authorities. On anothe r occ asion, J ett, who serve d as an e nforc er f or the J ones org anization, murdered Walter Gre en (" W. Green" ) at A. J ones' direc tion because W. Green ha d made dispar ag ing r emar ks a bo ut A . Jon e s. Inea rl y 1 9 9 5 , De S h an e C art er

(" D. C art er ") , a p artn er

o f A

. J o n es ', beca me involved in an alter cation with Anthony Gre en (" A. Gre en" ), a close associate of rival dr ugdeale r Elway

Wil liams ("E . Wil liams"). As a re sult of animosity

stemming fr om that alterc ation, A. J ones and D. Carter murdere d A. Gre en on Mar ch 31, 1995, spar king a n ong oing f eud betwe en the Jones org anization and the Will iams org anizatio n. E. Willi ams s ub se qu e ntl y hir e d M ark

Col e s a nd Ap pe lla nts Hi ll and Cha pma n, kn own c oll e c tiv e ly

a s th e " Yo un gGuns ," a s e nf or c e rs . In October

1995, the YoungGuns murder ed D. Car ter. 5In the ensuingmonths, A. J ones and me mbers of his org anization

re pe ate dly

atte mpt e d to loc ate and

kil l E . Wil liams. Th e re we re a lso other a cts of violence betwee n the two org anizations. For example, on J anuar y 25, 1996, J ett and anothe r member of the Jones org anization eng ag ed in a shootout with the YoungGuns. Coles was wounde d during the shootout, and a fr iend of his who had no involveme nt in the drugbusiness, Glen Wilson, was kill ed. As a result of the ong oing violence, both or g anizations were f orce d to limi t their drugdealing activities, ca

using lost profits for

all conce rned. Inea rl y Fe b ru ary 1 9 9 6 , Ap p el l an tJ o h nBe n t o n , wh o i s C h ap m an 's un c le , d e c ide d to atte mpt to b ro ke r a

tr uc e in a n e ff or t to save his nephew ' s life. B enton contac ted Danie l Ross, an acqua intance of Be nton's a

nd a close associate of A. Jones'. A t a meetingarr ang ed b y R o s s , th e Y o un g Gu n s agr ee d t o murd er

E

. W i l l i am s i nex ch an ge for A. Jones' promise to forg o his effor ts to kil l them. On Fe bruar y 26, the YoungGuns persua ded E. Willi ams and his driver , Der rick Rivers, to g ive them a r ide to Coles' house . E. Wil liams and Rivers wer e in the fr ont of the vehic le, and Coles, Chapman, a nd Hill were in the rea r. Duringthe drive to Coles' house, Chapman a sked Rivers to pull down a side stree t so that the g roup could purc hase a lcohol at a bar . When the automobile came to a stop, Chapman, Hill, and Coles beg an firingtheir we apons. Rivers wa s killed almost im mediately . E. Wil liams was seve rely

wounded but mana g ed to esc ape. After the shooting, B enton took the YoungGuns to a saf e house. At that ti me , th e Yo un gGuns and B e nto n b e lie ve d th at E . Wil liams had bee n killed, and A. Jones was so informed. B enton left the sa fe ho us e br ie fl y

and re tur ne d w ith$1 5, 00 0 h e ha d o bta ine d f ro m Ro ss and A. Jones; he distributed $3,000 eac h to Chapman, Hill, and Coles (l e avin g$6 ,0 00 un a c c ounte d f or ). Whe n it

wa s le arn e d th at E . Wil

liams had not died in the shooting, the Y oungGuns and A. Jones e ng a g e d in

fu rt he r atte mpt s to take E. Willi ams' lif e . T he se e ff

or ts wer e ultimately

abandone d, appar ently

due to A. Jones' inca

rce ration on firea rms char g es in 1996. Whil e inc arc e rate d, A. Jone s c on tin ue d to ma ste rm ind

e ff or ts t o eliminate those per ceive d as a thre at to the J ones org anization. I n May 1996, J ett killed Octavian H enry , a member of the org anization who wa s su sp e c te d o f p ro vid inginf or matio n to law e nf

or c e me nt a

uth or i- 6tie s. In F e br ua ry 19 97 , a n atte mpt wa s ma de on

the lif e of An g e lo Carter (" A. Carter ") , another

member of

the J ones org anization who was suspec ted of be ing a

n informant. In a fa irly

elabor ate se t up, D. J ones and J. W illiams, who was an enf orce r for the J ones org anization, invit ed A. Car

ter to D. Jones' house ; after A. Carter arr ived, D. Jone s a sk e d h im a

nd J. Willi ams t o g o to a

ne arb y re sta ur ant f or so me food. What D. J ones and J. W illiams knew, but A. Carter did not, wa s that th e re sta

ur ant w a s to be the sc e ne of an ambu sh . A s J. Will iams and A. Car

ter wa ited for their

takeout orde r, Unde rwood e ntere d the store and spoke briefly

to the pair. As Unde rwood wa s leaving , he shot A. Carter in the le g . At about this tim e, a by stander obse rved a vehicle pull up in front of the re staurant a

nd saw its occupa

nts fire sever al shots at A. Carter , who was f leeingthe re staurant on f

oot. One of the se sh ots , o r p os sib ly

ano the r f ro m U nd e rw oo d, hit

A. Cart e r i n the bac k as he w as running . A. Carter survived the attack. Ba sed upon this evidence , Appellants we re c onvicted of the followingc ri me s: - Conspiracy

to commit murder in aid of ra ckete ering (E . Wil liams) , s e e 18 U. S.C. A. § 1 95 9( a )( 5) (We st 20 00 ): B e nto n, Cha

pma n, Hi ll, Jett , a

nd J. Willi ams; - Murde r in aid of r acke teer ing ( Rivers), see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1 95 9( a )( 1) (We st 2 00 0) : Ch a pma n a nd Hi ll; - Attempted murde r in aid of r acke teer ing ( E. Wil liams), se e 18 U. S.C. A. § 1 95 9( a )( 5) : Ch a pma n a nd Hi ll; - Murde r in aid of r acke teer ing ( Westmoreland), see 18 U. S.C. A. § 1 95 9( a )( 1) : D . Jon e s; - Conspiracy

to retaliate ag ainst witnesses (He nry and A. Cart e r) , s e e 18 U. S.C. A. § 3 71 (We st 2 00 0) : D . Jon e s, Jett , U nd e rw oo d, and

J. Willi ams; - Conspiracy

to distribute heroin and c ocaine , see 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999): All Appellants ex cept B enton. 7Appellants now ra ise numerous c halleng es to their convic tions and

se nte nc e s. II. Al l App e lla

nts c ha lle ng e ru lin g s o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

de nyingthe ir motion to s ever

and re jectingtheir cla im that the Governme nt exerc is e d it s p e r e mp to r

y s tr ik e s in a r a c ia ll y d is c r im in ato r

y ma n n e r . We c on c lud e that bo th c ha lle ng e s la c k me ri t. A. Prior to trial, the district court denie d Appellants' motion for sever

anc e un de r F e de ra l Ru le of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 14 . App e lla nts c ha lleng e this ruling on a

ppeal, maintainingthat they wer e pre judiced by the joint trial. W e re

ject this contention. Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) pr ovides that " [t ]wo or more de fenda

nts may be cha rg ed in the same indictment . . . if they are alleg ed to have participated in the same a ct or tra nsaction or in the same ser ies of ac ts or transac tions constitut ing a n offe nse or offe nses." Ordinar ily , defe ndants who ar e indicted tog ether should be tr ie d to g e the r; joi nt t

ri a ls " pr omo te e ff

ic ie nc y and se rv e the int e re sts of justice by

avoidingthe sca

ndal and inequity

of inconsistent verdicts." Z afiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). A district court may

sever defe ndants if a joint trial will prejudice the def endant or the Gover

nment. See F ed. R. Crim. P. 14. The proponent of seve ranc e bea

rs the burde n of demonstrating that a joint trial will cause a ctual pre

judice. See United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1995). B eca use " a ce rtain amount of c onflict among defe ndants is inherent in most multi -def endant tria ls," United States v. Smit h, 44 F.3d 1259, 1267 ( 4th Cir. 1995), a def endant de siring se ve ra nc e " mus t sh owmor e tha n me re ly that a se pa rate tr ia l w ou ld offe r . . . a be tter cha

nce of acquittal," United States v. Spitl er, 800 F.2d 1267, 1271 ( 4th Cir. 1986) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Rathe r, se ve ra

nc e is a pp ro pr iate " on ly

if the re is a se ri ou s r isk

that a joint trial would compromise a spec ific trial rig ht of one of the defe n- 8da

nts , o r p re ve nt t

he jur y fr om m akin ga

re lia ble jud g me nt a

bo ut guil t or innoce nce." Z afiro, 506 U .S. at 539. A district court possesses broad discr etion in ruling on a motion for sever ance . See Smith, 44 F.3d at 1266. We c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in de nyingthe se ve ra

nc e mot ion . In th e fi rs t pl a c e , w e no te that on ly Jett makes a ny specific argument reg ardingprejudice . He maintains that the e vid e nc e a g a ins t hi m w a s w e ak a nd tha t th e jur y " wo uld lik e ly have re a c he d a

dif fe re nt r e su lt" ha d it

no t be e n p re se nte d w ithe vide nc e a dmi ssi ble on ly

a g a ins t Jett' s c od e fe nd ants . B r. of Ap pe lla nts at 36. The r emainingAppellants ar g ue g ener ally that they prese nted inc on sis te nt d e fe ns e s and tha t th e ma ss o f e vid e nc e ma de it i mpo ssi

ble fo r t he jur y to s e pa rate ly a sse ss t he c ulp a bil ity of e a c h d e fe nd ant. None of these a rguments persua des us that the district cour t abused its discretion. We have c onsistently ref used to reve rse the de nial of a motion for seve ranc e whe n the ver dict returne d by the jury "de monstr ate [s] its a

bil ity to f oll owthe ins tr

uc tio ns and

ma tc h e vid e nc e wi th de fe nd ants and

c ounts ." Un ite d St ate s v . Ri le y , 9 91 F .2 d 1 20 , 1 25 (4 th Cir . 1 99 3) ; se e , e .g ., Un ite d St ate s v . F or d, 88 F .3 d 1 35 0, 13 61 (4 th Cir. 1996). Her e, the jury demonstrated its ability

to "matc h evidenc e with defe ndants and c ounts" whe n it acquitted B enton of the dr ug conspirac y

char g e. We there fore aff

irm the denial of the motion for sever ance . B. Duringthe cour se of jury selec tion, the Governme nt used eig ht of its 12 pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e s to str ike bla c k f e ma le ve nir e me mbe rs . Ap pe lla nts ob je c te d to the Go ve rnme nt' s u se of its pe re mpt or

y c ha ll e n g e s un d e r

B at s o nv . K e n tu c ky, 4 7 6 U

. S

. 7 9 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , an d i t s p r o g e n y, arguing that the Gover

nment had discriminated on the basis of ra ce in exercising its cha lleng es, there by violating the E qual Protection Clause. We conclude that the district court did not err in rejec ting Ap pe lla nts ' B atso n c la im. The e x erc ise of per emptory challeng es by

the Gover

nment in a rac ially discriminatory

manner violates the Equal Protec tion Cl ause. Se e B atso n, 47 6 U .S. at 89 . Ade fe nd ant who c ha lle ng e s th e e xer c ise of a pe remptory

challeng e on equa l protection g rounds bea rs the bur- 9den of pr oving intentional discr imination by the Gover

nment. See id. at 93 (" As in any

equal pr otection ca se, the burde n is, of course , on the [part y ] wh o a lle g e s d isc ri min ator y se le c tio n . . . to p ro ve the e xiste nc e of purp os e fu l di sc ri min atio n. " (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit

ted)). T he Supreme Court has delineated a bur den-shiftingproce dure for c ourts to follow in analy zing a c laim of purposef

ul discrimination in the jury

selec tion process. See Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306, 312 (4 th C ir . 2 00 0) , c e rt . d e nie d, 12 1 S. Ct. 13 67 (2 00 1) . T he pa rt y ra isingthe e qu a l pr ote c tio n c ha lle ng e mus t f ir st e sta bli sha pr ima fa c ie case of purpose ful discrimination in the selection proc ess, in light of all of the " rele vant circ umstances, includingwhether there has bee n a patter n of strikes ag ainst members of a particula r ra ce." Edmonson v. L e e sv ill e Con c re te Co. , 5 00 U. S. 6 14 , 6 31 (1 99 1) . O nc e a pr ima fac ie ca se of discr imination is established, the bur den shifts to the pa rt y wh os e c on du c t is c ha lle ng e d to c ome fo rw ard wi th a no nd iscriminatory

explanation for the use of the per emptory

strike. See Purke tt v . E le m, 5 14 U. S. 7 65 , 7 67 (1 99 5) (p e r c ur iam) . T o s atis fy thi s burden, the party

need of fer only a ra ce- neutra l expl anation for the strike; the re ason nee d not be worthy of belief or re lated to the issues to b e tr ie d o r t o th e pr os pe c tiv e jur or ' s a bil ity to p ro vid e a c c e pta

ble jury service . See id. at 767-68. The trial court must then dec ide whether the par ty challeng ing the selec tion process ha s proven that the dec ision to ex erc ise the strike wa s motivated by rac ial bias. See id. at 767. "Afinding by

the district court c oncer

ning whether

a pere mptory

challeng e wa s exercised for a ra cially discriminatory

rea so n is g ive n g re at de fe re nc e by thi s c ourt ; w e re vie w that f ind ingon ly for c lear err or." J ones v. Plaster, 57 F .3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995); see H erna ndez v. New Yor

k, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plura lityopinion) (explaining that " the best evide nce [reg ardingdiscriminatorypurpose] often will be the deme anor of the attorne y

who exercises the ch al l en ge, " ev al u at i o no f w h i ch "l i es p ec u l i ar l y wi th i na t ri al j u d ge's province " ( internal quotation marks omitted))

. Her e, the district cour

t initi ally ruled that Appe llants had made out a prima f acie case of a B atson violation. Although the c ourt later reve rsed itself on that point, it did so only afte r the Gove rnment had proff ere d its ex planations for the challeng ed strikes. And, the court ru le d th at e ve n if

it a ssume d th at App e lla

nts ha d ma de out a

pr ima fac ie ca se, the Gove rnment had pr offe red r ace -neutra l expl anations for the c halleng ed per emptory strikes and Appe llants had not demon- 10strated that those e x planations wer e pre text ual. Acc ording ly , we c onsider only the question of whe ther the district c ourt committed clea r e r r o r in a c c e p ti n gth e G o v e r

n me n t' s e xp la

n ati o n s . Se e H e r

n an d e z, 500 U.S. at 359 (plurality opinion). 1. Venire Member #10186 The Gove rnment explained that it struck venire member #10186 beca use she ha d previously

serve d on a jury

that deadloc ked and beca use she lived in zip code 21206, close to the are a in which the criminal ac tivity

occur red. B oth of these pr offe red e x planations are rac ially neutra l. See Malone v. V asquez, 138 F.3d 711, 720 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1998) (holdingthat prosec utor' s "e x perie nce [that] it was not a g ood idea to have jurors who we re f amiliar with the ar ea of

a cr ime" was ra ce- neutra l rea son for pe remptory strike); United States v. R u d as , 9 0 5 F. 2 d

3 8 , 4 1 (2 d

C i r. 1 9 9 0 ) ( h o l d i n g th atv en i re m em b er 's prior ser vice on hungjury

was leg itimate rea son for pe remptory strike). Ap pe lla nts argue that th e Go ve rnme nt' s " zip c od e " e xplanatio n is implausible beca

use the Gove rnment did not strike another venire me mbe r who liv e d in

zip c od e 21 20 6 a

nd did no t stri ke ve nir e me mbe rs wh o li ve d in

zip c od e 21 20 5, wh ic h is c on tiguo us wi th t he zip c od e in whic h th e c ri min a l a c tiv ity too k p la c e . Se e Pur

ke tt, 51 4 U .S. at 768 (notingthat an implausible explanation for a pe remptory strike may be e vid e nc e of

purp os e fu l di sc ri min atio n) . E ve n if we dis c re dit the Go ve rnme nt' s " zip c od e " e xplanatio n, ho we ve r, a le g iti mate ba sis for strikingvenire member #10186- -her prior ser vice on adeadloc ke d ju ry -- re ma ins , a

nd is unc ha lle ng e d b y

Ap pe lla nts

. 2. Venire Members #10180 a nd #10158 The Gove rnment conte nded that it struck venir e member s #10180 and #10158 bec ause it wa s conce rned that they lacke d the intellectual capa city to serve a s jurors. See United States v. Montg omery , 210 F .3 d 4 46 , 4 53 -5 4 ( 5th

Cir . 2 00 0) (a ff

ir min gre je c tio n o f B atso n c ha lleng e to strike asse rtedly

based upon intellec tual capa city of venire member) . Specifica lly , the Gover nment noted that venire member #10180 appea

red to have bee n unable to complete the juror que stionna ir e ; sh e re sp on de d " y e s" to a qu e sti on a sk ingwh e the r s he liv e d in 11an apa

rtment or a sing le-fa

mily home, and r esponded " Idon' t know what you mean" to a question askingher to de scribe he r neig hborhood, misspelling the wor d "know ." J.A. 262. Venire member #10180 also had diff

iculty answe ringthe questions of the district cour t during v o i r d i re . T h e G o v ern m en to b s erv edth atv en i re m em b er # 1 0 1 5 8 's questionnaire c ontained numer ous misspelli ng s and that she se emed to h ave tr ou

ble un de rs tand ingand

re sp on din gto q

ue sti on s d

ur ingvo ir dire. Ap p el l an t s n o t e t h atb o thv en i re m em b er s h adco mp l et edh i gh sc ho ol a nd ha d b e e n e mpl oye d f

or many y e ars . A t be st, the se fa c ts te nd to u nd e rm ine the Go ve rnme nt' s e xplanatio n f or the str ike s. Ul timate ly , h ow e ve r, the dis tr ic t c ourt wa s r e qu ir e d to make a

c re dib ili ty deter mination based on numerous f actor s including the demea nor of counsel for

the Gover

nment, and we cannot sa

y that the district court clea rly err ed in cr editing the Gover nment' s expl anation. See Anderson v. City

of B essemer

City , 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). 3. Venire Member #10109 Th e Go ve rnme nt a sse rt e d th at it str uc k v e nir e me mbe r # 10 10 9 p ri

marily beca use she ha d a fr iend who had w itnessed a shootingand was in witness protec tion; the Government wa s conce rned that the experience of the ve nire membe r' s friend " might have an intimidating eff ect on [the venire member' s] abili ty to support the g overnme nt." J .A. 264. The G overnme nt also cited the ve nire membe r' s y outhful ag e (22) and conc omitant lack of substantial community ties and the fa c t th at sh e liv e d in

zip c od e 21 20 7, ne ar whe re the c ri min a l a c tiv ity took place. Ap pe lla nts c ha lle ng e the Go ve rnme nt' s e xplanatio ns on tw o f ro nts

. F ir st, the y

ma int a in t

hat ve nir e me mbe r # 10 10 9' s e mpl oy me nt a s a sc ho olt e a c he r c on sti tut e d a su ff ic ie nt t ie to t

he c omm un ity . E ve n if the fa cts reg ardingthe venire member' s employ ment would allow a finding of ra cial bias, they do not demand such a

finding . The c ontr ary c on c lus ion

re a c he d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt

the re fo re wa s n ot c le arl y e rr on e ou s. Se e Un ite d St ate s v . Sp ri g g s, 10 2 F .3 d 1 24 5, 12 55 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) (p e r c ur iam) (h old ingthat di str ic t c ourt did no t c omm it clea r er ror in cr editing G overnme nt's e x planation that it struck a potential juror bec ause it " was lookingfor . . . pe ople who had r aised 12f

am i l i e s i nth i s c i ty, p e o p l e w h o h av e a s t ak e i no ur

c o m mun i ty" (interna l quotation marks omitted)). Second, Appe llants point outthat zip code 21207 is not near the a rea wher e the c riminal activity took place and that seve ral other venire members lived in that zip code but we re no t stru c k b y

the Go ve rnme nt. Ev e n if we a c c e pt A

pp e lla nts ' argume nt o n th is p oint, A pp e lla nts do no t c ha lle ng e the pr ima ry ba sis fo r t he str ike

-- that th e ve nir e me mbe r' s a sso c iatio n w ithso me on e in wi tne ss p ro te c tio n mi g ht m ake he r h e sit ant t o v ote to c onvic t in a c a se inv olv inga lle g atio ns of

re ta liatio n a g a ins t G ov e rnme nt w itn e sse s. 4. Venire Members #10101 a nd #10099 The Gove rnment explained that it struck these ve nire membe rs beca use of c oncer

n that they

might be bia sed ag ainst law enf orce ment office rs. Venir e Membe r #10101 had be en mar ried to a B altimore City police off

icer with 30 y ear s of servic e in the Ea stern District of Ba ltimore, the district where the cr iminal activity took place. T he Go ve rnme nt a sse rt e d th at c e rt a in r e sp on se s g ive n b y thi s v e nir e me mber dur ing voir

dire c aused the Gover

nment to question whether she c ou ld b e imp art ia l, p art ic ula rl y g ive n th at th e e vid e nc e at tr ia l w ou ld include alleg ations of police c orruption. As to venire member #10099, the Go ve rnme nt e xpla ine d th at it be lie ve d s he might b e bia se d a g a ins t the police ba sed on her

statement duringvoir dire that, whe n her sister ha d b e e n r ob be d, the po lic e did no t r e sp on d a s q

uic kly a s th e y sh ou ld have be cause of the ne ighbor hood in which the cr ime took place. Both of the se explanations are rac e neutr al. See United States v. Go nza le z-B a lde ra s, 11 F .3 d 1 21 8, 12 22 -2 3 ( 5th Cir . 1 99 4) (a c c e pting, a s nondiscriminatory , strike base d on Gover nment' s conce rn that venire member w ould be biased be cause of re lation to police office rs who serve d in are a that wa s subject of trial a nd as to which ther e wo uld be a lle g atio ns of

po lic e c or

ru pti on ); Un ite d St ate s v . Ca mpb e ll, 980 F.2d 245, 249 ( 4th Cir. 1992) (holding that potential dissatisfaction with poli ce r esponse to cr ime was prope r basis for pere mptory challeng e). Appellants do not appe ar to dispute the ne utrality of the Gove rnme nt' s e xplanatio ns fo r t

he str ike s; r athe r, the y

ma int a in t

hat th e e vide nc e do e s n ot s up po rt

the Go ve rnme nt' s c la im o f p ote nti a l bi a s. Wit h respe ct to venire member #10101, A ppellants note that she wa s div or c e d a

nd e str ang e d f

ro m he r f or me r h us ba nd . Y e t a g a in, thi s 13asser

tion amounts to not hing mor e than a conflict in the e vidence , and we c annot say

that the district court c ommitt ed cle ar e rror in cre diting the Gover nment' s expl anation. We also re ject Appe llants' c ontention that the strike of ve nire membe r #10099 wa s improper be cause she advised the district c ourt that she could be fair a nd impartial reg ardless of any

opinion she might have of the police handlingof the robbery of her sister. The Gove rnment' s expl anation of a pere mptory str ike ne e d n ot r ise to t

he le ve l of

a c ha lle ng e fo r c a

us e . Se e Ev ans , 220 F.3d at 312. In sum, we conc lude that the district cour t did not commit clea

r err or in ac cepting , as nondiscriminatory , the Gover nment' s expl anatio ns fo r t he c ha lle ng e d s tr ike s. We t he re fo re re

je c t App e lla

nts ' B atson challeng e. III

. We n e xt co ns ide r J. Wi lli ams' c la ims c on c e rn ingthe a c tio ns of his tr ia l c ouns e l. O n th e mor

nin gthe Go ve rnme nt c omp le te d it s c a se in c hie f, J. Willi ams wro te no te s to tw o p ro sp e c tiv e de fe ns e wi tne sse s, Hilton Thomas and Sean Dill. B oth were expected to testify reg arding the mur de r o f John Jon e s. In th e le tte rs , J. Wil liams r e c ounte d th e te stimony of prose cution witnesses, in violation of the witness seque stratio n o rd e r e nte re d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt , a

nd a dv ise d T ho ma s a

nd Di ll how to testify . J . Wil liams ga ve the letter s to his attorney and instructed him to deliver the le tters to Thomas and Dill. Counsel re vie we d th e le tte rs and

a dv ise d J. Wil liams a g a ins t g ivi ngthe m to the witnesses, but J. W illiams persisted and counse l offer ed no fur ther protest. Duringthe luncheon r ece ss, counsel met with Thomas and Dill, who were incar cer ated, a nd attempted to show them the letter s throug h the plexiglass par tition i n the visiting room. When Thomas and Dill wer e unable to rea d the letters through the par tition, counsel g ave the letters to a United States Ma rshal and a sked him to deliver them. The Mar shal rea d the letters, c opied them, and de livered the orig inals to Thomas and Dill. The copie s were provided to counse l for the Gover nment, who subsequently moved to exclude the testimony of Th oma s and

Di ll. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d th is m oti on , a

nd a dd it i o n al l y ru l edth atth e l et t er s co u l d b e i n tro d u ce d i nth e G o v ern m en t 's rebuttal c ase if J. W illiams t ook the stand in his own defe nse. J

. W i l l i am s e l e c t e d

n o tt o t e s t i f

y. 14J. Willi ams n owc on te nd s th at hi s tr ia l c ouns e l w a s c on sti tut ion a lly

ine ff e c tiv e . T o p re va il o n th is c la im, J. Willi ams mus t de mon str ate that "c ounsel' s repr esentation fell below an obje ctive standa rd of r easonablene ss" a

nd "that there is a r easona ble proba bility that, but for c ouns e l' s unp ro fe ssi on a l e rr or s, the re su lt o f t he pr oc e e din gwo uld have be en diffe rent." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). A " rea sonable proba bility " is one sufficie nt to undermine our conf idence in the outcome. See id. at 694. J . Wil liams' ine ffe ctive assistanc e cla im face s an additional hurdle. A def endant may

obtain revie w of a

n ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im on direc t appea l by

first prese nting the c laim to the district court in a motion for new tria l pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. See United States v. Russell, 221 F.3d 615, 619 ( 4th Cir. 2000). B e c a us e J. Willi ams d id n ot f

oll owthi s c ours e , w e wi ll r e vie w h is claim only

if the constitutional violation "conc lusively appea rs" on the fa c e of

the re c or d. I d. at 61 9 n .5 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit

ted). Our reluc tance to reviewineffe ctive assistanc e cla ims on direct a pp e a l st e ms f

ro m th e fa c t th at " the re c or d is us ua lly ina de qu ate ly develope d," r evea ling " only ambig uous sy

mptoms of a more c omplex set of re lationships which cannot be a dequate ly addre ssed on direc t appea l." United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 1991). For this reason, inef

fec tive assistance claims usually are better r aised in a mot ion to v a c ate se nte nc e purs ua nt t o 2 8 U .S. C.A . § 22 55 (We st Supp. 2001). See id. Her e, we have little difficulty concluding , from the f

ace of the rec ord, that the pe rfor

mance of J. W illiams' counse l fell below a n objective standa

rd of r easona

bleness. Upon r eadingthe letters, c ounse l sh ou ld h ave be e n a

wa re that de liv e ri ngthe m w ou ld at le a st v iol ate the witness seque stration order and could a lso constitute subornation of per jury . Howeve r, we cannot disce rn fr om the fac e of the rec ord w h e th e r J. Wi ll ia ms w a s p r e

ju d ic e d b y h is c o un s e l' s d e f

ic ie n c ie s . We a c c or din g ly

dis mis s th is c la im. 2

_________________________________________________________________ 2 J. Willi ams a lso ma int a ins that hi s atto rn e y ' s a c tio ns c on sti tut e d c ri mina l and e thi c a l vi olatio ns and

thu s c re ate d a

n a c tua l c on fl ic t of

int e re st that adver sely

aff ecte d counsel' s perf

ormanc e, re quiring reve rsal without a spec ific showingof pre

judice. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 15I V.

J ett raises two c halleng es to his conviction. First, he c ontends that the dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in a llo wi ngthe Go ve rnme nt t o im pe a c h h im with prior written a

nd oral stateme nts when the Gove rnment had failed to disclose those statements prior to trial. Second, Jett maintains that th e c on dit ion s o f h is c on fi ne me nt c on sti tut e d a de nia l of a c c e ss to counsel in violation of the Six th Amendment. We reje ct both of the se c la ims

. A. Jett te sti fi e d in

his own d e fe ns e at tr ia l and de nie d invo lve me nt i n the murder s of W. Gree n, Octavia n Henr y , and Glen Wilson. J ett further de nied any

relationship wit h A. J ones. On c ross-examination, the Gover nment soug ht to impeach Jett wit h a letter he had written to a fede ral prose cutor off

eringto provide information about the J ones org anization and with oral statements made duringa prof fer session. J ett objected, ma intaining that the G overnme nt had violated F eder al Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) (1)( A) by failingto disclose the wr itt e n a nd or a l st ate me nts to d e fe ns e c ouns e l pr ior to t ri a l. T he dis

trict court ove rruled this objec tion. As is r e le va

nt h e re , Ru le 16 (a )( 1) (A ) r e qu ir e s th e Go ve rnme nt t o disclose to the def

endant " any

rele vant written .. . stateme nts made by the def endant" within the possession of the Gover nment and known to the prosec utor, and the substanc e of a ny oral stateme nt g iven in response to interrog ation by a Gove rnment ag ent " if the [G] overnme nt intends to use that statement at trial." The Gove rnment c on c e de s th at it s f

a ilure to d isc los e the wr itt e n a nd or a l st ate me nts violated Rule 16(a) (1)( A). See United States v. Scafe , 822 F.2d 928, 93 5 ( 10 th C ir . 1 98 7) (h old ingthat th e dis c ov e ry ob lig atio ns of

Rul e

_________________________________________________________________ 348-50 (1980) . We rejec t this claim on it s merits. The re cord is cle ar that at th e tim e of

tr ia l, J. Wi lli ams' c ouns e l w a s a bs olute ly un awa re tha t hi s actions we re le g ally

or ethica lly

suspect. Eve n assuming that an ac tual c on fl ic t c an e xist a

bs e nt c ouns e l' s awa

re ne ss o f a

ny pr ob le m, w e fa il t o see- -and J. W illiams has not demonstrated--how a conf lict of which counsel wa s unawa

re c ould have a dverse ly

aff ecte d his perfor

mance . 1616 (a )( 1) (A ) a pp ly to e vid e nc e us e d in

re butta l or

on c ro ssexamination). We conclude, how ever , that J ett was not substantially prejudice d by the nondisclosure, a

nd there fore that reve rsal is not require d. See United States v. Camarg o-Ve rg ara , 57 F.3d 993, 998 ( 11th Cir. 1995). " Substantial prejudice e x ists when a def endant is unduly

surpr ise d a nd la c ks an a de qu ate op po rt un ity to p re pa re a de fe ns e , o r i f the mistake substantially

influence s the jury ." I d. at 998-99; see United States v. Salameh, 152 F .3d 88, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (pe r curiam) (" Substantial prejudice mea ns the prejudice resultingfrom the [G] overnme nt's untimely disclosure of e vidence , rathe r than the prejudice attributable to the e vidence itself." ( internal quotation marks omitted)). We first note that Jett could not have been " undulysurprised" by

the statements, since he himself made them. See United S t at e s v . R i v e r a , 9 4 4 F

. 2 d 1 5 6 3 , 1 5 6 6 ( 1 1 thC i r . 1 9 9 1 )

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, J ett' s failure to reque st a continuanc e whe n the Gover nment soug ht to introduce the written and ora l statements on cross-e x amination te nd s to ind ic ate that no pr e jud ic e e xiste d. Se e Un ite d St ate s v . B e ra s, 183 F.3d 22, 27 ( 1st Cir. 1999). Finally , there is no possibi lity that the discover

y violation had a substantial influenc e on the de terminatio n o f guil t by

the jur y . T he e vid e nc e su

pp or tin gthe c ha

rg e s a g a ins t J ett was substantial, and the improper a dmission of J ett' s prior statements added little to the Gover nment' s case . See United States v. Bue no-Sierra , 99 F.3d 375, 380 ( 11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1181 ( 2d Cir. 1993). B. Prior to trial, J ett was tra

nsfer red f rom the B altimore City

Detention Center to the Mary

land Corre ctional Adjustment Center (M CA C) . A t MC AC , Jett w a s n ot a llo we d c on ta c t vi sit s w ithc ouns e l. And, bec ause of

a malfunc tioning telephone sy stem in the visiti ng are a, counse l sometimes was forc ed to shout throug h a plexiglass par

t i t i o ni no rd er

t o co m mun i ca t e w i thJ et t

. Ad d i t i o n al l y , co un s el 's re pe ate d r e qu e sts that Jett be a llo we d to lis te n to and dis c us s w ith c ouns e l a ta pe that w ou ld b e int

ro du c e d at tr ia l w e re de nie d. Jett maintains that these diffic ulties were so sever e as to c onstitut e a violatio n o f h is Si xth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o c ouns e l. 17The c onstitut ional g uara ntee of counsel ne cessa

rily includes the "oppor tunity for . . . c ounsel to confe r, to consult with the acc used and to prepa re his def ense." Aver

y v. Alabama , 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). Complete denial of the a ssistance of c ounsel, whethe r ac tual or constructive, is per se reve rsible er ror. See Perry

v. L eeke , 488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989). Not e very

restric tion on counsel' s acc ess to the def endant amounts to a deprivation of the rig ht to counsel, howeve r. See id. at 280-85 (holdingthat prohibition of consultation betwee n defe ndant and de fe ns e c ouns e l du

ri ngbr ie f r e c e ss b e tw e e n d e fe nd ant' s te sti

mony on dir e c t and

c ro ss- e xami natio n d id n ot a mou nt t o c omp le te denial of c ounsel). He re , a lth ou g h c ouns e l' s r e pr e se ntatio n o f Je tt w a s unq ue sti on a bly rende red more difficult by the conditions at MCAC, those difficulties wer e not so sever e as to amount to the total denial of ac cess to counsel. The r ecor d demonstrates that J ett' s counsel vig orously defe nded him thr ou g ho ut t

he tr ia l. And , Jett po int s to no sp e c if ic pr e jud ic e ari singfr om t he pr ob le ms h e ha d c omm un ic atin gwi th c ouns e l. V. B e nto n, Cha

pma n, and Hi ll m a int a in t

hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in denying the ir motions for judgme nt of ac quittal pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 with respec t to the rac ketee ring char g es ar ising fr om the murder of Rivers and the attempted murder of E. Willi ams. 3 We reviewthe denial of a motion for a judg ment of a c qu itt a l de no vo . Se e Un ite d St ate s v . Ro me r, 14 8 F .3 d 3 59 , 3 64 (4 th Cir . 1 99 8) . Wh e n, a s h e re , th e mot ion fo r j ud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l is based on the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence , our role is limited to conside ri ngwh e the r " the re is s ub sta nti a l e vid e nc e , ta

kin gthe vie w m os t favor able to the Gove rnment, to support" the ver dict. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). We must bear in mind that

" [t]he jur y , n ot t he re vie wi ngc ourt , w e ig hs the c re dib ili ty of the e vidence and re solves any

conflicts in the evide nce pr esente d." United States v. Murphy , 35 F.3d 143, 148 ( 4th Cir. 1994). Furthe r, " if the

_________________________________________________________________ 3 As noted pre viously , Be nton, Chapman, and Hill wer e convic ted of conspirac y

to murder E. Williams in aid of racke teer ing. Cha pman and Hill were also convicte d of murder ing River s in aid of ra ckete eringand at t em p t i n g t o murd er

E

. W i l l i am s i nai d

o f r ac k et ee ri n g. 18evidenc e supports diffe rent, re asonable interpre tations, the jury

decide s which interpr etation to believe." I d. Reversa l for insuffic ient e vid e nc e is r e se rv e d f

or c a se s in wh ic h " the pr os e c uti on ' s f a ilure is clea r." Bur ks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978). In sum, we " may no t ov e rt ur n a su bs tanti a lly

su pp or te d v e rd ic t me re ly

be c a us e [we] find[ ] t he ver dict unpalatable or dete rmine[ ] that another , rea sonable ve rdict would be pr efe rable ." United States v. Bur g os, 94 F.3d 849, 862 ( 4th Cir. 1996) (en ba nc); see United States v. Hoy te, 51 F .3 d 1 23 9, 12 45 (4 th C ir . 1 99 5) (o bs e rv ingtha t a de fe nd ant c ha lleng ing the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to support his conviction bears "a heavy burden" ). As is releva

nt here , 18 U.S.C.A. § 1959(a) pr ovides for the punishment of [w] hoever , as consider ation for the r ece ipt of. . . any thing of pec uniary

value f rom an e nterprise eng ag ed in ra ckete ering a ctivity , or for

the purpose of

g ainingentra

nce to or maintaining or

incre asingposition i n an ente rprise e ng ag ed in rac ketee ringactivity , murders . . . or attempts or conspire s to do so . . .. Thus , th e Go ve rnme nt w a s r e qu ir e d to pr ov e (1 ) t hat th e Jone s o rg anization was an ente rprise e ng ag ed in ra ckete eringactivity ; (2) that Be nton, Chapman, and Hill conspire d to murder E. Williams and that Cha pma n a nd Hi ll mur de re d Ri ve rs and atte mpt e d to mur de r E . Wil

liams; a nd (3 ) t hat B e nto n, Cha

pma n, and Hi ll c omm itt e d th e se a c ts either ( a) a s consideration for the re ceipt of somethingof pec uniary value or (b) f or the purpose of g ainingentra nce to the Jones org anization. Cf. United States v. Concepcion, 983 F .2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992) (se tting for

th simi lar de scription of the e lements of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1959(a) ). B enton, Chapman, a nd Hill do not dis pute that the Governme nt presente d sufficie nt evidence reg ardingthe first and se cond elements. Rather , they

maintain that the Gover

nment failed to prove that th e ir a c tio ns a g a ins t Riv e rs and E. Willi ams w e re take n in e xch ang e fo r p e c un iary

g a in o r f or the purp os e of

g a ini nge ntr anc e to the J ones org anization. We beg in with Benton' s sufficienc y challeng e. We agree with Be nton that the Gover

nment prese nted no evidenc e to support a c onclu- 19sio n th at hi s p art ic ipatio n in the c on sp ir a c y

to m ur de r E . Wil liams was unde rtake n for the pur pose of g ainingentry

into the J ones org anization. 4 Acc ording ly , the denial of Be nton's motion for a cquittal can be aff irmed only

if there is sufficient evide nce to support a conclusion that Be nton conspired to murde r E. Willi ams in exchang e forsomething of pecunia ry value f rom the Jones orga

nization. The evidence prese nted by

the Gover

nment was c erta inly

adequate for this purpose

. As descr ibed above , the Gover nment prese nted testimony that afte r the shooting of

Rivers and E. Williams, Benton took the YoungGuns to a safe house, left br iefly , and re turned with $15,000 obtained f rom A. J ones and Ross. B enton distributed $3,000 of this money to eac h of the YoungGuns, leaving$6,000 unacc ounted for. B e nto n a rgue s th at th is e vid e nc e a llo we d th e jur y to c onvic t hi m only "by piling infe renc e upon infe renc e," Direc t Sales Co. v. United State s, 31 9 U .S. 70 3, 71 1 ( 19 43 ), but w e do no t a g re e . A t a min imum, a re asonable jury

could infer

from the spe ed with which B enton ob ta ine d th e mon e y

that th e pa

rt ie s sh are d a

n e xpe c tatio n th at c omple tio n o f t

he a ssi g ne d ta sk

of mur de ri ngE. Willi ams w ou ld b e fo llowed by monetary remune ration. And, in lig ht of the evide nce that Be nton rec eived $15,000 but dispensed only $9,000 to the Young Guns, it require s no g reat leap to conc lude that B enton kept the rema ining $6,000. We ther efor e af firm the denia l of Be nton's motion fo r j ud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l. We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the convictions of Chapman and Hill. As with Be nton, the fac ts relatingto the pa y me nt m a de fo llo wi ngthe atte mpt on E. Willi ams' lif

e su pp or t a c on c lus ion

that Ch a pma n a nd Hi ll a c te d n ot s imp ly

to p re se rv e the ir own lives, but also for pe cuniar y g ain. See Conce pcion, 983 F.2d a t 381 (holding that purposes spec ified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1959 need not be def endant' s "sole or

principal motive" for c ommitt ing c harg ed ac t of violence ). And, the e vidence prese nted at trial a lso supports a finding that Chapman and Hill eng ag ed in ac ts of violence a g ainst Rivers and E. Willi ams for the purpose of g ainingentry

into the J ones org anization. A rational jury

could conc lude that in betra ying the ir forme r employ er, Chapma

n and Hill alig ned themselve s with the J ones org a-

_________________________________________________________________ 4 Indeed, the jury

acquitted B enton of pa

rticipatingin the narc otics dealingactivity

that was the pr imary

focus of the J ones org anization. 20nization and that A. J ones, in ag ree ing to lift the c ontrac t on the lives

of the YoungGuns, ac cepte d this alliance a nd allowed them into the J ones org anization. 5 V I. Under wood, whose pa

rticipation in the attempt on A. Carte r' s life led to his conviction for c onspiring to r etaliate a g ainst Governme nt w it n e s s e s , ma inta in s th at h e w a s e n ti tl e d to ana li b i i n s tr

u c ti o n . We revie w the re fusal of the district court to g ive this instruction for a bu se of dis c re tio n, se e Un ite d St ate s v . Abb a s, 74 F .3 d 5 06 , 5 13 (4 th Cir. 1996), bea

ringin mind that Underwood wa s entitled to the instruction if it was supported by the evidenc e pre sented at trial, see United States v. Hicks, 748 F .2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1984). An alibi is "[a] defense that place s the defe ndant at the r eleva nt tim e of c ri me in a

dif fe re nt p la c e tha

n th e sc e ne inv olv e d a

nd so re mov e d th e re fr om a s to re nd e r i t im po ssi ble fo r h im t o b e the g uil ty p arty . " Bl ac k 's L aw Di ct i o n ary 7 1 (6 thed

. 1 9 9 0 ). Un d erwo o d 's "a libi" def

ense c onsisted of testimony from himself and othe rs that he was pre sent at the re staurant at the same time as A. Ca rter but that he did not shoot A. Carter and le ft the sce ne bef ore the shooting oc c ur re d. As the Go ve rnme nt p oints o ut, thi s is no t an a lib i; i t is sim

ply an asse rtion of innocenc e. Ac cording ly , the district court did not abuse its discre tion in denying the reque sted instruction. V II. We t ur n n owto M ars ha ll' s c ha lle ng e to h is c onvic tio n. Ma rs ha ll wa s c ha rg e d o nly wi th t he na rc oti c s c on sp ir a c y . In a dd iti on to e vidence reg ardingMarsha ll's role in narc otics dealing , the Gover nment prese nted evidenc e that Mar shall assisted in disposing of the body of Cha rl e s A dd iso n, Jr., wh o w a s a c c ide nta lly sh ot t o d e ath whil e me m-

_________________________________________________________________ 5 Cha pma n a nd Hi ll a lso c on te nd

that th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o support their convic tions for conspiringto distribute cocaine and her oin. Ba sed on the e vidence prese nted at trial, a rational jury

could conc lude that Chapman and H ill became me mbers of the narc otics conspirac y that wa s th e fo c us of

the Jone s o rg anizatio n b y a g re e ingto m

ur de r E . Wil

liams. 21be rs of

the c on sp ir a c y

we re pa c ka g ingc oc a ine fo r s a le . M ars ha ll asser ts that the prese ntation of this evidence amounted to a c onstructiv e ame ndme nt o f t

he ind ic tme nt. A c on str uc tiv e ame ndme nt o c c ur s " [w]he n th e [G]ov e rnme nt, thr ou g h it s p re se ntatio n o f e vid e nc e and /or its argume nt, or

the dis

trict court, through its inst ructions to the jury , or both, broade ns the bases f or convic tion bey ond those cha rg ed in the indictment." United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 203 ( 4th Cir. 1999). A construc tive ame ndme nt i s a

str uc tur a l e rr or

no t su bje c t to re vie w f

or ha rm le ssness. See United States v. F loresca , 38 F.3d 706, 712 ( 4th Cir. 1994) (en ba nc). We c on c lud e that th e pr e se ntatio n o f t he c ha lle ng e d e vid e nc e did not constructively

amend the indictment by allowingthe jury

to convict Marsha ll of a cr ime not char g ed by the g rand jury . The e vidence reg ardingMarsha ll's involvement in the disposal of Addison' s body w a s p l a i n l y r e l e v an tt o h i s p ar t i c i p at i o ni nth e n ar c o t i c s c o n s p i r a c y, in that the testimony

established that the de cision to leave the body in an alley

was made in order to pr event the police from discove ring the c oc a ine pa c ka g ingop e ratio n in pr og re ss at th e tim e of

the sh oo ting. A ccor dingly , the evidenc e wa s intrinsically related to the cha

rg ed c on sp ir a c y

and its pr e se ntatio n d id n ot a me nd the ind ic tme nt. 6 See United States v. Hug hes, 213 F .3d 323, 329 (7th Cir.) (holdingthat introduction of evidenc e of unc harg ed cr iminal activitydid not constructively

amend indictment bec ause e vidence "c ompleted the story of the c rime or c rimes cha rg ed and w as nec essar

y to enable the jury to fully understand a

nd make se nse of" char g ed conspira cy (interna l quotation marks omitted), vac ated, 121 S. Ct. 423 (2000), judg ment reinstated in pe rtinent part, 248 F .3d 1160 (7th Cir. 2001) (unpublished order).

_________________________________________________________________ 6 For this reason, Mar shall' s alterna tive argument--that the a dmission of the e vidence violated Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 404(b)- -also fa ils. S ee Un ite d St ate s v . Ch in, 83 F .3 d 8 3, 88 (4 th C ir . 1 99 6) (h old ingtha t e vidence of other c rimes, wrong s, or ac ts is admissi ble when it is " inext rica

bly intertwined" with the char g ed off ense ( internal quotation marks omitted)). 22V III

.

Al l App e lla

nts e xce pt B e nto n w e re c onvic te d o f c on sp ir ingto d istribute coc aine a

nd heroin a

nd wer e sente nced to va

rying te rms of imprisonment--ra

ng ing f rom 262 months to li fe- -forthose convict i o n s . Ho we v er , n o n e o f t h es e s en t en ce s wa s b as edo nfi n d i n gs reg ardingthe ty

pe and qua

ntity of nar cotics attributable to e ach Ap pe lla nt. Rathe r, in e a c h c a se the dis tr ic t c ourt a pp lie d a c ro ssre fe re nc e to t

he mur de r guid e lin e ba se d o n th e va ri ou s h omi c ide s w ith which, the district cour

t found at sentenc ing, e ach A ppellant had be en i n v o l v e d d ur i n gth e c o ur s e o f

th e n ar c o t i c s c o n s p i r a c y. 7 See United States SentencingGuidelines Manua l § 2D1.1(d)( 1) (1997)

. 8 The drug tr a ff ic kin gc ount o f t

he ind ic tme nt d id n ot a lle g e a sp e c if ic qu anti ty of nar cotics, and the jury

was not instructed to make a findingreg ardi n gth e qu an t i ty o f

dr u g s i n v o l v e d

i nth e c o n s p i r a c y. Ap pe lla nts no w c ha lle ng e the ir

se nte nc e s, ma int a ini ngtha t th e ir

_________________________________________________________________ 7 Whil e the dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s c or re c t th at a pp lic atio n o f t

he c ro ssref ere nce ma de finding s reg ardingdrugty pe and qua

ntity unnece ssary fo r p ur po se s o f a pp lyingthe se nte nc ingg uid e lin e s, the c ourt e rr e d in fa iling to make such finding s for purpose s of deter mining the maximum statut or y pe na lty fa c e d b y e a c h App e lla

nt. Se e Un ite d St ate s v . B ow e ns , 22 4 F .3 d 3 02 , 3 14 (4 th C ir . 2 00 0) (i nd ic atin gtha t 21 U. S.C. A. § 8 41 se ts forth diffe rent maximum penalties de pendingupon the quantity and ty pe of na rc oti c s invo lve d in

the of fe ns e , a s to wh ic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt mus t m ak e f i n d i n g s ats e n t e n c i n g ) , c e rt

. d e n i e d , 1 2 1 S

. C t

. 1 4 0 8 ( 2 0 0 1 )

. In short, the district court improper ly assumed that ea ch Appe llant was subje c t to a statut or y maximumpe na lty

of lif e imp ri so nme nt. With out a finding reg ardingthe applica ble statutory

maxi mum, the district court simply could not know whethe r the guideline sentenc e it imposed was within statutory

limit s. See Edwa

rds v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998) ( "[A] max imum sentence se t by statute trumps a hig her se ntence se t f or th i n th e Gu ide lin e s. " ). Ho we ve r, in l ig ht o f o ur c on c lus ion

tha t, under A pprendi, the statutory

maxi mum penalty

for a ll Appellants was 20 y ear s, we ne ed not re mand for c orre ction of this error

. 8 The murde r guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, sets a base offe nse leve l of 43, resultingin a pre sumptive life sentenc e in all ca ses. See U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt .A (sente ncingtable). The variations among A ppellants' sente nc e s r e su lte d f

ro m do wnwa

rd de pa rt ur e s b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

a s to so me Ap pe lla

nts

. 23convictions for c onspiring to distribute an unspe cified qua ntity of her

oin and coc aine subjec ted them to a maximum penalty of 20 y ear s purs ua nt t o 2 1 U .S. C.A . § 84 1( b) (1 )( C) (We st Su pp . 2 00 1) . B e c a

us e Appellants fa iled to raise this claim bef ore the district court, our revie w is for plain e rror . 9 See F ed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Ol ano , 5 07 U. S. 7 25 , 7 31 -3 2 ( 19 93 ). In o rd e r t o d e mon str ate pla in err or, Appe llants must s how that an e rror occur red, that the err or wa s plain, and that the e rror

aff ecte d their substantial rig hts. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732; United States v. J ackson, 124 F .3d 607, 614 (4th Cir. 1997). Even if

Appellants ca

n satisfy these re quirements, cor

rec tion of the e rror

rema ins within our discretion, which we "should not exercise . . . unless the e rror

` seriously

aff ect[s] the fa irness, integ rity or public reputation of judicial proce eding s.' " O lano, 507 U.S. at 732 (sec ond alteration in original) ( quoting United States v. Y oung , 470 U.S. 1, 17 (1985)). W e c o n cl u d e t h atal l Ap p el l an t s h av e d em o n s tra t ederro r. Al th o u gh Appellants' convictions on the drugconspirac y char g e subjec ted them to a maxim um statutory

penalty of 20 y ear s (240 months), eac h Ap pe lla nt r e c e ive d a

se nte nc e g re ate r t

ha n 2 0 ye ars . A s e xpla ine d in United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156-57 ( 4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) , this was err or. More over, the err or wa s plain. See id. at 160. Acc ording ly , we turn to the que stion of whether the er ror a ffe cted Ap pe lla nts ' su bs tanti a l r ig hts

. An er ror a ffe cts substantial rig hts when it is prejudicial, i.e. whe n it "ac tually

aff ect[s] the outcome of

the proc eeding s." United States v. Hasting s, 134 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1998). Chapma n, Hill, and D. J ones, ea ch of whom rec eived a life sentenc e on the dr

ugtrafficking c onviction, cannot demonstrate that their substantial rig hts were

_________________________________________________________________ 9 Ap pe lla nts ma int a in t

hat A nto ine Mars ha ll o bje c te d to the fa ilure to alleg e spec ific drugquantity in the indictment in a pretria l motion and maintain that they

joined in this obj ection prior to tria l. We disagr ee. T he portion of Marsha ll's motion to which Appellants re fer argues only

that th e G o v e r n me n t i mp r o p e r ly

c h ar g e d M ar s h a ll w it

hd is tr ib u ti n ga

" mi xture or substanc e" containingcoca ine or he roin; at no point does the motion claim that drug quantity is an eleme nt of the off

ense. I ndeed, se ver al t i m es th e m o t i o nar gu es th atdru g qu an t i ty i s ani s s u e f

o r s en t en ci n g, no t f or tr ia l. 24a ff

e c te d b e c a

us e the y a lso re c e ive d li fe se nte nc e s f or mur de r i n a id of ra ckete ering . Under

wood, who re ceive d a sente nce of 262 months on the drugtraff

ickingconviction, ca

nnot demonstrate that the e rror aff ecte d his substantial rights bec ause he was c onvicted of two of fe ns e s c arr

yinga tot a l maximumstatut or

y pe na lty of 30 0 mo nth s. 10 Had the district c ourt bee n awa re when it sentenc ed Unde rwood that the maxim um penalty

for his drugtraff

ickingconviction was 20 y ear s, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) would have obligated the cour t to achieve the g uid e lin e se nte nc e of

26 2 mo nth s " by

imp os inga

te rm of imp ri sonment of 240 months or less on ea ch count of conviction and or dering those terms to be ser

ved conse cutively

to achieve the total punishment mandated by the guidelines." United States v. Ang le, 254 F.3d 514, 518 ( 4th Cir. 2001) (en ba nc). In contra st, J . Wil liams, J ett, Marsha ll, and Montgome ry have de monstrated that th e e rr or

a ff e c te d th e ir

su bs tanti a l r ig hts . J. Wil liams a nd Jett , both of whom rec eived life sentenc es on the drugtraff ickingconvictio ns , w e re e a c h c onvic te d o f t hr e e c ounts c arr

yingan a g g re g ate statuto ry maximumpe na lty

of 35 y e ars . 11 Had the district c ourt bee n awa re at th e tim e of

se nte nc ingthat th e maximumstatut or y pe na lty for the dr ugtraff ickingconvictions was 20 year s, it would have bee n require d to impose consecutive se ntence s for e ach c ount of conviction in order to a

pproxi mate, as c losely

as possible, the guidelines sentence of life imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) ; see a lso United States v. Saccoc cia, 58 F .3d 754, 786 & n.28 ( 1st Cir. 1995) (approving a 660-y ear sentenc e imposed pursua nt to § 5G1.2(d) as " the func

tional equivalent of life without parole" ). B ut, beca use we cannot sa

y that 35 y ear s imprisonment is t he func tional equivalent of alife sentence , we c onclude that J. W illiams' and Jett's substantial rig hts were

_________________________________________________________________ 10 In addition to the 240-month statutory maxi mum penalty

for the dr ug traff ickingconviction, Under

wood was subjec t to a statutory maxi mum pe na lty of fi ve y e ars fo r c on sp ir ingto r e ta liate a g a ins t G ov e rnme nt w itnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(a) (1). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 371. 11 In addition to the 20-y ear statutory maxi mum penalty

for the dr ug tr a ff ic kin gc onvic tio n, Willi ams a nd Jett fa c e d a te n- y e ar s tatut or

y maximum penalty

for c onspiring to c ommit m urder in aid of ra ckete ering , see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1959(a)( 5), and a five-year statutory penalty for c onspiring to r etaliate a g ainst Governme nt witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(a) (1), se e 18 U.S.C.A. § 371. 25aff

ecte d by the impositi on of life se ntence s on the drugtraff icking convictions. We also conclude that Montgome ry ' s sentence of 292 months and Marshall’s se ntence of 264 months affe cted their substantial rig hts. Montgomer y and Mar shall were convicted only of the drugtraff

ickingcount, and a ccor dingly wer e ea ch subjec t to a statutory maxi mum penalty

of 240 months. As we he ld in Promi se, an er ror suc h as this affe cts substantial rig hts. See Promise, 255 F.3d at 160-61. In Promise, those members of the en banc court that c onsidered the question were equally

divided reg ardingwhether to notice an Ap pr e nd i e rr or

lik e the e rr or s h e re . Co mpa re id. at 16 1- 64 (Wi lki ns , J ., joined by

Wil kinson, C.J , and Willi ams and Tr axler, J J .) (a rguing that err or should not be noticed) with id. at 186-91 (Motz, J ., joined by Widener, Michae l, and King , J .J .) (a rguing that error

should be no tic e d) . T hu s, the qu e sti on wa s le ft op e n f or a su bs e qu e nt p ane l. Rece ntly , a pane l of this court held that the imposition of a sentenc e g reater than tha

t allowed by

a def endant' s conviction must be noticed on plain err or re view. See United States v. Cotton, 2001 W L901269, at *5-*7 (4th Cir. Aug . 10, 2001). We are compelled to follow Cotton and ac cording ly

must noti ce the plain err ors in the sentenc es of J

. W i l l i am s , J e t t , an d

M o n t g o m e r

y. S e e E th e r i d g e v . N o r f

o l k & W

. Ry. Co. , 9 F .3 d 1 08 7, 10 90 (4 th C ir . 1 99 3) (" A d e c isi on of a pa ne l of thi s c ourt be c ome s th e law o f t

he c ir c uit and is b ind ingon

oth e r p ane ls unless it is overruled by

a subseque nt en banc opinion of this court or a supe rsedingcontra

ry decision of the Supre me Court." ( internal quotation marks omitted)). IX. F or the re a so ns se t f

or th a bo ve , w e re

je c t a ll o f A

pp e lla nts ' c ha lleng es to their convic tions ex cept f or J. W illiams' cla im of ineffe ctive a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l, whic h w e dis mis s. We t he re fo re a ff

ir m App e llants ' c onvic tio ns . H ow e ve r, we va c ate the se nte nc e s o f J. Wi lli ams, J et t , M ar s h al l , an d

M o n t go m ery

an d re m an d fo r r es en t en ci n g. AFF I RMED I

N PART, DI SMI SSED I

N PART, AN D V AC AT ED AN D REM AN DE D I N PA RT 26