alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Kortney C., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Savitri L., Appellant, et al., Respondents.

[770 NYS2d 758]

In a child protective proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, Savitri L. appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Salinitro, J.), dated August 29, 2002, as, after a hearing, granted the petition, entered a finding of neglect against her, and directed the issuance of a final order of protection against her.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (ii) provides that a prima facie case of child abuse or neglect is “established by evidence of (1) an injury to a child which would ordinarily not occur absent an act or omission of [the] respondents, and (2) that [the] respondents were the caretakers of the child at the time that the injury occurred” *(Matter of Philip M.,*82 NY2d 238, 243 [1993]). After a prima facie case of neglect is established, the burden of going forward shifts to the caretakers to offer a reasonable explanation as to how the injury occurred *(see Matter of Marc*A., 301 AD2d 595, 596 [2003]; *Matter of Philip M., supra,*at 244).

In this case, a prima facie case of neglect was established by expert medical testimony. An emergency room doctor testified that the seven-month-old child suffered a spiral fracture of the femur which could only have been caused by the intentional infliction of a twisting force to the child’s leg. This is a sufficient factual basis for a finding of neglect *(cf. Matter of Brandyn P.,*278 AD2d 533 [2000]). Since the testimony established that the baby was in the care of the appellant, Savitri L., at the time of the injury, the burden shifted to her to explain how the injury occurred. The appellant indicated that the child fell from a changing table and that she caught her on her stomach or by her arm, but she failed to tell either the parents or hospital personnel about the fall. The appellant did call the parents after the child began crying, and helped secure treatment for the child.

A medical expert testified that the spiral fracture could have been caused accidentally in two ways, either by the baby land*533ing on her leg after a fall or by being caught by the leg in midair after falling. This testimony contradicted the appellant’s explanation, as she testified that the child did not hit the ground and she did not grab the child’s leg at any point.

Accordingly, the Family Court’s determination is supported by the record. Florio, J.P., Smith, Luciano and Rivera, JJ., concur.
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-15-0000771 31-JAN-2017 08:47 AM
#### In the Matter of Katherine Peabody, Respondent, v John Peabody, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 902]

Mercure, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Washington County (Hemmett, Jr., J.), entered February 15, 2002, which partially granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order of custody.

The parties are the parents of a 10-year-old boy, Joshua, of whom they have joint custody pursuant to a prior order entered upon a stipulation. While staying at respondent’s family farm, Joshua was injured after falling from the back of a chair. Joshua suggested that his uncle, Charles Peabody, may have caused his fall by pushing him. When petitioner discovered bruises on Joshua’s back shortly after the incident occurred, she contacted the police. A state trooper went to the farm to arrest Peabody, who allegedly threatened the officer with a rock and pitchfork, causing the officer to draw his gun before Peabody submitted to arrest.

Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding, seeking modification of the prior custody order to grant her sole custody of Joshua and to prohibit Peabody from having contact with Joshua. Following a hearing, Family Court found no significant change in circumstances warranting an award of sole legal custody to petitioner. Nevertheless, based upon the incident with the trooper, the court modified the prior custody order with respect to visitation, directing, among other things, that Joshua was not to be left alone in Peabody’s presence. Respondent appeals.

Initially, we reject respondent’s assertion that Family Court concluded that no change in circumstances existed. While the court found no change in circumstances warranting a change in the parties’ arrangement with respect to *custody,*the court did determine that the incident involving Peabody and the state trooper constituted a sufficient change requiring modification of the prior custody order with respect to *visitation.*According Family Court’s findings appropriate deference, we agree that this incident—in particular, the threatening situation created in *805the home environment by Peabody’s behavior—demonstrated that the change in the parties’ visitation arrangement was necessary to ensure the continued best interest of Joshua *(see Matter of Bishop v Livingston,*296 AD2d 602, 603-604 [2002]; *Matter of Haggerty v Herter,*272 AD2d 790, 791 [2000]; *Matter of Royea v Hutchings,*260 AD2d 678, 679-680 [1999]; *cf. Matter of Reese v Jones,*249 AD2d 676, 677 [1998]). We note that nothing in our decision prevents either party from seeking a modification of Family Court’s order upon a further change in circumstances evincing that the restrictions on Peabody’s contact with Joshua are no longer warranted.

Cardona, P.J., Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
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#### Jireh Wait *versus*Alfred Gibbs *et al.*

Where a seaman, having performed a fishing voyage, demanded his share of the fish, but without offering any security for his proportion of the expenses, but the owners of the vessel refused, and afterwards sold the fish, it was *held,*that the seaman might recover the balance due *to*him in an action for money had and received, without making a new demand.

Assumpsit for money had and received, for the purpose of recovering the plaintiff’s proportion of the proceeds of three fishing trips performed by him in the defendants’ vessel called the Clarion. Plea, the general issue.

At the trial, before *Morton*J., the plaintiff called as a witness one Manchester ; who testified that he kept the books of the vessel during the three trips and settled the accounts with Baker and Studley, two of the defendants ; that the plaintiff’s proportion was 102 dollars and 30 cents, out of which were to be deducted the great and little generals and the freight of the fish to New York, amounting in the whole to 40 dollars and 50 cents ; that before the fish were carried to New York, the plaintiff demanded his proportion of Baker (the captain) and Studley, but they alleged that the freight of the fish belonged to the vessel, and refused to deliver them.

The defendants contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, because he did not offer any security for his part of the expenses when he demanded the fish, and because he had made no demand since the sale of the fish. But these objections were overruled, and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants moved for a new trial.

*152
      *Oct.*22d.

*Oct. 25th.*

*W. Baylies*and *Coffin,*

for the defendants, cited Act of 13 *Cong.*1 *Sess. c. 2,*passed June 19, 1813.

*L. Williams*and *Bassett,*for the plaintiff,

said that the plaintiff’s demand for his proportion of the fish was refused, not because he did not offer security for his part of the expenses, but because the plaintiff claimed a right to the freight of the fish to New York. The fish were thus tortiously taken and carried away and converted into money, and a demand would not be necessary even to support trover.

*Per Curiam*

A specific demand, and an offer to pay the great and little generals or to have them deducted, might be necessary, if this were an action for a proportion of the fish ; but the fish had been turned into money, and a balance was due to the plaintiff, and an action for money had and received lies to recover it without an actual demand. But here was a demand for a proportion of the fish, which would be sufficient in this action, if a demand were necessary.

*Judgment according to verdict.*
      ***

*S.C.*4 Pick. 298.
<PAGE>   1
EXHIBIT 15.1

                     INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REVIEW REPORT

The Board of Directors and Stockholders
NCS HealthCare, Inc. and Subsidiaries


We have reviewed the accompanying condensed consolidated balance sheet of NCS
HealthCare, Inc. and subsidiaries (the Company) as of March 31, 1998, the
related condensed consolidated statements of income for the three-month and
nine-month periods ended March 31, 1998 and 1997 and the condensed consolidated
statements of cash flows for the nine-month periods ended March 31, 1998 and
1997. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's
management.

We conducted our reviews in accordance with standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A review of interim
financial information consists principally of applying analytical procedures to
financial data, and making inquiries of persons responsible for financial and
accounting matters. It is substantially less in scope than an audit conducted in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, which will be performed
for the full year with the objective of expressing an opinion regarding the
financial statements taken as a whole. Accordingly, we do not express such an
opinion.

Based on our reviews, we are not aware of any material modifications that should
be made to the accompanying condensed consolidated financial statements referred
to above for them to be in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.

We have previously audited, in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, the consolidated balance sheet of NCS HealthCare, Inc. and
subsidiaries as of June 30, 1997, and the related consolidated statements of
income, stockholders' equity and cash flows for the year then ended, not
presented herein, and in our report dated August 1, 1997, we expressed an
unqualified opinion on those consolidated financial statements. In our opinion,
the information set forth in the accompanying condensed consolidated balance
sheet as of June 30, 1997 is fairly stated, in all material respects, in
relation to the consolidated balance sheet from which it has been derived.


Cleveland, Ohio                                         /s/   Ernst & Young LLP
April 28, 1998






                                       14
1

Medina, Dayana

From: kpgaus@aep.com

Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2013 8:36 AM

To: Pettyjohn, Mary; Medina, Dayana

Cc: Brian Bond (tbbond@aep.com); wemast@aep.com; kjmunson@aep.com; jjhenry@aep.com; 

bwmoore@aep.com; jchendricks@aep.com; jjewell@trinityconsultants.com

Subject: Re: FW: EPA Response regarding AEP/SWEPCO Flint Creek

Attachments: Consolidated Spreadsheet_2013-04-05.xlsx; Final ADEQ Cost Estimate Summary WEM Rev 2 4-5-5.xlsx; 

flint_creek_april_2013_bart_response.pdf; Flint_Creek_BART_Analysis_2013-04-05.pdf; AEP MATS 

letter-7-18-12.pdf

Mary, attached is a response to EPA's questions, a revised BART FFA, and updated cost files. Please note that the 

updated modeling files are available on Trinity's FTP site. The user name is AEP and the password is Trinity. Let me 

know if you have any questions. 

Kris Gaus, QEP 

American Electric Power 

Air Quality Services 

office: 214/777-1113 

fax: 214/777-1138 

"Pettyjohn, Mary" <PETTYJOHN@adeq.state.ar.us> wrote on 03/26/2013 07:50:20 AM: 

> "Pettyjohn, Mary" <PETTYJOHN@adeq.state.ar.us> 

> 03/26/2013 07:50 AM > 

> To > 

> "Kris Gaus (kpgaus@aep.com)" <kpgaus@aep.com>, "Brian Bond 

> (tbbond@aep.com)" <tbbond@aep.com> > 

> cc > 

> Subject > 

> FW: EPA Response regarding AEP/SWEPCO Flint Creek > 

> FYI > > From: Medina, Dayana [mailto:Medina.Dayana@epa.gov] 

> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 4:28 PM 

> To: Pettyjohn, Mary 

> Cc: Donaldson, Guy; Feldman, Michael 

> Subject: EPA Response regarding AEP/SWEPCO Flint Creek > > Hi Mary, 

> > Here is our response to the email you forwarded on 3/19/13 from AEP/SWEPCO. > > Thank you for providing a copy of the vendor’s performance guarantee 

> of NID for Flint Creek. However, it is unclear to us what the 

> averaging period is for the vendor’s 0.055 lb/MMBtu emission 

> guarantee (i.e., is this on a 30 day rolling average?). The average 

> controlled emission rate can vary considerably depending on whether 

> performance is being measured on a daily, monthly, or annual time 

> period. If any other page(s) of the vendor’s proposal specify the 

> averaging time period, please provide this to us. BART limits have 

> generally been based on a 30 day rolling average. 
2

> > For NOx BART, if you have a vendor guarantee or any other 

> documentation to support the selection of 0.23 lb/MMBtu (using LNB/ 

> OFA), please provide this to us as well. 

> > > > Thank you, 

> > Dayana Medina > U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 6 > Multimedia Planning and Permitting Division > Air Planning Section (6PD-L) > 214-665-7241 >
<PAGE>   1
EXHIBIT 15.2

May 14, 1999

The Board of Directors and Stockholders
NCS HealthCare, Inc. and Subsidiaries

We are aware of the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 No. 333-49417; Form S-3 No. 333-63437;Form S-3 No. 333-47293; Form
S-3/A No. 333-29565; Form S-3/A No. 333-35551; Form S-8 No. 333-70741 and Form
S-8 No. 333-72243) of NCS HealthCare, Inc. and subsidiaries of our report dated
May 14, 1999, relating to the unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial
statements of NCS HealthCare, Inc. and subsidiaries that are included in its
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31,1999.


                                          /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, John L. Higgins, certify that:

1.    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Connetics
Corporation;

2.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.    The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c)    disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5.    The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b)    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: November 8, 2004

/s/ John L. Higgins
-------------------------------------------------
John L. Higgins
Executive Vice President, Finance and
Corporate Development and Chief Financial Officer
#### FAAGATA of Fagatogo and LAUVALE of Fagatogo, Plaintiffs v. AFOA of Fagatogo, Defendant

No. 1-1934

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Matai Name: “Lutu” of Fagatogo]

August 26, 1935

H. P. WOOD, *Chief Justice*

OPINION AND JUDGMENT

On this 26th day of August 1935 before me came Afoa, Faagata and Lauvale all of the Village of Fagatogo, in accordance with an agreement made by all of them with me on the 19th day of August 1935 that between the two dates an agreement should endeavor to be reached between the three of them as to the holder of the name Lutu.

By the decision of the High Court rendered in the case tried in the year 1905 Afoa was given the pule of the name Lutu.

It appears at the hearing held on this day that the three parties heretofore mentioned have not been able to agree on a candidate and it is therefor my opinion that Aofa may choose whomsoever he sees fit as the holder of the matai name Lutu.

Afoa in the absence of agreement with the other two parties has decided to take the name Lutu himself.

It is however my opinion that as the names Lutu and Afoa are both high names they should not both be held by the same person and accordingly and in accordance with the ruling of the Attorney General it will be necessary for *525Afoa to resign his matai name Afoa before he takes the name Lutu.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernesto Garcia VASQUEZ, a/k/a Francisco Oswaldo Garcia-Lopez, a/k/a Victor, a/k/a Francisco Ernesto Garcia Lopez, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7530

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 24, 2017

Decided: May 1, 2017

Ernesto Garcia Vasquez, Appellant Pro Se.

Elizabeth Freeman Greene, Steven R. Kaufman, Assistant United States Attorneys, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appel-lee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ernesto Garcia Vasquez seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Vasquez has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
<PAGE>


                                  EXHIBIT 10(A)

                           NATIONAL AUTO CREDIT, INC.
                               555 MADISON AVENUE
                                   29TH FLOOR
                            NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022


                                                              September 12, 2002


Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 5th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20549-0609


    Re: National Auto Credit, Inc. Form 10-Q for the Quarter Ended July 31, 2002
    (Commission File No. 1-11601)

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief
Executive Officer of National Auto Credit, Inc. (the "Issuer") hereby certify
that the periodic report referenced above and filed by the Issuer with the
Securities and Exchange Commission fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
and that information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Issuer.

                                                 Very truly yours,

                                                   /s/ James J. McNamara
                                                   ---------------------
                                                   James J. McNamara
                                                   Chief Executive Officer


                                       29
----

Exhibit 13.1 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report ofMicromem Technologies Inc. (the ''Company'') on Form 20-F for the Fiscal YearEnded October 31, 2008 (the ''Report''), I, Joseph Fuda, Chief Executive Officerof the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to§906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, based on my knowledge, that: 

(1) 

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) 

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

| Date: February 18, 2009 | /s/ Joseph Fuda                                    |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                    | Joseph Fuda                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|                    | Chief Executive Officer                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|                    | (Principal executive officer)                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

 

----