alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# New Mexico State University

Physical Science Laboratory, Unmanned Aircraft Flight Test Center

1050 Stewart St. Las Cruces, New Mexico 88003

- 8002

Request for amendments to FAA 333 UAS exemption Exemption No. 13425 Regulatory Docket No. FAA

– 2015

– 3533

- 0001

Contact:

Dennis Zaklan
Deputy Director, UAS FTC NMSU, Physical Science Laboratory

575

- 646

- 9417 https://uasftc.psl.nmsu.edu/public/

1050 Stewart St. Las Cruces, New

Mexico 88003

- 8002December 2

, 2015

U. S. Department of Transportation

Docket Management System

1200 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20590

Re: Amendment to Exemption No. 13425 Regulatory Docket No. FAA

– 2015

– 3533

- 0001

Dear Sir or Madam: The New Mexico State University Physical Science Laboratory (NMSU PSL) is requesting an amendment to our existing 333 exemption as listed and described below. The purpose for the amendment is to be able to offer the services as listed in the existing 333 exemption. Each amend ment will s erve to increase the functionality and usefulness of sUAS and the increased functionality will serve to create safer working environments in the industries in which they are deployed.

1. Additional Aircraft

NMSU PSL would like to add additional sUAS to the e xisting exemption to include:

 3D Robotics X4

 3D Robotics Solo

 3D Robotics Iris and Iris Plus

 Leptron Avenger

 SenseFly eBee

 Aeronautic Ltd. Orb iter

 Sophisticated Unmanned Solutions Vortex 700

 Aeryon Scout

 Aeryon SkyRanger

 AirRobot AR100B

2. In addition to the listed sUAS above, NMSU PSL would like to add any sUAS that

fit the criteria as a sUAS that has completed the NMSU UAS Flight Test Center airworthiness process . All sUAS that will operate under this 333 Exemption will

meet all weight, sp eed and other criteria spelled out in the 333 exemption.

Dennis Zaklan

Deputy Director, UAS FTC New Mexico State University, PSL
#### William COLEMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James MCRAE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6064

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

William Coleman, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinoin.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

William Coleman seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a' substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Coleman has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS AT AND FOR THE PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
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<CASH>                                          30,174
<SECURITIES>                                         0
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Francisco Javier SANCHEZ-VILLARREAL, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41119 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 31, 2017

Eileen K. Wilson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Francisco Javier Sanchez-Villarreal, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Francisco Javier Sanchez-Villarreal appeals the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence of 155 months of imprisonment, imposed following his conviction of possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. He sought a sentence reduction based on *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), and *Welch v. United States,*— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016). On May 23, 2017, this court issued its opinion in Sanchez-Villarreal’s direct appeal of the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. *United States v. Sanchez-Villarreal,*857 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2017). This court vacated Sanchez-Villarreal’s 155-month sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. *Id.*at 722-23.

Because the § 3582(c)(2) motion related solely to the 155-month sentence imposed pursuant to the district court’s judgment of October 19, 2016 (which has now been vacated), Sanchez-Villarreal’s appeal must be DISMISSED as moot. Sanchez-Villarreal’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and his motion for the appointment of counsel are DENIED as unnecessary.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5,4.
Exhibit 32.1

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. Section 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Annual Report of **Asian Alliance Ventures, Inc.** (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Matt Mecke, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)     The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
/s/ Matt MeckeMatt MeckeChief Executive OfficerDecember 12, 2003
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-01-00165-CR

Shawn David McCulley, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LAMPASAS COUNTY, 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 7062, HONORABLE JOE CARROLL, JUDGE PRESIDING

A jury found appellant Shawn David McCulley guilty of arson, for which the district

court assessed punishment of imprisonment for sixteen years. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 28.02

(West Supp. 2002). We will modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

Appellant’s court-appointed attorney filed a brief concluding that the appeal is

frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d

807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Jackson v.

State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App.

1969). A copy of counsel’s brief was delivered to appellant, and appellant was advised of his right

to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.
2

We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree that the appeal is frivolous

insofar as no reversible error is shown. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. 

We do find nonreversible error in the judgment. The judgment recites that appellant

waived trial by jury and pleaded guilty. In fact, appellant was convicted by a jury after pleading not

guilty. The judgment shall be modified to so reflect. As modified, the judgment of conviction is

affirmed.

__________________________________________

Lee Yeakel, Justice

Before Justices Kidd, Yeakel and Patterson

Modified and, as Modified, Affirmed

Filed: December 13, 2001

Do Not Publish
#### Miguel Angel QUIJOSA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72816

Agency No. [ AXXX-XXX-XXX ]

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 15, 2017

Miguel Angel Quijosa, Pro Se

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Rosanne Perry, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Miguel Angel Quijosa, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reconsider. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider, *Cano-Merida v. INS,*311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider as untimely where Quijosa’s filed the motion over seven months after the filing deadline. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) (setting a 30 day deadline for motions to reconsider).

' We do not consider Quijosa’s contentions relating to the agency’s underlying denial of cancellation of removal. We previously addressed the agency’s denial of relief in *Quijosa v. Holder,*No. 13-73669 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014) (Order).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### A. YOUNG, Plaintiff v. SAMOA SHIPPING *&*TRADING COMPANY, LT'D., CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT, ISLAND GOVERNMENT, Defendant

No. 14-1912

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division

Date unknown

[Names of Judges unknown]

DECISION

The complaint is dismissed, as to defendant Samoa Shipping and Trading Company. The plaintiff failed to take proper steps to secure the delivery of his goods in accordance with the bill of lading and unreasonably delayed the presentation of his claim to the proper party.

*265The plaintiff also failed to take requisite steps for the recovery of the value of his goods within a reasonable length of time.

The court finds, therefore, that the defendant Samoa Shipping & Trading Company has been debarred by the conduct of the plaintiff from protecting its own interests in that it the Samoa Shipping & Trading Company was unable to promptly trace the final disposition of the goods in question.

However, the action of the court is not based on the seven day limitation contained in the sixth section of .the conditions of the Bill of Lading, as the court considers this limitation would have been unreasonable in this case, if the plaintiff had acted within a reasonable time.

As to the defendant, the Island Government, no liability has been shown and the complaint is also dismissed as to said defendant.

Costs are assessed at $20.00 to be paid by plaintiff.
#### Sue Dubeshter, Doing Business as Speed Oil Service, Appellant, *v.*Life-Lube Oil Corp., et al., Respondents, and Leonard Schottlandt, Defendant.

Submitted February 24, 1943;

decided April 8, 1943.

*677
      *David Kashman*for appellant.

*Mitchell Antman*and *Paul W. Hessel*for respondents.

Order affirmed, with costs, and question certified answered in the negative. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
ex1013.htm


EXHIBIT 10.13


 


GUARANTY


 


Dated:  February 15, 2012


 


For sufficient consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, and to induce CCR OF MELBOURNE, INC. (“Lender”) to accept that certain Revolving Line of Credit Promissory Note (the “Note”) of even date herewith in the original principal amount of $500,000.00 from FCID MEDICAL, INC. (“Borrower”), and the Loan Agreement dated of even date herewith (the “Loan Agreement”), the undersigned hereby unconditionally guaranties to Lender the prompt payment of all amounts due on the Note and Loan Agreement as and when the same shall become due whether by acceleration, extension or otherwise and the due and prompt performance of all obligations under the Note and the Loan Agreement.  Lender may extend or renew any indebtedness or release any lien or collateral securing same, or waive any rights thereunder, or release any accommodation party or party secondarily liable thereon, all without the acknowledgement and consent of the undersigned and without thereby releasing or diminishing its rights against the undersigned hereunder.  The undersigned waives notice of acceptance of this Guaranty, notice of any extensions of credit or other acts by Lender and waives diligence, presentment, demand, notice, protest and suit by Lender in respect to the indebtedness hereby guaranteed, and Lender may enforce this Guaranty without first suing the Borrower or any other party or proceeding against any security it may have.  The undersigned agrees to pay all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees and other legal expenses whether incurred at or before the trial level and/or in any appellate, bankruptcy or administrative proceeding, paid or incurred by Lender in connection with the enforcement of this Guaranty.  This Guaranty shall bind and inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns of the parties hereto.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Guarantor has executed this Guaranty as of the day and year first above written.


 



	Signed, sealed and delivered	“GUARANTOR”	 	 
	in the presence of:	 	 	 
	 	MEDICAL BILLING ASSISTANCE, INC.	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	By: /s/ Christian C. Romandetti	 	 
	 	Print Name: Christian C. Romandetti	 	 
	 	Title: President	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	Print Name: 	 	 	 
	Print Name:  	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	STATE OF FLORIDA	 	 	 
	COUNTY OF BREVARD	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 















The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 15th day of February, 2012, by Christian C. Romandetti, as President of MEDICAL BILLING ASSISTANCE, INC., on behalf of the corporation.  Said person (check one) X is personally known to me,  ̈ produced a driver's license (issued by a state of the United States within the last five (5) years) as identification, or  ̈ produced other identification, to wit:  _______________________.







/s/ Julie L. Hardesty


Print Name: Julie L. Hardesty


Notary Public, State of Florida


Commission No.: DD876139


My Commission Expires: 05/12/2013
#### Valierie MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NCL (BAHAMAS), LTD., a foreign corporation d.b.a. Norwegian Cruise Line, and /or NCL America., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-12019 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(March 1, 2017)

Jay Mitchell Levy, Ryan Marks, Jay M. Levy, PA, Miami, FL, Robert L. Gardana, Robert L. Gardana, PA, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Richard J, McAlpin, Daniel Scott Mar-cotte, McAlpin Conroy, PA, Miami, FL, Geoffrey Edward Probst, Norwegian Cruise Lines, Inc., Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee

Before HULL, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee NCL (Bahamas), Ltd. on plaintiff-appellant Valierie Miller’s negligence action under federal maritime law for the reasons outlined in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned discussion of the duty owed by the ship to Ms. Miller as well as the open and obvious nature of the danger presented.

AFFIRMED.
#### Peter J. TROGLIO, Appellant, v. SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 15862.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued Nov. 17, 1966.

Decided Dec. 13, 1966.

George W. Schroeck, Erie, Pa., for appellant.

Irving Murphy, MacDonald, Illig, Jones & Britton, Erie, Pa., for appellee.

Before McLAUGHLIN, KALODNER and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

This suit for slander was tried to the Court. The latter made twenty-seven specific fact findings, affirmatively holding that there were no communications made by defendant capable of defamatory interpretation; that there was no evidence in the entire record of any special harm or damage suffered by plaintiff which was proximately caused by any utterance or communication of defendant’s agents or employees; that the communications defendant did make were qualifiedly privileged.

Factually there was sufficient evidence to support the Court’s findings and we find no prejudicial trial errors of law.

The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
#### Commonwealth *versus*Stephen Cooper.

Where one is indicted for a rape, and the jury cannot agree to convict him, *tiny*may find him guilty of an assault with intent to commit a rape.

The defendant was indicted for a rape. After the cause was committed to the jury, they remained together through the night • *175and, in the morning, being sent for into Court, stated to the Court that one of their number was of opinion that, if suitable resistance had been used, the crime could not have been committed; and that, on this ground, he was fully resolved never to join his brethren in a verdict of guilty.

*The Court*

then conferred together, and the *Chief Justice*instructed the jury that they might find the prisoner guilty of a lower offence, if they were all convinced that an assault was made by him with intent to commit the crime charged in the indictment; that the Court, whatever their own impressions might be, were not desirous of gaining an opinion from the jury, after due deliberation and the exercise of a sound discretion, and doubts still remaining in the mind of a juror; but there would be no inconsistency in those of the jury who believed the crime to have been actually committed, as charged, to find the prisoner guilty of an assault with an intent to commit the crime, which, by the statutes on this subject, (1) as construed by the Court, was necessarily included in the greater crime, *(a)*

The jury retired, and in a few minutes returned with a verdict of guilty of an assault with an intent to commit a rape; and the verdict was received and recorded.

(1)

*Stat.*1784, c. 66, § 11; 1805, c. 97.

(a)

**The only exception to this rule seems to be, where the prisoner, by being originally indicted for a different offence, would be deprived of any advantage which he would otherwise be entitled to claim, in which case the prosecutor is not allowed to oppress the defendant by altering the mode of proceedings. — 1 Chitty, *Crim.*Law, 639.
**Exhibit 23**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We hereby consent to the incorporation byreference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-153333 333-152245, 333-142229, 333-124354, 333-102082, 333-88770, 333-88730, 333-30088, 333-88811, 333-48260, 333-52644, 333-75736 and 333-111548) of TIBCO Software Inc. of our reportdated January 27, 2009 relating to the financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this Form 10-K. 

/s/ PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP 

San Jose, California 

January 27, 2009
1

Hunt, Jeff

From: Stanfill, Michael G (Env Dept) [Michael.Stanfill@bnsf.com]

Sent: Thursday, October 14, 2010 2:24 PM

To: sclo461@ECY.WA.gov

Cc: Seep, David C

Subject: Request for 2008 State of Washington Data

Attachments: 2008CountyReport.doc; 2008 State of Washington CountyReport.pdf

Sara Clouse 

 

Attached is the emissions data by county for the year 2008 as per your request. I am not able to furnish it to you in a 

spreadsheet but have attached a copy in word for your use. 

 

Please feel free to call me to discuss further. 

 

Michael Stanfill 

Director Environmental Engineering and Program Development 

BNSF Railway Company 

920 SE Quincy 

Topeka, KS 66612-1116 

 

785-435-2225 

785-435-2202 Fax
Exhibit 23

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We hereby consent to the incorporation by
reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-142229, 333-124354, 333-102082, 333-88770, 333-88730, 333-30088, 333-88811, 333-48260, 333-52644, 333-75736 and 333-111548) of TIBCO Software Inc. of our report dated January 25, 2008
relating to the financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this Form 10-K.



|                              
|------------------------------
|/S/ PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP
|                              
|San Jose, California          
|January 25, 2008