alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Waiver of Executive's 2011 Bonus dated March 7, 2012



 Exhibit 10.8 
 Hill Feinberg Waiver 
 WAIVER OF EXECUTIVE’S 2011 BONUS

 This Waiver of Executive’s 2011 Bonus (“Waiver”) is hereby executed effective as of the date
set forth below (the “Effective Date”) by the undersigned (the “Executive”), as an employee of FIRST SOUTHWEST HOLDINGS, LLC (the “Employer”), a subsidiary of PLAINSCAPITAL
CORPORATION, a Texas corporation (“Plains Capital”), on behalf of himself, his heirs, executives, successors and assigns for good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency and receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.

 WHEREAS, the Employer, Plains Capital and the Executive entered into that certain Employment Agreement dated
December 18, 2008, as amended by the First Amendment to Employment Agreement dated as of March 2, 2009 (the “Employment Agreement”), pursuant to which the Executive is entitled to receive an annual bonus for any
given year that is not less than the average bonus paid to Executive by Employer in respect of the three (3) calendar years immediately preceding the year of such bonus (the “Guaranteed Bonus”); 

WHEREAS, the Executive desires to waive a portion of the Guaranteed Bonus that would be payable to him in March of 2012 with
respect to the fiscal year ending December 31, 2011. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this Waiver, as of the Effective
Date, notwithstanding any provisions of the Employment Agreement, or any other agreement or understanding between the Employer and the Executive, the Executive hereby irrevocably and unconditionally waives and relinquishes his rights and any and all
claims to receive $91,777 of the Guaranteed Bonus for 2011 (the “Waived Amount”). 
 The Executive
further certifies, acknowledges and agrees that: 
  

	 	1.	No portion of the Guaranteed Bonus is payable until March, 2012, and that as of the Effective Date, no portion of the Guaranteed Bonus has been credited to his account
or made available to him without restriction. 

  

	 	2.	As of the Effective Date, he shall not longer have any right, title, claim or interest in the Waived Amount and neither the Employer nor Plains Capital shall have any
obligation either now or in the future to pay the Waived Amount to the Executive, or his heirs, estates or assigns. 

  

	 	3.	He has read and completely understands the provisions of this Waiver and that he is signing freely and voluntarily, without duress, coercion or undue influence.


 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Executive has executed this Waiver effective as of the 7th day of March, 2012.

  

			
	
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Hill Feinberg

	Printed Name: Hill Feinberg
#### Ronald Satish EMRIT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINUUM LEGAL; Caci, Inc.; United States Department of Energy; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1230

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

Ronald Satish Emrit, Appellant Pro Se. Charles R. Claxton, PALEY, ROTHMAN, GOLDSTEIN, ROSENBERG & COOPER, CHARTERED, Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Satish Emrit appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil action for failure to state a claim. On appeal, we confíne our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. *See*4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Emrit’s informal brief does not challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, Emrit has forfeited appellate review of the court’s order.**See Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,*370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

*

 Even assuming, without deciding, that the issues Emrit articulates in his notice of appeal are properly before us, we find no reversible error in the district court’s dispositive ruling on those bases.
**Exhibit 10.23**

 

**AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE**

**BLOCKBUSTER INC.**

**AMENDED AND RESTATED SENIOR EXECUTIVE SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN**

 

This Amendment No. 1 (this “Amendment”) to the Blockbuster Inc.Amended and Restated Senior Executive Short-Term Incentive Plan (the “Plan”), is dated as of March 8, 2005. 

 

1.     The Plan is hereby amended and restated as follows: 

 

The name of the Plan is changed to the “Blockbuster Inc. Senior Executive Annual Performance Bonus Plan” and allreferences throughout the Plan to the “Blockbuster Inc. Amended and Restated Senior Executive Short-Term Incentive Plan” are removed and replaced with “Blockbuster Inc. Senior Executive Annual Performance Bonus Plan.” 

 

2.     Except as expressly provided in this Amendment,the Plan is not amended, modified or altered in any manner and remains in full force and effect. 

 

3.     This Amendment was adopted by the Board of Directors of Blockbuster Inc. and became effective on March 8, 2005.
---

Exhibit 13.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Micromem Technologies
Inc. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the Fiscal Year Ended October 31, 2011
(the Report), I, Dan Amadori, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, based on my knowledge, that:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of
      section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
  and                                  
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
      of the Company.

|Date: February 24, 2012 | /s/
      Dan Amadori        
|----------------------- | -----------------------------
|                        | Dan Amadori                  
|                        | Chief Financial Officer      
|                        | (Principal financial officer)

---
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 NOVEMBER 29, 2010

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 ________________________

 No. 10-11436 

Non-Argument Calendar

 ________________________

 D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cr-00539-RAL-TGW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MARIANO VELASQUEZ-DIAZ,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

 Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Middle District of Florida

 ________________________

(November 29, 2010)

Before CARNES, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Mariano Velasquez-Diaz appeals his sentence of imprisonment for 30

months for one count of conspiring to transport illegal aliens for financial gain, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), (B)(1), two counts of transporting illegal aliens for

financial gain, id. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(i), and one count of entering the

United States unlawfully, id. §§ 1325(a)(1), 1329. Velasquez-Diaz challenges the

enhancement of his sentence for reckless endangerment, U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 2L1.1(b)(6) (2009), and the admission of hearsay evidence at

his sentencing hearing. We affirm.

Velasquez-Diaz argues that the admission of hearsay violated his right of

confrontation, but he acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by our

decision in United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005). 

We held in Cantellano that the right of confrontation does not extend to sentencing

proceedings. Id. The district court did not err by admitting hearsay evidence

during Velasquez-Diaz’s sentencing proceeding. 

Velasquez-Diaz also argues that the evidence did not support an

enhancement for reckless endangerment, but we disagree. A district court may

enhance a sentence by two levels if the defendant created, either intentionally or

recklessly, a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to an alien whom he

smuggled or transported. United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th

Cir. 2010). The district court found that Velasquez-Diaz endangered aliens who

paid him to transport them from Arizona to Florida, and we may not disturb that

2
finding of fact unless we are “left with a definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.” United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134,

1136 (11th Cir. 2004). The record establishes that Velasquez-Diaz instructed his

cohorts to engage the child safety locks in vans to ensure that none of the illegal

aliens escaped the vans without paying for their transportation, and those vans

were overloaded to the extent that aliens were forced to sit in the floorboard and

on unsecured objects in the cargo area. These conditions would have made it

difficult for the illegal aliens to extricate themselves or avoid injury in the event of

an accident. We cannot say that the district court clearly erred.

 We AFFIRM Velasquez-Diaz’s sentence.

3
#### George TAKARA, Appellant, v. C. F. HANSON, Deputy Commissioner, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, Pacific Compensation District, and Hawaiian Electric Company, Limited, a Hawaii corporation, Appellee.

No. 20778.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Nov. 23, 1966.

Alvin T. Shim, Eichi Oki, Honolulu, Hawaii, for appellant.

Ted Gamble Clause, Honolulu, Hawaii, for appellee Hawaiian Elec. Co.

Herman T. F. Lum, U. S. Atty., Honolulu, Hawaii, John W. Douglas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Morton Hollander, Washington, D. C., for appellee Hanson.

Before CHAMBERS, HAMLEY and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges.

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge:

After the big 1962 typhoon swept Guam, the Hawaiian Electric Company sent to the Island about 40 employees for emergency repair work. Takara was one of them.

While in Guam, Takara was entitled to some coverage under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., as extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651.

On November 27, 1962, after about 12 days of work in Guam and at the conclusion of the day’s labor at the job site, Takara and a fellow worker decided to have dinner at a restaurant nearby. They rejected the company supplied bus transportation back to their camp site. This meant they would have to later fend for transportation back as best they could. At about 9:30 p. m. they were out on an unlighted highway “thumbing” a ride back to the construction camp. While doing so, Takara was struck by a United States Navy truck which broke his leg.

We are not concerned here with the Federal Tort Claims Act, but with the benefits, if any, under the acts mentioned above. Did the injury arise out of and in the course of his employment? The district court said “no.” Apparently, the district court viewed the situation as one where the commissioner could have properly found either way. But we say “yes.”

We are unable to distinguish Takara’s case from our Self v. Hanson, 9 Cir., 305 F.2d 699. The Self case may have been an extension of previously held concepts *393of liability under the acts with which we deal here. But the commissioner did not seek certiorari on Self. We note that Self is cited in O’Keefe v. Smith, etc., 380 U.S. 359, 85 S.Ct. 1012, 13 L.Ed.2d 895, on a “compare” basis in the majority opinion.

The judgment of the district court affirming the order of the deputy commissioner is reversed for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
#### Adolf Axelrath, Appellant, *v.*Spencer Kellogg and Sons, Inc., Respondent.

Submitted April 5, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*769
      *Sydney J. Schwartz*and *Howard F. B. Mulligan*for appellant.

*Carver W. Wolfe*and *J. Newton Nash*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. Order affirmed, and question certified answered in the affirmative. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Finch, J.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

ANDREW MICHAEL GOMEZ,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 21

- 30008

D.C. No. 4:20

- cr

- 00006

- BMM

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Brian Morris, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 14, 2021 * *

Before: PAEZ , NGUYEN, and OWENS , Circuit Judges.

Andrew Michael Gomez appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges the 120

- month mandatory minimum sentence imposed following his

guilty

- plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S .C. §§ 841 (a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846 . We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 16 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 21

- 30008

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm

.

Gomez contends that his mandatory minimum sentence is substantively

unreasonable because it is greater than necessary and conflicts with 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)

. A s he concedes, th is contention is foreclosed

. See United States v.

Wipf , 620 F.3d 1168 , 1170

- 71 (9th Cir. 2010) ( § 3553 (a) d oes not authorize a

district court to impose a sentence below the mandatory statutory minimum ).

B ecause Gomez has not shown that Wipf is “clearly irreconcilable” with

intervening higher authority, we are bound to follow it. See Miller v. Gammie , 335

F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (e n banc)

.

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.03

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-72192, 333-58510, 333-55828, 333-54886, 333-48582,
333-46252, 333-84545, 333-89170 and 333-89172) and on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-107963,
333-72746, 333-61410 and 333-80419) of Homestore, Inc. of our report dated March
10, 2004, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of
Homestore, Inc. included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2003.

                                          /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Los Angeles, California
March 10, 2004
#### Celestine Smelley, Respondent, v Jimmie Ahmed, Also Known as Jimmie Stockley, Appellant.

[771 NYS2d 167]

*560In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dye, J.), dated March 24, 2003, which denied her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The plaintiff slipped and fell on ice in the middle of a street. Where the defendant engages in snow removal, liability will not result unless it is shown that the defendant, by his or her snow removal operation, made the condition of the street more hazardous *(see Plona v City of New York,*289 AD2d 215 [2001]; *Palmer v City of New York,*287 AD2d 553 [2001]; *Bautista v City of New York,*267 AD2d 265 [1999]; *see also Bernstein v City of New York,*69 NY2d 1020 [1987]). The defendant established her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that she did not create the alleged hazardous condition by negligently removing snow away from her car, which was parked at the curb of the street. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Ritter, J.P., S. Miller, Luciano and Townes, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gregory HOLT, also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-30345 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 15, 2017

Camille Ann Domingue, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Gregory Holt, Pro Se

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Gregory Holt, now Arkansas prisoner # 129616, appeals the district court’s denial of the petition for a writ of coram nobis *391that he filed with respect to his 2005 conviction of making threats against the President’s family. His motion to file a supplemental brief is GRANTED.

We review the district court’s “factual findings for clear error, questions of.law de novo, and the district court’s ultimate decision to deny the writ [of coram nobis] for abuse of discretion.” *Santos-Sanchez v. United States,*548 F.3d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2008), *vacated on other grounds by*559 U.S. 1046, 130 S.Ct. 2340, 176 L.Ed.2d 559 (2010). This court’s “review is limited by the presumption of correctness of prior proceedings and the narrow range of claims cognizable in granting the” writ of coram nobis. *United States v. Dyer,*136 F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 1998).

Holt has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition. A writ of coram nobis is not a substitute for an appeal and will issue only if there is no other remedy available. *See id.*at 422. “[A] petitioner seeking coram nobis must exercise reasonable diligence in seeking prompt relief.” *Id.*at 427 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, he must provide sound reasons for failing to seek appropriate relief earlier. *Id.*at 422. Holt’s failure to provide these reasons suffices to show that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his petition. *See id.*

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 10.1

Contract



This Contract shall be made and entered into among and between MB Tech (hereinafter referred to as MBTT) and Eastech (hereinafter referred to as EST) with mutual good faith to exclusively import and distribute Active Antenna (hereinafter referred to as Product) invented by MB Tech. The parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed in duplicate originals by their respective officers duly authorized and each party shall keep one copy.



Article 1



EST shall import the Product for 1 year from the dart of signing this Contract.



Article 2



To secure MBTTs manufacturing operations, EST shall exert its best effort to place orders purchasing 45,000 sets of Product, which equals to 675,000,000 Japanese Yen.

Provided that, both parties shall faithfully execute the following conditions.

1.

MBTT shall test Product in Hokkaido and Kuyshu provinces where a satellite signal is weakest.

The approval shall be given under the condition that Product shall not cause any problem when a human being watches the image of TV.

When and if Product shall not show a good quality of image in the above areas even with Product gain of 31 to 32dB, EST shall provide an approval that Product can be distributed in the limited area as determined by mutual consent.



2.

MBTT shall be set to deliver Product in and after March 2004.



3.

If the condition as set forth in Paragraph 1 is fulfilled, EST shall place purchase orders as follows:



A.

March 2004

2,000 Sets

B.

April  2004

3,000 Sets

C.

May  2004

3,000 Sets

D.

In and after June 2004

5,000 Sets / Month



Article 3



The Product price shall be 15,000 Japanese Yen. Upon the completion of field test, both parties shall determine the price in consideration of market situations.



Article 4



MBTT take full responsibility for the quality of Product. When and if the quality has cause damage to EST, MBTT shall pay full compensation for such loss.



Article 5



EST shall do its best to estimate annual import amount on a monthly basis and to provide MBTT with preliminary purchase orders.



Article 6



The payment shall be made in Japanese Yen. EST shall open L/C in favor of MBTT.



Article 7



ESTs distributorship shall be limited in Japan. MBTT shall not be allowed to distribute Product in Japan directly or by 3rd party.



Article 8



The provisions of this Contract can be modified by mutual consent when and if any event shall occur beyond the control of both parties.



Article 9



The term of this Contract shall be automatically extended for another one year, unless one party shall provide the other party with its intention of termination prior to three (3) months



Article 10



Any matters are not covered in this Contract shall be settled under the international business practices and by mutual consent.





September 2, 2003



MB Tech Korea

Eastech



CEO & President

CEO & President



Tea Hyun Shin

Isobe Kenji



/s/ Tea Hyun Shin

/s/ Isobe Kenji
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gregorio TORRES-PEREZ, also known as Gregorio Perez, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41215 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 20, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern *352District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Gregorio Torres-Perez, Pro Se

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Gregorio Torres-Perez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Torres-Perez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4,
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric Joyner, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 900]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (William Leibovitz, J.), rendered on or about December 19, 2001, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833 [1976]). We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal.

Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 460.20, defendant may apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals by making application to the Chief Judge of that Court and by submitting such application to the Clerk of that Court or to a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of this Department on reasonable notice to the respondent within 30 days after service of a copy of this order, with notice of entry.

Denial of the application for permission to appeal by the judge or justice first applied to is final and no new application may thereafter be made to any other judge or justice. Concur—Tom, J.P., Williams, Marlow and Gonzalez, JJ.