alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Robert GRANT, Appellant, v. SUTORBILT CORPORATION et al., Appellees.

No. 21552.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

April 6, 1965.

*808Donald V. Organ, Jerome P. Halford, New Orleans, La., for appellant.

Ernest A. Carrere, Jr., New Orleans, La., Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, New Orleans, La., of counsel, for appellee.

Before WISDOM and GEWIN, Circuit Judges, and BOOTLE, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Robert Grant, the plaintiff-appellant, sustained an injury while employed by Crescent Insulators, Inc. A direct action was then instituted against Travelers Insurance Company, the liability insurer of Crescent. Appellant’s theory of recovery was that he was injured by the negligence of one Charles Davis who allegedly was an “executive officer” of Crescent within the terms of the insurance policy in question. Davis served somewhat as the general manager of Crescent but was not an elected officer and had no authority to sign checks. The appellees, contending that appellant’s sole remedy was under the Louisiana workmen’s compensation statute, moved for summary judgment on the ground that Davis was not an “executive officer” within the terms of the policy. The trial court granted the motion and appellant brings this appeal.

The appellant contends that the question of whether or not Davis was an “executive officer” is factual in nature and should have been submitted to a jury for determination. This same contention was thoroughly discussed and rejected in Bruce v. Travelers Ins. Co., 266 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1959).

We are convinced that the ruling complained of was correct and we affirm.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose YANEZ-DOMINGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50483

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 2, 2017

Benjamin Holley, Assistant U.S., Blanca Quintero, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S., Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Holly A. Sullivan, Law Office Of Holly A. Sullivan, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Yanez-Dominguez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 18-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Yanez-Dominguez contends that the district court improperly relied on his criminal history as a reason to deny the parties’ joint request for a fast-track departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 and impose an above-Guidelines sentence. The court did not abuse its discretion. *See United States v. Rosales-Gonzales,*801 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2015). The court properly considered Yanez-Dominguez’s criminal and immigration history, including his two previous illegal reentry offenses for which he received lengthy sentences. *See id.*at 1184. Moreover, the 18-month sentence, two months above the high end of the guideline range, is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Kisasi David LIGGINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eric ARNOLD, Acting Warden; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15151

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 5, 2017

KISASI DAVID LIGGINS, CSP-California State Prison (Corcoran), pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R, App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Kisasi David Liggins, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Liggins’s due process claim because Lig-gins failed to allege facts sufficient to show a protected liberty interest. *See Sandin v. Conner,*515 U.S. 472, 483-85, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (a prisoner has no federal or state protected liberty interest when the sanction imposed neither extends the length of his sentence nor imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); *Serrano v. Francis,*345 F.3d 1071, 1077-78 (9th Cir, 2003) (due process procedural protections “adhere only when the disciplinary action implicates a protected liberty interest”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001085402
<NAME>                        PIEZO INSTRUMENTS, INC.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                    DEC-31-2000
<CASH>                          0
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   0
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                0
<PP&E>                          0
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           22,080
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        17,500
<OTHER-SE>                      (39,580)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    0
<SALES>                         0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                0
<CGS>                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   1,976
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (1,976)
<INCOME-TAX>                    100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             0
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (2,076)
<EPS-BASIC>                     (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (.01)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32:

Certifications Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934



                                CERTIFICATION OF
                           CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
                             CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the  accompanying  annual report on Form 10-KSB of Rocketinfo
Inc. for the year ended  December  31,  2005,  I certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, to my knowledge, that:

1.   the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Rocketinfo Inc. for the year ended
     December 31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   the information contained in the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year
     ended December 31, 2005, fairly presents in all material respects, the
     financial condition and results of operations of Rocketinfo Inc.

                  /s/ Gary Campbell
By:               -----------------------
Name:           Gary Campbell
Title:            CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Date:             April 14, 2006



                  /s/ Karl Harz
By:               -----------------------
Name:           Karl Harz
Title:            Chief Financial Officer
Date:             April 14, 2006
#### Howard COCHRAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert RAMSEY, Police Officer at Phoenix Police Department; Michael Feist, Officer, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16217

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 15, 2017

Howard Cochran, Pro Se

Clarence E. Matherson, Jr., Assistant Counsel, Phoenix City Attorney’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Howard Cochran appeals pro se the district court’s judgment following bench trial in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for clear error the district court’s findings of fact and accord special deference to the district court’s credibility determinations. *Allen v. Iranon,*283 F.3d 1070, 1076, 1078 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

The district court did not clearly err in its factual findings or credibility determinations because both were “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” *Husain v. Olympic Airways,*316 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the district court’s findings are plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the appellate court cannot reverse even if it is convinced it would have found differently.”).

We reject as unsupported by the record Cochran’s contentions that the district court was biased against him.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 Nos. 333-38926, 333-83321, 333-83325, 333-83327, 333-73664,
333-100003, 333-106057, 333-106058 and 333-120154 and Form S-3 No. 333-110389)
of Art Technology Group, Inc. and in the related Prospectus of our reports dated
March 9, 2006 with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Art
Technology Group, Inc., Art Technology Group, Inc. management's assessment of
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Art Technology
Group, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
December 31, 2005.

                                        /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
March 9, 2006
#### Marina CALOVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16044

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*387Submitted September 26, 2017 **

FILED OCTOBER 5, 2017

Marina Calove, Las Vegas, NV, pro se.

Ariel Edward Stern, Esquire, Akerman LLP, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Ap-pellee.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM *

Marina Calove appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell,*845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Calove’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) because notice disputing the alleged debt was made more than thirty days after the initial communication about the debt. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (written dispute by the debtor must be made within thirty days after receipt of the initial communication about the debt); *Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer Cty. Inc.,*171 F.3d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[A] tardy request for verification of the debt ... [does] not trigger any obligation ... to verify the debt.”). We reject as without merit Calove’s contention that she alleged other violations of the FDCPA in the operative complaint.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Andres MONTOYA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D16-1685

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 9, 2018.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, SALTER and LUCK, JJ.

**ON CONFESSION OF ERROR**

PER CURIAM.

Based on the state's confession of error, with which we agree, we reverse special condition twelve - "You will have no contact (direct or indirect) with the ... victim's family during the period of probation" - in the community control and probation portion of defendant Andres *994Montoya's sentence, and remand for the entry of a corrected order of probation that does not contain this condition. *See**Scott v. State*, 109 So.3d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) ("The State properly conceded that the trial court erred in imposing a written sentence that conflicts with the oral pronouncement. The written sentence designated the defendant both a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual felony offender. The oral pronouncement, however, reflects that the trial court designated the defendant a prison releasee reoffender only. The oral pronouncement of sentence prevails over a subsequent and conflicting written sentencing order."). Montoya's sentence is affirmed in all other respects.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 33 (Thursday, February 17, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9099-9100]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03418]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11654]


Notice of Determinations; Culturally Significant Objects Being 
Imported for Exhibition--Determinations: ``Louise Bourgeois: 
Paintings'' Exhibition

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: I 
hereby determine that certain objects being imported from abroad 
pursuant to agreements with their foreign owners or custodians for 
temporary display in the exhibition ``Louise Bourgeois: Paintings'' at 
The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, New York, the New Orleans 
Museum of Art, New Orleans, Louisiana, and at possible additional 
exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, are of cultural 
significance, and, further, that their temporary exhibition or display 
within the United States as aforementioned is in the national interest. 
I have ordered that Public Notice of these determinations be published 
in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chi D. Tran, Program Administrator, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-
632-6471; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2a594f495e434544181e1f136a595e4b5e4f044d455c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="22514741564b4d4c1016171b6251564356470c454d54">[email protected]</span></a>). The mailing address is U.S. 
Department of State, L/PD, 2200 C Street, NW (SA-5), Suite 5H03, 
Washington, DC 20522-0505.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The foregoing determinations were made 
pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), E.O. 12047 of March 27, 1978, the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681, 
et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of Authority No. 234 
of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236-3 of August 28,

[[Page 9100]]

2000, and Delegation of Authority No. 523 of December 22, 2021.

Stacy E. White,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Professional and Cultural Exchanges, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2022-03418 Filed 2-16-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Theresia Ann WALLER, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11214 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 18, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Theresia Ann Waller, Pro Se

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Theresia Ann Waller has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Waller has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Jorge MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-102

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 22, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 13.1

**Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant  to 18 U. S. C. Section 1350,   as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of WAVECOM S.A.  (the “Company”) hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge,  that:

| (i) | The Annual Report on Form 20-F of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated: April 11, 2007 | /s/ Ronald D. Black                                              |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                       |                                                                  |  |
|                       | Ronald D. Black        Chief Executive Officer        Wavecom SA |

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 1350 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended or incorporated by reference in any registration statement of the Company filed under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### SENECA INS. CO., Plaintiff-Appellant v. ALLIED INS. CO. et al Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-55079

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 5, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed June 7, 2017

Everett Leroy Skillman, Jr., Counsel, Everett L. Skillman, Attorney at Law, Orange, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Shanna Elaine Burkholder, Anthony L. Cannon, Esquire, Attorney, Cannon & Nelms, PC, Anaheim, ■ CA, for Defendants—Appellees

Before: BEA and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ,* Senior District Judge.

*

 The Honorable J. Frederick Motz, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Seneca Insurance Company (“Seneca”) appeals the district court’s (1) Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of its equitable contribution claim against AMCO Insurance Company (“AMCO”); and (2) summary judgment in favor of AMCO on Seneca’s remaining breach of contract claim. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

1. An equitable contribution claim requires “two or more valid contracts of *437insurance covering the particular risk of loss and the particular casualty in question.” *Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co.,*65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 305 (1998). Seneca’s first amended complaint alleged that Seneca rescinded its insurance policy retroactive to a date prior to the fires. Accordingly, Seneca’s equitable contribution claim is not viable because there were not two valid contracts of insurance covering the Insureds’ loss at the time of the fires.

2. The district court correctly found that Seneca’s breach of contract claim is barred by the applicable one-year limitations period. A one-year limitations period applies pursuant to the express terms of the AMCO Policies and California Insurance Code § 2071 because Seneca’s first amended complaint alleged that the insureds, Seneca’s assignors, were entitled to recover against AMCO for fire-damage property loss.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3,
THE STATE OF TEXAS 

### M A N D A T E

TO THE 186TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas on February 4, 2015, the cause upon appeal to

revise or reverse your judgment between

Gary A. Campbell, Appellant(s)

V.

The State of Texas, Appellee(s)

No. 04

- 14

- 00918

- CR and Tr. Ct. No. 2013CR3125

was determined, and therein our Court of Appeals made its order in these words:



## In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is

DISMISSED.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals for the Fourth

District of Texas, in this behalf and in all things have the order duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

Witness the Hon. Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas,

with the seal of the Court affixed and the City of San Antonio on April 6, 2015.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853