alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Rhonda FLEMING, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-20732

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 8, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rhonda Fleming, Pro Se

Before DENNIS, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Rhonda Fleming, federal prisoner # 20446-009, has filed several motions seeking summary reversal, remand, and other relief from the district court’s denial of her motion for relief from her criminal judgment entered upon her conviction of one count of conspiring to commit health care fraud and wire fraud, 35 counts of aiding and abetting health care fraud, 10 counts of aiding and abetting wire fraud, 16 counts of money laundering, and five counts of engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) or (6), Fleming sought relief from the portion of the judgment that ordered her to pay over $6 million in restitution, including over $5.8 million to be paid to Medicare.

Rule 60(b) is a rule of civil procedure, not of criminal procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Fleming has not shown that her request to amend the restitution order in her criminal judgment was cognizable pursuant to Rule 60(b). Her appeal is without arguable merit and thus frivolous. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS, and all outstanding motions are DENIED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

Fleming is WARNED that frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive filings will invite the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal, monetary sanctions, and restrictions on her ability to file pleadings in this court and any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction. *See Coghlan v. Starkey,*852 F.2d 806, 817 n.21 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting federal courts’ inherent power to sanction litigants for frivolous filings).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. I
msbi_Current_Folio_Ex1012



		

			Exhibit 10.12

		





		
			AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
		

		
			 
		

		
			THIS AMENDMENT NO.  2 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is made and entered into as of January 1, 2019 (the “Effective Date”) by and between Midland States Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”), Midland States Bank, an Illinois banking corporation (the “Bank”) (the Bank and the Company hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Employer”), and Douglas J. Tucker (“Executive”).
		

		
			 
		

		
			RECITALS
		

		
			 
		

			
	
			
				 A.
			

			
	
			
			The Executive serves as Senior Vice President, Corporate Counsel, of the Company and the Bank, and has entered into an Employment Agreement with the Company and the Bank, dated as of December 1, 2010, as amended by that certain Amendment No. 1 to Employment Agreement dated as of December 15, 2017 (the “Employment Agreement”).




		
			 
		

			
	
			
				 B.
			

			
	
			
			As a result of Amendment No. 1 to Executive’s Employment Agreement containing errors with respect to Executive’s bonus and long-term incentive award percentages, the Company’s Compensation Committee has instructed that an amendment to Executive’s Employment Agreement be executed reflecting the correct percentages.




		
			 
		

		
			AGREEMENTS
		

		
			 
		

		
			Now therefore, the Employment Agreement is hereby amended as follows:
		

		
			 
		

			
	
			
				 1.
			The reference in Section 4(b) of the Employment Agreement to a target Incentive Bonus is hereby amended to “not less than forty percent  (40%)”; and the reference to  a long-term incentive bonus percentage for the Executive is hereby amended to “forty-five percent (45%).”




		
			In all other respects the Employment Agreement shall remain fully in force and effect.
		

		
			 
		

		
			IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the Effective Date.
		

		
			 
		

		
			MIDLAND STATES BANCORP, INC. andDOUGLAS J. TUCKER
		

		
			MIDLAND STATES BANK
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			By:  /s/ Leon J. Holschbach               /s/ Douglas J. Tucker 
		

		
			Name:Leon J. Holschbach[Signature]
		

		
			Its:Vice-Chairman
#### Raleigh D. WIGGINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6610

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 25, 2017

Raleigh D. Wiggins, Appellant Pro Se.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

■ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Raleigh’D. Wiggins seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as successive his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(e)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v.*McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial, of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Wiggins has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FARON E. LOVELACE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. ROBIN SANDY; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. No. 15-35518 D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00430-REB
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho Ronald E. Bush, Chief Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Subm itted August 16, 2016 * * Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. Idaho state prisoner Faron E. Lovelace appeals pro se from the m agistrate judge’s judgm e nt dism issing with prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising out of the allegedly im proper term ination of a prison visit. We review de novo whether a m agistrate judge has jurisdiction. A llen v. Meyer , 755 F.3d 866, 867-68 

# FILED
AUG 26 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

* * The panel unanim ously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argum e nt. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).(9th Cir. 2014). We vacate and rem a nd.

Contrary to the m agistrate judge’s statem ent in its order dism issing Lovelace’s am ended com plaint, Lovelace did not consent to proceed b efore a
m agistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (authorizing m agistrate judge to “conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil m a tter and order the entry of judgm ent in the case” “[u] pon the consent of the parties”). The consent form sfiled on October 17, 2014 and March 18, 2015 were executed by putative coplaintiff Melissa Kuntz-Corta, not Lovelace. Accordingly, we vacate the judgm ent and rem and to the district court for further proceedings. See Allen , 755 F.3d at 868 (judgm ent entered by m agistrate judge a nullity where som e parties did not consent to m agistrate judge’s jurisdiction). On rem a nd, the district court m ay review the com plaint de novo in the first instance pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or m ay construe the m agistrate judge’s May 18, 2015 order as a report and recom m endation and afford Lovelace reasonable tim e to file objections. In light of our disposition, we do not consider the other issues raised in the opening brief. VACATED and REMANDED.

15-35518 2
#### TAFIA, Plaintiff v. LILI and SATELE, Defendants

No. 21-1902

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division

May 14, 1902

Before: HON. E. W. GURR, *District Judge of Tutuila,*and MAUGA, *District Judge C. 1*

DECISION

THIS CAUSE came on for hearing at Leone on the 2nd day of May, 1902. The Plaintiff, Tafia, was present and was represented by Mele, her mother. The Defendant, Lili, was represented by Sopoaga, her brother. Satele was represented in person.

The statement of claim having been read, the defendant Lili pleaded in bar a decree of the High Court vesting the *44property claimed in her and her children absolutely after a trial in which the defendant Satele was plaintiff and the said Lili and Sopoaga were defendants.

Evidence for the plaintiff was deduced from the following witnesses: Mele, Tuataga, Leiato, Tuia and Maiava.

The hearing was then adjourned to take place at Fagatogo on May 13th, 1902, and on the 13th day of May, all parties being assembled in the District Court House at Fagatogo, the defendant, Satele, announced his desire to compensate the said Tafia for any loss she may have sustained by his action against the defendant Lili, as aforesaid, by apportioning other land in the Tualatai District for the use of the plaintiff Tafia. The plaintiff Tafia, and the defendant, Satele, both admitted that they could give no good and sufficient reason for causing the former judgment to be vacated, and that the property now claimed should vest in the said Lili, as decreed by the High Court.

The defendant, Lili, was then excused from further attendance, and the Court then adjourned to enable Tafia, the plaintiff, and Satele, the defendant, to confer together, with a view to settling and adjusting any differences that may exist between them.

NOW, on this 14th day of MAY, 1902, appear before the Court, the plaintiff, Tafia, and the defendant, Satele, and submit in writing an agreement entered into between them, and ask the Court to give judgment accordingly.

NOW, therefore, it is hereby ordered and adjudged by the Court:—

> 1. That the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant, Lili, be and the same is hereby dismissed.

> 2. That judgment be entered up in terms of the agreement herein submitted as between Tafia and Satele.

Costs of Court, amounting to $25, are to be paid by the defendant, Satele.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 7 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 7

  Authorizing the use of the rotunda of the Capitol to honor the last 
 surviving Medal of Honor recipient of the Second World War upon death.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 21, 2021

 Mrs. Miller of West Virginia (for herself, Mr. Mooney, Mr. McKinley, 
 Mr. Bishop of Georgia, Mr. Webster of Florida, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Steube, 
  Mrs. Rodgers of Washington, Mr. Bacon, Mr. Biggs, Mr. Massie, Mrs. 
 Harshbarger, Mr. Budd, Mr. Burchett, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mrs. Greene of 
    Georgia, and Mr. Cicilline) submitted the following concurrent 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
  Authorizing the use of the rotunda of the Capitol to honor the last 
 surviving Medal of Honor recipient of the Second World War upon death.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. HONORING LAST SURVIVING MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENT OF SECOND 
              WORLD WAR.

    (a) Use of Rotunda.--At the election of the individual (or next of 
kin of the individual), the last individual to die who was awarded the 
Medal of Honor for acts performed during World War II shall be 
permitted to lie in honor in the rotunda of the Capitol upon death.
    (b) Implementation.--The Architect of the Capitol, under the 
direction and supervision of the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall take the 
necessary steps to implement subsection (a) upon the death of the 
individual described in such subsection.
                                 <all>
```
#### Thomas E. YOUNG, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 20023.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Sept. 19, 1966.

Decided Sept. 29, 1966.

*960Mr. William A. Mann, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.

Mr. Charles A. Mays, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Joel D. Blackwell, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Fahy, McGowan and Tamm, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant was indicted and tried for second degree murder, found guilty, and appéals. A statement made by the trial judge at a bench conference, if heard by any of the jurors, would have prejudiced the defense and required reversal. When trial counsel pointed out to the court that the jury might have heard some of these comments the following occurred:

> The Court: I can’t conceive that they did. I thought I was speaking very low. I will ask them, if you wish.

> Mr. Stanford [counsel for defendant] : I know it was on the borderline. If it was not on the borderline, I would not make the request.

> The Court: Do you want me to ask the jury?

> Mr. Stanford: Yes, sir.

> The Court: I will ask them.

> (In open court:)

> The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, during the bench conference that just occurred, did any member of the jury hear anything that the Court said? If so, please raise your hand.

> (No response.)

> The Court: Apparently not. Thank you.

Counsel did not pursue the matter further. In light of the foregoing we would not be justified in reversing. *Cf.*Young v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 315, 346 F.2d 793, 796.

It is also urged that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The fatal shooting of the deceased, though it occurred during a struggle with appellant, was with a pistol in appellant’s grasp following an altercation between the two, and on all the evidence the criminal responsibility of appellant as indicted was a fair question for the jury.

There being no basis for reversal on either ground above mentioned or on any other, the judgment is

Affirmed.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6272 

To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 with respect to the issuance 

of quality control guidance issued by the Secretary of Agriculture. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 7, 2023 

Mr. MOORE of Alabama introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL 

To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 with respect 

to the issuance of quality control guidance issued by 

the Secretary of Agriculture. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PUBLIC COMMENT ON QUALITY CONTROL 

4 GUIDANCE. 

5 Section 16(c) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 

6 (7 U.S.C. 2025(c)) is amended by adding at the end the 

7 following: 

8 ‘‘(10) PUBLIC COMMENT ON QUALITY CONTROL

9 GUIDANCE.— 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6272 IH

1 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall 

2 provide notice and make available for public 

3 comment for a period of not fewer than 60 days 

4 any new or updated guidance proposing sub5 stantive changes for conducting quality control 

6 reviews prior to any such guidance being final7 ized. 

8 ‘‘(B) SCOPE.—The requirement in (A) 

9 shall be applicable to any proposed guidance 

10 reasonably expected to require state agencies to 

11 make changes to systems, procedures, or staff12 ing pertaining to quality control reviews or that 

13 impact verification requirements for supple14 mental nutrition assistance program recipients. 

15 ‘‘(C) EXCEPTION.—In the case of an ur16 gent and immediate need, the Secretary may 

17 issue interim final guidance simultaneous with 

18 the notice and comment requirements required 

19 in (A).’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
Robert Daniel WALTERS v. Michelle Deakle WALTERS

2160278

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 16, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 31(b)

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                         PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Michael R. Sayre, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Pinnacle Data
Systems, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: August 12, 2003


/s/ Michael R. Sayre
-------------------------
Chief Financial Officer

                                      -24-
EX-10.2



 Exhibit 10.2 

 
 



 
 May 9, 2012 
  

David Huls 
 11165 Alameda Avenue 

Inver Grove Heights, MN 55077 
 RE: Relocation
Assistance 
 Dear David: 
 In
consideration of your service and continued commitment to ACL the company will provide to you the following Relocation Assistance in addition to that agreed in your employment letter dated July 19, 2011 (“Letter”). 

 

	A)	 $50,000 lump sum payment in lieu of the company-paid temporary living and commuting expense for the balance of your commuting period from
June 1,, 2012 to September 1, 2012. This payment
does not alter your obligations under the Relocation Agreement dated July 27, 2012. Note this payment will not be grossed-up to cover federal and state income taxes. 



 

	B)	$200,000 lump sum payment in lieu of your projected target 2012 Annual Incentive Compensation Plan (“AIC”) bonus payable at 100% of plan achievement. If your
actual 2012 AIC bonus is greater than $200,000 you will receive the difference. These payments will be subject to applicable deductions and statutory withholdings. If your employment is terminated for cause or if you resign for any reason prior to
the 2012 AIC bonus payout in 2013 you agree to repay the Company the pro-rated difference between the year-to-date AIC bonus calculation and the $200,000. 

 Please acknowledge your understanding and agreement to the terms outlined above by signing, dating and returning a copy of this letter to me. 
 Sincerely, 
 /s/ Mark Knoy 
 Mark Knoy 
 President & Chief Executive Officer 

 
  

			
		
	/s/ David
Huls                                         
       	  	5-9-12                    
	David Huls	  	Date