alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Cullen M. HANKERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35580

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

FILED OCTOBER 5, 2017

Cullen M. Hankerson, Tacoma, WA, pro se.

Elizabeth Anna-Marie Baker, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Washington Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appellees.

*385Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Former Washington state prisoner Cullen M. Hankerson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from the alleged failure to investigate a tort claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Marsh v. County of San*Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hankerson § 1983 claims against defendant Pressel because Hankerson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Pressel caused a deprivation of any federal or constitutional right in his handling of Han-kerson’s tort claim. *See id.*(elements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hankerson’s § 1983 claims against the Department of Risk Management because “state agencies are ... protected from suit under § 1983.” *Wolfe v. Strankman,*392 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 2004).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hankerson’s retaliation claim against defendant Combo because Hankerson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Combo took any adverse action against Hankerson for filing civil complaints. *See Rhodes v. Robinson,*408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).

The district court properly granted summary judgment regarding Hankerson’s RICO claims because Hankerson failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. *See Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff still must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hankerson’s motions for leave to amend his complaint to add additional defendants and claims. *See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,*316 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and factors for permitting leave to amend).

We reject as unsupported by the record Hankerson’s contentions concerning judicial bias, discovery issues, and collusion between defense counsel and the district court.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EX PARTE Raheem Deontay RAMSEY

1160298 (CR-15-1121)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 10, 2017

Cert. denied.
Exhibit 99.5



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of
Brookfield Office Properties Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2013, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Dennis H. Friedrich, Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that to the best of my knowledge:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





|By:    /s/ Dennis H. Friedrich
        Dennis H. Friedrich
        Chief Executive Officer
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 
| | 



| | 
| | 



March
31, 2014
DISMISS and Opinion Filed May 17, 2019 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-19-00308-CV
STEVEN K. TOPLETZ, Appellant V. RAYGAN BRYCE WADLE, INDEPENDE NT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF LYNDA CARROLL WILLIS, DECEASED, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF LANCASTER BLUEGROVE, L.P., Appellee

On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 416-04120-2012



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Whitehill, Partida-Kipness, and Pedersen, III Opinion by Justice Whitehill Before the Court is appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal. Appellant explains that the

appeal is now unnecessary because the trial court has vacated t he appealed order. We grant the

motion and dismiss this appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a)(1).

190308F.P05 /Bill Whitehill/ BILL WHITEHILL JUSTICE–2– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

STEVEN K. TOPLETZ, Appellant

No. 05-19-00308-CV V.

RAYGAN BRYCE WADLE, INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF LYNDA CARROLL WILLIS, DECEASED, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF LANCASTER BLUEGROVE, L.P., Appellee On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 416-04120-2012. Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. Justices Partida-Kipness and Pedersen, III participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appe al is DISMISSED

. Subject to any agreement be tween the parties, it is ORDERED that appellee RAYGAN BRYCE WADLE, INDEPENDENT ADMINIS TRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF LYNDA CARROLL WILLIS, DECEASED, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF LANCAST ER BLUEGROVE, L.P. recover his cost s of this appeal from appellant STEVEN K. TOPLETZ.

Judgment entered May 17, 2019
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6487 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6487

 To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to prohibit health plans 
   from imposing fees on health care providers for electronic funds 
 transfers and health care payment and remittance advice transactions, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 28, 2023

 Mr. Murphy (for himself, Mr. Griffith, Mrs. Miller-Meeks, Mr. Kilmer, 
  Mr. Bera, and Ms. Schrier) introduced the following bill; which was 
 referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to 
   the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to prohibit health plans 
   from imposing fees on health care providers for electronic funds 
 transfers and health care payment and remittance advice transactions, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Fees for EFTs Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITING HEALTH PLANS FROM IMPOSING FEES ON HEALTH CARE 
              PROVIDERS FOR ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS AND HEALTH CARE 
              PAYMENT AND REMITTANCE ADVICE TRANSACTIONS.

    Section 1173(g)(4)(B)(ii) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1320d-2(g)(4)(B)(ii)) is amended--
            (1) in subclause (I), by striking at the end ``and'';
            (2) in subclause (II), by striking at the end the period 
        and inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subclause:
                                    ``(III) prohibit the imposition of 
                                any charge, fee, or other payment 
                                (including through a withhold from 
                                payment) by a health plan or entity 
                                completing the transaction on the 
                                plan's behalf, on a health care 
                                provider for electronic fund transfers 
                                and health care payment and remittance 
                                advice transactions made on or after 
                                January 1, 2024.''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 10.81




Letter agreement effective January 1, 2011 between Rob Krolik and Move, Inc. regarding paid time off




MOVE 910 East Hamilton Ave., 6thFloor
Campbell, CA 95008




November 17, 2010




Dear Rob,




Effective January 1, 2011, you and other senior executives reporting directly to the CEO (the “Leadership Team”) will no longer be subject to, or accrue or accumulate paid time off under the vacation, floating holiday and/or paid sick leave policies set forth in the Move Inc. Employee Handbook or in your offer letter or any other documentation with the Company.




Rather, members of the Leadership Team will be permitted to take paid time off for vacation and personal matters, subject to business needs, with the approval of the CEO. The primary limitations on permitting the taking of vacation or time off for personal matters will be those dictated by your job responsibilities. Accordingly, there will be no prescribed limits on the amount of vacation or personal time, if any, that you may request or be permitted to take in a given year notwithstanding any reference thereto in any offer letter or any other documentation with the Company.




In addition, paid time off for occasional, short illnesses will be permitted on an as-needed basis, subject to medical verification if requested by the CEO. Leadership Team members who qualify for and are granted a leave of absence under Move Inc.’s Disability Leave of Absence or Family and Medical Leave of Absence policies will be paid for up to a maximum of ninety (90) days of any such leave taken in any twelve (12)-month rolling period, less any income received from any income replacement benefits or insurance provided pursuant to any applicable law or Company-sponsored insurance or benefit program.




Members of the Leadership Team will retain all vacation accrued on or before December 31, 2010. Paid time off taken on or after January 1, 2011 will reduce any such accrued vacation balance. If upon separation from employment, a Leadership Team member has a balance of unused vacation, he or she will be paid out in accordance with the Company’s policies and practices and applicable law.




Please indicate you acceptance of these terms by signing below and returning this letter to me.




Very truly yours,




/s/ Steve BerkowitzSteve BerkowitzChief Executive Officercc
Carol Brummer, VP, Human ResourcesName
/s/ Rob Krolik
Date
11/17/10Rob Krolik


---
Lawrence Oneal BEASLEY v. STATE

CR-16-0393

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 26, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Order entered May 13, 2022

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00918-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.I.J., S.M.J., S.D.J. II, CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-20-07514

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s May 12, 2022 motion for an extension of 

time to file his brief on the merits. We GRANT the motion and extend the time to 

June 13, 2022.

/s/ CRAIG SMITH

JUSTICE
#### Joseph Brand, Respondent, *v.*Allen Brand et al., Appellants.

(Argued September 28, 1871;

decided January term, 1872.)

Dependants were jointly indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of §100; plaintiff was indebted to Edward Brand, one of the defendants, in an equal or greater amount. It was agreed, by parol, between plaintiff and Edward, that the debt due the former should be set off and applied upon the demand of the latter, and that the former’s claim be thereby canceled. Plaintiff brought this action to recover his demand. *Held,*that the agreement was not one. of sale or transfer, and was not within the provisions of the statute of frauds. (Gray and Leonard, CC., dissenting.)

*D. K. Obiey*for the appellants.

*Lymam, Tremain*for the respondent.

*676Hunt, 0., reads for reversal.

Gray, C., for affirmance.

For reversal, Lott, Ch. C., Hunt and Earl, 00.

For affirmance, Gray and Leonard, CO.

Order of General Term reversed, and judgment, upon report of referee, affirmed, with costs.
#### Arnulfo DAVILA, Petitioner-Appellant v. Rodney W. CHANDLER, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution Fort Worth, Respondent-Appellee

No. 16-11495 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 22, 2017

Arnulfo Davila, Pro Se

Before OWEN, ELROD, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Arnulfo Davila, federal prisoner # 32490-177, pleaded guilty to distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine *385and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and he was sentenced to a total of 300 months of imprisonment. He filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging his conviction and sentence. The district court determined that the claims raised in Davila’s petition arose under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and dismissed the § 2241 petition. The district court denied Davila leave to proceed IFP on appeal and certified that the appeal was not in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Davila now requests leave from this court to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal.

Davila must demonstrate both financial eligibility and a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 24(a); *Carson v. Polley,*689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). Davila has submitted a declaration establishing financial eligibility for IFP status. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (a)(2). However, Davila’s claims amount to a collateral attack on a federal conviction and sentence, rather than a challenge to the manner in which a sentence is being executed, and the proper procedural vehicle for asserting these claims is a § 2255 motion. *See Robinson v. United States,*812 F.3d 476, 476-77 (5th Cir. 2016). To proceed under the savings clause of § 2255, Davila must establish that the remedy provided under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention. *See*§ 2255(e); *see Reyes-Requena v. United States,*243 F.3d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2001).

Davila’s argument that there is an inadequate factual basis for his conviction is a fact-based challenge that is not based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision. *See Reyes-Requena,*243 F.3d at 904. Additionally, his argument that his sentence was erroneously enhanced based upon Texas controlled substance convictions also does not meet the savings clause test, as the claim is a sentencing challenge and not a challenge to his underlying conviction. *See Padilla v. United States,*416 F.3d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 2005); *Reyes-Requena,*243 F.3d at 904.

Davila has therefore failed to show that his appeal involves nonfrivolous issues. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). His motion to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### AFOA, MALALA and TULIFUA, Plaintiffs v. SEVAAETASI, Defendant

Nos. 8 & 10-1919

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [“Matai” title: “Te’o”]

December 22, 1919

A. M. NOBLE, *President of High Court;*and MOLIOO, *Associate Member*

DECISION

During the early part of November, 1919, Teo-Malala, of the village of Vailoa died and on November 18th, 1919, the defendant, Sevaaetasi, filed application to register himself under the “matai” name, Teo, in accordance with Section 45 of the *Codification of the Regulations*and Orders for the Government of American Samoa.

*318On November 21st, 1919, the Plaintiffs, Malala and Tulifua, filed objection to the registration of Sevaaetasi and claimed the right for Malala to be registered under the “matai” name, Teo, and on November 22nd, 1919, the Plaintiff, Afoa filed objection to the registration of Sevaaetasi and claimed the right to be registered under the “matai” name, Teo.

The objection of Malala and Tulifua brought the matter for trial before the High Court, being case No. 8 and the objection of Afoa again brought the matter for trial before the High Court, being case No. 10. Both cases brought to a hearing on December 22nd, 1919.

It is unnecessary to go into detail as to the claims of these parties, since the same are so conflicting as to make it impossible to determine just who were the former predecessors of the “matai” name, Teo, or the order in which they held the Teo name.

While the Court recognizes all of the parties to be members of the Teo family, the Court is of the opinion from all the evidence, that the plaintiff Malala’s right to register his name as Teo is paramount to that of the other parties, and that the plaintiff, Malala, should be permitted to register his name as Teo-Malala in the Register of “Matai” Titles in the office of the Secretary of Native Affairs, and to receive from said Secretary certificate of said registration.
#### Ulysses G. Pierce, Respondent, *v.*Cray Line Motor Tours, Inc., et al., Appellants.

Submitted March 11, 1943;

decided April 15, 1943.

*730
      *Harold B. Slingerland*for Kuny Schaffer, appellant.

*David B. Sugarman*and *Ira H. Michael*for Gray Line Motor Tours, Inc., appellant.

*Carleton J. King*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with one bill of costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Elmer NEIVA-OREJUELA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40048 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 5, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern *288District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Elmer Neiva-Orejuela, Pro Se

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Elmer Neiva-Orejuela was sentenced to 41 months of imprisonment, following his guilty plea to illegal reentry after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends the district court erred by applying the 16-level crime-of-violence enhancement, based on his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a . habitation. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2015 ed.)

Although post *-Booker,*the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, the district court must avoid significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines sentencing range. *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 48-51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). If no such procedural error exists, a properly preserved objection to an ultimate sentence is reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. *Id.*at 51, 128 S.Ct, 586; *United States v. Delgado-Martinez,*564 F.3d 750, 751-53 (5th Cir. 2009). In that respect, for issues preserved in district court, its application of the Guidelines is reviewed *de novo;*its factual findings, only for clear error, *E.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez,*517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008).

Neiva was convicted of burglary under Texas Penal Code § 30.02, a divisible statute. *See United States v. Uribe,*838 F.3d 667, 670-71 (5th Cir. 2016), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1359, 197 L.Ed.2d 542 (2017). Therefore, under the modified categorical approach, the court may consider certain state-court documents. *Id.*

Those documents demonstrate that Neiva pleaded guilty under § 30.02(a)(1), which, for purposes of the crime-of-violence enhancement, constitutes generic burglary of a dwelling. *Id.*Accordingly, the court did not err in applying the enhancement. *See*U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2015 ed.); *Uribe,*838 F.3d at 671.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM WATERMARC FOOD MANAGEMENT CO. FORM 10-Q FOR THE 3RD QUARTER OF FISCAL 1999
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-27-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-28-1999
<CASH>                                         660,500
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  364,398
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    180,747
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,476,952
<PP&E>                                      17,145,841
<DEPRECIATION>                              11,594,993
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,093,475
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,276,397
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    329,540
<COMMON>                                     1,189,155
<OTHER-SE>                                 (10,452,468)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,093,475
<SALES>                                     24,419,362
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            24,419,362
<CGS>                                        7,302,401
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               27,310,772
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (3,289,339)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (3,289,339)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.13)
        

</TABLE>