alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Reginald Lamont SHUMPERT, Plaintiff-Appellant v. John GAUNT; Leslie McWilliams; Eddy Lange, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-50632 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 2, 2017

Reginald Lamont Shumpert, Pro Se

Joe Anthony Rivera, Esq., Ñaman, Howell, Smith & Lee, P.L.L.C., Waco, TX, for Defendant-Appellee

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Reginald Lamont Shumpert appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)®. Because the district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous, review is for abuse of discretion. *See Rogers v. Boatright,*709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013).

Shumpert does not challenge the district court’s analysis of his false imprisonment claim or the court’s basis for dismissing his complaint. He does not address the district court’s conclusion that his claims were barred under judicial and prosecutorial immunity and *Heck v. Humphrey,*512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Instead, he rehashes his claim that Bell County officials violated his constitutional rights when they conspired to falsely imprison him after he posted bail.

When an appellant fails to identify any error in the district court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant had not appealed that issue. *Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Although pro se briefs are afforded liberal construction, arguments must be briefed in order to be preserved. *Yohey v. Collins,*985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). Because Shumpert fails to raise any argument regarding the *232district court’s dismissal of his false imprisonment claim, it is abandoned.

As Shumpert has abandoned his sole issue on appeal by failing to brief it, he has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his complaint as frivolous. *See Rogers,*709 F.3d at 407. Because the instant appeal lacks arguable merit, it should be dismissed as frivolous. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2. Likewise, Shumpert’s motion for the appointment of counsel and all of his outstanding motions are denied.

The district court’s dismissal of Shum-pert’s § 1983 complaint and the dismissal of this appeal as frivolous count as strikes under the three-strikes provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See Coleman v. Tollefson,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1759, 1761, 191 L.Ed.2d 803 (2015); *Adepegba v. Hammons,*103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996). Shumpert is cautioned that if he accumulates another strike under § 1915(g), he will not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. *See*§ 1915(g).

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS DENIED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Clara Lewis BROCKINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Angela Warren; Ginny Barr; Toni Boone, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-2341

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 27, 2017

Clara Lewis Brockington, Appellant Pro Se,

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Clara Lewis Brockington seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissing her civil complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Because it is possible that Brock-ington could cure the defects in her complaint through amendment, the order she seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. *See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y,*807 F.3d 619, 623-25, 628-30 (4th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow Brockington to file an amended complaint. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED AND REMANDED*
##### 



Exhibit 10.73
 
   
    Base Salary (effective August 1, 2006)
    
    $
    190,000Target Incentive at 100% of Plan
    
    $
    55,000Over-Achievement Bonus Opportunity
    
    $
    25,000
  %
    
    %Weight
    
    Performance Metric
    
    Target
    
    Achieve
    
    Payout75
    %
        
    Corporate EBITDA
    
    $
    28,000,000
    *
    
    
    85
    %
    
    
    70
    %90
    %
    
    
    80
    %95
    %
    
    
    90
    %100
    %
    
    
    100
    %25
    %
        
    Corporate Revenue
    
    $
    130,249,000
    
    
    
    90
    %
    
    
    70
    %93
    %
    
    
    80
    %96
    %
    
    
    90
    %100
    %
    
    
    100
    %
 
 *
    
    Excludes accrual for 2007 Executive Incentive Program  www.navisite.com




---



##### 



For example:
    
    Corp EBITDA
$3MM / $4MM
75% x $25,000
    
    = $31MM
= 75%
= $18,750
      
 /s/ Monique Cormier
    
    10/25/06Signed  Monique Cormier
    
    Date
 www.navisite.com
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEODEGARIO SALVADOR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; TRUSTEE 

CORPS, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15750 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00149-LDGGWF 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Lloyd D. George, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 8, 2017**

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. 

Leodegario Salvador appeals pro se from the district court’s summary 

judgment in his diversity action seeking to quiet title. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Owen, 519 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-15750

F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Salvador 

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Bank of America’s

interest in the subject property had been extinguished by the foreclosure sale. See 

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116 (a Homeowners Association (“HOA”) has a “super 

priority” lien with respect to other liens, and the HOA’s super priority lien may 

constitute up to nine months of HOA fees); SFR Invs. Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 

334 P.3d 409, 414 (Nev. 2014) (a holder of a first deed of trust may preserve its 

interest in the subject property if the amount of the super priority lien is tendered 

prior to the HOA foreclosure sale). 

AFFIRMED.
Vincent YOUNG v. STATE of Mississippi

2016-CT-00542-COA

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Filed: April 13, 2018 Closed: June 21, 2018

Certiorari - Denied.
#### Marcia A. SIENKO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Commissioner Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35121

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 2, 2017 *

Filed June 06, 2017

Paul Bradford Eaglin, Attorney, Eaglin Law Office, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Michael W. Cotter, U.S. Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office, District of Montana, Billings, MT, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, Lars J. Nelson, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, SSA, Seattle Region, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Marcia A. Sienko appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. At step four of the sequential evaluation process, the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Sienko could perform her past relevant work. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Molina v. Astrue,*674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.

The ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to the contradicted opinion of treating physician Dr. Scott Burk regarding the intensity and limiting effect of Sienko’s impairments. The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting Dr. Burk’s opinion. The ALJ stated that Dr. Burk’s opinion was inconsistent with the medical evidence and relied heavily upon Sienko’s non-credible subjective reports regarding the severity of her impairments. *See Valentine v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin.,*574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009). The credibility determination is not challenged on appeal, and is, therefore, waived. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

The ALJ provided germane reasons for only giving some weight to the opinion of lay witness Brian Ragland by stating that Ragland’s opinion was inconsistent with *428the medical evidence. *See Molina,*674 F.3d at 1114 (explaining that the ALJ must give reasons that are germane to each witness to discount competent lay-witness testimony).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Liberty Court Condominium Residential Unit Owners Coalition et al., Appellants, v Board of Managers of Liberty Court Condominium, Respondent.

[772 NYS2d 6]

*444Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paula Omansky, J.), entered June 26, 2003, which denied plaintiff condominium unit owners’ motion for partial summary judgment on their cause of action to compel the defendant Board of Managers to amend the condominium’s bylaws so as to provide for a method of nomination of candidates for election to the Board, unanimously modified, on a search of the record and on the law, to grant the Board summary judgment dismissing such cause of action, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Under Real Property Law § 339-v (1) (a), a condominium’s bylaws must “provide for . . . [t]he nomination ... of a board of managers.” Insofar as pertinent, the condominium’s bylaws provide that members of its Board are to be elected at each annual meeting of its unit owners, and that the meetings of unit owners are to be governed by the current edition of Robert’s Rules of Order, or any other rules acceptable to a majority of the unit owners present at the meeting. The current tenth edition of Robert’s Rules of Order (2000) provides that in the absence of a bylaw or an established custom prescribing a nominating process, nominations are to be made from the floor or as otherwise directed by a vote of the society at the time of each election (at 556). It further appears that 30 days before an annual meeting, defendant Board distributes a notice to plaintiff unit owners with the names and biographies of the persons standing for election to the Board, and advising that any unit owners can submit their names to the Board or present themselves at the meeting as a candidate. We reject plaintiffs’ arguments that calling for nominations from the floor at the time of an election is not a fair and effective method for nominating a board of managers, and that the bylaws’ provision therefor by way of a reference to Robert’s Rules of Order does not comport with the statutory requirement that the bylaws provide for the nomination of a board of managers. We also find that the premeeting notice that defendant customarily distributes before the annual meeting is in accord with the above-mentioned provision of Robert’s Rules of Order, and gives fair and effective notice thereof. Accordingly, on a search of the record, we grant partial summary judgment to defendant Board dismissing so much of the complaint as seeks to compel it to amend the condominium’s bylaws so as to provide a method of nominating candidates for its membership. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Ellerin, Lerner and Marlow, JJ.
#### Odie HILL, Appellant, v. MORGAN POWER APPARATUS CORPORATION, Appellee (two cases).

Nos. 18357, 18358.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Nov. 22, 1966.

Henry Woods, of McMath, Leather-man, Woods & Youngdahl, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.

William H. Sutton, of Smith, Williams, Friday & Bowen, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before VOGEL, Chief Judge, GIBSON, Circuit Judge, and REGISTER, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellant, a citizen of Arkansas, was injured on October 24, 1964, in an accident in Arkansas while using a defective swivel manufactured by defendant-appellee, a Washington corporation. Two separate actions were commenced by plaintiff-appellant, one in warranty and one in tort, alleging that the swivel was defective and was the cause of plaintiff-appellant’s injury. In each case plaintiff-appellant attempted to obtain jurisdiction over the defendantappellee by virtue of provisions of Ark. Stat.Ann. § 27-2502:

> *“Bases of personal jurisdiction ovei persons outside this state.”*

In interpreting the Arkansas statute, Judge Young found it inapplicable and accordingly quashed the service in both cases. Judge Young’s opinion is published in D.C., 259 F.Supp. 609. Because he has arrived at a permissible conclusion with reference to Arkansas law and a conclusion with which we are in complete accord, we affirm on the basis of his opinion as published.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lle e , v. GLORIA HILDA NAVAR RETE, AKA Gloria N av arre te ,

De fe nda nt-Appe l la

nt. No. 16-50187

D.C . No. 3:15-c r-00596-B EN-3
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Southe rn Distric t of C a lifornia R oge r T. B e nite z , Distric t Judge , Pre s iding A rgue d a nd Subm itte d

August 10, 2017 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : REINHAR

DT, KOZINSKI, a

n d C HR ISTEN, C i rc u it Judge s.

“ W e re vie w the distric t c ourt’ s inte rpre tation of the[U.S. Se nte nc ing] Guide line s de novo, thedistric t c ourt’ s a pplic ation of theGuide line s to the fa c ts of the c a se for a

buse of disc re tion, a

nd the distric t c ourt’ s fa c tua l findings for c le ar



# FIL ED
SEP 14 2017 M O LLYC. DW Y ER, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.e rror.” Unite d State s v . Tre a dw e ll , 593 F.3d 990, 999 (9th C ir. 2010). W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C
. § 1291, a nd we a ffirm
. 1. The distric t c ourt inc re a se d Na va rre te ’ s se nte nc e unde r U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for m a inta ining a sta sh house
. Se e U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), c m t . n.17 (2015). Under the c irc um sta nc e s of this c a se , the distric t c ourt did not err by im posing a se nte nc e e nha

nc e m e nt unde r § 2D1.1(b)(12). 2. U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.1(c ) provide s for a n upwa rd a djustm e nt ba se d on the de fe nda n t’ s role in the offe nse . The distric t c ourt found tha t Na va rre te wa s “ a

lot
c lose r to the top [of the drug-tra ffic king orga niz ation] tha

n she wa s . . . to the bottom .” The re c ord supports the distric t c ourt’ s findings. The

distric t c ourt did not e rr whe n it inc re a s e d Na va rre te ’ s se nte nc e by

two le ve l s for he r role in the offe nse . Se e Unite d State s v . Maldonado , 215 F.3d 1046, 1050–51 (9th C i r. 2000); Unite d State s v . Vare l a , 993 F.2d 686, 691–92 (9th C ir. 1993). AFFIRM E D.

2
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Mauricio ESPINOZA-JIMENEZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51448 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED September 11, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee.

Mauricio Espinoza-Jimenez, Cl Dalby, Post, TX, pro se.

Judy Fulmer Madewell, Maureen Scott Franco, Federal Public Defender’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

*357Before DAVIS, PRADO, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Mauricio Espinoza-Jimenez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Espinoza-Jimenez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. *See United States v. Pesina-Rodriguez,*825 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED in part as frivolous, *see*5th Cir. R. 42.2, and in part as moot based on Espinoza-Jimenez’s completion of his term of imprisonment, *see United States v. Heredia-Holguin,*823 F.3d 337, 340-42 (5th Cir. 2016).

*

 Pursuant to 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Amendment to ENSCO International Incorporated 1998 Incentive Plan


 Exhibit 10.2 
 2012 AMENDMENT TO THE 
 ENSCO INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED 

1998 INCENTIVE PLAN 
 (As Amended on August 23, 2011, and 
 As Assumed by Ensco plc as of
December 23, 2009) 
 THIS AMENDMENT is effective the 14th of May 2012, by Ensco plc, having its principal office in London, England (hereinafter referred to as the
“Company”). 
 WITNESSETH: 
 WHEREAS, ENSCO International Incorporated adopted the ENSCO International Incorporated 1998 Incentive Plan, effective May 12, 1998 (which, as previously amended from time to time is referred to
herein as the “Plan”); 
 WHEREAS, the Plan was assumed by the Company effective as of December 23, 2009; 

WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) has authorized and approved this Amendment to the Plan by unanimous written
consent on May 8, 2012; and 
 WHEREAS, the Company now desires to adopt this 2012 Amendment to the Plan in order to (i) delete the
definitions of “ADR” and “ADS” in Section 2 of the Plan, and (ii) amend the definition of “Share” in Section 2 of the Plan; 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and covenants herein contained, the Company hereby adopts the following 2012 Amendment to the Plan: 

1. Section 2 of the Plan is hereby amended by deleting the definitions of “ADR” and “ADS.” 

2. The definition of “Share” in Section 2 of the Plan is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows: 

“Share” shall mean one Class A ordinary share of the Company, nominal value US$0.10 per Share. All references
to in the Plan to shares of common stock, stock, shares of Ensco Delaware, American depositary shares, and/or ADSs shall be read and considered to be references to Class A ordinary shares of the Company unless the context otherwise requires,
and all references (specific or otherwise) to “stockholders of the Company” shall be read and considered to be references to holders of Class A ordinary shares of the Company, unless the context otherwise requires, and all provisions
of the Plan shall be consistently interpreted and applied. 
 [signatures on next page] 






 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this 2012 Amendment to the ENSCO International Incorporated 1998
Incentive Plan to be signed on its behalf by and a its duly authorized officer, effective as first above written. 
  

			
	ENSCO PLC
	
	/s/ Christopher T. Weber
	 By:
	 	Christopher T. Weber
	 Its:
	 	Vice President – Treasurer
Exhibit 10.1

                                                                      1 May 2001

Dear James Holtz

I am  pleased  to  confirm  ESC  Medical  System's  offer  for you to  join  our
organization  as Executive  Vice  President of STAR.  In this  capacity you will
report  directly  to Robert  Grove,  President  of STAR.  The  compensation  and
employee benefits program for this position are outlined as follows:

Base Salary

You will receive a base salary of $ 15,494 per month ($ 185,931 annualized).

Management Bonus Program

As a member of the Executive  Staff you will be eligible to  participate  in the
Company Bonus Plan at a 50% base  participation  rate. The Plan is  specifically
designed to reward  participants  based upon the  attainment  of  Corporate  and
personal performance. The bonuses are paid quarterly.

Stock Option Plan

Upon your joining our  organization  we will recommend to the Board of Directors
that you be considered  for a stock option grant of 90,000 shares of Esc Medical
Systems  stock,  at a price as will be at the date of closing.  The options will
vest over a three-year period, 30,000, 30,000 and 30,000 respectively.

Stay Bonus

A special bonus payment, in addition to any other compensation provided, will be
paid to you after 24 month from closing of the transaction. This payment will be
made providing you are still a full time employee with the company on that date.
The bonus will be in the amount of US $ 150,000  of your  current  salary at the
time it is paid.

Executive Benefits Program

ESC  Medical  Systems  offers an  attractive  employee  benefits  program  which
includes:  company  medical and dental  insurance  coverage,  life and  accident
insurance, disability coverage, a most generous 401k plan with dollar for dollar
matching up to 6% of your annual salary, and flexible spending accounts.

ESC Medical  Systems will provide you with a special  Executive  Benefit Program
that provides for an additional  five (5) days of vacation  during each calendar
year and deferred  compensation options through a Supplementary  Retirement Plan
and Rabbi Trust arrangement that are designed to complement our 401k plan.

We look forward to your joining our organization. To indicate your acceptance of
this  offer  please  sign and  return  one  copy of this  letter  to me.  In the
meantime, if you have any questions please do not hesitate to call me.

Best regards,

/s/Yossi Gal
-----------------------------
Yossi Gal
Vice President of Human Resources

/s/James Holtz
-----------------------------
James Holtz                                Date


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