## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

__ _________________________ No. 02

- 23

- 00073

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 233rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 233

- 719643

- 22
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr an d Wal ker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker 

### V ECENTIE 

### M ORALES 

### , Appellant

V


### . A

. D

. W

. , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ve centie Morale s, a cting p ro se, ap peals from a lifetime protective order
rendere d against him pursuant to C hapter 7B of the Texas Code of Cri mina l
Procedure

. We will affirm

. I. BACKG ROUND
P ursuant to Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure , the Tarrant County C ri mina l Distric t Att orney ’ s Office filed an application on behal f of A.D.W. 1
for a li fetime protective order against Morales. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. Ann.

art
. 7B.001(a) (1), (3). Morales , who i s currently incarcerated, was serv ed via the Tex as Depart ment of Criminal Justice law l ibrary for his assigned prison unit. T he citation provided Morales notice that a hea ri ng on the app lication would be h eld on Ap ril 12, 2023, but de spite receiv

ing thi s notice, Mor ales did not appear at th e hearing.
At the April 12, 2023 hea ring, the S tate introduced certified co p ies of (1) an indictment alleg

ing that Morales had , among other things, sexually assaulted A.D.W. 2
in Tar rant County and (2) a judgm ent refle cting that Morales had been convicted of
the se xual assault

.

1 To protect t he id e ntity of the victim in this case, we will refer to her by her initials

. C f

. Tex. Fam. Co de Ann

. § 109.002(d) ; Tex. R. App. P. 9.9

.
2 The in dictment refer red to the se xual

- assau lt victi m as “ A. D.W. ” At the hearing, th e trial court took judicial notic e of t he State ’ s applic ation , which co nfirmed that the applicant was the same A.D.W. ref erenced in the indictment.3

A t the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted A.D.W. a lifetime
pr otective order against Morales as required by Article 7B.003( b) of the Texas Code
of Crim inal Proc edure. Morales appeals from that order.
II. DISCUSSION Morales argues 3 that (1) his due process rights were violated because he was no t present at the hearing on the application for protective order , (2) he was impr operly
de nied his right to a jury trial , (3) the tri al court lacked juri sd iction , (4) he was harm ed by an unspeci fied form of corruption between the Tarrant County Cr iminal Di strict
Attorn ey ’ s Office and other judicial syst em officials, (5 ) the State impro perly bro ugh t the ap plication on A.D.W. ’ s beha lf wit hout her consent, and (6) the protective order
is null and void because Morales has not been finally con victed of fa mily vi olence. 4
We will address th ese issues

— all of which are merit l e ss or forfeited

— in turn be low. 5

3 We granted Morales leave to fi le an amended brief to address a specific issue. But Morales ’ s “ am ended ” brief on ly addresses some

— but not all

— of the issues rai sed in his original brief

. I n the interests of justice, we have interpreted Morales ’ s
“ amended ” brief as a supplemental bri e f

. See Brumley v. McDuff

, 616 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. 2021) (stressing tha t courts sh ould ack nowledge the s ubst ance o f th e relief sought despite the formal sty lin g of the pleading) ; State Bar of T ex. v. Heard

, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) ( “ W e look to t he subst ance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title give n to i t. ” )

.

4 Only the first two of thes e issues are ex plicitly enumerated in the “ Errors ” sect ion of Morales ’ s brief. However, because w e liberally construe briefs and because Morales raises the additional complaints set forth abo ve in the othe r sect ions of his brief , we wi ll address them in the intere st of ensuring completeness

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) (“The statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly included.” ); Perry v. Co hen , 272 S.W.3d 585, 587

– 8 8 (Tex. 2008 ) (“[W]e liberally construe issues presented to obtain a just, fair, and4

A. M ORALES ’ S D UE P ROCESS R IGHTS W ER E N OT V IOLATED In his first issue, Morales argues that his due process rights were vio lated
b ecau se he wa s not present at the April 12, 2023 hearing

. Specifically, Morales
contends tha t the trial court erred by “ not allowing [him] to be at the court he aring ” even though Morales “ was in the Tarrant Cou nty Jai l on the very day of th e hearing. ” This argum ent is me ritless.

equitable adjudication of the rights of the li tigants.”); In re F.F. , No. 10

- 12

- 00462

- CV, 2013 WL 2639217, at *7 n.3 (Tex. App.

— Wac o June 6, 2013 , no pet. ) (mem. op. ) (ad d ressing issues as argued in “argument” section of brief rather than in “issues presented” when sections conflicted) ; see also Carr v. Jaffe Aircraft Corp. , 884 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1994, no writ) (a ddressing issu e in the interest o f compl eteness)

.

5 As the State points out, Morales ’ s brief lacks record citat ions

. Th us, he has arguably f or f eited all of his appellate issu es . See Tex . R. App. P. 38.1 (i) ( providing that an ap pellant ’ s b ri e f “ must c ontain a clear and concise argument for the c ontentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record ” (emph asis added) ); Fredon ia State Bank v. Gen

. Am. Life Ins. C o. , 8 81 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (observing t hat error m a y b e waived by inadequate briefing) ; see also Amir

- Shari f v. Mason , 243 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 20 08, no pet.) ( “ A pro se litigant is held to the sam e standards as licensed attorneys and mus t comply with applicable laws and rules of p rocedure.” ( fi rst citin g Mansfield State Ban k v. Cohn , 573 S.W .2d 18 1, 184

– 85 (Tex. 1978); and then citing Strange v. Cont ’ l Cas. Co. , 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.

— Da lla s 2004, pet. denied)) ) . But d espite Morales ’ s inadequate briefing , we w ill address t he merits of h is appeal to the extent reasonably possible

. Se e Eco Planet, LLC v. ANT Trading , No. 05

- 19

- 00239

- CV, 2020 WL 6 707561, at *5 (Te x. Ap p.

— Dallas Nov. 1 6, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (Osbo r ne, J., concurring) ( “ Appellate courts have the discre tion to waive issues fo r inadequate briefing. ” (first citing F redoni a State Bank , 881 S.W.2d at 284 ; and then citing Horton v . Stovall , 591 S. W.3d 567, 569

– 7 0 (Tex. 2019) ) ; c f. Perry , 272 S.W. 3 d at 587 ( “ [A] p pellate courts should reach the merits of an app eal whenever r easonably possible

. ” )

.5

An inmate does not have a n absolute right to appear in person at every court proceeding. In re Z.L.T. , 124 S.W. 3 d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003). R ather , i f a n in mate wi shes to appear at a heari ng in a civil proceeding, he must file a request fo r a bench

warr ant providing sufficient information to al low the trial cour t to balance the
in mate ’ s need to appear at the hearing against the need to protect the corr ect iona l
system ’ s integrity

. See id. (setting forth factors courts s hould consider in dec iding

w he ther to grant a bench warrant). Thus, t he burden is on the inmate to establish his right to relief

, and if he fail s to present sufficient informatio n t o the trial court , the
trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the request. Ringe r v. Kimb all , 274 S.W.3d 865, 86 8 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (citing Z.L .T. , 124 S.W. 3 d at 166). Here, the record co ntains no evi dence demonstrat ing tha t Morale s requested a
bench warrant or that he otherwise sought and was denied access to th e trial c ourt by motion, objection, or other complaint

. Indeed, rather than seeking t o appear at the April 12, 2023 hearing, Morales filed numerous proced ura l challenges to the application. Because Mora les fail ed to request a bench warrant or to ot herwise seek

access to the court at the trial level, he has not preserved his complaint for ou r revie w . See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (a) ; Smith v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles , No. 02

- 0 2

- 00035

- C V, 2003 WL 22724996, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant waived his complaint concerning his right of acces s to6

cou rt when he did not request a bench warrant or otherwise seek ac cess to the court
at the tr ial level)

. Fur ther, under Title 4 of the Texas Family Code, w hich applies to protective
orders entered under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedu re, see Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 7B.008 , a trial court may ente r a default pro tective o rder “that is binding on a respondent who does not attend a hearing if: (1) the responde nt received service of the application and notice of hearing; and (2) p roof of se rvice was filed with the court before the hearing , ” T ex . F am . C ode A nn . § 85.0 06 (a )

. T he
record reflects that Morales received service of the application and notice of the April 12, 2023 hearing and that proof of service was file d with the trial co urt pri or to the hearing. Thu s, the trial court was s tatu torily au tho rized to e nte r the pro tective

or der agains t Morales even though he did not attend the hearing. See id. ; Dix v. Foster , No. 06

- 22

- 00040

- CV, 2022 WL 7208630 , at *2

– 3 ( Tex. App.

—

Texarkana Oct. 13,
2022 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) (concluding that issuan ce of def aul t protective order under Chapter 7B of the Te xas Code of C riminal Procedure did not violate incarcerated appellant ’ s due process rights because he had been properly s erved and had received adequate notice of the hearing).
Because Morales faile d to pres erv e his complaint regarding access to the cou rt and because the trial court had authority t o enter the protective order in Morales ’ s ab sence , we overrule Mora les ’ s firs t i ssue.7 B. M ORALES H AD N O R IGHT TO A J URY T RIAL
I n his second issue , Morale s argues tha t he was im properly de prived of his right

to a jury trial. Howeve r, Morales had no right to a jury trial at the protective

- order
he aring. Se e Williams v. Williams , 19 S.W.3d 544, 54 6

– 48 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied

); Winsett v . Edgar

, 22 S.W.3 d 510, 512 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied)

. Accordingly, we overrule his second issue.

C. T HE T RIAL C OURT H AD J URI SDICTION
Moral es claims that neither he nor A.D.W. reside in Tarrant County and that, therefore, the tri al cou r t l acke d per sonal juris d ict ion

. This argument lack s merit.
The Texas Code of C rimi nal Procedure provides that a n applicatio n for a Chapter 7B protective order may be filed in a di strict court in ( A) the county i n which

t he applica nt resides , (B) the county in which the alleged offender resides, or (C) any county in which an element of the alleged offense occurred. T ex. Code Crim. Pr oc . Ann. art. 7B.001(b)(1). The S tate ’ s application

— of which the trial court took j udi cial
notice

— alleged that Morales reside s in Tarra nt County and that the off ense occurred
in Tarrant Co unty
. Further, at the hearing on the app licat ion , the trial court adm itted
into evidence certified co pies of an indic tment all eg ing that Morales had sexually
assaulted A.D.W. in Tarrant County and a jud gme nt reflecting that Morales had been

con victed of th at offense

. To suppo rt his argument that the trial cour t lacked perso nal jurisdiction,
Morales asserts

—

without citing any evidence in the record

— that neither he nor8

A.D.W. reside s in Tarrant County. Bu t Mor ales does not contest th e fact that the
sexual assault occurred in T arrant County. See id. art. 7B.001(b)(1)(C). Be cause the
record cont ains unco ntested evidence showing th at the se xual assault occurred in
Tarrant Co unty , Mor a les ’ s naked assertio n t hat both A.D.W. and he reside
el s e w here

— even if true

— is not sufficient to show that the tr i al co ur t lac k ed personal jurisdiction

. See id. There fore, w e o verrule M orale s ’ s jurisdictional complain t. D. M ORALES ’ S C ORRUPT ION C LAIM I S U NSUPPORTED AN D U NP RES ERVED
Mor ales alleges that he was ha rmed by an unspecified form of cor ru ption between the Tarrant County Criminal District Attorn ey ’ s Office and other ju dicial system officials. However, Mora le s offers nothing m ore than vague a l legat ions to support hi s c orrup tion cl ai m ; h e provides no detailed facts, cit ation s to the r ecord , or substantive a rgument
. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (g)

– (i)

. Thus, Mo rales has for f ei ted his complaint due to inad equate briefing. See id. ; Fredonia State Bank , 881 S.W.2d at 284 ; McK innon v. Wallin , No. 03

- 17

- 00592

- CV, 2018 WL 3849399, at *2

– 3 (T ex . App.

— Austin Aug. 14, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. o p.) (hold ing that pr o se a ppellant had
waiv ed his issues b y inadequate briefing )

. Mo reover, even if Mora les h ad adequately
b riefed the is sue , because he did not proper ly r aise his corruption claim in the tr ial
court, he has failed to preserve it for appel lat e revi ew. See Tex. R. App. P. 3 3.1; Franklin v. City of Fort Worth , No. 02

- 12

- 00456

- CV, 2014 WL 3696092, at *1 (Tex. App.

— For t Worth J uly 24, 2014, no pet. ) (mem

. op.) (addressing preservation)

.9

E. T H E S TATE H AD A UT H ORITY TO F ILE THE A PPLICATION Morales a sserts that the S tate lacked authorit y to file the protective order
ap plication b ecause it has “ no signed paper ” or “ notarized aff i da vit ” f rom A.D.W. asking for a protective order. How ever, no such written authorization is r equired.
T he T exas Code of Criminal Procedure expressly authorizes

— and indeed , requires

—

t he State to file an application for a protectiv e order on b eh alf o f a sexu al assault
victim promptly afte r t he offender ’ s convic tion unless the victim req uests that the application not be filed

. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 7B.001 ( a)(3), (a

- 1 ), (a

- 2).
There is not hing in the recor d to suggest t hat A.D.W. instructed the S tate n ot to seek a protective o rde r ; thus, the S tate was statutorily au tho rized to file the application. S ee id. Accordingly , we o verrule M orale s ’ s complaint

.

F. F AMILY V IOL ENCE C ONVICTION I S N OT R EQUIR ED
Mor ales asser ts that t he pro tective order is “ n ull an d void ” because he “ does

not h ave a final conviction of f amily violence. ” However, a family v iolence
conviction is no t a p re requisite to t he ent ry of a C hapter 7B protective order

. See id.
art. 7B.003

. Ra ther , the s ta t ute (1) requires a trial cour t to i ssue a protective ord er i f it
fin ds that “ there are re a s onab le grounds to belie ve that the applica nt is the victim of
sexual assault or abu se, stal king, or trafficking ” and ( 2) provides that an offender ’ s convic tion for sexual assault constitutes “ re asonab l e g rounds. ” Id. art . 7B .003( b)

– (c)

. Thus, having found that M orales had been convicte d of sexual ly assaulting A.D.W. , the trial court was statutorily requi red to issue the protective order. See id.10

Ac co r dingly , we overrule M orales ’ s complaint th at the prot ec tive order is null and
void because he has not been con victed of family viol ence . III. CONCLUSION Having o verruled all of Morale s ’ s issu es, we affirm the protective order. /s/ Br ian Walker
B r ian Walke r Justic e Delive red: February 8, 2024