FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FIDEL ANTONIO MENDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-30170

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-06024-FVS-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Fred L. Van Sickle, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 4, 2014—Seattle, Washington

Filed August 26, 2014

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Paul J. Watford,

Circuit Judges, and Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, Senior

District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Watford

* The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, Senior District Judge for the

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, sitting by

designation.
2 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

Affirming the district court’s denial of a motion to

dismiss a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge under

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the panel held that under Washington

law, the defendant’s juvenile adjudication of second-degree

unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Revised Code

of Washington § 9.41.040(2)(a) – an offense that, if

committed by an adult, is a felony punishable by up to five

years in prison – constitutes a “conviction” of “a crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”

and may therefore serve as a predicate for the § 922(g)(1)

prosecution.

Observing that Washington law treats juvenile

adjudications as convictions once a defendant enters the adult

criminal justice system, the panel rejected the defendant’s

contention that Washington law establishes a general rule

barring the treatment of juvenile adjudications as

“convictions” of “crimes.”

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 3

COUNSEL

Diane E. Hehir (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender,

Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho,

Yakima, Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.

Alexander C. Ekstrom (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney; MichaelC.Ormsby, United States Attorney, United

States Attorney’s Office, Yakima, Washington, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

In 2007, a juvenile court adjudicated Fidel Mendez guilty

of second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, in

violation of Revised Code of Washington (RCW)

§ 9.41.040(2)(a).1

 That offense, if committed by an adult, is

a felony punishable by up to five years in prison. RCW

§§ 9.41.040(2)(b), 9A.20.021(1)(c). In 2012, after Mendez

had become an adult, a park ranger found him in possession

of a shotgun. The federal government charged him with

violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for

a person to possess a firearm if he’s previously been

“convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by

 

1

 Section 9.41.040(2)(a) provides in relevant part: “A person, whether

an adult or juvenile, is guilty of the crime of unlawful possession of a

firearm in the second degree, if the person . . . owns, has in his or her

possession, or has in his or her control any firearm: . . . If the person is

under eighteen years of age . . . .” RCW § 9.41.040(2)(a).
4 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”2 The

indictment alleged—based on the 2007 juvenile

adjudication—that Mendez had been convicted of a such a

crime.

Mendez moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that,

under Washington law, his 2007 juvenile adjudication does

not constitute a “conviction” of a “crime” for purposes of

§ 922(g)(1). After the district court denied the motion,

Mendez entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right

to challenge on appeal whether his 2007 juvenile adjudication

meets the statutory definition of “a crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Congress has defined “crime punishable byimprisonment

for a term exceeding one year” to exclude certain offenses not

relevant here. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). It has also provided

the following direction: “What constitutes a conviction of

such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law

of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” Id. 

Congress thus chose not to provide a uniform answer, as a

matter of federal law, to the question whether a juvenile

offense constitutes a “conviction” of a “crime.” We must

look instead to state law to determine whether Mendez’s 2007

juvenile adjudication may serve as the predicate for his

prosecution under § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Valerio,

441 F.3d 837, 839–40 (9th Cir. 2006).

 

2

 Section 922(g)(1) provides in relevant part: “It shall be unlawful for

any person—(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or

transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting

commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 5

At first blush, Washington law seems to support Mendez. 

Most of the statutes governing juvenile offenders are found

in RCW Title 13, which contains the following provision: 

“An order of court adjudging a child a juvenile offender or

dependent under the provisions of this chapter shall in no case

be deemed a conviction of crime.” RCW § 13.04.240. 

Mendez argues that this provision reflects the State’s policy

decision to place juvenile adjudications on a different footing

from adult convictions when assessing an individual’s

criminal history. That argument finds further support in the

Washington Supreme Court’s admonition that juveniles are

deemed to commit “violations” or “offenses,” not “crimes.” 

Monroe v. Soliz, 939 P.2d 205, 208 (Wash. 1997); In re

Frederick, 604 P.2d 953, 954 (Wash. 1980).

We must nonetheless reject Mendez’s position. 

Washington courts have held that, despite its sweeping

language, RCW § 13.04.240 is actuallyquite limited in scope: 

It applies only when the defendant is still within the juvenile

justice system. Because the juvenile system is focused on

rehabilitation of the youthful offender, § 13.04.240 “is

properly concerned with preventing an adjudication of guilt

from being considered a crime while one is still a juvenile, as

this approach furthers its rehabilitative purpose.” State v.

Johnson, 76 P.3d 265, 267 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). After

reaching adulthood, however, an individual who commits

further crimes falls under the adult criminal justice system,

whose primary purpose is punishment. Id. Within that

system, § 13.04.240 has no effect, and juvenile adjudications

may therefore be treated as convictions of crimes. In

Johnson, for example, the court held that an adult defendant’s

prior juvenile adjudication for assault with a deadly weapon

rendered him ineligible for sentencing under Washington’s

Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative, which requires that
6 UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ

the defendant have no prior “convictions” for a violent

offense within the preceding ten years. RCW

§ 9.94A.660(1)(c). In addition, Washington’s Sentencing

Reform Act “unambiguously includes juvenile adjudications

under Title 13 in the definition of criminal history,” Johnson,

76 P.3d at 268, and “allows consideration of prior juvenile

adjudications in sentencing an individual who is now an adult

and has committed a crime as an adult.” Id. at 267–68; see

also RCW §§ 9.94A.030(9), 9.94A.525.

Once an individual becomes an adult, Washington law

also allows juvenile adjudications to be used as predicate

offenses for certain crimes. As it happens, one such crime is

unlawful possession of firearms, see RCW § 9.41.040,

Washington’s state-law analogue to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Among other things, § 9.41.040 criminalizes possession of a

firearm by a defendant who has previously been “convicted

. . . of any serious offense as defined in this chapter.” RCW

§ 9.41.040(1)(a). The statute expressly states that,

“[n]otwithstanding . . . any other provisions of law, as used in

this chapter, a person has been ‘convicted,’ whether in an

adult court or adjudicated in a juvenile court, at such time as

a plea of guilty has been accepted, or a verdict of guilty has

been filed . . . .” RCW § 9.41.040(3) (emphasis added). 

Based on that provision, Washington courts have held that

juvenile adjudications for a “serious offense” may serve as

the predicate for a § 9.41.040 prosecution. See State v.

Wright, 946 P.2d 792, 794–95 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); State

v. McKinley, 929 P.2d 1145, 1148–50 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).

In light of this authority, we cannot agree with Mendez’s

contention that Washington law establishes a general rule

barring the treatment of juvenile adjudications as

“convictions” of “crimes.” When the defendant is charged as
UNITED STATES V. MENDEZ 7

an adult, as Mendez was here, Washington law imposes no

such general bar. That fact distinguishes this case from

United States v. Walters, 359 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2004), on

which Mendez relies. The provisions of Virginia law at issue

there established that, “as a general rule,” Virginia does not

treat juvenile adjudications as convictions, even for

individuals who have since become adults. Id. at 346. 

Against that backdrop, the Fourth Circuit found it irrelevant

that Virginia law permitted juvenile adjudications to be

treated as convictions in certain limited circumstances. Id.

Because RCW § 13.04.240 does not apply to adult offenders,

Washington has no general rule like the one established by

Virginia law. The specific circumstances in which

Washington law treats juvenile adjudications as convictions

are the only guideposts available to inform our assessment of

state law, and they all point in the same direction—that

Washington law treats juvenile adjudications as convictions

once a defendant enters the adult criminal justice system.

Under Washington law, we conclude that Mendez’s 2007

juvenile adjudication constitutes a “conviction” of “a crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 

18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20), 922(g)(1). Accordingly, the district

court properly denied his motion to dismiss the felon-inpossession charge. We address Mendez’s remaining

contentions in an accompanying memorandum disposition.

AFFIRMED.