alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Moses Davis WARNER, also known as Moses Davis, Jr., Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-30104 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Camille Ann Domingue, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA, Cristina Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Moses Davis Warner, Pro Se

Before KING, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Moses Davis Warner has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Warner has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not. be published and is not precedent except under the-limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Robert Charles HAMMOND, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-2952

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

September 25, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6316 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6316

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 12, 2024

 Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and 
                              Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To amend title 40, United States Code, to establish an expiration date 
 of certain committee resolutions with respect to leases or projects, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AUTHORIZATIONS.

    Section 3307 of title 40, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(i) Expiration of Committee Resolutions.--
            ``(1) In general.--Unless a lease is awarded or a 
        construction, alteration, repair, design, or acquisition 
        project is initiated not later than 5 years after the 
        resolution approvals adopted by the Committee on Transportation 
        and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives or the 
        Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate 
        pursuant to subsection (a), such resolutions shall be deemed 
        expired.
            ``(2) Application.--This subsection shall only apply to 
        resolutions approved after the date of enactment of this 
        subsection.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives March 11, 2024.

            Attest:

                                             KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### IN RE: Tara Chand SINGHAL, Petitioner.

No. 16-1818

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: December 6, 2016

Decided: December 21, 2016

Tara Chand Singhal, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Tara Chand Singhal filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking: (1) an order voiding the district court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint in this action; and (2) transfer of the action to a different district court judge. We deny the petition.

Mandamus is a drastic remedy that should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Relief is available only when the petitioner has demonstrated a clear right to the relief sought. In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007).

*876Because Singhal has not made the requisite showing, we deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### STATE OF CONNECTICUT *v.*CLERMONT DOUGLAS

(AC 19916)

Mihalakos, Flynn and Daly, Js.

Argued May 1

officially released May 22, 2001

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of ElixirGaming Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for thequarterly period ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, Clarence Chung,President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Andy Tsui, ChiefAccounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

1.             The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.             The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.

 

 
| By:    |   | /s/ Clarence Chung                    |   | Dated: | May 14, 2010 |
|--------|--------|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|-------------------|
|   |   | Clarence Chung                        |   |   |              |
| Title: |   | President and Chief Executive Officer |   |   |              |
|   |   |                                  |   |   |              |
|   |   |                                  |   |   |              |
| By:    |   | /s/ Andy Tsui                         |   | Dated: | May 14, 2010 |
|   |   | Andy Tsui                             |   |   |              |
| Title: |   | Chief Accounting Officer              |   |   |              |

 

 

This certification is made solely for the purposes of18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to the knowledge standard containedtherein, and not for any other purpose.

 

----
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 37 (Thursday, February 24, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 10365]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03948]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Formations of, Acquisitions by, and Mergers of Bank Holding 
Companies

    The companies listed in this notice have applied to the Board for 
approval, pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 
1841 et seq.) (BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR part 225), and all other 
applicable statutes and regulations to become a bank holding company 
and/or to acquire the assets or the ownership of, control of, or the 
power to vote shares of a bank or bank holding company and all of the 
banks and nonbanking companies owned by the bank holding company, 
including the companies listed below.
    The public portions of the applications listed below, as well as 
other related filings required by the Board, if any, are available for 
immediate inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank(s) indicated below and 
at the offices of the Board of Governors. This information may also be 
obtained on an expedited basis, upon request, by contacting the 
appropriate Federal Reserve Bank and from the Board's Freedom of 
Information Office at https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/request.htm. 
Interested persons may express their views in writing on the standards 
enumerated in the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)).
    Comments regarding each of these applications must be received at 
the Reserve Bank indicated or the offices of the Board of Governors, 
Ann E. Misback, Secretary of the Board, 20th Street and Constitution 
Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20551-0001, not later than March 25, 2022.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (Sebastian Astrada, 
Director, Applications) 101 Market Street, San Francisco, California 
94105-1579:
    1. Endeavor Bancorp, San Diego, California; to become a bank 
holding company by acquiring Endeavor Bank, San Diego, California.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 18, 
2022.
Michele Taylor Fennell,
Deputy Associate Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2022-03948 Filed 2-23-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ruben PACHECO-SOTO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-2097

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Filed August 16, 2017

Shaheen Torgoley, Office of the United States Attorney, District of New Mexico, Las Cruces, NM, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rabindranath Ramana, Calvert Law FirmCalvert Law Firm, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant-Appellant

Before KELLY, EBEL, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Per Curiam

After entering into a plea agreement that included an appeal waiver, Ruben Pa-cheeo-Soto pleaded guilty to drug and weapons offenses. He was sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment. Despite the waiver, Pacheco-Soto filed a notice of appeal to challenge the sentence. The government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver. In response to the motion, Pacheco-Soto’s counsel states: “After speaking with counsel, Mr. Pacheco-Soto agrees with the government that the appellate waiver should be enforced and this appeal should be dismissed.” Resp. at 3.

We grant the motion to enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal.

*

 This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,299,589
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   75,902
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  1,111,406
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,528,949
<PP&E>                                         687,720
<DEPRECIATION>                                 164,817
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,576,214
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,235,836
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,094
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,576,214
<SALES>                                         17,705
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                69,074
<CGS>                                            5,745
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,745
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,156,499
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             123,710
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,216,880)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,216,880)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,216,880)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.17)
        

</TABLE>
* The Honorable Stephen M. Reasoner, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 01-2891

___________ Anthony Nelson, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Appeal from the United States Ricky McCarrell, Sgt., Varner Super * District Court for the Eastern Max, ADC; T. Brown, Grievance * District of Arkansas. Officer, Varner Super Max, ADC; * R. Toney, Warden, Varner Super Max, * [UNPUBLISHED] ADC; Ray Hobbs, Chief Deputy * Director, Varner Super Max, ADC, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: October 31, 2001 Filed: November 2, 2001

___________ Before HANSEN, FAGG, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Arkansas inmate Anthony Nelson appeals the district court's * dismissal without prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against four Arkansas Department of-2- Corrections employees for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court's dismissal was proper. Although Nelson's supporting documents show he had exhausted administrative remedies with defendant Ricky McCarrell at the time of the district court's ruling, Nelson fails to show he had exhausted them with the remaining defendants. See Graves v. Norris , 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We also deny Nelson's pending motion. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Carlton Pharoah STROTHER, Petitioner-Appellant v. B. E. BLACKMON, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution Yazoo City Low, Respondent-Appellee

No. 16-60539 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 5, 2017

Carlton Pharoah Strother, Pro Se

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Petitioner-Appellant Carlton Pharoah Strother, federal prisoner # 19302-045, was convicted of two counts of conspiracy, thirteen counts of aggravated identity theft, and ten counts of access device fraud. He now appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. Strother argues that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is illegally executing his sentence by calculating his release date based on the original written judgment instead of the orally pronounced sentence. He characterizes the sentence as one that is “illegal and invalid” because the written judgment was “entered without jurisdiction.”

We review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. *Padilla v. United States,*416 F.3d 424, 425 (5th Cir. 2005). Generally, a federal prisoner may bring a § 2241 petition only to challenge the manner in which his sentence is carried out and must seek relief under 28 U.S.C, § 2255 if he wishes to attack his conviction or sentence. *Id.*at 425-26. However, a federal prisoner may raise a claim in a § 2241 petition that would otherwise be appropriate in a § 2255 proceeding if he establishes that his claim falls within § 2255’s savings clause. *Id.*at 426; *see*§ 2265(e). For the savings clause to apply, Strother must establish that his claim (1) is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that he might have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and (2) was foreclosed by circuit law at the time of his trial, direct appeal, or first § 2255 motion. *See Reyes-Requena v. United States,*243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001).

Strother’s claim that his sentence, as reflected in the original written judgment, is invalid constitutes an attack on the validity of the sentence, but because he does not argue that he was convicted of a now-nonexistent offense, his claim does not fall within the savings clause. *See Padilla,*416 F.3d at 426-27; *Reyes-Requena,*243 F.3d at 904. To the extent that Strother is challenging the BOP’s execution of his sentence, his challenge is cognizable in a § 2241 petition, but his argument is unavailing. There is no error in the' amended written judgment, and the BOP is not erroneously executing his sentence.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir, R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### IN RE: Edward E. ELLIOTT, Debtor, Edward E. Elliott, Appellant, v. Diane C. Weil, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellee.

No. 16-60020

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 9, 2017 * Pasadena, California

Filed June 14, 2017

Andrew Edward Smyth, Attorney, Smyth Law Office, Los Angeles, CA, for Appellant

John Nowlan Tedford, Aaron E. de Leest, Danning Gill Diamond & Kollitz, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Appellee

Before: WALLACE, CHRISTEN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

The bankruptcy court properly held that Edward E. Elliott was not entitled to a homestead exemption with respect to his residence (the Buckingham Property). As relevant here, a debtor may exempt property recovered by the bankruptcy trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 642 only if (1) the property was not voluntarily transferred from the estate by the debtor, and (2) the debt- or did not conceal the property. 11 U.S.C. § 622(g)(1). Diane C. Weil, the trustee of Elliott’s bankruptcy estate, recovered the Buckingham Property under § 642 by means of a turnover action. The bankruptcy court therefore properly relied on § 522(g) in considering whether Elliott was entitled to a homestead exemption with respect to the Buckingham Property.

Elliott does not dispute the bankruptcy court’s findings that he voluntarily transferred the Buckingham Property and that he concealed his interest in that property. By failing to dispute these findings, Elliott has effectively conceded that he is not entitled to a homestead exemption under § 622(g) with respect to the Buckingham Property.

Elliott contends that *Law v. Siegel,*— U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014), compels a contrary result, but he is mistaken. In *Law,*the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court cannot withhold an exemption provided under the Bankruptcy Code unless there is a valid statutory basis to do so. *Id.*at 1196-97. As explained above, § 522(g) provided a valid statutory basis for the bankruptcy court’s disallowance of Elliott’s claimed exemption.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Julio Cesar LOPEZ-BELIS, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-73654

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 14, 2016 *

Filed December 22, 2016

Julio Cesar Lopez-Belis, Pro Se

OIL, Erik R. Quick, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Julio Cesar Lopez-Belis, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence factual findings and review de novo questions of law. *Wakkary v. Holder,*558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). We deny the petition for review.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Lopez-Belis established changed or extraordinary circumstances to excuse his untimely asylum application. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)-(5); *see Toj-Culpatan v. Holder,*612 F.3d 1088, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Thus, we deny the petition as to his asylum claim.

Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determinations that the threat Lopez-Belis received in Guatemala does not rise to the level of past persecution, *see Nahrvani v. Gonzales,*399 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2005) (threats did not compel finding of past persecution), and that he failed to establish it is more likely than not that he would be persecuted on account of his union membership, leadership, or political opinion, *see Tamang v. Holder,*598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard for withholding is more demanding than for asylum); *see also Zetino v. Holder,*622 F.3d 1007, 1015-16 (9th Cir. *9952010) (assailants did not kill applicant’s family on account of a protected ground); *Nahrvani,*899 F.3d at 1153-54 (fear of future persecution too speculative).

• Finally, substantial evidence support the agency’s denial of Lopez-Belis’s CAT claim because he failed to establish that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the government in Guatemala. *See Silaya v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.