alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Humberto MEDINA-CABRERA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72058

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 14, 2017

Angela Andrea Levesque, Attorney, Levesque Law PLLC, Meridian, ID, for Petitioner

Virginia Lum, Attorney, OIL, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Humberto Medina-Cabrera, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s continuous physical presence determination, *Lopez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft,*381 F.3d 847, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2004), and the agency’s adverse credibility determination, *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo constitutional claims. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding because Medina-Cabrera’s testimony was internally inconsistent, unreliable, and not supported by sufficient evidence. *See Shrestha*at 1039-1044, (detailing REAL ID Act adverse credibility standards). Because Medina-Cabrera’s testimony was not credible and he did not provide sufficient supporting documentation regarding his departures from the United States during the statutory time period, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that he did not meet his burden of establishing continuous physical presence. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A), (d).

Medina-Cabrera has not established that inadequate interpretation deprived him of *624a fundamentally fair hearing. *See Aden v. Holder,*589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To establish a due process violation, a petitioner must show that defects in translation prejudiced the outcome of the hearing”).

To the extent Medina-Cabrera contends the agency should have exercised its sua sponte authority to reopen his case, we lack jurisdiction to consider this contention. *See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder,*633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2011); *cf. Bonilla v. Lynch,*840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

We do not reach Medina-Cabrera’s remaining contentions related to his supplemental hardship evidence. *See Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (review is limited to the actual grounds relied upon by the BIA).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Susan Crowley, Respondent, v Westbury Kennel Association, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[769 NYS2d 906]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Westbury Kennel Association, Inc., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Covello, J.), entered March 28, 2003, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant.

The appellant established that neither overcrowding nor a failure to supervise the crowd proximately caused the plaintiffs accident *(see Williams v New York Rapid Tr. Corp.,*272 NY 366 [1936]; *Blashka v South Shore Skating,*193 AD2d 772, 773 [1993]; *Ryan v City of New York,*7 AD2d 298, 299 [1959], *affd*6 NY2d 896 [1959]). In opposition, the plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the appellant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Altman, J.P., Goldstein, Crane and Mastro, JJ., concur.
#### Lennox Morgan, Appellant, v Randolph Laurent et al., Respondents.

[770 NYS2d 646]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (F. Rivera, J.), dated December 6, 2002, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

We reverse the Supreme Court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, since there are triable issues of fact as to whether the conduct of the defendant Randolph Laurent contributed to the cause of the subject motor vehicle accident *(see Romano v 202 Corp.,*305 AD2d 576). Florio, J.P., Smith, Luciano and Rivera, JJ., concur.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council

          - [Docket No. AS22-02]

# AGENCY:

Appraisal Subcommittee of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.

# ACTION:

Notice of meeting; cancellation.

The Special Meeting, which was published in accordance with Section 1104 (b) of Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, as amended, at 87 FR 8840, February 16, 2022 and scheduled for Wednesday, February 23, 2022 at 10:00 a.m. ET, was cancelled.

James R. Park,

Executive Director. 

[FR Doc. 2022-04075 Filed 2-25-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6700-01-P
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices 

# Order

September 23, 2009

138745

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 138745 COA: 283210 Wayne CC: 07-014043-FC MARQUEZ MAURICE GOINS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 3, 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appe al, we VACATE the sentence of the Wayne Circuit Court,

and we REMAND this case to the trial court fo r resentencing. For the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion, the trial co urt’s scoring of offense variable 13 was improper. The Court of Appeals alternate ba sis for scoring OV 13 wa s improper because it impermissibly included conduct that was already scored under OV 12. MCL 777.43(2)(c). In all other re spects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

M ARKMAN , J. ( concurring ).

Justice Weaver dissents because she is “not persuaded that the decision of the Court of Appeals was clearly erroneous or that defendant has suffered any material injustice . . . .” It is diffi cult to understand how Justice Weaver can assert that this decision was not “clearly erroneous” when th e Court of Appeals cited conduct scored under OV 12 to justify the scoring of OV 13 contrary to the express command of MCL 777.43(2)(c). It is equally difficult to under stand how Justice Weaver can assert that defendant has not suffered any “material in justice” where the trial court imposed a

minimum sentence of 132 months when it tho ught the correct guideline range was 126 to 210 months while the correct guideline range is 108 to 180 months. Thus, the lower courts unmistakably applied the law in an “erroneous” manne r, and equally unmistakablyI, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 23, 2009

0916 2

caused a “material injustice” to a person who, but for the instant or der, might have been imprisoned for a term beyond that intended by the Legislature and the trial court.

W EAVER

, J., ( dissenting ).

I dissent. I would not vacate the senten ce and remand this case and I would deny leave to appeal because I am not persuaded that th e decision of the Co urt of Appeals was clearly erroneous or that defendant has suffe red any material injustice in this case.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6516 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6516

  To reauthorize the Director of the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum to support Holocaust education programs, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 30, 2023

  Mr. Carter of Georgia (for himself, Ms. Manning, Ms. Stefanik, Ms. 
 Wasserman Schultz, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Fitzpatrick, and 
Mr. Moolenaar) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To reauthorize the Director of the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum to support Holocaust education programs, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Never Again Education 
Reauthorization Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION.

    Section 4(a) of the Never Again Education Act (Public Law 116-141) 
is amended by striking ``each of the 4 succeeding fiscal years'' and 
inserting ``each succeeding fiscal year through fiscal year 2030''.
                                 <all>
```
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|                                                                                |                                                                       |   |   |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
|                                                                                |                                                                       |   |
|           February 28, 2007  | /s/ Dan Amadori*                                                      |   |
|                                                                                | Dan Amadori                                                           |   |
|                                                                                | Chief Financial Officer                (Principal financial officer)  |   |
|                                                                                |

|   |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| *      |   | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to us and will be retained by us and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. |

----
#### Guillermo VERA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Connie GIPSON, Warden, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16420

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed June 2, 2017

Guillermo Vera, Pro Se

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Guillermo Vera, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for relief from judgment following the dismissal of *398his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an Eighth Amendment violation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, *Casey v. Albertson’s Inc.,*362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Vera’s motion because Vera did not identify any grounds for relief from the judgment. *See*Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); *United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc.,*555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth grounds for relief).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This’ disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Bond vs. The State.

The issue to a plea of not guilty to an indictment for *assault and battery,' cannot,*by consent of parties, be tried by the court. *(Wilson vs. The Slate,*16 *Ark. Sep.)*

*Appeal from the Circuit Court of Scott County.*

Hon. Felix J. Batsoh, Circuit Judge.

Fowler *&*Stillwell, for the appellant.

JORDAN, Attorney General, contra.

Mr. Justice Scott

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was an indictment for an assault and battery. The defen*291dant pleaded not guilty, and the State joined isáue. By consent of the parties, tliis issue was'tried by tlie court sitting as a jury. Upon hearing the testimony the court found the defendant guilty, and assessed a fine of ten dollars, rendering judgment accordingly.

The defendant moved in arrest of judgment, which, upon being overruled by the court, the defendant excepted, setting out all the evidence in his bill of exceptions, and appealed to this court.

The only point made by the appellant, is, that the issue joined can only, by the law of the land, be tried by a jury. The Attorney General makes no point in the case, conceding, as is true, that it is within the influence of the decision in the case of *Wilson vs. The*State, 16 *Ark. Rep.,*decided at the last term.

The judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded to be proceeded with.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan Luis MENDEZ-VALTIERRA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40192 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Juan Luis Mendez-Valtierra, Pro Se

Before KING, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

*371PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Juan Luis Mendez-Valtierra has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Mendez-Valtierra has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
//Si 

TkE CHAMBER 

-iPPARTMEMTQF^ 

"j;\?JSPORTATiON ^ 

• -<^T fH^ER/VIlONS 

;0!0 r.rT -U P 2^ SH 

Auburn-Lewi ston 

Municipal Aiipoit 

FIv to t^E A 

August 10. 2010 

Honorable Ray LaHood, Secretary 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

400 7* Street SW 

Washington, DC 20590 

Dear Secretary LaHood: 

The Androscoggin County Chamber of Commerce Is committed to supporting the 

application for a Small Community Air Service Grant (SCASD) through the U.S. 

Department of Transportation. We will help promote the program and develop a 

fund raising campaign for the local match for the grant. It has been a tong time 

since our communities have had commercial air service and the tremendous 

growth and development in the area over the past decade will surely make that 

service successful. 

The Androscoggin Chamber has been a tremendous supporter of the local 

airport and we will continue that support in the future. We will work closely with 

the Airport Board and their staff to make sure that the program is well promoted 

with local and regional businesses and with the community at-large. The more 

flights available to our local business community, the stronger their commitment 

will be to flying out of the local airport and the more effort they will make to 

promote the Auburn Lewiston Airport's service and convenience to their 

customers, suppliers and employees. 

I look fonward to working on this exciting project. 

Sincere!] 

Charies A. Morrison 

President 

II' r.r-Sruvi. i CCVIIK ,M KivP,v.K fLA/.'. 

111 2li7-7W.22.li) . t:A\2l)7-7e.1-44«l • U-M,MI l>.K>i(8,wi)l«<<K.i,iKi.c>rMi n m 

Auburn-Lewiston Municipal Airport - Small Community Air Service Development Grant - August 2010 27
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42504

STATE OF IDAHO

,

Plaintiff

- Respondent

,

v.

RILEY O’SHAUGHNESSY BEAMAN

,

Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 535

Filed: June 29, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Michael E. Wetherell , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years, for felony driving under the influence,

affirmed

.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson , Deputy Appellate Public Defend er, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________

Before MELANSON, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge; and GUTIERREZ, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Riley O’Shaughnessy Beaman pled guilty to felony driving under the influence . I.C. §§

18

- 8004 and 18

- 8005(6), (9)

. In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed.

The district court sentenced Beaman to a unified t erm of five years, with a minimum period of

confinement of two years

. Beaman appeals.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the senten ce are well established and2 need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 114, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.

1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Beaman ’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7171

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHAD ALLEN REEVES, a/k/a Chad Reeves,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior 

District Judge. (7:06-cr-00009-JCT; 7:07-cv-80011-JCT-MFU)

Submitted: November 2, 2012 Decided: November 6, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Chad Allen Reeves, Appellant Pro Se. Ronald Andrew Bassford, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Chad Allen Reeves seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for 

reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief on 

his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2012) motion. The order is 

not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Reeves has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED