alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MARTIN BROTHERS MILL & FOUNDRY SUPPLY COMPANY *v.*FRUEHAUF CORPORATION.

Sales — Implied Warranty — Negligence—Design op Dump Trailer.

Finding by trial judge that damage to dump trailer was caused by load imbalance rather than defective design, not clearly erroneous, precludes recovery on plaintiff’s counts of implied warranty and negligence in aetion against defendant seller of trailer.

Reperence por Points in Headnote

46 Anj Jur, Sales § 826.

*574• Appeal from Common Pleas Court of Detroit; O’Hair (John D.), J.

Submitted Division 1 May 8, 1968, at Detroit.

(Docket No. 2,867.)

Decided May 31, 1968.

Declaration by Martin Brothers Mill *&*Foundry Supply Company, a Michigan corporation, against Fruehauf Corporation, a Michigan corporation, for damages to dump trailer suffered in tipping over. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

*William A. McFawn,*for plaintiff.

*Frank 8. Perkin, Jr.,*for defendant.

Per Curiam.

The trial judge found that load imbalance rather than defective design caused the trailer sold by the defendant to the plaintiff Martin Brothers Mill & Foundry Supply Company to tip over.

We have examined the record and conclude that such finding was not clearly erroneous. GrCR 1963, 517.1. That finding precludes recovery oh plaintiffs’ implied warranty as well as on their negligence counts. *Piercefield*v. *Remington Arms Company, Inc.*(1965), 375 Mich 85, 98; Prosser, Torts (3d ed), p 683,n 63.

Affirmed. Costs to appellee.

Levin, P. J., and Burns and Dalton, JJ., concurred.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Nelson Nehemias MENDEZ-DE PAZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-41543 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 20, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U:S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Nelson Nehemias Mendez-De Paz, Pro Se

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Nelson Nehemias Mendez-De Paz has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed briefs in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Mendez-De Paz has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s briefs and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

**Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4,
#### Elease HILL; Carlton Newsome; Vada Smith Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CITY OF EL DORADO, an Incorporated Body through Mayor Frank Hass in his Official Capacity as Mayor and City Council in their Individual Official Capacity as the City Council of El Dorado Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-2854

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 10, 2017

Filed: May 17, 2017

Terrence Cain, Little Rock, AR, Brian G. Smith, Sr., Smith *&*Nworkorie, Farm-erville, LA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Henry C. Kinslow, El Dorado, AR, Michael Allen Mosley, Arkansas Municipal League, Legal, North Little Rock, AR, Matthew Keith Wren, Wren Law Firm, Little Rock, AR, for Defendant-Appellee

Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Elease Hill, Carlton Newsome, and Vada Smith appeal the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action. Appellants have identified no valid basis for reversal of the rulings they challenge, and we find none.2 See Malone v. Hinman, 847 F.3d *382949, 952 (8th Cir. 2017) (de novo review). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Susan 0. Hickey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.

2

. We.have not considered arguments appellants raise for the first time on appeal. See Schaffer v. Beringer, 842 F.3d 585, 592 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, U.S. Feb. 17, 2017 (No. 16-1262).
**Exhibit
        32.1**
 
 **iDNA,
        INC.**
 **CERTIFICATION
        OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER**
 **PURSUANT
        TO RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934**
 **AND
        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 I,
        James
        J. McNamara, Chief Executive Officer of iDNA, Inc., a Delaware corporation
        (the
“Registrant”), in connection with the Registrant’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
        for the period ended July 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
        Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), do hereby represent, warrant and
        certify ,
        in
        compliance with Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
        18
        U.S.C Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
        to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
        knowledge:
 
 (1)
        The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 
 (2)
        The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the
        Registrant.
 
 
 /s/
        James
        J. McNamara
 
 Name:
        James J. McNamara
 Title:
        Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
 (principal
        executive officer)
  Date: September
        16 ,
        2008
   
 A
        signed
        original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
        authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
        in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
        by Section 906, has been provided to iDNA, Inc. and will be retained by iDNA,
        Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
        upon
        request.
  51
<PAGE>   1
                      NCS HEALTHCARE MAKES ANNOUNCEMENT

Exhibit 99.1

Cleveland, Ohio (January 28, 1998) - NCS HealthCare, Inc. (Nasdaq:NCSS) reports
that earlier today, government authorities, pursuant to a warrant, sought and
obtained various documents and records from a pharmacy located in Herrin,
Illinois operated by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company.

Government authorities have not informed the company of the purpose of the
inquiry. No other operating unit of the company has been contacted. The company
intends to cooperate fully with the government's inquiry.

NCS acquired the Herrin, Illinois pharmacy in June, 1996. The pharmacy's
operation accounts for less than 2 percent of NCS' fiscal year-to-date sales
and operating profitability. This pharmacy continues to provide services
without interruption to long-term care residents in the region.

NCS HealthCare, Inc. is a leading independent provider of pharmacy and related
services to long-term care and acute care facilities, including skilled nursing
centers, assisted living facilities and hospitals. NCS serves over 171,000
residents of long-term care facilities in twenty-eight states and manages
hospital pharmacies in nineteen states.

Contact:        Kristen H. Schulz
                Director of Investor Relations
                (216) 514-3350

                                      15
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that th i s

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except for the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-60348 Summary Calendar

QUINTIN L. MILTON Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus
JACKSON PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division

District Court No. 3:98-CV-467

June 8, 2000 Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Quintin Milton sued his former employer, the Jackson Public School District, alleging he was discharged based on his national origin in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e et seq ., and 42 U.S.C.A. §1981. Milton also asserted state law claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Jackson Public Schools with regard2

to Milton’s federal discrimination claims and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Having reviewed the parties’ briefs , the district court’s comprehensive opinion, and pertinent sections of the record, this Court agrees that Milton was neither able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination nor adduce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that national origin was a determinative factor in his termination. This Court therefore affirms for essentially the same reasons stated by the district court.

AFFIRMED.
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I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6549 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to direct the Administrator of the 

Federal Aviation Administration to adjust certain requirements with respect to sovereignty and use of airspace, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 1, 2023 

Ms. ESHOO (for herself, Mr. CA ́RDENAS, Mr. MULLIN, Mr. PANETTA, and Mr. 

SHERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to direct the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to adjust 

certain requirements with respect to sovereignty and use 

of airspace, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fairness in Airspace 

5 Includes Residents Act’’ or the ‘‘F-AIR Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. SOVEREIGNTY AND USE OF AIRSPACE. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 40103(b)(1) of title 49, 

8 United States Code, is amended to read as follows: 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6549 IH

1 ‘‘(1)(A) The Administrator of the Federal Aviation 

2 Administration shall develop plans and policy for the use 

3 of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order 

4 the use of the airspace necessary to ensure— 

5 ‘‘(i) as a primary priority, the safety of aircraft; 

6 and 

7 ‘‘(ii) as secondary co-equal priorities— 

8 ‘‘(I) the efficient use of airspace; and 

9 ‘‘(II) the minimization of the impact of 

10 aviation noise, and other health impacts, on 

11 residents and communities, and other impacts 

12 of the use of airspace on the environment. 

13 ‘‘(B) The Administrator may modify or revoke an as14 signment when required in the public interest.’’. 

15 (b) UPDATES TO FAA PRIORITIES.—Not later than 

16 12 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the 

17 Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 

18 shall— 

19 (1) review the regulations, policies, procedures, 

20 and processes of the Administration and modify 

21 them as necessary to reflect the priorities in clauses 

22 (i) and (ii) of section 40103(b)(1)(A) of title 49, 

23 United States Code, as added by subsection (a); and 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•HR 6549 IH

1 (2) update the mission statement of the Admin2 istration to reflect such priorities. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-01-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   34,828
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,663
<INVENTORY>                                     57,234
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<PP&E>                                          85,312
<DEPRECIATION>                                  41,127
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 167,802
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           53,177
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           109
<OTHER-SE>                                     104,637
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   167,802
<SALES>                                        139,407
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               139,407
<CGS>                                          105,198
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  123,958
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 991
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 14,458
<INCOME-TAX>                                     5,675
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              8,783
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     8,783
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .90
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .88


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Seth Douglas RAYBON, registered owner and claimant to One 1964 Pontiac 2-Door Automobile, Serial No. 834D-24101, Appellant.

No. 10647.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 5, 1966.

Decided Oct. 27, 1966.

*322Irvin B. Tucker, Jr., Raleigh, N. C., for appellant.

William S. McLean, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Robert H. Cowen, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and BRYAN and WINTER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal arises out of the forfeiture of an automobile allegedly used in the illicit whisky business. The question tendered is one of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the inference that the cases observed by the agents as they were unloaded from the automobile were the, same cases containing gallon jars later found at the still at the other end of the path from the unloading site. After the unloading, one of the men was observed carrying two of the cases into the woods along the path that led to the still.

While the testimony showed that the still could be reached by another path, the whole record abundantly justifies the inference that the cases of glass jars at the still site were four of the six cases which the agents saw being unloaded from the automobile.

Affirmed.
#### In the Matter of Casey VV., a Person in Need of Supervision, Appellant. Kathryn A. Charbonneau, as Probation Officer of the Fulton County Probation Department, Respondent.

[772 NYS2d 107]

Cardona, P.J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Fulton County (Jung, J.), entered June 3, 2003, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 7, to revoke a prior order of probation and placed re*786spondent in the custody of the Fulton County Department of Social Services for a period of one year.

In March 2003, respondent was adjudicated a person in need of supervision and placed on probation for one year. Thereafter, in April 2003, petitioner filed a petition alleging that respondent violated the terms and conditions of her probation. After a hearing at which respondent’s school psychologist testified and various school reports were admitted into evidence, Family Court determined that respondent violated the terms of her probation. Although requested, respondent was precluded from offering evidence in reference to a specific disposition and only allowed to be heard in summation on an appropriate disposition. The court revoked the prior dispositional order and placed respondent in the custody of the Fulton County Department of Social Services (hereinafter DSS) for a period of one year. On appeal, respondent seeks reversal of the order of placement and remittal for a dispositional hearing. She contends, among other things, that Family Court erred when it denied her request to introduce dispositional evidence.

Initially, petitioner has advised the Court by letter that “the child has now returned home,” and contends that the appeal has been rendered moot, electing not to submit responding papers. We note that the dispositional order has not expired by its own terms. Moreover, our inability to discern from petitioner’s statement whether respondent has been released from DSS custody and has been returned to the custody of her parent(s) precludes a determination that respondent has been afforded all the relief that she seeks on this appeal *(cf. Matter of Evan P.,*1 AD3d 831 [2003]). Therefore, we cannot say the appeal has been rendered moot.

Addressing the merits of respondent’s claim, we find that while Family Ct Act § 779 does not specifically require a separate dispositional hearing upon a finding of a violation of probation, the parties should be given an opportunity to present evidence relevant to a proper disposition *(see Matter of Josiah RR.,*277 AD2d 654, 654 [2000]) in order to comply with the requirements of due process *(see*Family Ct Act § 711). Because respondent was not afforded that opportunity, the appropriate remedy is to remit this matter for a new hearing *(see Matter of Josiah RR., supra*at 654) unless the dispositional order placing respondent in DSS custody has fully expired.

Mercure, Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and matter remitted to the Family Court of Fulton County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.
#### Sterling Ray CUNIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kate BROWN, in her Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Oregon; Colette Peters, in her Official Capacity as Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections; Kristin A. Winges-Yanez, in her Official Capacity as Chairperson, Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35519

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 10, 2017 Portland, Oregon

Filed June 13, 2017

Ryan Timothy O’Connor, O’Connor Weber, LLC, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Jeff Payne, Oregon Department of Justice, Salem, OR, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: BYBEE and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,* Senior District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

*465MEMORANDUM **

Cunio appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim on *Younger*abstention grounds. We review de novo whether *Younger*abstention applies. *Green v. City of Tucson,*255 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

*Younger*abstention is only appropriate if “the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding.” *San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose,*546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008). The pending proceeding before the Oregon Court of Appeals does not provide Cunio “an adequate opportunity to raise his federal constitutional claims.” *Meredith v. Oregon,*321 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 2003). That proceeding .only addresses the 48-year minimum sentence imposed by the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (“Parole Board”) in 2012 for Cunio’s homicide offenses. *See*Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335 (challenging final orders of the Parole Board). Oregon law required Cunio to challenge the 23-year portion of his determinate guidelines sentence for his non-homicide offenses in separate proceedings. *See*Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 138.050 (direct appeal), 138.510-680 (post-conviction relief). None of these proceedings provided Cunio an “adequate” and “full and fair” opportunity to challenge the combined effect of his sentences as a de facto life sentence without parole, or to challenge the constitutionality of Oregon’s bifurcated sentencing scheme for juveniles convicted of homicide and non-homicide crimes in a single judgment. *Meredith,*321 F.3d at 818-19. The district court therefore should not have abstained.

REVERSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.