alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32(a)

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

OF QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q

OF PINNACLE
DATA SYSTEMS, INC.

FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2006

The undersigned is the Chief Executive Officer of Pinnacle Data Systems, Inc. (the Issuer). This certification is made pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This certification
accompanies the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Issuer for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2006.

I, Michael R. Sayre, certify that, the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and that information contained in the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer.

This certification is executed as of November 14, 2006.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Michael R. Sayre   
|Chief Executive Officer



31
L.C.H. v. SHELBY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2150885

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 14, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. GABRIEL RUIZ SALCEDO,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 22

- 10151
D.C. No. 1:10

- cr - 00055

- JMS

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 16, 2023 * * Honolulu, Hawaii Before: BEA, COLLINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Gabriel Ruiz Salcedo appeals the district court’s denial without prejudice of
his motion to reduce sentence , brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act (“FSA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We vacate and remand for reconsideration in light of intervening case law.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 13 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Salcedo is currently serving two concurrent life sentences in federal prison for two drug convictions. When Salcedo was sentenced in 2011, he was subject to a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment for each of his convictions. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2010). In 2018, the FSA non

- retroactively amended the mandatory minimum provisions of § 841, and the parties agree that if Salcedo were sentenced today, he would be subject to a ma ndatory minimum term of 15 years rather than life imprisonment. The district court reasoned that, if sentencing Salcedo today

— considering the 15

- year mandatory minimum, Salcedo’s underlying offense, Salcedo’s criminal history, and other sentencing factors

— the court would sentence
Salcedo to a term within a range of 262

– 327 months imprisonment (approximately
22

– 27 years). Salcedo argu es that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify a sentence reduction given the disparity between the sentence he received in 2011 and the sentence he would receive today, among other factors. The district court denied Salcedo’s motion for a reduction in sentence as “premature,” citing legal

“ uncertainty” in the Ninth Circuit as to w hether a district court can consider a sentencing disparity created by a non

- retroactive change to a mandatory sentencing scheme when determining whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify granting a defendant’s motion for sentence reduction un der 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).3

The district court decided this case before our decision in United States v.
Chen , 48 F.4th 1092, 1093 (9th Cir. 2022), which held that “a district court may consider the First Step Act’s non

- retroactive changes to sentencing law, in combination with other factors particular to the individual defendant, when determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist fo r a sentence reductio n .” Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order denying Salcedo’s
motion to reduce sentence and remand to the district court to consider the motion in light of intervening case law.
VACATED AND REMANDED
.
From: Venu Ghanta/DC/USEPA/US

To: "Whiteman, Chad" <Chad_S_Whiteman@omb.eop.gov>

Date: 01/17/2013 01:41 PM

Subject: small refiner language

In CAA section 211(o)(9), enacted as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress provided 

a temporary exemption to small refineries (those refineries with a crude throughput of no more 

than 75,000 barrels of crude per day) through December 31, 2010. Congress provided that small 

refineries can receive a temporary extension of the exemption beyond 2010 based on a 

determination of disproportionate economic hardship. We approved a number of extensions to 

the exemption for 2011 and 2012. However, at this time, no exemptions have been approved for 

2013. As a result, for this proposal we have calculated the proposed 2013 standards without a 

small refinery/small refiner adjustment. We are seeking comment on whether it would be 

appropriate to extend the two year exemption for small refineries as discussed in section 211 

(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II). Note that if such exemptions were granted before finalizing the standards, or if 

an individual small refinery or small refiner requests an exemption and is approved following the 

release of this NPRM and prior to issuance of the final rule, the final standards will be adjusted 

to account for the exempted volumes of gasoline and diesel. This adjustment would add a 

proportionate increase in volume and cost to all other obligated parties. We encourage any 

producers of gasoline and/or diesel who believe that they may be eligible under the small 

refinery exemption provision to send a petition to the EPA under the provisions of §80.1441 or 

§80.1442. We believe that the approach EPA is currently using to assess disproportionate 

economic hardships for small refineries appropriately addresses the intent of the statutory 

provision and the needs of the affected parties.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-27-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-29-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-28-1996
<CASH>                                           2,797
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   76,615
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     85,240
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               166,899
<PP&E>                                         166,998
<DEPRECIATION>                                  58,321
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 315,629
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           43,492
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           120
<OTHER-SE>                                      93,162
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   315,629
<SALES>                                        110,928
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               110,928
<CGS>                                           98,360
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   98,360
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,052
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  5,737
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,215
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,522
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,522
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .30
        

</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-40364

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

EDUARDO GARCIA GARCIA, also known as Eduardo Garcia,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:09-CR-2065-1

Before DAVIS, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Eduardo Garcia

Garcia has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d

229 (5th Cir. 2011). Garcia Garcia has not filed a response. We have reviewed

counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We

concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue

for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 17, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 12-40364 Document: 00512085306 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/17/2012
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

** **

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

** **

In connection with theQuarterly Report of VendingData Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB/A for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we,Steven J. Blad, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, and JohnR. Spina, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.                                       The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

2.                                       The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.
| By:    | /s/ Steven J. Blad                     |   | Dated: | December 9, 2003 |
|--------|----------------------------------------|--------|--------|------------------|
|   | Steven J. Blad                         |   |   |             |
| Title: | Chief Executive Officer and  President |   |   |             |

 
| By:    | /s/ John R. Spina                     |   | Dated: | December 9, 2003 |
|--------|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|------------------|
|   | John R. Spina                         |   |   |             |
| Title: | Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer |   |   |             |

 

This certification ismade solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to theknowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.

 

----
#### Isaac Hathaway, by his Guardian, in Error, *versus*Joseph Clark 3d.

*Oct*22*d.*

A plaintiff in error, after failing to prove an error in fact assigned, cannot assign another error in fact.

At April term, 1826, of the Court of Common Pleas, Clark, as plaintiff, recovered a judgment against Hathaway. On this writ of error the judgment was alleged to be erroneous, *first,*because Hathaway was under guardianship as a person *non compos*and no notice of the suit was given to the guardian ; — *secondly,*because Hathaway was an idiot. The plaintiff in error having had leave, at a former term of this Court, to strike out the second error assigned, now moved to have the assignment of it restored, and that the defendant in error should be required to plead thereto.

*Eddy*supported the motion.

He said that a second writ of error could not be issued ; 2 Wms’s Saund. 101 *a ; Burleigh*v. *Harris,*2 Str. 975 ; and that a writ of error is amendable. *Sword-Blade Company*v. *Dempsey,*2 Str. 892. *[Parker*C.J. You have already amended.]

*W. Bay lies, contra.*

We objected that the plaintiff in error *151could not assign two errors in fact, whereupon he struck out one, and he failed to sustain the other. [5 Pick. 490.] 2 Tidd’s Pr. 1108 ; 2 Bac. Abr. 487, Error, *K.*If he cannot assign two errors at the same time, he cannot have the assignment of the second error restored.

*Oct.*25th

*Per Curiam.*

The plaintiff in error has failed to prove the error on which he relied. He cannot re-assign another error, nor have one which has been struck out restored.

*Judgment of C. C. P.*affirmed.
#### John J. Sweeney, Appellant, *v.*National City Bank of Troy, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Argued January 15, 1943 ;

decided March 4, 1943.

*630
      *Howard Osterhout, Chester W. Cuthell*and *Robert W. Maloney Jr.,*for appellant.

*Frederick E. Draper*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Dissenting: Loughran and Finch, JJ.
PROMISSORY NOTE
                                 (Interim Loan)

$65,000.00                                                  September 24, 1996
                                                            San Jose, California

         FOR VALUE  RECEIVED,  the  undersigned  promises to pay to Bell Sports,
Inc.,  a  California  corporation  ("Payee"),  the  principal  sum of Sixty Five
Thousand  Dollars.  No  interest  shall  accrue or be payable  on the  principal
balance  provided that the principal  balance is timely paid in accordance  with
the following terms.

         Interest will be imputed at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, and
shall be added to the W-2 of the undersigned employee.  The undersigned employee
will pay all taxes on interest so imputed.

         The balance of the note is payable as follows:

                  (1) Fifty  percent  (50%) of any bonus (if any) awarded to the
undersigned  by Payee after the date hereof  shall be applied by Payee to reduce
the balance hereof;

                  (2) The entire  principal  balance  hereof is due and  payable
upon the earlier of the following: (a) the termination,  for whatever reason, of
the undersigned as an employee of the Payee;  (b) the dissolution or liquidation
of the Payee; or (c) the third  anniversary of this promissory note as reflected
by the date at the top hereof.

         In the event that the note is not paid strictly in accordance  with all
of the above terms, then and thereafter the principal balance will bear interest
at the maximum legal rate until paid in full.

         This Note is  secured by a  Collateral  Pledge  Agreement  of even date
herewith,  the terms of which are  incorporated  herein by reference.  This Note
shall for all purposes be governed by and construed in accordance  with the laws
of the State of California.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have caused this Promissory Note to
be executed as of the day and year first above written.


                                                     /s/ Mary George
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Employee, Mary George

         I join the act and deed of  Employee,  my  husband/wife,  and  agree to
joint and several liability of all obligations hereinabove imposed.


                                                     /s/ 
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Employee's Spouse
#### Saul PELAYO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G. HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-16837

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 14, 2016 *

Filed December 22, 2016

*1001Saul Pelayo, Pro Se

Ian Michael Ellis, Attorney, AGCA— Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appel-lee

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *1001*See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Saul Pelayo appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. *Williams v. Parmmo,*775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Pelayo’s retaliation claim because Pelayo failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. *See Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Paramo,*775 F.3d at 1191 (a prisoner who does not exhaust administrative remedies must show that “there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.... ”); *see also McBride v. Lopez,*807 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2015) (to show that a threat rendered the prison grievance system unavailable, a prisoner must show that he actually believed prison officials would retaliate against him, and that his belief was objectively reasonable).

Pelayo’s motion to compel discovexy, filed on July 7,2016, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

MIGUEL V. RODRIGUEZ
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee.

No. 4D2023

- 2207

[ December 28, 2023 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.853 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Andrew L. Siegel, Judge; L.T. Case No. 95

- 15728CF10A.

Miguel V. Rodriguez, Raiford, pro se

.

No response required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed

.

W ARNER
, C IKLIN and G ERBER
, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing

.
**Exhibit 3.3**

**CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT OFCERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATIONOFOPTION CARE, INC.**

**Option Care, Inc.**, a corporation organized and existing under and byvirtue of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the“Corporation”),

**DOES HEREBY CERTIFY:**

**FIRST:**                   Thatthe Board of Directors of the Corporation adopted a resolution proposing anddeclaring advisable the following amendment to the Corporation’s Certificate ofIncorporation:

**RESOLVED**, that the Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation beamended by changing the first paragraph of the Fifth Article thereof so that,as amended, the Article shall be and read as follows:

 

FIFTH:  The total number of shares of all classes ofstock which the Corporation shall have authority to issue is 90,000,000,consisting of two classes as follows: 30,000,000 shares of Preferred Stock, par value $0.01 per share(“Preferred Stock”), and 60,000,000 shares of Common Stock, par value $0.01 pershare (“Common Stock”).

 

**SECOND:            **That, thereafter, at the annual meeting of the Corporation’sstockholders held on June 4, 2002, the holders of a majority of the totalnumber of shares of common stock issued and outstanding as of the record dateof the annual meeting approved of the amendment to the Fifth Article of the Corporation’sCertificate of Incorporation.

**THIRD**:**                 **Thatthe aforesaid amendment was duly adopted in accordance with the applicableprovisions of Section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the State ofDelaware.

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF,** said Corporation has caused this certificate to besigned by Joseph Bonaccorsi, its Senior Vice President, General Counsel andSecretary, this 18th day of June, 2002.
|   |   | /s/  Joseph P. Bonaccorsi |                                                    |
|--------|--------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   | By:                       | Joseph P. Bonaccorsi                                    |
|   |   | Title:                    | Senior Vice President,  General   Counsel and Secretary |
|        |        |                           |                                                         |  |

 

----
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

OF QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q

OF
PINNACLE DATA SYSTEMS, INC.

FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2009

The undersigned is the Chief Executive Officer of Pinnacle Data Systems, Inc. (the Issuer). This certification is made pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
This certification accompanies the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Issuer for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2009.

I,
Michael R. Sayre, certify that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that
information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer.

This certification is executed as of August 7, 2009.



|                                
|--------------------------------
|/s/    Michael R. Sayre         
|Name: Michael R. Sayre          
|Title:   Chief Executive Officer