alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis BURSTON, Jr., a/k/a Black, a/k/a David Smith, a/k/a Melvin Roberts, a/k/a David Brown, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7741

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 25, 2017

Curtis Burston, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Seth Morgan Wood, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Curtis Burston, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Burston has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                     AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                      SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

         In connection with the Report of Joystar, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-KSB/A for the for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), we,
William Alverson, President and Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ William Alverson
-------------------------------------
William Alverson
President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
November 4, 2004
**EXHIBIT32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

** **

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Elixir Gaming Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the quarterly period ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, Gordon Yuen,President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and David R. Reberger,Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

1.     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.     The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result ofoperations of the Company.

 

 
| By:    |   /s/ Gordon Yuen                    |   | Dated:      August 13,  2008 |
|--------|------------------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   Gordon Yuen                        |   |                                                            |
| Title: |   President, Chief Executive Officer |   |                                                            |
|   |                                           |   |                                                            |
|   |                                           |   |                                                            |
| By:    |   /s/ David R. Reberger              |   | Dated:      August 13,  2008 |
|   |   David R. Reberger                  |   |                                                            |
| Title: |   Chief Financial Officer            |   |                                                            |

 

This certification is madesolely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to theknowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.

 

----
#### Jimmy POWELL, also known as Jamel Ansaaru El Majid, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Timothy MORRIS, Warden; Roger Davis, Food Director; Gene Newsome; Kenneth Powell, Chaplain; Eugene Wigglesworth, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-60155 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 20, 2017

Jimmy Powell, Pro Se

Benny McCalip May, Esq., Office of the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, for Defendants-Appel-lees Timothy Morris, Kenneth Powell, Eugene Wigglesworth

Rebecca Goforth Bush, Senior Counsel, Law Office of Scott C. Campbell, Jackson, MS, for Defendants-Appellees Roger Davis, Gene Newsome

Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jimmy Powell, Mississippi prisoner # 48033, filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against officials at the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging that they violated his First and Eighth Amendments rights. He appeals the magistrate judge’s grant of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and the concomitant dismissal of his suit.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as that employed by the district court. *Carnaby v. City of Houston,*636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving party establishes this, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific evidence to support his claims. *Duffie v. United States,*600 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2010).

“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §, 1997e(a); *Dillon v. Rogers,*596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010). The defendants’ summary judgment evidence shows that Powell failed to exhaust the MDOC’s two-step Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) with respect to his complaint that he was not receiving a Halal diet, as he did not complete the second step of the ARP. *See Wilson v. Epps,*776 F.3d 296, 300 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015); MDOC Inmate Handbook, ch. VIII. Moreover, Powell has not met his burden of presenting evidence that shows that he exhausted the ARP. *See Duffie,*600 F.3d at 371; *Gonzalez v. Seal,*702 F.3d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2012).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R, 47,5.4.
K.F., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-2698

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 2, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Benjamin Lucero CANO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11656 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 29, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Benjamin Lucero Cano, Pro Se

Before DENNIS, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Benjamin Lucero Cano, federal prisoner # 34330-177, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction based upon retroactive Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. By seeking leave to proceed IFP, Cano is challenging the district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a).

In this court, Cano argues that the district court failed to conduct the mandatory first-step inquiry regarding his eligibility for a reduction of his sentence. He asserts that the district court was required to recalculate his base offense level based on the drug quantity determined by the jury and then apply Amendment 782 in order to reach the proper guidelines range of imprisonment. Additionally, in his brief, Cano requests the appointment of counsel.

The district court’s implicit ruling that Cano was eligible for a sentence reduction was correct. *See Dillon v. United States,*560 U.S. 817, 826-27, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6). Cano’s challenge to the district court’s first-step calculation is beyond the scope of a § 3682(c)(2) proceeding and is, therefore, *224without merit. *Dillon,*560 U.S. at 831, 130 S.Ct. 2683; *United States v. McBride,*402 Fed.Appx. 909, 911 (5th Cir. 2010),

Cano does not challenge the district court’s discretionary determination that no reduction was warranted after consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. *Mapes v. Bishop,*541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008); *Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, he has not shown that the denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion was an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Benitez,*822 F.3d 807, 810-11 (5th Cir. 2016).

Cano’s appeal does not present a non-frivolous issue. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2. Cano’s motion for appointment of counsel is also DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cm. R. 47.5,4.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

Certifications Pursuant to Section 302 

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002****

 

I, Curtis J. Parker, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this report onForm 10-Q/A of Cotelligent, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered bythis report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others with those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusion about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. Theregistrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors: 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: September 21, 2005
#### William R. HANCOCK, individually and as Trustee of Hancock and Company, Inc. Profit Sharing Trust, under trust instrument April 3, 1993, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KULANA PARTNERS, LLC, a Hawaii Limited Liability Company; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-15233

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted October 20, 2016, Honolulu, Hawaii

FILED JUNE 09, 2017

Timothy Joseph Hogan, Attorney, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jade Lynne Ching, Attorney, Nakashi-ma Ching LLC, Honolulu, HI, John S. Rhee, Esquire, Attorney, Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing, Honolulu, HI, for Defendant-Appellee Kulana Partners, LLC.

Eric Blake Levasseur, Esquire, Royce Robert Remington, Attorneys, Hahn, Loeser & Parks, LLP, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant-Appellee Fidelity National Title and Escrow of Hawaii, Inc.

Before: WALLACE, FARRIS, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The mandate issued in this case is hereby RECALLED. We WITHDRAW our previous memorandum disposition filed on November 7, 2016 (Dkt. 37) and replace it with the one filed concurrently with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

MEMORANDUM *

William R. Hancoek appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his claims for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and trespass and ejectment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Having' reviewed the relevant materials, we believe that a clarification of Hawaii law would resolve this case. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand to the district court with instructions to certify the following questions to the Hawaii Supreme Court pursuant to Hawaii Rule of Appellate Procedure 13:

> 1. Whether a claim relating to a forged deed is subject to the statute of limitations for fraud?

> 2. Whether the recording of a deed provides constructive notice in an action for ' fraud?

We are mindful that our framing of these questions does not limit the Hawaii Supreme Court’s “consideration of any issues that it determines are relevant” and that “it may in its discretion reformulate the question[s].” *Cornhusker Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kachman,*514 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).

VACATED AND REMANDED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
14299

#### WILSON v. BANK OF CAMDEN *ET AL.*

(185 S. E., 617)

September, 1935.

*363
      *Messrs. Kirkland & DeLoach,*for appellant,

*Messrs. M. C. Woods*and *H. U. Davis,*for respondents,

May 15, 1936.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Carter.

This suit by John Wilson, as Receiver of Northwestern Railroad of South Carolina, as plaintiff, against the defendants, the Bank of Camden and D. A. Boykin, as conservator of the Bank of Camden, commenced in the Court of Common Pleas for Kershaw County, is a suit for the purpose of recovering judgment against the defendants in the sum of $1,000.00, together with interest thereon from March 4, 1933. The defendants denied liability. Issues being joined, *364the case was tried in said Court before his Honor, Judge G. Duncan Bellinger, who rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which judgment the defendants duly appealed to this Court.

The nature of the suit and the facts involved are fully set forth in the decree rendered by his Honor, Judge Bellinger, and for the reasons stated in his Honor’s decree we think the judgment should be affirmed.

It is, therefore, the judgment of this Court that the exceptions be and are hereby overruled and the judgment of the lower Court affirmed.

• Note: The order of his Honor, Judge G. Duncan Bellinger, will be incorporated in the report of the case.

Mr. Chief Justice Stabrer and Messrs. Justices Bonham, Baker and Bishburne concur.
#### Patrick A. BOCKARI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-15019

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 ***

Filed August 15, 2017

Patrick A. Bockari, Pro Se

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Patrick A. Bockari appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his *310action alleging claims related to his bank account. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Cr*um v. Circus Circus Enters.,*231 F.3d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bockari’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Bockari failed to allege facts sufficient to show any violation of federal law or diversity of citizenship. *See*28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a); *Kuntz v. Lamar Corp.,*385 F.3d 1177, 1181-83 (9th Cir. 2004) (addressing diversity of citizenship under § 1332); *Yokeno v. Mafnas,*973 F.2d 803, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (analyzing whether plaintiffs complaint presented a “substantial federal question”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to amend Bockari’s second amended complaint after notifying Bockari of the deficiencies in his pleadings and affording him two opportunities to amend. *See Chodos v. West Publ’g Co.,*292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and stating “when a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion' in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly broad” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid*310ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Dwight BERNARD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6225

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 18, 2017

Decided: July 21, 2017

Richard Dwight Bernard, Appellant Pro Se. Olivia L. Norman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges,

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this'circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Richard Dwight Bernard appeals the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for reduction of sentence. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Bernard,*No. 3:03-cr-00420-JRS-3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 2017). We deny Bernard’s motion for an enlargement of time to appeal as moot and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this *224court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
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.
November 5, 2014 

manatt 

inanatt I phelps I phillips 

0001‘

., 

A 71, 

VP0

000.1 

362528 S James G. Votaw 

Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP 

Direct Dial: (202) 585-6610 

E-mail: JVotaw@manatt.com 

RECEIVED 

OPPT CBIC 

2014 NOV. 06 AM 11:37 

CBIC Control Number 

p. 1 

** SANITIZED VERSION** 

Document Control Office (7407M) 

Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics 

U.S. Invironmental Protection Agency 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20460-0001 

Re: Docket No. EPA-HQ-OPPT-2014-0390 

Notice of Intent to Submit Adverse Comments 

Ladies and Gentlemen: 

Please accept this letter as notice of intent to submit adverse comments on the direct final 

rule issued with respect to 40 CFR 10776 at 79 FR 63,837 col. 2 (Oct. 27, 2014). [ 

In light of this notice, I understand the Agency now will withdraw the direct final rule 

applicable to 40 CFR 10776 and issue a proposed rule for public comment. 

202870770.1 

700 12th Street, N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, District of Columbia 20005 Telephone: 202.585.6500 Fax: 202.585.6600 

Albany I Los Angeles I New York I Orange County I Palo Alto I Sacramento I San Francisco I Washington, D.C.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of : No. 121 DB 2023 (No. 72 RST 2023)

:

REBECCA CHRISTINE SHAEFFER : Attorney Registration No. 315712

:

PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT :

FROM ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION : (Out of State)

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2

nd day of November, 2023, the Report and Recommendation of 

Disciplinary Board Member dated October 25, 2023, is approved and it is ORDERED that 

REBECCA CHRISTINE SHAEFFER, who has been on Administrative Suspension, has 

demonstrated that she has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law 

required for admission to practice in the Commonwealth, shall be and is, hereby 

reinstated to active status as a member of the Bar of this Commonwealth. The expenses 

incurred by the Board in the investigation and processing of this matter shall be paid by 

the Petitioner.