alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT32.1**

** **

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANTTO**

**SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

** **

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Elixir Gaming Technologies,Inc. (formerly known as VendingData Corporation) (the “Company”) on Form10-QSB/A for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we,Gordon Yuen, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and David R.Reberger, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

1.                                       The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

2.                                       The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.
| By:    | /s/  Gordon Yuen                                                 |   | Dated:  November 12, 2007 |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
|   | Gordon  Yuen                                                     |   |                      |
| Title: | President, Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive  Officer) |   |                      |
|   |                                                             |   |                      |
| By:    | /s/  David R. Reberger                                           |   | Dated:  November 12, 2007 |
|   | David R. Reberger                                                |   |                      |
| Title: | Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)            |   |                      |

 

This certification is made solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for anyother purpose.

** **

** **

** **

----

** **

** **
#### Kristy CUNNINGHAM Plaintiff-Appellant v. Leona BATES, in her Individual Capacity; Dennis Smith, in his Individual Capacity; David Kennedy, in his Individual Capacity; Daniel R. Bullock, in his Individual Capacity; Spring Henson Gray, in her Individual Capacity; Donald Duncan, in his Individual Capacity; Rick Baker, in his Individual Capacity; The City of Farmington, Missouri; St. Francois County, Missouri Defendants-Appellees Police Officer John Doe, City of Farmington Police Officer Defendant

No. 17-1523

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 18, 2017

Filed: October 30, 2017

David M. Duree, David M. Duree *&*Associates, O’Fallon, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Clinton B. Roberts, Roberts & Roberts, Farmington, MO, for Defendant-Appellee Leona Bates

Rachel A. Bates, King & Krehbiel, Saint Louis, MO, Mark Zoole, Mark H. Zoole, P.C., Saint Louis, MO, for Defendants-*589Appellees Dennis Smith, David Kennedy, Daniel R. Bullock, Spring Henson Gray, Donald Duncan, Rick Baker, The City of Farmington, Missouri, St. Francois County, Missouri, Police Officer John Doe

Before WOLLMAN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Kristy Cunningham appeals after the district court1 adversely granted judgment on the pleadings, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Upon *de novo*review, *see Montin v. Moore,*846 F.3d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 2017) (reviewing *de novo*a grant of a Rule 12(c) motion), we conclude that the district court properly determined that Cunningham’s claims for damages were barred under *Heck v. Humphrey,*512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (stating that if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated). Accordingly, we affirm. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the ' Eastern District of Missouri.
#### Seth Wakeman et al., Respondents, *v.*George Brisbane, Appellant.

(Argued October 3, 1871;

decided January term, 1872.)

Decided upon the facts in the case.

*679
      *A. N. Weller*for the appellant.

*Seth Wakemcm*for the respondents.

Gray, C., reads for affirmance.

All concur. Judgment affirmed,, with costs.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6398 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6398

To increase the asset thresholds at which financial institutions become 
        subject to certain requirements, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 14, 2023

   Mr. Barr introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To increase the asset thresholds at which financial institutions become 
        subject to certain requirements, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Financial Institution Regulatory 
Tailoring Enhancement Act''.

SEC. 2. INCREASED ASSET THRESHOLDS.

    (a) Bureau Supervision.--Section 1025(a) of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5515) is amended by striking 
``$10,000,000,000'' each place it occurs and inserting 
``$50,000,000,000''.
    (b) Durbin Amendment Requirements.--Section 921(a)(6) of the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. 1693o-2(a)(6)) is amended by 
striking ``$10,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$50,000,000,000''.
    (c) Volker Rule Requirements.--Section 13(h)(1)(B)(i) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(1)(B)(i)) is amended by 
striking ``$10,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$50,000,000,000''.
    (d) Qualified Mortgage Requirements.--Section 129C(b)(F)(i) of the 
Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(F)(i)) is amended by striking 
``$10,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$50,000,000,000''.
    (e) Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Requirements.--Section 
201(a)(3)(A) of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer 
Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5371 note (a)(3)(A)) is amended by striking 
``$10,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$50,000,000,000''.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 99.01

                  SCHEDULE II-VALUATION AND QUALIFYING ACCOUNTS

                  YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2002, 2001, AND 2000

                                 (IN THOUSANDS)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                       BALANCE AT         CHARGED TO COSTS                      WRITE-OFFS NET     BALANCE AT END
                                    BEGINNING OF YEAR       AND EXPENSES         OTHER          OF  RECOVERIES        OF YEAR
                                    -----------------     ----------------     ---------        --------------     --------------
<S>                        <C>      <C>                   <C>                  <C>              <C>                <C>
ALLOWANCE FOR
DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS          2002     $          24,225     $          5,115     $      --        $       18,642     $       10,698
                           2001                 4,477               29,990         3,913 (1)            14,155             24,225
                           2000                 1,627                3,035           789 (1)               974              4,477

VALUATION ALLOWANCE FOR
DEFERRED TAX ASSETS

                           2002     $         323,619     $        (28,137)    $ 53,311 (1)(2)   $          --     $      348,793
                           2001                74,611              294,944      (45,936)(1)(2)              --            323,619
                           2000                16,570               42,261       15,780 (1)(2)              --             74,611
</TABLE>


----------
(1)  Balances acquired from acquisitions.

(2)  Balances will be credited to equity upon reduction of valuation allowances.
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**iDNA,
      INC.**


**CERTIFICATION
      OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934**


**AND
      18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





I,
      Robert
      V. Cuddihy, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of iDNA, Inc., a Delaware corporation
      (the “Registrant”), in connection with the Registrant’s Quarterly Report on Form
      10-Q for the period ended October 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), do hereby represent,
      warrant and certify, in compliance with Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
      knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Registrant.








/s/
                Robert V. Cuddihy, Jr.Name:
                Robert V. Cuddihy, Jr.Title:
                Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer(principal
                accounting and financial officer)Date:
            December
                14, 2007






A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to iDNA, Inc. and will be retained by iDNA,
      Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.
EX-10.19





 Exhibit 10.19 

FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 TO THE

 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP MASTER RETIREMENT PLAN 

January 1, 2015 Restatement 

WHEREAS, Fifth Third Bank (“Fifth Third”) sponsors and maintains the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Retirement Plan, as amended
and restated effective January 1, 2015, and as subsequently amended (“Plan”); 
 WHEREAS, Fifth Third desires to amend
the Plan to make a technical clarification to the Code section 436 restrictions; 
 WHEREAS, pursuant to Plan section 13.1(a), Fifth
Third reserved the right to amend the Plan at any time; and 
 WHEREAS, pursuant to Plan section 13.1(b), Fifth Third delegated
authority to the Fifth Third Bank Pension, 401(k) and Medical Plan Committee and its Chairman to amend the Plan. 
 NOW, THEREFORE,
effective as of January 1, 2018, the Plan is hereby amended in the following respects: 
 1.    Section 3 of
Appendix XX of the Plan is amended in its entirety to read as follows: 
 “3. Limitations Applicable If the Plan
Sponsor Is In Bankruptcy. Notwithstanding any other provisions of the plan, a participant or beneficiary is not permitted to elect, and the plan shall not pay, a single sum payment or other optional form of benefit that includes a prohibited
payment with an annuity starting date that occurs during any period in which the plan sponsor is a debtor in a case under title 11, United States Code, or similar Federal or State law, except for payments made within a plan year with an annuity
starting date that occurs on or after the date on which the plan’s enrolled actuary certifies that the plan’s adjusted funding target attainment percentage (determined by not taking into account any adjustment of segment rates under §
430(h)(2)(C)(iv) of the Internal Revenue Code) for that plan year is not less than 100 percent. In addition, during such period in which the plan sponsor is a debtor, the plan shall not make any payment for the purchase of an irrevocable
commitment from an insurer to pay benefits or any other payment or transfer that is a prohibited payment, except for payments that occur on a date within a plan year that is on or after the date on which the plan’s enrolled actuary certifies
that the plan’s adjusted funding target attainment percentage for that plan year is not less than 100 percent. The limitation set forth in this Section 3 does not apply to any payment of a benefit which under § 411(a)(11) of the
Internal Revenue Code may be immediately distributed without the consent of the participant.” 












 2.    Except as otherwise amended herein, the Plan shall continue in
full force and effect. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Fifth Third has caused this amendment to be executed by its duly authorized representative
this 20th day of December, 2018. 
  

			
	FIFTH THIRD BANK
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Robert P. Shaffer

		 	Chairperson for the Fifth Third Bank
		 	Pension, 401(k) and Medical Plan
		 	Committee



  
 -2-
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Misael TELLEZ-SOLORZANO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-10208 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Date Filed: 12/21/2016

Leigha Amy Simonton, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Offiee, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Christopher Allen Curtis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, Lauren Anita Woods, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Misael Tellez-Solorzano appeals the 78-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues that, because he was originally sentenced to deferred adjudication for his 2006 Texas kidnapping offense, he does not have a prior aggravated felony conviction and was, therefore, improperly sentenced under § 1326(b)(2). He also argues that, because the indictment failed to charge a prior conviction, his sentence violates the statutory maximum sentence allowed by § 1326(a). He correctly concedes that this argument is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 239, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), but he raises it to preserve it for further review.

Because Tellez-Solorzano did not object in the district court to the use of his 2006 kidnapping conviction as a basis for applying § 1326(b)(2), review is for plain error. *See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago,*564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009). Tellez-Solorzano must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and affects his substantial rights. *See Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). If he makes such a showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error, but only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” *Id.*(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

*940A term of deferred adjudication probation in Texas does not count as a term of imprisonment for purposes of § 1326(b)(2). *Mondragon-Santiago,*564 F.3d at 368-69. Unlike in *Mondragon-Santiago,*however, Tellez-Solorzano’s deferred adjudication was revoked, and, by the time of Tellez-Solorzano’s 2013 removal, he had been adjudicated guilty of- kidnapping and sentenced to a three-year prison term. Therefore, the district court did not commit error, plain or otherwise, by sentencing him under § 1326(b)(2). *See United States v. Gracia-Cantu,*302 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that' this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-26-1998             SEP-27-1997
<CASH>                                               0                       0
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   35,242                  34,097
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,747                   1,865
<INVENTORY>                                     41,334                  35,731
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                77,623                  71,133
<PP&E>                                          71,983                  69,054
<DEPRECIATION>                                  35,154                  31,724
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 137,725                 132,622
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           23,431                  23,148
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                           111                      57
<OTHER-SE>                                      97,328                  86,478
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   137,725                 132,622
<SALES>                                        174,639                 166,364
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               174,639                 166,364
<CGS>                                          130,541                 124,856
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  154,167                 147,867
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 556                     988
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 19,916                  17,509
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,947                   7,004
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             11,969                  10,505
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                    11,969                  10,505
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.07                     .92<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.03                     .89<F1>
<FN>
<F1>The earnings per share amounts have been restated to comply with Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 128, "Earnings per Share."
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6520 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6520

 To exclude individuals who are not citizens of the United States from 
     the number of persons used to determine the apportionment of 
           Representatives and the number of electoral votes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 30, 2023

  Mr. Edwards (for himself, Mr. Duncan, Mr. Van Drew, Mr. Nehls, Mr. 
Moore of Alabama, Mr. Palmer, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Jackson of Texas, Mr. 
Weber of Texas, and Mr. Rose) introduced the following bill; which was 
       referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To exclude individuals who are not citizens of the United States from 
     the number of persons used to determine the apportionment of 
           Representatives and the number of electoral votes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Representation Without Legal 
Immigration Act''.

SEC. 2. EXCLUSION OF NONCITIZENS FROM NUMBER OF PERSONS USED TO 
              DETERMINE APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES AND NUMBER OF 
              ELECTORAL VOTES.

    (a) Exclusion.--Section 22(a) of the Act entitled ``An Act to 
provide for the fifteenth and subsequent decennial censuses and to 
provide for an apportionment of Representatives in Congress'', approved 
June 18, 1929 (2 U.S.C. 2a(a)), is amended by striking ``not taxed'' 
and inserting ``not taxed and individuals who are not citizens of the 
United States''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to the apportionment of Representatives carried out 
pursuant to the decennial census conducted during 2030 and any 
succeeding decennial census.
                                 <all>
```
#### Dillow v. Wilson, Judge.

Intoxicating Liquors: injunction: contempt: evidence.

*Appeal from Crestón Superior Court.*

Saturday, October 22, 1887.

On the 18th day of June, 1886, the defendant was, by the decree of the court below, enjoined and perpetually restrained from engaging in the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors. On the 23d day of December, 1886, he was adjudged by said court to be in contempt for having violated said injunction, and a fine of $500 was assessed against him. An. application was made to this court, and a writ of certiorari was issued, to review the said contempt proceedings.

*Higbee <& Hanna,*for plaintiff.

Ho appearance for defendant.

Rothrock, J.

The sole ground on which the plaintiff claims a reversal of the judgment against him is that the evidence did not warrant the finding that he had violated the injunction. We have carefully examined the testimony of all the witnesses in the case, and our conclusion is that the judgment of the superior court is correct. Affirmed.