alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Phillip Dewayne WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-10359 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 27, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Phillip Dewayne Williams, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

*422PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Phillip Dewayne Williams has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Williams has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### SUPERIOR COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Appellant v. VOLTSTAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Appellee

2016-1204

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

February 13, 2017

Sid Leach, Snell *&*Wilmer, LLP, Phoenix, AZ, argued for appellant.

Jerold I. Schneider, Schneider Roth-man IP Law Group, Boca Raton, FL, argued for appellee. Also represented by Joel B. Rothman.

(Wallach, Hughes, and Stoll, Circuit Judges).

*1015JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
<PAGE>
                                  EXHIBIT 32.2
                   Certification of Periodic Financial Report
                       Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of M~Wave, Inc.
(the "Company") certifies that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the
Company for the quarter ended March 31, 2004 fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
information contained in that Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Dated: May 14, 2004                         /s/ Joseph A. Turek
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Joseph A. Turek
                                            Chief Executive Officer

                                            /s/ Jim Mayer
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Jim Mayer
                                            Chief Financial Officer


This certification is made solely for purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject
to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.


                                       29
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Guadalupe DELGADO-HERNANDEZ, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-41690 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 21, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Guadalupe Delgado-Hernandez, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Guadalupe Delgado-Hernandez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Delgado-Hernandez has not filed a response.

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the appeal is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R, 47.5.4.
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46489

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TIMOTHY WILLIAM SNOW,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Filed: June 14, 2019

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Canyon County. Hon. Bradly S. Ford, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of thirteen years, with a minimum 

period of confinement of one and one-half years, for sexual abuse of a child under 

sixteen, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; LORELLO, Judge;

and BRAILSFORD, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM 

Timothy William Snow pled guilty to sexual abuse of a child under sixteen. I.C. § 18-

1506. In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The district court 

sentenced Snow to a unified term of thirteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of 

one and one-half years. Snow appeals, arguing that his sentence is excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
2

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Snow’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 
COTELLIGENT GROUP, INC. CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE QUARTER ENDED
JUNE 30, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
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<S>                             <C>
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<CASH>                                           589
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   44296
<SALES>                                        46333
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               46333
<CGS>                                          32712
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  10605
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   4
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               104
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 2908
<INCOME-TAX>                                    1134
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             1774
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                    1774
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      0.18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      0
        


</TABLE>
#### Rufus Julius Cornelius ANDERSON, a/k/a Rufus Julius C. Anderson, a/k/a Rufus J. Anderson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREENVILLE HEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1062

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

*282Rufus J. C. Anderson, Appellant Pro Se. David Lee Harris, Jr., Michael Montgomery Shetterly, OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, PC, Green-ville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Rufus Julius Cornelius Anderson appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss his employment discrimination action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny Anderson’s motion for an order of protection or restraining order, deny his motion for a subpoena, grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Anderson v. Greenville Health Sys.,*No. 6:16-cv-01051-MGL, 2016 WL 6405751 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Mark SCHEFFER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 74-2101

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 15, 1975.

Opinion Withdrawn March 27, 1975.

Daniel Mark Scheffer, pro se.

Anthony J. P. Farris, U. S. Atty., Edward B. McDonough, Jr., James R. Gough, Asst. U. S. Attys., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before WISDOM, GOLDBERG and GEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 Rule 18, 5 Cir.; *see*Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

PER CURIAM!:

Appellant Scheffer was convicted by a jury on charges related to the illegal importation of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174, and was sentenced to three concurrent eight-year terms. That conviction was reversed by this Court for reasons involving the warrantless search of appellant’s home. United States v. Scheffer, 5 Cir. 1972, 463 F.2d 567. Scheffer was re-tried, convicted again and the same sentence was imposed. Appellant unsuccessfully appealed this second conviction, United States v. Collins, 5 Cir. 1973, 478 F.2d 837, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1010, 94 S.Ct. 373, 38 L.Ed.2d 248, and then moved the district court for a reduction of his sentence. The motion was denied; Scheffer appeals.

We cannot say either that the sentence was illegal or that the district judge abused his discretion in refusing to reduce appellant’s sentence. United States v. Johnson, 5 Cir. 1973, 476 F.2d 1251, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 852, 94 S.Ct. 146, 38 L.Ed.2d 101. The record shows, *923however, that Scheffer was nineteen years old at the time of his offense and thus was eligible for sentencing pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act. 18 U.S.C. § 5010. The district court order denying appellant’s motion for reduction of sentence offers no indication that the court considered the propriety of sentencing Scheffer under the Act, even though Scheffer submitted several affidavits which raised the issue. We therefore vacate appellant’s sentence and remand the case to district court for an express determination of whether Scheffer would benefit from treatment under the provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act. Dorszynski v. United States, 1974, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855; United States v. Usher, 5 Cir. 1974, 500 F.2d 388.

Vacated and remanded.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM:

The original opinion in this ease, 506 F.2d 922, is withdrawn and the appeal is dismissed as moot.

Dismissed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30042 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. KEN A BARDELL Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:07-CR-218-1
Before SMITH, STEWART and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Ken A. Bardell appeals his sentence of 57 months of imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea c onviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He argues that the district court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight. Bardell contends that his conduct, throwing a loaded gun behind a bar where people were standing, did not warrant the enhancement. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D September 30, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 08-30042

2 We review the district court’s determination that a defendant’s conduct constituted reckless endangerment under § 3C1.2 for clear error. Se e United Statesv. Lugman, 130 F.3d 113, 115-16 (5th Cir. 1997). Section 3C1.2 provides for a two-level increase in a defendant’s offense level if he “recklessly created a substantial risk ofdeath or serious bodily injury toanother person in the course offleeing from a lawenforcement officer.” Reckless refers to a situation in which the defendant “was aware ofthe risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation.” § 2A1.4, comment. (n.1) (cross-referenced in § 3C1.2, comment. (n.2).). Theapplicability of§ 3C1.2 is not limited “tosituations resulting in actual harm or manifesting extremely dangerous conduct by a defendant.” U nited States v. Jimenez, 323 F. 3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2003); s ee also United States v. Villanueva, 69 F. App’x 657 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.2 was proper where the defendant threw a bag containing methamphetamine onto a public sidewalk while fleeing from police because anyone, including a child, could have picked up the methamphetamine and ingested it). Bardell has not shown that the district court’s imposition of the § 3C1.2 enhancement was clearly erroneous. AFFIRMED.
EX-10.4



 Exhibit 10.4 
 SECOND AMENDMENT 
 TO 

EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE EQUITY PLAN 

THIS AMENDMENT is made this 13th day of March, 2012, by Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. (the “Company”). 

WITNESSETH: 
 WHEREAS, the Company,
with the approval of the Company’s Board of Directors (“Board”) on March 13, 2012, but contingent upon receiving approval of the Company’s shareholders at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders held on May 8, 2012, and the
approval of the Company’s shareholders on May 8, 2012, adopted the Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. 2012 Executive Management Performance Incentive Plan (the “2012 Plan”); and 

WHEREAS, it is the desire of the Company and the Board to discontinue the issuance of any new awards under the Executive Management Performance
Incentive Plan effective as of January 1, 2007, as amended (the “Plan”), as shareholder approval of the 2012 Plan has been obtained; 
 WHEREAS, the Board has the power to amend or discontinue the Plan pursuant to Section 12 thereof; 

NOW, THEREFORE, effective as of May 8, 2012, the Board hereby amends the Plan as follows: 

(1)    Section 12 to the Plan is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: 

“Pursuant to the foregoing authority, this Plan shall terminate on May 8, 2012; provided, however, all Awards outstanding on such date
shall continue in full force and effect in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Awards and the provisions of the Plan in effect immediately prior to such date of termination.” 

(2)    Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the respective meanings ascribed thereto in the Plan.

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be executed as the date first written above. 

 

			
	CLIFFS NATURAL RESOURCES INC.
		
	BY:	 	/s/    James Michaud
		 	 James Michaud
 Senior Vice President, Human
Resources
#### Le’Eldred PALM, I, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GO DADDY.COM, INC.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15919

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*962Submitted November 16, 2016 *

Filed November 22, 2016

Le’Eldred Palm, I, Pro Se, Lakewood, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Aaron M. McKown, Cozen O’Connor, Miami, FL, Paula Lynn Zecchini, Wrenn Bender LLLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Go Daddy.com, Inc.

Oliver Grady Query, Query Sautter For-sythe, LLC, Charleston, SC, for Defendant-Appellee Richard Sinnott, Mr.

Before: LEAVY, SILVERMAN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Le’Eldred Palm, I, appeals pro se from the district court’s orders denying his motions for reconsideration in his action alleging violations of the Sherman Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

The filing of the second and third motions to reconsider did not toll the time to appeal the underlying dismissal or the first motion to reconsider. *See Swimmer v. IRS,*811 F.2d 1343, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1987), *abrogated on other grounds by Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino,*116 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, we do not consider Palm’s contentions regarding the merits of the district court’s order dismissing his action, or the district court’s order denying his first motion for reconsideration, because Palm failed to timely file a notice of appeal. *See*Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of judgment); *Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc.,*476 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A timely notice of appeal is a non-waivable jurisdictional requirement.”); *Swimmer,*811 F.2d at 1344-45.

In his opening brief, Palm fails to challenge the district court’s orders denying his second and third motions to reconsider the dismissal of his underlying action, and he has therefore waived any such challenge. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *see also Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant.... ”).

We reject as unsupported by the record Palm’s contentions that the district court demonstrated prejudice against him or denied him due process.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The
undersigned, Edward Braniff, Acting Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer, of Smart Energy Solutions, Inc. (the “Company”) certifies, under the
standards set forth and solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of
our knowledge, the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended
December 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that Form
10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and  results  of operations of the Company.





Dated:  April
13, 2009





/s/ Edward BraniffEdward
      BraniffActing
      Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer(Principal
      Executive & Financial
Officer)





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. James Allen CRIPPEN Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-3735

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 26, 2017

Filed: June 30, 2017

Abram McGull, II, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Springfield, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellee

James Allen Crippen, Pro Se

Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

After the district court1 denied his motion to suppress evidence, James Allen Crippen pleaded guilty to child-pornography offenses and was sentenced below the advisory Guidelines range. On appeal, Crippen’s counsel has moved to withdraw, *304and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), challenging the denial of the suppression motion. Crippen’s unconditional guilty plea, however, forecloses our review of the suppression ruling. See United States v. Christenson, 653 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2011). Further, having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfriv-olous issues for appeal.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 1⁄86 district court, and we grant counsel’s moti0n to withdraw,

1

. The Honorable M. Douglas Haipool, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.