# Gazzetta ufficiale C 347/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0944
  doi:10.3000/19770944.C_2013.347.ita |
| --- | --- |
| Gazzetta ufficiale
  dell'Unione europea | C 347 |
| | |
| Edizione in lingua italiana | Comunicazioni e informazioni | 56o anno28 novembre 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0944

doi:10.3000/19770944.C_2013.347.ita

Gazzetta ufficiale

dell'Unione europea

C 347

Edizione in lingua italiana

Comunicazioni e informazioni

56o anno28 novembre 2013

---

| Numero d'informazione | Sommario | pagina |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicazioni |
| | COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2013/C 347/01 | Autorizzazione degli aiuti di Stato sulla base degli articoli 107 e 108 TFUE — Casi contro i quali la Commissione non solleva obiezioni (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2013/C 347/02 | Comunicazione dalla Commissione relativa alla direttiva 2003/122/Euratom del Consiglio sul controllo delle sorgenti radioattive sigillate ad alta attività e delle sorgenti orfane e al regolamento (Euratom) n. 1493/93 del Consiglio sulle spedizioni di sostanze radioattive tra gli Stati membri | 2 |
| 2013/C 347/03 | Non opposizione ad un'operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings) (
  1
  ) | 3 |

Numero d'informazione

Sommario

pagina

II   Comunicazioni

COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

2013/C 347/01

Autorizzazione degli aiuti di Stato sulla base degli articoli 107 e 108 TFUE — Casi contro i quali la Commissione non solleva obiezioni (
  1
  )

1

1

2013/C 347/02

Comunicazione dalla Commissione relativa alla direttiva 2003/122/Euratom del Consiglio sul controllo delle sorgenti radioattive sigillate ad alta attività e delle sorgenti orfane e al regolamento (Euratom) n. 1493/93 del Consiglio sulle spedizioni di sostanze radioattive tra gli Stati membri

2

2013/C 347/03

Non opposizione ad un'operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings) (
  1
  )

1

3

| | IV   Informazioni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2013/C 347/04 | Tassi di cambio dell'euro | 4 |
| 2013/C 347/05 | Comunicazione della Commissione sui tassi di interesse per il recupero degli aiuti di Stato e di riferimento/attualizzazione in vigore per i 28 Stati membri con decorrenza 1o dicembre 2013[Pubblicato ai sensi dell’articolo 10 del regolamento (CE) n. 794/2004 della Commissione, del 21 aprile 2004 (GU L 140 del 30.4.2004, pag. 1)] | 5 |
| | Corte dei conti |
| 2013/C 347/06 | Relazione speciale n. 10/2013 Politica agricola comune: il sostegno specifico previsto in base all’articolo 68 del regolamento (CE) n. 73/2009 del Consiglio è ben concepito e attuato in modo soddisfacente? | 6 |
| | INFORMAZIONI RELATIVE ALLO SPAZIO ECONOMICO EUROPEO |
| | Autorità di vigilanza EFTA |
| 2013/C 347/07 | Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di non sollevare obiezioni | 7 |
| 2013/C 347/08 | Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di chiudere un caso di aiuto esistente in seguito all'accettazione delle opportune misure da parte di uno Stato EFTA | 8 |
| 2013/C 347/09 | Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di non sollevare obiezioni | 9 |
| 2013/C 347/10 | Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di non sollevare obiezioni | 10 |
| 2013/C 347/11 | Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia, su aiuti di Stato in relazione al finanziamento dell’introduzione di servizi a banda larga nelle aree rurali dell’Islanda | 11 |

IV   Informazioni

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

2013/C 347/04

Tassi di cambio dell'euro

4

2013/C 347/05

Comunicazione della Commissione sui tassi di interesse per il recupero degli aiuti di Stato e di riferimento/attualizzazione in vigore per i 28 Stati membri con decorrenza 1o dicembre 2013[Pubblicato ai sensi dell’articolo 10 del regolamento (CE) n. 794/2004 della Commissione, del 21 aprile 2004 (GU L 140 del 30.4.2004, pag. 1)]

o

[Pubblicato ai sensi dell’articolo 10 del regolamento (CE) n. 794/2004 della Commissione, del 21 aprile 2004 (GU L 140 del 30.4.2004, pag. 1)]

5

Corte dei conti

2013/C 347/06

Relazione speciale n. 10/2013 Politica agricola comune: il sostegno specifico previsto in base all’articolo 68 del regolamento (CE) n. 73/2009 del Consiglio è ben concepito e attuato in modo soddisfacente?

6

INFORMAZIONI RELATIVE ALLO SPAZIO ECONOMICO EUROPEO

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

2013/C 347/07

Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di non sollevare obiezioni

7

2013/C 347/08

Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di chiudere un caso di aiuto esistente in seguito all'accettazione delle opportune misure da parte di uno Stato EFTA

8

2013/C 347/09

Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di non sollevare obiezioni

9

2013/C 347/10

Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di non sollevare obiezioni

10

2013/C 347/11

Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia, su aiuti di Stato in relazione al finanziamento dell’introduzione di servizi a banda larga nelle aree rurali dell’Islanda

11

| | V   Avvisi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMENTI AMMINISTRATIVI |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2013/C 347/12 | Invito a presentare proposte nell'ambito del piano di attuazione dell'impresa comune Celle a combustibile e idrogeno | 31 |
| | PROCEDIMENTI GIURISDIZIONALI |
| | Corte EFTA |
| 2013/C 347/13 | Ricorso presentato il 16 agosto 2013 da Konkurrenten.no AS contro l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA (Causa E-19/13) | 32 |
| | PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2013/C 347/14 | Notifica preventiva di una concentrazione (Caso COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV) — Caso ammissibile alla procedura semplificata (
  1
  ) | 34 |

V   Avvisi

PROCEDIMENTI AMMINISTRATIVI

Commissione europea

2013/C 347/12

Invito a presentare proposte nell'ambito del piano di attuazione dell'impresa comune Celle a combustibile e idrogeno

31

PROCEDIMENTI GIURISDIZIONALI

Corte EFTA

2013/C 347/13

Ricorso presentato il 16 agosto 2013 da Konkurrenten.no AS contro l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA (Causa E-19/13)

32

PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA

Commissione europea

2013/C 347/14

Notifica preventiva di una concentrazione (Caso COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV) — Caso ammissibile alla procedura semplificata (
  1
  )

1

34

| | Rettifiche |
| --- | --- |
| 2013/C 347/15 | Rettifica dei giorni festivi nel 2013: Stati EFTA/SEE e istituzioni SEE (GU C 42 del 14.2.2013) | 35 |

Rettifiche

2013/C 347/15

Rettifica dei giorni festivi nel 2013: Stati EFTA/SEE e istituzioni SEE (GU C 42 del 14.2.2013)

35

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE |

---

(1)   Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE

1

| IT | |
| --- | --- |

IT

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II Comunicazioni

COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/1

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Autorizzazione degli aiuti di Stato sulla base degli articoli 107 e 108 TFUE

Casi contro i quali la Commissione non solleva obiezioni

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

2013/C 347/01

| Data di adozione della decisione | 22.10.2013 |
| --- | --- |
| Numero di riferimento dell'aiuto di Stato | SA.36775 (13/N) |
| Stato membro | Spagna |
| Regione | Pais Vasco | Zone miste |
| Titolo (e/o nome del beneficiario) | Ayudas a la reestructuración y relanzamiento de empresas en crisis/PYME/BIDERATU |
| Base giuridica | Borrador de Decreto XXX/2013 por el que se establecen ayudas destinadas a la reestructuración y relanzamiento de empresas en crisis |
| Tipo di misura | Regime | — |
| Obiettivo | Ristrutturazione di imprese in difficoltà, PMI |
| Forma dell'aiuto | Sovvenzione rimborsabile |
| Dotazione di bilancio | | Dotazione totale: 18 milioni di EUR |

Data di adozione della decisione

22.10.2013

Numero di riferimento dell'aiuto di Stato

SA.36775 (13/N)

Stato membro

Spagna

Regione

Pais Vasco

Zone miste

Titolo (e/o nome del beneficiario)

Ayudas a la reestructuración y relanzamiento de empresas en crisis/PYME/BIDERATU

Base giuridica

Borrador de Decreto XXX/2013 por el que se establecen ayudas destinadas a la reestructuración y relanzamiento de empresas en crisis

Tipo di misura

Regime

—

Obiettivo

Ristrutturazione di imprese in difficoltà, PMI

Forma dell'aiuto

Sovvenzione rimborsabile

Dotazione di bilancio

Dotazione totale: 18 milioni di EUR

| | Dotazione annuale: 6 milioni di EUR |
| --- | --- |

Dotazione annuale: 6 milioni di EUR

Intensità

50 %

Durata

Fino al 31.12.2015

Settore economico

Attività manifatturiere

Nome e indirizzo dell'autorità che eroga l'aiuto

| Dpto. de Desarrollo Económico y Competitividad Gobierno Vasco |
| --- |
| C/ Donostia-San Sebastián, 1 |
| 01010 Vitoria Gasteiz |
| ESPAÑA |

Dpto. de Desarrollo Económico y Competitividad Gobierno Vasco

C/ Donostia-San Sebastián, 1

01010 Vitoria Gasteiz

ESPAÑA

Altre informazioni

—

Il testo delle decisioni nelle lingue facenti fede, ad eccezione dei dati riservati, è disponibile sul sito:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm

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| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/2

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Comunicazione dalla Commissione relativa alla direttiva 2003/122/Euratom del Consiglio sul controllo delle sorgenti radioattive sigillate ad alta attività e delle sorgenti orfane e al regolamento (Euratom) n. 1493/93 del Consiglio sulle spedizioni di sostanze radioattive tra gli Stati membri

2013/C 347/02

Ai sensi dell'articolo 13 della direttiva 2003/122/Euratom del Consiglio e dell'articolo 8 del regolamento (Euratom) n. 1493/93 del Consiglio, gli Stati membri comunicano alla Commissione il nome e l'indirizzo delle autorità competenti nonché tutte le informazioni necessarie per mettersi rapidamente in contatto con dette autorità.

Gli Stati membri sono inoltre tenuti a trasmettere alla Commissione le eventuali modifiche a tali dati.

La Commissione è tenuta a comunicare tali informazioni, e le eventuali modifiche, a tutte le autorità competenti della Comunità e a pubblicarle nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea.

Di seguito viene indicata l'autorità competente in Croazia e tutte le informazioni necessarie per contattarla rapidamente.

Autorità competente in Croazia di cui alla direttiva 2003/122/Euratom del Consiglio sul controllo delle sorgenti radioattive sigillate ad alta attività e delle sorgenti orfane e al regolamento (Euratom) n. 1493/93 del Consiglio sulle spedizioni di sostanze radioattive tra gli Stati membri

CROAZIA

| Ufficio di Stato per la sicurezza radiologica e nucleare |
| --- |
| Frankopanska 11 |
| HR-10000 Zagreb |
| Tel. +385 14881770 |
| Fax +385 14881780 |
| http://www.dzrns.hr |

Ufficio di Stato per la sicurezza radiologica e nucleare

Frankopanska 11

HR-10000 Zagreb

Tel. +385 14881770

Fax +385 14881780

http://www.dzrns.hr

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| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/3

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Non opposizione ad un'operazione di concentrazione notificata

(Caso COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings)

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

2013/C 347/03

In data 18 novembre 2013 la Commissione ha deciso di non opporsi alla suddetta operazione di concentrazione notificata e di dichiararla compatibile con il mercato comune. La presente decisione si basa sull'articolo 6, paragrafo 1, lettera b) del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio. Il testo integrale della decisione è disponibile unicamente in lingua inglese e verrà reso pubblico dopo che gli eventuali segreti aziendali in esso contenuti saranno stati espunti. Il testo della decisione sarà disponibile:

| — | sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore, |
| --- | --- |

—

sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore,

| — | in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/it/index.htm) con il numero di riferimento 32013M7067. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario. |
| --- | --- |

—

in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/it/index.htm) con il numero di riferimento 32013M7067. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario.

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IV Informazioni

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/4

---

Tassi di cambio dell'euro (1)

27 novembre 2013

2013/C 347/04

1 euro =

| | Moneta | Tasso di cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dollari USA | 1,3596 |
| JPY | yen giapponesi | 138,43 |
| DKK | corone danesi | 7,4586 |
| GBP | sterline inglesi | 0,83405 |
| SEK | corone svedesi | 8,9100 |
| CHF | franchi svizzeri | 1,2305 |
| ISK | corone islandesi | |
| NOK | corone norvegesi | 8,2530 |
| BGN | lev bulgari | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corone ceche | 27,341 |
| HUF | fiorini ungheresi | 299,08 |
| LTL | litas lituani | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats lettoni | 0,7029 |
| PLN | zloty polacchi | 4,2036 |
| RON | leu rumeni | 4,4376 |
| TRY | lire turche | 2,7499 |
| AUD | dollari australiani | 1,4952 |
| CAD | dollari canadesi | 1,4382 |
| HKD | dollari di Hong Kong | 10,5406 |
| NZD | dollari neozelandesi | 1,6638 |
| SGD | dollari di Singapore | 1,7056 |
| KRW | won sudcoreani | 1 447,24 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricani | 13,8377 |
| CNY | renminbi Yuan cinese | 8,2839 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,6433 |
| IDR | rupia indonesiana | 16 038,43 |
| MYR | ringgit malese | 4,3922 |
| PHP | peso filippino | 59,378 |
| RUB | rublo russo | 44,8979 |
| THB | baht thailandese | 43,670 |
| BRL | real brasiliano | 3,1311 |
| MXN | peso messicano | 17,8203 |
| INR | rupia indiana | 84,5060 |

Moneta

Tasso di cambio

USD

dollari USA

1,3596

JPY

yen giapponesi

138,43

DKK

corone danesi

7,4586

GBP

sterline inglesi

0,83405

SEK

corone svedesi

8,9100

CHF

franchi svizzeri

1,2305

ISK

corone islandesi

NOK

corone norvegesi

8,2530

BGN

lev bulgari

1,9558

CZK

corone ceche

27,341

HUF

fiorini ungheresi

299,08

LTL

litas lituani

3,4528

LVL

lats lettoni

0,7029

PLN

zloty polacchi

4,2036

RON

leu rumeni

4,4376

TRY

lire turche

2,7499

AUD

dollari australiani

1,4952

CAD

dollari canadesi

1,4382

HKD

dollari di Hong Kong

10,5406

NZD

dollari neozelandesi

1,6638

SGD

dollari di Singapore

1,7056

KRW

won sudcoreani

1 447,24

ZAR

rand sudafricani

13,8377

CNY

renminbi Yuan cinese

8,2839

HRK

kuna croata

7,6433

IDR

rupia indonesiana

16 038,43

MYR

ringgit malese

4,3922

PHP

peso filippino

59,378

RUB

rublo russo

44,8979

THB

baht thailandese

43,670

BRL

real brasiliano

3,1311

MXN

peso messicano

17,8203

INR

rupia indiana

84,5060

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(1)  Fonte: tassi di cambio di riferimento pubblicati dalla Banca centrale europea.

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| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/5

---

Comunicazione della Commissione sui tassi di interesse per il recupero degli aiuti di Stato e di riferimento/attualizzazione in vigore per i 28 Stati membri con decorrenza 1o dicembre 2013

[Pubblicato ai sensi dell’articolo 10 del regolamento (CE) n. 794/2004 della Commissione, del 21 aprile 2004 (GU L 140 del 30.4.2004, pag. 1)]

2013/C 347/05

Tassi di base calcolati ai sensi della comunicazione della Commissione relativa alla revisione del metodo di fissazione dei tassi di riferimento e di attualizzazione (GU C 14 del 19.1.2008, pag. 6). A seconda dell’uso del tasso di riferimento, vanno ancora aggiunti gli opportuni margini come definiti nella presente comunicazione. Per il tasso di sconto questo comporta l’aggiunta di un margine di 100 punti base. Il regolamento (CE) n. 271/2008 della Commissione, del 30 gennaio 2008, che modifica il regolamento di esecuzione (CE) n. 794/2004, prevede che, se non diversamente stabilito in una decisione specifica, anche il tasso di recupero venga calcolato aggiungendo 100 punti base al tasso di base.

I tassi modificati sono indicati in grassetto.

La tabella precedente è stata pubblicata nella GU C 310 del 25.10.2013, pag. 6.

| Dal | Al | AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU | IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | UK |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1.12.2013 | 31.12.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,10 | 0,56 | 0,75 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 3,83 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,79 | 0,56 | 0,75 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 4,37 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |
| 1.11.2013 | 30.11.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,10 | 0,56 | 0,75 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 3,83 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,79 | 0,56 | 0,91 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 4,37 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |
| 1.10.2013 | 31.10.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,30 | 0,56 | 0,75 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 4,62 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 | 0,56 | 0,91 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 5,20 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |
| 1.8.2013 | 30.9.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,30 | 0,56 | 0,88 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 4,62 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,25 | 0,56 | 0,91 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 5,20 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |
| 1.7.2013 | 31.7.2013 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,30 | 0,56 | 0,88 | 0,56 | 0,85 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 2,49 | 4,62 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 1,08 | 0,56 | 1,10 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 3,18 | 0,56 | 5,20 | 1,60 | 0,56 | 0,56 | 0,99 |

Dal

Al

AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES

FI

FR

HR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

1.12.2013

31.12.2013

0,56

0,56

1,10

0,56

0,75

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

3,83

0,56

0,56

0,79

0,56

0,75

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

4,37

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

1.11.2013

30.11.2013

0,56

0,56

1,10

0,56

0,75

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

3,83

0,56

0,56

0,79

0,56

0,91

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

4,37

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

1.10.2013

31.10.2013

0,56

0,56

1,30

0,56

0,75

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

4,62

0,56

0,56

0,99

0,56

0,91

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

5,20

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

1.8.2013

30.9.2013

0,56

0,56

1,30

0,56

0,88

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

4,62

0,56

0,56

1,25

0,56

0,91

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

5,20

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

1.7.2013

31.7.2013

0,56

0,56

1,30

0,56

0,88

0,56

0,85

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

0,56

2,49

4,62

0,56

0,56

1,08

0,56

1,10

0,56

0,56

3,18

0,56

5,20

1,60

0,56

0,56

0,99

---

Corte dei conti

| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/6

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Relazione speciale n. 10/2013 «Politica agricola comune: il sostegno specifico previsto in base all’articolo 68 del regolamento (CE) n. 73/2009 del Consiglio è ben concepito e attuato in modo soddisfacente?»

2013/C 347/06

La Corte dei conti europea informa che è stata pubblicata la relazione speciale n. 10/2013 «Politica agricola comune: il sostegno specifico previsto in base all’articolo 68 del regolamento (CE) n. 73/2009 del Consiglio è ben concepito e attuato in modo soddisfacente?».

La relazione è disponibile, per essere consultata o scaricata, sul sito Internet della Corte dei conti europea: http://eca.europa.eu

La relazione può anche essere ottenuta in versione cartacea, gratuitamente, facendone richiesta al seguente indirizzo:

| European Court of Auditors |
| --- |
| Unit ‘Audit: Production of Reports’ |
| 12, rue Alcide de Gasperi |
| 1615 Luxembourg |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| Tel. +352 4398-1 |
| E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu |

European Court of Auditors

Unit ‘Audit: Production of Reports’

12, rue Alcide de Gasperi

1615 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1

E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu

oppure compilando un buono d'ordine elettronico su EU-Bookshop.

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INFORMAZIONI RELATIVE ALLO SPAZIO ECONOMICO EUROPEO

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/7

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Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di non sollevare obiezioni

2013/C 347/07

L'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA non solleva obiezioni riguardo alla seguente misura di aiuto di Stato:

| Data di adozione della decisione | : | 11 settembre 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Numero dell'aiuto | : | 74137 |
| Numero della decisione | : | 319/13/COL |
| Stato EFTA | : | Norvegia |
| Titolo (e/o nome del beneficiario) | : | polo d'innovazione NCE Maritime |
| Base giuridica | : | articolo 61, paragrafo 3, lettera c), dell'accordo SEE |
| Tipo di misura | : | aiuti individuali per l'animazione di un polo |
| Obiettivo | : | promozione dell'innovazione |
| Forma dell'aiuto | : | sovvenzione |
| Dotazione di bilancio | : | dotazione globale: 60 milioni di NOK |
| Durata | : | fino al luglio 2016 |
| Settore economico | : | settore marittimo |
| Nome e indirizzo dell'autorità che eroga l'aiuto | : | Innovation Norway |
| PO Box 448 |
| Sentrum, Akersgata 13 |
| 0104 Oslo |
| NORWAY |

Data di adozione della decisione

:

11 settembre 2013

Numero dell'aiuto

:

74137

Numero della decisione

:

319/13/COL

Stato EFTA

:

Norvegia

Titolo (e/o nome del beneficiario)

:

polo d'innovazione NCE Maritime

Base giuridica

:

articolo 61, paragrafo 3, lettera c), dell'accordo SEE

Tipo di misura

:

aiuti individuali per l'animazione di un polo

Obiettivo

:

promozione dell'innovazione

Forma dell'aiuto

:

sovvenzione

Dotazione di bilancio

:

dotazione globale: 60 milioni di NOK

Durata

:

fino al luglio 2016

Settore economico

:

settore marittimo

Nome e indirizzo dell'autorità che eroga l'aiuto

:

Innovation Norway

PO Box 448

Sentrum, Akersgata 13

0104 Oslo

NORWAY

Il testo della decisione facente fede, ad eccezione dei dati riservati, è disponibile sul sito dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/8

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Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di chiudere un caso di aiuto esistente in seguito all'accettazione delle opportune misure da parte di uno Stato EFTA

2013/C 347/08

L'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha proposto opportune misure, che sono state accolte dall'Islanda, in merito alla seguente misura di aiuto:

| Data di adozione della decisione | : | 11 settembre 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Numero dell'aiuto | : | 70476 |
| Numero della decisione | : | 318/13/COL |
| Stato EFTA | : | Islanda |
| Titolo | : | Finanziamento del servizio nazionale islandese di radiodiffusione Ríkisútvarpið (RÚV) |
| Base giuridica | : | Legge n. 23/2013 sul servizio pubblico di radiodiffusione islandese, legge n. 38/2011 sui mezzi di comunicazione e legge n. 90/2003 sull'imposta dei redditi |
| Obiettivo | : | n.p. |
| Forma dell'aiuto | : | Pagamenti diretti del Tesoro per finanziare il servizio pubblico di radiodiffusione |
| Settore economico | : | Radiodiffusione |
| Altre informazioni | : | L'Autorità ha concluso che le modifiche al quadro legislativo e normativo della RÚV soddisfano le opportune misure proposte dall'Autorità nella decisione n. 38/11/COL e rendono il finanziamento della RÚV compatibile con il funzionamento dell'accordo SEE. Di conseguenza, non essendovi motivo di dare ulteriore seguito alla questione, l'Autorità ha deciso di chiudere il caso |

Data di adozione della decisione

:

11 settembre 2013

Numero dell'aiuto

:

70476

Numero della decisione

:

318/13/COL

Stato EFTA

:

Islanda

Titolo

:

Finanziamento del servizio nazionale islandese di radiodiffusione Ríkisútvarpið (RÚV)

Base giuridica

:

Legge n. 23/2013 sul servizio pubblico di radiodiffusione islandese, legge n. 38/2011 sui mezzi di comunicazione e legge n. 90/2003 sull'imposta dei redditi

Obiettivo

:

n.p.

Forma dell'aiuto

:

Pagamenti diretti del Tesoro per finanziare il servizio pubblico di radiodiffusione

Settore economico

:

Radiodiffusione

Altre informazioni

:

L'Autorità ha concluso che le modifiche al quadro legislativo e normativo della RÚV soddisfano le opportune misure proposte dall'Autorità nella decisione n. 38/11/COL e rendono il finanziamento della RÚV compatibile con il funzionamento dell'accordo SEE. Di conseguenza, non essendovi motivo di dare ulteriore seguito alla questione, l'Autorità ha deciso di chiudere il caso

Il testo della decisione facente fede, ad eccezione dei dati riservati, è disponibile sul sito dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/9

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Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di non sollevare obiezioni

2013/C 347/09

L'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA non solleva obiezioni riguardo alla seguente misura di aiuto di Stato:

| Data di adozione della decisione | : | 25 settembre 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Numero dell'aiuto | : | 74289 |
| Numero della decisione | : | 355/13/COL |
| Stato EFTA | : | Norvegia |
| Tipo di misura | : | Regime di aiuto notificato dalla Norvegia per la compensazione dei costi delle emissioni indirette, valutato ai sensi dell'articolo 61, paragrafo 3, lettera c), dell'accordo SEE |
| Obiettivo | : | Tutela ambientale |
| Forma dell'aiuto | : | Sovvenzione |
| Dotazione di bilancio | : | Circa 2 840 milioni di NOK tra il 2013 e il 2020 |
| Settore economico | : | Diverse industrie ad alto consumo di energia |
| Nome e indirizzo dell'autorità che concede l'aiuto | : | Norwegian Environment Agency |
| PO Box 5672 Sluppen |
| 7485 Trondheim |
| NORWAY |

Data di adozione della decisione

:

25 settembre 2013

Numero dell'aiuto

:

74289

Numero della decisione

:

355/13/COL

Stato EFTA

:

Norvegia

Tipo di misura

:

Regime di aiuto notificato dalla Norvegia per la compensazione dei costi delle emissioni indirette, valutato ai sensi dell'articolo 61, paragrafo 3, lettera c), dell'accordo SEE

Obiettivo

:

Tutela ambientale

Forma dell'aiuto

:

Sovvenzione

Dotazione di bilancio

:

Circa 2 840 milioni di NOK tra il 2013 e il 2020

Settore economico

:

Diverse industrie ad alto consumo di energia

Nome e indirizzo dell'autorità che concede l'aiuto

:

Norwegian Environment Agency

PO Box 5672 Sluppen

7485 Trondheim

NORWAY

Il testo della decisione facente fede, ad eccezione dei dati riservati, è disponibile sul sito dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/10

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Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di non sollevare obiezioni

2013/C 347/10

L'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA non solleva obiezioni riguardo alla seguente misura di aiuto di Stato:

| Data di adozione della decisione | : | 11 settembre 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Numero dell'aiuto | : | 74138 |
| Numero della decisione | : | 320/13/COL |
| Stato EFTA | : | Norvegia |
| Titolo (e/o nome del beneficiario) | : | NCE Systems Engineering Innovation Cluster |
| Base giuridica | : | Articolo 61, paragrafo 3), lettera c), dell'accordo EFTA |
| Tipo di misura | : | Aiuti individuali per l'animazione dei poli |
| Obiettivo | : | Promozione dell'innovazione |
| Forma dell'aiuto | : | Sovvenzioni |
| Dotazione di bilancio | : | Bilancio complessivo: 50 milioni di NOK |
| Durata | : | Fino a luglio 2016 |
| Settori economici | : | Sottomarino, marittimo, automobilistico, aereo, della difesa e aerospaziale |
| Nome e indirizzo dell'autorità che eroga l'aiuto | : | Innovation Norway |
| PO Box 448, Sentrum |
| Akersgata 13 |
| 0104 Oslo |
| NORWAY |

Data di adozione della decisione

:

11 settembre 2013

Numero dell'aiuto

:

74138

Numero della decisione

:

320/13/COL

Stato EFTA

:

Norvegia

Titolo (e/o nome del beneficiario)

:

NCE Systems Engineering Innovation Cluster

Base giuridica

:

Articolo 61, paragrafo 3), lettera c), dell'accordo EFTA

Tipo di misura

:

Aiuti individuali per l'animazione dei poli

Obiettivo

:

Promozione dell'innovazione

Forma dell'aiuto

:

Sovvenzioni

Dotazione di bilancio

:

Bilancio complessivo: 50 milioni di NOK

Durata

:

Fino a luglio 2016

Settori economici

:

Sottomarino, marittimo, automobilistico, aereo, della difesa e aerospaziale

Nome e indirizzo dell'autorità che eroga l'aiuto

:

Innovation Norway

PO Box 448, Sentrum

Akersgata 13

0104 Oslo

NORWAY

Il testo della decisione facente fede, ad eccezione dei dati riservati, è disponibile sul sito dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/11

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Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia, su aiuti di Stato in relazione al finanziamento dell’introduzione di servizi a banda larga nelle aree rurali dell’Islanda

2013/C 347/11

Con decisione n. 302/13/COL del 10 luglio 2013, riprodotta nella lingua facente fede nelle pagine che seguono la presente sintesi, l’Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha avviato un procedimento ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia. Copia della decisione è stata inviata per informazione alle autorità islandesi.

Con la presente comunicazione l’Autorità di vigilanza EFTA invita gli Stati EFTA, gli membri dell’UE e le parti interessate a inviare eventuali osservazioni sulla misura in oggetto entro un mese dalla data di pubblicazione, al seguente indirizzo:

| Autorità di vigilanza EFTA |
| --- |
| Registro |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

Registro

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Le osservazioni ricevute saranno comunicate alle autorità islandesi. Su richiesta scritta e motivata degli autori delle osservazioni, la loro identità non sarà rivelata.

SINTESI

Procedura

Nel febbraio 2011, l’Autorità di vigilanza EFTA («l’Autorità») ha ricevuto una denuncia relativa a un presunto aiuto di Stato illegale concesso all’operatore di telecomunicazioni Síminn per l’introduzione di reti a banda larga nelle aree rurali d’Islanda. Successivamente l’Autorità ha inviato due richieste di informazioni alle quali le autorità islandesi hanno risposto. L’Autorità ha ricevuto ulteriori informazioni dal denunciante nel maggio 2012 e nel maggio 2013.

Descrizione della misura

All’inizio del 2007 le autorità islandesi, tramite il Fondo delle telecomunicazioni («il Fondo») (1), hanno effettuato una mappatura e un’analisi della copertura attuale e futura a banda larga nelle aree rurali dell’Islanda. Ciò si è tradotto in una lista di 1 118 edifici nei quali si è ritenuto improbabile che gli operatori privati sarebbero stati in grado di distribuire servizi nel futuro prossimo. Nel febbraio 2008 le autorità islandesi hanno pubblicato un bando per l’introduzione di servizi a banda larga negli edifici individuati. L’offerta di Síminn è stata considerata la più favorevole, e le autorità islandesi hanno avviato dei negoziati con questa società. Successivamente la portata del progetto è stata estesa per includere altri 670 immobili.

L’accordo tra il Fondo e Síminn è stato ultimato nel febbraio 2009. A causa dell’estensione della portata del progetto, la compensazione e il periodo di introduzione sono stati incrementati rispetto all’offerta di Síminn. Inoltre si è applicato un indice ai pagamenti sulla base del tasso di cambio con una valuta straniera, invece che sulla base dell’indice generale dei prezzi del consumo come previsto inizialmente. La rete doveva essere costruita in modo da permettere l’accesso ad altri fornitori di servizi Internet («ISP»). Il progetto era tecnologicamente neutrale e, come è stato poi verificato, il 55 % degli edifici erano connessi tramite UMTS, il 41 % tramite ADSL e il 4 % tramite satellite/Wi-Fi.

Tuttavia, secondo una nota del Fondo, per quanto concerne le connessioni UMTS, Wi-Fi e satellitari esiste solo l’accesso alla rivendita, e non l’accesso all’ingrosso. Il denunciante ha inoltre sollevato obiezioni in merito al grado di accesso alla rete ADSL offerto ad altri ISP.

Osservazioni delle autorità islandesi

Le autorità islandesi non ritengono che i contributi relativi all’accordo con Síminn costituiscano un aiuto di Stato, in primo luogo perché non ricorrono le condizioni di cui all’articolo 61, paragrafo 1, dell’accordo SEE. Inoltre le autorità islandesi sono del parere che il contributo si possa considerare come il finanziamento di un servizio pubblico e che i criteri del «test Altmark» siano soddisfatti. Nel caso in cui l’Autorità ritenga che la misura costituisca un aiuto di Stato, tale aiuto potrebbe considerarsi compatibile con l’articolo 61, paragrafo 3, dell’accordo SEE tenendo conto degli obiettivi della misura, tra cui l’aumento dell’accesso della popolazione a banda larga nelle zone assistite. Inoltre questo tipo di aiuto deve considerarsi come il finanziamento di servizi di interesse economico generale (SIEG), cfr. gli orientamenti dell’Autorità sulle reti a banda larga (2).

Presenza di aiuto di Stato

Vantaggi derivanti da risorse statali concesse a un’impresa

Poiché il Fondo è stato istituito per legge ed è di proprietà dello Stato islandese, dal quale riceve risorse tramite il bilancio annuale dello Stato, la misura risulta finanziata da risorse statali. Inoltre, Síminn è il più grande operatore di telecomunicazioni islandese. Di conseguenza qualsiasi aiuto incluso nell’accordo è stato concesso a un’impresa.

Inoltre, il finanziamento pubblico del progetto ha assicurato a Síminn un vantaggio economico che, in condizioni normali, sarebbe coperto dal bilancio di questa società. Anche se una gara d’appalto tende a ridurre l’entità del sostegno finanziario necessario, si può discutere se la compensazione per i nuovi edifici sia stata stabilita mediante una procedura di gara o se, di fatto, sia stata determinata dopo aver scelto l’offerta di Síminn. Di conseguenza la valutazione preliminare dell’Autorità indica che non si può escludere a priori un vantaggio economico.

Síminn è il solo beneficiario dei fondi statali e pertanto la Commissione ritiene, in via preliminare, che la misura sia selettiva.

Distorsione della concorrenza e incidenza sugli scambi fra le parti contraenti

La partecipazione pubblica all’introduzione di un’infrastruttura per la fornitura di servizi di comunicazione elettronica rafforza la posizione del fornitore selezionato di rete rispetto ai suoi concorrenti. In generale, i mercati dei servizi di comunicazione elettronica sono aperti al commercio e alla concorrenza tra operatori e fornitori di servizi in tutto lo Spazio economico europeo. Pertanto, nel parere preliminare dell’Autorità, la misura è tale da rischiare di falsare la concorrenza e incidere sugli scambi all’interno del SEE.

Finanziamento di un servizio pubblico e test Altmark

La sentenza Altmark stabilisce quattro condizioni fondamentali che una compensazione per servizio pubblico deve soddisfare per non costituire un aiuto di Stato in virtù dell’assenza di qualsiasi vantaggio (3). L’Autorità ritiene in via preliminare che la fornitura di un’adeguata copertura a banda larga in aree di inefficienza del mercato potrebbe qualificarsi come SIEG, e che a Síminn sia stato attribuito un chiaro mandato mediante un contratto. Tuttavia, l’inclusione dei nuovi edifici e le successive modifiche del contratto al termine della procedura d’appalto possono causare problemi in relazione al resto dei criteri Altmark. Di conseguenza l’Autorità non può concludere, per il momento, che i criteri di questa sentenza siano soddisfatti.

Compatibilità dell’aiuto

Ai sensi dell’articolo 61, paragrafo 3, lettera c), dell’accordo SEE «gli aiuti destinati ad agevolare lo sviluppo di talune attività o di talune regioni economiche» possono essere considerati compatibili con il funzionamento dell’accordo SEE, sempre che non alterino le condizioni degli scambi e della concorrenza nel SEE in misura contraria al comune interesse. L’Autorità ha valutato la compatibilità della misura in base a principi di valutazione comparata e ad alcuni principi dei suoi orientamenti sulle reti a banda larga.

L’Autorità ritiene, in via preliminare, che il sostegno all’introduzione di reti a banda larga nelle zone rurali e poco servite dell’Islanda risponda a obiettivi ben definiti di interesse comune, sia uno strumento appropriato per conseguire gli obiettivi fissati e offra un incentivo agli investimenti al fornitore scelto.

Tuttavia, a causa delle numerose modifiche al contratto, la procedura di appalto potrebbe non costituire una gara aperta e non discriminatoria in conformità con gli orientamenti sulle reti a banda larga. L’Autorità si chiede altresì se Síminn sia stata obbligata a consentire un accesso all’ingrosso sufficiente alle parti UMTS e ADSL della rete. L’assenza di un obbligo di accesso all’ingrosso sufficiente potrebbe conferire a Síminn dei vantaggi economici e concorrenziali. Di conseguenza la misura, in base alla valutazione comparata, non sembra in linea con i principi di proporzionalità e limitazione delle distorsioni della concorrenza.

Pertanto, a seguito della valutazione preliminare, l’Autorità esprime dubbi sul fatto che il finanziamento dell’introduzione dei servizi a banda larga nelle aree rurali d’Islanda possa considerarsi compatibile con l’articolo 61, paragrafo 3, lettera c), dell’accordo SEE.

Conclusione

Alla luce delle considerazioni sopra esposte, l’Autorità ha deciso di avviare il procedimento d’indagine formale ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia in relazione al finanziamento dell’introduzione di un servizio a banda larga nelle aree rurali dell’Islanda. Le parti interessate sono invitate a presentare le loro osservazioni entro un mese dalla pubblicazione della presente comunicazione nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea.

A norma dell’articolo 14 del protocollo 3, tutti gli aiuti illegali possono formare oggetto di recupero presso i beneficiari.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 302/13/COL

of 10 July 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential State aid granted to Síminn for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I and Article 4(4) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 2 February 2011 (Event No 585458), Og fjarskipti ehf. (Vodafone Iceland) lodged a complaint with the EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’) concerning alleged unlawful State aid granted to Síminn for the roll-out of broadband networks in rural areas of Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 2 February 2011 (Event No 585458), Og fjarskipti ehf. (Vodafone Iceland) lodged a complaint with the EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’) concerning alleged unlawful State aid granted to Síminn for the roll-out of broadband networks in rural areas of Iceland.

| (2) | By letter dated 1 April 2011 (Event No 590838), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letters dated 28 April 2011 (Event No 596157) and 17 May 2011 (Event No 598419) and e-mail dated 31 May 2011 (Event No 599981), the Icelandic authorities requested extensions to the deadline to reply. By letter dated 22 June 2011 (Event No 601861), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By letter dated 1 April 2011 (Event No 590838), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letters dated 28 April 2011 (Event No 596157) and 17 May 2011 (Event No 598419) and e-mail dated 31 May 2011 (Event No 599981), the Icelandic authorities requested extensions to the deadline to reply. By letter dated 22 June 2011 (Event No 601861), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information.

| (3) | By e-mail dated 2 October 2011 (Event No 614576), the Authority received an inquiry by an interested party containing relevant new information. By letter dated 17 November 2011 (Event No 613338), the Authority acknowledged receipt of the inquiry and informed the interested party that it was free to either provide the Authority with additional information or lodge a formal complaint with the Authority. The Authority received more information from the interested party by e-mails dated 19 November 2011 (Event No 615746 and Event No 615747). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By e-mail dated 2 October 2011 (Event No 614576), the Authority received an inquiry by an interested party containing relevant new information. By letter dated 17 November 2011 (Event No 613338), the Authority acknowledged receipt of the inquiry and informed the interested party that it was free to either provide the Authority with additional information or lodge a formal complaint with the Authority. The Authority received more information from the interested party by e-mails dated 19 November 2011 (Event No 615746 and Event No 615747).

| (4) | By e-mail dated 23 May 2012 (Event No 657203), the Authority received further information from the complainant. By letter dated 8 January 2013 (Event No 657178), the Authority, after assessing the new information provided by the complainant, requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter dated 11 March 2013 (Event No 665601), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

By e-mail dated 23 May 2012 (Event No 657203), the Authority received further information from the complainant. By letter dated 8 January 2013 (Event No 657178), the Authority, after assessing the new information provided by the complainant, requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter dated 11 March 2013 (Event No 665601), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information.

| (5) | Finally, the Authority received further information from the complainant by letter dated 10 May 2013 (Event No 672303). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Finally, the Authority received further information from the complainant by letter dated 10 May 2013 (Event No 672303).

2.   The complaint

| (6) | The complainant, Og fjarskipti ehf. (Vodafone), is a company that is active on the electronic communications market and provides fixed telephony, mobile and data services in Iceland. The complainant is currently the second largest operator in Iceland following the incumbent Skipti hf. and its subsidiaries Síminn and Míla. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The complainant, Og fjarskipti ehf. (Vodafone), is a company that is active on the electronic communications market and provides fixed telephony, mobile and data services in Iceland. The complainant is currently the second largest operator in Iceland following the incumbent Skipti hf. and its subsidiaries Síminn and Míla.

| (7) | According to the complaint, unlawful State aid was granted by the Telecommunications Fund (‘the Fund’) to Síminn through an agreement entered into between the two parties for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland (‘the Agreement’). The complainant maintains that the tender procedure was flawed, since significant changes were effected in the final Agreement between Síminn and the Fund, from the original tender documents published by the State Trading Centre (‘the STC’). The complainant maintains that these changes were at the behest of Síminn and were highly favourable to the company. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

According to the complaint, unlawful State aid was granted by the Telecommunications Fund (‘the Fund’) to Síminn through an agreement entered into between the two parties for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland (‘the Agreement’). The complainant maintains that the tender procedure was flawed, since significant changes were effected in the final Agreement between Síminn and the Fund, from the original tender documents published by the State Trading Centre (‘the STC’). The complainant maintains that these changes were at the behest of Síminn and were highly favourable to the company.

| (8) | According to the complaint, the following fundamental changes were implemented in the final Agreement between the Fund and Síminn. Firstly, the scope of the project was increased significantly to include a total of 1 788 locations instead of the 1 118 locations that were defined in the tender documents. Secondly, the roll-out period was extended from 12 months to 18 months and provisions concerning penalties for breach of the roll-out period were changed significantly. Thirdly, the payment to Síminn was increased from ISK 375 million to ISK 606 million and the indexation of the payment was based on foreign currency indexation instead of the general consumer price index as stipulated in the tender documents. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

According to the complaint, the following fundamental changes were implemented in the final Agreement between the Fund and Síminn. Firstly, the scope of the project was increased significantly to include a total of 1 788 locations instead of the 1 118 locations that were defined in the tender documents. Secondly, the roll-out period was extended from 12 months to 18 months and provisions concerning penalties for breach of the roll-out period were changed significantly. Thirdly, the payment to Síminn was increased from ISK 375 million to ISK 606 million and the indexation of the payment was based on foreign currency indexation instead of the general consumer price index as stipulated in the tender documents.

| (9) | Furthermore, the complainant maintains that the access mandated by the final Agreement was confined to resale access as opposed to the wholesale access originally prescribed in the tender document (4). The complainant claims to have repeatedly requested wholesale access to the network without success (5). According to the complaint, this has led to an unacceptable distortion of competition and has given Síminn a significant first mover advantage on the relevant market. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Furthermore, the complainant maintains that the access mandated by the final Agreement was confined to resale access as opposed to the wholesale access originally prescribed in the tender document (4). The complainant claims to have repeatedly requested wholesale access to the network without success (5). According to the complaint, this has led to an unacceptable distortion of competition and has given Síminn a significant first mover advantage on the relevant market.

| (10) | As regards further grounds of the complaint, the complainant is of the view that all the conditions for the measure to involve State aid under the first paragraph of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. Furthermore, the complainant maintains that the alleged aid measure does not qualify for any of the relevant exemptions and therefore must be considered as being incompatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As regards further grounds of the complaint, the complainant is of the view that all the conditions for the measure to involve State aid under the first paragraph of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. Furthermore, the complainant maintains that the alleged aid measure does not qualify for any of the relevant exemptions and therefore must be considered as being incompatible with the EEA Agreement.

3.   Description of the measure

3.1.   
  Background

3.1.1.   The role of the Telecommunications Fund

| (11) | The Fund was established by Act No 132/2005, and its role, as established by statute, is to promote development in the field of telecommunications in Iceland as described in the official Telecommunications Strategy (‘the Strategy’) approved by Althingi (6). Article 2 of this act states that the Fund is established to oversee the allocation of funds to projects pertaining to the roll-out of electronic communications infrastructure, thus increasing security and competitiveness of the society in the field of electronic communications and other projects entailed in the Strategy, provided that such projects are not likely to be executed on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The Fund was established by Act No 132/2005, and its role, as established by statute, is to promote development in the field of telecommunications in Iceland as described in the official Telecommunications Strategy (‘the Strategy’) approved by Althingi (6). Article 2 of this act states that the Fund is established to oversee the allocation of funds to projects pertaining to the roll-out of electronic communications infrastructure, thus increasing security and competitiveness of the society in the field of electronic communications and other projects entailed in the Strategy, provided that such projects are not likely to be executed on market terms.

| (12) | The Fund is financed by a statutory contribution from the Treasury. The Fund is administered by the Ministry of the Interior, which appoints the members of the Fund’s board for a five-year term. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Fund is financed by a statutory contribution from the Treasury. The Fund is administered by the Ministry of the Interior, which appoints the members of the Fund’s board for a five-year term.

| (13) | The Fund has worked on four key priorities stipulated in the Strategy, of which the roll-out of broadband services was the last one to be implemented. According to the Icelandic authorities, an open tender procedure was used in all of the projects. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The Fund has worked on four key priorities stipulated in the Strategy, of which the roll-out of broadband services was the last one to be implemented. According to the Icelandic authorities, an open tender procedure was used in all of the projects.

3.1.2.   The mapping and coverage analysis

| (14) | In early 2007, the Fund hired a branch of the Farmer’s Association to verify census information in rural areas, especially the most rural ones (7). This work resulted in a comprehensive and current overview of buildings that could potentially form part of the project. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In early 2007, the Fund hired a branch of the Farmer’s Association to verify census information in rural areas, especially the most rural ones (7). This work resulted in a comprehensive and current overview of buildings that could potentially form part of the project.

| (15) | In February 2007, the Fund called for information on current market areas from broadband service providers (8) as a first step in mapping current and future broadband coverage. The aim of this exercise was to identify market failures, by distinguishing between ‘grey’, ‘black’ and ‘white’ areas in remote regions in Iceland (9). A public advertisement, placed in the newspaper Morgunblaðið, called for information on all current broadband service areas (i.e. areas that had a continuously available (not dial-up) Internet access of at least 512 kb/s for a reasonable fixed monthly price), as well as planned areas (not yet serviced) that would be functional by June 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In February 2007, the Fund called for information on current market areas from broadband service providers (8) as a first step in mapping current and future broadband coverage. The aim of this exercise was to identify market failures, by distinguishing between ‘grey’, ‘black’ and ‘white’ areas in remote regions in Iceland (9). A public advertisement, placed in the newspaper Morgunblaðið, called for information on all current broadband service areas (i.e. areas that had a continuously available (not dial-up) Internet access of at least 512 kb/s for a reasonable fixed monthly price), as well as planned areas (not yet serviced) that would be functional by June 2008.

| (16) | The Fund received information on market areas in various forms from several broadband service providers and individuals (10). With the coverage areas in place, the next step was to input GPS coordinates for all residences outside known areas of ADSL coverage. The resulting multi-layered map of residences outside of all current and planned (total) broadband coverage areas was sent to the participating broadband service providers for a further detailed review. This led to considerable updates to the map made on the basis of the service providers’ comparisons of the map with their customer databases. After this work was completed, the Fund sent to each of the 78 municipalities in Icelanda list of buildings outside of service areas and a print-out of the updated broadband coverage map for that municipality. Each municipality then reviewed the ‘white’ areas on the map for missing buildings, or for buildings which did not qualify for the project. In order for a building to qualify, it had to be an official permanent year-round residence and/or place of work of at least one person. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Fund received information on market areas in various forms from several broadband service providers and individuals (10). With the coverage areas in place, the next step was to input GPS coordinates for all residences outside known areas of ADSL coverage. The resulting multi-layered map of residences outside of all current and planned (total) broadband coverage areas was sent to the participating broadband service providers for a further detailed review. This led to considerable updates to the map made on the basis of the service providers’ comparisons of the map with their customer databases. After this work was completed, the Fund sent to each of the 78 municipalities in Icelanda list of buildings outside of service areas and a print-out of the updated broadband coverage map for that municipality. Each municipality then reviewed the ‘white’ areas on the map for missing buildings, or for buildings which did not qualify for the project. In order for a building to qualify, it had to be an official permanent year-round residence and/or place of work of at least one person.

| (17) | The Fund’s mapping and coverage analysis resulted in a precise list of buildings to be included in the project. The initial scope of the project was 1 118‘white’ buildings, which were individually identified by their GPS coordinates. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The Fund’s mapping and coverage analysis resulted in a precise list of buildings to be included in the project. The initial scope of the project was 1 118‘white’ buildings, which were individually identified by their GPS coordinates.

3.1.3.   The tender procedure and selection of the successful bidder

| (18) | In February 2008, the STC, on behalf of the Fund, published a call for tender for the project ‘Háhraðanettengingar til allra landsmanna’. This project consisted of the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas where the Icelandic authorities had identified a market failure, on the basis that it was deemed unlikely that private operators would roll out services in those areas on market terms. The project covered the 1 118‘white’ buildings identified by the Fund in its research. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In February 2008, the STC, on behalf of the Fund, published a call for tender for the project ‘Háhraðanettengingar til allra landsmanna’. This project consisted of the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas where the Icelandic authorities had identified a market failure, on the basis that it was deemed unlikely that private operators would roll out services in those areas on market terms. The project covered the 1 118‘white’ buildings identified by the Fund in its research.

| (19) | Following the publication of the tender, the STC engaged in several discussions with interested bidders, resulting in a prolongation of the deadline to submit tenders until 4 September 2008. Five tenders were received by the STC, which varied in terms of price and the technical solutions proposed. Síminn submitted two tender offers: the lowest-priced tender in the amount of ISK 378 million and the highest (for the highest average download speed offered) in the amount of ISK 5 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Following the publication of the tender, the STC engaged in several discussions with interested bidders, resulting in a prolongation of the deadline to submit tenders until 4 September 2008. Five tenders were received by the STC, which varied in terms of price and the technical solutions proposed. Síminn submitted two tender offers: the lowest-priced tender in the amount of ISK 378 million and the highest (for the highest average download speed offered) in the amount of ISK 5 billion.

| (20) | According to the tender description, the purpose of the award criteria used was to identify the most economically advantageous tender. Four evaluation criteria were used: (i) total price (50 %); (ii) build-out speed (15 %); (iii) download speed (25 %); and (iv) 2G GSM (optional) (10 %) (11). The STC received four valid offers (and one invalid offer) by 4 September 2008. The offers received were as follows:










  Bidders, tender — 14 121 | ISK | Project time | Avg. Mb/s | GSM | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Total price | Months | Downl. speed | Optional | Points |
| Síminn hf. | 379 000 000 kr. | 12 | 6 | Yes | 95 |
| NordiskMobileIslandehf | 974 864 503 kr. | 12 | 3 | Yes | NA |
| Vodafone | 1 858 339 001 kr. | 15 | 6,2 | Yes | 52 |
| Vodafone | 2 256 549 333 kr. | 17 | 6,5 | Yes | 49 |
| Síminn hf. | 5 000 000 000 kr. | 22 | 12 | Yes | 39 |

(20)

According to the tender description, the purpose of the award criteria used was to identify the most economically advantageous tender. Four evaluation criteria were used: (i) total price (50 %); (ii) build-out speed (15 %); (iii) download speed (25 %); and (iv) 2G GSM (optional) (10 %) (11). The STC received four valid offers (and one invalid offer) by 4 September 2008. The offers received were as follows:

Bidders, tender — 14 121

ISK

Project time

Avg. Mb/s

GSM

Total price

Months

Downl. speed

Optional

Points

Síminn hf.

379 000 000 kr.

12

6

Yes

95

NordiskMobileIslandehf

974 864 503 kr.

12

3

Yes

NA

Vodafone

1 858 339 001 kr.

15

6,2

Yes

52

Vodafone

2 256 549 333 kr.

17

6,5

Yes

49

Síminn hf.

5 000 000 000 kr.

22

12

Yes

39

| (21) | As the first offer from Síminn received the highest number of points (95 points) under the above-mentioned criteria, the STC entered into negotiations with Síminn (12). Furthermore, the STC requested that Siminn participate in several explanatory meetings; such meetings being standard procedure after the opening of a tender. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As the first offer from Síminn received the highest number of points (95 points) under the above-mentioned criteria, the STC entered into negotiations with Síminn (12). Furthermore, the STC requested that Siminn participate in several explanatory meetings; such meetings being standard procedure after the opening of a tender.

3.1.4.   The expansion of the roll out area

| (22) | In early December 2008, the Post and Telecom Administration in Iceland (‘the PTA’) received a request from a service provider, Wireless Broadband Systems (‘WBS’), asking to be deregistered as a telecommunications provider in Iceland. WBS had previously participated in the Fund’s mapping and coverage analysis and had informed the STC of its coverage plans during the period leading up to the STC’s call for tender. The departure of WBS from the market and the subsequent withdrawal of its coverage plans resulted in a substantial change to the list of buildings which neither had, nor would receive, broadband coverage in the near future on market terms. When the service provider's planned coverage area was withdrawn from the total cumulative coverage map, 670 additional ‘white’ buildings appeared, spread across the country. These buildings were considered by the Fund to become part of the scope of the new telecommunications policy. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

In early December 2008, the Post and Telecom Administration in Iceland (‘the PTA’) received a request from a service provider, Wireless Broadband Systems (‘WBS’), asking to be deregistered as a telecommunications provider in Iceland. WBS had previously participated in the Fund’s mapping and coverage analysis and had informed the STC of its coverage plans during the period leading up to the STC’s call for tender. The departure of WBS from the market and the subsequent withdrawal of its coverage plans resulted in a substantial change to the list of buildings which neither had, nor would receive, broadband coverage in the near future on market terms. When the service provider's planned coverage area was withdrawn from the total cumulative coverage map, 670 additional ‘white’ buildings appeared, spread across the country. These buildings were considered by the Fund to become part of the scope of the new telecommunications policy.

| (23) | The Fund requested information from the STC on whether it was possible to increase the scope of the project as part of the ongoing tender procedure. The STC responded on 7 January 2009, taking the view that a certain amount of expansion could fit within the tender and that such an expansion was in line with the regulatory framework on public procurement. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The Fund requested information from the STC on whether it was possible to increase the scope of the project as part of the ongoing tender procedure. The STC responded on 7 January 2009, taking the view that a certain amount of expansion could fit within the tender and that such an expansion was in line with the regulatory framework on public procurement.

| (24) | To establish that existing or new providers had no intentions of increasing their service areas by including any of the 670 additional ‘white’ buildings, the Fund requested that the STC call out again for any plans to offer services for these 670 buildings. On 23 January 2009, the STC published an announcement in the newspaper Morgunblaðið seeking information from market players on roll-out plans for broadband services in additional areas not previously included in the tender (13). According to the Icelandic authorities, this was in line with the previous methodology used by STC when it made its initial call for information on service areas. By inviting information via an advertisement, the request for information was not exclusive to those service providers that had previously handed in their tender offers but was intended to reach all service providers. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

To establish that existing or new providers had no intentions of increasing their service areas by including any of the 670 additional ‘white’ buildings, the Fund requested that the STC call out again for any plans to offer services for these 670 buildings. On 23 January 2009, the STC published an announcement in the newspaper Morgunblaðið seeking information from market players on roll-out plans for broadband services in additional areas not previously included in the tender (13). According to the Icelandic authorities, this was in line with the previous methodology used by STC when it made its initial call for information on service areas. By inviting information via an advertisement, the request for information was not exclusive to those service providers that had previously handed in their tender offers but was intended to reach all service providers.

| (25) | The STC did not receive any additional or new plans for servicing the 670 identified buildings. The STC subsequently took the decision to consider these additional buildings as falling within the scope of the project. It therefore sought to revise the contractual agreement being negotiated with Síminn so as to include the additional buildings. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The STC did not receive any additional or new plans for servicing the 670 identified buildings. The STC subsequently took the decision to consider these additional buildings as falling within the scope of the project. It therefore sought to revise the contractual agreement being negotiated with Síminn so as to include the additional buildings.

3.2.   
  The Agreement between the Telecommunications Fund and Síminn

3.2.1.   General

| (26) | On 25 February 2009, the Fund (the purchaser) and Síminn (the seller) entered into an agreement concerning the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland. According to the Agreement, the seller was to build out a high-speed network and broadband services in areas which previously did not have access to such services. The network and the service was to extend to all homes where at least one person was registered and had residence all year round, and to businesses which were operational all year round. The Agreement covered a total of 1 788 buildings: the 1 118 buildings originally identified in the tender documents, plus the additional 670 buildings added during the course of the negotiations. After the completion of the roll-out, the Agreement provided that the seller would be the owner of the network. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

On 25 February 2009, the Fund (the purchaser) and Síminn (the seller) entered into an agreement concerning the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland. According to the Agreement, the seller was to build out a high-speed network and broadband services in areas which previously did not have access to such services. The network and the service was to extend to all homes where at least one person was registered and had residence all year round, and to businesses which were operational all year round. The Agreement covered a total of 1 788 buildings: the 1 118 buildings originally identified in the tender documents, plus the additional 670 buildings added during the course of the negotiations. After the completion of the roll-out, the Agreement provided that the seller would be the owner of the network.

3.2.2.   The contract period and the contract amount

| (27) | According to Article 4 of the Agreement, the contract period extends from the date of signature until 1 March 2014. If both parties agreed, the period could be extended for up to two years. However, according to Article 10 of the Agreement, the period for the construction of the network formally commenced on 1 March 2009 and lasted until 1 March 2011. The Fund allowed for an extended roll-out period (18 months) because of the increase in the scope of the project. The Fund agreed to this on the condition that the roll-out for at least 1 118 buildings would be finished in the first 12 months in accordance with the tender offer from Síminn. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

According to Article 4 of the Agreement, the contract period extends from the date of signature until 1 March 2014. If both parties agreed, the period could be extended for up to two years. However, according to Article 10 of the Agreement, the period for the construction of the network formally commenced on 1 March 2009 and lasted until 1 March 2011. The Fund allowed for an extended roll-out period (18 months) because of the increase in the scope of the project. The Fund agreed to this on the condition that the roll-out for at least 1 118 buildings would be finished in the first 12 months in accordance with the tender offer from Síminn.

| (28) | For the roll-out of the network and the service, the purchaser was to pay a total of ISK 606 128 801. The price for the increase in scope of 670 buildings was agreed upon, on the basis of the average unit price offered initially by Síminn, multiplied by the number of new buildings. Therefore, the payment to Síminn increased from ISK 379 million to ISK 606 million. The purchaser was to pay 70 % of the total amount to the seller at the signing of the Agreement, a further 20 % once the network had become operational and the final 10 % after a three-month trial period had passed. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the roll-out of the network and the service, the purchaser was to pay a total of ISK 606 128 801. The price for the increase in scope of 670 buildings was agreed upon, on the basis of the average unit price offered initially by Síminn, multiplied by the number of new buildings. Therefore, the payment to Síminn increased from ISK 379 million to ISK 606 million. The purchaser was to pay 70 % of the total amount to the seller at the signing of the Agreement, a further 20 % once the network had become operational and the final 10 % after a three-month trial period had passed.

| (29) | The payments were indexed on the basis of the exchange rate with a foreign currency instead of the general consumer price index, as was originally intended. This choice of indexation was, according to the Icelandic authorities, the result of the unusual economic conditions, and of the uncertainty resulting from the financial crisis. The foreign currency used was the Danish krone (DKK) as it stood on 3 September 2008 (DKK 1 = ISK 16,513). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The payments were indexed on the basis of the exchange rate with a foreign currency instead of the general consumer price index, as was originally intended. This choice of indexation was, according to the Icelandic authorities, the result of the unusual economic conditions, and of the uncertainty resulting from the financial crisis. The foreign currency used was the Danish krone (DKK) as it stood on 3 September 2008 (DKK 1 = ISK 16,513).

3.2.3.   Technical requirements

| (30) | According to Article 2.1 of the tender description, the project was technologically neutral and there were no particular specifications on how the network should be constructed or which technological solution should be used (14). |
| --- | --- |

(30)

According to Article 2.1 of the tender description, the project was technologically neutral and there were no particular specifications on how the network should be constructed or which technological solution should be used (14).

| (31) | In addition to providing high-speed Internet access to buildings, the bidders were also encouraged to provide mobile voice services (2G GSM) (15). This service was to fulfil the criteria set out in the PTA’s telecommunications plan (Icelandic: fjarskiptaáætlun) for 2005-2010 which included voice services, roaming possibilities and the provision of user equipment at favourable prices. The provision of mobile 2G GSM services accounted for 10 points in the tender criteria. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

In addition to providing high-speed Internet access to buildings, the bidders were also encouraged to provide mobile voice services (2G GSM) (15). This service was to fulfil the criteria set out in the PTA’s telecommunications plan (Icelandic: fjarskiptaáætlun) for 2005-2010 which included voice services, roaming possibilities and the provision of user equipment at favourable prices. The provision of mobile 2G GSM services accounted for 10 points in the tender criteria.

| (32) | The technical solution offered by Síminn was based on four different technologies: ADSL (16), UMTS (17), Wi-Fi (18), and satellite. As it turned out, after construction of the network was completed, 55 % of buildings were connected with UMTS (3G fixed wireless), 41 % with ADSL and 4 % with satellite/Wi-Fi. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The technical solution offered by Síminn was based on four different technologies: ADSL (16), UMTS (17), Wi-Fi (18), and satellite. As it turned out, after construction of the network was completed, 55 % of buildings were connected with UMTS (3G fixed wireless), 41 % with ADSL and 4 % with satellite/Wi-Fi.

3.2.4.   Access requirements

| (33) | According to Article 2.2.13 of Annex I to the Agreement, the network was to be constructed so as to allow for access by other ISPs on a wholesale basis. Those ISPs should be able to buy on request the basic service from Síminn at wholesale prices, and should be permitted to deliver services over the network to their retail customers. Access was to be granted by convenient means (such as through access to the broadband remote access server (‘BRAS’)). All ISPs were to be granted equal service and equal access to the network, irrespective of their connection to the seller. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

According to Article 2.2.13 of Annex I to the Agreement, the network was to be constructed so as to allow for access by other ISPs on a wholesale basis. Those ISPs should be able to buy on request the basic service from Síminn at wholesale prices, and should be permitted to deliver services over the network to their retail customers. Access was to be granted by convenient means (such as through access to the broadband remote access server (‘BRAS’)). All ISPs were to be granted equal service and equal access to the network, irrespective of their connection to the seller.

| (34) | In Annex II to the Agreement, entitled ‘Enquiries and answers 1-22 during the tender period, new location lists, clarifications to the tender documents and minutes of the tender presentation’, there are further clarifications concerning access requirements. With regard to wholesale access, four options are outlined. They are as follows (19): | Option 1: The seller (Síminn) sets up an xDSL connection for users and delivers bitstream to purchasers behind the DSLAM equipment. Purchasers (the ISPs) handle the trunk line connection from the DSLAM via ATM and/or IP network to the service centre. This gives purchasers greater control over the quality of the service they sell, but it requires a substantial investment on their part. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(34)

In Annex II to the Agreement, entitled ‘Enquiries and answers 1-22 during the tender period, new location lists, clarifications to the tender documents and minutes of the tender presentation’, there are further clarifications concerning access requirements. With regard to wholesale access, four options are outlined. They are as follows (19):

Option 1: The seller (Síminn) sets up an xDSL connection for users and delivers bitstream to purchasers behind the DSLAM equipment. Purchasers (the ISPs) handle the trunk line connection from the DSLAM via ATM and/or IP network to the service centre. This gives purchasers greater control over the quality of the service they sell, but it requires a substantial investment on their part.

| | Option 2: The seller provides an xDSL connection from an ATM/IP network over a trunk line connection from the DSLAM. In this instance, the purchaser can control the quality of the transmission on the ATM network to a certain degree. Purchasers operate their own BRAS and can therefore control the technological variables of the equipment and maintain information on users. |
| --- | --- |

Option 2: The seller provides an xDSL connection from an ATM/IP network over a trunk line connection from the DSLAM. In this instance, the purchaser can control the quality of the transmission on the ATM network to a certain degree. Purchasers operate their own BRAS and can therefore control the technological variables of the equipment and maintain information on users.

| | Option 3: In this instance, bitstream is delivered to the purchaser via an IP network operated by the seller, who also operates the DSLAM and is responsible for the quality of the service. It is conceivable that the purchaser could negotiate for various quality terms for his customers. |
| --- | --- |

Option 3: In this instance, bitstream is delivered to the purchaser via an IP network operated by the seller, who also operates the DSLAM and is responsible for the quality of the service. It is conceivable that the purchaser could negotiate for various quality terms for his customers.

| | Option 4: This is a typical example of Internet subscription resale. The Internet connection that the seller sells to the purchaser is the same as that which it sells to his own retail customers. The purchaser operates no part of the network and is only responsible for selling the service unchanged. It does, however, have the option of sending its customers a single invoice for all services provided via high-speed connection. |
| --- | --- |

Option 4: This is a typical example of Internet subscription resale. The Internet connection that the seller sells to the purchaser is the same as that which it sells to his own retail customers. The purchaser operates no part of the network and is only responsible for selling the service unchanged. It does, however, have the option of sending its customers a single invoice for all services provided via high-speed connection.

| (35) | According to Annex II to the Agreement, Síminn is free to offer options 1-4, but is obliged to at least offer option 3 in all instances where ADSL technology is used in the project (20). Furthermore, it is expressly stated that Síminn must follow the PTA’s decisions and rules in this regard (21). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

According to Annex II to the Agreement, Síminn is free to offer options 1-4, but is obliged to at least offer option 3 in all instances where ADSL technology is used in the project (20). Furthermore, it is expressly stated that Síminn must follow the PTA’s decisions and rules in this regard (21).

| (36) | Where UMTS technology is used in the project, Síminn is only obliged to follow option 4 (22). That option entails the supply of user equipment and installation by Síminn in all instances, regardless of who the retailer is. Síminn is also obliged to handle customer and maintenance services. According to the Icelandic authorities, the main reason for this arrangement is that Síminn claims that it is necessary for it to have full access and control of the UMTS network end-to-end, including all the user equipment, in order to guarantee that the quality and service level are in line with the tender documents. Conversely, the Fund allowed for open access to be excluded with regard to satellite and Wi-Fi connections, on the grounds that it would be very difficult and impractical to implement such access (23). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Where UMTS technology is used in the project, Síminn is only obliged to follow option 4 (22). That option entails the supply of user equipment and installation by Síminn in all instances, regardless of who the retailer is. Síminn is also obliged to handle customer and maintenance services. According to the Icelandic authorities, the main reason for this arrangement is that Síminn claims that it is necessary for it to have full access and control of the UMTS network end-to-end, including all the user equipment, in order to guarantee that the quality and service level are in line with the tender documents. Conversely, the Fund allowed for open access to be excluded with regard to satellite and Wi-Fi connections, on the grounds that it would be very difficult and impractical to implement such access (23).

| (37) | In Annex 10 to the Agreement, there are standardised resale agreements (Icelandic: endursölusamningar) between Síminn and ISP resellers for the resale of UMTS-high-speed services and ADSL services. For option 4, these standard agreements include standard minimum discounts based on speed, as follows (24): | UMTS 1 Mb/s = 10 % |
| --- | --- | --- |

(37)

In Annex 10 to the Agreement, there are standardised resale agreements (Icelandic: endursölusamningar) between Síminn and ISP resellers for the resale of UMTS-high-speed services and ADSL services. For option 4, these standard agreements include standard minimum discounts based on speed, as follows (24):

UMTS 1 Mb/s = 10 %

| | UMTS 2 Mb/s = 7,5 % |
| --- | --- |

UMTS 2 Mb/s = 7,5 %

| | UMTS > 2 Mb/s = 5 % |
| --- | --- |

UMTS > 2 Mb/s = 5 %

| (38) | For ADSL, the following minimum discounts apply in respect of option 4 access: | ADSL 1 000 = 5 % |
| --- | --- | --- |

(38)

For ADSL, the following minimum discounts apply in respect of option 4 access:

ADSL 1 000 = 5 %

| | ADSL 2 000 = 5 % |
| --- | --- |

ADSL 2 000 = 5 %

| | ADSL 4 000/8 000 = 7,5 % |
| --- | --- |

ADSL 4 000/8 000 = 7,5 %

| | ADSL 6 000/12 000 = 10 % |
| --- | --- |

ADSL 6 000/12 000 = 10 %

As regards wholesale access to ADSL according to options 1-3, the ISP reseller/retailer would receive a minimum discount of 35 % from Síminn’s retail price. According to the Icelandic authorities, this discount was determined in line with the PTA Decision No 8/2008.

| (39) | According to a note from the Fund dated 14 August 2009, concerning the organisation of access options in the Agreement, there is only resale access available with regard to UMTS connections. Such connections do not benefit from more infrastructure-based wholesale access options. According to the Fund, the above discounts should therefore apply if another ISP wants resale access to Síminn’s network. The Authority has not yet received detailed information regarding the underlying methodology used to calculate the UMTS resale discounts set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

According to a note from the Fund dated 14 August 2009, concerning the organisation of access options in the Agreement, there is only resale access available with regard to UMTS connections. Such connections do not benefit from more infrastructure-based wholesale access options. According to the Fund, the above discounts should therefore apply if another ISP wants resale access to Síminn’s network. The Authority has not yet received detailed information regarding the underlying methodology used to calculate the UMTS resale discounts set out above.

4.   Comments by the Icelandic authorities

| (40) | The Icelandic authorities do not consider the payments made to Síminn, under the terms of the Agreement, to involve State aid, as they take the view that the conditions of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not met. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities are of the view that these payments can be characterised as the funding of a public service, that the four cumulative criteria of the ‘Altmark test’ are fulfilled, and that the measure for that reason does not constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Icelandic authorities do not consider the payments made to Síminn, under the terms of the Agreement, to involve State aid, as they take the view that the conditions of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not met. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities are of the view that these payments can be characterised as the funding of a public service, that the four cumulative criteria of the ‘Altmark test’ are fulfilled, and that the measure for that reason does not constitute State aid.

| (41) | The Icelandic authorities emphasise that a broadband service is in general a service of general economic interest (25). The Icelandic authorities note that they contacted private operators and published an advertisement in order to establish whether any market investor was willing to invest in the infrastructure. Since no one declared any interest in providing the service, the Icelandic authorities concluded that these areas did indeed suffer from a market failure and would not get high-speed Internet connections without the assistance from the Fund. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The Icelandic authorities emphasise that a broadband service is in general a service of general economic interest (25). The Icelandic authorities note that they contacted private operators and published an advertisement in order to establish whether any market investor was willing to invest in the infrastructure. Since no one declared any interest in providing the service, the Icelandic authorities concluded that these areas did indeed suffer from a market failure and would not get high-speed Internet connections without the assistance from the Fund.

| (42) | According to the Icelandic authorities, the nature and scope of the service were clearly defined in the tender process and the subsequent Agreement with Síminn (i.e. to install an infrastructure to enable certain buildings to gain a high-speed Internet connection). The Icelandic authorities state that Síminn, in this particular instance, was formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of this obligation, which was clearly defined by means of an open tender procedure for a defined service (despite technological neutrality). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

According to the Icelandic authorities, the nature and scope of the service were clearly defined in the tender process and the subsequent Agreement with Síminn (i.e. to install an infrastructure to enable certain buildings to gain a high-speed Internet connection). The Icelandic authorities state that Síminn, in this particular instance, was formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of this obligation, which was clearly defined by means of an open tender procedure for a defined service (despite technological neutrality).

| (43) | When the planned coverage area of WBS was withdrawn from the cumulative coverage map, 670 additional ‘white’ buildings appeared. When the Fund requested that the STC call out again for plans to offer services for these 670 buildings, this was done by means of an advertisement and not by direct contact exclusively with those few service providers that had previously handed in their tender offers. This was the method used when initially calling for information on service areas. The Icelandic authorities emphasise that bilateral communications with the parties which had submitted previous tenders were held to be inadequate. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

When the planned coverage area of WBS was withdrawn from the cumulative coverage map, 670 additional ‘white’ buildings appeared. When the Fund requested that the STC call out again for plans to offer services for these 670 buildings, this was done by means of an advertisement and not by direct contact exclusively with those few service providers that had previously handed in their tender offers. This was the method used when initially calling for information on service areas. The Icelandic authorities emphasise that bilateral communications with the parties which had submitted previous tenders were held to be inadequate.

| (44) | The Icelandic authorities note, further, that open access terms were available to third parties for a number of months in advance of the commencement of sales in the project. They state that, when sales began in each section, the Fund informed the inhabitants that Síminn was not the exclusive retailer and that all other retailers could sell Internet services to people living/working in the area. Furthermore, according to the Icelandic authorities, Síminn offers third-party (roaming) access to its 2G GSM voice services, while no wholesale access to 3G voice services is provided for by the tender documents or by the Agreement, since the project in question does not concern the provision of 3G voice services. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Icelandic authorities note, further, that open access terms were available to third parties for a number of months in advance of the commencement of sales in the project. They state that, when sales began in each section, the Fund informed the inhabitants that Síminn was not the exclusive retailer and that all other retailers could sell Internet services to people living/working in the area. Furthermore, according to the Icelandic authorities, Síminn offers third-party (roaming) access to its 2G GSM voice services, while no wholesale access to 3G voice services is provided for by the tender documents or by the Agreement, since the project in question does not concern the provision of 3G voice services.

| (45) | Finally, if the Authority were to consider the measure to constitute State aid, the Icelandic authorities have expressed the view that such aid could be considered compatible with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, having regard to the objectives of the measure, including the objective to increase public broadband access in assisted areas. In this regard, the Icelandic authorities have also invited the Authority to assess whether such aid should be considered to constitute the financing of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI’). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Finally, if the Authority were to consider the measure to constitute State aid, the Icelandic authorities have expressed the view that such aid could be considered compatible with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, having regard to the objectives of the measure, including the objective to increase public broadband access in assisted areas. In this regard, the Icelandic authorities have also invited the Authority to assess whether such aid should be considered to constitute the financing of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI’).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (46) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (47) | In the following chapters, the State funding of the abovementioned project will be assessed with respect to these criteria. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

In the following chapters, the State funding of the abovementioned project will be assessed with respect to these criteria.

1.1.   
  State resources

| (48) | According to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, a measure must be granted by the State or through State resources in order to constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

According to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, a measure must be granted by the State or through State resources in order to constitute State aid.

| (49) | The State, for the purpose of Article 61(1), covers all bodies of the State administration, from the central government to the city level or the lowest administrative level as well as public undertakings and bodies (26). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The State, for the purpose of Article 61(1), covers all bodies of the State administration, from the central government to the city level or the lowest administrative level as well as public undertakings and bodies (26).

| (50) | The Fund is, as described above, established by law and owned by the Icelandic State which allocates resources to the Fund through the annual State budget. Therefore, the first criterion of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Fund is, as described above, established by law and owned by the Icelandic State which allocates resources to the Fund through the annual State budget. Therefore, the first criterion of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Undertaking

| (51) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an advantage upon an undertaking. Undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (27). Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (28). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an advantage upon an undertaking. Undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (27). Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (28).

| (52) | Síminn is Iceland’s biggest telecoms operator, offering services such as mobile, fixed telephone, Internet and TV services on the Icelandic market. It is thus clear that any aid involved in the Agreement between Síminn and the Fund has been conferred upon an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Síminn is Iceland’s biggest telecoms operator, offering services such as mobile, fixed telephone, Internet and TV services on the Icelandic market. It is thus clear that any aid involved in the Agreement between Síminn and the Fund has been conferred upon an undertaking.

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (53) | Firstly, the aid measure must confer on the beneficiary undertaking advantages that relieve it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. In the present case, the financing of the project by public authorities has provided an economic advantage to the selected supplier of the network that would normally be covered by its budget, and has allowed the selected operator to provide a broadband network on conditions not otherwise available on the market. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that the financial support has enabled Síminn, as the successful bidder, to conduct its commercial activities in respect of the network under conditions which would not otherwise have existed in the absence of the measure (29). |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Firstly, the aid measure must confer on the beneficiary undertaking advantages that relieve it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. In the present case, the financing of the project by public authorities has provided an economic advantage to the selected supplier of the network that would normally be covered by its budget, and has allowed the selected operator to provide a broadband network on conditions not otherwise available on the market. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that the financial support has enabled Síminn, as the successful bidder, to conduct its commercial activities in respect of the network under conditions which would not otherwise have existed in the absence of the measure (29).

| (54) | Although a competitive tender procedure tends to reduce the amount of financial support required and avoid excessive profits, the aid will also allow the operator to offer end-to-end services prima facie at lower prices than if it had had to bear all costs itself and thus attract more customers than under normal market conditions. The selected operator will also acquire ownership of the network, as well as other tangible and intangible assets with State funds (e.g. equipment, customer relations), even after the lifetime of the projects. In view of the above, it is clear that an economic advantage will be granted to the selected operator (30). Furthermore, it is not clear that the compensation for the 670 additional buildings was established through a competitive tender, as the compensation method for this part of the project is unclear, or whether it was in fact determined after Síminn’s bid was chosen. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Although a competitive tender procedure tends to reduce the amount of financial support required and avoid excessive profits, the aid will also allow the operator to offer end-to-end services prima facie at lower prices than if it had had to bear all costs itself and thus attract more customers than under normal market conditions. The selected operator will also acquire ownership of the network, as well as other tangible and intangible assets with State funds (e.g. equipment, customer relations), even after the lifetime of the projects. In view of the above, it is clear that an economic advantage will be granted to the selected operator (30). Furthermore, it is not clear that the compensation for the 670 additional buildings was established through a competitive tender, as the compensation method for this part of the project is unclear, or whether it was in fact determined after Síminn’s bid was chosen.

| (55) | The preliminary assessment of the Authority thus shows that an economic advantage cannot be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The preliminary assessment of the Authority thus shows that an economic advantage cannot be excluded.

| (56) | Secondly, the aid measure must be selective, in that it must favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. Public funding of the broadband network in rural areas of Iceland was granted to Síminn, as the successful tenderer. Since Síminn is the only recipient of the State funds, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the measure is selective (31). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Secondly, the aid measure must be selective, in that it must favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. Public funding of the broadband network in rural areas of Iceland was granted to Síminn, as the successful tenderer. Since Síminn is the only recipient of the State funds, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the measure is selective (31).

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between contracting parties

| (57) | The measure must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The measure must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (58) | According to settled case-law, the mere fact that a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, is considered to be sufficient in order to conclude that the measure is likely to affect trade between contracting parties and distort competition between undertakings established in other EEA States (32). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

According to settled case-law, the mere fact that a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, is considered to be sufficient in order to conclude that the measure is likely to affect trade between contracting parties and distort competition between undertakings established in other EEA States (32).

| (59) | Public involvement in deploying infrastructure to provide electronic communications services alters existing market conditions by strengthening the position of the selected supplier of the network in relation to its competitors. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Public involvement in deploying infrastructure to provide electronic communications services alters existing market conditions by strengthening the position of the selected supplier of the network in relation to its competitors.

| (60) | The beneficiary of the measure will be active in deploying a broadband network infrastructure in a market which can be entered directly or through financial involvement by participants from other EEA States. In general, the markets for electronic communications services (including the wholesale and the retail broadband markets) are open to trade and competition between operators and service providers across the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The beneficiary of the measure will be active in deploying a broadband network infrastructure in a market which can be entered directly or through financial involvement by participants from other EEA States. In general, the markets for electronic communications services (including the wholesale and the retail broadband markets) are open to trade and competition between operators and service providers across the EEA.

| (61) | Therefore, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the measure threatens to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA (33). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Therefore, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the measure threatens to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA (33).

1.5.   
  Funding of a public service and the Altmark test

| (62) | The Icelandic authorities take the view that the contribution can be characterised as funding of a public service; that the four cumulative criteria of the ‘Altmark test’ are fulfilled, and that the measure, for that reason, does not constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Icelandic authorities take the view that the contribution can be characterised as funding of a public service; that the four cumulative criteria of the ‘Altmark test’ are fulfilled, and that the measure, for that reason, does not constitute State aid.

| (63) | The Court of Justice’s judgment in Altmark provided clarification regarding the conditions under which public service compensation does not constitute State aid, owing to the absence of any advantage (34). However, for such compensation to escape qualification as State aid in a particular case, four main conditions, commonly referred to as the Altmark criteria, must be satisfied (35). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Court of Justice’s judgment in Altmark provided clarification regarding the conditions under which public service compensation does not constitute State aid, owing to the absence of any advantage (34). However, for such compensation to escape qualification as State aid in a particular case, four main conditions, commonly referred to as the Altmark criteria, must be satisfied (35).

| (64) | The four conditions are as follows: (i) the beneficiary of a State-funding mechanism for an SGEI must be formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of an SGEI, the obligations of which must be clearly defined; (ii) the parameters for calculating the compensation must be established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over competing undertakings; (iii) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the SGEI, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; and (iv) where the beneficiary is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation granted must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical well-run undertaking would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The four conditions are as follows: (i) the beneficiary of a State-funding mechanism for an SGEI must be formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of an SGEI, the obligations of which must be clearly defined; (ii) the parameters for calculating the compensation must be established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over competing undertakings; (iii) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the SGEI, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; and (iv) where the beneficiary is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation granted must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical well-run undertaking would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| (65) | The EEA EFTA States have, in general, a wide discretion concerning the identification of a service as an SGEI, while following the relevant case-law which sets out the general principles to be respected (36). The provision of adequate broadband coverage to all citizens in areas where no other operators are providing, or will provide, such services in the near future could well be characterised as an SGEI (37). Furthermore, Síminn seems to have been given a clear mandate assigned by way of a contract, which, according to the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, can be seen as a required entrustment act (38). |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The EEA EFTA States have, in general, a wide discretion concerning the identification of a service as an SGEI, while following the relevant case-law which sets out the general principles to be respected (36). The provision of adequate broadband coverage to all citizens in areas where no other operators are providing, or will provide, such services in the near future could well be characterised as an SGEI (37). Furthermore, Síminn seems to have been given a clear mandate assigned by way of a contract, which, according to the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, can be seen as a required entrustment act (38).

| (66) | However, the fact that the compensation for the 670 buildings that were added to the project after the withdrawal of WBS from the market was decided on after Síminn had won the tender appears to raise problems in relation to the rest of the Altmark criteria. The parameters for calculation of the compensation for the additional units do not seem to have been established in an objective and transparent manner beforehand. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

However, the fact that the compensation for the 670 buildings that were added to the project after the withdrawal of WBS from the market was decided on after Síminn had won the tender appears to raise problems in relation to the rest of the Altmark criteria. The parameters for calculation of the compensation for the additional units do not seem to have been established in an objective and transparent manner beforehand.

| (67) | Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have not sufficiently explained why the payments were indexed to the Danish krone, as it stood on 3 September 2008, and what effect this arrangement had on the overall compensation to Síminn. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have not sufficiently explained why the payments were indexed to the Danish krone, as it stood on 3 September 2008, and what effect this arrangement had on the overall compensation to Síminn.

| (68) | The public procurement rules do allow for some changes to the contract through subsequent negotiations (39). However, the magnitude of the extension to the scope and compensation does cause the Authority to doubt whether the parameters for calculation of the compensation can be said to have been determined through a public procurement procedure. Furthermore, the Authority has not received information allowing it to conclude that this part of the compensation did not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs related to the additional buildings. When a project increases in scope, so may the chance that economies of scale may reduce the unit costs. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The public procurement rules do allow for some changes to the contract through subsequent negotiations (39). However, the magnitude of the extension to the scope and compensation does cause the Authority to doubt whether the parameters for calculation of the compensation can be said to have been determined through a public procurement procedure. Furthermore, the Authority has not received information allowing it to conclude that this part of the compensation did not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs related to the additional buildings. When a project increases in scope, so may the chance that economies of scale may reduce the unit costs.

| (69) | Finally, even though Síminn was chosen as a service provider in accordance with a public tender, only the compensation for the first 1 118 buildings was based on the public procurement process. The compensation for the additional 670 buildings was determined after Síminn had won the tender. Moreover, the Authority has not received information indicating that the Icelandic authorities have conducted a benchmarking exercise, with a typical well-run and adequately-equipped undertaking, concerning the costs likely to be incurred in constructing and operating the broadband network for the additional buildings. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Finally, even though Síminn was chosen as a service provider in accordance with a public tender, only the compensation for the first 1 118 buildings was based on the public procurement process. The compensation for the additional 670 buildings was determined after Síminn had won the tender. Moreover, the Authority has not received information indicating that the Icelandic authorities have conducted a benchmarking exercise, with a typical well-run and adequately-equipped undertaking, concerning the costs likely to be incurred in constructing and operating the broadband network for the additional buildings.

| (70) | Hence, at this stage, the Authority cannot conclude that all of the Altmark criteria are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Hence, at this stage, the Authority cannot conclude that all of the Altmark criteria are fulfilled.

1.6.   
  Conclusion with regard to the presence of State aid

| (71) | With reference to the above considerations, the Authority cannot, at this stage and based on its preliminary assessment, exclude that the measure under assessment includes elements of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Under the conditions referred to above, it is thus necessary to consider whether the measure can be found to be compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

With reference to the above considerations, the Authority cannot, at this stage and based on its preliminary assessment, exclude that the measure under assessment includes elements of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Under the conditions referred to above, it is thus necessary to consider whether the measure can be found to be compatible with the internal market.

2.   Compatibility assessment

2.1.   
  Introduction

| (72) | Support measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) or Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement and are necessary, proportional and do not cause undue distortion of competition. The Icelandic authorities argue that any aid involved in the Agreement between the Fund and Síminn is compatible with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Support measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) or Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement and are necessary, proportional and do not cause undue distortion of competition. The Icelandic authorities argue that any aid involved in the Agreement between the Fund and Síminn is compatible with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement.

| (73) | On the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, ‘aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas’ may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EEA to the extent that is considered to be contrary to the common interest. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

On the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, ‘aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas’ may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EEA to the extent that is considered to be contrary to the common interest.

| (74) | The Authority’s recently published Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (‘the 2013 Broadband Guidelines’) (40) contain a detailed interpretation of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement in this sector. The previous Guidelines on the application of State aid rules to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (‘the 2010 Broadband Guidelines’) were first adopted on 3 February 2010, and were therefore not in effect at the time at which Síminn and the Fund entered into the Agreement. However, the 2010 Broadband Guidelines were based on the existing decision-making practice of the European Commission (41). The Authority will therefore assess the Agreement in the light of the fundamental principles concerning State aid to broadband infrastructure which are outlined in the 2010 Broadband Guidelines, and of the decisional practice that existed at the time of the signing of the Agreement and which has continued in more recent cases. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Authority’s recently published Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (‘the 2013 Broadband Guidelines’) (40) contain a detailed interpretation of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement in this sector. The previous Guidelines on the application of State aid rules to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (‘the 2010 Broadband Guidelines’) were first adopted on 3 February 2010, and were therefore not in effect at the time at which Síminn and the Fund entered into the Agreement. However, the 2010 Broadband Guidelines were based on the existing decision-making practice of the European Commission (41). The Authority will therefore assess the Agreement in the light of the fundamental principles concerning State aid to broadband infrastructure which are outlined in the 2010 Broadband Guidelines, and of the decisional practice that existed at the time of the signing of the Agreement and which has continued in more recent cases.

2.2.   
  The balancing test and the Broadband Guidelines/decisional practice

| (75) | In assessing whether an aid measure can be found to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potential negative side effects, such as distortions of trade and competition. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

In assessing whether an aid measure can be found to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potential negative side effects, such as distortions of trade and competition.

| (76) | In applying this balancing test, the Authority will assess the following questions (42):






  (a) | Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address a market failure or other objective? |
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(76)

In applying this balancing test, the Authority will assess the following questions (42):

(a)

Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address a market failure or other objective?

| (b) | Is the aid well designed to deliver the objective of common interest? In particular:






  (i) | Is State aid an appropriate policy instrument, i.e. are there other, better-placed instruments? |
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(b)

Is the aid well designed to deliver the objective of common interest? In particular:

(i)

Is State aid an appropriate policy instrument, i.e. are there other, better-placed instruments?

| (ii) | Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of undertakings? |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of undertakings?

| (iii) | Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid? |
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(iii)

Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid?

| (c) | Are the distortions of competition and the effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive? |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Are the distortions of competition and the effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive?

2.2.1.   Objective of common interest

| (77) | Broadband connectivity is a key component for the development, adoption and use of information and communication technologies in the economy and in society. The project appears to target only ‘white’ areas (43). |
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(77)

Broadband connectivity is a key component for the development, adoption and use of information and communication technologies in the economy and in society. The project appears to target only ‘white’ areas (43).

| (78) | The Authority considers support for broadband network deployment in rural and underserved ‘white’ areas as promoting territorial social and economic cohesion and addressing market failures (44). Moreover, the roll-out of a broadband network contributes to reducing the ‘digital divide’ that sets apart areas or regions within a country where affordable and competitive broadband services are on offer and areas where such services are not (45). It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that the aid pursues genuine cohesion and economic development objectives, which are considered to be well-defined objectives of common interest. |
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(78)

The Authority considers support for broadband network deployment in rural and underserved ‘white’ areas as promoting territorial social and economic cohesion and addressing market failures (44). Moreover, the roll-out of a broadband network contributes to reducing the ‘digital divide’ that sets apart areas or regions within a country where affordable and competitive broadband services are on offer and areas where such services are not (45). It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that the aid pursues genuine cohesion and economic development objectives, which are considered to be well-defined objectives of common interest.

2.2.2.   Design of the measure and the need to limit distortion of competition

2.2.2.1.   Is aid the appropriate instrument?

| (79) | The Authority has not received information on whether the Icelandic authorities considered any alternatives to public financing of the broadband network in order to address the market failure. However, the Authority, as well as the Commission, has previously examined the use of grants or tax incentives to end users, as well as the possibility of using ex ante regulation (46). These measures have been found unlikely to lead to sufficient investments for the provision of broadband services to underserved areas. Hence, in situations such as the case at hand, there seems to be no alternative to granting public funding to overcome the lack of broadband connectivity. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority has not received information on whether the Icelandic authorities considered any alternatives to public financing of the broadband network in order to address the market failure. However, the Authority, as well as the Commission, has previously examined the use of grants or tax incentives to end users, as well as the possibility of using ex ante regulation (46). These measures have been found unlikely to lead to sufficient investments for the provision of broadband services to underserved areas. Hence, in situations such as the case at hand, there seems to be no alternative to granting public funding to overcome the lack of broadband connectivity.

| (80) | It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that public funding for the provision of broadband services is an appropriate instrument to achieve the set objectives. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that public funding for the provision of broadband services is an appropriate instrument to achieve the set objectives.

2.2.2.2.   Does the aid have an incentive effect?

| (81) | The public consultation conducted by the Icelandic authorities showed that it was unlikely that a broadband network covering the unserviced buildings would be provided by the market in the near future. By providing financial support to the roll-out of the network, the bidders to the public tender changed their investment decisions. Thus, the Authority’s preliminary view is that the aid provided an investment incentive. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The public consultation conducted by the Icelandic authorities showed that it was unlikely that a broadband network covering the unserviced buildings would be provided by the market in the near future. By providing financial support to the roll-out of the network, the bidders to the public tender changed their investment decisions. Thus, the Authority’s preliminary view is that the aid provided an investment incentive.

2.2.2.3.   Proportionality of the aid and limitation of distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (82) | The Icelandic authorities carried out a detailed mapping and coverage analysis in 2007. Hence, the competitive conditions and structure prevailing in the given area were analysed and all stakeholders affected by the relevant measure were consulted (47). Against this background, the Authority’s preliminary view is that the mapping and coverage analysis contributed to minimising potential distortions of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Icelandic authorities carried out a detailed mapping and coverage analysis in 2007. Hence, the competitive conditions and structure prevailing in the given area were analysed and all stakeholders affected by the relevant measure were consulted (47). Against this background, the Authority’s preliminary view is that the mapping and coverage analysis contributed to minimising potential distortions of competition.

| (83) | The withdrawal of WBS from the market resulted in a substantial change to the list of buildings that neither had, nor would, receive broadband coverage in the near future on market terms. Subsequently, the Icelandic authorities called out again for plans to offer services to the buildings originally covered by the plans of WBS. This was done by way of a newspaper advertisement which, according to the Icelandic authorities, was in line with previous communication with the market. This method of communication allowed all service providers to alert the Icelandic authorities of any roll-out plans in the area. It is thus the Authority’s preliminary opinion that the newspaper advertisement appears to have been an adequate method for communication in this situation. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The withdrawal of WBS from the market resulted in a substantial change to the list of buildings that neither had, nor would, receive broadband coverage in the near future on market terms. Subsequently, the Icelandic authorities called out again for plans to offer services to the buildings originally covered by the plans of WBS. This was done by way of a newspaper advertisement which, according to the Icelandic authorities, was in line with previous communication with the market. This method of communication allowed all service providers to alert the Icelandic authorities of any roll-out plans in the area. It is thus the Authority’s preliminary opinion that the newspaper advertisement appears to have been an adequate method for communication in this situation.

| (84) | It follows from the 2010 Broadband Guidelines that the open tender approach ensures that there is transparency for all investors wishing to bid, as well as minimising the potential State aid advantage and reducing the selective nature of the measure. The use of open tenders to promote these objectives in broadband deployment has been recognised by the Commission in decisional practice predating the contract under assessment (48). |
| --- | --- |

(84)

It follows from the 2010 Broadband Guidelines that the open tender approach ensures that there is transparency for all investors wishing to bid, as well as minimising the potential State aid advantage and reducing the selective nature of the measure. The use of open tenders to promote these objectives in broadband deployment has been recognised by the Commission in decisional practice predating the contract under assessment (48).

| (85) | As emphasised by both the 2010 Broadband Guidelines and the fundamental principles of EEA public procurement law, equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders is an indispensable condition for an open tender. The Icelandic authorities conducted a public procurement procedure in order to choose the provider of the broadband network and subsequent services. After the conclusion of the aforementioned tender procedure, WBS withdrew from the market. This resulted in an increase in the amount of buildings in need of broadband services. As a consequence, changes to the contract with the chosen supplier were made concerning its scope, compensation and the roll-out period. Changes were also made concerning the indexation of the total payments (49). The complainant claims that, due to changes made to the contract after the supplier was selected, the tender procedure does not meet the essential requirements of equal and non-discriminatory treatment. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

As emphasised by both the 2010 Broadband Guidelines and the fundamental principles of EEA public procurement law, equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders is an indispensable condition for an open tender. The Icelandic authorities conducted a public procurement procedure in order to choose the provider of the broadband network and subsequent services. After the conclusion of the aforementioned tender procedure, WBS withdrew from the market. This resulted in an increase in the amount of buildings in need of broadband services. As a consequence, changes to the contract with the chosen supplier were made concerning its scope, compensation and the roll-out period. Changes were also made concerning the indexation of the total payments (49). The complainant claims that, due to changes made to the contract after the supplier was selected, the tender procedure does not meet the essential requirements of equal and non-discriminatory treatment.

| (86) | The Authority would like to underline that, even though the Public Procurement Directive does not apply to the procurement of broadband networks and services (50), the procurement is still subject to the fundamental principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment (51). |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority would like to underline that, even though the Public Procurement Directive does not apply to the procurement of broadband networks and services (50), the procurement is still subject to the fundamental principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment (51).

| (87) | The complainant argues that other bidders did not get the chance to submit offers for the additional buildings and that the increase in locations does not necessarily entail a corresponding increase in costs and the roll-out period. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The complainant argues that other bidders did not get the chance to submit offers for the additional buildings and that the increase in locations does not necessarily entail a corresponding increase in costs and the roll-out period.

| (88) | The Authority recognises that the alterations made to the draft contract included in the tender documents are significant and may constitute infringements of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination amongst bidders. As mentioned in Section II.1.5 above, the public procurement rules do allow for some changes to the contract through negotiations to take place after the supplier has been selected. However, due to the considerable extent of the changes to both the scope, compensation and roll-out period, the Authority has doubts whether the procurement process can be seen as an open tender within the meaning of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The Authority recognises that the alterations made to the draft contract included in the tender documents are significant and may constitute infringements of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination amongst bidders. As mentioned in Section II.1.5 above, the public procurement rules do allow for some changes to the contract through negotiations to take place after the supplier has been selected. However, due to the considerable extent of the changes to both the scope, compensation and roll-out period, the Authority has doubts whether the procurement process can be seen as an open tender within the meaning of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

| (89) | Nevertheless, the price paid to Síminn after the expansion of the scope was still significantly lower than the price offered by the other bidders (52), and the price estimated by the Fund in advance. The changes may therefore have been justifiable due to the discrepancy between the prices. However, considering that the purpose of conducting a tender process is to achieve the lowest price for the community, the Authority cannot at this stage exclude that these changes to the contract are incompatible with the principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

Nevertheless, the price paid to Síminn after the expansion of the scope was still significantly lower than the price offered by the other bidders (52), and the price estimated by the Fund in advance. The changes may therefore have been justifiable due to the discrepancy between the prices. However, considering that the purpose of conducting a tender process is to achieve the lowest price for the community, the Authority cannot at this stage exclude that these changes to the contract are incompatible with the principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders.

| (90) | Moreover, with regard to the switch from consumer price indexation to foreign currency indexation, the complainant claims that this has resulted in a further increase in payment to Síminn due to the devaluation of the ISK following the financial crisis. The Icelandic authorities have not sufficiently explained the reasons behind this change, nor why they decided to apply the exchange rate of 3 September 2008 and what effect this had on the final payments to Síminn. They are hereby invited to do so. The assessment of this information is necessary in order to conclude whether these changes to the final contract entailed the granting of State aid and, if so, whether the aid can be seen as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(90)

Moreover, with regard to the switch from consumer price indexation to foreign currency indexation, the complainant claims that this has resulted in a further increase in payment to Síminn due to the devaluation of the ISK following the financial crisis. The Icelandic authorities have not sufficiently explained the reasons behind this change, nor why they decided to apply the exchange rate of 3 September 2008 and what effect this had on the final payments to Síminn. They are hereby invited to do so. The assessment of this information is necessary in order to conclude whether these changes to the final contract entailed the granting of State aid and, if so, whether the aid can be seen as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (91) | Mandating effective third-party wholesale access to a subsidised broadband infrastructure is a necessary component of any State measure funding the construction of a new broadband infrastructure. In particular, wholesale access enables third-party operators to compete with the selected bidder (e.g. when the latter is also present at the retail level), thereby strengthening choice and competition in the areas concerned by the measure, while at the same time avoiding the creation of regional service monopolies (53). Furthermore, granting effective wholesale access to competitors minimises the distortions of competition that follow from any State aid measure. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Mandating effective third-party wholesale access to a subsidised broadband infrastructure is a necessary component of any State measure funding the construction of a new broadband infrastructure. In particular, wholesale access enables third-party operators to compete with the selected bidder (e.g. when the latter is also present at the retail level), thereby strengthening choice and competition in the areas concerned by the measure, while at the same time avoiding the creation of regional service monopolies (53). Furthermore, granting effective wholesale access to competitors minimises the distortions of competition that follow from any State aid measure.

| (92) | The importance of granting effective third-party wholesale access to subsidised networks has been emphasised by Commission practice which predates the contract under assessment (54). |
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(92)

The importance of granting effective third-party wholesale access to subsidised networks has been emphasised by Commission practice which predates the contract under assessment (54).

| (93) | The 2013 Broadband Guidelines have recently emphasised that wholesale access obligations imposed on a subsidised network should be aligned with the portfolio of access obligations laid down under the sectoral regulation rules. However, in principle, subsidised companies should provide a wider range of wholesale access products than those mandated by national regulatory authorities (‘NRAs’) under sectoral regulation, since the aid beneficiary is using not just its own resources, but also taxpayers' money to deploy its own infrastructure. Such wholesale access should be granted as early as possible before starting network operation (55). |
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(93)

The 2013 Broadband Guidelines have recently emphasised that wholesale access obligations imposed on a subsidised network should be aligned with the portfolio of access obligations laid down under the sectoral regulation rules. However, in principle, subsidised companies should provide a wider range of wholesale access products than those mandated by national regulatory authorities (‘NRAs’) under sectoral regulation, since the aid beneficiary is using not just its own resources, but also taxpayers' money to deploy its own infrastructure. Such wholesale access should be granted as early as possible before starting network operation (55).

| (94) | Following its 2008 analysis of the market for wholesale broadband access, the Icelandic NRA, the PTA, required Síminn (as the firm designated with significant market power) to comply with all fair and reasonable requests by other electronic communications undertakings for open access to specialised network infrastructure related to copper local loops at the wholesale level, including the possibility of having bitstream services delivered at various points along the network (56). It was specified therein that Síminn shall, inter alia, respond to reasonable and appropriate requests for access to options 1, 2, 3 and 4 as defined in paragraph 34 above. This PTA Decision was cited in the tender description. |
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(94)

Following its 2008 analysis of the market for wholesale broadband access, the Icelandic NRA, the PTA, required Síminn (as the firm designated with significant market power) to comply with all fair and reasonable requests by other electronic communications undertakings for open access to specialised network infrastructure related to copper local loops at the wholesale level, including the possibility of having bitstream services delivered at various points along the network (56). It was specified therein that Síminn shall, inter alia, respond to reasonable and appropriate requests for access to options 1, 2, 3 and 4 as defined in paragraph 34 above. This PTA Decision was cited in the tender description.

| (95) | Indeed, the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications seeks to facilitate competition through new entrants becoming progressively more reliant on their own infrastructure over time where it is efficient for them to do so (57). Regulation that promotes efficient investment in companies’ own infrastructure is considered more conducive to promoting effective and self-sustaining competition. This has led to a regulatory approach in electronic communications markets whereby, in the presence of significant market power, multiple access products at different levels of the network hierarchy are simultaneously available to alternative operators. Such differentiated access options accommodate differing levels of network roll-out of the alternative providers. As noted by the European Regulators’ Group (‘ERG’, now known as the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications or ‘BEREC’), this ‘ladder of investment’ approach to regulation is a well-established principle in the present regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (58). |
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(95)

Indeed, the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications seeks to facilitate competition through new entrants becoming progressively more reliant on their own infrastructure over time where it is efficient for them to do so (57). Regulation that promotes efficient investment in companies’ own infrastructure is considered more conducive to promoting effective and self-sustaining competition. This has led to a regulatory approach in electronic communications markets whereby, in the presence of significant market power, multiple access products at different levels of the network hierarchy are simultaneously available to alternative operators. Such differentiated access options accommodate differing levels of network roll-out of the alternative providers. As noted by the European Regulators’ Group (‘ERG’, now known as the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications or ‘BEREC’), this ‘ladder of investment’ approach to regulation is a well-established principle in the present regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (58).

| (96) | In addition to the established regulatory practice on effective wholesale access to broadband services, State aid decisions have also involved a dynamic approach to the range of access options which have been required. For example, in the 2006/2007 decisions concerning investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the-home broadband network (59), wholesale access was to be granted at both the passive (60) and active (61) layers of the network. Furthermore, in a 2010 decision concerning the deployment of very high-speed broadband networks in France (62), wholesale access was to be required on all levels of the subsidised infrastructure. Since the support was granted for the passive infrastructure of the network (e.g. ducts, dark fibre), access to the passive level of the network was to be facilitated as already foreseen in a decision taken by the French NRA, ARCEP, in 2010 (63). However, an active access product was also to be provided to any third party with a reasonable demand for such a product (64). The demand was considered reasonable if the following three conditions were fulfilled: (i) the access-seeker provides a coherent business plan which justifies the activation of the network; and (ii) the access-seeker shows that it does not have the financial means to install its active equipment; and (iii) no active access product is already offered in the same geographic area by a private operator at equivalent prices to those of more densely populated areas (65). |
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(96)

In addition to the established regulatory practice on effective wholesale access to broadband services, State aid decisions have also involved a dynamic approach to the range of access options which have been required. For example, in the 2006/2007 decisions concerning investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the-home broadband network (59), wholesale access was to be granted at both the passive (60) and active (61) layers of the network. Furthermore, in a 2010 decision concerning the deployment of very high-speed broadband networks in France (62), wholesale access was to be required on all levels of the subsidised infrastructure. Since the support was granted for the passive infrastructure of the network (e.g. ducts, dark fibre), access to the passive level of the network was to be facilitated as already foreseen in a decision taken by the French NRA, ARCEP, in 2010 (63). However, an active access product was also to be provided to any third party with a reasonable demand for such a product (64). The demand was considered reasonable if the following three conditions were fulfilled: (i) the access-seeker provides a coherent business plan which justifies the activation of the network; and (ii) the access-seeker shows that it does not have the financial means to install its active equipment; and (iii) no active access product is already offered in the same geographic area by a private operator at equivalent prices to those of more densely populated areas (65).

| (97) | While the above examples predominantly refer to wholesale Internet access to fixed-line networks, it is not clear to the Authority why a similar dynamic access approach would not also be applicable in the case of wholesale Internet access to networks using mobile access technologies. For example, where NRAs have identified significant market power in the wholesale market for mobile access and call origination services in a regulatory context, a range of different access remedies have been facilitated in recognition of the differing levels of network roll-out of market participants. In its 2007 finding of dominance in the wholesale mobile access and call origination market in Iceland, the PTA observed that, given the diversity of the mobile phone market and the various needs of the parties that might conceivably seek access, all forms of wholesale access that may reasonably be granted and that can promote competition in the retail market should fall within the scope of the access obligation (66). In this respect, Síminn was required to comply with all reasonable and appropriate requests for access to: (i) national roaming (67); (ii) co-location and joint utilisation (68); (iii) mobile virtual network operator (‘MVNO’) access (69) and (iv) resale (70). |
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(97)

While the above examples predominantly refer to wholesale Internet access to fixed-line networks, it is not clear to the Authority why a similar dynamic access approach would not also be applicable in the case of wholesale Internet access to networks using mobile access technologies. For example, where NRAs have identified significant market power in the wholesale market for mobile access and call origination services in a regulatory context, a range of different access remedies have been facilitated in recognition of the differing levels of network roll-out of market participants. In its 2007 finding of dominance in the wholesale mobile access and call origination market in Iceland, the PTA observed that, given the diversity of the mobile phone market and the various needs of the parties that might conceivably seek access, all forms of wholesale access that may reasonably be granted and that can promote competition in the retail market should fall within the scope of the access obligation (66). In this respect, Síminn was required to comply with all reasonable and appropriate requests for access to: (i) national roaming (67); (ii) co-location and joint utilisation (68); (iii) mobile virtual network operator (‘MVNO’) access (69) and (iv) resale (70).

| (98) | It follows from Article 2.1 of the tender description, which is marked as Annex I to the Agreement, that the project under assessment was technologically neutral. In accordance with this principle, Síminn deployed the publicly funded network using ADSL, UMTS, satellite and Wi-Fi technology (71). Thus, to avoid potential distortions of competition in electronic communications markets where State aid is involved, it appears that third-party operators should be generally granted effective wholesale access in a technology-neutral manner and reasonably adapted to their respective access needs. |
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(98)

It follows from Article 2.1 of the tender description, which is marked as Annex I to the Agreement, that the project under assessment was technologically neutral. In accordance with this principle, Síminn deployed the publicly funded network using ADSL, UMTS, satellite and Wi-Fi technology (71). Thus, to avoid potential distortions of competition in electronic communications markets where State aid is involved, it appears that third-party operators should be generally granted effective wholesale access in a technology-neutral manner and reasonably adapted to their respective access needs.

| (99) | According to Annex II to the Agreement, the seller is free to offer options 1-4, but is only obliged to offer option 3 in all instances where ADSL broadband technology is used in the project (see paragraph 34 above) (72). At the same time, however, it is stipulated in the Agreement that wholesale access to ADSL-based services should be granted on the same terms as prescribed by the PTA’s 2008 decision concerning wholesale broadband access, which obliged Síminn to provide options 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, this obligation to provide all four options was not entirely clear from the tender documents and the subsequent Agreement, given that they only expressly noted an obligation to offer option 3. Furthermore, the PTA’s 2008 wholesale broadband access decision is potentially subject to change and would not therefore appear an adequate substitute for a clear specification of the access obligations in the actual tender documents and subsequent Agreement itself. |
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(99)

According to Annex II to the Agreement, the seller is free to offer options 1-4, but is only obliged to offer option 3 in all instances where ADSL broadband technology is used in the project (see paragraph 34 above) (72). At the same time, however, it is stipulated in the Agreement that wholesale access to ADSL-based services should be granted on the same terms as prescribed by the PTA’s 2008 decision concerning wholesale broadband access, which obliged Síminn to provide options 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, this obligation to provide all four options was not entirely clear from the tender documents and the subsequent Agreement, given that they only expressly noted an obligation to offer option 3. Furthermore, the PTA’s 2008 wholesale broadband access decision is potentially subject to change and would not therefore appear an adequate substitute for a clear specification of the access obligations in the actual tender documents and subsequent Agreement itself.

| (100) | Furthermore, in the instances where UMTS technology is used to deliver broadband services as part of the project, the seller is only required to follow an option 4/resale-based form of access (73). According to the Icelandic authorities, the main reason for this arrangement is that the seller claims that it is necessary for it to have full access and control of the UMTS network end-to-end (see paragraph 36 above). Option 4 is based on the definition of basic services set out in Chapter 2.2.9 of the tender documents, which describes a traditional Internet resale service whereby the reseller does not operate any part of the network. Furthermore, according to this description, Síminn supplies the user equipment and installation in all instances regardless of who the retailer is, and also handles the customer and maintenance services. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

Furthermore, in the instances where UMTS technology is used to deliver broadband services as part of the project, the seller is only required to follow an option 4/resale-based form of access (73). According to the Icelandic authorities, the main reason for this arrangement is that the seller claims that it is necessary for it to have full access and control of the UMTS network end-to-end (see paragraph 36 above). Option 4 is based on the definition of basic services set out in Chapter 2.2.9 of the tender documents, which describes a traditional Internet resale service whereby the reseller does not operate any part of the network. Furthermore, according to this description, Síminn supplies the user equipment and installation in all instances regardless of who the retailer is, and also handles the customer and maintenance services.

| (101) | The contract/tender documents thereby oblige the seller to provide limited wholesale access to the ADSL network (i.e. option 3), and only resale access to the UMTS/3G network (74). Furthermore, based on the latest information received from the complainant, it appears that such access to the UMTS/3G network has not yet been agreed between Síminn and the complainant (75). As noted in paragraphs 37 and 39 above, standardised resale agreements, including standard resale discounts for both ADSL and UMTS technology, were included in Annex 10 to the Agreement. However, the Authority has not yet received full details regarding the precise underlying methodology used to calculate all of these resale discounts and cannot therefore come to a concrete view at this stage on the extent to which this access pricing would replicate competitive market conditions or contribute to avoiding anticompetitive pricing by the seller. |
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(101)

The contract/tender documents thereby oblige the seller to provide limited wholesale access to the ADSL network (i.e. option 3), and only resale access to the UMTS/3G network (74). Furthermore, based on the latest information received from the complainant, it appears that such access to the UMTS/3G network has not yet been agreed between Síminn and the complainant (75). As noted in paragraphs 37 and 39 above, standardised resale agreements, including standard resale discounts for both ADSL and UMTS technology, were included in Annex 10 to the Agreement. However, the Authority has not yet received full details regarding the precise underlying methodology used to calculate all of these resale discounts and cannot therefore come to a concrete view at this stage on the extent to which this access pricing would replicate competitive market conditions or contribute to avoiding anticompetitive pricing by the seller.

| (102) | Furthermore, the Authority has not yet received fully comprehensive information on all of the access-related correspondence between the affected parties to date and thus cannot come to a view regarding the reasonableness of any such access requests or refusals at this time. While, as noted above, it is claimed that Síminn requires full access and control of the UMTS network in order to guarantee the specified quality and service levels, it has not been explained precisely why it is necessary for Síminn to control the entire value chain, and why greater involvement from third-party access seekers’ own systems/infrastructure is not feasible in this regard. In the absence of any clear justification in this respect, the lack of a defined wholesale access obligation which allows for different levels of involvement of the access-seeker’s own infrastructure in relation to the UMTS network would appear to give Síminn a competitive and commercial advantage in respect of this part of the network. This could allow Síminn to establish the initial relationship with the end user and thereby build up a customer base and take market shares without having to compete effectively with third-party operators. This is because, under a resale-only access obligation, third-party operators would be limited in terms of the extent to which they could differentiate their services (for example, in terms of price and product features/functionality) from that of Síminn. |
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(102)

Furthermore, the Authority has not yet received fully comprehensive information on all of the access-related correspondence between the affected parties to date and thus cannot come to a view regarding the reasonableness of any such access requests or refusals at this time. While, as noted above, it is claimed that Síminn requires full access and control of the UMTS network in order to guarantee the specified quality and service levels, it has not been explained precisely why it is necessary for Síminn to control the entire value chain, and why greater involvement from third-party access seekers’ own systems/infrastructure is not feasible in this regard. In the absence of any clear justification in this respect, the lack of a defined wholesale access obligation which allows for different levels of involvement of the access-seeker’s own infrastructure in relation to the UMTS network would appear to give Síminn a competitive and commercial advantage in respect of this part of the network. This could allow Síminn to establish the initial relationship with the end user and thereby build up a customer base and take market shares without having to compete effectively with third-party operators. This is because, under a resale-only access obligation, third-party operators would be limited in terms of the extent to which they could differentiate their services (for example, in terms of price and product features/functionality) from that of Síminn.

| (103) | In addition, the apparently limited nature of the wholesale access options formally prescribed for the ADSL-based broadband services in receipt of State support may also have restricted the extent to which third-party operators could meaningfully differentiate their offering relative to Síminn’s retail offering (76). According to the complainant, it took years to get satisfactory wholesale access to the ADSL service rolled out under the Agreement. While, as noted above, the Authority has not yet received fully comprehensive information on all of the access-related correspondence to date, the Authority cannot exclude that Síminn has been granted a first-mover advantage in relation to a significant part of the publicly-funded broadband infrastructure. If this is the case, this would in turn result in economic and competitive advantages for Síminn, which does not seem to be in line with the principles of proportionality and limitation of the distortion of competition under the balancing test. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

In addition, the apparently limited nature of the wholesale access options formally prescribed for the ADSL-based broadband services in receipt of State support may also have restricted the extent to which third-party operators could meaningfully differentiate their offering relative to Síminn’s retail offering (76). According to the complainant, it took years to get satisfactory wholesale access to the ADSL service rolled out under the Agreement. While, as noted above, the Authority has not yet received fully comprehensive information on all of the access-related correspondence to date, the Authority cannot exclude that Síminn has been granted a first-mover advantage in relation to a significant part of the publicly-funded broadband infrastructure. If this is the case, this would in turn result in economic and competitive advantages for Síminn, which does not seem to be in line with the principles of proportionality and limitation of the distortion of competition under the balancing test.

| (104) | This view is supported by the Mediaset case, where the European Courts found that a subsidy granted to consumers who purchased a terrestrial digital TV-decoder created an economic advantage for terrestrial broadcasters, in comparison to satellite broadcasters. The Courts observed that ‘building up an audience is a crucial part of the business for broadcasters of TV programmes [...] the aid measure at issue created an incentive for consumers to switch from the analogue to the digital terrestrial mode, while limiting the costs that digital terrestrial TV broadcasters had to bear, enabling those same broadcasters to consolidate their existing position on the market — as compared with the position of new competitors — in terms of brand image and customer retention’ (77). |
| --- | --- |

(104)

This view is supported by the Mediaset case, where the European Courts found that a subsidy granted to consumers who purchased a terrestrial digital TV-decoder created an economic advantage for terrestrial broadcasters, in comparison to satellite broadcasters. The Courts observed that ‘building up an audience is a crucial part of the business for broadcasters of TV programmes [...] the aid measure at issue created an incentive for consumers to switch from the analogue to the digital terrestrial mode, while limiting the costs that digital terrestrial TV broadcasters had to bear, enabling those same broadcasters to consolidate their existing position on the market — as compared with the position of new competitors — in terms of brand image and customer retention’ (77).

2.3.   
  Conclusion with regard to the balancing test and the compatibility of the measure

| (105) | After having assessed the measure under the relevant criteria of the balancing test, the Authority’s preliminary conclusion is that it cannot exclude that the lack of a clear and effective wholesale access obligation with clearly defined pricing principles gave the network operator a disproportionate advantage that may cause distortions of competition. Hence, the Authority is, at this stage, not able to conclude that the aid to Síminn is compatible with the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

After having assessed the measure under the relevant criteria of the balancing test, the Authority’s preliminary conclusion is that it cannot exclude that the lack of a clear and effective wholesale access obligation with clearly defined pricing principles gave the network operator a disproportionate advantage that may cause distortions of competition. Hence, the Authority is, at this stage, not able to conclude that the aid to Síminn is compatible with the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (106) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘[t]he EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until th[e] procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘[t]he EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until th[e] procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (107) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the aid measures to the Authority. Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have, by tendering out and financing the broadband network, put those measures into effect before the Authority has adopted a final decision. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of any aid involved might therefore be unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the aid measures to the Authority. Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have, by tendering out and financing the broadband network, put those measures into effect before the Authority has adopted a final decision. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of any aid involved might therefore be unlawful.

4.   Opening of the formal investigation

| (108) | Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Icelandic authorities, the Authority, after carrying out the preliminarily assessment, takes the view that the contract between Síminn and the Fund concerning for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland appears to involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Icelandic authorities, the Authority, after carrying out the preliminarily assessment, takes the view that the contract between Síminn and the Fund concerning for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland appears to involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement.

| (109) | Given these doubts and the potential impact of State aid on the investments of private operators, it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

Given these doubts and the potential impact of State aid on the investments of private operators, it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure.

| (110) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute aid. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute aid.

| (111) | The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the project on relevant markets. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the project on relevant markets.

| (112) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (113) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted already to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted already to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

| (114) | Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication, |
| --- | --- |

(114)

Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The contract between Síminn and the Telecommunications Fund concerning for the roll-out of broadband services in rural areas in Iceland appears to involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is initiated regarding the aid referred to in Article 1.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide, within one month from notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the measures under the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English-language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 10 July 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sverrir Haukur GUNNLAUGSSON

College Member

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(1)  Il Fondo delle telecomunicazioni è stato istituito per controllare l’assegnazione di fondi pubblici a progetti relativi all’introduzione dell’infrastruttura di comunicazioni elettroniche in Islanda.

1

(2)  Orientamenti dell’Autorità sull’applicazione delle norme sugli aiuti di Stato all’introduzione rapida delle reti a banda larga. La prima versione degli orientamenti è stata adottata dopo la conclusione dell’accordo tra Síminn e il Fondo delle telecomunicazioni, e pertanto non ha avuto alcun effetto all’epoca. Tuttavia gli orientamenti si fondavano sulla prassi decisionale esistente della Commissione europea.

2

(3)  Causa C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH e Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg contro Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, (Raccolta 2003, pag. I-7747).

3

Altmark Trans GmbH e Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH

(4)  As further described in paragraph 34 below, the tender documents initially set out a range of possible access options where ADSL infrastructure (see footnote 13 for a definition of this technology) is used for delivery of the broadband services in question. These ranged from more resale-based options (where the access seeker relies significantly on the host operator’s systems/infrastructure) to more infrastructure-based options (where the access seeker relies to varying degrees on its own systems/infrastructure), albeit not clearly mandating all of these access options as will be discussed further below. In the case of any services delivered via UMTS (see footnote 14 for a definition of this technology), the tender documents only proposed a resale-based access option.

4

(5)  The Authority has received similar allegations from an interested party that also claims to have unsuccessfully tried to obtain wholesale access to Síminn’s network (Event No 614576).

5

(6)  See Act No 132/2005 on the Telecommunication Fund of 20 December 2005.

6

(7)  They did so by comparing the official legal residence information to information from municipalities, their own databases of farmers and by asking local people with up-to-date knowledge, and in some instances even calling particular homes or neighbours’ homes, when in doubt.

7

(8)  Also referred to interchangeably herein as ‘service providers’, ‘Internet service providers’, or ‘ISPs’.

8

(9)  ‘Black areas’ are those in which there are or there will be in the near future at least two basic broadband networks of different operators and broadband services are provided under competitive conditions. ‘Grey areas’ are areas in which one network operator is present and another network is unlikely to be developed in the near future. ‘White areas’ are areas in which there is no broadband infrastructure and where such infrastructure is unlikely to be developed in the near future. For further clarification, see the Authority’s Guidelines on the rapid deployment of broadband networks, available online at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-IV—Application-of-state-aid-rules-in-relation-to-rapid-deployment-of-broadband-networks.pdf

9

(10)  The Fund provided free of charge technical assistance for all the service providers that did not have the technical capability to provide accurate shape-files that could be used in ARCis-GIS applications.

10

(11)  The provision of access to voice services was optional for potential bidders in respect of buildings that would not receive this service on market terms and was confined to the provision of 2G GSM voice services only. 2G refers to second generation mobile technology, while GSM (global system for mobile communications) refers to the standard on which it is based.

11

(12)  See letter from the Icelandic authorities to the Authority, dated 22 June 2011 (Event No 601861).

12

(13)  According to the Icelandic authorities, the publication of the announcement also took account of the provisions of Act No 84/2007 on Public Procurement, in order to ensure the equal treatment of companies during public procurement. The Act implements into Icelandic legislation the act referred to at point 2 of Annex XVI to the EEA Agreement, Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ L 245, 7.9.2006, p. 22 and EEA Supplement No 44, 7.9.2006, p. 18). The STC advertises all their projects/tenders in this particular section of the newspaper concerned.

13

(14)  The description of the technical requirements of the project are found in the tender description, which is marked as Annex I to the Agreement. The Annexes form part of the Agreement and are binding upon the parties.

14

(15)  See Article 1.2.3.1 of Annex I to the Agreement and footnote 8 of this Decision.

15

(16)  ADSL stands for asymmetric digital subscriber line. Digital subscriber line (DSL) technologies use traditional (fixed) copper telephony networks to deliver digital broadband signals.

16

(17)  UMTS stands for universal mobile telecommunications system which refers to third generation (3G) mobile technology that can deliver higher capacity data/broadband services than under second generation (2G) mobile technology. 3G can be used for applications such as mobile voice telephony, SMS and mobile Internet access services, as well as for fixed wireless Internet access.

17

(18)  Wi-Fi refers to the use of local radio links for the transmission of voice and data communications to individual homes or business premises.

18

(19)  Taken from the English version of the PTA’s analysis of market 12, available online at: http://www.pfs.is/upload/files/Market%2012%20%20Annex%20A%20%20Analysis-%20of%20market.Public.pdf

19

(20)  This represents 41 % of the whole project.

20

(21)  In Annex II to the Agreement, reference is made to PTA Decision No 8/2008 of 18 April 2008, on the designation of undertakings with significant market power and imposition of obligations in the market for wholesale broadband access (market 12) (see also footnote 53 below). Furthermore, pursuant to the PTA Decision No 26/2007, Mila, a company associated with Siminn, was designated with significant market power in the market for wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to metallic loops and sub-loops for the purpose of providing broadband and voice services. Mila is consequently subject to a range of wholesale access obligations, such as an obligation to comply with reasonable requests for unbundled wholesale access to local loops, including the copper lines and related services. However, due, inter alia, to the economics of providing broadband services via unbundled local loops in remote rural areas, a material demand for this wholesale access service may nevertheless be unlikely.

21

(22)  This represents 55 % of the whole project.

22

(23)  This represents 4 % of the whole project.

23

(24)  These are discounts off Síminn’s retail price.

24

(25)  They refer, in this regard, to Commission Decision N 196/10 Establishment of a Sustainable Infrastructure Permitting Estonia-wide Broadband Internet Connection (EstWin project) (not yet published).

25

Establishment of a Sustainable Infrastructure Permitting Estonia-wide Broadband Internet Connection

(26)  See the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s Decision No 55/05/COL to close the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the sale of 1 744 rental apartments in Oslo (Norway), Section II.3, p. 19 with further references, OJ L 324, 23.11.2006, p. 11 and EEA Supplement No 56, 23.11.2006, p. 1.

26

(27)  Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraphs 21-23 and Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2008] Ct. Rep. 61, paragraph 78.

27

Höfner and Elser

Macroton

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  Case C-222/04 Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 108.

28

Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA

(29)  See EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL on the rapid deployment of a Next Generation Access network in rural areas of the municipality of Tromsø, Section II.1.2, and Commission Decision SA.33063 — Italy — Trentino NGA (OJ C 323, 24.10.2012, p. 6), paragraph 77.

29

Trentino NGA

(30)  Commission Decision N 14/08 — United Kingdom, Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach (OJ C 150, 17.6.2008, p. 3), paragraph 37.

30

Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach

(31)  See EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL, cited above, footnote 26.

31

(32)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] Ct. Rep. 76, paragraph 59; Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paragraph 11.

32

The Government of Norway

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris

Commission

(33)  See EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL and Commission Decision SA.33063 — Italy — Trentino NGA.

33

Trentino NGA.

(34)  Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-7747.

34

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH

(35)  See paragraphs 87 to 93 of the Judgment.

35

(36)  See the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest (not yet published), available online at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI—Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf

36

(37)  As expressed by the Commission previously in the area of access to broadband services, for instance in Commission Decision N 381/04 Pyrénées-Atlantiques (OJ C 162, 2.7.2005, p. 5). See also paragraph 49 of the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, and paragraph 22 of the Authority’s 2010 Guidelines on the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of broadband networks. The Authority will address the relevance of these guidelines in Section II.2.1 of this Decision.

37

Pyrénées-Atlantiques

(38)  See paragraph 52 of the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest.

38

(39)  See for example Article 33(3)(a) of Directive 2004/18/EC. The provision states that: ‘In the case of works procurement, contracting authorities may award contracts by a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice in the following cases: in the case of an additional work not included in the project initially but considered essential and must, through unforeseen circumstances, be carried out by the same bidder, provided that such work cannot be technically or economically separated from the main contract without great inconvenience to the contracting authorities. The same applies if an additional work is necessary in order to finish an agreed work. The aggregate value of contracts awarded for additional work may not exceed 50 % of the amount of the original contract amount.’ The Directive does not apply to the procedure at hand, as procurements concerning the construction of telecommunication networks are exempted (see Article 13), but its fundamental principles still do (see Section II.2.2.2.3 below). The Authority is in doubt whether all the criteria of Article 33(3)(a) are fulfilled.

39

(40)  This latest set of Broadband Guidelines was adopted by the Authority on 20 February 2013 (not yet published), available online at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-IV—Application-of-state-aid-rules-in-relation-to-rapid-deployment-of-broadband-networks.pdf

40

(41)  See paragraph 5 of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

41

(42)  See for example Commission Decisions C 35/2005 Broadband development Appingedam (OJ L 86, 27.3.2007, p. 1), and N 14/08 Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach.

42

Broadband development Appingedam

Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach

(43)  See definition in footnote 3.

43

(44)  See paragraphs 39-40 of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

44

(45)  See for example EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL, Section 3.2.1.2.

45

(46)  See for example EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 231/11/COL and Commission Decision N 14/08 Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach, paragraphs 54-55.

46

Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach

(47)  Paragraph 49(a) of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

47

(48)  See for instance Commission Decision N 508/08 — United Kingdom, Provision of Remote Broadband Services in Northern Ireland (OJ C 18, 24.1.2009, p. 1), Commission Decision N 475/07 — Ireland, National Broadband Scheme (NBS) (OJ C 282, 24.11.2007, p. 3) and Commission Decision N 157/06 — United Kingdom, South Yorkshire Digital region Broadband Project (OJ C 80, 13.4.2007, p. 2).

48

Provision of Remote Broadband Services in Northern Ireland

National Broadband Scheme (NBS)

South Yorkshire Digital region Broadband Project

(49)  The changes are explained in further detail in Section I.3.1.4 of this Decision.

49

(50)  Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 13.

50

(51)  The Court of Justice of the European Union has confirmed in its case-law that the internal market rules of the Treaty apply also to contracts outside the scope of the procurement directives, as long as the contract is of interest to economic operators located in other Member States. See, for example, Cases C-324/98 Telaustria, [2000] ECR I-10745, paragraph 60, C-231/03 Coname, [2005] ECR I-07287, paragraph 16, and C-458/03 Parking Brixen, [2005] ECR I-08585, paragraph 46. See also the Commission interpretative communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives, OJ C 179, 1.8.2006, p. 2.

51

Telaustria

Coname

Parking Brixen

(52)  See the table in Section I.3.1.3.

52

(53)  Paragraph 49(f) of the 2010 Broadband Guidelines.

53

(54)  See Commission Decisions C 53/2006 Investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the home (FttH) network (OJ L 247, 16.9.2008, p. 27), paragraph 96, and N 14/08 United Kingdom, Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach, paragraph 57(c), and N 475/07 — Ireland, National Broadband Scheme (‘NBS’), paragraph 45(e).

54

Investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the home (FttH) network

United Kingdom, Broadband in Scotland — Extending Broadband Reach

Ireland, National Broadband Scheme

(55)  Paragraph 77(g) of the 2013 Broadband Guidelines.

55

(56)  PTA Decision No 8/2008 (see footnote 18 above).

56

(57)  See, for example, Article 8(5)(c) of Act referred to at point 5cl of Annex XI to the EEA Agreement (Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33)) (OJ L 116, 22.4.2004, p. 60 and EEA Supplement No 20, 22.4.2004, p. 14), as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulations Directive) (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37) (not yet incorporated into the EEA Agreement) and Act referred to at point 5cl of Annex XI to the EEA Agreement (Regulation (EC) No 544/2009 (OJ L 167, 29.6.2009, p. 12); OJ L 334, 17.12.2009, p. 4 and EEA Supplement No 68, 17.12.2009, p. 4) which notes one of the objectives of the regulatory framework as the promotion, where appropriate, of infrastructure-based competition.

57

(58)  ERG 06(33), Revised ERG Common Position on the Approach to Appropriate Remedies in the ECNS Regulatory Framework, May 2006.

58

(59)  See footnote 51 above and Commission Decision (C(2007) 6072 final) on case C 53/06 (ex N 262/05, ex CP 127/2004), Investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the home (FttH) network.

59

Investment by the city of Amsterdam in a fibre-to-the home (FttH) network

(60)  Passive network access refers to access to the passive network without any electronic equipment (i.e. physical network elements such as ducts, fibre, cabinets, etc.).

60

(61)  Active access refers to access to the activated network (i.e. whereby the systems or technical components necessary to operate the network are in place, such as switches, routers or splitters).

61

(62)  Commission Decision N 330/10 — France — Programme national «Très Haut Débit» — Volet B.

62

Programme national «Très Haut Débit» — Volet B

(63)  This included the availability of an offer to connect the access-seekers’ own networks, to connect different parts of the network and to connect to the end consumer.

63

(64)  In this regard, this form of network activity was not being funded by the programme, but access to active wholesale products was nonetheless required where there was a reasonable demand for such products.

64

(65)  See Decision referred to in footnote 59, paragraph 24.

65

(66)  The PTA, in its Decision on the designation of undertaking with significant market power and imposition of obligations in the market for access and call origination on public mobile phone networks (market 15), and Analysis of the wholesale market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks (market 15), 5 February 2007.

66

(67)  ‘National roaming’ refers to an agreement among mobile network infrastructure operators to use each other’s networks to provide services in geographic areas where they do not yet have coverage.

67

(68)  This refers to an obligation on Síminn to offer other mobile network operators the ability to physically locate their equipment on, or to jointly utilise existing land or mobile infrastructure (such as cable ducts, buildings and structures, or masts).

68

(69)  ‘Mobile virtual network operator’ (MVNO) refers to a provider of mobile services which does not have its own spectrum resources and may or may not own mobile network infrastructure, depending on the particular business model pursued and the extent to which they rely on the facilities provided by the host mobile network. According to the PTA’s definition in its 2007 decision, in cases involving pure virtual network access, the virtual network operator controls the system that is necessary for interconnection and roaming in other operators’ networks but does not own a distribution system (i.e. the wireless part of the mobile phone network).

69

(70)  A reseller typically has neither mobile spectrum nor network infrastructure, but has the direct customer relationship and may handle, inter alia, customer billing, marketing and sales of the service to end user under an independent brand name. According to the PTA’s definition in its 2007 decision, the reseller does not own any independent mobile network infrastructure and purchases virtually all support services at the wholesale level.

70

(71)  As previously noted, 55 % of buildings were connected with UMTS (3G fixed wireless), 41 % with ADSL and 4 % with satellite/Wi-Fi.

71

(72)  According to the information provided by the Icelandic authorities, wholesale access was to be effective from 2008 to 2014 and the parties to the contract can add up to two years to its term depending on market developments and other factors (see paragraph 27 above).

72

(73)  Reference is made to Chapter 3.2.4 of Section I for a description of Options 1-4.

73

(74)  The Fund, in its note dated 14 August 2009, confirms that only resale access is available with regard to UMTS connections.

74

(75)  As regards voice services, and as further noted in footnote 8 above, the Icelandic authorities state that access to voice services in this project was confined to the provision of 2G GSM to a few identified buildings only and that Síminn offers third-party 2G (roaming) access in this regard.

75

(76)  It appears from the tender documents and from the Agreement that only option 3 was clearly mandated, although the PTA’s 2008 wholesale broadband access decision may have provided some further support for third-party requests for access to the more infrastructure-based wholesale options 1 and 2.

76

(77)  Case T-177/07 Mediaset SpA v European Commission [2010] ECR II-02341, paragraph 62, upheld by Case C-403/10 Mediaset SpA v European Commission (not yet published), paragraph 64.

77

Mediaset SpA

European Commission

Mediaset SpA

European Commission

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V Avvisi

PROCEDIMENTI AMMINISTRATIVI

Commissione europea

| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/31 |
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28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/31

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Invito a presentare proposte nell'ambito del piano di attuazione dell'impresa comune «Celle a combustibile e idrogeno»

2013/C 347/12

Si avvertono gli interessati della pubblicazione di un invito a presentare proposte nell’ambito del piano di attuazione annuale 2013 dell’impresa comune «Celle a combustibile e idrogeno» (FCH JU).

Si sollecitano proposte per il seguente invito: FCH-JU-2013-2

La documentazione relativa all'invito, in cui si precisano le scadenze e la dotazione finanziaria, è disponibile nel seguente sito web:

http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/page/fp7_calls

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PROCEDIMENTI GIURISDIZIONALI

Corte EFTA

| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/32 |
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28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/32

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Ricorso presentato il 16 agosto 2013 da Konkurrenten.no AS contro l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

(Causa E-19/13)

2013/C 347/13

In data 16 agosto 2013 dinanzi alla Corte EFTA ha proposto ricorso contro l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA la società Konkurrenten.no AS, rappresentata da Jon Midthjell, avvocato, dello studio legale Advokatfirmaet Midthjell AS, Grev Wedels plass 5, 0151 Oslo, Norvegia.

La ricorrente chiede alla Corte EFTA di:

| 1) | annullare la decisione dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA n. 519/12/COL, del 19 dicembre 2012, (AS Oslo Sporveier e AS Sporveisbussene) e condannare la parte convenuta e gli eventuali intervenienti al pagamento delle spese; |
| --- | --- |

1)

annullare la decisione dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA n. 519/12/COL, del 19 dicembre 2012, (AS Oslo Sporveier e AS Sporveisbussene) e condannare la parte convenuta e gli eventuali intervenienti al pagamento delle spese;

| 2) | annullare la decisione dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA n. 181/13/COL, dell'8 maggio 2013, (Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS, Oslo Vognselskap AS e Unibuss AS) e condannare la parte convenuta e gli eventuali intervenienti al pagamento delle spese processuali; |
| --- | --- |

2)

annullare la decisione dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA n. 181/13/COL, dell'8 maggio 2013, (Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS, Oslo Vognselskap AS e Unibuss AS) e condannare la parte convenuta e gli eventuali intervenienti al pagamento delle spese processuali;

| 3) | condannare l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA (e gli eventuali intervenienti) al pagamento delle spese processuali. |
| --- | --- |

3)

condannare l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA (e gli eventuali intervenienti) al pagamento delle spese processuali.

Elementi di fatto e di diritto e motivi del ricorso:

| — | la ricorrente, Konkurrenten.no AS, è un operatore privato che agisce sul mercato dei bus express nella regione centrale e meridionale della Norvegia, |
| --- | --- |

—

la ricorrente, Konkurrenten.no AS, è un operatore privato che agisce sul mercato dei bus express nella regione centrale e meridionale della Norvegia,

| — | la ricorrente ha presentato all'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA due denunce per aiuti di Stato concessi a Oslo Sporveier, la prima l'11 agosto 2006 e la seconda l'8 settembre 2011, |
| --- | --- |

—

la ricorrente ha presentato all'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA due denunce per aiuti di Stato concessi a Oslo Sporveier, la prima l'11 agosto 2006 e la seconda l'8 settembre 2011,

| — | l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha chiuso il caso concernente la prima denuncia, senza avviare un'indagine formale, il 21 giugno 2010. Tale decisione è stata annullata dalla Corte EFTA il 22 agosto 2011 nell'ambito della causa E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no AS c. Autorità di vigilanza EFTA (Raccolta 2011 della Corte EFTA, pag. 266), |
| --- | --- |

—

l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha chiuso il caso concernente la prima denuncia, senza avviare un'indagine formale, il 21 giugno 2010. Tale decisione è stata annullata dalla Corte EFTA il 22 agosto 2011 nell'ambito della causa E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no AS c. Autorità di vigilanza EFTA (Raccolta 2011 della Corte EFTA, pag. 266),

| — | la decisione dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA del 28 marzo 2012 di avviare un'indagine formale sugli aiuti potenziali alla AS Oslo Sporveier e alla AS Sporveisbussene è stata pubblicata nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea, nonché nel supplemento SEE, il 5 luglio 2012, |
| --- | --- |

—

la decisione dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA del 28 marzo 2012 di avviare un'indagine formale sugli aiuti potenziali alla AS Oslo Sporveier e alla AS Sporveisbussene è stata pubblicata nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea, nonché nel supplemento SEE, il 5 luglio 2012,

| — | con decisione del 19 dicembre 2012, l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha chiuso l'indagine formale sugli aiuti potenziali alla AS Oslo Sporveier e alla AS Sporveisbussene. L'8 maggio 2013 l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha preso una decisione sui presunti aiuti alla Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS, Oslo Vognselskap AS e Unibuss AS. Nessuna di queste decisioni è stata ancora pubblicata nella Gazzetta ufficiale o nel supplemento SEE, |
| --- | --- |

—

con decisione del 19 dicembre 2012, l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha chiuso l'indagine formale sugli aiuti potenziali alla AS Oslo Sporveier e alla AS Sporveisbussene. L'8 maggio 2013 l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha preso una decisione sui presunti aiuti alla Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS, Oslo Vognselskap AS e Unibuss AS. Nessuna di queste decisioni è stata ancora pubblicata nella Gazzetta ufficiale o nel supplemento SEE,

| — | con il presente ricorso la ricorrente chiede l'annullamento di entrambe le decisioni. |
| --- | --- |

—

con il presente ricorso la ricorrente chiede l'annullamento di entrambe le decisioni.

La ricorrente sostiene tra l'altro che l'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA:

| | in relazione alla prima decisione (del 19 dicembre 2012):






  — | ha considerato in modo illegittimo che l'apporto di capitale costituisse in parte un aiuto esistente e in parte non costituisse un aiuto e che la compensazione forfettaria annuale costituisse un aiuto esistente, e |
| --- | --- | --- |

in relazione alla prima decisione (del 19 dicembre 2012):

—

ha considerato in modo illegittimo che l'apporto di capitale costituisse in parte un aiuto esistente e in parte non costituisse un aiuto e che la compensazione forfettaria annuale costituisse un aiuto esistente, e

| — | ha violato l'articolo 61 SEE in relazione all'uso di contributi del gruppo per conseguire situazioni fiscali negative cumulative. |
| --- | --- |

—

ha violato l'articolo 61 SEE in relazione all'uso di contributi del gruppo per conseguire situazioni fiscali negative cumulative.

| | In relazione alla seconda decisione (dell'8 maggio 2013):






  — | non ha rispettato l'obbligo di avviare un'indagine formale considerando in modo illegittimo che l'operazione costituisse un aiuto esistente e che i prestiti di liquidità a breve termine e gli appalti concessi senza indire una gara d'appalto non costituissero aiuti, e |
| --- | --- | --- |

In relazione alla seconda decisione (dell'8 maggio 2013):

—

non ha rispettato l'obbligo di avviare un'indagine formale considerando in modo illegittimo che l'operazione costituisse un aiuto esistente e che i prestiti di liquidità a breve termine e gli appalti concessi senza indire una gara d'appalto non costituissero aiuti, e

| — | non ha rispettato l'obbligo di avviare un'indagine formale sulle garanzie concesse senza versamento di premi e sui prestiti pubblici a lungo termine a favore di infrastrutture concessi a AS Oslo Sporveier alle condizioni applicabili al comune stesso, considerando in modo illegittimo le misure come aiuti esistenti. |
| --- | --- |

—

non ha rispettato l'obbligo di avviare un'indagine formale sulle garanzie concesse senza versamento di premi e sui prestiti pubblici a lungo termine a favore di infrastrutture concessi a AS Oslo Sporveier alle condizioni applicabili al comune stesso, considerando in modo illegittimo le misure come aiuti esistenti.

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PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA

Commissione europea

| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/34

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Notifica preventiva di una concentrazione

(Caso COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV)

Caso ammissibile alla procedura semplificata

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

2013/C 347/14

| 1. | In data 19 novembre 2013 è pervenuta alla Commissione la notifica di un progetto di concentrazione in conformità dell’articolo 4 del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio (1). Con tale operazione le imprese Rheinmetall AG («Rheinmetall», Germania) e Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen GmbH («Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen», Germania) acquisiscono, ai sensi dell’articolo 3, paragrafo 1, lettera b), del regolamento comunitario sulle concentrazioni, il controllo comune di Rheinmetall International Engineering GmbH («Rheinmetall International Engineering», Germania), una società di nuova costituzione che si configura come impresa comune, mediante acquisto di quote. |
| --- | --- |

1.

In data 19 novembre 2013 è pervenuta alla Commissione la notifica di un progetto di concentrazione in conformità dell’articolo 4 del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio (1). Con tale operazione le imprese Rheinmetall AG («Rheinmetall», Germania) e Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen GmbH («Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen», Germania) acquisiscono, ai sensi dell’articolo 3, paragrafo 1, lettera b), del regolamento comunitario sulle concentrazioni, il controllo comune di Rheinmetall International Engineering GmbH («Rheinmetall International Engineering», Germania), una società di nuova costituzione che si configura come impresa comune, mediante acquisto di quote.

| 2. | Le attività svolte dalle imprese interessate sono le seguenti:






  — | Rheinmetall: opera su scala mondiale nella produzione di componenti auto e sistemi di difesa, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Le attività svolte dalle imprese interessate sono le seguenti:

—

Rheinmetall: opera su scala mondiale nella produzione di componenti auto e sistemi di difesa,

| — | Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen: opera su scala mondiale nella prestazione di servizi di progettazione, appalto e costruzione, in particolare nei settori della prospezione di petrolio e gas e delle linee di produzione industriale, |
| --- | --- |

—

Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen: opera su scala mondiale nella prestazione di servizi di progettazione, appalto e costruzione, in particolare nei settori della prospezione di petrolio e gas e delle linee di produzione industriale,

| — | Rheinmetall International Engineering: la joint venture riprenderà gran parte delle attività di Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen relative ai servizi di progettazione, appalto e costruzione ed estenderà la prestazione di questi servizi al settore della difesa. |
| --- | --- |

—

Rheinmetall International Engineering: la joint venture riprenderà gran parte delle attività di Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen relative ai servizi di progettazione, appalto e costruzione ed estenderà la prestazione di questi servizi al settore della difesa.

| 3. | A seguito di un esame preliminare la Commissione ritiene che la concentrazione notificata possa rientrare nel campo d'applicazione del regolamento comunitario sulle concentrazioni. Tuttavia, si riserva la decisione definitiva al riguardo. Si rileva che, ai sensi della comunicazione della Commissione concernente una procedura semplificata per l'esame di determinate concentrazioni a norma del regolamento comunitario sulle concentrazioni (2), il presente caso potrebbe soddisfare le condizioni per l'applicazione della procedura di cui alla comunicazione stessa. |
| --- | --- |

3.

A seguito di un esame preliminare la Commissione ritiene che la concentrazione notificata possa rientrare nel campo d'applicazione del regolamento comunitario sulle concentrazioni. Tuttavia, si riserva la decisione definitiva al riguardo. Si rileva che, ai sensi della comunicazione della Commissione concernente una procedura semplificata per l'esame di determinate concentrazioni a norma del regolamento comunitario sulle concentrazioni (2), il presente caso potrebbe soddisfare le condizioni per l'applicazione della procedura di cui alla comunicazione stessa.

| 4. | La Commissione invita i terzi interessati a presentare eventuali osservazioni sulla concentrazione proposta.
  Le osservazioni devono pervenire alla Commissione entro dieci giorni dalla data di pubblicazione della presente comunicazione. Le osservazioni possono essere trasmesse alla Commissione per fax (+32 22964301), per e-mail all’indirizzo COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o per posta, indicando il riferimento COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV, al seguente indirizzo:





  Commissione europea |
| --- | --- |
| Direzione generale della Concorrenza |
| Protocollo Concentrazioni |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

La Commissione invita i terzi interessati a presentare eventuali osservazioni sulla concentrazione proposta.

Le osservazioni devono pervenire alla Commissione entro dieci giorni dalla data di pubblicazione della presente comunicazione. Le osservazioni possono essere trasmesse alla Commissione per fax (+32 22964301), per e-mail all’indirizzo COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o per posta, indicando il riferimento COMP/M.7077 — Rheinmetall/Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen/Rheinmetall International Engineering JV, al seguente indirizzo:

Commissione europea

Direzione generale della Concorrenza

Protocollo Concentrazioni

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  GU L 24 del 29.1.2004, pag. 1 («il regolamento comunitario sulle concentrazioni»).

(2)  GU C 56 del 5.3.2005, pag. 32 («la comunicazione sulla procedura semplificata»).

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Rettifiche

| 28.11.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 347/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.11.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 347/35

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Rettifica dei giorni festivi nel 2013: Stati EFTA/SEE e istituzioni SEE

(
  Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea C 42 del 14 febbraio 2013

  )

2013/C 347/15

Il presente elenco sostituisce e annulla quello pubblicato nella GU C 42 del 14.2.2013, pag. 6, e nel Supplemento SEE n. 10 del 14.2.2013, pag. 5.

Giorni festivi nel 2013: Stati EFTA/SEE e istituzioni SEE

| | Islanda | Liechtenstein | Norvegia | Autorità di vigilanza EFTA | Corte di giustizia EFTA |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1o gennaio | X | X | X | X | X |
| 2 gennaio | | X | | X | |
| 3 gennaio | | | | X | |
| 6 gennaio | | X | | | |
| 2 febbraio | | X | | | |
| 12 febbraio | | X | | | |
| 19 marzo | | X | | | |
| 28 marzo | X | | X | | |
| 29 marzo | X | X | X | X | |
| 1o aprile | X | X | X | X | X |
| 25 aprile | X | | | | |
| 1o maggio | X | X | X | X | X |
| 9 maggio | X | X | X | X | X |
| 10 maggio | | | | X | |
| 17 maggio | | | X | | |
| 20 maggio | X | X | X | X | X |
| 30 maggio | | X | | | |
| 17 giugno | X | | | | |
| 24 giugno | | | | | X |
| 5 agosto | X | | | | |
| 15 agosto | | X | | | X |
| 8 settembre | | X | | | |
| 1o novembre | | X | | X | X |
| 8 dicembre | | X | | | |
| 23 dicembre | | | | X | |
| 24 dicembre | X | | | X | |
| 25 dicembre | X | X | X | X | X |
| 26 dicembre | X | X | X | X | X |
| 27 dicembre | | | | X | |
| 30 dicembre | | | | X | |
| 31 dicembre | X | X | | X | |

Islanda

Liechtenstein

Norvegia

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

Corte di giustizia EFTA

1o gennaio

X

X

X

X

X

2 gennaio

X

X

3 gennaio

X

6 gennaio

X

2 febbraio

X

12 febbraio

X

19 marzo

X

28 marzo

X

X

29 marzo

X

X

X

X

1o aprile

X

X

X

X

X

25 aprile

X

1o maggio

X

X

X

X

X

9 maggio

X

X

X

X

X

10 maggio

X

17 maggio

X

20 maggio

X

X

X

X

X

30 maggio

X

17 giugno

X

24 giugno

X

5 agosto

X

15 agosto

X

X

8 settembre

X

1o novembre

X

X

X

8 dicembre

X

23 dicembre

X

24 dicembre

X

X

25 dicembre

X

X

X

X

X

26 dicembre

X

X

X

X

X

27 dicembre

X

30 dicembre

X

31 dicembre

X

X

X

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