1

Filed 5/2/23 Robertson v. Larkspur Courts CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

J. MARTIN ROBERTSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. LARKSPUR COURTS et al ., Defendants and Respondents. A166818
(Marin County Super. Ct. No. CIV

- 1504551)

Thi s is our fourth opinion i n this litigation, which has been pending for

over seven years. Rather than resolving the merits of this appeal, however,
we dismiss it under the disentitlement doctrine. That doctrine permits us to “dismiss an appeal where the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower court’s orders or engaged in obstructive tactics,” a standard amply met here. ( Gwartz v. Weilert (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 750, 757

– 758 ( Gwartz ). )
A fter discovering mold in his apartment, p laintiff J. Martin Robertson
sued several entities , including respondents. 1 Robertson and respondents entered a stipulation for settlement, and judgment was entered to enforce the

1 Respondents, all of whom were involved in the management of Robertson’s apartment complex, are Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America, Riverstone Residential Group, LLC, Greystar RS CA, Inc., and Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC. The oth er four named defendants never appeared in the litigation.2

stipulation’s terms. In 2018, we affirmed the judgment , which a warded Robertson $28,000, required the parties to accept a mutual release, and required Robertson to sign a dismissal of the action with prejudice. ( Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (May 22, 2018 , A152226 ) [nonpub. opn.] ( Robertson I

).) We also affirmed the trial court’s order awarding sanctions to respondents , and we awarded respondents their appellate costs . ( Ibid. ) Two further appeals ensued, the latter of which also resulted in an award of appellate costs to respondents. ( Robertson v. Larkspur Courts ( Jun. 19, 2019, A154206 ) [nonpub. opn.] ( Robertson II ); Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (Oct. 5, 2021, A160942 ) [nonpub. opn.] ( Robertson III ).) Respondents paid Robertson the $28,000 they owe d him, but he refuse d to comply with his obligations under the judgment to enter a mutual release
and dismiss the lawsuit. He refused to comply with these obligations even though respondents offered not to pursue the sanctions award and both
orders awa rding appellate costs, no part s of which ha ve ever been paid. In

response , the trial court entered an order deeming respondents’ proposed release signed by all the parties and dismissing the case with prejudice. Robertson now appeals from that order, c laiming that (1) the trial court lacked authority to deem the release signed ; (2) the release was inconsistent with the judgment ; and (3) dismissal of the case deprived him of his rights. 2 We agree with respondents, however, that the disentitlement doctrine applies, and we therefore grant their motion to dismiss the appeal

.

2 Robertson filed a request for judicial notice of 29 “matters,” all of which are federal materials that do not require a request for judicial notice and/or are irrelevant to the remaining issues in this case. Thus, we deny the request in full.3 I. B ACKGROUND
A. Robertson’s Previous Appeals
We begin by summarizing the case’s facts and history through our Octob er 2021 decision in Robertson III

. Robertson , who is a lawyer, filed this
suit in December 2015 alleging that respondents and other entities inappropriately responded to the discovery of mold in his Larkspur apartment. Robertson and respondents reached a settlement and signed an agreement under which Robertson agreed to dis miss his claims in exchange for $28,000. In May 2017, t he trial court entered judgment to effectuate the
settlement’s terms

. Robertson unsuccessfully moved to vacate the judgment,
and the court awarded $1,280 in sanctions to respondents, concluding that the motion to vacate was frivolous. The following May, we affirmed the judgment and sanctions order in Robertson I

. We also a warded respondents their costs on appeal , which they then sought in the amount of $463.20. Meanwhile, both before and after the judgment was entered,

r espondents tried to pay the $28,000 to Robertson , but he refused to provide his social security number and other personal information (social security information), which respondents believed the ir insurer needed to comply with Medicare reporting requirements. In February 2018, w hile Robertson I was pending, the trial court granted respondents’ moti on to enforce the judgment
and ordered Ro bertson to provide the social security information.
Robertson appealed that order, initiating Robertson II

. In our
June 2019 opinion, we vacated the order on the basis the trial court lacked jurisdiction to ente r it while Robertson I was pending. In doing so, we did not
reach the merits of Robertson’s claim that the court erred by ordering him to disclose the social security information.4

On remand, Robertson filed motions seeking postjudgment attorney fees, po stjudgment costs, and interest on the judgment , and respondents filed a second motion to enforce the judgment

. While th o se motions were pending, respondents ’ insurer paid Robertson the $28,000 despite his failure to provide the social security information. In August 2020, the trial court denied Robertson’s motions and granted respondents’ motion to enforce the judgment

. The court ordered the parties to “jointly lodg e a signed mutual release[,] if they agree on [one,] or .

. . each separately lodge a proposed mutual release if they do not agree on [one].” It also ordered Robertson “to sign a standard form Dismissal of Prejudice of this action.” Robertson again appe aled, c laiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider respondents’ second motion to enforce the judgment and that it erred by denying him postjudgment attorney fees, costs, and
interest. In October 2021, we issued our Robertson III opinion a ffirming the court’s rulings. In doing so, we explicitly rejected Robertson’s challenge to the court’s finding s that (1) respondents made an “ unconditional tender ” of
the $28,000 settlement payment , despite their request for the social security informatio n before making it ; and (2) respondents’ delay in paying was due to his “vexatious and obstructionist conduct.”
B. T he Proceedings Leading to T his Appeal and Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
I n September 2020 , around the time Robertson III was initiated, each side submitted a proposed mutual release to the trial court. Respondents’ proposed release stated that Robertson and respondents, “along with each of their respective affiliates, predecessor entities, and successor entities

. . . , he reby mutually release one another from all claims arising in any way out of, or related to, [Robertson’s] occupancy of the [Larkspur] apartment .” In an accompanying case management statement, r espondents reported that5

Robertson objected to their proposed release because he wanted (1) “a ‘carve

out’ ” to permit him to pursue “ fees/costs/damages/interest allegedly incurred during the [post

- settlement] time period where the parties were attempting to negotiate a long

- form release agreement” and (2 ) a term “ad dress[ing] the

so
- called ‘non

- appearing’ defendants in this matter, including their alleged relationship to the ‘appearing’ defendants.” Reflecting these demands, Robertson’s proposed release stated that
Robertson would discharge his claims against resp ondents “and their affiliates, subsidiary and predecessor entities except ” for five categories of claims, including postjudgment interest on the settlement amount, costs and fees incurred litigating the social security information issue, and potential federal and state claims involving that issue. (Boldface omitted.) His release
also left spaces for describing respondents’ “form of organization” and affiliates.
In summer 2022, several months after t he Robertson III remittitur
issue d, respondents filed a case management statement reporting that Robertson continued to refuse to agree to a mutual relea se and still “ha[d] not paid outstanding sanctions and appellate costs.” Respondents also filed another proposed release that was similar to their previous release. At the case management conference that September, the trial court set

an order to show cause (OSC) hearing for October 19, 2022, to address why respondents’ proposed release should not be deemed signed by all the parties

. It allowed the parties to submit their position s on this issue by September 30.
R espondents filed a statement arguing it was appropriate to deem the release signed , but Robertson did not file anything by the deadline. Instead, on October 13, he filed three ex parte application s seeking orders (1) requiring respondents to provide more details about th eir insurer ’s claim to need the6

social security information to comply with Medicare reporting requirements , even though the insurer had already paid him without obtaining that
information ; (2) requiring respondents to provide information about their form o f organization and affiliates so he could ensure a release “of the claims of all named defendants ” ; and (3) staying the case to permit him to file a
federal lawsuit “concerning federal questions that [respondents’] and the [California] courts’ decisions ha ve raised.” (Boldface and italics omitted.) On October 17, 2022, the date for which Robertson noticed a hearing on his ex parte applications, the trial court held a hearing and denied all three applications. Two days later, the court held the OSC hearin g on its
scheduled date

. After hearing argument by the parties, the court entered an
order “deem[ing] the release as proposed by [respondents] signed by all parties ” and dismissing the case with prejudice. Robertson appealed the
order on December 15. Before the appellate record was filed, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine. After receiving three extensions of time on his opposition to the motion to dismiss , Robertson filed the opposition in conjunction w ith his opening brief.
II. D ISCUSSION
A. General Legal Standards “An appellate court has the inherent power to dismiss an appeal by a party that refuses to comply with a lower court order.” ( Gwartz , supra , 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.) “ Courts cannot f unction if their orders and judgments are routinely ignored by litigants or their counsel ,” and “litigants

are [not] free to ignore or refuse to comply with subsequent trial court orders ” when their lawful attempts to challenge a court’s rulings are unsucc essful

. ( Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 736,7

756.) Rather, “ ‘[a] trial court ’ s judgment and orders, all of them, are presumptively valid and must be obeyed and enforced. [Citation.] They are
not to be frustrated by litigants except by legally provided methods. ’ ” ( Ibid. )
The disentitlement doctrine “is not jurisdi ctional” but i s instead “a discretionary tool that may be used to dismiss an appeal when the balance of the equitable concerns makes dismi ssal an appropriate sanction.” ( Gwartz , supra , 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.) It is based on the principle that “ ‘[a] party to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitu de of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state.’ ” ( Stol tenberg v. Ampton Investments, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1230, quoting MacPherson v.
MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277 ; see Polanski v. Superior Court (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 507, 538 [party cannot “seek[] relief from the courts while ‘insulating [himself] from the consequences of an unfavorable result’ ”]. ) We may dismiss an appeal under the disentitlement doctrine “where the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower court’s orders or engaged in obstructive tactics,” even if the appellant has not been formally held in contempt. ( Gwartz , supra , 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 757

– 758 .) The doctrine
has been repeatedly applied in cases where the appellant “has frustrated or obstructed legitimate efforts to enforce a judgment” ( id. at p. 758), and it “ ‘is particularly likely to be invoked where the appeal arises out of the very order

. . . the party has disobeyed.’ ” ( Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica,
Inc. (201 5) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265

. ) “ [T]he merits of the appeal are
irrelevant to the application of the doctrine.” ( Ibid. )
B. Dismissal Under the Disentitlement Doctrine Is Justified. Respondents argue that dismissal under the disentitlement doctrine is
warranted because Robertson has violated multiple court orders . These8

include orders requiring him to dismiss the underlying case with prejudice, sign a standard mutual release , and pay sanctions a nd appellate costs. Respondents also argue that Robertson violated the trial court’s order setting the OSC hearing by filing ex parte applications after the deadline to submit position statements and setting the hearing on those applications two days
befo re the OSC hearing. We agree with respondents that t he equities favor dismiss ing the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine

. We affirmed t he judgment requiring Robertson to sign a release and dismiss the action with prejudice almost five years ago

. R egardless of whether his position about the social security information was reasonable, by mid

- 2020 he received the $28,000 settlement payment without having to provide that information. Even though respondents thus fulfilled their primary obligation unde r the judgment nearly three years ago, Robertson refused to negotiate a mutual release in good faith or take any other action to help finally bring this litigation to a close. By now challenging the mutual release that was deemed signed only because of his intransigence, Robertson is clearly “se eking the benefits of an appeal while willfully disobeying the trial court’s valid orders and thereby frustrating [respondents’] legitimate efforts to enforce the judgment.” ( Gwartz , supra , 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.) In arguing otherwise, Robertson reiterates h is objections to the mutual release’s terms and his views on matters that are not at issue in th is case

. We decline to address the merits of the appeal, which are i rrelevant to application of the disentitlement doctrine, or his o ngoing concerns about the social security information. He also claims that respondents have unclean hands because they want to dismiss this appeal “to cover up their ongoing concealment of m aterial information,” namely the information about9

Medicare reporting requirements that he sought below through one of his
late

- filed ex parte applications

. Discovery about the social security information has no conceivable relevance at this point , and we agree with respondents that Robertson’s attempt to seek it below violated at least the spirit of the trial court’s order permitting position statements before the OSC hearing. Moreover, as Robertson admits, he has never paid the amounts due
under the trial court’s July 2017 sanctions order or th is court’s May 2018 award of appellate costs in Robertson I. 3 The failure to pay sanctions and other awards of fees and costs is a common ground for applying the
disentitlement doctrine , and we conclude i t supports dismissal here . (See,

e.g., Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians , supra , 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 757; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 166

– 167.) In arguing otherwise, Robertson claims he is not in violation of any
court orders since respondents “offered to waive their rights to collect the
sanctions and costs ” and the mutual release deemed signed is “broad enough to cover releases of [respondents’] claims” for those charges. Th is posit ion is specious. First, r espondents offered to waive the sanctions and costs , which were clearly not contemplated under the original stipulation for settlement , to incentivize Robertson to fulfill his obligations to enter a mutual release
and dismiss the lawsuit. In other words, h is refusal to comply with the judgment was the only reason respondents offered not to seek payment. Second, in this appeal Robertson seeks to overturn the mutual release , which

3 We also awarded respondents their appellate costs in Robertson III , but they state that they never pursue d those costs “in hopes of mitigating disputes and being done with this case.”10

the trial court deemed signed only after he failed to negotiate in good faith

. He cannot simultaneously contend that the very release he challenges
insulates him from having to comply with other court orders. In short, Robertson has persistently refused to comply with the judgment or pay the sanctions and costs he owes respondents. D espite our

entreat y in Robertson I that he work constructively to resolve this cas e, he
has unreasonably prolonged the litigation while burdening res pondents, the trial court, and us with his voluminous filings and meritless arguments. We
decline to entertain yet another appeal by s omeone who displays such disregard for court orders and the legal process.
III. D ISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. Respondent s are awarded their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)11 _________________________ Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Margulies, J.

_________________________ Banke, J.

Robertson v. Larkspur Courts A 166818