Filed 7/3/23 Marriage of Mona and Schmelzer CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re Marriage of STEPHANIE 

MONA and TROY SCHMELZER.

________________________________

STEPHANIE MONA,

Appellant,

v.

TROY SCHMELZER,

Respondent.

B317609

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BD626890)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Wendy L. Wilcox, Judge. Affirmed.

Appellant, in pro. per.

No appearance by Respondent.

_________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from a post-judgment order modifying 

child and spousal support and determining arrearages payable by 

Troy Schmelzer to ex-wife Stephanie Mona.1 The family court

ordered Troy to pay down the arrearages he owes for child 

support, spousal support, and unreimbursed medical expenses by

$100 each, or a combined $300, per month.

Stephanie appealed. She argues the trial court’s order 

amounts to an abuse of discretion, as it “would take 254 years 

and 7 months [for Troy] to [pay the balance due]” to Stephanie.

Troy has not made any appearance on appeal.

We find no error and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We piece together the following from the scanty record we 

were provided.

I. Background Information

Troy and Stephanie married on February 17, 2001. They 

separated on July 13, 2015. They have two minor children, ages 

12 and 14, and one adult child, age 20.

On September 10, 2015, Stephanie filed a petition for 

dissolution of her marriage to Troy.

On October 17, 2016, the judgment of dissolution 

(judgment) was filed and entered by the court. We were not 

provided a copy of the parties’ judgment. We glean some of the 

judgment’s terms from pleadings filed four and a half years later. 

The judgment ordered Troy to pay Stephanie $10,114 in child 

1 We refer to the parties by their first names.
3

support per month. The judgment also ordered Troy to pay 

Stephanie spousal support of $6,852 per month.

II. Post-Judgment Motion to Modify Child and Spousal 

Support

On April 9, 2021, Troy filed a request for order (RFO) to 

modify visitation, child support, spousal support, and for the 

“[r]elease of [Troy’s] California Law License”; he also filed an 

Income and Expense (I&E) declaration (which was not provided 

to us). He sought to modify the judgment’s child support order to 

guideline amount and to modify and/or terminate spousal 

support.

Troy stated there has been “a substantial and material 

change of circumstances since entry of [the judgment]” in that his 

employment as a partner at Baker Hostetler was “involuntarily 

terminated” on February 28, 2019. The judgment’s support 

terms were based on his then income of $707,136 per year. He 

has “since been unable to find comparable employment.”

After months passed with “no success in finding a position 

in a law firm,” Troy started his own practice, Schmelzer IP. As 

he was undertaking this effort, he was notified in October 2019 of 

the “imminent suspension of [his] California law license due to 

falling behind on child support payments in the preceding 

months in which [he] had no income.” This “disqualifie[d] [him] 

from providing services or earning income as an attorney in 

California.” He thus relocated his law practice to Arizona where 

he also has a law license. However, the global COVID-19 

pandemic then began and “added to [Troy’s] difficulties in finding 

employment.”

“Although [his] Arizona law license remains active for now, 

the suspension of [his] California license is very public and 
4

prominent and has had the consequence of making it virtually 

impossible to find employment as an attorney, even in Arizona.” 

Until his child support obligation is “reduced to a level 

commensurate with [his] substantially changed circumstances, so 

that [he] can be in compliance going forward and obtain release of 

[his] law license, [he] will continue to be unable to find 

substantial employment in [his] field.” Troy requested that the 

court “order the California Department of Child Support Services 

to issue a release of his California law license no. 211460 to the 

State Bar of California.”

Troy further alleged that on March 30, 2020, Stephanie 

“petitioned the State Bar of Arizona to revoke [his] Arizona law 

license.” He alleged: Stephanie sought “to deprive [him] of his 

ability to generate income by her petition with the State Bar of 

Arizona for his permanent disbarment, based on false allegations 

including that [he] had quit his job to ‘find himself. . . . [T]his is 

simply not true. [¶] If [Stephanie] truly has a continued need for 

spousal support from [him], she would not petition his licensing 

authority to revoke his law license at all, much less make such a 

petition based on false and damaging allegations. . . . It would not 

be just or equitable for this court to continue ordering spousal 

support to a party that is actively seeking to strip the supporting 

party of his ability to earn income.”

Troy next alleged he “currently is unable to support himself 

and has no ability to pay spousal support.” He “completely 

tapped all financial resources, and at this point [was] living on 

the basis of loans from [his] mother and the goodwill of a friend.” 

He alleged that Stephanie “has been living comfortably in the 

home of the boyfriend with whom she cohabits for the last two 

years, with the children having rooms and attending high quality 
5

schools. She has a higher monthly income (unemployment 

compensation) than [him].” He provided, as an exhibit, a copy of 

Stephanie’s resume as an “Event Design and Production 

Manager” where she describes herself as a “[r]esults-oriented 

professional with over 15 years of experience.” She previously 

attended law school and also has experience working as a legal 

secretary prior to event planning.

On May 21, 2021, Stephanie filed her responsive 

declaration opposing Troy’s RFO. She alleged that Troy “stopped 

paying child support & spousal support in April 2019, and 

currently owes $275,000 child support arrearages and $206,000 

in spousal support arrearages.” She and the children are 

“surviving by living with her boyfriend in Van Nuys, borrowing 

money from her parents, and receiving government assistance in 

the form of Cal-fresh (food stamps) & Medi-Cal (health 

insurance).” Due to Troy’s “continued non-payment, she was 

forced to file for bankruptcy in August 2019, and had both of her 

vehicles repossessed in December 2019.”

That same date, Stephanie filed an I&E declaration, a copy 

of which was not included in the record before us.

On May 25, 2021, Los Angeles County’s Department of 

Child Support Services (DCSS) filed a responsive declaration that 

the “current order for child support should remain in full force 

and effect unless there is a change in circumstances, then 

guideline child support should be ordered.” (Italics added.)

On May 26, 2021, Troy filed an updated I&E declaration—

again not included in the appellate record.

At the hearing held July 30, 2021, the court found there 

has been a material change in circumstances warranting a 

modification of child and spousal support. We were not provided 
6

a reporter’s transcript of this hearing. The minute order provides 

the court “note[d] that child support and spousal support shall be 

based on the parties’ current Income and Expense 

Declaration[s].” The minute order further provides that hearing 

“is continued to October 29, 2021” and that the parties are 

ordered “to submit proposed DissoMasters based on the current 

Income and Expense Declarations by the parties.”

III. Post-Judgment Motion to Determine Arrears Owed

On September 1, 2021, Stephanie filed an RFO for a 

determination of arrearages owed for child support, spousal 

support, and unreimbursed medical expenses. She alleged Troy 

informed her in January 2019 that “he would be quitting his job 

as a patent attorney” and “taking some time off ‘to find himself.’ ” 

She initiated a case against Troy with DCSS on April 15, 2019. 

She “was forced to file for bankruptcy, which was granted in 

August 2019.” She was then informed by Troy that he “would be 

starting his own law firm, and that it would be months before he 

would be able to pay any form of support again.”

She also filed a declaration of payment history, stating that 

Troy owes her $287,924.75 in child support arrearages, $85,980 

in spousal support arrearages, and $3,685 in unreimbursed 

medical expenses; the sums include interest.

On September 30, 2021, Stephanie filed another RFO re 

modification of child custody because she was moving to 

Maryland with the children. A hearing was set for November 19, 

2021.

On October 5, 2021, Troy filed an updated I&E declaration. 

On October 6, 2021, Stephanie filed her I&E declaration. On 

October 8, 2021, Troy filed another I&E declaration. The record 
7

provided to us did not include any of the parties’ I&E 

declarations.

Based on the parties’ current and updated I&E 

declarations, Troy argued in his October 5, 2021 brief to the court 

that child support should be $323 per month and spousal support 

should be $106 per month. He also notified the court that his 

California law license “is currently on administrative suspension 

due to his inability to be current on child support payments, and 

his Arizona law license is on probation status as a result of 

[Stephanie’s] complaint to the Arizona State Bar asking that he 

be permanently disbarred.” He explained that for him to “obtain 

reinstatement of his California law license, and to avoid 

suspension of his Arizona law license, he must come into 

compliance with child support payments going forward, and 

arrange a repayment plan for child support arrears.” He 

suggested $100 per month for the repayment of arrears.

In her brief filed October 6, 2021, Stephanie informed the 

court that she has not had a job since 1999 when she was a legal 

secretary and has no marketable skills. However, she stated in 

the spousal support declaration attachment (Judicial Council 

form FL-157) that she recently “[got] her real estate license in 

California” but has since moved with the children to Maryland to 

live with her mother. Stephanie calculated child support for all 

three children, despite the fact that the eldest child was no longer 

a minor.

IV. Hearing and Ruling

On October 21, 2021, the court heard Stephanie’s RFO re 

arrearages owed. We were not provided a reporter’s transcript of 

this hearing, which severely restricts our review. The minute 

order provides the “matter with respect to the child support and 
8

spousal support arrearages is heard” and the “matter with 

respect to the unreimbursed medical expenses is heard.” The 

court ordered Stephanie to prepare an updated declaration of 

payment history through March 30, 2021. The court ordered 

Troy to pay Stephanie the unreimbursed medical expenses 

pursuant to the judgment. The court further ordered Troy to pay 

Stephanie $100 each towards child support arrearages, spousal 

support arrearages, and unreimbursed medical expenses every

month, commencing November 1, 2021, making it a combined 

$300 monthly due on the first of every month.

The hearing continued on October 29, 2021. We were 

provided a reporter’s transcript of this hearing. The court noted 

“it found a material change of circumstance at the previous 

hearing.” The court ordered Troy to pay Stephanie $296 per 

month as and for child support commencing November 1, 2021.

Stephanie informed the court that she “redetermined [the 

arrearages] going back retroactive to April, and it came out to . . . 

[$]243,000 in child support arrearages. You said a hundred 

dollars a month. That would make it 202 years for him to pay it 

back.”

The court explained that the October 21st order “is based 

on where we are today.” Troy “has to get his licenses in order” so 

that he may “go get a job [so that he] can pay you more . . . . It’s 

what he raised last time, and which is my concern, is that who’s 

going to hire him if, in fact, he has issues with the state bar in 

California and the state bar in Arizona? He’s trying to clear 

those up, and so he can go and get a job that’s actually going to 

pay him something that is going to pay you back faster. That’s 

why I said, this is what we’re working with today. But I expect 

that to change once he gets his licenses in order. Because there 
9

are jobs out there that he can get that are going to pay him a lot 

more than what he’s trying to do himself.”

The following exchange took place between the court and 

Troy:

Troy stated, “The status of my legal licenses is depending 

on me getting current with child support.” He requested that the 

court order “a temporary child support amount . . . based on all 

the numbers we have right now, so that [he] can at least get 

current and get [his] licenses in good order.”

The court: “[C]orrect me if I’m wrong, but you said you 

would go and get a job from somewhere—from a firm, rather than 

what you’re doing today, once you get your licenses cleared; 

correct?”

Troy: “My earning capacity will certainly be greater . . . if I 

had my law licenses.”

The court: “[I]f [Troy’s] license is cleared up, then [he] can 

go and find a job working for a firm. [He] worked for great firms 

previously. [He] can work for a firm, which will make a lot more 

money than [what] you’re making a month by yourself. Right?”

Troy: “Yes. Yes.”

The court: “[T]hat’s what you said last time we were 

together, so that you can go and do that. So you can make a lot 

more money and you can get caught up and pay [Stephanie] back. 

[¶] . . . [¶] And that’s why I said that this is where we are today. 

But I expect it to be different once we get this order in line, so he 

can clear up the [state bar] license issues.”

“[I]n order to determine what the amount of support is, we 

need . . . to understand what the custody and visitation schedule 

[is]. I can’t get to what that schedule is until we go through your 

RFO in November regarding the move-away, because A) I have to 
10

address the LaMusga[2]factors, and B) for a move-away, . . . the 

court orders the parenting plan assessment II. “I think what I 

need to do is at least—I need to have [Troy’s] request for order 

trail the custody and visitation request for order, because the 

only way that I can determine what the numbers are . . . based 

on.” The court “continue[d]” Troy’s RFO and “ha[d] it trail 

[Stephanie’s] RFO”; it reserved all other issues for later 

determination.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Stephanie contends the trial court’s order on the child and 

spousal support arrearages amounts to an abuse of discretion, 

and requests that we reverse.

Finding no error, we affirm.

I. Applicable Law

A motion for the determination of arrearages is a “species 

of declaratory judgment or accounting unconnected with any 

specific enforcement of the support obligation.” (County of Shasta 

v. Smith (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 329, 334; see In re Marriage of 

Sabine & Toshio M. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1214 [a family 

court has the authority “to determine whether any arrearages 

exist and, if so, the amount due”]; In re Marriage of Robinson

(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 93, 98 [a determination of arrearages 

“ ‘rests upon an existing order rendered in a family law action’ ”].) 

The determination of arrearages is “treated as a money 

judgment” enforceable under Family Code section 290. (County 

2 Referring to In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 

1072.
11

of Shasta, at p. 334; see In re Marriage of Lackey (1983) 

143 Cal.App.3d 698, 702–203.)

The Family Code permits a trial court to modify or 

terminate a child support order “at any time as the court 

determines to be necessary.” (Fam. Code, § 3651, subd. (a).)

A party seeking modification of a child support order must 

“ ‘introduce admissible evidence of changed circumstances.’ ” (In 

re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234.)

“The party seeking the modification bears the burden of showing 

that circumstances have changed such that modification is

warranted.” (In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 

1039, 1054.)

Modification of spousal support, even if the prior amount is 

established by agreement, requires a material change of 

circumstances since the last order. (In re Marriage of Dietz

(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 387, 396.) Change of circumstances 

means a reduction or increase in the supporting spouse’s ability 

to pay and/or an increase or decrease in the supported spouse’s 

needs. (Ibid.) It includes all factors affecting need and the 

ability to pay. (Ibid.) A party moving to modify or terminate 

spousal support usually has the burden to show a material 

change in circumstances since the time of the last support order. 

(In re Marriage of West (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 240, 246.) A trial 

court considering whether to modify a spousal support order 

considers the same criteria set forth in Family Code section 4320 

as it considered in making the initial order. (Dietz, at p. 396.)

A change of circumstances may include, for example, an 

“ ‘increase or decrease in either party’s income available to pay 

child support.’ ” (In re Marriage of Leonard (2004) 

119 Cal.App.4th 546, 556.) Regarding child support modification, 
12

“ ‘[s]o long as the statewide statutory formula support 

requirements are met (Fam. [Code,] § 4050 et seq.), the 

determination is made on a case-by-case basis and may properly 

rest on fluctuations in need or ability to pay.’ ” (Ibid.)

II. Standard of Review

We review the family court’s order granting or denying a 

request for a modification of child support and spousal support 

for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Usher (2016) 

6 Cal.App.5th 347, 357 (Usher) [child support]; In re Marriage of 

Berman (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 914, 919 [spousal support].) 

“Discretion is abused when its exercise is arbitrary, whimsical, or 

capricious.” (In re Marriage of Battenburg (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 

1338, 1343.) We reverse “ ‘ “only if prejudicial error is found after 

examining the record of the proceedings below.” ’ ” (In re 

Marriage of Lusby (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 459, 472.) “When 

conducting an abuse of discretion review, appellate courts 

consider (1) whether the trial court’s factual findings are 

supported by substantial evidence, (2) whether the trial court 

followed applicable legal principles, and (3) whether the trial 

court reasonably exercised its discretionary authority—that is, 

whether any judge reasonably could have made such an order.” 

(In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 529.)

It is well established that courts will not modify child 

support “unless there has been a material change of 

circumstances following the previous determination.” (Usher, 

supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 357; accord In re Marriage of 

Brinkman (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1292 [“party seeking a 

modification must present evidence that establishes a change of 

circumstances”]; In re Marriage of Laudeman (2001) 

92 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1016 [stipulated agreement to pay support 
13

above guideline formula cannot be modified downward unless 

moving party “presents admissible evidence of changed financial 

circumstances”].)

“The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to 

modify a spousal support order based upon changed 

circumstances.” (In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 

830, 836 (Swain).) In exercising its discretion, the trial court 

considers the same criteria set forth in Family Code section 4320 

as it was obligated to consider in making the initial support 

order. (In re Marriage of Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 

1225, 1235.) “These factors include the ability of the supporting 

party to pay; the needs of each party based on the standard of 

living established during the marriage; the obligations and assets 

of each party; and the balance of hardships to each party.” (In re

Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.) A supported 

spouse’s receipt of additional income in the form of retirement 

benefits may constitute a change in circumstances. (In re 

Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274–1276.)

In exercising its discretion, a trial court must follow 

established legal principles and base its findings on substantial 

evidence. (Swain, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 836.) If the trial 

court conforms to these requirements, its order will be upheld 

whether or not the appellate court agrees with it or would make 

the same order if it were a trial court. (Ibid; In re Marriage of 

Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 47, fn. omitted.) However, a 

court abuses its discretion if its findings are wholly unsupported, 

because a consideration of the evidence is essential to a proper 

exercise of judicial discretion. (Swain, at pp. 836–837.)
14

III. Analysis

Stephanie contends the trial court erred in ordering Troy to 

pay $100 per month towards the $305,635.95 child and spousal 

support arrearage balance owed to Stephanie. She argues that 

“would take [Troy] 254 years and 7 months to [complete payment 

of arrearages owed]” which “essentially wiped the $305,635.95 

debt clean” as Stephanie will “not be alive for the next 254 years 

and 7 months [and] [t]his order denies her of this legal right” to 

obtain child and spousal support arrearages. She contends this 

amounts to an abuse of discretion and asks that we reverse and 

“order a new hearing so that a reasonable re-payment plan of 

these arrearages be made, and/or so that [Stephanie] may file a 

motion to obtain a judgment for the amount owed.”

Our task here is to determine whether the court abused its 

discretion in concluding that Troy demonstrated a material 

change in his circumstances. Stephanie, however, does not argue 

that the trial court erred in reducing Troy’s monthly spousal 

support obligation because there had been no material change in 

circumstances since the October 17, 2016 judgment to warrant 

such a reduction. In fact, the extreme change in Troy’s income 

and finances is not even discussed by Stephanie on appeal. 

Instead she focuses on the fact that repayment of the arrearages 

at a rate of $100 per month would take 254 years to fulfill, 

amounting to an abuse of discretion.

We find Stephanie’s argument on appeal is not well taken.

First, the trial court did not order $100 monthly payments 

by Troy towards the arrears. The court ordered $100 monthly 

payment towards the arrears for child support, spousal support, 

and unreimbursed medical expenses each, totaling $300 per 
15

month towards arrears. This is in addition to the child support of 

$296 per month.

Second, the trial court made clear multiple times during 

the hearing that this was an interim order. At the hearing held 

October 29, 2021, the court explained that its October 21, 2021 

order “is based on where we are today” and that Troy is “trying to 

clear [his law license issue] up, . . . so he can go and get a job 

that’s actually going to pay him something that is going to pay 

you back faster. That’s why I said, this is what we’re working 

with today. But I expect that to change once he gets his licenses 

in order.” (Italics added.) The trial court indicated to the parties 

that this issue shall be revisited when Troy’s issue with the 

California State Bar and Arizona State Bar is resolved, so that 

Troy “can make a lot more money” and “can get caught up and 

pay [Stephanie] back.” The court indicated to Stephanie that it 

“expect[s] [the payment amount] to be different once we get this

order in line, so he can clear up the [state bar] license issues” and 

reserved this issue for later determination. Thus, Stephanie is 

empowered to file a motion to redetermine payment on 

arrearages owed based upon the trial court’s ruling and 

statements made on the record.

Third, we are precluded from making a determination as to 

whether the trial court erred by setting the arrearages payment 

amount to $300 a month, because Stephanie did not include a 

single I&E declaration filed by her or Troy, nor the reporter’s 

transcript of the October 21, 2021 when the court made its

determination. The court noted as early as July 30, 2021 that 

“child support and spousal support shall be based on the parties’ 

current Income and Expense Declaration[s].” Stephanie’s failure 

to include the I&E declarations in the appellate record is fatal to 
16

her appeal. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate 

procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to 

be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on 

the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the 

trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the 

judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) 

“ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on 

matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be 

affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 

2 Cal.3d 557, 564, italics added.) It is appellant’s burden on 

appeal to produce a record “ ‘which overcomes the presumption of 

validity favoring [the] judgment.’ ” (Webman v. Little Co. of Mary 

Hospital (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 592, 595.) Failure to provide an 

adequate record requires that the issue be resolved against 

Stephanie. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296;

see Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1362.)

On this record, we cannot say the court abused its 

discretion.

DISPOSITION

We affirm. No costs are awarded.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J. VIRAMONTES, J.