NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHANE BADDING,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

DAVID CLOUSE, individually and in his

official capacity as Sheriff of Navajo

County, Arizona; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

 and

COUNTY OF NAVAJO; NAVAJO

COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,

Defendants.

No. 21-16821

D.C. No. 

3:20-cv-08315-DWL-ESW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 17, 2023** 

San Francisco, California

FILED

JUL 19 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Shane Badding appeals from the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of

his action alleging violations of federal and state law against Navajo County

Sheriff David Clouse and Navajo County Sheriff Deputy Newman (collectively,

“Defendants”).1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review de

novo an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co.

of Am., 15 F.4th 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2021). “We review the denial of leave to

amend for an abuse of discretion, but we review the futility of amendment de

novo.” Cohen v. ConAgra Brands, Inc., 16 F.4th 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2021). We

also review de novo questions of federal and state law. Asante v. Cal. Dep’t of

Health Care Servs., 886 F.3d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm. Because the

1

 Badding also sought to name Navajo County Sheriff Deputy Pendergast as

a defendant, but the district court properly found that Deputy Pendergast had not

been timely served. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Moreover, because “[a] [d]istrict

[c]ourt may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who

have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that

of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally

related,” Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury of U.S. of Am., 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th

Cir. 1981), the district court did not err in dismissing the action as against Deputy

Pendergast. 

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parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of the case, we need not

recount it here. 

I

The district court did not err in dismissing Badding’s federal claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants. First, Badding has not plausibly alleged any

violations of the First, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments against Deputy Newman

because Badding’s amended complaint fails to allege any facts beyond “mere

conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 6778 (2009). Badding’s

Fifth Amendment claim is foreclosed by Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2106–08

(2022). Badding has also failed to plausibly allege a violation of the Fourth

Amendment because his amended complaint does not allege that the arrest lacked

probable cause or exigent circumstances, nor does it identify any clearly

established law holding that Defendants’ alleged actions constituted excessive

force. See LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Accordingly, Deputy Newman is entitled to qualified immunity. See LSO, Ltd. v.

Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000).

Second, Badding’s § 1983 claim against Sheriff Clouse fails because

Badding has alleged no facts from which it can be plausibly inferred that Sheriff

Clouse was involved in or “ratifi[ed]” any actions of the deputies. Christie v. Iopa,

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176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). Nor does respondeat superior provide a

basis for liability under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Sheriff Clouse is therefore

also entitled to qualified immunity. See LSO, 205 F.3d at 1157.

Third, Badding’s § 1983 claim under Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against Navajo County fails to plausibly allege “a

deliberate policy, custom, or practice” that caused the alleged constitutional

violations. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir.

2012) (citation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78. 

II

The district court did not err in dismissing Badding’s state-law assault claim

because Badding failed to plausibly allege that his detention was unsupported by

probable cause. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-409

(2023). 

III

The district court correctly held that Badding’s state-law negligence claim is

foreclosed by Ryan v. Napier, 425 P.3d 230 (Ariz. 2018), because the “negligent

use of intentionally inflicted force is [not] a cognizable claim” under Arizona law. 

Id. at 236.

IV

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The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the second

amended complaint with prejudice, because Badding “failed to add the requisite

particularity to [his] claims.” Nguyen v. Endologix, Inc., 962 F.3d 405, 420 (9th

Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see id. (holding that “the district court’s discretion to

deny leave to amend is particularly broad” where the district court has previously

granted the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint).

AFFIRMED.

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