No. 87-510 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

TRUSTEES OF LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL 

DISTRICT NO. 13, EUREKA, MONTANA 

Respondent and Appellant, 

CARL R. HOLDEN , JR. , 

Appellant and Respondent 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 

In and for the County of Missoula 

The Honorable Leif B. Erickson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Susan Loehn, County Attorney, Libby, Montana 

Richard P. Bartos, Office of Public Instruction, 

Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Robert S. Keller; Keller and German, Kalispell, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 18, 1988 

Decided: M~Y 31 1988 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Mr. Holden1s teaching contract with the Appellant 

(School District) was terminated. He appealed administratively. Following administrative review, the District Court 

for the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, ordered 

the School District to pay Mr. Holden the salary due under 

his contract of employment. The School District appeals. We 

affirm. 

The issues are: 

1. Did the District Court err in finding that the 

County Superintendent ' s findings of fact and conclusions of 

law were not clearly erroheous? 

2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the determination of the County Superintendent that the Board of 

Trustees did not have good cause to dismiss Mr. Holden? 

Mr. Holden was employed by the School District, in 

Eureka, Montana, beginning in October 1983. In his first 

year, he taught music, chorus, and band for grades 3 through 

12. Mr. Holden's formal evaluation, completed in April 1984, 

was marked satisfactory in all areas except rapport with 

students. 

In the 1984-85 school year, Mr. Holden1s contract was 

renewed and grades 1 and 2 were added to his teaching load. 

On October 2, 1984, Mr. Holden called a girl a "slob" in 

class because she was not paying attention and was slumped 

down in her chair. The elementary school principal and the 

superintendent met with Mr. Holden regarding this incident. 

In a letter of reprimand dated October 3, 1984, the superintendent informed Mr. Holden that another such incident of 

abuse would be grounds for dismissal. 

Five days later, Mr. Holden made the comment, "move 

over, Goodyear," to a child or group standing in front of a 
tape machine. The children reported the incident to the 

school administrators, as a comment directed to one child who 

was "heavy built." The superintendent and the elementary 

principal met again with Mr. Holden and gave him the option 

of resigning or being suspended until a hearing could be held 

on the charges against him. He also was informed that he had 

the right to be present at the hearing and to have counsel 

present. He did not attend the hearing, but submitted a 

letter to be read into the record. After hearing the evidence, the Board of Trustees voted to dismiss Mr. Holden. 

Mr. Holden appealed to the Lincoln County Superintendent 

of Schools (County Superintendent), before whom a second 

hearing was held, pursuant to 20-4-207(2), MCA (1983) : 

Any teacher who has been dismissed may in 

writing within 10 days appeal such dismissal to the 

county superintendent. Following such appeal a 

hearing shall be held within 10 days. If the 

county superintendent, after a hearing, determines 

that the dismissal by the trustees was made without 

good cause, he shall order the trustees to reinstate such teacher and to compensate such teacher 

at his contract amount for the time lost during the 

pending of the appeal. 

The County Superintendent concluded that the School District 

had failed to substantiate good cause for termination and to 

ensure Mr. Holden's due process rights. She ordered the 

School District to pay Mr. Holden the money to which he was 

entitled under his 1984-85 contract. The School District 

appealed to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 

who reversed the County Superintendent and affirmed the Board 

of Trustees' original decision. Then Mr. Holden appealed to 

District Court, which reversed the decision of the State 

Superintendent and ordered the School District to pay Mr. 

Holden his salary due under the 1984-85 contract. The School 

District appealed that decision to this Court. 
Did the District Court err in finding that the County 

Superintendent's findings of fact and conclusions of law were 

not clearly erroneous? 

The School District raises three separate arguments 

under this issue. It first argues that the County Superintendent was clearly in error when she ordered the School 

District to pay Mr. Holden the sums due to him under his 

1984-85 contract. The County Superintendent made her decision in January 1985, and the School District asserts that 

she had no jurisdiction to award any judgment for contract 

amounts due beyond that date. 

Mr. Holden does not dispute that the County Superintendent erred in awarding him his wages for the entire year. 

The District Court, too, concluded that the County Superintendent exceeded her authority. We order this award stricken 

from the County Superintendent's decision. However, the 

District Court pointed out that by the time it considered 

this matter, the school year had expired, so that the award 

of the full contract amount was appropriate. The District 

Court properly ordered that these monies be paid to Mr. 

Holden as damages. 

The School District next argues that the County Superintendent improperly declined to make fact findings on an 

alleged incident in October 1983, despite the existence of 

evidence as to that event. In that incident, Mr. Holden 

apparently had said something to the third grade class which 

distressed them. Mr. Holden's personnel file contains no 

written evidence of this incident. The County Superintendent 

stated: 

Exactly what was said, to whom it was said, and the 

follow up discussion with the principal are vaguely 

and inconsistently presented in the testimony. 
The School Board correctly points out that Mr. Holden was not 

given notice of the above incident as a reason for his termination. As a result, the incident could not properly be used 

as a reason for his dismissal. See Bd. of Trustees, Etc. v. 

Super. of Pub. Inst. (1977), 171 Mont. 323, 327, 557 ~.2d 

1048, 1050-51. The County Superintendent properly noted in 

her conclusions that she was limited to consideration of the 

evidence supporting the specific charges given as a reason 

for Mr. Holden's dismissal. We hold that it was not error to 

omit additional findings on the incident. 

Third, the School District argues that the County Superintendent improperly discussed the issue of progressive 

discipline. This discussion appears under the heading "other 

due process considerations" in the County Superintendent's 

order and was not necessary to the determination of whether 

the School District had good cause for terminating Mr. 

Holden's contract. We hold that the discussion is not essential to the good cause determination by the County Superintendent and does not constitute clear error. 

I!: 

Was there sufficient evidence to support the determination of the County Superintendent that the Board of Trustees 

did not have good cause to dismiss Mr. Holden? 

Under § 20-4-207, MCA, a school district may dismiss a 

teacher before his contract has expired "for immorality, 

unfitness, incompetence, or violation of the adopted policies 

of such trustees." The County Superintendent concluded that: 

Only 2 incidents of inappropriate language 

were deemea worthy of written documentation and 

clear directives for Mr. Holden. This does not 

seem to be a preponderance of evidence, nor sufficient cause for dismissal. 

The ability to maintain control and/or motivate students seems clearly to me to be a matter of 
competence . . . Although sarcastic and cutting 

language is totally inappropriate in the classroom, 

it was not proven that Mr. Holden's language impaired his ability to "discharge the duties of his 

position." 

Under § 20-4-207, MCA, neither the State Superintendent 

of Public Instruction nor the District Court may substitute 

its judgment for that of the County Superintendent on issues 

of fact. Frazer School Dist. No. 2 v. Flynn (Mont. 1987), 

732 P.2d 409, 410, 44 St.Rep. 248, 250. The transcript used 

on appeal is from the hearing before the County Superintendent. Sections 20-3-107 (2), MCA, and 20-3-210 (3) , MCA. 

Further, findings of the reviewing agency cannot be included 

as facts when they are not part of the County Superintendent's findings. Frazer, 732 P.2d at 411. The decision of 

the State Superintendent of Public Instruction includes a 

number of findings which were not part of the County Superintendent ' s findings . After reviewing the findings of the 

County Superintendent, we conclude that they are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. 

The District Court stated that the County Superintendent 

had the discretion to decide that the two incidents were not 

so serious as to merit dismissal of Mr. Holden. We agree. 

Without condoning the remarks Mr. Holden made to his students, we hold that it was not error for the County Superintendent to conclude that the two incidents were not good 

cause for Mr. Holden's dismissal. 

Affirmed. 
>LA 4.29 

Justices