alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Michael KNIGHT Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-3670

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 19, 2017

Filed: July 24, 2017

Bruce E. Clark, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Michael Knight, Pro Se

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, Michael Knight challenges the sentence the district court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to *479drug and gun charges, pursuant to a written plea agreement. His counsel has moved to withdraw and submitted a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), raising the reasonableness of the sentence.

We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable, because our review of the record demonstrates that Knight entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, see Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997); the argument falls within the scope of the waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver, see United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver.

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion, and we dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
Antwan DILWORTH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D18-1239

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 5, 2018

Antwan Dilworth, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

Makar, Winokur, and Winsor, JJ., concur.
#### William R. WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Robert A. Heinze, Warden, Folsom State Prison, Represa, California, Arthur L. Oliver, Acting Warden et al., Appellees.

No. 20659.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Nov. 16, 1966.

*844William R. Wilson, in pro. per. Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edsel W. Haws, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, Cal., for appellees.

Before MADDEN, Judge of the Court of Claims, and MERRILL and BROWNING, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is taken from a denial of habeas corpus. The writ was sought from the District Court on two grounds: (1) that appellant was denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) that incriminating statements introduced in trial were secured without advising him of his right to counsel or to remain silent, contrary to Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964).

The first ground was considered by the Supreme Court of California on direct appeal. People v. Wilson, 60 Cal.2d 139, 32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452 (1963). In rejecting appellant’s contention the court stated grounds we find persuasive. 60 Cal.2d at 154, 32 Cal.Rptr. at 54, 383 P.2d at 462:

> “In the case at bench defendant has not shown — nor does it appear that he could show — that he was in any way prejudiced by the setting of his trial for a date approximately two months beyond the last day to which he had consented. At the time of his objection to such setting, more than seven months had already elapsed since the filing of the information, due in most part to numerous continuances granted at defendant’s request or with his consent; and defendant fails to demonstrate how a further delay of less than one-third of that duration could have affected in any respect the fairness of his subsequent trial.”

The second ground is without merit for the reason that *Escobedo*is not to be applied retroactively. Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966).

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.2

 

**CERTIFICATION**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Terra Energy & Resource Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date therein specified (the “Report”), I, Alexandre Agaian, as Principal Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

 
| (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 
| (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

Date:  April 15, 2009

 
|   | /s/ Alexandre Agaian        |
|--------|-----------------------------|
|   | Alexandre Agaian            |
|   | Principal Financial Officer |
EXHIBIT 23.1



                          Independent Auditors' Consent



The Board of Directors
E*Comnetrix Inc.

We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  to  the  Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (Registration Number 333-10826,  333-12078 and 333-12916)
of  E*Comnetrix  Inc. of our report  dated  February  28,  2002  relating to the
consolidated  balance  sheets of  E*Comnetrix  Inc. as at December  31, 2001 and
2000, and the related consolidated statements of operations and deficit and cash
flows for the years then ended which report appears in the Annual Report on Form
10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2001.

Our report dated February 28, 2002 contains an explanatory paragraph that states
that the Company  has  suffered  recurring  losses  from  operations  that raise
substantial  doubt  about  its  ability  to  continue  as a going  concern.  The
consolidated  financial  statements  do not include any  adjustments  that might
result from the outcome of that uncertainty.



/s/ KPMG LLP

Vancouver, Canada
March 28, 2002
#### Hamed FATHI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-56251

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 14, 2016 *

Filed December 22, 2016

Hamed Fathi, Pro Se

Aileen Marie Hunter, Esquire, Attorney, Bryan Cave LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Hamed Fathi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his diversity action alleging state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. *Thompson v. Paul,*547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Fathi’s claims against defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) because Fathi failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Chase was not a proper party to initiate foreclosure proceedings, and Fathi lacked standing to bring a preemptive suit to challenge Chase’s authority to foreclose. *See Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,*245 Cal.App.4th 808, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 790, 795 (2016) (California courts do not allow preemptive suits challenging the foreclosing party’s authority to foreclose because such suits “would result in the impermissible interjection of the courts into a nonjudicial scheme enacted by the *991California Legislature.” (citation omitted)); *Gomes v. Countryimde Home Loans, Inc.,*192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 819, 824 (2011) (California law does not “provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure process is indeed authorized” absent “a *specific factual basis*for alleging that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct party”); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in an opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Name
    
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    DelawareFreeborders, Inc.
    
    DelawareGoIndustry DoveBid plc
    
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    MinnesotaGovLoop, Inc.
    
    MinnesotaICG Commerce Holdings, Inc.
    
    DelawareICG Commerce, Inc.
    
    PennsylvaniaICG Commerce Australia Pty Limited
    
    AustraliaICG Commerce Brasil Servicos de Contratacão de Suprimentos Ltda.
    
    BrazilICG Commerce Canada Inc.
    
    Ontario, CanadaICG Commerce Czech Republic s.r.o.
    
    Czech RepublicICG Commerce India Private Limited
    
    IndiaICG Commerce Investments, LLC
    
    DelawareICG Commerce International, LLC
    
    DelawareICG Commerce International II, LLC (f/k/a ICG Commerce Mexico I, LLC)
    
    DelawareICG Commerce Mexico II, LLC
    
    DelawareICG Commerce (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.
    
    ChinaICG Commerce UK Limited
    
    United KingdomICGC Singapore Pte. Ltd.
    
    SingaporeInvestor Force Holdings, Inc.
    
    DelawareInvestor Force, Inc.
    
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    DelawareLGO Corporation (f/k/a Logistics.com, Inc.)
    
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    Delaware
Exhibit 23.1


Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm





The Board of Directors and Stockholders


Perficient, Inc.:





We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-89076, No. 333-42624, No. 333-100490, No. 333-116549, No. 333-117216, No. 333-123177, No. 333-129054, No. 333-138602, No. 333-142267, No. 333-145899, No. 333-147687, No. 333-148978, and No. 333-152274) on Form S-3 and (No. 333-42626, No. 333-44854, No. 333-75666, No. 333-118839, No. 333-130624, No. 333-147730, No. 333-157799, and No. 333-160465) on Form S-8 of Perficient, Inc. (the Company) of our report dated March 2, 2011, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of the Company as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2010, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2010, which report appears in the December 31, 2010 annual report on Form 10-K of the Company.




Our report dated March 2, 2011, on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2010, contains an explanatory paragraph that states the Company acquired Kerdock Consulting, LLC (Kerdock) and speakTECH during 2010, and management excluded from its assessment of the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2010, Kerdock’s and speakTECH’s internal control over financial reporting associated with 9% and 4% of the Company’s total assets and total revenues, respectively, as of and for the year ended December 31, 2010. Our audit of internal control over financial reporting of the Company as of December 31, 2010 also excluded an evaluation of the internal control over financial reporting of Kerdock and speakTECH.


/s/ KPMG LLP


St. Louis, Missouri


March 2, 2011
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements contained in the Company's Report on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 2000 and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              3-MOS               9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000         DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-2000         JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000         SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                          30,698              30,698
<SECURITIES>                                    16,266              16,266
<RECEIVABLES>                                   72,275              72,275
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (19,882)            (19,882)
<INVENTORY>                                     47,676              47,676
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               154,604             154,604
<PP&E>                                          15,838              15,838
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (8,861)             (8,861)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 174,515             174,515
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           59,155              59,155
<BONDS>                                         94,036              94,036
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                   0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                   0
<COMMON>                                           578                 578
<OTHER-SE>                                      20,746              20,746
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   174,515             174,515
<SALES>                                         37,058             115,601
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                37,058             115,601
<CGS>                                           14,320              48,474
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   14,320              48,474
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,293              12,115
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                  98
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,293              12,017
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                (292)
<CHANGES>                                            0                   0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,980              11,576
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0                   0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.14                0.41

</TABLE>
#### Laurie J. JONES Plaintiff-Appellant v. Nancy BERRYHILL,1 Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-3300

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 6, 2017

Filed: June 12, 2017

Matthew J. Ketcham, Noland & Caddell, Fort Smith, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Fatima Shah, Social Security Administration, Office of General Counsel Region VI, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

1

. Nancy Berryhill has been appointed to serve as Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c),

*277PER CURIAM.

Laurie J. Jones appeals from an order of the District Court2 affirming the Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income after a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). We have carefully considered the arguments made by Jones, and we conclude that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s finding. See Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091, 1093 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

2

. The Honorable Mark E. Ford, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
J

- A20023

- 17

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. CHRISTOPHER ZIEMBA Appellant No. 60 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13 , 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 66

- CR

- 0000324

- 2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2018 A jury convicted Appellant, Christopher Ziemba, of open lewdness, indecent exposure, stalking, and two counts of disorderly conduct. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of imprisonment of eight to 23 1⁄2 months of imprisonment, to be followed by twelve months of probation on January 14, 2015. This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence by order dated March 16, 2016. On November 21, 2016, Ziemba filed a pro se motion entitled “Defendant’s Motion for Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel and a New Trial.” The trial court dismissed the motion, and Ziemba filed this pro se appeal. Ziemba filed the November 21, 2016, mo tion after his judgment of sentence had become final. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113 (petition for allowance ofJ

- A20023

- 17

- 2

-

appeal from Superior Court order must be filed within 30 days); 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence becomes final at expiration of time for seekin g review). Furthermore, his motion alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Under these circumstances, his motion should have been treated as petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See Commonwealth v. Taylor , 65 A.3d 462, 46 7

- 468 (Pa. Super. 2013) ( finding “untimely post

- sentence motion filed after finality of judgment is to be treated as a PCRA petition,” if it raises issues cognizable under the PCRA)

. We therefore remand for an assessment of Ziemba’s claims pursuant to the PCRA. We note the court denied Ziemba’s petition for in forma pauperis status. Ziemba has challenged this denial on appeal and asserted that his employment status changed as of January 1, 2017. In light of our remand, we direct the PCRA court to determin e whether Ziemba currently qualifies as indigent and, if so, appoint him counsel. See Commonwealth v. Stossel , 17 A.3d 1286, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2011). Furthermore , we deny, as moot, the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss Ziemba’s appeal due to defects in his b rief. Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order

. Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss is denied. Jurisdiction relinquished.J

- A20023

- 17

- 3

-

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 02/09/2018
#### Evans *vs.*Benton.

December 18.

Error to the Madison Circuit; George Shannon, Judge.

*Notice judicial. Officers. Editor’s certificate of publication, Absent defendants.*

Chancerv, Case 127.

This court yvill lake ju• dicial notice, that ceeain persons aro*390officers without their names of office appearing in their acts. — But Tt mast appear on the face of tho .certificate of the insertion of the order of publication in the newspaper, that the person certifying is the editor.

*389Judge Mills

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is a writ of error to. reverse a decree in chaneery, perpetuating an injunction, and decreeing the restoration of a sum of money. The decree was rendered on taking the bill *pro confesso*after order of publication returned against the defendant below as a non resident.

The following certificate, annexed to a ropy of the order of publication, is the.only evidence that the publication was ever made.

**•Farmer’s Chronicle Office.*

I certify that the annexed advertisement of Jesse Benton, against Elisha Evans, has been published for two months successively, in the- Farmer’s Gimmick:, commencing April 29th 1325. expiring June 29th 1825. Given under my hand dm 2d dav of July, 1825, *Joseph Turner”^*

*390Mandate,

*Gafter ion*for plaintiff; *Turner*for defendant.

This certificate is too defective, to warrant tlie decree. Foripcrly, such proof was made by affidavit, and now the legislature has allowed the bare certifícate of the editor or publisher of the paper to be sufficient, and be may certify the fact, as an officer may do in many cases.

it is true, that this court will take judicial notice that certain persons are officers of Government, even when the name of office is not inserted in their official acts.

But it would certainly be extending this principio very far, to say that a court should judicially know who is editor of a public print, which is a bare employment or calling, and not an office It is therefore essential that the certificate should shew on its face, that, it is made by the editor, who conducts the paper. It docs not appear from this certificate, that; the editor had any hand in, making it,, or that it was not made by some other person in the office.

The decree for this defect, must’ be reversed-with, costs, and the cau.se he remanded for new proceedings, commencing with the proof of the order of publication.
#### Stanton M. BUCH; Sharon A. Stinus, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35287

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 17, 2017 * Anchorage, Alaska

Filed August 21, 2017

Ben Whipple, Attorney, Law Offices of Benjamin I. Whipple, Palmer, AK, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Richard L. Pomeroy, Assistant U.S. Attorney, John Anthony Fonstad, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: GRABER, CLIFTON, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiffs Stanton M. Buch and Sharon A. Stinus timely appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, as barred by the doctrine announced in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950). Reviewing de novo, Whittaker Corp. v. United States, 825 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2016), we affirm.

Plaintiffs challenge the correctness of the Supreme Court’s decision in Feres. Because the Supreme Court has not overruled Feres, we must follow it. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (“[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the absence of any Supreme Court decision overruling [an earlier Supreme Court precedent], we must follow the Supreme Court precedent that directly controls, leaving to the Court the prerogative of overruling its own prior decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are bound to follow this well-worn path [of Feres].”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication .and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.