alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT - 31.1**

 

MOSSIMO,INC.

 

CERTIFICATIONOF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER

 

I, Mossimo Giannulli, Chairman andCo-Chief Executive Officer of the registrant, certify that:

 

1.               I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Mossimo,Inc.;

 

2.               Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

 

3.               Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.               The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a)              Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant is, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, made known to us by others, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;

 

(c)              Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(d)             Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s first fiscal quarter) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.               The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal controls over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

 

(a)              All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarizeand report financial information; and

 

(b)             Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.

 
| /s/ MOSSIMO GIANNULLI                   |   |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|
| Mossimo Giannulli                       |
| Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer |
| May 19, 2006                            |

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS AT AND FOR THE PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 2000, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           7,265
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  207,412
<ALLOWANCES>                                    14,412
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               237,074
<PP&E>                                          86,975
<DEPRECIATION>                                  26,758
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 332,498
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          335,879
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             2
<OTHER-SE>                                    (16,255)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   332,498
<SALES>                                        280,522
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               280,522
<CGS>                                          250,889
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  172,601
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (776)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,873
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (155,022)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (11,410)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (155,022)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (143,612)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (7.26)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (7.26)


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fidencio CASTRO-VERDUGO, aka Fidel Castro-Verdugo, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50207

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 3, 2017 * Pasadena, California

OCTOBER 10, 2017

Lawrence E. Spong, Assistant U.S., Benjamin Holley, Assistant U.S., Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael Marks, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GRABER, MURGUIA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*408MEMORANDUM **

Defendant Fidencio Castro-Verdugo appealed the district court’s denial of his 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that his underlying removal proceeding did not comport with due process and could not serve as the basis for his charge under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Reviewing de novo, United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004), we affirm.

The district court did not err in denying Castro-Verdugo’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The IJ complied with the procedural due process requirement to inform Castro-Verdugo of his eligibility to apply for relief from removal and afford him the opportunity to apply for such relief. See United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 804 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1234, 194 L.Ed.2d 229 (2016). The IJ “meaningfully advised” Castro-Verdugo of his rights where the IJ informed him of the right to present evidence, identified the specific relief he might be eligible for, and engaged in a one-on-one discussion with him giving him an opportunity to understand what the IJ was considering and to respond. See United States v. Melendez-Castro, 671 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

Castro-Verdugo also argues that his case is analogous to Melendez-Castro in which the court held Melendez-Castro was not meaningfully advised of his right to seek voluntary departure because the IJ told Melendez-Castro that he was eligible for relief, but immediately stated he would not grant the relief because of Melendez-Castro’s criminal history. Id However, Melendez-Castro is distinguishable because here there is no indication in the record before us that the IJ prejudged Castro-Verdugo’s possible application for relief.

Accordingly, Castro-Verdugo’s underlying removal order is not fundamentally unfair and stands as a predicate element for his charge under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, removed alien found in the United States.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6474 

AN ACT 

To amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to expedite geothermal exploration and development in previously studied or developed areas. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 6474 EH

1 SECTION 1. NEPA REVIEW. 

2 Section 390 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 

3 U.S.C. 15942) is amended— 

4 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘, or the 

5 Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 (30 U.S.C. 1001 et 

6 seq.) for the purpose of exploration or development 

7 of geothermal resources’’ after ‘‘or gas’’; and 

8 (2) in subsection (b)— 

9 (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘or gas’’ 

10 and inserting ‘‘, gas, or geothermal’’; and 

11 (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘or gas’’ 

12 and inserting ‘‘, gas, or geothermal’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 24, 

2024. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6474 

AN ACT 

To amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to expepreviously studied or developed areas. dite geothermal exploration and development in
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

SHAWN TYSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D2024-0410

May 1, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for

Sarasota County; Thomas W. Krug, Judge.

Shawn Tyson, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

LaROSE, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
#### Eric FLORES, Plaintiff-Appellant v. DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE-CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-20406

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 30, 2017

Eric Flores, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Eric Flores, Texas prisoner # 2051801, moves this court for authorization to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) following the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Flores has also filed a motion for this court to order Texas Department of Criminal Justice officials to produce a certified copy of his inmate trust account. As Flores has raised only fanciful allegations, including claims that he has already been executed and that the defendants have used technology from outer space to harm him and his family, he has failed to show that he should be allowed to proceed IFP on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) or that his appeal of the district court’s judgment presents a nonfrivolous issue. *See Banos v. O’Guin,*144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998); *Carson v. Polley,*689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). Flores’s motions are therefore denied.

The facts surrounding the IFP decision are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the appeal. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 & n.24 (5th Cir. 1997). The appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues and is dismissed as frivolous. 5th Cir. R. 42.2. Flores is WARNED that any future frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive filings will subject him to additional and progressively more severe sanctions. Flores is DIRECTED to review all pending matters and move to dismiss any that are frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive.

MOTIONS DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Dorsey M. RYAN, Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., a Corporation, Appellee.

No. 18406.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Nov. 8, 1966.

Heartsill Ragon, of Warner, Warner, Ragon & Smith, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellant. C. R. Warner, Jr., and H. P. Warner, Fort Smith, Ark., were with him on the brief.

P. H. Hardin, of Hardin, Barton, Hardin & Jesson, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellee. Sam McClaren, Denver, Colo., was with him on the brief.

Before YOGEL, Chief Judge, MATTHES, Circuit Judge, and DUNCAN, Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This was an action by Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., plaintiff, against Dorsey M. Ryan, defendant, to recover on account of unjust enrichment based on fraud resulting from plaintiff’s sale of mineral leases to defendant, a geologist. The case was tried to the court without a jury, the Honorable John E. Miller, Chief Judge, presiding. Judgment was entered in the District Court in the sum of $20,171.24, in addition to which defendant was ordered to reassign to the plaintiff 1% overriding royalty interest on the leaseholds in question. Defendant appeals to this court, claiming insufficiency of the evidence and other related errors. Judge Miller’s opinion in the case plus his opin*178ion on the motion for a new trial were published as Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ryan, W.D.Ark., Fort Smith Div., 1966, 250 F.Supp. 600. We have read that opinion carefully and are in full concurrence therewith. It is a complete refutation of the claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment and of the other related errors claimed by Ryan in this court. We see no good reason for restating or reiterating that which Judge Miller has said so well in his opinion. On the basis thereof, this case is in all things affirmed.
#### Buford &c. *vs.*Burdett.

May 26.

Error to the Garrard Circuit; John *L.*Bbihges, Judge-

*Interest. Amendments. Error. Release. Costs.*

Hebt.

Case 8Í.

Error in the judgment as to i he day on which the interest *commenced.*

*Judge Owsley*

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The judgment to which this writ of error is prosecuted, except, as to the interest, is in strict conformity to the note upon which the original action in the circuit court was founded, but the interest is. made, by the .judgment, to commence the first of August 1821, and to continue to run until the debt is paid, whereas, by the stipulations of the note, interest. was not to commence running until the first of September of that year. As respects the time when *227ibc interest is made to begin to run, therefore, the Judgment, is unquestionably erroneous.

Order ofcourt at the next term permit-) ing plaintiff to release the excessive interest.

*Query*— May an error in a judgment on a specialty as to the day of the commencement of interest be amenderl at a subsequent term.

An order in such case permiling plaintiff to-release the erroneous interest has itself no effect, nor can it give any additional operation to a release executed in pursuance thereof.

An error in a judgment prejudicial to a defendant cannot he cured by a re-, lease of th.a plaintiff.

This error appears to have been discovered by Burdett after the term of the court at which the judgment was rendered had elapsed, and, ata subsequent term, he applied to the court and obtained the following order.

“On motion of the plaintiff leave is given him to release one month’s interest on the judgment rendered in his favour against the defendants, at, the September term of this court, in the year 1822, it appearing that there was an error in entering said judgment.”

What would have been the effect of this order if it had purported to be an amendment of the error in the judgment as to the interest, is unnecessary now to be considered; for be that as it may, it is perfectly clear, that the order as made cannot be interpreted into an amendment of the error.

Notwithstanding the order, the judgment remains precisely as it was originally entered, and although Burdett was by the order permitted to release the errror, any release Which might be afterwards made by him could have no more effect upon the error in the judgment than would the execution of a release without the order.

And it has been repeatedly held that no er,ror in a judgment prejudicial to a defendant can be cured by a release of the plaintiff.

It follows, therefore, that although a release may have been executed by Burdett under the order, neither the release nor order can have removed or corrected the error in the judgment — and that of course the judgment must he reversed with cost, the cause remanded to the court below, and a judgment there entered in conformity with the principles of this opinion.

*Cnpertnn*for plaintiff; *Crittenden*for defendant,.
January 20 , 201 5

U. S. Department of Transportation

Docket Management System

1200 New Jersey Ave., SE

Washington, DC 20590

Dear Sir or Madam:

Attached please find Skycatch, Inc. ’s request for an exemption from the listed Federal

Aviation Regulations to allow commercial operation of its Small Unmanned Aircraft

Systems (“ sUASs ”) for aerial imaging for safety and monitoring of secured and

controlled environment agricultural sites. This exemption request is exclusiv ely for the

use of the UAS manufactured by Skycatch, Inc., a San Francisco based company.

Also attached to this letter is the Skycatch UAS Flight Manual, which outlines the

operating requirements, limitations, and technical specifications for the Skycatc h system

. Skycatch submits this manual as a Confidential document under 14 CFR 11.35 (b) as the

entire manual contains proprietary information that the applicant has not and w ill not

share with others. The M anual contains operating conditions and procedur es that are not

available to the public and are protected from release under the Freedom of Information

Act 5 USC 552 et. seq.

Thank you for your time and consideration, and please let me know if you have any

questions.

Sincerely,

Gabriel Dobbs

Di rector of Policy

Skycatch, Inc.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMTION EXTRACTED FROM THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q
FOR THE SIX MONTH PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              AUG-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 SEP-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAY-31-1998
<CASH>                                         136,050
<SECURITIES>                                   8,321,852
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               8,457,902
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 8,457,902
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          204,499
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    1
<COMMON>                                       10,560
<OTHER-SE>                                     8,242,842
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   8,457,902
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               324,004
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  166,005
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                157,999
<INCOME-TAX>                                   32,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            125,999
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   125,999
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .14
        


</TABLE>
#### Willie Junior HINES, a/k/a Willie Hines, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN TYGER RIVER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6085

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

*288Willie Junior Hines, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Willie Junior Hines seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as successive and unauthorized his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability.. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists, would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable . or wrong. *Slack v.*McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Hines has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
_116. h..

ELM S °LOTIONS

Or* amingemiammilivmmimm

520 W. Lake Mary Blvd, Suite 100, Sanford, FL 32773 Office: (407) 732-7710 Fax: (610) 728-7184

August 25, 2015

Department of Transportation

Docket Management System

West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE

Washington, DC 20590-001

Re: Amendment to Exemption No. 11779

Docket FAA-2015-0911

Dear Sir or Madam:

We petition to add two (2) Inspire 1 UAVs, as well as the Century Neo 660 to the exemption issued

to RKC Media Solutions, Inc. (Exemption No. 11779; Docket ID: FAA-2015-0911) (the "Exemption").

The associated (required) manuals for the three UAVs are enclosed.

The other terms and conditions of the Exemption remain the same.

There have not been (nor will there be) any changes in the conditions and reasons relative to public

interest and safety that were the basis for granting the original Exemption.

Sincerely,

Randy C. Zachary, President

RKC Media Solutions, LLC

520 W Lake Mary Blvd., Suite 100

Sanford, FL 32773

Enclosures

01290961 8/25/2015
##### 



Exhibit 99.7 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Brookfield Properties Corporation
(the Company) on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2003, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, Craig J. Laurie, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my
knowledge:  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company. By:
    /s/ Craig J. LaurieCraig J. LaurieMay 18, 2004
    
    Senior Vice President andChief Financial Officer