alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
| 1.     |                                 The quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended      October 31, 2009 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements      of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934      as amended, and |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |   |
|--------|--------|

| 2.     |                                      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | /s/      PATRICK GOEPEL      |
|--------|------------------------------|
|   | Patrick      Goepel          |
|   | Chief      Executive Officer |
|   | December 15,      2009  |

----
EXHIBIT 32

                                CERTIFICATION OF
                             CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                              OF GASCO ENERGY, INC.
                         PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350


         In connection with the  accompanying  amendment to the Annual Report of
Gasco Energy,  Inc. (the  "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended  December
31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"),  I, Mark A. Erickson,  Chief  Executive  Officer of the Company,
hereby certify, to my knowledge, that:

     1.   The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



                                           /s/ Mark A. Erickson
                                           ---------------------
                                    Name:  Mark A. Erickson
                                    Date:  March 1, 2006



<PAGE>




                                CERTIFICATION OF
                             CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                              OF GASCO ENERGY, INC.
                         PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350


         In connection with the  accompanying  amendment to the Annual Report of
Gasco Energy,  Inc. (the  "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended  December
31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, W. King Grant, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, to my knowledge, that:

     1.   The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



                                           /s/ W. King Grant
                                           ---------------------
                                    Name:  W. King Grant
                                    Date:  March 1, 2006
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


The Board of Directors
Internet Capital Group, Inc.

We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (No.
333-34736) on Form S-8 of Internet Capital Group, Inc. and subsidiaries of our
reports dated February 20, 2003 with respect to the Consolidated Balance Sheets
of Internet Capital Group, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2002 and
2001, and the related Consolidated Statements of Operations, Cash Flows,
Stockholders' Equity (Deficit) and Comprehensive Loss for each of the years in
the three-year period ended December 31, 2002 and related schedule, which
reports appear in the December 31, 2002 annual report on Form 10-K of Internet
Capital Group, Inc.

Our report dated February 20, 2003 contains an explanatory paragraph that
describes Internet Capital Group, Inc.'s change in its method of accounting for
goodwill, discontinued operations, accounting for an investment, accounting for
notes receivable from stockholders and reporting gains on extinguishment of
debt in 2002 and derivatives in 2001.

KPMG LLP

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
April 15, 2003
#### GIBSON *&*ODOM ELECTRIC COMPANY, Inc., Appellant, v. R. F. BALL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Inc., and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, Appellees.

No. 22824.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 28, 1966.

Samuel I. Rosenberg, Ernest A. Carrere, Jr., Frank C. Allen, Jr., of Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, Robert J. Martin, Jr., of Polack, Rosenberg & Rittenberg, New Orleans, La., for appellant.

A. J. Schmitt, Jr., George R. Blue, of Beard, Blue, Schmitt & Treen, New Orleans, La., Richard U. Simon, of Simon & Simon, Fort Worth, Tex., for appellee R. F. Ball Const. Co.

Before JONES and COLEMAN, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The appellee, R. F. Ball Construction Company, Inc., was the prime contractor of a construction job in New Orleans, Louisiana. The appellant, Gibson & Odom Electric Company, Inc., claimed it was the low bidder for an electrical subcontract and that it had entered into a verbal agreement with Ball to perform the electrical work. Before the documents were in satisfactory form, Ball notified Gibson & Odom that it had withdrawn from the proposed subcontract. Ball gave the electrical subcontract to another. Gibson & Odom sues for breach of contract and says that under instructions from Ball it had incurred obligations and expenses. It sought recovery both on the theory of a *183breach of contract and on quantum meruit. The district court made findings and conclusions, deciding that no binding contract had been made and Gibson & Odom was not entitled to a recovery of damages or for anticipated profits. The district court gave Gibson a judgment of $3,496.17 as reimbursement for expenditures made in doing preliminary work. The question in the district court was primarily one of fact. The question here is whether the findings of the district court are clearly erroneous. We decide that they are not. The judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Timothy Harnett, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 888]

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Barbara Newman, J), rendered December 14, 2000, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of sodomy in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of 18 years and 1 year, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. Issues of credibility were properly considered by the jury and there is no basis for disturbing its determinations *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94 [1903]). The fact that the jury rendered a mixed verdict is explainable and does not warrant a different conclusion *(see People v Rayam,*94 NY2d 557 [2000]).

The record fails to support defendant’s claim that he was excluded from a conference with a prospective juror *(see People*
      *339
      *v Velasquez,*1 NY3d 44 [2003]). On the contrary, we conclude that the court followed a standard procedure which ensured defendant’s presence each time a panelist asked to address the court in private, including the occasion at issue.

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur— Nardelli, J.P., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Lerner and Gonzalez, JJ.
#### Nanette GROSS, Individually and as representative of Terry Gross, deceased; Diane Horton, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Bobby Horton, deceased; Kevin Horton, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. NCH CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-60646

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 22, 2017

Dana Jan Swan, Esq., Chapman, Lewis & Swan, Clarksdale, MS, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Amy Lewis Champagne, Esq., Samuel D. Gregory, Baker; Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Jackson, MS, for Defendant-Appellee

Before DAVIS, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

*204PER CURIAM: *

This tragic case arises from an early-2010 outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease at the Hotel Chester in Starkville, Mississippi. Four of the five plaintiffs contracted the disease from the hotel’s cooling system, and the plaintiffs allege that the fifth plaintiff did as well. Two of the plaintiffs died, and another became severely sick.

The plaintiffs sued multiple parties for negligence. All but NCH Corporation, which had provided water treatment for the hotel since 2004, were later dismissed. NCH then moved for both summary judgment and to strike the plaintiffs’ experts. In a well-reasoned order, the district court granted NCH’s motions and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. For essentially the same reasons given by the district court, we AFFIRM.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cm. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Presidential Documents

10685 

Federal Register 

Vol. 87, No. 37 

Thursday, February 24, 2022 

Title 3— 

The President 

Notice of February 23, 2022 

Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to 

Cuba and of the Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels 

On March 1, 1996, by Proclamation 6867, a national emergency was declared 

to address the disturbance or threatened disturbance of international relations 

caused by the February 24, 1996, destruction by the Cuban government 

of two unarmed, United States-registered civilian aircraft in international 

airspace north of Cuba. On February 26, 2004, by Proclamation 7757, the 

national emergency was expanded to deny monetary and material support 

to the Cuban government. On February 24, 2016, by Proclamation 9398, 

and on February 22, 2018, by Proclamation 9699, the national emergency 

was further modified based on continued disturbances or threatened disturbances of the international relations of the United States related to Cuba. 

The Cuban government has not demonstrated that it will refrain from the 

use of excessive force against United States vessels or aircraft that may 

engage in memorial activities or peaceful protest north of Cuba. 

Further, the unauthorized entry of any United States-registered vessel into 

Cuban territorial waters continues to be detrimental to the foreign policy 

of the United States because such entry could facilitate a mass migration 

from Cuba. It continues to be United States policy that a mass migration 

from Cuba would endanger United States national security by posing a 

disturbance or threatened disturbance of the international relations of the 

United States. 

Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies 

Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency with respect 

to Cuba and the emergency authority relating to the regulation of the anchorage and movement of vessels set out in Proclamation 6867, as amended 

by Proclamation 7757, Proclamation 9398, and Proclamation 9699. 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with FR PREZDOC4
10686 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 37 / Thursday, February 24, 2022 / Presidential Documents 

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to 

the Congress. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

February 23, 2022. [FR Doc. 2022–04144 

Filed 2–23–22; 11:15 am] 

Billing code 3395–F2–P 


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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

GLORIA HILDA NAVARRETE, AKA

Gloria Navarrete,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50187

D.C. No. 

3:15-cr-00596-BEN-3

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 10, 2017

Pasadena, California

Before: REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

“We review the district court’s interpretation of the [U.S. Sentencing]

Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of

the case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear

FILED

SEP 14 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
error.” United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

1. The district court increased Navarrete’s sentence under U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a stash house. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), cmt.

n.17 (2015). Under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not err by

imposing a sentence enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12).

2. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) provides for an upward adjustment based on the

defendant’s role in the offense. The district court found that Navarrete was “a lot

closer to the top [of the drug-trafficking organization] than she was . . . to the

bottom.” The record supports the district court’s findings. The district court did

not err when it increased Navarrete’s sentence by two levels for her role in the

offense. See United States v. Maldonado, 215 F.3d 1046, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2000);

United States v. Varela, 993 F.2d 686, 691–92 (9th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED. 

2
#### VAA, Plaintiff v. IULI, Defendant

No. 4-1916

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [“Matai” name: “Salanoa”]

Date unknown

A. M. NOBLE, *Associate Judge High Court*

This cause coming on to be heard before His Honor, A. M. Noble, Associate Member of the High Court, plaintiff and defendant both being present, and it appearing to the Court that the matters in controversy have been amicably settled.

It is therefore, ordered, considered and adjudged by the Court that the plaintiff “VAA” is entitled to register himself under the “matai” name “SALANOA”, in the Register of “Matai” Titles in the office of the Secretary of Native Affairs.

It is further ordered, considered and adjudged by the Court that the cost of this action, to-wit, $10.00 be paid by the plaintiff “VAA”.
#### Mehrdad SHAYEFAR; Gina Shayefar, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Von-Alan Hinano KALELEIKI, Defendant-Appellant, and Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki, Defendant.

No. 16-16610

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

OCTOBER 5, 2017

Wendy Cole Lascher, Ferguson Case Orr Paterson LLP, Ventura, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Von-Alan Hinano Kaleleiki, Lahaina, HI, pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Von-Alan Hinano Kaleleiki appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Shayefars in their action to quiet title. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment and determination of subject matter jurisdiction. *Haro v. Sebelius,*747 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Shayefars’ claim to quiet title because defendants failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they held superior title to the Shayefars on the subject property. *See Maui Land & Pineapple Co. v. Infiesto,*76 Hawaii 402, 879 P.2d 507, 512-13 (1994) (“In an action to quiet title, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove title in and to the land in dispute ... [by showing] either that he has paper title to the property or that he holds title by adverse possession ... [and] that he has a substantial interest in the property and that his title is superi- or to that of the defendants.”); *Makila Land Co., LLC v. Kapu,*139 Hawai'i 261, 388 P.3d 49, 50 (Ct. App. 2016) (“A prima facie case can be made in various ways, but is usually done by bringing forward evidence of the initial land grant award' and tracing ownership forward to the plaintiff through ‘mesne conveyances, devise, or descent’ or through evidence of adverse possession .... ” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); *Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Silva,*124 Hawai'i 476, 248 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Ct. App. 2011) (“If the plaintiff and the defendant both bring forward evidence supporting their claims of title, then the court must decide, based on the evidence presented, which *468party has title superior to that of the other party.”).

To the extent that appellant challenges the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the district court properly determined that there was diversity jurisdiction. *See 28*U.S.C. § 1332(a); *Naffe v. Frey, 789*F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth requirements for diversity jurisdiction); *see also United States v. Lorenzo,*995 F.2d 1448, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting jurisdictional challenge by Hawaiian nationals).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Kevin HERRING Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-1634

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 13, 2017

Filed: July 21, 2017

*470Dan Chatham, Ravi T. Narayan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Iowa, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Kevin Herring, Pro Se

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Kevin Herring appeals the district court’s1 order revoking his supervised release and imposing a 10-month sentence. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief questioning the reasonableness of Herring’s revocation sentence.

Our review of the record satisfies us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Herring as it did. See United States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 744 (8th Cir. 2016) (appellate court reviews district court’s revocation sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard).

The judgment is affirmed, and counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is granted.

1

. The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6208

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JAMES FELTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District

Judge. (CR-93-88, CA-96-484-R)

Submitted: January 15, 1998 Decided: January 27, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Felton, Appellant Pro Se. Ruth Elizabeth Plagenhoef, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. United States v. Felton, Nos. CR-93-88; CA-96-484-R (W.D.

Va. Jan. 22, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
#### NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. LOCAL 1367, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO et al., Respondents.

No. 22034.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 5, 1966.

Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, N. L. R. B., Melvin J. Welles, Atty., N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., Arnold Ordman, General Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, Herman M. Levy, Attorney, N. L. R. B., for petitioner.

Warner F. Brock, Herman Wright, Houston, Tex., Mandell & Wright, Houston, Tex., for respondents.

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge, and CHOATE, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The order of the National Labor Relations Board will be enforced. See Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board, 5th Cir., 368 F.2d 12. No. 22239, Dec., November 9, 1966.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

CHOATE, Senior District Judge

(concurring) :

I concur in the decision to enforce the order of the National Labor Relations Board because of the respondent’s clear failure to represent one segment of its members properly. The facts of this case show a definite breach of the union’s duty to represent impartially all members, which amounts here to an unfair labor practice upon the part of the union.

However, I fully realize that here the Board is treading perilous waters by taking over the duties of unions. By far, the preferable procedure is to let individuals take ordinary steps, such as filing suit, to adjust such grievances. The reasoning in Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board, 5th Cir., 368 F.2d 12, No. 22239, in my opinion tends to set a dangerous precedent, in that it puts the court in the position of approving the Board’s action in telling a labor union (a private organization) how to perform its functions.

My concurrence is largely upon the basis of expediting the remedy in a case of clear fault, rather than approving the method employed, which I recognize could be most destructive of unions if carried forward to any extent by the Board.