alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Nathaniel Jerome CASEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1410

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Domingo Gonzalez, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 661]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Katz, J.), rendered January 18, 2002, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, bail jumping in the second degree, and unlawful possession of marijuana, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the identification by the complainant was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of the crime of robbery in the second degree is without merit. An identification by a single witness can be sufficient to support a criminal conviction *(see People v Fermin,*235 AD2d 328 [1997]). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Davis,*220 AD2d 525 [1995]).

The defendant’s contention that reversal is required as a result of a remark made during the People’s summation regarding sentencing is also without merit. The court properly *580sustained the defendant’s objection to the remark and subsequently gave the jury appropriate curative instructions. Under the circumstances, the defendant was not prejudiced by the remark *(see People v Tosca,*98 NY2d 660, 661 [2002]; *People v Hornedo,*303 AD2d 602, 603 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 595 [2003]). Prudenti, P.J., S. Miller, H. Miller and Adams, JJ., concur..
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, Benjamin Leboe, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of Asian Alliance Ventures, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report.
4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15) for the registrant and we have:

a)     designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b)     evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c)     presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;
5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

a)     all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b)    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and
6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Dated this 12th day of December, 2003.



| | /s/ Benjamin Leboe
Benjamin Leboe
Principal Financial Officer
| | -------------------------------------------------------------





---
#### James Daggett, Plaintiff in Error, *versus*Oliver Pratt.

Where a note is made payable at a day certain, with less interest than the lawful rate, or without interest, and if not then paid, with lawful interest until paid, — not being paid at maturity, lawful interest from the date is recoverable.

This was a writ of error *coram vohis.*The original action was Drought by *Pratt*against *Daggett,*upon four several promissory notes, payable at distant days. Three of them were made payable, with interest, at three per cent, per annum, if paid at their maturity; “ if not, six per cent, interest to be paid; ” and the fourth was payable without interest “ until the note is out; if not paid then, lawful interest until paid.” The notes not having been paid when they became due, judgment was rendered upon them all, with lawful interest, at six per cent., from the date of the notes to the rendition of the judgment.

The error assigned was the amount of the damages — it being contended by *Reed,*for the plaintiff in error, that the true construction of the promise was, that interest was to be allowed at six per cent, from the time fixed in the notes for payment of the principal.

But *the Court*were of a different opinion, and affirmed the formel ludgment.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS  FOR THE PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           1,201,952
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      643,943
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                        973,287
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,202,354
<PP&E>                                             320,044
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   3,801,143
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,430,545
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           118,990
<OTHER-SE>                                       2,247,352
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     3,801,143
<SALES>                                            805,978
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   805,978
<CGS>                                              369,755
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,329,930
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    26,187
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,919,894)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,919,894)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       (0.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (0.28)
                                               


</TABLE>
Opinion filed February 21, 2020



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ No. 11

- 20

- 00049

- CR

__________ IN RE BILLY CHARLES WILKIN S

Original Mandamus Proceeding

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Relator, Billy Charles Wilkins
, filed this original petition for writ of mandamus in which he requests that we instruct the Justice of the Peace for Precinct No. 4 in Brown County to dismiss an arrest warrant that was issued on June 13, 1995, in Cause Numb er 4226. Article V, s ection 6 of the Texas Constitution , which delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the intermediate courts of appeals
, provides that the courts of appeals have original jurisdiction as prescribed by law. T EX

. C ONST

. art. V, § 6

. Sect ion 22.221 (a) of the Government Code authorizes this court to issue a writ of
mandamus in order t o enforce our jurisdiction

. T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN

. § 22.221(a) (West Supp. 2019 ). We may also issue a writ of mandamus against “a judge of a district, statutory county, statutory probate county, or county court” ; “a judge of a2

district court who is acting as a magistrate at a court of inquiry”; or “an associate judge of a district o r county court appointed by a judge under Chapter 201, Family
Code
, ” so long as those judges are in our district. Id. § 22.221(b). Relator’s petition seeks mandamus relief against a justice of the peace. We do not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of man damus against a justice of the peace

. Easton v. Franks , 842 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see also In re Garcia , No. 13

- 18

- 00651

- CV, 2018 WL 6219254, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg Nov. 28, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Further, Relator’s petition does not demonstrate that the relief that he requests is necessary to enforce our appellate juris diction. See In re
Smith , 355 S.W.3d 901, 9 01

– 02 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2011, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus against justice of the peace where relators did not argue or show that writ was necessary to enforce the court’s jurisdiction ). Therefore, we dismiss the pe tition for writ of ma ndamus for lack of jurisdiction

.

PER CURIAM

February 21, 2020 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C. J. , Stretcher , J., and Wright, S.C.J. 1
Willson, J., not participating.

1 Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, sitting by assignment.
Murphy SINCLAIR, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2439

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

NOVEMBER 15, 2017

Following review of the petition for emergency writ of habeas corpus, it is ordered that said petition is hereby denied.

SALTER, EMAS and LOGUE, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6085 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6085

 To prohibit the implementation of the Draft Resource Management Plan 
 and Environmental Impact Statement for the Rock Springs RMP Revision, 
                    Wyoming, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 26, 2023

 Ms. Hageman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit the implementation of the Draft Resource Management Plan 
 and Environmental Impact Statement for the Rock Springs RMP Revision, 
                    Wyoming, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RESTRICTION ON DRAFT RMP AND EIS FOR ROCK SPRINGS RMP 
              REVISION, WYOMING.

    The Secretary of the Interior may not finalize, implement, 
administer, or enforce the Draft Resource Management Plan and 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Rock Springs RMP Revision, 
Wyoming, referred to in the notice of availability titled ``Notice of 
Availability of the Draft Resource Management Plan and Environmental 
Impact Statement for the Rock Springs RMP Revision, Wyoming'' published 
by the Bureau of Land Management on August 18, 2023 (88 Fed. Reg. 
56654).
                                 <all>
```
[EXHIBIT 32.1]

   CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL
            OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                   AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
           SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

   I,  Bradley  Wilson, certify, pursuant to  18  U.S.C.  Section
1350,  as  adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act  of  2002, that the Annual Report of North American Liability
Group,  Inc. on Form 10-KSB/A for the annual period ended  December
31, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained  in  such Form 10-KSB/A fairly presents in  all  material
respects  the  financial condition and results of  operations  of
NorMexSteel, Inc.



By: /s/ Bradley Wilson
   --------------------------------
   Name: Bradley Wilson
   Title:  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
#### Danny Lee CAESAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES ARMY; Board of the Correction of Military Records, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16505

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 20, 2017

Danny Lee Caesar, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Danny Lee Caesar appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from his military service. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Caesar’s federal claims because members of the armed forces may not file suit against the government for injuries incurred- during service. *See Hodge v. Dalton,*107 F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1997) *(Feres*doctrine bars members of the armed forces from bringing “an action against the Government or armed services personnel for injuries during activity under the control or supervision of a commanding officer.” (internal citation omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Caesar’s breach of contract claim because money damages are not an available remedy for the government’s breach of an enlistment contract. *See Jablon v. United States,*657 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1981).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Vance Gordan GEIST v. Timothy PENN and Anita Penn

2160341

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 16, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATE



As required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, (as amended by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002), I certify that:



(1)        The Annual Report of VirTra Systems, Inc. for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)        The information contained in that Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ L. Kelly Jones

L. Kelly Jones

chief executive officer and chief financial officer

March 22, 2005



1
#### David Dwayne DUGAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gary SWARTHOUT, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-16043

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 17, 2017

Margaret Joan Littlefield, Attorney, Law Office of Margaret Littlefield, Boli-nas, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant

David Dwayne Dugan, Pro Se

*622Maria G. Chan, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this cas.e is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

David Dwayne Dugan appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging a 2009 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings denying parole and deferring his next parole hearing for five years in accordance with California Penal Code § 3041.5 (“Marsy’s Law”). We dismiss.

This court issued a certificate of appeal-ability (“COA”) on whether application of Marsy’s Law to delay Dugan’s next parole hearing for five years violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, and whether Dugan’s membership in a class action precludes his individual litigation of this claim in habeas. We vacate the COA as improvidently granted and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. *See Nettles v. Grounds,*830 F.3d 922, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding that claims fall outside “the core of, habeas corpus” if success will not necessarily lead to immediate or earlier release from confinement), cer*t. denied,*580 U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 645, 196 L.Ed.2d 542 (2017) ; *Phelps v. Alameda,*366 F.3d 722, 727-28, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (merits panel has the power to rule on the propriety of a COA).

The dismissal of this appeal does not preclude Dugan from pursuing conditions of confinement claims in a properly filed civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All pending motions are denied as moot.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Order entered November 18, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01445-CV

MONTGOMERY J. BENNETT AND EVAN (VAN) LANE SHAW,

Appellants

V.

MATTHEW ZUCKER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 330th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-19-17721

ORDER

Before the Court is appellee’s November 17, 2020 motion to extend time to 

file his brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER the brief be filed no later than 

December 2, 2020.

The Court’s July 15, 2020 order providing that this appeal shall be submitted 

concurrently with its companion appeal, appellate cause number 05-20-00488-CV, 

remains in effect.
/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Chromcraft Revington, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, Benjamin M. Anderson-Ray, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and
Frank T. Kane, Vice President - Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of
          the Company.


/s/ Benjamin M. Anderson-Ray
-------------------------------------
Benjamin M. Anderson-Ray
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

November 14, 2006


/s/ Frank T. Kane
-------------------------------------
Frank T. Kane
Vice President-Finance and
Chief Financial Officer

November 14, 2006
EXHIBIT 32.2


            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 ADOPTED
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Excalibur Industries, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ending December 31,
2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Matthew C. Flemming, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify the following pursuant to Section 18, U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.



/s/ Matthew C. Flemming
-----------------------
Matthew C. Flemming, Chief Financial Officer
March 31, 2005
Roger Anthony DIXON v. STATE

CR-15-0152

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 26, 2017

Affirmed.
#### Bryan Rigoverto Garcia VENTURA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-71190

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

Tania T. Pham, Law Offices of Tania Pham, Woodland Hills, CA, for Petitioner

OIL, Allison Frayer, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*272MEMORANDUM **

Bryan Rigoverto Garcia Ventura, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Molina-Morales v. INS,*237 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001). We deny in part and grant in part the petition for review, and remand.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that, even if Garcia Ventura established membership in a cognizable social group, he failed to demonstrate a causal nexus between the harm he suffered and fears and a protected ground. *See id.*at 1051-52 (personal dispute not grounds for asylum unless connected to a protected ground). Thus, we deny the petition as to asylum.

Respondent’s unopposed request to remand Garcia Ventura’s CAT claim to the agency to assess the impact of this court’s decision in *Barajas-Romero v. Lynch,*846 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2017) is granted.

Each party shall bear its own costs for this petition for review.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part; REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.