Nos. 06-14-00164-CR

In the 

Sixth Court of Appeals 

at Texarkana, Texas 

_______________________ 

Christopher Neal McGonigal, 

Appellant, 

v.

The State of Texas, 

Appellee. 

 _______________________________ 

On Appeal from the 

6

th District Court of Red River County 

Hon. Eric Clifford, Presiding 

_______________________________

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

 

 

 

Don Biard 

 State Bar No. 24047755 

 Counsel for Appellant 

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

ACCEPTED

06-14-00164-CR

SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

TEXARKANA, TEXAS

12/31/2014 4:09:13 PM

DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERK

 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 1/8/2015 3:29:00 PM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
1

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Defendant Below

Appellant in this Court

Christopher Neal McGonigal

Counsel for Appellant:

Don Biard (on appeal)

State Bar No. 24047755

38 First Northwest

Paris, Texas 75460

Tel: (903)785-1606

Fax: (903)785-7580

Email: dbiard@att.net

Dan Meehan (at trial)

State Bar No. 13898700

202 West Madison

Clarksville, Texas 75426

Tel: (903)427-4547

Fax: (903)427-4549

Appellee in this Court

The State of Texas

Counsel for Appellee:

Hon. Val Varley

State Bar No. 20496580

Red River County Attorney’s Office

400 North Walnut

Clarksville, Texas 75426

Tel: (903)427-2009

Fax: (903)427-5316
2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of Parties and Counsel................................................................1

Table of Contents................................................................................2

Index of Authorities.........................................................................3-4

Issues Presented...................................................................................5

Summary of the Argument........................................................................................6

Statement of the Case.........................................................................8

Procedural History..............................................................................9

Facts.......................................................................................10-11

Argument and Authorities................................................................12-24

Prayer..........................................................................................24

Certificate of Service.........................................................................25

Certificate of Compliance With Rule 9.4(i)(3)........................................................26
3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Caselaw

Banks v. State, 158 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2005), pet. 

ref’d.........................................................................................................................22

Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1978)............................................18

City of Keller 168 S.W.3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2005).....................................................12

Cortez v. State, 571 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).......................................22

Franco v. State, 552 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)......................................15

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973)........18

Hacker v. State, 389 S.W. 3d 860, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).............................12

Long v. State, 590 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)....................................18,21

Marathon Corp v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. 2003)................................12

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).....................19

Prince v. State, 503 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).......................................17

Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Cr.App.1975)........................................18

Willis v. State, 2 S.W. 3d 397 (Tex. App. – Austin 1999), no pet......................16,17
4

Rules of Evidence

Tex. R. Evid. 410.....................................................................................................15

Tex. R. Evid. 801.....................................................................................................20

Tex. R. Evid. 802.....................................................................................................20

Tex. R. Evid. 803................................................................................................17,20

Tex. R. Evid. 902.....................................................................................................21

Rules of Procedure

Tex. R. Crim. Pro. 27.02..........................................................................................13

Secondary Sources

George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Criminal Practice and Procedure, §40.86..16
5

ISSUES PRESENTED

I. Whether the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment 

revoking Appellant’s deferred adjudication community supervision and

adjudicating Appellant guilty of the underlying offense?

II. Whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence?
6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The state filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s deferred adjudication community 

supervision. The only allegation contained in the state’s motion was that Appellant 

had committed the offense of Driving While Under the Influence of Drugs or 

Alcohol in Montgomery County, Kansas on or about May 9, 2014. The state 

presented two pieces of evidence to meet its burden of proof on this allegation. 

First, the state offered a “Defendant’s Acknowledgment of Rights and Entry 

of Plea” from a Kansas court signed by Appellant. This document did not specify 

what type of plea Appellant was entering, what offenses he may have been 

pleading to, when those offenses may have occurred, or where those offenses may 

have occurred.

Next, the state offered an Inmate Booking Sheet from the Montgomery

County, Kansas Sheriff’s Office. This document showed only Appellant’s

physical description, arrest date, and the offense with which he was charged. It 

contained no other information about the offense.

These two pieces of evidence are insufficient to prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that Appellant committed the offense alleged in the motion to revoke.

Further, the Inmate Booking Sheet was inadmissible hearsay evidence. Not 

only is it hearsay, but this document contains observations of law enforcement 
7

personnel and is not authenticated. The trial court erred by admitting it over 

defense objection. 
8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: Motion to Revoke Deferred Adjudication 

Community Supervision and Adjudicate Guilt on 

one charge of Indecency with a Child. 

Trial Court: The Honorable Eric Clifford

6

th District Court, Red River County, Texas

Trial Court Disposition: The trial court revoked Appellant’s community 

supervision, adjudicated Appellant guilty on the 

charge of Indecency with a Child, and sentenced 

Appellant to 20 years’ imprisonment. 
9

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

On February 19, 2013, Appellant, Christopher Neal McGonigal, was placed on 

deferred adjudication community supervision for one charge of indecency with a 

child.

2

 On June 2, 2014, the state filed a motion to adjudicate guilt.

3

 

A hearing was held on the motion on August 28, 2014.4 The trial court 

adjudicated McGonigal guilty of the charge of indecency with a child and 

sentenced McGonigal to serve a 20 year term.

5

 McGonigal timely filed notice of 

appeal.6

 

1 All references to the record on appeal are made in the following manner: CR pg.# and RR, 

pg.#. CR designates the Clerk’s Record and RR designates the Reporter’s Record, followed by 

the particular page in that record. RR Ex.# designates a particular exhibit in the Reporter’s 

Record. 

2 CR pg. 65

3 CR pg. 109

4 RR pg. 1

5 CR pg. 131

6 CR pg. 123
10

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The sole basis of the state’s motion to adjudicate guilt was an allegation that 

McGonigal had committed the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol 

or Drugs in Montgomery County, Kansas on or about May 9, 2014.7

During the adjudication hearing, the state called two witnesses. The first 

witness, Miranda Dean, was McGonigal’s probation officer in Red River County.8 

Ms. Dean was called for the primary purpose of introducing a document into 

evidence.9 This document was titled “Defendant’s Acknowledgment of Rights and 

Entry of Plea” and stemmed from a criminal case in the Fourteenth Judicial District 

of Kansas.10 Ms. Dean seemed unsure of what the document was and had no 

personal knowledge about the case.11

The state next called Alex Davidson, an investigator with the Red River 

County District Attorney’s Office. Mr. Davidson was called for the primary 

purpose of introducing another document into evidence. This document was titled 

“Montgomery County SO Inmate Booking Sheet” and contained McGonigal’s 

physical description, photograph, and arrest information.

12

 

7 RR pg. 5; CR pg. 109

8 RR pg. 6

9 RR pg. 7

10 RR, Ex. #1

11 RR pgs. 7, 9

12 RR, Ex. #2
11

Mr. Davidson testified that the Montgomery County, Kansas Sheriff’s Office 

had faxed him this document at his request.13 This document states that 

McGonigal was arrested on May 9, 2014 and had the charge of “Driving under 

influence of alcohol or drugs.”14

 

13 RR pg. 13

14 RR, Ex. #2
12

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Issue No. 1 Restated: The evidence is insufficient to show that Appellant 

committed the offense of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol or 

Drugs in Montgomery County, Kansas on or about May 9, 2014.

Standard of Review

To revoke probation (whether it be regular probation or deferred adjudication), the 

State need prove the violation of a condition of probation by a preponderance of 

the evidence. In the probation-revocation context, "a preponderance of the 

evidence" means "that greater weight of the credible evidence which would create 

a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of his probation."

Although a lower standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt," the preponderance of 

the evidence standard is a much higher standard than the search-and-seizure 

standards of "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion."15

Evidence does not meet this standard when the evidence offered to prove a 

vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its 

existence or when the finder of fact must guess whether a vital fact 

exists.16 “Some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, 

which is not the same as some evidence."17

a. The Plea Document Contains No Evidence of McGonigal’s Guilt

 

15 Hacker v. State, 389 S.W. 3d 860, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

16 Id., citing City of Keller 168 S.W.3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2005).

17 Marathon Corp v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. 2003).
13

The state presented only two pieces of evidence during the hearing. The 

first was the “Defendant’s Acknowledgment of Rights and Entry of Plea”.18 This 

document fails to show that McGonigal committed the alleged offense for several 

reasons.

First, it does not show what plea McGonigal entered in the case. This 

document appears to be a standard form used in plea cases in Kansas, similar to the 

form often used in Texas.

19

 Throughout the document it advises defendants of the 

effects of a plea of guilty and a plea of no contest. However, the document does 

not identify which type of plea McGonigal intended to enter. The document 

consistently speaks of both a plea of guilty and a plea of no contest.

Given the language of the document, it is certainly possible McGonigal 

intended to enter a plea of no contest to one or more of the charges rather than a 

plea of guilty. No judicial notice of the effect of a plea of no contest in Kansas was 

taken during the hearing. However, in Texas, a plea of no contest is not an 

admission of guilt.20 It is also important to note that this Kansas document does 

not contain any sort of judicial confession like its Texas counterpart.21

Second, this exhibit does not show to what crimes McGonigal intended to 

plead no contest or guilty to. Although paragraph six lists, “DUI, 1st” and “Driving 

 

18 RR, Ex. #1

19 See CR pg. 45

20 Tex. R. Crim. Pro. 27.02(5)

21 CR pg. 52
14

Left of Center” it is not clear that McGonigal intended to plead guilty to either or 

both of these offenses. The plea agreement was apparently attached to the original 

document in Kansas (para. 5 of the exhibit), but was not attached when this 

document was entered into evidence in Red River County. 

It is not uncommon for a defendant to be charged with two offenses and to 

reach a plea bargain in which the more serious offense is dismissed in exchange for 

a plea to the minor offense or to plead to a lesser included offense. Again, Exhibit 

#1 does not identify how McGonigal intended to plead.

Third, this exhibit does not show any proof that McGonigal actually plead to 

Driving Under the Influence or that his plea was accepted. This document is only 

an advisement of the defendant’s rights. It is not, on its face, a plea itself. The 

document is not signed or certified by a judge or magistrate.22 

The state did not introduce any other evidence from the Kansas case, such as 

a written judgment of conviction or a certified reporter’s record, to show how or if 

McGonigal plead to the offenses. Nor did the state offer any evidence as to what 

offense or offenses McGonigal was convicted of in the Kansas court.

Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that McGonigal intended to 

plead guilty and admit to committing the offense alleged in the state’s motion to 

 

22 Page 3 of the document contains a signature block for “JUDGE/Notary Public”. However, it is 

clear this is intended only to acknowledge the signatures of the defendant and his counsel. It also 

does not indicate whether this particular document was signed by a judge or a notary.
15

revoke, this would not be sufficient to revoke his community supervision. In 

Franco v. State, the defendant had been placed on community supervision and the 

state sought to revoke his community supervision. As part of plea negotiations

Franco signed a “Stipulation of Evidence” stipulating to the facts alleged in the 

state’s motion to revoke. During the hearing, however, Franco changed his mind 

and plead “not true” and objected to the admission of the Stipulation of Evidence. 

The trial court considered the stipulation over defense objection and revoked 

Franco’s community supervision.23

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. The 

court held that because Franco plead “not true”, the stipulation of evidence should 

not have been admitted into evidence.24

Here, the evidence is even less compelling. We have an advisement of 

rights which, at best, indicates that McGonigal intended to plead guilty or no 

contest to one or more offenses. However, there is no record that McGonigal 

actually plead to the offenses.25

b. The Inmate Booking Sheet Contains No Evidence of McGonigal’s Guilt

The second exhibit introduced by the state is a booking sheet from the 

Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office. It gives McGonigal’s general physical 

 

23 Franco v. State, 552 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

24 Franco at 144

25 See also Tex. R. Evid. 410 (a plea of guilty or no contest that was later withdrawn is not 

admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions)
16

description and states that he was arrested on May 9, 2014 and charged with “B1567 Driving under influence of alcohol or drugs; Misdemeanor: STAT”. 

Although the document states the arrest date was May 9, 2014, it does not specify 

that this was the same date that the alleged offense occurred. The state presented 

no evidence from the arresting officer in Kansas nor any testimony from any other 

person with knowledge of the details of alleged offense.

c. Taken together these documents do not meet the state’s burden

There are three ways in which the State may seek to prove the defendant 

engaged in criminal conduct during the community supervision period – (1) direct 

proof in the revocation hearing; (2) using a judgment of conviction; (3) using 

evidence from a criminal trial.26

Here, the state offered no direct proof – such as the testimony of the 

arresting officer. The state offered no judgment of conviction. And, the only 

evidence from a criminal trial offered was an advisement to McGonigal of his 

rights.

In Willis v. State, the defendant had been placed on community supervision 

in Caldwell County for the offense of theft. The state sought to revoke his 

community supervision. The state alleged that Willis had again committed theft 

while on community supervision. The primary evidence introduced by the state to 

 

26 Willis v. State, 2 S.W. 3d 397 (Tex. App. – Austin 1999), citing George E. Dix &Robert O. 

Dawson, Criminal Practice and Procedure, §40.86
17

prove this allegation was a judgment from a Brazos County court revoking Willis’s 

community supervision in a separate case. The written judgment from the Brazos 

County court recited that the court had found that Willis had committed the exact 

same offense as alleged in the state’s motion to revoke in Caldwell County.27

The Austin Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Caldwell County 

court revoking Willis’s community supervision. It found that the revocation order 

was, “[S]upported by no evidence other than the recitations in a revocation order 

entered by another judge, in another county, in another case, and where the 

defendant was represented by different counsel.”28

In our case, we do not even have a written order from the Kansas court 

finding that McGonigal committed any offense. Not only was he in another state, 

another case, and represented by different counsel, there is not even a cursory 

recitation that McGonigal committed the offense alleged in the motion to revoke.

Even if we had a judgment of conviction, the evidence would still be 

insufficient. As shown in Defendant’s Exhibit #1, McGonigal appealed his 

sentence (for an unspecified offense). It has long been the law that if a conviction 

is on appeal at the time of the revocation, it may not be used as the basis for 

revocation.29

 

27 Willis at 399

28 Willis at 400

29 Prince v. State, 503 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); see also Tex. R. Evid. 803(22)
18

d. Conclusion

Though not the same as a criminal trial, a proceeding to revoke probation 

portends a possible deprivation of liberty, and as such, the application of 

appropriate due process of law is constitutionally required.30 The fundamental 

tenant of our system of justice is that merely being arrested and charged with an 

offense is not evidence of the commission of that offense. 

The evidence presented during McGonigal’s revocation hearing shows, at 

best, that he was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence. It does 

not show that he plead guilty to that offense or that a court found him guilty of that 

offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly cautioned against relying 

solely upon evidence of a conviction to prove a violation of community 

supervision conditions.31 Here, we do not even have evidence of a conviction, only 

evidence of an arrest and charge. 

Evidence showing only that a probationer has been arrested and charged 

with an offense is insufficient to show that he has committed that offense. Holding 

otherwise would offend traditional notions of justice and deny McGonigal of his 

constitutional right to due process.

 

30 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973); Bradley v. State, 

564 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).

31 Long v. State, 590 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)
19

Issue No. 2 Restated: The trial court erred when it admitted state’s Exhibit #2 

over defense objection because the exhibit is inadmissible hearsay evidence.

Standard of Review

A trial court’s ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an 

abuse of discretion standard.32 Under that standard, the trial court’s ruling must 

have been within the zone of reasonable disagreement.33

a. Error Was Preserved

The state called its investigator, Alex Davidson, for the purpose of 

introducing the Montogmery County Sheriff’s Office inmate booking sheet. When 

the state offered this exhibit into evidence during Mr. Davidson’s testimony the 

defense objected on the basis of hearsay, lack of proper foundation, and 

relevancy.34 The exhibit was admitted over the defense objections.35

b. The document is inadmissible hearsay

Mr. Davidson testified that he had contacted the Montgomery County 

Sheriff’s Office and asked them for any book-in records they had for McGonigal. 

The sheriff’s office faxed him the document admitted as Exhibit #2.36

This document is a written statement made by a person not testifying in 

court and admitted for the purpose of proving that McGonigal had committed the 

 

32 Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

33 Id.

34 RR pg. 14

35 RR pg. 14

36 RR pgs. 13-14
20

offense of Driving Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol. Accordingly, it is 

hearsay.37

i. It is excluded under Tex. R. Evid. 803(6)

The only possible exception to the hearsay rule which this document might 

fall under is the exception for public records and reports.38 However, this 

document fails under this exception for several reasons.

First, in criminal cases, matters observed by law enforcement personnel are 

not admissible under this exception.39 The notation of “Driving under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs” could have only come from a police officer’s 

observation.

ii. It was not authenticated by a witness

Second, no foundation was laid regarding whether this report contained 

“matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a 

duty to report”.

40

 No one from the Montgomery County, Kansas Sheriff’s Office 

was called to testify regarding how these booking sheets are compiled and whether 

they have a duty under Kansas law to report the information contained in them. 

Nor did the trial court take judicial notice of any Kansas law imposing such a duty.

 

37 Tex. R. Evid. 801, 802

38 Tex. R. Evid. 803(8)

39 Tex. R. Evid. 803(6)(B)

40 Id.
21

iii. It was not authenticated by seal or certification

Third, the document was not a self-authenticating document. There is no 

seal, signature, or other certification which might make this document a selfauthenticated public record.41

 

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that booking sheets are inadmissible 

hearsay unless properly authenticated.42 In Long v. State, the defendant was placed 

on probation for aggravated assault. The state later sought to revoke his probation 

based on an allegation that he had committed theft. One of the pieces of evidence 

presented at his revocation hearing was a Sheriff’s Office booking sheet. Long 

objected to its admission on the basis of hearsay. The booking sheet was admitted 

over Long’s objection.43

The Court of Criminal appeals held that the trial court erred in admitting the 

booking sheet. The court said, “The booking sheet contained no certification that it 

was a true and correct copy, it bore no signature, and [the witness] testified that he 

did not have anything to do with the preparation of that document, nor was he 

present when it was prepared.44

The exact same facts are present in our case. The Montgomery County 

booking sheet, contained no certification that it was a true and correct copy, it bore 

 

41 Tex. R. Evid. 902; see also RR Ex. #1

42 Long v. State, 590 S.W.2d 138

43 Long at 139-140

44 Long at 140
22

no signature, and the witness testified that he had only received it by fax from the 

Sheriff’s office and knew no other information about the case.

Even documentary evidence of an out-of-state conviction must be 

authenticated before it may be admitted. In Banks v. State, the prosecution offered 

a “pen packet” from Illinois as proof of the defendant’s prior conviction.45 The 

packet contained a court order, a fingerprint card, and a report. However, the 

packet was not certified nor did it bear any kind of seal.46 The court held that the 

pen packet was inadmissible hearsay because it had not been properly 

authenticated and reversed the judgment of the trial court.47 In our case, the 

booking sheet was also not authenticated and, therefore, should not have been 

admitted.

c. Admission of the Document Resulted in Harm to Appellant

The Inmate Booking Sheet was the only evidence introduced in the hearing

tending to show that McGonigal had “committed the offense of Driving under 

Influence of Alcohol or Drugs on or about May 9, 2014 in Montgomery County, 

KS”. Exhibit #1 shows only that McGonigal intended to enter some kind of plea to 

“DUI; 1st” and “Driving Left of Center”. It does not state when those alleged 

offenses occurred. Although the styling of that document indicates it was filed in 

 

45 Banks v. State, 158 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2005), pet. ref’d; see 

also Cortez v. State, 571 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

46 Id. at 653

47 Id. at 652
23

the “District Court of Montgomery & Chautaugqua Counties”, it does not state 

where the alleged offense occurred. Further, that document does not state that 

McGonigal was suspected of the offense of “Driving Under the Influence of Drugs 

or Alcohol” but simply states, “I understand from discussion with my attorney that 

I am pleading to the following crimes which have the following range of penalties: 

“DUI, 1st”.

The Red River County probation officer, Miranda Dean, testified that she 

had no personal knowledge of the alleged offense.48 She even testified that she 

was not familiar with Exhibit #1, which she was being asked to indentify.49

The District Attorney’s own investigator, Alex Davidson, testified that he 

had no knowledge concerning the alleged offense other than the booking sheet.50

d. Conclusion

Exhibit #2 is inadmissible hearsay. The trial court erred when it admitted 

the document over defense objection. This error harmed McGonigal because this 

exhibit is the only scintilla of evidence which might show that McGonigal 

committed the offense alleged in the state’s motion to adjudicate guilt. 

 

48 RR pg. 9

49 RR pg. 7

50 RR pg. 15
24

CONCLUSION

The evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment revoking 

Appellant’s deferred adjudication community supervision. The state failed to meet 

its burden of proof to show that Appellant had committed the offense of Driving 

While Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol in Montgomery County, Kansas on 

May 9, 2014. Further, the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay evidence of 

Appellant’s arrest in Kansas. This error resulted in substantial harm to Appellant 

because it contained the only evidence that Appellant may have committed the 

offense alleged in the state’s motion to revoke.

PRAYER

Appellant requests this court to reverse the judgment rendered below and reinstate 

Appellant’s deferred adjudication community supervision

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Don Biard_________________

Don Biard

State Bar No. 24047755

McLaughlin, Hutchison & Biard, LLP

38 First Northwest

Paris, Texas 75460

Tel: (903)785-1606

Fax: (903)785-7580

Counsel for Appellant
25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on December 31, 2014 a copy of the foregoing Appellant’s Brief was 

served to the following parties by the method indicated below.

/s/ Don Biard //

Don Biard

Via Email and Regular Mail

Hon. Val Varley

Red River County District Attorney’s Office

400 N. Walnut

Clarksville, Texas 75426

Tel: (903)427-2009

Fax: (903)427-5316
26

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO TEXAS RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.4(i)(3)

__________________________________________________________________

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

Counsel for Appellant files this certification that Appellant’s brief is a computergenerated document that contains 4,155 words. Counsel further certifies that he 

relied on the word count of the computer program used to prepare this document.

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Don Biard //

Don Biard

State Bar No. 24047755

McLaughlin, Hutchison & Biard

38 First Northwest

Paris, Texas 75460

Tel: (903)785-1606

Fax: (903)785-7580

Attorney for Appellant