alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Record of Discussion 

### Docket No. FAA-2015 - Directorate Identifie r: 20 15-CE-025-AD With whom outside the FAA has this AD action been discussed (i.e ., Design Approval Holder, manufacturer, ATA, NBAA, RAA, AOPA, ALPA, GAMA, etc)?

ORGANiZATION PERSON CONTACTED DATE TOPICS DISC USSED Piper Aircraft Ken Fraley, Eric Wright Multiple Piper ass iste d in developing the corrective action and supersed ing service bulletin.

Other/ Additional Information:



### 10
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Antonio Leon, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 617]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Arlene Goldberg, J, on motion for reassignment of counsel; Joan Sudolnik, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered March 2, 2001, convict*404ing defendant of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 5 to 10 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant’s pretrial motion for substitution of assigned counsel, since he failed to establish good cause *(see People v Sides,*75 NY2d 822 [1990]). We note that on appeal defendant raises no issue as to counsel’s effectiveness. “Defendant’s unjustified hostility toward, and refusal to communicate with, his counsel did not constitute good cause” *(People v Merritt,*260 AD2d 319 [1999], *lv denied*93 NY2d 1023 [1999], citing *People v Sawyer,*57 NY2d 12, 19 [1982], *cert denied 459 US*1178 [1983]; *People v Medina,*44 NY2d 199, 208-209 [1978]).

Even if we were to infer from the colloquy concerning a readback of testimony that the readback went beyond the jury’s request to the extent defendant asserts, we would find that defendant was not prejudiced *(see People v Lourido,*70 NY2d 428, 435 [1987]; *People v Mariera,*219 AD2d 496 [1995], *lv denied*87 NY2d 923 [1996]). Concur—Buckley, P.J., Mazzarelli, Saxe, Sullivan and Rosenberger, JJ.
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We hereby consent to the incorporation byreference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-30612, 333-39068, 333-103198, 333-119764, 333-119772, 333-120303 and 333-120304) and on Form S-3 (No. 333-132445) of Blockbuster Inc. of our report dated March 1, 2007 relating to thefinancial statements, management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this Form 10-K. 

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 

Dallas, Texas 

March 1, 2007
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-102082, 333-88770,333-88730,333-30088, 333-88811, 333-48260, 333-52644, 333-75736 and 333-111548) and Form S-3 (No. 333-83491 and 333-110304) of TIBCO Software Inc. of our report dated January 16, 2004, relating to the financial statements, which appears in this Form10-K. 

 

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

 

San Jose, California 

January 20, 2004
Jeremy W. LOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1531

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Sylvia GONZALEZ, Appellant, v. ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 3D17-1145

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed November 29, 2017.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### James Lester ROUDABUSH, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D. LAWHORNE; F. Milano, Defendants-Appellees, and Sergeant F. Mensah; Stearns, Chief; G. Hunter; C. M. Kylton; Ervin; Graham; Hylton; J. Carey; A. Anderson; K. Pedersen; Lieutenant Rea, Defendants.

No. 16-7751

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 24, 2017

Decided: May 4, 2017

James Lester Roudabush, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Alexander Francuzenko, Philip Corliss Krone, Lee B. Warren, COOK CRAIG & FRANCUZENKO, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

James Lester Roudabush, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s November 16, 2015 order dismissing a portion of the claims raised in his civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l) (2012) and dismissing without prejudice his claims concerning law library access and medical treatment for high blood pressure, May 13, 2016 order denying his motion for summary judgment as premature, and November 29, 2016 order granting summary judgment to Appellees Lawhorne and Mi-lano. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 act. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

“An order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is not an appealable final order under § 1291 if the plaintiff could save his action by merely amending his complaint,” *Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y,*807 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the district court dismisses an action for failure to plead sufficient facts in the complaint, we lack appellate jurisdiction because the plaintiff could amend the complaint to cure the pleading deficiency. *Id.*at 623-25.

The orders Roudabush seeks to appeal are neither final orders nor appealable interlocutory or collateral orders. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow Roudabush leave to amend his claims concerning'law library access and medical treatment for high blood pressure. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS*
##### 



Exhibit 99.5 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14 OR 15d-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Craig J. Laurie, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 40-F of Brookfield Properties
Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The issuers other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the issuer and
have:  (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us
by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the issuers disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,
as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the issuers internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the period
covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the issuers internal
control over financial reporting; and  5.
    
    The issuers other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the issuers auditors and the Audit Committee of issuers board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting
which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the issuers ability
to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the issuers
internal control over financial reporting. Dated: May 18, 2004
    
    /s/ Craig J. LaurieCraig J. LaurieSenior Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer (Principal Financial Officer)
#### Jessie FREDERICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John MAGILL, Director, S.C.D.M.H., in his individual and official capacity; Holly Scaturo, Director— S.V.P.T.P, in her individual and official capacity; Kimberly Poholchuk, Program Coor. S.V.P.T.P., in her individual and official capacity; Warden Stevenson, Warden, BRCI, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-7105

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 17, 2016

Decided: November 22, 2016

Jessie Frederick, Appellant Pro Se. William Henry Davidson, II, David Allan De-Masters, Davidson & Lindemann, PA, Columbia, South Carolina; Eugene Matthews, Richardson Plowden, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jessie Frederick seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Frederick that the failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. *8341985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Frederick has waived appellate review by failing to file specific objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit-32.1


                        Certification Pursuant to
                          18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                          as Adopted Pursuant to
             Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the Amended Report of eClic, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB/A for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Evagelina Esparza Barrza, Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer,
Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer) of eClic, Inc.
(the "Registrant"), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Date: June 11, 2004
      -------------
                                           /s/ Evagelina Esparza Barrza
                                           ----------------------------
                                               Evagelina Esparza Barrza
                                               Chief Executive Officer
                                               Chief Financial Officer
#### Hebrew Publishing Company, Respondent, *v.*Asher Scharfstein, Appellant.

Submitted May 24, 1943;

decided June 18, 1943.

*Henry L. Burkitt*for motion.

No one opposed.

Motion granted.
#### Rodolfo VELASQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Megan J. BRENNAN *, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-15016

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 **

Filed February 27, 2017

Rodolfo Velasquez, Pro Se

Neill Tseng, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 Megan J. Brennan has been substituted for her predecessor, Patrick R. Donahoe, as Postmaster General under Fed. R. App. P, 43(c)(2).

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Velasquez’s request for oral argument, set forth in the reply brief, is denied.

MEMORANDUM ***

Rudolfo Velasquez appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging discrimination and retaliation in connection with the termination of his employment with the United States Postal Service. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Berg v. Popham,*412 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (judgment on the pleadings); *Doe v.**573*Abbott Labs.,*571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Velasquez’s disability discrimination claim because Velasquez failed to state a claim for relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). *See Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles,*179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); *Lovett v. Chandler,*303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth elements of a disability discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Velasquez’s retaliation claim because Velasquez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination. *See Coons v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,*383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act and rejecting plaintiffs contention that mere closeness in time established causality).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
D.R. and D.R. v. CLEBURNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2160549

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 23, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
A.H. v. SHELBY COUNTY, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2160206

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 18, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan Jose GARCIA-ESPINOSA Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40457 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Date Filed: 12/20/2016

Renata Ann Gowie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Juan Jose Garcia-Espinosa, Pro Se

Before DENNIS, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Juan Jose Garcia-Espinosa has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Garcia-Espinosa has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Celso JAIMES-MEDERO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-10962 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 18, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Christopher Allen Curtis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, Laura S. Harper, Esq., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Celso Jaimes-Medero pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. He was sentenced within the guidelines range to 168 months *271of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.

Jaimes-Medero asserts that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because his range of punishment was affected by facts that were not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues that the district court improperly found that he was accountable for 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine actual, which raised his base offense level and increased his guidelines range; he asserts that the district court’s finding with regard to drug quantity was an element of the offense. Jaimes-Medero concedes that his claim is foreclosed and notes that he raises the claim to preserve it for further review.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance or, alternatively, an extension of time to file a merits brief. The Government contends that the sole appellate issue is foreclosed in light of *United States v. Tuma,*738 F.3d 681, 693 (5th Cir. 2013), and *United States v. Bazemore,*839 F.3d 379, 393 (5th Cir. 2016).

As Jaimes-Medero concedes, we held in *Tuma*that a sentencing judge acts within his discretion by finding facts that affect a defendant’s guidelines sentencing range. *See*136 S.Ct. at 620-24. While he asserts that the holding of *Tuma*has been called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in *Hurst v. Florida,*- U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), he admits that such a contention is foreclosed by *Bazemore,*in which we determined that *Hurst*does not implicate the federal sentencing scheme or undermine *Tuma. See*839 F.3d at 393.

Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternate motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Douglas Richard WEIDNER, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51202 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 3, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Douglas Richard Weidner, Pro Se

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Douglas Richard Weidner has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Weid-ner has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir, R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Robert David LENHOLT, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3938

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### Charles R. ANDRUS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-20722 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 3, 2017

Charles R. Andrus, Pro Se

Susan Frances San Miguel, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Postconviction Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Ap-pellee

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Charles Andrus, Texas prisoner # 1249907, moves to proceed *in forma pawperis*(“IFP”) to appeal the dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, of a motion seeking authorization, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, to withdraw his state pleas of *nolo contendere*to aggravated robbery and burglary of a habitation. Andrus has moved for leave to file a supplemental brief.

By moving for IFP status in this court, Andrus is challenging the district court’s certification that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). This court’s “inquiry is limited to whether the appeal involves ‘legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).’ ” *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).

Andrus has failed to identify any errors in the district court’s analysis. *See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that plaintiffs failure to identify any error was' “the same as if he had not appealed that judgment”). Although this court liberally construes pro *se*filings, even *pro se*litigants must brief arguments to preserve them. *See Yohey v. Collins,*985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).

*322Andrus has therefore failed to show that his appeal involves “legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” *See Howard,*707 F.2d at 220 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The motion to proceed IFP' is DENIED, The motion to file a supplemental brief is GRANTED.

Andrus’s appeal is without arguable merit and is frivolous. *See id,*at 219-20. Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cíe. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.