F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

A R A C E L Y M A R I N E L A R E N A , P etitioner
,

v

.

J E F F E R S O N B

. S E S S I O N S I I I , Attorney General, Respondent. N o. 14-72003

Ag ency No. A095-731-273

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Arg ued April 6, 2016 Resubmitted Aug ust 4, 2017 Pasadena, California

F iled Aug ust 23, 2017

B efore: A. W allace Tashima, B arry G. Silverman, and Susan P. Graber, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e Graber; Dissent by

J udg e TashimaM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 2

SUMMARY *

Im m igration

The panel denied i n p a r t and dismissed in part A racely Marinelarena’s p e t i tion for review of the B oard o f I mmig r a tion A p peals’ d ecision finding her inelig ible for cancellation of removal because she had failed to meet h e r burden of proof to show that her con v i c t i o n was not f o r a disqualify ing controlled substance offense.

The p anel held that the conspiracy statute under which Marinelarena was c o n victed, California Penal Code § 182(a)(1), is overbroad but divisible as to the targ et crime. The panel f

urther held that the targ et crime, sale and transport of a controlled substance under California Health and Safety Code § 11352, is o verbroad and divisible as to the s p ecific controlled substance. According ly

, the panel applied the modified categ orical approach and concluded that the record

was inconclusive b ecause Marinelarena’s g uilty plea could have rested on an overt act that did not relate to heroin.

Addressing the effect of the inconclusive record, the panel f u r ther held that Y

oung v. H

older

, 697 F .3d 976 (9t h C i r. 2012) (en banc), which held that a petitioner cannot carry the burden of demonstrating elig ibility for c ancellation o f removal by establishing an inconclusive r ecord, remains g ood law because it is n o t irreconcilable with the later Supreme Court cases o f Moncrieffe v. Holder

, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013), and D escamps v. United States
, 1 33 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 3

Therefore, the panel concluded that Marinelarena is inelig ible for cancellation b ecause, with respect to elig ibility for relief, she bears the burden of proof to show that her conviction did
not relate to a controlled substance, and she could not meet this burden on an inconclusive record.

The panel also concluded that it lack ed jurisdiction to consider Marinelarena’s unex hausted claim that the

ex p ung ement of h er conviction removes it from the definition of conviction under the immig r ation laws.

Dissenting

, J udg e Tashima disag reed with the majority ’s conclusion that Moncrieffe does not abrog ate Y oung , concluding that the deci sions are irreconcilable. J udg e Tashima would g rant the petition for review.

COUNSEL

A n drew Knapp (arg

ued), Supervising Attorney ; L aura F re e (arg ued), I sis Miranda (arg

ued), L ilit Arab y a n, and Eric M. Sowatsky

, Certified L a w Students; South w estern L aw School, L os Ang eles, California; for Petitioner.

Tim Ramnitz (arg

ued), Attorney ; J ennifer P. L eving s, Senior L itig ation Counsel; Shelley R. G oad, Assistant Director; Office of I mmig ration L itig ation, Civil Division, United States Department of J ustice, W ashing ton, D .C.; for Respondent.

B rian Goldman (arg

ued), Orrick Herring ton & Sutcliffe L L P, San F r a ncisco, California; Manuel Varg as and Andrew W a c htenheim, I mmig rant D efen s e P roject, N ew Y ork, New York; J ay a shri Srikantiah and L isa W eissman-W ard,M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 4

I mmig r a nts’ Rig hts Clinic, Mills L eg al Clinic, Stanford L aw School, Stanford, California; for Amici Curi a e I mmig rant D e f e n s e P r o

j e c t , A m e r i c a n I m m i g r a t i o n L a w y e r s Association, Asian A mericans Advancing J ustice-Asian L aw Caucus, Community L eg al Services in East Palo A l t o , Detention W atch Network, F lorence I mmig rant a nd Refug ee Rig hts Project, Heartland A lliance’s National I mmig rant J ustice Center, I mmig rant L eg al Resource Center, National I mmig r a tion L aw Center, National I mmig ration Project of the Na t i o nal L awy ers Guild, Northwest I mmig rant Rig hts Project, Public Counsel, and U .C. Davis I mmig ration L aw Clinic.

OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:

Petitioner Aracely Marinelarena, a n ative and citiz en o f Mex ico, stands convicted of conspiring to sell an d transport

a controlled substance in violation of California Penal Code section 1 82(a)(1). After the federal g over n m ent initiated removal proceeding s, she conceded r emovability but a pplied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The immig rati o n j u dg e (“I J ”) denied relief. The B oard o f I mmig r a tion Appeals (“B I A”) held that Petitioner had fallen short of meeting her burden of proof, by failing to show that her c onviction was n ot for a disqual i f y ing controlled substance offense, and dismissed the appeal. W e h old that the conspiracy s t a tute under which Petitioner w as convicted is o verbroad b u t d ivisible, that Petitioner failed to carry her burden of proof to demonstrate th a t h e r conviction did not involve a federally controlled s u b s t a n ce, and that she has failed to ex haust the arg ument that ex pung ement of herM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 5

c o n v i c t i o n e r a s e s i t s i m m i g r a t i o n c o n s e q u e n c e s

. According ly

, we deny the petition f or review i n part a

nd dismiss it in part.

F ACTUAL

AND PROCEDURAL

B ACKGROUND

Petitioner f

irst entered the United States in 1992 without admission or inspection. I n 2000, she was convicted o f false personation o f a public officer, in violation of California Penal Code section 529. I n 2006, the State of California filed

a criminal complaint ag ainst Petitioner that charg e d her with

one c o u n t o f conspiring to commit a felony

, in violation o f California Penal Code section 182(a)(1). Spe cifically

, it charg ed Petitioner with conspiring to sell a n d transport a controlled substance in violation of Califo rnia Health a nd Safety Code section 11352. The criminal complaint alleg ed several overt acts in furtherance o f the conspir a c y , o n e o f which—the transportation of three ba gs c ontaining heroin—referred to a particular controlled substance. On March 26, 2007, pursuant to a plea of g u il t y , P etitioner was convicted of violating California P e nal Code section 182(a)(1). The state c ourt sentenced her to 136 day s’ imprisonment and three y ears’ probation. 1

Two day s later, the g overnment served Petitioner with a notice to appear for removal proceeding s. The notice charg ed Petitioner with removability as an alien who had remained in

1 A t h er rem ov al h earin g s, P etitio n er su b m i tted th e co m

p lain t to th e IJ an d ad m itted th at sh e w as “ co n v icted so lely o f Co u n t 1 o f th e Co m p lain t ,” w

h ich alleg ed th at sh e h ad co m m itted “ t h e crim e of CONSP IRA CY T O COMMIT A C RIME, i n v io latio n o f P ENA L CODE SECT ION 1 82 (a)(1 ),” sp ecif ically

, co n s p irin g “ to co m m it th e crim e of SEL L A ND T R A NSP O RT
, in v io latio n o f Sectio n 1 1 3 5 2 o f th e H EA L T H A ND SA FET Y Co d e.”M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 6

the United States long er than permitted, in violation o f 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B ) . Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal u nd e r 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Around the same time, Petitioner filed separate motions in state court to vacate her false personatio n a nd conspiracy convictions under California Penal Code section 1203.4. I n 2 0 0 9, California courts g ranted Petitioner’s motions and vacated those convictions.

At a removal h e a r i n g in 2011, Petitioner arg ued that her conspiracy conviction did not c onst i t u t e a controlled substance offense a s defined b y the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802, because th e conviction documents do
not specify the controlled s u b stance. Petitioner also a rg u ed that she was elig ible for cancellation of r emoval because her convictions had been vacated.

I n 2012, the I J held that Petitioner had failed to meet her burden to demonstrate elig ibility for cancellation of removal and ordered her removed to Mex ico. T he I J r ea s o ned that Petitioner had failed to show that she was el i gi b l e for relief despite her convictions for fals e p ersonation and conspiracy
to sell a nd transport a controlled substance. T he I J noted that Petitioner’s false personation con viction under California Pe n a l Code section 529 appeared to qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The I J a lso noted that Petitioner’s conspiracy conviction under California Penal Code section 182(a)(1) “for conspiracy to distribute heroin” b arr e d her from relief because it was a disqualify ing controlled substance o f f e n se. L astly

, althoug h both convictions h ad been vacated, the I J held that, because the con v ictions were not vacated on the merits, they

remained valid for immig ration purposes.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 7

O n appeal, the B I A held that Petitioner had failed t o establish that her conspiracy conviction did not qu al i f y as a

c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e o f f e n s e u n d e r 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I

I ). The B I A ex p lained that, althoug h California Health and Safety Code section 11352 is br o ader than the F ederal Controlled Substances A ct, 21 U.S.C. § 802, bec ause the state law covers more drug s than the federal definition, Petitioner submitted no eviden c e i dentify ing the controlled substance and, therefore, did not meet her burden of proof. The B I A did not reach the I J ’s additional r uling that Petitioner’s false personation conv i c t i on was a crime involving moral turpitude. Nor did it reach the ex pung ement question, because Petitioner did n ot raise it in her briefing to the B I A.

Petitioner timely petitions for review. W e also g ranted a motion by a g r oup of interested e n tities to file a joint amicus brief.

STANDARD OF REVI EW

W e r eview de novo q

uestions o f law and constitutional claims. Coronado v. Holder

, 759 F .3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014).

D I SCUSSI ON

A. Controlled Substance Offense

To be elig ible for cancellation o f removal under 8 U .S.C. § 1229b(b), a p etitioner must meet the following requirements: (1) have been phy sically present in the United States for a continuous p e r i o d of not less than 10 y ears immediately preceding the date of application; (2) have beenM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 8

a person of g o od m o r a l c haracter during that period; ( 3) not have been convicted o f, as applicable here, a c o n trolled substance offense; and (4) show that removal would cause “ex c eptional and e x tremely unusual hardship” to a f amily

m e m b er who is a citiz en of the United States or an al i e n lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Our analy sis

concerns the third requirement—that the petitioner not have been convicted of a controlled substance offense.

To d etermine whether a state conviction qualifies a s an offense r e l a t ing to a controlled substance as defined under federal law, we e mploy the categ or i c al and modified categ orical appro a c h e s set forth in Taylor v. United States
, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). “ F irst, w e ask whether the state law is

a categ o rical match with a federal [controlled substance] offense,” look i n g “only to the ‘statutory definitions’ of the corresponding offenses.” United States v

. M a rtinez-Lopez
, No. 14-50014, 2017 W L 3203552, at *3 (9th Cir. J u ly 28, 2017) (en banc) (quoting Taylor

, 495 U.S. at 600). “I f a state law p roscribes the same amount of or le s s c o nduct than that qualify ing a s a federal [ controlled s ubstance] offense, then the two offenses are a categ orical match. ” I d. (internal
quo t ation marks omitted). That result would end our analy sis.

B u t if the offenses are not a categ orical match, we proceed to a second step, asking whether the over broad portion of the statute of conviction is “divisible,” meaning that it “ sets out one or more e lements o f the offense in t h e alternative.” Id. at * 4 (quoting Descamps v. United S t a t e s , 133 S. Ct. 2 2 7 6
, 2281 (2013)). W e will “consult ‘au t h o r i tative sources of state law’ to determine whether a statute contains alternative elements defining multiple crimes

or alternative means by which a defendant mig ht commit theM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 9

same crime.” Id. (quoting Mathis v. U nited States
, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016)). E l em e n ts are “those circumstances on which the jury must un an i m o u sly ag ree.” U nited States v

. V e ga-Ortiz
, 822 F

. 3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2016). I f t h e statute is divisible, “then we may proceed to the third step in

our analy sis and apply the modified c a teg orical appr o ach.” Martine z

- L o pez , 2017 W L 3 203552, at *4. Under the modified c a teg orical approach, “we ex amine judicially noticeable documents of convict i o n ‘to determine which statutory phrase was the basi s fo r the conviction.’” Id. (quoting Descamps , 133 S. Ct. at 2285).

I n short, only when a state stat u te is both overbroad a nd divisible do we employ the modifi e d categ orical approach. We do so by ex amining certain conviction-related docum e n t s , including “the charg ing d oc u m e n t , the terms of a plea
ag reement or transcript of colloquy between judg e a nd defendant in which the factual basis for the p lea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record o f this information.” United S t a t es v. Leal-Vega

, 680 F .3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

W e ag ree with Petitioner that Califor n i a P enal Code section 182(a)(1) i s overbroad, meaning that the categ orical approach does not app l y

. B ut Petitioner also contends that the statute is indivisible, precluding the modified categ orical
ap p roach, and therefore cannot qualify as a controlled substance offense. W e disag ree.

1. Categ orical Approach

C a lifornia Penal Code section 182(a)(1) punishe s a b r o a d e r r a n ge o f c o n d u c t t h a n e i t h er 8 U

. S

. C

.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 10

§ 1 1 82(a)(2)(A)(i)(I

I ) or § 1227(a)(2)(B )(i). A defendan t could be convicted under section 1 82(a)(1) for any criminal conspiracy

, whether or not it relates to a controlled substance. A conviction under section 182(a)(1), therefore, cannot count

as a controlled substance o f f ense u nder the categ orical approach. See, e.g. , United States v. Trent
, 767 F

. 3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 201 4 ) (holding that a conspiracy conviction under Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 421(A)—a statute with tex t similar to th e t e x t of Cal. Penal Code § 182(a)(1)—is not a serious drug offense under the categ orical approach because “the statute could be violated in many way s that have nothing
to do with d

rug s”), cert. denie d

, 1 3 5 S. Ct. 1447 (2015), abrogated on other grounds by M athis , 136 S. Ct. at 2251.

2. Divisibility

S e c tion 182(a) criminaliz es the act of “ two or m o r e persons [ who] conspire : (1) T o commit any crime

. ” ( E m p hasis added.) Here, we must consider whether the conspiracy statute is divisible as to the targ et crime. 2 F a ced with a statute that incorporates “any ” C alifornia crime b y reference, we must “consult ‘authoritative sources of state law’ to determine whether [ t h e] statute contains a lternative elements defining multiple crimes or altern a t i v e means b y

2 U n ited S t a tes v. Ga rcia -S

a n ta n a , 7 7 4 F.3 d 5 2 8 (9 th Cir. 20 1 4), d oes

n o t af f ect o u r an aly sis o f w

h eth er th e co n s p iracy statu te, Calif orn ia P en al Co d e s ectio n 1 8 2 (a)(1 ), is d iv isib le. Ga rcia -S a n ta n a h eld th at Nev ad a’ s

co n sp iracy s tatu te, Nev

. Rev

. Stat. § 1 9 9 .4 8 0
, i s o v erb ro ad b ecau s e it d oes

n o t co n tain

, as an elem en t , an ov ert act. Ga rcia -S a n ta n a , 7 7 4 F.3 d at 5 3 4

. In a f o o t n o te, th e o p i n io n co n v ey s th at th e o m issio n o f an o v ert act req u irem en t can n o t b e cu red by reso rt to th e m o d if i e d c a t e g o rical
ap p ro ach to sh ow th at an o v ert act w as p ro v ed in a g iv en case. Id

. at 5 3 4

n .3

. A s w e d iscu s s b elo w i n tex t, an o v ert act is a req u i rem en t f o r a

co n sp iracy

co n v ictio n

u n der Calif

orn ia law

.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 11

which a defendant mig ht commit the same crime.” MartinezLopez , 2017 W L 3203552, a t *4 (quoting Mathis

, 136 S. Ct.
at 2256). T he key question is w h e t h e r a jury must find the purported element specifically

. Here, the California Supreme Court has supplied the answer.

California law requires jurors to ag ree unanimously o n the object crime of the conspiracy

. “ Under Penal Code section 182 the jury must also determine which felony defendants conspired to commit
, and if that felony is divided i n to deg rees, which deg r ee of the felony they conspired to commit.” People v. Horn
, 524 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Cal. 1974) (emphasis added); see also People v. Smith

, 3 3 7 P.3d 1159, 1168 (Cal. 2014) (“A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant and another person had the specific intent
to agree o r conspire to commit a n o f f en s e , as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense

, tog ether with proof of the c ommission o f a n overt act

. . . in furtherance of the conspiracy

. ” (emphas i s added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Pe t i t i o ner relies on a California Court of Appeal c ase, People v. Vargas
, 110 Cal. Rpt r. 2 d 210 (Ct. App. 2001), to arg ue that section 182 (a ) ( 1 ) is indivisible. I n Vargas
, the
court considered whether jurors must ag ree u n a n imously on

a l l the object crimes of a multipurpose conspiracy

, or if it i s

e noug h for the jurors to a g ree that crime, g enerally

, was t h e object of the c onspiracy

. Id. at 244–47. The opinion has caused uncer tainty as to the jury u nanimity requirement for multipurpose conspiracy convictions in California. See, e.g. , Trent
, 767 F .3d at 1 061 (citing V a rgas f or the proposition that

some jurisdictions “ may ” not r equire that “the jury a g r ee unanimously on what crime the conspirators ag r eed to commit”).M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 12

W h atever the California Court of Appeal inte n d ed to convey in Vargas
, the California Supreme Cou r t has never recog niz ed a jury unanimity ex c eption for m ultipurpose conspiracies. Our task, whe n a n s wering a question o f state law

, i s t o follow the precedents of the state’s hig h e st court. See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 586 v

. NLRB
, 540 F .3d 95 7
, 9 6 3 (9th Cir. 2 0 08) (“I n analy zing questions of state law, we are bound b y th e d e c i sions of the state’s hig hest court.”); Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.
, 265 F .3d 931
, 939 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[ F ] ederal courts a re bound by the pronouncements of the state’s hig hest court on applicable state law.

. . . I n assessing how a state’s hig hest
court would resolve a state law question—absent controlling
state authority

—federal courts lo o k to ex isting state law without p redicting potential c hang e s in that law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). B ecause the California Supreme Court requires that jurors ag ree on a specified object crime in order to convict a person o f conspiracy

, California Penal Code section 182(a)(1) is divisible.

3. Modified Categ orical Approach

B e cause California Penal Code section 182(a)(1) is both overbroad and divisible, w e proceed to the modified categ orical approach, in which we e x amine the specifics o f Petitioner’s conviction. The only d ocument i n the record relating to a controlled substance is the criminal complain t , which shows tha t the targ e t offense of the conspiracy was a violation o f California Health and Safety Code section 11352. That targ e t offense adds an additional lay er to our analy sis, because California Health and Safety Code section 11352 is, with r espect to the specific c ontrolled su b s t a n ce, itself an overbroad but divisib l e statute to which the modifiedM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 13

categ orical a

pproach applies. Martinez-Lopez
, 2017 W L 3203552, at *4–7.

The criminal complaint identifies transportation of heroin i n describing one of the o vert acts alleg ed as part o f t h e charg ed conspiracy ; no o ther drug is mentio n e d in the criminal complaint. Heroin is a controlled substance under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (defining “co n trolled substance” by reference to s t a tutory schedule); 21 U .S.C. § 812, Schedule I (b)(10) (listing heroin on Schedule I ). Even
so, the record in this case i s inconclusive. The conspiracy
count to which Petitioner pleaded g uilty does not identify the particular c ontrolled substance ex cept in the list of overt acts. B ut there is no plea a g reement, plea c olloquy

, judg ment, o r other document in the record that reveals the factual b asis for Petitioner’s g u ilty plea. B ecause Petitioner’s g ui lty plea could have rested on an overt act that did not relate to heroin,

we cannot conclusively connect the transporta t ion of heroin with her conviction. See Lara-Chacon v. Ashcroft

, 345 F .3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting tha t “ [ c ] harg ing papers alone a re never sufficient” to e stablish the elements o f conviction (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States

v. Velasco-Medina

, 305 F .3d 839, 852 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that a charg ing document “contain[ s] the e lements of t h e crime the g overnm en t set[s] o ut to prove ; it [ does] not establish th e elements to which [ the petitioner] admitted in his g uilty plea”).

On an inconclusive record, Petitioner is inelig ible for relief because, with respect to elig ibility for relief, she bears the burden of proof to show that her conviction did not relate
to a federally c ontrolled substance. “I f the evidence indicates
t h a t o ne or more of the g rounds for mandatory denial o f the application f

or relief m a y ap p ly

, the alien shall have theM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 14

burden of proving by a p r eponderance of the evidence that such g rounds do not apply

. ” 8 C.F .R. § 1240.8(d) (emphasis added). I n Y

oung v. Holder

, 697 F

. 3d 976, 990 ( 9th Cir. 20 1 2 ) ( en banc), we held that a “petitioner cannot carry the burden of demonstrating elig ibility for c ancellation o f removal b y establishing an i n c o n clusive record o f conviction.” Petitioner arg ues that w e must overru l e t h at aspect of Y

oung because it i s irreconcilable with a later United States Supreme Court case, Moncrieffe v

. H older

, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1687 (2013). W e turn to that pivotal issue.

B

. Burden of Proof

I f Y oung r emains g ood law, Petitioner is inelig ible for

c a ncellation of removal because the ambig uity in the r e c o r d
pr e v ents her from proving that her conviction did not relate
to a controlled substance as defined by f e deral law. A threejudg e panel may

“reject [ a] prior o pinion of this court” if an intervening and inconsistent Supreme Court d e c ision has “undercut the theory o r reasoning underly ing the prior circuit precedent in such a w ay that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Miller

, 335 F .3d a t 900. Petitioner a nd Amici contend that th is standard is met because, under Moncrieffe

, the inquiry under the c a teg oric al approach is whether “a conviction of the state o f f e n se necessarily involved [ the] facts equating to the g eneric federal offense.” 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (emphasis a d d ed) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). T hat inquiry

, they a s sert, is purely a question o f l a w—not fact—as to w hich the b urden of proof is irrelevant. W e disag ree both a s to the relevance o f Moncrieffe and as to the nature o f t h e i nquiry in the present contex t.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 15

I n Y oung , the petitio n er was removable and was f ound inelig ible for cancellation of removal on ac c o u n t of his conviction f

or “sale/transportation/offer[ ing ] to sell” cocaine base, an ag g ravated felony

. 697 F

. 3d at 980–81. The record of his conviction was inconclusive concerning the ag g ravated felony desig nation. 3 B ecause, in the REAL I D Act, Cong ress

“ p l a c e[ d ] the burden of demonstrating elig ibility fo r cancellation of r emoval squarely on the noncitiz en,” id. at 988, we held that the petitioner had the burden to establish that he ha d n o t committed an ag g ravated felony

, id. at 989;

see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (“An alien apply ing f or relief

or protection from removal has the burden o f p r o o f

. . . .”). The petitioner failed to satisfy his burden and, therefore, was inelig ible for relief f

rom remova l because the record was inconclusive on this point. Y oung , 697 F .3d at 990.

I n the later Supreme Court case, the petitioner h ad pleaded g uilty to p ossession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of a Georg ia state l a w

. M oncrieffe

, 133 S. Ct. at 1683. The B I A found the petitioner removable for h aving committed a drug -trafficking crime that is punishable a s a felony u nder the federal Controlled Substances Act, thus making it an ag g ravated felony

. Id. ; see also Moncrieffe v. Holder

, 6 62 F .3d 387, 3 8 9 –90 (5th Cir. 2011) (ex plaining the issue in the case as being whether the peti t i o n er w as removable as charg ed for having committed this crime). The Supreme Court asked and answere d the question whether the petition e r’ s conviction could be considere d categorically an ag g r avated felony when the

3 T h e p e t i t i o n er h ad p lead ed g u ilty to a ch arg in g d ocu m en t th at alleg ed 1 4 d if

f eren t th eo ries o f h ow h e co u ld h av e co m m itted th e o f

f en se,

so m e o f w

h ich w ere ag g rav ated f

elo n ie s an d so m e o f w

h ich w ere n o t. Yo u n g , 6 97 F.3 d at 9 9 0

.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 16

Controlled Substances Act punishes the a nalog ous offense a s both a felony and a misdemeanor. 133 S. Ct. at 1684–85. The Court held that the petitioner was not removable because he had not been convicted of an ag g r avated felony ; a pply ing the categ orical approach, t h e Controlled Substances A ct did
not “necessarily

” punish a s a felony all the conduct proscribed under the Georg ia statute. Id. at 1686–87.

Moncrieffe differs from Y o u ng because

, among other
reasons, the two cases a ddress entirely d ifferent leg al issues. Moncrieffe addressed the question whether the p etitioner was removable

, a question as to which the governme n t b e a r s the burden of proof. Y

o ung Sun Shin v. M

ukasey

, 5 47 F

. 3 d 1019, 1 0 2 4 ( 9 th Cir. 2008). B y c ontrast, the relevant portion o f Y o ung addressed only the question whether the petitioner was elig ible for cancellation of removal. As to that question, the noncitizen
, not the g o vernment, b ears the burden o f proof. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4); 8 C.F .R. § 1240.8(d). Thus it is Cong r ess, not the Supreme Court, that assig ned the burden o f proof to a noncitiz en w ho seeks relief in the form o f cancellation o f removal. S ee 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (“An alien apply ing for relief or protection from removal has the burden of proof to establish that the alien” is elig ible.). The Moncrieffe opinion d oes not c i t e that statute any where, a nd for g o od reason. As noted, the iss u e b e fore the Court concerned removability , not relief from removal.

I t is well established that the party who bears the burden of proof los es i f t h e record is inconclusive o n the c rucial point. See, e.g. , Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. W east , 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005) (holding that, u nder the I ndividu al s with Disabilities Education Act, whichever party seeks relief must carry the burden of persuasion, wheth er it be the parents o r the school district); Dir., O ffice of W o rkers’ Comp. ProgramsM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 17

v. Greenwich Collieri e s , 512 U.S. 267, 272–81 (1994) ( h o lding that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, t h e burden of proof encompasses the burden of persuasion; when
t h e evidence is evenly balanced, the p arty with the bu r d e n must lose). Moncrieffe did not c ite, let alone overrule, those and similar cases recog niz ing the effect of the burden of proof when the relevant evidence is in equipoise. That is because,

as discussed below, Moncrie f f e is not about the burden o f proof.

Under Supreme Court law, w hen evidence is in equipoise, the b u r den of p ersuasion determines the outcome. Nor is it problematic that the same inconclusive evidence can result in

a favorable decision on removability ( Moncrieffe ) y et an unfavorable decision on cancellation ( Y oung ). See Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc.
, 515 F .3d 1150, 1164–65 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that two factual finding s

were n ot i n c onsistent g iven that “it is log ically possible for the losing side to have varied with, because it d e p e n ded on, the burden of proof”); c f. U nited States v. M

ez a

- S o ria
, 935 F .2d 166, 169 (9th Cir. 1991) (n o t i ng that “courts have made it q uite clear that because d i f fe r e nt standards of proof

are involved, acquittal in a criminal action does not bar a civil suit based on the same fact s ” (internal q uotation marks a

nd brackets omitted)). I n Y

oung , w e joined the F ourth and T e nth Circuits in recog niz i n g that, when the burden of persuasion rests on the noncitiz en to show elig ibility for cancellation of removal, an inconclusive record fails to satisfy tha t burden. 697 F

. 3d a t 989 (citing S alem v

. Holder

, 647 F

. 3d 111, 115–16 (4th Cir. 2 0 11); G arcia v

. Holder

, 584 F .3d 1288, 1289–9 0 ( 1 0 t h Cir. 2009)); see also S yblis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.
, 763 F .3d 348, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2014) (reaching the same conclusion, post- Moncrieffe ); Sanchez v. Holder

, 7 57 F. 3 d 712, 720 n.6 (7th Cir. 2 014) ( s a me). But see Sauceda v

.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 18

Lynch

, 8 19 F .3d 526, 5 3 1, 532 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2 016) (rejecting Y

o u ng and holding that Mo n c r i e ffe creates a presumption that a defendant committed the “lea s t of the acts” that g oes unrebutted when Shepard documents “shed no lig ht on the nature o f the o f fense o r conviction,” even in the cancellation-of-removal contex t). 4

To be sure, Moncrieffe acknowledg ed that its analy sis for determining whether a particular crime of convi ction is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude “is the same in b oth” the r e moval and cancellation c o ntex ts. 133 S. Ct. at 1685 n.4 ( citing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder

, 5 60 U.S. 563 (2010), which considered whether the petitioner was elig ible for cancella t i o n of removal after having committed two simple possession offenses under Tex as state law). A nd that is true, so far as the d isc u s sion in Moncrieffe g oes: “[ c] onviction is the relevant statutory hook” whether determining removability or e lig ibili ty for relief from removal. Id. at 1685 (internal quotation marks omitted). B ut Moncrieffe d id not d iscuss the differen c e s in the burden o f proof in those two contex ts; it had no r e a s o n to. To the contrary , the Court limited its r e j e c t i on of the g overnment’s
sug g estion that a noncitiz en should have an opportunity to disprove the misdemeanor version o f t h e Georg ia statute to the categorical contex t: “ T h is solution is entirely

4 In Le v. Lyn ch

, 8 1 9 F.3 d 9 8
, 1 0 8 (5 t h Cir. 20 1 6 ), th e co u rt h eld t h at,

“ [n ]o tw ith stan din g th e in co n clu s iv e ev id en ce in th e in stan t case , . . . th e b u rd en rem ain s o n [th e petitio n er] to p ro v e elig ib ility f o r relief f

ro m

rem o v al.” B u t th ere, th e am b i g u ity d id n ot rest o n a d iv isib le statu t e, an d th e co u rt d e c l i n ed to d ecid e “ w h eth er Mo n crieffe af

f ected h o w co u rts sh o u ld ap p l y th e m o d i f

ied categ o ric al ap p ro ach to d eterm in e w h eth er a p rio r co n v ictio n d isq u alif ies a n on citizen f

ro m relief f

ro m rem o v al w

h en th e reco rd o f co n v i c t i o n i s am b ig u o u s as to w

h eth er th e elem en t s o f th e crim e co rresp o n d to a d isq u alif y in g o f f en se.” Id

. at 1 0 7 n .5

.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 19

i nconsistent with both the I NA’s tex t [8 U

. S

. C

. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1 229b(a)(3)] and the categorical approach .” M

oncrieffe

, 1 33 S. Ct. at 1690 (emphasis added). M o n crieffe therefore cannot be read to inform the rele v a n t dispute in Y

oung , which pertained only to the operation o f the burden of p r o o f when the modified c ateg orical approach applies. 5

F or all these reasons, Moncrieffe and Y oung ar e not clearly irreconcilable.

W e are equally unpersuaded by Petition e r a nd A mici’s
arg ument that the mod i f i e d categ orical approach involves only a leg al inquiry and that the burden of proof is irrelevant after Moncrieffe a

nd Descamps

. As noted, Moncrieffe did not decide o r even sug g est any thing about the burden of proof. Descamps
, for its part, did not intimate that ev e r y i nquiry under the modified categ orical approach is a question of law; it simply held that the modified categ orical approach was “a tool for implementing t h e categ orical approach” and, therefore, could not be applied to indivisible statutes. 133 S. Ct. at 2284, 2286–87.

5 A m ici also co n ten d th at Y o u n g i s c learly irreco n cilab le w i th Mo n crieffe b ecau se o f t h e latter’ s s tatem en t th at “ [t]h e categ o rical
ap p ro ach w as desig n ed t o av o id ” in co n sisten t treatm en t of “ tw o

n o n citizen s

. . . ‘ co n v icted o f ’ th e sam e o f

f en se.” Mo n crieffe

, 13 3 S

. Ct.
at 1 6 9 0

. T h e Co u rt m ad e th at co m m e n t in th e co n tex t o f ap p ly i n g th e categ o rical ap p ro ach

, n o t th e m o d i f i e d categ o rical ap p ro ach

. A n d A m ici’ s p ro p osed so l u tio n

—o v erru lin g Yo u n g an d allo w in g relief w h en th e reco rd

o f co n v ictio n is am

big u o u s—w o u ld n o t elim in ate th e p ro sp ect of in co n sisten t resu lts: T h e o p po rtu n ity f o r in div i d u als, co n v icted o f a g iv en

o f f en se, to o b tain relief w o u ld still v ary d ep en d in g o n th e reco rd ’ s clarity

, a s on ly th e d ef

au lt ru le w o u ld ch an g e. Su ch a ru le th eref o re w o u l d n o t

am elio rate A m ici’ s co n c e r n ab o u t in co n s isten t treatm en t o f sim ilarly situ ated p erso n s.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 20

Althoug h the modified c ateg orical approach, like the

c a t e go r i c al a p p r o a c h

, i n v o l v e s s o m e s t r i c t l y l e ga l issues—such as a statute’s d ivisibility —the inq u i r y into wh i c h part of a divisible statute underlies the petitioner’s crime of conviction is, if not factual, at least a mix ed question of law a nd f act. 6 “[ M] ix ed questions of law and f a c t” a re those in which “the historical fact s are admitted o r established, the rule of law is undisputed

, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statuto r y s t a ndard.” PullmanStandard v. Swint
, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n

. 19 (1982). The

mo d i fied categ o rical approach squarely fits within that definition. See Descamps
, 133 S. Ct. at 2284–85 (ex plaining that, under the modified categ or i c al approach, courts may review a pproved “ex tra-statutory materials

. . . [ to] discover which statutory phrase contained within a statute listing several different crimes[ ] covered a prior conviction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Taylor , 495 U.S. at 600 (holding that, under the categ orical approach

, courts “look only to the fact that the defendant had b een convicted of” certain c rimes (emphasis added)); see a l s o Apprendi v. New Jersey
, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“O t h e r t h an the fact of a prior conviction, any f

act that i n c reases the penalty for a crime b e y ond the prescribed statutory max imum must be submitted to a jury

, and proved bey ond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added)).

6 A t least o n e oth er circu it h as h eld th at th e d eterm in atio n o f t h e

o f f en se of co n v ictio n is a p u rely f actu al in q u iry

. S

ee L e , 8 1 9 F.3 d at 1 0 5 (“ [T ]h e alien h as th e b u rd en o f p ro o f to estab lish th at h e satisf ies th e ap p licab le elig ib ility req u irem en ts in ord er to p ro v e th at an y g ro u n d s f

or d en ial d o n o t ap p ly

. W h en an alien ’ s p rio r co n v ictio n is at issu e, th e

o f f en se of co n v ictio n itself is a fa ctu a l d etermin a tio n , n o t a l eg a l o n e

. Ho w ev er, d eterm in i n g w h eth er th at co n

v i ctio n is a p articu l ar ty p e of
g en eric of f en se is a leg al q u estio n .” (em p h asis ad d ed ) (citatio n s o m itted )).M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 21

W h en reviewing mi x e d questions of law and fact, we reg ularly consider the burden of persuasion. S ee, e.g. , Dorrance v. United States
, 809 F .3d 479, 484 (9th Cir. 2 015) (stating that the question whether ta x p a y e rs had a c ost basis in assets that they later sold, but for w hich they paid nothing

, “is a mix e d question of law a nd fact” as to w h ich the
tax pay e rs bear the burden of persuasion); United St a t es v

. Arreguin
, 735 F .3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013) (not i n g that “[ t] he issue of whether a person has actual or a p p a rent authority t o consent to a search is a mix ed question of law and fact” and that “the g o v e r n m e n t has the burden o f

es t a blishing the effectiveness of a third party ’s consent to a search”); United States v. B lackman

, 72 F .3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that we r eview de novo the district court’s ruling s o n the scope o f t he attorney -client privileg e because they involve “ mix ed questions of law and fact” and t h a t t h e burden of persuasion is on the party seeking to establish that the p rivileg e a

pplies); United States v. Lingenfelter

, 997 F .2d 632, 636, 637 (9th Cir. 1993) ( stating t h a t whether police conduct amounts to a “search” within the meanin g o f the F ourth Amendment is “ a mix ed question of law and fact” a nd that the defendant bears the burden o f demonstrating that he

or she had a leg itimate ex pect a t i o n of privacy in the place searched).

To summariz e, Moncrieffe is about removal ; by contrast, Yo u n g is about cancellation of removal. Moncrieffe d iscuss e s how the ca t e

g o r i cal approach works when defining a crime involving moral turpitude and say s no t h ing a t a ll about operation o f t h e b urden of proof, which was not an issue in that case. Y

oung discusses the b urden o f p r o of when apply ing the modified categ orical approach. Althoug h Descamps makes clear that the modified categ o r ical approach is “a tool for implementing the categ orical a pproach,” 133 S.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 22

Ct. at 2284, it i s a t ool that requires the consideration o f factual documents within the contex t of the law and, by that
process, makes the burden of pr o o f relevant. T hus, neither Moncrieffe nor Descamps requires us to overrule Y oung

. The decisions are not clearly irreconcilable.

C. Expungement

F inally

, Petitioner arg ues that t h e ex pung e ment of her conspiracy conviction removes it from the definition o f “conviction” under 8 U .S.C. § 1 101(a)(48)(A). 7 Specifically

, she c halleng es our deference to the B I A ’s interpretation o f § 1101(a)(48)(A). Se e M u rillo-Espinoza v

. INS
, 261 F .3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting the B I A’s interpretation o f § 1101(a)(48)(A) in I

n re Roldan

, 22 I

. & N. Dec. 512 (B .I .A. 1999) (en banc), as “preclud[ i n g] the recog nition o f

s u b s e q u e n t s t a t e r e h a b i l i t a t i v e e x p u n g e m e n t s o f convictions”).

Petitioner did not present that claim to the B I A, and it is
not ex hausted. W e lack jurisdiction over an u n ex hausted claim. See Barron v

. Ashcroft

, 3 5 8 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) ( holding that 8 U. S.C. § 1 252(d)(1) “ mandates

7 Sectio n 1 1 0 1 (a)(4 8 )(A ) p ro v id es:

T h e term “ co n v ictio n ” m ean s, w ith resp ect t o an alien

, a f o rm al j u d g m en t o f g u ilt o f th e alien en tered b y

a co u rt o r, if ad

j u dicatio n of g u ilt h as b een w ith h eld

, w h ere—(i) a j u d g e o r j u ry h as f o u n d th e alien g u ilty or th e alien h as en tered a plea of g u ilty o r n o lo co n ten dere

o r h as ad m itted su f

f icien t f acts to w arran t a f

in d in g of
g u ilt, an d (ii) th e j u d g e h as o rd ered so m e f o rm of
p u n ish m en t, p en alty

, o r restrain t o n t h e alien ’ s lib erty to b e im p o sed

.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 23

ex h aust i o n and therefore g enerally bars us, for lack o f subject-matter jurisdiction, from reaching the merits of a leg al

c l aim not p resented in administrative proceeding s below ” ). According ly

, we must dismiss the ex pung ement claim. 8

P etition DENIED IN P A RT a nd DISM I S S E D IN P A RT.

TASHI MA, Circuit J udg e, dissenting :

The majority ho l d s t h a t Y oung v. Holder

, 697 F .3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), remains g ood law because it is not clearly irreconcilable with Moncrieffe v

. Holder

, 1 33 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). Maj. Op. at 19. U nder Y oung , M ar i n e l arena

m u s t prove that she was not convicted of a c ontroll e d

s u b s t a nce offense in o rder to e stablish her elig ibility for cancellation of removal. B ecause the r ecord is a mbig u ous on t h i s p oint, the majority reasons, Marinelarena cannot satisfy her burden o f proof and is thus inelig ible for relief. Id. a t 13. I disag r ee with the majority ’s conclusion that Moncrieffe does
not abrog ate Y

oung. Under Moncrieffe

, the ambig uity in the record as to Marinelarena’s o ffense of conviction means that

8 Ev en if w e ag reed w ith P etitio n er t h a t t his claim q u alif ies f o r an

ex cep tio n to th e ex h au stio n req u irem en t, w e h av e rej ected a s i m i l a r arg u m en t o n t

h e m erits. S e e Reyes v. Lyn ch

, 8 34 F.3 d 1 1 0 4
, 1 10 8 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 6) (h o ld in g th at, ev en th o u g h a Calif o rn i a c o u rt set asid e a p etitio n er’ s earlier n o lo co n ten d ere p l ea, a “ state co n v ictio n ex p u n g ed

u n d er state law is still a co n v ictio n f o r pu rp o ses o f elig ib ility f or

can cellatio n of rem o v al an d a d j u stm en t o f statu s,” ev en w h en th e p etitio n er w as n ev er in carcerated

, b ecau se “ th e alien w as p u n ish ed o r h is lib erty w as restrain ed

b y th e term s o f

h is p ro batio n ”).M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 24

she h as not committed an o ffense disqualify ing her from relief. I respectfully dissent.

I n Moncrieffe

, the Supreme Court ex plained t h e f ramework for apply ing the categ orical approach to determ i n e whether a n oncitiz en has committed an ag g ravated felony

, a s defined b y the I mmi gr a tion and Nationality Act. 133 S. Ct.
at 1684–85. I n cases apply ing the categ orical approach,
courts compare the elements of a noncitiz en’s offense o f conviction t o those o f a g eneric f e d eral offense that would disqualify her f

rom relief. D escamps v

. United States
, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013). The Cou r t i n M oncrieffe specified that, u n der the categ orical approach, courts should “look ‘not
to the facts of the particular prior case,’ b u t instead to whether ‘ t h e state statute d efining the c rime of conviction’ categ orically fits within the ‘ g e n eric’ fede ral definition of a corresponding ag g ravated f elony .” Moncrieffe

, 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting Gonzales v

. D uenas-Alva r e z , 549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007)). “[ A] state offense is a categ orical match with a g eneral federal offense only if a convi c t i o n o f the state offense ‘ necessarily involved

. . . f a c t s e quating to [ the]
g eneral [ federal offense] .’” Id. (emphasis a dded) (quoting Shepard v. United States
, 5 44 U

. S

. 13, 24 (2005) ( p lurality opinion)). “W hethe r t

h e noncitiz en’s actual conduct involved such facts is ‘quite irrelevant.’” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl , 107 F .2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939)).

The Co urt further stated that, if a statute contains multiple, alternative v ersion s o f a crime (that is, if the modified categ orical approac h applies), “a court may det e r m ine which particular offense the n oncitiz en was convicted of by ex a min i n g the charg ing document a nd jury in s t r u c t i ons, or in the c ase o f a g u ilty plea, the plea
ag reement, plea c olloquy

, or ‘some comparabl e judicialM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 25

record of the factual basis for the plea.’” Id. (emphasi s added) (quoting Nijhawan v. Holder

, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009)). The Court labeled this inquiry as a whole “the categ ori c al approach,” as opposed to distingu ishing between the categ orical a

nd modified categ orical approaches. Id. at 1685.

I n Moncrieffe

, the g overnment arg ued that the p etitioner had committed a “felony punishable u n der t h e C ontrolled Substances Act” (“CSA”), whi c h q ualifies as an ag g ravated felony that would allow the petitioner t o be deported. Moncrieffe

, 1 33 S. Ct. at 1683. The Court disag r e ed

. I d. at 1684. The record established that Moncrieffe had been convicted u nder a sta t e s t atute proscribing conduct that constitutes an offense u n d e r the CSA, but the r ecord was ambig uous a s to whe t h e r the CSA would “‘necessarily ’ prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.” Id. a t 1685 (emphasis a dded). The Supreme Court held that “[ a] mbig uity

o n this point means that the conviction did not ‘necessarily ’ involve f acts that c orrespond to an offens e p u n ishable as a felony under the CSA.” Id. at 1687. “Under the categ orical approach, then, M o n c r i effe was not convicted of an ag g r avated felony

” allowing him to be deported. Id.

This analy sis is clearly irreconcilable with Y o ung

. Y oung holds that ambig uity in t h e r e cord as to whether the

nonc i t i z en committed an ag g ravated felony means that she

was c onvicted of the offense for p urposes of the immig r ation
statutes. Y

oun g , 6 9 7 F.3d at 988–99. Moncrieffe holds the opposite: I f the record does not conclusivel y establish that the noncitiz e n c o m m i tted the offense, then she was not convicted of the offense f or purposes of the immig r ation
statutes. Moncrieffe , 133 S. Ct. at 1687.M A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 26

The majority ’s arg uments to t h e contrary a re unpersuasive. The majority first contends that Moncrieffe does not control because it “addressed the question whether the petitioner was removable

, a question as to whi c h t h e gov e r n m e nt bears the burden o f proof,” while this case

concerns cancellation of r emoval, for which an applicant bears the burden of proving elig ibility

. Maj. Op. at 16. B ut Moncrieffe itself ex plicitl y f orecloses this d istinction,

ex p l ai ning that the categ orical “ analysis is the same in both [ the removal and cancellation of removal] contex ts.” Moncrieffe

, 133 S. Ct. at 1685 n.4 (emphasis added). Under Moncrieffe

, the framework for apply ing the cat e go rical a nd modified categ orical a p proaches does not depend on which party bears the b u r d en of proof in a particular kind o f immig ration proceeding

.

The majority sidesteps this ex plicit instruction by arg uing that Moncrieffe “limited” its holding “ t o the categorical
contex t.” Maj. Op. at 18–19. Per the majority

, “ Moncrieffe therefore cannot be r ead to inform the r e l e v a nt dispute in Y o ung , which p ertained only to the operation of the burden o f proof when the modified categ orical approach applies.” Maj. Op. at 19 ( footnote o mitted). This purpor t ed distinction
overstates the difference between the categ o ri ca l a nd modified categ orical approaches. As the Supreme Court has noted, the modified ca t e g orical approach is “ a tool for implementing the categorical ap p r oach ” that allows a court “to e x amine a limited class of documents to determine which of a statute ’ s a l t ernative elements f ormed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction

. ” Descamps v. U nited States
, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013).

Thus, in M

o n c r ieffe

, the Court outlined both what we have c alled the “categ or i cal” step o f the analy sis and theM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 27

“modified categ o rical” step of the analy sis, and then labeled the inquiry as a whole “ the cate go r ical a pproach.” Moncrie f f e , 133 S. Ct. at 1684–85 (outlining the categ orical and modified categ orical analy sis and stating that “[ t ] his

c ateg orical approach has a long pedig ree in our Natio n ’s immig ration law”). That is because the relevant inquiry in both categ o rical and modified categ orical cases i s the same: A court must compare the el e m ents of the offense of which the noncitiz en was convicted to the elements of a g eneric federal o ffense disqualify ing her from relief, and t h en determine what facts are n ecessarily established b y that conviction. T he only difference between the two a pproaches is that, in modified categ orical cases, a statute lists “multiple, alternative v ersions of [ a] crime,” Descamps
, 133 S. Ct. at 2 2 8 4, so the court must look to the r ecord of convicti o n t o determine “which particula r offense the noncitiz en was convicted of.” Moncrieffe

, 133 S. Ct. at 1 6 84. Once that determination is made, the relevant question i s t h e same a s t h a t i n categ orical cases: A court must ask w hat the noncitiz en’s conviction n ecessarily involved, “ not w hat acts [ the noncitiz en] committed.” Id. at 1685.

I n M ath i s v. United States
, 1 36 S. Ct. 2243 ( 2016), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the c ateg orical and modified categ orical approaches involve the same analy sis. The Court stated that, “when a statute sets out a sing le (or ‘indivisible’)
set o f elements to define a sing le crime,” a court should “line[ ] up that crime’s elements along side those of the g eneric offense and see[ ] if they match.” Id. at 2248. “Some statutes, however, have a more complicated (sometimes called ‘divisible’) structure, making the c omparison of e l e m ents harder.” Id. at 2249. Cases involving such statutes apply the

mo d i f i ed c ateg orical approach. Under this approach, “a

s e n t e ncing court looks to a limited class of documents ( f o rM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 28

ex a mple, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea ag reement and colloquy

) to determine w hat crime, with what elements,

a defendant w as convicted o f.” Id. “The court c a n then
compare that crime, as the categorical approach commands

, with the relevant g eneric offense.” Id. (emphasis added). 1

I n other words, whether a case applies what w e have called the “categ orical” or the “modified categ o rical” approach, the a n aly sis is the same: The court asks whether the noncitiz en w as n e c essarily convicted of a n offense disqualify i n g h e r from relief. I f the r ecord o f conviction is ambig uous on this point – as it is in this cas e

– then her “conviction did not ‘ necessarily ’ involve facts t h at

c o r r e spond to” a disqualify ing offense. Moncrieffe

, 133 S

. Ct. at 1687 (emphasis a d d ed). Thus, under the modified categ orical approach, Marinelarena was not convicted o f a controlled substance offense under federal law. 2

1 T h e m aj o rity co n ten d s th at “ th e in q u iry i n to w h ich p art of a d iv isib le
statu te u n d erlies th e p etitio n er’ s crim e o f co n v ictio n is, if n ot fa c tu al, at least a m i x ed q u estio n o f l a w an d f act” b ecau se th e in q u iry req u ires th e

co u rt t o ex am i n e certain do cu m en ts i n th e reco rd o f co n v ictio n

. Maj

. Op

. at 2 0

. T h is arg u m en t m isses t h e m ark

. T h e relev an t p o in t is th at, u n der th e m o d if ied categ o rical ap p ro ach

, t h e co u r t l o o k s at th o se d o cu m en ts

o n ly to d eterm in e w

h i ch crim e th e p etitio n er w as co n v icted o f

, an d

w h eth er th at cri m e ’s elem en ts m atch th o se o f a d isq u alif y i n g g en eric

o f f en se. T h is is a p u rely leg al in qu iry

. S ee Desca mp s , 1 3 3 S

. Ct. at 2 2 9 3 (“ T h e m o d if

ied ap p ro ach d oes n o t au th o rize a sen t en cin g co u r t to

su b stitu t e . . . a f acts- b ased in q u iry

f o r an elem en ts- b ased

o n e.”).

2 A lth o u g h th is is an op e n q u e s t io n in o u r circu it, an o th er p an el

recen tly h as ch aracterized Mo n crieffe

, 1 3 3 S

. Ct. at 1 6 78
, as “ su g g est[in g ]

an in co n clu siv e r eco rd w o rk s to a p etitio n er’ s ad v an tag e, reg ard l ess of

w h ich party bears th e b u rd en o f p ro o f .” Lo za n o -Arred

o n d o v. S essio n s , 2 0 1 7 W L 3 39 3 4 5 4
, at * 4 (9 th Cir. A u g

. 8
, 2 01 7 ) (citin g Alma n za -Aren a s

v. Lyn ch

, 8 15 F.3 d 46 9
, 4 8 8

– 8 9 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 6 ) (en b an c) (W atf o rd

, J
., co n cu rrin g in th e j u d g m en t ). In Alma n za -Aren a s , J u d g e W atf o rd n otedM A R I N E L A R E N A V

. S E S S I O N S 29

I would g rant the petition and respectfully dissent.

th at “ o u r decisio n in Yo u n g [is] f u n d a m en tally in co m

p atib le w ith th e categ o rical ap p ro ach

, esp ecially af ter Desca mp s an d Mo n crieffe clarif ied th e elem en ts- f

ocu sed n atu re of th e in q u iry .” Alma n za -Aren a s , 8 1 5 F.3 d at 4 8 9

.