alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION FOR R EHEARING

Appellate case name: Eric Ramirez and LA Public Insurance Adjusters, Inc. v. Dick Law

Firm, PLLC and Eric Dick

Appellate case number: 01

- 2 1

- 0 0 3 92

- C V

Trial court case number: 2019

- 30183

Trial court: 113 th District Court of Harris County

Date motion filed : January 1 7 , 2023

Party filing motion : Appe ll ees

It is ordered that the motion for rehearing filed by appellees, Dick Law Firm PLLC and

Eric Dick, is denied

.

Judge’s signature:

____

/s/ Julie Countiss

_______ Acting for the Court

Panel consists of: Justices Kelly, Countiss, and Rivas

- Molloy

.

Date:



### ___ February 7, 2023

___________________
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. James Lee WILLIAMS, II, also known as James Lee Williams, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-10028 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 31, 2017

James Lee Williams, II, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

James Lee Williams, II, federal prisoner # 97021-079, appeals the district court’s denial of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct the Pre-sentence Report (“PSR”) Addendum that was used by the district court in determining his sentence. Williams is serving a 120-month sentence for wire fraud.

Williams argues that he was entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 36 because paragraph 71 of the PSR Addendum incorrectly stated that he had two incident reports for lying or falsifying a statement when he had only one such incident.

In cases where there are no factual disputes, we review a district court’s denial of a Rule 36 motion *de novo. United States v. Mackay,*757 F.3d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 2014). Rule 36 provides that a district court may at any time correct a clerical error in the record arising from oversight or omission. Fed. R. Ceim. P. 36. The probation officer acknowledged a mistake in Williams’s PSR. The district court noted that the record is now clear and the Bureau of Prisons is fully apprised of Williams’s background. To the extent that the mistake or oversight is correctable under Rule 36, which we need not decide, the district court is correct that Williams failed to show it is not harmless or that it affects his substantial rights.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
From: <Alicea.Jezebele@epamail.epa.gov> To: <jschwendeman@firstenergycorp.com> Date: 7/21/2010 3:33 PM Subject: Re: Electronic Copy, FE Ext req Attachments: pic19067.gif; FE ExtReq.pdf

Greetings,

EPA has reviewed your extension requ est for the steam electric effluent guidelines questionnaire for the following FirstEnergy Generation Corp and FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company facilities:

Ashtabula Bay Shore Bruce Mansfield Davis Besse Eastlake Lake Shore R. E. Burger W. H. Sammis

The deadline for your plant to submit Version 1 and Version 2 of the completed questionnaire is extended to October 15, 2010. Please note that the deadline for Part G, if applicable, is unchanged and remains 120 days after receipt of the questionnaire. No extensions are granted for Version 4 of the questionnaire; the deadline for plants receiving this questionnaire remains 90 days after receipt.

If you need assistance during the completion of the steam electric questionnaire, please contact the steam electric helpline via e-mail at steamhelp@erg.com or by phone at 1-877-353-7560.

Sincerely,

(Embedded image moved to file: pic19067.gif)

From: jschwendeman@firstenergycorp.com

To: Jezebele Alicea/DC/USEPA/US@EPA

Date: 07/07/2010 09:56 AM

Subject: Electronic Copy, FE Ext req

Attached for your electronic files is a pdf copy of the FirstEnergyCorp. deadline extension request for the Effluent Guidelines ICR questionnaire. A hard copy of this request was submitted last week by courier.

(See attached file: FE ExtReq.pdf)

----------------------------------------- The information contained in this message is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately, and delete the original message.(See attached file: FE ExtReq.pdf)
Document Headings

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                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Election Commission

# TIME AND DATE:

Thursday, February 17, 2022 at 11:00 a.m.

# PLACE:

1050 First Street NE, Washington, DC. (This meeting will be a virtual meeting).

# STATUS:

This meeting will be closed to the public.

      ( print page 8585)    

# MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

Audit conducted pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 30111(b).

* * * * *

# CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

Judith Ingram, Press Officer. Telephone: (202) 694-1220.

*Authority:*                         Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b.                    

Laura E. Sinram,

Acting Secretary and Clerk of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 2022-03291 Filed 2-11-22; 11:15 am]

BILLING CODE 6715-01-P
#### Robert Dale ALEXANDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Max WILLIAMS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-36197

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 9, 2017 Portland, Oregon

Filed March 20, 2017

Jason P. Steed, Ross A. Williams, Attorneys, Bell Nunnally & Martin LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Peenesh Shah, AGOR—Office of the Oregon Attorney General, Salem, OR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FISHER, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Prisoner Robert Alexander brought suit against several prison personnel alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Alexander appealed the grant of summary judgment to four of the defendants: Dr, Gulick, Dr. Hansen, Dr. Shelton, and Nurse Gruenwald (collectively, “Defendants”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party. *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004).

To succeed on a claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” *Estelle v. Gamble,*429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The plaintiff must show more than “a difference of medical opinion”; instead, he must show that the defendant’s conduct was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and that the defendant consciously disregarded the excessive risk to the plaintiffs health. *Jackson v. McIntosh,*90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

There is no evidence that Defendants recognized Alexander’s need for treatment and yet acted with deliberate indifference to that need. Instead, the evidence shows that Alexander received constant or near-constant treatment during the time period at issue. Defendants prescribed medication, pursued testing, requested consultations, and ordered a variety of treatments to help Alexander. Alexander has not presented evidence to suggest that the treatment he received was medically unacceptable. Alexander’s reliance on *Snow v. McDaniel,*681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012), *overruled on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard,*744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), to demonstrate that Dr. Gulick acted with deliberate indifference in deciding to reduce Alexander’s Neurontin dosage is unavailing; unlike in *Snow,*there is no evidence that the challenged treatment de-*583cisión was medically inappropriate. *See id.*at 990 (reversing a grant of summary judgment to a physician’s assistant when he had denied plaintiff pain medication but a doctor reviewing the decision, later “totally disagree^!]”).

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NEWPORT TELEVISION, LLC v. Cyndi BOOTH

2150770

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 19, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Cross-Appeal - Affirmed.
Kenneth Lydell JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3990

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed June 1, 2018

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Brittany N. O'Neil, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Kenneth Lydell Jackson appeals the partial denial of his motion to correct sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Jackson, who was sixteen years old at the time of his offenses, entered open pleas to burglary of a conveyance while armed (count I), attempted robbery with a firearm (count II), and possession of a firearm by a delinquent (count III). He was sentenced to concurrent twenty-five year terms of prison on counts I and II. On count III, he received a concurrent fifteen-year prison sentence. In his rule 3.800(a) motion, Jackson argued that he was entitled to a full resentencing hearing and a judicial review of his sentence. The trial court granted Jackson's motion, in part, amending the sentencing documents to allow for a juvenile sentence review hearing, but denying a new resentencing hearing.

This Court has previously held that it is error to modify a juvenile defendant's sentence to allow for a review hearing without also holding a resentencing hearing under sections 775.082, 921.1401 and 921.1402, Florida Statutes. *Ruiz v. State*, 242 So.3d 1204 ; *Katwaroo v. State*, 237 So.3d 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) ; *Davis v. State*, 230 So.3d 487 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). Jackson's situation is identical. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order amending the sentencing documents to provide for a review hearing, but reverse and remand to allow the court to conduct a full resentencing hearing.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED

ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.

BERGER, J., concurring specially.

BERGER, J., concurring specially.

I concur based on this Court's decisions in *Ruiz v. State*, 242 So.3d 1204, *Katwaroo v. State*, 237 So.3d 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018), and *Davis v. State*, 230 So.3d 487, 488 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). However, were I *424writing on a clean slate, I would affirm. In my view, Jackson is not entitled to resentencing under *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), or *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), because his sentences are not de facto life sentences. *See, e.g.*, *Davis v. State*, 214 So.3d 799, 799-800 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
Brandyn Edward COX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D16-3370

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Marcella BUITRAGO, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. BANK OF AMERICA N.A., Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-4298

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME AND CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS INCLUDED IN THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE PERIOD ENDED
MARCH 31, 1999, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
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July 10, 2015

Kate Kelly, Director Office of Air Waste and Toxics U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 6th Ave., Seattle, WA 98119 

## Department of Environmental Conservation

DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY

Division Director 410 Willoughby Avenue, Suite 303

PO Box 111800 Juneau, Alaska 99811-1800 Main: 907-465-5100 Toll Free: 866-241-2805 Fax: 907-465-5129 www.dec.alaska.gov

Dear Ms. Kelly:
In response to your request, I am writing to confirm that Alaska Rules 18 AAC 50.075 and 50.076 as amended on January 29, 2015, contain a continuous emission limitation consistent with federal Clean Air Act (CAA) requirements and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) policy regarding excess emissions during start-up, shut-down and malfunction (or upset) conditions.
Alaska Rule 18 AAC 50.075 (a) (2) prohibits visible emissions from solid-fuel fired appliances that exceed 50% opacity for more than six minutes in any one hour in an area for which an air quality advisory is in effect under 18 AAC 50.245 or 18 AAC 50.246. Emissions created during a fifteen minute start-up period are not subject to this opacity limit. However, other requirements of state rules apply to solid-fuel fired appliances at all times, including during startup. Specifically, 18 AAC 50.076 stipulates the types of fuels that may be used in wood-fired heating devices, including wood, wood pellets, manufactured compressed logs, bricks and pucks. 18 AAC 50.076 (b) further stipulates that during the winter months - October 1 - March 31, dry wood (moisture content of 20% or less) is required. Additionally, AK rule 18 AAC 50.076 (c) explicitly prohibits burning of other materials, including wood that has paint, stains or other types of coating; wood that has been treated with preservatives including copper chromium, arsenate, creosote or pentacholorophenol; asphalt, rubber or tar products; chlorinated or halogenated organic compounds; compounds containing cyanide or asbestos; animal carcasses or putrescible garbage. This section of the rule prohibits burning of these materials at all times. All of these materials would increase emissions. These fuel restrictions constitute work practice requirements that limit emissions during startup conditions. AK rules 18 AAC 50.075 and 18 AAC 50.076 thus include limits on emissions that apply during all modes of source operation and impose continuous emission controls on solid-fuel fired appliances consistent with the requirements of the CAA applicable to State Implementation Plan (SIP) provisions.



### Clean AirMs. Kelly July 10, 2015

Accordingly, AK rules 18 AAC 50.075 and 18 AAC 50.076 create no exemptions for emissions during any mode of source operation (including startup, shutdown or malfunction/upset conditions).

Sincerely,

Denise Koch, Air Director Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
Order entered May 13, 2022

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05 - 21 - 00918 - CV IN THE INTEREST OF S.I.J., S.M.J., S.D.J. II, CHILDREN On Appeal from the 255th Judicial Dis trict Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF - 20 - 07514

O RDER Before the Court is appellant’s May 12, 2022 motion for an extension of time to file his brief on the merits. We GRANT the motion and extend the time to June 13, 2022

. /s/ CRAIG SM ITH JUSTICE
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.**

**SECTION 1350, ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OFTHE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned certifies that:

 

(1)                                 This Quarterly Reporton Form 10-Q of Option Care, Inc. for the period ended September 30,2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                 The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of Option Care, Inc.

 

 
| Date:  November 13, 2002 | By:    | /s/ Rajat  Rai                         |   |
|-------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------|--------|
|                          |   | Rajat Rai                              |   |
|                          |   | President  and Chief Executive Officer |   |

 

----
EX PARTE J.B., T.J., and H.B.

(In re: The matter of T.J.)

2160676

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 6, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### Jeffrey Roy CROSBY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David SHINN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-55951

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

Jeffrey Roy Crosby, Pro Se

Gwendolyn Millicent Gamble, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USLA—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, Diana L. Pauli, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Jeffrey Roy Crosby appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.

Crosby challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding in which he was sanctioned with the disallowance of good conduct time after he was found to have committed the prohibited acts of fighting with another person and possessing a weapon. Crosby maintains that his procedural due process rights were violated during the proceedings and that the evidence supported his statement that he was attacked by another prisoner and only sought to defend himself. The record shows that the disciplinary proceedings complied with the procedural due process requirements delineated in *Wolff v. McDonnell,*418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and that “some evidence” supported the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s (“DHO”) decision, see *Superintendent v. Hill,*472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). Assuming that Crosby is correct that prisoners have a due process right to present a self-defense claim in prison disciplinary proceedings, the record shows that Crosby was permitted to raise a self-defense claim before the DHO. The DHO considered the claim and rejected it as unsupported. That finding was also supported by “some evidence.” *See id.*

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Crosby’s section 2241 petition; therefore, the dismissal should have been on the merits and with prejudice. *See Bostic v. Carlson,*884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (section 2241 jurisdiction exists when a federal prisoner “claims that he has been denied good time credits -without due process”), *overruled on other grounds by Nettles v. Grounds,*830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). We, therefore, vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition with prejudice.

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.