SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5225-18T3

NEIL SEBSO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, by and 

through the Bergen County 

Prosecutor's Office, BERGEN 

COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, 

THE COUNTY OF BERGEN, by and 

through THE BERGEN COUNTY 

PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, and 

DENNIS CALO, Prosecutor of Bergen 

County,

Defendants,

and

ROCKLAND COUNTY, and

ROCKLAND COUNTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY,

Defendants-Respondents.

_______________________________

Submitted June 1, 2020 – Decided August 11, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Before Judges Rothstadt and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-2920-18.

Law Offices of Robert J. De Groot, attorneys for 

appellant (Robert J. De Groot, of counsel; Oleg 

Nekritin, on the brief).

Kaufman Semeraro & Leibman LLP, attorneys for 

respondents (R. Scott Fahrney, Jr., on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Neil Sebso appeals from the Law Division's April 26, 2019, Rule

4:6-2(b) order dismissing his claims against defendants Rockland County and 

the Rockland County District Attorney's Office (together, Rockland County) for 

lack of jurisdiction. The complaint alleged plaintiff suffered damages when the 

New York Police Department (NYPD), with the help of defendant Bergen 

County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO), searched plaintiff's Fort Lee apartment and 

seized approximately $111,000, which the BCPO later transferred to Rockland 

County, and which plaintiff later lost through forfeiture. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that Rockland County submitted itself to New 

Jersey's jurisdiction because the BCPO transferred the seized funds to Rockland 

County. We find no merit to plaintiff's contention and affirm substantially for 
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the reasons stated by the motion judge because plaintiff never produced any 

evidence that Rockland County submitted itself to New Jersey's jurisdiction.

The facts discerned from the motion record are summarized as follows. 

In March 2014, an NYPD detective contacted the BCPO for assistance in an 

NYPD investigation that had been ongoing, since 2012, into plaintiff's alleged 

role in an illegal gambling ring. Relying on an affidavit from a NYPD detective 

that was used to secure a warrant from a New York Court, a BCPO detective 

secured a New Jersey search warrant for plaintiff's home in Fort Lee. 

The next day, members of the Fort Lee Police Department (FLPD), the 

BCPO, and the NYPD jointly executed the search warrant at plaintiff's 

residence. Approximately $111,727 was seized during the search, among other 

items. The BCPO transferred those funds in 2014 to Rockland County at the 

written request of the NYPD and pursuant to a June 24, 2014 authorization for 

turnover issued by the Law Division. In its application for the turnover 

authorization, the BCPO noted that the seized property related to a joint 

investigation between the "Rockland County Investigative Resource Center . . . 

and the [NYPD] Organized Crime Investigation Bureau."

In 2015, the Rockland County District Attorney's Office determined that 

the seized funds "should be transferred to the District Attorney's Asset Forfeiture 
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Fund" in accordance with New York law. According to the Rockland County 

District Attorney's Office, no one ever came forward to claim the money. By 

November 18, 2015, Rockland County deemed the funds to have been forfeited. 

Almost three years later, on April 23, 2018, plaintiff filed his complaint 

in this matter for conversion, negligence, and failure to make a required 

disposition. The State of New Jersey, Bergen County, the BCPO, and Rockland 

County all responded to the complaint with motions to dismiss under Rule 4:6-

2. Plaintiff responded to the motions with a motion to amend his complaint to 

add claims for due process and civil rights violations against all defendants. 

At oral argument, plaintiff consented to dismiss Bergen County from the 

litigation, and the motion judge granted the State's motion to dismiss, without 

prejudice. The judge denied Rockland County's motion without prejudice and 

directed that "jurisdictional discovery" be completed within sixty days. The 

motion judge also granted plaintiff's motion and plaintiff filed his amended 

complaint. 

On March 27, 2019, Rockland County filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's 

amended complaint under Rule 4:6-2(b) based on a lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff 

opposed the motion and filed a motion to compel discovery. In his opposition, 

plaintiff relied on a letter, sent by the BCPO on August 1, 2017 to plaintiff's 
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counsel stating "the money seized from your client was the result of an assist 

which this office provided to the Rockland County District Attorney's Office. 

The monies seized were turned over to that office." Plaintiff also argued that 

when Rockland County received the money, it noted in its evidence/property 

intake receipt that the money was being used for an "ongoing investigation," and 

therefore as a participant in that investigation, it submitted itself to New Jersey's 

jurisdiction. 

After considering the parties' oral arguments, the motion judge granted 

Rockland County's motion and denied plaintiff's motion to compel discovery. 

In his oral decision, the judge concluded that New Jersey did not possess specific 

jurisdiction over Rockland County because Rockland County never purposefully 

availed itself of New Jersey. According to the judge, plaintiff could not 

demonstrate that Rockland County asked the NYPD to turn over the seized 

funds. The motion judge concluded "[t]here [was] nothing . . . to tell the [c]ourt 

that Rockland availed itself by way of specific jurisdiction, such that they should 

be haled into court in Bergen County to justify why they presently have [the] 

money and forfeited it under the State of New York laws." 

Thereafter, plaintiff and the remaining non-Rockland County defendants 

entered into a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice. This appeal followed. 
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When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of 

jurisdiction, R. 4:6-2(b), we "examine whether the trial court's factual findings 

are 'supported by substantial, credible evidence' in the record." Patel v. 

Karnavati Am., LLC, 437 N.J. Super. 415, 423 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting 

Mastondrea v. Occidental Hotels Mgmt., S.A., 391 N.J. Super. 261, 268 (App. 

Div. 2007)). Whether the facts support the exercise of jurisdiction is a question 

of law and is reviewed de novo. Mastondrea, 391 N.J. Super. at 268.

A plaintiff bears the burden to prove jurisdiction. Dutch Run-Mays Draft, 

LLC v. Wolf Block, LLP, 450 N.J. Super. 590, 598 (App. Div. 2017). When the 

motion to dismiss is made early in the litigation, a plaintiff need only 

demonstrate a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, utilizing pleadings and

affidavits. Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, Co., 309 N.J. Super. 443, 454 (App. 

Div. 1998). 

In order to establish a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, plaintiff must 

show a defendant has "sufficient contact with the forum state 'to make it 

reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and 

substantial justice,'" to exercise jurisdiction. Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 

344, 360 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
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320 (1945)). Jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant exists in two forms: 

specific and general. Jacobs, 309 N.J. Super. at 452.

Under general jurisdiction, a defendant may be sued for "virtually any 

claim, even if unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum" provided 

"the defendant's activities in [New Jersey] can be characterized as 'continuous 

and systematic' contacts." Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323 

(1989) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 

408, 416 (1984)).

For general jurisdiction to be applicable, a defendant's activities must be 

"so 'continuous and systematic' as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum 

[s]tate." FDASmart, Inc. v. Dishman Pharm. & Chems. Ltd., 448 N.J. Super. 

195, 202 (App. Div. 2016) (first alteration in original) (quoting Daimler AG v. 

Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014)). A defendant's "principal place of business 

and place of incorporation" generally indicates where that defendant is "at 

home" and thus subject to general jurisdiction. Ibid. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop 

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). Establishing 

general jurisdiction requires "extensive contacts between a defendant and a 

forum." Id. at 202-03 (quoting Mische v. Bracey's Supermarket, 420 N.J. Super. 
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487, 492 (App. Div. 2011)). Here, there is no dispute that New Jersey did not 

have general jurisdiction over Rockland County. 

Where, as here, New Jersey does not have general jurisdiction, it may 

exercise specific jurisdiction "over a defendant who has 'minimum contacts' with 

the state" when "the cause of action arises directly out of a defendant's contacts 

with [New Jersey]." Rippon, 449 N.J. Super. at 359 (quoting Lebel, 115 N.J. at

323). Minimum contacts "focus on 'the relationship among the defendant, the 

forum, and the litigation.'" Lebel, 115 N.J. at 323 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 

433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).

"[M]inimum contacts" are "satisfied so long as the contacts resulted from 

the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities of the 

plaintiff." Ibid. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 

286, 297-98 (1980)). "[W]hen the defendant is not present in the forum state, 

'it is essential that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails 

[itself] of the privilege of conducting activities within [New Jersey], thus 

invoking the benefit and protection of its laws,'" Baanyan Software Servs., Inc. 

v. Kuncha, 433 N.J. Super. 466, 475 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Waste Mgmt. 

Inc. v. Admiral Ins., 138 N.J. 106, 120 (1994)), such that the defendant can 

reasonably anticipate being sued in this State, Dutch Run, 450 N.J. Super. at 
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599. The "'[p]urposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not 

be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated 

contacts. The question is whether the defendant's conduct and connection with 

the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into 

court there." McKesson Corp. v. Hackensack Med. Imaging, 197 N.J. 262, 277-

78 (2009) (quoting Lebel, 115 N.J. at 323-24).

Applying these core principles here, we turn to plaintiff's pleadings and 

the information he submitted in opposition to Rockland County's motion to 

determine if he made a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction. In his 

amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that "[t]he [BCPO] has advised that it only 

seized the property upon request by the Rockland County District Attorney's 

Office." However, neither of the documents that defendant submitted in 

opposition to plaintiff's motion demonstrated any action taken by Rockland 

County to avail itself of the privilege of doing business in New Jersey.

Moreover, assuming that such actions would establish jurisdiction, it was 

the BCPO that conducted the search of plaintiff's apartment, and ultimately 

seized the money that it turned over to Rockland County based upon the NYPD's 

directions. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Rockland County had 

anything to do with that search or seizure. Its only allegedly wrongful act was 
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deeming plaintiff's property to have been abandoned and forfeited, both of which 

took place solely within New York, the state, for jurisdictional purposes, of 

Rockland County's principal place of business and of all its operations. 

At oral argument on the motion, plaintiff's counsel asserted that 

jurisdiction was established by virtue of the fact that Rockland County was the 

entity that ultimately received the seized funds. According to counsel, "[t]he 

evidence is that's where it wound up. It didn't come out of a vacuum. It didn't 

fall out of the sky. They requested the money to go there." However, the 

inference that counsel asked the motion judge to draw was insufficient to 

establish jurisdiction. Plaintiff cites no authority that states otherwise. 

We conclude that the motion judge correctly granted Rockland County's 

motion to dismiss substantially for the reasons stated by the motion judge in his 

oral decision as Rockland County had no contacts with New Jersey and it never 

took any affirmative action to purposefully avail itself of New Jersey 

jurisdiction.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiff's 

remaining arguments, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.