alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gordon Vasquez, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 891]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie Wittner, J., on speedy trial motion; Richard Carruthers, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered August 1, 2000, convicting defendant of attempted robbery in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to a term of 18 years to life, and order, same court (Richard Carruthers, J.), entered on or about October 30, 2001, which denied defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to CEL 440.10, unanimously affirmed.

*344The court properly denied defendant’s speedy trial motion. Only the period from June 25 to August 18, 1999 is at issue on appeal. In response to defendant’s motion, the People argued that this period was excludable because “[t]he case was adjourned for trial following decision on defendant’s pre-trial motions,” citing *People v Douglas*(156 AD2d 173 [1989]). Since, according to defendant’s own calculation, his speedy trial claim would be unavailing if only eight days were excludable, and since we find that an eight-day postdecision adjournment to prepare for a pretrial hearing and/or for trial was reasonable under the circumstances *(see e.g. People v Green,*90 AD2d 705, 706 [1982], *lv denied*58 NY2d 784 [1982]), we need not decide whether the entire adjournment was excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (a). Defendant’s argument that the court’s finding was contrary to the minutes of the June 25th adjournment is unpreserved *(see People v Goode,*87 NY2d 1045 [1996]; *People v Luperon,*85 NY2d 71, 77-80 [1995]; *see also People v Turriago,*90 NY2d 77, 83-84 [1997]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.

Defendant’s constitutional challenge to the procedure under which he was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, is without merit *(see People v Rosen,*96 NY2d 329 [2001], *cert denied*534 US 899 [2001]).

We have considered and rejected the claims contained in defendant’s pro se supplemental brief. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Lerner and Gonzalez, JJ.
Reported Emissions and Product Content 

Table 1. Reported Emissions and Product Content of PFOA, Precursors, and Higher Homologues from U.S. Operations 

Company Emissions Product Content Second 

Year 

Reductions 

Chemical 

Category Releases to all 

media from FP 

and Telomer 

Manufacturing

(kg)

kg of 

release / 

kg of 

product 

produced 

Dispersions

(ppm wetweight basis)

Other 

Fluoropolymers

(ppm dry-weight 

basis)

Telomers 

(ppm dryweight basis, 

unless stated 

otherwise)

PFOA, PFOA 

salts and 

Higher 

Homologues 

0 0 0 0 No Telomer 

Dyneon/3M 2008 Production 

Precursors 0 
Table 2. Reported Emissions and Product Content of PFOA, Precursors, and Higher Homologues from Non U.S. Operations 

Company Emissions Product Content Second 

Year 

Reductions 

Chemical 

Category Releases to all 

media from FP 

and Telomer 

Manufacturing 

(kg)

kg of 

release / kg 

of product 

produced 

Dispersions

(ppm wetweight basis)

Other 

Fluoropolymers

(ppm dry-weight 

basis)

Telomers 

(ppm dryweight basis, 

unless stated 

otherwise)

PFOA, PFOA 

salts and 

Higher 

Homologues 1,020 

For FP 

Production: 

<1 kg / 100 

kg 

4 3 

No Telomer 

Production Dyneon/3M 2008 

Precursors 0 
Reported Percent Reductions in Emissions and Product Content 

Table 3. Reported Percent Reductions in Emissions and Product Content of PFOA, Precursors, and Higher Homologues from

U.S. Operations 

% Reduction in 

Emissions % Reduction in Product Content 

Company 

Second 

Year 

Reductions 

Chemical 

Category 

% Reductions in 

total quantity of 

chemical(s) released 

from baseline year 

Fluoropolymer 

Dispersions 

Other 

Fluoropolymers 

Telomer based 

products 

PFOA, 

PFOA salts 

and Higher 

Homologues 100% 100% Not Applicable 

No Telomer 

Production 

Dyneon/3M 2008 

Precursors No Precursor production 
Table 4. Reported Percent Reductions in Emissions and Product Content of PFOA, Precursors, and Higher Homologues from 

Non U.S. Operations 

% Reduction in 

Emissions % Reduction in Product Content 

Company 

Second 

Year 

Reductions 

Chemical 

Category 

% Reductions in total 

quantity of 

chemical(s) released 

from baseline year 

Fluoropolymer 

Dispersions 

Other 

Fluoropolymers 

Telomer based 

products 

PFOA, 

PFOA salts 

and Higher 

Homologues 93% 99% 0 % 

No Telomer 

Production 

Dyneon/3M 2008 

Precursors No Precursor production
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-1758

In re: NICHOLAS OMAR MIDGETTE,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (4:04-cr-00054-FL-1; 4:12-cv-00008-FL)

Submitted: September 18, 2018 Decided: September 20, 2018

Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Nicholas Omar Midgette, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Nicholas Omar Midgette petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the 

district court has unduly delayed acting on his motion for pre- and post-judgment interest. 

He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. Our review of the 

district court’s docket reveals that the district court denied the motion on April 20, 2018,

and denied reconsideration on July 10, 2018. Accordingly, because the district court has 

recently decided Midgette’s case, we deny the mandamus petition as moot. We grant 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy John VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-5145

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Filed January 30, 2017

(D.C. Nos. 4:16-CV-00523-CVE-PJC and 4:00-CR-00126-CVE-6), N.D. Oklahoma

Leena Alam, Kevin Charles Danielson, Catherine J. Depew, Douglas Snow, Thomas Scott Woodward, Office of the United States Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, OK, Douglas A. Horn, Office of the United States Attorney, Eastern District of Oklahoma, Muskogee, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Timothy John Vaughn, Pro Se

Before HARTZ, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Harris L Hartz, Circuit Judge

Defendant Timothy Vaughn seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring a COA to appeal a denial of relief under § 2255). He contends that his life sentence must be set aside because the applicable provision of the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutionally vague. But that provision was irrelevant to his sentence. His life sentence was not imposed under the guidelines but under a statutory provision that has not been challenged as vague. We deny a COA because no reasonable jurist could have ruled in his favor.

Defendant was indicted on a charge of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The government filed an information setting forth his two prior felony *626drug convictions and stating that if he were convicted on the charge against him, it would seek an enhancement of his sentence under 21 U.S.C, § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (vii), which provide for a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment if a defendant convicted on that charge has two prior convictions of felony drug offenses.

The presentence investigation . report prepared after Defendant’s conviction in this case noted that Defendant had two prior convictions that qualified as controlled-substance offenses and one that qualified as a crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2. As a result, he was treated as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1 and his guidelines sentencing range was 360 months to life imprisonment.

Defendant’s complaint in this court is that some of the language in § 4B1.2 defining *crime of violence*is virtually identical to language in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), held to be unconstitutionally vague in *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). Indeed, we have held that this language in § 4B1.2 is also unconstitutionally vague. *See United States v. Madrid,*805 F.3d 1204, 1210—11 (10th Cir. 2015).

But Defendant’s mandatory life sentence was not affected by § 4B1.2. It was the statutory mandatory minimum for offenders with two prior felony drug offenses that caused him to receive a sentence of life imprisonment. Because Defendant has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), he is not entitled to relief.

We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Brian Mark KRAJEWSKI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-107

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 10.1


 



 

February
6, 2019


 


Ms.
Sharon Klugewicz


17
Roxbury Road


Rockville,
Centre 11570


 


Dear
Sharon:


 


It
gives me great pleasure to offer “at will’ employment for the position of Chief Operating Officer. You will report
to Stavros Vizirgianakis, President and Chief Executive Officer for your assignments.


 


The
base salary for this position will be $ 250,000 per annum, paid in twenty-four (24), semi- monthly salary cycles.


 


You
will receive an opportunity to earn 25% of your base salary on achievement of objectives that are established by the Chief Executive
Offer and yourself. Medical and Dental benefits begin upon your first day of service which will commence on March 1, 2019.
You will be eligible to participate in the company’s 401k plan after a completion of six months of service. For your first
year of service you will receive twenty (20) days of paid time off. A vehicle allowance of $600.00 will be paid to you in two
semi- monthly installments of $300.00.


 


You
will work out of our Corporate Headquarters at 1938 New Highway in Farmingdale, NY.


 


Upon
your first day of service the Chief Executive and you will establish areas of responsibility that will be directly assigned to
you.


 


Please
feel free to contact me with any questions that you may have. It is a sincere pleasure to offer you this senior position and I
am looking very forward to working with you.


 


Sincerely,


 


Joseph
J. Gigante 


Director
of Human Resources


 






    -6-
IN RE: Peggy M. Hairston ROBINSON

NO. 2017-B-1290

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 18, 2018

Second application for rehearing not considered. This court's judgment of December 6, 2017 became final and definitive when rehearing was denied on January 30, 2018. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2167. Supreme Court Rule IX, § 5 does not permit any further rehearing applications. Accordingly, no further filings shall be accepted in this matter.
Marsha WOMACK v. Jason PENN

2151001

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 7, 2017 Reh. denied May 19, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
492 A.2d 1319

#### STATE of Maryland v. ONE 1979 MERCURY AUTOMOBILE.

No. 59,

Sept. Term, 1985.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 6, 1985.

Submitted to MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

The Court having considered and granted the petition for writ of certiorari, in the above entitled case, it is this 6th day of June, 1985

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that in light of the opinion of the Court in *State of Maryland v. One 1980 Harley Davdison Motorcycle Vin*# *9G3593950 and State of Maryland v. One 1973 Ford Torino Vin # 3B30H169115,*303 Md. 154, 492 A.2d 896 (1985), the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals be, and it is hereby, reversed and case remanded to that Court with instructions to reverse the March 13, 1984 order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and remand the case to that Court for further proceedings consistent with the aforesaid opinion, the mandate to issue forthwith with costs to be paid by the appellee.
Arthur Lee GRIGGS v. STATE

CR-15-1445

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Reh. denied.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 39 (Monday, February 28, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 11079]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03539]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2021-N-0002]


New Animal Drugs; Withdrawal of Approval of New Animal Drug 
Application

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notification of withdrawal.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is withdrawing approval 
of a new animal drug application (NADA) at the sponsor's request 
because the product is no longer manufactured or marketed.

DATES: The approval is withdrawn as of February 28, 2022.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sujaya Dessai, Center for Veterinary 
Medicine (HFV-212), Food and Drug Administration, 7519 Standish Pl., 
Rockville, MD 20855, 240-402-5761, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f083859a918991de949583839199b0969491de989883de979f86"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="83f0f6e9e2fae2ade7e6f0f0e2eac3e5e7e2adebebf0ade4ecf5">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Elanco US Inc., 2500 Innovation Way, 
Greenfield, IN 46140, has requested that FDA withdraw approval of NADA 
093-329 for use of a prolonged-release bolus containing sulfamethazine 
in cattle because the product is no longer manufactured or marketed.
    Therefore, under authority delegated to the Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs and in accordance with Sec.  514.116 Notice of withdrawal of 
approval of application (21 CFR 514.116), notice is given that approval 
of NADA 093-329, and all supplements and amendments thereto, is hereby 
withdrawn February 28, 2022.
    Elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register, FDA is amending 
the animal drug regulations to reflect the voluntary withdrawal of 
approval of this application.

    Dated: February 14, 2022.
Lauren K. Roth,
Associate Commissioner for Policy.
[FR Doc. 2022-03539 Filed 2-25-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4164-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6162 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

379 North Oates Street in Dothan, Alabama, as the ‘‘LaBruce ‘Bruce’ 

Tidwell Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 1, 2023 

Mr. MOORE of Alabama (for himself, Mr. CARL, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, Mr. 

ADERHOLT, Mr. PALMER, Mr. STRONG, and Ms. SEWELL) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 379 North Oates Street in Dothan, Alabama, 

as the ‘‘LaBruce ‘Bruce’ Tidwell Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LABRUCE ‘‘BRUCE’’ TIDWELL POST OFFICE 

4 BUILDING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 379 North Oates Street in 

7 Dothan, Alabama, shall be known and designated as the 

8 ‘‘LaBruce ‘Bruce’ Tidwell Post Office Building’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6162 IH

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘LaBruce ‘Bruce’ Tid5 well Post Office Building’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### Humberto JIMENEZ, aka Humberto Vergara Jimenez, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-70918

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

Humberto Jimenez, Pro Se

Joseph Anthony O’Connell, OIL, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Humberto Jimenez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. We dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that Jimenez failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relative. *See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales,*424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005). Although the court would retain jurisdiction over colorable questions of law and constitutional claims, Jimenez’s contentions that the agency failed to consider relevant evidence of hardship or apply the correct legal standard are not supported by the record and do not amount to colorable claims. *See id.*(“To be colorable in this context, ... the claim must have some possible validity.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not reach Jimenez’s contentions concerning denial as a matter of discretion, *587because the BIA did not rely on that ground. *Andia v. Ashcroft,*359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency”)

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[EXHIBIT 32.2]


   CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL
            OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                   AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
           SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


   I,  Garth Jensen, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as  adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  of
2002,  that the Annual Report of North American Liability  Group,
Inc. on Form 10-KSB/A for the annual period ended December 31, 2004
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the   Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934  and  that  information
contained  in  such Form 10-KSB/A fairly presents in  all  material
respects  the  financial condition and results of  operations  of
NorMexSteel, Inc.



By: /s/ Garth Jensen
   ---------------------------------
   Name:  Garth Jensen
   Title:  Chief Financial Officer
#### Vicki SMITHERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jennifer SPECTH, at the United States Postal Service, Molly Knight, at the United States Postal Service, and Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, Defendants-Appellees.

16-732-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 27, 2017

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Vicki Smithers, pro se, Rochester, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Michael S. Cerrone, Assistant United States Attorney, for William J. Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY.

PRESENT: José A. Cabranes, Rosemary S. Pooler, Gerard E. Lynch, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Vicki- Smithers, proceeding *pro se,*appeals from the District Court’s judgment dismissing her claims of employment discrimination against two United States Postal Service employees and the Postmaster General. The District Court dismissed Smithers’s claims on the ground of invalid service, holding that Smithers had failed to serve the United States in a proper and timely fashion, as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

On appeal, Smithers argues only the merits of her discrimination claims and does not address her failure to effect proper service. For that reason, we hold that *723she has waived any challenge to the District Court’s determination that she failed to properly and timely serve process. *See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.,*412 F.3d 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[Arguments not made in an appellant’s opening brief are *waived...LoSacco v. City of Middletown,*71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that a pro *se*appellant abandons an issue not raised in her appellate brief). Even if we excused Smithers’s failure to argue the service-of-process issue on appeal, which we have discretion to do “if manifest injustice would otherwise result,” *JP Morgan Chase Bank,*412 F.3d at 428, the District Court’s decision was correct.

We review a dismissal for improper service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) for abuse of discretion. *See Dickerson v. Napolitano,*604 F.3d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 2010). In the context of a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing adequate service. *See id,*at 752. The District Court was correct to dismiss Smithers’s claim on the ground of improper service because Smith-ers made no reasonable effort to effect proper service. *See id.*at 753.

Nevertheless, the District Court failed to specify that its dismissal of Smithers’s claims was without prejudice, as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Remand is not necessary, however, because we have authority to modify the judgment to specify that dismissal was without prejudice. *See U.S. ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp.,*60 F.3d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1995).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the District Court’s February 3, 2016 judgment is MODIFIED to provide that Smithers’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice, and is AFFIRMED as modified.