## CASE NO. 06-14-00094-CV

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IN THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS

_____________________________________________________________ Nancy Elizabeth Bowman, Appellant,

vs. Jerry Davidson and Diana Davidson, Appellees.

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On Appeal from the 71st Judicial District Harrison County, Texas Cause No. 13-0618 The Honorable Brad Morin, Presiding

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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

_____________________________________________________________ JACK M. SANDERS, JR. State Bar No. 17592000 109 East Houston Street P.O. Box 1387 Marshall, Texas 75671-1387 (903) 935-7172 (903) 938-8616 (Fax) sanders.jack@sbcblobal.net ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ACCEPTED 06-14-00094-CV SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 3/19/2015 10:52:36 AM DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERKPrea m bl e

COM ES NOW N ANCY ELIZABETH BOW M A N , Ap p el l an t h e r e i n , wh o h ereb y res pect fu l l y m ak es an dfi l es t h i s , h er Ap p el l an t ’ s Bri ef.
I n t h e i n t eres t of cl ari t y , Nan cy El i zab et h Bo wm an wi l l b e referred t o a s

“ Bo wm an ,” w h il e J E RRY DAVIDSON, Ap p el l ee h erei n , wi l l be referred t o as

“ J erry ”, an d DIANA DAVIDSON, t h e o t h er Ap pel l ee herei n , wi l l b e refer r e d t o as

“ Di an a.” Co l l ect iv el y , t h e Ap p el l ees wi l l b e referred t o as “ t he Dav i d s on s . ”
In t h i s Bri ef, t h e Rep o rt er’ s Reco rd w i l l b e ci ted by v ol u m e an d p ag e: l i n e as

“

_ _ _ RR

_ _ _ :

_ _ _ ”, t h e Rep o rt er’ s Su p p l em en t al In d ex es w il l b e ci t ed as R. Su p p. R. In d ex , t h e Cl erk ’ s Reco rd wi l l b e ci t ed b y p a g e a s “ CR

_ _ __ _ ,” t h e Cl erk ’ s Su p p l em en t al Reco rd s w i l l b e ci t ed as “ C

. S u p p . R

. ” an d t h e p l ai n t i ff’ s

ex h ib i t s wi l l b e ci t ed b y reco rd v o l u m e an d ex h i bi t n u m b er as “ 4 RR P.Ex

.

_

_ _ _.” Th e Ap p en d i x wi ll b e referred t o as “ Ap p x. .”

iiI denti ty o f Pa rti es a nd Co uns el

Pu rs uan t t o Tex

. R. Ap p . P. 3 8.1 (a), Bo wm an h ereb y s ub m it s a l i s t o f p art i es

an d co u n s el i n t eres t ed i n t h i s cas e: Ap p el l an t an dh er Ap p el l at e/ Tri al Co u n s el : Nan cy El i zab et h Bo wm an c/ o J ack M . San d ers , J r. St at e Bar No . 1 7 5 92 0 0 0 1 0 9 Eas t Ho u s t o n St reet P.O. Bo x 1 3 8 7 M ars h al l , Tex as 7 5 67 1 -1 3 8 7 (9 0 3 ) 9 3 5 -7 17 2 (9 0 3 ) 9 3 8 -8 61 6 (Fax ) s an d ers .jack @s b cb lo b al .n et Ap p el l ees an d t h ei r Tri al Co u n s el : J erryan d Di an a Dav i d s o n c/ o Al an E. Bro wn St at e Bar No . 0 3 0 90 5 0 0 Bo y d& Bro w n , P.C. 1 2 1 5 Pru i t t Pl ace Ty l er, Tex as 7 57 0 3 (9 0 3 ) 5 2 6 -9 00 0 (9 0 3 ) 5 2 6 -9 00 1 (Fax ) aeb ro wn @ s u d den l i n km ai l .co m

iiiTa bl e o f Co ntents

Pream bl e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i Id en t i t y o f Part i es an dCo u n s el

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i i Tab le o f Co n t en t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
In d ex o f Au t h ori ti es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i i St at em en t o f t he Cas e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 St at em en t Reg ard i n g Oral Arg u m en t

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Is s u es Pres en t ed

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Su m m ary o f t h e Arg u m en t

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 St an d ard s o f Rev iew.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A. Leg al Su ffi ci en cy

o f t h e Ev i den ce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. Fact ual Su ffi ci en cy o f t h e Ev i d en ce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 St at em en t o f Fact s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A. Bu b b a Bi t a Lo n g Ti m e Fri en d o f t h e Dav i d so n s Pri o r t o Bi t in g Bo wm an . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Bu b b a Had a Hi st o ry o f Ag gres s i v e, Pro t ect iv e an dPo s s es s i v e Beh av i o r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 C. Du e t o Bu b b a’ s Beh av i o r, t h e Dav i ds o n s W arn ed New Gu es ts AtTh ei r Ho m e No t t o In t eract W i t h Bu b b a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0
D. Th e Laws u i t an dt h e Ap p eal

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

ivArg um en t an dAu t h o ri t i es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3

Fi rs t Is s u e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3
Bo wm an was en t i t l ed t o affi rm at i ve ju ry fi nd i n g s as a m at t er o f l aw reg ard i n g t he d an g ero us p ro p en s i t i es o f t h e D av i d so n s ’ d o g a n d th e Dav i d s o n s’ k n o wl ed ge o f t h e do g ’ s d an g ero u s p ro pen s i t i es , o r i n th e al t ern at i v e, t h e ju ry ’ s fi n d i n gs was ag ai n st t h e g reat wei g h t an d p rep on d eran ce o f t h e ev i d en ce. Arg um en t s Rel at i n g t o t h e Fi rs t Is s u e A. St ri ct Li ab i l it y

Cl ai m s In v o l v i n g a Do m es t i c Do g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3
1

. Th e Seco nd El em en t o f Dan g ero u s Pro p en s i t i es . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4
2

. Th e Th i rd El em en t Req u i ri n g t h e Own er’ s Kn o wl ed ge. . . . . 1 6
B. Th e Reco rd Co n t ai n s On l y Affi rm at i ve Ev i d en ce o f Bu b b a’ s Dan g ero u s Pro p en s i t i es an dt h e Dav i d so n s’ Kn o wl ed g e o f t h e Dan g ero u s Pro p en s i t i es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7
1

. Th ere i s No o r Li t t l e Ev i d en ce t o Su p p o rtBu b b a Di d No t Hav e Dan g ero u s Pro p en si ti es an dAffi rm at i v e Ev i d en ce t o Su p p o rt He Di d

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8
2

. No o r Li t t l e Ev i d en ce t o Su p p o rt t he Dav i d s on s Di d No t Kn o w o r Di dNo t Hav e Reas on t o Kn o w Bu b b a Had Dan g ero u s Pro p en s i t i es an dAffi rm at i v e Ev i d en ce t o Su p p o rtTh ey

Di dHav e Kn o wl ed ge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 C. Co n cl u si o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9

vSeco n dIs s u e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1

Bo wm an was en t i t l ed t o an affi rm at i v e an s w er as a m at t er of l aw t hat th e d o g ’ s d an gero u s p ro p en si t i es were t h e p ro du ci n g cau s e o f Bo wm an ’ s i n ju ri es , o r i n t he al t ern at i v e, a n eg at i v e fi n d i ng wo u ld h av e b een ag ai n s t t h e g reat wei g h t an dp rep o n d eran ce o f t h e ev i d en ce. Arg um en t s Rel at i n g t o t h e Seco n dIs s u e A. St ri ct Li ab i l it y

Req u i res Bo wm an t o Pro v e t h e Dan gero u s Pro p en s i t i es W ere t h e Pro d uci n g Cau s e o f Bo wm an ’ s In ju ri es . . . . . 3 1
B. Th e Reco rd Co n t ai n s On l y Affi rm at i ve Ev i d en ce i n Su p p o rt o f Bu b b a’ s Dan g ero u s Pro p en s it ies As t h e Pro d u ci ng Cau s e o f t h e Bi te.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 C. Co n cl u si o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 Pray er. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 Cert i fi cat e o f Co m

p l i an ce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 Cert i fi cat e o f Serv i ce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6

viI ndex o f Autho ri ti es

Cas es Tex as Su p rem e Co u rt Ca i n v. Ba i n , 7 0 9 S.W .2 d1 7 5 (Tex . 1 9 8 6 ) (p er cu ri am ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Co l lo r a v. Na va r r o , 5 7 4 S.W .2 d6 5 (Tex . 1 9 7 8 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 Cr o u ch er v. Cr o u ch er , 6 6 0 S.W .2 d5 5 (Tex . 1 9 8 3 )..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Fo r d Mo to r

Co . v. Led

es ma , 2 4 2 S.W .3 d3 2 (Tex . 2 0 0 7 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1
Ho l ley v. W

a t ts , 6 2 9 S.W .2 d6 9 4 (Tex . 1 9 8 2 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Ma r s h a ll v. Ra n n e , 5 1 1 S.W .2 d2 5 5 (Tex . 1 9 7 4 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 , 1 4, 1 6 , 3 1
Tr a yl o r v. Go u l di ng , 4 9 7 S.W .2 d9 4 4 (Tex . 1 9 7 3 )..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
W a s h i n g t o n v. Rel i a b l e Li

f e In s . Co

. , 5 8 1 S.W .2 d1 5 3 (Tex . 1 9 7 9 ) .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7

Tex as Co u rt s o f Ap p eal Al l en ex r el . B.A. v. Alb i n , 9 7 S.W .3 d6 5 5 (Tex . Ap p . — W aco 2 00 2 , n o p et .).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3
Bea rd v. Bea rd , 4 9 S.W .3 d4 0 (Tex

. Ap p . — W aco 2 0 0 1 , p et . d en i ed ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
viiBel

g er v. S ween ey , 8 3 6 S.W .2 d7 5 2 (Tex . Ap p . — Ho u s t o n [1 s t Di s t .] 1 9 9 2, wri t d en i ed )..

. . 1 6 Ca r r as co v. S t ewa rt , 2 2 4 S.W .3 d3 6 3 (Tex . Ap p . — El Pas o 2 0 0 6 , n o p et .)..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Du n n i n g s v. Ca st r o , 8 8 1 S.W .2 d5 5 9 (Tex . Ap p . — Ho u s t o n [1 s t Di s t .] 1 9 9 4, wri t d en i ed )..

. . 1 5
Fa r ley v. M.M. Ca t tl e Co

. , 5 4 9 S.W .2 d4 5 3 (Tex . Ci v . Ap p . — W aco 1 97 7 , wri t ref’ dn .r.e.).

. . . . . . 1 5
Ma ch a la v. W

eems , 5 6 S.W .3 d7 4 8 (Tex . Ap p . — Tex ark an a 2 0 0 1 , n o p et .).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Owen s v. Co u r

y , 6 1 4 S.W .2 d9 2 6 (Tex . Ap p . — Am ari l lo 1 9 8 1 , n o wri t ).

. . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 , 1 5 Pl u mmer v. Es t a t e o

f Pl u mmer , 5 1 S.W .3 d8 4 0 (Tex . Ap p . — Tex ark an a 2 0 0 1 , p et . d en i ed ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ra w Hi d e Oi l & Ga s Co ., In c. v. Ma xu s Exp l or a t io n Co

. , 7 6 6 S.W .2 d2 6 4 (Tex . Ap p . — Am ari l lo 1 9 8 8 , wri t d en i ed ).

. . . . . . . . . . 5 , 6 Th o mp so n v. Cu r t is , 1 2 7 S.W .3 d4 4 6 (Tex . Ap p . — Dal l as 2 0 0 4 , n o p et .).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 , 3 1
Vi l l ar ea l v. El i z o n d o , 8 3 1 S.W .2 d4 7 4 (Tex . Ap p . — Co rp u s Ch ri st i 1 9 92 , n o wri t ).

. . . . . . . . . 1 5
W el l s v. Bu r n s , 4 8 0 S.W .2 d3 1 (Tex . Ci v . Ap p . — El Pas o 1 9 7 2, n o wri t ). .

. . . . . . . . . 1 3 , 1 5

viiiOu t o f St at e Cas es

Su p rem e Co u rt Po z na n s ki ex r el

Po z n a n s ki v. Ho r va t h , 7 8 8 N.E.2 d1 2 5 5 (In d

. 2 0 0 3 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 , 1 5
Dea rd o f f v. Bu r g er , 6 0 6 A.2 d 4 8 9 (Pa. 1 9 9 2 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5
Ro b in s o n v. Ma r i no , 3 W as h . 4 3 4 , 2 8 P. 7 52 (1 8 92 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6

Tex as Ru l es o f Ap p el l at e Pro ced u re Tex

. R. Ap p . Pro . 9 .4 (i )(3 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
Tex

. R. Ap p . Pro . 9 .5 (a).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6
Tex

. R. Ap p . Pro . 3 8 .1 (a).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i i

Ot h er Au t h o ri t i es Res tat em en t (Seco n d ) o f To rt s § 5 0 9

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6, 1 9 , 2 0

ixSta tem ent o f the Ca s e

Nat u re o f t h e Un d erl y i n g Cas e: S u i t f o r p e r s o n al i n

ju ri es d u e t o t h e Dav id s o ns ’ d o g at t ack i n g Bo wm an . CR 1 1 -1 6

. Tri al Co u rt : Th e 7 1 s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Harri s o n Co u n ty , T ex as , t h e

Ho n orab l e Brad M o ri n , Pres i d i n g . Di s p os i t i o n : Th e C o u r t en t ered J u d g m en t fo r t h e D av i d so n s b as ed o n t h e

J u ry ’ s fi n d i n g s . Ap p x . 1 ; 3 A C. Su p p . R. 4 -5

. Sta tem ent Reg a rdi ng Ora l Arg um ent Bo wm an bel i ev es o ral arg u m en t i s cal l ed fo r i n t h i s cas e. Th ere are n o t m an y

cas es i n Tex as wh ere s t ri ct l i ab il i t y h as b een fo un d wi t h reg ard t o d om es t i c an i m al s . Bu t t h is cas e i s u n iq ue an d fi t s s q u arel y wi t h i n t h e co m m o n l aw req ui rem en t s fo r

s t r i c t l i a bi l i t y s et o u t b y th e Tex as Su prem e Co u rt y ears ag o . Th u s , t h i s i s an i m p o rt an t c a s e w i t h reg ard t o fu t u re d o g b i t e cas es an d to t h e ju ri s pru d en ce o f t h i s St at e. Fu rt he r , i t i s i m

p os s i b l e t o i n cl u d e al l o f t h e ev id en ce p res en ted d u ri n g t h e
t h ree d ay t ri al wh i ch s u p p ort s s t ri ct l i ab il i ty i n t o t h i s Bri ef. Th u s, Bo wm an req u es t s
t h e o p po rt u n i t y to arg u e t o t he Co u rt t h e m a i n p o i n t s o f ev i d en ce wh i ch l eav e n o
q u es ti o n t h at t h e ju ry

m ad e i n co rrect fi n d in g s as t o s t ri ct l i ab i l i t y i n t hi s cas e.

1I s s ues Pres ented Fi rs t Is s u e Bo wm an was en t i t l ed t o affi rm at i ve ju ry fi nd i n g s as a m at t er o f l aw reg ard i n g t he d an g ero us p ro p en s i t i es o f t h e D av i d so n s ’ d o g a n d th e Dav i d s o n s’ k n o wl ed ge o f t h e d o g ’ s d an g ero u s p ro pen s i t i es , o r i n th e al t ern at i v e, t h e ju ry ’ s fi n d i n gs was ag ai ns t t h e g reat wei g h t an d p rep on d eran ce o f t h e ev i d en ce. Seco n dIs su e Bo wm an was en t i t l ed t o an affi rm at i v e an swer as a m at t er of l aw t h at th e d o g ’ s d an gero u s p ro p en si t i es were t h e p ro du ci n g cau s e o f Bo wm an ’ s i n ju ri es , o r i n t he al t ern at iv e, a n eg at i v e fi n d i n g wo ul d h av e b een ag ai n s t t h e g reat wei g h t an dp rep o n d eran ce o f t h e ev i d en ce.

2Sum m a ry o f the Arg um ent

St ri ct l iab i l i t y wi t h reg ard t o d o m es t i c an i m al s i s n o t a n ew co n cep t i n Tex as . Th e l aw h as l o n g been i f a d o g h as d an g ero u s p ro pen s i t i es , t h e own ers k new o r h ad

reas on t o k n o w ab o u t t h e d an g ero u s p ro p en s it ies an d t h e d o g b i t es s o m eo n e, as a

res u l t of th e d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es , t h en t he o wn e r s are l i ab l e, p eri o d. Th at i s t h e l aw i n Tex as . Th e ju ry is ch arg ed wi t h ap p l y i n g t h e fact s o f t h e s p eci fi c cas e t o t h e l aw. If th e p rep o n d e r a n ce o f t h e ev id en ce s u p po rt t h e el em en t s , t h en t h e j u ry m u s t

en t er t he fi nd i n g . Here, t h e ju ry fai l ed t o fo l lo w t h e l aw, an d t h u s , f a i l e d t o e n ter t h e co rrect fi nd i ng s . T h ere was o verwh el m i n g ev i d en ce p r e sen t ed at t ri al i n s up p o rt o f t h e Dav id s o n s ’ do g h av i n g d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es i n t h e fo rm o f t h e p ro tect i v en es s an d
ag g res s i o n t o ward s t ran g ers . Th ere was al s o ov erwh el m i n g ev i d en ce at tri al t h at t h e Dav id s o n s k new fro m earl y o n t h at Bu b b a ex h ib i t ed su ch beh av i o rs . Th e Dav i d s on s

e v en warn ed fo r s afet y of new g u es ts t o prev en t a b i t e l i k e wh at h ap p e n e d t o Bo wm an . Th e law d o es n o t re q u i r e a n act u al p ri o r b it e t o s ho w d an g ero u s
p ro p en s it i es . Yet , t here i s o n e i n t h is cas e. Fi n al l y , t h ere was o v erwh el m i n g

ev i d en ce at t ri al th at Bu b b a’ s p ro t ect i v en es s an d ag g res s i o n t o ward s t ran g ers cau s ed
Bu b b a t o b i t e Bo wm an . Des p i t e al l o f t h e o v erwh el m i n g ev i den ce, t h e j u ry ch o s e n ot
t o en t er t h e co rrect fi n d i n g . It m ay h av e b een b ecau s e t h ey j u ry s ym p at h i zed wi t h t h e

3Dav id s o n s o r d i s l ik ed Bo w m an . Th e reas o n fo r t h e ju ry ’ s fai l ure t o fo l l o w t h e l aw

i s i rrel ev an t

. Bo wm an i s n o w en t i t led t o s eek t h i s ev i d en t i ary rev i ew t o co rrect t h e

wro ng bas e d o n t h e reco rd

. Acco rd i n g l y , Bo wm an as k s t h is Co u rt t o rev i ew t h e

reco rd i n i t s en t i ret y an d rev er s e t h e j u r y’ s fi n d i ng t o Qu es ti o n N o . 1 as t o ei t h er Di an a o r J erry an d en t er an affi rm at i v e fi n d in g as t o Qu es t i o n No

. 2. 1 T h en , rem an d
t h e cau s e b ack t o t h e t ri al co u rt fo r a d et erm i nat i on as t o d am ag es al o n e.

1 The Court of Appeals can reverse the jury finding as to Diana or J erry alone and send the cause back to the trial court because either answer will lead to liability of a defendant. 4Sta nda rds o f Rev i ew

W h en a p art y h av i n g t h e b u rd en o f p ro o f ap p eal s fro m an ad v ers e fact -fi n d i n g i n t he t ri al co u rt , t h e p o i n t o f erro r s h o ul db e t h e m at t er w as es t ab li s hed as a m at t er

o f l aw o r t h at t h e ju ry ’ s fi n d i n g w as ag ai n s t t h e g reat wei g h t an d prep o n d eran ce o f
t h e ev i d en ce. Cr ou ch er

v. Cr o u ch er , 6 6 0 S.W .2 d5 5 , 5 8 (Tex

. 1 9 83 ). Th e s p eci fi c

s t an d ard s as t h ey rel at e t o leg al an d fact u al s u ffi ci en cy o f t h e ev i d en ce are s et fo rt h b el o w. A. Leg al Su ffi ci en cy

o f t h e Ev i d en ce Leg al s u ffi ci en cy p o i n ts o f erro r as s ert a co m p l et e l ack o f ev id en ce o n an i s s ue. Ra w Hi d e Oi l & G a s Co

. , In c. v. Maxu s Exp l or a t io n Co

. , 7 66 S.W .2 d 2 6 4, 2 7 5 (Tex

. Ap p . — A m ari l l o 19 8 8 , w ri t d en i ed ). L eg al s u ffi ci en cy p o i nt s are d es i g n at ed as “ n o

ev i d en ce p o i n t s ” o r “ m at t er o f l aw p o i n t s ,” d ep en d i n g u p on wh et h er t h e co m p l ai n i n g
p art y h ad t h e b u rd en o f pro of. Id

. Th e ap p ro p ri at e l eg al s u ffi ci en cy ch al l en g e h ere,

as Bo wm an h ad t h e b u rd en o f p ro o f fo r h er st ri ct l i ab i l i t y cl ai m , i s a m at t er o f l aw
p o i n t

. Ca r r a s co v. S t ewa r t , 2 2 4 S.W .3 d 3 6 3 , 3 6 7 (Tex

. Ap p . — El Pas o 2 0 0 6 , n o
p et .).
In rev i ewi n g a m at t er o f l aw p o i n t , t h e Co u rt o f Ap peal s m u s t ex am i n e t h e

en t i re reco rd fo r ev i d en ce t h at su p po rt s t h e ju ry ’ s fi n d i n g , i g n ori n g an y ev i d en ce to
t h e co n t rary . Ho l l ey v. W at t s , 62 9 S.W

. 2 d 6 9 4 , 6 9 6 (Tex . 1 9 8 2). If n o ev i d en ce to

5s u p p ort th e fi nd i n g i s fo u n d , t h e Co u rt o f Ap p e a l s m u s t t h en ex am i n e t he en t i re

reco rd ag ai n t o d et erm i n e i f a co n t rary p o s i t io n is es t ab l i sh ed as a m at t er o f l aw. Id .; Pl u mmer v. Es t a t e of Pl u mmer , 5 1 S.W .3 d 8 4 0 , 8 4 1 (Tex

. Ap p . — T ex ark an a 2 0 0 1,
p et . d en ied ).
B. Fact ual Su ffi ci en cy o f t h e Ev i d en ce Fact ual s u ffi ci en cy p o i n t s o f erro r co n ced e co n fl i ct i n g ev id en ce o n an i s s ue,
y et m ai n t ai n t h a t t h e ev i d en ce ag ai n s t t h e ju ry ’ s fi nd i n g i s so g reat as t o m ak e t h e f i nd i n g erro n eo u s
. Ra w Hi d e Oi l & G a s Co ., In c ., 7 66 S.W .2 d at 2 7 5

. F a c t u a l

s u ffi ci en cy p o i n ts o f erro r are d es i g n at ed as “ in s u ffi ci en t ev i d en ce p o in t s ” o r “ g reat wei g h t an d p rep o n deran ce p o in t s , ” d ep en di n g u p on wh et h er t h e co m p lai n in g p art y h ad t h e b u rd en of p r o o f

. Id

. Th e ap p ro p ri at e fact u al s u ffi ci en cy ch al l en g e h ere as Bo wm an h ad t h e b u rd en o f p ro o f fo r h er s t ri ct l i ab i l i t y cl ai m i s a g reat wei g h t an d
p rep o n d eran ce p o i n t

. Bea r d v. Bea r d , 4 9 S.W

. 3 d 4 0 , 5 5 (Tex

. Ap p . — W aco 2 0 0 1,
p et

. d en i ed ); M

a ch a l a v. W

eems , 5 6 S.W .3 d 7 4 8 , 7 5 4 (Tex

. Ap p . — Tex ark an a 2 0 0 1,

n o pet .). In rev i ewi n g a g reat wei g h t an d p rep on d eran ce p o i n t , t h e Co u rt o f Ap p eal s

m u st ex am i n e th e en ti re reco rd t o d et erm i n e if t h ere i s so m e ev i d en ce t o s u p p o rt t h e ju ry ’ s fi nd in g , an dt h en d et erm i n e wh et h er, i n l i g h t o f t h e en t i re reco rd , t he fi n d i n g i s m an i fes t l y u n

ju s t

. Ca i n v. Ba i n , 7 0 9 S.W .2 d 1 7 5 , 1 76 (Tex

. 1 9 8 6 ) ( p e r cu ri am );
Tr a yl o r v. Go u l di ng , 4 9 7 S.W .2 d9 4 4 , 9 45 (Tex . 1 9 7 3 ).

6Sta tem ent o f Fa cts

Th i s s u i t ari s es fro m t h e i n ju ri es Bo wm an s u ffered o n t he ev en in g o f J u n e 2 4,
2 0 1 2 as a res u l t o f D av i d s o n s ’ d o g b i t i n g h er in t h e f ace. Th e Dav i d s o n s o wn t wo Au s tral i an Bl u e Heel ers . 4 RR 8 7 : 1 9 -2 4

. Di an a acq u i red t h e d o g s , b ro th er an d s i s t er, wh en t h ey were s i x week s o l d

. 4 RR 8 8: 6 -9

. Th e d o g t h at b i t Bo wm an was h er 1 1
y ear o l dm al e Bl u e Heel er n am ed Bu b b a. A. Bu b ba Bi t a Lo n g Ti m e Fri en do f t h e Dav i d so n s Pri o r t o Bi t i n g Bo wm an Ab o ut a y ear befo re Bu b b a bi t Bo w m an , h e b i t Bi l ly St ro ng (“ St ro n g ”), a l o n g
t i m e fam i l y fri en d

. Ap p x. 3 ; 1 R. Su p p . R In d ex , Vi d eo Dep o s i ti o n of Bi l ly St ro n g ; 2
8 RR P. Ex

. 2 0

. Th e i n ci d en t o ccu rred w h en a rep ai rm an l eft h i s bag o f t o o l s i n s i d e
t h e Dav i d s o n s ’ h o m e. Ap px . 3 ; 1 R. Su p p . R In d ex , Vi d eo Dep o s i t i o n o f Bi l l y St ro n g . Di an a as k ed St ro n g t o t ak e t h e b ag o f to o l s o u ts i de t o t h e rep ai rm an b efo re h e h ad a ch an ce t o l eav e. Id

. Aft er St ro n g g rab b ed t h e t o o l b ag , he to o k o ff at a tro t
t o ward s t h e fro n t d oo r, an d Bu b b a b i t h im o n th e b ack of t h e l eg . Id

. Bu b b a h ad a h o l d o f St ro n g ’ s l e g a n d D ian a h ad t o h o ll er at Bu b b a t o t u rn St ro n g lo o se. 4 RR 9 9 : 2 4 -1 00 : 3

. Di an a w i t n es s ed t h e en t i re ev en t

. 4 RR 9 9 : 1 6 -1 9

. Sh e kn ew t h at Bu b b a l ai d h i s t eet h o n St ro n g an d t hat Bu b b a h ad l eft a red m ark an d b ru i s e o n t h e

2 F or the Court of Appeals’ convenience, in addition to citing to the video deposition included in the Reporter’s Record in the Supplemental Ex hibit I n dex , B o wman has also attached the line and pag e ex cerpt from B illy Strong ’s deposition that B owman is rely ing on and that was included in the video shown the jury in the Appellant’s Appendix , Tab 3.

7back of Strong’s leg. 4 RR 100:4-10; Appx. 3; 1 R. Supp. R. Index, Video

Deposition of Billy Strong. Although the Davidsons do not always describe the prior incident with Strong as a “bite,” Strong certainly does. Appx. 3; 1 R. Supp. RR Video Deposition of Billy Strong. He also thought the dog should have been put up after the incident whenever anyone came over to the Davidsons so it would not happen again. Appx. 3, 1 R. Supp. R. Index, Video Deposition of Billy Strong. B. Bubba Had a History of Aggressive, Protective and Possessive Behavior Bubba generally does not have a problem with people he knows. 4 RR 100:17- 20. However, he shows aggression toward strangers. 4 RR 100:21-22. Diana has known this all of Bubba’s life. 4 RR 100:23-24. Both of the Davidsons admit Bubba is aggressive, protective and possessive. 4 RR 94:17-19; 4 RR 138:20-22, 146:19-23. Bubba is just not like other dogs. 4 RR 147:23-148:1. Diana frequently uses both aggressive and protective when describing Bubba. 4 RR 93:22-94:16. Diana knows Bubba is aggressive because he barks and jumps at the fence when people come to their house. 4 RR 94:20-22. She has signs up saying beware of the dogs because she wants people to beware of them and does not want to take the chance that Bubba will hurt someone by biting them. 4 RR 94:23-95:5, 95:9-11. Bubba acts protectively when anyone, including Jerry, gets between him and Diana. 4 RR 138:12-16, 138:24- 25. Bubba is showing his protectiveness and possessiveness when he barks and pushes people away from Diana. 4 RR 139:5-7. Further, when Bubba gets between
8J erry an d Di an a, h e is ex h i b i t i n g a l o w l ev el o f ag g res si o n t o ward s J erry . 4 RR

1 3 8 : 1 2 -1 5 , 1 3 8 : 2 1 -2 5 ; 5 RR 2 8 : 7 -1 1

. T o hav e Bu bb a ex h i b i t i n g s u ch b eh av i o r
t o ward s J erry , s o m eo n e Bu b b a h as al s o b on d ed w i t h, i s a red fl ag f o r d an g ero u s b eh av i o r. 5 RR 2 8 :1 2 -1 8

. Th e Dav i d s o n s pu t Bu b b a u p w h e n c h i l d r en co m e o v er b ecau s e t h e ch i l d ren m i g h t g et b i t , 4 RR 1 0 2: 9 : 1 7 , an d t h ey pu t Bu b ba up al s o wh en
t h ere are a l arg e n u m

b er o f p eo p l e at t h ei r h om e t hat t h e d o g d o es n o t k n o w. 4 RR
1 0 3 : 1 8 -2 4 , 4 RR 1 4 0 : 1 8 -2 4 . Th ere was a p ro pen s it y fo r Bu b b a t o b e d an g ero u s . 4
RR 14 7 : 6 -2 2

. T h e Dav i d s o n s ’ fri en d s wo ul d ev en w arn n ew g u es ts ab o u t i n t eract i n g wi t h Bu b b a. 5 RR 2 4 : 2 4 -2 5 :7

. J erry t es t i fi ed t h at y o u n ev er k n o w w h a t B u b b a i s
g o i n g t o d o at an y

t i m e o r wh en h e i s g oi n g t o b l o w up . 4 RR 1 4 9 : 13 -1 4 , 1 5 0 : 3-5

. Bo wm an al s o hi red an ex p ert t o t es t i fy at t ri al i n t h i s cas e, Dr. Lo re Hau g (“ Dr.
Hau g”), wh o i s Bo ard Cert i fi ed Vet eri n ari an Beh av i o r. 5 RR 8 :2 1

. Sh e al s o recei v ed ad d it i o n al trai ni ng s p eci fi cal l y i n an i m al b eh av i o r. 5 RR 8 : 24 -2 5

. Sh e wo rk s wi th

an i m al s wi t h v ari o u s l ev el s an d s t y l es o f b eh av i o r d i s o rd ers , 5 RR 9 : 7 -8 , i n cl u d i n g d o g s wi t h ag g res si v e ten d en ci es . 5 RR 9 : 1 3 -1 5

. Al l of h er o p i n i o n s at t ri al were

o ffered b as ed o n h er trai ni n g , ed u cat i o n an d ex p eri en ce. 5 RR 9 : 2 4 -1 0 : 1

. Dr. Hau g
t es t i fi ed t h at “ p ro tect i v e” an d ‘ t erri t o ri al ” are wo rd s t h at o wn ers us e t o d es cri b e t y p es

o f ag g res s i v e b eh av i o r. 5 RR 25 : 1 3 -1 5

. In t h e v as t m ajo ri t y o f cas es , d o g s o n l y g et

wo rs e w h e n t h e o wn ers d o n o t d o an y t h i n g to s t o p ag gres s i v e t en d en ci es . 5 RR
2 5 : 1 6 -2 2. A d o g t hat i s p o s s es s i v e an d p ro t ect i v e can b e a d an g er, 5 RR 2 5 : 2 3 -2 5,
9es p eci al ly i f t h e o wn ers d o n o t h i n g t o t rai n t h e d o g . 5 RR 2 7: 1 8 -2 1

. Th e Dav i d s on s

d i d n o th i n g t o p ro p erl y t rai n Bu b b a. 4 RR 8 9: 1 4 -1 5 ; 4 RR 1 3 0: 1 7 -1 8 ; 5 RR 2 7 : 1 8

- 2 1

. Fu rt h er, t h i s p ro t ect iv e an d ag g res s iv e b eh av i o r d o es n o t fal l wi t h i n t h e ran g e o f

a t y p i cal o r n o rm al co m

p an i o n d o g . 5 RR 2 3 : 1 4-1 6

. M o reo v er, Bu b b a b i t i n g St ro n g

was n o t ap p ro p ri at e ev en fo r c at t l e h erd in g d o gs . 5 RR 29 : 13 -1 5

. W el l s o ci al i zed

an d t rai n ed d o g s k n o w t h e d i fferen ce b et ween a hu m an bei n g an d cat t l e. 5 RR 3 8 : 1 0

- 1 7

. W i th Bu b b a’ s p as t p o s s es s i v e a n d p r o t ect i v e b eh av i o rs an d t h e co n cern t h at
p ro m p t edt h e Dav i d s o n s warn i n g s , i t was o n l y a m at t er o f t i m e b efo re s o m eo n e g ot h u rt

. 5 RR 3 7 : 1 3 -1 6

. Dr. Hau g i s p os i t i v e th at t h e Dav i d s o n s reco g n i zed t h e ri s k
Bu b b a p os ed t o n ew g ues ts . 5 RR 3 9 : 1 3 -2 1

. C. Du e t o Bu b b a’ s Beh av i o r, t h e Dav i d s on s W arn ed New Gu es t s At Th ei r Ho m e No t t o In t eract W i t h Bu bb a Du e t o Bu b ba’ s ag g res s i ve n at u re, t h e Dav i d s o n s wo u l d warn gu es t s w h o were

s t ran gers t o t h e do g n o t to t o u ch o r l o o k at t h e d o g . 4 RR 9 3: 1 9 -2 5 , 9 5 : 2 1 -2 3 , 4 RR
1 3 1 : 7 -1 0. T h e warn i ng s were g i v en t o p ro t ect p eo p l e fro m a b it e. 4 RR 95 : 2 4 -9 6 : 4,
1 1 4 : 2 -4 , 4 RR 1 31 : 2 0 -2 3

. Jerry a d m i t t e d t h ey g i ve t h e w arn i n g s ab o u t Bu b b a b ecau s e t h ey k n ew th ere was a p ro p en s i t y th ere fo r Bu b b a t o b i t e. 4 RR 1 4 0 : 1 0 -1 3. Th e Dav i d s o n s h av e b een g i v i n g t hei r warn i n g ab o u t Bu b b a fo r a l o n g p eri o d o f t i m e
p ri o r to Bu b b a b i t i n g Bo wm an . 4 RR 1 0 1 : 1 0 -1 5

. Di an a ju s t di d n o t k n o w i f an d wh en Bu bb a m i g h t act o n h i s ag g res s i v e b eh av i o r. 4 RR 1 0 1 : 16 -2 3

. If i n Bu b b a’ s

10m i n d Di an a was in d an g er, Bu b b a wo u l d b eco m e ag g res s i v e. 4 RR1 3 9: 2 0 -1 4 0 : 5.

Di an a h ad reas o n t o k no w th at Bu b b a m ay be d an g ero u s b ecau s e s h e h ad reas o n t o k n o w Bu bb a m ay b i t e so m eo n e. 4 RR 1 01 : 2 4 -1 0 2 : 2

. Th e Dav i d s o n s warn ed p eo p l e
t h at cam e t o t h ei r h o m e ab o u t B u b b a b ecau s e t hey were co n cern ed t h at s o m et h i n g b ad m i gh t h ap p en . 5 RR 1 4: 2 2 -2 4

. E v ery cl i en t Dr. Hau g h as ev er h ad t h at h av e
g i v en w arn i n g s t o p eo p le ab o u t t h e i r d o g s h av e d o n e s o b ecau se t h e o w n ers h av e

s o m e k n o wl ed g e ab o u t th e d o g’ s p rev io u s b eh av i o r t h at m ak es th em co n cern ed t h at

s o m et h in g b ad i s g o i ng to h ap p en . 5 RR 1 7 : 3 -7 , 2 4 : 1 -4

. Th ere i s n o o th er reas o n to
g i v e w arn i n gs u n l es s so m et hi n g s i m i l ar h as h ap pen ed i n t he p as t. 5 RR 1 7 : 7

- 8 , 2 3 : 1 8 -2 4: 4 , 2 4 : 2 0 -2 2

. Peo p l e t h at h av e n o rm al d o g s , wi t h o ut ag g res s i v e t en d en ci es , d o n o t g i v e warn i ng s . 5 RR 1 7: 9 -1 2

. On t h e n i g h t o f t h e occu rren ce, t h e Dav i d so n s an d t h ei r g u es ts al l s at d o wn to
eat d in n er at a tab l e. Di an a l ed Bo wm an t o s i t d own at th e t ab l e ri g ht n ex t to h er. 4
RR 29 : 1 4 -2 1

. T h ere i s no d i s p u t e as t o wh ere D i an a an d Bo wm an were s it t i n g b efo re
t h e at tack . 4 RR 1 0 6 : 1 7-1 8

. Bu b b a s at o n t h e fl o or i n b et ween Di an a an d Bo wm an d u ri n g t h e d i n n er. 4 RR 3 0 : 11 -1 3

. Bu b b a al way s s at at t he t ab l e n ex t t o Di an a. 4 RR
1 0 6 : 1 9 -2 2

. Th e s eat i n g arran g em en t was cram p ed du e t o t h e n u m

b er o f g ues t s an d

ev ery o n e was s i tt i n g cl o s e t o get h er. 4 RR 3 0 : 2 5 -3 1 : 1 4 ; 5 RR 3 4 :9 -1 8

. It was n o i s y i n t h e r o o m an d Bo wm an l ean ed o v er t o ward s Di an a t o t el l h er s o m et h i n g . 4 RR

113 2 : 1 5 -1 8; 4 RR 1 08 :6 -7 , 1 1 0: 1 3 -1 6

. At t hat p oi nt , Bu b b a ju m p ed u p an d b i t Bo wm an i n t he face. 4 RR 3 3: 6 -9 ; 4 RR 1 0 8 : 4 -7

. D. Th e Laws u i t an dt h e Ap peal On Au g u s t 5 , 2 01 3 , Bo w m an fi l ed s u i t ag ai n st t h e Dav i d s o n s fo r st ri ct l i ab i l i t y

an d n eg l i g en ce i n o rd er t o reco ver fo r h er s i g n i fi can t in ju ri es cau s ed b y Bu b b a’ s b i t e. CR 1 1 -1 6

. On Sep t em

b er 30 , 2 0 1 3 , t h e D av i d s on s fi l ed an Ori g i n al An s wer. CR 5 9

- 6 3

. On Au g u s t 1 9 , 2 0 1 4 t h e p art i es wen t t o t ri al , 4 RR 6 , an d t h ree d ay s l at er t h e t ri al

co n cl u d ed wi t h t h e s ub m i s s i o n o f t h e ch arg e t o t h e ju ry . 6 RR 4 2 ; CR 1 1 9 8 -1 2 0 9. On A u gu s t 2 1 , 2 0 1 4 , t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d th ei r verd i ct an s weri n g “ no ” t o t h e fi rs t
q u es ti o n reg ard i n g s t ri ct l i ab i l it y fo r b o t h J erry an d Di an a. Ap px . 2 ; CR 1 1 9 8 -1 2 0 9. On Au g u s t 2 8 , 2 01 4 , a J ud g m en t was en t ered b y t h e Co urt

. Ap p x . 1 ; 3 A C. Su p p . R.
4 -5

. On Sep t em

b er 2 4 , 2 0 1 4 , Bo w m a n f i l ed a M o t i o n fo r New Tri al o r In t h e Al t ern at i v e, M o ti o n fo r J u d g m en t No n Ob s t an t e V erd i ct o . 2A C. Sup p . R. 4 -7

. Th e Tri al Co u rt h el d a h eari n g an d den i ed Bo wm an ’ s M o t i o n . CR 1 43 0

. On No v em b er 2 4 , 2 0 1 4, Bo wm an fi l ed her No t i ce o f Ap p eal

. CR 1 4 3 3 -1 43 4

. No w, Bo wm an s eek s

rev i ew w i t h t h is Co u rt o f t he j u ry ’ s fi n d i n g s reg ard in g d an g ero u s pro p en si t i es an d
p ro d uci n g cau s e.

12A rg um ents a nd Autho ri ti es Fi rs t Is s u e (Res t at ed )
Bo wm an was en t i t l ed t o affi rm at i ve ju ry fi nd i n g s as a m at t er o f l aw r e g ard i n g t he d an g ero u s p ro p en s it i es o f t h e Dav i d s o n s ’ d og an d t h e Dav i d s o n s’ k n o wl ed ge o f t h e d o g ’s d an g ero u s p ro pen s i t i es , o r i n th e al t ern a t i v e, t h e ju ry ’ s fi n d i n g s were ag ai n s t t h e g reat wei g ht an d p rep on d eran ce o f t h e ev i d en ce. A. St ri ct Li ab i l it y

Cl ai m s In v o l v i ng a Do m es t i c Do g In Tex as , as i n m an y s tat es , i t h as l o n g b een es t a b l i s h ed th at act i o n s fo r d am ag es cau s ed by v i ci o u s d o m es t i c an i m al s are g o v ern ed b y p ri n ci p l es o f s t ri ct l i ab i l i t y . Ma r

s h a l l v. Ra n n e , 5 1 1 S.W .2 d 2 5 5 , 2 5 8 (Tex

. 1 9 7 4 ). Th e el em en t s o f a

s t ri ct l i ab i l i t y cl ai m in v o l v in g a d o g are: (1 ) t h e d efen d an t o wn ed o r p o ss es s ed t h e d o g ; (2 ) t h e d o g had d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es ab n o rm al t o i t s cl as s ; (3 ) t he o wn er k n ew

o r h ad reas o n t o k n o w t h e d o g h ad d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es ; an d (4 ) t h e d o g ’ s d an gero us p ro p en s i t i es w ere t h e p ro d u c i n g c a u s e o f t h e p lai n t i ff’ s i n ju ri es . Id.; Th o mp so n v. Cu r t is , 12 7 S.W .3 d 4 4 6, 4 5 1 (Tex

. Ap p . — Dal l as 20 0 4 , n o p et .); Al l en

ex r el

. B.A. v. Al b i n , 9 7 S.W .3 d 6 5 5, 6 6 0 (Tex

. Ap p . — W aco 2 0 0 2 , n o p et .); Owen s

v
. Co u r y , 6 1 4 S.W .2 d 9 2 6 , 9 2 8 (Tex

. Ap p . — Am ari l l o 1 9 8 1 , no wri t ); W el l s v
. Bu r ns , 4 80 S.W .2 d 31 , 3 3 (Tex

. Ci v . Ap p . — El Pas o 19 7 2 , n o wri t ). Th e fi rs t el em en t o f a s t ri ct l i ab il it y cl ai m was n o t at i ss u e i n t h i s cas e i n t h a t t h e Dav i d s on s

13read i l y ad m i t t h ey o wn Bu b b a, t h e d o g th at b i t Bo w m a n . 4 RR 8 7 : 1 9 -2 2 ; 4 RR

1 3 0 : 1 1 -1 4

. 1

. Th e Seco nd El em en t o f Dan g ero u s Pro p en s i t i es W i t h reg ard t o t h e s eco n d el em en t , t h e p l ai n t i ff m us t p ro v e d a n g ero u s
p ro p en s it i es ab n o rm al t o o t h er d o g s . Des pi t e t h e Tex as Su p rem e Co u rt ’ s lo n g ag o

reco g n it i o n o f s t ri ct l i ab i l it y as s et fo rt h in th e Res t at em en t , t h ere are n o t m an y Tex as

cas es wh ere t h e el em en ts o f s t ri ct l i ab i l i t y are d is cu s s ed . Th us , i t i s h el p fu l t o l o o k
t o o t h er s t at es Su p rem e Co u rt s t h a t ad o p t ed t h e Res t at em en t el em en t s fo r t h ei r

ex p lan at i o n as t o t h e el em en t s as wel l as t h e Tex as cas es th at hav e d i s cu s s ed t h e el em en t s . Gen er a l l y , al l d o gs , reg ard les s o f b reed an d s i ze, are p res u m ed t o b e h arm l es s d o m es t i c an im al s . Po z n a n s ki ex r el Po z n an s ki v. H o r va th , 7 8 8 N.E.2 d
1 2 5 5 , 1 2 5 8 (In d

. 2 0 0 3 ); Ap p x. 5

. 3 Th e g reat m ajo ri t y o f d o g s are reg ard ed as fri en d s

an d co m p an i o n s o f m an . Res t at em en t (Seco n d ) of To rt s § 5 0 9 cmt

. f. (ad o p ted b y t h e Tex as Sup rem e Co u rt i n Ma r s h a l l , 5 1 1 S.W .2 d at 2 5 8 ); Ap px . 8

. T h ey are h arm l es s

an d i f a d o g is i n t he po ss es s i on o f ch aract eri s t ics d an g ero u s t o m an k i n d , it s h o u l d b e
reg ard ed as ab no rm al

. Id

. Al t h ou g h t he m ajo ri t y o f d o gs are h arm l es s , an o wn er h as a ri g h t t o k e e p a

v i ci o u s d o g fo r t h e n eces s ary p ro t ect i o n o f l i fe an d p ro p ert y , p ro v i d ed t h at t h e o wn er

3 The out of state cases are included in the Appellant’s Appendix for the Court of Appeal’s convenience. 14t ak es p ro p er p recau ti o n s t o p recl u d e t h at v i ci o u s n es s fro m ex h i bi t in g i t s el f. Dea r d o f f
v. Bu r g er , 6 0 6 A.2 d4 8 9 , 4 9 2 (Pa. 1 99 2 ); Ap px . 6

. Tex as co u rt s h av e prev i o u s l y h el d “ d an g ero u s p ro pen s i t i es ” m e a n s t h e d o g

m u st hav e h ad v ici o u s , d an g ero us o r m is ch i ev ou s p ro p en s i t i es . Vi l l a r ea l v. E l i z o n d o , 8 3 1 S.W .2 d 4 7 4 , 4 7 7 (Tex

. Ap p . — Co rp u s Ch ri s t i 1 9 9 2 , n o wri t ); Owen s , 6 1 4 S.W .2 d at 9 2 8 ; W

el l s , 4 8 0 S.W .2 d at 3 3

. Th i s el em en t ad d res s es d o gs t h at are v i ci ou s

as w el l as an im al s t h at are n ot v i ci o u s , b u t h av e a dan g ero u s t en den cy t h at i s u n u s u al

an d n o t n e c e s s ary fo r t h e p u rp o s es fo r wh i ch s u ch an i m al s are u su al l y k ep t

. Res tat em en t (Seco n d ) o f To rt s § 5 0 9 cmt

. c.; s ee a l s o Fa r ley v. M.M. Ca t t l e Co

. , 5 4 9 S.W .2 d 4 5 3 , 45 6 (Tex

. Ci v . Ap p . — Wa co 19 7 7 , wri t ref’ d n .r.e.). Fu rt h er, t h e

an i m al ’ s “ cl as s ” i s n o t l i m i t ed t o a s p eci fi c b reed o f th at an im al

. D u n n i n g s v. Ca s tr o , 8 8 1 S.W .2 d 5 59 , 5 6 1 (Tex

. Ap p . — Ho us t o n [1 s t Di s t

. ] 1 9 9 4, wri t d en i ed ) (n o

ev i d en ce s u g g es t i n g W ei m aran er h ad d an g e ro u s p ro pen si ti es t hat were ab n o rm al

co m p ared t o o t h er d o g s ). Th u s , b eh av i o rs t h at are n o t us u al t o d o g s i n g en eral an d
t h at cau s e a co n cern fo r t he s afet y o f o t h ers i s a d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t y . Ot h er s t at es h av e g i v en a l i t t l e m ore g u id an ce as t o “ d an g ero u s t en den ci es .”
A d an g ero u s t en den cy h as b een d efi n ed b y t h e In d i an a Su p rem e Co u rt as “ a t en d en cy

o f t h e an im al t o d o an y act t h at m i g h t en d an g er th e safet y o f p ers o n s o r p ro p ert y in

a g i v e n s i t u at i o n.” Po z n a ns ki , 7 8 8 N.E.2 d at 1 2 5 8 ; Ap p x . 5

. A d o g can ev en b e fo u n d t o h av e d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es b as ed o n t he b it e t h a t i s th e b as i s o f t h e s u i t

. 15Id

. An u n p ro v o ked , i n t en t i o n al b i t e t h at i s n o t cl as s i fi ed as a p l ay fu l n i b b le, ev en i f

i t i s t he fi rs t b i t e, s ho ws a d an gero us pro p en s i t y . Id

. Bark in g an d ju m pi n g at s t ran g ers

as wel l as a p ri o r b i t e h as b een f o u n d s u f fi ci en t i n o t h er s t at es to s h o w a d o g h as

v i ci o u s t en d en ci es an d t o h o l d t h e d e f e n d an t s t ri ct l y l i ab l e. Ro b i n s o n v. Ma r i n o , 3
W as h . 4 3 4 , 2 8 P. 7 5 2 , 7 5 3 (1 8 9 2 ); Ap p x . 7

. 2

. Th e Th i rd El em en t Req u i ri n g t h e Own er’ s Kn o wl ed ge Th e t h i rd el em en t req u i res t h e p l ai n t iff t o pro v e t he o wn er kn ew o r h ad reas o n
t o k n o w th e d o g h ad d an g ero u s p ro p en s it i es . It i s n o t neces s ary t o t h e ap p l i cat i o n o f

s t ri ct li ab i l i t y fo r t h e o wn er o f th e d o g t o k n o w o f i t s ab n o rm al l y d an g ero u s
p ro p en s it i es . Res t at em en t (Seco n d) o f T ort s § 5 09 cm t

. g; Ap p x . 8. It i s en o u g h t h at h e h av e reas on t o k no w th ereo f. Id

. Th us , i t i s n o t ev en n eces s ary fo r t h e o wn er to k n o w o f a p ri o r at tack o n h u m an s . Id

. A d o g i s n o lo n ger reg ard ed as en t it l ed t o o n e b i t e. Id

. It i s en ou g h t hat th e o wn er k n o ws t h at t h e d o g o n o t h er o ccas io n s ex h i b i t ed

s u ch a t en d en cy t o at t ack h u m an s o r o t h er an i m al s o r o t h erwi s e do h arm a s s h o u l d
ap p ri s e h i m o f i t s d an g ero u s ch aract er. Id

. Th e k n o w l ed g e el em en t m ay b e fu l fi l l ed wi t h ev i den ce o f ei t her act u al o r co n s t ru ct i v e kn o wl ed g e. S ee Bel ger v. S ween ey , 8 3 6 S .W. 2 d 7 5 2 , 7 5 4 (Tex

. Ap p . — Ho u s t on [1 s t Di s t .] 1 99 2 , wri t d en i ed ). Th e term

“ reas o n t o k n o w” m ean s i n fo rm at i o n fro m w h i ch a reas o nab l y i n t el l i g en t p ers o n

wo u l d i n fer t h at t h e an i m al h as d an g ero u s p ro pen s i t i es . Ma r s h a l l , 5 1 1 S.W .2 d at 2 5 8 -5 9

. 16B. Th e Reco rd Co n t ai n s On l y A ffi rm at i v e Ev id en ce o f Bu b b a’ s D an g ero u s

Pro p en s i t i es an dt h e Dav i d s o n s ’ Kn o wl ed g e o f t h e Dan g ero u s Pro p en s i t i es A rev i ew o f t he reco rd dem o n s t rat es t h at t h ere i s n o ev id en ce t o s u p p ort Bu b b a d i d n o t h av e d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t ies n o r is t h ere ev i d en ce t h at t h e D av i d s o n s d i d n ot k n o w o r h av e reas o n t o kn o w o f Bu bb a’ s dan g ero u s p ro p en si ti es . F u r t h er, t h e

co n vers e i s t ru e, Bo wm an p res en t ed a g reat d eal o f ev id en ce i n s up p o rt of Bu b b a’ s d an gero us p ro p en s i t ies an d t h e Dav i d s o n s’ k n owl ed g e. T h e p a rt i es s ub m i t t ed t h e

s eco n d an d t h i r d s t ri ct l i ab i l i t y el em en t s t o g et her i n t h e fo l l o wi n g q ues t i o n an d i n s t ru ct i o n t o t h e ju ry in t h e Co u rt ’ s Ch arg e: Qu es t i o n No . 1 On t h e o ccas i o n i n q u es ti o n , d i d t h e D av i d so n s k n o w o r hav e reas o n t o k n o w t h at t h ei r d o g h ad d an g ero u s p ro pen s i t i es n ot n o rm al fo r a d og .

“ Reas on t o k no w” m ean s t h e act o r has i n fo rm at i on fro m wh i ch a p ers o n o f reas o n ab l e i nt el l i g en ce wo u l d i n fer t h at th e fact i n q u es t i o n ex i s t s, o r t h at s u c h p e r s o n wo u ld go v ern h i s co n d u ct u n d er th e as s u m p t i o n t hat s u ch fact ex i st s . It i s en o u g h th at t h e po s s es s o r o f t h e an i m al k n o ws t h at i t h ad o n o t h er o ccas i o n s ex h i b i ted s u ch a t en d en cy t o at t ack h u m an b ei n gs o r o t h er an i m al s o r o t h erwi s e do h arm as s h o ul d ap p ri s e hi m o f it s d an g ero u s ch aract er. Th u s, t he fact t h at a d o g h as t o h i s k no wl ed g e u n s u cces s fu l l y at t em pt ed t o at t ack h u m an b ei n g s o r an i m al s i s s u f fi ci en t t o bri n g i t s p o s s es so r wi t h i n k n o wl ed g e req u i rem en t

. Su ffi ci en t al s o i s an y fo rm o f i l l t em p er d i s p l ay ed i n t h e p res en ce o f m an o r b eas t wh i ch wo ul d ap p ri s e a reas on ab l e m an th at an i m al i f un co n t ro l l ed wo u l d m ak e su ch an at t ack

.

“ Dan g ero u s pro pen s i t i es ” m ean s v ici o us o r ag g res s i v e t en d en ci es t hat are n o t n o rm al fo r a d o g .

17An s wer “ Yes ” o r “ No ”.
An s wer: J erry Dav i ds o n An s wer: Di an a Dav i d s o n Ap p x . 2 ; CR 1 2 0 1. Th e ju ry an s wered “No ” t o b o t h J erryan d Di an a. Id

. 1

. Th ere i s N o o r Li t tl e Ev i d en ce t o Su p p ort Bu b ba Di d No t Hav e Dan g ero u s Pro p en s i t i es an dAffi rm at i v e Ev i d en ce t o Su p p o rt He Di d
A rev i ew o f t h e en t i re reco rd d em on s trat es th at t h ere w as n o ev id en ce to

s u p p ort t h e ju ry ’ s fi n d i n gs . Th e Dav i d s o n s o ffered n o ev i d en ce t o p ro v e Bu b b a’ s
p ro t ect i v en es s was n o rm al to al l d o g s, t h at Bu b b a was n o t u n us u al wi t h reg ard t o h i s b eh av i o r aro u n d s t ran g ers o r Di an a, o r t h at wh en Bu b b a at t ack ed Bo wm an i t was n ot

an ag gres s i v e o r d an g ero u s b eh av i o r. Fu rt her, a s eco n d rev i ew o f t h e reco rd rev eal s s i g n i fi can t ev i d en ce t o s h o w Bu b b a h a d d a n g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es . Th ere are n o Tex as cas es t h at h ol d t h e b i t e at i s su e can n o t b e co n s i d ered t o d et erm i n e wh et h er t h e an i m al h as d a n g ero u s
p ro p en s it i es . Bu b ba ex h i b i t ed a d an gero u s p ro p en s i t y b y v i ci o u sl y at t a c k i n g Bo wm an wi t h ou t an y p ro v o cat i o n cau si ng h er s ev e r e i n j u r i e s t o h er face. 4 RR 3 2 : 1 1 -2 2

. B u b b a m ad e n o n oi s e o r warn i n g b efo re he ju m p ed u p an d at t ack ed
Bo wm an . 4 RR 3 2 : 2 4-3 3: 6

. Th e Dav i d s o ns d o n o t d en y t h e at t ack n o r do t h ey d en y
t h e b i t e cau s ed Bo wm an s ev ere i n ju ri es . Di an a wi t n es s ed th e at t ack

. 4 RR 3 3 : 1 3 -2 4.

18Further, the Davidsons did not try to explain the bite as playful or something other

than a vicious attack meant to injure Bowman. Additionally, both Diana and Jerry described dangerous propensities in Bubba at trial. A “dangerous propensity” would include a prior bite of a human being. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 cmt. c. Billy Strong described the prior incident to the jury through his deposition testimony as a bite. Billy Strong: Q: Had Bubba bitten people, anybody before [Bowman] that you were aware of? A: Yes. Q: Who? A: Me. App x. 3 ; 1 Sup. RR Video Deposition of Billy Strong. Further, Diana and Jerry admitted that they knew Bubba bit Strong a year before the attack on Bowman. Diana Davidson: Q: And I believe when Billy Strong got bit that you saw the bite. When Billy Strong got bit did you see the incident? A: I did. 4 RR 99:16-19. Q: So he had a hold of him at the pants leg? A: Yes. Q: And you know that it left a bruises? A: Yes. Q:So you agree that the dog laid teeth on Mr. Strong, a human being? A: I do know this, yes.
19Q: An dy ou s aw i t ?

A: I d i d

. 4 RR 1 0 0 : 2 -1 0

. J erry al s o ad m i tt ed k n o wi n g t h at Bu bb a cau s ed a red m ar k o n St ro n g ’ s l eg . 4 RR 1 46 : 1 9 -2 3

. Ev en wi t h cat t l e d o g i n s t i n ct s , Bl u e Heel ers s h o u ld k n o w t h e d i fferen ce b et ween a co w an d a h u m an b ei n g . 5 RR 3 8 : 1 0-1 7 . Th ere are

n o T ex as cas es affi rm i ng a fi n d i n g o f n o s tri ct l i ab i l i t y wh en t h ere was an ad m i s s i o n

o f a p ri or b i t e. If Bu b b a’ s bi t e t h at i s at i s s ue i n t hi s cas e o r h i s p ri or b i t e were n o t en o u g h,
t h en Di an a an d J erry ’ s t es t i m o n y re g a r d i n g hi s p ro t ect i v en es s o f Di an a an d
ag g res s i v en es s t oward s s t ran g ers d em o n s t rat ed d an g ero u s pro p en s i t i es . “ D an g ero u s
p ro p en s it i es ” al s o m ean dan g ero u s t en d en ci es t h at are un u su al an d n o t n eces s ary fo r
t h e pu rp o s es fo r wh i ch d o g s are u s ual l y k ep t

. S ee Res t at em en t (Seco n d ) o f To rt s , §
5 0 9 cmt

. c; Ap p x . 8

. Th e Dav i d s o n s ad m i t Bu b b a h ad a d an g ero u s t en d en cy t o b e
ag g res s i v e, p ro t ect iv e an d p o s ses s i v e t hat was n o t l ik e o t h er d o g s. 4 RR 9 4 : 1 7 -1 9,
1 4 6 : 1 1 -1 8

. He wa s p r o t e c t i v e o f D i an a, 4 RR 9 3 : 2 2-2 5 , an d Bu b b a h ad a p ro b l em wi t h s t ran g ers al l o f h i s l i fe. 4 RR 1 0 0: 2 1 -2 4

. Di an a Dav i d s o n : Q: An dd i d y o u al s o t el l h er [Bo wm an ] t h at t he d o g was ag g res s i v e? A: I t h i n k , I d o n ’ t k n ow wh et h er I s ai dag gres s i v e o r p ro tect i v e. He i s v ery p ro t ect i ve o f m e. 4 RR 9 3 : 2 2 -2 5

20Q: I as k ed y o u a q u es t i on ri g h t h ere o n Li n e 2 0

. M y q u es t i o n was , o k ay ,

wh at d o y o u m ean b y

aware o f d o g s . Wh at was y o ur an s wer? A: Th e d o g i s ag g res si v e, y o u k n o w, i f h e d o es n ’ t k n o w s o m eo n e. 4 RR 9 4 : 7 -1 1 Q: Yo u s ai dwas p ro tect i v e al s o ? A: He i s . Q: So we h av e ag gres s i v e, p ro t ect i v e, an dp o ss es s i v e; i s t h at co rrect ? A: Yes

. 4 RR 9 4 : 1 5 -1 9

. W h en Bo wm an ’ s co u n s el as k ed Di an a wh y s h e d es cri b ed Bu b b a as
ag g res s i v e, s he s ai d : A: He i s v ery v erb al wh en s t ran gers co m e u p . He b ark s , ju m p s at t h e fen ce, h e g i v es u s t h e i nd i cat io n t hat , y o u k n o w, h e t el l s u s t h at s o m eo n e i s th ere an d al l

. So I hav e si g ns o u t say i n g b eware o f t h e d o g s , b ecau s e I wan t t h em t o b e aware o f t h em . He h as n ev er b i t t en an y b o d y , bu t I ju s t d i d n ’ t wan t t o t ak e th e ch an ce, b ecau s e h e d o es b ark an dju m p at t he fen ce wh en s o m e s t ran g er co m es up . Q: W h at ch an ce d o n’ t y o u wan t t o t ak e? A: I d o n’ t wan t t o t ak e an y ch an ces o f an y

o f o u r an i m al s h u rt i n g an y b o d y . 4 RR 9 4: 2 1 -9 5: 5. Q: Is i t fai r t o s ay y o u d i d n ’ t wan t t o t ak e t h e ch an ce o f t h e d o g b i t i n g s o m eb o dy ? A: Th at i s ri g h t

. 4 RR 9 5 : 9 -1 1

. Al th o u g h Jerry t es t i fi ed th at Bu bb a was n o t d an g ero u s , t h e q u es t i o n i s d a n g e r o us p ro p en si t i es o r t en d en ci es . In o t h er wo rd s , a p ro p en s i t y o r n at u ra l i n cl i n at i o n t o act d an g ero us . J erry s t at ed t h e fo l l owi n g at t ri al i n s u p p ort o f Bu b b a h av in g “ d an g ero u s p ro p en si t i es ”:

21J erryDav i d so n:

Q: So , I real i ze y o u r p o s i t i o n i s t h att h e d o g i s n o t d an gero u s , co rrect ? A: Ri g h t

. Q: Bu t y o u can ’ t s ay t h at al l y o u r, y o u r warn i n gs al l were t h ere fo r t h ere was t h i s p ro p en si t y f

o r d an g er, co rrect ? Th at i s d ifferen t fro m b ei n g d an g ero u s . A: Ri g h t

. Q: Th ere was a p ro p en s i t y t h ere; co rrect ? A: Co rrect

. 4 RR 1 4 7 : 6 -1 4

. Fu rt h e r , J e r r y t es t i fi ed th at Bu b b a was v ery p ro tect i v e o f Di an a, 4
RR 1 3 0 : 22 -1 3 1 : 6 , 1 3 8 : 2 1 -2 5 , an d h ad a cl ear d is l ik e o f s t ran g ers . 4 RR 1 3 6 : 1 6 -2 0.
J erry ad m i t t ed Bu b ba wo u l d bark an d p u s h h i m away fro m Di an a wh en t h ey d an ced

a n d Bu bb a wo ul d do t h e sam e t o an y o n e el s e t h at t ri ed t o get b et ween t h e d o g a n d Di an a. 4 RR 1 38 : 2 1 -2 5 , 1 3 9: 5

- 7

. J e r r y ev en ad m i t s s o m eo n e l ean i n g i n t o ward Di an a wo u l d b e a t h reat t o t h e d o g . 4 RR 1 4 0 : 3 -5 . Dr. Hau g t es t i fi ed t h at b ark i n g, ju m p i n g an d p us h i n g b et ween J erry an d Di an a i s a l o w lev el ag g res s i o n t h at i s a red fl ag . 5 RR 2 8 :7 -1 8

. If Bu b b a wo u l d act t h at way t o wa r d s J erry , Bu b b a wo u l d n ot h es i t at e t o be m ore ag g res s i v e wi t h a s t ran g er. Fu rt h er, Jerry ad m i ts t hat Bu b b a was d i fferen t i n t h at way

fro m o t h er d og s , 4 RR 1 4 7: 2 3 -1 4 8 : 1

. Las t ly , wh et h er y o u u s e t h e wo rd pro t ect i v e, p o s s es s i ve or ag gres s i v e, Bu b b a

ex h ib i t ed d an g ero u s b eh av i o rs t h at cau s ed th e Dav i d s on s t o warn al l n ew g ues t s n ot
t o i n t eract wi t h Bu bb a fo r fear t h at h e w o u l d b e p ro t ect i v e o f Di an a an d b it e t h em .

224 RR 95 : 1 3 -1 4 , 9 5 : 2 1 -2 5 ; 4 RR 1 3 1 : 1 2 -1 5 , 1 3 1 : 2 0 -2 3

. Th e Dav i d s on s h ad b een

g i v i n g t h e warn in g ab o u t Bu b ba fo r a l on g t i m e b efo re Bu b b a bi t Bo wm an . 4 RR
1 0 1 : 6 -1 5. Fu rt h er, n o t o n l y d i d t h e Dav i d s o n s warn p eo p le, b ut t h ei r fri en d s wo u ld

ev en warn n ew gu es t s ab o u t Bu b b a. 5 RR 2 4 : 2 4 -2 5 : 7

. J erry ad m i ts t h at Bu b b a was
p ro t ect i v e i n t h at h e w o ul ds t an dh i s g ro u n d w i t h Di an a an d t h at i s al so wh y Di an a
g av e t h e warn i n g s . 4 RR 13 0 : 2 2 -1 3 1 : 1 0. Pro t ect iv e an d p o s s es s iv e b eh av i o r
g en eral l y ju s t get s w o rs e an d wo rs e o v er t i m e i f n ot fo rm al ly co rrect ed

. 5 RR 2 5 : 1 6

- 2 2

. So , i f n ot co rrect ed , p ro t ect iv en es s an d p os s es si v en es s b eco m es dan gero u s . 5 RR
2 5 : 2 3 -2 5. Th e Dav i ds o ns d i d n o t ev er co rrect Bu b b a’ s b eh av i o r. 4 RR 8 9 : 1 4 -1 5;
4 RR 1 30 : 1 7 -1 8 ; 5 RR 27 : 1 8 -2 1

. Bu b b a’ s b eh av i o r d i d n o t fi t wi th i n t h e b eh av i o r o f wh at i s accep t ab l e o f a t y

p i cal o r n o rm al d o g . 5 RR 23 : 1 4 -1 6

. Di an a h ers el f ad m i t t ed

s h e h ad reas o n t o k n o w t he d o g m i g h t b i t e s o m eb o d y an d th at w as reas o n t o k n o w h e [Bu bb a] m ig h t b e d an g ero u s . 4 RR 1 0 1 : 2 4 -1 0 2 :2

. Th e Dav i d s on s al s o t es t i fi ed as fo l l o w s : Di an a Dav i d s o n : Q: Is i t fai r t o s ay y o u d i d n ’ t wan t t o t ak e a ch an ce o f th e d o g b i t i n g s o m eb o dy ? A: Th at i s ri g h t

. Q: Th at i s wh y

y o u warn t h em ? A: I warn ed th em , y es , b ecau s e h e is v ery p ro t ect i v e o f m e an d h e d o es - - h e, i f h e d o es n ’ t k n ow s o m eo ne h e b ark s at t h em . 4 RR 9 5: 9 -1 5

. 23Q: So t h e cau s e o f y o u r warn i n g s i s h i m b ei ng ag g res s i v e?

A: Yes Q: Yo u r wan t i n g t o av o i da b i t e; co rrect ? A: Yes

. 4 RR 9 5: 2 1 -2 5.
J erryDav i ds o n : Q: Do y o u b el i ev e h e wo u l d b e ag gres s i v e i f h e, t h e do g , t ho u g h t Di an a was i n d an ger? Y: Yes

. 4 RR 1 39 : 2 0 -2 2

. Q: Ok ay . W el l , th at i s wh y y o u g i v e t h e warn i n g s i s b ecau s e y ou k new t h e p ro p en s i t y was t h ere fo r i t [t he b i t e] t o h ap pen ? A: Yes , t h at i s t h e reas o n t h at t h ey g i v e t h e warn i ng . 4 RR 1 40 : 1 0 -1 3

. Q: Th ere was a p ro p en s i t y t h ere; co rrect ? A: Co rrect

. Q: Ok ay . An dy o u k n ew t h at ? A: W el l, l i k e I s ay , I d i d n ’ t g iv e t h e warn i n g? Q: Th at was t h e reas o n , t h at was t h e reas on fo r t h e warn i n g? A: Th at was t h e reas o n m y wi fe g av e t he warn in g . Q: Becau se o f t h e p ro p en s i t y fo r d an ger? A: Ri g h t

. 4 RR 1 4 7 : 1 3 -2 2

. A cco rd i n g ly , t h e Dav i d s o n s ’ o wn tes t im o n y d em on s trat es t h at t h ey
g av e t h e warn i ng s t o n ew g u es t s b ecau s e o f Bu b b a’ s p ro t ect i v e an d ag g re s s i v e

24t en d en ci es an d b ec au se t hey w ere afrai d Bu b b a w o u ld b i t e s o m eo ne i f t h ey d id

i n t eract wi t h t h e d o g . 2

. No o r Li t t l e Ev i den ce t o Su p p o rt t he Dav i d s on s Di d No t Kn o w o r Di d No t Hav e Reas on t o Kn o w Bu b ba Had Dan g ero u s Pro p en s it i es an d Affi rm at i v e Ev i den ce t o Su p p o rt Th ey Di d Hav e Kn o wl ed g e Nex t , t h e reco rd rev eal s t h at th e Dav i d s on s cl earl y k n ew o r h ad reas o n t o k n o w

o f Bu b b a’ s d an g ero u s p ro p en s it i es . Fi rs t , t h e Dav i ds o ns were aware o f Bu b b a’ s p ri o r b i t e. Di an a wi tn es s ed Bu b b a b it e St ro n g . 4 RR 9 9 :2 4 -1 00 : 3. Sh e h ad t o cal l t h e d o g

o ff St ro n g t o g et h i m t o l et g o of St ro n g ’ s l eg . 4 RR 9 9 :2 4 -1 00 : 3

. Di an a k n ew t h at Bu b b a b i t o r n i p p ed St ro n g an d l eft a b ru i s e on h i s l eg . 4 R R 1 0 0 : 4-1 0

. J erry al s o k n ew ab o u t t h e p ri o r b i t e. 4 RR 1 4 6 : 1 9 -2 3

. Seco n d , b o t h Di an a an d J erry ad m i t t h ey warn ed n ew p eo p l e t o s t ay away fro m Bu b b a b ecau s e th ey were afrai d Bu b b a wo u l d b i t e s o m eo n e. 4 RR 9 5 : 2 1 -2 5 , 1 0 1 : 2 4

- 1 0 2 : 2 , 1 1 4 : 2 -4 ; 4 RR 1 3 1 : 1 2 -1 5 , 1 3 1 : 2 0 -2 3

. Dr. Hau g t es t i fi ed t hat ev ery cl i en t s h e h as h ad th at g av e warn i n g s ab o u t t h ei r d o g d id s o b ecau s e t hey h ad s o m e k n o wl ed g e ab o ut t h e d o g ’ s p rev i o u s b eh av i o r t h at m ad e t h em co n cern ed t hat s om et h i n g b ad was
g o i n g t o h ap p en . 5 RR 1 7 :3 -7

. Peo p le g iv e w arn i n g s ab o u t th ei r d o g s b ecau s e t h e d o g ’ s b eh av io r co n cern s t h em . 5 RR 1 7 -1 2-1 4

. Dr. Hau g was p os i t i v e t h at t h e Dav id s o n s reco gn i zed t he ri s k Bu b b a p o s ed

. 5 RR 3 9 : 1 0-2 1

. Ag ai n , th e Dav i d s on s d i dn o t refu t e o r co nt rad i ct Dr. Hau g ’ s t es t i m o n y .

25Th i rd , b ot h D i a n a a n d J e rry d es cri be Bu b b a as p ro t ect i v e o f Di an a an d as

d i s l i k in g s t ran gers . Bo t h Di an a an d J erry rep eat ed l y d es cri b e Bu b b a as ag g res s i ve,
p ro t ect i v e an d po s s es s i v e at d i fferen t p oi n t s d u ri n g t h ei r t ri al t es ti m o n y . 4 RR 9 4 : 1 7

- 1 9 ; 4 RR 1 3 8: 2 0 -2 2

. Di an a ad m i ts Bu b ba was t h at way al l o f hi s l i fe. 4 RR 1 0 0 -2 3

- 2 4

. Fu rt h er, J erry ad m i t s t h at Bu b b a act s ag g res s i v e b y b ark i ng an d p u s h i n g an y o n e
t h at g et s t o o cl o s e t o Di an a. 4 RR 13 8 : 12 -1 5 , 2 1 -2 5

. H e h ad k n o wn ab o u t t h i s b eh av i o r fo r a l o n g t i m e. 4 RR 1 3 9: 1 -4

. Fu rt h er, h e un d ers to o d t h e b eh av io r was a
p art o f Bu b b a b ei n g p ro t ect iv e o f D i an a. 4 RR 1 3 9 : 5 -7

. Di an a h ers el f ad m i t t ed s h e h ad reas o n t o kn o w t h e d og m i g h t b i te s o m e b o d y an d t h at was reas o n t o k n o w h e [Bu bb a] m ig h t b e d an g ero u s . 4 RR 1 0 1 : 2 4 -1 0 2 : 2

. A p ri o r b i t e i s n ot req ui redt o s h o w d an g ero u s p ro pen s i ti es . Th e Dav i d s o n s ’
t es t i m o ny at t ri al s eem ed t o s u g g es t t h at wh en Bu b b a bi t St ro n g i t was a p l ay fu l b i t e. 4 RR 9 6 : 1 3 -2 1

. Th erefo re, t he p ri o r b i t e d o es n o t co u n t an d i s i rrel ev an t. Bu t ev en i f t h e Co u rt bel i ev es t h i s t o be tru e, i t d oes n o t ch an g e t h e Dav i d s o n s o wn t es t i m o ny
reg ard i n g Bu b b a’ s ag g res s i v en es s t o ward s t ran g ers an d p ro t ect i v en es s o f Di an a. 4
RR 9 5 : 9 -1 3 ; 4 RR 1 30 : 2 2 -1 3 1 : 6 , 1 3 6 : 1 6 -2 0, 1 38 : 21 -2 5 , 1 3 9 : 1 -7

. Th es e are d an ger o u s p r o p en s i t i es an d t h e Dav i d s on s were w el l aware o f t h em p ri or t o Bu b b a b i t i n g Bo wm an . M o s t, i f n o t al l , o f t h e Dav i d s o n s ’ t es t i m o n y ev i d en ci n g k n o wl ed ge o f Bu b b a’ s d an gero us p ro p en s i t i es was s o l i ci t ed d u ri n g Bo w m an ’ s cas e i n ch i ef w h en t h e 26Dav id s o n s were c a l l ed as ad v ers e wi t n es ses . If t h ei r t es ti m o n y h ad b een an y t h i n g

o t h er t h an co nci s e, cl ear an d co ncl u s i v e, t h e y c o u l d h av e co rrect ed th ei r o wn
t es t i m o ny d u ri n g th e Dav id so n s’ cas e i n ch i ef. Ho wev er, i n Dav i d s o n s ’ cas e i n ch i ef,

o n l y Di an a t es t i fi ed (J erryd id n o t ). In fact , t h e o n l y q u es t i o n as k ed o f Di an a wh en

s h e t es t i fi ed i n h er o wn cas e i n ch i ef b y Bo wm an ’ s co u n s el was : Di an a Dav i d s o n : Q: M rs . Dav i d so n , are y o u reca n t i n g an y o f y o u r t es ti m o n y fro m y es t erd ay ? A: I d o n ’ t t h i n k s o. 4 RR 1 5 7 : 2 1 -2 3

. In Co l l o r a v. Na va r r o , t h e Tex as Su prem e Co urt h el d a d i rect ed

v erd i ct m ay b e b as ed o n t h e u n co n t ro vert ed t es ti m o n y o f a p art y t o th e l aws u i t wh en
t h e t es ti m o n y i s cl ear, d i rect , p o s i t i v e an d unc o ntr a dict ed , i s d ev oi d o f i n co n s i s t en ci es

an d i s un co n t rad i ct ed

. Co l l o r a , 5 7 4 S.W

. 2 d 6 5 , 6 9 (Tex

. 1 9 7 8 ); s ee a ls o W a sh i n g t o n

v. Rel i ab l e Li

f e In s
. Co

. , 58 1 S.W .2 d 1 5 3 , 1 59 (Tex

. 1 9 7 9 ) (h o l d i n g t h e j u ry m u s t b el i ev e an i n t eres t ed wi t n es s as a m at ter o f l aw i f t hei r t es t i m o n y is t h e o n l y
t e s t i m o n y o n an i s su e an d i t is cl ear, di rect an d p o s i t i v e an d i s un co n t rad i ct ed ). Cl earl y , i f t h e ju ry h as t o bel i ev e a p l ai n t i ff’ s cl ear an d co n ci s e tes t im on y wh en
t h e p lai n t i ff h a s t h e b u rd en o f pro o f, t h e ju ry wo u ld cert ai n ly h av e t o t ak e t h e d efen d an t s , i n t h i s cas e t h e Dav i d s o n s’ t es t i m o n y , d u ri n g Bo wm an ’ s cas e i n ch i ef as
t ru e, wi t h o u t b ei n g ab le t o p as s o n i t s cred i bi l i t y. Th i s i s es peci al l y t ru e s i n ce t h e Dav id s o n s h ad an o p p o rtu n i t y t o recan t o r r e b u t t h e tes t i m o n y i n t hei r o wn cas e in
27ch i ef, bu t fai l ed t o d o so . Th e Dav i d s on s cal l ed n o e x p ert wi t n es s es . Fu rt h er, t h e

k n o wl ed g e o f t h e o t h er wi tn es s es cal l ed by t he Dav i d so n s i s no t at i s s u e i n t h i s cas e. Th e D av i d so ns ’ k n owl ed g e o f t h ei r o wn d o g ’s p ro p en s i t i es t o b e d an g ero u s i s t h e
q u es ti o n fo r t he ju ry . Th e o th er l ay wi t n es s es can n o t b e s ai d t o h av e co n t rad i ct ed t h e Dav id s o n s ’ o wn ad m i s s i o n s t o t h ei r k n o w l ed g e o f Bu b b a’ s d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es . Th ere i s n o q u es t i o n t o t h e ju ry as t o w h at o th ers o b serv ed o r b el i ev ed

. Th e Dav id s o n s ’ t es t im o n y m u s t be r e l i ed u p o n as cred i b l e. A cco rd i n g t o t h e Tex as Su p rem e Co urt , t he j u ry can n o t d i s reg ard t h e Dav i ds o ns ’ t es t i m o n y fo r an y reas o n

an d m u s t t ak e i t as t ru e. Th us , t h e ju ry h ad n o o pt i on , b u t t o f i n d t h e Dav i d s on s

s t ri ct l y l i ab l e as a m at t er o f l aw, p eri od

. If t h e Co urt fi n d s s o m e ev i d en ce i n t h e reco rd to s u pp o rt t h e ju ry ’ s fi n d i n g , a fact ual s u ffi ci en cy rev i ew o f t he ev i d en ce rev eal s t he ju ry ’ s fi n d i n g s as t o Qu es t i o n No

. 1 fo r b o t h J erry an d D i an a were ag ai n s t t h e g reat wei gh t an d p rep o n d eran ce o f
t h e ev i d en ce. Th u s , al t h o u g h t h ere m ay b e s o m e co n fl ict i n g ev i d en ce o n t h e i s s ue,
t h e ev i d en ce ag ai ns t t h e ju ry ’ s fi n d i n g s t o Qu es t i on N o . 1 i s s o g reat as t o m ak e t h e ju ry ’ s fi nd i n g s erro n eo u s an d s u b ject to rev ers al

. A cco rd i n g l y , Bo wm an as k s t h e Co u rt of Ap p eal s t o rev ers e t he ju ry ’ s fi n d i n g s o f “ n o” t o Qu es t io n No

. 1 as t o Di an a

an d /o r J erry an d en t er fi n d i n g s o f “ y es .” Becau s e t h er e i s l eg al l y an d fact u al l y i n s u ffi ci en t ev i d en ce i n s u p p o rt o f t h e ju ry ’ s fi n di n g s , t he ju ry ’ s fi n d i n g s s h o u l d b e

rev ers ed

. 28C. Co n cl u si o n

Th e D av i d so n s cl earl y wan t ed Bu b b a t o be p ro tect i v e an d p o s s es s i v e o f Di an a

s o s h e wo u l d b e p ro t ect ed wh en J erry w as o u t o f t o w n wi t h wo rk

. 4 RR 1 3 9 : 8 -1 6.
Bo wm an i s n o t c l a i m i n g t h e Dav i d s o ns w ere w ro n g t o wan t o r ev en en co u rag e
p ro t ect i v en es s i n th ei r d o g . B u t as Dr. Hau g t es t i fi ed , p ro t ect iv en es s i s a b eh av i o r
t h at can h av e a t en d en cy o r p ro p en s i t y t o ward d an g er. 5 RR 25 : 1 6 -2 5 , 2 6: 2 -3

. Th u s , i t i s th e d og o wn er’ s res po ns i bi l i t y t o trai n a d o g wi t h reg ard t o wh en t o b e p ro t ect i v e

an d wi t h wh o m . 5 RR 2 7 : 1 -1 7

. Fu rt h er, i f t h e o w n ers d o no t p ro p erl y t rai n t h ei r d o g,
t h en t h ey h av e t he r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o rem o v e t h e d og fro m s i t u at i on s w h ere t h e d o g

m ay act p ro t ect i v el y i n i n ap p ro p ri at e s i t u at i o n s . 5 RR 2 5 :2 3 -2 7: 17

. Th e Dav i d s on s h ad t h e ab i l i t y

an dk no wl ed g e t o k n o w wh en a d o g h ad d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es an d
t o p ro t ect g u es t s b ecau s e t h ey h ad a d o g n am ed , M ag g i e, b efo re Bu b b a an d al way s k ep t h er up wh en p eo p l e cam e o v er. 5 RR 3 1 : 1 6 -3 2 :2 ; 5 RR 1 5 0 : 4 -1 8

. Th e Dav i d s o n s k n ew g at h eri n g s i n v o l vi n g s t ran g ers i n t h ei r h o m e were

s i t u at i o n s w h en t h e d o g wo u ld act p ro t ect i v el y o r t he D av i d s o n s wo u l d n o t h a v e

warn ed al l n ew g u es t s ab o u t t he d o g , 4 RR 9 5 : 1 3 -1 4 , 9 5: 2 1-2 5 , 4 RR 1 3 0 :2 2 -1 3 1 : 1 0,

o r p u t t he d o g u p w h en t h ere was a l arg e g at h eri ng . 4 RR 1 03 : 1 8 -2 4

. It was o n l y a

m at t er o f t i m e b efo re s o m eo n e g o t h u rt

. 5 RR 3 7 : 1 3 -1 6

. Yet t h e Dav i d s on s d i d n ot
t rai n th e d o g , 4 RR 8 9 : 1 4 -1 5 ; 4 RR 1 3 0 : 1 7 -1 8; 5 RR 2 7: 1 8 -2 1 , n or d i dt h ey al way s
p u t t h e d o g u p . In o rd er t o s at i s fy t h e el em en t s o f s t ri ct l iab i l i t y wi t h do m es t i c d og s 29al l Bo wm an h ad t o p ro v e w as d an g ero u s pro p en s i t y an d kn o wl ed g e. Sh e d i d s o

t h ro u g h t h e Dav id s o n s ’ o wn t es t i m o n y at t ri al

. Th e fact t hat t he ju ry an s wered “No ”
t o Qu es t i o n N o . 1 m ay refl ect t h e ju ry ’ s d i s s at i sfact i o n wi t h t he l aw, b u t i t w a s n o t wi t h i n th ei r p o wer t o ch o s e t o f o l l o w t h e l aw o r n o t. Th e ev i d en ce i n t he reco rd fu l fi l l s t h e s eco n d an d t h i rd el em en t s of th e cl ai m as a m at t er o f l aw o r t h e ev i d en ce i s s o o v erwh el m i n g ly i n s u p p o rt o f affi rm at i v e fi n d i n g s as t o j u s t i fy rev e r s al

. Acco rd in g ly , Bo wm an as k s t h e Co u rt t o fo l l o w t he l aw an d rev ers e t h e ju ry ’ s fi n d i ng s

as t o b o th J erryan dDi an a fo r Qu es t i on No . 1

.

30Seco n dIs su e (Res t at ed )
Bo wm an was en t i t l ed t o an affi rm at i v e an s w er as a m at t er of l aw t h at th e d o g ’ s d an gero u s p ro p en si t i es were t h e p ro du ci n g cau s e o f Bo wm an ’ s i n ju ri es , o r i n t he al t ern at i v e, a n eg at i v e fi n d i ng wo u ld h av e b een ag ai n s t t h e g reat wei g h t an dp rep o n d eran ce o f t h e ev i d en ce. A. St ri ct Li ab i l it y

Req u i res Bo wm an t o Pro v e t h e Dan g ero u s Pro p en s i ti es W ere t h e Pro d u ci n g Cau s e o f Bo wm an ’ s In ju ri es Bo wm an i s al s o en t it l ed t o a fi n d i n g t h at Bu bb a’ s d an g ero u s p ro p en s it i es were
t h e p ro d u ci n g cau s e o f h er i nju ri es . W i t h reg ard t o t h e l as t el em en t , Bo wm an h as

co n cl u s i v e ev i d en ce t o p ro v e Bu b b a’ s d an g ero u s p r o pen s i ti es were t h e p ro d u ci n g

cau s e o f h er i n

ju ri es . Ma r

s h a l l , 5 1 1 S.W .2 d at 2 5 8

. A “ p r o d u c i n g cau s e” i s a

s u b s t an t i al fact o r in b ri n gi n g ab o u t an i n ju ry , an d wi t h ou t wh ich t h e i n j u ry wo u l d n ot h a v e o c c u r red

. Fo r d M

o t o r Co

. v. Ledes ma , 2 4 2 S.W .3 d 3 2, 4 6 (Tex

. 2 0 0 7 ). Th i s d efi n i t i o n i n cl ud es th e es s en t i al el em en t s o f p ro d u ci n g cau se: (1 ) t h e cau s e m u s t b e

a s u b s t an t i al cau s e o f t h e ev en t a t i s s u e a n d (2 ) i t m u s t b e a b u t -fo r cau s e, n am el y wi t h o u t wh i ch t h e ev en t w ou l d n o t h av e o ccu rred

. Id

. Pro o f o f p ro d u ci n g cau s e i n v o l v es a l o wer bu rd en t han p ro of o f pro x i m at e cau s e, becau s e p ro o f o f p ro d u ci n g

cau s e d o es n o t req ui re a s h o wi n g o f fo res eeab i l i t y . Th o mp s o n , 12 7 S.W .3 d at 4 5 1.
B. Th e R e c o rd Co n t ai n s On l y Affi rm at i v e Ev i d en ce i n Su p p o rt o f Bu b b a’ s Dan g ero u s Pro p en s i t ies As t h e Pro du ci n g Cau se o f t h e Bi t e Al t h ou g h t he ju ry d i d no t an s wer Qu es t i o n N o. 2 reg ard i n g p ro d u ci n g cau s e i n t he Co u rt ’ s Ch arg e, t h e ev i d en ce i n t h e reco rd , ei t h er as a m at t er o f l aw o r b ecau s e 31t h e g reat wei gh t an d prep o n d eran ce o f t h e ev i d en ce su p po rt s i t , en t i t l es Bo wm an to

an affi rm at i v e an s wer t o t he q u es t i o n o f wh et her Bu b b a’ s d an gero u s pro p en s i ti es

were t h e p ro du ci n g cau s e o f Bo wm an ’ s in ju ri es . As set fo rt h ab o ve, th e Dav i d s on s ad m i t Bu b b a was ag g res s i v e, p ro t e c t i v e a n d p o s s es s i v e. 4 RR 9 4: 1 7 -1 9 ; 4 RR
1 4 6 : 1 1 -1 8

. Bu b b a was v ery p ro t ect i v e o f Di an a, 4 RR 9 3 :2 2 -2 5 , an d h a d a cl ear d i s l i k e o f s tran g ers . 4 RR 1 0 0 : 2 1 -2 4

. Th es e d an g ero u s t en d en ci es were t h e
p ro d uci n g cau se o f Bu bb a’ s b i t e. On t he n i g h t o f t h e o ccu rren ce, Bo wm an s at n ex t
t o Di an a at t h e d in n er t ab l e. 4 RR 2 9 :1 4 -2 1; 4 RR 1 0 6 :1 7-1 8

. Sh e was l e an i n g
t o ward Di an a w h en Bu b b a bi t her i n t h e face. 4 RR 3 2: 1 5 -1 8 ; 4 RR 10 8 : 6 -7 , 1 1 0 : 1 3

- 1 6

. Fu rt h er, Dr. Ken n et h W

. San d ers , Bo w m an ’ s m ed ical ex p ert , t es t i fi ed t hat i n h i s

o p i n i o n , bas ed o n reas o nab l e m ed i cal p ro bab i l i t y , a l l o f t h e p ro b l em s Bo wm an h as

ex p eri en ced wi t h her l i p s an d m o u t h were a res u l t o f t he d o g at t ack o n J u n e 24 , 2 0 1 2. Ap p x . 4 ; 1 R. Su p p . R. In d ex , Vi deo Dep o s i t i o n o f Dr. Ken net h W . San d ers . 4
Th e ag g res s i v e, p ro t ect i v e, an d p o ss es s i v e b eh av i o rs p rev io u sl y ex h ib i t ed by
Bu b b a l ed t o th i s b i t e. 5 RR 8 7 : 1 4 -2 5

. Bu b b a was p ro t ect i n g Di an a fro m t h e s t ran g er

o f t h e g ro u p , Bo wm an . If Bu b b a wo u l d p u s h J erry away fro m Di an a d em on s t rat i n g

4 F or the Court of Appeals’ convenience, in addition to citing to the video deposition included in the Reporter’s Record in the Supplemental Ex hibit I n dex , B o wman has also attached the line and pag e ex cerpt from Dr. Kenneth Sanders’ deposition that B owman is rely ing on and that was included in the video shown the jury in the Appellant’s Appendix , Tab 4. 32a l o w l ev el o f ag g res s i o n , 5 RR 2 8 : 7 -1 8 , wh at wo ul d he d o t o s o m eo n e h e d i d n ot

k n o w wh o was l ean i n g t o ward Di an a: t h e an s wer i s p ro t ect Di an a b y b it i n g t h em . J erryDav i ds o n : Q: an d t h e m ere fact o f s o m e b o d y l ean i n g t o w ard Di an a, as far as we k n o w, t hat co u l ds et t h e d o g o ff? A: Ri g h t

. 4 RR 1 4 0 : 3 -5

. Fu rt h er, Bu b b a b i t h er o n th e ri gh t si d e o f t he face wh i ch i s co n s i s t en t wi t h Bo wm an l ean i n g o v er t o s p eak wi t h Di an a. 4 RR 3 3: 2-1 0

. Bu b b a’ s d an g ero u s
p ro p en s it i es were a s u b s t an ti al fact or i n bri n g i n g ab o u t th e b i t e an d wi t h o u t wh i ch t h e b i t e wo u l d n o t h av e o ccu rred

. Acco rd i n g l y , t h e ev i d en ce s u p p o rt s a fi nd i n g o f “ y es ”

as t o wh et h er Bu b b a’ s dan g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es were the pr o duc i ng c au s e o f Bo wm an ’ s i n ju ry . C. Co n cl u si o n It i s cl ear fro m t h e reco rd t h at Bu b b a h ad d an gero u s t en d en ci es i n th at h e was

v ery p ro t ect i v e o f D ian a an d d i s tru s t i n g of n ew p eo p le. Th e ci rcu m s t an ces o f t h e

n i g h t i n q u es ti o n h ad Bo wm an , a n ewl y i nt ro d uced p ers o n t o Bu b b a, s i t t i n g cl o se to Di an a at t h e d i nn er tab l e wi t h Bu b b a s i t t i n g d i rect l y i n bet ween t h em . J erry t es t i fi ed
t h at Bu b ba d o es no t l i ke an y o n e, i n c l u d i n g J erry , t o g et t o o cl o se t o Di an a. 4 RR
1 3 8 : 1 2 -2 5 , 1 3 9 : 5-7 . Fu rt h er, Bu b b a wi ll s t an dh i s g ro u n d wh en h e feel s a t h reat t o Di an a. 4 RR 1 3 0: 22 -1 3 1 : 6

. W h en Bo wm a n l e a n ed i n t o ward Di an a, Bu b b a s aw Bo wm an t ry i n g t o g et cl os e t o Di an a. Th us , t h e o n l y e v i d en ce i n th e reco rd to
33ex p lai n th e at t ack was Bu b ba’ s d an g ero us p ro p en si ty fo r p ro t ect i v en es s an d

ag g res s i o n t o ward s t ran gers . Ev en t h e J u dg e o f t h e t ri al co urt b el iev ed t h at Bu b b a’ s d an gero us p ro p en s i t i es w ere th e p ro d u ci ng cau s e o f Bo wm an ’ s i nju ri es . 7 RR 9 : 1 1

- 1 5

. Acco rd i n g l y , i f t h e Co u rt fi n d s t h e an s wer t o Qu es t i o n No

. 1 s h o u l d be rev ers ed , t h e reco rd d em on s t rat es t h e o n l y accep t ab l e an s wer t o Qu es t i on No

. 2 i s “ y es .” Th erefo re, Bo w m an as k s t h e Co u rt t o en ter s u ch fi n d i n g . W HEREFORE, PREM ISES CONSIDERED, Bo wm an pray s th e ju d g m en t b e i n al l res p ect s REVERSED wi t h reg ard t o d an g ero us p ro p en si t ies as to ei t h er o r b o th
t h e Dav i d s on s an d p ro du ci n g cau s e, an d t h e cau s e b e REM ANDED b ack t o t h e t ri al

co u rtfo r a d et erm i n at i o n o f d am ag es , fo r t h e reas o n s s et fo rt h h erei n . In t h e al t ern at i ve, Bo wm an p ray s t h e ju dg m en t b e REVERSED as t o ei t h er o r b o t h t he Dav i d s on s as t o d an g ero u s p ro p en s i t i es an d t h e cau s e b e REM ANDED b ack
t o th e t ri al co urt fo r fu rt h er p ro ceed i n g s , as t he Co u rt s ees fi t , fo r th e reas o ns s et fo rt h h erei n . Fu rt her an d i n t h e al t ern at i v e, Bo wm an p ray s fo r t h e cau se t o b e REM A NDED b ack to t h e t ri al co u rt fo r a n ew t ri al , i f n eces sary .

34B o wm an p ray s fo r s uch o t h er an d fu rt h er rel ief, g en eral o r s peci al , in l aw o r

i n eq u it y , t o wh i ch s h e m ay s h o w h ers el f t o b e ju s t l y en t i t l ed

. Res p ect fu l ly

s u b m i t t ed ,
/ s / Ja ck M. S a nd er s , Jr

. J ACK M . SANDERS, J R. 1 0 9 Eas t Ho u st on St reet P.O. Bo x 1 3 8 7 M ars hal l , Tex as 7 5 6 7 1 -1 38 7 (9 0 3 ) 9 35 -7 1 7 2 (9 0 3 ) 9 38 -8 6 1 6 (Fax ) s an d ers . jack @ s b cb l o b al .n et ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Certi fi ca te o f Co m pl i a nce Pu rs uan t t o Tex

. R. Ap p. Pro

. 9

. 4 ( i )(3 ), t h e u n d ers i g n s hereb y cert i fi es t h at acco rd i n g t o t h e wo rd co u n t fu n ct i o n o f t h e co m p u ter p ro g ram us ed t o g en erat e t h e d o cu m en t , t h e p o rt i o n s o f t h e Ap p el l an t ’ s Bri ef s u b ject t o t h e r u l e c o n t ai n 7 ,5 7 4 wo rd s t o t al an dt h at t h e t ex t t h ereo f i s i n 1 4 p o i nt Ti m es New Ro m an fo n t

.
/ s / Ja ck M. S a nd er s , Jr

. J ack M . San d ers , J r.

35Certi fi ca te o f Serv ice

Th e u n d ers i g n edh ereb y

cert i fi es t hat , p u rs u an t t o Tex

. R. Ap p . Pro

. 9 .5 (a), a t ru e an d co r r e c t c o p y o f t h e fo reg o i n g Ap p el l an t ’ s Bri ef h as b een s en t t o t h e fo l l o w i n g c o u ns el o f reco rd t h ro u g h t h e Co u rt ’ s o n -l i n e fi l i n g s y s t em , o n t h i s , t h e 1 9 t h d ay o f M arch , 2 0 1 5 : Al an E. Bro wn Bo y d& Bro w n , P.C. 1 2 1 5 Pru i t t Pl ace Ty l er, Tex as 7 57 0 3 Co u n s el fo r t h e Ap p el l ees

/ s / Ja ck M. S a nd er s , Jr

. J ack M . San d ers , J r.

36

## CA S E N O . 0 6 -1 4- 00 0 9 4

- CV

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ IN THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ Nan cy El i zab et h Bo wm an , Ap p el l an t ,

v s. J erryDav i d s o n an d Di an a Dav i d s o n , Ap p el l ees .

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ On Ap p eal fro m

t h e 7 1 s t J u d i ci al Di s t ri ct Harri s o n Co un t y , Tex as Cau s e No . 1 3 -0 61 8 Th e Ho no rab l e Brad M o ri n , Pres i d i n g

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ APPENDI X

_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J ACK M . SANDERS, J R. 1 0 9 Eas t Ho u st on St reet P.O. Bo x 1 3 8 7 M ars hal l , Tex as 7 5 6 7 1 -1 38 7 (9 0 3 ) 9 35 -7 1 7 2 (9 0 3 ) 9 38 -8 6 1 6 (Fax ) s an d ers . jack @ s b cb l o b al .n et ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

37APPENDI X TABLE OF CONTENTS

DOCUM ENTS TAB
J u d g m en t en t ered Au g u st 1 4 , 2 0 0 8

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Co u rt ’ s Ch arg e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Tran s cri p t Ex cerp t s fro m t he Vi d eo Dep os i t i o n o f Bi ll y St ro ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Tran s cri p t Ex cerp t s fro m t he Vi d eo Dep os i t i o n o f Dr. Ken n et h San d ers . . . . . . . . 4
Po z na n s ki ex r el

Po z n a n s ki v. Ho r va t h , 7 88 N.E.2 d 1 25 5 (In d . 2 0 0 3 ).

. . . . . . . . . 5
Dea rd o f f v. Bu r g er , 6 0 6 A.2 d4 8 9 (Pa. 1 9 9 2 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ro b in s o n v. Ma r i no , 3 W as h. 4 3 4 , 2 8 P. 7 5 2 (1 8 9 2 ).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Res tat em en t (Seco n d ) o f To rt s § 5 0 9

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

38**08/~/2614** 15:28 BOYD- 

# 0 PAGE 05/06 flLElHOUteORD**+'~** HARRISON, COUNTY, lWS

. ,

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

. ; CAUSE NO. 13-0618

NANCY ELIZABETH BOWMAN 

### v.
JERRY DAVIDSON and DIANA DAVIDSON § § § § § § IN TirE DISTRICT COuRBv ---t""Ei£!!:::,....;..:.- 71"'" JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS
JtiDGMENT
On August 18, 2014, this cause came on to be heard in this court. PlaintiffN ancy Elizabeth Bowman appeared in person and by her attorney ofrecord, Jack Sanders, and announced ready for trial. Defendants Jerry Davidson and Diana Davidson appeared in person and by his attorney of record, Alan E. Brown, and announced ready for trial. A jury having been previously dexnanded, a jury consisting oftwelve qualified jurors was duly impaneled and sworn, and the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court submitted the questions of fact to the jury. The charge ofthe.court and verdict of the jury are inco!'POrated for all purposes herein by reference. Because it appears to the court that the verdict of the jmy was for Defendants and against Plaintiff, judgment should be rendet:ed on the verdict in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff The court, after hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, is of the opinion that Plaintiff should take nothing by this suit.

ITISTHEREFOREORDEREDBYTHECOURTthatPlaintifftakenothingbythissuitand that ail costs of court be taxed against Plaintiff.

Judgment ]>age 1**08/25/2~14** 15:28 903525'=0 BOVDBFDWN 

## Q

All other reliefnot expressly granted in this Judgment is denied.

Signed this 

# ...zL day

# of_.,_A'-'-~-J---->' 1014

# ~·

# JUDG~

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

AlllliE. Bro State Bar**No~. ~9lJ,l.oo"..­**  Attomey for Defendants

Pagel PAGE 06/06

# F I L E D .**~n 1** 
R

CAUSE NO. 13-0618

NANCY ELIZABETH BOWMAN § § § § § § IN THE DISTRICT COURT


### v. 71 ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
JERRY DAVIDSON AND DIANA DAVIDSON HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS

COURT'S CHARGE

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: This case is submitted to you by asking questions about the facts, which you must decide
from the evidence you have heard in this trial. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but in matters of Jaw, you must be governed by
the instructions in this charge. In discharging your responsibility on this jury, you will observe all the
instructions which have previously been given you. I shall now give you additional instructions which you should carefully and strictly follow during your deliberations.

1. Do not let bias, prejudice or sympathy play any part in your deliberations.
2. In arriving at your answers, consider only the evidence introduced here under oath and
such exhibits, if any, as have been introduced for your consideration under the rulings of
the Court, that is, what you have seen and heard in this courtroom, together with the law

as given you by the Court. In your deliberations, you will not consider or discuss anything that is not represented by the evidence in this case. 3. Since every answer that is required by the charge is important, no juror should state or consider that any required answer is not important.**~·**4. You must not decide who you think should win, and then try to answer the questions accordingly. Simply answer the questions, and do not discuss nor concern yourselves
with the effect of your answers. 5. You will not decide an issue by lot orby drawing straws, or by any other method of
chance. Do not return a quotient verdict. A quotient verdict means that the jurors agree to abide by the result to be reached by adding together each juror's figures and dividing by
the number of jurors to get an average. Do not do any trading on your answers; that is,

one juror should not agree to answer a certain question one way if others will agree to

answer another question another way. 6. You may render your verdict upon the vote of ten or more members of the jury. The same
ten or more of you must agree upon all of the answers made and to the entire verdict. You will not, therefore, enter into an agreement to be bound by a majority or any other vote of less than ten jurors. If the verdict and all of the answers therein are reached by unanimous agreement, the presiding juror shall sign the verdict for the entire jury. If any juror disagrees as to any answer made by the verdict, those jurors who agree to all findings
shall each sign the verdict.

These instructions are given you because your conduct is subject to review the same as that
of the witnesses, parties, attorneys and the judge. If it should be found that you have disregarded any of these instructions, it will be jury misconduct and it may require another trial by another jury; then
all of our time will have been wasted.

The presiding juror or any other juror who observes a violation of the Court's instructions
shall immediately warn the one who is violating the same and caution the juror not to do so again.When words are used in this charge in a sense which varies from the meaning commonly understood, you are given a proper legal definition, which you are bound to accept in place of any other definition or meaning.

Answer "Yes" or "No" to all questions unless otherwise instructed. A "Yes" answer must be
based on a preponderance ofthe evidence. If you do not find that a preponderance ofthe evidence supports a "Yes" answer, then answer "No". The tenn "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight and degree of credible testimony or evidence introduced before you and admitted in
this case. Whenever a question requires other than a "Yes" or "No" answer, your answer must be
based on a preponderance of the evidence.

"Bowman" shall mean Nancy Elizabeth Bowman, plaintiff herein.

"Defendants" shall refer collectively to Jerry Davidson and Diana Davidson, defendants
herein.

The "dog" shall mean and refer to Bubba, the male dog owned or possessed by Jerry Davidson and Diana Davidson.

The "occurrence in question" means the incident on June 24, 2012 when Bowman was bitten by the dog owned by Jerry Davidson and Diana Davidson.

f""- •
.. 1**~:** •**~** "**:~~~·· qr~t,**  ·-.. _ .... ..a. .**~**QUESTION NO. 1

On the occasion in question, did the Davidsons know or have reason to know that their dog
had dangerous propensities not nonnal for a dog.

"Reason to know" means the actor has information from which a person of reasonable intelligence would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct
under the assumption that such fact exists.

It is enough that the possessor of the animal knows that it has on other occasions exhibited
such a tendency to attack human beings or other animals or otherwise to do harm as should apprise
him of its dangerous character. Thus, the fact that a dog has to his knowledge unsuccessfully attempted to attack human beings or other animals is sufficient to bring its possessor within knowledge requirement. Sufficient also is any form of ill temper displayed in the presence of man or beast which would apprise a reasonable man that the animal if uncontrolled would make such an attack.
"Dangerous propensities" means vicious or aggressive tendencies that are not nonnal for a dog.

Answer "Yes" or "No".

Answer: Jerry Davidson 

# No

Diana Davidson

. [A. 

### UL

.... 

## -=-- 

# --- -::
. . • ......If you have answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No.2 otherwise, do not

answer Question No.2

QUESTION NO.2

Was the animal's dangerous propensities the producing cause of the plaintiffs injury?

You are instructed that "PRODUCING CAUSE" means a cause that was a substantial factor
in bringing about the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred. There may be

more than one producing cause.

Answer "Yes" or "No":

Answer:

-----

< ••**("~** ·i 

# u
____ _QUESTION NO. 3

If you answered "no" to Question 1, please answer the following question. Otherwise, do not

answer the following question.

Did the negligence, if any, of Jerry Davidson or Diana Davidson in handling the dog proximately cause Bowman's injuries?
"Negligence" means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a
person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.
"Negligence" with regard to handling a dog, may include one who keeps a dog which
possesses only those dangerous propensities which are normal to other dogs is required to know its
normal habits and tendencies. He is, therefore, required to realize that even ordinarily gentle dogs are likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm.
"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces

an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate

cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have
foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

l • ..I'In order for Bowman to be negligent, Defendants had to adequately warn Bowman.

An "adequate warning" is a warning that catches the attention of a person and conveys a fair
indication of the nature and extent of the danger being warned against in the mind of a reasonably prudent person.

Answer "Yes" or "No".

Jerry Davidson 

# No

Diana Davidson 

# Nv

BowmanQUESTION NO. 4:

If you answered "yes" to Jerry Davidson or Diana Davidson and Bowman in Question No.3, please answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.
Assign percentages of responsibility only to those you found caused or contributed to cause the injury. The percentage you find must total I 00 percent. The percentages must be expressed in
whole numbers. The percentage of responsibility attributable to a person is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found. The percentage attributable to any one need not be the

same percentage attributed to that one in answering another question.

For each person you found that caused or contributed to cause the injury, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each:

a. Jerry Davidson %

---------------------- b. Diana Davidson %



### ----------------------
c. Bowman %

----------------------- Total 100 %**--------~~-------**

- - 

### -**~-**QUESTION NO. 5

If you answered Questions No. 1 and No.2 with "yes", please answer the following question. If you answered Question 3 with "yes" as to Jerry or Diana Davidson and with "no"

as to Bowman or answered 50 percent or less as to Bowman in Question No. 4, then please

answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate
Bowman for her injuries, if any, that resulted from the occurrence in question?

Consider the elements of damages listed below and none other. Consider each element separately. Do not award any sum of money on any element if you have otherwise, under some other element, awarded a sum of money for the same loss. That is, do not compensate twice for the same loss, if any. Do not include interest on any amount of damages you find.

Answer separately, in dollars and cents, for damages, if any.

a. Medical care expenses that, in reasonable probability, Bowman will incur in the future.
Answer:

---- b. Physical pain and mental anguish sustained in the past. Answer:

----
c. Physical pain and mental anguish that, in reasonable probability, Bowman will sustain in the future.
Answer:

----d. Disfigurement sustained in the past. Answer:

----
e. Disfigurement that, in reasonable probability, Bowman will sustain in the future. Answer:

---- f. Physical impairment sustained in the past. Answer:

---- g. Physical impairment that, in reasonable probability, Bowman will sustain in the
future.
Answer:

---- h. Loss of earning capacity sustained in the past. Answer:

----



## ..After you retire to the jury room, you will select your own presiding juror. The first thing the presiding juror will do is to have this complete charge read aloud and then you will deliberate upon
your answers to the questions asked.

It is the duty of the presiding juror:
1. To preside during your deliberations; 2. To see that your deliberations are conducted in an orderly manner and in accordance with the instructions in this charge; 3. To write out and hand to the bailiff any communications concerning the case which you desire to have delivered to the judge; 4. To vote on the issues; 5. To write your answers to the issues in the spaces provided; and 6. To certify to your verdict in the space provided for the presiding juror's signature or to obtain the signatures of all the jurors who agree with the verdict if your verdict is less than unanimous.
You should not discuss the case with anyone, not even with other members of the jury, unless
all of you are present and assembled in the jury room. Should anyone attempt to talk to you about the

case before the verdict is returned, whether at the courthouse, at your home, or elsewhere, please
inform the judge of this fact.

When you have answered all of the questions which you are required to answer under the
instructions ofthe judge, and your presiding juror has placed your answers in the spaces provided
and signed the verdict as presiding juror or obtained the signatures, you will inform the bailiff at the
door of the jury room that you have reached a verdict, and then you will return into Court with your verdict.

JUDGE PRESIDING



# r """AA-- 

# ..We, the jury, have answered the above and foregoing questions as herein indicated, and herewith return same into court as our verdict.
(To be signed by the presiding juror if unanimous.)

Presiding Juror

(To be signed by those rendering verdict if not unanimous.)

# ~~~~6v<U~ {) {J.;YU(f/

# ,~') ,/! "" Y 1**,~4,-** (_J**~-** - --1 2

3

9
10 11 Page I

CAUSE NO. 13-0618**N~21~:NCY** ELIZABETH**BOl~MAN,** Pla.ir1tiff', IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS

De .fenda.n t.s., 71ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

I>J0\7E:V1BEF. 1.8, 2013 \]OLUI\]E l OE' J.
Ll **************************************** **************
13 14 15 produced as a**wi~ness** at the instance of the De M and duly sworn, was taken in the above-styled and

18 4:34 p.m. to 5:43 p.rn., before rerri 19 in and fer the**s~ate** of Texas, reported by computerized
m stenotype machine, at the offices of Mr. Jack Sanders, 21 Jr., 109 East Houston Street, Marshall, Texas, pursuant
ll to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the provisions 

### n stated on che record or attached hereto.
24 25

Eiectronica!iy signed by Terri Lynn Smith (501-237-608-4107) Deposition Resources, 1nc. 800.295.4 l 09 16a5ed0f-8516-4c02-81 cc-9c82S8f78b4cPage2

1 A**~** P E A R A N 2 E S 2 :!LR" ,_T.ACI< SPJ'1DERS I**~TR.** 3 fl.TTORNEY AT**L~,W** 109 East Houston**S~reet** 4 Marshall, Texas 75671 {903) 935-7.172 5 - . , ..., l:"acsimi1e: (903) 938-8616
6 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: Nancy Elizabeth Bowman
7 8 MR. AU\N E. BROWN BOYD & BROWN, P.C. 9 1215 Pruitt Place Tyler, Texas 75703 10 Telep.'.rtorte: 903 ::;26-9JCO Facsim.i le: 903 5?6-9CiCl 11 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS: Jerry Davi 12 13 14 15**~** ALSO PRESENT: Mr Sart Leigh, videographer
17 18 19 20 21 22
23 24 25

Electronically signed by Terri Lynn Smith (601-237-608-4107) Ms. Nancy Elizabeth Bowman

Deposition Resources, Inc. 800.295 .4109 16a5ed0f-8516-4c02-81 cc-9c8298f78b4cPage 28 

# :I the fac:e, I-1e j:irn.pe<J t:.p arid got f-1er tri.ere. Q. Okay. So could you actually see the dog

-- 3
4 Q.

-- part er the dog when

-- when he bit?
5
6 Okay. Do you recall before the bite, I mean, 7 was the**do~** making noise or doing anything, or was it 8 just sort of out of the blue?
9 No. He was just sitting there.
10 Q. Novv,**y~ou.** s.a.-Ld Ms
... 8()V/rI1a.n 1ean.ed, lvha.t,
11 direction of the dog?
12 A .. 13 Now, would that have

-- so if the dog's between
14 Yis. Bowman and Diana, that

-- she was tr1en leaning in 15 tte direction also of Diana?
16
17 Had the. Bt1bba
18 we're, at this point, tal about Bubba. Okay? We**~** understand that? 20 Yes. 21 Q. All right. Had Bubba n1tten peop1e, anybody


### n before that you were aware of? 23 A.
24 Q. 25 A. Okay. h 7 l1c>? Me.

Deposition Resources. Inc. 800.295 .4109 Electronically signed by Terri Lynn Smith (601-237-608-4107) 16a5ed0f-8516-4c02-81 cc-9c8298f78b4cPaoc 30 b

1 Q. Okay"
.. 2 A .. Okay.**Tha~'s** when I signed it.
3 Q. So so you told Jack or someone in nis 4 office
5 Yes .. 6 Q.
-- a.bout \-Vha t t1apperled., a.nd. sornebody '-";rote**~** +- 7 out and then you signed it saying, Yeah, that's

-- 8 A .. Yes.
9

-- that's what happened?
10 l-\
.. Yes .. 11 Q. Okay. Okay. Now, when it says that

-- what 12 does it say? It says, I was bitten or the dog bit me. 13 What's the language there?
14 "Niooed me on the back of my leg. 0 Okay. De yol1**rernerr~be:c** the occasion., sc<rt of 16 mean, were you just sitting around or can you 17

-- ao you remember**wha~** was happening that the dog did 18 that?
19 A,. 20**~e_i** us -- tell us what occurred.
21 They had had a repairman there to work on their 22 heater, and he had gotten up and left and forgot his nag 

### n of tools and was out in his car fixing to leave, and
24 Diana asked me to take the bag of tools out. So I 25 grabbed che tools and I took off at a trot towards the

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1 front door, and Bubba got me.
2 Q. Okay.
3**!~** .. He nipped me on**~he** back of the
4**?~ll** right .. Did

-- did it break the skin?
5 A. No.
6 Okay. Just left a reci rnark
7 A. Yeah; bruised, but

.... 8 Q. Okay. Did you seeK any medical attention?
9**T~**

.. c·;,. • No. 10 Q. Okay.
11 Diana respond? Did she holler at the dog or :ing?
12 Do you.**rern.err~ber?** 13 Yes. She fussed at him.
14 Okay. Other than**t~at** occurrence -- well,**~et** 15 me strike thac:..
16 Had you ever known Bubba tc do that,
17 know, bite, a.hold of sorrtebocly t;E::f<>re?
18 A.**t~o** .. 19 Had you ever observed Bubba out working, W messing with tne cows? 21 A. Not real no.
22 ('; "'·' 23 A.
24 n ..,. 25 is? Okay. He doesn't go cut there mucn. Okay. Now, do you know what breed of dog Bubba

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1 know, I'm thinking, weii, ne nipped me, you know.
2 () xo• He might ge1::. somebody else?

3 Yeah. He migbt somebody. I've kr1own 1-iirn, 4 you know, since he was brought there, a puppy, so .... 5**~ow** long was it :ram the time when he nipped

7 V' .!

.. ,. 8 Q.**()}ca~:/** . 9 A .. 10 In c:.hat did any -- was there any
11 other inc:ider1t, else happen that made you any 12 more concerned or was that sort of it?
13 That was it.
14 Q. Did Diana ever say anything to you a:ter
15 ne bit you that she was more concerned or or**-~** 16 No. 17 Ckay. aces Bubba respond to Diana? 18 In other hrorc.ts, if Diana**~-;;1.ves** I-1in a c:::crrrrnar1d er 19 20 21
22
23
24
25 whatever, does the re Yes .. Q. Yes. Equally the same or more one than the**a~her?**
7\ .ti

.• Q. I clon.' t Okay. T co0ldn't tell you that.

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1 p.m. 2 (Break from 5:17 p.rn. to 5:19 p.m.)
3 4 record at 5:19 o.m. 5

7 Mr. Strong, my name's Jack Sanders, and I
8 represent I"".Ts
..**Bo\~1n.art,.** And to cl.arify, I cam.e to see 9 you, and you told me what happened, I wrote it down, and
w then you made some corrections, I think, where you 11 initialed it and you signed that; is that correct? 12 A. 13 Your stacement. We're talking about No.

-- 14 15 Q.

-- l'-Jo. <l?
16 lA. Yes .. 17 All right, sir. Now, I have previous ta.k.en
18 the deposition of Mrs. Davidson this morning, and we've W talked about the**bi~e** that's mentioned there in Exhibit**~** No. 4, and she says that she witnessed that

-- that**~b.i.te** .. Is that your .., - ' ::·eccJ....Lec-:.::ioc.

-- 21 22 Yes.
23

-- when**~he** dog attacked you -- or bit you? 24 Yes. 25 And I believe she described it as she had to

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1 tell you**~he** trutn.
2 I was just wondering if it's as the dog aged he 3 got more aggressive or more protective?
4 I think I've lived at that house
5 longer than what I've thought. If he's 11 years ala,
6 I've been there longer than that,**~u** •••. 7 That's what t:.hey said this morning. 8 Looking back on this, what could have been done to avoid 9 this accident?
10 1-\. should have been put up, period.
11 Q. All y 12 For that fact..
13 Q. Sir.
14 It should have iust been put up to avoid 15 something like that.
16 All right. And

-- and let me**as~** you this:
·11 Where you work, you're in maintenance?

18
19
20 21 7'. n. Q.

Q. Yes. Is safety a big element er aspect of your job? -'!.es, sir .. .LZ\.nd -- a.nd cio yo1_:_ ag·ree th.at:. i. f t:X.-1::::
..**~re'** s a ll dangerous situation, that it's the duty to warn about
B that dangerous situation; is that correct?
24 A. 25 Q. Yes. A:nd if :/OU c:ar1':. adequa_te1y vvarn ab<)Ut.**t~f1at**

Deposition Resources, Inc. 800.295.4109 Electronically signed by Terri Lynn Smith (601-237-608-4107) 16a5ed0f·8516-4c02-81 cc-9cS298f78b4cPage 58

1 dangerous situation, what's the next best thing?
2
3 Q. To do away with the

-- 4 !".. De away -- 5 {\ ':i.::::: .. dangerous situation?
6 with the dangerous situation, yes. 7 li.11 riqht. So I guess is it fair to say that 8 1: the Davidsons couldn't adequately warn about Bubba, 9 that they shoulti have put nim up? 10 Yc::s
.. 2e should have been put up.
'11 All riqht. Now, was there beer being consumed

12 that day? A. Yes .. 14 Q.
15 beer that day?
16 I couldn't say about that.
17 Q
.. All right. And is the band still together
18 ing?
19 l'i.**Occasior1a~l** We don't play all the L 20 anyrncre . 21 Q. .? ... ll riqt:"C.. Ar:cJ ·io you -- you say you. go o'\rer
ll there, did you say two or three times a week?
23 T have been. Here lately I have not been.
24 Okay. Mr. Davidson said that there was a 25 group, I think he said**jus~** about every day that comes

Electronically signed by Terri Lynn Smith (601-237-608-4107) Deposition Resources, Inc. 800.295.4109 1 Sa5edOf-8516-4c02-81cc-9c8298f78b4cPage 60
1 would have happened?
2 A .. Yes.
3 Q. Okay. But d ,,**~,** ycu. recall
4 any anybody raising any concern or the issue of
5 putting the dog up that icular evenir«;;?
6 P. •• No. I don't

-- I don't recall them saying put 7 the aog up. 8 Q. And you observed nothing that you felt like
9**wo~La** have put anyone on notice that, vPS better put 10 trie dog u"p becau.se tiers**ac~ti:-1g** c;_ certair1 way 1:or1ic;b.t?
11 A
.. No.
12 Q. Okay. P.
... nd. t.:..he dog's been 01Jt there a ' ""'-'t- C)f
13 times when you've been over there since this happened,
14 righ.t? 15 Yes.
16 And you've never asked them to put the dog up 17 when you've been aver there, nave you?
18
19 20 21
22 23
24 25 1\ r--:..
... No. Okay. You haven't been concerned that he's going to bite you agaLn or c No. Q. ()}<a y. I mean, he could, right? 1:1... -·Y-ea:r1
.. He could, but

-- Q.**Okay~** J.r1 <::>t.h.er wc-Jrds, that's like v.rha t yc·u said earlier about**~ ~he**  dog's aangerous.

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1 bit you, obviously he**bi~** at you, he mignc bite somebody 2 else, right?
3 Yes .. 4 Q. Okay. But you're still around the dog fairly
5 frequently and nave no real concerns about 6 or biting you?
7 No. When Diana and Jerry leave to go -- or it 8 they're going to go out of town, they call me, and I go 9 over there and let the dogs out and all that stuff, so
10 it's

.... 11 Okay.
12 A. I have no concern about him**bi~** me. 13 So the am I correct that the only real thing
14 that sort of changed since**~s.** Bowman has been bitten is 15 that now when new neoole er guests come over, 16 they put the dog up?
'17 Yes.

18 Q. Because o.f \tJ!:at. I10W ' n.a.s happened?
19 A .. Yes.
20 MR. BROWN: Okay. All right. Okay. 21 Thank you I pass the witness. 22 (Examination concluded at 5:40 p.m.l 23 24 BY MR. SANDERS:
25 You sa\l thac. on ·partict:lar n. t there v.:as

Electronically signed by Terri Lynn Smith {601-237-608-4107) Deposition Resources. Inc. 800.295.4109 16a5ed0f-8516-4c02-81 cc-9c8298f78b4cl
2
3
4

6
7
8
9 10 Page 64

CAUSE NO. 13-0618 NAt-JCY ELIZABETl-I**BC)ltJ.MAJ~J** I Plaintiff, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

\IS" HARRISON**COUNT~,** TEXAS JEP.RY DAVIDSON AND
Defendants. 71ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DEPOSITION OF BILLY STRONG**l'JCiV.EMBF~IZ** 18, 2012

i, TERRI**L~NN** SMITH, Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, he cert.ify 11 to the following:
12 That the witness, BILLY STRONG, was duly sworn Ll by the officer and that the transcript of the oral
14 deposition is a true record of the testimony
15 the 1ntness;
16 That exa1nj
.. :-i.a ti OTi an.d sigr.ature the
17 to - '. '

. '**depos1~1on ~ranscrip~**  was waived by the witness IB and**agreeme~t** of**t~e** parties at the time of the**~** deposition; 20 That the original deposition was delivered to 21 Mr. Alan E. Brown; 22 That the amount of time used by each party**a~** 

### n the deposition is as follows: 24 Mr. Jack Sanders, 00 hours, 20 minutes 25 Mr. Alan E. Brown

- 00 hours, 45 minutes

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1 the deposition officer's 2 charges to the Defendant for preparing the original
3 deposition transcr ' ana any 4 5 deposition officer at the time said testimony was taken, 6 tne following includes all pan:.ies of record:
7
8
9
10 Mr. Jack Sanders, Jr., Attorney for Plaintiff,**f~ancy** Eli zabetl1 BovJman.;
Mr. Alan E. Brown, Attorney for Defendants, Jerry Davidson and Diana Davidson. That a copy of this certificate was served on / I 11 all parties shown herein on 

### ll/Ztr/b4 anci filed with t.he
12 Clerk pursuant to Rule 203.3. 13 I further certify that i am neither counsel
14 for, related to, nor any of the parties or 15 attorneys in the action in which this proceeding was 16 taken, and further that I**a~** noc financial or U otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. 18 19 2013

.. 20 21
22
23
24 25 Certifieci cJn the 25th day

Excira-:.ior1**[)a~.e:** Deposition Resocrces, Inc. ?ir1n ist:::-.-ation. l\o

.. : 409 515 North Church Street Palestine, Texas 75801 'fe lept.one: Fac.:s ile: (903; 729-3289 (903) 727-0986

Deposition Resources, Inc. 800.295.4109 E!ectronicaHy signed by Terri Lynn Smith {601-237-608-4107) 16a5ed0f-8516-4c02-81 cc-9c8298f78b4c1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

### 14 KENNETH W. SANDERS, M.D.

- 3/26/2014

NANCY ELIZABETH BOWMAN Plaintiff, 

### v. JERRY DAVIDSON and DIANA DAVIDSON Defendants. NO. 13-0618 § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § § § 71ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT § § § § OF HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS

VIDEOTAPED/ORAL DEPOSITION OF KENNETH W. SANDERS, M.D. MARCH 26, 2014

15 VIDEOTAPED/ORAL DEPOSITION OF KENNETH W. SANDERS, 16 M.D., produced as a witness at the instance of the 17 Plaintiff, and duly sworn, was taken in the 18 above-styled**~nd** -numbered cause on the 26th day of 19 March, 2014, from 3:10 p.m. until 3:54 p.m., before 20 Amanda J. Leigh, certified Shorthand Reporter in and 21 for the State of Texas, reported by machine shorthand, 22 at Knight and sanders, 1811 East Bert Kouns Industrial 23 Loop, conference Room, Shreveport, Louisiana 71105, 24 pursuant to the Texas Rules of civil Procedure and the 25 agreement(s) hereinafter set forth, if a

LEIGH 

### & ASSOCIATES COURT REPORTING AND VIDEO (877) 790-3376 FAX (877) 790-33 1KENNETH W. SANDERS, M.D.

- 3/26/2014


### 1 A P P E A R A N C E S 2 3 

### 4 5 6 

### 7 8 

### FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 

### Jack sanders, Jr., 

### Esq. LAW OFFICE OF JACK SANDERS, JR. 

### 109 

### East Houston Marshall, Texas 75670 Telephone: 903-925-7172
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: 

### 9 Alan 

### E. Brown, 

### Esqe BOYD 

## &**BROWN~** 

### P.C. 

### 10 1215 

### Pruitt Place Tyler, Texas 75703 11 

### Telephone: 903-526-9000 12 

### 13 ALSO PRESENT: 14 15 16 

### 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 

### Mr. Bobby Bryant, Videographer

LEIGH 

### & ASSOCIATES COURT REPORTING AND VIDEO (877) 790-3376 FAX (877) 790-3377 2KENNETH W. SANDERS, M.D.

- 3/26/2014

1 feel the tongue. 2 There's no reason she shouldn't be able 3 to feel the tongue--that's a completely different 4**nerve-~but** I

-- I think she must be thrusting the S tongue to move the lip out of the way so she doesn't 6 bite it, and she's biting the tongue. That's what I 7 would think. 8 Q. Do you expect her to have any trouble 9 speaking? 10 11 just A. she does wi some -- some sounds, I mean, almost like a lisp type of a problem. when you 12 can't get the lips to make the correct positioning to 13 make to say the sounds, then you're going to have 14 some some issues with that

-- 15 Q. And is that

-- 16 A. and that's

-- that's what's going on: 17 she's having a little trouble with the lips actually 18 coming together or staying tight in certain areas when 19 we make certain sounds; and so while she's doing that, 20 then the sounds are going to not sound normal. 

### 21 Q. Is it your opinion, based on reasonable 22 medical probability, all of the problems that you have 23 discussed is a result of this dog attack on June 24, 24 2012? 25 A. Yes.

LEIGH 

### & ASSOCIATES COURT REPORTING AND VIDEO (877) 790-33 FAX (877) 790-3377 

### 271 2 3 KENNETH W. SANDERS, M.D.

- 3/26/2014
Q. And what is that opinion? I asked you if you had an opinion, and you said yes -- A. Oh. 4 Q.

-- and tell us
... ? 5 A. The opinion that I

-- okay, I'm sorry. Ask 6 me again. 7 Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether all the 8 problems that you 1 ve talked about here are a direct 9 result of the dog bite or dog attack of June 24, 2012? 10 A. Yes. My opinion is that what I see on her 11 now, around the mouth, is related to dog bites. 12 Q. All right, sir. 13 Now, in your report, you talk about the 14 cost of future surgery and scar revision. Is that 15 something that you -- do we need to talk about**that~** or 16 are you going to tell her that she doesn't think

-- are 

### 17 you telling her probably not going to help, or is that 18 going to be kind of optional with her? 19 A. At this point, probably the only one I would 20 off

-- if she really wanted to try, would be the lower 21 lip, the mucosal advancement area; and we could redo 22 that. Basically cut that off and do another mucosal 23 advancement. 24 25 Q. And describe that surgery. A. we'd pull the lip back; make an incision on

LEIGH 

### & ASSOCIATES COURT REPORTING AND VIDEO (877) 790-3376 FAX (877) 790-3377 281 2 3 4 5 6 KENNETH W. SANDERS, M.D.

- 3/26/2014

NANCY ELIZABETH BOWMAN Pl ai nt:i ff, 

### v. JERRY DAVIDSON and DIANA DAVIDSON Defendants. NO. 13-0618 § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § § 

### § 71ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT § § § § OF HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE TO THE 7 VIDEOTAPED/ORAL DEPOSITION OF KENNETH W. SANDERS, M.D. MARCH 26, 2014 8 9 I, Amanda J. Leigh, certified shorthand Reporter 10 in and for the State of Texas, hereby certify: 11 That the**witness~** KENNETH 

### w. SANDERS, M.D., was 12 duly sworn and that the transcript of the deposition is 13 a true record of the testimony given by the witness; 14 That witness waived signature; 15 That $445.00 is the deposition officer's charges 16 to counsel for the Plaintiff, for preparing the 17 original deposition and any copies of exhibits; 

### 18 That pursuant to information given to the 19 deposition officer at the time said testimony was 20 taken, the following includes all parties of record 21 and the amount of time used by each party at the time 22 of the deposition: 23 24 25

LEIGH 

### & ASSOCIATES COURT REPORTING AND VIDEO (877) 790-33 FAX (877) 790-3377 43KENNETH W. SANDERS, M.D.

- 3/26/2014

1 FOR THE PLAINTIFF: TIME: 00:32 2 Jack Sanders, Jr., Esq. LAW OFFICE OF JACK SANDERS, JR. 3 109 East Houston Marshall, Texas 75670 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 

### 15 16 

### 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 FOR THE DEFENDANTS: TIME: 00:11 Alan E. Brown, Esq. BOYD 

### & BROWN, P.C. 1215 Pruitt Place Tyler, Texas 75703

I further certify that I am neither counsel for. related to, nor employed by any of the parties in the action in which this proceeding was taken, and further that I am not financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

2014. certified to by me on this 9th day of April,

i gh, CSR /3791 Expiration: 12/31/2014 Firm Registration: 684 LEIGH 

### & ASSOCIATES COURT REPORTING AND VIDEO certified shorthand Reporters 911 west Loop 281, suite 211 Longview, Texas 75604 Telephone: {903) 295-2955 Facsimile: {214) 279-5900

LEIGH 

### & ASSOCIATES COURT REPORTING AND VIDEO (877) 790-3376 FAX (877) 790-3377 44Supreme Court of Indiana.

Alyssa POZNANSKI, a Minor, by her Parent and Next Friend, Heather POZNANSKI and Heather Poznanski, individually, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v. George HORVATH, Appellee (Defendant). No. 71S03–0111–CV–592. May 30, 2003. Minor and her mother brought personal injury action against owner of mixed-breed sheep dog after dog bit minor. The Superior Court, St. Joseph County, R.W. Chamblee, Jr. , J., granted summaryjudgment for owner. Minor and her mother appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Transfer was granted. The Supreme Court, Rucker , J., held that owner could not be held liablegiven lack of evidence that owner had any knowledge that dog exhibited dangerous or vicious propensities and absence of evidence that breed to which dog belonged exhibited such propensities. Judgment of superior court affirmed in part and cause remanded. Opinion, 749 N.E.2d 1283, vacated in part.

West Headnotes [1] Judgment 228 181(2) 228 Judgment 228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 228k181 Grounds for Summary Judgment 228k181(2) k. Absence of Issue of Fact. Most Cited CasesA genuine issue of material fact exists in summary judgment context where facts concerning anissue that would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences. Trial Procedure Rule 56(C)

. [2] Judgment 228 185(2) 228 Judgment 228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 228k182 Motion or Other Application 228k185 Evidence in General 228k185(2) k. Presumptions and Burden of Proof. Most Cited Cases On motion for summary judgment, any doubt as to a fact or an inference to be drawn is resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Trial Procedure Rule 56(C)

. [3] Appeal and Error 30 863 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General 30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of Decision Appealed from

30k863 k. In General. Most Cited CasesAppellate court must carefully review a decision on a summary judgment motion to ensure that a party was not improperly denied its day in court. Trial Procedure Rule 56(C)

. [4] Animals 28 66.5(2) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(2) k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k68)Act of unprovoked biting by a dog does not necessarily mean the dog is dangerous or vicious. [5] Animals 28 74(3) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k74 Actions 28k74(3) k. Presumptions and Burden of Page 1 788 N.E.2d 1255 (Cite as: 788 N.E.2d 1255)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.Proof. Most Cited Cases

Under common law, all dogs, regardless of breed or size, are presumed to be harmless domestic animals. [6] Animals 28 74(3) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k74 Actions 28k74(3) k. Presumptions and Burden of Proof. Most Cited CasesPresumption that dog is harmless domestic animal is overcome by evidence of a known or dangerous propensity as shown by specific acts of theparticular animal, with “dangerous propensity” being a tendency of the animal to do any act that might endanger the safety of persons or property in a given situation. [7] Animals 28 66.5(2) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(2) k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k68) Jury could reasonably conclude in negligence action against dog owner that dog at least exhibiteddangerous, if not vicious tendencies, in biting victim who received hospital and medical attention including several stitches to her face. [8] Animals 28 74(3) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k74 Actions 28k74(3) k. Presumptions and Burden of Proof. Most Cited CasesJury may not reasonably infer, from a dog's exhibition of dangerous or vicious tendencies for the first time, that the dog's owner knew or should have known of those tendencies. [9] Animals 28 66.1 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.1 k. Duties and Liabilities in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k69) When wild animals are kept as pets, an owner is liable for injuries caused by the animal, even if the owner had no prior knowledge of the animal's propensity to cause harm, and even if the owner has exercised the utmost care in preventing harm. [10] Animals 28 66.1 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.1 k. Duties and Liabilities in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k69) In essence, strict liability is imposed on ownersof wild animals for injuries caused by those animals. [11] Animals 28 66.2 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.2 k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k70) Owners of domestic animals may be held liable for harm caused by their pet, but only if the owner knows or has reason to know that the animal has dangerous propensities. [12] Animals 28 66.5(2) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(2) k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k70) Unlike with wild animals, when the owner of a dog has knowledge of its dangerous propensities, rules of liability are based upon negligence and not strict liability. Page 2 788 N.E.2d 1255 (Cite as: 788 N.E.2d 1255)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.[13] Animals 28 66.5(4)

28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(4) k. Contributory and Comparative Negligence. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k71) Animals 28 66.5(6) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(6) k. Assumption of Risk. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k71)Because action against owner to recover for injuries inflicted by dog is one sounding in negligence, the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are available to limit liability. [14] Animals 28 66.5(2) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(2) k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k70) Where there is no evidence of an owner's actual knowledge that his or her dog has dangerouspropensities, the owner may nonetheless be held liable provided there is evidence that the particular breed to which the dog belongs has dangerous propensities, even where the owner's dog has never before attacked or bitten anyone. [15] Animals 28 66.5(2) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(2) k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k70) Jury could not infer that owner of mixed-breed sheep dog knew that dog was dangerous or vicious,and thus owner could not be held liable in negligence action for first-time bite by dog, where there was no evidence presented that owner had any knowledge that dog exhibited dangerous or vicious propensities and no evidence that breed to which dog belonged exhibited dangerous or vicious propensities. *1257 Daniel H. Pfeifer,Jon A. Criss , Sweeney,Pfeifer, Morgan & Stesiak, South Bend, IN, Attorneys for Appellants. Lynn M. Butcher , Don G. Blackmond , South Bend, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

CIVIL TRANSFER RUCKER , Justice. The question we address in this opinion is whether the very act of an unprovoked biting by a dog that in the past displayed no vicious tendenciesis sufficient by itself for a jury to infer that the animal's owner knew, or should have known, of the dog's vicious tendencies. We grant transfer to hold that it is not.

Facts and Procedural History In this summary judgment action the following facts are not in dispute. George Horvath lives in South Bend and owned a mixed-breed sheepdog named Hey. The dog had never bitten anyone and was well behaved. No one had ever complained about Hey, and he did not usually wander out of Horvath's yard. On July 23, 1997, Horvath allowed Hey to remain outside unattended. The dog was neither on a leash nor confined by a fence. WhenAlyssa Poznanski and her mother walked by Horvath's home, Hey bit Alyssa without provocation.As a result Alyssa suffered a cut to her face requiring stitches. Among other things, a South Bend city ordinance provides in pertinent part “[e]very owner and/or his agent of an animal within the City shall see that his or her animal ... is properly restrainedand not at large.” Appellant's App. at 91. The ordinance defines “at large” as “any animal that is not Page 3 788 N.E.2d 1255 (Cite as: 788 N.E.2d 1255)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.under restraint.” Id. at 92.

In her individual capacity and on behalf of Alyssa as next friend, Alyssa's mother (hereafter“the Poznanskis”) sued Horvath for personal injuries and medical expenses. In response, Horvath filed a motion for summary judgment. Finding there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Horvath knew or should have known of any vicious tendencies of the dog, the trial court granted the motion. The Poznanskis appealed. On review, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether Horvath: (1) knew or should have knownof the dog's vicious propensities; (2) used reasonable care in keeping the dog restrained; and (3)could be held liable under the local ordinance requiring proper restraint of animals. *1258 Horvathsought transfer, which this Court previously granted. Poznanski v. Horvath, 761 N.E.2d 423 (Ind.2001)

. Standard of Review [1][2][3] Our standard of review is the same as that used in the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) ; Tom–Wat, Inc. v. Fink, 741 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ind.2001) . A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue that would dispose of the litigation are in dispute orwhere the facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences. Woodward Ins., Inc. v. White, 437 N.E.2d 59, 62 (Ind.1982) . Any doubt as to a fact or an inference to be drawn is resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind.2000) . We must carefully review a decision on a summary judgment motion to ensure that a party was not improperly denied its day in court. Tom–Wat, 741 N.E.2d at 346

.

Discussion Relying on Layman v. Atwood, 175 Ind.App. 176, 370 N.E.2d 933 (1977) , the Court of Appealsin this case concluded that Horvath could not be absolved of liability simply because his dog had never before bitten anyone. According to the court, “the very fact that Hey bit Alyssa without provocation is evidence from which a reasonable inference can be made that Hey had vicious tendencies. Further, itmay be inferred that if the dog had vicious tendencies based on this one incident, then similar to Layman, a question of fact exists as to whether Horvath knew or, at the least, should have known of these tendencies.” Poznanski v. Horvath, 749 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)

. In Layman, a father acting in his individual capacity and as next friend, sued Larry and Sherrod Atwood when their Saint Bernard bit the father's eight-year-old daughter. The Atwoods moved for summary judgment that was supported by affidavit. Among other things, the affidavit provided that the dog had always been an affectionate companion to the Atwood children and that prior to this incident had never bitten or harmed anyone in any way. Layman, 370 N.E.2d at 934. The trial court granted the motion. On review the Court of Appeals reversed.Noting that the dog-biting incident was unprovoked, the court held: A jury could reasonably infer that the very act ofunprovoked biting by the Atwoods' dog was evidence of that animal's vicious tendencies. If an animal does, indeed, have vicious tendencies a jury could reasonably infer that the animal's ownerknew or, at least, should have known of those vicious tendencies. Id. at 935. [4][5][6][7] We first observe that the “very actof unprovoked biting” by a dog does not necessarily mean the dog is dangerous or vicious. Under our common law, all dogs, regardless of breed or size, are presumed to be harmless domestic animals. Ross v. Lowe, 619 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ind.1993) . This presumption is overcome by evidence of a known or dangerous propensity as shown by specific acts of the particular animal. Id. A dangerous propensity is a tendency of the animal to do any act that might Page 4 788 N.E.2d 1255 (Cite as: 788 N.E.2d 1255)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.endanger the safety of persons or property in a given situation. Id. Thus, depending on the facts of a particular case, a dog's unprovoked biting may ormay not be evidence of the dog's vicious tendencies. For example, although technically a “biting,” a playful nibble on the hand is one thing, while a “teeth-baring” clamp on the arm is quite another. In any event, in this *1259 case the record shows thatHey either “bit” or “nipped” Alyssa in the face. Appellant's App. at 59. Regardless of the characterization, the incident resulted in Alyssa receiving hospital and medical attention including several stitches to her face. Under these circumstances ajury could reasonably conclude that Hey at least exhibited dangerous, if not vicious, tendencies. [8] The question remains whether in light of a dog exhibiting dangerous or vicious tendencies for the first time, may a jury reasonably infer that the dog's owner knew, or at least should have known of those tendencies. If so, then this inference alone is enough to create a genuine issue of material fact todefeat a dog owner's claim that he or she was unaware of such tendencies. We conclude however that a jury may not make such an inference. [9][10][11][12][13] When wild animals are kept as pets, an owner is liable for injuries caused by the animal. Irvine v. Rare Feline Breeding Ctr., Inc., 685 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) , trans. denied. This is so even if the owner had no prior knowledge of the animal's propensity to causeharm, and even if the owner has exercised the utmost care in preventing harm. In essence, strict liability is imposed on owners of wild animals. Id. Owners of domestic animals may also be held liable for harm caused by their pet but only if the owner knows or has reason to know that the animal has dangerous propensities. Klenberg v. Russell, 125 Ind. 531, 25 N.E. 596, 597 (1890) ( “[T]he owners of creatures which, as a species, are harmless and domesticated, and are kept for convenience or use, such as dogs ... are not liable for injuries willfully committed by them unless he is proved to have had notice of the inclination of the particular animals complained of to commit such injuries.”); see also Artificial Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Martin, 102 Ind.App. 74, 198 N.E. 446, 448 (1935) . As with wild animals this liability also attaches regardless of the amount of care exercised by the owner.However, unlike with wild animals, when the owner of a dog has knowledge of its dangerous propensities, “[the] rules of liability are based upon negligence and not strict liability.” Alfano v. Stutsman, 471 N.E.2d 1143, 1144 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (quoting Doe v. Barnett, 145 Ind.App. 542, 251 N.E.2d 688, 694 (1969) ). Because it is an actionsounding in negligence, the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are available to limit this liability. Borton v. Lavenduskey, 486 N.E.2d 639, 642 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) , trans. denied.In certain instances, a cause of action in negligence can survive without the owner's actual knowledge of the animal's dangerous propensities. Indeed, such knowledge may even be constructive. Doe, 251 N.E.2d at 692. Nonetheless, when an owner does not know of his animal's dangerous propensities, the rule is not that the jury may infer or impute such knowledge. Rather, “the rule is that the owner is bound to know the natural tendencies of the particular class of animals to which [the] dog belongs.” Ross, 605 N.E.2d at 788 (emphasis added). If the propensities of the class to which thedog belongs are the kind which one might reasonably expect would cause injury, then the owner must use reasonable care to prevent injuries from occurring. Id. [14] Thus, where there is no evidence of an owner's actual knowledge that his or her dog has dangerous propensities, the owner may nonetheless be held liable provided there is evidence that theparticular breed to which the dog belongs has dangerous propensities. And this is so even where the owner's dog has never before attacked or bitten anyone. See, e.g., *1260 Holt v. Myers, 47 Ind.App. 118, 93 N.E. 1002, 1002–03 (1911) (observing that the ferocious nature of a bulldog was sufficient to provide the owner with constructive notice of the Page 5 788 N.E.2d 1255 (Cite as: 788 N.E.2d 1255)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.dog's dangerous propensities). In essence, a jury

may not infer that an owner knew or should have known of a dog's dangerous or vicious propensities from the fact of a first time, unprovoked biting. Rather in such an instance, a jury may infer that the owner knew or should have known of the dog'sdangerous or vicious propensities only where evidence shows that the particular breed to which theowner's dog belongs is known to exhibit such tendencies. [15] In the case before us, there was no evidence presented that Horvath had any knowledgethat Hey exhibited dangerous or vicious propensities. The record shows Hey was very well trained, behaved well, responded when Horvath called to him or told him to stay. Hey did not wander out of Horvath's yard or wander around the neighborhood. The record also shows that Horvath never received any complaints about Hey's conduct or behavior.And even though Horvath's home was near an elementary school, Hey did not get excited or nervouswhen he heard children playing, screaming or making loud noises. Nor was there any evidence presented to the trial court that the breed to which Hey belonged, a mixed-breed sheep dog, exhibited dangerous or vicious propensities. Accordingly, a jury could not infer that Horvath knew that his dog was dangerous or vicious.On the question of whether there is any genuine issue of material fact that Horvath knew or should have known of Hey's vicious tendencies, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeals' opinion on this point is thus vacated. We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals' resolution of the Poznanskis' claim that Horvath could be heldliable under the local ordinance requiring proper restraint of animals. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court inpart. This cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SHEPARD , C.J., and DICKSON , SULLIVAN and BOEHM , JJ., concur. Ind.,2003. Poznanski ex rel. Poznanski v. Horvath 788 N.E.2d 1255 END OF DOCUMENT Page 6 788 N.E.2d 1255 (Cite as: 788 N.E.2d 1255)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Cathy A. DEARDORFF, Natural Mother andGuardian of Jessica Deardorff, and Cathy A. Deardorff, Individually, Appellants,

v. Carol BURGER, Appellee. Argued Jan. 15, 1992. Filed April 3, 1992. Dog bite victim and mother brought action against owner. The Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County, Civil Division, No. 2060 S of1988, Schaffner, J., entered judgment on jury verdict in favor of owner. Plaintiffs appealed. The Superior Court, No. 00442 Harrisburg 1991, Popovich , J., held that: (1) theory of absolute liability was inapplicable; (2) single bite on prior occasion wasinsufficient to put owner on notice of dog's allegedly vicious propensity; and (3) alleged negligence of one owner could not be imputed to alleged co-owner. Affirmed. West Headnotes [1] Animals 28 66.5(2) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(2) k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k70) Theory of absolute liability was inapplicable to action to recover for dog bite, even if owner hadknowledge of dog's previous biting of another person. [2] Animals 28 66.2 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.2 k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k70)Mere awareness and ownership of vicious animal does not per se expose one to liability for injuries inflicted absent failure on part of owner to take proper precautions to preclude that viciousness from exhibiting itself. [3] Animals 28 66.5(2) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(2) k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k70) Single bite on prior occasion was insufficient to put owner on notice of dog's allegedly vicious propensity; there was lack of evidence concerning circumstances surrounding the prior bite. [4] Animals 28 66.5(7) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(7) k. Persons Liable for Injuries in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k72) Alleged negligence of one owner of dog couldnot be imputed to alleged co-owner in action to recover for dog bite. **490 *46 Theresa L. Shade Wix , Harrisburg, for appellants. Kerry V. Smith , Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before McEWEN , POPOVICH and JOHNSON , JJ.

POPOVICH , Judge: 606 A.2d 489 Page 1 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489 (Cite as: 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.In this appeal, we re-examine the law concerning the liability of dog owners for the actions of their pets. We are asked to review the June 26, 1991, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County denying a motion for a new trial filed by the plaintiff/appellant, Cathy A. Deardorff, natural mother and guardian of Jessica Deardorff, individually. FN1 We affirm. FN1. The June 26, 1991, order was reduced to judgment on July 11, 1991, and, thus, is appealable. Pa.R.App.P. 301(c)

. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial, this Court will reverse only when the lower court has clearly and palpably abused its discretion or committed an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. Lilley v. Johns-Manville Corp., 408 Pa.Super. 83, 596 A.2d 203 (1991)

. With the preceding in mind, our review of theevidence discloses that, on the afternoon of November 16, 1986, 2-year-old Jessica, her father (David) and Shane Burger were in Shane's backyard raking leaves. Within 15 minutes of their arrival, Shane let the dog out of the house to roam in the backyard. Shane recalled that the trio played in the leaves and Jessica ran toward the dog, a 75-pound German shepherd named “Smokey”. Jessica was told by her father to “get *47 back” toward him. Shane offered to return the dog to the house, but the father did not feel it was necessary. The next thing to occur, as told by Shane, was that: ... [the child] was playing in the leaves. And she came upon [the dog] ... She hugged him around the neck and she was off to the side. And [the dog] tried ... to get away from her at that point in time.... ... [I]t all happened so fast. [Shane] just saw Smokey pulling back. There was-if he would have bit Jessica, she probably would not have a face at this point in time. He's got quite a snout on him. He did yelp, okay, as he usually does when something's happening to him that he does not like. But [Shane] did not see [the dog], youknow-there was no lunging at the child or anything like that. The dog veered back. She fell down, and we grabbed the kid and, you know,went because then we realized ... she's bleeding.... And it just happened like that, (indicating) that fast. [N.T. 54] Jessica was taken to the hospital, sedated and received stitches “all over the face ... under the eye,over her eye [and] by her lip[.]” The child was released the same day. Within a month, the stitcheswere removed, and a scar remained above and below the child's left eye. On June 13, 1988, a writ of summons was filed against Carol Burger, Shane's mother and the owner of the home in which the dog lived, for “negligently and carelessly restraining her dog.” Paragraph 5. The plaintiff claimed damages in excess of $20,000 for the injuries sustained by the child “[d]ue solelyto the negligence and carelessness of [Carol Burger].” Id. at 6. Following a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant/CarolBurger. Post-trial motions were denied and an appeal to this Court ensued. [1] The first claim of the appellant concerns the assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the theory of absolute liability of a dog owner aware of the animal's vicious propensities and the resulting injuries incurred by someone bitten by the animal. This liability, *48 the appellant maintains, is absolute regardless of the circumstances of the accident and the exercise of any care or caution by the dog's owner.The appellant cites Section 509 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Mann v. Weiand, 81* Pa. 243 (1875) in support of her proposition. We find that the trial **491 court's instructions on negligence were sufficient and did not require the inclusion of an absolute liability charge given that Section 509 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has yet to be adopted in this Commonwealth, a 606 A.2d 489 Page 2 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489 (Cite as: 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.point which the appellant concedes in her brief at

page 11. With regard to the case of Mann v. Weiand, supra, a civil action for damages resulting from the defendant's negligent keeping of a ferocious dog, the court wrote:We think one instance may show such unmistakable evidence of a vicious propensity as to make the owner of the dog, with notice, liable for any subsequent act of a similar character. The gist of the action for the subsequent misconduct of the dog, is for keeping it after knowledge of its vicious propensity: May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B., 101; Wheeler v. Brandt, 23 Barb., 324 . It thereupon becomes the duty of the owner so to keep his dogas to guard against a repetition of similar misconduct. He is bound to secure it at all events, and is liable to parties afterwards injured if the mode he has adopted to secure it proves insufficient: Wood on Nuisance, section 763; Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp., 482; Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod., 332. The principle on which this rule rests was held in Mann v. Reed, 4 Allen, 431, to be, that a ferocious animal, liable to do injury to men or property, is a nuisance, and that keeping it after notice of such liability is so wrongful, that the owner is chargeable for any neglect to keep it with such care that it cannot do any damage to a person who without any essential fault is injured thereby. The same rule applies with reference to other nuisances: Wood on Nuisances, section 766; Foish v. Sheet, 221 Barb., 333; Hughes v. McNamara, 106 Mass., 281; Marsh v. Jones, 21 Vt., 378 . Hence the keeping of a *49 vicious dog neara public highway, endangering the safety of persons passing thereon, is a nuisance, operating as an obstruction, and renders the person knowinglykeeping it there liable to indictment, and also liable to an action in favor of any person injured thereby: Granger v. Findley, 7 Irish C.L.Rep., 417; Wood on Nuisance, section 768. 81* Pa. at 254. The reason for so holding was that an owner of a dog, after he had notice, was bound to secure it at all events, and failure to do so resulted in the owner's liability to persons injured thereafter. See Commonwealth v. Carl, 87 Pa.Super. 110, 112 (1925)

. [2] In Andrews v. Smith, 324 Pa. 455, 188 A. 146 (1936) , our Supreme Court had occasion to reexamine the question in the context of a compulsory non-suit. It wrote: The theory upon which courts have so long ruled that liability for damages cannot be fastened upon the owner of a dog when that dog has bittensomeone unless the owner knew of the dog's vicious propensities, is that it would be unfair tohold the owners of domestic animals that are normally harmless responsible for the vicious acts of these animals unless they were put on notice that the animal was vicious. In so holding, the courts have merely applied the principle that no man is responsible for injuries caused by his property unless he himself was guilty of negligence in his manner of controlling or not controlling that property.

* * * * * *

mere ownership alone of inherently and apparently harmless property does not carry with it liability for damages for an injury of which that property was the instrumentality.

* * * * * * “Knowledge of the dangerous character of a thing is only the equivalent of foresight of the way inwhich it will act. If the thing is generally supposed to be universally harmless, and only a specialist would foresee that in a given case it would do damage, a person who did not foresee it *50 and who had no warning would not be held liable for the harm....” The majority of the court below held that there is nothing in the Dog Law of May 11, 1921, P.L. 606 A.2d 489 Page 3 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489 (Cite as: 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.522, as amended by the Act of May 6, 1927, P.L.

833, that rendered defendants liable to the plaintiff **492 for the injuries inflicted upon him by the former's dog. That act does not purport tochange or affect in any way the rule that an owner's liability for the vicious acts of his dog cannot be predicated upon ownership alone but it must be based also on an owner's knowledge of his dog's viciousness and his failure then to takeproper steps to prevent that viciousness displaying itself to the hurt of human beings. 324 Pa. at 459-460, 188 A. 146 (Emphasis added). Thus, it is clear from the Andrews v. Smithruling, which made specific reference to and discussed Mann v. Weiand, that mere awareness and ownership of a vicious animal does not per se expose one to liability for injuries inflicted absent afailure on the part of the owner to take proper precautions to preclude that viciousness from exhibiting itself. Id.; but see Darby v. Clare F. And R. Co., 111 Pa.Super. 537, 540, 170 A. 387 (1934)

. More recently, this Court in Miller v. Hurst, 302 Pa.Super. 235, 448 A.2d 614 (1982) (en banc),had reason to decide whether a dog owner who permitted a dog to run free in violation of the Dog Law of 1965, FN2 requiring that the dog be restrained, was liable, without further proof of negligence, for injuries caused when the dog bit a child. FN2. The Act of December 22, 1965, P.L. 1124, Art. VII, § 702, 3 P.S. § 460-702 , repealed by The Dog Law of 1982, December 7, P.L. 784, No. 225, Art. I, § 101, 3 P.S. § 459-101 et seq. (Supp.1991)

.We found that the Legislature enacted the statute to protect the public from personal injury, property damage and other hazards created by roving dogs. As a result, we: ... adopt[ed] the requirement of the statute as the standard for determining whether a person ha[d] complied with the common law duty to exercise ordinary care. * * * * * * *51 [We went on to hold that, a]lthough somestates ha[d] gone further and imposed absolute liability for damages caused by roving dogs, we f[ou]nd it improvident and unnecessary to effectsuch a monumental change without legislative action. The legislature in Pennsylvania [was observed to] ha[ve] enacted a Dog Law which require[d] that owners of dogs prevent their animals from running at large, but it ha[d] not yet imposed absolute liability upon an owner who violate[d] such law. Therefore, we d[id] not usurp the function and prerogative of the legislature. We h[e]ld merely that violation of the legislatively enacted Dog Law is negligence per se. 8 This, we believe[d], [wa]s consistent with the intent of the legislature and also with the holdings of courts of other jurisdictions having similar laws.

----- FN8. A dog owner may always show that his or her dog escaped despite the exercise of due care. In such case, the roving of the dog would not constitute negligence. Id., 302 Pa. Superior Ct. at 243-244 & n. 8, 448 A.2d at 618-619 & n. 8

. Likewise, the successor to The Dog Law of1965 makes no provision for imposing absolute liability upon dog owners for failing to keep their dogs confined or controlled; to-wit: § 459-305. Confinement of dogs It shall be unlawful for the owner or keeper of any dog to fail to keep at all times such dog either: (1) confined within the premises of the owner; (2) firmly secured by means of a collar andchain or other devise so that it cannot stray beyond the premises on which it is secured; or 606 A.2d 489 Page 4 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489 (Cite as: 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.(3) under the reasonable control of some person, or when engaged in lawful hunting, exhibition or field training. The Act of December 7, 1982, P.L. 784, No. 225, Art. III, § 305, effective January 1, 1983, 3 P.S. § 459-305 (Supp.1991) ; see also Andrews v. Smith, supra. **493 *52 However, we do not rest our decision upon the absence of any provision in the present and past dog statutes to establish liability premised upon notions of absolute liability, for aperson may rely on common law principles, in addition to statutory violations, to establish liability. See Skowronski v. Bailey, 330 Pa.Super. 83, 478 A.2d 1362, 1365 n. 3 (1984) . Nonetheless, undereither category, be it statute or common law principles, we are convinced that proof of negligence, in contrast to holding one absolutely liable, is the vehicle by which accountability for injury sustained because of a dog bite is to be established. See Andrews v. Smith, supra; Miller v. Hurst, supra.Therefore, the trial court acted properly in refusing to instruct the jury that absolute liability was established once it was shown that the appellee had knowledge of Smokey's previous biting of one John Walmer. See Andrews v. Smith, supra; Miller v. Hurst, supra. [3] The second argument proffered by the appellant suggests that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a single instance of vicious conduct on the part of a dog is sufficient to put its owner on notice of the dog's vicious propensities. Again, we look to Andrews v. Smith, supra, for guidance in responding to the appellant's assertion; namely, the Court wrote: “As soon as the owner knows or has good reason to believe that the animal is likely to do mischief, he must take care of him; it makes no difference whether this ground of suspicion arises from one act or from repeated acts. The only restriction is that the act done must be such as to furnish a reasonable inference that the animal is likely to commit an act of the kind complained of. ” The minority judge in his dissenting opinion said that the “maxim that ‘every dog is entitled to his first bite’ is not supportable in law or justice.” With this we agree. We do not understand that this maxim has ever found acceptance *53 in the courts of this Commonwealth. A dog may show ferocious propensities without biting anyone and if he does so, it is his master's duty to see to it that he is not afforded an opportunity to take a ‘first bite.’

* * * * * * Animals such as horses, oxen and dogs are not beasts that are ferae nature, i.e., wild beasts, but are classed as mansuetae natura, i.e., tamed and domesticated animals, and their owners are not responsible for any vicious acts of theirs unless the owners have knowledge that they are likely to break away from their normal domestic nature and become vicious. Of all animals, dogs have probably been the longest domesticated and thevast majority of them can be allowed their freedom without imperiling the public safety. 324 Pa. at 458, 459, 188 A. 146 (Emphasis added). Further, in Mann v. Weiand, supra, the Court observed that “one instance [of an attack by a dog] may show such unmistakable evidence of a vicious propensity as to make the owner of the dog, with notice, liable for any subsequent act of a similar character.” 81* Pa. at 254. Accord Fink v. Miller, 330 Pa. 193, 195, 198 A. 666 (1938)

. Instantly, the testimony on the question ofpropensity was equivocal. For example, Shane Burger was told by the appellee of the incident in which Smokey bit a Mr. Walmer. However, he diddescribe how Mr. Walmer had been observed kicking Smokey on three occasions. During each episode, the dog, according to Shane, “back[ed] down” or “just ... jerked away” and made its way into the 606 A.2d 489 Page 5 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489 (Cite as: 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.backyard with its tail between its legs. The dog

never exhibited any signs of viciousness to Shane or Mr. Deardorff.Also, Shane depicted Smokey as a “kind” animal-like a big puppy dog-who had never“snapped” at the witness or anyone else in its company.The appellee described Smokey in terms similar to her son's account, e.g., *54 He's a great dog. He has a great personality. He's actually very timid. If he does anything wrong, he's the kind of dog that if he does something wrong **494 he'll sit back and put his ears back....” [N.T. 69] Smokey had played with other children without “any difficulties” and the animal was considered“just ... part of the family”. In light of the preceding, the trial court gave the following charge to the jury: ... an important thing for you to decide iswhether this dog, Smokey, had vicious propensities. The dictionary defines propensity as being an intense and often urgent natural inclination to do something. Therefore, in considering whether the dog has a propensity towards violence, you must determine whether the dog had an intentional and often urgent natural inclination to be vicious. It's the Plaintiff's burden to prove that the Defendant was negligent, and a part of that in this case is that this dog Smokey had dangerous propensities. Even if you find that Smokey was a dog with vicious or dangerous propensities, the Plaintiff must establish that Defendant Carol Miller knew that, that she had knowledge that her dog had those propensities. No matter how innocent thevictim may be or how serious the injury sustained, the owner of the dog is not responsible for the consequences of the dog's bite if she has no reason to know the viciousness or dangerous propensities of the dog. [N.T. 85-86] Consistent with the precepts espoused by the Court in Andrews v. Smith, supra, and Mann v. Weiand, supra, we find that, because of a lack of evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the Walmer incident, it would have been improper forthe trial court to have advised the jury, in unqualifying terms, that a single bite on a prior occasion was sufficient to put the appellee on notice of Smokey's alleged “vicious” propensity. See Fink v. Miller, supra. Accordingly, since the appellant did not prove that Smokey had unmistakable vicious tendencies known to the appellee, *55 from the single bite ofMr. Walmer, she failed to make out a case warranting the single-bite instruction. Id. [4] As to the last of the appellant's averments,we adopt the rationale of the lower court in response thereto as appropriate and proper under the facts and law; to-wit: Finally, the plaintiff contends that the Courterred in refusing to instruct the jury that the negligent acts of one co-owner of a dog may be imputed to the other co-owner of that dog. The plaintiff asserts that the Court should have told the jury that when individuals are engaged in a common enterprise, a mutual relationship of agency is created among them and that a findingof negligence regarding one of them will be imputed to the other. The plaintiff cites DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333 (1950) in support of this argument. The plaintiff concludes that such an instruction was warranted because the defendant and her son, Shane, were co-owners of “Smokey.” Actually, in the present case, therewas no allegation in the complaint that the defendant and her son were co-owners of the dog, or that the son was negligent. The testimony did establish the premise that mother and son were co-owners. Legally, the DeVillars case is no authority for the premise that one negligent owner of a dog makes the other owner responsible and we are satisfied now, as we were at the trial, that the suggested instruction was not proper in this 606 A.2d 489 Page 6 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489 (Cite as: 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.case.

Lower Court Opinion at 8. From our review of the evidence against the backdrop of the applicable law, we find that thejury's verdict was proper, and no error was committed by the trial court to justify the grant of a new trial. Order affirmed. Pa.Super.,1992. Deardorff v. Burger 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489 END OF DOCUMENT 606 A.2d 489 Page 7 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489 (Cite as: 414 Pa.Super. 45, 606 A.2d 489)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.Supreme Court of Washington. ROBINSON ET UX. v. MARINO. Jan. 11, 1892. Appeal from superior court, King county; T. J. HUMES, Judge.Action by E. O. Robinson and Carrie Robinson, his wife, against S. Marino. There was judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. HOYT, J., dissenting.

West Headnotes Animals 28 66.5(2) 28 Animals 28k66 Injuries to Persons 28k66.5 Dogs 28k66.5(2) k. Vicious Propensities and Knowledge Thereof. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 28k70) Unless the owner of a dog knows that it has a savage disposition, and is accustomed to bite, he is not liable for injuries due to its bite. Animals 28 74(4) 28 Animals 28k66 Personal Injuries 28k74 Actions 28k74(4) k. Admissibility of Evidence. Most Cited Cases Where the complaint alleged that the dog was of a ferocious disposition, and accustomed to bite or attempt to bite people, testimony as to particular instances when he had done so was proper. Animals 28 74(8) 28 Animals 28k66 Personal Injuries 28k74 Actions 28k74(8) k. Questions for Jury. Most Cited Cases Evidence that the dog was kept chained; that when at large he had been known to attack people; and that defendant had said he was afraid the dog would break loose and hurt some one-warranted submitting to the jury the question as to the dog'sferocious disposition and the defendant's knowledge thereof. Appeal and Error 30 203.3 30 Appeal and Error 30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court of Grounds of Review 30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings Thereon 30k202 Evidence and Witnesses

30k203.3 k. Competency of Witnesses. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 30k203(3))The competency of a witness will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Damages 115 127.11 115 Damages 115VII Amount Awarded 115VII(B) Injuries to the Person 115k127.11 k. Internal Injuries in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 115k131(3)) Damages 115 127.15 115 Damages 115VII Amount Awarded 115VII(B) Injuries to the Person 115k127.12 Head and Neck Injuries in General; Mental Impairment

115k127.15 k. Brain Injuries in General; Mental Impairment. Most Cited Cases 28 P. 752 Page 1 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752, 28 Am.St.Rep. 50 (Cite as: 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.(Formerly 115k131(3))

Damages 115 127.19 115 Damages 115VII Amount Awarded 115VII(B) Injuries to the Person 115k127.18 Arm, Hand, Wrist, and Shoulder Injuries

115k127.19 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 115k131(3)) Where plaintiff had her arm bitten to the bone by a dog, and her side lacerated, and the nervous shock consequent upon the attack greatly prostrated her, a verdict for $800 was not so excessive as to be disturbed. Damages 115 158(2) 115 Damages 115VIII Pleading 115k156 Issues, Proof, and Variance 115k158 Personal Injuries and Physical Suffering 115k158(2) k. Consequences of Injury in General. Most Cited Cases Where the allegations of a complaint were that the plaintiff, by reason of the bite of a dog, suffered great pain in body and mind, was prevented from attending to her household duties, and obliged to expend $50 for the services of a physician, and that she was damaged to the extent of $2,500, she was entitled, without any special allegation, to recoverfor all the direct and obvious results of the said injury, including physical pain and mental anguish. Evidence 157 545 157 Evidence 157XII Opinion Evidence 157XII(C) Competency of Experts 157k545 k. Preliminary Evidence as to Competency. Most Cited Cases In an action to recover for injuries occasioned by the bite of a dog, where a physician had testified that he treated two wounds for the plaintiff, it wasproper to ask him whether he had sufficient knowledge to tell what probably caused the wounds. Negligence 272 1635 272 Negligence 272XVIII Actions 272XVIII(C) Evidence 272XVIII(C)4 Admissibility 272k1635 k. Similar Facts and Transactions; Other Accidents. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 272k125) To show that a defect in property existed andcaused a particular injury, evidence of other accidents or injuries occurring about the same time and place from the same or similar cause is admissible. **752 *435 White & Munday, for appellant. T. H. Cann and Battle & Shipley, for respondents.
ANDERS, C. J. This was an action brought by respondents, as husband and wife, to recover damages for injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff Carrie Robinson by a dog owned and kept by appellant. On the trial one Dr. Hilton, a witness for plaintiff, having testified that he treated two wounds on plaintiff, which he described, was asked this question: “From your knowledge as a surgeon and general practitioner, can you tell what the probable cause of thosewounds was?” The question was objected to by defendant on the ground that the same was incompetent, and was not in the nature of expert testimony. The court overruled the objection, and exception was duly taken and allowed, and this ruling *436 of the court is assigned as error. Appellant also insists that the witness was not shown to be competent to testify as an expert, but it is a sufficient answer to this objection to state that the point was not raised in the court below, and cannot be urged for the firsttime here. We must therefore assume that the witness was competent. Indeed, the competency of the witness as an expert is sufficiently disclosed by the 28 P. 752 Page 2 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752, 28 Am.St.Rep. 50 (Cite as: 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.record, for it is there shown that he had been a practicing physician and surgeon for 20 years, and wasstill practicing as such at the time of the trial. Physicians and surgeons of experience are presumed to be acquainted with all matters pertaining to their profession, and to be competent to testify concerning the same. Rog. Exp. Test. (2d Ed.) 43, 99. And that a medical expert may give an opinion as to the means by which a particular wound was inflicted is the prevailing doctrine of the courts. Id. 127, 128, and cases cited. But the question here objected to called for no opinion whatever except as to whether the witness had sufficient knowledgeto tell what probably caused the wounds described. He was not asked to state what caused them, or even what probably caused them. Thequestion was preliminary in its nature, and the objection was properly overruled. But, even if it was error to permit the question to be propounded to thewitness, we think the judgment should not be reversed, as the defendant could not have been prejudiced thereby. It was clearly shown by other competent testimony in the case that the plaintiff Mrs. Robinson was bitten by defendant's dog, and thatwhatever injuries she suffered resulted therefrom. The admission of incompetent testimony under such circumstances would not justify us in reversing the judgment of the trial court. Brown v. Forest, 1 Wash. T. 201

. Appellant also insists that it was error to permitthe witness Addie Simons to testify to particular instances of *437 the action of the dog in question, for the reason that no testimony had been offered to show that defendant had any knowledge of the same, and that it was not competent to prove the disposition of the dog by such testimony. We think the objection cannot be sustained. It was alleged in the complaint that the dog was of a ferocious and mischievous disposition, and accustomed to attack and bite mankind; and it is quite evident that that fact could not be more readily made manifest than by testimony descriptive of his actions. Whether ornot the dog was vicious was one of the principal issues to be determined by the jury, and it was certainly competent to show that previously to the occasion on which he attacked Mrs. Robinson he had bitten or attempted to bite another person. It is alleged in the brief of appellant that the evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs failed to show that the dog was of a ferocious disposition, andfailed to show that defendant had notice or knowledge of such disposition, and failed to show any negligence on the part of the defendant in suffering the dog to be at large; and it is therefore contended that defendant's motion for a nonsuit should have been granted. But we are of the opinion that there was sufficient testimony to go to the jury upon each of the points made by counsel. Several witnessesfor the plaintiffs had testified that the dog had always been kept chained, which was strong evidence that he was ill-disposed; and that **753 he would bark and jump at persons going near him while tied, and endeavor to get loose. The plaintiff Mrs.Robinson testified that she had lived on the opposite side of the street from the residence of the defendant for about three years, and that she had known the defendant's dog during that time, and that on the morning of November 2, 1890, she went to the house of defendant to get vegetables, as she had been accustomed to do; that when she got to the corner of the house the dog was lying with his nose on the *438 door-step, which she thought was something unusual, and sprang upon her and bit and bruised her badly, and bit her arm to the bone; and Mrs. Simons had testified that on one occasion, and the only time she ever saw the dog at large, she saw him run after and seize hold of a woman's dress as she ran out through the gate; and Mr. Peterson hadtestified that the defendant stated to him the summer before that he was afraid that his dog would get loose and bite his (Peterson's) child, because she was in the defendant's garden so much. With such testimony before it, the court would not have been justified in granting defendant's motion. The owner of a domestic animal is not liable, in the absence of statutory provision, for any injury it may inflict upon others, unless he has notice of its inclination to commit such an injury. But, according to the 28 P. 752 Page 3 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752, 28 Am.St.Rep. 50 (Cite as: 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.more modern and more reasonable doctrine, it is

not necessary that he should have had actual positive notice. If he has notice that the disposition of the animal is such that it would be likely to commitan injury similar to the one complained of, it is sufficient. It is not necessary that the notice be of injury actually committed. Thus, in case of a dog known to be vicious and ferocious by its keeper, it is unnecessary to show that he had previously bitten any person. The keeper of such a dog must see to itthat he is kept securely, or be responsible for all injury done by him. Cooley, Torts, (2d Ed.) 404, 405; 2 Shear. & R. Neg. (4th Ed.) § 630; Flansburg v. Basin, 3 Ill. App. 531; Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251. In the case last cited, REDFIELD, J., said: “The duty which the law casts upon the keeper of a dangerous and malicious domestic animal is but the enforcement of a common moral duty, binding upon all men, that a man should so keep and use his own property as not to wrong and injure others. The formula used in text-books and in forms given for pleadings in such cases-‘accustomed *439 to bite’-does not mean that the keeper of a ferocious dog is exempt from all duty of restraint until the dog has effectually mangled or killed at least one person. But, as he is held to be a man of common vigilance and care, if he had good reason to believe from his knowledge of the ferocious nature andpropensity of the dog that there was ground to apprehend that he would, under some circumstances, bite a person, then the duty of restraint attached, and to omit it was negligence.” In this case it was not shown that the defendant had any knowledge that the dog had ever attacked or bitten any person before he attacked the plaintiff, but we think it was fairly shown that he knew, or should have known, that the disposition of the dog was such as to make it highly probable that he would bite some one incase he should ever break his fastening or be untied, and it was therefore the duty of the defendant to effectually restrain him. 2 Shear. & R. Neg. § 628. And the fact that he endeavored to do so, and that the dog broke loose, or was untied by someother person, and without his consent or knowledge, will not, of itself, exempt him from liability for injury inflicted by the dog while so at large.Partlow v. Haggarty, 35 Ind. 178; Wilkinson v. Parrott, 32 Cal. 102; Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195. In Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195, it washeld that, in an action against the owner of a ferocious dog for injuries inflicted by it, proof that the animal is of a savage and ferocious disposition is equivalent to express notice. And it has even beenheld that the knowledge of the wife is the knowledge of the husband in such cases. 2 Shear. & R. Neg. § 630, note. The defendant testified in his own behalf that the reason he always kept the dog chained was to prevent him from following his team as he went around town selling vegetables. He also stated that he did not recollect ever telling Peterson he was afraid his dog would bite his child, *440 and did not think he so stated, and that he never was afraid the dog would bite anybody, and that the dog had never before bitten any one, and that no one had ever complained of the dog to him. Defendant's wife also testified that the dog never bit any personbefore, but neither of them contradicted the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses that he was “cross,” and would jump at persons while chained, andwould try to get loose. The court properly instructed the jury upon the law applicable to the case, and specially charged them that before plaintiffs could recover in the action they must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had knowledge that the dog was of a ferocious and mischievous disposition and accustomed to attack and bite mankind. The jury must have found, uponall the facts and circumstances in evidence, that defendant had such knowledge; and we cannot say that their verdict was unwarranted by the evidence, and therefore find no error in the refusal to grant a new trial. Appellant further contends that plaintiffs were not entitled, upon the pleadings and evidence, to averdict for more than the amount paid for medicines and medical attendance. It is claimed that there is no sufficient allegation of special damage 28 P. 752 Page 4 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752, 28 Am.St.Rep. 50 (Cite as: 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.in the complaint, and no proof whatever of the

value of plaintiff's services or of the amount of damage sustained by her; that whatever damages she sustained were not the necessary consequencesof her injuries,-were, therefore, special, and consequently not recoverable in this action because not alleged. It is true that there is no proof of the value of plaintiff's services, and it is therefore reasonable to presume that the jury awarded no damage **754 on that account. But we think the learned counsel for appellant are in error in assuming that under theallegations of the complaint no damages can be recovered except the amount shown to have been paid for medical services and medicine. The complaint alleges *441 “that the said dog, while in the wrongful keeping of defendant as aforesaid, and wrongfully and negligently suffered by defendant to go at large without being properly guarded and confinedas aforesaid, attacked and bit plaintiff Carrie Robinson on the arm and wrist and on her side, thereby severely wounding and injuring her, said plaintiff, whereby she suffered, and still suffers, great pain of body and mind, and thereby was prevented for the period of five days from attending to her household duties, and was obliged to and did expend the sum of $50 for medicines and the services of a physician in the endeavor to heal herself of said wounds and injuries; that by reason of said wounds and injuries plaintiffs have been damaged in the sum of $2,500.” It is a well-settled principle of law that damages which are the natural and necessary result of an injury need not be specially pleaded. The plaintiffs had a right, under the allegations of the complaint, to recover a fair compensation for all the direct and obvious results of the injuries received, including physical pain and mental anguish. Suchdamages are implied by law, and need not be specially alleged. 3 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) p. 586; 3 Suth. Dam. 715; Curtis v. Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. 534, Tyson v. Booth, 100 Mass. 258. And no doubtthe jury, in estimating the damages, took into consideration, as they had a right to do, not only the physical and mental suffering of plaintiff, but also the effect produced upon her nervous system as shown by the evidence, and for which she was treated by her physician for some six weeks after the wounds upon her person had healed. It is further contended by appellant that the verdict for $800 is excessive. We cannot agree with counsel for appellant that the injuries received by plaintiff were altogether of a trifling character. Thewound upon her wrist, while only about the diameter of an “eight-penny nail,” penetrated to the bone. Her dress and corset were bitten through, and her side lacerated for the space *442 of three-quarters of an inch and to the depth of a quarter of an inch. But her greatest injury resulted from the fright and mental terror, and the nervous shock produced by the unprovoked, sudden, and unexpected attack upon her by this savage and infuriated beast. She says she was rendered so nervous that she couldscarcely sleep for some time afterwards; and, according to the testimony of her husband, when she heard the dog barking, as she often did, she was soterrified that he was afraid she would go into convulsions. And there was testimony tending to show that she was still suffering from nervousness at the time of the trial. It is impossible to lay down any precise rule for measuring the damages in cases like the one at bar, and the amount of the recovery must of necessity be left to the sound discretion and judgment of the jury, subject to be revised by the court when it clearly appears to be excessive. Whilethe amount of the verdict may seem large, we cannot say that it is so disproportionate to the injury asto indicate that it was the result of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, and we therefore see no reason for disturbing it. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. DUNBAR, STILES, and SCOTT, JJ., concur. HOYT, J. I dissent.

Wash. 1892. Robinson v. Marino 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752, 28 Am.St.Rep. 50 28 P. 752 Page 5 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752, 28 Am.St.Rep. 50 (Cite as: 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752)

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28 P. 752 Page 6 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752, 28 Am.St.Rep. 50 (Cite as: 3 Wash. 434, 28 P. 752)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.Restatement of the Law - Torts Database updated March 2015 Restatement (Second) of Torts

Division Three. Strict Liability Chapter 20. Liability of Possessors and Harborers of Animals

Topic 2. Harm Caused by Animals Otherwise Than by Trespass by Livestock
§ 509 Harm Done by Abnormally Dangerous Domestic Animals Comment: Reporter's Note Case Citations - by Jurisdiction
(1) A possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the harm.(2) This liability is limited to harm that results from the abnormally dangerous propensity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know. Comment:

a . The general rule stated in this Section is subject to a number of exceptions and qualifications, too numerous to state in a single Section. The Section should therefore be read together with § 510 , on the effect of an unforeseeable act of a third person, another animal or a force of nature; § 511 , on liability to trespassers, as to which there is in turn a qualification in § 512 ; § 515 , on assumption of risk and contributory negligence; § 516 , on watchdogs; and § 517 , on acts done in performance of a public duty. b . The phrase “has reason to know” here as elsewhere in the Restatement means that the person in question knows or from facts known to him should know. (See § 12 ).

c . Animals dangerous although not vicious. In the usual situation to which the rule stated in this Section is applicable the animal is vicious, that is, has a tendency to attack human beings or other animals that is abnormal in animals of its class. The rule is also applicable if the animal is not vicious but has a dangerous tendency that is unusual and not necessary for the purposes for which such animals are usually kept. Thus one who keeps a large dog that he knows to be accustomed to fawn violently upon children and adults is liable under the rule stated in this Section for harm done by its dangerous playfulness or over-demonstrative affection. This is also true of one who keeps a dog that he knows to have an abnormal tendency to destroy crops and other vegetation. d

. Rationale. One who keeps a domestic animal that to his knowledge is vicious, or which though not vicious possesses dangerous propensities that are abnormal thereby introduces a danger not usual to the comREST 2d TORTS § 509 Page 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 (1977)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.munity and which, furthermore, is not necessary to the proper functioning of the animal for the purposes that it

serves. On the other hand, those who keep domestic animals such as bulls and stallions that are somewhat moredangerous than other members of their species do not introduce any unusual danger, since the somewhat dangerous characteristics of these animals are a customary incident of farming and the slightly added risk due to their dangerous character is counterbalanced by the desirability of raising livestock.

e . Animals in which dangerous propensities are normal. There are certain classes of domestic animals in which dangerous propensities are normal although abnormal in other classes of their species. Bulls are more dangerous than cows and steers; stallions are more dangerous than mares and geldings; rams are more dangerous than ewes and lambs. However, these animals have been kept for stud purposes from time immemorial so that the particular danger involved in their dangerous tendencies has become a normal incident of civilized life. This,together with the fact that the virility which makes them dangerous is necessary for their usefulness in performing their function in the socially essential breeding of livestock, justifies the risk involved in their keeping. Therefore, the law has not regarded bulls, stallions and rams as being abnormally dangerous animals to be kept under the strict liability stated in this Section. So, too, certain kinds of livestock are less gentle than others. ThusBurma cattle are more wild and dangerous than most other breeds. However, since Burma cattle have been recognized as socially desirable animals, this addition to the normal dangerous characteristics of cattle is not enough to make them abnormally dangerous. Although one who keeps these animals is not subject to the strictliability stated in this Section, he is liable unless he exercises in their custody care commensurate with their normal dangerous characteristics. On the other hand, although a certain amount of danger is inseparable from the keeping of these socially essential or useful animals, there is no social value in keeping animals that are vicious or have other dangerous propensities that are in excess of those necessary for their utility and are abnormal to their class. f

. Dogs. Although dogs, even hunting dogs, have no material utility comparable to cattle, horses and otherlivestock, they have from time immemorial been regarded as the friends and companions of man. The great majority of dogs are harmless, and the possession of characteristics dangerous to mankind or to livestock is properly regarded as abnormal to them. Consequently the possessor of a dog is not liable for its biting a person or worrying or killing livestock unless he has reason to know that it is likely to do so. Statutes frequently abolish the necessity of scienter and impose strict liability for all harm caused to human beings and livestock by dogs. Even in the absence of a statute the possessor of a dog known by him to be vicious is liable for harm caused by it although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it. As to the privilege to use dogs to protect property from intrusion, see § 516 . As to the liability to trespassers generally, see §§ 511 and 512

. g . Knowledge of dangerous propensities—scienter. It is not necessary to the application of the rule stated in this Section that the possessor of the domestic animal know of its abnormally dangerous propensities; it is enough that he has reason to know of them. Thus it is not necessary that he know that it has previously attacked human beings or animals or has done harm by being over-violent in play or by digging up vegetation. A dog is not necessarily regarded as entitled to one bite. It is enough that the possessor of the animal knows that it has on other occasions exhibited such a tendency to attack human beings or other animals or otherwise to do harm asshould apprise him of its dangerous character. Thus, the fact that a dog has to his knowledge unsuccessfully attempted to attack human beings or other animals is sufficient to bring its possessor within the rule stated in this Section. Sufficient also is any form of ill temper displayed in the presence of man or beast that would apprise areasonable person that the animal if uncontrolled would make an attack. It is not enough, however, that the posREST 2d TORTS § 509 Page 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 (1977)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.sessor of the animal has reason to know that it has a propensity to do harm in one or more specific ways; it is necessary that he have reason to know of its propensity to do harm of the type that it inflicts.

Illustrations: Illustrations: 1. A keeps a dog, which he knows to be in the habit of running after automobiles and yapping at their wheels. A chains the dog in his yard. The dog escapes, without any negligence on the part of A, runs into the street, and barks at the wheels of B's passing automobile. The dog is caught under one of the wheels, B's car is thrown into the ditch, and B is injured. A is subject to liability to B under this Section.2. A keeps a dog in his apartment on the second floor. A knows that the dog is in the habit of rushing at the window and leaning out of it in order to bark at pedestrians passing below. The dogrushes to the window to bark at B, loses its footing, and falls on B and injures him. A is subject to liability to B under this Section. h

. Knowledge of servant. It is not necessary for the possessor of a domestic animal himself to have reason to know of its abnormally dangerous propensities; it is enough that a servant to whom he has entrusted its custody has reason to know of it. (See the Restatement, Second, Agency § 283 ).
i

. Harm resulting from dangerous propensity. The strict liability stated in Subsection (1) extends only to such harm as results from the abnormally dangerous propensity of the animal, of which the possessor knows or has reason to know. The basis of his liability is that by keeping the animal with knowledge, or reason to know,of the abnormal propensity he has exposed those in his vicinity to an abnormal risk. His strict liability is therefore limited to the scope of that risk. He may still be liable for any negligence in keeping the animal or in dealing with it, which results in other harm; but in the absence of knowledge he is not liable for harm not reasonably to be expected in the light of his knowledge. Thus one who keeps a vicious dog, knowing that it has a propensity to bite, is not liable when the dog lies down in the street and is run over by an automobile, with resulting harm to the driver of the car, unless he has insome way been negligent in failing to prevent the occurrence. If the dog bites a man, he is liable even in the absence of negligence. Knowledge, or reason to know, that an animal has a tendency to attack or fight with other animals is not necessarily knowledge or reason to know that it will attack human beings. If the possessor knows that his dog has the playful habit of jumping up on visitors, he will be liable without negligence when the dogjumps on a visitor, knocks him down and breaks his hip; but he is not necessarily liable when the dog unexpectedly bites a postman, when he never has shown any inclination to do so before. Knowledge of one propensity may under particular circumstances give reason to know that the animal is likely to do something reasonably similar, even though he has not yet done it. Thus a horse that has attempted to bite persons in its vicinity may fairly be regarded as equally likely to kick them if afforded the opportunity. Reporter's Note This Section has been changed by the addition of Subsection (2). In support of the rule stated in Subsection (1) see: Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3 Cir.1943) ; Vigue v. Noyes, 113 Ariz. 237, 550 P.2d 234 (1976) ; Strange v. Stovall, 261 Ark. 53, 546 S.W.2d 421 (1977) ; Barger v. Jimerson, 130 Colo. 459, 276 P.2d 744 (1954) ; Farrior v. Payton, 57 Haw. 620, 562 P.2d 779 (1977) ; Tamburello v. Jaeger, 249 La. 25, 184 So.2d 544 (1966) ; Bachman v. Clark, 128 Md. 245, 97 A. 440 (1916) ; Papke v. Tribbey, 68 Mich.App. 130, 242 N.W.2d 38 (1976) ; Harris v. Breezy Point Lodge, 238 Minn. 322, 56 N.W.2d 655 (1953) ; Humes v. Salerno, 351 S.W.2d 749 (Mo.1961) ; Emmons v. Stevane, 77 N.J.L. 570, 73 A. 544 REST 2d TORTS § 509 Page 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 (1977)

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