IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

February 19, 2020 Session

MARK T. CROSS v.. RIVER SOUND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 

INCORPORATED

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County

No. 196872-2 Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr., Chancellor

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No. E2019-01183-COA-R3-CV

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This is an appeal from an order of partial summary judgment. Although the trial court 

attempted to certify its order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of 

Civil Procedure, we hold that such certification was improvident. There being no final 

judgment before us, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY

and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

Lewis S. Howard, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, River Sound Homeowners 

Association, Incorporated.

Christopher D. Heagerty, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Mark T Cross.

OPINION

Background

The parties to this appeal are Mark Cross and the River Sound Homeowners 

Association, Inc. (“the HOA”). Mr. Cross resides in the River Sound subdivision and 

operates an Airbnb at his residence. The HOA contends that Mr. Cross’s operation of an 

Airbnb at his residence in the River Sound Community is in violation of the HOA’s 

Amended and Restated Declaration of Restrictions. Prior to the onset of this litigation, 

the HOA made demand on Mr. Cross to cease and desist offering others access to his 

property and also demanded that Mr. Cross refrain from offering his property to others 

via advertisement on the internet in violation of the HOA’s restrictions. The HOA 

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threatened monetary penalties if Mr. Cross failed to acquiesce in its demands. 

Mr. Cross soon filed suit in the Knox County Chancery Court (“the trial court”) as 

a result of the above controversy, and in his October 25, 2018 petition, he sought 

declaratory relief regarding the Declaration of Restrictions pertinent to the subdivision,1

as well as monetary damages. According to Mr. Cross, the use of his property amounted 

to the grant of a “license” to others, not a “lease.” The HOA filed an answer and 

counterclaim in December 2018. Therein, the HOA alleged that Mr. Cross “uses his 

residence as a short term rental property.” The HOA further alleged that Mr. Cross was 

in violation of the subdivision’s restrictions, and it sought the issuance of an injunction 

against continued violations, as well as the recovery of certain costs and expenses. 

Pursuant to a January 2, 2019 motion for summary judgment filed by Mr. Cross, 

on May 16, 2019, the trial court entered an order of partial summary judgment granting 

him certain declaratory relief. Of note, the May 16 order did not adjudicate all issues in 

the case. In fact, the order openly acknowledged that the issue of Mr. Cross’s damages 

“remain for adjudication.” The trial court concluded the order, however, by certifying it 

as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Although a Rule 60.02 motion was thereafter filed by the HOA,2that motion was 

ultimately denied, leading to the present appeal. 

Discussion

In its appellate brief, the HOA raises a number of concerns connected to the trial 

court’s grant of partial summary judgment. As explained below, however, we are unable 

to reach these issues in this appeal. Under the rules of appellate procedure, we are first 

required to consider whether this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 

case, whether or not presented for review. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b). 

Typically, appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments only. See 

Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (“Unless an appeal from 

an interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by statute, appellate courts have 

jurisdiction over final judgments only.”). Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate 

Procedure provides that:

In civil actions every final judgment entered by a trial court from which an 

appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals is appealable as of 

right. Except as otherwise permitted in rule 9 and in Rule 54.02 Tennessee 

Rules of Civil Procedure, if multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are 

involved in an action, any order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims 

 

1 The text of Mr. Cross’s petition refers to the subdivision’s restrictions as “By-Laws.” 

2 This motion was alternatively brought by the HOA pursuant to Rule 59.04, as a motion to alter 

or amend. 
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or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable 

or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before entry of a final 

judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a) (emphasis added).

In this case, inasmuch as the trial court’s own order acknowledged that further 

issues remained to be decided in the case, there clearly was not a “final judgment” in the 

traditional sense. Indeed, an “order that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims, rights, 

or liabilities of all the parties is not final.” In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 

645 (Tenn. 2003). As alluded to above, however, Rule 54.02, which was invoked by the 

trial court in this case, is a potential exception to the final judgment bar. As a prior panel 

of this Court recently explained:

Rule 54.02 “is an exception to Rule 3 that permits the trial court, 

without permission from the appellate court, to certify an order as final and 

appealable, even if parts of the overall litigation remain pending in the trial 

court.” Johnson v. Nunis, 383 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). It 

allows “the trial court to convert an interlocutory ruling into an appealable 

order.” Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 380 S.W.3d 42, 49 (Tenn. 

2012). However, “the trial court’s authority to direct the entry of a final 

judgment is not absolute.” Brentwood Chase Cmty. Ass’n v. Truong, No. 

M2014–01294–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 5502393, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Oct. 30, 2014) (citing Crane v. Sullivan, No. 01A01–9207–CH–00287, 

1993 WL 15154, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1993)). “Rule 54.02 does 

not apply to all orders that are interlocutory in nature.” Konvalinka v. Am. 

Int'l Grp., Inc., No. E2011–00896–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 1080820, at *3 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2012). An order can only be certified as final in 

limited circumstances. Johnson, 383 S.W.3d at 130. Because Rule 54.02 

provides that a trial court may “direct the entry of a final judgment as to 

one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties,” the order certified 

as final must be dispositive of an entire claim or a party. Bayberry, 783 

S.W.2d at 558. In other words, the order at issue must dispose of at least 

one entire claim or resolve all of the claims against at least one 

party. Konvalinka, 2012 WL 1080820, at *3. “The purpose of the 

certification rule is to enhance judicial economy and ‘to prevent piecemeal 

appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units.’” Cates v. 

White, No. 03A01–9104–CH–00130, 1991 WL 168620, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Sept. 4, 1991) (quoting Curtiss–Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 

446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980)).

Whether a particular order disposes of a distinct and separable 

“claim” that is subject to Rule 54.02 certification is a question of law 
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reviewed de novo. Ingram, 379 S.W.3d at 238; Brown v. John Roebuck & 

Assocs., Inc., No. M2008–02619–COA–R3–CV, 2009 WL 4878621, at *5 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2009). If the trial court certifies a judgment as 

final, but it is not conclusive as to an entire claim or party, an appeal from it 

will be dismissed even though the trial court decided to treat the order as 

final. FSGBank, N.A. v. Anand, No. E2011–00168–COA–R3–CV, 2012 

WL 554449, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2012). Without a final 

adjudication of at least one claim, Rule 54.02 is simply inapplicable. King 

v. Kelly, No. M2015–02376–COA–R3–CV, 2016 WL 3632761, at *4 

(Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2016), perm app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

For the purposes of Rule 54.02, a “claim” is defined as the 

“‘aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the 

courts.’” Carr v. Valinezhad, M2009–00634–COA–R3–CV, 2010 WL 

1633467, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2010) (quoting Brown, 2009 WL 

4878621, at *6). “‘[A] complaint asserting only one legal right, even if 

seeking multiple remedies for the alleged violation of that right, states a 

single claim for relief.’” Christus Gardens, Inc. v. Baker, Donelson, 

Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., No. M2007–01104–COA–R3–CV, 

2008 WL 3833613, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2008) (quoting Liberty 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976)). Rule 54.02 cannot be 

used to appeal a part of a single claim or to test a single legal theory of 

recovery.

E. Sols. for Buildings, LLC v. Knestrick Contractor, Inc., No. M2017-00732-COA-R3-

CV, 2018 WL 1831116, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2018). 

Having reviewed the record transmitted to us, we are of the opinion that the trial 

court’s Rule 54.02 certification was improvident. The rights at issue on appeal are 

clearly linked with the undecided issue of damages, and as such, should be entertained by 

this Court, if at all, together, not in successive appeals. See Crane v. Sullivan, No. 

01A01-9207-CH-00287, 1993 WL 15154, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1993) (noting 

that “[p]iece-meal appeals are not favored” and holding that a Rule 54.02 certification 

was improvident when an issue the trial court declared final and appealable was 

“inextricably linked with the remaining issues not yet decided”). The present appeal is 

hereby dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the case is remanded for 

such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this opinion. 

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ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE