Opinion issued February 11, 20 20

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 17 - 00945 - CR

——————————— CHRISTIAN SHAWN WILL IAMS , Appella nt

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appell e e
On Appeal from the 434th District Court Fort Bend C o un t y, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 15 - DCR - 070091B

OPINION ON REHEARING Christian Shawn Williams was convicted of murder. On appeal, he raise s three issues : (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court err e d in ad mitting expert testimony ; and (3) the trial court erred2

in admitting statement s made by a co defen d ant to his cellmate. We affirm the t rial
court ’ s judgment. 1 Background O n the evening of May 28, 2015, Stephanie Peña was shot and killed in a retail pharmacy parking lot while she sat in the driver’s seat of h e r car . A witness in the parking lot heard a gunshot and sa w a young Afri c an - American ma n run from a black car to a white car. The white car sped away , and the witness called 911. Responding officers foun d a spent cartridge casing on the floorboard of Peña ’ s car. They also found a small amount of marijuana and a b eer can th a t was still co ld to the touch. They recovered Peña’s cell phone and extracted its contents to a separate drive. Cell phone data record s showed that before her death, Peña was communicati n g with a phone number registered to Solita ire William s , Ch ristian Wi lliams ’ s mother

. T he number was the same number he had giv en to the Fort Bend County probation department as his own. T he records assoc iated with that phone number showed multiple communi c ations wit h Peña, including more than 75 text messages and two calls , between the a fternoon and evening of May 28, but

1 We issued a memorandum opinion on August 1, 2019, in which we affirmed Williams ’ s conviction , holding that the trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony or admitting statem ents made by a codefendant. We declined to reac h sufficiency o f the e vidence because it was filed i n a supplemental brief . Williams moved for rehearing. We deny the motion, withdraw our August 1, 2019 memorandum opinion and judgment of the same date , and issue this substitute opinion and judgment in their stead

.3

not after the time Pe ña died. Police tried to locate Williams’s phone after the murd er, but it was turned off throughout the entire inve s tigation. Investigators discovered other phone numbers as sociated w ith Williams by contacting his probation officer. They obtained a warrant to “ ping ,” or connect with, a number associated with him , pro vid ing law enforcement with the phone’s l ocation eve r y 15 minutes. The phone was located in an apartment comple x in Houst on. Simultaneou sly , detectives investigated another person, Robert Dike, based on leads they had gathered . Dike lived in the same apart ment complex where Williams’s phone pinged. After su rveil lance, officers obtained an arrest warrant for Williams an d went to the apartment. When they arrived, Williams jumped from the third

- floor b alcony to the second

- floor balcony and surrendered. Dike wa s in the apartment and was arrested on traffic warra nts. Detectives later obtain ed the actual text messages betwee n Will iams and Peña

. The text messages demonstrated that Williams contacted Peña to purchase marijuana. The two negotiated a price for two ou nces of marijuana and debated where to meet for the purch ase. Eventually, they agreed on a location near the pharma cy par king lot. The last communication between them was a 90

- second phone ca ll, the details of which are unknown. Williams was charged with capital murder. At trial, the jury heard testimony consi stent with the above facts. Additionally, Pe ña ’ s friend te stifie d that he h ad4

met up with P e ña shortly before her death. He met her in the parking lot of a fast food restaurant and got into the passe nger seat of her dark Lexus sedan

. They met so that the f

riend could view and possibly purchase some marij uana. Whi le the y were in P e ñ a ’ s car, she received a phone call fro m a man. The friend believed that he h eard the name “ C hristian ” during the conversat i on. Demond Walton testified th at he was cellm ates with Robert Dike, who eventually was also char ged with the murd er . Wh ile in the Fort Bend County jail, the two men became friends , and Dike told Walton why he was in jail. Dike said that he and Williams i ntended to rob a drug dealer for marijuana. T he ju ry fo und Williams guilty of the lesser

- include d offense of murd er and sentenced him to 23 years’ imprisonment. Analysis We address three issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support Wil liams ’ conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting testi mony from a cell phone analys t because her methods were un reliable ; (3) the trial court erred in admitting Walton ’ s testimony because it was inadmissible hearsay and violated his right to confr ontation. We affirm. I. Sufficie ncy of the Evidence Williams claims that the evidence is insuffic ien t to support his murder conviction.5

A. Standard o f Review When revi e wing the legal sufficie ncy of the evidence to support a conviction, w e consider all of the e vidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the jur y was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonabl e doub t. Merritt v. State , 368 S.W.3d 516, 52 5 (T ex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Jackson v . Virginia , 443 U. S . 307, 31 8

– 1 9 (1979 ). We consider all evide nce in the

re co rd, whether it was admissible or inadmissible. Winfrey v. State , 393 S.W. 3d 763, 767 (Tex. C rim. App. 2013). The jury i s the sole judge of cr edibility and weight to be given to the testimony of the wi tnesses
. Lancon v. State , 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim . App. 2008). The jury may acc ept or reject all or any part of a witness ’ s testimony. Id. A person commits the offense of murder if he: (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; (2) intends to cause serious bodily in jury and commit s an act clearly dangerous to human life that c auses the d eath of an indi vidual; or (3) comm its or attempts to commit a fe l ony, other than

ma nslaughter , and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate fl ight from the c om mission or attempt, he commi ts o r attempts to commit an act clearly dan gerous to hu man lif e that causes the death of an individual. See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE § 19.02(b).6

B. Analysis The evidence was sufficient to support Williams ’ s conviction. Th e record reflec ts that a witness in the retail pharmacy parking l ot heard a gunshot that killed Pe ña and de scribed seeing a man fi ttin g Williams ’ s general d escription running from a dark Lexus sedan where the victim was shot and getting in to the back of a white car. The witness called 911. Peña ’ s friend testified that he met u p with her on th e day she died to consider purchasing some mar ijuana

. He testified t hat Pe ña brought the marijuana, they met in a fast food restaurant parking lot, and he g ot into the pas senger side of her dark

- colored Lexus sedan

. While he was viewing the

ma rijuana, Peña received a ca ll from a man wanting to purchas e the same marijuana. The friend believed he heard the name “ Christian ” in the conversation. T he frie nd left without purchasing the marijuana Peña showed him. Demond Walton, a man who was incarcerated with Wil liam s ’ s codefendant, testified that the cod efe ndant told him that he and Williams planned to rob their victim of her drugs. T h e po lice did not discover any m arijuana in Peña ’ s car,

cor roborating the testimony that she had been robbed of he r marijuana. Pe ñ a ’ s phone contained communications with a phon e number that Williams had given to the Fort Bend County probation department as hi s number. The phone records showed tha t the two were communicating up until the time of P e ñ a ’ s death, but not after it . When po lice tried to ping the phone after the death, it was always7

turned o ff. When the police arrived to arrest Williams at Dike ’ s apartment complex , he jumped off a third

- floor balcony in a n attempt to escape, but he was caught

. Ci rcumstantial evidence is as p robative as direct evidence and can be suffici ent to establish guilt

. H o oper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). T h e jury heard that Williams communicated with the victim numerous times until the time of her death , and then he turned his pho ne off. He fit the description given by the wi tness to t he shooting. When police tried to arrest him, he jumped off a balcony to try to escape . His codefenda nt , Dike, told someone in jail that he and Williams intended to rob the victim of marijua na. The ev ide nce showed that Pe ña had marijuana in her p ossession immediately before her death but had very little after, suggesting she had been robbed

. We ho ld that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule William s ’ s first issue. II. A dmissib ility of Expert Testim ony In his second issue, W illiams asserts that the trial court erred in ad mitting
te stimo ny from a Department of Public Safety analyst about cell phone location tracking. He argues that th e court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony because the analyst did not know her methodology’s error rate

. The State responds tha t the an al yst w as qualified to opine on the location of cell phones , and her lack8

of knowledge regarding error rat es in the underlying software did not impact t he reliability of her opinion that the cell phone was near the pharmacy around the time of the m urder. A. St andar d of Review We review the trial court’s decision to allow expert testimony for an abuse of discreti on. Gallo v. State , 239 S.W.3d 757, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We

w ill uphold a tri al court’s ruling on the admissibility of an expert witnes s as lon g as it falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Taylor v. State , 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Absent a clear abuse of discretio n, the trial court’s d ecision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be disturbed. Wyatt

v. State , 23 S. W.3d 18, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The court considers three conditions in admitting a witness as an expert : “(1) the witness qualifies as an e xpert by reason of his knowledge, skil l, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject mat ter of t he test imony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert testimony will
actua lly assist the fact

- finder in deciding the cas e.” Rodgers v. State , 205 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see Kelly v. State , 824 S.W.2d 568, 57 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see also T EX
. R. E VID
. 702. These conditions are commonly referred to as qualifi cation, reliability, and relevance. Vela v. St ate , 209 S.W.3d9

128, 1 31 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2006). Before admitting expert testimony, the trial co urt
must d eterm ine that all three conditions are met. Id. B. Analysis The State called Elizabeth Buhay, an analyst w ith the Department of Public Safety’s Telephon e Records Analysis Cen ter (TRAC) as an expert to testify on the approximate location of Pe ña ’ s c el l phone and a cell phone linked to Williams based on historic al phone records and a list of the coordinates of H ouston area cell phone towers provided by carr iers to law enforcemen t. The cell phon e records

were admitted into evidence without objection du ri ng a det ectiv e’s testimony. The detective testified that he sent the records to the TRAC analyst for mapping. T he trial court held a hearing outside the pres ence of the jury to co nsider Williams’ s motion to exclude Buhay’s testimony. At the hearing, Buh ay testifi ed ab out her qualifications to opine on these subjects. She stated that sh e had worked as a crime analys t for three years and was trained in cell phon e mapping by the FBI, the Department o f Public Safety, and an outside company. During her career , she had worke d on hundreds of cases to identify the location of a cell phone using records. Buhay testified that cell phones ping a nearby tower when in us e a nd cell phone records include the coor dinates for the tower. Her job is to map the tower locatio ns using t he co ordinates provided in the cell phone records. The records are10

uploaded digitally to a mapping softw are. She uses the software to create a map of calls or texts over ti me or in a speci fic area

. Buhay testified that she employs these techniqu es on a da ily b asis. For this particular investigation, she received a request from Texas Ranger P. Luna to review phone records f

or three different cell phones

. Although Luna provid ed her with the records from the carrier, Buhay also requested the origina l records from the carrier to verify her work. She determined the location of the phone when it pinged a cell phon e tower. S he attached details from the call or text to each point , i ncluding the tim e and the person the phone was contacting , 2 and s he plotte d the data on m aps , showing where a particular phone was located throughout the day and what cell tower it contact ed when it was being used

. Williams argues t hat Buhay’s opinion wa s unreliable bec ause she admitted that there we re newer software programs av ailable to pl ot the data , and she was unaware of the current program’s error rate. Texas Rule of Evidence 705(c) governs the reliability of expert testimony

. It states that “[a]n e xpert’s opinion is inadmissible if the underlying facts or data do not pro vi de a suf ficie nt basis for the opinion.” T EX
. R. E VID
. 705(c). The reliability inquiry is flexible, at times focu sing on the reliability of scientific knowledg e, at other times on t he expert’s pers onal knowledge and experience. Vela , 209 S.W.3d at 134. E x pe rience a lone may

2 The inv estigator testified earli er in the t rial that the cell phone records do not incl u de the substance of the text messages.11

provide a sufficient basis for an expert’s testimony. Id. The proponent of the expert
must esta blish some foundation for the reliability of t he expert’s opinion. I d. To be conside red reliable, evidence from a scientific theory must sati s fy three c riter ia: “(a) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (b) the technique applying the th e ory must be valid; and (c) the technique must have bee n properly applied on the occasion in question.” Cob l e v. State , 330 S.W.3d 253, 273 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2010 ) (qu oting Kelly , 824 S.W.2d at 573 ). When “soft” sciences are at issue, the trial court must inquire “ ( 1) whether the field of expertise is a legitim ate one, (2) whether t he subject matte r of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of that fi el d, and ( 3) wh ether the expert’s testimony properly relies upon and/or utilizes the principles involved in the fi eld.” Id. (quoting Nenno v. State , 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 1998)). “Thi s inquiry is somewhat more flexible than the Kelly factors a pplicabl e to Newtonian and medical science .” Coble , 330 S.W.3d at 273. The general principles announced in Kelly apply, but the specific factors may, or may n ot apply depending on the context. Id. Under both Kelly and Nenno , reliability should be evaluat ed with re feren ce to the standards applicable to the particular professional field in question. Id. The task Buha y was called upon to perform was not complex a nd it was verifiable. See Thompson v. State , 425 S.W.3d 480, 489 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 20 12, pet. ref’ d) (“The complexity of the technique employed in this case to12

interpret the [cell phone] records is not great

— [the witness] only needed to know h ow the records were pr oduced and what the data in each column signified.”); Robinson v. State , 3 68 S.W.3d 588, 601 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2012, pet. ref’d) (“The analysis is straightforward and not particularly comp lex.”). Buhay was tasked with mapping the loca tion of cell phones us ing the location of towers identified in each phone’s records. She testifi ed that sh e was trained in cell phone mapping, employed the techniques daily, and had three years of experience do ing it. T he plotting software’s error rate did not impact the reliab ility of her opi nions

. The cell phone records showed the exact tower to wh ic h the ph one c onnected , and Buhay testified that she checked the records for accuracy. See Thompson , 425 S.W.3d a t 488

– 89 (rejecting challenge to expert opinio n based on argument it was possible de fendant’s cell phone was located miles away fr o m tower sho wn in

reco rds). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that B uhay’s opin ion on the general location of Williams’s and the victim’s cell phon es was reliable. We overrule William’s second issue. III. Admissibility of Co con spirato r’s S tatements Williams asserts that the trial court erred when it overruled his objections to introduct ion of certain statements made by Robert Dike to Demond Walton. Walt on testified abou t what his cellmate, Robert Dike, told him while they wer e13

i ncarcer ated. Williams argues that the statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause and were in admissible hearsay

. A. Confrontation Clause The Confrontation Clause p rohibits the admi ssion of “testimonial hearsay” unless the declarant is un ava ilable to te stify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross

- examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washing ton , 541 U.S. 36, 53, 68 (2004); see U.S. C ONS T
. amend. VI. Texas Ru le of Evidence 80 1(d) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the dec laran t while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asse rted. T EX
. R. E VID
. 801(d). Testimonial statem ents include, at a min imum, “ p rior test imony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or a t a former tria l” and “police interrogations.” Crawford , 541 U.S. at 68; Woods v. State , 152 S.W.3d 105, 11 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Whether a statement is test imonial and therefore subject to the ac cused’s right to confrontation is a question of law we re vi ew de no vo. S ee Langham v. State , 305 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In making the determination whethe r a particular statement is testimonial, we co nsider whether the sta tement was (1) ex parte in

- court testimony or its functional equivalent, ( 2) extraju dicia l statements containe d in formalized testimonial materials, or (3) statements that were made under circumstances that would lead an objective wit ness to reasonably bel ieve that the sta tement would be available for use at a14

later criminal pro se cution. Melen dez v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305, 309

– 10 (2009) ( quoting Crawford , 541 U.S. at 51

– 52); Langham , 3 05 S.W.3d at 576. The Supreme Court specifica lly distinguished a de fendant’s stateme nts to police f ro m his statements to friends, noting that “ [a] n acc user who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who

ma kes a casual remark to an acquaintance does no t.” Crawford , 541 U.S. at 51. Further, the Court has ruled that a statement is not testimonial i f its prim ary p urpose is not to create an out

- of

- court substitute for trial testimony. Michigan v. Bryant , 562 U.S . 344, 358 (2011) (noting that “the most impor tant instances in whic h the [Confrontat ion] Clause restricts the introduction of out

- of

- court
st at ements a re th ose in which state actors are involved in a formal, out

- of

- court interrogation of a witness to obta in evidence for trial ” ). Williams argues that his coconspirator’s st atement to Walton should be considered testimonial based on a generalized id ea that all s tatements one inmate makes to another about a case are made with the knowledge that the statement

c ould be available for potential use at a later criminal prosecution. But the fact tha t Dike and Walton were incarcerated at the time of their co nversati ons d id not make the statements testimonial. 3 Walton testified that he and Dike became friends while

3 S ee Rodriguez v. State , Nos. 07

- 15

- 00412

- CR & 07

- 16

- 00 124

- CR, 2016 WL 7439189, at *3 (Tex. Ap p.

— Amarillo Dec. 21, 2016, no pe t.) (me m. op., not designated fo r publicati on) (noting that i ncarcerated declarant’s kn o wledge that15

in jail and as friends , they shared information a bout why they were in jail

. Here, the p rimary purpose of Walton’s statements to Dike was not to cr eate an out

- o f

court substitute for tri a l testimony. See Espinoza v. Thaler , No. 2:11

- CV

- 00146, 2012 WL 774989, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2012) (noting trial c ourt’s finding that

re corded jailhouse phone conversations were not testimonial statements becau se they we re in itiated by co

- defendant, not by law enforcement, and such conversations were co

- defendant’s spontan eous statements to private persons). We conclu de that the statements were not testimo nial, and the trial court did not violate the Confrontati on Clause by ad mitting Walton ’s testimony into evidence. B. Hearsay Williams also argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony because it was hear say . Walton testified that Dike told hi m he and Williams intended to rob Peña of drugs on the da y of the m urder

. Generally, the hearsay rule excludes any out

- of

- court statements offered by a party at trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. T EX
. R. E V ID
. 801(d) (defin ing hearsay); T EX
. R. E VID
. 802 (admissibility of hearsay ); Walter v. St ate , 267 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). One of the
phone conversation could be used in later criminal proceeding did not make recorded s tatemen ts testimonial); see also Townse nd v. State , No. 03

- 17

- 00495

- CR, 2018 W L 3978489, at *3 (Tex. Ap p.

— Austin A ug. 21, 2018, no p et.) (mem. op., not design a ted for publication) (recorded statements of defendant, co - defendant, and another inmate in three

- way ja ilhouse phone call were not test imonial and made between acquain tances) ;16

exceptions to the hearsay rule allows t he admission of statements made against the de clarant’s interest. T E X
. R. E VID
. 803(2 4). This exception permits admission of a statement that : (a) a r eason able person in the declarant’s position would have made only if the person believed it to be true b e cause, when made, it was so contrary to the de clarant’s proprietary or pecuniary int erest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declar ant’s clai m aga inst someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability or to make the declaran t an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace; a nd (b) is supported b y corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is o ffere d in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Id. The rati o nale behind admitting these types of statement s “stems from the

comm onsense notion t hat people ordinarily do not say things that are damaging to themse lves unless they believe they are true.” Walter , 267 S.W.3d at 890. “[A] reasonable person would not nor m ally claim that he committed a crime, unless i t were true.” Id. Rul e 803(24) sets o ut a two

- step foundation requirement for admissibility of hearsay s tatem ents. Id. ; Coleman v. State , 428 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). F irst, the trial court must determine whether
t he statement subjects the declarant to criminal liability and whether the declarant realized th is when he made the statement. Walter , 267 S.W.3d at 890

– 91. Second,
t he trial court must then determine whether s u fficient corroborating circumstances exist tha t clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Id. at 891.17

Both statements that are directly a gains t the declarant’s interest and collateral “blame

- sharing” statements that implicate both the declar a nt and others may be admissible under Rule 803 (24) if corroborating circumstances cl early indicate their trustworthiness. Id. at 896. “Blame

- shifting” state ments that implicate another person but minimize the declarant’s culpability are not admissible und e r this rule, absent extraordinary circumstance s. Id. ; see also Guidr y v. State , 9 S. W.3d 133, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding statements inadmissib le un der Rule 803(24) because statements were “not so equally against both [the declarant’s] and [the de f endant’s] interests as [to] reach this level o f reliability”). The t rial court is “o bligated to parse a generally self

- inculpatory narrative and weed o ut th ose specific factual statements that are self

- exculpatory or shift blame to another.” Walter , 267 S

. W.3d at 897. The determination of whether cor roborating circumstanc es clearly indic ate trustworthiness lies within the trial court’s discret ion. Mason v. S tate , 416 S.W.3d 720, 734 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (citing Cunningham v. S t ate , 877 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994 )). When analyzing the sufficiency of corroborating circumstances, a number of factors are rele vant: (1) wheth er the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant; (2) whether the decl a

rant was so situated that he might have commit ted the crime; (3) the timing of the d eclaration; (4) the spontaneity of the declaration; (5) t he18

relatio nship between the declarant and the party to whom the statement was made; and (6) the existence of indep e ndent corroborative facts. Woods v. State , 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004 ); Coleman , 428 S.W.3d at 159. The first two factors are not releva nt wh en, as here, the statements are offered by the State to inculpate the defendant. Woods , 152 S.W.3d a t 113. The trial court may consider evidence w hich undermines the re liability of the statement as well as evidence corroborating its trustwor thiness. M ason , 416 S.W.3d at 734 (citing Cunningham , 877 S.W.2d at 312). We first consider whether the statement s admitted by the trial court subject Dike to c riminal liability and whether he recog nized that at the time he made the
statements. See Walter , 267 S.W. 3d at 890

– 81. Walton testified that Dike told him that he and Williams intended to rob the victim of mar i juana. The statement place s Dike at the scene of the murder with Wil liams, and there fore subjects him to criminal liability for attempted rob bery at a minim um . The statement implicate s both Williams and Dike equally. See Walter , 267 S.W.3d at 899 (“[O]ut

- o f

- court statements from a co

- defendant that ar e against the declaran t’s penal intere st but also inculpate the defendant are viewed with some suspicion. That suspicion is lessened when the speaker makes no distinction between his conduct and that of the de f endant

— where there is absolute equality.”). Th e trial court could ha ve reasonably co ncluded that Dike recognized at the time he spoke with hi s cellmate19

that admitting he intended to participate in a robbery was against his penal interest. See Coleman , 428 , S.W.3d at 160 (trial court could conclude tha t defendant knew that telling his girl friend he had participated in a murder was against his pe nal intere st). A reasonable person would have understood that admitting to att empted robbery was against his inter e st. We now must determine whether sufficient corroborating circumst ances indicate t he trustworthiness of Dike’s statements to Walton. Dike spoke with Wa lton while both were incarcerated in county jail. He made the statements gradually , over time, as they b ecame friends and in a private setting. See W oods , 152 S.W.3d at 11 3 (“These were ‘st reet corner’ statements that Rhodes made to his frien ds without any moti ve to shift blame to another or minimize his own involvement in the murders.”); Dewberry v. State , 4 S.W.3d 735, 751

– 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ( considering, in holdin g that hearsay sta tements were admissible, that statements were either spontaneously made or made in response to casual inquiries from “friends and criminal acquaintances not connected to t he commission of the offense”). The State al so presented independe nt corroborative e vidence that verified Dike’s statements to Walton. Th e S tate introd uced phone records that showed that Williams was communicating with the victim up to the point of her d e ath regarding meeting up with her and purchas ing marijuana . A cell record expert expl ained the20

location of William’s phone during that con versation. The expe rt also opined that Williams’ s phone and the victim’s phone pinged the same cell tower at the near e st time to the shooting. Evidence suggested a robbery was planned, including evidence that a g un was involved and that law enforcement did not find two ounces of mari juana with the victim. Law enforcement testified that they found less than a gram of mari

juana, instead of the two ounces that the vict im intended to sell to Williams in the parking lot. Wi lliams and Dike were arrested together ten days later. Cell phone t racki ng evidence showed that their phones were traveling together and that they were toge ther the day of the arrest. Finally, Dike and Walton’s conversations occurred soon after the murder. We conclude that the corroborating c ircumstances indicate the
tr ustwo rthiness of Dike’s statements to Walton. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Walton’s testi mony concerning the st atements that Robert Dike made t o him. We overrule Willia m s ’ s third iss ue.21 C onclusion We affirm t h e judgment of the trial court.

Peter Kelly Justice Panel consists of Jus tices Keyes, K elly, and Goodman. P ublish

. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47 .2(b).