UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAROL HAWLEY, 

Defendant – Appellee. 

No. 16-1000 

 (D.C. No. 1:14-CR-00204-RM-3) 

(D. Colo.) 

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

A jury convicted Carol Hawley of conspiracy to possess 50 grams or more of 

methamphetamine and possession of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. See 21 

 

*

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. 

This order and judgment is an unpublished decision, not binding precedent. 10th 

Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation to unpublished decisions is not prohibited. Fed. R. App. 32.1. 

It is appropriate as it relates to law of the case, issue preclusion and claim preclusion. 

Unpublished decisions may also be cited for their persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

Citation to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical 

notation B (unpublished). Id. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

November 14, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
- 2 - 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), 846. She was sentenced to 240 months 

imprisonment. She wants us to reverse the convictions because, in her view, both her 

motions to suppress and for a mistrial should have been granted. We see no error and 

affirm. 

I. Motion to Suppress 

A. Background 

In 2012, Arapahoe County Sherriff’s Officer Kelly Draper was assigned to the 

FBI’s gang task force. As part of that assignment, he led the investigation of Debbi 

Martinez, a methamphetamine distributor in Denver, Colorado. He obtained a wiretap 

for her telephone. In early March 2013, he intercepted several telephone conversations 

between Martinez and Hawley indicating Hawley redistributed drugs for Martinez. 

On March 12, 2013, Draper intercepted a telephone conversation between 

Martinez and Hawley wherein they discussed Hawley traveling to Fort Collins to deliver 

methamphetamine. Later that evening, task force agents observed Hawley engage in a 

hand-to-hand drug transaction with John Smith, a known Martinez drug associate. Later, 

Martinez called Smith who informed her that he had given Hawley “a half of a zip,” 

meaning “a half of an ounce.” (R. Vol. I at 96.) Martinez told Smith that was the wrong 

amount; Hawley needed half a pound because “she needs to trip with it.” (Id. at 97.) 

Shortly after that telephone conversation, officers observed Hawley leave Martinez’s 

residence with Kintessa Ernest. Hawley, who was driving, proceeded to Smith’s 

residence where agents observed her in another hand-to-hand drug transaction with 
- 3 - 

Smith. 

After Hawley left Smith’s residence, surveillance agents observed her engage in 

several “burn runs,” driving maneuvers designed to determine whether one is being 

followed by the police. (Id. at 98.) Draper directed a member of his surveillance team to 

request a “wall stop” of Hawley’s vehicle by the local police.1

 (Id. at 105.) The 

surveillance agent did so, describing Hawley’s vehicle and stating “he believed it was a 

load car, [with a] significant amount of drugs in it.” (Id. at 122.) 

Within minutes, Jeff Meyer, a City of Denver patrol officer, responded to the 

request. He followed Hawley’s vehicle and observed it make a wide sweeping left turn 

onto the shoulder of a road before returning to the road. Based on that turn, Meyer 

believed the driver was under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DUI) and initiated a 

traffic stop.2

 At about the same time, Draper dispatched a canine officer to the scene. 

Meyer approached Hawley and asked for her driver’s license and vehicle 

registration. She did not respond with the requested items, but instead produced a 

 

1

 A “wall stop” is motivated by investigating officers’ belief that the vehicle 

contains contraband. Critically, however, the stopping officer must have reasonable 

suspicion for the stop (quite apart from the information provided by the investigating 

officers), for instance, the observation of a traffic violation. The purpose is to place a 

“wall” between the stopping officer and the investigating officers so as not to jeopardize 

the secrecy of an ongoing investigation. Such stops are valid law enforcement tactics 

designed to ensure a stopping officer’s safety (fear of reprisal should the suspects know 

the real reason behind the stop) and the continued integrity of an underlying 

investigation. United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d 1338, 1348 (10th Cir. 2008). 

2

 According to Meyer’s testimony, his experience has revealed wide-sweeping 

turns to be a strong indication of a driver being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
- 4 - 

Department of Corrections identification card. Six minutes after stopping the vehicle and 

upon his suspicion of a DUI, Meyer requested the assistance of a Drug Recognition 

Expert (DRE) to determine whether Hawley was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.3

While Meyer was waiting for the DRE, canine officer Gordon Carroll arrived on 

scene. He walked his certified drug dog around the exterior of Hawley’s vehicle. The 

dog alerted to the passenger side front door. He then placed the dog inside the vehicle, 

where it again alerted, this time to the passenger front floorboard and the back of the 

center console. Officer Carroll searched the vehicle, finding 226 grams of 

methamphetamine.4

 

Hawley was indicted with conspiracy to possess and possession of 50 grams or 

more of methamphetamine. She moved to suppress the drugs, arguing the initial stop and 

subsequent search of her vehicle were invalid under the Fourth Amendment. 

The judge denied the motion. He concluded the initial stop of Hawley’s vehicle 

was proper because Meyer reasonably suspected her of driving under the influence of 

drugs or alcohol based on the wide left turn. He also decided the search of her vehicle 

was valid for either of two reasons. First, the task force had probable cause to believe the 

vehicle contained drugs based on the information it had obtained through surveillance 

 

3

 Meyer requested a DRE because he was not formally trained to determine 

whether a driver is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 

4

 The DRE performed the necessary tests on Hawley. He ultimately determined 

probable cause to arrest her for a DUI was lacking. She was arrested, however, for the 

drugs found in her vehicle. 
- 5 - 

and the wiretap of Martinez’s telephone. Second, there was probable cause to search the 

vehicle based on the drug dog’s alert. And, because the dog alerted to the vehicle prior to 

the DRE arriving on scene, there was no undue delay because the purpose of the stop—to 

investigate whether Hawley was driving under the influence—had not yet concluded. 

B. Discussion 

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, “[w]e view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and accept the court’s factual 

findings unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Stephenson, 452 F.3d 1173, 1176 

(10th Cir. 2006). We review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under 

the Fourth Amendment. Id. 

1. Traffic Stop 

“A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and must be objectively 

reasonable to pass constitutional muster.” United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1234 

(10th Cir. 2007). “[It] is reasonable if it is (1) justified at its inception and (2) reasonably 

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 

United States v. Karam, 496 F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). 

Hawley concedes the initial stop of her vehicle was valid, whether based on the 

illegal turn or Officer Meyer’s reasonable suspicion of DUI. See Lyons, 510 F.3d at 1234 

(“A traffic stop is valid at its inception if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation 

or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment 

violation has occurred or is occurring.”) (quotation marks omitted). Her concession 
- 6 - 

effectively abandons her contrary argument made in the district court. 

But, even apart from the traffic violation, the stop of Hawley’s vehicle was 

justified. “[T]he lawfulness of [a traffic stop] is not limited to situations where an officer 

suspects a traffic or equipment violation”; “[s]uch a stop is [also] justified if the officer 

bears a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” See United States v. 

Whitley, 680 F.3d 1227, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). To 

determine whether reasonable suspicions exists, we consider “the totality of the 

circumstances” and ask whether the officer had “a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 

449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). 

That standard is easily satisfied here. Based on the information obtained from the 

wiretap and surveillance, Officer Draper knew (1) Martinez was a methamphetamine 

distributor, (2) Hawley conversed with Martinez about traveling to Fort Collins to deliver 

methamphetamine, (3) Hawley subsequently engaged in a hand-to-hand drug transaction 

with Martinez’s known source of supply, Smith, (4) Martinez informed Smith that he had 

provided Hawley the wrong amount of drugs (half a pound was needed, not a half of an 

ounce), (5) Hawley thereafter engaged in a second hand-to-hand drug-transaction with 

Smith; and (6) after meeting with Smith, Hawley engaged in a number of “burn runs.” 

Draper and his team reasonably suspected Hawley of illegally transporting a half a pound 
- 7 - 

of methamphetamine.5

 

Hawley focuses on the “collective knowledge” or “fellow officer” rule, arguing 

Meyer could not rely on the information Draper or the task force gleaned from the 

wiretap and surveillance because it was never conveyed to him. Meyer was told only that 

the dispatching officer “believed [Hawley’s vehicle] was a load car [with a] significant 

amount of drugs in it.”6

 (R. Vol. 1 at 122.) 

But the “fellow officer” rule has both a “vertical” and “horizontal” component: 

Vertical collective knowledge exists if one officer actually has probable cause and 

instructs another officer to act without communicating the information he knows 

that would justify the action. Horizontal collective knowledge, in contrast, exists 

when many officers have pieces of the probable cause puzzle, but no single officer 

possesses information sufficient for probable cause. In the latter situation, courts 

may consider whether officers who are acting together collectively possess 

sufficient information to support probable cause, provided that they have actually 

communicated the information to each other. 

See Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcolm, 755 F.3d 870, 881 (10th Cir. 2014) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). This case implicates vertical collective knowledge—one 

officer, Draper, has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and instructs another officer, 

 

5

 Hawley claims Officer Draper and the task force never saw her with drugs and 

instead relied on telephone conversations she had with Martinez which never mentioned 

drugs. But the surveillance officers twice observed her in a hand-to-hand drug 

transaction with Smith. And, while the telephone conversations never mentioned the 

word “drugs” or “methamphetamine,” Officer Draper testified that most drug-traffickers 

regularly speak in “coded language,” as was done in this case. (R. Vol. 1 at 88.) 

6

 Hawley’s brief is difficult to follow. She makes this argument in challenging 

whether there was probable cause to search the vehicle. But it only makes sense if 

applied to the initial stop of her vehicle. That is because Meyer was involved only in the 

initial stop. Officer Carroll, not Meyer, searched the vehicle. Yet, she conceded the 

initial stop was valid based on Meyer’s observed traffic violation. 
- 8 - 

Meyer, to act. United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d 1338, 1345 (10th Cir. 2008). In such 

circumstances, there was no need for Draper to have communicated specific information 

to Meyer. See Whitley, 680 F.3d at 1234 (“Under the vertical collective knowledge 

doctrine, an arrest or stop is justified when an officer having probable cause or reasonable 

suspicion instructs another officer to act, even without communicating all of the 

information necessary to justify the action”; “[t]hus, an officer with reasonable suspicion 

may instruct another officer to make a Terry stop without communicating the basis for 

the stop, so long as the communicating officer has reasonable suspicion to make the stop 

himself.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230, 233 

(1985) (stop of person by officers of one police department based on a “wanted flyer” 

issued by another police department was valid even though the flyer itself did not provide 

sufficient information to justify the stop but the officers who issued the flyer had 

reasonable suspicion the wanted person had committed an offense); United States v. 

Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938, 943 (10th Cir. 2011) (one officer’s stop of defendant’s vehicle 

upon the request of a second officer was permissible because the second officer had 

reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation). 

The reasons for the “fellow officer” rule are obvious. Police officers do not often 

have the luxury of time and should be able to reasonably rely on the information provided 

by other officers without having to “cross-examine [them] about the foundation for the 

transmitted information.” Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231 (quotation marks omitted). The 

public benefits as well when police officers are allowed to efficiently perform their 
- 9 - 

duties. At the same time, “the intrusion on [a defendant’s] personal security is 

minimal”—“[l]ittle, if any, additional individual freedom would result from requiring 

officers to set forth their grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable cause in their 

communications with other officers.” Wilkinson, 633 F.3d at 942 (quotation marks 

omitted); see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232. Moreover, defendants, like Hawley, still 

have the opportunity to challenge the claimed reasonable suspicion under the Fourth 

Amendment but must properly direct their challenges. Hawley tried and failed. 

2. Probable Cause to Search 

Hawley complains probable cause to search her vehicle was wanting. She is 

mistaken. Like the district judge, we see more than ample evidence to support probable 

cause for the search under either of two scenarios. 

First, “[p]robable cause to search a vehicle is established if, under the totality of 

the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains contraband or 

evidence.” Chavez, 534 F.3d at 1344 (quotation marks omitted); see also Florida v. 

Harris, --- U.S. ---, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (“A police officer has probable cause to 

conduct a search when the facts available to him would warrant a person of reasonable 

caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.”) (quotation marks 

omitted). That standard is easily met in this case. The same information giving Draper 

reasonable suspicion to stop Hawley’s vehicle also gave him probable cause to search 

it—the wiretap and surveillance evidence established more than a fair probability that 

Hawley’s vehicle contained a half pound of methamphetamine. And, under the vertical 
- 10 - 

collective knowledge rule, Draper could have directed Carroll to search the vehicle (even 

without the dog sniff) without relaying to him the information establishing probable 

cause.7

Second, the positive alert by the certified drug dog gave Carroll probable cause to 

search the vehicle. United States v. Engles, 481 F.3d 1243, 1245 (10th Cir. 2007) (“It is 

undisputed that once the [drug] dog alerted to the trunk and side door, the officers had 

probable cause to search the car and its contents.”); see also United States v. Ludwig, 641 

F.3d 1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[A] positive alert by a certified drug dog is 

generally enough, by itself, to give officers probable cause to search a vehicle.”). And, 

although the district judge determined the task force had a reasonable basis to dispatch a 

canine officer to the scene and subject Hawley’s vehicle to a dog sniff, neither probable 

cause nor reasonable suspicion is necessary because a dog sniff is not a search under the 

Fourth Amendment. Engles, 481 F.3d at 1245 (“A dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle 

parked in a public place does not require reasonable suspicion because it is not a Fourth 

Amendment intrusion.”); see also Ludwig, 641 F.3d at 1250 (“It is well settled that a drug 

 

7

 Hawley argues Officer Meyer did not, on his own, have probable cause to search 

her vehicle and he could not rely on the information the task force gleaned from the 

wiretap and surveillance because it was never communicated to him as required by the 

“fellow officer” rule. As stated previously, see supra n.6, we believe she meant to say he 

did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. Nevertheless, even assuming she 

means what she says, she is mistaken for three reasons. First, Carroll, not Meyer, 

searched the vehicle. Second, as we have explained, Draper had probable cause to search 

the vehicle and, under the vertical collective knowledge rule, he could direct Carroll to 

perform the search without relaying the probable cause information to Carroll. Finally, 

as we discuss, Carroll had probable cause to search the vehicle once the drug dog alerted 

to it. 
- 11 - 

dog’s sniff of the outside of a car is not itself a search for Fourth Amendment purposes 

and so doesn't require a showing of probable cause to justify it.”). 

Of course, absent reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, police may not 

extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff. Rodriguez v. 

United States, --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-16 (10th Cir. 2015). But that did not 

happen here. The purpose of the stop was to determine whether Hawley was driving 

under the influence. That purpose could not be completed without the DRE. The dog 

alerted prior to the DRE’s arrival; the dog sniff did not unreasonably prolong the stop. 

Id. at 1616; see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406-09 (2005) (dog sniff that 

occurred while officer was in the process of writing a warning ticket did not improperly 

extend the duration of the stop).8

II. Motion for a Mistrial 

A. Background 

During jury selection, the judge asked those in the jury pool whether anyone felt 

“that drugs are a scourge on society.” (R. Vol. 3 at 47.) Three prospective jurors 

indicated yes. When the judge asked one of them to “[t]ell us what you mean by that,” he 

responded: 

 

8

 Hawley says there was a 20-minute delay between Officer Meyer’s call for a 

canine officer and his appearance at the scene. Once again, Hawley is mistaken. See 

supra n.6. Officer Draper, not Meyer, called for a canine officer at 1:46 a.m.; canine 

officer Carroll arrived nine minutes later (1:55 a.m.). Officer Meyer called for a DRE six 

minutes after the stop; the DRE arrived approximately 11 to 13 minutes later. That is not 

an unreasonable delay. 
- 12 - 

 I live in Englewood and part of the city is infested with meth. I mean, we 

call it the hood, that part of it. We say it every day. I think I have seen the—the 

defendant. I—I think I recognize the person. 

(Id.) The judge immediately told the prospective juror to “[s]top.” (Id.) He held a bench 

conference and asked the attorneys whether they had any objection to dismissing the 

prospective juror. The government did not object but defense counsel moved for a 

mistrial (out of the hearing of the jury): “Judge, the whole panel heard that. I mean I 

submit that’s a problem. I think this has infected the panel. He basically said there’s [an] 

area of Englewood that’s a meth-infested area.” (R. Vol. 3 at 48.) The judge asked 

where Hawley had lived. One of the prosecutors responded “[s]he is somewhat 

transient.” (Id.) When asked whether the offense took place in Englewood, the other 

prosecutor indicated no, saying “Lakewood, Arapahoe and Santa Fe.” (Id.) The judge 

denied the motion and excused the prospective juror. 

Shortly thereafter, the judge told the venire: 

 Now, before we go further, I want to cover, briefly, some things. You need 

to understand that I can’t have a situation where somebody is thinking that they 

may have seen somebody. I am sure that he is wrong, but I am also sure, that a 

person believes what a person believes, and you get something in your head, it 

could impact the trial and the critical issue is being fair. 

 So this case is not about some open-air market in Englewood and again, 

I’m not suggesting that the gentleman was trying to do something improper, but I 

do think that it is inappropriate for an individual to think that he knows one of the 

people, whether that be the defendant or the Government or anyone else. 

 So, is there anyone here who does not understand—more importantly, what 

I’m telling you is this, his comment, Oh I think I know . . . is nothing. It is 

meaningless. It is not in any way, shape or form any form of evidence, should not 

be considered by you. Is there anyone who has any difficulty with that concept or 

is unable to follow that instruction? 

(Id. at 50.) No prospective juror indicated an inability or unwillingness to follow the 
- 13 - 

instruction. 

Hawley later testified to having gone to a friend’s house in Englewood upon her 

release from jail. 

B. Discussion 

“[A] district court . . . is in the best position to judge the effect which improper 

statements might have upon a jury. The court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial based on 

improper statements during voir dire will therefore be disturbed only on a clear showing 

of abuse of discretion.”9

 United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1180 (10th Cir. 2005) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). 

When improper or prejudicial remarks are made by one member of the venire and 

heard by another during jury selection, we ask whether the defendant’s right to a fair and 

 

9

 Hawley claims prejudice is presumed because the prospective juror’s comments 

constituted extraneous information relating to the case and communicated to the jury. 

See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). She also argues the presumption 

is conclusive and the issue is unreviewable because the jury has already reached a verdict 

in this case. See United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th Cir. 1980). We 

disagree. First, Remmer involved a private communication between a juror and an 

unknown third party during trial. 347 U.S. at 450-51. We have found no cases applying 

Remmer in a case such as this, where a presumptive juror provides information to other 

potential jurors during voir dire, and we decline to extend it in this case. See United 

States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Although we are uncertain that the 

presumption of prejudice called forth in Remmer . . . would apply to communications 

among venirepersons, as opposed to communications from outside sources, we need not 

resolve that issue here . . . .”). Second, even were the Remmer presumption to apply, 

Greer does not make it conclusive. Hawley relies on the opinion of one judge; the other 

two panel members disagreed. 620 F.3d at 1386 (Doyle, J., concurring) (“I do not favor 

having a conclusive presumption approach to the question.”); id. at 1391 (Barrett, J., 

dissenting) (rejecting conclusive presumption). 

 
- 14 - 

impartial jury was violated by the remarks. Small, 423 F.3d at 1180. In other words, 

“whether the juror[s] can lay aside [their] impression or opinion and render a verdict 

based on the evidence presented in court.” United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 

1300 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he partiality of the petit jury is 

evaluated in light of those persons ultimately empaneled and sworn, not those who are 

excused from service.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Hawley says the prospective juror’s comments about having “recognized [her] as a 

drug user from Englewood’s ‘hood’” denied her a fair trial because she was on trial for 

distributing methamphetamine. (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 3-4.) The comments, he adds, 

were especially prejudicial because they pertained directly to her guilt or innocence. 

Hawley is not entirely candid. The prospective juror did not say where he had 

seen Hawley or how he recognized her, let alone that he recognized her as drug user from 

Englewood.10 And he was equivocal—“I think I have seen . . . the defendant. I . . . think

I recognize the person.” (R. Vol. 3 at 47 (emphasis added).) That said, we acknowledge 

our assessment is being made from a cold record and the comments are ambiguous. In 

context, the remarks could, in total, suggest he recognized her as a drug user. 

Nevertheless, even assuming the venire construed the comments as Hawley suggests, we 

see no abuse of discretion. 

 

10 It appears that was the understanding of the judge, who was present when the 

comments were made. He seemed concerned that the prospective juror believed he 

recognized Hawley, not that he recognized her as a drug user. In any event, as we 

explain, even accepting Hawley’s interpretation of the comments, the judge did not abuse 

his discretion in denying a mistrial. 
- 15 - 

At the time of the statement, the judge had no information linking Hawley to 

Englewood or to using methamphetamine in Englewood.11 Hawley argues, however, that 

her transient nature should have alerted him to the possibility that the prospective juror 

did recognize her. One of the prosecutors did inform the judge that Hawley was 

“somewhat transient.” (R. Vol. 3 at 48.) But the other prosecutor also (correctly) told 

him the events of the offense occurred in areas other than Englewood. Thus, the judge 

reasonably assumed the prospective juror was mistaken and so informed the other 

members of the venire. And, again, the prospective juror’s statement that he recognized 

Hawley was equivocal. 

More importantly, the judge told the venire that the statement was not evidence 

and should not be considered. He then asked the panel whether anyone would be unable 

to follow that instruction. No one answered in the affirmative and the judge obviously 

took them at their word. “Because the district court is in the best position to judge . . . the 

sincerity of the jurors’ pledge to abide by the court’s instructions, its assessment is 

entitled to great weight.”12 McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1300. (quotation marks omitted). 

Later, once the jury was empaneled and sworn, the judge reiterated that the jury’s 

role was “to find, from the evidence, what the facts are” and told the jurors “[t]hings 

 

11 Hawley’s later testimony linked her to Englewood. But she never renewed her 

motion for a mistrial at that time. 

12 Hawley says the judge “did nothing to dispel the prejudice of [the prospective 

juror’s] statement . . . but merely dismissed [the juror] for bringing it up.” (Appellant’s 

Op. Br. at 6.) As we have shown, this is simply not so. See also supra n.6. 
- 16 - 

outside of . . . this courtroom are not evidence.” (R. Vol. 2 at 25, 29.) The judge 

repeated this admonition at the close of the evidence: 

 You must make your decision based only on the evidence that you saw and 

heard here in court. Do not let rumors, suspicion or anything else that you may 

have seen or heard outside of Court influence your decision in anyway. The 

evidence in this case includes only what the witnesses said while they were 

testifying under oath, the exhibits that I allowed into evidence and the stipulations 

to which the lawyers agreed. Nothing else is evidence. 

(R. Vol. 2 at 955.) We presume the jury followed these instructions and did not consider 

the presumptive juror’s comments in reaching its verdict. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1467. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered by the Court: 

Terrence L. O’Brien 

United States Circuit Judge