alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6809

KENT BELL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

J. MESSINA, (Woman) Staff MCTC; STACEY HOFFMAN, (Staff) MCTC; 

JASON GANOE, (Staff) MCTC; RICHARD DOVEY, (Warden) MCTC,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:17-cv-01354-GLR)

Submitted: November 29, 2018 Decided: December 4, 2018

Before DUNCAN and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kent Bell, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Kent Bell appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(2012) complaint. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the 

Appellant’s brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Bell’s informal brief does not 

challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, Bell has forfeited appellate review 

of the court’s order. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The 

informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited 

to issues preserved in that brief.”). Accordingly, we deny Bell’s motion for appointment 

of counsel and affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Lovie FOLMAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-2464

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Order entered May 20, 2014 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00548-CV 

No. 05-14-00549-CV 

IN RE RICKY VERA LOPEZ, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 291st Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F04-505-78 

ORDER 

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DENY relator’s petition for writ of 

mandamus. We DENY as moot relator’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, although we 

have considered the petition without payment of the mandamus filing fee. We ORDER that 

relator bear the costs of this original proceeding. 

/s/ DAVID L. BRIDGES 

 JUSTICE
Thomas MAFFEI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-1108

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[June 14, 2018]

Fred Haddad of Fred Haddad, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jessenia J. Concepcion, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Gerber, C.J., Gross and Ciklin, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 28 (Thursday, February 10, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 7885]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-02783]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-94155; File Nos. SR-MIAX-2021-60, SR-EMERALD-2021-43]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Miami International Securities 
Exchange, LLC, MIAX Emerald, LLC; Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rule 
Changes To Amend Fee Schedules To Adopt Tiered-Pricing Structures for 
Additional Limited Service MIAX and MIAX Emerald Express Interface 
Ports

Feburary 4, 2022.
    On December 1, 2021, Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC 
(``MIAX'') and MIAX Emerald, LLC (``MIAX Emerald'') (collectively, the 
``Exchanges'') each filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``Commission''), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ a 
proposed rule change (File Numbers SR-MIAX-2021-60 and SR-EMERALD-2021-
43) to adopt a tiered-pricing structure for additional limited service 
express interface ports. The proposed rule changes were immediately 
effective upon filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 
19(b)(3)(A) of the Act.\3\ The proposed rule changes were published for 
comment in the Federal Register on December 20, 2021.\4\ On January 27, 
2022, the Commission temporarily suspended the proposed rule changes 
and instituted proceedings under Section 19(b)(2)(B) of the Act \5\ to 
determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposed rule 
changes.\6\ On February 1, 2022, the Exchanges withdrew the proposed 
rule changes (SR-MIAX-2021-60 and SR-EMERALD-2021-43).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A). A proposed rule change may take 
effect upon filing with the Commission if it is designated by the 
exchange as ``establishing or changing a due, fee, or other charge 
imposed by the self-regulatory organization on any person, whether 
or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory organization.'' 
15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
    \4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 93771 (December 14, 
2021), 86 FR 71940 (December 20, 2021) (SR-MIAX-2021-60); 93772 
(December 14, 2021), 86 FR 71965 (December 20, 2021) (SR-EMERALD-
2021-43).
    \5\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94087, 87 FR 5918 
(February 2, 2022).
    \7\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\7\
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-02783 Filed 2-9-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jaime ABIMEL-MEDELLIN, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11575 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 31, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Peter Michael Fleury, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, Lauren Anita Woods, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jaime Abimel-Medellin appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for'illegal reentry. He argues that the district court reversibly erred by enhancing his base offense level based upon its determination that his prior Texas conviction for assaulting a family member a second time within a year was a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

Abimel-Medellin now argues that the “crime of violence” definition in § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, both as applied and on its face. He did not raise in the district court his instant argument that § 16(b) is unconstitutional as applied because, in Texas, assaults can be committed recklessly. Accordingly, we review that issue for plain error only. *United States v.*Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Abimel-Medellin concedes, correctly, that our decision in *United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria,*831 F.3d 670, 677-78 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), *petition for cert. filed*(Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259), forecloses his argument that § 16(b) is unconstitu*290tional on its face. Furthermore, we held in *Gonzalez-Longoria*that § 16(b) is constitutional as applied to Texas family-violence assault convictions, like Abimel-Medellin’s, that “consisted of intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing] bodily injury to another.” *Id.*at 678; *see also*Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.11(a); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1). Thus, *Gonzalez-Longoria*forecloses both of Abimel-Medellin’s constitutional arguments.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance based on Abimel-Medellin’s concession that *Gonzalez-Longoria*forecloses his issues on appeal. The motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED as unnecessary.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47,5.4.
Gerry Vaughn WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-1946

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 9, 2018

Gerry Vaughn Williams, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and LUCK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Genesis Bioventures, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Douglas C. Lane, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

|   | /s/ Douglas Lane                                         			

Douglas C. Lane |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | Chief Executive Officer &  Principal |
|--------|------------------------------------------|

|   | Financial Officer |
|--------|-------------------|

|   | April			17, 2007 |
|--------|------------------|
Bryan MORTON v. STATE of Mississippi

2016-CT-00804-COA

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Filed: April 10, 2018 Closed: June 28, 2018

Certiorari - Denied.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ MARIO AKOTHE, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. WARDEN BEAR, Respondent - Appellee. No. 17-6221 (D.C. No. 5:17- CV-00693-D) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , MURPHY , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ The district court denied Oklahoma st ate prisoner Mario Akothe’s application for habeas relief under 28 U. S.C. § 2254 on the ground th at it was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). To appeal that ruling, Mr. Akothe must obtain a certificate of appealability (“COA”) from this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c )(1)(A) (requiring a COA to appeal “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court”). To obtain a COA, he must show “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

* This order is not binding precedent, ex cept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and colla teral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 27, 2017
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); accord Dulworth v. Jones , 496 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2007). Mr. Akothe does not address timeliness in his brief requesting a COA. Although we liberally construe Mr. Akothe’s filings because he represents himself, we do not act as his advocate. Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 92 7 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). Without an argument from Mr. Akot he as to why reasonable jurists would debate the district court’s ruling, we must deny a COA a nd dismiss this matter. We also deny Mr. Akothe’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge
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#### INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC, Appellant v. MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC, Appellee

2016-1360

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

December 9, 2016

*788John R. King, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, LLP, Irvine, CA, argued for appellant. Also represented by Brenton R. Babcock, Edward M. Cannon, Paul A. Stewart.

Adam Conrad, King & Spalding LLP, Charlotte, NC, argued for appellee. Also represented by Daryl Joseffer, Paul Al-essio Mezzina, Washington, DC; John C. Alemanni, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Winston-Salem, NC; Steven Moore, San Francisco, CA.

(Dyk, Plager, and Reyna, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
Sidney JONES v. Irozenell PRUITT

2015-CT-01559-COA

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Filed: March 6, 2018 Closed: May 10, 2018

Motion Desc: Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Certiorari - Denied.
Ollie Gabriel LANIER v. STATE

CR-16-0442

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 26, 2017 Reh. denied June 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Lance REBERGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael KOEHN; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-17430

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 20, 2017

Lance Reberger, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Lance Reberger appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and retaliation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the “three-strikes” rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *Andrews v. Cervantes,*493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint, *City of L.A. v. San Pedro Boat Works,*635 F.3d 440, 446 (9th Cir. 2011), and the denial1 of leave to proceed in forma pauperis, *O’Loughlin v. Doe,*920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990). We reverse and remand.

The district court properly concluded that Reberger has three prior strikes, as this court determined in *Reberger v. Baker,*657 Fed.Appx. 681 (9th Cir. 2016).

However, the district court abused its discretion in denying Reberger leave to proceed in forma pauperis because both the original and proposed amended complaints plausibly allege that Reberger was under imminent danger of serious physical injury because defendants continue to refuse to give him his HIV and seizure medications regularly. *See 28*U.S.C. § 1915(g); *see also Andrews,*493 F.3d at 1055 (an exception to the three-strikes rule exists “if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing”). On remand, the district court shall permit Reberger to proceed in forma pauperis on the amended complaint.

Reberger’s “motion for case for submission” and “motion for reversal and remand” are denied as moot.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eduardo PENALOZA-CARLON, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40477 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Date Filed: 12/20/2016

Renata Ann Gowie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of- Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Eduardo Penaloza-Carlon, Pro Se

Before DENNIS, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Eduardo Penaloza-Carlon has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Penaloza-Carlon has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appel-. late review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further, responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should riot be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cm. R. 47.5,4,
Robert Gary SIMS, Jr. v. STATE

CR-15-0402

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 26, 2017 Reh. denied June 16, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit 31(a)

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND INTERIM CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Michael R. Sayre, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Pinnacle Data Systems, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants
other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e), for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any
change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting); and

5. The registrants
other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                               
|-------------------------------
|Date: May 12, 2006             
|                               
|/s/ Michael R. Sayre           
|Chief Executive Officer and    
|Interim Chief Financial Officer
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 22

- 00144

- CV

City of Valley Mills, Texas v. William Chrisman and Darrin Troxell

On Appeal from the 220th District Court of Bosque County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. CV18005

JUDGMENT
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEAL S, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and rendered . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court REVERSED and RENDERS judgment in accordance with its opinion . Costs of the appeal are adj udged against appell ee s

. We further order this decision certified below for observance.
November 16 , 2023
456 A.2d 665

#### Commonwealth v. Kaiser, Appellant.

Submitted December 7, 1981.

James R. Protasio, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Dean N. Livermore, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.

Judgments of sentence affirmed.