alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Alvaro AGUILERA-MENDOZA, a.k.a. Jose Alvarado Aguilera-Mendoza, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10279

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

Brian G. Larson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Rachel Cristina Hernandez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Krissa Marie Lanham, USPX—Office of the US Attorney, Two Renaissance Square, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jose Alvaro Aguilera-Mendoza, Pro Se

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Alvaro Aguilera-Mendoza appeals from the district court’s order denying his *25118 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Aguilera-Mendoza’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Aguilera-Mendoza the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED. Aguilera-Mendoza’s pro se motion for appointment of new counsel is DENIED.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Robert Lee PRESAS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40139 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Amy Howell Alaniz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Scott Andrew Martin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, John Moreno Parras, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Robert Lee Presas, federal prisoner # 41912-179, appeals the sentence imposed following the most recent revocation of his term of supervised release, which was based on his arrest for again assaulting his long-time companion, Michelle Llamas. Presas challenges a special condition of supervised release imposed by the district court that prohibits him from all contact with Llamas or her family without the prior written consent of the probation officer.

“A district court has wide discretion in imposing terms and conditions of supervised release.” *United States v. Paul,*274 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 2001). The sentencing court may impose “any ... condition it considers to be appropriate” so long as the condition “is reasonably related” to certain sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary,” and it “is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In the instant case, Presas argues that this condition is overly broad and it involves a greater deprivation than reasonably necessary of his liberty interest in maintaining an intimate relationship with Llamas. We review the imposition of a discretionary condition of supervised release for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Ellis,*720 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2013).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this condition. This condition prohibits Presas from contacting only a small group of peo-*378pie, it applies only during the two years he will be on supervised release, and he may contact Llamas by obtaining the written consent of his probation officer. We also note that, because the record suggests that Presas and Llamas seem unable to avoid violence in their relationship, a condition prohibiting contact without the prior authorization of the probation officer serves a dual purpose of protecting Llamas from future assaults and preventing Presas from again violating the conditions of his supervised release.

AFFIRMED.

*

**Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
JPD PRIVATE TRUST COMPANY, LTD., as Trustee of the GPD Charitable Trust dated December 7, 2010, and Gian Paul Deblasio a/k/a John P. Deblasio, Appellants, v. WILMERHALE a/k/a Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale, and Dorr LLP., Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-581

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 16, 2018

Roy D. Wasson of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, for Appellants.

Thomas A. Zehnder and David B. King of King, Blackwell, Zehnder & Wermuth, P.A., Orlando; Edward K. Cheffy of Cheffy Passidomo, P.A., Naples; Richard J. Rosensweig and Richard M. Zielinski of Goulston & Storrs, PC, Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, LUCAS, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan LEOS-SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51398 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Juan Leos-Sanchez, Pro Se

Before KING, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Juan Leos-Sanchez has moved for leave to *373withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Leos-Sanchez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *373published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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THIS SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS  FOR THE PERIOD ENDED  SEPTEMBER  30,  1998,  AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     2,496,641
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<CGS>                                              732,215
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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-1293

LAMAR IRONHORSE,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

A.I., a minor child,

 Plaintiff,

v.

TERRY B. STOMEL, Individually; ADLER AND STOMEL, a Public Corporation,

 Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:21-cv-00027-D)

Submitted: September 8, 2022 Decided: September 12, 2022

Before HARRIS and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1293 Doc: 21 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 1 of 3
2

Lamar IronHorse, Appellant Pro Se. John Thomas Crook, BAILEY & DIXON, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1293 Doc: 21 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 2 of 3
3

PER CURIAM:

Lamar Ironhorse appeals the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss and dismissing his complaint without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction 

and for failure to state a claim, as well as numerous nondispositive orders. We have 

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm. Ironhorse v. 

Stomel, No. 7:21-cv-00027-D (E.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2021; June 11, 2021; July 1, 2021; 

Sept. 16, 2021; Jan. 19, 2022; Feb. 17, 2022). We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court 

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1293 Doc: 21 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 3 of 3
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002*

 

In connection with the Quarterly Reportof Capital Corp of the West (“the Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period endedSeptember 30, 2003 as filed with Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (“the Report”), I, Thomas T. Hawker , President and Chief ExecutiveOfficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)                                  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| November 12, 2003 |                                                    |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
|                   |                                                    |
|                   | /s/ Thomas T. Hawker                                    |
|                   | Thomas T. Hawker  President and Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
#### Robert M. HERRERA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15-70139

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 16, 2016 *

Filed November 21, 2016

Robert M. Herrera, Pro Se.

Ivan Clay Dale, Attorney, Joan I. Oppenheimer, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division/Appellate Section, William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Robert M. Herrera appeals pro se from the Tax Court’s order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction his action related to his 2008 tax liability. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a). We review de novo, *Gorospe v. Comm’r,*451 F.3d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 2006), and we affirm.

The Tax Court properly concluded that it lacked'jurisdiction over Herrera’s petition because Herrera did not file it within 90 days of a notice of deficiency or 30 days of a notice of determination. *See*26 U.S.C. §§ 6213(a) (establishing a 90-day requirement for appealing a notice of deficiency); 6320(c) & 6330(d)(1) (establishing .a 30-day requirement for appealing a notice of determination concerning notices of lien or notices of intent to levy); *Gorospe,*451 F.3d at 968 (the Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and its subject matter is defined by Title 26 of the United States Code).

We do not consider Herrera’s contention, raised for the first time on appeal in this case, that the Internal Revenue Service sent his mail to an incorrect address. *See Kochansky v. Comm’r,*92 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1996).

*944We lack jurisdiction to consider Herrera’s contentions regarding the Tax.Court decisions in Nos. 15717-10, 26902-10, and 29326-11 because Herrera did not file a notice of appeal from those decisions. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 13(a)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 7483 (“Review of a decision of the Tax Court shall be obtained by filing a notice of appeal!.]”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### In the Matter of John Redmond et al., Petitioners, v Raymond Kelly, as Police Commissioner of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.

[771 NYS2d 497]

Determination of the Police Commissioner, dated April 8, 2002, finding petitioner Medina guilty of specified misconduct and thereupon placing Medina on dismissal probation for one year and suspending him for 45 days, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Lewis Stone, J.], entered December 13, 2002) dismissed, without costs.

Substantial evidence, most notably the testimony of the complainant *(see Matter of Bonenfant v Kelly,*306 AD2d 108 [2003]), supports respondent’s findings that petitioner Medina, in violation of departmental rules, participated in wrongfully restraining and transporting the complainant and neither attempted to prevent his partner from mistreating the complainant nor reported his partner’s misconduct in dealing with the complainant. In light of the gravity of the proven misconduct, the penalty imposed on Medina is not shocking to our sense of fairness *(see Matter of Kelly v Safir,*96 NY2d 32, 39-40 [2001]).

Petitioner Redmond, who had retired from the police force prior to the commencement of the disciplinary hearing underlying the challenged April 8, 2002 determination, is not aggrieved by that determination, which by its terms affects only petitioner Medina. To the extent that Redmond seeks to challenge the determination made against him following a prior disciplinary hearing in this matter, that determination is not before us, the article 78 proceeding brought with respect to that earlier determination having been discontinued with prejudice pursuant to stipulation and the matter having, pursuant to the same stipulation, been remanded for a new hearing. We would note, however, that even if the determination respecting Redmond following the earlier hearing were properly before us, there would be no ground warranting its disturbance. There was substantial evidence adduced at both hearings that Redmond wrongfully restrained and transported the complainant, and, given that wrongdoing, the penalty imposed by the earlier determination and apparently served by Redmond prior to his *408retirement from the force—a one-year dismissal probation and a 25-day suspension—was not shockingly severe. Concur— Buckley, P.J., Mazzarelli, Saxe, Sullivan and Rosenberger, JJ.
================================================================================


Exhibit 32: Certifications Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934



                                CERTIFICATION OF
                           CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
                             CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the  accompanying  annual report on Form 10-KSB of Rocketinfo
Inc. for the year ended  December  31,  2006,  I certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, to my knowledge, that:

1.       the  Annual  Report  on Form  10-KSB of  Rocketinfo  Inc.  for the year
         ended  December  31,  2006  fully  complies  with the requirements of
         Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       the  information contained in the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the
         year ended December 31, 2006, fairly  presents  in all  material
         respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of
         Rocketinfo Inc.

                /s/ Bill Ganz
By:             -----------------------
Name:           Bill Ganz
Title:          President
Date:

                /s/ Paul Eagland
By:             -----------------------
Name:           Paul Eagland
Title:          Chief Financial Officer
Date:
**Exhibit 32.2****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with the Annual Report of Too, Inc. (the “Company”), on Form 10-K for the fiscalyear ended January 28, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, Poe A. Timmons, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer) of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, asadopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Company.Dated:April 10, 2006            /s/ Poe A. Timmons              Poe A. Timmons         Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer         (Principal Financial Officer)  
81
<PAGE>



                                                                  EXHIBIT - 32.2

                                  MOSSIMO, INC.

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Mossimo, Inc. (the Company) on Form
10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I Manuel Marrero, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition, results of
                  operations, and cash flows of the Company.


/s/      Manuel Marrero
---------------------------
         Manuel Marrero
         Chief Financial Officer
         November 7, 2003
<PAGE>


                                                                      EXHIBIT 23


                            [DIXON HUGHES PLLC LOGO]


             INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM'S CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on
Form S-8 (File No. 333-83875) of Wake Forest Bancshares, Inc. of our report
dated December 21, 2005, relating to the consolidated financial condition of
Wake Forest Bancshares, Inc. and subsidiary as of September 30, 2005 and 2004,
and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders' equity, and
cash flows for the years ended September 30, 2005 and 2004, appearing in the
Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Wake Forest Bancshares, Inc., included herein.

[DIXON HUGHES PLLC]

Raleigh, North Carolina
December 21, 2005
M.B. v. In the matter of J.E.F., a minor child

2160358

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 12, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### Barry HUTCHINS, Appellant v. DEPARTMENT OF DISABILITY, et al., Appellees

No. 16-5302

September Term, 2016

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed On: February 21, 2017

Barry Hutchins, Pro Se

R. Craig Lawrence, U.S. Attorney’s Office, (USA) Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee

BEFORE: Henderson and Brown, Circuit Judges, and Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge

*8JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief and appendix filed by appellant. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). Upon consideration of the foregoing and the motion for appointment of counsel, it is

ORDERED that the motion for appointment of counsel be denied. In civil cases, appellants are not entitled to appointment of counsel when they have not demonstrated sufficient likelihood of success on the merits. It is

FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order entered August 26, 2016, be affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing appellant’s complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The dismissal without prejudice allows appellant to file a new complaint that complies with Rule 8(a).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.