alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Mikel Walters, Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC, 4770 Buford Highway NE, Mailstop F-63, Atlanta, Georgia 30341, Telephone (404)639-0913,                         *MWalters@cdc.gov.*

                        The Director, Strategic Business Initiatives Unit, Office of the Chief Operating Officer, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, has been delegated the authority to sign                         **Federal Register**                         notices pertaining to announcements of meetings and other committee management activities, for both the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.                    

Kalwant Smagh,

Director, Strategic Business Initiatives Unit, Office of the Chief Operating Officer, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

[FR Doc. 2022-03870 Filed 2-23-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4163-18-P
EX PARTE Andre Legay WALLACE

1160314 (CR-15-1324)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 10, 2017

Cert. denied.
Date: Time: Location: UAV Pilot pre - flight checklist: Physical inspection of UAV: Notes:________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ Physical inspection of Remote Control: Notes:________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ Proper personnel on - site: Notes:________________________________ ________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ Proper notifications and permissions received, Property owner/manager, FAA, COA,_________________________________________ ________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ Weather conditions:
_____________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________ _____________________________________________________________ Safe distance perimeter set:______________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________ Flight notes:__ ______________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________
John C. ALLEN v. Patsy ALLEN, Dr. Jacob B. Webster, M.D., William Brantley, Carolyn M. Dohn, and Samuel N. Crosby

2160413

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 12, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Transferred to Sup. Ct. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
#### Daniel Cummings, Plaintiff in Error, *versus*William H. Pruden.

Where the plaintiff, in an action before a justice of the peace, had leave to discontinue, the defendant could hot have judgment for his account filed by way of set-off.

This writ of error was brought to procure the reversal of a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace for this county, wherein *Cummings*was plaintiff and *Pruden*was defendant.

The action was upon a promissory note for 10 dollars made by ihe defendant, and payable on demand to the plaintiff. It appeared, from the record, that the plaintiff, after entering his action, had leave to discontinue; and the defendant, having more than four days previous to the return of the writ filed an account before the justice, as a set-off to the plaintiff’s demand, prayed that the same might be allowed; and the justice entered judgment for him, for the sum of 20 dollars damage and 66 cents costs.

*Greenleaf*for the plaintiff in error.

*Frost,*for the defendant in error,

relied on the provision of the statute of 1784, c. 28, § 12, that, where an account is duly filed, “ If, upon the trial, it shall appear that there is a balance due to the defendant, he shall recover the same, *in the same, manner as if he had brought his action*therefor.” And he argued that, although the plaintiff might have no cause of action, the defendant was, *192nevertheless, entitled to recover his just demand, having taken the course directed by law.

*Sed per Curiam.*

Let the judgment be reversed as to the damages awarded to the defendant, and affirmed as to the costs.
#### Christopher A. BLAKE; Linda B. Blake, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. U.S. BANK NA, as Trustee for the Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2012-3; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-35061

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 14, 2016 *

Filed December 22, 2016

Christopher A. Blake, Pro Se Linda B. Blake, Pro Se

Adam G. Hughes, Attorney, Anglin Fle-welling Rasmussen Campbell *&*Trytten LLP, Seattle, WA, Renee M. Parker, Attorney, Wright, Finlay *&*Zak, LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Christopher A. Blake and Linda B. Blake appeal pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in their diversity action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas,*323 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because the Blakes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC was the holder of their promissory note and therefore entitled to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. *See Brown v. Wash. State Dep’t of Commerce,*184 Wash.2d 509, 359 P.3d 771, 778-80, 787 (2015) (explaining that Washington law permits separation of note ownership from enforcement and holding that a loan servi-cer who held an endorsed note was the beneficiary with legal authority to enforce the obligation and foreclose); *see also*Wash. Rev. Code § 61.24.030 (7)(a) (a “declaration by the beneficiary made under the penalty of perjury stating that the beneficiary is the actual holder of the promissory note” is “sufficient proof that the beneficiary is the owner of any promissory note ... secured by the deed of trust”). Moreover, the Blakes lack standing to challenge the validity of the assignment of their promissory note into a secu-ritized trust. *See Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Slotke,*192 Wash.App. 166, 367 P.3d 600, 606 (2016).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Blakes’ motions to compel discovery because their first motion failed to comply with procedural rules and the district court reasonably directed the parties to file a joint discovery plan in response to their second motion. *See Hallett v. Morgan,*296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and describing court’s broad discretion to permit or deny discovery).

AFFIRMED.

**

 xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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#### GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, TUTUILA, Petitioner v. TUFUE, a Samoan, Respondent

No. 43-1902

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Asila” in Fagatogo]

December 13, 1902

U. SEBREE, Captain, U.S. Navy, *President of the High Court*

Under Regulation No. 20-1900, enabling the Government to acquire lands for Public Purposes.

JUDGMENT

This cause having been commenced at the instance of the Government of the United States of America, against *55the above-named Respondent, for the purpose of ascertaining the sum to be paid by the said Government as compensation in respect of the lands and premises hereinafter described, the property of the Respondent herein, said lands being required for Public Uses; AND the Registrar of Titles for the United States Naval Státion, Tutuila, under the provisions contained in the Ordinance No. 20-1900, to regulate the acquisition of land by the Government of the United States for Public Uses having given due and proper notice to the Respondent herein, and a reference to arbitration to settle and adjust the amount of compensation to be paid to the above-named Respondent for said land, as shown by the award of the Arbitrators appointed for that purpose, and the Report of the Registrar of Titles now on file in this Court, recommending the Government be declared the proprietor of said land and premises upon payment of the sum of $400, interest and costs, IT IS NOW THEREFORE ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows; to wit:—

> 1. That the Government of the United States of America shall pay to the Respondent, Tufue, the sum of $400, together with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per centum per annum from the 7th day of March, 1901, to the 10th day of December, 1902, amounting to $56.26 and shall pay costs of attorney, arbitration, Registrar’s and High Court costs, amounting to $120.50, said sum making a total of $576.76, in consideration of the release of all claims and demands of the said Respondent to said land and premises.

> 2. That in consideration of the payment of said sum of $576.76, as aforesaid, the Government of the United States of America be and the same is hereby declared the proprietor of ALL that piece or parcel of land situate in Fagatogo, in the United States Naval Station, Tutuila, and called or known as “ASILA”.

*56The REGISTRAR OF TITLES is hereby directed to issue a Certificate of Title to said land in favor of the said Government according to said Order and Judgment.

GIVEN under my hand and seal of the Court on this 13th day of December, 1902, A.D.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-4280

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus SCHOLAR MCGLEN JEFFERSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief District Judge. (CR-04-19) Submitted: October 21, 2005 Decided: March 7, 2006 Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Public Defender, Windy C. Venable, Research and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).*Jefferson does not challenge his guilty plea or otherwise attack the integrity of his convictions. - 2 - PER CURIAM: Scholar Jefferson, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000), and using a firearm in connection with drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000). The plea agreement stipulated to a drug quantity of 1,030.7 grams of cocaine and 17.8 grams of cocaine base. At sentencing, the district court found Jefferson responsible for 2,561.6 grams of cocaine. Jefferson objected to that drug quantity. The district court denied Jefferson’s objections and sentenced him to 130 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Jefferson asserts that he is entitled to resentencing because the Government breached the plea agreement. * In response, the Government has commendably moved for remand, conceding that it undermined the plea agreement’s stipulation as to drug quantity by making comments that could be construed as suggesting that a greater drug quantity finding than that set forth in the plea agreement would be appropriate. Jefferson does not oppose a remand for the purpose of resentencing. We grant the Government’s motion to remand. “We remand the case to a different district judge for resentencing as we are required to do.” United States v. Peglera , 33 F.3d 412,- 3 - 413, 415 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971)). Therefore, we affirm Jefferson’s conviction, vacate the sentence imposed by the district court, and remand for reconsideration of the sentence by a different judge.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-17-00037-CV 

VALERIE L. MCNALLY NOW 

KNOWN AS VALERIE JENKINS 

AND KELLY ALANA MCNALLY 

A/K/A KELLY ALANA WILKINS 

 APPELLANTS

V. 

JOSEPH P. MCNALLY APPELLEE

---------- 

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF PARKER COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NO. CIV-14-0690 

---------- 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

---------- 

Appellants Valerie L. McNally now known as Valerie Jenkins and Kelly Alana 

McNally a/k/a Kelly Alana Wilkins brought an appeal from the trial court’s 

December 20, 2016 “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Traditional and No-Evidence 

 1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. 
2 

Motions for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendants’ Traditional and NoEvidence Motions for Summary Judgment.” Upon our review of the record, we 

determined that the trial court’s December 20 order may not have been final and 

appealable because it did not resolve all claims against all parties. 

Therefore, on March 17, 2017, we sent the parties a letter expressing our 

concern that we lacked jurisdiction. In our letter, we stated that the December 20 

order did not appear to be a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, 

and we asked the parties to file a response showing grounds for continuing the 

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. Appellants responded to our letter by conceding 

that the December 20 order is not final or appealable and by expressing that 

counsel for appellee Joseph P. McNally agrees that the order is not appealable.2 

We agree that the order is not a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, 

so we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 

43.2(f); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. 

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (West Supp. 2016) (listing types of 

appealable interlocutory orders). 

PER CURIAM 

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER and MEIER, JJ. 

DELIVERED: April 27, 2017 

 2Appellants stated that when they filed their notice of appeal, they were 

unsure whether the December 20 order qualified as a final judgment and filed the 

notice of appeal “in an abundance of caution.”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MARCUS TEAGUE,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 123 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 30th day of July, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
Zendarius Ziqae WHITE v. STATE

CR-15-1493

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Reh. denied.
EXHIBIT 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date: January 28, 2010
    /s/ Robert I. ChenRobert I. ChenPresident, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 14.1




                                MOVING BYTES INC.
                                 CODE OF ETHICS




     The Company's  principal  executive officer,  principal  financial officer,
principal  accounting  officer  or  controller,  or persons  performing  similar
functions  ("Accountable  Person")  shall be  subject to the  following  code of
ethics:

     o    each  Accountable  Person shall conform to honest and ethical conduct,
          including  the ethical  handling of actual or  apparent  conflicts  of
          interest between personal and professional relationships;

     o    each Accountable  Person shall avoid conflicts of interest,  including
          disclosure to another  Accountable Person of any material  transaction
          or relationship that could reasonably be expected to give rise to such
          a conflict;

     o    each Accountable Person shall make full, fair,  accurate,  timely, and
          understandable  disclosure in reports and  documents  that the company
          files with, or submits to, the SEC and in other public  communications
          made by the company;

     o    each Accountable Person shall comply with all applicable  governmental
          laws, rules and regulations;

     o    each  Accountable  Person shall promptly report violation of this Code
          of Ethics to another Accountable Person;

     o    each Accountable Person is fully accountable to adhere to this Code of
          Ethics.
AFS-14-348-E

July 9, 2014

 Exemption No.11024

 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2014-0439

Mr. Ashok Kumar

Parent of Suchir Kumar

555 West 53rd Street, #945

New York, NY 10019

Dear Mr. Kumar:

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your request for an exemption. It transmits 

our decision, explains its basis, and lists the conditions and limitations of the exemption, 

including the date it ends.

The Basis for Our Decision

By letter posted June 26, 2014, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on 

behalf of Suchir Kumar for an exemption from § 121.311(b) of Title 14, Code of Federal 

Regulations (14 CFR). That exemption, if granted, would allow Suchir to exceed the 

specified weight limit for an FAA-approved child restraint system (CARES, manufactured by 

AmSafe Corporation) during use of that child restraint system (CRS) aboard a United States 

(U.S.) aircraft.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition 

in the Federal Register because the requested exemption would not set a precedent and any 

delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Suchir.

The FAA has issued grants of exemption in circumstances similar in all material respects to 

those presented in your petition. In Grant of Exemption No. 9834 (copy enclosed), the FAA 

found that numerous people with physical challenges had previously completed flights using 

restraint systems that addressed unique physical needs regarding safety, support, and security 

in the same manner of operations as described in this petition. The FAA further found that the 

petition would not set any new precedents regarding the use of restraint systems by persons 

with disabilities.
2

Having reviewed your reasons for requesting an exemption, I find that—

• they are similar in all material respects to relief previously requested in the enclosed Grant 

of Exemption No. 9834;

• the reasons stated by the FAA for granting the enclosed Grant of Exemption No. 9834 also 

apply to the situation you present; and 

• a grant of exemption is in the public interest.

Our Decision

Under the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113, and 44701, which the FAA 

Administrator has delegated to me, I hereby grant Suchir Kumar an exemption from 

§ 121.311(b). In addition, any air carrier or commercial operator operating under part 121 

while Suchir is aboard its aircraft is granted an exemption from 14 CFR § 121.311(b) to the 

extent necessary to allow him to use an FAA-approved CRS aboard a U.S. aircraft.

All operations under this exemption must be conducted with at least one of Suchir’s parents or 

a caregiver accompanying him. Suchir Kumar may only occupy a passenger seat with no 

passenger seated behind him. In addition, Suchir’s parent or caregiver must carry a copy of 

this exemption and advise the air carrier about the contents of the exemption at least 48 hours 

before the date of each flight.

This exemption terminates on July 31, 2019, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Sincerely,

/S/

Ricardo Domingo

Acting Deputy Director, Flight Standards Service

Enclosure