alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From:nancyhyke[mailto:hykeinalaska@yahoo.com] Sent:Saturday,May05,2012 1:16PM To:Hank@hankm.com Subject:EssentialAirServiceforkakeAlaska To whom It May concern, Air Excursions provides our mail and flight service here in Kake. I have lived and worked here in Kake since 1996. Air Excursions provides excellent, , dependable air service on a constant basis. My husband works for Alaska marine Highway so he needs to fly in and out of Kake all year to get to his dispatched assignments.This has proven very difficult for him in the past, however sinceAir Excursions has been flying into Kake he has made every assignment with out having to leave home three days early. Air excursions is the only air servicewe have had in Kake that provides us with a consistent schedule that they stick to, so the people who live here and work out oftown can get back and forth towork in a timely fashion. The employees and pilots are always polite, courteous and very helpful.

The flight service that comes into Kake provides a way for us to get mail and freight, as well as doctor appointments and vacation time. It is really an essential part of southeastAlaska life. I hope thatAir excursions will continue to be our flight service and mail carrier, we received our mail all year this year in a timely manner. In the pastwe have gone two weeks or more without mail in the winter. I supportAir Excursions bid to continue to provide us with reliable air service. I hope theywill continue to be our flight service for years to come. Ifyou have any questions please feel free to call me at sosvalue Mart 907-785-6444 Home 907-785-3231 cell 907-518-4190 Nancy LHyke
<Page>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
listed below and related Prospectuses of Intermedia Communications Inc. and
Digex, Incorporated, of our report dated January 30, 2001, except for Notes 13
and 15 as to which the date is March 2, 2001, and except for Notes 5 and 17 as
to which the date is November 27, 2001 with respect to the consolidated
financial statements and schedule of Digex, Incorporated, included in this
Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) of Digex, Incorporated for the year ended December
31, 2000.

--    (Form S-3 no. 33-99940) pertaining to the registration of Intermedia's
      warrants issued in connection with the 13.5% Senior Notes Due 2005 and
      common stock issuable upon exercise of such warrants

--    (Form S-3 no. 333-45019) pertaining to registration of $500,000,000 of
      Intermedia's Debt Securities, Preferred Stock, Depositary Shares and
      Common Stock

--    (Form S-8 no. 333-84025) pertaining to the registration of 9,000,000
      shares of Digex's Class A Common Stock reserved for the Digex,
      Incorporated Long-Term Incentive Plan

--    (Form S-8 no. 333-34506) pertaining to the registration of 650,000 shares
      of Digex's Class A Common Stock reserved for the Intermedia Communications
      Inc. 401(k) plan

--    (Form S-8 no. 333-39098) pertaining to the registration of 6,000,000
      shares of Digex's Class A Common Stock reserved for the Digex,
      Incorporated Long-Term Incentive Plan

--    (Form S-8 no. 333-40240) pertaining to the Digex, Incorporated 401(k) Plan


                                        /s/   ERNST & YOUNG LLP

McLean, Virginia
December 5, 2001
EX PARTE A.C.T.

(In re: J.L.O. v. A.C.T.)

2160732

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 23, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. denied.
SCPW-21-0000373 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I
FRANCIS P. GRANDINETTI, Petitioner,

vs. THE HONORABLE PETER K. KUBOTA, Judge of the Circuit Court of the

Third Circuit, State of Hawai # i, Respondent Judge.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (CASE NO. 3PC930000141) ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.)

Upon consideration of petitioner Francis P. Grandinetti’s motion for reconsideration, filed on July 16, 2021, and the record,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, July 20, 2021. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Michael D. Wilson /s/ Todd W. Eddins Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCPW-21-0000373 20-JUL-2021 08:07 AM Dkt. 10 ODMR
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local

Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-11412 Summary Calendar

SONDRA L. COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ASMARA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; NHP FOUNDATION, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas (3:95-CV-1520-G)

February 18, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, WIENER and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Sondra L. Collins appeals an adverse summary judgment in her Fair Housing

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), action against Asmara Limited Partnership and NHP2

Foundation, owner-operator of Wellington Place Apartments, Dallas, Texas. Our

review of the record and briefs of the parties persuades that the district court did not

err in its entry of judgment, and on the basis of the facts detailed, authorities cited,

and analysis made by the district court in its comprehensive Memorandum Order

rendered and filed on October 11, 1996, we AFFIRM.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Deangelo MCNEIL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4750

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 27, 2017

Thomas Richmond McPherson, III, MCPHERSON LAW, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill West-moreland Rose, United States Attorney, Sanjeev Bhasker, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*253PER CURIAM:

David Deangelo McNeil appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to a prison term of one year and one day. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” *United States v. Webb,*738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not ‘plainly unreasonable.’ ” *Id,*“When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” *United States v. Thompson,*595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); *Thompson,*595 F,3d at 546-47. If there is no significant procedural error, we then consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances: *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

McNeil claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to explain adequately its reasons for imposing a prison term of one year and one day. Having reviewed the record, we find the district court’s explanation sufficient. *See Thompson,*595 F.3d at 547 (discussing standard). We also reject McNeil’s argument that his sentence, which exceeded by one day the applicable Sentencing Guidelines’ advisory policy statement range, is substantively unreasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Phillip MARTINEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Steve LANGFORD and Chairman United States Parole Commission, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 17-55232

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

Phillip Martinez, Pro Se

Peter Hardin, Anwer Khan, Special Assistant United States Attorney, L. Ashley Aull, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondents-Appellees

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Phillip Martinez appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review for abuse of discretion, *see Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y,*725 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.

Martinez contends that the district court erred in denying his. request for an order enjoining the United States Parole Commission and the United States Probation Office from requiring him to submit to drug and alcohol testing as a condition of his parole. Because Martinez failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, the district court did not abuse its discretion. *See Winter v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council,*555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”).

Martinez’s request for sanctions, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
#### IN RE: Darryl CARTER, Debtor. Darryl Carter, Appellant, v. Ron L. Barber, Appellee.

No. 16-60034

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 15, 2017

*308Darryl Carter, Pro Se

Ron L. Barber, Pro Se

Scott Michael Hutchison, Attorney, Law Offices of David A. Wallis, Sacramento, CA, for Appellee

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Darryl Carter appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) judgment dismissing as moot Carter’s request for injunctive relief, and vacating and remanding the remainder of the bankruptcy court’s judgment in Carter’s adversary proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. *Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian),*564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The, BAP properly concluded that Carter’s request for injunctive relief was moot because Carter sought to enjoin an unlawful detainer proceeding that had concluded. *See Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc. v. Stanley (In re Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc.),*152 F.3d 1178, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1998) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a case is constitutionally moot when “an event occurs while a case is pending appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief’ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject as without merit Carter’s contention that the BAP erred by construing his “time expenditures” as a request for attorney’s fees.

To the extent Carter contends that the BAP improperly remanded his damages claims to the bankruptcy court instead of resolving them in the first instance, we reject such contention as without merit.

All pending requests and motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Janis Alyssia MILLER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Paul BLACKMAN, Sheriff of Highlands County, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-4294

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 28, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6697

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHELLY WAYNE MARTIN, a/k/a Wayne,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:04-cr-00029-JFM-3; 1:12-cv-02890-JFM)

Submitted: September 24, 2013 Decided: September 27, 2013

Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Shelly Wayne Martin, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Clayton Hanlon, 

Robert Reeves Harding, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Shelly Wayne Martin seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2013) motion. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Martin has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
## In T he Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07 - 22 - 00124 - CV IN THE INTEREST OF A.H., A CHILD On Appeal from the 360th District Court Tarrant County, Texas 1 Trial Court No . 360 - 563169 - 14 , Honorable Patricia Bennett , Presiding 

### June 14 , 2022 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. Appellant, Gary Hawley Jr. , appeal s from the trial court’s Order in Suit to Modify Parent - Child Relationship . Now pending before this C ourt is Hawley’s unopposed motion seeking voluntary dismissal of the appeal. The C ourt finds that the motion to dismiss complies with the requirements of Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and that granting the motion will not prevent any party from seeking relief to which it would otherwise be entitled. As no decision of the C ourt has been delivered to date, we grant the motion. The appeal is dismissed. Because the motion does not reflect an agreement

1 Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this C ourt by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 73.00 1 .2

of the parties concerning the payment of costs, costs will be t axed against Hawley . See T EX . R. A PP . P . 42.1(d). No motion for rehearing will be entertained and our mandate will issue forthwith. Per Curiam
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<LEGEND>
     This schedule  contains summary  financial information extracted from SEC
     Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
     statements as of and for the nine months ended September 30, 1998.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000883946           
<NAME>                        TREEV INC
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</TABLE>
Paul NEWMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-0893

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

August 18, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Samuel Philip ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50678 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 5, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Samuel Philip Adams, Pro Se

Before OWEN, ELROD, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Samuel Philip Adams, now federal prisoner # 31576-380, was convicted of possession of child pornography. He filed a motion in the district court styled, “Pro-Se Motion to Reverse ‘Void’ Federal Judgment/Conviction to Correct a ‘Manifest Injustice’ and Plain Error, Pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 52(b).” The district court denied the motion as meaningless and unauthorized and because it lacked jurisdiction. It decerti-fied Adams’s in forma pauperis (IFP) status. Adams has applied in this court for leave to proceed IFP.

*223Adams asserts that the federal court had jurisdiction to reach his constitutional claims because he has a First Amendment right to petition the court for relief. Adams has not shown that his appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). We deny the motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal and dismiss the appeal as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cíe. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

April 29, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

RHONDA STIRLING,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAVID STIRLING; DONNA

DUCKETT STIRLING,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-2026

(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-00842-MV-ACT)

(D.N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before GORSUCH, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

Rhonda Stirling filed suit against her ex-husband and his wife in federal

court alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the

case, however, holding that Ms. Stirling failed to state a federal claim on which

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review that decision de

*

 After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.

34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This

order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
novo and with considerable solicitude to Ms. Stirling who proceeds pro se. See

Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). 

Even so we cannot help but affirm. As the district court explained, § 1983

“allows citizens to sue those who violate their constitutional rights while acting

‘under color of’ state law.” SECSYS, LLC v. Vigil, 666 F.3d 678, 683-84 (10th

Cir. 2012). But in this case Ms. Stirling has sued only her ex-husband and his

new wife, neither of whom are state actors, and so her § 1983 claim must fail just

as the district court held. On appeal, Ms. Stirling argues that a state trial judge

also violated her rights. But we generally do not review new arguments made for

the first time on appeal. And, in any event, Ms. Stirling has neither named that

judge as a party nor explained how the judge acted in concert with the defendants

she has named. Thus, even were we to take cognizance of this new argument Ms.

Stirling still lacks any state actor or state action.

The district court’s dismissal of Ms. Stirling’s claims is affirmed and her

motion to proceed in this appeal without prepayment of fees is denied. She is

reminded of her obligation to pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Neil M. Gorsuch

Circuit Judge

2
#### Richard B. HIME, Claimant-Appellant v. David J. SHULKIN, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee

2016-2123

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 20, 2017

Sandra Waldorf Wischow, Goodman Allen Donnelly PLLC, Glen Allen, VA, argued for claimant-appellant. Also represented by Erin Elizabeth Ralston.

Adam E. Lyons, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, ar*977gued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by Benjamin C. Mizer, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr„ Martin F. Hockey, Jr., L. Misha Preheim; Amanda Blackmon, Y. Ken Lee, Office of General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

(Prost, Chief Judge, Clevenger and Reyna, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.