### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON D ec em be r 4, 200 1 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA URICE L AS HAU N N AS H

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Tip ton County

No. 3933 Joseph H. Walk er, Judge

No. W2000-02971-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Fe bruary 8, 2002

The Appe llant, Maurice L aShaun Nash, was found g uilty by a Tipt on County jury of possession of a Schedule VI

controlled substanc e with the intent to deliver, a Class E fe l o ny . The trial c ourt sentenc ed Nash, as a Rang e I standard offende r, t o eig hteen months in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. On appe al, Nash r aises three issues for our revie w: (1) whe ther the se arc h war rant wa s issued upon pr ob a ble c a us e ; ( 2) wh e the r i ntr od

uc tio n o f N a sh ’s pr e se nc e duri nga pr ior dru g s ale at the same residenc e constituted evidenc e of a prior bad ac t in violation of Rul e 404(b) of the Te nnessee Rules of Evid ence; an d ( 3) wh e the r t he e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l w a s su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the ve rd ic t. After revie w, we f

ind t h e i s s ues pre sented a re w ithout merit. According ly , the judg ment of conviction is aff

irmed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e ntof t he Ci r c uitCo ur t i s A ffirm e d.

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P. J ., and D A V ID H. W EL L ES , J ., joined.

C. Michae l Robbins, Memphis, Tenne ssee ( on appea l); J . Thomas Caldwell, Ripley , Tenne ssee ( at trial), for the Appellant, Ma

urice L aShaun Na sh. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Michael Moore , Solicitor Genera l; J . Ross Dy er, Assistant Attorney

Gene ral; Elizabeth T. Rice, Distric t Att o r n e y G e n e r a l; a

n d Ry a n Br own, Assistant District Attorney

Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

In October

of 1999, Covington Police De partment Invest i gator, Ricky Chandler, r ece ived complaints reg ardingthe pre sence of numerous indivi duals and ve hicles at a house located at 1401 Howar d Street. B ased upon the se complaints, Investig ator Chandler conducte d a thre e-w eekIn v e stiga to r C hand l er explai ned t hat t he use of t he co nf i d ent i al i nf

o rma nt i n purchasi ng drugs was “f o r t he 1
p u rp o se o f ex e c u ting a se a rc h w a rr a n t.” T h e info rm a n t wa s n o t ca lled a s a w itne ss a t t ria l.
-2- surveillan c e o f

th e lo c ati o nf

o r p e r io d s o f

tw o to thr e e h o ur s at a

ti me

. T h e s ur

v e il la n c e r e veale d
nume ro us ve hic le s a

rr ivi ngand

le avin g the loc a tio n; d e sc ri be d a s “ in and ou t” tra ff ic . H e a lso observe d “five to seven diff er en t people that stayed ther e off and on.” D uringthe per iods of surveillance , it was estimated that the Appellant was present “80 to 85%” of the t ime. On Octobe r 26th, a police infor

mant was equipped with a sm all elec tronic t ransmitting device, whic h permitted In v e s t i g a t o r

C h an d l e r t o l i s t e nan d

r e c o r d c o n v e r s a t i o n s b e tw e e nth e i n f o r m an tan d a th i r d p arty. Th e inf or mant w a s in str

uc te d by Inv e sti g a tor Cha nd le r to g o to 14 01 Ho wa rd Str e e t and

a tte mpt to purcha se drug s. At the time of the planne d drugbuy and for a t wo -h o u r per iod prior there to, the 1 only persons inside the house wer e the Appe llant and B rian How ard.

Investig ator Chandler

positioned himself direc tly acr oss the s tree t to observe a nd listen on h is rece iver a s the transa ction took place. Cha ndler obser

ved Howa

rd standingat the fr ont door while the informa

nt went inside. The Appellant was see n crossingin front of the door way inside the house seve ral times. After enter ing the house, t he informant purcha sed one ounce of ma rijuana f rom th e Appellant. Although Investig ator Chandler did not actually

see the transac tion take place , C h an d l er t es t i fi edth ath e r ec o gn i z edth e A p p el l an t ’s v o i ce o nth e t ap e r ec o rd i n g.
On the followi n g d ay , Oc t o b er 2 7 th , In v es t i gat o r C h an d l er o b t ai n eda s ea rc hwa rr ant for 1401 Howar d Street. The se arc h war rant wa s based upon Chandle r’s surveillance of the residence a nd the transac tion which took place there the ni g ht befor e. After sea rchingthe home, off

icer s discovere d 70 g rams of ma

rijuana, dig ital scales, ba lance s ca les, and plastic ba g s. I nvestig ator Chandler testified that the only

persona l item found in the house was a picture of the Appe llant and four othe r individuals. None of the Appe llant’s p ossessions or belong ings w ere found in the house a nd no persons we re pr esent whe n the police e ntere d the house to sea rch.
At trial, the State introduced pr oof that the utilities to the house were in the name of the Appellant. The defe nse introduce d proof that the hous e was occupie d by Edric Weathe rs. The r ental manag er of the property testified t hat t he Howard S tree t residenc e was rented to Edr ic Weather s, and that Weathers signed the written l ease , paid the deposit, and pa id the rent. The Appellant, testifying on his own behalf, stated that he ha d lived at his mother’s house in Atoka for the pa st two y ear s. He
a c kn ow le dg e d th at he wa s a c los e fr ie nd of Weathe rs , an d that the uti lit ie s to the pr op e rt y we re in his name . T he Ap pe lla

nt e xpla ine d th a t wh e n he va c a te d h is C ov ing ton re sid e nc e to r e tur

n to his mother’s home, he transfe rre d his utilities to 1401 Howar d Street to ac commodate Weathe rs, who
c ou ld n ot p ay

the de po sit

. AN AL YSI S

A. Va lidi tyof Se ar c h Wa r r ant The Appe llant contends that the sea rch w arr ant is invalid as the af fidavit supporting the
wa rr ant f a ile d to e sta

bli shpr ob a

ble c a us e . In a se c on da

ry c ha lle ng e to t

he va lid ity

of the wa rr ant,-3-

the Ap pe lla

nt c on te nds th at th e a ff

ida vit c on ta ins “ a

fa lse state me nt” or

a “ re c kle ssl y

ma de fa lse statement.”

When review ing a

trial court’ s ruling on a mot ion to suppress, questions of credibility of the witnesses, the we ight an dvalue of the evidenc e, and r esolutions of conflicts in the evide nce a re matters entr

usted to the trial judge as t he trier of fa ct. State v. Carter , 16 S.W .3d 762, 765 (Tenn. 2000). F indings ba sed on evidenc e that do not involve issues of credibility are revie wed de novo by this court without a presumption of cor rec tness. Sta tev . B ine tte , 33 S.W .3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000)

. The que stion of whether

Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of C riminal Procedur e re quires suppre ssion of the e vidence in this case is a que stion of law which we revie w de novo with no presumption of
corr ectne ss affor ded to the judg ment of the c ourt below. State v. Coffee , 54 S.W .3d 231, 232 (Tenn. 2001). The sta

ndard of revie w for the mag istrate’s de termination of proba ble cause for

the issuance of the sea rch w arr ant is whether

the mag istrate had a substantial ba sis f or concluding that the sea

rch
war rant would yield evidenc e of wrong doing. Sta te v . J ac um in , 778 S.W .2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989)

. “A mag istrate’s de termination of probable cause is acc orded ‘g reat defe renc e’ by a re viewingcourt.” Id. at 431-32.

The Af fidavit, in pertinent par

t, includes the followingrec itation of fac ts a s provided by the aff iant, Investig ator Chandler :
After rec eiving numerous complaints on the above mentioned addr ess I have se nt an inf or mant to 140 1 H ow a

rd in C ov ing ton , T ipt on

County , T e nn e sse e wi thi n th e la st 72 hours and p u rc h ased a pproxi mately

one (1) ounce of

marijuana

from Maur ice Nash for the purpose of

developingenoug h probable cau s e t o reque st a sear ch warrant . The purc ha se wa s mo nit or e d a nd wi tne sse d b y

me . I have us e d th is informant on over a doz en controlled buy s in the past which ha ve re sulted in severa l le g a l se arc h w arr ants , a

rr e sts and c onvic tio ns a

nd se ve ra l pe nd ingind ic tme nts

.
T h e f o l l o wi n g p ro o f w as i n tro d u ce d atth e s u p p re s s i o nh ea ri n g:
PROS ECUTOR: Tell me whe re you wer e - - wher e you observe d. CH AN DL ER: Ok ay . I wa s a lmo st d ir e c tly

a c ro ss t he str e e t. PROS ECUTOR: And y our CIwent to the door. CHANDL ER: Yes, sir. PRO SEC UT OR : Who did y ou se e a t th a t po int ?

. . . CHANDL ER: Mr. Howa rd and Mr . Nash.

. . . CHANDL ER: [Appellant] was on the c ouch at the t ime the deal took place but I had seen him pass in fr ont of the door. He was on c rutche s at that time. PROS ECUTOR: But your CIwas we aring a wire ? CHANDL ER: Yes, sir. PROS ECUTOR: Could y ou hear what took place ?T he A p p el l ant chal l enges t hi s st at em ent i n the af f i d avi t t hat Inves t i gat o r Cha nd l er “ wi t ness ed ” t he i l l egal drug 2

a c tivity as his te stim o n y a t t h e su p p re ssio n he a rin g ind ic a te d tha t he “d id n ’t se e the a c tua l t ra n sa c tio n go d o w n .”
-4- CHANDL ER: Yes, sir. I could l isten to the transac tion go down. I rec og nized Mr. Nash’s voic e on the tape

.

. . . CHANDL ER: The CI called him by

his name - - called Ma

urice by his name.

. . . PROS ECUTOR: I s there a ny doubt in y our mind that that was the voice of Maur ice Nash? CH AN DL ER: No do ub t at a ll.

In d e nyingthe Ap pe lla

nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss, the tr ia l c ourt

re c ite d th e fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s:
The a ffidavit swo rn t o p rocur e the se arc h war rant is supported by

information provided by

an off icer who personally observe d an informant enter a residenc e and he ard a dr ugtr ans a c tio n b y

wa y of a mon ito ri ngdev ice

. Th e c ourt fi nd s th a t th is inf o rm at i o n i s presumed r eliable a s provided by the offic er. State v. Me lson , 638 S.W. 2d 34 2; Sta tev . B ro wn , 638 S.W .2d 436. The c ourt hear d no proof to rebut the presumption. The c ourt finds the wa rra nt was ade quate.

. . . The motion to suppress is denied.

We a g re e wi th t

he se fi nd ing s and

the tr ia l c ourt ’s c on c lus ion that th e a ff

ida vit wa s su ff ic ie nt t o establish probable cause

. T h e s ea rc h war rant in this case was issued ba sed upon information persona lly

observe d by

the af fiant and a lso upon information which he ove rhea rd by means of a

n elec tronic listening device

. The aff idavit states that one ounce of marijuana was purc hased f rom the Appellant at the 1401 Ho ward Street addr ess. The a ffidavit cle arly states that the purc hase w as “monitored a

nd witnessed” by

the affiant. Finally , the affidavit provides that the informant ha s been

2 used by the police in “ove r a dozen c ontrolled buy s in the past which have resulted in severa l leg al
se arc h w arr ants , a

rr e sts and c onvic tio ns .” Th e a ff

ida vit su ff ic ie ntl y inf

or me d th e ma g istra

te of bo th ( 1 ) th e b a s i s f

o r th e i n f o r m an t ’ s kn o w l e d g e , an d

( 2 ) a b a s i s e s t a b l i s h i n g th e i n f

o r m an t ’ s c r e d i b i l i ty. S pinelli v. United States , 3 93 U. S. 4 10 , 4 12 -1 3, 89 S. Ct . 5 84 , 5 87 (1 96 9) ; A gu il ar v. Texas , 378 U. S. 1 08 , 1 14 , 8 4 S. Ct. 15 09 , 1 51 4 ( 19 64 ); J ac um in , 778 S.W .2d at 436.

Ac c or din g ly , w e fi nd the a ff ida vit wa s suf

fi c ie nt to es ta

bli shpr ob a

ble c a us e and that no fa lse or misleadingstatements wer e conta ined in the af fidavit or in the procur ement of the war rant. Sta te
v . Li ttl e , 560 S.W .2d 403, 407 (Tenn. 1978). Moreove r, the basis of knowledg e of both the infor mant and affiant and the i nformant’ s reliability can be deter mined from the e ntirety

of the a ffidavit. Sta te v. Me lson , 638 S.W .2d 342, 356 (Tenn. 1982). The trial court proper ly denied the A p p el l an t’s mot ion to s up pr e ss.P r ose cut or: So i t s my un ders t andi ng t hat bef ore t he buy t oo k pl ace , y ou s aw 3 [ t he A pp el l ant ] i n t he hous e? C ha nd l er: Y es. P r ose cut or: A nd t hen y ou s aw h i m af t er t he buy t oo k pl ace ? C ha nd l er: Y es.

A l t ho ug h the tri al co urt, aft er a jury-ou t 4 0 4 (b ) he aring , p erm i t t ed i ntro d uc t i o n of t he ab o ve t esti m o ny, i t also 4 fo u n d “tha t t h e un fair p re ju d ic e o u tw e igh e d the p ro b a tive va lue w ith re g a rd to the c o n c lus io n m a d e a s to w h o a c tua lly d i d t he sal e, ” and dir ect ed Inves t i gat o r Cha nd le r n o t to id e n tif y t he A p p el l ant as t he sel l er. A l t ho ugh t he t ri al co urt
a ttem p te d to sh ie ld fro m the ju ry th e fac t t h a t i t wa s the A p p e llan t wh o so ld d ru g s to the p o lice info rm a n t, lit tle w a s le ft t o t he jur y ’ s i m agi nat i o n f rom t he p roo f

i nt rod uced t hat t he A p p el l ant was, i n f act , t he d rug s el l er.
-5- B. Admission of

P rior Dr ug Activity We next examine the Appellant’s a rgument that the t rial court err ed by denying his motion in limi ne which sought exclusi on of any evidenc e per

taining to a

n alleg ed drugtransac tion between him and an in fo rm ant t

he pr e vio us night. Th e Ap pe ll ant con ten ds that th e int ro du c tio n o f t

his testimony was “unfairly prejudicia l” and exceede d the s cope of those narr owly define d exceptions contained w ithin Rule 404(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce. At trial, th e St ate w a s p e r mi tt e d to intr o d

u c e th e f o ll o w in g p r o o f w it

h r e g ar d to the Ap pe lla nt’ s p ri or dr uga c tiv ity , w hic h w e summa ri ze a s f oll ow s:
On Oc tob e r 2 6, 19 99 , Inv e st igat or Cha nd le r t e sti fi e d th a t he po sit ion e d h ims e lf
acr oss the street f

rom the 1401 Howa

rd Stree t address and then dire cted two informants into the house in a n attempt to pur chase drug s. Chandler r elated that he had bee n surveilling the house for two hours at this time and had deter mined that the only occupa nts of the h o u se we re the Appellant and B rian How ard. Mr . Howar d pretty much s tay ed at the doorwa y of the house most of the time, e ither on the porc h or at the door

way

. . . . The CI ’s walked up, one we nt into the house, one stay ed at the door. Chandler

observe d the Appellant in the house

. After about forty -five se conds 3 to a minute, not much more than a minute . . . they

ca me bac k out and Chandler followed his informants to a pr ear rang ed mee ting place

. The infor mants delivere d to Chandler one bag of a g ree n leaf y materia l that f

ield-tested positive for

marijuana

. 4

The State a

rgues that the testimony

co n ce rn i n g t h e alleg ed drugsale on the pr evious nig ht was proper , and was offe red to e stablish a common scheme or plan, i.e. , that the house wa s beingutiliz ed by the Appellant f

or t he sol e purpose of sellingdrug s. On appe al, the State asse rts that at trial the “State’s theor

y was that the [Appellant] used 1401 Howar d Street as his ‘stash house ’ and Chandle r’s testimony ‘wa s highly

probative to this matter.’”

Rul e 40 4( b) of

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f E vid e nc e pr ov ide s:
Evidence of other c rimes, wrong s, or ac ts is not admis sible to prove the
c ha ra c te r o f a pe rs on in or de r t o s ho w a c tio n in c on fo rm ity

wi th t he c ha ra c te r t ra it.-6-

I t may , howeve r, be a dmissibl e for other purpose s. The conditions which must be satisfied bef

ore a llowing suc h evidenc e ar e: (1) The court upon reque st must hold a hear ing outside the jury ’s prese nce; ( 2 ) The court m

u s t d e te r mi n e th a t a

mate r ia l i s s u e e xis ts o ther tha n c on du c t c on fo rm ing wi th a c ha ra c te r tr a it and

mus t up on

re qu e st state on the re cord the materia l issue, the ruling , and the r easons f or admitting the e vidence ; and (3 ) Th e c ourt mus t e xclu de the e vid e nc e if its pr ob a tiv e va lue is outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice.

In Sta te v . M

all ar d , 40 S.W .3d 473, 487 (Tenn. 2001) , our supre me cour t rec ently held “e vidence that th e de fe nd ant h a s c omm itt ed some oth e r c ri me wh oll y ind e pe nd e nt o f t

hat f or wh ic h h e is
c ha rg e d, e ve n th ou g h it

is a c ri me of the same c ha

ra c te r, is u su a lly

no t a dmi ssi bl e becau se it is irrele vant.” None theless, wher e the prior cr ime “is rele vant to some matter a ctually in issue in the
c a se on tr ia l and if its pr ob ativ e va lue a s e vid e nc e of su c h matte r in iss ue is no t outw e ig he d b y its prejudicia l eff

ect upon the def

endant, then suc h evidenc e may be prope rly

admitted.” Mallard, 40 S.W. 3d a t 48 7. Ad dit ion a lly , th is c ourt ha s p re vio us ly

state d, “ on ly in a

n e xce pti on a l c a se wi ll another crime, wrong , or bad a ct be r eleva nt to a n i s s ue other

than the ac cused’ s char acte r. Such exceptional case s include identity , intent, motive, opportunity , or re buttal of mistake or a ccide nt.” State v. Luellen , 867 S.W .2d 736, 740 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

. First, we are not persuade d by the State’s ar g ument that admission of the Appellant’s pr ior drugsale wa s releva

nt to establish a common scheme or plan. In order to qualify

as a common scheme or plan, the modus operandimust be so unique or distinctive as t o be li ke a sig nature

. Sta te v. Hallock, 8 7 5 S

. W

. 2 d

2 8 5 , 2 9 0 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 3 ). T h e o ff en s e i nth e i n s t an tca s e, al th o u gh of the same char acte r as the prior drug sale, was clea rly not so disti nctive as to be like a sig nature

. At the hea ringon the m otion, the t rial court permitted introduction of the prior drugsale but for diff ere nt gr ounds than those now ar g ued by the State:

There is a rele vant issue as to the c onnection of the [Appellant] with the premises involved in 1401 Howar d in Coving ton where the controlled substanc e wa s found, upon execution of the wa rra nt . . . so the key

issue for the jur

y is the connec ti on of the [Appellant] t o the pre mises.”

We believe this finding corr ectly states the rele vant issue which, in ef fec t, is whether the A

ppellant constructively

possessed the mar ijuana found at 1401 Howar d Street. We also find mater ial to the issue of construc tive possession, the fac t that the Appellant sold ma rijuana to the informant at the Howar d Street addr ess on Octobe r 26 , and that mar ijuana wa s seized from the same pre mises on th-7-

the followingday

. These fac ts a re rele vant to the question of whether the Appellant had contr ol over the house and knowledg e that marijuana was pre sent. We ag ree with the trial court’ s findings ( 1) that the probative value of the Appellant’s unlawful activities at the Howar d Street addr ess was not outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, T ennesse e Rule of Evide nce 404(b)(3) ; and (2) that proof wa s shown by clea

r and convincing evidenc e that the Appellant committed the crime. Sta te v. Parton , 6 94 S.W. 2d

29 3, 30 3 ( Te nn . 1 98 5) . T his iss ue is w ith out me ri t.

C. Suf fi ciency of the Evidence The Appe llant maintains that the evidenc e pre sented at t ri al i s insufficient to support the jur y ’s ve rd ic t of g uil ty . Spe c if ic a lly , th e Ap pe lla

nt a sse rt s th a t th e e vid e nc e int ro du c e d a g a ins t hi m was “purely circ umstantial,” and argues t hat t he S tate failed to prove that he “wa s in possession and control of the pr emises at 1401 Howa rd Street.” A jury conviction removes the presumption of i nnocenc e with which a defe ndant is cloake d and re place s it with one of g uilt, so t hat on appe al, a c onvicted def endant ha s the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is sufficient. Sta tev . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

. In deter mining the suf

fi ci en cy of the e vidence , this court does not rew eig h or re evaluate the evidenc e. State v. Cabbage , 5 71 S.W. 2d 83 2, 83 5 (T e nn . 197 8)

. L ike wi se , it is n ot t he duty of thi s court to re visit questions of witness cr edibility on appea l, that function beingwithin the pr ovince of the trier of

fac t. See generally Stat e v. Adkins , 7 86 S.W. 2d 64 2, 64 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) ; State v. Burlison , 868 S.W .2d 713, 718-19 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1993 ). I n s t ead, the defe ndant must establish that the evidenc e pre sented at trial was so def icient that n o rea sonable trier of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the off ense be y ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct . 2 78 1, 27 89 (1 97 9) ; State v. Cazes , 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) , cert. de nied , 513 U. S. 1 08 6, 11 5 S. Ct. 74 3 ( 19 95 ); Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3(e)

. Th e S tat e is e nti tle d to the str on g e st leg itimate vie w of the evidenc e and a ll reasona ble infer ence s which may be dra wn there from. Sta te
v . H arris , 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992) , cert. de nied , 507 U.S. 954, 113 S. C t. 1368 (1993).

A crime may be established by circ umstantial evidence alone. State v. Tharpe , 726 S.W .2d 89 6, 89 9- 90 0 ( Te nn . 1 98 7) . H ow e ve r, be fo re an a c c us e d ma y be c onvict ed of a

c ri min a l of

fe ns e based only

upon circ umstantial evidenc e, the f acts a nd circ umstances “ must be so strong a nd cog ent as to exclude eve ry

other re asonable hy

pothesis save the guilt of the de fenda nt.” Sta tev . Crawf

or d , 470 S.W .2d 610, 612 (Tenn. 1971) . In other wor ds, a conviction may not rest solely

upon conjec ture, gue ss, speculation, or a mere possibility

. Tharpe, 726 S.W .2d at 900. Instead, a “we b of guilt mus t be woven around the defe ndant from which he cannot esca pe and from which fa cts and circ umstances [the fac t finder] could draw n o o th e r r e a s o n a b lein

fe rence save the g uilt of the defe ndant beyond a re asonable doubt.” State v. Sex ton , 9 17 S.W .2d 263, 265 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (e mphasis added)

. A conviction for

possession of a c ontrolled substance may be based up o n actua l or constructive posse ssion. S ta te v . B ro wn , 8 23 S.W. 2d 57 6, 57 9 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); State v. Cooper , 7 36 S .W .2 d 12 5, 12 9 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ). B e fo re a pe rs on c an b e fo un d to constructively

possess a drug , it must first appe ar that the person ha s the power and intention at any-8-

g ive n tim e to e xer c ise do min ion and c on tr ol ov e r the dr ug s e ith e r d ir e c tly

or thr ou g h o the rs

. Sta te v. W illiams , 623 S.W .2d 121, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)

. We acknow ledg e that in revie wing a conviction for possession of a c ontrolled substance , the dispositi ve question is not ownership or whether the ac cused ha d control over the place wher e the drug s were found; rathe r, t he question is whether the ac cused ha d actua l or construc tive possession of the drug s themselves. Indeed, unde r a the ory of construc tiv e p o s s es s i on, phy sical pre sence or dominion over the drug s is not re quired. To the contra ry , constructive posse ssion only require s “the power and intention . . . to exercise dominion and control” over the drug s ei t h er dire ctly or indirectly

. Id. at 12 5. Ob vio us ly , p ro of that th e a c c us e d ha d ow ne rs hip or c on tr ol o ve r t

he pr op e rt

y wher e contr aband is ke pt may help re solve the question of c onstructive possession be cause it gives rise to an inferenc e of knowledg e and possession of the c ontraba nd. See Sta tev . B ro wn , 915 S.W .2d 3, 7- 8 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); State v. Jac kson , N o. M1 99 8- 00 03 5- CCA -R3-CD ( Te nn . Cr im. App. at Na shville, May

5, 2000). None theless, it is not a prere quisite for convic tion. The proof , in the light most favor able to the State, e stablished that on the nig ht of Octobe r 26 , the Appellant was one of two individuals involved in the sale of mar ijuana at a house located th
a t 14 01 Ho wa

rd Str e e t. Th e ne xt d ay , fo llo wi ng e xec uti on of a se a rc h w arr ant, mari

jua na wa s a g a in located at the same a ddre s s. Virtually no evidenc e wa s found to establish that the Howa rd Street ho us e was beingus e d a s a re sid e nc e by

anyon e . A lth ou g h n e ith e r t he Ap pe lla

nt n or any of his possessions were found i n the hous e at the t ime of t he search, the police estim ated that the Appellant was pre sent “80 to 85%” of the t ime during their periods of surveillance . Fr om these fa cts, we f ind sufficie nt evidence to conclude that t h e pre mises were in the Appellant’s c ontrol, and that he possessed the “ power

and intention to e x erc ise dominion and control” over the marijuana seized by the police dur ing the sear ch. Acc ording ly , we find the proof sufficie nt to establish that the Appellant knowing ly

possessed mar ijuana in excess of .5 ounc e with the inten t t o d el i v er. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417( g )(1)

. CO NC LU SION

We f ind that the trial court proper ly denied the Appellant’s motion in limi n e s eeking exclusion of the Appellant’s prior dr ug activity

at the Howa

rd Street a ddress. M o reove r, we c on c lud e that the a ff

ida vit c on ta ine d su ff

ic ie nt inf or matio n fo r the ma g ist

rate to f ind pr ob a ble c a us e for the is s u an c e o f th e w ar r an t. Wi th r e g ar d to th e Ap p e ll an t’ s s u f f ic ie n c y ar g u me n t, w e f

ind the evidenc e leg ally

sufficie nt to support the jury ’s ver dict. Ac co rd ingly , the judg ment of convic tion for felony possession of marijuana in e x cess of one-ha lf ounce with the intent to deliver is aff irmed.

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE