alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
14374

#### LAY v. STATE RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AUTHORITY

(188 S. E., 368)

*37
      *Mr. F. Fhrlich Thomson,*for appellant,

*Mr. R. Beverly Herbert,*for respondent,

November 9, 1936.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice FishburnE.

*38After a carfeul examination of the record in this case, and consideration of the single issue presented, the Court is satisfied with the well-considered order of his Honor, G. Duncan Bellinger, Circuit Judge, which will be reported.

The judgment of the Court is that the exceptions be dismissed, and that the judgment of the Circuit Court be, and hereby is, affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Stabler, Messrs. Justices Bonham and Baker and Mr. Acting Associate JysTicE A. L. Gaston concur.
John Carson CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D16-3968

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 24, 2018 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 21, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Cindy GOLD, Appellant, v. SUPERIOR AUTO BODY SHOP, INCORPORATED, a Florida Profit Corporation, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2167

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 14, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Jontez Torrell HOLT v. STATE

CR-16-0150

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Todrick ROBERTS a/k/a Natan Torres, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-2681

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 16, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Benjamin ATKIN, Appellant, v. Murray L. KANE, M.D., Appellee.

No. 3D17-1838

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed July 5, 2018

Dickinson Wright PLLC, and Alan J. Perlman and Vijay G. Brijbasi (Fort Lauderdale), for appellant.

Simon, Schindler & Sandberg, LLP, and Sherryll Martens Dunaj and Neal L. Sandberg, Miami, for appellee.

Before SALTER, EMAS and LOGUE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

*575Benjamin Atkin, defendant below, appeals from the trial court's order striking his answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint, and the resulting final judgment entered in favor of Murray Kane, plaintiff below.1

We affirm that portion of the trial court's order which concluded that the actions and conduct of Atkin, including his answer to the complaint and answers to interrogatories, "at best were inaccurate and, at worst ... are deceptive." We also affirm the trial court's order insofar as it determined that Atkin's conduct and actions justified the imposition of sanctions.

However, we reverse that portion of the trial court's order striking Atkin's pleadings, leading to entry of a final judgment against him. We hold that imposition of this severest of sanctions-foreclosing any further defense of the action and the resulting entry of final judgment-was simply too severe under the circumstances presented and was not commensurate with the conduct and actions at bar. *See*, *e.g.*, *Prater v. Comprehensive Health Ctr., LLC*, 185 So.3d 559, 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).

We therefore vacate the final judgment, reverse in part the order striking Atkin's pleadings, and remand to the trial court for consideration of commensurate sanctions and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1

Atkin also seeks to appeal the trial court's order which determined only entitlement to attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2016) but deferred a determination of the amount of those fees. We dismiss this portion of the appeal as one taken from a nonfinal, nonappealable order. *See**Tower Hill Prime Ins. Co. v. Torralbas*, 176 So.3d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) ; *Reid v. Estate of Sonder*, 63 So.3d 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ; *Chaiken v. Suchman*, 694 So.2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) ; *Gonzalez Eng'g, Inc. v. Miami Pump and Supply Co., Inc.*, 641 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
**MUZAK HOLDINGS LLC**

**Section 302 Certifications**

 

**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**Certification of the Chief Financial Officer**

 

I, Stephen P. Villa, Chief Financial Officer of Muzak Holdings LLC certifythat: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Muzak HoldingsLLC; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

(a) Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and 

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: March 30, 2004 

/s/ Stephen P. Villa 

Name: Stephen P. Villa 

Title: Chief Financial Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Burnell SEPT, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30232

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

*263Zeno Benjamin Baucus, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Steven C. Babcock, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, FDMT—Federal Defenders of Montana (Billings), Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Sept’s request for oral argument is denied.

MEMORANDUM **

Larry Burnell Sept, Jr., appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 60-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for transportation of a person with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Sept contends that the district court violated his due process rights by relying on unreliable hearsay evidence to find that his offense involved physical violence against the victims and by varying upward on that basis. The district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the victims’ hearsay statements regarding Sept’s violence against them. *See United States v. Berry,*258 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2001). Contrary to Sept’s contention, the victims’ statements, which were consistent with each other and with the statement of one victim’s mother and that of a third victim, were sufficiently corroborated to provide the minimum indicia of reliability necessary for consideration at sentencing. *See id.*at 976-77.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Leonard A. GIVENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David AARON; Timothy Reynold; John Doe 1-5; Louis Griffin; John Hunt; James Bird; Matthew Boone; Manuel Zaccheus, Defendants-Appellees, and David R. Mitchell, Defendant.

No. 16-7291

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 28, 2017

Decided: May 9, 2017

*232Leonard A. Givens, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Ap-pellees.

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Leonard A. Givens appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Givens v. Aaron,*No. 3:14-cv-00378-FDW, 2016 WL 4546448 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2016). We deny Givens’ motion for appointment of counsel and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

OF QUARTERLY REPORT ON
FORM 10-Q

OF PINNACLE DATA SYSTEMS, INC.

FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2010

The undersigned is the Chief
Executive Officer of Pinnacle Data Systems, Inc. (the Issuer). This certification is made pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This certification accompanies the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Issuer for
the quarterly period ended September 30, 2010.

I, John D. Bair, certify that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
period ended September 30, 2010, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer.

This certification is
executed as of October 29, 2010.



|                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------
|/s/ John D. Bair                                 
|Name: John D. Bair Title:
Chief Executive Officer
#### Timothy Whitney *versus*Samuel H. Peckham.

In an action for a malicious prosecution for an offence, a conviction of the plaintiff, of such offence, before a justice of the peace having jurisdiction, is conclu sive evidence of probable cause; although, upon appeal from the justice, the plaintiff was acquitted.

Case for a malicious prosecution, before a justice of the peace, for • an alleged assault and battery. Trial on the general issue before *Putnam,*J. The plaintiff offered in evidence a copy of the record and proceedings before the justice, by which it appeared that *Whitney*pleaded not guilty to the complaint of *Peckham;*that the justice found him guilty, and sentenced him to pay a fine of two dollars and costs. *Whitney*appealed from this sentence to the Circuit Court of Common Pleas, where he was acquitted.

The judge, being of opinion that the conviction before the justice, he having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the complaint, was conclusive evidence that there was probable cause, directed a non-suit ; and the point being reserved for the opinion of the whole *225Court, the nonsuit was confirmed, and the defendant had judgment for his costs. (1) *(a)*

*Lincoln*for the plaintiff.

*Mills*and *L. Bigelow*for the defendant.

(1) (a)

See 1 *Wils.*232, *Reynolds vs. Kennedy. (a)*Vide *Cotton, vs. James,*l *B. & Ad.*12d. — *Pierce vs. Thomson,*6 *Pick.*193.
#### Joseph Brazer, Appellant, *versus*Jesse S. Dean and Another, Administrators, &c.

The judge of probate may allow to the widow of an intestate the wno.e of the personal estate, unless the amount be so great as to make the allowance extravagant

And, m such case, the charges of administration may be deducted from the proceeds of the real estate sold, by order of court, for the payment of the intestate’s debts.

The appellant was a creditor of the estate of *Nathaniel Myrick,*deceased, the respondents’ intestate, and appealed from a decree oí the judge of probate for the county of *Penobscot,*allowing the administration account of the respondents.* The estate was insolvent; the real estate, had been sold by virtue of a license for that purpose ; and the personal estate, amounting, by the inventory, to 146 dollars, had been allowed to the widow of the intestate for her use. That sum constituted one article in the account in question ; and, in consequence, the charges of the respondents for the expenses of administration were deducted from the proceeds of the sale of the real estate.

*One reason of appeal was, that the judge had allowed to the administrators the expenses and charges of settling the estate out of the said proceeds, which had been sold, by order of court, for the payment of the just debts which the deceased 3wed at the time of his death, with incidental charges; the estate so sold not having been taken by the said administrators on execution, or on a mortgage, in payment of a personal demand. (1)

(1)

 Vide *Stat.*1788, c. 51.

*Per Curiam.*

This objection cannot prevail; because, the estate being regularly sold for the payment of debts, the proceeds are not distinguishable from the other personal estate, but the whole forms one common fund for the payment of debts and the expenses of administration. It is true that all the personal estate, in the present case, having been given to the widow, the expenses of the adminis tration are, eventually, taken out of the proceeds of the real estate But there can be no valid objection to this, the estate being regularly sold; and it would have been necessary to sell it, if there had been no expenses of administration.

Another reason of appeal was the said allowance, to the widow, of the whole personal estate of the deceased.

*But the Court*saw nothing improper in such a course, unless the amount of such personal estate was so great as to make the *172allowance extravagant, which they did not consider to he the case, here. (2)

*Decree affirmed.*

(2)

 Vide *Stat.*1816, c. 95.
#### Michael J. PENCE; Tauni R. Pence, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16607

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 21, 2017

Michael J. Pence, Pro Se

Tauni R. Pence, Pro Se'

Robert W. Norman, Jr., Attorney, Houser & Allison, APC, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

Mark D. Ghernoff, Chernoff Law Firm, PC, Scottsdale, AZ, for Defendant-Appel-lee Northwest Trustee Services Incorporated

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*293MEMORANDUM **

Michael J. Pence and Tauni R. Pence appeal pro se from the district court’s order dismissing their diversity action alleging state law claims arising out of the foreclosure sale of their property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the dismissal of an action for failure to comply with a court order. *Ferdik v. Bonzelet,*963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.

In their opening brief, plaintiffs fail to address how the district court erred by dismissing their action for failing to comply with the district court’s order to file an amended complaint. As a result, plaintiffs have waived their challenge to the district court’s order. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”).

Because we affirm the district court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ action for failure to comply with the district court’s order, we do not consider plaintiffs’ arguments addressing the underlying merits of the action.

All pending requests and motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Josiah Pierce *versus*Thomas Spring, and Others

Trespass is the most suitable action, under the statute of 1795, c. 75, § 3, which gives treble damages for cutting down trees, Sz.c., pending an action for the recovery of the land on which such trees are growing.

This was an action of *trespass,*under the statute of 1795, c. 75, <§> 3, which gives treble damages to the party aggrieved, against persons who cut down trees, &c., pending an action for recovering possession of lands on which such trees,. &c., are standing.

After a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the action should have been debt, instead of trespass.

*Emery*and *Adams,*in support of the motion,

relied on the statute of 1793, c. 43, § 4, which enacts that pecuniary fines, or forfeitures, &c., shall and may be sued for and recovered by action of debt, &c.; and they held the word *shall*to be imperative, and that the word *may,*added, was not intended to weaken its force. (1)

*Longfellow,*for the plaintiff.

Debt lies only for a sum certain The case here was still in its nature a trespass, and the damages uncertain. The damages are first to be ascertained by a jury, and afterwards trebled. The statute of 1793 relates wholly to pecuniary fines and forfeitures, the amount of which is always fixed or limited by the law which imposes them. (2)

(1)

 See 1 *Chitty on*Pleading, 101.— *Bac. Abr.*title Debt, A.— *Com. Dig.*title *Action upon*Statute, *E.*— Strange, 828.

(2)

*Bac. Abr.*ubi supra. — 7 *Mass. Rep.*202, *Bigelow*vs. *Cambridge and Concord*Turnpike.

*Curia.*

The statute giving the threefold damages, in this case, *436has not prescribed the form of action to be used for their recovery. There can be no objection to trespass, * which is, indeed, the most suitable one. The motion in arrest is overruled.

*Judgment on the verdict.*
#### Melvin Lee MOBLEY, III, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Munib I. ALISHAH, Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-40461

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 31, 2017

Melvin Lee Mobley, III, Pro Se

Ariel Nicole Wiley, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Law Enforcement Defense Division, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellee

Before DAVIS, GRAVES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Mobley alleged that Texas correctional officer Munib Alishah used excessive force when escorting him from the infirmary to administrative segregation. Mobley asserted that he had a “psych episode” and that he “momentarily pulled away” while he was handcuffed. He contended that Alis-hah, in response, snatched and jerked him before choking him, which caused injuries to his neck. The trial court appointed counsel for Mobley, and the case proceeded to trial before a magistrate judge. The jury rejected Mobley’s claims.

Mobley argues that three errors taint that verdict. First, he says that the restraints that were placed on him during trial prejudiced the jury. Second, he argues that he should have been able to introduce evidence of similar violent episodes in the defendant’s work as a correctional officer. Third, he challenges the district court’s decision to announce the verdict without the jury in the courtroom.

Having reviewed the trial record and the arguments of the parties, we find no basis for reversing the jury’s verdict. The first alleged error was not raised in the trial court and thus the record does not reveal the extent, if any, to which the restraints were visible to the jury. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s Rule 404(b) ruling. And while the criminal rules of procedure require that the jury be present when the verdict is announced, the civil rules do not. *Compare*Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a), *with*Fed R. Civ. P. 48.

AFFIRMED. Mobley’s motion to appoint counsel on appeal is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Arthur Terry HOCKADAY v. STATE

CR-16-0464

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 29 (Friday, February 11, 2022)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 7964]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03043]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards

CFR Correction

    This rule is being published by the Office of the Federal Register 
to correct an editorial or technical error that appeared in the most 
recent annual revision of the Code of Federal Regulations.

0
In Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 400 to 571, 
revised as of October 1, 2021, in Sec.  571.108, remove S5.1 and S5.2.

[FR Doc. 2022-03043 Filed 2-10-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 0099-10-D
#### Benjamin T. Hoagland, Respondent, *v.*Benjamin I. H. Trask, Appellant.

An assignee for the benefit of creditors can maintain an action, in his individual character, to recover a claim due the assignpr; he is not required to sue as trustee.

(Submitted January 6, 1872;

decided May term, 1872.)

Action to recover the sum of $2,500, alleged to have been loaned defendant by the firm of Hoagland &Van Pelt. Plaintiff claimed title under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. Upon the trial, when the assignment was offered in evidence, defendant objected, upon the ground that plaintiff sued in his individual capacity, not as a trustee. Objection overruled, and, at the close of the evidence, defendant asked the court to charge the jury that plaintiff could not recover, because he held the claim as trustee. Various exceptions were also taken as to rejection of testimony'. Exceptions ordered to he heard, at first instance, at General Term; there, motion for new trial was denied and judgment ordered on verdict.

*687
      *Beébee, Dean*efe *Donohue*for the appellant.

*James I. Stearns*for respondent.

Lott, Oh. C., reads for affirmance.

All concur. Judgment affirmed.
Dorall Daniel MARSHALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-57

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.