### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE N ove mb er

4, 200 8 S es sio n

RAYMOND COX and ELAI NE COX v. T ENNESSE E FARMERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Campbell Coun ty No. 15,389 Hon. Bi lly Joe White, Chancellor

No. E2007-00590-COA- R3-CV - FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2009

The P laintiffs sued defendant insurance company alleging brea ch of the i nsuranc e policy betwe en the pa r t i e s

. T h e T r i a l C o u r tg r a n t e d p ar t i a l s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tt o d e f e n d a n to n t h e c o n t e n ts

cover age on pla intiffs’ home destroye d by fire. The judgment wa s granted on the grounds that the plai n ti f f s d id n o t f

il e a p r o p e r p r o o f o f lo s s o f th e c o n te n ts w ith in th e ti me f r a me r e q u ir e d b y the policy, and that defe ndant was pr ejudiced the reby. The partial summary judgment is the princ ipal iss ue on app e a l a ndwe a ff ir m th e Ju dg me nt o f the Tria l Co urt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t A ff ir me d.

H ER S CHEL P ICK EN S F R ANKS , P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which C H A RL ES D. S US ANO , J R ., J., and D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , J., joined.

Ger ald L. Gulley, Jr., K noxville, Tennesse e, for appellants, Raymond and E laine Cox.

Michae l R. Campbell an d Ka t h ryn M. R ussell, Chattanooga, Tenne ssee, f or appe llee, Te nnessee Farmers Mutual I nsuranc e Company.

OP IN ION

Pla int if fs su e d T e nn e sse e F arm e rs Mu tua l Ins ur anc e Com pa ny (T e nn e sse e F arm e rs ) f o r b r e a c h o f in s u r an c e c o n tr a c t, v io lati o n o f th e T e n n e s s e e Co n s u me r Pr o te c ti o n Act, and constructiv e fr aud and ba d faith. Plaintiffs’ complaint ave rs that on or a bout May 23, 2000 the plaintiffs’ home wa s damag ed by an ac cidental f

ire c ausing a loss of the house and contents, and that Tenne s s ee Fa rm ers pr ovided cove rag e to them for loss ca used by fire to the dw elling, othe r-2-

structure s, persona l proper ty , and los s sustained for debris re moval and dama g e to landsca ping, a nd that Tenne sse e F arm e rs br e a c he d th e c on tr a c t of ins ur anc e by

fa ili ng , in

ba d f a ith , to pa y pla int if fs ’ claims. Tenne ssee F arme rs answe red a nd alleg ed that plainti ff

s had bre ache d the contra ct of ins ur anc e by

fa ili ngto c omp ly

wi th t he pr ov isi on s o f t

he c on tr a c t in

the ir makin g a c la im f or fi re los s under the policy

.

Num erous motions and fur ther plea dings w ere filed and a cted upon by the Trial Judg e , w hic h a

re no t an is su e on

a pp e a l.

Tenne ssee F arme rs motion for partial summary judgme nt under Cover ag e C of the policy relating to plaintiffs’ c ontents claim was he ard by the Trial J udg e on Dec ember 6, 2005. The Trial Court g rante d defe ndant’s motion for par tial summ ar y j u d gm en t on a finding there wer e no materia l fac ts in disput e, and that defe ndant was e ntitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. The Court de nie d p la int if

fs ’ c la im f

or c on te nts c ov e ra g e . T he Court e xpla ine d th a t pl a int if

fs did no t f ile the ir

c omp le te d p ro of

of los s un til mor e tha

n se ve n mon ths a ft e r t

he y fi le d th e ir

inc omp le te pr oo f o f l os s form in J uly

2002, and more than nine months a fter the fire itself, and that there was no e x cuse f or this delay . The Tr ial Court gr anted plaintiffs a n interlocutory

appea l which was not pe rfe cted by plaintiffs. The Tr ial Court tr ied the rema ining issues and based upon the evidenc e pre sented at trial the Trial Court held in its final judg ment enter ed on F ebrua ry 12, 2007, that plaintiffs wer e entitled to rec over $18,375.00 f

or dama g es to landsca

ping, $15,000.00 fo r debr is removal, $2,000.00 for d am age s to the swimming pool, and $27,079 for loss of the dwelling under Cover ag e A a nd $5,686.63 in prejudg ment interest. The final judgme nt is not raised as an is sue on appea l, and the iss ue on a pp e a l is the pr op ri e ty of the pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt g ra

nte d on Cov e ra g e C of

pla int if fs ’ p o l i c y.

A ce rtified copy of the policy

was filed a

nd parts of the policy

pertinent to this appea l

are a s f oll ow s:

Cover age C - P ersonal P ropert y
What Personal Property

is Covered We cover : 1. Personal prope rty

owned or used by an insured a

ny wher e in the wor ld.

RE P OR TIN GA C LA IM DUTIES O F P ERSON OR ENT ITY SE EKING

CO VE RAGE F AI LU RE TO C OM P LY WI TH TH ESE N OTICE A ND DU TY RE QU IREMEN TS M AYRE SUL T IN DE NI AL OF CO VE RA G E U ND ER THIS P OLICY
Duty to Cooper ate with Us-3- Pe rs on and e nti tie s se e kin g c ov e ra g e un de r t his po lic y mus t:

1

. coope r a te w it

h u s an d an y o n e w e n a me in th e in v e s ti g a ti o n , s e tt le me n t, or defe nse of a

ny claim or suit; and

* * * *

7

. m a k e a l i s t o f

a l l d a m a g e d

. . . p r o p e rt y s h o w i n g i nd e t a i l t h e qu an t i t y, purcha se price , date a

nd place of ac quisiti on, actua l cash va lue, re place ment cost, and amount of l oss claimed and attach to such list all bi lls, rece ipts, and related documents that substantiate the fig ures in the list; and

8. send to us within 60 day s after loss the list set forth in 7 above and a pr oof of loss signed a

nd sworn to by

a per son or entity

seekingcover ag e . . . .

I n the m otion for partial summary judgme nt, Tennesse e F arme rs filed a ffidavits and

su pp or tin g do c ume nts wh ic h e sta bli sh e d that pla int if

fs ini tia lly su

bmi tte d pr oo f of

los s w ith in s ixty day s of the loss, but the proof of loss was in co m p l ete a

nd contained no inf

ormation about the inventory of per sonal contents loss under c overa g e C of the p o l i cy

. Wit hout an itemized lis t of pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y c on te nts , T e nn e sse e F arm e rs re pr e se nte d th a t it wa s una ble to i ns pe c t th e fi re sit e to determine w hether

the claimed c ontents were in the dwelling at the time of the fire. Tenne ssee Fa rmers r ejec ted the initial proof of loss, and returne d the i ncomplete proof of loss to plaintiffs by letter on July

24, 2000, from Mr. Camp b ell to Mr. Cox which advise d that the proof of loss was incomplete and una cce ptable, and the letter include d instructions providi ng the information that neede d to be included in the proof of loss. The letter instructed plaintiffs to complete the proof of loss, have it notarized, and re turn to the insurer a nd admoni s h ed that “no exceptions will be considere d in y our cla im” and that “if the conditio n s of y our insuranc e contr act a re not met, y our claim could be put in jeopa rdy .”

The Coxes submi tted a co m p l et ed sworn proof of loss to Tenne ssee F arme rs that included a c laim f

or loss of persona l contents under Cove rag e C on Fe bruar y 22, 2001, nine months afte r the fir e loss. A s eventy -two page inventory of contents was attached to the pr oof of loss, and another aff idavit by Tenne ssee F arme rs explained the conse quence of the de lay in completing the proof of loss as follows: “ At this point [Februa ry 22, 2001] t here was no wa y for Te nnessee Fa

rmers to i ns pe c t th e sit e of

the fi re los s to de te rm ine wh e the r t he pers on al pro pe rt

y /c on te nts c la ime d to have be en destroyed we re in the dw el l i n g p ri o r to the fire .” Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of R ay m o n d C o x wi t h i t s re s p o n s e t o t h e mo t i o n s fo r su m m ary j u d gm en t , as t o t h e m o t i o no nC o v er age C. The affidavit fails to state t hat t he affidavit i s made on the pe rsonal knowledg e of Mr . Cox

. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. The fac ts set out in the aff idavit material to the Coverag e C issue a re that Mr. Cox stated that he c ooperated as fully as possible to expedite pay ment of his claims, including signingdocuments allowingTenne ssee Fa rm ers to conduc t an investig ation and author izi ng the insurer to c onduct sche duled and e scorted inspe ctions of the pre mises. He did not st at e when he perf ormed these activities, but that he made demand for pay ment of his claims by

“my sworn proof-4-

of loss and many

oral de mands within 90 day s of my loss . . . .”

Re g ard ingthe pr oo f o f l os s, Mr . Co x state d th e fo llo wi ng :
My first proof of

loss Iprovided to the de fenda nt was re turned to me with out explanation ex cept that it was not c omplete. I provided the de fenda

nt a supplement to my orig inal proof of

loss after r ece iving a

complete c opy

of my policy , which wa s
nece ssary to acc urate ly

deter mine my content cove rag e and how to corr ectly fill out the forms. I was direc ted to g ive the supplemented proof of loss to the defe ndant’s claim re prese ntative who aga in would not rec eive it. Fur ther, the de fenda

nt’s ag ent

a ssu re d my the y wo uld pa y and tha t I ne e d n ot f

ile su it.

Mr . Co x did n ot s tate in his a ff ida vit wh e n h e pr od

uc e d th e se c on d p ro of

of c la im. Plaintiffs attache d numerous documents to their “Pl aintiffs’ Response to Def endant’ s Motions for Part ia l Summa

ry Judg me nt. ” Ho we ve r, the re c or d re ve a ls pla int if fs fa ile d to put the se do c ume nts proper ly befor e the Tr i al C ourt. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06 requires that supportingand opposing aff idavits sha ll set forth fac ts as would be admissible in evidenc e. The documents plaintiffs soug ht to use t o supp o rt t

h e ir r e s p o n s e w e r e a ll h e ar s ay an d th e y w e r e n o t a

u th e n ti c a te d

an d ma de admissible under the Ten n es s ee Rules of Evidence

. See Price v . Bec ker , 821, S. W . 2d 597, 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)

. Both pa rties ra ise issues on appea l. The issues pre sented on a ppeal a re:

A. Does the Court of Appea ls ha ve jurisdiction to revie w and c onsider the g rant of summary

judgme nt reg ardingplaintiffs’ cla im for contents unde r C Coverag e whe n plaintiffs’ notice of appea l states that the appeal i s of the fina l judgme nt entere d on Fe bruar y 12, 2007 and does not state that the partial

s u m m ar y j u d g m e n te n t e r e d

o nJ anu ar

y 1 8 , 2 0 0 6 i s a

p p e a l e d ?

B. Did the Trial Court er r whe n it gr anted de fenda nt’s motion for partial

s u m m ary j u d gm en to np l ai n t i ff

s ’ c l ai m fo r c o n t en t s u n d er C C o v er age beca use plaintiffs fa iled to submit a proof of loss more than se ven months

a f t e r t h e y w e r e p r o v i d e d

w i t h t h e p r o o f

o f l o s s f o r m ?
Summary judgme nt is appropriate o n l y wh en the moving party demonstrates that there are no g enuine issues of materia l f act and that he or

she is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 3; By rd v . H all
, 84 7 S.W. 2d 20 8, 21 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) . I f t he mov ingpa

rt y
make s a pr op e rl y su pp or te d mo tio n, the burd e n of pr od uc tio n the n sh if

ts to t he no nmo vin g pa

rt y to show that a g enuine issue of materia l f act exis ts to be resolved by the trier of

fac t. Byrd, 847 S.W .2d at 215, Staples v. CBL & Assoc., Inc . 15 SW 3d 83, 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). This Court review s
a s u m m ary

judgme nt motion de novo , as a que stion of law w i t h o u ta p r e s u mp t i o no f

c o r r e c t n e ss. Finister v. Humboldt Gene ral Hosp., Inc.
, 970 S. W. 2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1998), and the evidenc e and-5-

all rea sonable infe renc es ar e viewe d in the light most favor able to the nonmovingparty

. By rd , 847 S. W . 2d at 210-211.

The fir st issue for consider ation is Te nnessee Fa rmers’ contention that the Court of Appea ls does not have jurisdiction over this appeal be cause the notice of app ea l filed by p l ai n t i f f s / a p p e l l an t s d i d

n o ts p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g n a t e t h e p art i a l s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tr e gar d i n g C o v er age C entere d by

the Trial Court.

Tenne ssee F arme rs’ a

rg ues t hat “[ i] n order

to obtain appellate r eview, the appellant must specify

in the Notice of

Appea l the J udg ment or Orde r fr om which re lief is soug ht.” I n support of this contention, Tenne ssee F arme rs re lies on Tenn. R. App. P . 3 (f) ; Hall v. Hall, 772 S.W .2d 432, 435 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); a nd sever al unre ported c ases. Ap p ellants argue the notice of appe al encompa sses all of the or ders of the Trial Court de spite the fa ct that the notice only desig nated the fi na l ju dg me nt, and

a dd iti on a lly

ur g e d th e Cour t to ex erc ise le nie nc y re g ard ingthe ir

fa ilure to desi gn at e t h e J anuar

y 18, 2006 order

g rantingpartial summary judgme nt in favor of

Tenne ssee Fa rmers be cause they

filed the notice pr o s e

.
When c onsidering this iss ue this Court has focuse d on whether the “notice function” of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f

) has been served, to deter mine whether the s cope of revie w m ust be limit ed to the order desig nated in the notice of a ppeal. I n Thompson v. Logan, No. M2005-02379-COA- R3- CV, 2007 WL 2405130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2007), Judge Cottrell conduc ted a thoroug h revie w of the Te nn e sse e c a se law o n th e a pp lic a tio n o f T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (f ) t hat is ins tr

uc tiv e . In th a t c a se the trial co u rt en t er ed an order on the mer its of the case and later enter ed an or der de nying the appellants' motion to alter or amend. Appellants filed a noti ce of appea l on September 23, 2005 that desig nated the June 20, 2005 and Augu s t 2 9 , 2 0 0 5 order s by date a nd substance. T he appe al was premature, howe ver, as a mot ion for sanctions was sti ll befor e the trial court at the time the notice was filed. T he trial c ourt enter ed an or der in re gar d t o t h e m o tion for sanc tions on Dece mber 12, 2005. Thompson, at *9

. Th e a pp e lla nts ne ith e r a

me nd e d th e no tic e of

a pp e a l no r d id t

he y fi le another notice of a

ppeal that de signated t h e Decembe r 12, 2005 orde r as one of the orde rs being appea led. They

did, however , raise the Dec ember 12, 2005 order as an issue on a

ppeal in their br ief along with the other orde rs.

The Thompson Court

be g an it s ana ly sis wi th Tenne ssee R u le s o f A p p e llate Proce dure Rul e 3( f) that st a te s:

Th e no tic e of

a pp e a l sh a ll s pe c if

y the pa rt y or par tie s ta kin g the a

pp e a l, .

.. sh a ll de s i g n a t e t h e j u d g m e n t f r o m w h i c h r e l i e f i s s o u g h t , an d s h a l l n a m e t h e c ou rtto which the appea l is taken. An appeal s hall not be dismissed for informa lity of for m or title of the notice of

appea l.

The Thompson Court ref

er en ce d the Advisory

Commi ttee Comments to Rul e 3(f )-6-

that st a te s:

This subdivisi on specifie s the content o f t h e notice of a ppeal. The purpose of

the notice of a

ppeal is simply

to declar e in a f

ormal wa y an intention to appea l

. As long as this purpose is met, it is irrelevant that the pa per f iled is deficient in s o m e other respe ct. S i m i l ar l y , the notice of appea l play s no part in def ining the sc ope of appellate revie w. S cop e of re vie w i s tr e a te d in

ru le 13 . T his su

bd ivi sio n r e a d in conjunction with rule 13(a ) per mits any question of law to be broug ht up for re view as long as any

party formally decla res a n intention to appeal in timely fashion.

The Court i nterpre ted t he C omments to Rule 3(f) to sug g est that compliance with that pr ov isi on sh ou ld b e de te rm ine d und e r a br oa d inte rp re tatio n that foc us e s on inte nt an d n ote d th a t, as the c ommentary

indicates, Rule 13 ofte n comes into play in t h e C ourt’s consider ation of the eff icac y of notices of

appea l. Rule 13(a) g overns the sc ope of r eview on appea l a nd provides that “any question of law may be broug ht up for r eview a nd relief by any party .” Te nn. R. App. P. 13(a). Th e Court

the n c on su lte d th e Ad

vis or y Com mitte e Com me nt t o Ru le 13 (a ) t hat st a te s:

T his subdivis ion r e

j e c t s us e o f t he no t ic e o f a pp e a l a s a r e v ie w- li m it in g device

. I n f e de ra l practic e the no tic e of a pp e a l ha s li mit e d r e vie w i n tw o p ri nc ipa l w ay s. Som e c ourt s h a ve lim ite d th e qu e sti on s an a pp e llan t ma

y ur g e on re vie w t o th os e affectingthe portion of the judg ment specifie d in the notice of a ppeal. How ever , s i n ce t h e p ri n ci p al u t i l i t y o f t h e n o t i ce o f ap p ea l i s s i mp l y t o i n d i c a t e ap ar t y 's intention to take an appeal, thi s limi tation seems undesira ble. The f eder al cour

ts have also limit ed the issues an appellee may raise on a

ppeal in the a

bsence of the app el l ee's ow n notice of a ppeal. He re a g ain, since ne ither the issues pre sented for revie w nor the a

rg uments in support of those issues are set forth in the notice of appea l, there se ems to be no g ood rea son for so limi ting the que stions an appellee may urg e on re view. The result of eliminating any requirem ent that an appellee fi le the appellee's own notice o f a p p ea l is that once any party fil es a notice of appeal the app ellate c ourt m ay consider the case as a w hole. (empha sis added).

The Court then revie wed multipl e case s wher e the Court of Appea ls had consider ed questions reg arding the sufficienc y of a notice of appe al and obse rved that most of the case s indicated e ither a stric t application of Rule 3(f) or else an approa ch declining to use that rule as an issue-limiti ng device and conc entrating instea d on the purpose of the notice of

appea l. Thompson, *12.

The Thompson Court, held t hat t he appellate cour t could consider issues c ontained in o rd e rs or

jud g me nts that w e re no t sp e c if ic a lly de sig nate d in

the no tic e of a

pp e a l, and de c lin e d to interpre t Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f) a s an issue-limiting devic e. Cases relied on by the Thompson Court-7-

that are most factually

simil ar to the c ase be fore us are Gliddon v. Glidden
, N o

. 8 6

- 3 2 0

- I I , 1 9 8 7 WL 94 52 a t *1 -2 (T e nn . Ct . App . Apr . 1 6, 19 87 ); and J.W .G. v, T.L.H.G., No. M2002-02656-COA- R3- J V, 2003 WL22794537 at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003).

Ten nes see Fa

rm e rs c ite s G r ig

s b y v

. U n iv

. Te nn. Med. Ctr. , No. E2005-010199- COAR3-CV, 2006 WL 408053 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 22, 2006) a nd Goad v. Pasipanodya, No. 01A02- 9509-CV-00426 1997 WL749462 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. D ec. 5, 1997) to support its contention that Rule 3 (f) should be narr owly construed. T hese cas es are ea sily distinguishable f

rom this case, a s Thompson points out, because both c ases involved se parate orde rs, e ac h immediately appea lable, dismiss ing inde pendent de fenda nts, and the holding of ea ch wa s about the timing of the filing of the notice of a

ppeal a nd not about the content of the notice of appea l. Thompson 2007 WL 2405130 at * 15 - 16. We conc lude this issue is without merit and re ly on the Thompson c a se ’s ana ly sis

.

The ne x t issue is the propriety of the summary

judgme nt on Coverag e C. The Tr ial Court in g ranting partial summ ary judgme nt stated that plaintiffs did not file their c ompleted proof of loss until m ore tha

n seven months af

ter the submission of the proof of loss form to them by Tenne ssee F arme rs in J uly 2000 and more than nine months after the fire . The Court found that the

re c or d c on ta ine d n o e xcu se fo r t his de lay , a

nd g ra nte d th e jud g me nt.

Plaintiffs argue t h e judg ment should be reve rsed be cause they had ra ised issues of

mate ri a l f a c t in the ir re sp on se to Te nn e sse e F arm e rs ’ state me nt of mate ri a l fa c ts no t in dis pu te wi th a document sty led “Pl aintiffs’ Response to Defe ndant’s Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment and Plaintiffs’ Motion to R evise the Court’s Pre vious Ruli ng s Pursuant to Rule 54.02" and a “Supplemental Memora

ndum in Oppositi on to Def endant’ s Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment [Un de r] C ov e ra g e C” . Pl a int if fs do no t c ite to o r r e ly

on the ir re sp on se to T e nn e sse e F arm e rs ’ statem e n t o f mate r ia l f

a c ts n o t in d is p u te th a t th e y f il e d in D e c e mb e r 2 0 0 5 a lo n g w it h the supplemental re sponse to defe ndant’s motion in their brief. Plaintiffs claim that the documents they do re ly on ide nti fi e d pa

pe rs and state me nts that c on tr a dic te d th e fa c ts s e t f or th i n T e nn e sse e F arm e rs ’ statement of mate rial fa cts not in dispute, which made summary judgme nt inappropriate

.

Tenne ssee F arme rs ar g ue that plaintiffs’ r espo n s es to its st atement of materia l fac t

no t in dis pu te we re imp ro pe r a

nd sh ou ld n ot b e c on sid e re d. Th e Tr ia l Co ur t did not a c c e pt p la int if

fs ’ first attempt to respond to Tenne ssee F arme rs’ statement of m ater ial fac ts not in dispute or its second response as it held there wer e no mater ial fac ts in disput e. We conc lude that the sec ond response was
no t su ff ic ie nt t o me t th e re qu ir e me nts of Te nn . R. Civ

. P . 5 6. 03 a s it re sp on de d to fo ur

te e n f a c ts when de fenda

nt had only

set forth nine material fa cts. The e arlier response to defe ndant’s stateme nt of mater ial fac ts set forth i n the document entitled “Plaintiffs’ R esponse to De fenda nt’s Motion for Partial Summary

J udg ment and Plaintiffs’ Mot ion to Revise the Court’s Previous Rulings Pursuant to Rule 54.02" ha s two deficie ncie s

. T h e first is that none of the doc uments attache d to that

re sp on se wo uld

be a dmi ssi ble in e vid e nc e a s r e qu ir e d b y Te nn . R. Civ . Pr o. 56 .0 6 a s th ey are a ll he ars ay and we re no t a

uth e nti c ate d by Mr

. Cox or anyon e e lse by a ff ida vit

. Se c on d, th e res po ns e-8-

filed in 2003 was supe rce ded by plaintiffs’ De cembe r 2005 re sponse to defendant’s stateme nt of

mate ri a l f a c ts. Th e De c e mbe r r e sp on se state d th a t on ly tw o o f d e fe nd ant’ s n ine state d mate ri a l f a c ts

wer e disputed. The r emaining seven material fa cts wer e undisputed.

Ac cord in gly , b ot h res po ns es t o d efen dan t’ s s tat eme nt of m ate ri al fa c t a re pr ob le ma

tic and it was within the Tria l Court’s discretion not to consider these response s. The purpose of the require ments of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 is t o “assist the Court in focusing on the cr ucial portions of the re c o r d ” in

d e te r mi n in g w h e th e r

th e r e is a

g e nu in e is s u e r e qu ir in g a tr ia l o nth e me r it s

. See Advisory Commi ttee Comment to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 56.03. W e h av e h el d t h at a n o n m o v i n g p ar t y 's failure to comp l y with Rule 56.03 may result in the trial cour

t's r efusa l to consider the f actua l contentions of the nonmoving party even though such fac ts c ould be asce rtained from the re cord. Owens v. Bristol Motor Speedway, I nc

. 7 7 S

. W.3d 771, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App.,2001)(c itations omitted).

A tri a l c ourt , a c tin g wi thi n it s d isc re tion, may wa ive the re qu ir e me nts of the Rul e 56.03 under c erta in circumstanc es. Owens at 774 - 775. The re is n o i n d ication her e that the Tr ial Court considere d or did not addre ss the issue of wai v er in its order. The Re cord shows the Trial Court held there wer e no issues of mate rial fact, and based on the poor quality and conf using nature of plaintiffs’ r esponses to def endant’ s statement of mate rial fa cts and consideringthe discre tionary nature of t he decision in the Trial Court’s discount of plaintiffs’ re sponses as they did not comport with Rule 56.03, it was not error

.

As s u m i n g arguendo that the Court considere d response s filed in Dec ember 2005, t h e re s p o n s e w as n o ts u ff i ci en tt o ra i s e i s s u es o f m at er i al fa ct

. T h e i s s u es ce n t ra l t o t h e C o u rt 's evalua t i o n of a motion for summar y judgme nt are whether

a fa ctual dispute exists , whether the disputed fac t is material to the outcome of the case , and whether the disputed fac t c reates a g enuine issue for tria l. By rd

v . H all

, 847 S.W .2d 208, 214 (Tenn.1993) . Plaintiffs disputed only two of the

mate ri a l f a c ts, numbe rs 2 a

nd 9, se t f or th b y de fe nd ant. Pla int if

fs ’ r e sp on se to n

umb e r 2 state s:

“ [d]isp ute d th a t Pla int if

fs fa ile d to pr ov ide tim e ly a uth or iza tio n” be c a

us e de fe nd ant ha d s tate d in

an ea rlier f iled document that it had rec eived both a uthorizations and pe rmission on May 30, 2000, and June 1, 2000, respe ctively .” This r esponse is appare ntly , but not certa inly , relative to defe ndant’s state me nt o f m a te ri a l f

a c ts not in dis pu te numbe r 2 tha t the Coxe s had fa ile d to pro vid e imm e diate authorizations to Tennessee Fa rmers nece ssary to its investigation of their financ ial condition and backg round and ha d failed and ref used to pr ovide Tenne ssee Fa rmer acc ess to the loss sit e for the purposes of c onducting a caus e an d o rig in investigation.” But most importantly , the fa ct that the Cox es may

or may not ha

ve cooper ated with T ennesse e Fa rmers’ cause and orig in investigation soon af t er t h e f i re i s n o tm at er i al t o t h e i s s u es ra i s ed b y t h e m o t i o nfo r s u m m ary j u d gm en to nC o v er age C. Only the issue of the de lay

in providing the proof of loss is m ater ial to this m otion.

Plaintiffs a lso a

ppare ntly disputed defe ndant’s statement re g ardingwhen Te nnessee Fa rmers was able to inspe ct the site of the fire loss to dete rmine if the c ontents claimed to have been-9-

destroy ed we re in the dw elling pr ior to the fire. Plaintiffs’ exact response number 9 is: “Disputed. I nspection of the f

ire sce ne wa s undertake n by the Def endant on J u n e 8, 2000" as stated by Tenne ssee F arme rs’ in an e arlier filed docume nt. This response is dec eptive bec ause Te nnessee Fa rmers w as allowe d by

plaintiffs to inspect the pre mises on June 8, 2000 as par t of its cause a

nd orig in investigation. Parag raph 9 of defe ndant’s st atement of materia l fac ts is that it could not inspect for e vidence that the co n t en t s cl ai m ed we re pr esent be fore the fire beca use it did not rece ive the proof of loss of contents until nine months af ter the fire. The cause and orig in investigation on J une 8 and the c on te nts inv e sti g a tio n that ne ve r o c c ur re d w e re no t th e same . M r. Smith e sta bli sh e d in th his a ff ida vit tha t th e c on te nt i nv e sti g a tio n c ou ld n ot o c c ur un til a ft e r t

he pr oo f o f c la im of

c on te nts loss was provided be cause he nee ded to look for e vidence that the items claim ed had bee n in the dwelling at the ti me of the fire. Without a list of the c ontents claimed to be da mag ed he w ould not know what to look for. A ccor dingly , plaintiffs did not cr ea t e a g enuine issue of materia l fac t

re g ard ingthe inv e sti g ati on on th e c on te nts c la im und e r C ov e ra g e C and the Tr ia l Co ur

t c or re c tly found that the re sponses did not raise mate rial issues of fa ct in dispute.

Mo re ov e r, the Tr ia l Co ur t shou ld n ot h a ve c on sid e re d th e nin e e xhibi ts atta c he d to the “Supplemental Me morandum in Opposition to Defenda nt’s Motion for Parti al S ummary J udg ment Coverag e C” a s plaintiffs/appellants urg e this Court to do. The documents consisted of (1) a letter fr om Vickie Knig ht to Mr. Cox ; a Nove mber 14, 2000 letter from Mr. Cox t o Tenne ssee Fa rmers; a November

13, 2000 let t er fr o m M r. Knolt on to Mr. Cox ; a September 12, 2000 letter fr om M r. Kn olt on

to M r. Judso n; a

Janu ary 5, 20 01 le tte r f

ro m Mr . K

no lton to Mr . Co x; an

Ap ri l 3, 2001 letter fr om Mr. Knolton to Mr. J udson; an April 2 7 , 2001 letter fr om Mr. Knolton to Mr. J udson; a May

8, 2001 letter fr om Mr. Knolton to Mr. J udson; and a Mar ch 8, 2001 letter from Mr. K n o lt o nto M r

. an d

M r s

. Co x.

Th e se do c ume nts , like th e do c ume nts a tta c he d to “ Pla int if fs ’ R e sp on se to Def endant’ s Motion fo r P ar t ial Summary J udg ment and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Revise the Court’s Previous Ru li n g s Pur s u an t t o Ru le 5 4

. 0 2 " ar e n o t a dmi s s ib le in e v id e n c e a s th e y

h a v e n o t be en authenticated. Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rul e 56.06 pr ov ide s:

Sup po rt ing and

op po sin g a ff

ida vit s sh a ll b e ma de on

pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e , s uc h f a c ts

a s w ou ld b e a dmi ssi ble in ev ide nc e , a nd sh a ll s ho w a ff

ir mativ e ly that th e a ff

iant i s
c omp e te nt t o te sti fy

to t he matte rs state d th e re in. Swo rn or c e rt if ie d c op ie s o f a ll paper s or par

ts thereof ref

err ed to in an aff

idavit sha ll be attache d there to or serve d there with. . . .

Plaintiffs mere ly

attache d these nine doc uments to their memorandum, a nd did not have the documents authe nticated by aff idavit. See Dalton v. Dale, No. M2002-01205-COA- R3- CV, 2003 WL 726669 (Tenn. Ct. App. Ma r. 4, 2003). See also Price v. Be cke r , 812 S. W . 2d 597, 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).-10- The subjec t policy

of insuranc e re qu i res the insured to provide Te nnessee Fa rmers a proof of loss within six ty

day s of the loss in the cooper ation section of the policy . I t is undisput ed t h at p l ai ntiffs did not provide a c omplete proof of loss for contents unde r cove rag e C until nine

mon ths a ft e r t

he fi re and

that c ov e ra g e fo r los s of co nte nts wa s den ie d d ue to p la int if

fs ’ t ard ine ss. The only excuse for de l ay

offe red by

plaintiffs is that Tennesse e F arme rs did not send a c ertified

c op y of the po lic y

to p la int if

fs un til mor e tha

n six mon ths a ft e r t

he fi re . T he pla int if

fs do no t e xpla in why a ce rtified copy

of the policy

was ne cessa

ry befor e they could proce ed with pr epar ing a proof

o f l o s s o r w h y t h e c o p y o f t h e p o l i c y M s

. K n i g h t s e n t t o p l a i n t i f

f s i nJ u l y 2 0 0 0 d i d n o ts u f f i c e

. In their last ana ly sis, plaintiffs argue Tenne ssee F arme rs, by its actions, waived the sixty day provision i n t h e p o l i cy

an d i s es t o p p edfr o m re l yi n g o nt h e s i x t y d ay p ro v i s i o nt o j u s t i fy

d en i al o f c o v er age
u n d er C overa g e C. The insure d’s fa ilure to produce a sworn pr oof of loss within the time period require d in the policy

is fatal to the cla im unless the c onditions are wa ived by the insured. Central National Ins. Co. Of Omaha v. M

fr’s. A cc eptance Co., 544 S. W . 2d 362, 364 (Tenn. 1976) . The Supreme Court in that case found that the plaintiff, w ho had fa iled to file a proof of loss as re quired by the policy of i nsuranc e, had “ brea ched material c onditions of the policy ”. The Court expl ained:

[Pla int if f] h a s f a ile d, wi tho ut e xcu se , to fi le a sw or n pr oo f o f l os s and

ha s r e fu se d to respond to re peate d re q u es t s o f insurer that he make himself available to the Company for discussion of the a ll ege d loss. The policy clea rly require s that he pe rf or m th e se a c ts, and

c on dit ion s th e lia

bil ity of the Com

pa ny up on the ir pe rf or manc e

. Th e br e a c h of su c h c on dit ion s, un le ss w a ive d b y the ins ur e r, pr e ve nts

a re cover y upon the i nsuranc e contract; and, there is no such wa iver he re. The filing of the re quisite proof of loss may obviate the ne cessity

for g iving notice of loss, but the g iving of

notice of loss does not satisfy the re quirement that proof of loss be filed.

Ce ntral N ati on al, 544 SW 2d at 364 (interna l citations omit ted).

Tenne ssee Fa

rmers relies on Sc ot v . E

x c ha nge Mu t. Ins. Co. , N o

. 8 6

- 4 5

- 1 1 , 1 9 8 6 WL 6276 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 4, 1986)( aff’d 1987 WL 15298 (Tenn. Aug

. 10, 1987), a f actua lly simil ar
case to this case. In that case , the in surer argued that the de lay

in filing a

proof of loss was preju di cia l to the ins ur e r a nd c ontin ue d th is f a ilure re su lte d in

the fo rf e iture of pla int if fs ’ r ig ht t o
rec over. This Court ag ree d and explained how the insure r wa s prejudice d by the late f iling of the pr oo f o f l os s a s f

oll ow s:

[T] he adjuster

was not able to make . . . an a ppraisal of loss of persona l property by an examination of the re mains. I n order to make a

n int e lli g e nt examination and verific ation of loss of persona l pr operty , it was nec essar y for him to have a

list of the proper ty lost and its claimed value so that he might sea rch the ruins for e vidence s of the exist ence of such pr o p er t y , i t s value a nd its damag e. Only

plaintiff was in a position t o furnish such a list, and plaintiff delay ed six months and one day . During-11- su c h a pe ri od , in

the or din ary

cou rse of event s, the re ma ins of pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y
wo uld pr ob a bly be so di sturb e d o r a lte re d b y the va nd a ls o r c ur ios ity

se e ke rs a s to seriously impair ability

of def endant to ver ify

the claim of pla intiff.

Sc ott a t * 7.

Her e, Te nnessee Fa rmers ha s shown throug h the aff idavit of Mr. Smith, t hat it was unable to asse ss whether the contents c laimed in t h e late filed proof of loss were actua lly

in the dw e lli nga t th e tim e of

fi re a s n ine mon ths ha d p a sse d s inc e the fi re a nd pla int if

fs did no t pr op e rl y contest this st at em ent by

aff idavit. Howeve r, plaintiffs ar g ue that Te nnessee Fa rmers w aived the six ty day proof of loss provision by

its actions. T hey rely

on Bush v. Ex change M

ut. Ins. Co. 866 S. W. 2 d 5 7 5 ( T e n n

. A p p

. 1 9 9 3 )

. Wh il e Bu sh cert a inl y e xpla ins the ru le that un de r c e rt a in circ umstances the a ctions of an insure r will constitute waiver of the c ooperat i o n p rovisions of a polic y of ins ur anc e , p la int if

fs ’ r e lia nc e on the nin e do c ume nts that w e re a tta c he d to the ir supplemental opposition t o d ef en d an t ’s m o t i o nfo r s u m m ary j u d gm en tas s u

p p o rt fo r t h ei r c ontention of wa iver we re not c onsidered by the Trial Court, and a s we he ld were not properly put befor e the Tr ia l Co ur

t and are no t adm iss ibl e in ev ide nc e . H e re the pla int if fs fa ile d to re sp on d w ithpr oo f t o
cre ate a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t reg ardingth e wa iver of the policy provisions by

Tenne ssee Fa rmers. A ccor dingly , we a ffirm the pa rtial summary

judgme nt as to cover ag e found by the Trial J udg e. We a ffirm the J udg ment of the Trial Court a nd rema nd, with the cost of the a

ppeal a ssessed

on e -h a lf to p la int if

fs and on e -h a lf to d e fe nd ant.

______________________________

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.