2017 UT App 180

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

BRITANY MINTER,

Appellant.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20160854-CA

Filed September 28, 2017

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Vernice S. Trease

No. 151903199

Melissa G. Stirba, Attorney for Appellant

Simarjit S. Gill and Tony F. Graf Jr., Attorneys

for Appellee

Before JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN, JILL M. POHLMAN, and

DIANA HAGEN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Britany Minter appeals her conviction of assault, a class A 

misdemeanor. Minter does not challenge her related convictions 

for criminal trespass, a class B misdemeanor, and disorderly 

conduct, an infraction. We affirm.

¶2 Minter was convicted of assault causing substantial 

bodily injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(3)(a) (LexisNexis 

Supp. 2016) (providing for the enhancement of assault to a class 

A misdemeanor if “the person causes substantial bodily injury to 

another”). “Substantial bodily injury” is defined as “bodily 

injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or 

causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or 

temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
State v. Minter

20160854-CA 2 2017 UT App 180

member or organ.” Id. § 76-1-601(12)(LexisNexis 2012). On appeal, 

Minter does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

proving that she used force against the victim or that the victim

suffered substantial bodily injury. However, Minter argues that 

the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Minter was not lawfully acting to defend herself or a 

third person when she struck the victim.

¶3 “Utah law requires the State to disprove the affirmative 

proposition of self-defense, not just prove guilt, beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235, ¶ 35, 359 

P.3d 1272 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A 

person is justified in using non-deadly force against another in 

self-defense ‘when and to the extent that the person reasonably 

believes that force or a threat of force is necessary to defend the 

person or a third person against another person’s imminent use 

of unlawful force.’” Id. ¶ 44 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-

402(1)(a)(LexisNexis 2012)). “In determining [the] imminence” of 

the threat or the “reasonableness” of force used in self-defense, 

“the trier of fact may consider . . . the nature . . . [and] the 

immediacy of the danger.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)(a)–(b)

(LexisNexis 2012). “Force is justifiable under section 76-2-402 

only if a reasonable belief in the imminence of unlawful harm 

and in the necessity of defensive force coincide with the 

defendant’s use of force.” State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 14, 299 

P.3d 1133. Accordingly, the jury in this case had to decide 

whether the State met its burden to disprove that Minter 

“reasonably believed force was necessary to defend herself” or 

another person against another’s imminent use of unlawful 

force. See Maama, 2015 UT App 235, ¶ 23. In doing so, the jury 

was called upon to consider the nature and immediacy of the 

threat that the victim posed. See id.

¶4 “We will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 

evidence only if the evidence presented at trial is so insufficient 

that reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict.” 

State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ¶ 40, 52 P.3d 1194 (citation and 
State v. Minter

20160854-CA 3 2017 UT App 180

internal quotation marks omitted). On appellate review, we 

“assume that the jury believed the evidence that supports the 

verdict” and do not “re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses or 

second-guess the jury’s conclusion.” See id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶5 Minter contends that the State’s evidence could not have 

convinced a reasonable jury beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Minter did not act in self-defense or defense of another person.

The evidence established that Minter had met the victim’s adult 

daughter at a bar earlier that evening. When the daughter 

returned home, she and her boyfriend began quarrelling in the 

driveway. The victim and her son, who was armed with a 

machete, went outside to break up the argument. After the 

boyfriend left, the victim insisted that her daughter come inside 

to get a coat. Minter, who was walking home from the bar, heard 

the commotion and intervened. When the victim grabbed her 

daughter’s arm and tried to pull her into the house, Minter 

struck the victim with an open palm, causing the victim to suffer 

a broken nose, bruising throughout her face, and a blood clot 

under her eye. At trial, Minter claimed she “felt very threatened 

by [the victim] and her son and the commotion” and that “the 

overall situation was threatening and volatile with a significant 

verbal altercation between Minter and [the victim] and the 

presence of [the victim’s son] and his machete in close 

proximity.” Minter also testified that the victim hit her first, but 

the victim testified that she never struck Minter.

¶6 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Minter did not reasonably believe that force was necessary to 

defend herself or the victim’s daughter. Thus, the evidence was 

sufficient to support Minter’s assault conviction.

¶7 Accordingly, we affirm.