alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Zantana BRAUHER, also known as Zantana Rae Brauher, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41597 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 1, 2017

Andrew R. Gould, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Zantana Brauher, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

*440PER CURIAM: *

Zantana Brauher, federal prisoner # 28054-379, was convicted in 2013 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, and she was sentenced below the guidelines range to a 96-month term of imprisonment and to a three-year period of supervised release,

Brauher filed motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting that she should receive a minor role adjustment under Guidelines Amendments 782 and 794. The district court construed the motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and denied them. Brauher gave timely notice of her appeal. The district court determined that the appeal was not taken in good faith, and it denied Brauher’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. Brauher has applied in this court for leave to proceed IFP on appeal.

By moving this court for leave to proceed IFP, Brauher is challenging the district court’s determination that her appeal is not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and'citation omitted).

Brauher asserts that she is entitled to a minor role adjustment under Amendment 794. Brauher does not contend that she is entitled to relief under § 3582(c)(2). Her argument is that she should have been permitted to raise her sentencing issue in a § 2255 motion. Technical Guidelines applications, however, are not of constitutional dimension and are not cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding. *See United States v. Vaughn,*955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992); *see also United States v. Samuels,*59 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1995).

Brauher contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to “properly motion the court prior to her sentencing -hearing” and that the trial court erred in “refusing to allow ... counsel to move for the minor participant role to be applied to her sentence.” These contentions have not been considered because they are not directed to the trial court’s reasons for its certification decision. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202.

Because the appeal is fi-ivolous, leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2; *Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 n.24.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Charles A. LALIBERTE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Charles E. SAMUELS, Jr., Director of Bureau of Prisons; Christopher Nickrenz, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-2497

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: November 29, 2016

Filed: December 2, 2016

Charles A. LaLiberte, Kansas City, MO, pro se.

Jeffrey P. Ray, Asst. U.S, Atty., Kansas City, MO (Tammy Dickinson, U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellees

Before SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Charles LaLiberte appeals after the district court1 dismissed his pro se complaint. Upon careful review, we find no reason to reverse the dismissal order because, among other reasons, we agree with the district court that it had no personal jurisdiction over defendants. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92, 100 S.Ct. 669, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (nonresident defendant must have minimum contacts such that suit “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”); Miller v. Nippon Carbon Co., 528 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 2008) (de novo review). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
1

**From:** Paul Chakroff **Sent:** 6/ 24/ 2015 7:22 PM **To:** Dunham, Sarah **Cc:** Timothy Bower **Subject:** Question from today's Webinar on the Clean Power Plan Sarah Dunham, Thank you for your informative presentation at the NAEP / Vermont Law webinar this afternoon. One point of clarification please. By way of context - - I live and work on St. Croix, US Virgin Islands. While listening to your presentation, I searched for and found EPA's web page on the October 2014 Supplemental Proposal ( http://www2.epa.gov/car bon
- pollution
- standards/fact

- sheet
clean
- power- plan
- supplemental
- proposal ). Joining the webinar from under a ceiling fan and in front of a computer running off electricity generated by combustion of #2 diesel, imagine my surprise when I read: EPA is aware of two potentially affected sources in the U.S. Virgin Islands, however the sources have not operated for several years and are not operating now so the agency is not proposing a goal for this territory. I th ought the Clean Power Plan applied to all fossil fuel fired power plants, not just coal
- fired power plants. If the USVI is exempt due to size or fuel source, I may understand, but that should be reflected on the EPA web page. To be fair to our local ut ility, I think the VI Water and Power Authority (WAPA) will meet the very modest 2030 threshold in the Clean Power Plan with renewables already on grid or in the pipeline. That notwithstanding, I think the territory should be included in the Plan, not exem pted from it. Inclusion will a) keep the pressure on the utility to accept higher grid penetration of renewables, and b) allow WAPA and USVI to rightfully receive the national recognition it deserves when it meets the 2030 milestone (albeit, a standard m ore easily achievable on a <150 MW peak grid than a multi
- GigaWatt State grid). Re. point a), last night in a public meeting, Black & Veatch, the WAPA contractor preparing a USVI Integrated (energy) Resource Plan made the point that WAPA will not likely b e subject to2

EPA's Clean Power Plan. I.e., we are already planning our 20
- year future energy portfolio on the basis that we are not subject to federal clean power goals. Re. point b), Territorial law (VI Act 7075 Sec. 1152) requires WAPA to meet the foll owing renewable energy goals. I.e. the federal Clean Power Plan is not an imposition greater than that already imposed on the utility by the territorial government. If we meet the territorial law, we should easily meet the federal Clean Power Plan goal.

I look forward to your position on why EPA feels USVI should be exempt from the Clean Power Plan. Certainly, as an island territory surrounded by rising and warming seas, we have more at risk from climate change than many of the states covered by the Plan. And, imposition of the federal goal has no greater socioeconomic impact than milestones already imposed by the territorial government (enacted by the legislature and signed by the governor). Thank you, 

### Paul Paul Chakroff, MSc, CEP Pe Che Consulting, Inc. paulchakroff@gmail.com 340

- 626

- 0983 This image cannot currently be displayed.
**EXHIBIT -32.2**

 

MOSSIMO, INC.

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofMossimo, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30,2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the Report), I Edwin Lewis, Vice-Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer ofthe Company, certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that tothe best of my knowledge:

 

(1)   The Report, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit -32.2, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of theSecurities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition, results of operations, and cashflows of the Company.

 
| /s/    | Edwin Lewis                                   |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Edwin Lewis                                   |
|   | Vice-Chairman and Co-Chief Executive  Officer |
|   | November 14, 2005                        |

 

A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTENSTATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 HASBEEN PROVIDED TO THE COMPANY AND WILL BE RETAINED BY THE COMPANY AND FURNISHEDTO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF UPON REQUEST.

 

THIS CERTIFICATION ACCOMPANIES THE FORM 10-QTO WHICH IT RELATES, IS NOT DEEMED FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION AND IS NOT TO BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO A FILING OF THECOMPANY UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 OR THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 (WHETHERMADE BEFORE OR AFTER THE DATE OF THE FORM 10-Q), IRRESPECTIVE OF ANYGENERAL INCORPORATION LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN SUCH FILING.

 

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**GREGORY MARK DUNBAR,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 50 WM 2015** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 18th day of September, 2015, the Petition for Leave to File** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal** Nunc Pro Tunc **is** DENIED

**.**
Anthony Terrell EVANS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-1005

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**







**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 ADOPTED**


**PURSUANT
      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of Shumate Industries, Inc., a Delaware
      corporation, (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the year ending December 31,
      2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
      (the “Report”), I, Matthew C. Flemming, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
      certify the following pursuant to Section 18, U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:





1.
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and





2.
            The
                information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.











/s/
      Matthew C. Flemming


Matthew
      C. Flemming, Chief Financial Officer


March
      30,
      2007
Exhibit 31.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Philip Luizzo, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Accufacts Pre-Employment
Screening, Inc;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the
registrant and I have:

         a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

         b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing of this annual
report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

         c) presented in this annual report my conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;

5. I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or
persons performing the equivalent function):

         a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

         b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
controls; and

6. I have indicated in this annual report whether or not there were significant
changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect
internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation,
including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses.

Date:   April 10, 2006

/S/ PHILIP LUIZZO.
-----------------
Philip Luizzo.

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
EX PARTE Neil WALKER

CR-16-0386

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 3, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Alvarado, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 881]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ronald Zweibel, J.), rendered December 15, 2000, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 15 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s claim that his right of confrontation was violated when the undercover officer identified himself only by his shield number during his testimony is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Contrary to defendant’s argument, a Confrontation Clause argument requires a specific contemporaneous objection *(see e.g. People v Kello,*96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]; *People v Maher,*89 NY2d 456, 462-463 [1997]). In this case, as a result of the lack of objection, the People were never called upon to establish a need for anonymity *(see People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10 [1995]). Were we to review this claim, we would find that the fact that the undercover officer testified anonymously did not cause defendant any prejudice *(see People v Mulligan,*298 AD2d 233 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 562 [2002]).

The People established a proper chain of custody for the introduction of prerecorded buy money *(see People v Julian,*41 NY2d 340 [1977]). There is no evidence that the money recovered from defendant was commingled with money recovered from another person arrested along with him.

To the extent that the existing record permits review, we conclude that defendant received effective assistance of counsel *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; *see also Strickland v Washington,*466 US 668 [1984]).

We have considered and rejected the remaining claims contained in defendant’s pro se supplemental brief. Concur— Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Williams and Friedman, JJ.
LAURIE GLISSON,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

___________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-3982

Opinion filed January 22, 2015.

Petition for Writ of Prohibition.

Michael Ufferman, of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for 

Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, David Campbell and Virginia Harris, Assistant 

Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DENIED.

PADOVANO, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., CONCUR.
May 28, 2015 

Mr. Scott Richard 

802 Canyon Avenue 

Cody, WY 82414 

Dear Mr. Richard: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It 

explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your April 23, 2015, exemption request on behalf into the public docket 

(No. FAA-2015-1159), but we are unable to process your request any further. The 

information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For 

us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following: 

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief. 

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole. 

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division 

Enclosure
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
**PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
I, Brion Umidi, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ReGen Biologics,Inc.;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
     4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a — 15(e) and 15d — 15(e)) for the registrant and have:
     a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
     b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and
     c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and
     5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, tothe registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
     a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and
     b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.
Date: August 12, 2004         By: /s/ BRION UMIDI           Brion Umidi     *Chief Financial Officer*
Carlton JOYNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-3156

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Pablo ORTIZ-RIOS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41153 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 18, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Pablo Ortiz-Rios, Pro Se

*246Before KING, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Pablo Ortiz-Rios has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2011). Ortiz-Rios has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.