alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF PERIODIC REPORT**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, the undersigned, Jay C. Peterson, Chief Financial Officer of ForgentNetworks, Inc. (the “Company”), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 
|   | 1.     | The quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period  ended April 30, 2008 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of  section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as  amended, and |
|--------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|   | 2.     | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all  material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the  Company.                                                                                                |

 

 
|   | /s/ JAY C. PETERSON     |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | Jay C. Peterson         |
|   | Chief Financial Officer |
|   | June 16, 2008      |

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to Forgent Networks, Inc. and will be retained by ForgentNetworks, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission orits staff upon request.  The foregoingcertification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosuredocument.

 

----
#### Richard POLIDI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR; John Does 1-5; Jane Does 1-5, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1001

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 24, 2017

Richard Polidi, Appellant Pro Se.

*227Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Richard Polidi appeals the district court’s orders denying relief on his civil complaint and denying his Motion for a New Hearing. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Polidi v. North Carolina State Bar,*No. 1:16-cv-01322-TSE-IDD (E.D. Va. Oct. 31, 2016; Nov. 30, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED December 16, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-50467 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus TRINI JOHN HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. MO-03-CR-20-ALL

-------------------- Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Trini John Hernandez (“Hernandez”), appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 11 months’ imprisonment. Hernandez contends that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained by police officers. A district court may revoke a term of supervised release upon a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).No. 03-50467 -2- The district court’s revocation of supervised release is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Grandlund , 71 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1995). Hernandez has failed to demonstrate that his case is factually distinguishable from United States v. Montez , 952 F.2d 854, 857-59 (5th Cir. 1992)(absent a showing of harassment by police, the exclusionary rule does not apply to revocation of supervised release hearings). Hernandez’s statements, although made without the benefit of Miranda warnings following his arrest, were disclaimers of ownership of the “daytimer” at issue here and not in any way inculpatory. Hernandez’s supervised release was revoked on the basis of tangible evidence found pursuant to the search of the vehicle, which includes the daytimer and its contents, specifically Hernandez’s social security card and the pawn ticket bearing his name and birthdate. Because these items were seized incident to a lawful Fourth Amendment search following his arrest, there is no basis for distinguishing Montez from Hernandez’s case. Consequently, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### Roger William HULL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kathryn REYNOLDS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15055

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 17, 2017

Roger William Hull, Pro Se

James N. Bolotin, Deputy Attorney General, AGNV—Nevada Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Roger William Hull appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims related to constant illumination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We *274review de novo. *Grenning v. Miller-Stout,*739 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014). We. affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hull failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent by using excessive light in his prison dormitory, resulting in migraines. *See Farmer v. Brennan,*511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety... ,”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hull’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) motions for a stay and request for discovery because Hull failed to demonstrate that the discovery he requested would have precluded summary judgment. *See Getz v. Boeing Co.,*654 F.3d 852, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a plaintiff must show that the discovery sought would have precluded summary judgment).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in not considering Dr. Lockley’s affidavit because such evidence would not defeat summary judgment. *See Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA,*285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard of review for district court’s rulings concerning admissibility of evidence on summary judgment).

We reject as without merit Hull’s contentions that the district court erred in considering appellees’ light test evidence, denying Hull’s motion for sanctions, finding that its screening order allowed only one condition of confinement claim to proceed, and allowing defendants to change their defense.

We do not consider Hull’s allegations that were not raised in the operative complaint, including his allegations that prison officials recently installed new lights, that additional lights are now lit all day, and that he now suffers from sleep deprivation. These new allegations must be raised in a separate action.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000883720
<NAME> CELOX LABORATORIES, INC.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1998
<CASH>                                         204,360
<SECURITIES>                                   651,367
<RECEIVABLES>                                   58,105
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     52,985
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               986,046
<PP&E>                                         410,419
<DEPRECIATION>                                 262,664
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,191,525
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          131,147
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        27,442
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,032,936
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,191,525
<SALES>                                        222,441
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               222,441
<CGS>                                          105,808
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  243,991
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (238,429)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (238,429)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (238,429)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.09)
        





</TABLE>
#### Margaret H. Schott, Respondent, *v.*Leopold Schwartz, Appellant.

(Submitted September 21, 1871;

decided January term, 1872.)

Plaintiff, a married woman, while the act of 1860, (Laws of 1860, chap. 90) concerning the rights and liabilities of husband and wife, was in force, without the written consent of her husband, under an agreement with defendant, deeded certain real estate to grantees named by defendant. The deed was subject to a mortgage, plaintiff giving her bond conditioned to pay any sum due thereon over $1,100. The grantees went into possession under her deed, and continued in possession until ousted by foreclosure and sale under the mortgage, upon which there was due $1,378 at the time specified in plaintiff’s bond. Neither the grantees nor defendant offered to reconvey or to rescind the contract. Subsequent tó the execution of this deed, and while the grantees therein named were in possession under it, plaintiff and her husband joined in a deed of the premises to a third person. In an action upon a bond given as a part of the consideration of the first *deed,—Held,*that although such deed was invalid, there was not a total failure of consideration; that defendant’s remedy for the defect of title was for damages only, and that the question was unaffected by the execution of the second deed, as the possession of the grantees in the first deed under claim of title was an adverse holding, and therefore under the statute (1 R. S., 739, § 147) the second was absolutely void; also, that no complaint could be made of an eviction arising from the foreclosure of the mort*667gage. It was the duty of the grantees to pay it and to look to plaintiff for the excess over $1,100 upon her bond. This had nothing to do with the question of failure of title.

*Wm. C. Huger*for the appellant.

*8. H. Ten Eyck*for the respondent.

Leonard and Hunt, CO., read for affirmance.

All concur. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Order filed April 13, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-12-00144-CR

____________

HENRY ONYINYE IWU, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Court

County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 

ORDER

Appellant is represented by retained counsel, Raiysa Reece. No reporter's record 

has been filed in this case. Terri Johnstone, the court reporter, informed this Court that 

appellant had not made arrangements for payment for the reporter's record. On March 15, 

2012, the clerk of this court notified appellant that we would consider and decide those 

issues that do not require a reporter's record unless appellant, within 15 days of notice, 

provided this court with proof of payment for the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c). 

Appellant filed no reply. 

Accordingly, we issue the following order.
We ORDER appellant's retained counsel, Raiysa Reece, to file a brief in this appeal 

on or before May 14, 2012. If Raiysa Reece does not timely file the brief as ordered, we 

will issue an order directing the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the reason for the 

failure to file the brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b)(2).

PER CURIAM
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**


**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
      OF
      2002**


In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of American Security Resources Corporation,
      a Nevada corporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December
      31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”),
      Randall Newton, Chief Financial Officer, does hereby certify, pursuant to § 906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to his knowledge:


(1)
        The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2)
        The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
  By:
                  /s/ Randall NewtonName:
                  Randall NewtonTitle:
                  CFO
 
  April
        2,
        2006
  A
        signed
        original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
        to
        American Security Resources Corporation and will be retained by the Company
        and
        furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
        request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ivan MARTINEZ-RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50268

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*755Submitted January 18, 2017 *

Filed January 24, 2017

Christopher Paul Tenorio, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Daniel Earl Zipp, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US' Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee

Michelle Betancourt, Esquire, James Fife, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ivan Martinez-Ramirez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 12-month sentence imposed upon his revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Martinez-Ramirez contends that the district court procedurally erred and violated his due process rights by failing to notify him at sentencing for the underlying offense that he could receive an above-Guidelines sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. The record does not support this contention. At his sentencing on his underlying offense, Martinez-Ramirez received notice of all of the conditions of his supervised release and the district court informed him of the possible penalties for violating those conditions.

Martinez-Ramirez next argues that the district court did not explain the upward variance adequately. This argument is also belied by the record, which reflects that the court sufficiently explained its reasons for the sentence by reference to appropriate considerations. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Martinez-Ramirez finally claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the one-third upward variance from the Guidelines range was not warranted. The district court did not abuse its discretion. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Martinez-Ramirez’s lengthy period of noncompliance. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
Stephen Jamel LEA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-3704

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

October 05, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

The petition for belated appeal is granted in circuit court case number 2014-CF-4633-XX. This order shall serve as a timely notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence, the latter imposed August 5, 2016. Within twenty days the trial court shall consider appellant's eligibility for appointment of appellate counsel, provided appellant files within ten days a motion in the circuit court requesting same accompanied by a financial affidavit, and shall enter an order thereupon, with a copy to appellant and a copy to this court.

The circuit court clerk shall treat this order as a notice of appeal, promptly certify same and return it to this court as with any notice of appeal, accompanied by any order of indigency that may have been entered by the circuit court, and a new appellate case number will be assigned to this appeal and an acknowledgment letter will issue at that time.

SILBERMAN, MORRIS, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
#### Jerad ROSS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Leslie FLEMING, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6406

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 25, 2017

Jerad Ross, Appellant Pro Se.

Craig Stallard, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jerad Ross seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ross has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 11



                               GALEY & LORD, INC.
                       STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF
                               PER SHARE EARNINGS


Computation of Average Shares Outstanding (In Thousands):

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                         Three Months Ended                       Nine Months Ended
                                      June 28, 1997     June 29, 1996       June 28, 1997    June 29, 1996

<S>                                       <C>              <C>                 <C>               <C>   
Average Common Shares
     Outstanding                          11,625           11,691              11,600            11,732
Add Dilutive Options                         430              198                 390               210
                                        --------         --------            --------          --------

Primary Average Shares                    12,055           11,889              11,990            11,942

Incremental Shares Arising
     from Full Dilution
     Assumption                               52                0                 105                 7
                                        --------         --------           ---------          --------

Average Shares Assuming
     Full Dilution                        12,107           11,889              12,095            11,949
</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6354 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6354

   To amend title 10, United States Code, to increase the number of 
   individuals from the District of Columbia who may be appointed to 
                      military service academies.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 9, 2023

  Ms. Norton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 10, United States Code, to increase the number of 
   individuals from the District of Columbia who may be appointed to 
                      military service academies.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Service Academies District of 
Columbia Equality Act''.

SEC. 2. UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY.

    Section 7442(a)(5) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``Five'' and inserting ``Fifteen''.

SEC. 3. UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY.

    Section 8454(a)(5) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``Five'' and inserting ``Fifteen''.

SEC. 4. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY.

    Section 9442(a)(5) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``Five'' and inserting ``Fifteen''.
                                 <all>
```