alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.02




STATEMENT OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


OF MOVE, INC.


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


§ 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the report on Form 10-K of Move, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned Robert J. Krolik, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/ ROBERT J. KROLIKRobert J. KrolikChief Financial OfficerMove, Inc.Date: February 18, 2011




A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Move, Inc. and will be retained by Move, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




---
#### RLI INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Marie COSTELLO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-20126 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 6, 2017

Greg Keith Winslett, Esq., Attorney, Marcie Lynn Schout, Esq., Quilling, Selan-der, Lownds, Winslett *&*Moser, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*342Peter M. Kelly, Attorney, Kelly, Durham *&*Pittard, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Brad Thomas Wyly, Wyly & Cook, P.L.L.C., Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JONES, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

After her recreational vehicle was vandalized, appellant Marie Costello submitted a damage claim under an insurance policy issued by appellee RLI Insurance Co. The recreational vehicle was not registered when it was vandalized, and RLI denied Costello’s claim based on a provision that excludes coverage for losses to the recreational vehicle if it “does not have a valid motor vehicle registration at the time of the loss.” RLI also filed this declaratory-judgment action, seeking a judicial determination that there was no coverage under the policy.

The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to RLI. In particular, the district court rejected Costello’s argument that Texas Insurance Code section 862.054—Texas’s anti-technicality statute—precludes RLI from relying on the vehicle-registration exclusion as a defense to coverage. Emphasizing the Texas Supreme Court’s recent discussion of that statute in *Greene v. Fanners Insurance Exchange,*446 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. 2014), the district court noted that the statute applies only to “breaches.” Thus, the district court reasoned, because no breach occurred in this case, the statute is inapplicable. The district court also considered other Texas Supreme Court cases that Costello claims differentiate this case from *Greene,*and the court distinguished those cases in much the same way that the Texas Supreme Court itself distinguished them in *Greene.*

Having reviewed the briefs and the record, we AFFIRM for essentially the reasons given by the district court.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Davonceyea Vonshal STEMBRIDGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-3949

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 23, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
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<ARTICLE> 5
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       2,604,492
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               85,704,284
<ALLOWANCES>                                 8,705,292
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                       2,484,367
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,005,289
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             102,906,271
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        54,445
<OTHER-SE>                                  19,490,194
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               102,906,271
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            20,076,611
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             8,807,370
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             3,420,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,804,359
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,044,882
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,558,000        
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,486,882
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .44
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIME ALVAREZ RUIZ, AKA Francisco 

Alvarez, AKA Gerardo Casares, AKA Alex 

Ramirez, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent. 

No. 14-71427 

Agency No. A077-068-317 

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 11, 2017**

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Jaime Alvarez Ruiz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an 

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 20 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-71427 

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is 

governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s 

factual findings. Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). We 

deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

As to past persecution, the agency found Alvarez Ruiz was not credible 

regarding the only direct past harm he allegedly experienced in Mexico, namely,

his claim of arrest and abuse by police. Alvarez Ruiz does not challenge this 

finding. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-1080 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are deemed 

waived). As to future harm, the agency found Alvarez Ruiz’s proposed social 

group was not cognizable. He does not challenge this finding. See id. Further, we 

lack jurisdiction to consider the new social group he presents to the court for the 

first time. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner 

must exhaust claims in administrative proceedings below). Because Alvarez Ruiz 

does not otherwise challenge the BIA’s basis for denying withholding of removal, 

we deny the petition for review as to this claim.

Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Alvarez Ruiz’s

CAT claim because he did not show it is more likely than not he would be 

tortured by or with the consent or acquiesce of the government if returned to 
3 14-71427 

Mexico. See Silaya, 524 F.3d at 1073.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1997
<CASH>                                             701
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,708
<ALLOWANCES>                                       646
<INVENTORY>                                     50,431
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                          10,884
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,383
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  78,562
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           19,883
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    78,562
<SALES>                                          3,800
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                22,192
<CGS>                                            2,415
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   19,639
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 601
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,906
<INCOME-TAX>                                       744
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,162
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,162
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .26
        

</TABLE>
rand_ex107.htm


EXHIBIT 10.7







Promissory Note




 



	$[•]	March 9, 2011





                                                                                         

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to PAY TO THE ORDER OF [•], at [•], or such other place as shall be designated by the holder of this Note in writing, the principal sum of [•] Dollars ($[•]) together with all interest thereon from March 9, 2011, at the rate of two percent (2%) per annum until maturity, all payable in lawful money of the United States of America, as follows:


 


Commencing on April 9, 2011, and on the ninth (9th) day of each successive month through March 9, 2014, monthly payments of interest and principal, in the amount of $[•], shall be due and payable; provided, however, that if the maker hereof timely makes all payments due under the Notes (as hereinafter defined) other than the last monthly payment due under each of said Notes, then the last monthly payment due under this Note shall be waived.  For purposes hereof, the term “Notes” shall mean and include this Note, and (i) that certain Note of even date herewith in the original principal amount of $[•] from the maker hereof to and in favor of [•], (ii) that certain Note of even date herewith in the original principal amount of $[•] from the maker hereof to and in favor of [•], and (iii) that certain Note of even date herewith in the original principal amount of $[•] from the maker hereof to and in favor of [•].







On March 9, 2014, all remaining principal (together with any accrued interest) shall be due and owing.







This Note shall be prepayable in whole or in part at any time without penalty.







All payments shall apply first to accrued interest, and the remainder, if any, to reduction of principal. If any installment of principal or interest is not paid within fifteen (15) days of receipt of written notice of nonpayment by the maker hereof (and subject to any defenses available to the maker hereof pursuant to that certain Stock Purchase Agreement dated March 9, 2011, the whole indebtedness (including principal and interest) remaining unpaid, shall, at the option of the holder, become immediately due, payable and collectible.  Each maker and endorser hereof agrees, jointly and severally, to pay all costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, in case the principal of this Note or any payment on the principal or any interest thereon is not timely paid, whether suit be brought or not.


 



	 	MAKER: 






RANDOM SOURCE, INC., a Florida corporation







By: /s/ David A. Kriegstein


DAVID A. KRIEGSTEIN, President
#### IN RE: Serajul HAQUE, Appellant.

No. 15-5187

September Term, 2015

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed: 07/26/2016

Serajul Haque, Milpitas, CA, Pro Se.

BEFORE: Kavanaugh and Srinivasan, Circuit Judges, and Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by the appellant. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34®. Upon consideration of the foregoing, the motion to consolidate with several closed appeals, and the supplement thereto to consolidate with 53 “cases in trial court,” it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s denial of leave to file, entered June 11, 2015, be affirmed. Appellant has provided no grounds to review the district court’s denial of leave to file an unspecified document not on the docket and not provided by the appellant. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to consolidate with several closed appeals be dismissed as moot and to consolidate with 53 “cases in trial court” be denied.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JU LY 30, 2014

NO. 03

- 12

- 00702

- CV

Cynthia Schlapper, Appellant

v.

Rand K. Forest and Crosswater Yacht Club, L.P., Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 261ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES PURYEAR AND GOODWIN

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court on September 5, 2012. Having

reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the C ourt holds that there was no reversible error

in the trial court’s judgment . Therefore, the C ourt affirms the trial court’s judgment

. The

appellant shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below.
Rodney E. LOCKETT, DOC #917795, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2097

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 14, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Frederick BANKS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dr. Allissa MARQUEZ; Dr. Logan Graddy; Dr. Cahill; Mark Hornak; U.S. District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania; Jeff Sessions; Director of Bureau of Prisons; Adrian Roe; Robert Cessar; Soo Song, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 17-6387

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

Frederick Hamilton Banks, Appellant Pro Se.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

*160Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Frederick Banks appeals the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice what the district court construed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. In his petition, Banks sought immediate release from custody or, in the least, that his competency proceedings be conducted. Banks explicitly admitted in his petition that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and, thus, we discern no error in the district court’s decision to sua sponte dismiss Banks’ petition for failure to administratively exhaust.- *See Custis v. Davis,*851 F.3d 358, 361-63 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss an inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies only if failure to exhaust is apparent on the face of the complaint and the district court did not first require the inmate to substantiate exhaustion). Accordingly, we grant Banks’ application to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6223 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6223

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to remove a requirement for 
    payment settlement entities to file returns relating to certain 
                         participating payees.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 3, 2023

  Mr. Perry introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to remove a requirement for 
    payment settlement entities to file returns relating to certain 
                         participating payees.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``1099K Elimination Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT FOR RETURNS RELATING TO PAYMENTS MADE IN 
              SETTLEMENT OF PAYMENT CARD AND THIRD PARTY NETWORK 
              TRANSACTIONS.

    (a) In General.--Subpart B of part III of subchapter A of chapter 
61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking section 
6050W (and by striking the item relating to such section in the table 
of sections for such subpart).
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--
            (1) Section 3406(b)(3) of such Code is amended by inserting 
        ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (D), by striking the ``, or'' 
        at the end of subparagraph (E) and inserting a period, and by 
        striking subparagraph (F).
            (2) Section 6724(d) of such Code is amended--
                    (A) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking clause 
                (xxiii), and
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph 
                (FF).
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to returns for calendar years beginning after the date of the 
enactment of this section.
                                 <all>
```
#### Margaret M. Dauphinee, as Administratrix of the Estate of John Dauphinee, Deceased, Appellant, *v.*New York Rapid Transit Corporation, Respondent.

Argued March 1, 1943;

decided April 8, 1943.

*684
      *Ralph Stout*and *Stephen Callaghan*for appellant.

*William C. Chanler, Corporation Counsel (Paxton Blair*and *Irving Galt*of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Raymond Scott STANDAFER Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4093

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 5, 2017

Filed: July 11, 2017

William Reiser Ripleym, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Davenport, IA, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Raymond Scott Standafer, Pro Se

*328Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Raymond Standafer challenges the sentence the district court1 imposed upon his guilty plea to a drug offense, which he committed while on supervised release. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the district court, in sentencing Mr. Standafer, abused its discretion by failing to give adequate consideration to his history of drug addiction, and by imposing consecutive prison terms for the drug offense and the revocation of supervised release.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Mr. Standafer, and in particular, we conclude that the court did not commit an error of judgment in weighing his drug addiction against other relevant factors. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (discussing appellate review of sentencing decisions under abuse-of-discretion standard; abuse of discretion occurs when court fails to consider relevant factor, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant factor, or commits clear error of judgment in weighing appropriate factors). We further conclude that the imposition of consecutive prison terms was proper. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 cmt. n.4(C) (recommending that sentence for instant offense be imposed consecutively to sentence imposed for revocation where defendant commits instant offense while serving period of supervised release).

Having independently reviewed the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

1

. The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.