J-S56031-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.G.H., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1842 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 18, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): No. 2020-A0034

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 31, 2020

J.H. (Father) appeals from the decree entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) involuntarily terminating his parental 

rights to his daughter, A.G.H. (Child) (D.O.B. January 2018) and changing 

Child’s permanency goal to adoption.1 We affirm.

I.

A.

The Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth (OCY) became 

involved with Child’s family in August 2018 because of concern regarding 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Child’s birth mother, L.M. (Mother) voluntarily relinquished her parental 

rights on July 27, 2020. She is not a party to this appeal.
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Father and Mother’s (collectively, Parents) lack of stable housing, 

unemployment and drug abuse (heroin). The Family Service Plan (FSP) OCY 

implemented in October 2018 provided for Child to live with paternal 

grandmother (Grandmother) and for supervised visitation with Parents. Child 

was adjudicated dependent on January 15, 2019, after Father violated the FSP

by refusing to comply with OCY’s drug screen request.

B.

On February 24, 2020, OCY filed a petition seeking termination of 

Parents’ parental rights to Child. The trial court held a hearing with regard to 

Father on August 18, 2020.2 OCY presented the testimony of the family’s 

caseworker Reginald Nelson (Nelson) and Father testified on his own behalf.

Nelson testified that Child has continuously resided with Grandmother 

since October 2018. (See N.T. Termination Hearing, 8/18/20, at 11-12). 

After Nelson’s initial attempts to schedule a meeting with Father to discuss 

the goals of the FSP via text messages, phone calls and unannounced visits

failed, he sent Father a copy of the plan in the mail. (See id. at 15). When 

Nelson made contact with Father, they discussed the requirements of the FSP, 

specifically, that Father participate in drug and alcohol treatment, submit to 

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2 The hearing was conducted remotely via videoconference due to the COVID19 pandemic.
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random drug screening, obtain stable housing and steady employment, 

abstain from drug use and consistently visit with Child. (Id. at 16).

Nelson testified that at the time OCY filed the petition for termination of 

parental rights, Father had not met any of the FSP goals. (See id.). Although 

Father underwent an evaluation and was advised of his need for substance 

abuse treatment in July 2019, he failed to enroll in any such program. (See 

id. at 17-18). Father did not provide OCY with any documentation of 

treatment until approximately one month before the hearing in July 2020 that

showed that he was participating in a Suboxone medication management 

treatment program.

3

 (See id. at 18, 36). Nelson testified that Father was 

largely noncompliant with drug screening attempts and that three of his four 

drug tests were positive. (See id. at 21-22). Father has tested positive for 

cocaine, methamphetamine, opiates and fentanyl and he admitted to 

marijuana use. (See id. at 21-22, 37). Nelson also obtained Father’s drug 

screen results administered through the medication management treatment 

program. These screens were negative except for the drugs he had been 

prescribed. (See id. at 36-37).

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3 Suboxone is a medication approved by the Food and Drug Administration for 

the treatment of opioid addiction. See Abruzzese v. Bureau of Prof'l &

Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of Cosmetology, 185 A.3d 446, 449 n.1

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
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Regarding the requirement of suitable housing, Nelson testified that he 

was able to visit Father’s apartment on April 19, 2019. The residence was not 

appropriate for Child and had no electricity. (See id. at 23, 25). Father did

not cooperate with Nelson’s numerous attempts to revisit the home until two 

weeks before the hearing and it remained unsuitable for Child. (See id. at 

23-25).

Concerning the goal of stable employment, Nelson explained that Father 

does not have a steady job, that he works seasonally and that he was 

unemployed during the six months prior to the filing of the termination 

petition. (See id. at 25-26). At the time of the hearing, Father had recently

started a job but Nelson opined that Father still did not have the ability to 

support himself and Child. (See id. at 26). With regard to visitation, Father 

has not been consistent in his efforts to schedule supervised visitation with 

Child and his whereabouts have been unknown to OCY during certain time 

periods. (See id. at 27-28). When Father eventually attempted to arrange 

vitiation in July 2020, the visits were declined because he did not provide 

documentation of his participation in drug treatment nor was he compliant

with drug screens. (See id. at 28-29). Just prior to the hearing, Father began 

FaceTime telephone visitation with Child but the calls were not consistent. 

(See id. at 29, 37-38).

In describing the conditions of Grandmother’s home, Nelson testified 

that it is suitable for Child and that Grandmother provides Child with 
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appropriate clothing and meets all of her other everyday necessities. (See 

id. at 25, 33). Grandmother and Child have a strong bond and Grandmother 

provides her with emotional support. (See id. at 33-34). Nelson opined that 

Father’s parental rights to Child should be terminated, that termination is in 

Child’s best interests, and that she would not be irreparably harmed by 

termination. (See id. at 34).

Father then testified that he has lived by himself in his apartment for 

about two years, that it is a safe and stable environment for Child and that he 

has allowed Nelson to visit on multiple occasions. (See id. at 45). Father

explained that he is participating in a Suboxone maintenance treatment 

program and that he was about to start an intensive six-month outpatient 

program. (See id. at 46, 63). Father testified that he provided for Child while 

she lived with him until she was eight months’ old, and that when supervised 

visitation began, he saw her every other day at Grandmother’s house. (See 

id. at 47-49, 52). Father averred that he has telephone or FaceTime contact 

with Child daily through Grandmother, that Child is happy when she sees him 

and that she calls him “Dada.” (See id. at 51-52). Father expressed his love 

for Child and his desire to change his life to raise her. (See id. at 52).

Father admitted on cross-examination that he began using heroin in 

August 2018 when his brother died. (See id. at 53). Prior to that, he used 

Percocet because he had kidney stones. (See id. at 54). Father explained 

that he had used heroin once every three or four days and that he snorted 
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about seven bags of the drug during each episode. (See id. at 58). Father 

testified that he stopped using heroin in June 2020. (See id. at 59). He also 

stated that his apartment was never without electricity and that Nelson’s 

testimony to the contrary was “a lie.” (Id. at 60). Father explained that he 

was laid off from his job at about the time he started using heroin, that he 

was collecting unemployment and working “under the table lately.” (Id.).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered its decree

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(1),(2),(8) and (b) 

of the Adoption Act.4 Father timely appealed and he and the trial court 

complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(i)-(ii).

5

II.

On appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred in terminating his 

parental rights pursuant to multiple subsections of 2511(a). The crux of 

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4 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.

5 Our standard of review in termination of parental right cases

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result.

In re J.W.B., 232 A.3d 689, 695 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted).
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Father’s claim is that he has made significant progress towards improving his 

life to care for Child, including participating in drug treatment and screening, 

securing suitable, safe housing and maintaining consistent contact with Child. 

Father also argues that termination of his parental rights is not in Child’s best 

interests and is premature given that he has a significant bond with Child and 

is capable of caring for her.

A.

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs the involuntary termination of 

parental rights and requires a bifurcated analysis:

. . . Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re Adoption of B.G.S., 240 A.3d 658, 662-63 (Pa. Super. 2020) (case 

citation omitted).

As noted, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(1),(2), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act, which provide:

(a) General rule.─The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either 

has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to 

a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 

months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

(b) Other considerations.─The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (8) and (b).

It is well-settled that “[w]e need only agree with [the trial court’s]

decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) and subsection (b) in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” Int. of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 

465, 473 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). For the following reasons, we
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conclude that the trial court correctly determined that OCY met its burden of 

proof under subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b).

B.

We first address termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2).

Section 2511(a)(2) provides for termination of parental 

rights where the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). The grounds 

for termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) due to 

parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to 

the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as 

incapacity to perform parental duties.

This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to 

make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption 

of full parental responsibilities. At a termination hearing, the 

orphans’ court may properly reject as untimely or disingenuous a 

parent’s vow to follow through on necessary services when the 

parent failed to co-operate with the agency or take advantage of 

available services during dependency proceedings.

Id. at 473–74 (case citations omitted).

Applying these principles, the trial court concluded that Father’s history 

of substance abuse, unstable employment and inadequate housing rendered 

him incapable of parenting Child and caused her to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence. The court found:

Father does not have the means to support Child because 

he is unemployed. He was laid off from his former job when he 

started to use heroin. He admitted to using heroin beginning 
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between August and November 2018 and continuing until June 

2020. He admitted to spending his unemployment income on

drugs.

Father’s living arrangement is not suitable to provide the 

subsistence necessary for Child’s wellbeing. Father has made no 

meaningful attempts to remedy this situation before OCY filed the 

termination petition. Such neglect has caused Child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for her 

physical or mental wellbeing, and Father has not shown that the 

cause of his neglect can be remedied.

. . . The overwhelming evidence that Father did not comply 

with substance-abuse treatment [] suggests that he continues to 

use drugs or does not care about his Child. His drug use has 

caused Child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for her physical or mental well-being. 

Despite efforts of OCY and Mr. Nelson to make Father seek 

treatment for substance-use disorder, it appears that such 

incapacity or refusal cannot or will not be remedied voluntarily by 

him. These circumstances indicate that Father is incapable of 

providing safety and permanency for Child now and in the future.

(Trial Court Opinion, 9/24/20, at 10-11).

Further, with regard to Father’s living arrangements, the trial court 

specifically found Father’s testimony alleging Nelson’s “lie” concerning the 

condition of his apartment not credible. (See N.T. Termination Hearing, at 

70). Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. We decline 

to disturb the court’s credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it

terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

6

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6 For similar reasons, clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that 

termination was also warranted under subsections 2511(a)(1) and (8). Father 
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C.

Having found that termination of Father’s parental rights was 

appropriate under Section 2511(a), the next step of our inquiry is to consider 

whether termination is in the best interests of Child under Section 2511(b).

With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the 

effect that terminating the parental bond will have on the child. 

In particular, we review whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. It is well settled that intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.

One major aspect of the “needs and welfare” analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond that the 

child has with the parent, with close attention paid to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing any such bond. The fact that 

a child has a bond with a parent does not preclude the termination

of parental rights. Rather, the trial court must examine the depth 

of the bond to determine whether the bond is so meaningful to 

the child that its termination would destroy an existing, necessary, 

and beneficial relationship. Notably, where there is no evidence 

of a bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer 

that no bond exists.

It is sufficient for the trial court to rely on the opinions of 

social workers and caseworkers when evaluating the impact that

termination of parental rights will have on a child. The trial court 

may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and 

stability the child might have with the foster parent.

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has not shown an ability to overcome his substance abuse, unemployment or 

living arrangement issues to the extent that he could appropriately care for 

Child. Although he has recently undergone some substance abuse treatment 

and claims to have made lifestyle changes to provide necessary support for 

Child, the trial court did not err in concluding that he fell short in this regard.
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Int. of K.M.W., supra at 475 (case citations and most quotation marks 

omitted).

Instantly, Father maintains that he and Child have a significant bond

and that Child is excited to see him during telephone visitation and refers to

him as “Dada”. He argues that termination is premature and not in Child’s

best interests.

In contrast, Nelson testified that Child has lived continuously with 

Grandmother for approximately two years and that Grandmother has 

consistently met all of Child’s material and emotional needs. Nelson further 

testified that Child and Grandmother share a strong bond and he opined that

termination of Father’s rights is in Child’s best interests and would not 

irreparably harm her.

The trial court, after considering all of the testimony, determined that 

termination served Child’s best interests. The court noted its appreciation for 

Father’s recent efforts to place himself in drug treatment and make regular 

telephone contact with Child. (See N.T. Termination Hearing, at 70-71). 

However, it found that termination would best meet Child’s developmental, 

emotional and physical needs, stating: “. . . the fact that she recognizes you 

and is happy to see you on FaceTime does not make you an appropriate parent 

for this child. . . . I believe you love her, but that’s not enough. You are 

fortunate that your mother was willing to step in.” (Id. at 71; see also Trial 

Ct. Op., at 13).
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The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that terminating

Father’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests. Child has resided with 

Grandmother for most of her short life. Grandmother cares for Child and 

meets all of her needs. Father’s opioid addiction and inability to provide a 

safe environment or financial support for Child further establish that 

termination is in her best interests. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights to Child and in 

changing her goal to adoption.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/31/20