PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

BRANDON ROSS WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-6021 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 5:20-CR-00211-PRW-1)

_________________________________ 

Laura Deskin, Research and Writing Specialist, (and Jeffrey M. Byers, Federal Public 

Defender, on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Danielle Connolly, Assistant United States Attorney, (and Robert J. Troester, United 

States Attorney, on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, KELLY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

_________________________________ 

Defendant Brandon Ross Williams pled guilty to being a felon in possession of 

a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. 

On appeal, he challenges his lengthy sentence as an improper application of the 

Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). He asserts that his two prior Arkansas drug 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 6, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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convictions are not categorically “serious drug offenses” under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) because his state convictions could have applied to hemp, and 

hemp was no longer a federally controlled substance at the time of his federal 

sentencing. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) 

and we affirm.

Ultimately, this case is all about timing. Specifically, in the context of 

assessing whether a prior state drug conviction qualifies as a predicate “serious drug 

offense” under the ACCA, we must resolve the proper time of comparison to 

determine whether state and federal drug laws are a categorical match. There are two 

possible approaches: (1) comparing the state drug schedules in effect at the time of 

Mr. Williams’ prior convictions and the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of 

his federal sentencing (“time of federal sentencing comparison”); and (2) comparing 

the state drug schedules in effect at the time of Mr. Williams’ prior convictions and 

the federal drug schedules in effect at the time he committed the instant federal 

offense (“time of federal offense comparison”). See United States v. Gregory 

Williams, 48 F.4th 1125, 1133 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2022)

For the reasons discussed below, we adopt the time of federal offense 

comparison. Since there was a categorical match between Arkansas’ definition of 

marijuana at the time of Mr. Williams’ prior convictions and the federal definition at 

the time he committed his federal offense, the district court properly applied the

ACCA enhancement.

 

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Background

On May 2, 2018, a Dewey County Sheriff’s Deputy initiated a traffic stop of 

Mr. Williams’ car after observing two traffic violations. 2 R. 9. Mr. Williams 

appeared under the influence, and an inventory search of the car revealed a loaded 

Glock 27 pistol and a loaded Glock magazine. Id. 

On August 18, 2020, Mr. Williams was indicted for being a felon in possession 

of a firearm on or about May 3, 2018. 1 R. 11–12. On November 4, 2021, Mr. 

Williams pled guilty to the indictment and acknowledged he potentially faced a 

minimum 15-year sentence pursuant to the ACCA. Id. 53–65.1

 

The presentence investigation report (PSR) classified Mr. Williams as an 

armed career criminal and thus subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e). To trigger the ACCA’s application, the PSR identified three prior Arkansas 

convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense: (1) a 2001 conviction for 

delivery of marijuana; (2) a 2003 conviction for residential burglary; and (3) a 2003 

conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. 2 R. 10, 13–15. The 

enhancement increased the statutory range on his § 922(g) conviction from 0–10 

years’ imprisonment to 15 years to life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 

As for the Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR calculated Mr. Williams’ initial 

base offense level as 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2k2.1(a)(4)(A). The ACCA designation 

1 Mr. Williams initially pled guilty on January 28, 2021, but withdrew his plea 

upon learning he was subject to the ACCA enhancement. He nonetheless reentered a 

guilty plea later. 

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increased the offense level to 33 under § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B). Three levels were then 

subtracted for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a)–(b). At an offense level 

of 30 with a criminal history category of IV, the guidelines range was 135 to 168 

months’ imprisonment. However, the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum 

increased the guidelines range to 180 months’ imprisonment.

Mr. Williams objected to the ACCA designation arguing the 2001 and 2003 

Arkansas drug convictions do not qualify as “serious drug offenses” and thus cannot 

serve as valid predicate offenses under the ACCA. He argued they do not qualify 

because the Arkansas drug schedule in effect at the time of his state convictions is 

categorically overbroad in that it criminalized more substances than did the federal 

Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in effect at the time of his federal sentencing in 

2022. Specifically, Arkansas included hemp in its definition of marijuana at the time 

of Mr. Williams’ state convictions, see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-101 (2001), id.

(2002), while the federal CSA has exempted hemp from its definition of marijuana 

since December 20, 2018. See Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 

115-334, § 12619, 132 Stat. 4490, 5018; 18 U.S.C. § 802(16) (“The term ‘marihuana’ 

does not include . . . hemp.”). Without the ACCA designation, Mr. Williams total 

offense level would be 17 with a Guidelines range of 37–46 months’ imprisonment. 

2 R. 33. 

The district court overruled the objection. Relying on United States v. 

Traywicks, 827 F. App’x 889 (10th Cir. 2020), the district court found that since 

there was a categorical match between the federal and state drug schedules at the 

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time of the prior state convictions, the convictions qualify as predicate offenses under

the ACCA. 3 R. 68–69. Thus, on January 25, 2022, the district court sentenced Mr. 

Williams to 180 months’ imprisonment. Id. 89.

Discussion

As noted, Mr. Williams argues that the ACCA enhancement is improper 

because his two prior Arkansas drug convictions are categorically broader than the 

ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” in effect at the time of his federal 

sentencing. After Mr. Williams was sentenced, this court held that “a defendant’s 

prior state conviction is not categorically a ‘serious drug offense’ under the ACCA if 

the prior offense included substances not federally controlled at the time of the 

instant federal offense.” Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1138. However, we left open 

“whether the district court looks to the federal definition at the time of the 

commission of the instant federal offense or at the time of sentencing thereon.” Id. at 

1133 n.3. It was unnecessary to decide that issue because the federal definition of 

marijuana excluded hemp at both times. Id. 

That is not the case here. Both parties agree that the application of the ACCA 

enhancement turns on whether the Arkansas offense is overbroad. Here, there is a 

categorical match under the time of federal offense comparison such that application 

of the ACCA is proper, as both the Arkansas state drug schedules in effect in 2001 

and 2003 and the federal drug schedules in effect on May 3, 2018 when Mr. Williams 

committed his federal offense, included hemp. See Aplt. Br. at 14; Aplee. Br. at 16. 

There is a categorical mismatch under the time of federal sentencing comparison, as 

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the federal drug schedules excluded hemp pursuant to the 2018 Farm Bill at the time 

of Mr. Williams’ sentencing on January 25, 2022.

The two parties disagree only on which version of the federal drug schedules

we must look to in determining categorical overbreadth. The government urges we 

look at the federal drug schedules in effect when Mr. Williams committed his 

underlying federal offense. Mr. Williams contends we must look at the federal drug 

schedules in effect when he was sentenced. 

A. The ACCA

The ACCA imposes a sentence enhancement for being a felon in possession of 

a firearm for any person who has “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony 

or a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Relevant here, the statutory 

definition of “serious drug offense” includes “an offense under State law, involving 

manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a 

controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the [CSA] (21 U.S.C. 802)), for 

which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 

924(e)(2)(A)(ii). In turn, 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) states a “controlled substance” is “a 

drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or 

V of part B of this subchapter [21 U.S.C §§ 811–14].” We now must determine 

whether Mr. Williams’ prior state drug convictions qualify as serious drug offenses. 

B. Whether Mr. Williams was properly subjected to an enhanced sentence 

under the ACCA

We review de novo whether a prior state conviction qualifies as an ACCA 

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predicate offense. Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1137. To determine whether a 

prior state drug conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense, we employ the 

categorical approach. See United States v. Cantu, 964 F.3d 924, 926–27 (10th Cir. 

2020). “Under the categorical approach, a state drug offense that includes nonfederally controlled substances is overbroad and thus not categorically a ‘serious 

drug offense.’” Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1137. 

1. In employing the categorical approach, circuit courts have employed different 

approaches to resolve the embedded timing issue 

 

In employing the categorical approach, the circuits have taken a variety of 

approaches regarding which version of drug schedules apply. Only one other circuit 

has addressed the precise issue presented here. Instead, the circuit debates have 

largely concerned whether a court should compare state and federal law as it existed 

at the time of the prior state conviction (time of prior state conviction comparison) or 

compare past state law with some version of current federal law. 

As noted, this court adopted the time of federal offense comparison, albeit 

leaving open the specific issue we must answer. Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1133

& n.3. We relied in part on holdings of the First and Ninth Circuits that courts must 

look to the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of federal sentencing to 

determine whether a prior conviction is a “controlled substance offense” within the 

meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Abdulaziz, 998 F.3d 

519, 531 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Bautista, 989 F.3d 698, 703 (9th Cir. 2021). 

Those cases of course addressed this timing question in the context of the Guidelines 

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and not the ACCA — an important distinction. Such a distinction is important as 

those circuits found the term “controlled substance” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) to be 

limited to substances listed in the federal CSA, Bautista, 989 F.3d at 702; Abdulaziz, 

998 F.3d at 529, whereas this court has found that the meaning of “controlled 

substance” in the Guidelines is not so limited. United States v. Jones, 15 F.4th 1288, 

1294 (10th Cir. 2021). Moreover, those cases were deciding whether to employ a 

time of federal sentencing or time of prior state conviction comparison. A time of 

federal offense comparison was never considered. 

In the ACCA context, the Fourth Circuit held courts must compare federal law 

in effect at the time of federal sentencing with the state law in effect at the time of 

state sentencing for the prior convictions. See United States v. Hope, 28 F.4th 487, 

504–05 (4th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Fourth Circuit adopted the time of federal 

sentencing comparison. The court based its decision on the fact that “the Sentencing 

Guidelines require that a district court use the manual that is ‘in effect on the date 

that the defendant is sentenced . . . .’” Id. at 505 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11). While 

it appears adopting the time of federal sentencing comparison as opposed to the time 

of federal offense comparison would have been outcome determinative (like Mr. 

Williams, the defendant in Hope committed his crime prior to the 2018 Farm Bill but 

was sentenced afterward, and argued overbreadth based on the 2018 Farm Bill’s 

exclusion of hemp) the Fourth Circuit also presented its resolution as a dispute 

between whether to employ the time of federal sentencing comparison or time of 

prior state conviction comparison. Id. at 492–93, 504–05. 

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Next, the Eighth Circuit held that under the ACCA, “the categorical approach 

requires comparison of the state drug schedule at the time of the prior state offense to 

the federal schedule at the time of the federal offense.” United States v. Perez, 46 

F.4th 691, 700 (8th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Eighth Circuit adopted the time of federal 

offense comparison. However, it appears the court was not required to decide 

whether to consult federal law at the time of the federal offense or federal 

sentencing.2

 Instead, it was confronted with whether to use the federal definition at 

the time of the prior state conviction or a more current definition. Id. at 699–700. 

The court in Perez rooted its decision in due process and fair notice considerations

stating that consulting the federal drug schedule in force at the time of the federal 

offense ensures that a defendant has notice of whether his prior convictions could 

affect the penalty he faces for the underlying federal offense. Id. Interestingly, Perez

employed a different comparative approach under the Guidelines, holding that 

“whether a prior state conviction is a controlled substance offense for Guidelines 

purposes is based on the law at the time of conviction, without reference to current 

2 This understanding of Perez is reinforced by some imprecise language in the 

court’s holding. After deciding the relevant timeframe is the “time of the federal 

offense,” the Eighth Circuit went on to state that “[w]hether a previous state 

conviction is a serious drug offense only becomes salient at the time of sentencing . . 

. . Therefore, the federal law in effect at the time of the federal sentencing is the 

relevant definition for ACCA purposes.” Id. While Perez sends mixed signals 

concerning the timing issue, it unequivocally applied the relevant drug definition at 

the time of the federal offense—2019—even though the defendant was sentenced in 

2021, and thus employed the time of federal offense comparison. Id. at 696–97, 699–

700.

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state law.”3

 Id. at 703 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit like our circuit has 

found that the term “controlled substance,” is not limited to those substances listed in 

the federal CSA. Id. at 702. 

Next, the Third Circuit explicitly parted ways with the Fourth Circuit’s 

decision in Hope and held “that courts must look to the federal law in effect when the 

defendant committed the federal offense.” United States v. Brown, 47 F.4th 147, 153 

(3d Cir. 2022). Most importantly, the Third Circuit appears to be the only circuit 

presented with the precise issue this court faces — whether to adopt the time of 

federal offense comparison or the time of federal sentencing comparison. Cf. Hope, 

28 F.4th at 504–05 (discussing why it employed a time of federal sentencing 

comparison as opposed to a time of prior state conviction comparison). 

The Third Circuit’s decision to adopt the federal offense approach was guided 

in part by the federal saving statute, which provides that the “repeal of any statute 

shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability 

incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide.” 1 

U.S.C. § 109. Under the saving statute, “penalties are ‘incurred’ under the older 

statute when an offender becomes subject to them, i.e., commits the underlying 

3 On the same day that Perez was issued, the Sixth Circuit, in the context of the 

Guidelines’ career offender enhancement — U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) — and to determine 

the meaning of “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 adopted a 

time of prior state conviction comparison and held courts must consult “the drug 

schedules in place at the time of the prior conviction” not the drug schedules in place 

at the time of instant federal sentencing. United States v. Clark, 46 F.4th 404, 408 

(6th Cir. 2022). 

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conduct that makes the offender liable.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 272 

(2012). The Third Circuit determined that the 2018 Farm Bill effected a repeal 

within the meaning of the saving statute given that it changed the definition of 

marijuana and thereby indirectly affected federal penalties associated with prior 

serious drug offenses. Brown, 47 F.4th at 151. Moreover, since the defendant 

committed the offense prior to the effective date of the 2018 Farm Bill, the defendant 

incurred his penalties at that time, when there was still a categorical match for 

purposes of the ACCA. Id. at 151–52. Lastly, the court determined the 2018 Farm 

Bill did not make the new definition of marijuana retroactive and therefore did not 

disturb application of the federal saving statute. Id. at 152–53. 

The Third Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey, 

which addressed a similar timing issue. 567 U.S. 260. In Dorsey, the Court 

considered whether lighter sentencing penalties for crack cocaine introduced by the 

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 should apply to offenders who committed their offense

prior to the Act’s passage. 567 U.S. at 264. There, the Court found pre-Act 

offenders were entitled to the lesser penalties because the Act incorporated a 

background sentencing principle embodied in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

that courts apply the Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing. Id. at 275. In 

contrast, the Third Circuit found that nothing in the 2018 Farm Bill implies 

retroactive application of newer versions of the federal drug schedule nor does it 

direct courts to look to the background sentencing principle embodied in the 

Sentencing Reform Act. Brown, 47 F.4th at 152. 

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Additionally, in reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit noted that applying 

the time of federal offense comparison best comports with fair notice principles as it 

allows a defendant to know whether his prior convictions constitute serious drug 

offenses when he commits the underlying federal offense. Id. at 153. Moreover, it 

reasoned that applying federal law at the time of federal sentencing would lead to 

significant and arbitrary sentencing disparities. Id. While the court acknowledged 

all line-drawing creates some degree of arbitrariness, it concluded that any resulting 

disparity ought to be rooted in a defendant’s voluntary conduct, as opposed to when 

that defendant is sentenced, which can be affected by countless considerations

beyond the defendant’s control.4

 Id. Thus, the defendant in Brown was properly 

subjected to the ACCA’s enhanced penalties because there was a categorical match 

between the federal and state definition of marijuana at the time he committed his 

federal offense even though there was a subsequent mismatch caused by the 2018 

Farm Bill when he was sentenced. Id. at 150–53.

Lastly, we note that the Eleventh Circuit initially adopted the time of federal 

offense comparison as well. See United States v. Jackson, 36 F.4th 1294, 1297 (11th 

Cir. 2022) superseded, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022). Much like Perez and Brown, 

its decision was grounded in the fact “that due-process fair-notice considerations 

4 The Third Circuit offered the hypothetical of two defendants violating the 

same law on the same date in 2016 in identical fashion with identical prior 

convictions. Id. at 153. However, if one pleaded earlier and was sentenced in 2017, 

that defendant would be subject to the ACCA whereas the defendant who was 

sentenced after the 2018 Farm Bill would receive a lighter sentence. Id. 

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require us” to adopt the time of federal offense comparison. Id. However, the 

Eleventh Circuit reversed course and adopted the time of prior state conviction 

comparison holding that approach was required by the Supreme Court’s decision in 

McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011). See Jackson, 55 F.4th at 855. Thus, 

in employing the categorical approach the court compared the state drug schedules to 

the federal drug schedules as they existed at the time of the prior state conviction. Id.

at 856. It is worth noting that this court explicitly rejected the contention that 

McNeill controls which version of federal law courts must consult because McNeill

“was discussing a subsequent change in the prior offense of conviction—and not the 

federal definition to which it is compared.” Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1142–43. 

For those keeping count, in the ACCA context that makes two circuits 

adopting the time of federal offense comparison, see Brown, 47 F.4th at 153; Perez, 

46 F.4th at 700; one circuit adopting the time of federal sentencing comparison, see

Hope, 28 F.4th at 504–05; and one circuit adopting time of prior state conviction 

comparison—after originally adopting the time of federal offense comparison, see

Jackson, 55 F.4th at 855. As for determining whether prior convictions can serve as 

predicate “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.2, every circuit that limits the definition of “controlled substance” to the 

federal definition as embodied in the CSA has adopted the time of federal sentencing 

comparison. See Abdulaziz, 998 F.3d at 531; Bautista, 989 F.3d at 703. By contrast, 

in circuits that do not define “controlled substance” by reference to the CSA, every 

circuit to reach the timing question has held that a court only consults the law at the 

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time of the prior state conviction, not current federal or state law. See Clark, 46 

F.4th at 408; Perez, 46 F.4th at 703. Though the cases on the timing issue are not 

entirely uniform, we think that the correct approach is to employ the time of federal 

offense comparison.

2. The parties’ contentions 

Mr. Williams argues the time of federal sentencing comparison is correct 

because the “text, history, and purpose of the ACCA all point toward comparing the 

state drug schedules at the time of state conviction to current CSA drug schedules.” 

Aplt. Br. at 15. Mr. Williams contends that because the text reflects an 

understanding that the drug schedules may change, one must apply current federal 

law as opposed to older versions. Id. at 17. For support, he points out that the term 

“controlled substance” is defined as “a drug or other substance, or immediate 

precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter.” Id. at 

15 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 802(6)). In turn, Part B of the relevant subchapter states that 

in addition to these initial five schedules, “[t]he schedules established by this section 

shall be updated and republished on a semiannual basis.” Id. at 15–16 (citing 21 

U.S.C. § 812(a)). Moreover, Mr. Williams argues that Congress was aware of the 

background principle that we apply the sentencing laws in place on the date of 

sentencing when crafting § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Id. at 18 (citing Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 

275). 

In addition, he urges this court to follow the Fourth Circuit’s lead in Hope. As 

discussed, Hope relied on the fact that the Guidelines require courts to use the 

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manual in effect on the date of sentencing.5

 Lastly, to the extent there is ambiguity, 

Mr. Williams urges this court to apply the rule of lenity and decide the timing issue 

in his favor. Aplt. Br. at 22–23. 

In response, the government argues that the federal saving statute resolves the 

question in its favor. Aplee. Br. at 13–17. It argues Mr. Williams incurred his 

ACCA penalty on the date he committed his offense. See Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 272. 

Moreover, just as the Third Circuit found, it argues the 2018 Farm Bill constitutes a 

repeal within the meaning of the saving statute as it excluded hemp from the 

definition of marijuana and thereby indirectly affected federal penalties for marijuana 

convictions. See id. (discussing that a repeal occurs when a new statute decreases the 

penalties under the older statute). Moreover, it argues, as the Third Circuit found, the 

2018 Farm Bill did not express an intent to apply retroactively6 and, as such, Mr. 

Williams properly incurred the enhanced ACCA penalties because he committed his 

underlying offense while hemp was still included in the federal definition of 

marijuana.

Mr. Williams counters that reliance on the federal saving statute is inapposite. 

Aplt. Reply Br. at 2–6. According to Mr. Williams, the relevant sentencing statute is 

5 In fact, Hope directly quoted Bautista, a Guidelines case, which stated “it 

would be illogical to conclude that federal sentencing law attaches ‘culpability and 

dangerousness’ to an act that, at the time of sentencing, Congress has concluded is 

not culpable and dangerous. Hope, 28 F.4th at 505 (quoting Bautista, 989 F.3d at 

703) (emphasis in original). According to the Fourth Circuit, such a view would 

nullify Congress’ ability to revise the criminal code. Id. 6 Mr. Williams concedes the bill’s new definition of marijuana is not 

retroactive. Aplt. Reply Br. at 3. 

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18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and that statute has not been changed by any act of Congress. 

Moreover, the 2018 Farm Bill did not repeal penalties for marijuana convictions but 

merely modified the definition of marijuana to exclude hemp. Thus, the saving 

statute is simply not in play here and it cannot tell us which federal drug schedule to 

consult in conducting our categorical analysis. Id. at 3. Instead, according to Mr. 

Williams and as the Fourth Circuit found in Hope, background sentencing principles, 

utilized in Guidelines cases, require us to consult the federal drug schedule in effect 

at the date of sentencing.

3. Analysis 

Mr. Williams’ first contention — that the “text, history, and purposes of the 

ACCA” dictates that we adopt time of federal sentencing comparison — is 

unavailing. To be sure, the ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” does 

reference a schedule that is subject to change. However, that simply does not address 

which version of that changing drug schedule a court must consult in conducting its 

categorical analysis. He provides no other textual, historical, or purpose-based 

arguments. 

In addition, Mr. Williams’ reliance on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hope is 

unpersuasive. Hope relied on Guidelines cases such as Bautista7 and the Guidelines 

directive that courts use the manual in effect on the date of sentencing, neither of 

7 Indeed Hope mistakenly asserts that Bautista concerned a similar timing 

issue in the ACCA context. Id. at 505 n.15. The case did not concern the ACCA but 

rather whether a prior conviction was for a “controlled substance offense” under 

§ 4B1.2(b) of the Guidelines. Bautista, 989 F.3d at 701. 

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which applies here. 28 F.4th at 505. As the Third Circuit rightly pointed out, this is 

not a Guidelines case, but rather a case involving the ACCA, which omits a similar 

directive requiring courts to use the law in effect at the time of sentencing. Brown, 

47 F.4th at 153–54. Accordingly, Mr. Williams’ argument concerning background 

sentencing principles embodied in the Guidelines does not overcome the due process 

and fair notice considerations that ultimately carry the day as discussed below. To be 

sure, the cases that have employed the time of federal sentencing comparison for 

purposes of the Guidelines could be persuasive and favor Mr. Williams’ position. 

However, Bautista and Abdulaziz are distinctly unpersuasive given that unlike the 

Tenth Circuit, the First and Ninth Circuits limit the term “controlled substance” in 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) to substances listed in the federal CSA, Bautista, 989 F.3d at 

702; Abdulaziz, 998 F.3d at 529. As for the circuits that have reached this issue but 

do not so limit the term “controlled substance” like the Tenth Circuit does, see Jones, 

15 F.4th at 1294, they have employed a time of prior state conviction comparison. 

See Clark, 46 F.4th at 408; Perez, 46 F.4th at 703. In total, looking to these out-ofcircuit cases discussing the timing issue under the Guidelines provides little 

meaningful guidance. Thus, we decline to follow Hope, which expressly relied on 

those cases. 

In rejecting Mr. Williams’ argument, we instead adopt the time of federal 

offense comparison as due process and fair notice considerations mandate such an 

approach. It is vital that when a defendant commits a federal offense, that defendant 

is aware of the penalties he faces and the nature of his prior convictions should he 

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have any. See United States v. Johnson, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). Leaving a 

defendant in limbo until he is sentenced violates this notice requirement. As Judge 

Hartz noted, applying the federal schedules in effect at the time of the federal offense 

best comports with fundamental notions of due process. See Cantu, 964 F.3d at 936–

37 (Hartz, J., concurring). This court in Gregory Williams embraced this rationale 

when it chose the time of federal offense as the appropriate reference point. See 48 

F.4th at 1142. So too did the Third and Eighth Circuits. See Brown, 47 F.4th at 153 

(“[T]his rule gives a defendant notice not only that his conduct violated federal law, 

but also of his potential minimum and maximum penalty for his violation and 

whether his prior felony convictions could affect those penalties.” (internal quotation 

omitted)); Perez, 46 F.4th at 699. 

In addition, this approach minimizes potential disparities in sentencing. Under 

Mr. Williams’ desired approach, two individuals who violate § 922(g) in identical 

respects with identical prior convictions could receive different sentences simply 

because they might be sentenced at different times. See Brown, 47 F.4th at 153. 

Sentencing dates are affected by a variety of factors including plea negotiations, 

health concerns, and court schedules. In fact, several years may pass between the 

commission of an offense and sentencing. See e.g., United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 

930, 933–34 (10th Cir. 2012) (indicating over six years passed between the 

defendant’s commission of his offenses and sentencing thereon).

In light of this troubling potential for disparity, the Third Circuit reasoned, 

“[i]f penalties are to differ because of an arbitrarily selected date, it seems fairer that 

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the severity of the penalty depend upon the voluntary act of a defendant in choosing 

the date of his criminal conduct than upon the date of sentencing.” Brown, 47 F.4th 

at 153 (quoting United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 2010)). Of 

course, we recognize disparities could result from the time of federal offense 

comparison. However, the approach we adopt makes those disparities less arbitrary 

as it ties them to a defendant’s voluntary act. Moreover, it avoids another 

problematic aspect inherent in the time of federal sentencing comparison. That 

approach could incentivize delay (in hopes of a change in the law creating or 

eliminating a categorical mismatch) to the defendant’s or government’s advantage.

As for the government’s federal saving statute argument and Mr. Williams’ 

dispute of its applicability, we note that Congress did not change the ACCA — the 

underlying sentencing statute at issue here. Moreover, the 2018 Farm Bill simply 

excluded hemp from its definition of a controlled substance, it did not repeal 

penalties for marijuana convictions. What it did do is de-criminalize hemp. The 

government argues the 2018 Farm Bill set off a chain of events that indirectly 

affected penalties under the ACCA and as such implicated a statutory change of the 

ACCA. Given the more direct approach of our disposition, we need not resolve this 

contention. 

Lastly, the rule of lenity does not rescue Mr. Williams’ argument. “[T]he rule 

of lenity applies when a court employs all of the traditional tools of statutory 

interpretation and, after doing so, concludes that the statute still remains grievously 

ambiguous, meaning that the court can make no more than a guess as to what the 

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statute means.” Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 789 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., 

concurring). First, we are not in a position where we must merely guess which is the 

correct approach. Instead, we exhaust our tools of statutory interpretation by looking 

to our own circuit decisions in Cantu and Gregory Williams. In addition, the basis of 

our decision is rooted in due process and avoiding arbitrary sentencing discrepancies. 

Second, not a single circuit court when confronted with these timing issues has 

resorted to the rule of lenity. While that does not prevent us from becoming the first 

circuit to do so, it demonstrates that our normal tools of interpretation are sufficient, 

and that the statute is not so “grievously ambiguous.” Also, not employing it here

comports with the Court’s admonition that “the rule of lenity rarely comes into play.” 

Shular, 140 S. Ct. at 788.

Because there was a categorical match between Arkansas’ definition of 

marijuana at the time of Mr. Williams’ two prior drug convictions and the federal 

definition at the time he committed the underlying 922(g) offense, the district court 

properly applied the ACCA’s enhanced penalties.

AFFIRMED. 

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