The Honor able Samuel H. Ma y s, J r., United S tates Dist rict J udg e for the Western District * of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0499n.06 No. 09-5399 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , Plaintif f-Appellee , v. DOUG LAS WHIS NANT Defendant-

Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COLE an d MCK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; MAYS, Distr ict Judge. * Cole, Circ uit Jud ge . Def endant- Appellant Doug las W h i s n ant cha lleng es his convictions and 300-month sentenc e for being a felon in possession of fire arms and a mmuniti on, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1), a

nd possession of an unre g istered mac hine g un, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d). We AF F IRM

. I. BACKG ROUND I n Fe bruar

y 2 0 0 7 , J ean Johnson, W hisnant’s forme r spouse, disappe are d, and the investi g ation of her

disappea ranc e immediately

focuse d on Whis nant bec ause of their tumultuous

re la tions hi p. As pa

rt of the inv e sti g a tio n, law e nf or c e me nt a

pp lie d f or and re c e ive d a

wa rr a nt t o

sear ch his proper

ty . The wa

rra nt, issued by a Tennessee state cour t judge on Marc h 9, 2007,No. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 2 - au th o r iz e d

a s e ar c h o f

“ th e e n ti r e p r e mi s e s , w o o d s , f ie ld s , c u r ti la g e , th e r e s id e n c e an d a ll o ut buildings and a ll vehicles and e quipment” for “the body of

. . . J ean J ohnson

. . . or portions thereof ; human b loo d; t

he purs e and

pe rs on a l e ff

e c ts o f Je an Joh ns on ; F or d v an ke y s; a pin k su itc a se ; a sma ll

secur ity came ra a nd video ca ssette tape; a

.38 caliber

Smit h an d Wesson pist ol . . . bombs, gun po wd e r, e xplos ive s, and

g un c omp on e nts .” (D ist

ri c t Co ur t Re c or d ( “ R.” ) 1 6, Re sp . to Mo t. t o Suppress, Ex. E: Searc h Warrant.) Of fi c e rs fr om s e ve ra l di ff

e re nt a g e nc ie s e xec ute d th e se arc h w arr ant, div idi ng int o te a ms t o

sear ch the pr operty . Captain Tommy Ray J eff ers of the Scott Co u n ty

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment was assig ned to sea

rch the residenc e. On the porc h, he noticed c onstruction materia ls and plasterboa rd used for dry wa l l ing. O nce inside, he enter ed a r oom with a picture ha ng ing ove r a f

ireplac e and noticed that the f

ireplac e utensils wer e cove red in a white powder that rese mbled dry wall dust. H e also n o ti c e d

th a t t h e p a in t s u r

r o u n d in g th e p ic tu

r e a p p e ar e d to h a v e b e e nr e c e n tl y

to u c h e d -up. Realizing that the picture may have be en hungin an ef

fort to conc eal e vidence , J eff ers, joined by oth e r of fi c e rs , re mov e d it. Th e of

fi c e rs the n c ou ld se e that the wa ll re c e ntl y ha d be e n patc he d. Ne xt, the of fi c e rs c ut a

sma ll h ole in t

he patc h thro ug h w hic h Jef fe rs c ou ld s e e wh a t a

pp e are d to be ro lls of cloth. The office rs then enlar g ed the opening and discove red that the cloth actua lly was numer ous g un ba g s. Be cause of Whis nant’s history of bomb-making , the office rs wer e conce rned t h at t h e a rea inside the wall mig ht be rig g ed with explos ives. They there fore asked members of the bomb-squad unit to remove the items. As member s of the unit remove d the items from the wa ll, they discovere d firea rms, ammunition, and bomb-making materia ls. I n ad d i t i o n to severa l rifles, shotg uns, andNo. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 3 - pistols, a St en mac hine g un an d t wo p en guns we re f ound. Also, a sea

rch of a wor kshop on Whis nant’s prope rty

uncover ed compone nts of a Sten machine g un. L ess than two we eks later , on Marc h 21, 2007, a g rand jury indicted Whisnant on one count of beinga f

el o n i n p o s s ession of fire arms and a mmuniti on, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)( 1). Whis nant filed a

motion to s uppress the f

irea rms and ammunition found behind the wa ll of his home. During the suppressi o nh ea ri n g, t h e m agi s t ra t e j u d ge h ea rdt es t i m o n y fr o m s ev er al o ffice rs, including Detec tive Donnie Ander son, who was prese nt dur ing the sear ch. After the district c ourt denied the motion to s uppress, it came to light that Ander son had eng ag ed in pr ofessional misconduct unr elated to this case. Consequently , the mag istrate judge conducte d a second hear ing without testim ony from Ander son. During the s econd he aring , J eff ers testified a

nd explained the manner

in which the sea

rch

was e x ecute d and desc ribed the c ircumstance s leading to the decision to cut a hole in the wall. The mag istrate judg e conc luded that the “of fice rs re asonably

made a cce ss into the wall” to sea rch f or the ite ms l ist e d in

the “ br oa dly

wo rd e d s e arc h w arr ant, ” and re c omm e nd e d d e nyingthe mot ion to suppress. (R. 41, Report a nd Recommendation, 7.) The district court ag ree d and denied the motion. On July 16 , 2 00 8, a

g ra nd jur y re tur ne d a su pe rs e din g ind ic tme nt char gin g Whis na nt w ith kn ow ing ly

po sse ssi ngan unr e g ist e re d ma c hin e g un , in v iol a tio n o f 2 6 U .S. C. § § 5 84 1, 58 61 (d ), in addition to the previous fe lon-in-possession char g e. The c ase a g ainst Whi snant proce eded to tria l. A number of la w e n f orce ment office rs testified as to the items uncover ed duringthe sea rch of Whis n an t ’s residence. Ag ent For est Webb of the Bur eau of

Alcohol, Tobac co, and F irea rms (“A T F” ) t es tified that he wa s part of the team that executed the se arc h and had disc overe d components of a S ten m achine g un. Ag ent S ean K napp, aNo. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 4 - firea rms specia list with the ATF, then ex plained to the j ury that both a S ten gun and components of a Sten g un qualify

as a ma ch i n e g un and must be re g istered unde r fe dera l law. Knapp f urther explained that, for purpose s of fe dera l law, Whisnant possessed three machine guns: “the func tional machine gun, t he cut out re ceive r, and c ombination of parts fr om which a mac hine g un could be

a sse mbl e d. ” (R . 8 6, Tr ia l T r. , 4 5- 46 .) Th e Go ve rnme nt a lso int ro du c e d e vid e nc e un de r F e de ra l Ru le of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) that Whis na nt pr e vio us ly ha d be e n c on vic te d in state c ourt fo r i lle g a lly possessing a

Sten machine gun. Finally , a fing erpr int ex aminer te stified that a fing erpr int belonging to Whi snant was f

ound on the seized fully -asse mbled Sten gun. Be fore resting , the Gover nment read a number of stipulations int o the re cord: (1) the

commerc ially

manufa cture d firea

rms found on Whis nant’s proper ty wer e manuf

actur ed outside the State of Tenne ssee; (2) Whis nant was a convicted f

elon; and (3) none of the firea rms found on Whis na nt’ s p ro pe rt

y we re re g ist e re d. Whisnant of fe re d n o w itn e sse s and

wa s c on vic te d o n b oth

c ounts
. The United States Probation Office then pre pare d a Prese ntence I nvestig ation Report (“PSR”). The PSR determined that Whisna n t wa s an Armed Car eer Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 4 (e) (2), a

nd calc ulated an of

fense level of 34. The PSRplace d Whis nant in criminal history cate g ory I V, a n d , b as ed on that categ ory and the of

fense level of 34, se t Whi snant’s advisory g uid e lin e s r ang e a t 26 2 to 32 7 mo nth s o f i mpr iso nme nt. Whis na nt d id n ot o bje c t to the PSR. On Marc h 11, 2009, the district court he ld a s entenc ing hear ing. After consideringthe fa ctors listed in 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a) and the Gu i d el i n es rang e, the district cour t sentence d Whis nant to a within-Guidelines sentenc e of 300 months. The district cour t did so in part beca

use Whisnant hasNo. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 5 - an e xten siv e c ri min a l hi sto ry , w a s o n p ro batio n at th e tim e of the of fe ns e , an d sinc e ha s p le d g uil ty to his former spouse’ s murder. Whis nant timely

appea led. II. AN AL YSI S On ap p ea l, Whi snant argues that: (1) la w enf orce ment violated his Fourth Ame ndment rig hts; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) is unc onstitut ional under the Second Amendme nt; (3) insufficie nt evidenc e supported his c onvictions; and (4) the district c ourt should h av e gi v en him a belowGuidelines sentenc e. A. F our th Am e ndm e nt c lai m Whis nant arg ues t hat l aw enforc ement viol ated his Four th Amendment rights. I n particula r, he a sse rt s th a t by c utt ing ho le s in the int e ri or wa lls of his ho us e , la w e nf or c e me nt s e ize d th e wa lls and thus exceede d the scope of the sea rch w arr ant. “When re viewing a district cour t’s decision on

a m o t i o n t o s u p p ress, we use a mixed standard of r eview: we revie w the finding s of fa ct for c lear

err or and c onclusions of law de novo.” U n ite d States v. See , 574 F.3d 309, 313 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Whether a seizure is rea sonable unde r the F ourth Amendment is a question of l aw and thus is revie wed de novo. United States v. Ev ans , 5 81 F .3 d 3 33 , 3 40 (6 th Cir. 2009). I n addition, when the district court has denied a motion to suppress, we “re view[] the evidenc e in the lig ht most likely to suppor t the district c ourt’s dec ision.” United States v. Adams , 583 F.3d 457, 463 ( 6th C i r. 2 009) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). He re, the district court conclude d that the sea

rch w as re asonable , and we ag ree .No. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 6 - Th e Sup re me Court

ha s h e ld t

hat “ [a] lawf

ul se arc h of

fi xed pr e mis e s g e ne ra lly

e xten ds to the e nti re are a

in w hic h the ob

je c t of the se arc h may be fo un d an d is not li mit e d b y the po ssi bil ity that separ ate a cts of entr

y or openingmay

be re quired to complete the sea rch.” Un ite d S

tat es v . R os s , 456 U.S. 798, 820- 21 (1982). To illustrate, the Court offer ed the f ollowing e x ample: “[A] warra nt that author i z es an officer to searc h a home f

or illeg al wea

pons also provides author ity to open closets, che sts, drawe rs , an d co ntainers in which the wea pon might be f

ound.” Id. at 821. Admittedly , the interior of a wa ll does not fit precisely th e def inition of a container . Fur ther, pa rt of W h i s nant’s prope rty

—his wall—was dama g ed. B ut the Supreme Court has e x plained:

“ [O]f fi c e rs e xec uti ng se arc h warr ants on oc c a sio n must dama g e pr op e rt y in o rd e r t o p e rf

or m th e ir duty .” Dalia v. United States , 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979). More over, like othe r F ourth Amendment inq uir ie s, “ the mann e r in wh ic h a wa rr ant is e xec ute d” —in c lud ing the dama g e of pro pe rt y —“ is subject to later judicia l reviewas to its reasona bleness.” Id. ; se e als o United States v. Ramire z , 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (“The ge nera l touchstone of rea sonablene ss which gover ns Fourth Ame ndment analy sis gove rns the method of e x ecution of the war rant.” (interna l citation omitt ed))

. Severa l fac ts support the conclusion that t he officer s in this case acte d rea sonably

. First, the

war rant wa s worded br oadly , per m i t ting the of fice rs to sear ch “the entire pr emises.” Sec ond, the decision t o cut a hole i n the wall was based on t he pre sence of dry wall dust, the hapha zard paint job around the picture, a

nd the re cently

plastere d patch of

dry wall behind the picture. Third, the off icer s first cut a small hole in the wa ll, on l y cu t t i n g a l ar g er hole once it bec ame c lear that items were hidden behind the wall. Finally , the damage to Whis nant’s property was slig ht, and “[t] here is noNo. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 7 - indication that [t he off

icer s’] int rusion went beyond what wa s nece ssary .” Da lia , 441 U.S. at 258 n.20. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the e x ecut i o n o f the wa rra nt was re asonable

. Cf. United S ta te s v . Sloan , 17 F. App’ x 759, 761 (10th Cir. 2001) (findingthat office rs ac ted re asonably by dig g ing up de fe nd ant’ s y ard a ft e r the y dis c ov e re d mon e y pr otr ud ing fr om t

he so il) ; United States v. W e inbender , 1 09 F.3 d 1 32 7, 13 29 -30 (8t h C ir . 1 99 7) ( ho ld in g that law enfo rcem ent act ed re aso nably by re mov ingdr

y wa ll t o f ind c on tr a ba nd ); Un ite d Stat es v. G re

go ry , No. 90-30327, 1991 WL86885, at *2 (9th C ir. May 13, 1991) (finding that office rs acted re asonably by removing car

pet in sear ch of na rc oti c s) ; United States v. Be cke r , 929 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding t hat offic ers a cted

rea sonably

by using a jackha

mmer to se arc h beneath a

concr ete slab to find dr

ug -making materia ls). B. Se c ond A m e ndm e nt c lai m Next, Whis nant relies on District of Columbia v. Heller , 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), to ar g ue that the f ed er al s t atute prohibiting felons fr om possessing f irea rms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) , violates the Second A mendment. Whisnant mi srea ds the dec ision. I n Heller , the Supreme Court re cog nized an individual right to bear arms but also held that “ the rig ht secure d by the S econd Amendment i s not unlimi ted.” Heller , 128 S. Ct. at 2816. In particula r, the Court noted that “nothing in [ the] opini on s h ould be taken to c ast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire arms by felons.” Id. at 2816-17. Re lyingon

that la ngua g e fr om Heller , this Court has held that § 922(g )(1) comports with the Second Amendme nt, stating that “ proh i b i t i o n s on felon possession of fir ear ms do not viol ate the Second Amendm en t , ” a n d “C o n gre s s ’s p ro h i b i t i o no nfe l o np o s s es s i o no f f i re ar m s is constituti onal.”No. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 8 - United States v. Carey , 602 F.3d 738, 741 ( 6th Cir. 2010) (citi n g Un i t ed S tates v. Frazier , 3 14 F. Ap p’ x 801 , 8 07 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) ); se e als o United States v. Khami , 36 2 F . App ’x 50 1, 50 7- 08 (6 th Cir. 2010) (re

jecting Second Amendme nt challeng e to § 922(g )(1) ). W e ther efor e re ject Whisnant’s Se c on d A me ndme nt c la im. C. Suf

fi ciency of the evidence Whis nant also ar g ues that the Gover nment prese nted insufficient e vidence to convict him of either c harg e. When re viewing the suffic iency of the e vidence , we “ view[] the evidenc e in the lig ht most favor able to the prosecution,” a nd if “ any rational trier of fac t c ould ha ve found the essential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt,” we a ffirm. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 1. 18 U.S.C. § 922(

g) ( 1) I n order to s ec u re a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1), the G overnme nt must prove thr e e e le me n ts : ( 1 ) th a t t h e d e f e n d an t h a d

a p r e v io u s f

e lo n y c o n v ic ti o n ; ( 2 ) th a t t

h e d e f e n d ant possessed a f

irea rm; and (3) that the fire arm traveled in or a ffe cted inter state commer ce. Uni ted States v. Gardner , 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2007). At trial, the par ties stipulated to the first and third elements. Thus, the only disputed element was the sec ond—whether Whis nant possessed the fi re arm . The possession r equire ment of § 922(g )(1) can be satisfied by showing that the def endant ha d actua l or constructive possession of t he firear m. United States v. Kincaide , 1 45 F .3 d 7 71 , 7 82 (6 th Cir. 1 9 9 8 ). “C onstructive possession exist s when a person doe s not have a ctual possession but instead knowing ly

has the powe r and the intention at a g iven time to exercise dominion and controlNo. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 9 - over a n object, either

direc tly or throug h others.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omi tted). I n addition, pr oo f t hat th e de fe nd ant “ ha s d omi nio n o ve r the pr e mis e s w he re the fi re arm is l oc a te d” su ff

ic e s to establish constructive posse ssion. Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). The ev id e n c e a t t

r ia l w a s s u f

f ic ie n t t o p r o v e th a t W h is n an t h a d c o n s tr u c ti v e p o s s e s s io nof the se ize d fir e arm s and

a mmunit ion . Wh isn ant a dmi tte d to liv inga t th e a dd re ss w he re the ite ms

wer e found, a

nd other re cords c onfirm his addre ss. Moreover , he has of fer ed no evide nce that someone other

than him c ut a

hole in his wall; stuffed the hole w ith firear ms, ammuniti on, and g unmaking materia ls; patched the dr y wall; hung a p i ct u re o ver the patch; and pa inted the ar ea surrounding the picture

. 2. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861( d) Sufficient evide nce a lso supports W hisnant’s conviction for possession of an unreg istered machine gun. Sections 5841 and 5861(d) criminalize an individual’s possession of a machine g un that ha s n ot b e e n re g ist e re d with the Natio na l F ir e arm s Re g istra tio n a nd Tr ans fe r R e c or d. 26 U. S.C. §§ 58 41 , 5 86 1( d) ; Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994). F or purpose s of § 5861(d),

a ma c hin e g un

is d e fi ne d a s “ any

we a po n whi ch sh oo ts,
. . . o r c an b e re a dil y re sto re d to sh oo t, automatically

more than one shot, w ithout manua l reloading , by a sing le func tion of the trig g er. The term shall also include the fra me or re ceive r of a

ny such we ap o n . . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). To p ro v e a v iolation of § 5861(d), the G overnme nt must demonstrate not only that the def

endant possessed a ma chine gun but also that the defendant “knew of the features of his [ g un] t hat broug ht it within t he scope of the Ac t.” Staples , 511 U.S. at 619.No. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 10 - T h e p art i e s s t i p u l a t e d

t h a tW h i s n an th a d n o tr e g i s t e r e d an y o f t h e f i r e ar m s o nh i s p r o p e rt y. Thus, to establish a vi olation, the Government had to prove that: (1) Whisnant had possession of a firea rm; (2) that satisfies the statutory defi n i t i o n o f a machine g un; and (3) he was a war e of the op e ratio n a

nd fe a tur e s o f t

he g un that r e nd e r i t a

ma c hin e g un

un de r f e de ra l la w. As to the fi rs t element, a

fully -asse mbled Sten gun a nd components of a

Sten gun w ere found on Whisnant’s proper ty . I n addition, Whi snant’s fing erpr int was found on the f ully -asse mbled g un. Wit h reg ard to the sec ond element, AT F Ag ent Knapp te stified that the fully -asse mbled Sten gun f it the statutory definition beca

use it fired thre e five -round a utomatic bursts during a test-fire

. Moreove r, as Ag ent Knapp e x plained to the jury , the Sten g un components found on Whisnant’s proper ty also qualify

as a ma chine gun. Cf. United States v. Carter , 46 5 F.3d 658, 664 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (holding that

“ po sse ssi ng the fr ame or re c e ive r of a ma c hin e g un and pa rt s de sig ne d and int e nd e d for us e in

conver ting a wea pon into a machine gun” satisfie s t h e d ef i nition of machine gun for pur poses of indicting a

n individual under § 5861(d) ). To prove the final element—that W hisnant knew of the features of his fire arm that broug ht it withi n the Act—the Go v er n m ent offe red e vidence that Whis nant m an u fa ctured Sten guns a nd component par

ts and previously

had bee n convicted of possessing a

Sten gun, thus e stablishing the r equisite knowledg e. D. Se nt e nc ing Finally , Whis nant argues that the district cour t should have g iven him a below- Guidelines sentenc e. In his brief, Whisnant provides only two sentenc es to make this argument and off ers no le g a l su pp ort or ana ly sis . “ I ssu e s a dv e rt e d to in a pe rf un c tor y mann e r, un a c c omp anie d b y so me eff ort at deve loped ar g umentation, are deeme d waived.” El-Moussa v. H older , 569 F.3d 250, 257No. 09-5399

United States of America v . Douglas W hisnant

- 11 - (6t h Cir. 20 09 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) ; see also id. ( “ I ti s n o ts u f f i c i e n tf o r a p a rt y to mention a possible argument in [ a] skeletal way , leavingthe co u rt t o p u t fl esh on its bones.”) (a lte ration in ori gin a l) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) . T hu s, Whis na nt h a s w a ive d h is sentenc ing c halleng e. Mo re ov e r, e ve n if

Whis na nt’ s argume nt i s d e e me d n ot w a iv ed, othe r h ur dle s st y mie his

succe ss. First, he a

rg ues that the dist rict court should have de parte d from the Guide lines rang e, but we do “ not reviewdistrict court dec isions n o t to depar t downwar d” unless the c ourt did not understand its discretion to do so, Un ite d S tat es v . P uc k

e tt , 422 F.3d 340, 345 ( 6th Cir. 2005)—an

a rgu m e n t t h a t W h i s n an t h a s n o t m a d e . S e c o n d , h i s c l a i m s t i l l f a l l s s h o rt e v e n i f w e i n t e rp re t hi s

argume nt a s a

c ha lle ng e to t

he di st ric t c ourt ’s de c isi on no t to va

ry . T he dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y calc ulated the a dvisory

Guideline ra

ng e, to which Whisn ant did not object, and c onsidered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a ) fa ctors bef ore ha nding dow n the within-Guidelines sente nce. Whisnant has fa iled to rebut the pre sumption of reasona bleness that ap p l ies to such a se ntence , see United States v. Vonner , 5 16 F .3 d 3 82 , 3 89 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) (e n b anc ), and we e a sil y re je c t hi s c la im. III . C ON CL USI ON For all of these r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.