alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### James Donald RUSSIAN, Petitioner-Appellant v. Rodney W. CHANDLER, Respondent-Appellee

No. 16-10693 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 3, 2017

James Donald Russian, Pro Se

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

James Donald Russian, federal prisoner # 24285-031, was convicted in the District of Kansas on various weapons and narcotics charges, as well as of contempt of court, and was sentenced to 137 months of imprisonment. While his appeal from that judgment was pending in the Tenth Circuit, Russian filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his sentences. He also filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in the Northern District of Texas (the district court), where he is confined. In light of Russian’s pending Tenth Circuit appeal, the district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.1 Russian now appeals to this court.

Russian’s § 2241 petition does not challenge the conditions of his confinement but, rather, the legality of his underlying convictions and sentences; therefore, it is properly construed as a § • 2255 motion. *See Pack v. Yusuff,*218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000). However, because Russian was sentenced in the District of Kansas, the Northern District of Texas lacked jurisdiction to so construe it. *See*§ 2255(a); *Pack,*218 F.3d at 451; *Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard,*35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court thus properly disposed of Russian’s petition according to the law governing improperly filed § 2241 cases. On appeal, we review the dismissal of a § 2241 petition on jurisdictional grounds de novo. *Merlan v. Holder,*667 F.3d 538, 539 (5th Cir. 2011).

*247Russian does not challenge the district court’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction over his § 2241 petition. Although pro se briefs are to be liberally construed, even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them. *Yohey v. Collins,*985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Russian’s failure to address the basis of the district' court’s action “[i]n practical effect ... is the same as if he had not appealed that judgment.” *Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Moreover, Russian’s argument that as a purported subject of the sovereign Republic of Kansas, he is not subject to the criminal laws of the United States does not “involv[e] legal points arguable on their merits.” *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly) we dismiss the appeal as frivolous. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

1

. Following the filing of the notice of appeal in this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Russian's convictions, vacated his sentences in part, and remanded for resentencing. *United States v. Russian,*848 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2017).
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Miguel Agustin RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40928

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 1, 2017

Anna Elizabeth Kalluri, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, H. Michael Sokolow, Assistant *305Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, GRAVES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Miguel Agustín Rodriguez-Lopez challenges the district court’s characterization of his robbery conviction as a “crime of violence” under the 2015 United States Sentencing Guidelines. Rodriguez-Lopez pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to being found in the U.S. after previous ■ deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Adopting the recommendation of the United States Probation Office’s presentencing investigation report, and over his objection, the district court found that Rodriguez-Lopez had previously been deported following a crime of violence, triggering the 16-level Guidelines enhancement. This was offset by a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 21. Rodriguez-Lopez was assigned 10 criminal history points, including 3 points for one of his Texas robbery convictions and 1 point for the other. With a total offense level of 21 and a Category V criminal history score, he faced a Guidelines range of 70-87 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Rodriguez-Lopez to 70 months.

On appeal, Rodriguez-Lopez argues that it was error for the district court to characterize his prior convictions for robbery under Texas law as crimes of violence within the Guidelines, resulting in more criminal history points than he deserved. He reasons that the residual clause of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2015), as it read when he was sentenced, is unconstitutional in light of *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that nearly identical language in the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague. However, he concedes that this position, and therefore his appeal, is foreclosed by circuit precedent. Nonetheless, he filed this appeal in hopes that the Supreme Court would decide the then-pending *Bedeles v. United States*favorably to him. While this case was pending, the Court decided *Bedeles*adversely to Rodriguez-Lopez, holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to constitutional vagueness challenges. — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 890, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017). That opinion disposes of Rodriguez-Lopez’s only issue on appeal. *See also United States v. Martinez,*682 Fed.Appx. 304 (5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

*

**Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Gertrude Sternfeld, on Behalf of Herself and All Other Common Stockholders, Similarly Situated, of Toxaway Tanning Company, Respondent, *v.*Toxaway Tanning Company et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

Argued March 11, 1943;

decided April 15, 1943.

*295
      *Joseph C. Slaughter, Charles H. Lieb*and *Morris Katz*for appellants.

*Stanley Rosenthal*and *Maxwell Okun*for respondent.

*296Rippey, J.

This action is grounded in fraud and deceit. It is not an action for damages. The defendant corporation is organized and existing under the laws of the State of North Carolina.

The relief sought is a declaration that a preferred stock issue of the defendant corporation be declared illegal and of no effect: that the stock certificates issued thereunder be declared null and void and cancelled; that the holders of such stock be directed to return any of such stock held by them to the defendant corporation for cancellation and that the corporation be directed to cancel the same; that the corporation be enjoined from in any wise dealing in or issuing any of such stock still remaining in the treasury; that the corporation and its officers be directed to file with the Secretary of State of North Carolina a certificate cancelling the certificate of the corporation under the authority of which the stock was authorized and that the defendants be enjoined from hypothecating, transferring or otherwise dealing with such stock and from declaring or paying dividends thereon. Some necessary defendants have not been served with the summons and have not appeared.

*297A judgment of a court in this State granting the relief sought could not be enforced nor could the plaintiff be granted complete relief without cancellation of recapitalization proceedings taken under the laws of a foreign state and of shares of stock issued thereunder and consequent interference with the internal affairs and management of a foreign corporation. In those circumstances, jurisdiction by our courts will not be entertained *(Travis*v. *Knox Terpezone Co.,*215 N. Y. 259; *Cohn*v. *Mishkoff Costello Co.,*256 N. Y. 102; *Rogers*v. *Guaranty Trust Co.,*288 U. S. 123). Considerations of convenience, efficiency and justice point to the courts of the domicile of the corporation for settlement of the issues presented and necessarily involved in a complete determination of the present case. That fraud is alleged is not a decisive factor inducing our courts to entertain jurisdiction.

The orders appealed from should be reversed with costs in all courts, the motion to dismiss the complaint granted, with ten dollars costs, and the question certified answered in the negative.

Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ., concur.

Ordered accordingly.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Ignacio FUENTES-BARRIGA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41710 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Ignacio Fuentes-Barriga, Pro Se

Before KING, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Ignacio Fuentes-Barriga has *364moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Fuentes-Barriga has filed an out-of-time response along with a motion for leave to file this response, which we GRANT. The record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of Fuentes-Barriga’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore decline to consider the claim without prejudice to collateral review. *See United States v. Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Fuentes-Barri-ga’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2. Fuentes-Barriga’s motion for the appointment of substitute counsel, incorporated in his response, is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *364published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20D0328. ROY LEE CHAMBERS, JR. v. THE STATE.

In 2012, a jury found Roy Chambers, Jr., guilty of armed robbery and

obstruction of an officer, and we affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See

Chambers v. State, No. A15A1617 (Aug. 11, 2015). He later filed an extraordinary

motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied in an order entered on January 3,

2020. On February 27, 2020, Chambers filed this application for discretionary

review. We lack jurisdiction.

An application for discretionary review must be filed within 30 days of entry

of the order or judgment to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The requirements of

OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for

appeal not made in compliance therewith. Boyle v. State, 190 Ga. App. 734, 734 (380

SE2d 57) (1989). Chambers’s application is untimely, as it was filed 55 days after

entry of the order he seeks to appeal. Accordingly, this application is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

March 20, 2020

03/20/2020
14426

#### SILVERMAN v. DEW *ET AL.*

(189 S. E., 756)

*461*Messrs. McBachin & Townsend,*for appellant,

*Messrs. Melton & Belser,*for respondent,

February 1, 1937.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Bonham.

This appeal is from an order of Judge Sharkey of the Civil Court of Florence sustaining a demurrer. The facts of the case are fully set out in the order appealed from. The conclusion of the trial Judge, which sustains the demurrer, is fully sustained by the authorities cited by him, *462and is satisfactory to this Court. Let the order of the trial Judge be reported.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Stabler and Messrs. Justices Carter, Baker and Fishburne concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND> 
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the balance
sheet and statement of operations found on pages 3 and 4 of the Company's form
10QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 1997 and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         117,590
<SECURITIES>                                 4,619,712
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,031,918
<PP&E>                                         135,276
<DEPRECIATION>                                  18,450
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,166,989
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           61,649
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           373
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,104,966
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,166,989
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  353,022
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (291,491)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (291,491)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (291,491)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.06)
        


</TABLE>
**Exhibit 99.4**
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14 OR 15d-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
I, Richard B. Clark, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 40-F of Brookfield Properties Corporation; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4.  The issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))for the issuer and have:
 (a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;  (b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  (c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the issuer’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the issuer’sinternal control over financial reporting; and
5.  The issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the issuer’s auditors and theAudit Committee of issuer’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction):
 (a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  (b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the issuer’s internal control over financialreporting.
Dated: March 31, 2005                                                               /s/ Richard B. Clark   Richard B. Clark   President and Chief ExecutiveOfficer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of

MICHAEL P. GUIDO

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 2548 Disciplinary Docket No. 3

Board File No. C1-18-859

(Supreme Court of Florida, Case No. 

SC18-271)

Attorney Registration No. 49274

(Out of State)

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of January, 2019, having failed to respond to a Notice 

and Order directing him to provide reasons against the imposition of reciprocal discipline, 

Michael P. Guido is suspended for one year from the practice of law in the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania. He shall comply with all the provisions of Pa.R.D.E. 217.
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**


Certification
      of Periodic Financial Report


Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350








Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
      adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of
      the
      undersigned officers of M~Wave, Inc. (the “Company”) certifies that the
      Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarter ended March
      31, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that Form 10-QSB fairly
      presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.








Dated:  October
                  22, 2007
              /s/
                  Jim MayerJim
                  MayerInterim
                  Chief Executive Officer/s/
                  Jeff FiglewiczJeff
                  FiglewiczChief
                  Financial Officer








This
      certification is made solely for purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject
      to
      the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other
      purpose.
EX PARTE D.L.G.

(In re: The matter of P.D., a minor child)

2160671

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 1, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed:
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 32 (Wednesday, February 16, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8840-8841]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03372]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL

[Docket No. AS22-02]


Appraisal Subcommittee; Notice of Meeting

AGENCY: Appraisal Subcommittee, Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    In accordance with Section 1104(b) of Title XI of the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, as amended, 
notice is hereby given that the Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC) will meet 
in open session for a special meeting:
    Location: This will be a virtual meeting via Zoom. Please visit the 
agency's homepage (www.asc.gov) and access the provided registration 
link in the What's New box. You MUST register in advance to attend this 
Meeting.
    Date: February 23, 2022.
    Time: 10:00 a.m. ET.
    Status: Open.

Action and Discussion Items

Amendment to FY22 ASC Budget
7-Hour National USPAP Update Course

    How to Attend and Observe an ASC Meeting: Due to the COVID-19 
Pandemic, the meeting will be open to the public via live webcast only. 
Visit the agency's homepage (www.asc.gov) and access the provided 
registration link in the What's New box. The meeting space is intended 
to accommodate public attendees. However, if the space will not 
accommodate all requests, the ASC may refuse attendance on that 
reasonable basis. The use of any video or audio tape recording device, 
photographing device, or any other electronic or mechanical device

[[Page 8841]]

designed for similar purposes is prohibited at ASC Meetings.

James R. Park,
Executive Director.
[FR Doc. 2022-03372 Filed 2-15-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6700-01-P
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

March 29, 2010 

s0322 

Order 

 

March 29, 2010 

140104 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 140104 

 COA: 284100 

Macomb CC: 2007-002480-FC 

STEPHEN C. GRANT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 6, 2009 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.