alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
                                                                   Exhibit 4.1.3

                              AMENDED AND RESTATED
                       CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
                                       OF
                      MEWBOURNE ENERGY PARTNERS 00-A, L.P.

         This Amended and Restated Certificate of Limited Partnership of
MEWBOURNE ENERGY PARTNERS 00-A, L.P. (the "Partnership") has been duly executed
and filed by the undersigned general partner pursuant to Section 17-210 of the
Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act and is an amendment and
restatement of that certain Certificate of Limited Partnership dated February
14, 2000, and as previously amended by that certain Certificate of Amendment to
Certificate of Limited Partnership dated October 31, 2000, as such are further
amended hereby to reflect, except for Mewbourne Development Corporation, the
withdrawal as general partners of each of the individuals and entities
previously named as general partners of the Partnership and the conversion of
the general partnership interests in the Partnership held by each of such
withdrawing individuals and entities into limited partnership interests in the
Partnership.

                                   ARTICLE ONE

         The name of the limited partnership is MEWBOURNE ENERGY PARTNERS 00-A,
L.P.

                                   ARTICLE TWO

         The address of the registered office of the Partnership in the State of
Delaware is Corporation Trust Center, 1209 Orange Street, Wilmington, County of
New Castle, Delaware.

                                  ARTICLE THREE

         The name and address of the registered agent of the Partnership in the
State of Delaware is The Corporation Trust Company, Corporation Trust Center,
1209 Orange Street, Wilmington, County of New Castle, Delaware.

                                  ARTICLE FOUR

         The name and business address of the sole general partner of the
Partnership is:

<Table>
<Caption>
                  Name                                 Business Address
                  ----                                 ----------------
<S>                                                    <C>
         Mewbourne Development Corporation             3901 S. Broadway
                                                       Tyler, TX   75701
</Table>

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Amended and
Restated Certificate of Limited Partnership by and through a duly authorized
officer thereof 30th day of August, 2001.


                                               MEWBOURNE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION



                                               By:
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  J. Roe Buckley, Treasurer
APELLIE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Bruce D. FULLER, Appellee.

Case No. 5D16-2571

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 17, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
(January 20, 2004)

#### Roman Aronov, Appellant, v Mikhail Leybovich et al., Respondents.

[770 NYS2d 741]

*512In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Schmidt, J.), dated October 13, 2002, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

The defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The affirmed medical reports of the defendants’ examining physicians indicated that a magnetic resonance imaging of the plaintiffs cervical spine taken one month after the accident revealed, inter alia, disc herniations and a disc bulge. Notably, the report of the defendants’ orthopedist specified the degrees of the range of motion in the plaintiffs cervical spine without comparing these findings to the normal range of motion. Thus, the defendants’ proof failed to objectively demonstrate that the plaintiff did not suffer a permanent consequential or significant limitation of use of his cervical spine as a result of the subject accident (see *Jones v Jacob,*1 AD3d 485 [2003]; *D’Angelo v Guerra,*307 AD2d 306 [2003]; *Ervin v Helfant,*303 AD2d 716 [2003]; *Franca v Parisi,*298 AD2d 554 [2002]).

Since the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the sufficiency of the papers in opposition need not be considered *(see Junco v Ranzi,*288 AD2d 440 [2001]). Altman, J.P., S. Miller, Adams and Mastro, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2 Section 906 CFO Certification

     CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing of this report on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter
ended April 5, 2005 (the "Report") by Pomeroy IT Solutions, Inc., the
undersigned hereby certifies that:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
          or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of Pomeroy IT Solutions, Inc.


          June 21, 2005                    /s/Michael E. Rohrkemper
                                           ------------------------------
                                           Michael E. Rohrkemper
                                           Chief Financial Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Pomeroy IT Solutions, Inc. and will be retained by Pomeroy IT
Solutions, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
#### Lord Byron SLATER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. L. CARTLEDGE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6052

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 26, 2017

Lord Byron Slater, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General, William Edgar Salter, III, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lord Byron Slater seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and *129denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(e)(1)(A) (2012). A certifícate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v, McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Slater has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Kaswana KELLY v. Kathleen ABRAMS et al.

2160018

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 7, 2017 Reh. denied May 19, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jamell S. Caraway, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 752]

Appeal by the de*537fendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (DiMango, J.), rendered June 21, 2001, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt is unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10 [1995]; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245 [1989]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94 [1903]). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86 [1974]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Santucci, J.P., Schmidt, Adams and Crane, JJ., concur.
EX PARTE Austin Jeremy BOBO

1160370 (CR-15-0960)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 10, 2017

Cert. denied.
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATE



As required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, (as amended by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002), I certify that:



(1)        The Annual Report of VirTra Systems, Inc. for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)        The information contained in that Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ L. Kelly Jones

L. Kelly Jones

Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

March 30, 2004
**Exhibit 31.1**
I, Robert P. May, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K ofCharter Communications Holdings, LLC and CharterCommunications Holdings Capital Corporation; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state amaterial fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, andother financial information included in this report,fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrants as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4.  The registrants’ other certifying officer(s) and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrants and have:
 (a)  Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed underour supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrants,including their consolidated subsidiaries,is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  (b)  [Reserved];  (c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrants’ disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as ofthe end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  (d)  Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrants’ internal control over financialreporting that occurred during theregistrants’ most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrants’ fourth fiscal quarter in thecase of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likelyto materially affect, the registrants’internal control over financial reporting;and
5.  The registrants’ other certifying officer(s) and I havedisclosed, based on our most recent evaluation ofinternal control over financial reporting, to theregistrants’ auditors and the audit committee of theregistrants’ board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions):
 (a)  All significant deficienciesand material weaknesses inthe design or operation ofinternal control overfinancial reporting whichare reasonably likely toadversely affect theregistrants’ ability torecord, process, summarizeand report financialinformation; and  (b)  Any fraud, whether or notmaterial, that involvesmanagement or otheremployees who have asignificant role in theregistrants’ internalcontrol over financialreporting.
Date: March 31, 2005   /s/ Robert P. May    Robert P. May  Interim President and Chief Executive Officer
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Alfonse L. Florio, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[770 NYS2d 800]

*777Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed May 5, 2003, which, inter alia, ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without good cause.

Substantial evidence supports the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board finding that claimant voluntarily left his employment without good cause. The record establishes that claimant was employed as a substitute teacher on a long-term assignment. He indicated a preference for teaching certain subjects, but was employed as a “floater” and was assigned where needed. Although claimant was initially told that he could show a movie in classes in which he was not comfortable teaching or for which there was no lesson plan, this policy changed. After a difficult day, claimant informed the head of substitute teachers that he was “not doing this anymore” and claimant’s name was removed from the list of substitute teachers. We find no reason to disturb the Board’s decision inasmuch as continuing work was available to claimant and his dissatisfaction with his assignments does not constitute good cause for leaving employment *(see Matter of Zalinka [Commissioner of Labor],*290 AD2d 629, 630 [2002]; *Matter of Rind [Commissioner of Labor],*273 AD2d 665 [2000]). Furthermore, inasmuch as claimant cited “lack of work” on his application for unemployment insurance benefits, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s finding that claimant made a willful false statement to obtain benefits *(see Matter of Fradys [Commissioner of Labor],*308 AD2d 672, 673 [2003]).

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Carpinello, Mugglin and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

Case No. 5D21-2728

LT Case No. 2021-CA-005257-O 

ARTHUR WILLIAMS, 

Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

________________________________/ 

Decision filed April 26, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Orange County, 

Paetra T. Brownlee, Judge.

Arthur Williams, Bristol, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,

Tallahassee, and Nora Hutchinson Hall, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellee. 

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, TRAVER and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 23
             CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


     We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the
Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 33-53561), the
Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 33-51021) and the
Prospectus constituting part of the Registration Statement on Form S-3 (No.
33-35137) of Premark International, Inc. of our report dated February 23, 1996
appearing on page 54 of the Annual Report to Shareholders which is incorporated
in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.  We also consent to the incorporation by
reference of our report on the Financial Statement Schedule, which appears on
page 33 of this Form 10-K.





Price Waterhouse LLP
Chicago, Illinois
March 25, 1996
**Exhibit 32.1**
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**
**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
     In connection with the Annual Report of Too, Inc. (the “Company”), on Form 10-K for the fiscalyear ended January 29, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, Michael W. Rayden, President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman ofthe Board of Directors of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adoptedpursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and
          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Company.
Dated: April 12, 2005    /s/ Michael W. Rayden      Michael W. Rayden    Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, and    Chief Executive Officer
#### Danny Ray CUBBAGE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold CLARKE, Director, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-7646

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: May 3, 2017

Danny Ray Cubbage, Appellant Pro Se.

Donald Eldridge Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Danny Ray Cubbage seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Cubbage has not made the Requisite showing. To the extent he seeks to raise claims on appeal by merely incorporating his § 2254 petition by reference in his informal brief, such incorporation is not sufficient to preserve his claims, *See*4th Cir. R. 34(b); *McCarver v. Lee,*221 F.3d 583, 588 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000). And his failure to address the district court’s procedural default ruling in his informal brief forecloses his challenge to that ruling. 4th Cir. R. 34(b); *Jackson v. Lightsey,*775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014). *184Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Order filed February 14, 2013

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 12

- 01007

- CV

____________ DORA BURNETT , Appellant

V.

PACIFIC EMPLOYERS IN SURANCE COMPANY, ET AL AND ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE C OMPANY, ET AL, Appellee s

On Appeal f

rom the 270th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2011

- 31924



### O R D E R
Appellant’ s brief was due January 28, 2013

. No brief or motion for
extension of time has been filed.

Unless appellant submits a brief to the clerk of this court on or before March 18, 2013 , the court will dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b).PER CURIAM
EX PARTE Ronald D. VETETO

(In re: Ronald D. Veteto v. Jeff Dunn et al.)

2160651

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 24, 2017 Reh. denied June 27, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 30 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
RUTH E. GILBERT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. STAR BUILDING SYSTEMS,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 97-6021 (D.C. No. 95-CV-1932) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges
.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 Plaintiff filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 motion for rec onsideration after she filed

her notice of appeal from the district court’s summ ary judgment decision. Because she did not file a separate notice of appea l from the district court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration, however, this court does not have jurisdiction to review that decision. See Williams v. Chater , 87 F.3d 702, 705 and n.1 (5th Cir. 1996). -2- Plaintiff appeals the district court’s decision gra nting defendant summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims that defendant violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), see 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and Oklahoma public policy wh en it terminated plaintiff’s employment. 1 This court reviews a summary judgment decision de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmo ving party. See Dye v. United States , 121 F.3d 1399, 1403-04 (10th Cir. 1997). Summaryjudgment is appropriate only if there are no genuinely disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We affirm the district court’s decision for substantially the reasons stated in its order dated November 15, 1996. Although the di strict court did not specifically address plaintiff’s claim that defenda nt had violated its duty to post notice of FMLA rights, see 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a), summary judgment was appropriate on that claim as well. See Blumenthal v. Murray , 946 F. Supp. 623,-3-

626-27 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (private litigant has no ba sis to seek relief for employer’s violation of FMLA’s requirements for posting notice ), and cases cited therein.
The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s motion to expedi te this appeal is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff’s other pending appellate motio ns and her request for appointment of counsel are DENIED.

Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge