SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2019-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KENNETH HINES,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted March 22, 2022 – Decided August 19, 2022

Before Judges Currier and DeAlmeida.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 15-08-0948.

Kenneth Hines, appellant pro se.

Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Kenneth Hines appeals from the November 13, 2019 order of 

the Law Division denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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I.

In 2015, a grand jury indicted defendant, charging him with first-degree 

conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)

and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; first-degree attempted robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 and 

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; two counts of second-degree possession of a weapon for an 

unlawful purpose; N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; and second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6.

Pursuant to an agreement with the State, defendant entered a plea of guilty 

to first-degree attempted robbery. Defendant admitted the following: In 2014, 

he, Alexandria Gomez, and Jaquan Dallas were in a van which defendant was 

driving. Aware Dallas was armed with a handgun, defendant agreed with the 

two others to rob Ronald Harris. Dallas left the van with the intent to commit

the robbery. Although he was unsuccessful in taking property from Harris, 

during the course of his attempt to do so, Dallas inflicted serious bodily injury 

on Rodney Burke.

In exchange for defendant's plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining 

counts of the indictment and waive its right to seek an extended sentence based 

on defendant's prior convictions. The trial court sentenced defendant to the 

seventeen-year prison term recommended by the State, subject to the No Early 
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Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, followed by a five-year period of parole 

supervision.

We affirmed defendant's sentence. State v. Hines, No. A-2406-17 (App. 

Div. Sept. 25, 2018).

In 2019, defendant filed a motion in the trial court pursuant to Rule 3:21-

10(b)(5) to correct an illegal sentence. He argued that he should have been 

sentenced in the second-degree range because an attempt to commit a crime of 

the first degree must be treated as a second-degree offense for sentencing 

purposes. See N.J.S.A. 2C:5-4(a) ("an attempt . . . to commit a crime of the first 

degree is a crime of the second degree . . . .").

On November 13, 2019, the trial court issued an order and written 

statement of reasons denying defendant's motion. The court concluded that

[t]he fact that no completed theft from Ronald Harris or 

Rodney Burke ever took place is of no bearing here. 

Normally, an inchoate, or unfinished, crime is 

considered an attempt, but this is not so in the case of 

robbery. Relevant case law states, unequivocally: 

"There is no such crime as an attempt to commit a 

robbery. Therefore, one who attempts to commit a theft 

(with the aggravating circumstances for a robbery being 

present) is guilty – if at all – of robbery." State v. 

Schenck, 186 N.J. Super. 236, 240 (Law Div. 1982).

The court found defendant admitted to an attempt to commit theft with the 

aggravating circumstances of robbery – that he, Gomez, and Dallas conspired to 
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rob Harris and during the attempt to commit that offense Dallas inflicted serious 

bodily injury on Burke. Thus, the court concluded, defendant admitted to 

committing first-degree robbery, not first-degree attempted robbery, and

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-4(a) was inapplicable to defendant's conviction.

This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following argument.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE 

ON THE BASIS OF ITS ERRONEOUS LEGAL 

CONCLUSION THAT THE CRIME OF 

ATTEMPTED ROBBERY WAS NOT COGNIZABLE 

UNDER THE NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL CODE.

II.

A motion to correct an illegal sentence may be filed at any time. R. 3:21-

10(b)(5); State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 309 (2012). An illegal sentence 

"exceed[s] the penalties authorized by statute for a specific offense." State v. 

Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000). "A sentence may also be illegal because it 

was not imposed in accordance with law. This category includes sentences that, 

although not in excess of the statutory maximum penalty," are not authorized by 

statute. Id. at 247. We review de novo the trial court's finding that a sentence 

is legal. Schubert, 212 N.J. at 303-04.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree with the trial court's 

conclusion that defendant was properly sentenced.
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A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of 

committing a theft, he:

(1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; 

or

(2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in 

fear of immediate bodily injury; or

(3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any 

crime of the first or second degree.

An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase "in 

the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an 

attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the 

attempt or commission.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a).]

In addition,

[r]obbery is a crime of the second degree, except that it 

is a crime of the first degree if in the course of 

committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, 

or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily 

injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the 

immediate use of a deadly weapon.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b).]

We agree with the trial court's rejection of defendant's argument that his 

co-conspirators' failure to complete their intended theft from Harris rendered 

their offense an attempted robbery. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a) plainly provides that a 
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first-degree robbery occurs when a person inflicts serious bodily injury on 

another during an attempt to commit a theft. As the Supreme Court explained, 

a defendant can be convicted of robbery, even if the 

theft is unsuccessful, if he or she (1) purposely takes a 

substantial step (2) to exercise unlawful control over 

the property of another (3) while threatening another 

with, or purposely placing another in fear of, immediate 

bodily injury.

[State v. Farrad, 164 N.J. 247, 258 (2000).]

Defendant admitted to facts constituting first-degree robbery. He was 

sentenced to a term of incarceration in the first-degree range consistent with his 

plea agreement with the State. His sentence complies with N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.

1

Affirmed.

 

1

 Although count three of the indictment charged defendant with first-degree 

attempted robbery, it alleges facts consistent with first-degree robbery. The 

record reveals defendant was aware of the allegations against him, was fully 

apprised of his rights, and with the assistance of counsel negotiated a favorable 

plea agreement. Prior to entry of the plea, the court informed defendant of the 

consequences of pleading guilty to first-degree robbery and of his sentencing 

exposure. We conclude the drafting error in the indictment was a matter of form

that did not prejudice defendant or his defense on the merits of the charges 

against him.