alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, *v.*David D. Famalett, Defendant.

District Court of Suffolk County, First District,

July 19, 1973.

*George J. Aspland, District Attorney (Richard Kitson*of counsel), for plaintiff. *David D. Famalett,*defendant in person.

Lawrence Newmark, J.

Defendant is charged with violation of section 512 (subd. 1, par. [a]) of the Tax Law of the State of New York in that he operated a vehicle which was required to have and display a tax plate, or a tax permit, without same. The defendant did not dispute the People’s allegations which were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The sole issue is on the law, whether an operator who is not the owner of the vehicle and who is unaware that the vehicle does not have the necessary tax plate or permit can. be convicted of the charge.

The Tax Law provisions applicable to this case are (§ 512, subd. 1, par. [a]) cle'arly not restricted to owners of vehicles but include users, without any indication that they must own the vehicle or have any particular relationship with the owner of the vehicle.

We are, therefore, left with the question of intent or knowledge. The offense charged here is not a crime and falls within that class of cases designated *malum prohibitum.*As the Court of Appeals has stated, ‘1 an act *malum prohibitum*is not excused by ignorance, or a mistake of fact when a specific act is made by law indictable irrespective of the deféndant’s motive or intent. His belief that he was right in what he did based on a mistake of fact is no defense.” *(People*v. *Werner,*174 N. Y. 132, 134).

Although he did not so designate it, a more complete description of such cases was given by Judge Cardozo in *Tenement*
      *361
      *House Dept. of City of N. Y.*v. *McDevitt*(215 N. Y. 160, 168-169), as follows: “ Prosecutions for petty penalties have always constituted in our law a class by themselves * * * That is true though the prosecution is criminal in form * * * In such cases, it is enough that according to common experience there is a more or less constant relation between the act or omission against which the penalty is aimed, and the guilt, whether due to design or to neglect, of the person by whom the penalty is payable. The legislature stops the inquiry when that relation has been ascertained, rules out the excuses of the individual, and requires him at his peril to conform ’ ’.

Thus, in this case, the defendant cannot raise any defense based upon his lack of knowledge of the facts. In addition, he is presumed to know the law and the legal consequences of his acts. *(Municipal Metallic Bed Mfg. Corp.*v. *Dobbs,*253 N. Y. 313; *People*v. *Boxer,*24 N. Y. S. 2d 628.)

Since violation of the section charged, *“*shall not be a crime and the penalty or punishment imposed therefor shall not be deemed for any purpose a penal or criminal penalty or punishment and shall not impose any disability upon or affect or impair the credibility as a witness, or otherwise, of any person convicted thereof ” (Tax Law, § 512, subd. 1, par. [g]) and in view of all the foregoing, the court must find the defendant guilty as charged.
#### Younis El SAYEDRI, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-2394

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 28, 2017

Younis El Sayedri, Petitioner Pro Se.

Christina Petersen Greer, John Hogan, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent,

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Petition dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Younis El Sayedri, a native and citizen of Sudan, petitions for review of orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeals from the immigration judge’s decisions finding him inadmissible for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C, § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012), ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012), and that he failed to meet his burden for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the CAT, and a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(l) (2012). We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

We lack jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2012), except as provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2012), to review the final order of removal of an alien convicted of certain enumerated crimes, including a crime involving moral turpitude. We retain jurisdiction “to review factual determinations that trigger the jurisdiction-stripping provision, such as whether [El Sayedri] [i]s an alien and whether []he has been convicted of [a CIMT].” *Ramtulla v. Ashcroft,*301 F.3d 202, 203 (4th Cir. 2002). Once we confirm these two factual determinations, we can only consider “constitutional claims or questions of law.” § 1252(a)(2)(D); *see Turkson v. Holder,*667 F.3d 523, 526-27 (4th Cir. 2012), Moreover, only such claims that are colorable will be reviewed under § 1252(a)(2)(D). *See Gomis v. Holder,*571 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]bsent a colorable constitutional claim or question of law, our review of the issue is not authorized by § 1252(a)(2)(D).”).

We conclude that, under the modified categorical approach, El Sayedri is removable as charged because his conviction for conspiracy to commit immigration document fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1546(a) (2012), is a crime involving moral turpitude. Therefore, our review is limited to colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. After reviewing El Saye-dri’s informal brief and his supplemental informal brief, we conclude that El Sayedri fails to raise a reviewable constitutional claim or question of law.

Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions áre adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DISMISSED*
## U nit edSta tes C ou rt o f A pp eal s For t h e Firs t C ircu it

No. 05-1822 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. JUAN MANUEL CRUZADO-LAUREANO, a/k/a Manny,

Defendant, Appellant. ERRATA SHEET The opinion of this Court issued on March 14, 2006 is amended as follows: On page 13, line 14, replace "3B3.1" with "3B1.3".
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cobey Daron WEBB, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6075

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 16, 2017

Decided: May 17, 2017

*210Cobey Daron Webb, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Ray Wolthuis, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Cobey Daron Webb seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion without prejudice as successive. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C; § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Webb has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Tanyon WATSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT FOR AGING & VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION SERVICES; Carrie Gilbert, Dars Counselor; Davian Morrell, Dars Counselor; Doug James, Dars Regional Director; Terry Bertsch; Julie Triplett, VA Disability Law Center Advocate, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1194

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 30, 2017

Decided: April 4, 2017

Tanyon Watson, Appellant Pro Se.

Pamela Brown Beckner, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; Steven Michael Traubert, DISABILITY LAW CENTER OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Tanyon Watson seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his civil action for lack of jurisdiction. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on January 6, 2017. The notice of appeal was filed on February 9, 2017. Because Watson failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We deny Watson’s motions to appoint counsel and to respond. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jose Alfredo MARTINEZ-GUILLEN, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40113 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jose Alfredo Martinez-Guillen, Pro Se

Before KING, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jose Alfredo Martinez-Guillen has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Martinez-Guillen has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### James COVINGTON and Alfreda Turnbow, Appellants, v. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., as successor to Washington Mutual Bank and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Appellees.

No. 14-7132

September Term, 2015

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed On: August 5, 2016

James Covington, Washington, DC, Pro Se.

Alfreda Turnbow, Washington, DC, Pro Se.

Michael Bertrand Roberts, Reed Smith LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellees.

BEFORE: Rogers, Kavanaugh, and Srinivasan, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s orders denying appellants’ discovery requests and granting summary judgment to appellees be affirmed. Appellants have not shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying their discovery requests. See Freedom Watch v. NSA, 783 F.3d 1340, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The district court correctly concluded that the loan modification agreement was invalid because it purported to modify a contract without the consent of all of the contracting parties. See Nyhus v. Travel Mgmt. Corp., 466 F.2d 440, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1972). As for appellees’ right to enforce the note, under D.C. law, the holder of a note indorsed in blank is normally entitled to enforce the instrument. Chase Plaza Condominium Ass’n v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 A.3d 166, 169-70 (D.C. 2014); see also D.C. Code §28:3-301 (holder of an instrument is entitled to enforce it); § 28:3-205. Appellants have presented no evidence capable of rebutting the district court’s conclusions that appellees own the mortgage loan and hold the note, nor have they shown that any of the related documents are fraudulent. Appellants’ remaining arguments fail, either because they were not raised in the opening brief and are therefore forfeited, see Fox v. Gov’t of the District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 25, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2015), because they were insufficiently developed and are therefore forfeit*820ed, see Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005), or because appellants have proffered no evidence indicating that summary judgment was inappropriate, see Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
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#### Santiago AZ-TECUM, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 13-72217

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

Rosana Cheung, Attorney, Law Office of Rosana Kit Wai Cheung, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner

*224Lance Lomond Jolley, Esquire, Trial Attorney, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent .

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Santiago Az-Tecum, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, *Wakkary v. Holder,*558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009), and we deny the petition for review.

Az-Tecum raises nc challenge to the BIA’s dispositive determination that his asylum application was untimely and that he failed to establish changed or extraordinary circumstances to excuse its untimely filing. *See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder,*706 F.3d 1072, 1079-1080 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived). Thus, we deny the petition for review as to Az-Tecum’s asylum claim.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Az-Tecum failed to demonstrate the past harm he suffered, even cumulatively, rose to the level of persecution. *See Wakkary,*558 F.3d at 1059-60. Substantial evidence also supports the determination that he failed to establish it is more likely than not that he would be persecuted on account of a protected ground. *See Zetino v. Holder,*622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). Thus, his withholding of removal claim fails.

Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because Az-Tecum failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Guatemalan government. *See Silaya v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid*225ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

No. 84782



# FILE JUN 2 4 2022

ELIZABETH BROWN CLERK OF SU EME COURT BY TH1 OF NEVADA AT CHEYENNE, LLC, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, D/B/A COLLEGE PARK REHABILITATION CENTER; HEALTHCARE REALITY OF CHEYENNE, LLC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION; AND FUNDAMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LLC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents, and JEFFREY A. MYERS; AND ANDREW JAMES, Real Parties in Interest.
ORDER DENYING PETITION This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus that would direct the district court to grant a motion in limine.

Petitioners have not provided this court with all the documents necessary to review this petition, including the motion in limine that is the subject of this writ petition and the district court order denying that motion. NRAP 21(a)(4) (providing that the petitioner shall submit an appendix containing all documents essential to understand the matters set forth in the petition); Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) (Petitioners carry the burden of demonstrating that
SUPREME COURT OF NEVA0A (01 I447A 

# ap oq-3extraordinary relief is warranted."). We therefore cannot properly evaluate

the petition. Pan, 120 Nev. at 229, 88 P.3d at 844 ("If essential information is left out of the petition and accompanying documentation, we have no way of properly evaluating the petition.").

Accordingly, we ORDER the petition DENIED.

Parraguirre

Hardesty

J. Stiglich

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge Gioyanniello Law Group Cap & Kudler Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

1.0 ) 1947A 2
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Annual Report of Salon Media Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Elizabeth Hambrecht, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company,
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



                                        /s/ Elizabeth Hambrecht
                                        -----------------------
         June 28, 2006                  Elizabeth Hambrecht
                                        Chief Executive Officer and President
Derrick Wayne MURRAY v. STATE

CR-15-0268

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017 Reh. denied May 26, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.