[Cite as Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. v. Ryan, 2014-Ohio-3932.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 14AP-102 

v. : (M.C. No. 2013CVF-1810)

James M. Ryan, Jr., : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 11, 2014 

 

Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLC, Stephanie F. Gilley, 

Mark Brncik and James Y. Oh, for appellee. 

James M. Ryan, Jr., pro se. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court 

CONNOR, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, James M. Ryan, Jr., appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Municipal Court granting the Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment 

filed by plaintiff-appellee, Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. ("Capital One"). Because there 

are no genuine issues of material fact and Capital One is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} Capital One filed a complaint against Ryan on January 16, 2013, alleging 

that Ryan owed Capital One $3,949.94 on a credit card account debt. Capital One alleged 

that Ryan had defaulted on his repayment obligation, and that upon demand, Ryan had 

failed to liquidate the balance due and owing. 
No. 14AP-102 2 

{¶ 3} Capital One attached a credit card statement to the complaint. The credit 

card statement covered the period from May to August 2012, and indicated that the 

account was past due and that the outstanding balance on the account was $3,949.94. The 

credit card statement instructed Ryan to make his checks payable to Capital One, and the 

return address on the statement listed Capital One's name and address. The statement 

also informed Ryan that his "account is being serviced by Capital One Services, LLC 

unless you've been notified otherwise." (Complaint, exhibit A2.)

{¶ 4} Ryan filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint on April 3, 

2013. Ryan noted that although Capital One was the plaintiff, the credit card statement 

attached to the complaint referenced Capital One Services, LLC. Ryan thus asserted that 

Capital One was not the real party in interest and did not have standing to bring the 

action. Ryan further alleged that Capital One violated Civ.R. 10(D) by failing to attach a 

copy of the account to the complaint. Capital One responded to the motion to dismiss on 

April 15, 2013, noting that it was the real party in interest as it had issued the credit card 

to Ryan and had never assigned the account to another party. Capital One noted that 

Capital One Services, LLC was merely the servicing agent for Capital One.

{¶ 5} On June 11, 2013, the trial court filed an entry stating that it would treat 

Ryan's motion to dismiss as a Civ.R. 12(E) motion for a more definite statement. The trial 

court noted that Capital One had attached a credit card statement reflecting the account 

number and the balance due to the complaint, and denied the motion for a more definite 

statement. On September 17, 2013, the trial court scheduled the case for an October 31, 

2013 pretrial. 

{¶ 6} On October 31, 2013, Ryan filed a motion for leave to file a motion for 

summary judgment and a motion for summary judgment. Ryan asserted in the motion for 

summary judgment that Capital One had "not established any verification that Capital 

One Bank (USA), N.A. was the original alleged lender or owner of the financial obligation 

instrument that it alleges in its Complaint that Defendant Ryan entered into as an alleged 

contract." (Emphasis sic.) (Motion for summary judgment, 3.) On November 15, 2013, 

Capital One filed a memorandum in opposition to Ryan's motion for summary judgment, 

noting that "there [was] no allegation of assignment in Plaintiff's complaint because there 

has been no assignment." (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, 3.)
No. 14AP-102 3 

{¶ 7} On November 15, 2013, Capital One filed a motion for leave of court to file a 

cross-motion for summary judgment instanter ("motion for leave"). The motion for leave 

noted that a "copy of the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is attached hereto and 

made a part hereof as if fully rewritten herein. Should the Court grant this Motion for 

Leave, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deem the Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment filed upon such date as the Motion for Leave is granted." (Motion for Leave, 1.) 

The motion for leave does not contain a certificate of service indicating that it was served 

on Ryan. On November 21, 2013, the trial court filed an order granting Capital One's 

motion for leave. Accordingly, Capital One's cross-motion for summary judgment was 

deemed filed on November 21, 2013.

{¶ 8} In the cross-motion for summary judgment, Capital One noted that the 

parties had entered into an agreement for the extension of credit in the form of a Capital 

One Visa Platinum credit card account, account number xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-1642. Capital 

One noted that Ryan thereafter received an extension of credit and "used the credit card 

and accumulated a balance that remains due and owing." (Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment, 4.) 

{¶ 9} Capital One supported its cross-motion for summary judgment with the 

affidavit of Barbara S. Edwards. Edwards averred that she was an "employee of Capital 

One Services, LLC (COSLLC), an agent and affiliate of Plaintiff Capital One Bank, (USA) 

N.A. (Capital One)." (Edwards Affidavit, ¶ 1.) Edwards explained that "COSLLC provides 

services to Capital One in connection with its credit card and related banking practices" 

and that her "job responsibilities as Litigation Support Representative provided [her] with 

access to all relevant systems and documents of Capital One needed to validate the below 

information." (Edwards' Affidavit, ¶ 1.) Edwards noted that the business records 

demonstrated that Ryan's credit card account had a balance of $3,949.94, that Capital 

One had demanded payment, but that no part of the balance had been paid. Edwards' 

affidavit incorporated by reference a copy of a customer agreement and one years worth 

of credit card statements. 

{¶ 10} On November 25, 2013, Ryan filed a motion to strike plaintiff's crossmotion for summary judgment because Capital One failed to serve the motion for leave on 

Ryan. On December 4, 2013, Ryan filed a motion to vacate the trial court's order granting 
No. 14AP-102 4 

the motion for leave because Capital One had failed to attach a proof of service to the 

motion for leave. Ryan thus asserted that, pursuant to Civ.R. 5(B)(3), the trial court could 

not consider the motion for leave. Ryan attached his own affidavit to the motion to vacate, 

averring that he did not receive service of the motion for leave but "[o]n November 25, 

2013 [he] personally visited the Clerk of the Franklin County Municipal Court, Franklin 

County Ohio and obtained a Certified copy of Plaintiff's Motion For Leave." (Ryan's 

Affidavit, ¶ 3.) 

{¶ 11} Ryan filed a motion for an enlargement of time to file a memorandum in 

opposition to plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on December 5, 2013. On 

December 20, 2013, Ryan filed another motion for an enlargement of time to file a 

memorandum in opposition to the cross-motion for summary judgment. Ryan asserted 

that he should not have to bear the expense of responding to the cross-motion for 

summary judgment until the trial court ruled on his motion to strike and motion to 

vacate.

{¶ 12} On February 4, 2014, the trial court filed an entry granting Capital One's 

cross-motion for summary judgment and denying Ryan's motion for summary judgment, 

motion to strike, and motion to vacate. Regarding Ryan's contention that Capital One was 

not the real party in interest, the trial court noted that "Capital One Bank is the Plaintiff 

and the issuer of this card." (Entry, 2.) The trial court further noted that Capital One had 

attached to its cross-motion for summary judgment credit card statements for the account 

from May 2011 to May 2012, with a final statement sent in August 2012, depicting charges 

and credits on the account. The trial court observed that Ryan "had ample time to file a 

response" to the cross-motion for summary judgment, but "instead has chosen to file 

frivolous motions with the court." (Entry, 3.) The trial court found no genuine issues of 

material fact, and entered judgment for Capital One in the amount of $3,949.94 plus costs 

and interest at the rate of three percent. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶ 13} Defendant appeals, assigning the following errors:

[I.] The Trial Court committed reversible error pursuant to 

Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 5(B)3 disregarding the fact that 

Capital One never served on Appellant its purported Plaintiff's 
No. 14AP-102 5 

Motion For Leave of Court to File Cross-Motion For Summary 

Judgment INSTANTER (R@16); and Capital One failed to 

attach proof of service endorsed thereon or separately filed; 

and the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Capital 

One's purported Plaintiff's Motion For Leave of Court to File 

Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment INSTANTER(R@16). 

[II.] The Trial Court committed reversible error pursuant to 

Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 56(A) disregarding the 

requirement that if the action has been set for pre-trial or 

trial, a motion for summary judgment may be made only with 

leave of court; and as the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction and 

could not consider Capital One's alleged Plaintiff's Motion For 

Leave of Court to File Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment 

INSTANTER (R@16) that violated Civ. R. 5(B) 3 and Civil R. 

5(B)(2) and was never served on Appellant; Capital One failed 

to obtain leave of court to file its PROPOSED Plaintiff's CrossMotion For Summary Judgment (with tendered INSTANTER 

entry) (R@16). 

[III.] The Trial Court committed reversible error disregarding 

the response time created by the Ohio Rules of Civil 

Procedure to provide Appellant fourteen (14) days period of 

time for a reply to Capital One's alleged Motion For Leave of 

Court to File Plaintiff's PROPOSED Cross-Motion For 

Summary Judgment INSTANTER (R@16) thereby denying 

Appellant's fundamental substantive and/or procedural due 

process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of 

the United States Constitution and similar due process rights 

guaranteed by Article 1, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 

[IV.] The Trial Court committed reversible error disregarding 

the fact that Capital One failed to serve on Appellant, 

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment (with 

tendered INSTANTER entry) (R@18) that should be dated 

11/19/2013, the date Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment was "accepted as filed upon the date the Trial 

Court's Order was granted" on 11/19/2013 and filed on 

11/21/2013 (R@17). 

[V.] The Trial Court committed reversible error failing to hold 

Oral or Non Oral hearing according to Rule thereby denying 

Appellant's fundamental substantive and/or procedural due 

process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of 

the United States Constitution and similar due process rights 

guaranteed by Article 1, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
No. 14AP-102 6 

[VI.] The Trial Court committed reversible error issuing a 

Judgment Entry (R@37) in favor of Capital One in the 

amount of $3,949.94 plus costs and interest at the rate of 3% 

as Capital One failed to prove "a provable [alleged] sum" of 

$3,402.35 failing to provide any evidence in the form of proof 

of any alleged debits or alleged credits that total $3,402.35 as 

an [alleged] beginning balance and Capital One did not allege 

a breach of contract claim in its Complaint (R@1). 

[VII.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by failing to 

strike the Affidavit of Barbara S. Edwards, Capital One's 

Exhibit '1 of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment 

(with tendered INSTANTER entry) (R@18) when presented 

with the contradictory written testimony evidence of Affiant, 

Barbara S. Edwards and Ms. Audra Funk, Esq. as to the true 

employee keeper of the records status of Affiant, Barbara S. 

Edwards on October 3, 2013, the date that Ms. Edwards 

attested; and genuine issues as to material fact were timely 

before the Trial Court pursuant to Civ. R. 56(C). 

[VIII.] Plaintiff's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment (with 

tendered INSTANTER entry) (R@18) was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence in violation of Article IV, 

Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution. 

[IX.] The Trial Court erred in making its comment in its 

Judgment Entry (R@37) that Appellant "chose to file frivolous 

motions with the Court" the result of which is an unfounded 

inferring that Appellant engaged in conduct pursuant to ORC 

2323.51 which Appellant did not and strongly denies. 

[X.] The Trial Court erred by granting Plaintiff's Cross-Motion 

For Summary Judgment (with tendered INSTANTER entry) 

(R@18) because Capital One failed to establish a prima facie 

case for an action upon an account based on contract and the 

Trial Court's Judgment Entry (R@37) failed to address 

genuine issues of material fact. 

{¶ 14} For ease of discussion, we address Ryan's assignments of error out of order.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 15} Appellate review of summary judgment motions is de novo. Helton v. 

Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 123 Ohio App.3d 158, 162 (4th Dist.1997). "When reviewing a 
No. 14AP-102 7 

trial court's ruling on summary judgment, the court of appeals conducts an independent 

review of the record and stands in the shoes of the trial court." Mergenthal v. Star Bank 

Corp., 122 Ohio App.3d 100, 103 (12th Dist.1997). We must affirm the trial court's 

judgment if any of the grounds raised by the movant at the trial court are found to support 

it, even if the trial court failed to consider those grounds. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker, 101 

Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42 (9th Dist.1995). 

{¶ 16} Summary judgment is proper only when the party moving for summary 

judgment demonstrates that: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to 

but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion 

for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most 

strongly construed in that party's favor. Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. 

Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 (1997). 

{¶ 17} When seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party 

cannot prove its case, the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the trial 

court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of the 

nonmoving party's claims. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). A moving 

party does not discharge this initial burden under Civ.R. 56 by simply making a 

conclusory allegation that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Id. 

Rather, the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate by affidavit or other evidence 

allowed by Civ.R. 56(C) that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support its claims. 

Id. If the moving party meets this initial burden, then the nonmoving party has a 

reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmoving party does not so respond, summary 

judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party. Id. 

IV. FOURTH AND FIFTH ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR – SERVICE OF CROSS 

 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

{¶ 18} Ryan's fourth assignment of error asserts the trial court committed 

reversible error by disregarding the fact that Capital One failed to serve the cross-motion 

for summary judgment on Ryan. Ryan's fifth assignment of error asserts the trial court 
No. 14AP-102 8 

committed reversible error by failing to hold a hearing on the cross-motion for summary 

judgment.

{¶ 19} Ryan notes that the trial court granted Capital One's motion for leave on 

November 21, 2013. The cross-motion for summary judgment was accordingly deemed 

filed on that day. Ryan states that he "acknowledged receiving Capital One PROPOSED

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment (with tendered INSTANTER entry) 

dated 11/15/2013," but states that he "was never served with Capital One's Cross-Motion 

for Summary Judgment." (Appellant's brief, 27.) 

{¶ 20} Although Ryan refers to a "proposed" cross-motion for summary judgment, 

there is no such document in the record. The record contains the motion for leave, the 

order granting the motion, and the cross-motion for summary judgment. To the extent 

Ryan's reference to a "proposed" cross-motion for summary judgment is meant to 

indicate that Capital One had to refile the cross-motion for summary judgment after the 

trial court granted Capital One's motion for leave, we note that "a trial court is within its 

discretion to consider a pleading that is properly attached to a motion for leave to file 

instanter." Lee v. Norton, 8th Dist. No. 88347, 2007-Ohio-534, ¶ 9.

{¶ 21} The cross-motion for summary judgment contains a certificate of service 

indicating that the motion was served on Ryan at the same address to which the 

complaint was served, via regular U.S. mail on November 15, 2013. When the record 

reflects that the Civil Rules pertaining to service have been followed, there is a 

presumption of proper service. Potter v. Troy, 78 Ohio App.3d 372, 377 (2d Dist.1992). 

"In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the address used by a plaintiff in a complaint 

will be assumed to be an address where it is reasonable to anticipate that service will be 

delivered to the defendant." In re Estate of Popp, 94 Ohio App.3d 640, 650 (8th 

Dist.1994). Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(c) provides that service by mail is deemed completed once the 

clerk has mailed the document. The certificate of service on the cross-motion for 

summary judgment demonstrates that service was completed in accordance with Civ.R. 

5. Accordingly, we may presume that the cross-motion for summary judgment was 

properly served on Ryan. 
No. 14AP-102 9 

{¶ 22} Under his fifth assignment of error, Ryan asserts that the trial court "failed 

to hold an oral hearing" on the cross-motion for summary judgment. (Appellant's brief, 

31.) Loc.R. 3.04(3) of the Franklin County Municipal Court provides as follows:

All motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to Civil 

Rule 56 are hereby set for non-oral hearing on the fifteenth 

day following service of the motion upon the responding 

party. The adverse party shall serve and file opposing 

affidavits and memorandum prior to the day set for non-oral 

hearing. An oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment 

shall not be held or scheduled unless counsel so requests in 

accordance with paragraph (1) of this rule, or unless the judge 

assigned to the case so requires. 

{¶ 23} Capital One did not request an oral hearing on the cross-motion for 

summary judgment, and the judge did not require it. Accordingly, the trial court was not 

required to hold an oral hearing on the cross-motion for summary judgment. Ryan's 

response to the cross-motion for summary judgment was due 14 days following service 

of the motion. Civ.R. 56(C); Loc.R. 3.04(1) (noting that "[a]ll parties wishing to respond 

in writing to a motion shall do so not later than the fourteenth day following service of 

the motion upon the responding party"); Hooten v. Safe Auto Ins. Co., 100 Ohio St.3d 8, 

2003-Ohio-4829, syllabus (noting that a court need not notify the parties of the date of 

consideration of a motion for summary judgment if the court's local rules provide 

sufficient notice of the hearing date). Although the motion was served on Ryan on 

November 15, 2013, it was not deemed filed until November 21, 2013. Ryan thus had 14 

days from November 21, 2013 to file a response to the cross-motion for summary 

judgment. Ryan never filed a response to the cross-motion. 

{¶ 24} Ryan asserts, in the alternative, that at a January 27, 2013 hearing, the 

trial court "altered the response time created by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure to 

provide Appellant fourteen (14) days period of time for a reply to Plaintiff's CrossMotion For Summary Judgment * * * by stating that he * * * would be deciding the 

motions." (Emphasis sic.) (Appellant's brief, 32.) By January 27, 2014, Ryan's 14-day 

response period had already expired. Regardless, the trial court did not grant Ryan extra 

time to respond to the cross-motion for summary judgment. At the January 2014 

hearing, the trial court noted that it had several of Ryan's motions pending before the 
No. 14AP-102 10 

trial court. The trial court asked Ryan if there were any other motions which he intended 

to file, stating "[l]et's get it today, so I've got them all and I can deal with them, because I 

have to deal with them first before we can start this trial, and there are quite a few." (Tr. 

5-6.) The trial court did not indicate that it was providing Ryan with additional time to 

respond to the cross-motion for summary judgment. 

{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, Ryan's fourth and fifth assignments of error are 

overruled.

V. FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR – MOTION FOR 

 LEAVE 

{¶ 26} Ryan's first assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred by 

considering Capital One's motion for leave, as the motion did not contain proof of service 

as required by Civ.R. 5(B)(3). Ryan's second assignment of error asserts that, because the 

motion for leave was not served on Ryan, Capital One failed to obtain leave of court to file 

its cross-motion for summary judgment. Ryan's third assignment of error asserts that the 

trial court committed reversible error because it did not provide Ryan with 14 days to 

respond to the motion for leave.

{¶ 27} When a case "has been set for pretrial or trial, a motion for summary 

judgment may be made only with leave of court." Civ.R. 56(A) and (B). When Capital One 

sought to file its cross-motion for summary judgment on November 15, 2013, the case had 

already been set for pretrial and trial. Accordingly, Capital One had to obtain leave of 

court to file the cross-motion for summary judgment. 

{¶ 28} As Ryan asserts, there is no proof of service attached to the motion for leave. 

Civ.R. 5(A) states that "every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte 

* * * shall be served upon each of the parties." Civ.R. 5(B)(3) provides that a "served 

document shall be accompanied by a completed proof of service which shall state the date 

and manner of service * * *. Documents filed with the court shall not be considered until 

proof of service is endorsed thereon or separately filed." See also Nosal v. Szabo, 8th Dist. 

No. 83974, 2004-Ohio-4076, ¶ 21 (noting that "[u]nlike the instances where an opposing 

party has the burden to prove that it did not receive service of a filing even though there 

was a properly signed proof of service, where there is no proof of service wither attached 
No. 14AP-102 11 

to the filing or separately filed with the trial court, the trial court simply may not consider 

the filing"). 

{¶ 29} For the reasons that follow, however, we find the trial court's consideration 

of the motion for leave to be harmless error. In a civil action, "[n]o error in * * * any ruling 

or order or in anything done * * * by the court * * * is grounds for * * * disturbing a 

judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent 

with substantial justice." Civ.R. 61. "The court at every stage of the proceeding must 

disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights 

of the parties." Id. See also Grenga v. Smith, 11th Dist. No. 2001-T-0040 (Mar. 15, 2002) 

(noting that while a party "may have technically violated Civ.R. 5(A), appellants have not 

demonstrated how the failure to serve his motion upon the remaining appellees 

prejudiced them" and concluding that any error in service "was harmless"). 

{¶ 30} The granting of leave to file an untimely motion for summary judgment is 

discretionary with the trial court. Brinkman v. Toledo, 81 Ohio App.3d 429, 432 (6th 

Dist.1992); City Loan & Sav. Co. v. Howard, 16 Ohio App.3d 185, 189 (2d Dist.1984). 

Accordingly, "a trial court's decision to grant leave to file will not be reversed absent an 

abuse of discretion." Boyle v. City of Portsmith, 4th Dist. No. 99CA669 (Mar. 31, 2001). 

See also Paramount Supply Co. v. Sherlin Corp., 16 Ohio App.3d 176, 180 (8th Dist.1984) 

(noting that the party complaining about a court's decision to grant another party leave 

must demonstrate prejudice).

{¶ 31} A trial court may, "in exercise of its sound discretion, consider a motion for 

summary judgment which has been filed, without express leave of court, after the action 

has been set for pretrial or trial." Indermill v. United States, 5 Ohio App.3d 243 (9th 

Dist.1982), paragraph one of the syllabus. This is so because "[l]eave of court may be 

express or implied by the action of the court." Coney v. Youngstown Metro. Hous. Auth., 

7th Dist. No. 00-C.A.-251, 2002-Ohio-4371, ¶ 42. " '[W]here the acceptance of a motion 

occurs by the grace of the court, the decision to accept is by itself leave of court.' " Meyer 

v. Wabash Alloys, L.L.C., 8th Dist. No. 80884, 2003-Ohio-4400, ¶ 16, quoting Lachman 

v. Wiermarschen, 1st Dist. No. C-020208, 2002-Ohio-6656. By "addressing [a] motion 

for summary judgment [filed out of rule and without leave of court], the trial court 

implicitly grant[s] leave to * * * file it." Smith v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 75 Ohio 
No. 14AP-102 12 

App.3d 567, 572 (1st Dist.2000); Meyer at ¶ 16 (when the court "acknowledged their 

motion [for summary judgment filed without leave] and set a hearing date" the court 

"showed that retroactive leave to file was granted"); Juergens v. Stang, Klkubnik and 

Assoc., Inc., 96 Ohio App.3d 223, 234 (1994) (noting that "[t]he acceptance of the motion 

[for leave to file a motion for summary judgment] by the court after the case has been set 

for pretrial is in itself by leave of court albeit without the formal writing saying 'I seek the 

leave of court' "); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Corwin, 6th Dist. No. WD-00-058 

(May 18, 2001) (the trial court "impliedly granted Marx and Corwin leave to file their 

motion for summary judgment when it considered and ruled on the motion").

{¶ 32} Because the trial court could have implicitly granted Capital One leave to file 

the cross-motion for summary judgment by simply accepting and acknowledging the 

cross-motion, the trial court's order expressly granting the motion for leave filed without 

proof of service amounts to harmless error. Moreover, Ryan fails to demonstrate how the 

trial court's decision to grant the motion for leave prejudiced his case. After the trial court 

granted Capital One's motion for leave and the cross-motion for summary judgment was 

deemed filed, the trial court provided Ryan with well over 14 days to respond to the crossmotion. As the trial court provided Ryan with a full and fair opportunity to respond to the 

cross-motion for summary judgment, the trial court's decision to grant Capital One leave 

to file the cross-motion did not prejudice Ryan's case or impair his substantial rights in 

any way. Compare Boyle (noting that "[b]y allowing the appellee to file a late motion for 

summary judgment and ruling on it before the deadline for filing a memorandum in 

opposition to the motion, the trial court failed to allow appellants to properly prepare a 

response" and thus abused its discretion); Duren v. Americare Columbus Nursing Ctr., 

10th Dist. No. 89AP-688 (June 28, 1990) (finding reversible error where the trial court 

simultaneously granted a party leave to file a motion for summary judgment and ruled on 

the motion for summary judgment); Capital One Bank v. Toney, 7th Dist. No. 06 JE 28, 

2007-Ohio-1571, ¶ 50 (noting that "a mere four days after granting leave to seek summary 

judgment instanter, the trial court entered summary judgment without waiting for a 

response," thereby "violat[ing] Civ.R. 56(C), which requires the court provide the nonmovant at least fourteen days to respond and file opposing affidavits"); Cooper v. 

Valvoline Instant Oil Change, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-392, 2007-Ohio-5930, ¶ 10 (noting 
No. 14AP-102 13 

that as "Valvoline filed its motion for summary judgment [out of rule and without leave of 

court] two months prior to the scheduled trial date" and Cooper had "ample time to 

respond to Valvoline's arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment," the 

"[t]he record [was] devoid of any indication that the trial court's allowance of Valvoline's 

motion for summary judgment prejudiced Cooper's case"); Coney at ¶ 44. Although the 

trial court provided Ryan with ample time to do so, Ryan chose not to respond to the 

cross-motion. 

{¶ 33} As Ryan's substantial rights were not affected by the trial court's order 

granting the motion for leave which lacked proof of service, the trial court's consideration 

of the motion for leave amounts to harmless error. We further find that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in awarding Capital One leave to file the cross-motion for 

summary judgment. 

{¶ 34} Based on the foregoing, Ryan's first, second, and third assignments of error 

are overruled.

VI. SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND TENTH ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR – SUMMARY 

 JUDGMENT PROPERLY AWARDED ON AN ACCOUNT 

{¶ 35} Ryan's sixth assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in entering 

summary judgment in Capital One's favor, as Capital One failed to establish a provable 

sum for the beginning balance on the credit card account. Ryan's eighth assignment of 

error asserts that the cross-motion for summary judgment was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Ryan's tenth assignment of error asserts that Capital One failed to 

establish a prima facie case for an action based on an account.

{¶ 36} In general, "[a]n action on an account is appropriate where the parties 

have conducted a series of transactions for which a balance remains to be paid." Dept. 

Stores Natl. Bank v. McGee, 7th Dist. No. 12 MA 103, 2013-Ohio-894, ¶ 16. Actions 

seeking to collect on a credit card balance "constitute actions 'on an account.' " Id., 

quoting Toney at ¶ 34. "The purpose of an action on an account is 'to avoid the 

multiplicity of suits necessary if each transaction between the parties (or item on the 

account) would be construed as constituting a separate cause of action.' " Citibank v. 

Lesnick, 11th Dist. No. 2005-L-103, 2006-Ohio-1448, ¶ 8, quoting Am. Sec. Serv., Inc. v. 

Baumann, 32 Ohio App.2d 237, 242 (10th Dist.1972).
No. 14AP-102 14 

{¶ 37} In order to adequately plead and prove an account, the " 'account must 

show the name of the party charged.' " Asset Acceptance Corp. v. Proctor, 156 Ohio 

App.3d 60, 2004-Ohio-623, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.), quoting Brown v. Columbus Stamping & 

Mfg. Co., 9 Ohio App.2d 123, 126 (10th Dist.1967). Although "[i]t begins with a balance 

preferably at zero, or with a sum recited that can qualify as an account stated," the 

balance "at least * * * should be a provable sum. Following the balance, the item or 

items, dated and identifiable by number or otherwise, representing charges, or debits, 

and credits, should appear." Brown. A summary "is necessary showing a running or 

developing balance or an arrangement which permits the calculation of the balance 

claimed to be due." Id. To constitute an account, "it is not necessary that every 

transaction that has transpired between the parties be included during the entire 

existence of their business relationship." Wolf Automotive v. Rally Auto Parts, Inc., 95 

Ohio App.3d 130, 134 (10th Dist.1994). See Am. Express Travel Related Servs. v. 

Silverman, 10th Dist. No. 06AP338, 2006-Ohio-6374, ¶ 9-10 (concluding 4 years worth 

of credit card statements and copy of the cardmember agreement constituted sufficient 

evidence of an account, as requiring American Express to produce 30 years worth of 

statements constituted "an unreasonable burden").

{¶ 38} " 'An account rendered by one person to another and not objected to by the 

latter within a reasonable time becomes an account stated.' " Creditrust Corp. v. 

Richard, 2d Dist. No. 99-CA-94 (July 7, 2000), quoting 1 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, 

Accounts and Accounting, Section 27, at 204 (1998). It is "the duty of the one to whom 

the account is thus rendered to examine the same within a reasonable time and object if 

he or she disputes its correctness." Id. (concluding the plaintiff pled a proper account, 

even though the credit card statement attached to the complaint showed no debits or 

credits, where the debtor did not timely object to the final balance within 60 days after 

receiving the statement, as the cardholder agreement required).

{¶ 39} The credit card statements attached to Capital One's cross-motion for 

summary judgment begin with a statement reflecting a due date of June 12, 2011, and a 

balance on the account of $3,463.60. The statement shows the previous balance was 

$3,402.35, and that Ryan charged $96.35 in goods and services over the statement 

period, previously paid $70.00 on the account, and incurred $34.90 in interest charges. 
No. 14AP-102 15 

Following the June 2011 statement, the monthly statements continue, reflecting five 

months worth of purchases and payments. Thereafter, the statements reflect that Ryan 

stopped making any payments on the account but continued to incur late fees. The last 

statement reflects that the account was past due for the period from May 16 to 

August 15, 2012, and reflects a balance of $3,949.94. 

{¶ 40} Every credit card statement Ryan received informed Ryan that, if he saw 

an error on his statement, he was obligated to "contact us [Capital One] within 60 days 

after the error appeared on your statement. You must notify us of any potential errors in 

writing." (Edwards' Affidavit, exhibit A2.) Ryan failed to submit any evidence 

demonstrating that he, at any time, objected to the $3,463.60 balance in June 2011. 

After the June 2011 statement, the statements reflect that defendant continued to incur 

expenses and make payments on the account, thereby indicating his assent to the 

$3,463.60 balance as an account stated. See Crown Asset Mgt., L.L.C. v. Gaul, 4th Dist. 

No. 08CA30, 2009-Ohio-2167, ¶ 10, fn. 1 (determining that a party's assent to an 

account stated may be express or "implied when an account is rendered by the creditor 

to the debtor and the debtor fails to object within a reasonable amount of time").

{¶ 41} The trial court properly concluded that the credit card statements, spanning 

over one year, qualified as an account. The documents reflect defendant's name, the last 

four digits of the account number, the name of the credit card (Visa Platinum), a sum 

recited to which defendant did not object, and itemized debits and credits which permit 

calculation of the final amount due. We agree with the trial court that the materials 

submitted by Capital One in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment were 

sufficient to establish a prima facie case for money owed on an account. See Citibank, 

N.A. v. Katz, 8th Dist. No. 98753, 2013-Ohio-1041, ¶ 12.

{¶ 42} In his tenth assignment of error, Ryan asserts that that the "Record lacks a 

copy of any alleged agreement clearly between Appellant and the Capital One Bank" and 

contends that "[a] party cannot prevail on its claims without proving the existence of an 

agreement." (Appellant's brief, 48.) This court has stated that "credit card agreements 

are contracts whereby the issuance and use of a credit card creates a legally binding 

agreement." Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Palmer, 63 Ohio App.3d 491, 493 (10th 

Dist.1989). Capital One issued the credit card to Ryan, and Ryan thereafter used the 
No. 14AP-102 16 

credit card to purchase goods and services, thereby creating a contract. See Calvary SPV 

I, L.L.C. v. Furtado, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-361, 2005-Ohio-6884, ¶ 18 (concluding that 

although the "cardholder agreement [did] not bear defendant's signature, the bank's 

issuance of the card and defendant's use of the card create[d] a binding contract"). 

{¶ 43} Moreover, Capital One attached an unsigned copy of a customer 

agreement to Edwards' affidavit. The customer agreement states "[w]elcome to Capital 

One," and informs Ryan that the terms " 'we' 'us,' and 'our' " in the customer agreement 

"means Capital One Bank." (Edwards' Affidavit, exhibit A1.) Through the agreement, 

Ryan "promise[d] to pay [Capital One] * * * for all amounts due resulting from the 

authorized use of your card or account" and informed Ryan that the payments he 

"mail[ed] to [Capital One] at the address for payment stated on your periodic statement 

will be credited to your account." (Edwards' Affidavit, exhibit A1.) All of the credit card 

statements attached to the cross-motion for summary judgment instructed Ryan to make 

his checks payable to Capital One, and the return address on the statements listed Capital 

One's name and address.

{¶ 44} Under his eighth assignment of error, Ryan asserts that the trial court erred 

in granting the cross-motion for summary judgment because it "is unclear from the 

Record that the alleged account set out in the Complaint * * * is and always has been 

owned by Capital One Bank, (USA) N.A." (Appellant's brief, 40.) Capital One issued the 

credit card to Ryan, and Ryan never presented evidence to establish that Capital One 

assigned the account to another party. Ryan has "argued that Capital One Services LLC, 

not Plaintiff, is the only entity referenced on the alleged agreement form Plaintiff attached 

as Exhibit 'A3' to its Complaint." (Appellant's brief, 40.) The credit card statements 

expressly informed Ryan that his "account is being serviced by Capital One Services, 

LLC." (Complaint, exhibit A3.) Edwards explained in her affidavit that Capital One 

Services, LLC was an agent of Capital One. The record thus demonstrates that Capital One 

Services, LLC merely serviced Ryan's account as an agent of Capital One. There is no 

evidence indicating that Capital One assigned Ryan's account to another party. 

Accordingly, Ryan failed to present evidence which would establish a genuine issue of 

material fact regarding Capital One's ownership of the credit card account.
No. 14AP-102 17 

{¶ 45} Based on the foregoing, Ryan's sixth, eighth, and tenth assignments of 

error are overruled.

VII. SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR – EDWARDS' AFFIDAVIT

{¶ 46} Ryan's seventh assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred by 

failing to strike Edwards' affidavit. Although Ryan filed a motion to strike the crossmotion for summary judgment based on Capital One's failure to serve the motion for 

leave on Ryan, Ryan never filed a motion asking the trial court to strike Edwards' 

affidavit. It is well-settled that a litigant's failure to raise an issue before the trial court 

waives the litigant's right to raise that issue on appeal. Gentile v. Ristas, 160 Ohio 

App.3d 765, 2005-Ohio-2197, ¶ 74 (10th Dist.). Therefore, we conclude that Ryan has 

waived this issue by failing to raise it before the trial court, and that he may not raise it 

for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, Ryan's seventh assignment of error is 

overruled.

VIII. NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR – "FRIVOLOUS MOTIONS"

{¶ 47} Ryan's ninth assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred by 

noting in its judgment entry that, instead of responding to the cross-motion for 

summary judgment, Ryan "chose to file frivolous motions with the court." (Entry, 3.) 

Ryan asserts that the trial court's comment indicates that the trial court believed that 

Ryan had engaged in frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51. However, as Capital One did 

not file a R.C. 2323.51 motion for an award of costs and fees, and as neither Capital One 

nor the trial court sought to impose Civ.R. 11 sanctions on Ryan, we fail to see how the 

court's characterization of Ryan's motions as frivolous prejudiced Ryan's case. 

Accordingly, Ryan's ninth assignment of error is overruled.

IX. DISPOSITION

{¶ 48} Having overruled Ryan's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, 

eighth, ninth, and tenth assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin 

County Municipal Court.

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur. 

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