NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 23-1155

LEONOR BEATRIZ CASTILLO-IRAHETA; A. N. C.,

 Petitioners 

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

On Petition for Review of a

Decision of the Board of Immigrations Appeals

(A212-993-896 & A212-993-895)

Immigration Judge: John B. Carle

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

on November 3, 2023

Before: JORDAN, ROTH and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 5, 2024)

OPINION*

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Petitioners Leonor Castillo-Iraheta and her daughter, a minor, seek review of the 

dismissal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) of their appeal from the decision 

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the 

petition for review.

I. 

Castillo-Iraheta and her daughter are natives and citizens of El Salvador who 

entered the United States in May 2017. Because Castillo-Iraheta did not have valid travel 

documents at the time of the application for admission, the Department of Homeland 

Security began removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). She conceded 

removability and filed the applications already noted based on her membership in two 

particular social groups: “Women in El Salvador” and “Women in El Salvador who have 

had children with known gang members.” App. 9-11.1

In written briefs and testimony before the IJ, Castillo-Iraheta described that, back 

in El Salvador, she was in a relationship and had two daughters with Gerson Javier 

Rodriguez Bermudez (“Rodriguez”). In 2014, Rodriguez received a call from an MS-13 

gang member demanding that he transport drugs for the gang. When he refused, the 

1 Before the IJ, Castillo-Iraheta described her second proposed group as “Women in El 

Salvador who have had children with or by known gang members.” Agency Record 

(“A.R.”) 133-34. Before us, Castillo-Iraheta omits the term “known” from her second 

proposed group because it is “repetitive and unnecessary.” See Pet’r Br. 1, 9. For 

purposes of our review, we refer to the proposed group in the same manner as the IJ and 

BIA.
3

caller threatened to kill his family. Following the phone call, Castillo-Iraheta and her 

daughters moved to a town thirty minutes away, and her relationship with Rodriguez 

ended soon after. In 2015, she learned that Rodriguez, who turned out to be a member of 

a different gang, was killed by police. She never suspected his gang membership. 

After Rodriguez’s death, Castillo-Iraheta lived peacefully in her town for two 

years. In April 2017, a stranger approached her at a doctor’s office, asking if she was 

Rodriguez’s wife and ordering her to “never come around the area again,” or else she 

would be killed. App. 3. The man did not identify himself as a gang member, and 

Castillo-Iraheta testified he looked “normal” and did not have any visible gang tattoos. 

Id. Fearing for her safety, she and her older daughter left El Salvador and entered the 

United States in May 2017. Her younger daughter stayed in El Salvador with CastilloIraheta’s mother, where they still reside and have experienced no threats or violence. 

Castillo-Iraheta testified that, although she was never harmed while living in El Salvador, 

she believes she and her daughter will be raped and killed by MS-13 if they return. She 

also fears gang violence generally. 

In January 2021, the IJ found Castillo-Iraheta removable and denied her requested 

relief, concluding that she had not suffered past persecution and did not have a wellfounded fear of future persecution on account of her membership in a particular social 

group. See App. 1-16. The IJ reasoned that: (1) the isolated threats did not rise to the 

level of past persecution—Castillo-Iraheta safely relocated following MS-13’s threat to 

her former partner, and she was not physically harmed or contacted again by the stranger 

at the doctor’s office; (2) her proposed particular social groups were not cognizable; and 
4

(3) even if they were, she failed to establish a nexus between her membership in those 

groups and the harm she feared. As for nexus, he found no evidence that anyone ever 

targeted Castillo-Iraheta on account of her nationality or gender and observed that “gangs 

target people in El Salvador regardless of gender, age or family ties.” App. 12. Her 

former partner’s death “may have been rooted in his failure to comply with the demands 

of the gang or his changing loyalties to another gang,” and that “animus ... now extended 

to her and her daughter.” Id. The threat she received in 2017, the IJ concluded, thus

“was rooted in vendetta, revenge and/or criminality” and not based on Castillo-Iraheta’s 

status as a Salvadoran woman. Id. Having concluded that she failed to satisfy the 

requirements for asylum, the IJ determined Castillo-Iraheta necessarily could not meet 

the higher burden of proving entitlement to withholding of removal. He also denied her 

CAT protection because she had not shown a likelihood of future torture by or with the 

acquiescence of a Salvadoran government official. 

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. It agreed that the “unfulfilled threats” 

Castilla-Iraheta experienced—once indirectly through her former partner and once 

directly by a stranger—were neither “highly ... menacing [in] nature” nor “sufficiently 

imminent or concrete.” App. 19. The BIA also agreed that her proposed particular social 

groups failed to meet the requirements of particularity and social distinction. It also 

found no clear error in the IJ’s finding that Castillo-Iraheta did not demonstrate she was 

targeted because of her membership in her proposed social groups “rather than due to 

some form of animus [the individuals] had against her former partner.” App. 21. It thus 

upheld the IJ’s denial of Castillo-Iraheta’s application for asylum and withholding of 
5

removal. As for her application for relief under CAT, it affirmed the IJ’s determination 

that she was not likely to be subject to torture upon removal, “particularly because she 

has not shown that any gang members would be aware of her return to El Salvador, locate 

her, and target her for harm rising to the level of torture.” App. 21. She timely petitioned

for review.

II.2

Castillo-Iraheta challenges the BIA’s decision that she is ineligible for asylum or 

withholding of removal based on her membership in two proposed social groups. She 

also quibbles with the BIA’s denial of her application for relief under CAT.3

 We address 

each in turn.

2

 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R § 1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction under 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). “Although our jurisdiction only extends to final orders of removal 

and thus only to decisions of the BIA, we also review the IJ’s decision to the extent it is 

adopted, affirmed, or substantially relied upon by the BIA.” Guzman Orellana v. Att’y 

Gen., 956 F.3d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 2020). We review the agency’s factual findings for 

substantial evidence and its legal determinations de novo. See Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y 

Gen., 952 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2020). Under the substantial evidence standard, we 

must “uphold the agency’s determination unless the evidence would compel any 

reasonable fact finder to reach a contrary result.” Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220 

(3d Cir. 2015). 3 The Government claims Castillo-Iraheta “waived all of the dispositive and salient 

issues” by failing to “substantively rais[e]” that (1) she experienced past persecution, (2) 

a nexus exists between her feared future persecution and her membership in her proposed 

particular social groups, and (3) she is eligible for CAT protection. Gov’t Br. 12. We 

disagree with that characterization. As an initial matter, nothing in her opening brief 

suggests she intentionally relinquished these issues in her petition for review. See United 

States v. Dowdell, 70 F.4th 134, 140 (3d Cir. 2023) (cleaned up) (“Waiver is the 

intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” whereas “forfeiture is the 

failure to make the timely assertion of a right,” a distinction that “can carry great 

significance”). In this context, we fail to see how Castillo-Iraheta forfeited the nexus 

issue, as her opening brief addresses it. See Pet’r Br. 7-8. She also mentions past 

persecution and CAT eligibility. See Pet’r Br. v, xi, 7-9; United States v. Brow, 62 F.4th 
6

A. Asylum and Withholding of Removal

To establish eligibility for asylum, Castillo-Iraheta must show a reasonable 

likelihood that she has been persecuted—or has a well-founded fear of persecution if 

returned to El Salvador—based on her membership in a particular social group. See 

8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2018). 

The standard for withholding of removal is higher still, requiring her to demonstrate a 

“clear probability” that she will suffer persecution on account of a protected ground. 

Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2020). Persecution is generally 

understood to encompass only severe harms, such as “threats to life, confinement, torture, 

and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Fatin 

v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). “A showing of past persecution gives rise to a 

rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.” Thayalan v. Att’y 

Gen., 997 F.3d 132, 138 (3d Cir. 2021). Without that presumption, Castillo-Iraheta must 

demonstrate both a subjective fear of persecution and an objectively reasonable 

possibility of future persecution. See S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 544. 

Though Castillo-Iraheta primarily challenges the BIA’s rejection of her proposed 

social groups, we first dispense with her argument—to the extent that she advances it—

that the IJ and BIA erred in determining that the two threats she experienced do not 

establish that she was persecuted in the past. See Pet’r Br. 8. The BIA’s conclusion is 

supported by substantial evidence. Castillo-Iraheta did not personally experience bodily 

114, 119 n.4 (3d Cir. 2023) (“[W]e may ... ‘affirm on any ground supported by the 

record as long as the appellee did not waive—as opposed to forfeit—the issue.’”).
7

harm or lose her freedom in the two incidents to which she testified. Even though 

unfulfilled threats can constitute persecution if they pose a “severe affront to [her] life or 

freedom” that is “concrete and menacing,” see Blanco, 967 F.3d at 313, we agree with 

the BIA’s determination that the oral threats Castillo-Iraheta experienced, while 

unsettling, are not at that level. After the initial threat against her partner, she moved to a 

new town where she lived peacefully and without incident for more than two years. Her 

mother and younger daughter still reside in El Salvador and have encountered no

problems. And the individual who threatened Castillo-Iraheta never approached or 

threatened her again. With this backdrop, there is no presumption of future persecution.

We also agree with the BIA’s determination that Castillo-Iraheta failed to establish 

that she will be targeted on account of her membership in a cognizable “particular social 

group.” A group must be “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable 

characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in 

question.” S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 540. 

To satisfy the particularity requirement, the group must have “discrete and ... 

definable boundaries that are not amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.” Id. at 

548 (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 

determination that “women in El Salvador” lacks particularity. A group comprised of 

“all women in a particular country” is “overbroad[] because no factfinder could 

reasonably conclude that all [of a country’s] women had a well-founded fear of 

persecution based solely on their gender.” See Chavez-Chilel v. Att’y Gen., 20 F.4th 138, 

146 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Guatemalan women” not sufficiently particularized). 
8

Substantial evidence likewise supports the BIA’s conclusion that “women in El 

Salvador who have had children with known gang members” lacks particularity and 

“definable boundaries” to be socially distinct. App. 20. The IJ determined, and we 

agree, that it is unclear whether the proposed group “would include women who are 

currently involved in a relationship with a known gang member, women who recently 

ended their relationship, women who ended their relationship years ago and/or women 

who were only casually involved with the alleged gang member” and that it “would also 

include women who conceived their child in an act of sexual violence.” App. 11. 

Castillo-Iraheta makes no attempt to define this group more precisely in her petition for 

review. The IJ also noted the lack of evidence in the record establishing that members of 

her proposed group would be perceived, considered, or recognized in El Salvador as a 

distinct group. Again, Castillo-Iraheta fails to direct us to anything in the record to 

challenge that conclusion. 

Even assuming Castillo-Iraheta belongs to a cognizable social group, we agree that 

she failed to demonstrate the requisite link between that group and her feared harm. The 

IJ found no “persuasive evidence” to support the notion that she was targeted because she 

had a child with her former partner or that the stranger cared that he was a former gang 

member, let alone that she was targeted because she was a woman in El Salvador. App. 

12. Instead, the IJ determined the threats were “rooted in animosity” or “vendetta” 

against her former partner and rightly concluded that those acts do not establish a claim 

for asylum. Id.; see Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 685 (3d Cir. 2015) 
9

(“[c]onflicts of a personal nature,” like isolated criminal acts, are not persecution on 

account of a protected characteristic). 

Castillo-Iraheta’s sole response is her conclusory statement that she and her 

daughter “were threate[ne]d with death because of the fact that they were women, and 

also women associated with a gang member,” which, she contends, was “not a personal 

vendetta but a recognition that their membership in the enunciated groups made them 

vulnerable to persecutors who could not be reigned [sic] in by the government or 

authorities.” Pet’r Br. 8. But she presents no evidence to establish that her allegedly

protected grounds are a “central reason” for the mistreatment she experienced, or fears, in 

El Salvador. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 1252(b)(4)(B); Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 

F.3d at 685 (relief “may not be granted when the characteristic at issue ‘played only an 

incidental, tangential, or superficial role in persecution’”). In fact, Castillo-Iraheta

testified she “ha[d] not the faintest idea why” the stranger at the doctor’s office 

threatened her. A.R. 131. And we agree with the BIA that the generalized evidence of 

violence against women in El Salvador does not speak to the motivations of the two men 

who threatened her and does not atone for her failure to establish the requisite nexus. See 

Elsayed v. Att’y Gen., 366 F. App’x 340, 342 (3d Cir. Feb. 17, 2010) (citing Vente v. 

Gonzales, 415 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2005)) (“[G]eneralized violence does not excuse 

the petitioner from demonstrating a nexus between the persecutory acts and a protected 

category.”). 

In sum, there is no compelling reason to reverse the BIA’s determination that 

Castillo-Iraheta failed to demonstrate that she was, or will be, singled out on the basis of 
10

her membership in a particular social group. Her failure to establish eligibility for

asylum necessarily precludes her from meeting the more stringent standard for 

withholding of removal. See Hernandez Garmendia v. Att’y Gen., 28 F.4th 476, 484 (3d 

Cir. 2022).

B. CAT Relief

To qualify for relief under the Convention Against Torture, Castillo-Iraheta needed 

to prove that, if she were removed to El Salvador, she would “more likely than not” be 

tortured “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence” of public 

officials. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2); 1208.18(a)(1); Blanco, 967 F.3d at 315. “Torture is 

an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, 

inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” 8 C.F.R § 1208.18(a)(2). To determine 

whether a petitioner is likely to be tortured, the BIA considers “all evidence relevant to the 

possibility of future torture,” including evidence of “past torture” and “gross, flagrant or 

mass violations of human rights within the country of removal.” Id. § 1208.16(c)(3). 

Substantial evidence supports the determination that Castillo-Iraheta failed to 

demonstrate a likelihood of future torture. The IJ reasonably concluded that she did not 

suffer torture in the past. Because the threats she experienced do not rise to the level of 

persecution, they necessarily do not meet the more stringent standard for torture. We 

likewise agree with the IJ and BIA that she has provided no evidence tending to show a 

future likelihood that she will suffer such treatment. The BIA thus properly denied her 

application for relief under CAT. 

* * * * *
11

Castillo-Iraheta is ineligible for asylum or withholding relief because she has not 

shown past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her 

membership in a cognizable particular social group. She also is ineligible for CAT relief 

because she has not proven that she likely would be tortured when she returns to El 

Salvador. We thus deny her petition for review.