Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A04-1410-CR-458 | April 22, 2015 Page 1 of 17

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Patricia Caress McMath

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Cynthia L. Ploughe

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Bryson Tyrone Street,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 22, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

21A04-1410-CR-458

Appeal from the Fayette Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Beth A. Butsch, 

Judge

Cause No. 21C01-1406-FA-338

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Bryson Tyrone Street appeals his convictions and sentence after a jury found 

him guilty of the following offenses: burglary, as a Class A felony; attempted 

robbery, as a Class A felony; attempted robbery, as a Class B felony; battery, as 

a Class C felony; carrying a handgun without a license, a Class C felony;
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criminal recklessness, as a Class D felony; neglect of a dependent, as a Class D 

felony; possession of marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor; and to being an 

habitual offender. Street raises five issues for our review, which we consolidate 

and restate as the following four issues:

1. Whether some of Street’s convictions are prohibited under

Indiana double jeopardy law;

2. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error in 

the admission of certain evidence;

3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

Street’s conviction for neglect of a dependent, as a Class D 

felony; and

4. Whether the trial court erred when it sentenced Street for 

being an habitual offender.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Michael Corn and his girlfriend, Bria Benjamin, lived together in Connersville 

with their two-year-old son. Corn and Benjamin became acquainted with Street 

around March of 2014. Between March and June, Street visited Corn and 

Benjamin’s home “about ten” times. Trial Tr. at 157. 

[4] Around 8:00 a.m. on June 11, 2014, Corn, Benjamin, and their son were 

awoken by someone kicking in their back door. A neighbor observed “a 

chubby person in a gray hoodie,” blue jeans, and with “a bandana around the[]
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face” kicking in Corn and Benjamin’s door. Id. at 136. The neighbor called the 

police.

[5] Meanwhile, Corn exited the family bedroom to investigate the noise at his 

door. Corn met an African-American man in the kitchen, and Corn observed

that the man was wearing a gray hoodie, blue jeans, a bandana around his face, 

and blue gloves. Although the man’s face was covered, Corn recognized him as 

Street based on “his voice and his shape and the way” he talked. Id. at 168. In 

the bedroom, Benjamin also heard and recognized Street’s voice. Street 

demanded Corn’s money, and when Corn stated that he did not have any,

Street instead grabbed Corn’s marijuana off of a kitchen counter. Street then 

pulled out a .25 caliber handgun and shot Corn in the thigh. Another shot 

struck the kitchen wall. Street fled before the police arrived.

[6] When the police arrived, Corn and Benjamin were initially reluctant to identify 

Street. But they did so later on June 11, and officers obtained and executed a 

warrant to search Street’s residence later that day. In executing the warrant, 

officers seized .25 caliber ammunition, a grey sweatshirt, blue jeans with blue 

gloves stuffed inside them, and bandanas. The officer also seized firearms, 

which included a loaded .22 caliber revolver, found inside of a pillow case on 

Street’s bed. Street had lived at that residence “for a few months” and shared 

the residence with his girlfriend, Iva Fine; Fine’s daughter, T.A.F.; and Fine’s 
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grandson, J.T.1 Street, Fine, and J.T. all slept in the same bed. Appellant’s Br. 

at 10. T.A.F. “look[ed] to [Street] as a father figure.” Trial Tr. at 428. 

[7] Officers arrested Street. In the booking room of the police station, while 

officers were conducting a pat-down of Street, a .25 caliber handgun “fell out of 

his groin area.” Id. at 455. Officers also discovered a small bag of marijuana 

“in the groin area of Mr. Street.” Id. at 457. Later ballistics testing revealed 

that the shots fired inside Corn and Benjamin’s residence were fired from the 

.25 caliber handgun that had fallen out of Street’s “groin area” during his 

booking. Id. at 455.

[8] On July 15, 2014, the State filed its amended charging information against 

Street, in which the State alleged that Street had committed the following 

offenses:

 Count I: burglary, as a Class A felony, on the grounds that Street “did 

break and enter the building or structure of [Corn and 

Benjamin] . . . with the intent to commit a felony and said act resulted 

in bodily injury” to Corn; 

 Count II: attempted robbery, as a Class A felony, on the grounds that 

Street “did knowingly or intentionally attempt to take property, to-wit: 

U.S. Currency from . . . Corn[] by use of force or threat of force and 

said conduct resulted in serious bodily injury” to Corn; 

 

1

 We note that T.A.F. is not J.T.’s mother.
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 Count III: attempted robbery, as a Class B felony, on the grounds that 

Street “did knowingly or intentionally attempt to take property, to-wit: 

U.S. Currency from . . . Corn[] by use of force or threat of force, while 

armed with a deadly weapon or resulting in bodily injury” to Corn; 

 Count IV: battery, as a Class C felony, on the grounds that Street “did 

knowingly touch [Corn] in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; by means 

of a deadly weapon, to wit: gun”; 

 Count V: criminal recklessness, as a Class D felony, on the grounds 

that Street “did recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally[,] with a deadly 

weapon, to wit: gun, perform an act that created a substantial risk of 

bodily injury” to Corn, Benjamin, and/or their son, namely, “Street 

fired one or more gunshots inside the residence”; 

 Count VI: neglect of a dependent, as a Class D felony, on the grounds 

that Street, “having the care of J.T . . . a dependent, did knowingly 

place said dependent in a situation that endangered the dependent’s life 

or health”; 

 Count VII: carrying a handgun without a license, a Class C felony; and

 Count VIII: possession of marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor. 

Appellant’s App. at 52-53. The State also alleged Street to be an habitual 

offender.

[9] During Street’s ensuing jury trial, in addition to evidence showing the above 

facts, the State played two video recordings to the jury. In one, Fine stated that 

Street “‘just did six years’” and, in the other, another person, Marcus Armstead, 
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stated that “the last few days were the most he’d seen Mr. Street in ten years 

because Mr. Street had been in jail.” Appellant’s Br. at 5 (quoting State’s Exs. 

18 & 19). Street did not object to the admission of those recordings, but, after 

the jury had viewed them, Street requested an admonishment to the jury. The 

trial court agreed, stating: 

I am admonishing you[,] that means I’m telling you, that you are 

not to consider and to regard as if you have never heard any 

remarks of any of those people with regard to Mr. Street and 

whether or not he has ever had a prior conviction of any kind or 

has ever been in prison. If you heard anything like that, it’s as if 

you never heard. You are to completely disregard it.

Trial Tr. at 285. Street did not request a mistrial following the admonishment.

[10] In the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor discussed how the evidence 

related to Counts I through V in reverse order as follows:

Criminal recklessness [Count V] . . . [is] based upon the facts that 

[Street] fired the gun where [Corn, Benjamin, and J.T. lived]. 

That was an act . . . creating a substantial risk of injury. . . . That 

is (inaudible) by a deadly weapon . . . Count IV [Count IV 

alleged Class C felony battery by a deadly weapon]. Why did he 

come here? Money (inaudible). [Corn] admitted he sold 

marijuana. . . . [Street] went there[,] he came in and . . . said 

where’s it at, where’s it at. . . . [Corn] . . . said that [Street had] 

said where’s the money, where’s the money but remember 

(inaudible) because you know I have a bag of weed (inaudible). 

But the money wasn’t right there on the table in the kitchen. So 

[Street] comes in, kicks through the door . . . and then when he 

demanded money and doesn’t get [it] he . . . fires (inaudible) and 

grabs something he does see on the table of value. And . . . with 

a .25 auto resulting in bodily injury, the gunshot wound. 
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(Inaudible) all the evidence you’ll find that the State has met the 

burden of proof on each and every element of the crimes charged 

against [Street] and return a verdict of guilty on all counts.

Tr. at 561-62. The jury found Street guilty as charged. 

[11] Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court found numerous aggravating 

circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. The court then entered its 

judgment of conviction and imposed its sentence as follows:

The Court hereby commits the Defendant to the Indiana 

Department of Correction[] for: Count I—40 years concurrent 

with 40 years on Count II. The Court merges the convictions on 

Counts II and III; consecutive to [sic] 8 years on Count IV; 

concurrent with 3 years on Count V; concurrent with 3 years on 

Count VI; concurrent with 8 years on Count VII; concurrent with 

1 year on Count VIII; to be served CONSECUTIVE to 30 years 

on being a Habitual Offender for a total of 78 years. . . .

Appellant’s App. at 183. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Double Jeopardy

[12] We first consider Street’s contention that several of his convictions violate 

Indiana’s prohibitions against double jeopardy. Questions of double jeopardy 

implicate fundamental rights and, as such, may be raised for the first time on 

appeal, or even by this court sua sponte. See Smith v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1040, 

1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Whether convictions violate double jeopardy is a 
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pure question of law, which we review de novo. Rexroat v. State, 966 N.E.2d 

165, 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[13] Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits double jeopardy, 

providing that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” 

As our supreme court has explained:

In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999)[,] this Court 

concluded that two or more offenses are the same offense in 

violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the 

statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence 

used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one 

challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another 

challenged offense. Under the actual evidence test, we examine 

the actual evidence presented at trial in order to determine 

whether each challenged offense was established by separate and 

distinct facts. Id. at 53. To find a double jeopardy violation 

under this test, we must conclude that there is “a reasonable 

possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to 

establish the essential elements of one offense may also have 

been used to establish the essential elements of a second 

challenged offense.” Id. The actual evidence test is applied to all 

the elements of both offenses. “In other words . . . the Indiana 

Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evidentiary 

facts establishing the essential elements of one offense also 

establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential 

elements of a second offense.” Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 

833 (Ind. 2002).

Our precedents “instruct that a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the 

jury used the same facts to reach two convictions requires 

substantially more than a logical possibility.” Lee v. State, 892 

N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008) (citing cases). The reasonable 

possibility standard “fairly implements the protections of the 
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Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause and also permits convictions for 

multiple offenses committed in a protracted criminal episode 

when the case is prosecuted in a manner that insures that 

multiple guilty verdicts are not based on the same evidentiary 

facts.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53 n.46. The existence of a 

“‘reasonable possibility’ turns on a practical assessment of 

whether the [fact finder] may have latched on to exactly the same 

facts for both convictions.” Lee, 892 N.E.2d at 1236. We 

evaluate the evidence from the jury’s perspective and may 

consider the charging information, jury instructions, and 

arguments of counsel. Id. at 1234.

Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719-20 (Ind. 2013) (last alteration original).2

[14] Of particular relevance to this appeal is our supreme court’s opinion in Pierce v. 

State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002). In Pierce, the defendant broke into the 

house of his victim. Inside, he raped his victim and demanded money from her. 

The defendant’s assault resulted in bodily injury to the victim. The trial court 

entered judgment of conviction against the defendant for, among other things, 

burglary, as a Class A felony, and robbery, as a Class B felony.

[15] In reviewing those two convictions, our supreme court held:

To convict Pierce of burglary as a Class A felony, the State must 

show that: (1) Pierce broke and entered (2) the victim’s house (3) 

with the intent to commit a felony therein (4) resulting in either 

bodily injury or serious bodily injury. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 

(1998). To convict Pierce for robbery as a Class B felony, the 

State must show that Pierce: (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) 

 

2

 Street does not challenge the validity of his convictions under either the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution or under the statutory elements test of the Indiana Constitution.
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took money (3) from the presence of the victim (4) by use of force 

or threat of force and (5) while armed with a deadly weapon or 

resulting in bodily injury to the victim. Id. 35-42-5-1.

Each of these crimes includes evidence or facts not essential to 

the other. The taking of money supports the robbery and the 

breaking and entering supports the burglary, but neither is an 

element of the other crime. Nevertheless, we have long adhered 

to a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that 

are often described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by 

the constitutional test set forth in Richardson. See Richardson, 717 

N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring); id. at 57 (Boehm, J., 

concurring). Among these is the doctrine that where a burglary 

conviction is elevated to a Class A felony based on the same bodily injury 

that forms the basis of a Class B robbery conviction, the two cannot 

stand. Cf. Campbell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 495, 500 (Ind. 1993) 

(battery and burglary); Wolfe v. State, 549 N.E.2d 1024, 1025 (Ind.

1990) (attempted rape and robbery); McDonald v. State, 542 

N.E.2d 552, 555-56 (Ind. 1989) (two robberies). Accordingly, the 

robbery conviction is reduced to a C felony.

Id. (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).3

 

3

 In Leggs v. State, we stated: “A defendant is subjected to double jeopardy ‘where a felony is elevated in 

class based on the same statutory factor and factual basis that was used to elevate another felony in class, 

[thus] [sic] the two cannot stand together and one must be reduced in class.’” 966 N.E.2d 204, 208-09 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Pierce, 761 N.E.2d at 830) (first alteration original to Leggs). The language quoted 

within this quote does not appear in Pierce but, rather, is from Hancock v. State, 768 N.E.2d 880, 880 (Ind. 

2002). To be sure, however, the impermissible double enhancement in Pierce was expressly limited to “the 

same bodily injury” underlying the Class A felony burglary and the Class B felony robbery. 761 N.E.2d at 

830. Likewise, the “same statutory factor and factual basis that was used to elevate” the two felonies in 

Hancock was the same drugging of a victim of rape and criminal deviate conduct. 768 N.E.2d at 880. Thus, 

the language in Hancock is more limited than it appears. For example, it does not prohibit multiple 

enhancements based on a defendant’s use of the same weapon in the commission of multiple offenses, which 

would be contrary to our supreme court’s holding in Miller v. State, 790 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2003) (“The 

defendant’s use of the same weapon in the commission of separate and distinct offenses . . . does not present 

a violation of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause.”).
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[16] Likewise, in Campbell, our supreme court held:

The Court of Appeals remanded this cause to the trial court with 

instructions to vacate the class C felony battery conviction and 

resentence appellant for battery as a class B misdemeanor, 

because the enhanced felony level of both [the Class C felony 

battery and Class A felony burglary] was based upon the same 

injurious consequences, violating state and federal double 

jeopardy prohibitions. We agree. Although the battery 

information alleged use of a deadly weapon and the burglary 

information alleged serious bodily injury, the basis for the 

elevation of both crimes was the same slashing of [the victim’s]

face. Appellant was improperly sentenced for battery as a class C 

felony.

622 N.E.2d at 500, clarified as still good law on this issue, Pierce, 761 N.E.2d at 830

n.4.

[17] Here, Street first argues that his convictions for Counts I and II—burglary, as a 

Class A felony, and attempted robbery, as a Class A felony, respectively—

violate the rule announced in Pierce. The State concedes both that Street’s

convictions on Count I and Count II violated Street’s double jeopardy rights

under Pierce and that the proper remedy is to vacate Street’s conviction for 

Count II, attempted robbery as a Class A felony. 

[18] However, the State’s concession that Count II should be vacated appears to be 

premised on reinstating Street’s conviction for Count III, attempted robbery as 

a Class B felony, which the trial court had originally “merge[d]” with Count II. 

See Appellant’s App. at 183. The State is partly right; Count III should be 

reinstated, but not as a Class B felony. At the times relevant to Street’s 
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convictions, the base-level offense for robbery was as a Class C felony. I.C. § 

35-42-5-1 (2014). That offense was enhanced to a Class B felony if the 

defendant committed the offense while armed with a deadly weapon or the 

offense resulted in bodily injury to another person. Id. And it was enhanced to 

a Class A felony if it resulted in serious bodily injury to another person. Id. 

[19] Here, the only difference between Count II and Count III was the State’s 

alternative assertions that the injury to Corn was either serious bodily injury—

and therefore the Class A felony alleged under Count II—or bodily injury—and 

therefore the Class B felony alleged under Count III. That is, the State charged 

Count III as a lesser-included offense to Count II, and, as such, the trial court 

was correct to conclude that it could not punish Street under both Count II and 

Count III. See, e.g., Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002). But 

Count III is still an enhancement to the base, Class C felony robbery, and the 

enhancement under Count III is premised on the same bodily injury that 

formed the enhancement under Count I and elevated the burglary offense to a 

Class A felony. See I.C. § 35-43-2-1(2). Pierce expressly requires that the Class 

B felony robbery conviction be reduced in these circumstances to a Class C 

felony. 761 N.E.2d at 830.

[20] We next consider Street’s argument that his conviction under Count IV—

battery, as a Class C felony—must be vacated in light of his conviction under 

Count III. As with the State above, here Street is partly right: his conviction 

for battery, as a Class C felony, cannot stand, but it cannot stand because the 

enhancement under Count IV is based on the same facts that resulted in his 
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enhancement under Count I, burglary as a Class A felony. As our supreme 

court explained in Campbell: “Although the battery information alleged use of a 

deadly weapon and the burglary information alleged serious bodily injury, the 

basis for the elevation of both crimes was the same” injury to the victim—

namely, Corn being shot by Street’s use of the deadly weapon. 622 N.E.2d at 

500. Accordingly, as in Campbell, here the Class C felony conviction must be 

reduced to a Class B misdemeanor. Id.; see I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a).

[21] In sum, we reverse Street’s convictions under Counts II, III, and IV. We 

remand with instructions that the trial court: vacate Street’s conviction under 

Count II; reinstate Street’s conviction under Count III for robbery, as a Class C 

felony; and reduce Street’s conviction under Count IV to battery, as a Class B 

misdemeanor. On remand, the court shall resentence Street accordingly.

Issue Two: Fundamental Error

[22] We next consider Street’s argument that his convictions must be reversed 

because the trial court committed fundamental error when it permitted the jury 

to hear the video recordings of Fine and Armstead, who both referenced 

Street’s prior incarceration. Because Street did not object to the admission of 

this evidence, “we will only reverse the trial court if the trial court committed 

error that was . . . a substantial, blatant violation of due process that must be so 

prejudicial to the rights of a defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” 

Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 11 (Ind. 2015) (quotations omitted)..
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[23] There is no question that it was error for the jury to hear of Street’s irrelevant 

prior convictions. As the Indiana Supreme Court has stated: “evidence of a 

prior conviction is as prejudicial as evidence can get . . . .” Thompson v. State, 

690 N.E.2d 224, 235 (Ind. 1997). Seizing on this, Street asserts that “we cannot 

say the jury’s decision was not based on knowing Mr. Street had previously 

been incarcerated for committing a criminal offense.” Appellant’s Br. at 6 

(emphasis added).

[24] But we can say exactly that. While Street did not object to the admission of the 

erroneous statements, he did request an admonishment that the jury disregard 

them, and the trial court admonished the jury accordingly. “We presume the 

jury followed the trial court’s admonishment and that the excluded testimony 

played no part in the jury’s deliberation.” Francis v. State, 758 N.E.2d 528, 532 

(Ind. 2001). If we must presume the jury followed an admonishment, then we 

cannot assume, as Street does, that the jury considered the erroneous statements

covered by the admonishment. 

[25] Moreover, the erroneously admitted statements were isolated, passing 

comments in a voluminous record. Cf. Rosales, 23 N.E.3d at 16 (holding that, 

but for the State’s “repeated insistence” on an erroneous statement of the mens 

rea necessary to convict, “the error in this case likely would not rise to the level 

of fundamental”). Juxtaposed against those passing comments is the thorough 

and descriptive testimony of Corn, Benjamin, and numerous officers and other 

witnesses. Those witnesses, among other things, personally identified Street as 

the invader or as the possessor of the handgun or determined that the handgun 
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found on Street’s person had been used in the home invasion. In light of that 

significant and incriminating testimony, we cannot say that the error here was 

so substantial and blatant as to have made a fair trial impossible. Therefore, no 

fundamental error occurred, and we affirm Street’s convictions.

Issue Three: Sufficient Evidence of Neglect of a Dependent

[26] Street also asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support 

his conviction for neglect of a dependent, as a Class D felony. Our standard for 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal 

conviction is as follows:

First, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of 

witnesses. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). 

Second, we only consider “the evidence supporting the judgment 

and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such 

evidence.” Id. (quoting Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 

2008)). A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial 

evidence of probative value supporting each element of the 

offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “It is the job of 

the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular 

case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we 

consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s 

ruling.” Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. 2005) 

(citations omitted).

Willis v. State, ___ N.E.3d ___, slip op. at 3 (Ind. 2015).

[27] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-46-1-4(a), to show that Street had 

committed neglect of a dependent, as a Class D felony, the State was required 
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to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Street, “having the care of a dependent, 

whether assumed voluntarily or because of a legal obligation,” knowingly or 

intentionally placed the dependent in a situation that endangered the 

dependent’s life or health. As alleged here, the State needed to show that Street 

had care of J.T. and knowingly or intentionally placed J.T. in a situation that 

endangered J.T. Street’s only argument on appeal is that the State did not show 

that Street voluntarily assumed care of J.T.

[28] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Street’s conviction. The 

State showed that Street allowed J.T. to sleep in Street’s bed. And, while J.T. 

slept in that bed, Street had a loaded firearm inside a pillow case on the bed. A 

reasonable trier of fact could conclude that, during that time, Street had 

voluntarily assumed care of J.T. while also placing J.T. in an endangering 

situation. Thus, we affirm Street’s conviction for neglect of a dependent, as a 

Class D felony.

Issue Four: Habitual Offender Enhancement

[29] Finally, we address Street’s contention that the trial court erred when it ordered 

Street’s habitual offender enhancement to be an independent, thirty-year 

sentence consecutive to the sentences imposed for Street’s offenses. The State 

concedes that the trial court erred in this respect. “A habitual offender finding 

does not constitute a separate crime nor does it result in a separate sentence[;] 

rather[,] it results in a sentence enhancement imposed upon the conviction of a 

subsequent felony.” Hendrix v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1045, 1048 (Ind. 2001). Thus, 
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we remand with instructions that the court properly impose Street’s habitual 

offender conviction as a sentence enhancement.

Conclusion

[30] In sum, we reverse Street’s convictions under Counts II, III, and IV, and we 

reverse the trial court’s imposition of a freestanding sentence for the habitual 

offender enhancement. We remand with instructions that the trial court: 

vacate Street’s conviction under Count II; reinstate Street’s conviction under 

Count III for robbery, as a Class C felony; reduce Street’s conviction under 

Count IV to battery, as a Class B misdemeanor; and resentence Street, 

including properly applying Street’s habitual offender enhancement against 

him. On all other issues, we affirm.

[31] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.