alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

### Medina, Dayana

From: kpgaus@aep.com Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2013 8:36 AM To: Pettyjohn, Mary; Medina, Dayana Cc: Brian Bond (tbbond@aep.com); wemast@aep.co m; kjmunson@aep.com; jjhenry@aep.com; bwmoore@aep.com; jchendricks@aep.com; jjewell@trinityconsultants.com Subject: Re: FW: EPA Response regarding AEP/SWEPCO Flint Creek
Attachments: Consolidated Spreadsheet_2013-04- 05.xlsx; Final ADEQ Cost Estimate Summary WEM Rev 2 4-5-5.xlsx; flint_creek_april_2013_bart_response.pdf; Flint_ Creek_BART_Analysis_2013-04-05.pdf; AEP MATS letter-7-18-12.pdf

Mary, attached is a response to EPA's questions, a revised BART FFA, and updated cost files. Please note that the updated modeling files are available on Trinity's FTP site. T he user name is AEP and the passwo rd is Trinity. Let me know if you have any questions.

Kris Gaus, QEP American Electric Power Air Quality Services office: 214/777-1113 fax: 214/777-1138

"Pettyjohn, Mary" <PETTYJOHN@adeq.state.ar.us> wrote on 03/26/2013 07:50:20 AM:

> "Pettyjohn, Mary" <PETTYJOHN@adeq.state.ar.us>
> 03/26/2013 07:50 AM

>

> To

> > "Kris Gaus (kpgaus@aep.com)" <kpgaus@aep.com>, "Brian Bond > (tbbond@aep.com)" <tbbond@aep.com>

>

> cc

> > Subject

> > FW: EPA Response regarding AEP/SWEPCO Flint Creek

>

> FYI

> > From: Medina, Dayana [ mailto:Medina.Dayana@epa.gov ] > Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 4:28 PM > To: Pettyjohn, Mary > Cc: Donaldson, Guy; Feldman, Michael > Subject: EPA Response regarding AEP/SWEPCO Flint Creek

> > Hi Mary,

> > Here is our response to the email you forwarded on 3/19/13 from AEP/SWEPCO.

> > Thank you for providing a copy of the vendor’s performance guarantee > of NID for Flint Creek. However, it is unclear to us what the > averaging period is for the vendor’s 0.055 lb/MMBtu emission > guarantee (i.e., is this on a 30 day rolling average?). The average > controlled emission rate can vary considerably depending on whether > performance is being measured on a daily, monthly, or annual time > period. If any other page(s) of the vendor’s proposal specify the > averaging time period, please provide this to us. BART limits have > generally been based on a 30 day rolling average.2 > > For NOx BART, if you have a vendor guarantee or any other > documentation to support the selection of 0.23 lb/MMBtu (using LNB/ > OFA), please provide this to us as well.

>

>

> > Thank you,

> > Dayana Medina > U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 6 > Multimedia Planning and Permitting Division > Air Planning Section (6PD-L)

> 214-665-7241

>
#### James M. Smith et al., Respondents, *v.*Wilson G. Fox, impleaded, etc., Appellant.

(Argued September 28, 1871;

decided January *term,*1872.)

Action upon a promissory note, dated March 3d, 1866, payable sixty days from date, executed by defendants and discounted by one Edward S. Rich, an individual banker. Plaintiffs claimed title by virtue of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, executed by Rich, April 12,1866. At the time Fox had a balance to his credit on deposit account with Rich to more than the amount of the note. Defendants asked to have sufficient of the account to balance the note set off against it. This the court refused. *Held, error,*on authority, of the case of *Smith*v. *Felton*43 FT. Y., 419).

*Sarmiel Hand*for the appellants.

*John Ganson*for the respondents.

Gteay, C., reads for reversal.

All concur.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide event.
Marie J. CHAMPAGNE, Petitioner, v. HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee FOR DEUTSCHE ALT-A SECURITIES MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2007-1, Respondent.

Case No. 2D17-4484

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 18, 2018.

Douglas W. Grissinger of Mellor, Grissinger & Backo, LLP, North Port, for Petitioner.

Michele L. Stocker of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Fort Lauderdale; and Kimberly S. Mello and Vitaliy Kats of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Dismissed.

KELLY, MORRIS, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
1

Small Manufacturing Process for PMN Chemical
Dow-WeylChem CDA #AR31320 1

Small Processing for PMN Chemical

1

2

Pot Boiler Distill x3

35 Heavies (20 NCS)

50 Lights (5 NCS)

Drum

Storage

4

3

175 NCS

from Reaction

260 Crude Product (200 NCS)

5

Water/Solvent

NCS = New Chemical Substance

all quantities = kg/day

6 Cleaning
Dow-WeylChem CDA #AR31320 1

Large Manufacturing Process for PMN Chemical

Reaction

Vessel

Divinylbenzene/Ethylvinylbenzene 1600

Solvent 6000

Hydrogen Peroxide 50% 2300

Catalyst and other Additives 800

Water 

6200 water and organics

(25 NCS)

1

3

1750 Organic

(1550 NCS)

4

Distill x3

200 Heavies (95 NCS) 

100 Lights (5 NCS)

Drum or 

Bulk 

Container

Storage

6

5

1450 NCS

7

Water/Solvent

Solvent 

2

8

Cleaning

NCS = New Chemical Substance

all quantities = kg/batch
Susie Lee MCLEMORE v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY

CR-15-0977

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

January 6, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Reh. denied.
Deborah L. WOOD, a/k/a Deborah Wood. Appellant, v. GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3332

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
The RESULTS TEAM. COM, INC., Appellant, v. CAPISTRANO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Cammy Fitzgerald, Shannon Cox and Seminole County Clerk of Court, Appellees.

Case No. 5D17-2718

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Armando RAMIREZ-HERNANDEZ, also known as Victor Garcia, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11712 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 3, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Armando Ramirez-Hernandez, Pro Se

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Armando Ramirez-Hernandez *321has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Ramirez-Hernandez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cíe. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### EDWARD BRENNAN *v.*BURGER KING CORPORATION

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15777.

*James P. Brennan,*in support of the petition.

Decided September 24, 1997

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 46 Conn. App. 76 (AC 15770), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff had proven future medical expenses to a reasonable probability?”
exv10w16xay






EXHIBIT 10.16(a)




AMENDMENT TO OPTION AGREEMENT

WITH GRANT DATE MARCH 24, 2008




     WHEREAS, Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc. (the “Company”) and Lyn Kirby (“Optionee”)
are parties to an Option Agreement with a Grant Date of March 24, 2008 (the “Option Agreement”)
whereby the Company granted Optionee the option to purchase 625,000 shares of the Company’s Common
Stock at an exercise price equal to $14.06 per share (the “Option”);



     WHEREAS, the Board of Directors on December 10, 2008 agreed to extend the exercise period of
the Option following termination of Optionee’s employment in certain circumstances; and



     WHEREAS, the Company and the Optionee desire to amend the Option Agreement to reflect this
extension.



     NOW THEREFORE, the Company and the Optionee hereby agree to amend Section 2 of the Option
Agreement effective December 10, 2008 to read as follows:




“2. Option Period. The Option shall be valid for a term commencing on the Grant
Date and will expire the earliest of: (i) ten (10) years from the Grant Date; (ii) the date
three (3) months after the Optionee voluntarily ceases to be a Service Provider, other than
for Good Reason (as defined in Optionee’s Employment Agreement with the Company dated June
16, 2008), death or Disability; (iii) June 24, 2012; (iv) fifteen (15) months after Optionee
ceases to be a Service Provider as a result of death or Disability; or (v) the date Optionee
ceases to be a Service Provider for reasons of Cause.”


In all other regards the Option Agreement shall remain in effect and outstanding.




Dated: January 27, 2009




ULTA SALON, COSMETICS & FRAGRANCE, INC.




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	/s/ Dennis K. Eck
 	 
	 	By:  	Dennis K. Eck 	 
	 	Its:  	Non-Executive Chairman 	 



OPTIONEE




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	/s/ Lyn Kirby
 	 
	 	Lyn Kirby
Jerrell Demetrius ROBERTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-0195

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 17, 2018]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Nancy Jack, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Damoorgian, Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.
Aaron C. PORTER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. David GEE, Sheriff of Hillsborough County; NaphCare, Inc., Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-1620

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 17, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

This appeal is dismissed as untimely filed.

The appellant's notice of voluntary dismissal" is denied as moot.

KELLY, MORRIS, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
#### FEPULIAI, Plaintiff v. FAUMUINA and LEALATAUA COUNTY, Defendants

No. 10-1904

High Court of American Samoa Civil Jurisdiction, Trial Division [Land: “Utuloa” near Steppe’s Point]

January 9, 1908

E. W. GURR, *Senior Member of Court;*MAUGA, Associate *Member*

DECREE

AT A SESSION of the High Court, held at Leone, on the 9th day of January, A.D., 1908.

> PRESENT, The Honorable E. W. Gurr, *Senior Member,*and the Honorable Mauga, *Associate Member*

> APPEARANCES:

> Fepuliai,

> Faumuina

> Leoso and Tuitele, *representing Lealataua County.*

*175THIS CAUSE having been brought on for trial pursuant to Precept of the President of the High Court, dated August 10th, 1907, and the parties appearing in propriae personae, the cause was tried before the Court, whereupon witnesses on the part of the plaintiff and the defendants were duly sworn and examined, and the evidence being closed, the cause was submitted to the Court for consideration and decision; and after deliberation thereof, the Court files its decision in writing, and

ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES that that portion of the land in dispute beginning at the mouth of the stream, Vai Saumani, upon the southernmost extremity of the land Fagalue, heretofore decreed to be the property of Toomata, thence in a northwesterly direction along the boundary between said land of Toomata — styled Fagalua —bearing 167 degrees, 300 feet; thence bearing 145 degrees, 400 feet; thence bearing 135 degrees, 300 feet; thence bearing 121 degrees, 100 feet; thence bearing 162 degrees, 270 feet; thence bearing 143 degrees, 284 feet to a rock on the seacoast thence following the seacoast in a southerly direction to Steppe’s Point, and again following the seacoast in a northeasterly direction to the place of beginning — said land being known as “Utuloa” — is the property of defendant Faumuina and of the Leusoalii (a body of “matais” of which Fepuliai is a member).
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan Jose GARCIA-GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40063 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 30, 2017

*296Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Juan Jose Garcia-Garcia, Pro Se

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Juan Jose Garcia-Garcia has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Garcia-Garcia has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with' counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave' to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6898** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. LORENZO RANTELLE NICHOLSON, a/k/a Zo , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Cour t for the District of South Carolina , at Greenville
. Henry M. Herlong, Jr. , Senior District Judge. ( 6:08

- cr - 00117

- HMH

- 4; 6:11

- cv - 70089

- HMH )

Submitted : December 20, 2011 Decided: December 22, 2011

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

D ismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Lorenzo Rantelle Nicholson, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circui t.2 PER CURIAM: Lorenzo Rantelle Nicholson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2011 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (200 6 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satis fies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2 003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U. S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Nicholson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and lega l3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Russell L. YATES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-484

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 15, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Brianna Knoppow EPA
#### Steven Dixon PRENTICE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. State of NORTH CAROLINA; United States of America, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 16-7678

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 27, 2017

Decided: May 4, 2017

Steven Dixon Prentice, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Steven Dixon Prentice seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his motion construed as one under both 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), (B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” *Id.*§ 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *See Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000);see *also Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *See Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Prentice has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
**Exhibit 31.3**
I, Derek Chang, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K ofCharter Communications Holdings, LLC and CharterCommunications Holdings Capital Corporation; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state amaterial fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, andother financial information included in this report,fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrants as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4.  The registrants’ other certifying officer(s) and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrants and have:
 (a)  Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to theregistrants, including their consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities,particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;  (b)  [Reserved];  (c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrants’ disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the periodcovered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  (d)  Disclosed in this report any change inthe registrants’ internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred duringthe registrants’ most recent fiscalquarter (the registrants’ fourth fiscalquarter in the case of an annual report)that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect,the registrants’ internal control overfinancial reporting; and
5.  The registrants’ other certifying officer(s) and I havedisclosed, based on our most recent evaluation ofinternal control over financial reporting, to theregistrants’ auditors and the audit committee of theregistrants’ board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions):
 (a)  All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrants’ ability torecord, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  (b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in theregistrants’ internal control overfinancial reporting.
Date: March 31, 2005   /s/ Derek Chang    Derek Chang  Interim Co-Chief Financial Officer  (Co-Principal Financial Officer)
1

Mears, Gilbert

From: Susan H. Jones <susan.jones612@earthlink.net>

Sent: Friday, August 29, 2014 10:02 AM

To: Mears, Gilbert

Subject: Docket #: EPA-HQ-TRI-2013-0281

Follow Up Flag: Flag for follow up

Flag Status: Flagged

Mr. Gilbert Mears

Toxics Release Inventory Program Division Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20460

Dear Mr. Mears:

More and more citizens are joining the fight against the oil and gas industries' invasion of our lives.  There is too much

danger associated with fracking and too much use of our precious water resources and loss of that water as it becomes

toxic waste.  There are too many problems with figuring out how to dispose of that waste.   

Please close the TRI Loophole that the oil and gas industries currently enjoy. America deserves to be moving forward

toward renewable sources of energy and not having the oil and gas industry use their power and money to keep this

country from leading the world in new sustainable technologies.

We all deserve to know exactly what oil and gas industry operations are releasing into our air, water and onto our land.  

The public's right to know must be guaranteed.

TRI reporting is crucial for all of us as we make decisions about the future of our country and the future of the whole

planet.

Sincerely,

Susan H. Jones

612 Hastings St.

Pittsburgh, PA  15206
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

May 30, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
133112 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 133112 COA: 264234 Wayne CC: 05-001502-01 LAMAR EDWARD TATE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 12, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

t0521 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 30, 2007

Clerk