alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 8 (Monday, January 13, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 2243]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-00405]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 8583]

In the Matter of the Designation of Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi; 
Also Known as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Also Known as Ansar al-Shariah 
Brigade; Also Known as Ansar al-Shari'a Brigade; Also Known as Katibat 
Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Also Known as Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; 
Also Known as Al-Raya Establishment for Media Production; Also Known as 
Ansar al-Sharia; Also Known as Soldiers of the Sharia; Also Known as 
Ansar al-Shariah; Also Known as Supporters of Islamic Law; as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist Pursuant to Section 1(b) of 
Executive Order 13224, as Amended

    Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(b) 
of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive 
Order 13268 of July 2, 2002, and Executive Order 13284 of January 23, 
2003, I hereby determine that the entity known as Ansar al-Shari'a in 
Benghazi, Also Known as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, Also Known as Ansar 
al-Shariah Brigade, Also Known as Ansar al-Shari'a Brigade, Also Known 
as Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, Also Known as Ansar al-Shariah-
Benghazi, Also Known as Al-Raya Establishment for Media Production, 
Also Known as Ansar al-Sharia, Also Known as Soldiers of the Sharia, 
Also Known as Ansar al-Shariah, Also Known as Supporters of Islamic 
Law, committed, or poses a significant risk of committing, acts of 
terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.
    Consistent with the determination in section 10 of Executive Order 
13224 that ``prior notice to persons determined to be subject to the 
Order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States 
would render ineffectual the blocking and other measures authorized in 
the Order because of the ability to transfer funds instantaneously,'' I 
determine that no prior notice needs to be provided to any person 
subject to this determination who might have a constitutional presence 
in the United States, because to do so would render ineffectual the 
measures authorized in the Order.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register.

     Dated: December 31, 2013.
John F. Kerry,
Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 2014-00405 Filed 1-10-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
#### Prentis L. HERNDON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALUTIIQ EDUCATION AND TRAINING, LLC, Defendant-Appellant, and Janina Zequeira-Perez, Defendant. Ahtna, Inc.; Arctic Slope Regional Corporation; Bristol Bay Native Corporation; Calista Corporation; Chugach Alaska Corporation; Koniag, Inc.; Old Harbor Native Corporation; Sealaska Corporation, Amici Supporting Appellant.

No. 16-1964

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 27, 2017

Decided: May 5, 2017

Ramsay C. McCullough, Kristina H. Va-quera, JACKSON LEWIS PC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Prentis L. Hern-don, Appellee Pro Se. Kevin Mark Cuddy, Sarah Langberg, STOEL RIVES LLP, Anchorage, Alaska, for Amici Supporting Appellant.

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Alutiiq Education & Training, LLC (“AET”) seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 546-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order AET seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. *See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,*546 U.S. 500, 515-16, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006); *see also*43 U.S.C. § 1626(g) (2012). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and deny Herndon’s motion to appoint counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Kevin Gene JEFFRIES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-209

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 11, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. SS. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of Crazy Woman Creek Bancorp
Incorporated  (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2003
(the "Report") as filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date
hereof, we, Gary J. Havens,  President and Chief Executive Officer,  and John B.
Snyder,  Vice President,  and Chief Financial Officer,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

(1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section  13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Gary J. Havens                          /s/ John B. Snyder
-------------------------------------       ----------------------------------
Gary J. Havens, President and               John B. Snyder, Vice President and
  Chief Executive Officer                     Chief Financial Officer



August 13, 2003

         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been  provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and  furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS AT AND FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH
31, 1999, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          25,397
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   84,901
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,763
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               116,127
<PP&E>                                         134,082
<DEPRECIATION>                                  20,333
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 240,386
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          134,035
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             2
<OTHER-SE>                                     104,388
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   240,386
<SALES>                                        140,529
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               140,529
<CGS>                                          121,435
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  134,473
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (223)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   777
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (218)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,497
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,274
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,223
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,223
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.22
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.22
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit
32




Certification
of Pennsylvania Commerce Bancorp, Inc. pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.




Pursuant
to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the
undersigned officers of Pennsylvania Commerce Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) does
hereby certify with respect to the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for
the period ended December 31, 2008 (the “Report”), that:




·
            The
      report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
  and




·
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material
      respects, the Company’s financial condition and results of
      operations.









/s/
      Gary L. NalbandianGary
      L. Nalbandian,
              Chief Executive
      Officer

















/s/
      Mark A. ZodyMark
      A. Zody,
              Chief Financial
      Officer

















Dated:   March
16, 2009




The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 1350 of
Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not being filed as part of the
Report or as a separate disclosure document.
#### In the Matter of the Bank of the United States, in Liquidation. Bayou Interests, Inc., Appellant. Garcent Corporation et al., Respondents.

Submitted April *21,*1943;

decided April 22, 1943.

Motion to amend remittitur denied without costs. (See 290 N. Y. 279.)
#### In the Matter of the Testimony of Phillip Kitzer, Sr., Before the United States Grand Jury—65 GJ 2072. Appeal of Phillip KITZER, Sr.

No. 15650.

United States Court of Appeals *Seventh*Circuit.

Nov. 18, 1966.

Doris A. Coonrod, Chicago, III., for appellant.

Edward V. Hanrahan, U. S. Atty., Nicholas M. Karzen, Chicago, Ill., for appellee, John Peter Lulinski, Lawrence Jay Weiner, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel.

Before ENOCH, EILEY and SWYGERT, Circuit Judges.

*678PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Phillip Kitzer, Sr., contends that he was denied due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution because the district court denied him a hearing before entering judgment dismissing his sworn petition. We have considered the briefs and the record in the light of the oral arguments made in this court, and we affirm the judgment.

The substance of the petition is that Kitzer gave certain testimony to the Grand Jury in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, on the promise of the Assistant United States Attorney that he would not be named in any indictment based upon that testimony; that notwithstanding the promise, the testimony given was transmitted without authority of a court order to a Grand Jury in Minnesota in violation of Fed.R. Crim.P. 6(e); that the subsequent order of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois authorizing transmission of that testimony to the Minnesota Grand Jury was entered without knowledge of the broken promise to Kitzer and without knowledge that the testimony had already been sent to Minnesota ; and that by virtue of the “tainted testimony” petitioner was indicted by the Minnesota Grand Jury following the breach of the promise of the Assistant 'United States Attorney.

The relief prayed was an order directing the Attorney General of the United States to move the Minnesota District Court to dismiss the indictment or, al-ternatively, for an order restraining further proceedings in the prosecution of the Minnesota indictment or an order .suppressing as evidence in that prosecution the disclosures made by petitioner to the Grand Jury in the Northern District •of Illinois.

We think it is clear that the district court was without jurisdiction to control discretionary actions of the Attorney General or to grant the relief requested with respect to him. Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1955).

The request for an order suppressing the “tainted” evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) contained no allegations which had not been concluded by the Minnesota court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the Minnesota indictment. No authority has been cited to support Kitzer’s claim to a hearing on his 41(e) motion when a previous motion on the same grounds was denied. We see no merit in this contention and hold that the district court did not err in denying the 41(e) motion without a hearing.

Affirmed.
Sandra ROSENBERG, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.

No. 1D17-2453

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 29, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jason C. MCCLURE, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50535 Cons. w/16-50536 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 27, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, Kenneth P. Kaplan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Kevin Joel Page, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jason C. McClure appeals his below guidelines sentence for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute methylone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C), 846. Because methylone is not specifically referenced in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), in calculating the guidelines range, the district court determined that MDMA was the most closely related controlled substance and therefore applied *285MDMA’s 500:1 drug equivalency ratio. On appeal, McClure contends that the district court did not recognize its authority to reject the 500:1 ratio and vary below the calculated guidelines range on that basis.

Although McClure objected to the court’s use of the 500:1 ratio, he did not object to the district court’s explanation for denying his objection or otherwise suggest that the court had failed to recognize its discretion to grant a variance on that specific basis. Therefore, we review the forfeited objection under the plain error standard. *See Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). To satisfy that standard, McClure must show an error that is “clear or obvious” and that “affects his substantial rights.” *See id.*(internal quotation omitted). If he makes such a showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. *See id.*

Contrary to McClure’s interpretation of the court’s comments at sentencing, the record does not reflect that the district court misunderstood its authority to vary below the guidelines range if it disagreed with the 500:1 drug ratio. Instead, it shows that the court found the argument for applying a lower ratio to be “weak;” the court made an individualized determination of the sentencing factors and varied below the guidelines range for other reasons. McClure has therefore failed to show that the court committed any clear or obvious error.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-04-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-02-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           7,981
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   52,207
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,160
<INVENTORY>                                     40,150
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               113,000
<PP&E>                                          33,639
<DEPRECIATION>                                  20,438
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 200,107
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           34,262
<BONDS>                                        150,977
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         10
<COMMON>                                            11
<OTHER-SE>                                       8,810
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   200,107
<SALES>                                         46,850
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                46,850
<CGS>                                           29,736
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   29,736
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,092
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,198
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (176)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (72)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (104)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (104)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### Mark James SAVOY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Howard PRINCE, Warden, Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-31121

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 14, 2017

Mark James Savoy, Pro Se

Jennifer Miller Ardoin, Attorney, District Attorney’s Office, Opelousas, LA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Mark Savoy, Louisiana prisoner # 580262, moves for a certificate of appeal-ability (“COA”) to appeal the denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Savoy claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. He also moves for appointment of counsel. To obtain a COA, Savoy must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

*345Savoy’s notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days from the entry of the final judgment denying his § 2254 petition; therefore, it is untimely. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Though Savoy’s notice of appeal was filed within the period for seeking an extension under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A)(i), he neither styled the notice as a motion for extension of time nor requested such an extension in the body of the notice.

Savoy’s post-judgment motion asking the district court to reconsider the denial of his motion for a COA did not toll the period for filing a timely notice of appeal. *See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill,*434 U.S. 257, 263, n.7, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). It also did not render his previously filed notice of appeal dormant until the district court entered its order disposing of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i), Because the notice of appeal was untimely, we lack jurisdiction to address the motion for a COA.

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction, the request for a COA is DENIED as MOOT, and the motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir, R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 ADOPTED


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report of Hemiwedge Industries, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2008,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Kenton Chickering III, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify the following pursuant to Section 18, U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:





1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





2.
            The
      information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.





/s/ Kenton Chickering
IIIKenton
      Chickering III, Chief Executive OfficerApril
      15, 2009