THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Jimmie Aiken, Leila Brown, Vernonda Cohen, Carla 

David, Anthony Sabb, James Ginn, and Shirley Rice, as 

named Plaintiffs representing a class of South Carolina 

citizens, Respondents, 

v. 

South Carolina Department of Revenue, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-001790 

Appeal from Orangeburg County 

Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27944 

Heard September 25, 2019 – Filed February 12, 2020 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

General Counsel Jason P. Luther, Counsel for Litigation 

Dana R. Krajack and Counsel for Litigation Sean G. 

Ryan, all of Columbia, for Appellant. 

Robert N. Hill, of Lexington, Mark B. Tinsley, of Gooding & 

Gooding, PA, of Allendale, Daniel W. Williams, of Bedingfield 

& Williams, LLC, of Barnwell and Charles H. Williams, of 

Williams & Williams, of Orangeburg, for Respondents. 
 

JUSTICE JAMES: Respondents, individually and as members of a putative class, 

brought this declaratory judgment action against the Department of Revenue seeking 

refunds of amounts garnished from their wages by the Department to satisfy 

delinquent debts they allegedly owe to other governmental entities. The merits of 

the case are not before the Court, as the sole issue on appeal arises from the circuit 

court's grant of Respondents' motion to strike one defense from the Department's 

answer to Respondents' second amended complaint. 

In the stricken defense, the Department alleges subsection 12-60-80(C) of the 

South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act (the RPA)1

 prohibits this action from 

proceeding as a class action against the Department. The Department appealed the 

circuit court's order to the court of appeals, and we certified the Department's appeal 

pursuant to Rule 204(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. We reverse 

the circuit court and hold this case cannot proceed as a class action against the 

Department. 

I. 

Each named Respondent allegedly owes or owed money to either Allendale 

County Hospital or The Regional Medical Center in Orangeburg. Both hospitals are 

governmental entities. The hospitals contracted with the Department to collect the 

alleged debts pursuant to section 12-4-580 of the South Carolina Code (2014). 

Section 12-4-580 is known as the Governmental Enterprise Accounts Receivable 

(GEAR) program and provides in pertinent part: 

The department and another governmental entity may 

contract to allow the department to collect an outstanding 

liability owed the governmental entity. In administering 

the provisions of those agreements, the department has all 

the rights and powers of collection provided pursuant to 

[Title 12] for the collection of taxes and all the rights and 

powers authorized the governmental entity to which the 

liability is owed. 

1

 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-60-10 to -3390 (2014 & Supp. 2019). 
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-580(A). Respondents contend the Department's use of 

section 12-4-580 (the GEAR program) and section 12-54-130 of the South Carolina 

Code (2014) (the wage garnishment statute) to collect these debts is unlawful for 

various reasons; the particulars of this contention are not before us. 

Respondents seek to represent a class of all persons similarly situated to them, 

and also seek to include in the class those persons whose wages were garnished to 

collect other types of delinquent debts, including student loan debt, tenant debt, and 

child care debt. In its answer, the Department alleged subsection 12-60-80(C) of the 

RPA prohibits this action from proceeding as a class action. Subsection 12-60-80(C) 

provides: 

Notwithstanding subsections (A) and (B), a claim or action 

for the refund of taxes may not be brought as a class action 

in the Administrative Law Court or any court of law in this 

State, and the department, political subdivisions, or their 

instrumentalities may not be named or made a defendant 

in any other class action brought in this State. 

Respondents moved to strike this defense. The Department argued the delinquent 

debts it collects are "taxes" under subsection 12-60-30(27) of the RPA (2014); 

therefore, the Department contended, the first clause in subsection 12-60-80(C) 

prohibits Respondents' putative class action because it is an action seeking "the 

refund of taxes." The Department also argued that even if the delinquent debts are 

not "taxes," the second (or "catchall") clause of subsection 12-60-80(C) bars "any 

other" class action against the Department. 

In granting Respondents' motion to strike, the circuit court ruled the first 

portion of subsection 12-60-80(C) does not apply to this case because the delinquent 

debts garnished from Respondents' wages are not "taxes" as that term is defined in 

subsection 12-60-30(27) of the RPA or as that term is commonly understood. The 

circuit court also rejected the Department's contention that the catchall clause of 

subsection (C) bars any other class actions against the Department. The circuit 

court's reasoning was threefold. First, the circuit court ruled this interpretation runs 

afoul of the one-subject rule set forth in Article III, section 17 of the South Carolina 

Constitution because it "multiplies the number of subjects within the same Act" that 

enacted subsection (C). In support of this ruling, the circuit court noted subsection 
(C) was enacted as part of Act No. 69 of 2003, and the title to Act 69 contains no 

reference to the RPA barring all class actions against the Department. Second, the 

circuit court ruled that had the General Assembly intended to bar class actions over 

non-tax debt, the General Assembly would have placed the bar in the GEAR statute 

(section 12-4-580) and not in the RPA. Third, the circuit court ruled that interpreting 

the second clause of subsection 12-60-80(C) to prohibit any and all other class 

actions against the Department would violate the doctrine of ejusdem generis. 

The Department raises two basic arguments in this appeal. First, the 

Department argues the debts it has collected from Respondents fall within the 

definition of "taxes" as set forth in subsection 12-60-30(27) of the RPA. As such, 

the Department contends, Respondents' action is an action for the refund of "taxes," 

thereby invoking the prohibition of class actions for the refund of taxes as set forth 

in the first clause of subsection 12-60-80(C) of the RPA. Second, the Department 

contends that even if Respondents' action is not an action for the refund of "taxes," 

the second, or "catchall," clause of subsection 12-60-80(C) prohibits this and all 

other class actions against the Department. We hold the catchall clause of subsection 

12-60-80(C) of the RPA prohibits this action from proceeding as a class action 

against the Department. 

II. 

"An issue regarding statutory interpretation is a question of law." Lightner v. 

Hampton Hall Club, Inc., 419 S.C. 357, 363, 798 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2017) (quoting 

Univ. of S. Cal. v. Moran, 365 S.C. 270, 274, 617 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ct. App. 2005)). 

"[T]his Court reviews questions of law de novo." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 

Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 

(2008)). 

"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear 

and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the 

court has no right to impose another meaning." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 

533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). What the General Assembly says in the text of the 

statute is the best evidence of its intent, and this Court is bound to give effect to the 

legislature's expressed intent. Id. 

Again, subsection 12-60-80(C) provides: 
 

Notwithstanding subsections (A) and (B), a claim or action 

for the refund of taxes may not be brought as a class action 

in the Administrative Law Court or any court of law in this 

State, and the department, political subdivisions, or their 

instrumentalities may not be named or made a defendant 

in any other class action brought in this State. 

(emphasis added to catchall clause). The answer to the question of whether this 

action may proceed as a class action is found in our analysis of the catchall clause 

of subsection (C). Therefore, we need not address the issue of whether the debts 

purportedly owed by Respondents to the hospitals are "taxes" as that term is defined 

in subsection 12-60-30(27) of the RPA. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 

Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an 

appellate court need not address remaining issues when the disposition of a prior 

issue is dispositive of the appeal). 

The Department argues the catchall clause of subsection (C) unambiguously 

provides the Department may not be named or made a defendant in any other class 

action brought in this State. Respondents argue we should adopt the circuit court's 

reasoning and affirm. As noted above, the circuit court's ruling that subsection (C) 

cannot be interpreted to bar all class actions against the Department was threefold: 

(1) the doctrine of ejusdem generis prohibits the Department's interpretation of the 

catchall clause of subsection 12-60-80(C), (2) had the General Assembly intended 

subsection (C) to apply to the instant case, it would have put the clause in the GEAR 

statute, and (3) subsection (C)'s purported prohibition of all class actions against the 

Department would violate Article III, section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution. 

We will now review the circuit court's reasoning. 

A. 

The circuit court ruled the doctrine of ejusdem generis prohibits the catchall 

clause of subsection (C) from being broadly interpreted to prohibit all class actions 

against the Department. "Under the [ejusdem generis] doctrine, ordinarily when 

general words follow the enumeration of particular classes or subjects, the general 

words should be construed as limited only to those of the general nature or class 

enumerated." State v. Wilson, 274 S.C. 352, 355, 264 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1980). 

"However, the doctrine of 'ejusdem generis' is only a rule of construction to be 

applied as an aid in ascertaining intent and has no application where it clearly 

appears that no such limitation was intended." Id. We hold subsection 12-60-80(C) 
indicates no intent to limit or restrict the general words "any other class action" in the 

catchall clause of subsection (C) to the specific subject of "taxes" set forth in the first 

portion of subsection (C). To interpret the catchall clause in this fashion would 

simply amount to an unnecessary re-recitation of the first portion of subsection (C); 

this would be an absurd and forced construction of the catchall clause of subsection 

(C). See Matter of Decker, 322 S.C. 215, 219, 471 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1995) ("A 

statute should be so construed that no word, clause, sentence, provision or part shall 

be rendered surplusage, or superfluous . . . ." (alteration in original) (quoting 82 

C.J.S. Statutes § 346)). 

B. 

Next, the circuit court reasoned that had the General Assembly intended for 

the catchall clause of subsection 12-60-80(C) to apply to the instant case (in which 

Respondents seek a refund of amounts collected under the GEAR statute), it would 

have placed the catchall clause in the GEAR statute. The Department contends we 

should consider the timing of the General Assembly's enactment of subsection 12-

60-80(C) in relation to our decision in Gardner v. South Carolina Department of 

Revenue, 353 S.C. 1, 577 S.E.2d 190 (2003). The plaintiffs in Gardner sought to be 

certified as representatives of a class of all taxpayers who suffered a reduction in 

their state income tax refunds after the Department collected debts under the 

auspices of the Setoff Debt Collection Act (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-56-10 to -120 

(2014)). The Setoff Debt Collection Act, like the GEAR statute, is a vehicle by 

which the Department is allowed to collect debts owed to various governmental 

agencies. The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' request for class certification 

pursuant to Rule 23 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court 

reversed the circuit court on January 27, 2003, holding the plaintiffs failed to 

establish the element of commonality required by Rule 23. 353 S.C. at 22-23, 577 

S.E.2d at 201. Four months after Gardner was decided, the General Assembly 

passed legislation that included subsection 12-60-80(C). See Act No. 69, 2003 S.C. 

Acts 718, 744. The Department argues the General Assembly intended to add 

subsection (C) to section 12-60-80 on the heels of Gardner to make it clear that (1) 

an action for the refund of taxes may not be brought as a class action in the 

administrative law court or in any court of law in this State, and (2) the Department 

may not be named or made a defendant in any other class action brought in this State. 

We need not consider the timing of the General Assembly's introduction and 

enactment of subsection 12-60-80(C), as we conclude the plain language of 
subsection (C), by itself, clearly prohibits the instant action from proceeding as a 

class action. 

C. 

Next, the circuit court concluded subsection 12-60-80(C)'s prohibition of all 

class actions against the Department violates the one-subject rule of Article III, 

section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution. This was error. Article III, section 

17 provides, "Every Act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one 

subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Even if we were to agree that the 

inclusion of subsection (C) multiplied the number of subjects in Act No. 69, the onesubject rule does not apply because that act has been duly codified. See S.C. Tax 

Comm'n v. York Elec. Coop., 275 S.C. 326, 333, 270 S.E.2d 626, 629-30 (1980) 

(holding an act's constitutional defect under Article III, section 17, was eliminated 

by "the proper inclusion" of that act in the codification of the code of laws); Colonial 

Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 233 S.C. 129, 148, 103 S.E.2d 908, 

917 (1958) (holding the deficiency that existed in the title of an act was of no 

consequence after the provisions of the act were codified), superseded on other 

grounds by Rule 208(b)(2), SCACR, as recognized in I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. 

Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000). 

III. 

We hold the plain language of subsection 12-60-80(C) prohibits this action 

from proceeding as a class action. We therefore reverse the circuit court and remand 

this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express no opinion 

on the merits of this case, and we express no opinion as to whether the Revenue 

Procedures Act applies to other issues in this case. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.