alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 31.1****CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER**Section 302 CertificationI, Mark R. Newburg, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of VendingData Corporation;     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:     a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;     b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report basedon such evaluation; and     c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s fiscal quarterpresented in this report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and     5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’sauditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):     a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial datainformation; and     b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financialreporting.        Date: August 14, 2007 By:  /s/  Mark R. Newburg    Mark R. Newburg, President, Chief Executive    Officer and Treasurer  (Principal ExecutiveOfficer)
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEFFINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, John C. Dong, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge, Watchit Media, Inc.’sQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2006 fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition andresults of operations of Watchit Media, Inc.

 

 
| Date: May 22, 2006 | By:    | /s/ John C. Dong                                       |   |
|--------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|               |   | John C. Dong                                           |
|               |   | Executive Vice  President and Chief Financial  Officer |

 

1

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Dejuan Lamont WILLIS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-10314 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 20, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Dejuan Lamont Willis, Pro Se

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent De-juan Lamont Willis has moved for leave to *153withdraw and has filed a brief and supplemental brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Willis has filed a response. The record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of Willis’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore decline to consider the claims without prejudice to collateral review. *See United States v. Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed counsel’s briefs and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Willis’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. *See United States v. Pesina-Rodriguez,*825 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, Willis’s motion to vacate sentence and remand for resentencing is DENIED, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *153published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
FILED iN 

JiH CO!JRT OF APPEALS 

114351 r !Q PR -7 PH q: 59 

USA ~.A TZ. CLERK CAUSE NO. 11-368-W 

rN THE INTEREST OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT 

CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON, ET AL 304TH DISTRlCT COURT 

CI-IILDREN DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS 

ORDER VACATING ORD.ER DENYING MOTION TO TRANSFER 

On this the & day of September, 2013, came on to be considered the above entitled 

and numbered cause and the Cottrt finds that the Court of Appeals~ Fifth District Court of 

Texas at Dallas, has ntled that this Court vacate the Order Denying Motion to Transfer 

signed on April 26, 2013 in the above-referenced cause, and that this cause be transferred 

to Van Zandt County, Texas. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order Denying Motion to Transfer signed in 

this cnusc on April 26, 2013, be and is hereby VACATED and that this cause be 

trAnsferred to VanZandt County, Texas. The District Clerk of the 304rh District Court i~ 

ORDERED to transfer the proceedings filed herein to the Disttict Clerk of VanZandt 

Cou11ty~ Tcxa~ . 

Sogncd !his l2day of September, 2013. 

~~ ~c. · " !i"'~ ~ .. '1 ~~ . ~ .~ E"f,)r ~ .· ,._,.., 1 • 1 p.· •· • . If; I , •. 1

, _,, .
#### ANTHONY HOPKINS *v.*COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

The petition by the petitioner Anthony Hopkins for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 47 Conn. App. 910 (AC 16191), is denied.

*957
      *David B. Rozwaski,*in support of the petition.

*Richard F.*Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided December 10, 1997
Brandi Michelle WATSON v. Justin Lee WATSON

2160314

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 23, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Collection Activity

Number of 

Respondents

Number of 

Responses 

per Party

Total Number 

of Responses

Time per 

Response

Cost per 

Response 

(Dollars) Total Hours

Total Cost 

(Dollars)

80.1416 - New renewable fuels and pathways (petitions) 150 1 150 8 824 1200 85200

80.1450 - Registration

(b)(1) at $103/hour 1010 1 1010 8 824 8080 832240

(b)(2) at $206/hour 1010 1 1010 24 4944 24240 4993440

CDX Registration 1010 1 1010 2 206 2020 208060

TOTALS 3180 3180 35540 6118940

Information Collection Burden by Type of Party

Table I: Producers of Renewable Fuel
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Mario Alberto CORDOVA-ZARATE, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40133 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 27, 2017

*421Lauretta Drake Bahry, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, Plaintiff-Appellee

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Evan Gray Howze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, John Moreno Parras, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Mario Alberto Cor-dova-Zarate appeals his 27-month sentence of imprisonment for illegally reentering the United States after deportation following a felony conviction. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1). He argues that the district court erred in recommending that he receive credit for time he spent in state custody before his transfer to federal custody because the recommendation does not have binding effect.

Cordova-Zarate did not object when the district court made the recommendation at his sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we review the issue for plain error. *United States v. Kirklin,*701 F.3d 177, 178 (5th Cir. 2012).

The Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), determines what credit, if any, will be awarded. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); *see Leal v. Tombone,*341 F.3d 427, 428 (5th Cir. 2003). Because a nonbinding recommendation could serve the salutary purpose of alerting the BOP to time the defendant spent in state custody that might apply to his federal sentence, Cordova-Zarate fails to show that the recommendation amounted to clear or obvious error. *See Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under *422the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Eric C. BEAUCHAMP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D.J. DOGLIETTO, Officer; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15616

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

FILED OCTOBER 6, 2017

Eric C. Beauchamp, Folsom, CA, pro se.

Trace Maiorino, Office of the California Attorney General, Kevin Allen Voth, Deputy Attorney General, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and. N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Eric C. Beau-champ appeals pro se from the district *397court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Williams v. Paramo,*775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); *Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R, Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Beauchamp’s federal claims because Beauchamp failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. *See Ross v. Blake,*— U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858-60, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (setting forth circumstances when administrative remedies are unavailable, including when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation”); *Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)); *Sapp v. Kimbrell,*623 F.3d 813, 823-24, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing limited circumstances where improper screening renders administrative remedies unavailable or where exhaustion might otherwise be excused).

The district court properly dismissed Beauchamp’s state law assault and battery claim as time-barred because, even with the benefit of all arguably applicable equitable tolling, Beauchamp failed to file this action within the applicable statute of limitations. *See*Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6(a)(1) (action must be commenced no more than six months after the notice of rejection of the government tort claim is mailed); *Fink v. Shedler,*192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (three-pronged test for equitable 'tolling in California).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Edward Haight, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Edward Haight, Appellant.

(Indictment No. 11473.)

(Indictment No. 11474.)

Argued April 15, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*Charles Blank*and *Charles J. Wallace*for appellant.

*Elbert T. Gallagher, District Attorney (John J. Dillon*of counsel), for respondent.

*834Judgments of conviction affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Ripply, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Finch, J.
#### In the Matter of Sharen Olsen, Respondent, v Michael Ucci, Appellant.

[772 NYS2d 67]

In a paternity proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 5, the father appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Spinner, J.), entered March 10, 2003, as, after a hearing, imposed incarceration costs upon him of $197 per day.

Ordered that on the Court’s own motion the notice of appeal from an order of the same court dated October 23, 2002, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the order entered March 10, *2003 (see*CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

*Ordered*that the order entered March 10, 2003, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the provision imposing incarceration costs is deleted.

Upon confirming the finding of the Hearing Examiner that *571the father was in willful contempt of an order requiring him to pay child^iupport, the Family Court directed *his*incarceration for a period of six months for contempt of court, unless he purged the contempt by paying the sum of $2,750, and further directed *the father to pay the sum of*$197 per day to the County of Suffolk for the cost of his own incarceration. The father appeals from so much of the order as imposed incarceration costs. We reverse the order insofar as appealed from.

The power of the Family Court, upon a finding that a support order was violated, is set forth in Family Court Act § 454. That provision does not permit the imposition of incarceration costs, and, as a court of limited jurisdiction, the Family Court cannot exercise powers beyond those which are granted to it by statute *(see Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. [Matthew] v Harry,*306 AD2d 490 [2003]; *Matter of Moron v Moron,*306 AD2d 349 [2003]; *Matter of DeMarco v Newton, 305*AD2d 501 [2003]; *cf. Matter of Pearson v Pearson,*69 NY2d 919, 921 [1987]). Therefore, the provision of the order imposing incarceration costs upon the father must be deleted *(see Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. [Matthew] v Harry, supra; Matter of Moron v Moron, supra; Matter of DeMarco v Newton, supra).*Florio, J.P., H. Miller, Schmidt and Crane, JJ., concur.
#### Michael SAMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RINO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-15275

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 16, 2016 *

Filed November 21, 2016

Michael Sammons, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Michael Sammons appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for *940lack of subject matter jurisdiction his diversity action seeking the appointment of a receiver. We have jurisdiction under 28 TJ.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Naffe v. Frey, 789*F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015), and we reverse and remand.

The district court dismissed Sammons’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it concluded that Sammons did not plead an amount in controversy over $75,000. However, Sammons’s proposed First Amended Complaint alleges that Rino International Corporation holds ownership interests in foreign companies, previously valued at $258 million, which makes his shareholder interest worth more than $75,000. Based on those allegations, it cannot be determined to a legal certainty that Sammons failed to meet the amount in controversy requirement. *See 28*U.S.C. § 1332(a); *Naffe,*789 F.3d at 1039-40 (setting forth elements of diversity jurisdiction and explaining that the “legal certainty” test requires a “district court [to] accept the amount in controversy claimed by the plaintiff unless it can declare to a legal certainty that the case is worth less”); *see also Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka,*599 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (under the legal certainty test, “a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction unless upon the face of the complaint, it is obvious that the suit cannot involve the necessary amount” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Sammons’s motion to submit the case on the briefs, filed on February 21, 2015, and his motion to submit the case to a screening panel, filed on February 24, 2015, .are granted.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### DANIEL LUCE *v.*UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION/PRATT AND WHITNEY AIRCRAFT DIVISION ET AL.

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15839.

*Francis X.*Drapeau, in support of the petition.

*Michael J. McAuliffe,*in opposition.

Decided December 10, 1997

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 47 Conn. App. 909 (AC 16725), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether, under the circumstances of this case, the Appellate Court properly excluded from the calculation of the workers’ compensation weekly benefit rate the value of the following forms of remuneration: medical, dental, life, accident/death and dismemberment and disability insurances; pension benefits; vacation and sick pay?”
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-04-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-01-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           6,559
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   61,042
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,212
<INVENTORY>                                     47,928
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               133,977
<PP&E>                                          34,158
<DEPRECIATION>                                  21,261
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 220,174
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           54,692
<BONDS>                                        166,919
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         10
<COMMON>                                            11
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,999
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   220,174
<SALES>                                         97,822
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                97,822
<CGS>                                           63,857
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   63,857
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                25,404
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,421
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    140
<INCOME-TAX>                                        57
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 83
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</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of Internet Capital Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Anthony P. Dolanski, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.

/s/ Anthony P. Dolanski
-------------------------
Anthony P. Dolanski
Chief Financial Officer
March 15, 2005
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.13
                                                                   -------------

 Confidential Materials omitted and filed separately with the Securities and
               Exchange Commission. Asterisks denote omissions.



                            Switchboard Incorporated
                               115 Flanders Road
                         Westboro, Massachusetts 01581



                               December 6, 2000




Mr. Fredric G. Reynolds
Executive Vice President and
 Chief Financial Officer
Viacom Inc.
1515 Broadway
New York, New York 10036

      Re:   [**]

Dear Fred:

     Reference is made to the [**], dated as of December 6, 2000. In
consideration for Viacom Inc. agreeing to [**] contained in the [**]
Agreement (the"[**] Agreement") dated as of [**] by and among [**], Banyan
Systems Incorporated, and Switchboard Incorporated ("Switchboard"), and the
License Agreement (the "License Agreement" and together with the [**]
Agreement, the "[**]/Switchboard Agreements") dated as of [**] by and between
[**] and Switchboard, Switchboard agrees that [**] 250,000 [**].




                                             Respectfully yours,

                                             SWITCHBOARD INCORPORATED

                                             By: /s/ Dean Polnerow
                                                 -------------
                                                 Dean Polnerow
                                                 President
#### MARYLOU BRADLEY *v.*TIMOTHY RANDALL ET AL.

*Kevin P. Walsh,*in support of the petition.

Decided September 24, 1997

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 45 Conn. App. 924 (AC 16301), is denied.
Garrick Demetrice CLOPTON v. STATE

CR-16-0103

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 26, 2017 Reh. denied June 16, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.