alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

 

RAE Systems Inc. 

Sunnyvale, California 

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-113437 and 333-109840) and Form S-8 (Nos.333-105368, 333-88684, 333-85720, and 333-32678) of RAE Systems Inc. of our report dated March 16, 2005, relating to the consolidated financial statements of RAE Systems Inc., which appears in this Annual Report on Form 10-K. 

 

/s/    BDO SEIDMAN, LLP 

 

BDO Seidman, LLP 

San Jose, California 

March 16, 2005
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6316 

To amend title 40, United States Code, to establish an expiration date 

of certain committee resolutions with respect to leases or projects, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 8, 2023 

Ms. TITUS (for herself and Mr. PERRY) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend title 40, United States Code, to establish an 

expiration date of certain committee resolutions with respect to leases or projects, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AUTHORIZATIONS. 

4 Section 3307 of title 40, United States Code, is 

5 amended by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(i) EXPIRATION OF COMMITTEE RESOLUTIONS.— 

7 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Unless a lease is awarded 

8 or a construction, alteration, repair, design, or ac9 quisition project is initiated not later than 5 years 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6316 IH

1 after the resolution approvals adopted by the Com2 mittee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the 

3 House of Representatives or the Committee on Envi4 ronment and Public Works of the Senate pursuant 

5 to subsection (a), such resolutions shall be deemed 

6 expired. 

7 ‘‘(2) APPLICATION.—This subsection shall only 

8 apply to resolutions approved after the date of en9 actment of this subsection.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
Steven FICHTMAN and Joan Fichtman, Appellants, v. Arthur Ivan JACOBS, Jacobs and Associates, P.A., and Jacobs, Scholtz and Associates, LLC, Appellees.

No. 1D17-2579

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 30, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Sandra TEJADA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50340 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 20, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr,, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Sandra Tejada, Pro Se

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Sandra Tejada has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. *171738, 87 S,Ct. 1896, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Tejada has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir, R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Timothy BANKSTON, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-60645 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 13, 2017

Scott F. Leary, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Michael Hallock, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Thomas Cohstantine Levidiotis, Esq., Oxford, MS, for Defendant-Appellant

Before BENAVIDES, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Timothy Bankston was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than five grams of cocaine base and two counts of using a communication facility to facilitate the distribution of cocaine. For the first time, Bankston argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by allowing his attorney to stipulate to certain evidence—that certain drugs and drug quantities were purchased by and seized from other coconspirators—■ without ascertaining whether he understood and agreed with his attorney’s decision to enter into the stipulation.

The right of confrontation is susceptible of waiver by counsel. *See United States v. Ceballos,*789 F.3d 607, 616 (5th Cir. 2015). A criminal defendant’s attorney “may waive his client’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence, ‘so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorney’s decision, and so long as it can be said that the attorney’s decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy.’ ” *Id.*at 614 (quoting *United States v. Stephens,*609 F.2d 230, 232-33 (5th Cir. *3391980)). We have “found a valid waiver of the right of confrontation without evidence that the defendant *himself*expressed agreement with the stipulation.” *Id.*at 615. Moreover, a district court is not required to ascertain whether the defendant agrees with trial counsel’s decision to stipulate to the admission of evidence. *See id.*at 613-17. Bankston did not dissent from counsel’s decision to enter into the stipulation, and trial counsel’s decision could be viewed as a strategic one given that his defense strategy was not to deny that the codefen-dants distributed or possessed drugs but to deny that he was involved in the drug distribution conspiracy.

Thus, Bankston’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was waived by counsel’s stipulation, and Bankston’s confrontation claim is unreviewable. *See id.*at 614; *United States v. Rodriguez,*602 F.3d 346, 350-51 (5th Cir. 2010); *United States v. Olano,*507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Further, the district court was not required to question' Bankston personally regarding the stipulation and therefore committed no error in not doing so. *See Ceballos,*789 F.3d at 615-16.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R, 47,5,4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald MCKENRICK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30197

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 17, 2017

Joseph E. Thaggard, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USMI—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Missoula, MT, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Evangelo Arvanetes, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDMT—Federal Defenders of Montana (Great Falls), Great Falls, MT, for Defendant-Appellant .

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Donald McKenriek appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

McKenriek contends that he is entitled to a sentence reduction under Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. We review de novo whether a district court had authority to modify a sentence under section 3582(c)(2). *See United States v. Leniear,*574 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 2009). The record makes clear that the district court imposed McKenrick’s sentence for reasons unrelated to the guideline range lowered by Amendment 782. Because McKenrick’s sentence was not “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the district court properly concluded that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction. *See United States v. Rodriguez-Soriano,*855 F.3d 1040; 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2017). Further, because McKen-rick was ineligible, the district court had no cause to consider McKenrick’s post-sentencing behavior or any other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) considerations. *See Dillon v. United States,*560 U.S. 817, 826-27, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-30616

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Brandon Holmes, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:21-CR-302-1

______________________________

Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Brandon Holmes appeals his sentence of 204 months of imprisonment 

following his guilty plea conviction for distributing methamphetamine. He 

contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable and that the district 

court erroneously balanced the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, giving undue 

weight to his criminal history and the resulting sentencing range calculated 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 25, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 22-30616 Document: 00516725076 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023
No. 22-30616

2

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 without adequately considering the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentencing disparities. We review the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence for abuse of discretion, and we apply a 

presumption of reasonableness to his within-guidelines range sentence. See 

Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766-67 (2020); United 

States v. Naidoo, 995 F.3d 367, 382 (5th Cir. 2021).

Here, the district court considered the Guidelines, § 3553(a), and 

Holmes’s arguments for a downward variance, but it ultimately concluded 

that the guidelines range was appropriate. Holmes’s arguments on appeal 

amount to mere disagreement with the weight that the court placed on his 

mitigating arguments and the sentence imposed, which is insufficient to 

support his contention that his sentence is unreasonable. See United States v. 

Aldawsari, 740 F.3d 1015, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ruiz, 621 

F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, Holmes has failed to rebut the 

presumption of reasonableness applicable to his within-guidelines range 

sentence and has not shown that the district court abused its discretion. See 

Naidoo, 995 F.3d at 382-83; United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.3d 161, 166-67 

(5th Cir. 2017).

AFFIRMED.

Case: 22-30616 Document: 00516725076 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/25/2023
#### Angela AYRES; Stephan Ayres, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee for the registered holders of Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Services 2001-2, Defendants-Appellees, and Litton Loan Servicing, LP; Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Services 2001-2; Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.; Salomon Smith Barney Holding; Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., formerly known as Salomon Brothers Realty Corp; J.P. Morgan Chase Bank; Citibank, NA, Defendants.

No. 16-2367

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 30, 2017

Decided: August 10, 2017

Angela Ayres, Stephan Ayres, Appellants Pro Se. Laurie Beth Goon, DUANE MORRIS, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Angela Ayres and Stephan Ayres seek to appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, and Bank of New York Mellon, in their action asserting claims related to mortgage fraud. Although “[t]he parties ... have not questioned [this Court’s] jurisdiction ..., [this Court has] an independent obligation to verify the existence of appellate jurisdiction” and may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. *Porter v. Zook,*803 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); *see*28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). “Ordinarily, a district court order is not final until it has resolved all claims as to all parties.” *Porter,*803 F.3d at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Regardless of the label given a district court decision, if it appears from the record that the district court has not adjudicated all of the issues in a case, then there is no final order.” *Id.*

In this ease, the district court’s order does not address .the Ayreses’ claim under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, which was part of Count 1 of the amended complaint, or their request for declaratory and injunctive relief, which was Count 6 of the amended complaint. Because the district court did not rule on these claims, it “never issued a final decision” in this matter. *Id.*at 699. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand to the district court for consideration of these claims. We express *212no opinion on the ultimate disposition of the claims. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED AND REMANDED*
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 617 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 617

    To amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to deem foods 
 containing xylitol as misbranded unless the label or labeling of such 
 foods contains a warning specifying the toxic effects of xylitol for 
               dogs if ingested, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 30, 2023

Mr. Schweikert (for himself, Mr. Waltz, Mr. Stanton, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. 
 Krishnamoorthi, Ms. Titus, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Fitzpatrick, 
 and Mr. Smucker) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                  the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to deem foods 
 containing xylitol as misbranded unless the label or labeling of such 
 foods contains a warning specifying the toxic effects of xylitol for 
               dogs if ingested, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Paws Off Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. XYLITOL LABEL AND LABELING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) In General.--Section 403 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 343) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
    ``(z) If it is a food that contains xylitol, unless the label or 
labeling of such food contains a warning specifying the toxic effects 
of xylitol for dogs if ingested.''.
    (b) Rulemaking.--
            (1) Interim rule.--Not later than six months after the date 
        of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue an interim 
        final rule to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a).
            (2) Final rule.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue a final rule 
        to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a).
    (c) Secretary Defined.--In this section, the term ``Secretary'' 
means the Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting through the 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7114

JOHN MARVIN OVERMAN, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

MARY STEVENS,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

JUANITA H. BAKER; THEODIS BECK,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,

District Judge. (CA-03-126-5-BO)

Submitted: November 30, 2004 Decided: December 20, 2004

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John Marvin Overman, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth F. Parsons,

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

John Marvin Overman, Jr., appeals the district court’s

order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint.

Overman challenges certain facts contained in the file relied on by

the North Carolina Parole Commission. The district court ruled

against Overman on the ground that his complaint was time-barred.

Claims under § 1983 arising in North Carolina have a three-year

statute of limitations. Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947

F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (4th Cir. 1991). The cause of action accrues

and the statute of limitations commences “when the plaintiff

possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that

reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.” Nasim v.

Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995) (en

banc). We conclude that Overman filed his complaint within three

years of obtaining sufficient facts to provoke his reasonable

inquiry, and the action is therefore timely filed. 

However, we hold that judgment was properly entered in

favor of Baker, Stevens, and Beck. The information in Overman’s

file that he contends was false was not relied on to a

constitutionally significant degree. See Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d

197, 201 (4th Cir. 1979) (“We hold . . . that in certain limited

circumstances a claim of constitutional magnitude is raised where

a prisoner alleges (1) that information is in his file, (2) that
- 3 -

the information is false, and (3) that it is relied on to a

constitutionally significant degree.”). 

Therefore, we affirm the decision of the district court.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Delvin R. BERG and Holly M. Berg, Appellants, v. FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3139

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
January 20, 2015

U. S. Department of Transportation 

Docket Management System

1200 New Jersey Ave., SE 

Washington, DC 20590

Dear Sir or Madam:

Attached please find Skycatch, Inc.’s request for an exemption from the listed Federal 

Aviation Regulations to allow commercial operation of its Small Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems (“sUASs”) for aerial imaging for safety and monitoring of secured and 

controlled environment agricultural sites. This exemption request is exclusively for the 

use of the UAS manufactured by Skycatch, Inc., a San Francisco based company. 

Also attached to this letter is the Skycatch UAS Flight Manual, which outlines the 

operating requirements, limitations, and technical specifications for the Skycatch system. 

Skycatch submits this manual as a Confidential document under 14 CFR 11.35 (b) as the 

entire manual contains proprietary information that the applicant has not and will not 

share with others. The Manual contains operating conditions and procedures that are not 

available to the public and are protected from release under the Freedom of Information 

Act 5 USC 552 et. seq.

Thank you for your time and consideration, and please let me know if you have any 

questions. 

Sincerely,

Gabriel Dobbs

Director of Policy

Skycatch, Inc.
#### Susan HURST, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MONITRONICS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-11177

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(March 13, 2017)

Karla Gilbride, Public Justice, PC, Washington, DC, Alexander H. Burke, Burke Law Offices, LLC, Chicago, IL, Clifton Dorsen, James Marvin Feagle, Skaar & Feagle, LLP, Decatur, GA, Justin Tharpe Holcombe, Skaar & Feagle, LLP, Woodstock, GA, Kris Skaar, Skaar & Fea-gle, LLP, Marietta, GA, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee

Laurie Webb Daniel, Cynthia Grace Burnside, J. Allen Maines, Grant Edward Lavelle Schnell, Jordan T. Stringer, Hoi-*744land & Knight, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN, and RIPPLE,* Circuit Judges.

*

The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Monitronics International, Inc. appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. With the benefit of oral argument, and following a review of the record, we affirm. Because we write for the parties, we set out only what is necessary to explain our decision.

Susan Hurst sued Monitronics under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, for allegedly improper automated telephone calls. In the district court, Monitronics claimed that it was the assign-ee of an agreement between Ms. Hurst and Spot Security, Inc., and asserted that it was entitled to compel arbitration of Ms. Hurst’s TCPA claim based upon an arbitration clause in that agreement. In order to demonstrate its status as an assignee of the agreement, Monitronics submitted the declaration of David Verret, its vice-president. In his declaration, Mr. Verret stated that the agreement between Ms. Hurst and Spot was “purchased by and assigned to Monitronics on September 30, 2011,” and that the assignment remained in effect during Ms. Hurst’s account with Monitron-ics. *See*D.E. 11-2 at ¶ 6.

The district court concluded, for a number of independent and alternative reasons, that Monitronics could not compel arbitration. One of those reasons was that, under Georgia law, Monitronics was required to submit the written assignment of the agreement but had not, and therefore could not rely on Mr. Verret’s declaration. *See*D.E. 22 at 2-3.

• In its initial brief, Monitronics does not challenge this particular ruling. This is a problem for Monitronics because when a decision is based on several different alternative grounds, an appellant who does not challenge all of those grounds cannot obtain reversal. *See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,*739 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2014). This alone warrants affirmance.

AFFIRMED.