alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          21,774
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             500
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                30,800
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    121,224
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          15,715
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            15,798
<LOANS>                                        260,114
<ALLOWANCE>                                      4,545
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 481,507
<DEPOSITS>                                     413,875
<SHORT-TERM>                                    18,103
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,794
<LONG-TERM>                                      3,274
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        34,033
<OTHER-SE>                                       9,428
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 481,507
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 18,488
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                6,030
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   957
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                25,475
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               9,160
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,137
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           15,338
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    1,690
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 13,552
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,763
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       3,763
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,687
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .58
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .56
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    8.67
<LOANS-NON>                                      1,494
<LOANS-PAST>                                       494
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 3,833
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    1,398
<RECOVERIES>                                       420
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                4,545
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             4,545
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Luis Antonio CASTRO-PALACIOS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51463 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Luis Antonio Castro-Palacios, Pro Se

Before KING, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Luis Antonio Castro-Palacios has moved for leave to withdraw and has *366filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Castro-Palacios has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Lorna Nagler, ChiefExecutive Officer of Christopher & Banks Corporation (the “Company”)certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.  The quarterly report of the Company on Form 10-Qfor the period ended November 29, 2008 as filed with the United StatesSecurities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended;  and

 

2.  The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date: January 8,  2009 |   |                                                    |
|-----------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------|
|                        |   |                                                    |
|                        | By:    | /s/ Lorna E. Nagler                                     |
|                        |   | Lorna E. Nagler *President and Chief Executive Officer* |

 

# ****
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Yak Communications (USA), Inc. (the
Company) Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Charles Zwebner, Chief Executive Officer and principal financial
officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1). |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | ---- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2). |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                         |  |  | 
|------------------------ |  |  | 
|Date: September 26, 2003 |  |  | 
|                         |  |  |
AGOBEN 1 MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2190

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

DECEMBER 20, 2017

ORDERED that the stipulated dismissal of appeal is recognized by the Court, and this appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida is hereby dismissed.
#### William THOMASTON, Appellant, v. Clarence T. GLADDEN, Warden, Oregon State Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 20209.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Dec. 2, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1967.

*694William Thomaston, in pro. per.

Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., of Oregon, Wayne Thompson and David Blunt, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salem, Or., for appellee.

Before MERRILL, BROWNING and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The district court examined the transcript of the state post-conviction hearing pursuant to the remand order in Thomaston v. Gladden, 326 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1964), and concluded that the state court hearing met the tests of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), and that the state court findings were fairly supported by the record. Applying federal constitutional standards, the district court determined the three issues left undecided by this court. 326 F.2d at 306. We have concluded from our own examination of the record in the light of the applicable authorities that these conclusions and determinations of the district court, outlined in its memorandum decision of October 19, 1964, were correct.

On the remand appellant also raised a new issue, claiming that his guilty plea was induced by his knowledge that the state had possession of the murder weapon, which had been illegally seized, and of appellant’s signed confession, which had been illegally obtained. The district court stayed further proceedings to permit appellant to submit this issue to the state court. Appellant moved to reopen the state court post-conviction proceeding, but before a hearing on his motion could be had, appellant moved to withdraw it. He relied upon this court’s statement that “It is conceded that Thomaston has exhausted his state remedies” (326 F.2d at 306). He also contended that he had tendered new evidence, rather than a new issue, and that in these circumstances Townsend v. Sain required that the federal district court itself hold an evidentiary hearing. 372 U.S. at 313, 83 S.Ct. 745.

Our remark was, of course, directed only to the issues then before us.

 Since appellant’s new contention was not the substantial equivalent of any which he had theretofore presented to the state court, but presented a materially different problem, appellant was *695required to submit it to the state court if the state court would hear it. Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173, 174-175 (9th Cir. 1964); Rose v. Dickson, 327 F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1964). The procedure which the district court followed to enable appellant to determine whether a state court remedy was available was the proper one. United States v. Fogliani, 343 F.2d 43, 48 (9th Cir. 1965); Blair v. People of State of California, 340 F.2d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 1965). The state court expressly stated that it would have granted appellant’s motion to reopen had he not withdrawn it. Accordingly, the district court in its memorandum filed May 14, 1965, properly concluded that appellant has failed to exhaust available state remedies as to the new issue.

Affirmed.
#### William Penniman *versus*Alanson Tucker.

In an action upon a policy of insurance, besides the special count for the loss, the declaration contained the usual money counts. A verdict being found for the defendant on the ground of the want of seaworthiness of the vessel, the plaintiff moved tor a new trial, alleging that he was entitled to recover back the premium; but as no notice had been taken of the point to the jury, the motion was overruled; the Court observing that the proceedings in the present action would furnish the assured a defence against the note given for the premium; and that, if judgment should be recovered upon the note and satisfied, he might recover back the money paid in an action for money had and received.

This was an action of the case by the assured in a policy of insurance against the defendant as underwriter. The declaration, besides a count for the loss, had also a count for money had and received, and another for money laid out and expended. At the trial the defence was the want of seaworthiness of the ship; and the jury returned a general verdict for the defendant.

After the verdict, *Prescott*and Hubbard, of counsel for the plaintiff, moved the Court to set it aside and grant a new trial, “ because the plaintiff, in his declaration, has set forth in two counts two causes of action against said *Tucker,*in the first of which he demanded a total loss on a policy underwritten by the said *Tucker,*in which the said *Tucker*admits that he has received the premium for such insurance and in the second count the plaintiff demanded a return *68of .said premium ; and the jury have found a general verdict for the said *Tucker,*on the ground that the vessel insured by said policy was not seaworthy; when they ought to have found a [ * 67 ] verdict for said *Penniman*on the said second * count, for a return premium ; the said general verdict being against the evidence given at the trial of the cause; ” and they cited the cases of *Rothwell*vs. *Cooke,*(1) and *Penson*vs. *Lee,*(2) in support of the motion.

(1)

 1 *Bos. & Pul.*172.

(2)

 2 *Bos. & Pul.*330.

*Per Curiam.*

Had the second count been considered at the trial, the plaintiff might have had a verdict for a return of the premium. But where no notice is taken of that point to the jury, the Court will not send the cause to a new trial for that object only. The verdict respects only the demand for a loss. The plaintiff is not without his remedy. Should the note given for the premium be put in suit, the proceedings in this action would furnish a defence against it; or even if judgment be recovered upon the note, and the same be satisfied, the plaintiff might recover the money back in an action for money had and received. The plaintiff can take nothing by his motion, *(a)*

*Judgment on the verdict.*(3)

(a)

 Vide *Whitcomb*vs. *Williams,*4 *Pick.*228. — *Cornwall*vs. *Gould,*4 *Pick.*444. — *Webster*vs. *Lee,*5 *Mass. Rep.*334. — *Hodges*vs. *Hodges,*9 *Mass. Rep.*370. — *Smith*vs. *Whiting,*post, 445.

(3)

 1 *East,*97, *in notis,*cited also in *Penson*vs. *Lee. —Marsh.*558
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Anthony GARCIA and Keicia Garcia, Appellants, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC; Meadow Point III Homeowner's Association, Inc.; and Meadow Point IV-A Master Association, Inc., Appellees.

Case No. 2D16-5053

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed January 26, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
| 1.   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and the consolidated result of operations of the Company for the periods presented. |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  By: |  /s/ Terry Howlett                                              |
|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Name:     | Terry Howlett                                                        |
| Title:    | Principal Executive Officer,Principal Financial Officer and Director |
| Date:     | April 15, 2011                                                       |
PH 1, LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A., etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2285

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

NOVEMBER 09, 2017

Following review of the petition for writ of prohibition, it is ordered that said petition is hereby denied.

SUAREZ, LOGUE and LINDSEY, JJ., concur.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-15-00521-CV

Roger Fay, Appellant

v.

Texas A&M University, Geochemical and Environmental Research Group; 

The College of Geosciences and Maritime Studies; Dr. Ray Bowen; Dr. Robert Duce; 

Dr. Norman Guinasso; Dr. Roger Sassen; and Dr. David Schink, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 97-08888, HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

On November 25, 2015, this Court dismissed this appeal for want of prosecution.1

Subsequently, counsel for appellant, claiming that computer problems had left him unaware of

the electronically-transmitted notices that had preceded our dismissal, has moved that we

withdraw our opinion and reinstate the appeal. Appellees have opposed the motion. We will grant

the motion, withdraw our opinion and judgment dated November 25, 2015, and reinstate the appeal.

We order—and our Clerk will also follow up with a phone call, lest there remain any further doubts

as to counsel’s receipt of the notice—that appellant’s brief is due on or before February 22, 2016.

See Fay v. Texas A&M Univ., No. 03-15-00521-CV, 2015 WL 7695211 1

(Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 25, 2015, no pet. h.).
It is ordered on January 21, 2016.

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Field

2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6443

THERON JOHNNY MAXTON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. David C. Norton, District Judge.

(CA-97-3811-0-6-BD)

Submitted: May 28, 1998 Decided: June 10, 1998

Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Theron Johnny Maxton, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* The district court erroneously stated in its order that

objections were filed on September 29, 1997, but this was well

before the magistrate judge issued his report and recommendation.

No objections were filed after Maxton received proper notice.

2

PER CURIAM:

Theron Johnny Maxton appeals the district court's order dismissing without prejudice his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

(1994). Maxton's case was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1994). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Maxton that failure to

file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate

review of a district court order based upon the recommendation.

Despite this warning, Maxton failed to object to the magistrate

judge's recommendation.*

The timely filing of objections to a magistrate judge's

recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the

substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned

that failure to object will waive appellate review. See Wright v.

Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985). See generally Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Maxton has waived appellate review by

failing to file objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Bobby Gene MILES v. STATE

CR-16-0106

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 3, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

ADRIN DEVES DANIELS a/k/a )

ADRIAN DEVES DANIELS, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D16-2380 

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed February 7, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas 

County; William H. Burgess III, and Philip J. 

Federico, Judges.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and 

Pamela H. Izakowitz, Assistant Public 

Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Kiersten E. Jensen, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and SILBERMAN and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
JD RESTORATION INC., Appellant, v. UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 4D17-2415

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 16, 2018]

Gray Proctor of Fox & Loquasto, P.A., Richmond, Virginia, and Mordechai L. Breier of Consumer Law Office, P.A., North Miami Beach, for appellant.

Sara M. Sandler and John P. Joy of Walton Lantaff Schroder & Carson, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*810*Affirmed. See**Quiroga v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp.* , 34 So.3d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Damoorgian, Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 4.1


 


THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON


NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON


 


 


2 HANSON PLACE, 12TH FLOOR, BROOKLYN,
N.Y. 11217


 


 


 


February 28, 2019


 


Hennion & Walsh, Inc.


2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza


Parsippany, New Jersey 07054


 


Smart Trust 418 (the “Fund”)


 


Dear Sirs:


The Bank of New York
Mellon is acting as trustee for the Fund, consisting of the unit investment trust (the “Trust”) included in
the Registration Statement relating to the Fund. We enclosed a list of the securities to be deposited in the Trust on the date
hereof. The prices indicated therein reflect our evaluation of such securities as of close of business on February 27, 2019, in
accordance with the valuation method set forth in the applicable Standard Terms and Conditions of Trust and Trust Agreement. We
consent to the reference to The Bank of New York Mellon as the party performing the evaluations of the Trust securities in the
Registration Statement (No. 333-228796) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the registration of the
sale of the Units of the Trust and to the filing of this consent as an exhibit thereto.


 


	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 
	 	/s/ GERARDO CIPRIANO
	 	Gerardo Cipriano
	 	Vice President
Tom Henry PARKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-1557

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed June 29, 2018

Tom H. Parks, Perry, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

*1297We affirm the order entered by the circuit court in Case No. 2017-100954-CFDL denying Appellant's Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief filed in that case, albeit not for the reasons provided by the court. We do so without prejudice to Appellant timely raising in Case No. 2007-000909-CFAWS his instant claim that the forfeiture of gain time by the Department of Corrections ("DOC") thwarted his plea bargain, as that appears to be the case so affected by the forfeiture. *See**Dellahoy v. State* , 816 So.2d 1253, 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ("The DOC's forfeiture of the gain time cannot be countermanded by the court, but neither can that forfeiture thwart the plea bargain.").

AFFIRMED, without prejudice.

TORPY, WALLIS, and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.