NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0681n.06 No. 09-5756 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

United States of Am eric a, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. Do nal d No ah, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

BEF ORE: M e r r it t, Ro ge r s, and K e th le dge , C ir c uitJudg e s. MERRITT, Circuit Judge. The Armed C are er Crimi nal Act defines a “ violent felony” as fo llo ws : (B ) the term “violent felony” mea ns any crime punishable by

imprisonment fo r a te rm e xce e din g on e y e ar, or

any a c t of juv e nil e de lin qu e nc y

inv olv ingthe us e or ca rry i n g o f a firea

rm, knife, or

destructive de vice that would be punishable by imprisonment for such ter m if committed by

an adult, that— (i ) ha s as an e le me nt the us e , att e mpt e d use , o r t hr e a te ne d u se of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of another ; or (i i) is bur g lary , ar so n, or

e xtor tio n, inv olv e s u se of

e xplos ive s, or otherw ise involves conduct that prese nts a serious potential risk of phy sical injury

to another . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (B ). De fenda nt Donald Noah ple d g uilty to one count of poss essing a fire arm afte r beingconvicted of

a fe lony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He wa s sentence d under theNo. 09-5756

United States v. Noah

-2- Armed Car eer

Criminal Act and re ceive d the mandatory 180-month sentenc e. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)

. On a pp e a l, N oa

h d isp ute s th a t a pr ior c on vic tio n fo r I nte nti on a lly Ev a din g Ar re st in a n Auto mob ile is a class of f

elony under Tennessee law that satisfies t he definition of a “violent fe lony ” under the Armed Car eer

Criminal Ac t. He, there fore , argues that this prior conviction should not count as one of the thr e e pr ior

vio le nt c ri me s n e c e ssa

ry to t ri g g e r t he mand a tor

y min imum se nte nc e un de r the Ac t. Be cause the intentional act of flee ing in a car in this case involves “c onduct that pre sents a ser ious potential risk of p h y s i ca l injury to another,” we a g ree with the district court that the prior felony should c ount a s a “violent fe lony ” for purposes of the Armed Car eer Criminal Act, and we aff irm the judg ment of the district cour t. An offe nse qualifie s as a “ v i o l en tfe l o n y ” u n d er t h e r es i d u al cl au s e o f § 9 2 4 (e )( 2 )( B) (i i)—one

t h a t “ o t h e r

w i s e i n v o l v e s c o n d

u c t t h a t p r e s e n t s a s e r i o u s p o t e n t i a l r i s k o f p h y s i c a l inj ury to another ”—if it i s “roughly simil ar, in kind as we ll as in deg ree of risk posed,” to the enumer ated offe nses. Begay

v. United States , 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2 0 0 8 ) (c onstruing the definition of “violent f e l o n y” c o n t a i n e d

i nt h e A r

m e d C ar e e r C r i m i n a l A c t )

. T o b e c o u n t e d a s a p r i o r v i o l e n tf e l o n y, the re fo re , a

c ri me mus t be sim ila

r to the lis te d off

e ns e s not onl y in de g re e of ri sk po se d, but a lso in the sense that it involves “purpose ful, violent, a nd ag g ressive c onduct.” Begay , 553 U.S. at 144-45. The indictment in this case state s that No ah “u n l awf ully and intentionally ” fle d from an office r af ter be ing sig naled to stop, “ther eby cre ating a risk of death or injury to third parties.” That offe nse would be a

Class D felony

under the Tenne ssee statute. See T e n n . Co d e A n n . § 39-16-No. 09-5756

United States v. Noah

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 16-603(b) (3) states: “A violation of subs ection (b) is a C lass E felony 1 unless the flig ht or attempt to elude c reates a risk of death or injury to innocent by standers or other third parties, in which c ase a violation of subsection (b) is a Class D f elony .”

-3- 603(b)( 3). Noah now a

rgues that he ple d g uilty

to a Class E felony , which does not include the 1 element of cre ating risk to others. See id. He say s that the judgme nt f or his conviction is ambiguous b ec au s e t h e j u d ge c ro s s edo u t “E ” a n d c i r c l ed“D

. ” W e d i s agr ee . W e t h i n k t h e T en n es s ee j u d ge plainly int en d ed t o mark the c onviction as a Class D violation. Noah c reated a r isk of death or i n j u ry to others while intentionally flee ing f rom an off

icer . This conduct cle arly meets the Begay

re qu ir e me nts of pr e se nti ng a “ se ri ou s pote nti a l r isk of ph y sic a l in

jur y ,” a s w e ll a s invo lvi ngthe same or similar k i n d of “pur

poseful, violent, and a g g ressive” conduct a s the enumer ated c rimes of burg lary , arson, e x tortion, or the use of e x plosives. Begay , 553 U.S. at 140-41. The Supreme Court has g rante d cer tiorari in a case f

rom the Seventh Circuit involving the use of a conviction under

I ndiana’ s fleeinglaw enf orce ment statute as a p ri o r violent felony for purposes of the Armed Car eer Criminal Act. United States v. Sykes , 598 F.3d 334 ( 7th Cir. 2010), cert. granted , No. 09-11311, 2010 WL2345244 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010). The c ase holds that a statute, like the one in the instant ca se, cr iminaliz es a “violent felony” as a ca teg orica l matter . Syke

s ag ree s with case s from the F ifth and Tenth Circuits. United States v. Harrimon , 568 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ) ; Uni ted St at es v . W est , 5 50 F .3 d 9 52 , 9 71 (1 0th Cir . 2 00 8) . O ne c a se fr om t he El e ve nth Circuit is in conflict with these c ases. United States v. Harrison , 558 F.3d 1280 ( 11th Cir. 2009). Reg ardle ss of the outcome of Syk es in the Sup re me Cou

rt , th e outc ome of

the ins tant c a se is l ike lyNo. 09-5756

United States v. Noah

-4- to sta nd due to the lang uag e found in N oah’s indictment. See Taylor v . United States , 495 U.S. 575, 60 2 ( 19 90 ); Shepard v. U nited States , 544 U.S. 23, 26 (2005). Given the Supreme Co u rt ’s p ri or interpre tations of t he Ar

med Care er Criminal Ac t, Noah’s pr ior conviction for flee ing in his ca

r af ter of fi c e rs ins tr

uc te d h im t o s top c arr ie s th e re qu isi te “ se ri ou s po ten ti al ri sk of ph y sic a l in

jur y to another ” and is the ty

pe of “purpose ful, violent, and aggressive conduct” that qualifies it as a pr ior violent felony

for pur poses of sente ncingunder the Armed Car eer Criminal Act. For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the district cour t is affirmed.