[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Jones v. Wainwright , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4870.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -4870
J ONES , A PPELLANT , v . W AINWRIGHT , W ARDEN , A PPELLEE . [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Jones v. Wainwright , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4870.] (No. 2020-0452—Submitted August 18, 2020—Decided October 15, 20 20.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals fo r Marion County, No. 9-19-81.

__________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Appellant, Anthony Jones, a prison inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeals allegin g that he has completed his sentence and is entitled to immediate release. T he Third District dismissed the petition. We affirm. Background {¶ 2} In 1985, after pleading guilty to involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery, Jones was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 12 to 50 years. He was released on parole in 1994, and the Adult Parole Authority granted him permission to move to Maryland. Maryland accepted transfer of Jones’s paroleS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 supervision on February 6, 2002. Two days later, the Ohio Depa rtment of Rehabilitation and Correction, Di vision of Parole and Community Services, created a “Close of Interest” report concerning Jones; that same day, J ones’s Ohio parole officer authored a document stating that, in view of Maryland’s acceptance of supervision, her reporting unit was “closing interest” in his c ase. {¶ 3} In January 2018, the Ohio Parole Board found that Jones had vio lated the conditions of his release and revoked his parole. Later th at year, Jones filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas against appellee, Lyneal Wainwright, warden of the Marion Corre ctional Institution. The common pleas court dismissed the petition, th e Third District affirmed the dismissal, and this court denied discretionary rev iew. See Jones v. Wainwright , 157 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2019-Ohio-4211, 132 N.E.3d 701. {¶ 4} In November 2019, Jones filed a second habeas petition against the warden, this time as an original action in the Third District. He alleged that the Ohio Parole Board lacked authority to revoke his parole because Ohio “closed” its parole supervision in 2002. The warden argued that Jones’s claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata and that the 2002 documents referring to the closure of Ohio’s parole supervision did not constitute a final release from paro le under R.C. 2967.16(A). Therefore, the warden contended, Jones remains in custody under his original sentence. The Third District agreed with both of the warden’s arguments and dismissed the petition. Jones has appealed to this court a s of right. Analysis {¶ 5} The warden raised res judicata as a defense in a motion styled as a “Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Ju dgment.” In accepting that defense, the Third District did not clearly stat e whether it was dismissing Jones’s petition for failure to state a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) or granting summary judgment under Civ.R. 56. That distinction or dinarily would matter—although res judicata usually is not a proper basis for dismissal underJanuary Term, 2020

3 Civ.R. 12 (under which the court examines only the pleadings), it is more readily applied under Civ.R. 56 (under whic h the court may consider ext rinsic evidence). See Jefferson v. Bunting , 140 Ohio St.3d 62, 2014-Ohio-3074, 14 N.E.3d 1036, ¶ 10-12. But the warden’s res j udicata defense does not depend on documents outside the pleadings. In two affidavits attached to his petit ion, Jones conceded that he filed a habeas petition in 2018. And he has never disp uted that he asserts the same claim here. So in this case, it does not matter wheth er the Third District dismissed the petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) or Civ.R. 56; eith er way, it was appropriate for the c ourt to consider whether res judicata appl ies. {¶ 6} Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment or decree rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the same c laim between the same parties or those in privity
with them.” Brooks v. Kelly , 144 Ohio St.3d 322, 2015-Ohio-2805, 43 N.E.3d 385, ¶ 7. Res judicata bars a successive habeas petition when the p etitioner either raised
or could have raised the same issu es in his first habeas action

. Id

. at ¶ 7-8. Given
that the claim Jones asserts here is iden tical to the one he as serted earlier, this case presents a straightforwar d application of res judicata. {¶ 7} But Jones contends that his first case cannot have preclusive e ffect for two reasons. First, he says th at the common pleas court was no t a court of competent jurisdiction, because he did not attach to his first petition documents that were required under R.C. 2725.04 and 2969.25 . Jone s offers lit tle support for this argument. It is well settled that the requirements of R.C. 272 5.04 and 2969.25 are mandatory and that the failure t o attach documents required und er those statutes
mandates dismissal of a habeas petition. Pence v. Bunting , 143 Ohio St.3d 532, 2015-Ohio-2026, 40 N.E.3d 1058, ¶ 6 (R.C. 2725.04); Russell v. Duffey , 142 Ohio St.3d 320, 2015-Ohio-1358, 29 N.E.3d 978, ¶ 11 (R.C. 2969.25). But not every mandatory requirement is jurisdictional in nature. Smith v. May , 159 Ohio St.3d 106, 2020-Ohio-61, 148 N.E.3d 542, ¶ 31. Jones refers to a cou rt of appeals that—S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 without any analysis—stated that noncompliance with R.C. 2725.0 4 was a “fail[ure] to properly in voke [its] jurisdiction,” Wilson v. Eberlin , 7th Dist. Belmont No. 08 BE 9, 2008-Ohio-4320, ¶ 1. And he cites another decisio n in which a court of appeals—again without any analysis—dismissed a complaint “fo r lack of jurisdiction” based on an inmate’s a failure to satisfy R.C. 29 69.25(C), State ex rel. Armengau v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-1070, 2017-Ohio-368, ¶ 3, 13. Those undeveloped statements, however, are not enough to show that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to adju dicate Jones’s first habeas petition. {¶ 8} Jones also contends that he coul d not have raised his claim pre viously because he now relies on documents that the warden produced aft er the first case
was dismissed. But whether or not Jones now has additional evi dence that he believes supports his c laim, the fact remains that he could—and did—assert the
same claim in a n earlier action. {¶ 9} We therefore affirm the Third District’s determination that Jon es’s claim is barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , and
S TEWART , JJ., concur.
D ONNELLY , J., dissents and would grant an alternative writ.

_________________ Anthony Jones, pro se. Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Maura O’Neill Jaite, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

_________________