FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

In re the Complaint of: 

JET CENTER PARTNERS, LLC 

Complainant 

-againstCOUNTY OF MONTROSE, COLORADO 

Respondent. 

Pursuant to Part 16 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations 

Docket No. 16-15-11 

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Respondent County of Montrose, Colorado ("the County"), by and through its 

undersigned counsel, hereby submits this Reply in Supp01t of Summary Judgment. While the 

County categorically disagrees with the arguments made by Complainant Jet Center Pmtners, 

LLC ("JCP") in its Answer to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Answer"), filed October 9, 

2015, per its Motion for Leave, the County addresses only three specific points relating to the 

Answer: (1) new evidence relating to the te1mination ofthe agreements between the County, 

MTJ, and Telluride Venture Pmtners, LLC ("TVP"); (2) the inapplicability ofthe federal 

standing doctrine of "capable of repetition but evading review" to Pmt 16 proceedings; and (3) 

the effect ofte1minating a contract on the rights of the terminated pmty. 

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ARGUMENT 

I. TVP HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE OPTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN IT AND THE 

COUNTY IS TERMINATED 

As discussed in detail in the County's Motion for Summary Judgment, the County has 

terminated both the MTJ FBO Agreement and the Montrose Regional Airpo11 Ground Lease 

("TVP Lease"), which eliminates the principal grounds for JCP's Complaint. (See Motion for 

Summary Judgment, pp. 3-4, 8, 10-11, 12, 13-14, 15-16,20, filed Sept. 16, 2015.) In its Answer 

to the County's Motion for Summary Judgment, JCP argued that, notwithstanding this action by 

the County, its Complaint should not be dismissed because the County allegedly "has not fully 

effectuated termination of the MTJ FBO Agreement and the TVP Ground Lease," because the 

"purpm1ed tetminations are actively contested by MTJ and TVP .. . . " (Answer, p. 12, filed Oct. 

9, 2015.) This same contention that MTJ and TVP are "actively contest[ing]" the termination of 

the MTJ FBO Agreement and the TVP Ground Lease also fmms a substantial part ofthe basis 

for JCP's arguments relating to its Second, FoUI1h and Fifth Causes of Action. (Answer, pp. 15, 

20-21.) Finally JCP argues that the structure ofthe Option Agreement between the County and 

TVP is also pat1 of the basis for its Sixth Cause of Action. (Answer, pp. 22-23.) 

While the question of whether MTJ and TVP are "actively contest[ing]" the termination 

of the agreements should be inelevant in light of the law governing termination of contracts and 

specific performance discussed below, there is additional new evidence relating to the 

termination of the agreements. Specifically, on September 17, 2015, after the County filed its 

Motion for Summary Judgment, it received a letter from TVP stating that, because the County 

had terminated the TVP Lease, TVP also considers the Option to Purchase Land that 

accompanied the TVP Lease to be terminated as well. (See Second Affidavit of Lloyd Arnold 

("Second Arnold Aff. ") (attached hereto as "Exhibit B"), pp. 1-2, ~ 4 & Exh. 4- Letter from 

Thomas J. Byrne to Bobbee J. Musgrave, Sept. 17, 2015, p. 1.) This is additional confirmation 

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that TVP understands that the TVP Lease and option agreement are no longer in force. 

Moreover, on October 28, 2015, undersigned counsel received correspondence from counsel for 

Majestic Skies, LLC, who was a 50% owner in MTJ, acknowledging that the County had 

terminated the MTJ FBO Agreement. (Second Arnold Aff., p. 2, ~ 6 & Exh. 5- Letter from 

Michael B. Manes to Bobbee J. Musgrave, Oct. 28, 2015, p. 1). Lastly, as ofthe date this Reply 

is filed, no litigation has been filed by either MTJ or TVP against the County. (Second Arnold 

Aff., p. 2, ~ 5). Thus, JCP's contention that the County is not in cunent compliance with its 

grant obligations because MTJ and TVP are purportedly "actively contest[ing]" the termination 

of their agreements with the County should be rejected. 

II. NOTWITHSTANDING JCP's MISCHARACTERIZATIONS OF LAW, BASIC LEGAL 

PRINCIPLES SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT HERE 

In its Answer, JCP makes two critical mischaracterizations of law in an effort to generate 

grounds for denying the County's Motion for Summary Judgment. An accurate examination of 

the relevant law shows that JCP's arguments are not well-founded and that the law favors the 

County's position. 

A. The "Capable Of Repetition But Evading Review" Standing Rule Does Not 

Apply To Part 16 Proceedings 

JCP contends that the federal standing doctrine allowing Article III courts to review cases 

concerning activities that are "capable of repetition but evading review" applies to Part 16 

proceedings before this Agency. (Answer, pp. 11-12.) 1 JCP then argues, notwithstanding that 

the County has terminated the allegedly unlawful agreements, thereby bringing it into cmTent 

1 The County notes that while the "capable of repetition but evading review" standing rule does not apply 

to this proceeding, even in Atticle III court proceedings the rule is a "narrow exception" to ordinmy standing rules. 

See Pharmachemie B. V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 276 F.3d 627, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (to satisfy this "naJTow exception," 

a patty must show that both that" I) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its 

cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining patty would be 

subjected to the same action again"). JCP failed to show in its Answer that there is a "reasonable expectation" of the 

County engaging in the same allegedly unlawful activities again. 

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compliance with grant assurance obligations (if it was ever in violation in the first place, which 

the County strenuously disputes), that this agency should still review the agreements for alleged 

violations. (!d.) However, JCP, cites no authority, whether from the FAA itself or any federal 

court reviewing decisions of the FAA, applying the "capable of repetition but evading review" 

doctrine to a Part 16 proceeding. In fact, the "actions capable of repetition but evading review" 

standing doctrine is obviously incompatible with the FAA's well-established cunent compliance 

doctrine, which emphasizes an examination of whether the cutTent state of affairs complies with 

grant assurances rather than whether past violations may have occmTed and been cured. 

Drake Aerial Enterprises, LLC v. City of Cleveland, Docket No. 16-09-02, 2010 WL 

691303 (F.A.A. Feb. 22, 201 0) is an excellent example of how the current compliance doctrine is 

applied to Part 16 proceedings in a manner that precludes application of the "capable of 

repetition but evading review" doctrine. In Drake, the respondent had originally allowed the 

complainant aerial banner towing company to operate from its airpmt, but three years later the 

respondent changed its position and baned towing operations. See 2010 WL 691303 at *1. The 

respondent then changed position again a year later and invited the complainant to resume 

operations, but the complainant declined to do so because it considered the respondent's 

conditions for access to be unreasonable. ld. Later, the complainant approached the respondent 

about again resuming operations from the airport, but the respondent denied the complainant 

access to the airpmt. See id. at *2. The complainant then filed a Part 16 complaint based in part 

on the denial of access. See id. at *9. In its answer to the complaint, the respondent stated that it 

had "reviewed its position" and was now going to offer the complainant access to the airpmt on a 

limited basis. !d. The terms of access were for a mere "60 cumulative days of banner towing" 

while the respondent "pursue[ d] permanent legislation to authorize and regulate banner towing" 

at the airpmt. !d. at * 10. No actual legislation had been introduced by the respondent at that 

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time, but rather the respondent was "prepared to submit the necessary legislative drafts" upon the 

occurrence of other contingencies. See id. at * 14. 

The complainant replied that the respondent's change in position was both insufficient on 

a going forward basis because it was purely reactive to the filing of the Part 16 complaint and 

because it did nothing to remedy past discrimination. See id. at * 11-12. The director rejected 

these arguments, stressing that it was the respondent's "last offer or negotiating posture" that was 

relevant in determining whether the respondent was in compliance, not the "speculative" claim 

that, but for the filing of the Part 16 complaint, the respondent would have continued to 

discriminate against the complainant. See id. Thus, because in its answer the respondent had 

offered the complainant temporary access to the airport and a possible legislative solution, the 

Director concluded the alleged grant assurance violations relating to the denial of access were 

sufficiently cured for the respondent to be deemed to be in cunent compliance. See id. at * 12. 

Drake could not have reached the result that it did if the "capable of repetition but 

evading review" doctrine applied to FAA Part 16 proceedings. The respondent's behavior of 

repeatedly changing its position prior to litigation and seemingly relenting only after the filing of 

a complaint, but without having actually made a permanent legislative change, is precisely the 

form of behavior that would likely present an "action capable of repetition but evading review." 

See FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (the doctrine "applies where 

(1) the challenged action is in its duration too shmt to be fully litigated prior to cessation or 

expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining patty will be 

subject to the same action again.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Drake is not an isolated case. The current compliance doctrine was applied to dismiss 

pmt of a Patt 16 action in U.S. Aerospace, Inc. v. Millington Municipal Airport Aut h., Docket 

No. 16-98-06, 1998 WL 1083384 (Director's Determination) (F.A.A. Oct. 20, 1998), despite an 

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obvious risk of repetition, in a factually analogous situation to that alleged by JCP here. In US. 

Aerospace, a complainant that wished to become a full service FBO at the respondent's airport 

brought a Part 16 action partially on the grounds that the respondent had effectively granted 

exclusive rights to an incumbent FBO through numerous privileges that were granted to the 

incumbent and not granted to other airpmi tenants. See 1998 WL 1 083 3 84 at * 13. The Part 16 

complaint was filed on February 26, 1998. !d. at *5. In April 1998, approximately two months 

after the filing of the complaint, the respondent terminated the incumbent's lease and directed the 

incumbent to vacate the airpott. !d. at * 10. In its pleadings to the FAA, the respondent did not 

deny that it had given the incumbent favorable treatment in a number of regards, but "stated that 

it is in the process of remedying the situation by terminating the contract with" the incumbent 

FBO and that the incumbent FBO had been evicted. !d. at * 14. 

In his ruling, the Director noted that the past conduct was potentially questionable, but 

emphasized that the "FAA's objective in the Part 16 process is not to punish past noncompliance" and that "Patt 16 is not intended as a means for a complainant to obtain redress for 

perceived injuries." ld. Rather, because of the focus on current compliance, the director noted 

that "the eviction effectively terminated any exclusive right that might have been granted" to the 

incumbent and that, because the respondent's agreement with the incumbent had been tetminated 

it was "unnecessary to make a definitive ruling on the issue in this case .... " !d. 

As with the result in Drake, this outcome in US. Aerospace would not have been likely 

under the "capable of repetition but evading review" doctrine that JCP urges the agency to now 

follow. The US. Aerospace respondent only terminated the offending lease after a Patt 16 

complaint was initiated against it and there was no indication that the respondent had been 

rendered permanently incapable, whether by law or physical circumstances, of giving 

discriminatorily favorable treatment to another FBO in the future. 

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H RODEN\ 1743260.4 
In the instant case, JCP is unable to dispute that the County has tetminated all of the 

agreements that JCP complains of and that MTJ and TVP have no ongoing business relationship 

with the County. (See Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 2-4.) Assuming, arguendo, that any 

grant assurance violations could have arisen from the agreements with MTJ and/or TVP, the 

termination of the agreements and the lack of any other business relationships with those pa1ties 

puts the County in substantially the same position as the respondent in US. Aerospace and JCP's 

claims should accordingly be dismissed pursuant to the cunent compliance doctrine. 

B. Once A Contract Is "Terminated" Parties No Longer Have Rights Under 

The Contract, Absent A Purely Hypothetical And Highly Unlikely Award Of 

Specific Performance 

In its Answer, JCP also tries to avoid the current compliance doctrine by arguing that 

grant assurance violations may still be deemed to be ongoing because MTJ and TVP purportedly 

have "actively contested" the termination of the agreements, thereby creating a risk of "future 

litigation." (Answer, pp. 12, 14-16, and 21.) This argument fails in three major regards. 

First, as a matter of black letter law: 

When a contract is terminated, even wrongfully, there is no longer a contract-

'no contract' -no duty to perform and no right to demand performance, 

unless specific performance is sought, which it is not here; there is only a right 

to seek and a duty to pay damages caused by the termination. 

Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F .3d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis 

added). Thus, it is irrelevant ifMTJ and TVP disagree with the County's decision to terminate 

its agreements with them - the agreements are terminated and MTJ and TVP as a matter of law 

no longer have any rights under those agreements unless and until such time as they successfully 

persuade a comt to grant them specific performance of those agreements. 

Second, as of the filing ofthis Motion, neither MTJ nor TVP has commenced any 

litigation against the County for any reason, let alone to seek specific performance of the various 

terminated agreements. (Second Arnold Aff., p. 2, ~ 5.) And TVP's acknowledgment that the 

7 

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option agreement between it and the County has also been terminated as a consequence of the 

TVP Lease being terminated suggests that TVP is not likely to pursue such litigation in the 

future. 

Finally, even if MTJ and/or TVP were to decide that they wished to pursue suits against 

the County demanding specific performance of the agreements, it is unlikely that they would be 

successful in such a course of action. Both agreements were made subject to Colorado law. 

(Complaint, pp. 4-5, ~ 8(a)-(b), Exh. E- MTJ FBO Agreement, p. 25, § 10.05 & Exh. F- TVP 

Lease, p. 13, art. XIV.I.) "Colorado comts generally disfavor specific performance, and prefer to 

allow parties to breach their contracts and face the ensuing consequences." CollectACheck, Inc. 

v. Check Collection & Recovery, Inc., Case No. 09-CV-00186, 2009 WL 1279329, *4 (D. Colo. 

May 6, 2009) (collecting Colorado cases). Specific performance is especially disfavored for 

complex, long-term contracts that would require continuing supervision by a comt to enforce. 

See Antero & Lost Park Reservoir Co. v. Lowe, 194 P. 945, 955-56 (Colo. 1920) ("Contracts 

which by their terms stipulate for a succession of acts, whose performance cannot be 

consummated by one transaction, but will be continuous, and require protracted supervision and 

direction, with the exercise of special knowledge, skill, or judgment in such oversight, are not, as 

a rule, specifically enforced."). 

Both the MTJ FBO Agreement and the TVP Lease were expressly long-term contracts: 

the MTJ FBO Agreement was for a preliminary term of 20 years with options for two, ten-year 

extensions (Complaint, p. 4, ~ 8(a), Exh. E, p. 2, §§ 1.01 & 1.02), while the TVP Lease was for a 

preliminary term of 30 years with options for two, ten-year extensions (Complaint, p. 5, ~ 8(b ), 

Exh. F, p. 3, art. IV.A-B). And both contracts are complex agreements that would require 

continuing supervision of precisely the sort that the Antero court warned against. See 194 P. at 

955-56. Further, the owners of MTJ, which was the entity that the County approved to develop a 

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second FBO at the Montrose Regional Airport, have changed without prior approval of the 

County. (Second Arnold Aff., p. 2, ~~ 6-7.) Under the MTJ FBO Agreement, any change in the 

ownership ofMTJ constitutes an assignment of the agreement, and thus prior written approval 

from the County was required for the transaction. (See Complaint, p. 4, ~ 8(a) & Exh. E, p. 23, § 

9.01.) The County has the right to reject any attempt to assign the MTJ FBO Agreement if it has 

"reasonable and verifiable concerns regarding the assignee's ability, based on experience and 

financial strength, to operate the FBO as a going concern." (!d.) As the County has learned that 

the change in ownership has the effect of increasing the ownership share of MTJ held by the 

prior owners of JetAway, and given the County's prior experience with those individuals, the 

County will not agree to an assignment of the MTJ FBO Agreement. (Second Amold Aff., p. 2, 

~ 8.) 

Consequently, even ifMTJ or TVP were to pursue litigation against the County and 

demand specific performance of the agreements, it is unlikely that they would be granted such 

relief. JCP's contention that MTJ and TVP are allegedly "actively contest[ing]" their 

termination is not only false but irrelevant to the question of whether the County is in violation 

of any grant assurances as MTJ and TVP no longer have any rights under the terminated 

agreement and are extremely unlikely to recover such rights via (presently non-existent and 

completely hypothetical) litigation. 

CONCLUSION 

The additional evidence received by the County after its filing of the Motion for 

Summary Judgment fmiher establishes that summary judgment is appropriate in this case. 

Meanwhile JCP's desperation to salvage its case has led it to significantly mischaracterize the 

applicable law. The cunent compliance doctrine requires dismissal of JCP's Complaint as the 

County has te1minated the agreements that were the basis for JCP's claims, MTJ and TVP are 

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extremely unlikely to ever be able to asseti rights under those agreements in the future, and there 

is no legal basis for JCP's contention that the "capable of repetition but evading review" doctrine 

applies to Part 16 proceedings. The Complaint should be dismissed. 

Respectfully submitted this 30111 day of October, 2015. 

HRODEN\ 1743260.4 

Bobbe . Musgrave, olo. Reg. # 12440 

Stephen D. Rynerso , Colo. Reg. # 34825 

1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100 

Denver, Colorado 80203-4541 

Special Counsel to the Board of County 

Commissioners of the County ofMontrose, 

Colorado 

Montrose County Attorney's Office 

Carolyn Clawson, Colo. Reg. # 19717 

Deputy County Attorney 

161 S. Townsend Ave. 

Montrose, CO 81401 

10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby cetiify that on this 301

h day of October, 2015, a true and conect copy ofthe 

foregoing document was served upon the following persons at the following address via Federal 

Express and e-mail: 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

Attention: FAA Pati 16 Airport Proceedings Docket, 

AGC-610 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Ave., S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

E-mail: 9-A WA-AGC-Pati-16@faa.gov 

( 1 original and 3 copies) 

Leonard D. Kirsh 

Shelley A. Ewalt 

McBreen & Kopko 

500 Nmih Broadway 

Jericho, New York 11759 

E-mail: LKirsch@mklawnyc.com 

SEwalt@mklawnyc.com 

Complainant's Counsel 

(1 copy) 

HRODEN\1743260.4 

II 
Exhibit B 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

In re the Complaint of: 

JET CENTER PARTNERS, LLC 

Complainant 

-againstCOUNTY OF MONTROSE, COLORADO 

Respondent. 

Pursuant to Part 16 ofthe Federal Aviation 

Regulations 

Docket No. 16-15-11 

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF LLOYD ARNOLD 

STATEOFCOLORADO ) 

) ss. 

CITY AND COUNTY OF MONTROSE ) 

I, Lloyd Arnold, first being duly sworn, state as follows: 

1. I am over the age of eighteen years. The statements contained in this Affidavit 

are personally known to me and are true. I am competent to testify about any of the matters 

contained herein. 

2. I am the Director of Aviation for the Montrose Regional Airport for Montrose 

County, Colorado ("the County"). I have held that position since December 10, 2007. In that 

position, I am responsible for all aspects of managing the Airport, including ensming that the 

Airport operates in a safe and efficient manner, and that it complies with all federal, state and 

local statutes, rules and regulations. As Director of Aviation I assist in negotiating contracts with 

vendors at the Airport, and personally patticipated in the negotiating of contracts with Majestic 

Skies, LLC, MTJ FBO Partners ("MTJ") and Telluride Venture Partners ("TVP"). 

3. Prior to the groundbreaking ceremony conducted by MTJ on May 11,2015, the 

County was told both in writing and orally that the owners ofMTJ were companies owned by 

Larry Danielle and Charles Horning. At the gtoundbreaking I was informed for the first time 

that Steve Stuhmer and Michael Girdner had some role in MTJ. 

4. On September 17, 2015, the County received a letter from counsel for TVP 

stating that, due to the termination of the Montrose Regional Airport Ground Lease ("TVP 

Lease"), TVP considered the option agreement that accompanied the TVP Lease to be 

HRODEN\1743644.1 
terminated. A true and accurate copy ofthat letter from Thomas J. Byrne to Bobbee J. 

Musgrave, dated September 17, 2015, is attached as Exhibit 4 to this Affidavit. 

5. As of the date of this Affidavit, neither MTJ nor TVP has filed a suit in any local, 

state or federal court naming the County as a defendant for any purpose, whether relating to the 

MTJ FBO Agreement, TVP Lease, or otherwise. 

6. On October 28, 2015, the County received a letter from counsel for Lawrence 

Danielle and Majestic Skies, LLC ("Majestic") stating that Mr. Danielle had transferred any 

interest held by himself, Majestic, and Four D's Montrose, LLC ("Four D's") in MTJ to TVP 

and TSG Asset Holdings, LLC ("TSG") as well as assigning to those parties any interest that Mr. 

Danielle, Majestic, or Four D's held in the MTJ FBO Agreement. A true and accurate copy of 

that letter from Michael B. Manes to Bobbee J. Musgrave, dated October 28, 2015, is attached as 

Exhibit 5 to this Affidavit. 

7. The County was unaware of the assignment and transfer of ownership from 

Mr. Danielle, Majestic, and Four D's to TVP and TSG prior to the assignment and transfer 

occurring and the County did not authorize either the assignment or transfer of ownership as 

required by Section 9.01 of the MTJ FBO Agreement. 

8. At least two of the individuals involved in the ownership and operation ofTVP, 

Michael Girdner and Steve Stuhmer, were formerly involved in the ownership and operation of 

JetAway Aviation LLC ("JetAway"). JetAway has a lengthy adversarial history with the County 

and was found in prior litigation to have committed numerous violations of airport regulations 

while under the ownership and management of Girdner and Stuhmer, respectively. Based on the 

July 2, 2009 Director's Determination, which says that an airport sponsor has the right to protect 

itself from the possibility of future costly and frivolous litigation, it is my understanding that the 

Airport is not required to do business with individuals who have sued them on numerous 

occasions. 

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 

Dated this ).J2 day of October, 2015 

~d~ Lloyd Arnold 

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1£.2 day of October, 2015, by 

Notary Public 

My commission expires: C>"6/ a '-'I / Z.o 1 '3 

2 

HRODEN\1 743644.1 
Exhibit 4 
BYRNE, KIELY & WHITE, LLC 

ATTORNEYS AT LAW 

THE CHANCERY SUITE 1300 

THOMAS J, BYRNE 1120 LINCOLN STREET 

ALSO ADMITTED IN NEW YORK AND CALIFORNIA DENVER, COLORADO 80203 

Bobbee J. Musgrave 

Bryan Cave LLP 

1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100 

Denver, Colorado 80203-4541 

TELEPHONE: (303) 861-5511 

FACSIMILE: (303) 861-0304 

September 17,2015 

• JOSEPH A. KIELY 

(1944-1992) 

Re: Montrose Regional Airport Ground Lease, Option to Purchase Land 

Dear Bobbee: 

Since the County has terminated the Montrose Regional Airport Ground Lease between 

Telluride Venture Partners, LLC and the County of Montrose for the reasons stated in your letter 

to me dated September 1, 2015, the Option to Purchase Land incorporated into the Ground Lease 

and attached thereto as Exhibit B is necessarily also terminated, at least for so long as the Ground 

Lease is terminated. 

Very truly yours, 

BYRNE, KIELY & WHITE, LLC 

Tho~~~ TJB/ale 
Exhibit 5 
LAW OFFICES 

MICHAEL B. MANES, P.A. 

950 S. PINE ISLAND ROAD, SUITE A-150 

PLANTATION, FLORIDA 33324 

MICHAEL B. MANES 

E-MAIL: michael@maneslegal.com 

October 28, 2015 

Via email: bobbee.musgrave@bryancave.com 

Bobbee J. Musgrave 

Bryan Cave LLP 

1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100 

Denver, Colorado 80203-4541 

Re: MTJ FBO Partners, LLC 

Dear Bobbee, 

TEL (954) 523-1844 

FAX (954) 474-4159 

This will confirm that after Montrose County rescinded the FBO Agreement 

and lease of the One Creative Place property, resulting in the termination of 

the FBO Agreement and the property being taken off airport, the litigation 

instituted by Lawrence Danielle as the owner of Majestic Skies, LLC and Four 

D's Montrose, LLC, between the members of MTJ FBO Partners was settled 

on September 18, 2015, and the litigation was subsequently dismissed. 

As part of the settlement, Lawrence Danielle, Majestic Skies, LLC and Four 

D's Montrose, LLC assigned its interest, if any, in MTJ FBO Partners, LLC and 

the rescinded FBO agreements and ground leases to Telluride Venture 

Properties, LLC and TSG Asset Holdings, LLC. 

Should you need anything further, please feel free to contact me. 

Best regards, 

MICHAEL B. MANES, P.A. 

· Michael Manes 

MBM/dbm 

C: Lawrence Danielle