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TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

State of California
 

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
 

Attorney General
 

:


 OPINION : No. 87-304
 

:


 of : July 13, 1988


 :
 

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP :


 Attorney General :


 :


 RONALD M. WEISKOPF :


 Deputy Attorney General :
 

:
 

THE HONORABLE MAXINE WATERS, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA
 

ASSEMBLY, has requested an opinion of this office on the following
 

questions:
 

1. What records pertain to "pending litigation" within
 

the meaning of subdivision (b) of section 6254 of the Public
 

Records Act?
 

2. Do records of a public agency which pertain to
 

litigation against the agency become exempt from public disclosure
 

under subdivision (b) of section 6254 when a claim against the
 

agency is filed if the records were not exempt from disclosure
 

before that time by other provisions of the Public Records Act?
 

3. Do police records which must be disclosed under
 

subdivision (f) of section 6254 become exempt from disclosure under
 

subdivision (b) when they pertain to pending litigation to which
 

the public entity is a party?
 

4. Is a claim filed against a public agency under
 

California's Tort Claims Act itself exempt from disclosure under
 

subdivision (b) of section 6254?
 

CONCLUSIONS
 

1. The phrase "records pertaining to pending
 

litigation" contained in subdivision (b) of section 6254 of the
 

Public Records Act refers to records of a public agency which have
 

specifically been prepared for litigation to which the agency is a
 

party.
 
2. Records generated in the ordinary course of a public
 

agency's business which may be relevant in future litigation to
 

which the agency might be a party are not exempt from disclosure
 

under subdivision (b) of section 6254 before a claim is filed with
 

the agency or litigation against it commences. Nor do such records
 

become exempt from disclosure under the subdivision once a claim is
 

filed or litigation against the agency actually commences.
 

3. Police records which had to be disclosed under
 

subdivision (f) of section 6254 of the Public Records Act are not
 

exempt from disclosure under subdivision (b) if they become
 

relevant in pending litigation to which the public agency is a
 

party.
 

4. A claim filed against a public agency under
 

California's Tort Claims Act is not exempt from disclosure under
 

subdivision (b) of section 6254 of the Public Records Act. 


ANALYSIS
 

The California Public Records Act ("the PRA"; Stats.
 

1968, ch. 1473, § 39, p. 2945; Gov. Code, §§ 6250-6265) deals with
 

the ability of members of the public to have access to public
 

records maintained by various state and local agencies throughout
 

the state. The term "public records" is defined in subdivision (d)
 

of section 6252 of the Act to include "any writing containing
 

information relating to the conduct of the public's business
 

prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency
 

regardless of physical form or characteristics." On a prior
 

occasion we observed that the definition is "nearly all-


encompassing" and that its legislative history indicates that it
 

was "intended to cover every conceivable kind of record that is
 

involved in the governmental process and . . . pertain to any new
 

form of record-keeping instrument as it is developed." (58
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 629, 633-634 (1975), quoting A Final Report of
 

the California State Assembly Statewide Information Policy
 

Committee on the California Public Records Act of 1968 (Mar. 1970),
 

1 Appendix to Journal of the Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1970) at p. 7;
 

cf. Braun v. City of Taft (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 332, 340; San
 

Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 774;
 

Vallejos v. California Highway Patrol (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 781,
 

785; Cook v. Craig (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 773, 781-782.)
 

The general policy of the PRA, like the federal Freedom
 

of Information Act upon which it was modeled (5 U.S.C., § 552,
 

et seq.), favors disclosure of public records. (§ 6250; cf.
 

Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange
 

(1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 893, 901; Cook v. Craig, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d
 

at 781; Braun v. City of Taft, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at 342; San
 

Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at 772; 53
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 136, 143 (1970).) Indeed, in enacting it, the
 

Legislature found and declared that "access to information
 

2. 87-304
 
 

 

concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental
 

and necessary right of every person in this state." (§ 6250.)
 

But, as was noted in Black Panther Party v. Kehoe (1974) 42
 

Cal.App.2d 645, 655:
 

"If citizenship in a functioning democracy requires
 

general access to government files, limited but genuine
 

interests also demand restricted areas of nonaccess.
 

Decisional law on the subject accepts the assumption that
 

a statute calling for general disclosure may validly
 

define reasonably restricted areas of nondisclosure,
 

provided that the latter are justified by genuine public
 

policy concerns."
 

The PRA thus strikes a balance between "the public's right to know"
 

and the need to maintain areas of nondisclosure for certain types
 

of government records. (Cf. 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 575, 579 (1981).)
 

It basically provides that except as otherwise provided, public
 

records are to be open to inspection at all times during the office
 

hours of public agencies (§ 6253, subd. (a)) and that any person
 

may receive a copy of any identifiable public record upon request
 

(§ 6256) and payment of a prescribed fee (§ 6256). (See 69
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 129, 131 (1986); 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 575, 579­

580, supra.) This general right of public inspection, though, is
 

followed in section 6254 with 20 categories of disclosure-exempt
 

material which permit an agency not to disclose particular records
 

that fall within them. (§ 6254 1

; Black Panther Party v. Kehoe,
 

supra, 42 Cal.App.2d at 656.) In addition, a "residual category"
 

of confidential records is described in section 6255 which permits
 

an agency to withhold a record from disclosure under the Act, where
 

"on the facts of [a] particular case the public interest served by
 

not making the record public clearly outweighs the public interest
 

served by disclosure of the record." (§ 6255; cf. Black Panther
 

Party v. Kehoe, supra at 650, 657; 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra at
 

584-585; 53 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 136, 148 supra.) It is also
 

important to bear in mind that a particular record may receive
 

protection from disclosure from a source outside the PRA.2
 

1

Section 6254 commences with the words: "Except as provided
 

in Section 6254.7, nothing in this chapter [i.e., the Public
 

Records Act] shall be construed to require disclosure of records
 

that are any of the following: . . . ." Exemptions contained in
 

subdivisions (a) through (t) then follow. Section 6254.7 deals
 

with whether some very particular types of records are "public
 

records."
 

2

The key exemption from PRA disclosure, that offered by
 

subdivision (k) of section 6254, was designed to recognize this.
 

It offers protection for "[r]ecords the disclosure of which is
 

exempted or prohibited pursuant to provisions of federal or state
 

law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code
 

3. 87-304
 
 

All of our questions pertain solely to the exemption
 

provided in subdivision (b) of section 6254. It provides an
 

express exemption from PRA disclosure for:
 

"Records pertaining to pending litigation to which
 

the public agency is a party, or to claims made pursuant
 

to Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) of Title 1
 

of the Government Code [i.e., California's Tort Claims
 

Act], until such litigation or claim has been finally
 

adjudicated or otherwise settled."
 

We are asked: (1) what records are embraced by the subdivision;
 

(2) whether records that were generated in the ordinary course of
 

an agency's business and were not exempt from PRA disclosure,
 

become exempt from disclosure by virtue of the subdivision when a
 

claim is filed against the agency and the records will pertain to
 

the litigation; (3) whether subdivision (b) provides an exemption
 

for police records which must be disclosed under subdivision (f) of
 

section 62543

; and (4) whether it covers the claim document
 

itself. Our answers are confined to the operation of subdivision
 

(b) and do not address whether another exemption may exempt a
 

particular document from public disclosure.
 

relating to privilege." (§ 6254, subd. (k).) The legislative
 

history of the PRA indicates that "[t]he effect of that language
 

[was] to continue in force the various statutes scattered
 

throughout the codes that pertain to records of a particular type
 

kept by a public officer or agency." ( Final Report , op. cit.
 

supra, at 13-14; cf., id. at 11.)
 

3

Subdivision (f) of section 6254 generally exempts from PRA
 

disclosure, "records of complaints to, or investigations conducted
 

by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures
 

of . . . any state or local police agency," but it also provides
 

that state and local law enforcement agencies shall disclose
 

certain information relating to "incidents" (such as the names and
 

addresses of persons involved and witnesses to them; a description
 

of any property involved; the date, time, and location; all
 

diagrams; statements of parties and witnesses) unless the
 

disclosure would endanger the successful completion of the
 

investigation or a related investigation. The subdivision also
 

requires state and local law enforcement agencies to make certain
 

other information public, i.e., certain information relating to
 

persons arrested by the agency and certain information relating to
 

complaints or requests for assistance received by the agency,
 

unless disclosure would endanger the safety of a person involved in
 

an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the
 

investigation or a related one.
 

4. 87-304
 
 

1. What Records Pertain To Pending Litigation?
 

We are first asked to decipher the phrase "records
 

pertaining to pending litigation." Specifically we are asked what
 

records are embraced by it. In resolving the question we first
 

turn to the words of the subdivision themselves and look to their
 

plain, ordinary and usual meaning. (Cf. People v. Craft (1986) 41
 

Cal.3d 554, 560; People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 310;
 

People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884; Madrid v. Justice
 

Court (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 819, 824; Rich v. State Board of
 

Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 607.) Reference to
 

dictionaries is helpful toward that end. (People v. Spencer (1975)
 

52 Cal.App.3d 563, 565; People v. Medina (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 473,
 

479; People v. Johnson (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 417, 419.)
 

Subdivision (b) offers protection to "records pertaining
 

to pending litigation to which the public agency is a party." The
 

term "pending litigation" is one of art which refers to a suit
 

which has already commenced but is not yet decided. (Ballentine's
 

Law Dict. (3d ed. 1969) at 929-930; Black's Law Dict. (4th ed.
 

1951) at 1291.) But the term "litigation" is a broad one and
 

embraces more than just court actions. For example, in the cognate
 

situations of the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (Gov. Code, § 11120
 

et seq.) and the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.)
 

the term has been defined as "any adjudicatory proceeding,
 

including eminent domain, before a court, administrative body
 

exercising its adjudicatory authority, hearing officer, or
 

arbitrator." (§ 11126, subd. (q); § 54956.9.) We believe it has
 

a similarly broad meaning in the Public Records Act. There section
 

6254, subdivision (b) would protect any records that "pertain" to
 

such actions to which an agency is a party.
 

The word "pertain" means to relate, to belong, to be
 

pertinent to something else. (Webster's Third New Intn'l. Dict.
 

(1971 ed.) at p. 1688.) Needless to say, that something else has
 

to exist. That "something else" here is "pending litigation"-­

i.e., "litigation" of whatever sort that actually exists because of
 

a filing of a first paper to initiate it. Once litigation
 

commences, papers will be generated as a result to deal with it.
 

When it spoke of "records pertaining to pending litigation" in
 

subdivision (b) we believe the Legislature had such documents in
 

mind.4
 

4

The subdivision of course also specifically mentions records
 

pertaining to "claims made pursuant to [California's Tort Claims
 

Act]" as coming within its exemption "until such . . . claim has
 

been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled." Generally
 

speaking, before bringing suit against a public entity, one must
 

first present a claim to it under the Tort Claims Act. (Gov. Code,
 

§ 810 et seq.; see §§ 810, 811.2, 945.4, 950.6; City of San Jose v.
 

Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 454; Loehr v. Ventura County
 

5. 87-304
 
It has been suggested, however, that the proper standard
 

to be used under subdivision (b) is to offer protection to any
 

records of an agency which might be "relevant to" or "relate to"
 

pending litigation to which it is a party, no matter when or why
 

they may have been created. In other words, should a record come
 

to relate to litigation, it would then be afforded protection under
 

subdivision (b). We reject the suggestion.
 

In the course of performing their normal statutory
 

functions, public agencies prepare a wide range of documents which
 

are subject to disclosure as public records under normal agency
 

practices. Indeed, only by having such documents publicly
 

available are the people able to be aware of the conduct of
 

governmental agencies and their expenditure of public funds. (Cf.
 

Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange,
 supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at 909; San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior
 

Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at 780.) These documents are prepared
 

with the knowledge that they will be subject to public scrutiny,
 

and the persons who prepare them, do so with that understanding.
 

One of the problems with the suggestion that is offered is that it
 

ignores that once documents are thus created for the public domain
 

and have been made public, their nature does not change. The
 

proverbial cat, as it were, is already out of the bag. (Cf. Black
 

Panther Party v. Keogh, supra, 42 Cal.App.2d at 656.) Indeed, in
 

this vein we would observe that section 6254.5 of the PRA goes even
 

further, for it provides that whenever an agency discloses a public
 

record which is otherwise exempt from the PRA to any member of the
 

public, "the disclosure shall constitute a waiver of the exemptions
 

specified in Section[] 6254 . . . ." We deal here with records
 

that were not previously exempt from disclosure.
 

Another problem with the suggestion is the consequences
 

that would ensue if it were adopted. Rather than looking to a
 

document's nature at the time it was created, the suggestion would
 

somehow mutate the already public nature of the document on the
 

happening of a subsequent event, the commencement of litigation,
 

and would exempt it from disclosure under the PRA. Massive numbers
 

of documents already in the public domain would no longer be
 

available until litigation to which they relate, is terminated.
 

For example, many property damage cases often involve project
 

engineering reports and studies which have already received
 

significant distribution prior to the litigation. But suddenly, a
 

suit over a levee failure in the Delta, for example, would make
 

Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1080; Eaton v.
 

Ventura Port Dist. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 862, 866.) Since the
 

protection offered by subdivision (b) specifically extends to
 

records which "pertain to" such claims, the effect of that specific
 

inclusion is to extend the chronological boundary of the
 

subdivision's protection back to the time after which such claims
 

are filed. 


6. 87-304
 
confidential all of the data on the Sacramento and San Joaquin
 

River Flood Control Projects and other Delta Water Management
 

Reports. And if the contention should be that heavy rains caused
 

the failure, the literal impact of the suggestion would make
 

weather reports and back up statistical data confidential and not
 

available to anyone until the litigation is resolved. We do not
 

believe the Legislature intended that effect of subdivision (b).
 

Statutes, after all, are construed considering the consequences
 

that might flow from particular constructions (cf. People v. Hannon
 

(1971) 5 Cal.3d 330, 335; Estate of Ryan (1943) 21 Cal.2d 498,
 

513; People ex rel. Riles v. Windsor University, Inc. (1977) 71
 

Cal.App.3d 326, 332) and interpretive constructions which defy
 

common sense or lead to absurdity are to be avoided ( Younger v.
 

Superior Court (Mack) (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113-114; Fields v. Eu
 

(1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 328).
 

For these reasons--and, as will be discussed next in
 

connection with our answer to the second question, because these
 

records antedate the initiation of particular litigation--we reject
 

the suggested interpretation of subdivision (b).
 

It has also been suggested that the meaning of the
 

exemption found in subdivision (b) should be strictly confined to
 

that which was briefly articulated in State of California ex rel.
 

Division of Industrial Safety v. Superior Court (1974) 43
 

Cal.App.3d 778. The court in that case said that subdivision (b)
 

"essentially provides public agencies with the protection of the
 

attorney-client privilege, including work product, for a limited
 

period while there is ongoing litigation." ( Id. at 783.) There
 

are several problems with giving such a limited meaning to
 

subdivision (b).
 

There is no question that the exemption found in the
 

subdivision was intended to uphold the attorney-client privilege
 

for public agencies and, indeed, the legislative history of the PRA
 

indicates as much. (Final Report, op. cit. supra, at 9.) However,
 

strictly focusing on the privilege and the rule does not provide a
 

satisfactory explanation of the meaning of subdivision (b) for
 

several reasons.
 

--To begin with, subdivision (b) is not the source of the
 

protection offered public agencies by the lawyer-client privilege
 

and the work-product rule; to the contrary, that protection
 

derives from other sources which antedate the passage of the Public
 

Records Act. (70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 28, 29, 31, 37 (1987); cf.
 

Evid. Code, §§ 954, 175; Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.) Indeed, the
 

aforementioned legislative history of the PRA states that "[t]his
 

section [i.e., subdivision (b)], in effect upholds the attorney-


client privilege. Subsections (f) and (k) [of § 6254] also
 

contribute to the strength of that privilege." ( Final Report,
 supra, at 9; emphases added.) Clearly, the Public Records Act did
 

not create it.
 

7. 87-304
 
 

--Then, as noted in a recent opinion dealing with the
 

matter, lawyer-client communications, work-product files, and
 

litigation records are not coextensive. "Just as lawyer-client
 

communications and work product files are not identical [citation],
 

a record may pertain to pending litigation without being a
 

confidential communication between lawyer and client or produced at
 

the initiative of the attorney in preparation for trial." (71
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 5, 8 (1988). Thus we said, "[b]y use of the word
 

'essentially', the court [in the Industrial Safety case] cannot be
 

said to have equated [them]." (Ibid.)
 

--Lastly, the time frame for protection offered by
 

subdivision (b) is more limited than that provided by the attorney-


client privilege or the work-product rule. As we have seen, and as
 

will be amplified in connection with our answer to the second
 

question, that of subdivision (b) begins with the commencement of
 

particular litigation to which a public agency is a party, or after
 

the filing of a claim against it under the Tort Claims Act, and
 

terminates with the final adjudication or settlement of the
 

litigation or the claim. The protection from disclosure offered by
 

the attorney-client privilege and work product rule is not so
 

temporally confined: it covers transactions antedating the
 

commencement of litigation (70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at 29-32,
 

37), and it continues after litigation has terminated (71
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at 8-9).


 Our interpretation has harmonized the exemption provided
 

in subdivision (b) for records pertaining to pending litigation
 

with the attorney-client privilege and the work product rule, by
 

interpreting the former to protect materials that are developed in
 

connection with an agency's prosecuting, defending, appealing or
 

settling any "litigation" to which it has become a party, upon a
 

complaint, or other initiating document, being filed. Subdivision
 

(b) would thereafter exempt from PRA disclosure all documents
 

generated for the litigation during its pendency.
 

We therefore conclude that the phrase "records pertaining
 

to pending litigation" found in subdivision (b) of section 6254 of
 

the PRA refers to records that are prepared in connection with
 

specific "litigation" to which a public agency has become a party.


 As we now see, the chronological boundary to establish when the
 

exemption of the subdivision applies, is the filing of the
 

complaint or other initiating document for the action; thereafter
 

subdivision (b) would exempt from disclosure all documents
 

generated in connection with the litigation. However, disclosure
 

would be required of documents that pre-date the filing of the
 

initiating document, unless their disclosure is protected by some
 

other provision of law.
 

8. 87-304
 
2. 	Agency Records Generated in the Ordinary Course


 of Business Before Litigation Commences 


The second question asks whether records of a public
 

agency which pertain to litigation against the agency become exempt
 

from public disclosure under subdivision (b) of section 6254 when
 

a claim is filed against the agency, if the records were not exempt
 

from disclosure before that time by other provisions of the Public
 

Records Act. In effect the question asks whether any records
 

maintained by an agency that are generated in the normal course of
 

business before particular litigation commences, or a claim against
 

an agency is filed, can ever be subsumed under the exemption found
 

in subdivision (b).
 

We assume the question contemplates two aspects: one,
 

whether records which are not otherwise exempt from disclosure but
 

which might perchance pertain to future litigation are for that
 

reason protected from disclosure by subdivision (b); and two,
 

whether records which do come to relate to particular litigation
 

involving the agency become exempt from public disclosure under the
 

subdivision if they were not otherwise exempt from disclosure
 

before that time. We conclude that subdivision (b) neither offers
 

exemption from disclosure to records on the chance that they might
 

become relevant in future litigation to which the agency might be
 

a party, nor does it offer exemption from disclosure once the
 

records do come to relate to such litigation.
 

By terms of subdivision (b) itself, the protection it
 

offers is temporary, in that it provides but a specific time frame
 

for its exemption from disclosure of public records to operate.
 

The subdivision speaks of "records pertaining to pending litigation
 

to which the public agency is a party, or to claims made pursuant
 

to [the Tort Claims Act]" and "until such litigation or claim has
 

been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled." Those phrases
 

confine the operative beginning and end of the protection provided
 

by the subdivision to the commencement of the litigation or claim,
 

i.e., the time after the first pleading is filed to initiate it,
 

and its termination. Accordingly, in answering the first question
 

we concluded that the phrase "records pertaining to pending
 

litigation" means those records of a public agency which have been
 

specifically prepared for particular litigation to which it has
 

become a party. Since the existence of particular litigation or a
 

particular claim is a sine qua non for records to be able to
 

"pertain to" it, the protection of subdivision (b) would not extend
 

to records that antedate the commencement of the litigation or the
 

filing of a claim.
 

Subdivision (b) plainly speaks of an exemption for
 

"records pertaining to pending litigation to which the public
 

agency is a party." (Emphasis added.) The legislative history of
 

the PRA indicates that was not meant to "grant to [a] public agency
 

the right to withhold information on the basis that litigation may
 

9.	 87-304
 
 

 

occur at some time in the future." (Final Report, op. cit. supra,
 at 9; emphasis added.) Thus, both the plain wording of the
 

subdivision, and the indication of legislative intent found in its
 

legislative history tell that subdivision (b) was never meant to
 

exempt from PRA disclosure, records generated in the ordinary
 

course of an agency's business on the mere possibility of future
 

litigation or a future claim being filed against it.5
 

Nor will such preexisting records become protected by the
 

subdivision once litigation actually commences, or a claim is filed
 

against the agency, and the records are relevant to the litigation
 

or claim. Subdivision (b) protects from PRA disclosure records
 

which pertain to pending litigation or claims filed against the
 

agency. With respect to the former, we have concluded that means
 

records which are specifically generated for particular litigation,
 

and not preexisting records that may have existed which may now be
 

5

It should be noted that in connection with the state's Open
 

Meeting Laws, the Bagley-Keene and Ralph M. Brown Acts, the
 

legislature has permitted state and local agencies to confer with
 

their attorney in closed session to discuss "pending litigation"
 

and the Legislature has defined that term for purposes of those
 

Acts to include, not only the point where an adjudicatory
 

proceeding has been "initiated formally" (§§ 11126(q)(1);
 

54956.9(a)), but points before that "where . . . there is a
 

significant exposure to litigation" against the state body or local
 

agency. (§§ 11126(q)(2)(A), 54956.9(b)(1).) It has been suggested
 

that since the term "pending" can mean "imminent" or "impending"
 

(cf. Webster's, op. cit. supra, at 1669), we should adopt a similar
 

meaning of "pending litigation" for the purposes of subdivision (b)
 

of the PRA and have it protect records generated by an agency
 

before litigation actually commences. We decline to do so.
 

As shown in the text, the term "pending litigation," like
 

"pending action," is a term of art and refers to a suit or other
 

action which has already commenced but is not yet decided; in other
 

words, an action or suit is pending from its inception until the
 

rendition of final judgment. The inception of an action follows
 

the filing of the first paper that commences it. The Legislature
 

has not defined the term "pending litigation" otherwise for
 

purposes of the PRA. The fact that it has done so elsewhere to
 

accord confidentiality for agency actions that occur at a time
 

before litigation actually commences does not mean that it meant to
 

do so here. (Cf. Safer v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 230,
 

238; Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 920, 927.) In
 

fact, as mentioned in the text, the legislative history of
 

subdivision (b) indicates that at least that subdivision was not
 

meant to grant an agency the right to withhold information because
 

of anticipated litigation. (Final Report, op. cit. supra, at 9.)
 

The records of course may be exempt from disclosure by reason of
 

another provision of law.
 

10. 87-304
 
relevant in it. If a record was a public record and not otherwise
 

exempt from disclosure before litigation commences, the fact that
 

litigation does commence would not change the public nature of the
 

record so as to exempt it from disclosure. Specifically, the
 

subdivision would not exempt from disclosure such records of an
 

agency that antedate the filing of a claim under the Tort Claims
 

Act.
 

We therefore conclude that records generated in the
 

ordinary course of a public agency's business which might perchance
 

pertain to future litigation are not exempt from disclosure by
 

reason of subdivision (b) of section 6254 before the "litigation"
 

actually commences, as when a claim or complaint is filed against
 

the agency, nor do they become exempt from disclosure under the
 

subdivision after that time, even though they might be relevant in
 

the action.
 

3.	 Police Records Which Must Be Disclosed
 

Under Section 6254, Subdivision (f) 


Next we are asked whether police records which must be
 

disclosed under subdivision (f) of the PRA section 6254 are exempt
 

from disclosure under subdivision (b) if they come to pertain to
 

pending litigation. Subdivision (f) provides an exemption from PRA
 

disclosure for records of complaints to, or investigations
 

conducted by any state or local police agency, but it also requires
 

those law enforcement agencies to disclose the names and addresses
 

of persons involved in, or witnesses to "incidents," and to make
 

public certain information relating to (i) persons arrested by the
 

agency and (ii) complaints or requests for assistance they have
 

received. Specific inquiry is made as to whether the filing of an
 

action against an agency, such as a wrongful death action, creates
 

an exemption from public disclosure of such previously existing
 

records as arrest records, police investigatory records, police
 

reports, incident reports and complaint reports. In other words,
 

when such records come to relate to "pending litigation" to which
 

a public agency is a party, is the mandate for disclosure contained
 

in subdivision (f) superseded by the exemption offered by
 

subdivision (b)? We conclude that it is not.
 

It is important to keep in mind that the exemptions from
 

disclosure that are set forth in section 6254 operate with
 

independent force; no single exemption from public disclosure under
 

the PRA controls any other, and each is independently examined to
 

determine its applicability. (Cf. 71 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 5, 8,
 

supra; Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of Berkeley, supra, 76
 

Cal.App.3d 931, 941; Cook v. Craig, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 773, 782­

784; Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 652­

656.) Thus, theoretically, if a record which otherwise has to be
 

disclosed under subdivision (f) happens to "pertain to pending
 

litigation" to which the local law enforcement agency or its public
 

entity is a party, i.e., if it actually was generated in connection
 

11.	 87-304
 
 

with an action which has commenced the agency, the record would not
 

have to be disclosed because it would receive exemption from
 

disclosure under subdivision (b) of section 6254.6 However, we do
 

not believe that scenario inherent in the question presented, for
 

it contemplates pre-existing police records and not records that
 

have been generated for particular litigation after it commences.
 

What we have are certain law enforcement records that
 

have already been prepared in the normal course of a law
 

enforcement agency's business, and in subdivision (f) the
 

legislature has mandated that they be disclosed to the public. The
 

records are thus created and maintained with that potential
 

publicity in mind. In our discussion of the meaning of the phrase
 

"records pertaining to pending litigation" we have seen how the
 

nature of a record for determining its exempt status is determined
 

at the time of its creation, and how its nature does not change
 

upon the happenstance of subsequent litigation. There is no reason
 

to treat records which are declared to be public under subdivision
 

(f) any differently. If they were records available to the public
 

before particular litigation commences, the commencement of the
 

litigation would not convert them to disclosure-exempt records
 

under subdivision (b).
 

Accordingly we conclude that the filing of an action
 

against an agency does not clothe its previously existing records
 

which had to be disclosed under subdivision (f) with an exemption
 

from disclosure under subdivision (b).
 

4. The Claim Itself
 

Subdivision (b) of section 6254 not only protects records
 

"pertaining to pending litigation to which the public agency is a
 

party" but also records pertaining to "claims made pursuant to
 

6

It would also seem patent from the structure of subdivision
 

(f) itself that it is meant to be self-contained, and that the
 

mandated disclosures that it contains are only meant to apply to
 

the exemption from PRA disclosure that it itself provides. The
 

first disclosure it requires (relating to "incidents") is stated as
 

an exception to the subdivision's general exemption from disclosure
 

which proceeds it (cf. People v. Corey (1978) 21 Cal.3d 738, 742;
 

Addison v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 486, 496;
 

Becker v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 282,
 

286), and the second disclosure it requires (relating to arrestees
 

and complaints) is preceded by the words "other provisions of this
 

subdivision notwithstanding." Thus assuming that a record does
 

come within subdivision (f)'s mandated disclosure and is not exempt
 

from that subdivision's general exemption, it would not mean that
 

other exemptions contained in the PRA would not apply to it.
 

12. 87-304
 
Division 3.6 . . . of Title 1 of the Government Code." (Cf. fn. 4,
 

ante.) That is California's Tort Claims Act.
 

Generally speaking, the Tort Claims Act requires the
 

presentation of a claim to a public entity for money or damages as
 

a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit against it. (Gov. Code, §§
 

905, 905.2, 910, 945.4.) The primary function that serves is to
 

apprise the governmental body of the possibility of imminent legal
 

action so that it may investigate and evaluate the claim and, where
 

appropriate, avoid litigation by settling meritorious claims.
 

(City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455;
 

C.A. Magistretti Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist. (1972) 27
 

Cal.App.3d 270, 276; Jenkins v. Contra Costa County (1985) 167
 

Cal.App.3d 152, 157.)
 

The claims process commences with the presentation of a
 

claim by the claimant or by a person acting on his behalf. (Gov.
 

Code, § 910; cf. §§ 905, 911.2.) That document would be a "public
 

record" because it is a "writing containing information relating to
 

the conduct of the public's business . . . retained by [a] . . .
 

local agency." (§ 6252, subd. (d); cf. Register Div. of Freedom
 

Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d 893,
 

901; San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d
 

762, 774-775.) The claim document is also one which relates to the
 

Tort Claims Act's processes and as we have seen, one which helps
 

set a chronological boundary to establish when the exemption of
 

subdivision (b) applies, before which some other exemption must be
 

considered to avoid disclosure of agency documents. (Fn. 4, ante.)
 

However, the problem with according the claim document itself
 

protection from PRA disclosure under subdivision (b) is that it
 

does not meet the criterion of the subdivision as we have
 

understood it.
 

We have interpreted the "pertaining to" phraseology of
 

subdivision (b) to protect documents that are generated as a result
 

of an action being commenced. Particularly, in answering the first
 

question, we interpreted the phrase "records pertaining to pending
 

litigation" as offering protection to records generated in
 

connection with particular litigation after it has commenced with
 

the filing of the first paper to initiate it. (Cf. fn. 5, ante.)
 

In other words, we perceived the subdivision to protect documents
 

which are created as a result of the initiation of litigation and
 

which are specifically designed to meet it. We specifically
 

rejected the suggestion that the protection should extend to other
 

records just because they might relate to the litigation.
 

There is no reason to treat documents involved in the
 

claims process any differently from documents involved in other
 

types of "litigation." We believe the Legislature deliberately
 

included coverage of records pertaining to claims made pursuant to
 

the Tort Claims Act in subdivision (b) to ensure that they would be
 

covered by it, however broadly the term "litigation" might be
 

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defined. (Cf. Final Report, op. cit. supra, at 9.) But for the
 

purposes of the subdivision, the documents involved in the process
 

would be treated the same as those involved in other "litigation."
 

Indeed, as the legislative history of subdivision (b) indicates:
 

"Any agency cannot be required to release
 

information that pertains to litigation involving that
 

agency. . . . [¶] The same principle applies to claims
 

made by individuals against public entities and public
 

employees." ( Final Report, op. cit. supra, at 9;
 

emphasis added.)
 

When a claim document is filed against an agency, it is the claim
 

which generates the action; the action does not generate the claim,
 

and it therefore would not be covered by subdivision (b) as a
 

record "pertaining to . . . claims made pursuant to [the Tort
 

Claims Act]."
 

In Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of
 

Orange, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d 893, request was made under the PRA
 

for certain documents regarding a secret settlement agreement
 

reached between a public agency and a tort claimant ( id. at 897)
 

and question arose whether the claimant's medical records, which
 

were appended to a letter sent by him to the county requesting
 

settlement of his claim, were exempt from disclosure under
 

subdivision (c) of section 6254. ( Id. at 899, 902.) The court
 

held they were not because, inter alia, they had been voluntarily
 

submitted by the claimant to further his private interest and "not
 

to accomplish any governmental purpose or goal." ( Id. at 902.)
 

Thus, the court said, the agency could not hide behind the
 

claimant's 'privacy' claim to justify its concealment of the
 

records from public scrutiny. (Ibid., citing San Gabriel Tribune
 

v. Superior Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 778.)
 

In the case, the county also resisted disclosing the
 

settlement agreement itself, under section 6255 of the PRA,
 

claiming that the public interest served by not making the record
 

public clearly outweigh[ed] the public interest served by
 

disclosure of the record. (158 Cal.App.3d at 909.) It claimed
 

that it was in the public interest to keep secret its settlement
 

policy and decisions, for if known to the public it would result in
 

frivolous tort claims, and it further argued that public scrutiny
 

of the county's settlement procedures would have an adverse impact
 

upon its economic ability to maintain itself as a tort defendant.
 

(Ibid.) The court disagreed:
 

"Against this interest must be measured the public
 

interest in finding out how decisions to spend public
 

funds are formulated and in insuring governmental
 

processes remain open and subject to public scrutiny. We
 

find these considerations clearly outweigh any public
 

interest served by conducting settlement of tort claims
 

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in secret, especially in light of the policies of
 

disclosure and openness in governmental affairs fostered
 

by both the CPRA and Brown Act. [O]pening up the
 

County's settlement process to public scrutiny . . . will
 

strengthen public confidence in the ability of
 

governmental entities to efficiently administer the
 

public purse." (158 Cal.App.3d at 909; fn. omitted.)
 

(See also San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, supra, 143
 

Cal.App.3d at 780.)
 

Although the exemption provided by subdivision (b) of
 

section 6254 was not at issue in the Freedom Newspapers, Inc. case,
 

we find the thrust of its reasoning applicable herein. If a public
 

agency can neither "hide behind" a tort claimant's "privacy claim"
 

under subdivision (c) to justify its not disclosing medical records
 

submitted in connection with a claim under the Tort Claims Act, nor
 

justify its not disclosing a settlement of a claim on the basis of
 

section 6255, can less be said of a justification not to disclose
 

the claim itself by reason of subdivision (b)?
 

We therefore conclude that a claim document filed with a
 

public agency under California's Tort Claims Act is not exempt from
 

PRA disclosure under subdivision (b) of section 6254.
 

* * * * *
 

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