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Filed 5/2/23 Robertson v. Larkspur Courts CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

J. MARTIN ROBERTSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LARKSPUR COURTS et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 A166818

 (Marin County

 Super. Ct. No. CIV-1504551)

This is our fourth opinion in this litigation, which has been pending for 

over seven years. Rather than resolving the merits of this appeal, however, 

we dismiss it under the disentitlement doctrine. That doctrine permits us to 

“dismiss an appeal where the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower 

court’s orders or engaged in obstructive tactics,” a standard amply met here. 

(Gwartz v. Weilert (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 750, 757–758 (Gwartz).)

After discovering mold in his apartment, plaintiff J. Martin Robertson 

sued several entities, including respondents.1 Robertson and respondents

entered a stipulation for settlement, and judgment was entered to enforce the 

1 Respondents, all of whom were involved in the management of 

Robertson’s apartment complex, are Teachers Insurance and Annuity 

Association of America, Riverstone Residential Group, LLC, Greystar RS CA, 

Inc., and Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC. The other four named 

defendants never appeared in the litigation. 
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stipulation’s terms. In 2018, we affirmed the judgment, which awarded 

Robertson $28,000, required the parties to accept a mutual release, and 

required Robertson to sign a dismissal of the action with prejudice.

(Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (May 22, 2018, A152226) [nonpub. opn.] 

(Robertson I).) We also affirmed the trial court’s order awarding sanctions to 

respondents, and we awarded respondents their appellate costs. (Ibid.) Two 

further appeals ensued, the latter of which also resulted in an award of 

appellate costs to respondents. (Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (Jun. 19, 2019, 

A154206) [nonpub. opn.] (Robertson II); Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (Oct. 5, 

2021, A160942) [nonpub. opn.] (Robertson III).) 

Respondents paid Robertson the $28,000 they owed him, but he refused

to comply with his obligations under the judgment to enter a mutual release 

and dismiss the lawsuit. He refused to comply with these obligations even 

though respondents offered not to pursue the sanctions award and both 

orders awarding appellate costs, no parts of which have ever been paid. In 

response, the trial court entered an order deeming respondents’ proposed

release signed by all the parties and dismissing the case with prejudice. 

Robertson now appeals from that order, claiming that (1) the trial court 

lacked authority to deem the release signed; (2) the release was inconsistent 

with the judgment; and (3) dismissal of the case deprived him of his rights.2

We agree with respondents, however, that the disentitlement doctrine 

applies, and we therefore grant their motion to dismiss the appeal.

2 Robertson filed a request for judicial notice of 29 “matters,” all of 

which are federal materials that do not require a request for judicial notice 

and/or are irrelevant to the remaining issues in this case. Thus, we deny the 

request in full.
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I.

BACKGROUND

A. Robertson’s Previous Appeals

We begin by summarizing the case’s facts and history through our

October 2021 decision in Robertson III. Robertson, who is a lawyer, filed this 

suit in December 2015 alleging that respondents and other entities 

inappropriately responded to the discovery of mold in his Larkspur 

apartment. Robertson and respondents reached a settlement and signed an 

agreement under which Robertson agreed to dismiss his claims in exchange 

for $28,000. In May 2017, the trial court entered judgment to effectuate the 

settlement’s terms. Robertson unsuccessfully moved to vacate the judgment, 

and the court awarded $1,280 in sanctions to respondents, concluding that 

the motion to vacate was frivolous. The following May, we affirmed the 

judgment and sanctions order in Robertson I. We also awarded respondents 

their costs on appeal, which they then sought in the amount of $463.20. 

Meanwhile, both before and after the judgment was entered, 

respondents tried to pay the $28,000 to Robertson, but he refused to provide 

his social security number and other personal information (social security 

information), which respondents believed their insurer needed to comply with 

Medicare reporting requirements. In February 2018, while Robertson I was 

pending, the trial court granted respondents’ motion to enforce the judgment 

and ordered Robertson to provide the social security information. 

Robertson appealed that order, initiating Robertson II. In our 

June 2019 opinion, we vacated the order on the basis the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to enter it while Robertson I was pending. In doing so, we did not 

reach the merits of Robertson’s claim that the court erred by ordering him to 

disclose the social security information. 
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On remand, Robertson filed motions seeking postjudgment attorney 

fees, postjudgment costs, and interest on the judgment, and respondents filed 

a second motion to enforce the judgment. While those motions were pending, 

respondents’ insurer paid Robertson the $28,000 despite his failure to provide 

the social security information. In August 2020, the trial court denied 

Robertson’s motions and granted respondents’ motion to enforce the 

judgment. The court ordered the parties to “jointly lodge a signed mutual 

release[,] if they agree on [one,] or . . . each separately lodge a proposed 

mutual release if they do not agree on [one].” It also ordered Robertson “to 

sign a standard form Dismissal of Prejudice of this action.”

Robertson again appealed, claiming that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider respondents’ second motion to enforce the judgment

and that it erred by denying him postjudgment attorney fees, costs, and 

interest. In October 2021, we issued our Robertson III opinion affirming the 

court’s rulings. In doing so, we explicitly rejected Robertson’s challenge to 

the court’s findings that (1) respondents made an “unconditional tender” of 

the $28,000 settlement payment, despite their request for the social security 

information before making it; and (2) respondents’ delay in paying was due to 

his “vexatious and obstructionist conduct.” 

B. The Proceedings Leading to This Appeal and Respondents’ Motion 

to Dismiss

In September 2020, around the time Robertson III was initiated, each 

side submitted a proposed mutual release to the trial court. Respondents’ 

proposed release stated that Robertson and respondents, “along with each of 

their respective affiliates, predecessor entities, and successor entities . . . , 

hereby mutually release one another from all claims arising in any way out 

of, or related to, [Robertson’s] occupancy of the [Larkspur] apartment.” In an 

accompanying case management statement, respondents reported that 
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Robertson objected to their proposed release because he wanted (1) “a ‘carveout’ ” to permit him to pursue “fees/costs/damages/interest allegedly incurred 

during the [post-settlement] time period where the parties were attempting 

to negotiate a long-form release agreement” and (2) a term “address[ing] the 

so-called ‘non-appearing’ defendants in this matter, including their alleged 

relationship to the ‘appearing’ defendants.” 

Reflecting these demands, Robertson’s proposed release stated that 

Robertson would discharge his claims against respondents “and their 

affiliates, subsidiary and predecessor entities except” for five categories of

claims, including postjudgment interest on the settlement amount, costs and 

fees incurred litigating the social security information issue, and potential 

federal and state claims involving that issue. (Boldface omitted.) His release 

also left spaces for describing respondents’ “form of organization” and 

affiliates. 

In summer 2022, several months after the Robertson III remittitur 

issued, respondents filed a case management statement reporting that 

Robertson continued to refuse to agree to a mutual release and still “ha[d] not 

paid outstanding sanctions and appellate costs.” Respondents also filed 

another proposed release that was similar to their previous release. 

At the case management conference that September, the trial court set 

an order to show cause (OSC) hearing for October 19, 2022, to address why 

respondents’ proposed release should not be deemed signed by all the parties. 

It allowed the parties to submit their positions on this issue by September 30. 

Respondents filed a statement arguing it was appropriate to deem the release 

signed, but Robertson did not file anything by the deadline. Instead, on 

October 13, he filed three ex parte applications seeking orders (1) requiring 

respondents to provide more details about their insurer’s claim to need the 
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social security information to comply with Medicare reporting requirements, 

even though the insurer had already paid him without obtaining that 

information; (2) requiring respondents to provide information about their 

form of organization and affiliates so he could ensure a release “of the claims 

of all named defendants”; and (3) staying the case to permit him to file a 

federal lawsuit “concerning federal questions that [respondents’] and the 

[California] courts’ decisions have raised.” (Boldface and italics omitted.)

On October 17, 2022, the date for which Robertson noticed a hearing on 

his ex parte applications, the trial court held a hearing and denied all three 

applications. Two days later, the court held the OSC hearing on its 

scheduled date. After hearing argument by the parties, the court entered an 

order “deem[ing] the release as proposed by [respondents] signed by all 

parties” and dismissing the case with prejudice. Robertson appealed the 

order on December 15.

Before the appellate record was filed, respondents filed a motion to 

dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine. After receiving three 

extensions of time on his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Robertson filed 

the opposition in conjunction with his opening brief. 

II.

DISCUSSION

A. General Legal Standards

“An appellate court has the inherent power to dismiss an appeal by a 

party that refuses to comply with a lower court order.” (Gwartz, supra, 

231 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.) “Courts cannot function if their orders and 

judgments are routinely ignored by litigants or their counsel,” and “litigants 

are [not] free to ignore or refuse to comply with subsequent trial court orders” 

when their lawful attempts to challenge a court’s rulings are unsuccessful. 

(Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 736, 
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756.) Rather, “ ‘[a] trial court’s judgment and orders, all of them, are 

presumptively valid and must be obeyed and enforced. [Citation.] They are 

not to be frustrated by litigants except by legally provided methods.’ ” (Ibid.) 

The disentitlement doctrine “is not jurisdictional” but is instead “a 

discretionary tool that may be used to dismiss an appeal when the balance of 

the equitable concerns makes dismissal an appropriate sanction.” (Gwartz, 

supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.) It is based on the principle that “ ‘[a] party 

to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court 

in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to legal 

orders and processes of the courts of this state.’ ” (Stoltenberg v. Ampton 

Investments, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1230, quoting MacPherson v. 

MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277; see Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 

180 Cal.App.4th 507, 538 [party cannot “seek[] relief from the courts while 

‘insulating [himself] from the consequences of an unfavorable result’ ”].)

We may dismiss an appeal under the disentitlement doctrine “where 

the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower court’s orders or engaged in 

obstructive tactics,” even if the appellant has not been formally held in 

contempt. (Gwartz, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 757–758.) The doctrine 

has been repeatedly applied in cases where the appellant “has frustrated or 

obstructed legitimate efforts to enforce a judgment” (id. at p. 758), and it “ ‘is 

particularly likely to be invoked where the appeal arises out of the very order 

. . . the party has disobeyed.’ ” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, 

Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265.) “[T]he merits of the appeal are 

irrelevant to the application of the doctrine.” (Ibid.)

B. Dismissal Under the Disentitlement Doctrine Is Justified.

Respondents argue that dismissal under the disentitlement doctrine is 

warranted because Robertson has violated multiple court orders. These 
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include orders requiring him to dismiss the underlying case with prejudice, 

sign a standard mutual release, and pay sanctions and appellate costs. 

Respondents also argue that Robertson violated the trial court’s order setting 

the OSC hearing by filing ex parte applications after the deadline to submit 

position statements and setting the hearing on those applications two days 

before the OSC hearing. 

We agree with respondents that the equities favor dismissing the 

appeal under the disentitlement doctrine. We affirmed the judgment 

requiring Robertson to sign a release and dismiss the action with prejudice 

almost five years ago. Regardless of whether his position about the social 

security information was reasonable, by mid-2020 he received the $28,000 

settlement payment without having to provide that information. Even 

though respondents thus fulfilled their primary obligation under the 

judgment nearly three years ago, Robertson refused to negotiate a mutual 

release in good faith or take any other action to help finally bring this 

litigation to a close. By now challenging the mutual release that was deemed 

signed only because of his intransigence, Robertson is clearly “seeking the 

benefits of an appeal while willfully disobeying the trial court’s valid orders 

and thereby frustrating [respondents’] legitimate efforts to enforce the 

judgment.” (Gwartz, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.)

In arguing otherwise, Robertson reiterates his objections to the mutual 

release’s terms and his views on matters that are not at issue in this case. 

We decline to address the merits of the appeal, which are irrelevant to 

application of the disentitlement doctrine, or his ongoing concerns about the 

social security information. He also claims that respondents have unclean 

hands because they want to dismiss this appeal “to cover up their ongoing 

concealment of material information,” namely the information about 
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Medicare reporting requirements that he sought below through one of his 

late-filed ex parte applications. Discovery about the social security 

information has no conceivable relevance at this point, and we agree with 

respondents that Robertson’s attempt to seek it below violated at least the 

spirit of the trial court’s order permitting position statements before the OSC 

hearing.

Moreover, as Robertson admits, he has never paid the amounts due 

under the trial court’s July 2017 sanctions order or this court’s May 2018 

award of appellate costs in Robertson I.3 The failure to pay sanctions and 

other awards of fees and costs is a common ground for applying the 

disentitlement doctrine, and we conclude it supports dismissal here. (See, 

e.g., Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 757; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 

36 Cal.App.5th 142, 166–167.) 

In arguing otherwise, Robertson claims he is not in violation of any 

court orders since respondents “offered to waive their rights to collect the 

sanctions and costs” and the mutual release deemed signed is “broad enough 

to cover releases of [respondents’] claims” for those charges. This position is 

specious. First, respondents offered to waive the sanctions and costs, which 

were clearly not contemplated under the original stipulation for settlement, 

to incentivize Robertson to fulfill his obligations to enter a mutual release 

and dismiss the lawsuit. In other words, his refusal to comply with the 

judgment was the only reason respondents offered not to seek payment. 

Second, in this appeal Robertson seeks to overturn the mutual release, which 

3 We also awarded respondents their appellate costs in Robertson III, 

but they state that they never pursued those costs “in hopes of mitigating 

disputes and being done with this case.” 
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the trial court deemed signed only after he failed to negotiate in good faith. 

He cannot simultaneously contend that the very release he challenges 

insulates him from having to comply with other court orders.

In short, Robertson has persistently refused to comply with the 

judgment or pay the sanctions and costs he owes respondents. Despite our 

entreaty in Robertson I that he work constructively to resolve this case, he

has unreasonably prolonged the litigation while burdening respondents, the 

trial court, and us with his voluminous filings and meritless arguments. We 

decline to entertain yet another appeal by someone who displays such 

disregard for court orders and the legal process.

III.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Respondents are awarded their costs on 

appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
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_________________________

Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Margulies, J.

_________________________

Banke, J.

Robertson v. Larkspur Courts A166818