This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper ve rsion filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 PAMELA K. DENNING, 2 Worker-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 32,566 4 KALLONI, LLC, d/b/a TOMASITA’S, 5 and REPUBLIC UNDERWRITERS 6 INSURANCE COMPANY, 7 Employer/Insurer-Appellees. 8

APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 9 David L. Skinner, Workers’ Compensation Judge 10

Gerald A. Hanrahan 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellant 13 Miller Stratvert P.A. 14 Nathan A. Cobb 15 Dan A. Akenhead 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellees 182 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 KENNEDY, Chief Judge. 2 {1} Pamela Denning (Worker) appeals from th e compensation order and the order 3 denying Worker’s motion for reconsiderati on entered by the Workers’ Compensation 4 Judge (WCJ) in favor of Kalloni, LLC, d/ b/a Tomasita’s (Employer), and Republic 5 Underwriters Insurance Company (Insurer). 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 {2} Worker was injured at work on Septembe r 16, 2009. She sustained injuries to 8 her head, cervical spine, thor acic spine, lumbar spine, a nd right hip. Worker became 9 physically unable to work as a result of these injuries, and she has not earned any 10 wages since the accident. She received Wo rker’s Compensation benefits until the 11 WCJ found that she reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) from her 12 physical injuries. Worker was terminatedfrom work on October 30, 2010, for reasons 13 unrelated to her accident. In 2011, nearly two years after the original accident, 14 Worker was diagnosed with psychological injuries, including depression, anxiety 15 disorder, and pain disorder. The WCJ denied benefits fo r her psychological injuries, 16 finding that they were not a result of her phys ical injury at work, but rather were the 17 direct consequence of her termination. Worker filed a motion for reconsideration on 18 the issue of the WCJ’s denial of benefits for her mental injuries on October 12, 2012 19 that was denied. Worker raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the WCJ erred by 203 failing to find a causal connection between Worker’s psychological injuries and the 1 work accident; (2) whether the WCJ erred by finding an exception to the 2 uncontradicted medical evidence rule; and (3) whether the WCJ erred by finding that 3 Worker was at MMI for her physical injuries and by not awarding continuing 4 temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for her mental injuries. II. DISCUSSI 5 ON 6 A. The WCJ’s Finding That There Is No Causal Connection Between 7 Worker’s Accident and Her Mental Injuries Is Affirmed 8 {3} Worker argues that the WCJ erred in its determination that there was no causal 9 connection between the accident she sustaine d at work and her psychological injuries. 10 Employer/Insurer argued, and the WCJ agreed, that Worker’s psychological problems 11 were triggered by he r termination from employment and not by he r accident at work. 12 For the reasons that follow, the WCJ’s ruli ng on this issue is affirmed. Factual 13 findings of a WCJ are subject to “[w]hole r ecord review” that c ontemplates “a canvass 14 by the reviewing court of all the evidence bearing on a finding or decision, favorable 15 and unfavorable, in order to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the 16 result.” Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight) , 1988-NMCA-091, ¶ 9, 108 N.M. 17 124, 767 P.2d 363. “Substantia l evidence on the whole reco rd is such evidence that 18 demonstrates the reasonableness of the admini strative decision. . . . We will not . . . 194 substitute our judgment for that of the agency[.]” Herman v. Miners’ Hosp. , 1991- 1 NMSC-021, ¶ 6, 111 N.M. 550, 807 P.2d 734. 2 {4} Worker was terminated from her empl oyment on October 30, 2010. The WCJ 3 found that she was a long-term employee of Employer, who rightly considered herself 4 to be a trusted and important member of the very successful restaurant and bar’s 5 management team. Her sense of self-worth was, in no small part, a product of her 6 work ethic and her long-term position. The WCJ also found that Worker’s sense of 7 self-worth was dependent on her employment. The undisputed reason for her 8 termination from employment wa s a change in management. When this employment 9 was terminated, her depressi on became debilitating. It hurt her feelings that, despite 10 the new owner of the restaurant being someone whom she had known since he was 11 twelve years old, he did not want Worker to continue as an employee after a nearly 12 thirty-year employment relationship. She told her psychiatrist, Dr. Karl Ray, that her 13 release from work was “like being kicked to the curb.” She cried about the “perceived 14 . . . ill treatment she had recei ved by her former [E]mployer.” On September 28, 15 2011, Worker reported to Dr. Ray th at she thought of suicide daily. Dr. Ray noted 16 that Worker “hadn’t said that she thought of [suicide] daily before then[.]” 17 {5} In the time period between Worker’s in jury and her termination by Employer, 18 Worker did not need or seek mental health treatment and did not have a mental 195 impairment. In her deposition, she admits thather depression was manageable up 1 until the point that Employer terminated he r employment. Worker’s treatment for 2 psychological problems began at the recommendation of Dr. Belyn Schwartz on 3 February 28, 2011, nearly two years af ter her accident on September 16, 2009, but 4 only four months after her termination from employment. Worker states that the 5 reason Dr. Schwartz referred he r to a psychiatrist was b ecause she “was . . . coming 6 unglued about [her] body being bad, and it didn’t start getting bad until after 7 [Employer] told [her] that another pers on was coming in with their own people and 8 [she] wouldn’t have a job there anymore.” This visit on February 28, 2011 was the 9 first time in the medical r ecord that Worker complain ed of suicidal ideation. On her 10 next visit to Dr. Schwartz, Worker was re ferred to Dr. Ray for psychiatric evaluation 11 and care. Worker states that she felt “betrayed.” She further stated that from the time 12 of the accident, September 2009, to the time of her termination, October 2010, she had 13 been a “little depressed” because her “body was not working right,” but she had come 14 to terms with the fact that it was just an accident, and she had to deal with it. Even 15 more, she admitted that, but for her termin ation by Employer, “[sh e] would [not] feel 16 like [she does], as far as mentally[.]” She believes her mental state would be better 17 had it not been for her termination from employment. 18 {6} The WCJ found that “Worker’s mental illness and mental impairment are not 19 the natural and direct result of the accident[,] but rather are the natural and direct result 206 of the termination of her employment.” The WCJ also concluded that “[t]he 1 termination of employment was for reasons unrelated to the accident or the physical 2 injuries suffered in the accident.” The WCJ stated: “But for the termination of 3 employment in October of [2010,] Worker would not presently be suffering from a 4 mental illness, would not presently have a mental impairment[,] and would not require 5 treatment from a mental health professional.” In a whole record review, we give 6 deference to the WCJ as the fact finder. Herman , 1991-NMSC-021, ¶ 6. The WCJ 7 concluded that Worker’s mental health problems did not derive from her original 8 injury. Given the clear course of Worker’s injury, termination, and the onset of her 9 depression, we conc lude that substantial evidence does support the WCJ’s findings 10 on this issue, we therefore affirm his decision. 11 B. The WCJ’s Finding That an Excepti on to the Uncontradicted Medical 12 Evidence Rule Applies Was Correct 13 {7} The uncontradicted medical evidence ruleis an exception to the general rule 14 that a trial court can accept or reject expert opinion as it sees fit. Lucero v. Los 15 Alamos Constructors, Inc. , 1969-NMCA-005, ¶ 12, 79 N.M . 789, 450 P.2d 198. The 16 rule is found in NMSA 1978, Section 52-1- 28(B) (1987), which requires a worker to 17 prove a causal connection between a disab ility and an accident by expert testimony. 18 Uncontradicted evidence by expert testimony is binding on the trial court. This rule 19 has four exceptions, however, one of which “occurs when the testimony is 207 contradicted, or subject to reasonable doubt as to its truth or veracity, by legitimate 1 inferences drawn from the facts and circum stances of the case.” The rule does not 2 require the fact finder to accept the version of facts upon which an expert’s conclusion 3 is based. Nunez v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp. , 1988-NMCA-109, ¶ 15, 108 N.M. 186, 769 4 P.2d 99. For example, if an expert misunde rstands the facts of a case, the fact finder 5 need not adopt the expert’s opinion that is based on that misunderstanding of the facts. 6 Id. (noting that an expert’s opinion is only as good as the factual basis for that 7 opinion). Dr. Ray and Dr. Gabriela Munoz, a ps ychologist, linked the termination of 8 Worker’s employment to her original injury . However, the WCJ determined that “the 9 termination of employment was not in any way, shape[,] or form linked to the work 10 accident.” He found “Worker’s testimony c oncerning the state of her mental health 11 after the . . . accident and before the termination of her employm ent as compared with 12 the state of her mental health after termin ation of her employment to be credible and 13 determinative as to the course of her mental illness.” {8} The psychiatric and 14 psychological evidence in this case is notuncontradicted because it is “subject to 15 reasonable doubt as to its truth or veracity , by legitimate inferences drawn from the 16 facts and circumstances of th e case.” Dr. Ray’s opinion as to the source of Worker’s 17 psychological conditions was based upon the oral history provided by Worker. Dr. 18 Munoz was never deposed, and the factual basis for her opinions was not presented 19 at trial. However, the WCJ found that , “[i]n this case[,] the mental health 208 professionals appear to link the termination of employment back to the . . . accident.” 1 This observation is given further credence by Dr. Ray’s deposition. On direct 2 examination by Worker, Dr. Ray causally related Worker’s psychological issues to the 3 workplace accident on September 16, 2009. However, on cross-examination, it 4 became apparent that Dr. Ray mistakenly believed that Wo rker was terminated as a 5 result of her workplace accident, and he based his causation opinions upon this 6 mistaken belief. He specifi ed that Worker’s fall at wo rk was not the immediate cause 7 of her depression and mental h ealth concerns. Dr. Ray stat ed: “[I]t is an antecedent 8 cause. If she hadn’t fallen, the terminati on of employment wouldn’t have occurred.” 9 However, the undisputed fact that the te rmination was a result of nothing more than 10 a change in management breaks the causal chain that Dr. Ray relied upon in forming 11 that opinion. 12 {9} The evidence and testimony as to the causal link between Worker’s injury and 13 her subsequent mental health problems is not uncontradicted and is subject to 14 reasonable doubt as to its veracity. Th is evidence is dubious because both doctors 15 relied solely on Worker’s oral testimony to form their conc lusion about causation. 16 What is more, Dr. Ray admitted to mis understanding the facts of the case in his 17 deposition. The WCJ’s conclusion that the uncontradicted medical evidence rule does 18 not apply is affirmed. 19 C. The WCJ’s Finding That Worker Ha s Obtained MMI and Its Denial of 209 Continued Benefits Is Affirmed 1 {10} The WCJ found that Worker reached MMI for her physical injuries suffered 2 with a nine percent whole person impairment rating and sedentary work restrictions. 3 The WCJ also found that Worker is not entitle d to additional indemnity benefits as a 4 result of her mental illness or mental impairment. Worker filed a motion for 5 reconsideration on October 12, 2012, asking that the WCJ reconsider his findings in 6 regard to whether Worker suffered a mental impairment as a result of her work injury. 7 In denying the Worker’s motion, the WCJ not ed that “the expert opinions concerning 8 causation were based on a pr esumed causal link between the . . . accident and the 9 termination of employment that [the WCJ found] simply did not exist.” Because we 10 agree with the WCJ in regard to the first two issues, we must affirm on this issue. The 11 Worker has reached MMI for her physical inju ries, which are the only injuries arising 12 from the accident. The denial of continued benefits for her mental injuries is also 13 affirmed. 14 II. CONCLUSION 15 {11} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the WCJ’s decision. 16 {12} IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

_________________________________ 18 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge 1910 WE CONCUR: 1

___________________________ 2 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 3

___________________________ 4 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 5