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Raymond WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3827

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 27, 2018

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SILBERMAN, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                     AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                      SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

In connection with the Report of Travelstar, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB
for the for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jerry Galant, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Jerry Galant
-------------------------------------
Jerry Galant
Chief Financial Officer
July 30, 2007
#### ***John Valier and Another, Plaintiffs in Error, *versus*John Hart, Jun., and Another.

'Vhere a judgment was rendered by a justice of the peace against an infant, in an action upon contract, error lies in this Court, since the infant could not appeal.

This writ of error was brought to reverse a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace for this county, in an action upon promises, wherein the plaintiffs in error were original defendants, and the defendants in error were original plaintiffs. The error assigned was the minority of one of the original defendants.

*Noble,*for the defendants in error,

moved the Court to quash the writ, on the ground that an appeal lay from the justice’s judgment to the Court of Common Pleas, and that, where an appeal lies, errai does not lie. He relied on the case of *Savage, in Error,*vs. *Gulliver.*
      (1)

4 *Mass. Rep.*171.

*By the Court.*

The very minority of the party, which is assigned

for error in this case, and which is not denied, disabled him from appealing. The decision in the case cited in support of the motion is very guarded, limiting it to cases where the party may appeal ; and the Court explicitly state their opinion, that the statute, in giving an appeal, has not taken away the remedy by error, in cases *275where the aggrieved party, without any loches on his part, cannot avail himself of an appeal, which it is very clear an infant cannot.

*Hubbard*for the plaintiffs in error.

*Motion overruled.*
      (2)

Vide 4 *Mass. Rep.*516, *Putnam, in Error,*vs. *Churchill.*
**Exhibit 32.2**
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**
**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
     In connection with the Annual Report of Too, Inc. (the “Company”), on Form 10-K for the fiscalyear ended January 29, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, William E. May, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer(Principal Financial Officer) of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, asadopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and
          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Company.
Dated: April 12, 2005    /s/ William E. May      William E. May    Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer    (Principal Financial Officer)
#### UNITED STATES Of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Everardo RODRIGUEZ-MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41550 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 8, 2017

Eileen K. Wilson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Oscar A. Vela, Jr., Esq., Attorney, Laredo, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before BENAVIDES, CLEMENT, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Everardo Rodriguez-Mendoza pleaded guilty with a written plea agreement to conspiracy to conceal, harbor, and shield an alien from detection in a building in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), (A)(v)(I), (B)(i). Rodriguez-Mendoza’s guilty plea was conditional under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), and he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

Rodriguez-Mendoza moved to suppress evidence acquired during the search of 3005 Barrios Street and any statements taken in violation of his constitutional rights. After considering the factors in *United States v. Cardoza-Hinojosa,*140 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 1998), the district court concluded that Rodriguez-Mendoza did not have standing to contest the search of 3005 Barrios Street. The district court found our application of the factors in *United States v. Briones-Garza,*680 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1982), a case with similar facts, instructive.

As in *BHones-Garza,*Rodriguez-Mendoza had permission to stay at the house, but *354he had no key. He could secure the house’s front gate and lock the front door, but he could not control who came into the house. He testified that on a few occasions he woke up to find the front door unlocked despite having locked it the previous night.

Rodriguez-Mendoza testified that, other than a trip with a smuggler to buy food, he was not permitted to leave the house. He felt trapped in the house and agreed that he had essentially been kidnapped.

There is no indication that Rodriguez-Mendoza “expected that the drop house would be free from [governmental] intrusion.” *See Briones-Garza,*680 F.2d at 422. Other than the fact that he ate and slept there, the house was not a normal residence. Rodriguez-Mendoza was “little more than a hostage” and “the nature of the place where [he] was required to stay does not indicate it would support any reasonable expectation of privacy on his part.” *See id.*at 421-22. As such, the district court did not err in concluding that Rodriguez-Mendoza lacked standing to challenge the search of the house under the Fourth Amendment.

Based on the foregoing, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.'
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-7109

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RICHARD A. ORR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, Chief District Judge. (2:00-cr-10067-jpj-1)

Submitted: October 21, 2008 Decided: October 28, 2008

Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard A. Orr, Appellant Pro Se. Steven Randall Ramseyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Richard A. Orr appeals the district court’s order

denying his motion to correct errors in the Presentence

Investigation Report. We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated

by the district court. See United States v. Orr , No. 2:00-cr10067-jpj-1 (W.D. Va. June 19, 2008). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Oswaldo SANCHEZ-CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51397

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 20, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Oswaldo Sanchez-Cruz, Pro Se

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Os-waldo Sanchez-Cruz has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Sanchez-Cruz has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel *173is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cíe. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
[Cite as State v. Shough, 2017-Ohio-9268.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 BUTLER COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2017-06-081 

 : D E C I S I O N 

 - vs - 12/28/2017 

 : 

RYAN SHOUGH, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CR2012-06-1018 

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Government Services Center, 315 

High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, OH 45011-6057, for plaintiff-appellee 

Christopher P. Frederick, 300 High Street, Hamilton, OH 45011, for defendant-appellant 

 Per Curiam.

{¶1} This cause came on to be considered upon a notice of appeal, the transcript 

of the docket and journal entries, the transcript of proceedings and original papers from the 

Butler County Court of Common Pleas, and upon the brief filed by appellant's counsel. 

{¶2} Counsel for defendant-appellant, Ryan Shough, has filed a brief with this court 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), which (1) indicates 

that a careful review of the record from the proceedings below fails to disclose any errors 
Butler CA2017-06-081 

by the trial court prejudicial to the rights of appellant upon which an assignment of error may 

be predicated; (2) lists one potential error "that might arguably support the appeal," Anders, 

at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; (3) requests that this court review the record independently to 

determine whether the proceedings are free from prejudicial error and without infringement 

of appellant's constitutional rights; (4) requests permission to withdraw as counsel for 

appellant on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (5) certifies that a copy of both 

the brief and motion to withdraw have been served upon appellant. 

{¶3} Having allowed appellant sufficient time to respond, and no response having 

been received, we have accordingly examined the record and find no error prejudicial to 

appellant's rights in the proceedings in the trial court. The motion of counsel for appellant 

requesting to withdraw as counsel is granted, and this appeal is dismissed for the reason 

that it is wholly frivolous. 

S. POWELL, P.J., RINGLAND and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan Manuel ACOSTA-NIEVES, Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-41702 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Date Filed: 12/12/2016

*895Renata Ann Gowie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Juan Manuel Acosta-Nieves, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Juan Manuel Acosta-Nieves has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Acosta-Nieves has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. .Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

**Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A.
11000 Broken Land Parkway
Columbia, MD 21044-3562
Attention: Master Servicing

RE: Officer's Certificate

Dear Master Servicer:

The undersigned Officer certifies the following for the 1999 fiscal year:


(A) I have reviewed the  activities and  performance of the Servicer  during the
    preceding  fiscal  year under the terms of the  Servicing  Agreement,  Trust
    Agreement,  Pooling and Servicing Agreement and/or Seller/Servicer Guide and
    to the best of these Officers' knowledge,  the Servicer has fulfilled all of
    its  duties,   responsibilities   or  obligations   under  these  Agreements
    throughout  such  year,  or if there has been a default  or  failure  of the
    servicer to perform any of such duties,  responsibilities or obligations,  a
    description of each default or failure and the nature and status thereof has
    been reported to Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A.;

(B) I have  confirmed  that the Servicer is currently an approved  FNMA or FHLMC
    servicer in good standing;

(C) I have confirmed that the Fidelity Bond, the Errors and Omissions  Insurance
    Policy  and any  other  bonds  required  under  the  terms of the  Servicing
    Agreement, Trust Agreement, Pooling and Servicing Agreement and/or
    Seller/Servicer Guide are in full force and effect;

(D) All premiums for each Hazard  Insurance  Policy,  Flood Insurance Policy (if
    applicable) and Primary  Mortgage  Insurance  Policy (if  applicable),  with
    respect  to each  Mortgaged  Property,  have  been  paid  and  that all such
    insurance policies are in full force and effect;

(E) All real  estate  taxes,  governmental  assessments  and any other  expenses
    accrued and due, that if not paid could result in a lien or  encumbrance  on
    any  Mortgaged  Property,  have been paid,  or if any such costs or expenses
    have not been paid with respect to any  Mortgaged  Property,  the reason for
    the non-payment has been reported to Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A.;

(F) All Custodial Accounts have been reconciled and are properly funded; and

(G) All annual  reports of  Foreclosure  and  Abandonment  of Mortgage  Property
    required per section  6050H,  6050J and 6050P of the Internal  Revenue Code,
    respectively, have been prepared and filed.

Certified By:



Officer

VICE PRESIDENT
Title

4-7-00
Date
Alexander LLAGUNO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-1062

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 31, 2018

Richard L. Rosenbaum of the Law Offices of Richard Rosenbaum, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marc B. Hernandez, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Taylor, Ciklin and Forst, JJ., concur.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FEBRUARY 26, 2013

NO. 03-12-00585-CV

S. M. M. and K. A. M., Appellants

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 425TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PEMBERTON AND FIELD

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being 

considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in the trial court’s 

judgment: IT IS THEREFORE considered, adjudged and ordered that the judgment of the trial 

court is in all things affirmed. It FURTHER appearing to the Court that appellants have filed an 

affidavit of inability to pay costs, it is FURTHER ordered that no costs of appeal be assessed 

against appellants; and that this decision be certified below for observance.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA22-0089

IN THE MATTER OF:

H.R., 

A Youth.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including August 1, 2022, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 23 2022

06/23/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0089
#### LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-1983-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

April 25, 2017

. FOR APPELLANT: Justin N. Kinney (Kathleen J, Devlin, on the brief), Kinney Lisovicz Reilly & Wolff PC, New York, NY.

FOR APPELLEE: Marshall T. Potash-nee (David R. Shyer, on the brief), Jaffe & Asher LLP, New York, NY,

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.

*92SUMMARY ORDER

Admiral Insurance Company appeals from a judgment of the District Court (D’Agostino, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of Liberty Insurance Corporation. Applying New York law, the District Court held that Admiral’s insurance policy required coverage of litigation costs of certain additional insureds on a primary basis, while Libei'ty’s policy provided only excess coverage. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We agree with the District Court that the Liberty policy’s “Other Insurance” section provides that the policy is primary only as to the additional insureds’ “own ... policies” — that is, those policies on which they are named insureds. Even accepting Admiral’s view that the “in comparison” clause describes the content of the Schenectady contract, we interpret the Liberty policy’s reference to the additional insureds’ “own ... policies” to mean that the Liberty policy is primary “in comparison” only to the policies of the additional insureds. That interpretation of the “in comparison” clause comports with the “reasonable expectations of a business person,” VAM Check Cashing Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 699 F.3d 727, 729 (2d Cir. 2012), and gives the clause its own “force and effect,” Raymond Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 5 N.Y.3d 157, 162, 800 N.Y.S.2d 89, 833 N.E.2d 232 (2005) (quotation marks omitted). We therefore conclude that the District Court correctly determined that the Liberty policy is excess to, not co-primary with, the Admiral policy.

We have considered Admiral’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.