NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LORENA ESMERALDA GALLEGOSMENDOZA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-71549 

Agency No. A078-282-077 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 17, 2021**

San Francisco, California

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and BRESS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Lorena Esmeralda Gallegos-Mendoza (Gallegos), an El Salvador citizen, 

seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing her 

appeal of an Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying her untimely motion to reopen 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 28 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (CAT). We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 

discretion and may grant relief only if the BIA’s decision was “arbitrary, irrational, 

or contrary to law.” Ocampo v. Holder, 629 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quotations omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the 

petition.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gallegos’s untimely motion 

to reopen based on changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).1 To show she was entitled to reopening on this basis, 

Gallegos had to:

(1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country of 

removal; (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material; (3) show that 

the evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or 

presented at the previous hearings; and (4) demonstrate that the new 

evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the 

original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief 

sought.

Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). The 

BIA reasonably concluded that Gallegos did not make this showing.

First, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Gallegos failed 

to show that conditions materially changed in El Salvador since her original 

1 The BIA treated Gallegos’s motion as one brought on this ground, and we thus do 

the same.
3 

immigration proceedings. The BIA reasonably concluded that Gallegos failed to 

provide “sufficient evidence of related changed country conditions,” rather than 

simply changed personal circumstances. Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1209 

(9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added). Evidence in the record supported the BIA’s 

determination that any worsening of violence in El Salvador since 2001 is 

incremental, and that circumstances there have not changed materially during the 

relevant time.

2

Second, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Gallegos failed to 

establish a prima facie case for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. 

See Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705, 718–19 (9th Cir. 2021) (legal standards). On 

this record, the BIA could conclude that Gallegos did not meet her “heavy burden of 

proving that, if proceedings were reopened, the new evidence would likely change 

the result in the case.” Young Sun Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quotations omitted). 

Because Gallegos did not contend that she suffered past persecution in El 

Salvador, to qualify for asylum she needed to show “a well-founded fear of future 

persecution” in El Salvador because of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). 

2 Our recent decision in Kaur v. Garland, — F.3d —, 2021 WL 2521610 (9th Cir. 

June 21, 2021), is distinguishable because in that case, the petitioner showed 

changed country conditions, namely, that “violence against women has materially 

increased in India.” Id. at *1. Gallegos has not shown a comparable material change 

in conditions in El Salvador.
4 

This included “showing, by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, . . .

facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution.” Silva, 993 F.3d at 719 

(quotations omitted). 

The BIA could reasonably conclude that Gallegos did not make the required 

prima facie showing. Gallegos does not contend that she suffered past persecution 

in El Salvador. Nor has Gallegos made out a prima facie case of a reasonable fear 

of future persecution. Gallegos admitted that she was not certain what would happen 

to her if she returned to El Salvador. And she only alleged that gangs “might look 

for” her. She did not, however, submit any “specific evidence” supporting a wellfounded fear that this would occur. Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 

2003). Gallegos provided no evidence that MS-13 continues to target her family,

and it is unclear how MS-13 would know to target Gallegos considering she left El 

Salvador 20 years ago. Although the killing of her family members was tragic, the

BIA could conclude that the possibility gangs would target Gallegos if she is

returned to El Salvador is “too speculative to be credited as a basis for fear of future 

persecution.” Silva, 993 F.3d at 719 (quotations omitted).

Because Gallegos did not meet her burden of proof for asylum, she also could 

not meet the more stringent requirements for withholding of removal and CAT 

protection. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1277 (9th Cir. 

2020) (“The evidentiary standard that applicants must meet for either withholding-
5 

of-removal or CAT relief is higher than the evidentiary standard for asylum.”). 

PETITION DENIED.