NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-376

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 10390

vs.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe (Doe), appeals from a Superior 

Court judgment affirming his reclassification by the Sex 

Offender Registry Board (SORB) as a level two sex offender. On 

appeal, Doe claims that the decision of the hearing examiner 

(examiner) was not based on substantial evidence, Doe's risk to 

reoffend is low and compels a level one classification, and the 

examiner erred in requiring Internet dissemination of Doe's

personal information. We affirm.

Background. In May 1998, Doe met the victim, a thirteen

year old runaway, at a gas station and engaged her in 

conversation. The victim told Doe that she was twenty-three

years old, lived with her sister, and could not return home 
2

because she had gotten into a fight with her sister. Doe said 

that he had just come from church. Doe was playing gospel music 

on his car radio and had "church papers" in his car. Because of 

the music and the papers, the victim felt safe with Doe, and she 

accepted his offer to put her up in a motel room for the night.

Doe then drove the victim to the motel and registered for a

room. When Doe opened the motel room door, he forcibly pulled 

the victim into the room and pushed her onto the bed. The 

victim was unable to scream for help because Doe held a pillow 

over her face. The victim told Doe that she was only thirteen 

years old and wanted to go home. Doe pushed the victim's bra up 

and began to touch her breasts. Doe then penetrated the 

victim's vagina with his penis. Doe told the victim that he 

would hunt her down and kill her if she told anyone about the 

rape. 

In November 1999, Doe was convicted of one count of rape 

and abuse of a child and one count of indecent assault and 

battery on a child under fourteen.1 Doe was sentenced to eight 

to nine years in State prison. In January 2009, SORB classified 

Doe as a level three sex offender. In March 2019, Doe moved for 

downward reclassification. In support of his motion, Doe 

1 Doe's conviction of indecent assault and battery was later 

reversed and the charge dismissed.
3

submitted reference letters from members of his church, where he 

is a founder and pastor. One of the authors indicated knowledge 

of Doe's sex offense history. After a hearing, the examiner 

classified Doe as a level two sex offender. A Superior Court 

judge affirmed SORB's ruling, and Doe appealed. 

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. When reviewing SORB's 

decision, we will not alter the decision unless it was

"(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; (b) in 

excess of SORB's authority; (c) based upon an error of law; 

(d) made upon unlawful procedure; (e) unsupported by 

substantial evidence; (f) unwarranted by facts found by the 

court, where the court is constitutionally required to make 

independent findings of fact; or (g) arbitrary or 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law."

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender 

Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 108-109 (2014) (Doe, No. 68549), 

citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). "The court must 'give due weight 

to [SORB's] experience, technical competence, and specialized 

knowledge . . . as well as to the discretionary authority 

conferred upon it.'" Doe, No. 68549, supra at 109, quoting 

G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). 

2. Level two classification. When reviewing a 

classification decision by SORB, we "must determine whether the 

decision is supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex 

Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 

459 Mass. 603, 632 (2011) (Doe, No. 10800). "A hearing examiner 
4

has discretion . . . to consider which statutory and regulatory 

factors are applicable and how much weight to ascribe to each 

factor." Doe, No. 68549, 470 Mass. at 109-110. 

Doe contends that the examiner erred by not attributing

sufficient weight to Doe's risk mitigating factors.2 This 

argument fails. Since 2007, Doe has been offense-free in the 

community, a risk mitigating factor to which the examiner gave 

full weight. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(29) (2016). Doe 

was also fifty-four years old at the time of the hearing, and he 

resided in a positive and supportive environment. See 803 Code 

Mass. Regs. § 1.33(30), (33) (2016). Additionally, Doe has 

sustained sobriety and employment, and he has volunteered 

extensively in his community. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 

§ 1.33(34) (2016). The examiner appropriately ascribed moderate

weight to these factors. 

Against these risk mitigating factors, the examiner weighed 

the following high risk and risk elevating factors. Doe used 

and threatened violence against a child stranger. See 803 Code 

Mass. Regs. § 1.33(3), (7)(a)(3), (8), (19) (2016). Doe had a 

2 As to Doe's argument that the decision was unsupported by 

substantial evidence, we discern no error where the examiner

properly relied on the Commonwealth's sentencing memoranda, 

filed after the defendant was convicted of the governing sex 

offense, which bore sufficient indicia of reliability and 

amounted to substantial evidence. See, e.g., Doe, No. 10800, 

459 Mass. at 638. 
5

history of substance use. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(9)

(2016). Doe also had a history of violent crime, and he accrued 

five disciplinary reports while incarcerated, including punching 

and choking his girlfriend during a visit. See 803 Code Mass. 

Regs. § 1.33(10), (11), (12) (2016). Furthermore, Doe had 

refused sex offender treatment, and he violated the terms of his 

parole three times. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(13), (24)

(2016). 

The examiner described the weight given to the elevating 

factors and explained how they outweighed the mitigating 

factors. The examiner carefully reasoned that the high risk

factor and risk elevating factors outweighed the risk mitigating 

factors and supported a determination that Doe's level of risk 

of reoffense and degree of dangerousness was moderate. 

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion. 

3. Internet publication. "Internet publication depends 

not only on the probability of reoffense and the danger posed by 

that potential reoffense, but also on the efficacy of online 

publication in protecting the public from being victimized by 

the offender." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex 

Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 654 (2019) (Doe, No. 

496501). "Internet publication will almost invariably serve a 

public safety interest by notifying potential victims of the 
6

risks presented by the offender in their geographic area." Id. 

at 655. The examiner is required "to ask whether, in light of 

the particular risks posed by the particular offender, Internet 

access to that offender's information might realistically serve 

to protect the public against the risk of the offender's sexual 

reoffense." Id.

Doe asserts that the examiner failed to make explicit 

findings that Internet publication of Doe's offender status 

would serve the public interest. To the contrary, the examiner 

made several findings related to the particular risks posed by 

Doe and the public safety interest that Internet publication 

would serve. First, the examiner emphasized that Doe violently 

raped a stranger child, as opposed to a family member, 

establishing that Internet dissemination would allow the public 

to take precautions when interacting with Doe. Second, because 

Doe has violated parole in the past, including when he committed 

the rape, the examiner reasonably concluded that community 

supervision is not a sufficient deterrent. Third, the examiner 

concluded that, if Doe were to reoffend, it would be against a 

stranger girl in the community, and Internet dissemination would 

allow community members to take steps to protect their children.3

3 Although not explicitly part of the examiner's analysis, 

we note that Doe continued to have relationships with children 

through his church activities, and his child victim initially 
7

Thus, we conclude that the examiner did not abuse his discretion 

by concluding that Internet dissemination of Doe's offender 

status served a public safety interest. See Doe, No. 496501, 

482 Mass. at 655. 

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond, 

Brennan & Smyth, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: September 17, 2024.

trusted Doe because he portrayed himself as an active church 

member. 

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.