Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Burkhart v. Wolf Motors of Naperville, Inc., 2016 IL App (2d) 151053

Appellate Court 

Caption

CARLA BURKHART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WOLF MOTORS OF 

NAPERVILLE, INC., d/b/a Toyota of Naperville, DefendantAppellee.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-15-1053

Filed September 21, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 14-AR-707; 

the Hon. Brian R. McKillip, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Joshua M. Feagans and Kristin N. Stone, both of Griffin/Williams 

LLP, of Geneva, for appellant.

James J. Laraia, of Laraia & Laraia, of Wheaton, for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the 

court, with opinion.

Justices Hutchinson and Burke concurred in the judgment and 

opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 The defendant, Wolf Motors of Naperville, Inc., made a mistake in advertising one of its 

cars for sale. The plaintiff, Carla Burkhart, tried to purchase the car at the advertised price. 

After the defendant refused to honor its advertisement on the ground that the advertised price 

was an error, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the defendant’s actions constituted 

breach of contract and consumer fraud. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals from that order. We affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On May 5, 2014, the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against the defendant, alleging 

breach of contract and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 

Practices Act (Act) (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2014)). The complaint alleged that on September 

23, 2013, the plaintiff saw that the defendant was advertising online at 

www.toyotacertified.com a 2011 Toyota 4Runner for $19,991. The plaintiff contacted the 

defendant and indicated that she was interested in purchasing the vehicle. After the plaintiff 

test-drove the vehicle, she informed the defendant that she wanted to purchase the vehicle. The 

defendant’s representative informed her that the price of the vehicle was $36,991. The plaintiff 

responded that she wanted the advertised price of $19,991. The defendant’s representative 

confirmed that the vehicle had been advertised for $19,991 but explained that the 

advertisement was a mistake. The defendant’s manager subsequently offered to sell the 

plaintiff the vehicle “at cost”—$35,000. The plaintiff refused to purchase the vehicle at that 

price. 

¶ 4 The complaint alleged that the parties had a valid and enforceable contract for the vehicle 

at the advertised price of $19,991 and that the defendant breached the agreement when it 

refused to sell the vehicle to the plaintiff at that price. Alternatively, the complaint alleged that 

the defendant committed consumer fraud and injured the plaintiff when it advertised the 

vehicle at a price for which it did not intend to sell. The defendant filed an answer to the 

plaintiff’s complaint, denying all material allegations.

¶ 5 On May 22, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendant 

argued that the erroneous advertisement did not constitute an offer that could be accepted so as 

to form a contract. The defendant further argued that its actions did not constitute consumer 

fraud because (1) it did not commit a deceptive act or practice, (2) it did not intend for the 

plaintiff to rely on any deceptive act or practice, and (3) the plaintiff did not incur any actual 

damages. 

¶ 6 In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted the deposition of 

its Internet director, Thomas Gregg. Gregg testified that the $19,991 advertised price for the 

subject vehicle was a clerical error and that the correct price for the subject vehicle was 

$36,991. He explained that the clerical error occurred with the entry of the subject vehicle into 

the Dealer Daily system. He testified that the person who had entered the vehicle into the 

Dealer Daily system was not very familiar with the process and was in training. The person had 

mistakenly entered the price of a different vehicle. After Gregg discovered on September 23, 

2013, that the price was incorrectly displayed, he immediately updated the price in the 

dealership DMS system, which then updated the listing on Dealer Daily. He did not realize that 

the update in the system took approximately four days to appear on the Internet. 
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¶ 7 The defendant also submitted the deposition of its used-car sales manager, Bryan Lieser. 

Lieser testified that, as of September 24, 2013, the appraised value of the vehicle in question 

was between $32,000 and $33,000. 

¶ 8 On July 9, 2015, the plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff 

argued that she was entitled to summary judgment because (1) the defendant admitted that it 

refused to sell the vehicle to the plaintiff as advertised and, alternatively, (2) the defendant 

admitted advertising a vehicle for sale without an intention of selling the vehicle as advertised. 

¶ 9 On September 24, 2015, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion. The trial court found that, due to a clerical error, 

the car had been listed at an erroneous price. The trial court then explained that there was no 

contract formed between the parties because there was no mutual assent, as the “plaintiff 

believed she was purchasing a car for $19,991 [while] the defendant’s salesman believed he 

was selling the same car for $36,991.” Further, the trial court found that there was no consumer 

fraud because “the defendant did not intend the plaintiff to rely on a deceptive practice in 

which the defendant never intended to engage.”

¶ 10 On October 20, 2015, the plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. 

¶ 11 ANALYSIS 

¶ 12 On appeal, the plaintiff does not dispute the trial court’s finding that the subject vehicle 

was advertised at the wrong price. Nonetheless, she insists that she did have a contract with the 

defendant or, alternatively, that the defendants’ deceptive advertising constituted consumer 

fraud. She therefore argues that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment and denying her motion for summary judgment. 

¶ 13 The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether a genuine issue of 

triable fact exists (People ex rel. Barsanti v. Scarpelli, 371 Ill. App. 3d 226, 231 (2007)), and 

such a motion should be granted only when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) 

(West 2014)). An order granting summary judgment should be reversed if the evidence shows 

that a genuine issue of material fact exists or if the judgment is incorrect as a matter of law. 

Clausen v. Carroll, 291 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (1997). We review de novo the trial court’s grant 

of a motion for summary judgment. Coole v. Central Area Recycling, 384 Ill. App. 3d 390, 395 

(2008). 

¶ 14 In order to establish a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege and prove the 

following elements: “(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by 

the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4) resultant injury to the plaintiff.” 

Henderson-Smith & Associates, Inc. v. Nahamani Family Service Center, Inc., 323 Ill. App. 3d 

15, 27 (2001). A valid and enforceable contract requires a manifestation of agreement or 

mutual assent by the parties to its terms, and the failure of the parties to agree upon or even 

discuss an essential term of a contract may indicate that the mutual assent required to make or 

modify a contract is lacking. The Delcon Group, Inc. v. Northern Trust Corp., 187 Ill. App. 3d 

635, 643 (1989). An advertisement is not an offer to a contract but rather constitutes an 

invitation to deal on the terms described in the advertisement. Steinburg v. Chicago Medical 

School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 330 (1977); see also O’Keefe v. Lee Calon Imports, Inc., 128 Ill. App. 2d 

410, 413 (1970). 
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¶ 15 In O’Keefe, the defendant advertised a 1964 Volvo station wagon for sale in the Chicago 

Sun-Times. The defendant instructed the newspaper to advertise the price of the car as $1795, 

but the newspaper erroneously advertised it as $1095. The plaintiff went to the defendant’s 

place of business and sought to purchase the car for $1095. After the defendant’s salesman 

refused to sell him the car at that price, the plaintiff filed a breach-of-contract claim against the 

defendant. The trial court subsequently granted the defendant summary judgment on the 

plaintiff’s complaint. O’Keefe, 128 Ill. App. 2d at 411. 

¶ 16 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the advertisement constituted an offer, which he 

accepted and which therefore served as the basis of a binding contract. The reviewing court 

rejected this argument, explaining: 

“We find that in the absence of special circumstances, a newspaper advertisement 

which contains an erroneous purchase price through no fault of the defendant 

advertiser and which contains no other terms, is not an offer which can be accepted so 

as to form a contract. We hold that such an advertisement amounts only to an invitation 

to make an offer. It seems apparent to us in the instant case, that there was no meeting 

of the minds nor the required mutual assent by the two parties to a precise proposition. 

There was no reference to several material matters relating to the purchase of an 

automobile, such as equipment to be furnished or warranties to be offered by 

defendant. Indeed the terms were so incomplete and so indefinite that they could not be 

regarded as a valid offer.” Id. at 413. 

¶ 17 Here, as in O’Keefe, the erroneous advertisement could not in itself serve as the basis of a 

binding contract between the parties. The advertisement did not reflect a price for which the 

defendant ever intended to sell the vehicle. As such, the advertisement did not constitute an 

offer, and the plaintiff’s “acceptance” of that advertisement did not establish a contract.

¶ 18 The plaintiff argues that O’Keefe is distinguishable because this case implicates the 

“special circumstances” that O’Keefe referred to. Specifically, the plaintiff points out that, 

unlike in O’Keefe, here (1) the plaintiff promised to pay the amount that was requested in the 

advertisement, (2) the advertisement referred to all of the equipment to be provided and the 

warranties offered, and (3) the defendant tried to use the advertisement to its advantage. We 

find the plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish O’Keefe unpersuasive. Although the advertisement in 

the instant case included more information than the advertisement in O’Keefe, the 

advertisements were sufficiently similar because they both contained the wrong information 

about an essential term: the price. Here, although the defendant’s manager did offer the car for 

a lower price after he learned that the plaintiff wanted it for the advertised price, the plaintiff 

never indicated a desire to purchase the car for anything other than $19,991. Accordingly, as 

there was never a meeting of the minds as to the price the plaintiff was willing to pay for the car 

and the price the defendant was willing to accept, there was no contract between the parties. 

See Delcon Group., Inc., 187 Ill. App. 3d at 643. 

¶ 19 Alternatively, relying on Williams v. Bruno Appliance & Furniture Mart, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 

3d 219, 221 (1978), the plaintiff argues that O’Keefe is no longer good law because it conflicts 

with the mandate of the Act that advertisements must be viewed as bona fide offers for sale. As 

this issue ties directly into the plaintiff’s second contention, we will address it in that context. 

¶ 20 The plaintiff’s second contention on appeal is that the defendant committed consumer 

fraud when it advertised the vehicle without intending to sell it at the advertised price. The 

plaintiff insists that the defendant’s advertisement constituted a per se violation of the Act 
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because the defendant refused to sell her the vehicle at the price that was listed in the 

advertisement. The plaintiff maintains that it is irrelevant whether the advertised price was 

correct. 

¶ 21 “To establish a claim under the [Act], a plaintiff must prove: (1) a deceptive act or practice 

by the defendant, (2) the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the 

occurrence of the deception in a course of conduct involving trade or commerce, and (4) actual 

damage to the plaintiff that is (5) a result of the deception.” Martinez v. River Park Place, LLC, 

2012 IL App (1st) 111478, ¶ 34. Recovery may be had for unfair as well as deceptive conduct. 

Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 403, 417 (2002). In measuring unfairness, 

courts consider: “(1) whether the practice offends public policy; (2) whether it is immoral, 

unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to 

consumers.” Id. at 417-18. Further, “in a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation 

brought under the [Act], a plaintiff must prove that he or she was actually deceived by the 

misrepresentation in order to establish the elements of proximate causation.” Avery v. State 

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 199 (2005). 

¶ 22 Although the record in this case reveals evidence as to some of the elements of a cause of 

action for consumer fraud, it is clear that plaintiff cannot prove all of them. Specifically, there 

is no evidence that the plaintiff suffered any damages. The plaintiff argues that her damages 

were at least $12,009: the difference between the price at which the car was advertised 

($19,991) and the appraised value of the car (at least $32,000). However, only a person who 

suffers actual damages as a result of a violation of the Act may bring a private action. 815 ILCS 

505/10a(a) (West 2014); Mulligan v. QVC, Inc., 382 Ill. App. 3d 620, 626-27 (2008). The Act 

provides remedies for purely economic injuries. White v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 368 Ill. App. 

3d 278, 287 (2006). Actual damages must be calculable and “measured by the plaintiff’s loss.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morris v. Harvey Cycle & Camper, Inc., 392 Ill. App. 3d 

399, 402 (2009). The failure to allege specific, actual damages precludes a claim brought under 

the Act. White, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 287. The purpose of awarding damages to a consumer-fraud 

victim is not to punish the defendant or bestow a windfall upon the plaintiff but rather to make 

the plaintiff whole. Mulligan, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 629. 

¶ 23 Here, the plaintiff is in the same position she was in before she saw the advertisement. The 

alleged damages she seeks would not compensate her for any actual loss but instead would 

constitute an improper windfall. See id. Accordingly, as the plaintiff suffered no damages, the 

trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Martinez, 2012 

IL App (1st) 111478, ¶ 34. We note that this is not the basis on which the trial court granted the 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment; however, it is well settled that we may affirm on 

any basis appearing in the record. Benson v. Stafford, 407 Ill. App. 3d 902, 912 (2010). 

¶ 24 In so ruling, we reject the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s advertising the vehicle 

at a price that it did not intend to honor was a “per se violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud 

Act” that entitles her to relief. Although even negligent or innocent misrepresentations are 

actionable under the Act, that still does not alleviate a plaintiff’s obligation to prove her 

damages. See Duran v. Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1039 (1992) (explaining 

that because innocent misrepresentations are actionable under the Act, damages will not be 

presumed). 

¶ 25 Further, we find the plaintiff’s reliance on Garcia v. Overland Bond & Investment Co., 282 

Ill. App. 3d 486, 493-94 (1996), Affrunti v. Village Ford Sales, Inc., 232 Ill. App. 3d 704, 707 
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(1992), and Bruno Appliance, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 222, to be misplaced. All of those cases 

involve deceptive “bait and switch” situations. A “bait and switch” occurs when a seller makes 

an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service, which the advertiser in truth does not 

intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch customers from buying the advertised 

merchandise to buying something else, usually at a higher price or on a basis more 

advantageous to the advertiser. Martinez, 2012 IL App (1st) 111478, ¶ 35. Here, the defendant 

did not engage in any “bait and switch,” as it did not try to induce the plaintiff to buy a vehicle 

other than the one that was advertised. 

¶ 26 The plaintiff nonetheless insists that the defendant “employed tactics shadily similar to a 

‘bait and switch’ in attempt to draw [the plaintiff] in.” In support of this accusation, the 

plaintiff points to the defendant’s offer to sell her the car “at cost” for a price that was actually 

higher than the defendant’s cost. We reject this argument. The fact remains that there is no 

evidence that the plaintiff actually suffered any damages due to the defendant’s deceptive 

advertisement. 

¶ 27 Finally, we also find the plaintiff’s reliance on Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Federal Trade 

Comm’n, 379 F.2d 666, 668-71 (7th Cir. 1967), to be misplaced. That case addressed whether 

Montgomery Ward had engaged in deceptive advertising when its advertised guarantees for 

some of its products conflicted with its written guarantees. However, as that case did not 

discuss damages that any customers might have suffered—something that our courts have 

consistently found is necessary in order for a plaintiff to maintain a consumer-fraud 

claim—Montgomery Ward does not require us to reach a different decision. 

¶ 28 CONCLUSION 

¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County. 

¶ 30 Affirmed.