SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA 

En Banc 

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court 

 ) No. CR-10-0211-PR 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) Court of Appeals 

 v. ) Division One 

 ) No. 1 CA-CR 09-0127 

TROY JASON LEWIS, ) 

 ) Apache County 

 Appellee. ) Superior Court 

 ) No. CR2003-112 

 ) 

 ) 

 ) O P I N I O N

__________________________________) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County 

The Honorable Donna J. Grimsley, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

________________________________________________________________ 

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One 

224 Ariz. 512, 233 P.3d 625 (App. 2010) 

AFFIRMED 

________________________________________________________________ 

MICHAEL B. WHITING, APACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY St. Johns 

 By Martin Brannan, Chief Deputy County Attorney 

Attorneys for State of Arizona 

LAW OFFICE OF EMILY DANIES Tucson 

 By Emily L. Danies 

Attorney for Troy Jason Lewis 

________________________________________________________________ 

H U R W I T Z, Vice Chief Justice 

¶1 A term of probation may be terminated “at a time 

earlier than that originally imposed if in the court’s opinion 

the ends of justice will be served and if the conduct of the 
2

defendant on probation warrants it.” A.R.S. § 13-901(E) (2010).1 

We granted review in this case to determine whether a court may 

terminate probation despite a defendant’s failure to complete 

all required community service and pay all outstanding fees and 

fines. 

I. 

¶2 In 2003, Troy Jason Lewis pleaded guilty to possession 

of a dangerous drug for sale. The superior court placed him on 

probation for five years and ordered him to perform forty hours 

per month of community service and pay $5400 in fines and fees. 

¶3 While on probation, Lewis tested positive for 

methamphetamine three times and was incarcerated for each 

violation. After the third violation, Lewis was placed in an 

inpatient rehabilitation program for 180 days. Lewis 

successfully completed the program and has remained drug-free. 

Lewis completed vocational training and has been steadily 

employed for several years. He has married, has two children, 

and regularly attends church. 

¶4 Lewis’s term of probation was to expire on September 

13, 2008. His probation officer petitioned for termination of 

probation on September 3, 2008. The petition noted that Lewis 

had not completed all required community service and had not 

                                                           

1

 We cite the current version of the statute because it has 

not been materially revised since the events that gave rise to 

this case. 
3

paid all outstanding fees and fines, but nonetheless recommended 

“unsuccessful termination” and the entry of a civil judgment for 

the remaining fees and fines. The State objected and filed a 

petition to revoke probation. Between October and December 

2008, Lewis paid most of the delinquent fines. On December 4, 

2008, his probation officer reported to the court that Lewis had 

completed 347 hours of community service, appeared “sincere in 

his desire to improve his life,” and opined that “continued 

probation would be of little benefit.” 

¶5 At a disposition hearing on December 8, 2008, Lewis 

addressed the court and acknowledged responsibility for the 

unpaid fines and fees. The trial court noted that Lewis had 

received letters of support from the community. Although 

finding that Lewis had neither paid all required fines nor 

completed all required community service, the court nonetheless 

decided to terminate probation, stating: 

Mr. Lewis, I tend to agree with you that probation is 

designed for rehabilitation, and I’m not certain that 

there’s anything that probation can assist you with at 

this point in time to complete any rehabilitative 

process. It seems that those efforts have been made, 

and I don’t think we’re going to get better by keeping 

you on probation. 

Therefore, I am going to follow the recommendation. I 

will unsuccessfully terminate your probation today 

because there’s . . . an outstanding amount, and that 

will be entered as a judgment against you. 
4

¶6 The State appealed. A divided court of appeals 

affirmed the termination of Lewis’s probation. State v. Lewis, 

224 Ariz. 512, 513 ¶ 1, 233 P.3d 625, 626 (App. 2010). Judge 

Hall dissented, arguing that § 13-901(E) “does not authorize a 

trial court to grant early release to a defendant whose 

performance while on probation has been unsatisfactory.” Id. at 

517 ¶ 27, 233 P.3d at 630 (Hall, J., dissenting).

¶7 We granted review to resolve a recurring issue of 

statewide importance. See ARCAP 23(c)(3). We have jurisdiction 

under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and 

A.R.S. § 12-120.24 (2003). 

II. 

A. 

¶8 “The trial court’s power to grant probation is not 

inherent but is derived from . . . statutory authority.” State 

v. Carter, 116 Ariz. 595, 597, 570 P.2d 763, 765 (1977). The 

legislature also has plenary power to determine when probation 

may be terminated. It has done so in § 13-901(E), which 

provides: 

The court, on its own initiative or on application of 

the probationer, after notice and an opportunity to be 

heard for the prosecuting attorney and, on request, 

the victim, may terminate the period of probation or 

intensive probation and discharge the defendant at a 

time earlier than that originally imposed if in the 

court's opinion the ends of justice will be served and 

if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants 

it. 
5

See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.4(a) (“At any time during the term 

of probation, upon motion of the probation officer or on its own 

initiative, the court, after notifying the prosecutor, may 

terminate probation and discharge the probationer absolutely as 

provided by law.”).

¶9 Section 13-901(E) vests trial courts with broad 

discretion to terminate probation. The State argues, however, 

that the statute did not authorize the superior court to 

terminate Lewis’s probation because he was “unsuccessful” – that 

is, he had neither completed all required community service nor 

paid all fines within the five-year probation period. The State 

cites Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.8(c)(2), which 

provides that “[u]pon a determination that a violation of a 

condition or regulation of probation occurred, the court may 

revoke, modify or continue probation,” and argues that the 

superior court was limited to these three options. 

¶10 Because the criteria for probation eligibility are a 

substantive matter determined by the legislature, Rules of 

Criminal Procedure cannot directly conflict with statutory 

directives. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(4) (giving this Court 

“[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any 

court”); Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85, 92 ¶ 26, 203 P.3d 

483, 490 (2009) (“[O]nce we determine that a statute conflicting 
6

with a court-promulgated rule is ‘substantive,’ the statute must 

prevail.”). Thus, if Rule 27.8(c)(2) were read to prohibit a 

court from terminating probation despite its conclusion that the 

“ends of justice will be served . . . and the conduct of the 

defendant on probation warrants it,” A.R.S. § 13-901(E), the 

Rule would exceed this Court’s rule-making powers. 

¶11 But, as the court of appeals noted, there is no 

inherent tension between Rule 27.8(c)(2) and § 13-901(E). See

Lewis, 224 Ariz. at 515 ¶ 18, 233 P.3d at 628. The Rule simply 

recites options available to the trial court when a defendant 

violates the terms of probation. But the legislature has 

provided another option under certain limited circumstances. If 

the superior court finds that, notwithstanding the defendant’s 

failure to complete all terms of probation successfully, he has 

nonetheless rehabilitated himself and no good purpose will be 

served by further probation, § 13-901(E) provides the judge with 

the discretion to terminate the probation. 

¶12 Citing State v. Moore, the State argues that § 13-

901(E) does not grant authority to terminate probation that is 

“unsuccessfully completed.” 149 Ariz. 176, 177, 717 P.2d 480, 

481 (App. 1986). But technically, no term of probation is 

successfully completed until it expires. Thus, the State’s 

broad reading of Moore would vitiate § 13-901(E) by disallowing 

early termination. 
7

¶13 But more importantly, Moore does not stand for the 

proposition advanced by the State. Moore expressly recognized 

that the trial court may terminate probation under § 13-901(E) 

when the ends of justice will be served and the defendant’s 

conduct so warrants. Id. The court then correctly explained 

that, by its terms, § 13-901(E) allows termination only if “the 

defendant’s conduct is such as to indicate rehabilitation.” Id. 

The Moore court’s dictum that the statute does not allow 

termination when probation is “unsuccessfully completed” simply 

reinforces the legislative mandate that before ordering 

termination, the trial court must find that the defendant’s 

conduct on probation was such as to demonstrate rehabilitation.2

C. 

¶14 The court of appeals thus correctly held that a trial 

court may terminate probation under § 13-901(E) when the 

defendant has not completed all terms of probation. To be sure, 

such a failure will typically indicate that the defendant is not 

                                                           

2 The State also relied below on State v. Hensley, which 

stated that “once the court finds that a defendant has violated 

probation, its only options are to revoke, modify, or continue 

the terms of probation.” 201 Ariz. 74, 79 ¶ 21, 31 P.3d 848, 

853 (App. 2001). But, as the opinion below noted, Hensley

interpreted A.R.S. § 13-901.01(E), which requires a court to 

impose new probationary terms when a person violates the terms 

of probation for a conviction for personal possession or use of 

a controlled substance. Lewis was convicted of possession for 

sale and § 13-901.01(E) does not apply to his case. See Lewis, 

224 Ariz. at 515 ¶ 16 n.6, 233 P.3d at 628 n.6. 
8

sufficiently rehabilitated to deserve termination, or, in the 

words of the statute, that neither “the ends of justice” nor 

“the conduct of the defendant on probation” justify early 

termination. But, in an appropriate case, the statute 

authorizes the trial court to terminate probation even if a 

probationer has been unsuccessful in fulfilling all conditions 

of probation within the original term. 

¶15 The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in 

terminating probation. See State v. Patel, 160 Ariz. 86, 89, 

770 P.2d 390, 393 (App. 1989) (reviewing early termination of 

probation for abuse of discretion). The probation officer had 

recommended early termination, and Lewis’s exemplary conduct 

after completing the inpatient program demonstrated his 

rehabilitation. Section 13-901(E), which expressly allows 

termination decisions to be based on the “opinion” of the trial 

court, entrusts broad discretion to the judges most able to 

determine the situation of a particular defendant in deciding 

whether sufficient rehabilitation has occurred to warrant 

termination. The judge here had ample evidence from which she 

could so conclude. The court’s conclusion that the “ends of 

justice” would not be served by continuing on probation a 

defendant who had already completed hundreds of hours of 
9

community service and paid most of his fines and fees was well 

within its statutory discretion.3

¶16 Nor was continuing probation necessary to ensure 

payment of Lewis’s outstanding fines and fees. The trial court 

is required to enter a civil judgment when probation is 

terminated, affirming the obligation of a defendant to pay 

outstanding costs, fees, fines, and restitution. A.R.S. § 13-

805(A)(1), (A)(2) (2010). The superior court appropriately did 

so here. 

III. 

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that § 13-901(E) 

permits a court to terminate the probation of a defendant who 

has not completed all required community service or paid all 

outstanding fines and fees if the statutory prerequisites are 

met. We also hold that the superior court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that the interests of justice and Lewis’s 

conduct while on probation warranted termination of his 

probation. We therefore affirm the opinion of the court of 

appeals and the order of the superior court. 

                                                           

3

 We encourage trial judges to make a record of their reasons 

for concluding that termination of probation is appropriate 

under § 13-901(E) when the defendant has failed to satisfy all 

conditions of probation. Such a record serves to ensure 

compliance with the statutory requisites and facilitates 

appellate review. 
10

 _______________________________________ 

 Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice 

CONCURRING: 

___________________________________ 

Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice 

___________________________________ 

W. Scott Bales, Justice 

___________________________________ 

A. John Pelander, Justice