J-S06015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.R.M.F.-S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.S.S., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1386 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County 

Orphans' Court at No: 13ADOPTIONS2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JULY 31, 2023

Appellant, R.S.S., appeals from the August 29, 2022 order terminating 

his parental rights to L.R.M.F.-S. (“Child”). We affirm. 

The record reveals that Bradford County Children and Youth Services 

(the “Agency”) filed an emergency petition for protective custody after an 

October 7, 2020 report of Appellant’s sexual abuse of Child (born in 2014). 

Appellant failed to appear at an October 13, 2020 shelter care hearing, which 

was then rescheduled for October 22, 2020. Appellant once again failed to 

appear. The hearing master made the following findings: 

The credible and uncontradicted testimony of R.S., Jr. 

established that he twice walked in on [Appellant] in the act of 

sexually abusing [Child—R.S. Jr.’s half-sister]: once penetrating 

the child’s vagina with his finger and on a second occasion 

attempting to insert his penis into the child’s vagina. 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Orphans’ Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 8/29/22, at ¶ 6. 

Based on these findings, the Agency assumed physical and legal custody. 

On March 25, 2021, on the motion of the Agency, the orphans’ court 

made a finding of aggravated circumstances and directed that no efforts were 

to be made to reunify Child with Appellant.1 Appellant never challenged that 

order, but at a September 17, 2021 hearing, Appellant maintained his 

innocence of the abuse and sought involvement with Child. In response, the 

Agency asked Appellant to undergo a sexual offender evaluation and provided 

Appellant with a list of providers. Appellant did not comply. 

On March 11, 2022, the Agency filed a petition for the termination of 

Appellant’s parental rights. The orphans’ court conducted a hearing on August 

23, 2022. In addition to the foregoing facts, the Agency produced evidence 

that Appellant poses an ongoing risk of inflicting physical abuse on Child. Child 

suffers from moderate to severe autism spectrum disorder, which Appellant, 

given his limited parenting capacity, cannot manage. Child is doing well with 

foster parents who can meet her special needs. While in placement, she has 

overcome malnourishment and grown to a healthy weight. 

On August 29, 2022, the orphans’ court issued the order on appeal, 

finding clear and convincing evidence in support of terminating Appellant’s 

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1

 The definition of aggravated circumstances appears in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302; 

it includes cases where the dependent child has been sexually abused by the 

parent. Upon a finding of aggravated circumstances, the orphans’ court may 

permit the Agency to cease reunification efforts. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1). 
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parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) and 

§ 2511(b). Appellant filed this timely appeal, in which he argues that 

termination of his parental rights was not warranted under any subsection of 

§ 2511. 

Our standard of review is well-settled. 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept 

the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court 

if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant claims the orphans’ court’s order was not supported 

by clear and convincing evidence because the orphans’ court based its decision 

on the uncorroborated testimony of Appellant’s minor son, R.S. Jr.

2

 Beyond 

his criticism of the orphans’ reliance on R.S., Jr.’s testimony, however, 

Appellant develops no legal argument under any subsection of § 2511(a). 

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2

 Appellant concedes, however, that the time to appeal from the findings of 

dependency and aggravated circumstances has passed. Appellant’s Brief at 

9. 
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We will focus our analysis on whether there exists clear and convincing 

evidence of for termination under § 2511(a)(2): 

The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). “The standard of clear and convincing evidence 

means testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable 

the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth 

of the precise facts in issue.” In re K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32. “If the 

court’s findings are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite result.” Id. 

“The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015).

As described above, Child’s placement resulted from Appellant’s alleged 

sexual abuse of her. A hearing master found the allegations credible, and the 

orphans’ court issued a finding of aggravated circumstances. Moreover, the 

orphans’ court’s decision did not rest merely on the testimony of R.S. Jr.

(which the orphans’ court was free to find credible). The record reflects that 

Appellant exhibited risk factors for future physical abuse of the Child. N.T. 

8/23/22, at 47-48. Appellant has a limited capacity to parent and that he will 
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be unable to meet Child’s special needs. Appellant exhibited little to no 

understanding of Child’s autism spectrum disorder and how to care for and 

manage Child’s behavior. Id. at 43-45. Child exhibited a lack of safety 

awareness around her house and elopement behavior, and Appellant’s lack of 

understanding of Child’s condition posed physical risks to her. In summary, 

the record reflects clear and convincing evidence of Appellant’s affirmative 

misconduct and his continued incapacity to parent Child. We discern no error 

in the orphans’ courts’ decision to terminate Appellant’s rights under 

§ 2511(a)(2). 

Next, we must consider Child’s needs and welfare under § 2511(b). 

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include [i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability. [D]etermination of the child’s needs and 

welfare requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 

the parent and child. The utmost attention should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

Recently, in Interest of K.T., ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 4092986 (Pa. 

June 21, 2023), our Supreme Court explained that, under § 2511(b), “courts 

should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing her 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above the concerns 

of the parent.” Id. at *13. The court must consider the child’s bond with preadoptive parents, if any, as well as the child’s bond with the biological parent. 
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Id. at *14. The court must determine whether the trauma of breaking any 

bond with the biological parent is outweighed by the benefit of placing the 

child in a permanent home. Id. at *15 (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 53). The 

parental bond, as well as “permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors 

may contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare.” Id. at *16. “[B]y 

evaluating the impact of severance to determine if it will impose more than 

an adverse or detrimental impact, courts correctly refine their focus on the 

child’s development and mental and emotional health rather than considering 

only the child’s ‘feelings’ or ‘affection’ for the parent, which even badly abused 

and neglected children will retain.” Id. In other words, courts must consider 

whether termination of parental rights will sever a parental bond that is 

“necessary and beneficial” to the child. Id. at *18. 

The § 2511(b) inquiry also includes consideration of:

[T]he child’s need for permanency and length of time in 

foster care [...], whether the child is in a preadoptive home and 

bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets 

the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, 

including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and 

stability. 

Id. Trial courts have discretion to assign appropriate weight to each of these. 

Id. 

Instantly, the orphans’ court acknowledged the likelihood of a bond 

between Appellant and Child but made findings supporting a conclusion that

the bond was not so necessary and beneficial to Child as to preclude 
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termination of Appellant’s parental rights. Id. at 6. “[Child] did not and has 

never expressed in any way that she missed [Appellant] or that she wanted 

to return to his care. From the time she was placed in the pre-adoptive home 

[...] she has received love, attention, care, and appropriate education and 

therapy.” Id. On the other hand, Child was removed from Appellant’s care 

due to sexual abuse and she was severely malnourished upon the Agency’s 

assumption of custody. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 3, 5. Child was 

unsafe in Appellant’s home due to his inability to meet the needs posed by her

autism spectrum disorder, and at risk of further abuse from Appellant. The 

orphans’ court rejected Appellant’s account of Child’s “idyllic” life with him as 

“delusional.” Id. at 7. On the other hand, Child’s pre-adoptive family is able 

to manage her special needs and she is happy, thriving, and properly 

nourished with her pre-adoptive family, where she had been for approximately 

a year and a half as of the Agency’s termination petition. Orphans’ Court 

Opinion, 7/10/23, at 6. 

In summary, the record supports a finding that the parent/child

relationship is neither necessary nor beneficial to Child under the 

circumstances of this case and that any harm resulting from its severance is 

outweighed by the positives of Child’s permanent placement with a family that 

can provide for her physical, developmental, and emotional needs. We discern 

no error in the orphans’ court's order. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/31/2023