alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
September 1, 2015 

By e-mail only 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Document Management System 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Re: Mosher-Thomas LLC Petition for Exemption 

FAA Docket Number: FAA-2015-2666 

Our File No.: 412.15212 

SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR EXEMPTION 

Dear Administrator: 

Petitioner Mosher-Thomas Industries LLC (MTI) submits this supplement to the 

petition for exemption filed on June 5, 2015, pending under docket number FAA2015-2666. 

In its petition, MTI sought a Section 333 exemption for the operation of two 

rotorcraft unmanned aircraft systems, the Blade 350 QX and the Tali H500. In this 

supplement, MTI seeks to add a similar exemption for a fixed-wing unmanned 

aircraft system, the PrecisionHawk Lancaster Mk-111 Rev-1V. 

The FAA is familiar with and has already determined that the PrecisionHawk 

Lancaster Hawkeye Mk-III meets the requirements of Section 333 ofthe Reform Act 

in light of its weight, speed, and operational capabilities. See e.g:, 

• Exemption No. 11273 to AIG PC Global Services, Inc.; 

• Exemption No. 11573 to Ag Tech Enterprises, Inc.; 

• Exemption No. 11551 to AgWorx Inc; 

• Exemption No. 11345 to PrecisionHawk, Inc. 

MICHAEL C. LINDBERG 

mlindberg@johnsonlindbcrg.com 

Direct (952) 956-6200 

MSBA Certified Civil Trial Specialist 
Because it does not carry flammable fuel and is lightweight, a grant of exemption to 

the PrecisionHawk Lancaster Mk-III Rev-IV would serve the public interest by 

reducing the hazards and emissions of heavier manned aircraft. 

A copy of the Precision Hawk Lancaster Mk-III Rev-IV Flight Operations Manual is 

attached, setting forth the technical specifications of its operation. 

Please grant an exemption to MTI for the Precision Hawk Lancaster Mk-III Rev-IV 

as well as the Blade 350 QX and the Tali H500. 

Sincerely, 

~~.~ 

Michael C. Lindberg 

JOHNSON & LINDBE 

MCL/pjd 

Enclosures
454 A.2d 180

#### Commonwealth v. Sitkin, Appellant.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 4, 1983.

Argued October 27, 1982.

Thomas I. Puleo, for appellant; Gail Thackeray, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before HESTER, WICKERSHAM and POPOVICH, JJ.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 July 2, 2019

d0624

Order 

Clerk

July 2, 2019

158487(68)

VELLA TRADER, Personal Representative of the

ESTATE OF THELMA L. DeGOEDE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 158487

COA: 339577

Kalamazoo CC: 2008-000191-CZ

COMERICA BANK, f/k/a, INDUSTRIAL STATE

BANK & TRUST COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s February 4, 

2019 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that 

reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).
#### CONTEST PROMOTIONS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-15213

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2017 * San Francisco, California

Filed August 16, 2017

*323Michael Floyd Wright, Esquire, Attorney, Law Office of Michael F. Wright, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

James Moxon Emery, San Francisco City Attorney’s Office, San Francisco, CA, Thomas S. Lakritz, Esquire, Attorney, City Attorney’s Office, City and County of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: GRABER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and MARSHALL,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, Senior United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which permits appellate review of interlocutory orders denying injunctions, Plaintiff Contest Promotions, LLC, appeals the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction. In its initial complaint, Plaintiff argued that Article 6 of the San Francisco Planning Code violates the First Amendment and that the accrual of penalties while Plaintiff mounted its First Amendment challenge violates Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The district court denied Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, and Plaintiff timely appealed.

After filing this appeal, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint alleging the same theories. Defendant City and County of San Francisco moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the district court granted Defendant’s motion. In an opinion filed this date, we affirm that dismissal. Accordingly, we dismiss this interlocutory appeal as moot. See Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Div./IBT v. BNSF Ry., 834 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that “subsequent entry of the final judgment in the case mooted the question of the procedural propriety of the preliminary injunction”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mount Vernon Mem’l Park, 664 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1982) (dismissing appeal from denial of preliminary injunction where the district court subsequently dismissed the relevant count of the complaint for failure to state a claim and appeal of that dismissal was before the court); see also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 257 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[interlocutory orders entered prior to the judgment merge into the judgment.”).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS INCLUDED IN
THE REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-KSB FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         142,996
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    119,714
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               313,085
<PP&E>                                          58,941
<DEPRECIATION>                                  26,918
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 350,608
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,580
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         5,311
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   350,608
<SALES>                                        652,385
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               652,385
<CGS>                                          393,582
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  505,163
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,532
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (242,828)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (242,828)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (242,828)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.07)


</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LEON K. PERKINS, §

§ No. 648, 2014

Defendant Below, §

Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware in and 

v. § for New Castle County

§

STATE OF DELAWARE, §

§

Plaintiff Below, § Cr. ID No. 0212008942

Appellee. § 

Submitted: December 3, 2014

Decided: January 13, 2015

Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and VALIHURA, Justices.

O R D E R

This 13th day of January 2015, upon consideration of the notice to 

show cause and the appellant’s response, it appears to the Court that:

(1) In 2005, the appellant, Leon K. Perkins, was convicted of 

Murder in the First Degree and related weapon offenses and was sentenced 

to mandatory life imprisonment plus sixteen years. On direct appeal, this 

Court affirmed Perkins’ convictions and sentence.1 In 2008, the Court 

 

1

Perkins v. State, 920 A.2d 391 (Del. 2007).
2

affirmed the denial of Perkins’ motion for postconviction relief under 

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.2

(2) Perkins has appealed the Superior Court’s November 5, 2014

order denying his motion for appointment of counsel. By notice dated 

November 24, 2014, the Clerk directed that Perkins show cause under 

Supreme Court Rule 29(b) why the appeal should not be dismissed for this 

Court’s lack of jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory appeal in a criminal 

matter.3

(3) In his December 3, 2014 response to the notice to show cause, 

Perkins states that he is entitled to the appointment of counsel to pursue 

further postconviction remedies. Perkins argues that, under the Delaware 

Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction to determine all appeals from the 

Superior Court in criminal cases, including his appeal from the Superior 

Court’s November 5, 2014 order denying his motion for appointment of 

counsel.

(4) Perkins is mistaken. Under the Delaware Constitution only a 

final judgment may be reviewed by the Court in a criminal case.4 In this 

 

2

State v. Perkins, 2008 WL 2406231 (Del. Super. June 11, 2008), aff'd, 2008 WL 

5191831 (Del. Dec. 11, 2008).

3

See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 29(b) (governing involuntary dismissal upon notice of the Court).

4 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(1)(b); State v. Cooley, 430 A.2d 789, 791 (Del. 1981).
3

case, the Superior Court’s November 5, 2014 order denying Perkins’ motion 

for appointment of counsel is an interlocutory order.

5

 The denial of Perkins’ 

motion is not appealable as a collateral order before the entry of a final order 

on a motion for postconviction relief.6

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rule 

29(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice

 

5

Accord Lopez v. State, 2014 WL 3586494 (Del. July 21, 2014); Harris v. State, 2013 

WL 4858990 (Del. Sept. 10, 2013); Brown v. State, 2012 WL 4466314 (Del. Sept. 26, 

2012) (dismissing appeals from Superior Court orders denying appointment of counsel as 

impermissible criminal interlocutory appeals).

6

See St. Louis v. State, 2012 WL 130877 (Del. Jan. 17, 2012) (citing Robinson v. State, 

704 A.2d 269, 271 (Del. 1998)).
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6188 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 420 Highway 17 North in Surfside Beach, 

South Carolina, as the ‘‘Nancy Yount Childs Post Office 

Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 6188 EH

1 SECTION 1. NANCY YOUNT CHILDS POST OFFICE BUILD2 ING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 420 Highway 17 North in 

5 Surfside Beach, South Carolina, shall be known and des6 ignated as the ‘‘Nancy Yount Childs Post Office Build7 ing’’. 

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

10 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

11 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Nancy Yount Childs 

12 Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives June 3, 2024. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6188 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostYount Childs Post Office Building’’. Surfside Beach, South Carolina, as the ‘‘Nancy al Service located at 420 Highway 17 North in
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              FEB-28-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   AUG-31-1997
<CASH>                                         776
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  8,644
<ALLOWANCES>                                   711
<INVENTORY>                                    51,680
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         11,887
<DEPRECIATION>                                 4,757
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 84,070
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          19,915
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   84,070
<SALES>                                        3,414
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               25,086
<CGS>                                          2,138
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  21,868
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             752
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                2,437
<INCOME-TAX>                                   951
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            1,486
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,486
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .33
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .33
        

</TABLE>
Order filed April 13 , 2012

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________
NO. 14

- 12

- 00 144

- CR

____________ HENRY ONYINYE IWU , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Court County, Texas Trial Court Cause No.



### ORDER

Appellant is represented by retained counsel, Raiysa Reece . No reporter ' s record

has been filed in this case. Terri Johnstone, the court reporter, informed this Court that appellant had not made arrangements for payment for the reporter ' s record. On March 15,

2012

, the clerk of this court notified appellant that we would consider and decide those issues that do not require a reporter ' s record unless appellant, within 15 days of notice, provided this court with proof of payment for the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c). Appellant filed no reply.

Accordingl y, we issue the following order.We ORDER appellant ' s retained counsel, Raiysa Reece , to file a brief in this appeal

on or before May 14, 2012 . If Raiysa Reece does not timely file the brief as ordered

, we will issue an order directing the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the reason for the

failure to file the brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b)(2).

PER CURIAM
#### Lydia L. Querze, Appellant, *v.*Raoul Querze, Respondent.

Submitted April 19, 1943;

decided May 20, 1943.

Motion to amend remittitur denied. (See 290 N. Y. 13.)
Order filed February 14, 2013 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-12-01007-CV

____________

DORA BURNETT, Appellant

V.

PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL AND ACE 

AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL, Appellees

On Appeal from the 270th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-31924

O R D E R

Appellant’s brief was due January 28, 2013. No brief or motion for 

extension of time has been filed. 

Unless appellant submits a brief to the clerk of this court on or before

March 18, 2013, the court will dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See

Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b). 
PER CURIAM
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Allen Jawann GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50729

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 14, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Allen Jawann Griffin, Pro Se

Before DENNIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Allen Jawann Griffin, federal prisoner # 27329-380, seeks a certificate of appeala-bility (COA) to appeal the district court’s dismissal, as time barred, of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his 2014 conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Griffin does not challenge the district court’s determination that his conviction became final on February 28, 2014, and that the limitations period expired one year later on February 28, 2015. He has therefore abandoned any such arguments on appeal. *See Hughes v. Johnson,*191 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir. 1999). Instead, Griffin contends that reasonable jurists would debate the district court’s application of the prison mailbox rule. Specifically, he argues that the district court improperly placed the burden of proving the filing date on him, rather than on prison authorities.

A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When, as here, the district court has denied habeas relief on procedural grounds, this court will issue a COA “when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000).

*349Reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court erred in dismissing Griffin’s § 2255 motion as time barred without developing the record as to when he placed the motion in the prison mail system. *See id., Stoot v. Cain,*570 F.3d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 2009). Further, Griffin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are facially valid constitutional claims. *See Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 683-84, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); *Houser v. Dretke,*395 F.3d 560, 561-62 (5th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, Griffin’s motion for a COA is GRANTED, the district court’s judgment of dismissal is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for further factual development as to when Griffin placed the § 2255 motion in the prison mail system. *See Whitehead v. Johnson,*157 F.3d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1998).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                             221
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   221
<PP&E>                                          10,701
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,675
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  12,922
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           12,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        45,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,525,600
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    12,922
<SALES>                                         37,856
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                37,856
<CGS>                                        2,582,853
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,582,853
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 254
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,542,578)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,542,578)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,542,578)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.57)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.57)


</TABLE>
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
                     906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


               In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the
period ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the "Report"), of 3CI Complete Compliance Corporation (the
"Company"), I, Donald P. Zima, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer
of the Company, certify as follows, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

               (a) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section
               13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

               (b) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
               all material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company.

/s/ Donald P. Zima
------------------------------------------------
Donald P. Zima
Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer
September 24, 2003
Cecelia N. KING v. Anna Belle L. NEWMAN

2160042

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 23, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.