alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# FILED September 28, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) For Publication ) Appellee, ) Filed: ) v. ) Madison County ) DENNIS KEITH and ) Hon. Whit LaFon, TIMOTHY COLLINS ) Judge ) Appellants. ) No. 02-S-01-9604-CC-00035

DISSENTING OPINION

I respectfullydissent from the majority’s judgment that the search warrant was properly supported by affidavit. In my view, an “affidavit” which does not show on its face that it was sworn to is no affidavit at all. Rather, it is merely an unsworn writing.

The State attempts to correct this deficiency by submitting proof that the supporting affidavit had been sworn. But the fact remains that at the time of the search, the search warrant
was not “supported by affidavit” as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-103 (1997), nor “supported by oa th or affirmation” as required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. If the occupant of the subject property had inspected the warrant
as it was being executed, he could have rightfully refused to allow the search. The constitutional right to so refuse an unreasonable2

searchshould not be later extin guished simply because the State corrected its mistake after the fact.

The rule the majority promulgates today is closely akin to the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule: as long as lawenforcement officers act honestly and reasonably , th en the fruits of their search will be admitted into evidence even though the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. United States v. Le on , 468 U.S . 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed.2d 677 (1984). We have not yet addressed the g ood faith exception in Tennessee, and I am wary of even the slightest, albeit oblique, movement in that direction.

Therefore, I would follo w Commonwealth v. Dozier , 366 N.E.2d 1270 (Mas s. App. Ct. 1977). In that case, a statute required that the affidavit supporting the search warrant be sworn before a justice, special justice, clerk, or assistant clerk. Because the jurat was unsign ed, the seized evidence was held properly suppressed. Id. at 1270.

In conclusion, this Court once stated:

The use of printed forms has made the procurement of a search warrant the merest formality, considering the fundament a l constitutional right which the searchinvades. Certainly, this Court can do no less than to require that the few blank spaces be filled in, and the other details of the formalitybe carried out with care and precision.3

Everett v. State , 182 Tenn. 22, 28, 184 S.W.2d 43, 45 (1944) (finding an affidavit deficient because the month was omitted from the date of the alleged offense). Because I adhere to this principle, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. I would find it necessary to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to this defective search warrant.

_______________________________ ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-31274

Summary Calendar

ALONZO MOORE, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY;

SUPERIOR STEEL, INC. GROUP LONG-TERM DISABILITY

PLAN, AN EMPLOYEE WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(97-CV-89)

September 3, 1998

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Alonzo Moore, Jr. ("Moore") was employed by Superior Steel,

Inc. ("Superior") as a welder. Superior contracted with Provident

Life and Accident Insurance Company ("Provident") to provide short

and long-term disability plans for its employees. These Plans were

issued in accordance with the Employment Retirement Income Security
2

Act (ERISA) and Provident was the Administrator and Claims

Fiduciary under the terms of the Plan. These Plans expressly

provide that the Administrator and Claims Fiduciary would have

"full, exclusive and discretionary authority to control, manage and

administer claims and to interpret and resolve all questions

arising out of the administration, interpretation and application"

of the Plan. In April 1995, Moore suffered a hernia and applied

for and received short-term benefits which commenced on or about

June 7, 1995. In November 1995, Moore filed claim a for a longterm disability benefits and this claim was approved by Provident

and he received approximately $1,060 per month through May 1996.

Based on periodic medical reports, Provident terminated Moore’s

long-term benefits effective May 31, 1996. Moore appealed his

termination to the Review Committee under the terms of the Plan

which affirmed the decision to terminate the long-term benefits.

In January 1997, Moore sued Provident in Louisiana state district

court alleging that Provident had wrongfully terminated Moore’s

benefits. Provident removed the case to the federal district court

and filed a motion for summary judgment. The federal district

court granted summary judgment and Moore appeals.

We have carefully reviewed the briefs, the record excerpts and

relevant portions of the record itself. For the reasons stated by

the district court in its ruling on motion for summary judgment

filed under date of October 24, 1997, we AFFIRM the final judgment

entered on that same date.

AFFIRMED.
#### Leonard J. PORTO III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jason FARRIS, Police Officer, individual and official capacity; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55126

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

FILED OCTOBER 5, 2017

Leonard J. Porto III, Laguna Beach, CA, pro se.

Philip D. Kohn, Ajit Singh Thind, Esquire, Rutan <& Tucker, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Leonard J. Porto, III, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to comply with court orders. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. *Pagtalunan v. Galaza,*291 F.3d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Porto’s action because Porto failed to comply with the district court’s orders instructing him to file an amended complaint comporting with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and curing the deficiencies identified in its pri- or screening orders. *See id.*at 642-43 (discussing the five factors for determining whether to dismiss under Fed. R.- Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order); *Ferdik v. Bonzelet,*963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (although dismissal is a harsh penalty, the district court’s dismissal should not be disturbed absent “a definite and firm conviction” that it “committed a clear error of judgment” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject as meritless Porto’s contentions that the district court erred by screening his in forma pauperis complaints and by resolving his case without discovery.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
454 A.2d 165

#### Commonwealth v. Kelly, Appellant.

Submitted October 13, 1982.

David G. Metinko, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before WIEAND, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
454 A.2d 170

#### In The Interest of Wiley. Appeal of York County Children and Youth Services. Appeal of Jan M. Wiley and Joan Wiley.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 14, 1983.

Submitted September 15, 1982.

S. Stanley Rebert, for appellants (at Nos. 22 & 44), and for participating party (at No. 55); Maria P. Cognetti, for appellant (at No. 55) and for participating parties (at Nos. 24 & 44); *622Ronald Perry, for Jon David Wiley, appellee (at Nos. 44 & 55).

Before CAVANAUGH, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.

Orders affirmed.
#### Mario GARCIA-MAYA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-73142

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 15, 2017

Mario Garcia-Maya, Pro Se

Kurt Barrett Larson, Senior Litigation Attorney, Channah Norman, OIL, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Mario Garcia-Maya, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence factual findings and review de novo questions of law. *Hernandez-Mancilla v. Holder,*633 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Garcia-Maya failed to establish the requisite ten years continuous physical presence for cancellation of removal, where he stated in his application for cancellation of removal and testified that he first entered the United States in 2002, but he was served with a notice to appear fewer than ten years later. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (to qualify for cancellation of removal, alien must show ten years continuous physical presence in the United States); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (continuous physical presence period ends when alien is served with a notice to appear).

*282The agency did not err in declining to address other eligibility factors for cancellation of removal, where the continuous physical presence requirement is dispositive. *See Simeonov v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (agency not rer quired to make findings on issues unnecessary to the result reached).

To the extent Garcia-Maya challenges the agency’s denial of administrative closure, we lack jurisdiction to review that denial. *See Diaz-Covarrubias v. Mukasey,*551 F.3d 1114, 1118-20 (9th Cir. 2009). We also lack jurisdiction to consider Garcia-Maya’s unexhausted ineffective assistance of counsel claim. *See Tijani v. Holder,*628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before the BIA.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Rudy LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11513 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 20, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rudy Lopez, Pro Se

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Rudy Lopez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Lopez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned officer of Rocketinfo, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby
certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that the Company's Annual
Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007 (the
"Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

                                 /s/Philip Graves
                                 ----------------------
                                 Philip Graves
                                 Chief Executive Officer

February 20, 2009
<PAGE>


                                                                           10.01

                                  September 29, 1997


Norm Smith

HAND-DELIVERED


Dear Norm,

In the event your employment is terminated without cause, Racotek will provide
you with six (6) months advance notice of your termination, or otherwise provide
you with compensation equivalent to six (6) months of pay at your
then-prevailing salary.  Until January 1, 1998, your then-prevailing salary
shall be considered to be the salary you will receive on January 1, 1998.
Please sign below to indicate your receipt and acknowledgement of this letter.

Very truly yours,


Mike Fabiaschi

Mike Fabiaschi
President & C.E.O.


ACCEPTED THIS 30th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1997:

                                            Norm Smith
                                            ---------------
                                            Norm Smith




                                          14
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 35 (Tuesday, February 22, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 9631]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03668]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Eye Institute; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Eye Institute Special Emphasis 
Panel; NEI Secondary Data Analysis Applications (R21).
    Date: March 28, 2022.
    Time: 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Eye Institute, National Institutes of Health, 
6700B Rockledge Drive, Suite 3400, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual 
Meeting).
    Contact Person: Ashley Fortress, Ph.D., Designated Federal 
Official, Division of Extramural Activities, National Eye Institute, 
National Institutes of Health, 6700B Rockledge Drive, Ste. 3400, 
Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 451-2020, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0f6e7c67636a762169607d7b7d6a7c7c4f61666721686079"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4627352e2a233f68202934323423353506282f2e68212930">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.867, 
Vision Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: February 15, 2022.
Tyeshia M. Roberson-Curtis,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2022-03668 Filed 2-18-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### The President, Directors, and Company, of the Boston Bank *versus*Solomon K. Chamberlin and Another.

Where an infant made a mortgage of hie land, and, after coming of age, conveyed the same land subject to the mortgage, this second deed was holden to confirm and make good the mortgage.

This was a writ of entry, upon the seisin of the demandants within thirty years, in fee and in mortgage. The demandants claimed under the deed of one *John D. Waterman,*an infant aged nineteen years. The tenants claimed under a deed from the same grantor after he came to full age; which deed recognizes the deed by him given to the demandants, and conveys the premises subject to the same.

The cause coming on for trial, at the last May term in this county, before *Putnam,*J., and he being of opinion that the deed to the demandants was voidable only, and that the deed to the tenants did not avoid it, the tenants were defaulted. If the Court should be of a different opinion, the default was to be taken off, and the demandants were to become nonsuit; otherwise, judgment was to be rendered on the default.

*Dwight,*for the tenants,

contended that the deed to the demand-ants was wholly void, and that the reference to it in the deed to the tenants had no operation to make it good ; and he cited the cases of *Jackson,*ex dem. *Wallace, & Al.*vs. * *Carpenter,*(1)*Jackson,*ex dem. *Brayton, & Al.*vs. *Burchin,*(2) and *Lloyd*vs. *Gregory.**(3)*

(1)

11 *Johns.*539.

(2)

14 *Johns.*124.

(3)

*Cro. Car.*501.

*But the Court*agreed in opinion, with the judge who sat at the trial, that the deed of the infant to the demandants was voidable only. The deed to the tenants was a recognition of it, and made it good and effectual. The cases from *New York*were different. The second deed in this case was a confirmation of the former one, and nod no operation to avoid it. Let judgment be entered for the demandants, as on mortgage.

*Gold*for the demandants, *(a)*

(a)

*Barnaby*vs. *Barnaby,*1 *Pick.*221. — *Oliver*vs. *Houdlett*& Al. 13 *Mass. Rep*239. — *Roof vs. Stafford,*7 *Cowen,*9. — *Belton*vs. *Briggs, 4 Dess.*465.— *Course*vs Birdsall, 1 *Johns. Cas.*127. — *Jackson*vs. *Todd,*6 *Johns.*257. — *Jackson*vs. *Bur*chin, 14 *Johns.*124. — *Wamsley*vs. *Lindenberger,*2 *Rand.*478. — *Roberts*vs. *Wiggin,*1 N *H. R.*73. — *Wright*vs. *Steele,*2 N. *H. R.*55. — *Kline*vs. *Bebee,*6 *Conn. R.*494.— *White*vs. *Flora,*2 *Tenn.*431. — Sed vide 1 *Atkinson's Conveyancing,*229.— 1 *Prest. Abstr.*324. — 4 *Barton, Conv.*9. — *Dixon,*tit. *Deeds,*471. — *Swansey*vs. *Administrator of Vanderheyden,*10 *Johns. R.*33. — *M'Gillis*vs. *Howe,*3 N. *H. R.*348.— *Curtin*vs *Patton,*11 *Serg.*Rawle. 305.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

               STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
               SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

         The undersigned, Robert C. White, is the President and Chief Executive
Officer and Principal Executive and Financial Officer of Wake Forest Bancshares,
Inc. (the "Company"). This statement is being furnished in connection with the
filing by the Company of the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year
ended September 30, 2004 (the "Report").

         By execution of this statement, I certify that:

         A)       the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
                  U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and

         B)       the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods
                  covered by the Report.

         This statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report
so that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not intended that
this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended.

         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



DATE: DECEMBER 23, 2004                   /S/ ROBERT C. WHITE
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          ROBERT C. WHITE

                                          PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                          AND PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE AND FINANCIAL
                                          OFFICER
**EXHIBIT32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of VendingData Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB forthe quarterly period ended March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, Steven J. Blad,Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, and John R. Spina, ChiefFinancial Officer and Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.             The Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.             The information contained in the Report fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations ofthe Company.

 

 
| By:    | /s/ Steven J. Blad                     | Dated: | May 17, 2004 |
|--------|----------------------------------------|--------|--------------|
|   | Steven J. Blad                         |   |         |
| Title: | Chief Executive Officer  and President |   |         |

 

 
| By:    | /s/ John R. Spina                      | Dated: | May 17, 2004 |
|--------|----------------------------------------|--------|--------------|
|   | John R. Spina                          |   |         |
| Title: | Chief Financial Officer  and Treasurer |   |         |

 

 

This certification ismade solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to theknowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.

 

----