No. 00-832 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2002 MT 102 

JON C. WELLS and CANDY A. WELLS, 

Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

v. 

M. DUANE YOUNG and NANCY YOUNG, 

husband and wife, 

Defendants and Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Big Horn, 

The Honorable Blair Jones, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellants: 

Martha Sheehy, Sheehy Law Firm, Billings, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Jeffrey J. Oven, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, P.L.L.P., 

Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: August 23, 2001 

 Decided: May 15, 2002 

 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk
2 

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 M. Duane Young and Nancy Young (“the Youngs”) appeal from the 

July 25, 2000, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of 

the Montana Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn County, 

permanently enjoining flood irrigation practices on their property. 

 Additionally, the Youngs appeal from the District Court’s October 

4, 2000, Order denying their Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., motion to 

alter or amend the judgment. We reverse. 

¶2 We find one issue dispositive of this appeal: 

¶3 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

permanently enjoined lawful flood irrigation practices on the 

Youngs’ property? 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶4 The Youngs own thirteen acres of real property near Hardin, 

Montana, which they purchased in 1988. Floyd Warren, Inc., 

leases approximately four acres of the Youngs’ property for crop 

production. The Youngs and their predecessors in interest have 

irrigated the four acre parcel for decades. Actual irrigation of 

the property is sporadic due to the lack of water and the type of 

crop selected for production. The annual income derived by the 

Youngs from crop production on their irrigated parcel of property 

is approximately $400.00. 

¶5 In 1992, Jon C. Wells and Candy A. Wells (“the Wells”) 

purchased real property and built a home adjacent to the Youngs’ 

irrigated parcel of property. Between the summer of 1994 and the 

fall of 1998, the Youngs’ property was flood irrigated three times. 
3 

 On each occasion, the Wells thereafter experienced flooding in the 

crawl space of their home. The Wells filed suit against the Youngs 

in the District Court claiming damages in excess of $80,000.00 

based on tort theories of negligence, nuisance, and trespass. In 

addition, the Wells sought a permanent injunction prohibiting 

future flood irrigation on the Youngs’ property. 

¶6 Following a bench trial, the District Court entered its 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on July 25, 2000. 

The specific findings of the District Court are critical to our 

analysis and will therefore be explained in some detail. 

¶7 The District Court found that the flood irrigation practices 

employed on the Youngs’ property are “typical of the practice of 

irrigators who utilize flood irrigation on crops.” Moreover, the 

District Court determined that it is unlikely that the flood 

irrigation practices conducted on the Youngs’ property caused a 

rise in groundwater so substantial as to cause the flooding 

experienced by the Wells. The District Court found that the “most 

plausible and credible explanation” of the flooding experienced by 

the Wells is the existence of a subsurface pathway or conduit, 

“most likely” an abandoned United States Bureau of Indian Affairs 

(“BIA”) ditch, extending from the head ditch on the Youngs’ 

property to the Wells’ home. Despite entering the prior findings, 

the District Court also found that the “saturation of the soils 

around the Wells’ residence and the entry of water into the Wells’ 

crawl space occurred as a result of the flood irrigation practices 

used in irrigating the Youngs’ field in 1994 and in 1998.” The 

District Court determined that the conduit or possibly other 
4 

conditions responsible for the water flooding the Wells’ property 

existed prior to the Wells’ purchase of the property and the 

construction of their home. 

¶8 Since the irrigation practices on the Youngs’ property 

predated the construction of the Wells’ home, the District Court 

reasoned that § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, precluded the Wells from 

recovering damages. Under this analysis, the Wells could not 

recover on their trespass actions pursuant to § 85-7-2212(2), MCA. 

 Similarly, the District Court concluded that the Wells’ nuisance 

claim was barred by § 27-30-101(3), MCA. The District Court 

disposed of the negligence claim by focusing on the Wells' failure 

to establish that the Youngs’ flood irrigation practices breached 

the standard of care of a reasonable farm irrigator engaged in 

flood irrigation. 

¶9 Nonetheless, the District Court permanently enjoined the 

Youngs from irrigating their property. The District Court 

determined that future irrigation without modification to the head 

ditch would result in “an unreasonable and substantial risk of 

continuing harm and irreparable injury to the Wells’ property.” 

Consequently, the District Court concluded that the imposition of a 

permanent injunction preventing flood irrigation on the Youngs’ 

property was justified until said irrigation practices did not 

result in the saturation of soil on the Wells’ property and the 

entry of water into the Wells’ home. 

¶10 After entry of the District Court’s July 25, 2000, Order, the 

Youngs moved the District Court to alter or amend its judgment 

pursuant to Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P. The Youngs requested that the 
5 

permanent injunction be vacated based upon the court’s 

determination that their irrigation practices were lawful. On 

September 25, 2000, the District Court conducted a hearing on the 

Youngs’ motion. On October 4, 2000, the District Court entered its 

Order denying the Youngs’ motion. 

¶11 The District Court relied on our decision in Madison Fork 

Ranch v. L & B Lodge Pole Timber Products (1980), 189 Mont. 292, 

615 P.2d 900, to support its conclusion that injunctive relief is 

available as a remedy to enjoin lawful activity when equity so 

warrants. The District Court noted that our holding in Madison 

Fork relied strictly on equitable principles of law and did not 

cite § 27-19-102, MCA. Nonetheless, the court determined that its 

imposition of the permanent injunction in this case comported with 

the procedures outlined in § 27-19-102, MCA. The court found that 

the continued use of flood irrigation on the Youngs’ property would 

result in immediate, irreparable and substantial harm to the Wells’ 

home, and thus the need to protect the Wells from substantial loss 

which they may potentially endure as a result of the irrigation. 

The court noted that the Youngs net only nominal income from such 

irrigation. The Youngs appeal. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶12 The grant or denial of an injunction is within the discretion 

of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

that discretion. Engel v. Gampp, 2000 MT 17, ¶ 33, 298 Mont. 116, 

¶ 33, 993 P.2d 701, ¶ 33 (citation omitted). Moreover, the 

granting of an injunction is an equitable remedy. Talley v. 

Flathead Valley Community College (1993), 259 Mont. 479, 491, 857 
6 

P.2d 701, 708 (citation omitted). Therefore, we review both 

questions of law and questions of fact arising upon the evidence 

presented in the record to determine if the court abused its 

discretion. See Section 3-2-204(5), MCA. Also see Boz-Lew 

Builders v. Smith (1977), 174 Mont. 448, 452, 571 P.2d 389, 391. 
7 

DISCUSSION 

¶13 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

permanently enjoined lawful flood irrigation practices on the 

Youngs’ property? 

¶14 The District Court determined that the imposition of a 

permanent injunction was warranted in this case pursuant to § 27-

19-102, MCA, and as a matter of equity. Accordingly, we must 

decide whether the District Court abused its discretion when it 

permanently enjoined flood irrigation practices on the Youngs’ 

property as both a matter of law and equity. We will first examine 

whether the District Court complied with the procedures stated in § 

27-19-102, MCA, and then, in turn, address whether the District 

Court abused its discretion in its efforts to achieve an equitable 

result. 

¶15 The Youngs claim that neither law nor equity permits the 

imposition of a permanent injunction precluding lawful irrigation 

practices. The Youngs contend that the trial court applied an 

incorrect legal standard when it permanently enjoined their 

irrigation practices, which it initially determined were lawful and 

did not cause the Wells’ damages. The Youngs assert that the 

applicable Montana statute governing the imposition of permanent 

injunctions, § 27-19-102, MCA, requires a breach of an obligation 

as a prerequisite to the imposition of a permanent injunction. The 

Youngs point out that the District Court did not expressly find 

that they breached a duty or an obligation owed to the Wells. 

Likewise, the Youngs argue that a breach of the duty imposed by § 

28-1-201, MCA, not to damage the property of another, cannot be 
8 

implied from the court’s findings. The Youngs maintain that if 

such a finding were implied, it would conflict with the court’s 

explicit findings and conclusions that: (1) they did not breach the 

standard of care of a reasonable farm irrigator engaged in flood 

irrigation, (2) the Wells’ trespass and nuisance actions are barred 

by § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, and (3) the flooding experienced by the 

Wells was caused by an underground conduit constructed by the BIA. 

¶16 The Wells respond that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion, under legal or equitable grounds, when it imposed a 

permanent injunction. While they do not dispute that a breach of 

an obligation is a prerequisite to the imposition of a permanent 

injunction pursuant to § 27-19-102, MCA, they assert that the 

statute serves only as “mere guidelines” to a district court when 

issuing permanent injunctions pursuant to its equitable powers. 

Moreover, the Wells observe that the District Court necessarily 

complied with the procedures set forth in § 27-19-102, MCA, since 

it specifically found that the Youngs breached the obligation 

imposed by § 28-1-201, MCA, when their irrigation practices caused 

“immediate, irreparable, and substantial harm” to the Wells’ home. 

 Further, the Wells assert that if not expressly stated, an implied 

finding exists that the Youngs breached the duty imposed by § 28-1-

201, MCA, as such a finding is consistent with the District Court’s 

express findings. 

¶17 While the parties agree that a district court must find a 

breach of an obligation by the party sought to be enjoined prior to 

imposing a permanent injunction, pursuant to § 27-19-102, MCA, they 

disagree over whether the District Court expressly or impliedly 
9 

found that the Youngs breached the obligation imposed by § 28-1-

201, MCA. Accordingly, in determining whether the District Court 

abused its discretion, we look to the District Court's findings to 

determine whether it found that the Youngs breached such 

obligation. 

¶18 The District Court specifically found in its July 25, 2000, 

Order that: 

The flood irrigation practice utilized on the Youngs’ field is 

typical of 

the practice of irrigators who utilize flood irrigation on 

crops. [Finding # 13] 

The field ditches on the Youngs’ field are of the correct 

size, located at 

or near the high point of the field which is necessary to 

irrigate the field 

and situated in a manner to convey water. [Finding # 14] 

Expert testimony established that it is unlikely that the 

flood irrigation 

conducted by Mr. Warren and Mr. Young caused a rise in 

groundwater 

so substantial as to cause the flooding experienced by the 

Wells. The 

most plausible and credible explanation of the flooding 

experienced by 

the Wells is the existence of a subsurface pathway or conduit 

from the 

head ditch on the Youngs’ property to the home on the Wells’ 

property. 

[Finding # 26] 

Conduits can result from decaying tree roots, old utility 

paths, and/or 

old abandoned ditches. The evidence indicates that all three 

possible 

sources exist on the Wells’ property. [Finding # 27] 

The most likely conduit is an abandoned BIA ditch which runs 

to or in 

close proximity to the Wells’ home. The BIA ditch was altered 

due to 

highway construction in 1961 with part of the ditch forming 

the head 

ditch now on the Youngs’ property and the abandoned portion of 

the 
10 

ditch traveling across the Wells’ property. [Finding #28] 

The District Court then expressly concluded in its July 25, 2000, 

Order that: (1) the Wells’ trespass actions are precluded by § 85-

7-2212(2), MCA, (2) the Wells’ nuisance action is precluded by § 

27-30-101(3), MCA, and (3) the Youngs did not breach the standard 

of care of a reasonable farm irrigator engaged in flood irrigation. 

¶19 Further, in its October 4, 2000, Order, the District Court 

stated: 

[T]his Court’s imposition of a permanent injunction comports 

with the 

procedure outlined in § 27-19-102, MCA. Defendants have a 

clear general 

duty (as do we all) not to damage the property of another. 

See § 28-1-201, 

MCA. Under the unique facts of this case, the Defendants 

continued use 

of flood irrigation upon their field clearly results in 

immediate, irreparable, 

and substantial harm to the Plaintiffs’ home. 

¶20 Clearly, the District Court entered a general finding in its 

October 4, 2000, Order determining that the Youngs breached the 

duty imposed upon them by § 28-1-201, MCA. In the face of this 

general finding, however, the District Court also entered specific 

findings and conclusions that the Youngs: (1) did not trespass, 

pursuant to § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, (2) did not create a nuisance, 

pursuant to § 27-30-101(3), MCA, and (3) conformed to the 

applicable standard of care required of them. This leads us to the 

inescapable conclusion that the District Court’s general finding 

that the Youngs breached the duty imposed by § 28-1-201, MCA, 

conflicts with its more specific findings and conclusions. We have 

previously held that when a general finding is inconsistent with a 

specific finding, the general finding will be rejected. Brubaker 
11 

v. D’Orazi (1947), 120 Mont. 22, 30-31, 179 P.2d 538, 542. Also 

see Section 1-3-225, MCA. Hence, we must reject the District 

Court’s general finding that the Youngs breached § 28-1-201, MCA. 

We conclude, rather, that the District Court abused its discretion 

when it imposed a permanent injunction pursuant to § 27-19-102, 

MCA, since the District Court entered specific findings and 

conclusions that the Youngs’ irrigation practices were lawful and 

were not negligently performed. 

¶21 We now turn to the question of whether the District Court 

abused its discretion, as a matter of equity, when it enjoined 

flood irrigation practices on the Youngs’ property. The Youngs 

contend that equity follows the law. The Youngs thus argue that, 

as a matter of equity, a finding of wrongful activity or the breach 

of an obligation is a prerequisite to the imposition of a permanent 

injunction since such a finding is required by § 27-19-102, MCA. 

The Youngs assert that the District Court abused its discretion 

when it permanently enjoined their lawful irrigation practices. 

¶22 The Wells argue that the injunction was entirely appropriate 

under the circumstances. They assert that the District Court 

correctly relied upon our holding in Madison Fork for the 

proposition that a court sitting in equity may enjoin conduct 

causing irreparable harm, which may be protected in some respects, 

if the equities of the particular case warrant injunctive relief. 

The Wells claim that the equities in this case, as properly 

balanced between the parties by the court, warrant injunctive 

relief. Specifically, the Wells claim that the equities clearly 

favor them since they will sustain substantial damages to their 
12 

home if the Youngs’ flood irrigation practices, which net the 

Youngs only nominal revenues, are allowed to continue. 

¶23 We have held that equity follows the law. See First National 

Bank of Twin Bridges v. Sant (1973), 161 Mont. 376, 383, 506 P.2d 

835, 840. We stated in Nelson v. Wilson (1928), 81 Mont. 560, 264 

P. 679, 683, that: 

Indeed, law and equity do not clash. In many cases they are 

commingled, 

administered together, and the rules of each have a place. 

Any idea that the 

law judges in defiance of equity and that equity is not bound 

by the law is 

erroneous. 2 Cooley’s Blackstone (4th Ed.) 430. While this 

case is a suit 

in equity, brought to obtain equitable relief, in it the law 

must be invoked 

to determine what rules govern transactions . . . so that both 

law and equity 

must be regarded. 

¶24 The cases cited by the Wells, wherein a permanent injunction 

was imposed, follow the principle that equity follows the law. 

Prior to the imposition of an injunction in those cases, wrongful 

conduct or the breach of an obligation were expressly identified. 

See Jefferson v. Big Horn County, 2000 MT 163, ¶ 17 and ¶ 28, 300 

Mont. 284, ¶ 17 and ¶ 28, 4 P.3d 26, ¶ 17 and ¶ 28 (injunction 

enjoining government’s unlawful imposition of tax vacated after 

change in law); Engel v. Gampp, 2000 MT 17, ¶ 58, 298 Mont. 116, ¶ 

58, 993 P.2d 701, ¶ 58 (encroachment of ditch right in violation of 

§ 70-17-112, MCA, enjoined); Ducham v. Tuma (1994), 265 Mont. 436, 

442-443, 877 P.2d 1002, 1006-1007 (activity constituting trespass 

enjoined); and Butler v. Germann (1991), 251 Mont. 107, 115, 822 

P.2d 1067, 1072 (encroachment of ditch right in violation of § 70-

17-112, MCA, enjoined). 
13 

¶25 Moreover, our decision in Madison Fork is distinguishable. 

The parties in Madison Fork entered into a contract whereby L & B 

Lodge Pole Timber Products (“L & B”) was allowed to cut beetle 

infested timber on the Madison Fork Ranch (“the Ranch”). 

Thereafter, L & B cut both beetle infested trees and uninfected 

trees. The Ranch subsequently notified L & B that they considered 

the contract terminated as a result of L & B’s failure to perform 

according to the contract terms. The Ranch filed suit and the trial 

court issued a temporary restraining order precluding further 

harvesting of timber on the Ranch. After a hearing, the court 

vacated the temporary restraining order. Shortly thereafter, L & B 

logged an additional 15 to 25 acres, including infested and 

uninfected timber. Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at 297, 615 P.2d at 

903. 

¶26 Following a trial, the trial court found that L & B “failed 

and refused to perform certain obligations under the contract” and 

concluded that L & B breached the contract. Madison Fork, 189 

Mont. at 298, 615 P.2d at 904. The trial court held that an 

injunction was proper because the destruction and threatened future 

destruction of the standing timber could not be remedied by an 

action at law. Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at 298, 615 P.2d at 904. 

On appeal, we held that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it imposed a permanent injunction enjoining L & B 

from harvesting both infested and uninfected timber since L & B 

breached the terms of the contract. Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at 

302, 615 P.2d at 906. Further, we held that the injunction was 

warranted because L & B entered the Ranch and continued to cut both 
14 

infested and uninfected timber after receiving notification of 

termination of the contract. Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at 302, 615 

P.2d at 906. 

¶27 Unlike Madison Fork, the District Court in this case entered 

no specific findings that the Youngs’ conduct was unlawful or that 

they breached an obligation. Rather, the District Court 

specifically determined that the Youngs’ conduct was lawful and 

that the “most plausible and credible explanation” of the flooding 

experienced by the Wells resulted from an abandoned BIA ditch. 

Therefore, based on the particular facts of this case, we conclude 

that the District Court abused its discretion, as a matter of 

equity, when it permanently enjoined flood irrigation practices on 

the Youngs’ property. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s 

imposition of a permanent injunction in this case. 

¶28 In passing, we note that the District Court concluded that § 

85-7-2212(2), MCA, does not prohibit injunctive relief. Although we 

agree that there may be circumstances where injunctive relief may 

be allowed, they do not exist here. For example, if an injured 

party acquired property before the water seepage existed or began, 

or the seepage contained toxic chemicals, injunctive relief may be 

appropriate. See Section 85-7-2212(2), MCA. In the matter before 

us, however, the District Court found that the Youngs and their 

predecessors irrigated the property many years before the Wells 

purchased their adjacent homesite. There is likewise no evidence 

in the record to suggest that the seepage here contained toxic 

chemicals. Under the facts presented here, and as determined by 
15 

the District Court, we conclude that the court abused its 

discretion in issuing the injunction. 

¶29 Reversed. 

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

/S/JULIE MACEK 

District Court Judge Julie Macek 

sitting in for Justice Cotter 
16 

Justice W. William Leaphart dissenting. 

¶30 I dissent. Based upon general equity principles, the 

deference afforded to district 

courts with respect to equitable relief and our established 

precedent, I would hold that the District Court properly enjoined 

the Youngs from further damaging the Wells’ home in order to earn 

approximately $400 per year. 

¶31 Equity principles permit the District Court’s decision under 

the facts of this case. The majority relies on the proposition 

that equity follows the law and, citing our 1928 Nelson decision, 

the notion that law and equity do not clash and are, in many cases, 

commingled. I agree with these basic equity tenants. However, I 

disagree with the majority’s narrow view of, what I believe, are 

courts’ broader equity powers to serve justice when a party lacks a 

remedy at law. 

¶32 Our early case law recognized a distinction between legal and 

equitable remedies. In State ex rel. Lewis and Clark County v. 

District Court (1931), 90 Mont. 213, 219-20, 300 P. 544, 546, we 

noted that while there are a great many exacting Code provisions 

which must be strictly followed as applied to actions at law, there 

are others with which the law provisions have nothing to do, except 

as equity follows the law, “and the two must not be confused.” 

Indeed, in the Nelson opinion cited by the majority, we also 

recognized that equity, while guided by rules and precedent, is 

“the correction of that wherein the law, by reason of its 

universality, is deficient.” Nelson, 81 Mont. at 572, 264 P. at 

683. 
17 

¶33 It is equally important to note that injunctive relief, as a 

device of equity, is appropriate when it appears that the 

commission or continuance of an act will produce irreparable injury 

to the party seeking relief. A continuing invasion of a property 

right may constitute an irreparable injury. Engel, ¶ 56 (citing 

Ducham, 265 Mont. at 442-43, 877 P.2d at 1006). What distinguishes 

an injunction from other forms of relief is that it is an equitable 

remedy granting prospective, as opposed to retrospective, relief. 

Jefferson, ¶ 18. Most importantly, equity dictates that an 

injunction be fashioned according to the circumstances of the case. 

Talley, 259 Mont. at 491, 857 P.2d at 708 (citing Montana Tavern 

Ass’n v. State of Montana by and through Dept. of Revenue (1986), 

224 Mont. 258, 265, 729 P.2d 1310, 1315). 

¶34 Here, the District Court invoked the law to determine what 

rules governed the transactions between the Youngs and the Wells. 

It properly determined that, under § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, the Wells 

could not maintain an action at law against the Youngs since the 

Youngs’ irrigation practices predated the Wells’ interest in their 

land. However, as the District Court concluded and the majority 

acknowledges, § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, does not preclude the 

possibility of injunctive relief to prevent future irreparable 

injury to property. 

¶35 The majority would restrict injunctive relief to only 

situations outlined in § 85-7-2212(2), MCA. That statute, however, 

does not address injunctive relief. Rather, it permits an action 

at law if an injured party acquired property before the water 

seepage existed or began or if the seepage contained toxic 
18 

chemicals. If a remedy at law exists, equitable relief is 

improper. Curran v. Dept. of Highways (1993), 258 Mont. 105, 109, 

852 P.2d 544, 546 (if party’s “loss can be compensated, of course, 

it is not an irreparable injury.”). As such, contrary to the 

majority’s conclusion, an equitable remedy would not likely exist 

in these particular situations. 

¶36 The majority also concludes that the District Court entered no 

specific findings that the Youngs’ conduct was unlawful or that 

they breached an obligation and, thus, the court’s reliance on 

Madison Fork was misplaced. However, what the majority fails to 

address is that the district court in Madison Fork enjoined lawful

conduct when it restrained L & B from harvesting infected timber on 

the Madison Fork Ranch. With regard to these trees, there was no 

breach of contract or breach of obligation. Yet, we upheld the 

district court’s injunction under the facts of that case on the 

basis of two general principles: that injunctions must be framed 

according to the circumstances of each case and that injunctions 

are proper if an act has or will produce irreparable injury. 

Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at 302, 615 P.2d at 906. 

¶37 In this regard, we have previously upheld injunctive relief 

restraining lawful activity. Boyer v. Karagacin (1978), 178 Mont. 

26, 32-33, 582 P.2d 1173, 1177 (upheld permanent injunction 

prohibiting legal parking of car which blocked access to adjacent 

business upon concluding that “ . . . an act, while technically 

legal, may be enjoined as a nuisance.”). In disputes among 

neighbors, such as the one at hand, we have approved of equitable 

measures restricting lawful conduct “for the sake of preserving 
19 

‘peace and tranquility.’” Engel, ¶¶ 52-53 (lawful user of easement 

required to give notice to neighbor by mail or telephone prior to 

exercising her right to access easement by vehicle). 

¶38 Here, while the District Court found that an abandoned BIA 

ditch was most likely responsible for flooding the Wells’ home, it 

also found that the Wells experienced flooding only when the 

Youngs irrigated their property. Thus, logically, the Court found 

that continued irrigation would cause further flooding and 

increased damage to the structural integrity of the Wells’ home and 

constitute a substantial risk of continuing harm and irreparable 

injury to the Wells’ property. In contrast, the court found that 

the Youngs irrigated only sporadically and that income the Youngs 

derived from crop production was minimal and, in part, unknown. 

Thus, the District Court reasoned that the potential damage to the 

Wells’ home and property was far greater than the nominal income 

the Youngs derived from crop production. Substantial evidence in 

the record supports this determination. 

¶39 To hold that the District Court abused its discretion in 

issuing injunctive relief under these facts is tantamount to saying 

that an irrigator may, for no good reason, continue causing 

irreparable damage to his neighbor’s home, in perpetuity. It would 

be a different situation altogether if the Youngs’ irrigation 

resulted in more than nominal income. By carefully considering 

the competing interests involved and fashioning injunctive relief, 

the District Court did not act on a whim or decide this case in 

defiance of the law. Giving due deference to the District Court, I 

would affirm. 
20 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler and Justice Jim Rice join in the 

dissent of Justice Leaphart. 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

/S/ JIM REGNIER