SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2873-18T3

DEIRDRE BREITHAUPT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JERRY EISENSTEIN,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________

Submitted February 24, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Moynihan and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, 

Docket No. FD-12-0749-18.

Deirdre Breithaupt, appellant pro se.

Jerry Eisenstein, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Deirdre Breithaupt appeals from a December 5, 2018 order that 

waived interest charged against defendant Jerry Eisenstein and reduced the 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

March 16, 2020
2

A-2873-18T3

weekly amount he was required to pay toward his child support arrears. The 

trial court entered a judgment on February 26, 1997, whereby plaintiff retained 

sole custody of the parties' child, and defendant became obligated to pay child 

support under the terms of the judgment. After reviewing the record, and in 

light of the governing legal principles, we affirm.

I.

In September of 1993, plaintiff and defendant had a child, S.L.B.

1

 The 

parties were never married. On February 26, 1997, the trial court entered a 

judgment concerning custody, child support, and other issues. The order granted 

plaintiff "sole and exclusive legal and residential custody of [S.L.B.]" and 

required that defendant pay weekly child support of $160 for S.L.B.'s support 

and maintenance "until further [o]rder of this [c]ourt or until [S.L.B.'s] 

emancipation." The support obligation was retroactive to October 15, 1993. 

The order also mandated that defendant "pay arrearages, plus interest in 

accordance with [Rule] 4:42-11, as follows: [$2500] within thirty . . . days of 

January 31, 1997 and $50[] per week thereafter."

On October 9, 2002, the judgment was registered in the State of New 

York. In October 2008, defendant was incarcerated after he fell behind on the

1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the child and for ease of reference.
3

A-2873-18T3

child support payments. Upon his release, he was unable to find work and began

living on social security. On January 20, 2009, a New York family court ordered

that defendant pay plaintiff $97,412.27 in arrears plus costs and disbursements. 

On February 1, 2011, the trial court entered an order that relinquished 

jurisdiction of the case to New York, based on plaintiff's consenting to the same 

on February 10, 2003. However, the matter was dismissed in New York on 

September 11, 2014, after the New York family court found that defendant no 

longer lived in New York.

Defendant sought to modify his child support obligation, but the trial court 

denied his application on January 21, 2016 because S.L.B. was "attending school 

full time." On December 9, 2016, S.L.B. became emancipated.

On June 12, 2018, defendant filed an application for a downward 

modification of the 1997 order, seeking to modify his arrears and to have any 

accrued interest waived. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Probation 

Division for this relief, defendant applied to the trial court for the same relief. 

The parties appeared before the motion judge on October 30, 2018.

On December 5, 2018, the motion judge entered an order waiving 

$81,930.28 in interest charged to defendant by the State of New York. The order 

also directed defendant to pay $32,670.70 in arrears in weekly payments of $50 
4

A-2873-18T3

until the balance was paid. On July 2, 2019, the motion judge issued an 

amplification of the December 5, 2018 order. The judge explained that as of the 

return date of defendant's application for a downward modification, he had 

found defendant's total arrears to be $163,332.27, which consisted of $97,412.27 

from the January 2009 order and $65,920 in support payments owed from 

January 21, 2009 through December 9, 2016, the date of S.L.B.'s emancipation. 

The judge found that defendant had paid $130,661.57 toward this balance. The 

judge noted that plaintiff argued that defendant's accrued interest at this time 

should be $81,930.28, but the judge explained that "any interest can only be 

calculated after a warrant of satisfaction is provided. This has not occurred and 

thus any assessment of interest would be improper."

The judge also found that plaintiff had not shown good cause that would 

warrant assessing interest payments, in light of the following:

Defendant receives social security, does not own any 

real estate, does not possess any retirement plans, and 

submits that his only asset is a vehicle worth [$5000] 

. . . . Defendant is disabled and is unable to work. In 

2008, [defendant] was incarcerated for six . . . months 

at the age of [sixty-two] for his inability to pay child 

support. He was hospitalized throughout the entirety of 

his incarceration due to complications stemming from 

his numerous health ailments. Upon his release, he was 

unable to find employment, which in turn affected his 

ability to timely pay his future obligations, allowing 

interest to accrue. Defendant is now [seventy-three] 
5

A-2873-18T3

years old and continues to suffer from numerous health 

ailments.

The judge considered that defendant's monthly social security income after

deductions for support payments was only $698.20, while his monthly income 

absent the support payments would be $2106. The judge also highlighted that 

defendant testified to monthly expenses of $1800,

2 defendant's only source of 

income is social security, and defendant claims he has never met his daughter, 

who is now emancipated. The judge contrasted defendant's situation with that 

of plaintiff, finding no "similar claims of financial hardship," as she "has been 

a federal government employee earning in excess of $100,000 annually." The 

judge thus concluded that "even if any judgment were satisfied, any assessment 

of post-judgment interest is not warranted."

In reducing defendant's weekly payments, the judge found that

[d]efendant has made a showing of a change in 

circumstances by showing the extent of his disability 

with substantial medical records and his resulting loss 

of income. Defendant is [seventy-three] years old and 

suffers from a variety of health ailments including Type 

I diabetes, retinopathy (eye disease), [and] neuropathy 

(nerve disease). Such ailments cause him to experience 

decreased vision, shakiness, and fatigue.

2

 These expenses include "rent, renter's insurance, repair costs, phone bill, food, 

laundry, clothing, health insurance, automobile insurance and expenses, and 

internet service."
6

A-2873-18T3

The judge concluded that based on defendant's limited income, as well as his 

medical ailments, "a decrease in [defendant's] weekly arrears payments was 

warranted." This appeal ensued.

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following arguments:

I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVIDE A 

FACTUAL BASIS FOR ITS DECISION THAT 

CHILD SUPPORT MONEY JUDGMENT 

ARREARAGE INTEREST WAS INAPPLICABLE 

AND CORRELATE IT WITH RELEVANT LEGAL 

CONCLUSIONS[.] (NOT RAISED BELOW).

II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVIDE A 

FACTUAL BASIS FOR ITS DECISION TO REDUCE 

PAYMENT AMOUNT WITHOUT A NEW CHANGE 

IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONSIDER THE NEW 

LAW REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CHILD 

SUPPORT PAYMENTS FOLLOWING 

EMANCIPATION[.] (NOT RAISED BELOW).

Plaintiff requests that this court reverse and remand the matter to the trial court 

for a determination as to the correct monthly payment to be paid by defendant 

toward arrears and the total arrears and interest owed.

II.

Our review of a Family Part judge's factual findings is limited. N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J. Super. 551, 577 (App. Div. 2010) 

(citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998)). These findings "are 

binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." 
7

A-2873-18T3

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of 

Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "Deference is especially appropriate 'when the 

evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Id. at 412 

(quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). We 

will only reverse if the trial judge's findings were "so manifestly unsupported 

by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence 

as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484 (quoting 

Fagliarone v. Township of North Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 

1963)). However, we give no deference to a trial court's interpretation of the 

law. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 89 (App. 

Div. 2006) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 

N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

III.

Plaintiff first argues that the motion judge erred by waiving the 

$81,930.28 owed by defendant for outstanding interest. Plaintiff relies on our 

decision in Pryce v. Scharff, 384 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2006), arguing that 

the court was required to impose such interest. We disagree.

In Pryce, we considered whether the plaintiff was "entitled to an order 

adding post-judgment interest to [the] defendant's Probation-enforced child 
8

A-2873-18T3

support account." Id. at 202. We held that the New Jersey Department of 

Human Services calculates post-judgment interest at the time of execution or 

satisfaction of a child support judgment. Id. at 215. In response to Pryce, our

Judiciary issued Administrative Directive #24-19, "Child Support Enforcement 

– Calculation of Interest on Child Support" (Dec. 2, 2019) (the Directive):

When the obligor pays the full arrears, such 

payment shall be accepted and posted immediately. 

After receipt of the obligor's full arrears payment and 

request for a warrant of satisfaction, the warrant of 

satisfaction shall be provided to the judgment creditor[]

. . . and the judgment creditor shall be informed of the 

right to post-judgment interest. The parties may agree 

on an interest calculation or may agree to waive or 

compromise such interest in a warrant of satisfaction.

Here, we find that the motion judge's decision to waive defendant's 

interest was both legally sound and based on ample credible evidence in the 

record. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12; Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484. Our holding 

in Pryce is clear that post-judgment interest is determined "at the time of 

execution or satisfaction." Pryce, 384 N.J. Super. at 215 ("[W]hen an obligor 

seeks a warrant to satisfy a judgment which is part of a Probation-administered 

child support account, Probation must calculate any post-judgment interest and 

ensure that the obligor pays the interest before the warrant of satisfaction is

issued."). The Directive expressly adopted this policy. See Administrative 
9

A-2873-18T3

Directive #24-19. As the judge correctly found, because no judgment of 

satisfaction has been requested or issued, any award of post-judgment interest 

would be premature. Thus, we affirm the motion judge's holding that plaintiff 

is not entitled to post-judgment interest at this time.3

Next, plaintiff contends that the motion judge erred by reducing the 

amount of defendant's weekly payments toward satisfying his arrears. Plaintiff 

argues that such relief contravenes N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.69, which mandates that 

when child support obligations are terminated upon a child's emancipation, "any 

arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of the termination shall remain due 

and enforceable." Because the judge reduced the amount of the weekly 

payments without reducing the amount of the judgment, the judge's decision did 

not run afoul of this statute.

In that regard, the motion judge's finding of changed circumstances is well 

supported by the evidence, which shows that defendant is of advanced age, he 

relies on social security as his sole source of income, and he suffers from several 

medical ailments "including Type I diabetes, retinopathy (eye disease), [and] 

3

 We need not address the motion judge's holding that defendant's interest 

payments should be waived based on defendant's change in circumstances. A 

reviewing judge may determine this issue at the time a judgment of satisfaction 

is executed.
10 A-2873-18T3

neuropathy (nerve disease)" that "cause him to experience decreased vision, 

shakiness, and fatigue." We find that the judge had a sufficient basis to decrease 

defendant's weekly support payments in light of the gap between his low income 

and his monthly expenses. See Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 149-52 (1980). As 

the motion judge made clear that defendant must still pay the remaining 

$32,670.70 in arrears, there is no discernible prejudice to plaintiff. See ibid.

To the extent that we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining 

arguments, we conclude that they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in 

a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.