F I LED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

August 3, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL ANDREW DARR, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

TOWN OF TELLURIDE, COLORADO,

 Defendant-Appellee.

 No. 06-1227

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Colorado

(D.C. No. 04-CV-01149-RPM)

Angela L. Ekker of Barnhart, Ekker & McNally, LLP, Englewood, Colorado, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

J. Andrew Nathan (Allyson C. Hodges with him on the brief), of Nathan, Bremer, Dumm

& Myers, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before MURPHY, HOLLOWAY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Darr filed a lawsuit against Defendant-Appellee Town

of Telluride, Colorado, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 

Darr’s complaint asserted several claims for relief, including claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 that (1) Telluride violated his procedural due process rights when it deprived him of
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his property interests in a pre-termination hearing and continued employment; (2)

Telluride deprived him of his constitutionally-protected liberty interest by impugning his

good name and reputation without providing a name-clearing hearing; and (3) Telluride

violated his substantive-due-process rights by arbitrarily and capriciously terminating his

employment. Darr’s fourth claim under review here sounds in state law: (4) Telluride

breached an implied contract with Darr by terminating him without cause and without a

pre-termination hearing. 

In an oral ruling, the district court granted Telluride’s summary-judgment motion. 

Appx., Vol. II, at 774-778. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Darr now appeals. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The Town’s Policies

Telluride hired Michael Darr as a deputy marshal on December 22, 2001, stating

that Darr was “appointed and employed in accordance with the Town of Telluride

Personnel Policies and Procedures, and the Ethics Code . . . .” Appx., Vol. I, at 286. 

These policies provided employees with the opportunity for notice and a hearing before

having their employment terminated. Appx., Vol. II, at 507-08. But the manual Darr

received stated “Undergoing Revision” on its cover and informed its readers that “[t]hese

policies and procedures are not intended to serve as an employment contract between the

Town and any Town employee.” Id. at 455, 469. 

On June 19, 2002, Telluride notified its employees that it was changing its existing
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policies and provided them with a draft of the proposed policies. The letter

accompanying the new policies stated that “[t]he manual is a complete rewrite and

revamping of the original policy. . . . Your input is essential. Please take the time to read

the draft and forward any comments or questions to Susan no later than Thurs. June 27

9:00 am. (If you prefer, give me a call or stop by the office.)” Appx., Vol. I, at 193. In

bold, large font, the letter also notified the town staff of an upcoming meeting about the

new policies: “A Board Meeting will be held Monday[,] July 1 to Consider All

Comments. Employees Who Wish to Speak with the Board are Invited and Encouraged

to Come to Rebekah Hall MONDAY[,] JULY 1 at 10:30 AM. See You There.” Id. 

(emphasis in original). The letter concluded by noting that the final version of the

policies would be brought to the Town Council for adoption on July 9. Id. 

Telluride did not record minutes of the July 1, 2002, meeting, but town employees

submitted affidavits stating that the meeting was held and that a discussion of the draft

policies took place. Appx., Vol. II, at 723, 730. There is no evidence that Darr attended

the meeting or otherwise made any comments about the new policies. After holding this

meeting, Telluride adopted the new policies by resolution on July 23, 2002. 

Although Telluride’s letter of June 19, 2002, correctly notes that the new policies

substantially revised the old policies (e.g., the new policies eliminated the pre-termination

hearing requirement imposed by the old policies), the new policies were substantially

similar in at least one respect: in bold print, the new policies state that 

[t]he policies in this manual are not intended and shall not be
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construed to vest any employee of the Town with any rights arising

from any express or implied contract of employment. The Town

reserves the right to change or rescind these policies, and to

determine the application of these policies to specific circumstances. 

The Town further reserves the right to alter or eliminate any benefits

provided to its employees. Any alteration, elimination, or revision

may be made applicable to then-current as well as future employees. 

Appx., Vol. I, at 122. 

The new policies also state on several occasions that employment with Telluride is

terminable at-will. Id. For example, the policies state that “[e]mployment with the Town

of Telluride is ‘at-will[.]’ Any employee may be terminated with or without cause, a

statement of reasons, or a hearing, just as any employee may resign at any time, for any

reason. Nothing in these policies is intended to modify the Town’s at-will employment

policies.” Id. Telluride also required its employees to sign a statement acknowledging

that they understand this language: 

I have received a copy of the Town of Telluride Personnel Policies

and Procedures Manual and I understand it is my responsibility to

read and comply with this document and any subsequent

amendments. I further understand that employment with the Town

of Telluride is “at-will[.]” Any employee may be terminated with or

without cause, a statement of reasons, or a hearing, just as any

employee may resign at any time, for any reason. Nothing in these

policies is intended to modify the Town’s at-will employment policy. 

[Signature line]. 

Appx., Vol. I, at 121. 

The policies also made employees aware that they were at-will employees

regardless of how Telluride handled their termination: “[e]mployment with the Town is

terminable at-will. Any employee may be discharged with or without cause, at the sole

discretion of and upon notice from the Town Manager. In most cases, however, dismissal
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will occur upon a written Notice of Dismissal . . . detailing the circumstances prompting

the disciplinary action . . . .” Id. at 132. The policies’ admonition that “[n]othing in these

policies is intended to modify the Town’s at-will employment policy,” id. at 121,

underscores the policies’ clear effect: Telluride could terminate employees at whatever

time and for whatever reason it saw fit, even though in “most cases” Telluride would

notify an employee why he or she was being fired. 

Telluride furnished Darr with a copy of the new policies after they were adopted. 

Darr admitted reviewing the new policies and signing the introduction and

acknowledgment form described above. Appx., Vol. I, at 229. Darr also understood that

the new policies superseded the old policies, answering “that’s a given” when Telluride’s

counsel asked him a question to this effect. Id. at 106.

The Citizens Advisory Board 

On January 21, 2003, Telluride adopted a resolution creating the Citizens Advisory

Board (“CAB”). Id. at 321. CAB’s function was to facilitate communication between

Telluride and its citizens and to raise awareness about health and safety issues affecting

the community. Id. at 322. CAB was composed of town-appointed community

volunteers and did not have policy, legislative, disciplinary, or supervisory power over

Telluride’s decisions. Id. at 323-24. Conversely, although Telluride drafted and adopted

CAB’s mission statement, which included objectives such as making recommendations to

the Town concerning marshal policies, Telluride did not offer CAB guidance on how to

conduct its operations. For example, the town mayor when the CAB was created
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testified that CAB lacked operating procedures and that Telluride never instructed CAB

about how to conduct its operations. Id. at 246, 247. 

The town mayor described CAB’s authority in the negative: “[t]his was not a

legislative or public policy board, had no authority. And . . . it is not a police commission

that investigates whether Officer X should or should not have shot so-and-so as he left his

apartment carrying an AR 16.” Id. at 248. Darr’s counsel asked the former mayor

whether “it [was] part of the discussion [when creating the CAB] that the CAB would be

involved in any disciplinary actions of police officers[.]” He replied: “[i]t certainly would

not be.” Id. 

The Events Precipitating Darr’s Termination

On February 25, 2003, CAB met to discuss several topics concerning Telluride’s

policing methods. Appx., Vol. I, at 326. Several citizens complained, and Darr was one

of the marshals identified. Id. at 184. Darr alleges that CAB’s chairman stated that Darr

“had left [his] previous employment under ‘suspicious circumstances[,]’ that [he] had

improperly displayed a handgun at a golf course and that [he] had ‘poached’ or stolen a

game of golf.” Appx., Vol. II, at 524. 

Telluride received several other complaints about Darr’s conduct. For example,

the former mayor testified that restaurant and bar owners complained that Darr

intimidated their customers and that he performed bar checks “in a very rough and

abusive manner.” Appx., Vol. I, at 238. Others complained that he “created

pandemonium” in another restaurant and that he improperly searched or interrogated a
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woman who had just fallen out of a window. Id. Moreover, the town manager testified

that he received several complaints about Darr and that “it became obvious that [Darr]

had a difficult time communicating and interacting with a good chunk of the public of this

community.” Id. at 367. 

CAB’s chairman again made Darr’s controversial policing methods a topic of

discussion in a local radio broadcast. After being asked about the variety of allegations

against Darr, the chairman explained: “[o]verzealous, controlling, uh, a lot of civil rights

violations in my opinion, illegal searches and seizures, uh, trying to be an undercover cop,

sitting in bars pretending he’s a cable guy and trying to get information on the drug

activity in town, uh, things of that nature.” Appx., Vol. II, at 660 (errors in original). 

According to Darr, the airing of these false allegations impugned his reputation,

honor, and integrity. On the contrary, Telluride contends that many of these complaints

correspond to Darr’s hard-nosed policing methods. For example, Telluride asserts that

the chief marshal warned Darr that engaging in high-profile, aggressive, and overzealous

policing would reduce Darr’s effectiveness as a deputy. Aplee. Br. at 10. 

Following these several complaints and a well-known private citizen’s complaint,

which the citizen circulated to Telluride and the media, the chief marshal placed Darr on

administrative leave pending the outcome of an investigation. Part of the investigation

ultimately revealed that Darr violated a departmental rule requiring marshals to respect

others. Appx., Vol. I, at 359. Specifically, “there are grounds to believe that Deputy Darr

was overbearing and rude in the execution of the first warning provided to [the citizen
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making the complaint].” Id. at 358.

On July 21, 2003, the chief marshal sent Darr a letter terminating Darr’s

employment with Telluride. Id. at 389. The letter explained that although Darr had

“performed admirably on a number of fronts,” there were other times when Darr’s

conduct “resulted in counseling for less than acceptable performance.” Id. Specifically,

the chief was troubled by Darr’s “judgment, tone and demeanor” when handling a search

of a suspicious individual and a separate DUI investigation, during which Darr violated a

departmental rule. Id. The chief also questioned Darr’s judgment on other occasions: 

You have been aware that there has been an undercurrent of hostility

developing toward you by certain segments of the community in

recent months. This attitude has become particularly prevalent

following [certain arrests you participated in]. In spite of this

knowledge, you recently chose to socialize in a liquor establishment

after completing an early-adjusted shift. Your plainclothes presence

in the bar antagonized the owners of the establishment and they

requested [that] you leave the premises. . . . I have to question the

judgment that was used in your selection of the after-shift “watering

hole” on this occasion. Instinctively, knowing what you know, I

would like to think that better judgment would have prevailed. 

Id. at 390. 

Finally, the crux of the chief’s decision seems to have been that Darr’s overzealous

policing methods had antagonized the community to the point where Darr could no longer

effectively perform his job. The chief explained: 

I have stated repeatedly . . . that an aggressive and heavy-handed

demeanor will not work in this community. Regrettably, a label has

been attached to you in this regard. It is my belief that it is rendering

your ability to effectively perform you [sic] role for the Marshal’s

Department non-existent, with no prospect of improvement. In

addition, your actions have adversely affected the public perception
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of the Department and I am not optimistic that the situation will

change. 

Id. 

Darr testified that he agreed with this assessment of his inability to effectively perform his

duties in Telluride and that the chief marshal accurately described the public’s perception:

“I believe I participated in that perception, but it wasn’t solely mine. . . . Officer

Merriman [participated in that perception as well.]” Id. at 109. 

As explained above, Darr then filed this federal lawsuit, which the district court

dismissed by granting Telluride’s motion for summary judgment (thereby also dismissing

Darr’s state-law claims). This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same legal standard used by the district court. Simms v. Okla. ex rel Dep’t of Mental

Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary

judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When applying this standard, we view the evidence and

draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Simms, 165 F.3d at 1326. If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, we

determine whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law. Kaul v.

Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir.1996).
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A. Procedural Due Process

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of

interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and

property.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). When a State seeks to

terminate a protected property interest, the right to notice and opportunity for a hearing is

usually paramount. Id. at 569-70, 570 n.7. Although these demands of due process are

often relatively clear, the question of whether an employee has a protected interest in

employment is less so. The Supreme Court has stated that property interests are not

created by the Constitution, but by existing rules or understandings that stem from

independent sources, “such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain

benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. at 577. 

To create a property interest, the state-law rule or understanding must give the

recipient “a legitimate claim of entitlement to [the benefit].” Id. For example, an

employee may possess a property interest in public employment if she has tenure, a

contract for a fixed term, an implied promise of continued employment, or if state law

allows dismissal only for cause or its equivalent. See id. at 576-77; Bishop v. Wood, 426

U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (10th Cir. 1999). 

1. What interest did Darr have in a pre-termination hearing?

Darr argues that Telluride violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due

process right by revising its employee manual to eliminate his property interest in a pretermination hearing without providing adequate notice. Darr says in his opening brief at
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35 that Telluride did not directly communicate to the employees, including Darr, that they

were being stripped of “their rights of due process by the enactment of the new policies.” 

Id. at 35. Darr also asserts that whether an employee “has a property interest in continued

employment is a question of fact for the jury.” Aplt. Br. at 32.

Darr’s attempt to manufacture a disputed issue of fact is unpersuasive. Telluride

does not argue that Darr had no right to sufficient notice of the revised policies. 

Defendant-Appellee’s Answer Brief at 13. Telluride appears to concede Darr’s right to

sufficient notice and says only that Darr received more than sufficient notice of the

revised policies. Id. at 13. The unpublished decision in Perrin v. Egger, which Darr

relies upon in his briefs, reviewed the same 1990 Telluride policy and held that “[t]he

limitation on [the Town Manager’s] power of dismissal is that she can make that decision

only after providing the employee with the hearing required by . . . the manual. Thus, the

plaintiff was entitled to a hearing and to that extent, he had an entitlement deserving some

degree of protection, i.e., the opportunity to present his case at a non-public hearing.” 

Aplt. Br. at appx. B, p. 4.

Regardless, Darr’s argument—that the jury must decide as a factual question

whether an employee has a property interest in a pre-termination hearing—wrongly

implies that summary judgment is never appropriate when an employee brings a

procedural due process claim. 

The facts here are clear and uncontested. We assume, because it is not contested,
 “The State may choose to require procedures for reasons other than protection 1

against deprivation of substantive rights, of course, but in making that choice the State

does not create an independent substantive right.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,

250-51 (1983) (footnote omitted). We have noted that “an entitlement to nothing but

procedure . . . ‘cannot be the basis for a property interest.’” Robbins v. United States

Bureau of Land Management, 438 F.3d 1074, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Town of

Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2808 (2005)).

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and we do not address, whether Darr had a property interest in a pre-termination hearing.1

Moreover it is unnecessary to decide this point because we conclude that Darr did not

have a constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. 

We now turn to the question whether Telluride’s old or new policies created a

constitutionally-protected interest in Darr for continued employment. 

2. Did Telluride’s old or new policies create a constitutionally-protected

interest in continued employment?

At-will employees lack a property interest in continued employment. Bishop, 426

U.S. at 345 n.8, 345-347. Under Colorado law, an at-will employee “generally may be

discharged at any time without cause or formal procedure.” Johnson v. Jefferson County

Bd. of Health, 662 P.2d 463, 471 (Colo. 1983) (en banc). “[T]he traditional rule with

respect to local government employees has been that: ‘[L]ocal government employees

hold their posts at the pleasure of the proper local government authorities and can be

dismissed without cause, in the absence of restrictions or limitations provided by law.” 

Fremont RE-1 Sch. Dist. v. Jacobs, 737 P.2d 816, 820 (Colo. 1987) (en banc). 

Darr asserts that the old policies created a constitutionally-protected property

interest in his employment. But Darr cannot point to any provision in the old policies that
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would confer such an interest. His argument that the old policies confer continuedemployment rights upon full-time workers is unavailing, since the policies define “fulltime” merely as an employee who served a six-month probationary period and who now

works forty hours per week. Appx., Vol. II, at 479. There is no evidence in the policies

or otherwise that completing this six-month probationary period transformed a Telluride

employee from an at-will employee into a tenured employee. Indeed, the old policies

expressly disavow the existence of any contractual relationship between the Town and its

employees. Id. at 469. Darr has failed to identify any fact or reason why he does not fall

within Colorado’s traditional rule that local government employees are employed at-will. 

Darr’s position that the new policies created a property interest in continued

employment is similarly unpersuasive. The new policies state in great detail that Town

employees are employed at-will and that the policies do not create an employment

contract. Appx., Vol. I, at 121, 122, 132. Darr’s unreasonable position that he thought

“at-will” meant “for cause”—notwithstanding the new policies’ clear definition of the

term “at-will”—is insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact, making it

appropriate to decide as a matter of law whether the new policies created a property

interest in continued employment. 

We also reject Darr’s argument that Telluride’s chief marshal created a policy and

custom of terminating marshals only for cause. When Telluride fired Darr, the operative

policies made clear that Darr was an at-will employee regardless of how Telluride

handled his termination: “[e]mployment with the Town is terminable at-will. Any
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employee may be discharged with or without cause, at the sole discretion of and upon

notice from the Town Manager. In most cases, however, dismissal will occur upon a

written Notice of Dismissal . . . detailing the circumstances prompting the disciplinary

action . . . .” Id. at 132. As explained above, the policies’ admonition that “[n]othing in

these policies is intended to modify the Town’s at-will employment policy,” id. at 121,

underscores the policies’ clear effect: Telluride could terminate employees without cause,

even though in “most cases” Telluride would notify an employee why he or she was

being fired. 

To be sure, our precedent supports the proposition that a town’s conduct may

negate the express disclaimers in its employment manual, thereby creating a disputed fact

as to whether the town and its employees’ mutual understandings created a property

interest. See, e.g., Kingsford v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 247 F.3d 1123, 1132 (10th Cir.

2001) (finding such a disputed fact in the procedural due process context). But again,

there is no evidence that this occurred here. Although the chief marshal testified that he

had never fired anyone without cause—“why would [he] want to . . .,” he asked

rhetorically in his deposition—the policies unequivocally explain that Darr was an at-will

employee regardless of how Telluride handled his termination. The chief marshal

followed this part of the handbook exactly as Darr could have expected. 

As a matter of policy, Telluride persuasively argues that we should not require it to

randomly fire employees to maintain its clearly explained at-will employment policy. 

Darr’s proposed rule—the mere fact that the chief marshal terminated five employees for
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cause negates the Town’s express policy that employees are employed at-will regardless

of how they are terminated—would play havoc with Telluride’s relationship with its

employees. Telluride would have the perverse incentive to randomly fire its employees

without cause in an effort to maintain its at-will employment policy and avoid lawsuits

like this one (a dilemma for Telluride because this effort would potentially expose it to

even more liability).

Accordingly, we hold that Darr did not have a property interest in continued

employment with Telluride.

3. Did Darr receive adequate notice and opportunity to be heard?

Since we assume, without deciding, that the old policies created a property interest

in a pre-termination hearing, the question presented is two-fold. First, we ask whether the

district court improperly resolved a genuine dispute of material fact when it decided that

Telluride revised its old policies after providing sufficient notice and opportunity for a

hearing. Second, if the district court did not resolve a genuine dispute of material fact,

then we must address whether the district court erred by granting Telluride’s summaryjudgment motion. 

Darr explains that the Colorado Supreme Court in Adams County Sch. Dist. No.

50 v. Dickey cited with approval Michigan law that “[a]n employer may, without an

express reservation of the right to do so, unilaterally change its written policy from one of

discharge for cause to one of termination at will, provided that the employer gives

affected employees reasonable notice of the policy change.” 791 P.2d 688, 693 (Colo.
See n. 1, supra. 2

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1990). Both parties look to Durtsche v. American Colloid Co., 958 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir.

1992), for an explanation of “reasonable notice,” but fail to recognize that Durtsche only

addressed how, under Wyoming contract law, a private employer could effectively

modify an employment manual that also constituted a contract with its employees. 

Indeed, we concluded in Durtsche that although Wyoming contract law allowed an

employer to change the terms of its employment manual without acceptance by and

additional consideration to its employees, such changes to the manual must be

conspicuous. Id. at 1009.

On the issue whether Telluride afforded Darr the process he was due under the

Fourteenth Amendment, however, the United States Constitution is our guide. See 2

Kingsford, 247 F.3d at 1128 (stating that “[w]hile a property right can only be created by

state law, once a property right is established, the determination of what process is due

before that right can be deprived is a question answered by the federal Constitution”). 

The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]n essential principle of due process is that a

deprivation of . . . property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing

appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.

532, 542 (1985). Specifically, “notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the

required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make

their appearance.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
Darr’s disagreement over whether the Town held the meeting does not create a 3

genuine dispute of fact. Darr asserts in his opening brief that “it does not appear that a

meeting as referred to in the memorandum was held on July 1, 2002, in which employees’

comments on the New Policies were considered.” Aplt. Br. at 13. This is the only time

that Darr mentions this issue in his opening brief, and he fails to provide any evidence to

support his assertion. Indeed, Darr’s reply brief actually identifies evidence that the

meeting occurred, without countering with evidence to the contrary. See Aplt. Reply Br.

at 14-15 (reciting Town employees’ testimony that the meeting occurred and that “a

discussion of the draft policies took place”). Darr’s unsupported assertion that the

meeting did not occur is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact.

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(1950) (citations omitted). The parties here do not genuinely dispute the following facts:

(1) The old policies Darr received conspicuously stated that they were “Undergoing

Revision”; (2) Telluride sent out a notice indicating that it planned to hold a hearing about

the revised manual before adopting it; (3) Telluride’s notice stated that the revised manual

completely rewrote and revamped the old policy; (4) Telluride’s notice provided the

hearing’s date, location, and time; (5) Telluride conducted the public hearing regarding

the revisions; (6) Darr had the opportunity to attend this meeting to ask questions and 3

make comments about the revised policies; (7) Darr declined to attend the hearing; (8)

Darr signed a written acknowledgment that he received, read, and understood the revised

policies; and (9) Darr’s acknowledgment form stated that the revised policies created an

at-will employment relationship and explained that “[a]ny employee may be terminated

with or without cause, a statement of reasons, or a hearing.” Appx., Vol. I, at 121. 

Given these undisputed facts, we find no error in the district court’s holding that

Telluride amended the old policies after providing Darr with constitutionally adequate

notice of and opportunity for a hearing. The only additional step that Telluride could
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have taken was to explain in its notice precisely how the revised policies rewrote the old

policies. But this is what the hearing was for: it defies the purpose of notice to impose the

burden on Telluride to explain in its notice of a hearing exactly what the substantive

changes to the policy meant, especially given that Telluride’s notice clearly stated that it

completely rewrote the old policies and that the new policies would be discussed fully in

an upcoming hearing. 

It is important to note once again that we are not addressing the question presented

in Durtsche—whether the employee was sufficiently apprised of the new policy to make

it enforceable as a binding contract. Instead, we are addressing the constitutional

question of whether Telluride provided notice and a hearing appropriate for this case. 

Although Telluride did not employ every theoretically conceivable method to notify Darr,

the Constitution does not require more procedure than that provided here. 

B. Liberty Interest: Name-Clearing Hearing

Darr arguably has a liberty interest in his good name and reputation as it related to

his employment with Telluride. See Melton v. City of Okla. City, 928 F.2d 920, 927

(10th Cir. 1991) (stating that a public employee has a claim for relief “[w]hen a public

employer takes action to terminate an employee based upon a public statement of

unfounded charges of dishonesty or immorality that might seriously damage the

employee’s standing or associations in the community and foreclose the employee’s

freedom to take advantage of future employment opportunities . . . ”). 

But to state a claim for relief, Darr must show how the government infringed upon
We need not address this issue further because, as we discuss below, Darr’s legal 4

theory fails to support his conclusion that Telluride can be held liable for CAB’s conduct.

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his alleged liberty interest. We have established a four-prong test for resolving this

question: first, the statements must impugn the employee’s good name, reputation, honor,

or integrity; second, the statements must be false; third, the statements must occur in the

course of terminating the employee or must foreclose other employment opportunities;

and fourth, the statements must be published. Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 481

(10th Cir. 1994). But see Renaud v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 203 F.3d 723,

728 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that Workman’s third element should have been

phrased conjunctively: the statement must occur in the course of terminating the

employee and must foreclose other employment opportunities, contrary to Workman’s

disjunctive phrasing).4

Darr does not assert, nor could he plausibly, that the chief marshal or any other

Town representative (with the possible exception of the CAB members) made

stigmatizing statements about him. The chief marshal’s only comment to the public about

Darr was that he was no longer a Telluride employee, appx., vol. I, at 112-113, a

comment which is not sufficient to support Darr’s claim because, for one thing, it is not a

false statement. Thus, the threshold question is whether CAB’s statements constituted

state action redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as opposed to private conduct by private

citizens. Unless Telluride can be held liable for CAB’s conduct, we need not address

whether Darr has satisfied the four Workman factors or whether Darr requested a name-
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clearing hearing.

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Darr must show that CAB acted “under color”

of state law—a test identical to the Fourteenth Amendment’s state-action requirement. 

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982) (stating that “it is clear that

in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action

‘under color of state law’ and the ‘state action’ requirement of the Fourteenth

Amendment are identical”); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) (stating

that “[i]n cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been treated as the

same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment”). We have

applied this state-action requirement in suits against local governments ever since the

Supreme Court plucked these municipalities’ shields against § 1983 liability. The reason

for doing so stems from § 1983’s purpose: “to deter state actors from using the badge of

their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide

relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). 

Thus, private conduct, no matter how atrocious, cannot ground § 1983 liability against a

state entity. 

The parties stake out opposite positions on whether Telluride may be liable for

CAB’s conduct. Telluride outlines several facts tending to show that CAB’s conduct may

not be attributed to Telluride. In response, Darr identifies evidence allegedly

demonstrating that although CAB did not have authority over Telluride, Telluride had

authority over CAB—suggesting that CAB’s conduct may be attributed to the Town. But
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putting aside the merits of these positions, we need not decide whether CAB acted under

color of law because even if Telluride could be held responsible for CAB’s conduct,

Darr’s legal theory does not support his claim for relief. 

Specifically, Darr asserts that “[u]nder § 1983, the Town is responsible for actions

of its representatives that result in the violation of an individual’s constitutional rights

when the Town has negligently failed to take steps to prevent or correct the constitutional

violation.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 25 (citing Rogers v. Board of Trustees, 859 P.2d 284, 287-

88 (Colo. App. 1993)). Yet Rogers explicitly rejected this theory: “The Supreme Court

has . . . ruled . . . that negligence cannot form the basis of a money damages liability

claim under § 1983.” Rogers, 859 P.2d at 287 (citation omitted). We too have stated this

rule and rejected Darr’s position. In Jojola v. Chavez, we stated that “[l]iability under §

1983 must be predicated upon a ‘deliberate’ deprivation of constitutional rights by the

defendant, and not on negligence.” 55 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in

original).

The Supreme Court has described the correct standard for subjecting a

municipality to liability under § 1983: “[A] local government may not be sued under §

1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead it is when

execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government

as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S.

658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff may prove the existence of an official policy or custom in at

least five ways: (1) the municipality may be liable for a decision by its properly
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constituted legislative body; (2) an official policy exists when the municipal board or

agency exercises authority delegated to it by a municipal legislative body; (3) actions by

those with final decision-making authority for the municipality constitute official policy;

(4) the municipality may be liable for a constitutional violation resulting from inadequate

training when its failure to train the lawless employee reflects a deliberate indifference to

the plaintiff’s constitutionally-protected rights; or (5) the municipality’s custom caused

the constitutional violation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989)

(inadequate training); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 481-82, 481 n.10

(1986) (municipal legislative action, individual with final decision-making authority, and

custom); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (agency exercising delegated authority).

Darr has not identified evidence demonstrating that CAB or its chairman’s conduct

reflects Telluride’s official policy or custom. CAB is not a legislative body. Telluride

never imbued CAB with authority to speak on its behalf or to discuss personnel issues. 

CAB did not have any input into Telluride’s personnel decisions, and so CAB was not the

final decision-making authority for the Town. And there is no evidence that Telluride

was deliberately indifferent to Darr’s constitutional rights or that Telluride created a

custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation. 

Instead, Darr asserts that his claim rests upon a negligence theory. Aplt. Reply Br.

at 25. For example, Darr states that Telluride’s liability is predicated on its negligent

supervision of CAB, which is evidenced by its failure to draft a mission statement or

charter governing CAB. Aplt. Reply Br. at 26. In sum, Darr argues, “[a]s a result of the
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Town’s negligent oversight of its own agency, Darr’s liberty interest was violated when

he was defamed by the Board at public meetings.” Id. 

We disagree with Darr’s misstatement of the law and with the erroneous

conclusion he reaches by applying it. Negligence is not a basis for liability under § 1983,

so Darr’s arguments must fail. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s

decision to dismiss Darr’s liberty-interest claim, but we affirm on the alternative ground

that Darr’s arguments to us were limited to proving the Town’s negligence—an

insufficient basis for liability under § 1983. 

C. Substantive Due Process

A public employee with a property interest in continued employment has a

substantive-due-process right not to be terminated for arbitrary or capricious reasons. 

Curtis v. Okla. City Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1215 (10th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Tenth Circuit authority for the proposition that “[i]n order to present a claim of

denial of ‘substantive’ due process by a discharge for arbitrary or capricious reasons, a

liberty or property interest must be present to which the protection of due process can

attach”). But the due process clause does not preclude public employers from

maintaining at-will employment relationships that the employer may terminate without

cause. See id. Thus, the district court correctly held that the Constitution did not prohibit

Telluride from terminating Darr, an at-will employee, without cause. 

Nevertheless, a substantive-due-process claim, if viable, requires assessing

whether a governmental action is arbitrary, irrational, or shocking to the contemporary
Despite a potential dispute over whether the shock-the-conscience test applies to 5

all due process violations, see Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 528-29, we need not decide the

issue in this case because Telluride’s conduct does not violate the due process clause

under any of the standards. 

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conscience. Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1200-01 (10th

Cir. 2003); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 528 (10th Cir. 1998).5

Telluride’s decision to terminate Darr because Darr violated a Town-imposed ethical rule

that he respect others on the job and because Darr could no longer effectively perform his

duties as a marshal is not arbitrary, capricious, or shocking to the conscience, but is a

rational response to the problems posed by Darr’s presence as a Telluride marshal. No

reasonable jury could conclude the opposite, and Darr does not dispute that these reasons

formed the basis for his termination. For example, Darr admitted in his deposition that he

was unable to effectively perform his job as a marshal because of the public’s negative

perception of him. We can think of only a few better reasons to fire an employee than the

fact that the employee can no longer perform his job duties because his allegedly hardnosed conduct generated a poisonous public reaction. 

None of Darr’s arguments requires a different result. Indeed, the Perrin v. Egger

decision, upon which Darr relies, held that “[b]ecause the [1990] manual did not require

cause for termination, there is no contract right to continued employment . . . .” Aplt. Br.

at appx. B. In that decision, as he did here, the district judge found that the plaintiff had a

right to a hearing under the old policies, but not a property interest in the employment

itself. 
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Similarly, none of the other decisions that Darr cites supports the proposition that a

public employer may not terminate an at-will employee without cause. Wieman v.

Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190, 192 (1952), held that a State may not attempt to bar

disloyal individuals from its employ by passing a statute imposing a loyalty oath

excluding persons solely on the basis of organizational membership, but never decided

whether an at-will employee has a substantive-due-process right not to be terminated

without cause; Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), considered whether the

public employer violated a contract-employee’s rights when the employer declined to

renew her contract, ostensibly because she was engaged in constitutionally-protected

civil-rights protests; and Morris v. Clifford, 903 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1990), addressed, in a

qualified-immunity context, whether a university’s decision not to renew a contractemployee’s contract violated the employee’s due process right to be free from arbitrary

and capricious discharge—a right that the university allegedly created because the

university’s faculty handbook stated that a tenured faculty member could be dismissed

only for adequate cause.

Unlike the plaintiffs in the above cases, Darr was an at-will employee whose

employment was terminated after he violated a departmental rule and allegedly

antagonized the community with his zealous policing. The substantive-due-process

clause does not forbid a public employer from terminating its at-will employees without

cause. Regardless, there is no evidence that Telluride terminated Darr based on arbitrary,

capricious, or conscience-shocking reasons. Thus, the district court did not err by
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granting summary judgment in Telluride’s favor on this substantive due process claim..

D. State Law Contract Claim

Colorado law creates two contract theories under which a terminated employee can

enforce termination procedures set forth in an employee manual. 

First, an employee may be entitled to a contract-based remedy if he or she can

demonstrate that the employer made an offer to the employee by promulgating the

termination procedures and that the employee’s initial or continued employment

constituted acceptance of and consideration for those procedures. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.

v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987). The employer’s willingness to be bound can

be inferred if the manual lacks a disclaimer stating that it does not constitute a contract or

if the disclaimer is not clear and conspicuous. Evenson v. Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.

Co., 879 P.2d 402, 409 (Colo. App. 1993). But the existence of a disclaimer is not

dispositive. The employer’s intent to be bound can be inferred if the manual contains

mandatory-termination procedures or requires just cause for termination. Id. If the

record evidence creates an issue as to whether an employment contract existed, then

summary judgment is inappropriate. Id.

Second, an employee may also be entitled to relief under a promissory-estoppel

theory if he or she can demonstrate that (1) the employer should have reasonably

expected its employee to consider the employment manual as a commitment from the

employer to follow the termination procedures outlined in the manual; (2) the employee

reasonably relied on the procedures to his or her detriment; and (3) injustice can be
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avoided only by enforcing the termination procedures. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 731 P.2d at

712.

The Colorado Court of Appeals in Evenson addressed an implied-contract claim

categorized under the first contract theory identified in Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.—the

employer manifested an intent to be bound by the manual. The Evenson court first

identified several disclaimer provisions in the plaintiff’s employment manual:

“Employees have been hired at the discretion of the company and their employment may

be terminated at its will and at any time.” Evenson, 879 P.2d at 409. Although this was

only one of several disclaimers appearing in the manual, Evenson held that a directed

verdict was inappropriate because the employee’s managers testified that they regarded

and applied the disciplinary procedures as mandatory. Id. There was further evidence

that the company’s CEO discussed compliance with the termination procedures before

terminating the plaintiff’s employment. Id. 

Darr cannot succeed on either of the above contract theories. Contrary to Darr’s

inaccurate assertions, both the original and revised policies contain a disclaimer, rebutting

any facial contention that Telluride manifested an intent to be bound by its policies. 

Compare Aplt. Br. at 58 (stating that the original policies did not contain a disclaimer),

with Appx., Vol. II, at 455, 469 (the old policies’ clear statements that they were

undergoing revision (a statement appearing on the cover) and that they did not constitute

an employment contract (a statement appearing on the first page)). We note that Darr’s

brief relies on two cases holding that a sufficient disclaimer would include a statement
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that the employment manual is not a contract and cannot become one, or a statement on

the first page that the employment manual is a collection of policies, not a contract. Aplt.

Br. at 57. The old policies at issue here included similar statements on the cover and on

the first page. Appx., Vol. II, at 455, 469. 

In light of Darr’s admission that the revised policies applied to him, the

conspicuous statement on the old policies that they were “Undergoing Revision,” and the

old policies’ statement that they did not create an employment contract, it is clear that

Telluride did not manifest an intent to be contractually bound to the old policies merely

by promulgating the policies and offering Darr employment. 

Darr’s promissory-estoppel theory is also unpersuasive. Darr argues that both the

old policies and the chief marshal’s past decisions to terminate employees with cause

created an implied contract not to terminate him without cause. According to Darr, these

claims raise a genuine dispute of material fact that the jury must resolve. 

But Darr’s admission that the new policies applied to him vitiates his reliance

claim. He cannot successfully claim that he reasonably relied on the old policies because

he simultaneously concedes that only the new policies were in effect. Darr’s reliance

would be unreasonable as a matter of law because he allegedly relied on policies he knew

were inoperative. Moreover, both the old and new policies made clear that they did not

constitute an employment contract. Darr even signed a form acknowledging that he

received the new manual and acknowledging that he could be terminated with or without

cause or a hearing. This language makes it unreasonable as a matter of law for Darr to
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rely on either manual as a contract, and it is a legally indefensible position that Telluride

should have reasonably expected Darr to ignore this clear language and rely on the

manuals.

In addition to Darr’s fatal admission regarding the old policies’ expiration, the new

policies clearly informed employees that the Town intended to maintain an at-will

employment policy regardless of other provisions in the policies or the way in which the

Town terminated its employees. Neither Telluride nor Darr could reasonably believe that

the new policies constituted a binding contract or that the chief marshal’s alleged

behavior could alter this clear language. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Darr did not present sufficient evidence in his favor

to defeat Telluride’s motion for summary judgment on this state law contract issue.

III. CONCLUSION

The Town constitutionally revised the old policies, Darr cannot subject the Town

to liability under § 1983 for acting negligently, Darr lacked a substantive-due-process

right in continued employment, and Darr’s employment manuals did not amount to

contracts with Telluride. Thus, the district court did not err by granting Telluride’s

summary-judgment motion and dismissing Darr’s federal and state claims. The district

court’s decision is therefore

AFFIRMED.