alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-03-1999
<CASH>                                             647
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   31,169
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,147
<INVENTORY>                                     35,892
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                71,166
<PP&E>                                          73,785
<DEPRECIATION>                                  36,500
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 130,146
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21,753
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           108
<OTHER-SE>                                     100,448
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   130,146
<SALES>                                         61,898
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                61,898
<CGS>                                           46,383
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   54,565
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  84
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,249
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,881
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,368
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,368
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .41
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .39
        

</TABLE>
# PUBLIC SUBMISSION As of: September 14, 2009 Tracking No. 80a0635c Comments Due: September 14, 2009

Docket: DARS

- 2009

- 0023 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Limitation on Procurements on Behalf o f DoD (DFARS Case 2008

- D005)

Comment On: DARS

- 2009

- 0023

- 000 1 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Limitation on Procurements on Behalf of DoD (DFARS Case 2008

- D005)

Document: DARS

- 2009

- 0023

- 0002 Public Comments 2008

- D005

- D.Mansfield



## Submitter Information

Name: Donald Mansfield Email: Donald.Mansfield@dau.mi l



## General Comment

To whom it may concern:

I believe that the final rule needs to include a definition of “Governmentwide acquisition contract”, which appears in the definition of “Direct acquisition”, that is specific to subpart 217.78. The term has a specific definition in the statute that differs from the definition at FAR 2.101. Here is the definition from the statute (Section 801 , paragraph (f)(3)):
(3) GOVERNMENT

- WIDE ACQUISITION CONTRACT

- The term `government

- wide acquisition contract' means a task or delivery order contract that

-- (A) is entered into by a

non

- defense agency; and
(B) may be used as the contract under whic h property or services are procured for one or more other departments or agencies of the Federal Government.

Here is the definition at FAR 2.101:“Governmentwide acquisition contract (GWAC)” means a task

- order or delivery

order contract for information technology established by one agency for Governmentwide use that is operated

— (1) By an executive agent designated by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to 40 U.S.C. 11302(e) getdoc+uscview+t37t40+1574+51++%2840%29%20%20AND%20%28%2840% 29%20 ADJ%20USC%29%3ACITE%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20> ; or
(2) Under a delegation of procurement authority issued by the General Services Administration (GSA) prior to August 7, 1996, under authority granted GSA by former section 40 U.S.C. 759 getdoc+uscview +t37t40+1574+51++%2840%29%20%20AND%20%28%2840% 29%20ADJ%20USC%29%3ACITE%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20> , repealed by Pub. L. 104

- 106. The Economy Act does not apply to orders under a Governmentwide acquisition contract.
[Italics added]
As you can see, th e FAR definition is more specific. If the term is not defined differently in the final rule, some may interpret the requirements at DFARS 217.7802 (b) as being applicable to “Governmentwide acquisition contracts” as that term is defined at FAR 2.101.

Do nald E. Mansfield
Exhibit 99.2 - Certification of Chief Executive Officer

                             CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                              18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                              AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                   SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection  with the Annual Report of eClic, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Justine M. Daniels, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  The Annual Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a)
     or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information  contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
     the Registrant.

/s/ Justine M. Daniels
----------------------------
    Justine M. Daniels
    Chief Executive Officer
    Chief Financial Officer
    March 26, 2003

<PAGE>
#### Josephine Macaluso, an Infant, by Lena Macaluso, Her Guardian ad Litem, et al., Appellants, *v.*Fresh Air Recreation Co., Inc., Respondent.

Submitted May 17, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*855
      *Frank J. Wheelan for*motion.

No one opposed.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs, and ten dollars costs of motion, unless the appeal is perfected, and appellants pay ten dollars costs, within ten days, in which event the motion is denied.
David E. DELGADO and Ramiro Barbaran, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Alfredo JIDY, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2055

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

DECEMBER 14, 2017

ORDERED that appellants' notice of voluntary dismissal is recognized by the Court, and this appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida is hereby dismissed.
#### Beyre, Guardian, v. Adams.

1. Pleading: answer: denial op knowledge or information as to certain facts. In an action for the value of a cow alleged to have died in consequence of certain acts of negligence of one Smith, defendant’s servant, defendant answered, “that of the alleged negligence of said Smith, and the death of said cow, the defendant has no knowledge or information to form a belief that said cow died in consequence of such negligence, and therefore denies the same.” *Held*that this answer put in issue only the alleged effect of the negligence, but not the allegation of negligence itself, and that it was error to require plaintiff to prove that allegation.

*Appeal from Clayton Circuit Court.*

Monday, December 12.

. Action for the recovery of the value of a cow. It is alleged that defendant had the animal in possession as bailee, and that she died in consequence of the negligence of his *383servant. There was a verdict and judgment for defendant. Rlaintiff appeals.

*Murdock dk Davidson*and *J.*larkin, for appellant.

*J. 0.*Oroshy, for appellee.

Reed, J.

It is alleged in the petition that the defendant’s servant was guilty of certain negligent acts which caused the death of the animal. The answer is as follows: “ That of the alleged negligence of said Smith, [the servant,] and the death of said cow, the defendant has no knowledge or information' to form a belief that said cow died in consequence of such negligence, and therefore denies the same.”

The question presented is whether an issue is formed as to the negligence of the servant by this answer. The circuit court ruled that the burden was on plaintiff to prove the acts of negligence alleged in the petition. Under our statute, (Code, § 2655,) the defendant may put in issue the allegations of the petition, either by a special or a general denial, or a denial of knowledge or information thereof sufficient to form a belief. The answer in question does not, either specifically or generally, deny the allegations of the petition. In express terms, it denies that defendant has any knowledge or information to form a belief “ that said cow died in consequence of such negligence.” As to that averment, it is sufficient to put upon plaintiff the burden of proving it; but it clearly does not put in issue the allegation that Smith was guilty of the negligence charged, and that allegation is to be deemed true.

The judgment of the circuit court will be

Reversed.
CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT      TO

| (1) | The                Report fully complies with the                requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange                Act of                1934; and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The                information contained in the                Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition                and results of operations of the                Company. |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:                February 4,                2008 | By:  /s/  David                A. Heaberlin |
|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                 | David                A.                Heaberlin                |
|                                                 | Chief                Financial                Officer           |
Octavious T. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3201

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 15, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT - 32.2

                                  MOSSIMO, INC.

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
                         PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Mossimo, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mali Shrinivas, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to the best of my knowledge:

              (1)  The Report to which this certification is attached as Exhibit
                   - 32.2 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
                   or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

              (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                   all material respects, the financial condition, results of
                   operations, and cash flows of the Company.


/s/ Mali Shrinivas
------------------------------------
Mali Shrinivas
Chief Financial Officer
May 14, 2004
Michael LUCAS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Department of REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-4032

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 11, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
EX PARTE Mark Christopher VEASEY

CR-16-0100

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 5, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. denied.
# Publicatieblad C 160A/27 m

| | ISSN 1977-0995 |
| --- | --- |
| Publicatieblad
  van de Europese Unie | C 160A |
| | |
| Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal | Mededelingen en bekendmakingen | 57e jaargang27 mei 2014 |

ISSN 1977-0995

Publicatieblad

van de Europese Unie

C 160A

Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal

Mededelingen en bekendmakingen

57e jaargang27 mei 2014

---

| Nummer | Inhoud | Bladzijde |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | V   Adviezen |
| | BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES |
| | Europees Geneesmiddelenbureau |
| 2014/C 160A/01 | Kennisgeving van annulering | 1 |

Nummer

Inhoud

Bladzijde

V   Adviezen

BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES

Europees Geneesmiddelenbureau

2014/C 160A/01

Kennisgeving van annulering

1

| | |
| --- | --- |
| 2014/C 160A/02 | Overzicht van de in de C A-Serie van het Publicatieblad gepubliceerde Vergelijkende onderzoeken | 2 |

2014/C 160A/02

Overzicht van de in de C A-Serie van het Publicatieblad gepubliceerde Vergelijkende onderzoeken

2

| NL | |
| --- | --- |

NL

---

V Adviezen

BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES

Europees Geneesmiddelenbureau

| 27.5.2014 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | CA 160/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.5.2014

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

CA 160/1

---

Kennisgeving van annulering

2014/C 160 A/01

Het Europees Geneesmiddelenbureau heeft besloten de volgende selectieprocedure te annuleren:

| — | EMA/AD/359: Hoofd afdeling IT-uitvoering, divisie Informatietechnologie (AD 10). |
| --- | --- |

—

EMA/AD/359: Hoofd afdeling IT-uitvoering, divisie Informatietechnologie (AD 10).

---

27.5.2014

| 27.5.2014 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | CA 160/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

CA 160/2

---

OVERZICHT VAN DE IN DE C A-SERIE VAN HET PUBLICATIEBLAD GEPUBLICEERDE VERGELIJKENDE ONDERZOEKEN

2014/C 160 A/02

Hierbij vindt u een lijst van C A-publicatiebladen „Vergelijkende onderzoeken” die in 2014 tot op heden gepubliceerd werden.

Deze publicaties verschenen — tenzij anders vermeld — in alle officiële talen.

| 5 | |
| --- | --- |
| 6 | |
| 11 | |
| 19 | |
| 21 | |
| 26 | |
| 27 | |
| 30 | (PL) |
| 35 | |
| 41 | (DE/EN/FR) |
| 42 | |
| 43 | |
| 46 | |
| 47 | |
| 48 | |
| 55 | |
| 56 | |
| 60 | |
| 62 | |
| 65 | |
| 73 | (DE/EN/FR) |
| 74 | |
| 81 | |
| 88 | |
| 92 | (DE/EN/FR) |
| 97 | |
| 98 | |
| 99 | |
| 108 | |
| 109 | |
| 116 | |
| 119 | |
| 133 | |
| 134 | |
| 136 | |
| 137 | (DE/EN/FR) |
| 140 | |
| 145 | |
| 152 | |
| 160 | |

5

6

11

19

21

26

27

30

(PL)

35

41

(DE/EN/FR)

42

43

46

47

48

55

56

60

62

65

73

(DE/EN/FR)

74

81

88

92

(DE/EN/FR)

97

98

99

108

109

116

119

133

134

136

137

(DE/EN/FR)

140

145

152

160

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Abraham SALAZAR-JUAREZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40510 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Date Filed: 12/20/2016

Renata Ann Gowie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Abraham Salazar-Juarez, Pro Se

Before DENNIS, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Abraham Salazar-Juarez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Salazar-Juarez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant parts of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cm. R. 47.5.4.
EX-10.2



 Exhibit 10.2 
 2012 Executive Incentive Payment Plan 
  

	1.	Target Incentive Payment Amount 

  

	 	•	35% of annual base salary (Robert Ben, Gerald Laures and Sally Washlow) 

  

	 	•	25% of annual base salary (other participants) 

  

	2.	Criteria 

 Incentive
payment amount tied to a targeted Cobra Electronics Corporation consolidated operating profit (“Operating Profit Target”) without regard to extraordinary or other nonrecurring or unusual items in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles unless the Compensation Committee determines that any such item shall not be disregarded (“Consolidated Operating Profit”). 
  

	3.	Payment Tiers 

  

			
	 •             Less than 21.2766% of Operating Profit
Target
	  	 –       0% of target incentive payment amount

		
	 •             21.2766% or greater of Operating Profit
Target but less than 42.5532%
	  	 –       10% of target incentive payment amount

		
	 •             42.5532% or greater of Operating Profit
Target but less than 63.8298%
	  	 –       30% of target incentive payment amount

		
	 •             63.8298% or greater of Operating Profit
Target but less than 100%
	  	 –       60% of target incentive payment amount

		
	 •             100% or greater of Operating Profit Target
but less than 117.0213%
	  	 –       100% of target incentive payment amount

		
	 •             117.0213% or greater of Operating Profit
Target
	  	 –       105% of target incentive payment amount



  

	4.	Other Terms 

  

	 	•	Incentive payments will be processed with the next regularly scheduled payroll after the approval by the Board of Directors of 2012 audited consolidated results, but
not later than March 15, 2013, subject to changes approved by the Compensation Committee 

  

	 	•	Consolidated Operating Profit will be calculated based on the Cobra Electronics Corporation consolidated results
Delimus Vaughn BURNS v. STATE

CR-16-0041

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017 Reh. denied May 12, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### * Salmon Clapp *versus*Nathan Hayward.

A prisoner in execution maíces a bond for the liberty of the yard, in a penal sum less than double the amount of the sums for which he is imprisoned; which is approved by two justices, according to the statute; the sheriff is chargeable for an escape, if he give such prisoner the liberty of the yard on such bond.

This was an action against the defendant, as sheriff of the county of *Plymouth,*for the escape of one *Jotham Dunfey,*a prisoner on execution, at the suit of the plaintiff; and it was referred to the decision of the Court, on the following facts: —

The said *Jotham,*being committed, on execution in favor of the plaintiff, for 15 dollars debt, 3 dollars 53 cents costs, 25 cents for the execution, and 3 dollars for the fees of commitment, gave a bond, with a surety approved by two justices *quorum unus,*to the plaintiff, in the sum of 39 dollars 70 cents, with the usual condition, for the liberty of the prison-yard; and he was at liberty within the limits of the said yard, from the execution of the bond until he was discharged from his imprisonment, by taking the poor debtor’s oath.

*254Judgment was to be entered, by nonsuit or default, as the opinion of the Court should be on the foregoing facts.

*Whiting*for the plaintiff.

*Metcalf*for the defendant.

*By the Court.*

Judgment must be entered for the plaintiff; on the ground that the bond, being for a penal sum *less*than double the amount of the sums for which the debtor was imprisoned, was void under the statute, or rather was not in conformity to it; and that the creditor was not obliged to accept such bond, but might, notwithstanding, charge the sheriff in an action for the escape.

It is not decided that a bond for more than double the amount would be, for that reason, sufficient to protect the sheriff. As to this point, no opinion is given, *(a)*

*Defendant defaulted.*

(a)

*Clap*vs. *Copan, 7 Mass. Rep.*101. — *Bartlett*vs. *Willis & Al.*3 *Mass. Rep.*105
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20 - 0304 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. WILLIAM EDDIE MOODY,

Defendant and Appellant .

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion, and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Supplement the Record is GRANTED . The transcript of the hearing in Judith Basin County District Court, Cause No. DC 23 - 2018 - 9 on December 16, 2019, shall be placed in the file of this Court for this cause . The Clerk shal l serve a copy of this Order upon the court reporter.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 24 2021

05/24/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0304
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVANUS HARYADI,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-72369

Agency No. A095-198-461

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 24, 2011** 

Before: PREGERSON, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

Stevanus Haryadi, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions pro se for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 

FILED

JUN 03 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-72369

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence

the agency’s factual findings, Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir.

2009), and we review de novo due process claims, Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d

889, 894 (9th Cir. 2003). We deny in part and grant in part the petition for review,

and we remand.

We reject Haryadi’s contention that the BIA violated his due process rights

by refusing to accept his late-filed brief, and by failing to explain why the IJ did

not err. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to

prevail on a due process challenge); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(c)(1). 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because

Haryadi failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the

consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Indonesia. See Wakkary,

558 F.3d at 1067-68.

 Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Haryadi failed

to demonstrate past persecution, because the harassment and mistreatment

suffered, even considered cumulatively, does not rise to the level of persecution. 

See id. at 1059-60 (concluding that beatings by Indonesian youth, robbery of

sandals and pocket money, and confrontation with a threatening mob on way to

bible school, were instances of discriminatory mistreatment). In analyzing future
3 08-72369

fear, however, the agency did not assess Haryadi’s claim under a disfavored group

analysis, and it did not have the benefit of our intervening decision in Tampubolon

v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we remand for the agency

to assess Haryadi’s asylum and withholding of removal claims under the

disfavored group analysis in the first instance. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12,

16-18 (2002) (per curiam).

Each party shall bear its own costs for this petition for review. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part;

REMANDED.