alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**

 

The Board of Directors 

Ariba, Inc.:

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in theregistration statements (Nos. 333-107864, 333-61064, 333-73458, 333-81773, 333-89119, 333-95665, 333-33544, 333-46820, and 333-84916) on Form S-8 of Ariba, Inc. of our report dated October 22, 2003 except as to note 12, which is as of January 23,2004, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Ariba, Inc. and subsidiaries as of September 30, 2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated statements of operations and comprehensive loss, stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for eachof the years in the three-year period ended September 30, 2003, which report appears in Amendment No. 3 to the September 30, 2003 annual report on Form 10-K/A of Ariba, Inc. 

 

Our report contains an explanatory paragraph that refers to the Company’s adoption of Statement of Financial AccountingStandards No. 142, *Goodwill and Other Intangibles*, effective October 1, 2002. 

 

/s/    KPMG LLP 

 

Mountain View, California 

May 12, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

REAPPOINTMENT TO THE 

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF LAW 

EXAMINERS

:

:

:

:

:

NO. 826

SUPREME COURT RULES DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of January, 2020, Kezia O. L. Taylor, Esquire, Allegheny 

County, is hereby reappointed as a member of the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners 

for a term of three years, commencing April 1, 2020.
#### Thomas BODNAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-55277

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 17, 2017

*276Thomas Bodnar, Pro Se

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Thomas Bod-nar appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park,*159 F.3d 374, 381 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissal on the basis of res judicata); *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bodnar’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims arising from the January 6, 2006 arrest as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because those claims were raised, or could have been raised, in a prior federal action between the same parties, and that action resulted in a final judgment on the merits. *See Cabrera,*159 F.3d at 381 (setting forth elements of res judicata and explaining that the doctrine bars subsequent litigation both of claims that were raised and those that could have been raised in the prior action).

The' district court properly dismissed Bodnar’s Eighth Amendment claims arising from medical treatment he received after the January 6, 2006 arrest because Bodnar failed to name the allegedly responsible defendants. *See Jones v. Williams,*297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation .... ”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bodnar further leave to amend because amendment would be futile. *See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and stating that dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate where amendment would be futile).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**CERTIFICATIONOF PERIODIC REPORT**

#### **PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, the undersigned, JayC. Peterson, Chief Financial Officer of Forgent Networks, Inc. (the “Company”),do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.                                       Thequarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended April 30,2007 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended, and

2.                                       Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|   |                    |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | /s/ JAY C. PETERSON     |   |
|   | Jay C. Peterson         |
|   | Chief Financial Officer |
|   | June 14, 2007           |

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 hasbeen provided to Forgent Networks, Inc. and will be retained by ForgentNetworks, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.  The foregoingcertification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 andis not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

----
#### Brad GREENSPAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IAC/INTERACTIVECORP, a Delaware corporation; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15908

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 17, 2017

Jared Peterson, Attorney, Law Office of Jared Peterson, Oceanside, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Kurt Alan Kappes, Attorney, Greenberg Traurig, P.A, Sacramento, CA, James Ian Serota, Greenberg Traurig LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee IAC/In-terActiveCorp

Lee H. Rubin, Donald Manwell Falk, Mayer Brown LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Google, Inc.

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Brad Greenspan appeals from the district court’s order denying his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment dismissing for failure to prosecute Greenspan’s putative shareholder class action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

In his opening brief, Greenspan failed to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his action or any other district court order, and therefore Greenspan waived any such challenge. *See Smith v.*Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[AJrguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *Greenwood v. F.A.A.,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim.... ”).

Greenspan’s notice of appeal challenging the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) May 2, 2016 Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, which was filed in the district court, should have been filed in this court. *See*15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(f) (providing that certain determinations of whistleblower awards “may be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals of the United States not more than 30 days after the determination is issued by the Commission”). We construe Greenspan’s notice of appeal as a petition for review. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 15(a)(4). In the interests of justice, we transfer Greenspan’s petition *280for review to this court. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1631; *Kolek v. Engen,*869 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1989) (setting forth conditions for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631); *see also Baeta v. Sonchik,*273 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[Bjecause the purpose of the transfer statute is to aid litigants who were confused about the proper forum for review, a petition that would be time-barred without a transfer satisfies the interest of justice test.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Clerk shall file Greenspan’s notice of appeal (District Court Docket Entry No. 104) as a petition for review of the SEC’s May 2, 2016 order and open a new case in this court.

Greenspan’s motion to certify questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court (Docket Entry No. 12) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Nichole Cherie GOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1571

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 27, 2018.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Robert D. Rosen, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, LUCAS, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Brion Umidi, certify that:

1.     I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ReGen
Biologics, Inc.;

2.     Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;

3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a  15(e) and 15d  15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;
and

5.     The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: August 14, 2003

By:
    
    /s/ BRION UMIDIBrion UmidiChief Financial Officer
### Faulk, Scott (OST) From: Sent: To: Subject: Harley Tancayo <harleytancayo@yahoo.com> Tuesday, November26, 2013 10:32 PM Faulk, Scott (OST) Mokulele airlines
Towhom it may concern, my name is HarleyTancayo, I always use Mokulele Airlines. It's the ontime airlines. It's been servicing Moloka'i for quite some time now. The workers here are very friendly and very helpful. It'll be greatto knowthat Mokulele could service Kalaupapa and the rest ofthe other island. They're reliable, efficient and prices are reasonable. Please choose Mokulele as your choice. Thankyou, Harley Tancayo

1
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1472 

To prohibit the use of Federal financial assistance for a certain high-speed 

rail development project in the State of California that was subject 

to a previous cooperative agreement, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 1, 2021 

Mrs. STEEL (for herself, Mr. MCCARTHY, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. LAMALFA, Mr. 

NUNES, Mr. GARCIA of California, Mr. ISSA, Mrs. KIM of California, Mr. 

MCCLINTOCK, Mr. BRADY, Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr. OBERNOLTE, and Mr. 

PERRY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To prohibit the use of Federal financial assistance for a 

certain high-speed rail development project in the State 

of California that was subject to a previous cooperative 

agreement, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop the High-Speed 

5 Money Pit Act’’. 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1472 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON PROVISION OF FEDERAL FINAN2 CIAL ASSISTANCE FOR CERTAIN HIGH-SPEED 

3 RAIL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. 

4 No Federal financial assistance may be provided to 

5 the State of California for a high-speed rail corridor devel6 opment project that is the same or substantially similar 

7 to the project that is the subject of Cooperative Agreement 

8 No. FR–HSR–0118–12–01–01 entered into between the 

9 California High-Speed Rail Authority and the Federal 

10 Railroad Administration. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000883505
<NAME> GLACIER 
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-02-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-04-1997
<CASH>                                              10
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      183
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      2,153
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,725
<PP&E>                                          68,063
<DEPRECIATION>                                  19,935
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  58,551
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,909
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            34
<OTHER-SE>                                      24,388
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    58,551
<SALES>                                         27,214
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                27,214
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   20,378
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,539<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 838
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    459
<INCOME-TAX>                                       172
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                287
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       287
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .09
<FN>
<F1>Includes $1,341 of non-recurring expenses related to Aqua-Vend acquisition.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Junior Spencer MORRIS, also known as Texas Black, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51062 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 2, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Damian Castillo, Esq., Law Offices of Damian Castillo, Midland, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Junior Spencer Morris appeals from the five-year sentence of imprisonment imposed following his third revocation of supervised release. He contends that the district court’s revocation sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable because it was inadequately explained and ignored or incorrectly weighed the relevant factors. Because he did not object to the sentence, we review for plain error. *United States v. Whitelaw,*580 F.3d 256, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2009). To prevail on plain-error review, a defendant must show a clear or obvious error that affected his or her substantial rights. *See id.*at 260. “If the defendant makes such a showing, ‘this court has the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” *Id.*

Morris has not made the required showing. Here, the record reflects the district court’s consideration of the statements of Morris and his counsel, the nature and circumstances of Morris’s violation of the conditions of his supervised release, his violent criminal history, his prior revocations, and the need to protect the public. The district court was not required to “engage in a checklist recitation” of sentencing factors, and Morris fails to demonstrate any clear or obvious procedural error. *See United States v. Kippers,*685 F.3d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Likewise, we have “routinely affirmed revocation sentences exceeding the advisory range, even where the sentence equals the statutory maximum.” *See United States v. Warren,*720 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *see also Kippers,*685 F.3d at 500-01. Morris’s mere disagreement with the district court’s balancing of the sentencing factors and the sentence it imposed is insufficient to establish clear or obvious substantive error warranting reversal. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. ' R. 47.5.4.
Order entered May 16, 2022

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00784-CR

RUBEN LABRADA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F18-75816-V

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s May 10, 2022 third motion for an extension 

of time to file his brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER appellant’s brief due 

by June 10, 2022.

/s/ BILL PEDERSEN, III

JUSTICE
Angela JULIAN v. SONIC AUTOMOTIVE, INC., d/b/a Tom Williams, BMW

2160440

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 12, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Jacobo VARELA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3067

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 20, 2018 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 7, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leonel ARTEAGA-GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51385 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Leonel Arteaga-Gonzalez, Pro Se

Before KING, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Leonel Arteaga-Gonzalez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Arteaga-Gonzalez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Joshua P. MOORE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-4222

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Belated appeal is denied.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 June 24, 2014

h0616

Order 

Clerk

June 24, 2014

148671

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 148671

COA: 319556

Oakland CC: 2012-240515-FH

MARK DANIEL McCRACKEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 17, 2014 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
TOYOBO SPECIALTIES (USA) INC. 


39555 Orchard Hill PL STE230, Novi, MI 48375 


Phone: (248) 449-3323 / Fax: (248) 449-3324 


E-mail: fushimi@toyobosp.com 


The Honorable Ray LaHood 

United States Department of Transportation 

CONTROL NO 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

. Washington, DC 20590 . 

Dear Secretary LaHood: 

On behalf of TOYOBO SPECIALTIES (usA) INC, I am writing to express our 


strong support for the applicationof Delta Air Lines for new nonstop service between 


Detroit and Haneda. 


Approval of Delta's new service would be a major benefit for our region, where 


many corporations have strong trade and market presence with Japan. There are 


over 500 Japanese companies located in Michigan and hundreds more whose business 


models rely on access to Japan and it's market. The growth of our business ties with 


Japarthas created demand forincrease(h:~apacity to Tokyo. Our business travelers 


look to the convenience of flying into Tokyo's downtown Haneda airport. 


Detroit is a proven and successful gateway to Asia, and as an airport that can 


support trans·pacific routes. This summer Delta is adding new service to Seoul and 


Hong Kong, fulfilling the commitment Delta made to DTW to make it the airlines 


gateway to Asia. The addition of Haneda as a destination is a natural fit that would 


dearly b~nefit'our business trav~lers.· 

Thank you for consideration of this request.
Jevon Deonta WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D18-0765

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 24, 2018]

Jevon Deonta Washington, Lake City, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

May, Damoorgian and Ciklin, JJ., concur.