alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### *The Honorable JOHN F. NANGLE, United States Distric t

Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation. ___________ No. 95-3608

___________ Jackie L. Russell, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Eastern * District of Arkansas. Shirley S. Chater, * Commissioner, Social Security * [PUBLISHED] Administration, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: April 11, 1996 Filed: July 29, 1996

___________ Before BEAM and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE, District Judge. *

___________ PER CURIAM.
Jackie L. Russell appeals a denial of social security benefits. We affirm.
Russell, now fifty years old, is an alcoholic. He was previousl y employ edas a roofer and a lawn-care worker. He has an eighth-grad e education. He filed for disability benefits cla iming that he is unable to work because of alcoholism, anti-social behavior and dysthymic disorder. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits, but that decision was reversed by the Appeals Council. On remand, the AL J again denied benefits.

### Because we find that the ALJ correctly denied benefits under 1 

### the stan dards in place at the time of Russell's hearing, we nee d not address the effect of rece nt amendments to the Social Security Act that eliminate alcoholism or drug dependence as a basis fo r obtaining disability benefits. Contract with America Advancemen t Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)). -2- Th e ALJ found that, although Russell has a severe combination o f impairments including alcohol dependency, his impairments do not prevent him from performing his past relevant work as a roofing or lawn-car e laborer. Like the district court, we have reviewed the record in this cas e and agr ee that substantial evidence in this record supports the ALJ' s conclusions.

The "mere presence of alcoholism is not necessarily disabling. " Mapes v. Chater , 82 F .3d 259, 263 (8th Cir. 1996). In fact the burden of proving disability ba sed on alcoholism is a high one. Id. A claimant is requir edto show that he has lost self-control to the point of bein g impotent to seek and use means of rehabilitation. Id. He must show that he is unable, not merely unwilling, to seek and use means o f rehab ilitation. Lorenzen v. Chater , 71 F.3d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1995)
. Here, a psychiatrist who examined Russell noted, "[b]asically, he doesn't want to sto p drinking, and has at this point no good reason to eve n consider it." Administrative Transcript at 255. The record also show s that Russell walked out of treatment several tim es and has missed numerous follow -up appointments. This, and other evidence in the record , demonstrates that Russell has failed to make the appropriate showing for disab ilitybased on alcoholism. Accordingly, further discussion i s unnecessary. We affirm for the reasons stated in the district court' s 1 opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

### -3- A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
OSCEOLA REGIONAL HOSPITAL, d/b/a Osceola Regional Medical Center, Petitioner, v. Ashley CALZADA and Juan L. Calzada, Individually and o/b/o J.L.C.O., a Child, Eric Frendak, CRNA, Osceola OB/Gyn, Michael R. Denardis, D.O., OB Hospitalist Group, LLC, Ezer A. Ojeda, M.D., et al., Respondents.

Case No. 5D17-4097

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed July 6, 2018

Jason M. Azzarone, David S. Nelson, and Louis J. La Cava, of La Cava & Jacobson, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioner.

Heather M. Kolinsky, of Law Office of Chad A. Barr, P.A., Altamonte Springs, for Respondents Ashley Calzada and Juan Calzada, individually and on behalf of J.L.C.O., a Child.

No Appearance for other Respondents.

PER CURIAM.

*1301Osceola Regional Hospital, d/b/a Osceola Regional Medical Center ("Osceola Hospital"), a defendant in a medical malpractice action brought by Ashley and Juan Calzada, seeks certiorari review of an order denying its motion to dismiss complaint. In its motion, Osceola Hospital alleged, *inter alia* , that the Calzadas had failed to comply with certain presuit investigation requirements applicable to medical malpractice cases under chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2013), with regard to their claims that Osceola Hospital was liable for the actions of three identified nurses. Because the trial court denied the motion without making necessary findings, we grant the petition.

Osceola Hospital's motion required the trial court to determine whether the Calzadas complied with chapter 766. However, after conducting a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court simply denied the motion without explanation. By doing so, the trial court "effected a denial of the procedural safeguards of chapter 766 for which certiorari relief is appropriate." *PP Transition, LP v. Munson* , 232 So.3d 515, 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (granting certiorari relief where trial court denied hospital's motion to dismiss without making express findings on plaintiffs' compliance with presuit investigation requirements applicable to medical malpractice cases); *see also**Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Herber* , 984 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that trial court departed from essential requirements of law by failing to determine whether patient conducted reasonable investigation and whether her claim rested on reasonable basis). On remand, the trial court shall make express findings as to whether the Calzadas complied with chapter 766's presuit requirements.1

PETITION GRANTED.

SAWAYA, TORPY AND EVANDER, JJ., concur.

1

Our decision does not preclude the trial court from addressing the Calzadas' claim that they were excused from providing a corroborating affidavit because of Osceola Hospital's alleged failure to timely provide requested medical records pursuant to section 766.204, Florida Statutes (2013).
Exhibit 10.3



LOGO



October 26, 2004



L. Dick Buell



Dear Dick:



I reference the letter (the Original Letter) written by me, as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Catalina Marketing Corporation (Catalina), to
you, dated March 3, 2004. The Original Letter spelled out the terms and conditions of your employment arrangement with Catalina as Chief Executive Officer, which commenced March 17, 2004. The purpose of this letter is to amend the Original Letter as
set forth below. When accepted by you in the manner stated below, this letter shall constitute an amendment to the Original Letter, and will be binding on you and Catalina, as follows:



The fifth full paragraph of the Original Letter is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows:



You will be eligible for reimbursement of relocation expenses incurred in
accordance with our Relocation Assistance Guidelines (the Guidelines) as modified by the balance of this paragraph. You will be eligible for reimbursement of Transition expenses described in the Guidelines incurred during the
first seven months of your employment and for Personal Property and Housing expenses described in the Guidelines for the period commencing the first day of your employment through October 31, 2005. Taxable reimbursements
under this paragraph will be grossed up. All relocation costs described or referenced in this paragraph are reimbursable to Catalina by you should you voluntarily leave employment with Catalina within eighteen months after the initial date of your
employment.



Except as set forth in this letter, the Original Letter shall
remain in full force and effect without change.



Sincerely,



|                              
|------------------------------
|/s/ Frederick W. Beinecke     
|Frederick W. Beinecke         
|Chairman of the Board         
|Catalina Marketing Corporation



ACCEPTED:/s/ L. Dick BuellL. Dick BuellDate: 10.29.04
K.H., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-2646

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 23, 2018.

K. H., a juvenile, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Thomas Christopher ELDER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-3326

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

October 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Granted.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

NADIA KUZMENKO, AKA Nadia Reyes,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 21

- 10111

D.C. Nos.

2:11

- cr

- 00210

- JAM

- 2

2:11

- cr

- 00210

- JAM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 9, 2022 * *
San Francisco, California

Before: HURWITZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN, ** * District Judge.

Nadia Kuzmenko was sentenced to 96 months ’ imprisonment in 2015 for wire

fraud. In March 2021, she moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. 

# FILE D

FEB 11 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)

. The di strict court denied the motion, concluding that Kuzmenko

failed to establish extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting relief,

and

, even if she had, reduction of her sentence was not appropriate under the

sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553( a). Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see

United States v. Aruda , 993 F.3d 7 9 7, 799 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam), we affirm.

A district court may base its denial of a motion for compassionate release

solely on the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Keller , 2 F.4th 1278, 1284 (9th

Cir. 2021). The district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so here. T he court

accu rately noted that Kuzmenko had served only 14.5 months of a 96

- month

sentence and concluded that granting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) relief “ at this point would

undermine the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors by minimizing the original

sentence’s deterrent effect, failing to provide just punishment, and failing to promote

respect for the law.” Moreover, the same district judge presided over Kuzmenko’s

5

- week trial, and had sentenced Kuzmenko to a below

- Guidelines term after

carefully analyzing the § 3553(a) factors

. S ee United States v. Wilson , 8 F.4th 970,

977 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that a minimal explanation for denying a § 3582(c) (2)

motion from the sentencing judge suffices in light of “the deference due to the

judge’s professional judgment a nd the context of a particular case”).

AFFIRMED.
| 1.   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and the consolidated result of operations of the Company for the periods presented. |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| By:    | /s/Terry Howlett                                                 |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                  |
| Name:  | Terry Howlett                                                         |
|   |                                                                  |
| Title: | Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer and Director |
|   |                                                                  |
| Date:  | January 25, 2010                                                      |
#### Barry Alan LAYTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Steven K. BORDIN, Chief Probation Officer, Butte County, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15-15319

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 14, 2017

*640Charles Marchand Bonneau, II, Esquire, Sacramento, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant

David Andrew Eldridge, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *640*See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Barry Alan Layton appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review a district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition de novo, *see Casey v. Moore,*386 F.3d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.

Layton contends that his .state conviction for carrying a concealed weapon under California Penal Code § 12025(a)(2) (2011) violates the Second Amendment. The state court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or based upon an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. *See*U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); *see also Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego,*824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[T]he Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms does not include, in any degree, the right of a member of the general public to carry concealed firearms in public.”).

We treat Layton’s additional argument as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability. So treated, the motion is denied. *See*9th Cir. R. 22-1(e); *Hiivala v. Wood,*195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Situation in and in Relation to Burma

On February 10, 2021, by Executive Order 14014, I declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in and in relation to Burma.

The situation in and in relation to Burma, and in particular the February 1, 2021 coup, in which the military overthrew the democratically elected civilian government of Burma and unjustly arrested and detained government leaders, politicians, human rights defenders, journalists, and religious leaders, thereby rejecting the will of the people of Burma as expressed in elections held in November 2020 and undermining the country's democratic transition and rule of law, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on February 10, 2021, must continue in effect beyond February 10, 2022. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14014 with respect to the situation in and in relation to Burma.

                        This notice shall be published in the                         *Federal Register*                         and transmitted to the Congress.                    

[FR Doc. 2022-02934

Billing code 3395-F2-P
Ernst ANICET, Petitioner, v. Julie JONES, etc., et al., Respondents.

No. 3D18-0047

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 9, 2018

Ernst Anicet, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent The State of Florida.

Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE, and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Denied. *See* *Barnard v. State*, 949 So.2d 250, 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("Habeas corpus may not be used to file successive 3.850 motions or to raise issues which would be untimely if considered as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850." (citing *Baker v. State*, 878 So.2d 1236, 1245-46 (Fla. 2004) ) ); *see also* *Hernandez v. State*, 990 So.2d 1116, 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ("However, even if we were to address the petition on the merits, it would be denied as the ground raised is refuted by the record.").
Vincent MENUTO & Jacqueline Menuto, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. David STELLATO, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-3605

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 14, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

314 

CA 14-00765 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

KELLY G. SHERIDAN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V ORDER

DAVID E. SHERIDAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

(APPEAL NO. 3.) 

 

PHILLIPS LYTLE LLP, BUFFALO (MICHAEL B. POWERS OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP, SYRACUSE (JANET D. CALLAHAN OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

KELLY M. CORBETT, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, FAYETTEVILLE. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County

(Martha E. Mulroy, A.J.), entered February 3, 2014. The order denied

defendant’s motion to expand his parenting time with his son. 

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed

without costs (see Abasciano v Dandrea, 83 AD3d 1542, 1545). 

Entered: June 19, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### Samuel Otugh, Respondent, v Bisambar Sanicharan et al., Defendants, and East West Management, Inc., Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 661]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant East West Management, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Johnson, J.), dated December 5, 2002, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff, a passenger in a taxicab which was involved in a collision with a second motor vehicle, commenced this action against various defendants, including the appellant, as the owner of the subject taxicab. The appellant moved for summary judgment in its favor on the ground that it did not own the taxicab. The Supreme Court properly denied the motion. After the appellant established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the admissible documentary evidence submitted in opposition raised a triable issue of fact *(see*CPLR 3212 [b]) as to whether the appellant did, in fact, own the subject taxicab. Santucci, J.P., Goldstein, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.
WILSON TRUCKING CORP. v. Fredrick A. FATHEREE

2160021

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 19, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
No. 29,134.

#### John L. Connolly, *Appellee,*v. The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Bourbon, *Appellant.*

(278 Pac. 714.)

Opinion filed July 2, 1929.

*John L. Connolly,*pro se.

*Fred W. Bayless*and *Harry Warren,*both of Fort Scott, for the defendant-.

The question involved is whether chapter 152 of the Laws of 1929 violates section 17 of article 2 of the constitution.

The act was prompted by destruction of the Bourbon county courthouse at Fort Scott, which burned on the night of January 12, 1929. The act took effect on February 5, 1929. It is not necessary to decide whether, under the circumstances, a special act would have been unconstitutional, since the act is general.

The reference to means of destruction is scarcely a limitation. The agencies mentioned were the common, natural agencies likely to destroy.

*453The classification, on the basis of population and. existence of a -city of the first class, was reasonable. The purpose of the statute was to provide for prompt building of a courthouse to replace one which had been destroyed, financed by a bond issue and not a tax levy, and without holding a bond election. The legislature might well desire to make the act general for the class of counties mentioned, without either granting or denying general privilege to proceed in the emergency manner.

The statute is valid.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with direction to deny the injunction.
#### Jerri Joette TILLETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-35399

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 17, 2017

Jerri Joette Tillett, Pro Se

*275Melissa A. Hombein, USHE—Office of the US Attorney, Helena, MT, Victoria L. Francis, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

**The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jerri Joette Tillett appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying her motion for a preliminary injunction in her action challenging the Bureau of Land Management, Interior Board of Land Appeals, and the United States Department of the Interior’s (collectively, “BLM”) management of the Pryor Mountain Wild Horse Range (“PMWHR”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). We review for an abuse of discretion. *Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco,*746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tillett’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. *See id.*(setting forth standard for issuance of preliminary injunction). Tillett failed to demonstrate that she would likely suffer irreparable harm from the use of control burns on the PMWHR in light of BLM’s agreement to delay implementing such control burn measures until at least September 2017. *See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,*559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n injunction cannot issue merely because it is possible that there will be an irreparable injury to the plaintiff; it must be likely that there will be.”). Tillett also failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of her challenge to the use of pesticides and herbicides on the PMWHR in light of the district court’s prior denial of her nearly identical claims. *See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,*399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth test for application of the doctrine of res judicata).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We do not consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

We reject as unsupported by the record Tillett’s contentions regarding alleged judicial misconduct.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Lucasta MANNING v. J.P. DIXON et al.

2160151

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 3, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.