United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-51038

Summary Calendar

____________

Austin James, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Deputy Glenn Larcom, individual capacity; Deputy J. Jiles, 

Badge Number 110; individual and official capacity, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:22-CV-149 

______________________________

Before Clement, Graves, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Austin James, a customer of the Travis County Records Division,

alleges that his civil rights were violated when he was denied entry to the 

Records Division’s office for refusing to wear a mask, in contravention of a 

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* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 11, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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county order. Because James failed to plausibly allege a violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, we AFFIRM.

I.

On December 21, 2021, Travis County Constable’s Office Deputies

G. Larcom and J. Jiles denied James access to the Travis County Records 

Division because James was not wearing a face covering, in violation of the 

county’s mask order. The second provision of the order required all 

“employees” “entering into or present within” specified Travis County 

buildings to wear a face covering. The third provision applied the same facecovering requirement to “Customers.” And the fifth provision stated that 

“Customers who do not wish to wear a face covering when entering into or 

visiting a designated County Facility . . . will be required to leave the 

premises.” The order did not contain any provision regarding whether 

“employees” who did not wish to wear a face covering would also be required 

to leave the premises.

James alleges that, during their confrontation, Jiles “pulled his [own] 

face covering entirely below his chin” and yet Jiles—unlike James—“was 

allowed reentry into the Records Office.” James therefore filed class-of-one 

equal-protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for this 

alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court 

dismissed James’ complaint for failure to plausibly allege a constitutional 

violation. James appeals.

II.

We review a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.

Petersen v. Johnson, 57 F.4th 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing In re Katrina 

Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). “To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “We may affirm a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal on any grounds raised below and supported by the record.” 

Petersen, 57 F.4th at 231 (quoting Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th 

Cir. 2007)).

III.

To establish an equal protection violation as a “class of one,” James 

was required to plausibly allege that (1) he was “intentionally treated 

differently from others similarly situated” and (2) “there was no rational 

basis for the difference in treatment.” Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d 

225, 233 (5th Cir. 2012). The district court found that James failed at the first 

prong because he had not identified any “other customer who attempted to 

enter the Records Office without a face covering who was not asked to 

leave,” and Jiles (an employee) was “not an apt comparator” because the 

applicable provision in the county’s mask order “applie[d] only to 

‘customers,’ not employees.” We agree.

While there is no “rigid, mechanical” test for determining whether 

James and Jiles are “similarly situated,” our court has explained that “[i]n a 

case like this one, which involves the application of an ordinance or statute, 

the plaintiff’s and comparators’ relationships with the ordinance at issue will 

generally be a relevant characteristic for purposes of the similarly-situated 

analysis.” Lindquist, 669 F.3d at 233–34. Our opinion in Beeler v. Rounsavall

is instructive. 328 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 2003). There, we found that the statute 

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at issue “clearly distinguishe[d] between applications for new permits and 

applications to renew existing permits” and therefore the plaintiff—who was 

applying for a new permit—and his proposed comparators—who were 

applying to renew an existing permit—“were not similarly situated.” Id. at 

817. As the district court recognized, the same logic applies here. The Travis 

County order clearly distinguished between “employees” and “customers.” 

And while it required both employees and customers to wear masks, only 

customers who declined to wear masks were “required to leave the premises.” 

Thus, Jiles—an employee—and James—a customer—were not similarly 

situated. Because James has not identified any customer-comparators, he has 

failed to plausibly allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 

A plausibly alleged constitutional violation is a required element of 

James’ § 1983 and § 1985 claims. E.g., Jackson v. Pierre, 810 F. App’x 276, 

280–81 (5th Cir. 2020). Since James did not establish a constitutional 

violation, the district court correctly dismissed James’ claims against Jiles

and Larcom in their personal capacities on qualified-immunity grounds, see 

Benfield v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2019), and his claims against 

Jiles in his official capacity on the merits, see City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 

U.S. 796, 799 (1986).1

We AFFIRM.

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1 We therefore need not address the district court’s other bases for dismissal.

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