If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

July 29, 2021

v No. 354414

Oakland Circuit Court

JAY DAVID SOULLIERE, LC No. 2018-269141-FH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The prosecution appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to 

suppress and dismiss charges. Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver 

methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i), and possession of alprazolam, MCL 

333.7403(2)(b)(ii). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained following an 

investigatory stop of defendant by police officers. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the charges. The prosecution now appeals. We reverse 

and remand to the trial court further proceedings.

I. FACTS

This case arises out of an investigatory stop of defendant on October 24, 2018. Oakland 

County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Scott Panin, who was, at the time of the incident in question, a 

detective with the Oakland County Narcotics Enforcement Team (“NET”), was conducting 

surveillance for a particular suspect at 560 Farmdale in Ferndale, Michigan (“Farmdale house”). 

Deputy Panin was an expert in street-level drug trafficking, based on 16 years of law enforcement 

experience, four years with NET, extensive drug-related trainings, and hundreds of drug-crime 

investigations. At approximately 1:00 p.m. on October 24, 2018, Deputy Panin observed a red 

minivan pull into the driveway of the Farmdale house, followed by a grey sedan that pulled in 

behind it. Deputy Panin spotted two individuals in the grey sedan, and then observed what 

appeared to be the passenger handing money to the driver, who appeared to be counting that 

money. Deputy Panin classified this as a “[hand-to-hand] transaction.” The entire encounter 

between the driver and the passenger lasted for only a couple of minutes—an encounter that 
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Deputy Panin classified as a “short-term [trafficking] transaction.” Deputy Panin relayed his 

observations to Ferndale Police Department Detective Austin Bishop, and based on the 

information that Detective Bishop obtained from Deputy Panin, Detective Bishop contacted road 

patrol officers and requested that they stop the grey sedan, which was later identified as defendant’s 

vehicle. The decision to stop defendant’s vehicle was based on what Detective Bishop knew about 

the Farmdale house, as well as Deputy Panin’s experience with drug trafficking, which indicated

that what Deputy Panin had observed in the driveway of the Farmdale house was a hand-to-hand

drug transaction. Notably, Detective Bishop knew defendant prior to the investigatory stop in 

question from former narcotics investigations involving defendant and methamphetamine.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the prosecution argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s 

motion to suppress evidence obtained following the investigatory stop of defendant by police 

officers. Specifically, the prosecution argues that the investigatory stop was supported by 

reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaging in drug-related criminal activity. We agree.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a suppression motion, People v Steele, 

292 Mich App 308, 313; 806 NW2d 753 (2011), and its application of Fourth Amendment 

principles, People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 31; 691 NW2d 759 (2005). However, this Court 

reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings. People v Hyde, 285 Mich App 428, 436; 

775 NW2d 833 (2009). “Clear error occurs if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm 

conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 565; 918 NW2d 

676 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the related provision of the 

Michigan Constitution explicitly protect the right of the people to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. It is well settled that unless a 

specifically established exception applies, searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are 

unreasonable per se. Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 357; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967). 

One exception to the general prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures is the so called 

“Terry stop.” See Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). Under Terry, 

“if a police officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe a person has committed or is 

committing a crime given the totality of the circumstances, the officer may briefly stop that person 

for further investigation.” People v Barbarich, 291 Mich App 468, 473; 807 NW2d 56 (2011). A 

reasonable suspicion is less than the level of suspicion needed for probable cause, but it requires 

something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion, i.e., a “hunch.” People v 

Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996).1

 

1 The key difference between reasonable suspicion and a “hunch” is that the latter is defined merely 

by the subjective impressions of the officer. See, e.g., United States v Thomas, 211 F3d 1186, 

1191 (CA 9, 2000) (“While courts analyze the facts leading to an investigatory stop in light of a 

trained officer’s experience, these facts must be more than the mere subjective impressions of a 

particular officer. Reasonable suspicion must be based on more than an officer’s inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or hunch.”) (cleaned up). 
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An investigatory stop of a motor vehicle may be based upon “fewer facts than those 

necessary to support a finding of reasonableness where both a stop and a search are conducted by 

the police.” People v Yeoman, 218 Mich App 406, 411; 554 NW2d 577 (1996). In determining 

whether reasonable suspicion existed, this Court should be guided by the principle that “common 

sense and everyday life experiences predominate over uncompromising standards.” People v 

Nelson, 443 Mich 626, 635-636; 505 NW2d 266 (1993). Deference should be given to the 

common-sense assessment of police officers that criminal activity is afoot, in consideration of the 

“police officer’s experience and the known patterns of certain types of lawbreakers.” People v 

Rizzo, 243 Mich App 151, 156; 622 NW2d 319 (2000). However, “an officer testifying that he 

inferred on the basis of his experience and training is obliged to articulate how the behavior that 

he observed suggested, in light of his experience and training, an inference of criminal activity.” 

People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 505-506; 556 NW2d 498 (1996). If an 

investigative stop of a motor vehicle is proper, the police officer may detain the vehicle briefly to 

“make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions.” Yeoman, 218 Mich 

App at 411. Finally, in situations involving a police team, the knowledge of each officer on the 

team is imputed to the other officers on the team when conducting a Fourth Amendment analysis. 

See United States v Cook, 277 F3d 82, 86 (CA 1, 2002) (“Here, common sense suggests that, 

where law enforcement officers are jointly involved in executing an investigative stop, the 

knowledge of each officer should be imputed to others jointly involved in executing the stop.”); 

United States v Gillette, 245 F3d 1032, 1034 (CA 8, 2001) (“Where officers work together on an 

investigation, we have used the so-called ‘collective knowledge’ theory to impute the knowledge 

of one officer to other officers to uphold an otherwise invalid search or seizure.”) (internal citation 

omitted). 

Detective Bishop, an expert in street-level drug trafficking, based on two years of NET 

experience, extensive training, and hundreds of drug-crime investigations, ordered the 

investigatory stop of defendant’s vehicle based on what he knew about the Farmdale house, 

including the fact that the previous Ferndale Police Department officer who was assigned to NET 

had open cases and investigations at the Farmdale house dating back to 2014 and 2015, and what 

he knew about defendant prior to the investigatory stop in question from former narcotics 

investigations involving defendant and methamphetamine.2 In addition, Detective Bishop was 

aware from his own “previous encounters” with the original suspect that drugs may be sold from 

the Farmdale house. Further, Detective Bishop ordered the investigatory stop based on Deputy 

Panin’s experience with drug trafficking, which confirmed that what he had observed in the 

driveway of the Farmdale house was a hand-to-hand transaction.

 

2 Deputy Panin explained that he relayed the “license plate” of the grey sedan to Detective Bishop 

when informing Detective Bishop about the suspected drug transaction. This would have 

connected defendant to the vehicle. Regardless, Detective Bishop’s knowledge of defendant is

imputed to Deputy Panin, such that Detective Bishop’s knowledge is properly considered in the 

Fourth Amendment analysis. See Cook, 277 F3d at 86. Despite the dissent’s contention to the 

contrary, this is an accurate reading of the record as to Detective Bishop’s role in the investigatory 

stop.
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Deputy Panin, also an expert in street-level drug trafficking, based on 16 years of law 

enforcement experience, four years with NET, extensive drug-related trainings, and hundreds of 

drug-crime investigations, described a hand-to-hand transaction between defendant and the 

passenger that he believed to be consistent with drug trafficking. Notably, Deputy Panin explained 

how his previous training and experience led him to the conclusion that the activity he witnessed 

looked like a drug transaction. Indeed, Deputy Panin’s previous training and experience led to his 

judgment that defendant was engaging in criminal activity. Deputy Panin observed a red minivan 

pull into the driveway of the Farmdale house, followed by a grey sedan that pulled in behind it. 

Deputy Panin later discovered that the person in the red minivan owned the Farmdale house. And 

through his training and experience, Deputy Panin knew that hand-to-hand transactions were likely 

transpiring when the owner of the house was also there. Further, Deputy Panin believed the 

encounter between defendant and the passenger to be consistent with drug trafficking because he 

saw the passenger handing money to defendant, defendant counting that money, followed by

defendant pulling out of the driveway and driving off—an encounter that did not last for more than 

a couple of minutes, which was, based on Deputy Panin’s training and experience, a short-term 

trafficking transaction. 

Although Deputy Panin did not actually see the passenger take something in return, the 

surrounding circumstances—an exchange of money for something within a short timeframe in the 

driveway of a house known as a place where people sold drugs, movement of defendant’s car 

immediately after the exchange, and the immediate departure of the passenger (i.e., the buyer)—

coupled with Detective Bishop’s knowledge and experience, support a fair probability that 

defendant was selling contraband from his vehicle.

3 Therefore, there was reasonable suspicion to 

investigate further. In other words, giving deference to Deputy Panin’s and Detective Bishop’s

knowledge and experience, defendant’s conduct gave rise to more than an unparticularized 

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. An apparent exchange in the driveway of a house known 

for drug sales was sufficient for Deputy Panin, in his 16-year experience as a police officer and 

detective with the Oakland County Sheriff’s Office, to relay his observations to Detective Bishop, 

who ultimately ordered the investigatory stop based on Deputy Panin’s experience with drug 

trafficking and what Detective Bishop knew about the Farmdale house. Accordingly, the trial 

court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and dismiss charges, and it is 

reversed.

III. CONCLUSION

 

3 Defendant argues that none of these facts, considered individually, were sufficient to support 

reasonable suspicion. This argument misses the mark. It is elementary that “multiple factors may 

be taken together to create a reasonable suspicion even where each factor, taken alone, would be 

insufficient.” United States v George, 732 F3d 296, 300 (CA 4, 2013). In other words, we consider 

the “totality of the circumstances,” not each individual fact, in assessing whether reasonable 

suspicion existed. See id. at 299-300. Courts “will not find reasonable suspicion lacking based 

merely on a piecemeal refutation of each individual fact and inference.” Id. at 300 (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). 
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Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ Michael J. Kelly