[Cite as KeyBank Natl. Assn. v. Hogan Elec. Co., L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-935.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

KEYBANK NATIONAL :

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 112010

v. :

HOGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY :

LLC, ET AL.,

:

Defendants-Appellants.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 23, 2023 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CV-18-908186

Appearances:

Dafney Dubuisson Stokes Esq., Jordyn N. Kopcow and 

Daniel C. Fleming, pro hac vice, for appellee.

John W. Hogan, pro se. 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:

Defendant-appellant John W. Hogan appeals the trial court’s denial of 

a document styled as a “Motion to dismiss false loan default claim[,] Reverse 

judgement[ and] Order KeyBank to return Lien payments.” For the reasons that 

follow, we dismiss the appeal.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History

On December 10, 2018, KeyBank National Association filed a 

complaint alleging breach of contract against Hogan Electric Company, LLC

(“Hogan Electric”) and alleging breach of personal guarantee against John W. 

Hogan.

Hogan filed an answer on December 26, 2018, on his own behalf and 

purportedly on behalf of Hogan Electric. The trial court struck the answer as to 

Hogan Electric, reasoning that “a non-lawyer corporate officer or agent cannot 

litigate or appear on behalf of a corporation.” Hogan thereafter wrote several letters, 

which are in the record, in which he described having difficulty retaining a lawyer to 

represent the company.

KeyBank filed a motion for default judgment against Hogan Electric 

Company LLC and summary judgment against John W. Hogan as guarantor of 

Hogan Electric Company LLC. On November 26, 2019, the trial court granted 

default judgment to KeyBank against Hogan Electric and granted summary 

judgment to KeyBank against Hogan; it awarded KeyBank $47,973.96 and ordered 

that the defendants were liable for that amount, jointly and severally. Neither 

Hogan Electric nor Hogan appealed that judgment.

Instead, on December 5, 2019, an attorney filed a notice of appearance 

on behalf of Hogan Electric and Hogan “for the limited purpose of attempting to 

negotiate a settlement, filing [a] motion requesting the court postpone the [trial] 

date, and requesting from the court permission to amend Mr. Hogan’s pro se 
filings.” This was the first time Hogan Electric had made any appearance, albeit 

limited, in the case. On January 2, 2020, Hogan Electric and Hogan filed a motion 

requesting “either a settlement conference or hearing for the [c]ourt to determine 

the amount of money owed, if any, to [KeyBank].” The trial court denied the motion 

on January 16, 2020.

Thereafter, KeyBank requested and the trial court ordered a debtor’s 

examination to take place no later than April 2, 2021. Hogan submitted two letters 

to the court in March 2021, in which he described his difficulty in retaining counsel 

to assist him in the litigation.

KeyBank requested a judgment lien and writs of execution between 

July and September 2021. The writs were returned as executed with “no response.” 

Hogan filed another request for a hearing on October 5, 2021.

KeyBank again requested writs of execution in February 2022 and the 

writs were again executed with “no response” in March 2022. Hogan submitted a 

letter to the court in June 2022, again requesting a hearing.

On August 4, 2022, Hogan filed a document styled a “Motion to 

dismiss false loan default claim[,] Reverse judgement[ and] Order KeyBank to 

return Lien payments.” On September 6, 2022, the trial court denied the motion, 

reasoning that “the case has been fully adjudicated * * *.”

Hogan appealed from the denial of that motion. He raises several 

alleged errors in a single assignment of error:
The trial court erred when it decided to strike my answer to the loan 

default claim because I am a non-lawyer and not dismiss the false line 

of credit default claim made by the plaintiff’s attorney. The trial court 

erred when it had the proof that KeyBank had changed the terms of the

2006 line of credit agreement in 2009. This change was prior to filing 

the line of credit default claim in 2018 based on the 2006 line of credit 

agreement. That was a false claim made by KeyBank and the case 

should have been dismissed. The plaintiff’s attorney made another 

false claim to the court. The attorney told the court that the 2009 

change in terms notice was a 2006 line of credit application 

supplemental document. The trial court erred when it did not hold the 

plaintiff’s attorney accountable for making the false claim to the court 

and by awarding a judgment to the bank based on the false claim. The 

trial court erred when the court did not dismiss the false loan default 

claim made by the bank. That would have eliminated the case and the 

need for a lawyer.

II. Law and Analysis

Hogan is attempting to appeal from the trial court’s November 2019 

final order granting a default judgment against Hogan Electric and summary 

judgment against him personally.1 We dismiss the appeal because it is not timely.

The November 2019 order was a final and appealable order; it 

disposed of all the claims between all the parties, leaving nothing to be determined. 

See Udelson v. Udelson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92717, 2009-Ohio-6462, ¶ 14–15. 

Hogan did not appeal from that order. He instead filed several motions over the 

next three years asking the court for hearings and arguing that KeyBank was not 

entitled to the judgment the trial court awarded. He appeals only from the denial of 

his most recent motion, the substance of which is again that the trial court erred in 

1 While we dismiss the appeal as untimely, we also note that Hogan Electric has 

not appealed the default judgment issued against it and has not filed an appearance in

our court.
entering the default judgment and the summary judgment against him and Hogan 

Electric in 2019; he says that KeyBank’s claims should have been dismissed.

Our court only has jurisdiction to consider appeals that are timely 

filed. See App.R. 4 (“[A] party who wishes to appeal from an order that is final upon 

its entry shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30 days of that 

entry.”); see also, e.g., LexisNexis v. Ostrow, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27715, 2017-

Ohio-9393, ¶ 4 (“App.R. 4’s time requirements are ‘mandatory and jurisdictional’ 

* * *.”), quoting Craft v. Ferguson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2002CA00346, 2003-Ohio3173, ¶ 15.

While Hogan’s appeal is timely from the denial of his August 2022 

“Motion to dismiss false loan default claim[,] Reverse judgement[ and] Order 

KeyBank to return Lien payments,” the substance of that motion addressed the 

merits of the November 2019 final judgment. This is an example of “bootstrapping,” 

that is, assigning error “from a final order that was not the subject of a timely notice 

of appeal” in an “otherwise timely appeal.” E.g., Basit v. Chapman, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 103425, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2399, 2–3 (June 23, 2016). Our court 

has consistently refused to address “bootstrapped” assignments of error. Id. 

(collecting cases); see also Chapon v. Std. Contracting & Eng., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 88959, 2007-Ohio-4306, ¶ 3. “Bootstrapping” “‘is procedurally anomalous and 

inconsistent with the appellate rules which contemplate a direct relationship 

between the order from which the appeal is taken and the error assigned as a result 
of that order.” Chapon at ¶ 3, quoting State v. Church, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

68590, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4838 (Nov. 2, 1995).

Hogan had thirty days to appeal after summary judgment was granted

against him. We are mindful that Hogan is not an attorney and he expressed 

difficulty in retaining an attorney to assist him in this litigation. But, pro se or not, 

because Hogan failed to timely appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider his appeal. 

See Chase Home Fin. LLC v. Oliver, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89531, 2008-Ohio-235, 

¶ 8 (“Because Watson failed to timely appeal the trial court’s judgment entry * * * 

we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.”).

III. Conclusion

Because Hogan’s attempt to appeal the trial court’s summary 

judgment is untimely, we dismiss the appeal.

It is ordered that the appellee recover from the appellant the costs herein 

taxed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________ 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR