alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jaime CARDENAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-50029

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 14, 2017

Jean-Claude Andre, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mack Jenkins, Cameron Schroeder, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Caleb Edward Mason, Attorney, Brown, White & Osborn LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jaime Cardenas appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the *642ten-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Cardenas contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to (1) recognize its authority to impose the sentence concurrently to the sentence imposed for his new criminal conviction; (2) consider the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors; and (3) address his arguments and explain the sentence. The district court did not commit any plain error. *See United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). The record reflects that the district court properly treated U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) as advisory rather than mandatory. The record further reflects that the district court considered the appropriate section 3553(a) sentencing factors as well as Cardenas’s arguments for concurrent sentences and sufficiently explained the sentence. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[Ajdequate explanation in some cases may also be inferred from the PSR or the record as a whole.”).

Cardenas further contends that the consecutive sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his difficult upbringing and the positive life changes he made while on supervised release. The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Cardenas’s multiple admitted violations. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); *United States v. Simtob,*485 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS**

 

 

 

 

The Board of Directors Genesis Bioventures, Inc.

 

 

 

We consent to theincorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-35734,333-81130 and 333-74652) on Form S-8 of Genesis Bioventures, Inc. (formerlyBiolabs, Inc.) of our report dated March 22, 2002, with respect to theconsolidated balance sheets of Genesis Bioventures, Inc. as of December 31,2001 and 2000 and the related consolidated statements of operations,stockholders’ equity and cash flows for the years ended December 31, 2001 and2000 and cumulative for the period from September 19, 1994 (inception) toDecember 31, 2001, which report appears in the December 31, 2001 annual reporton Form 10-KSB of Genesis Bioventures, Inc.

 

Our report datedMarch 22, 2002 contains an explanatory paragraph that states that the Companyhas suffered recurring losses from operations and negative cash flows fromoperations that raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as agoing concern.  The consolidatedfinancial statements do not include any adjustments that might result from theoutcome of this uncertainty.

 

 

/s/ KPMG LLP

 

 

 

Chartered AccountantsVancouver, CanadaApril 11, 2002

 

 

 

----
#### MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC, Appellant v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC, Cross-Appellant

2016-1401

2016-1404

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 20, 2017

Mitchell G. Stockwell, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Atlanta, GA, argued for appellant. Also represented by Steven Moore, San Francisco, CA; Daryl *976Joseffer, King *&*Spalding LLP, Washington, DC.

Brenton R. Babcock, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, LLP, Irvine, CA, argued for cross-appellant. Also represented by Edward M. Cannon.

(Newman, Taranto, and Chen, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
# ~ NORTH DAKOTA**~** DEPARTMENT

### of HEALTH

March 8, 2012

Mr. Carl Daly (SP-AR) Chief, Air Programs U.S. EPA, Region 8 1595 Wynkoop Street Denver, CO 80202-1129 Re: Section 128 Commitment DearMr. Daly: ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SECTION Gold Seal Center, 918 E. Divide Ave. Bismarck, N D 58501-1947 701.328.5200 (fax) www.ndhealth.gov 

# FILE

This letter is written to provide a commitment by the North Dakota Department ofHealth to comply with the requirements of Section 128 of the Clean Air Act. The Department will incorporate the following requirements ofthe North Dakota Department ofHealth's Ethics Policy in the State Implementation Plan for the Control ofAir Pollution: 

### Conflicts oflnterest A conflict of interest is definedas the conflict between the duties assignedto the employee andthe self-interest or other interests ofthe employee. Employees must avoid any interest, influence or relationship that might conflict or appear to conflict with the best interests of the Department of Health or the State of North Dakota, or that might affect one's workingjudgment or loyalty. Employees must avoid any situation in which their loyalty may be divided andpromptly disclose to their division director any situation where an actual or potentialconflictmay exist. 

### Ifemployees have a potential conflict ofinterest in any program, contract or legal matter involving the Department of Health or reasonably related to theirposition with the Department of Health, the employ(!..es must notifY ihe division director, section chiefor supervisor in writing ofthe potential conflict and the cause ofthe potential conflict and remove themselves from any negotiations, deliberations or decisions involving the conflict. The SIP revision will be applicable to anyone who approves permits or enforcement actions under North Dakota's Implementation ofthe Federal Clean Air Act. We believe these requirements fulfill the stipulations ofSection 128 oftheFederal Clean AirAct. The SIP revision will be submitted by May 31, 2013. Ifyou have any questions, please contact me.

# ~~~ Terry L. O'Clair, P.E. Director Division ofAir Quality TLO/TB:saj xc: Margaret Olson, Ass't. Attorney General

Environmental Health Section Chief's Office 701.328.5150 Division of Air Quality 701.328.5188 Division of Municipal Facilities

701.328.5211 Printedon recycledpaper. Division of Waste Management 701.328.5166 Division of Water Quality 701.328.5210
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-05-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-05-1996
<CASH>                                           3,168
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   61,551
<ALLOWANCES>                                       487
<INVENTORY>                                     22,012
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                87,467
<PP&E>                                          10,734
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,229
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 105,640
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           60,792
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            64
<OTHER-SE>                                      42,633
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   105,640
<SALES>                                         92,975
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                92,975
<CGS>                                           78,308
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   78,308
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 500
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,407
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,788
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,619
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.40
        

</TABLE>
Order filed September 18, 201 5

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 14

- 00862

- CR

____________ WOODROW MILLER , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 185th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca use No. 876249

- F



### O R D E R

The clerk’s record was filed November 4, 2014 . Our review has determined that a
relevant item has been omitted from the clerk's record. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c). The record
does not co ntain Woodrow Miller's Applicati on for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Harris County District Clerk is directed to file a supplemental clerk’s record on or before September 28, 2015, conta ining Woodrow Miller's Applicati on for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
If the omitted item is not part of the case file, the district cl erk is directed to file a supplemental clerk’s record containing a certified statement that the omitted item is not a part of
the case file.

PER CURIAM
#### Charles F. STANSBURY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Honorable Stephen M. WALDRON; Honorable Yolanda L. Curtain; Lisa Hyle Marts; Honorable Angela M. Eaves; Eric P. MacDonnell, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1033

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: August 9, 2017

Charles F. Stansbury, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Charles F. Stansbury, Jr., appeals the district court’s order denying relief.on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Stansbury’s claim that Defendant Lisa Hyle Marts fabricated evidence because Stansbury failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); *Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly,*550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct, 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); *see also Thomas v. Salvation Army S. Territory,*841 F.3d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating we may “affirm the district court on alternate grounds”). We affirm the dismissal of the remaining claims for the reasons stated by the district court. *Stansbury v. Waldron,*No. 1:16-cv-03888-GLR, 2016 WL 7338430 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
Exhibit 11 - Computation of Earnings Per Share

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
Earnings  Per  Share  (EPS),  presented  below is the  calculation  of basic and
diluted EPS for the Company for the Six months ended June 30, 1999 and 1998.

                                                                   1999                  1998
                                                             -----------------------------------
<S>                                                          <C>                      <C>
Net Income                                                   $9,173,118               $7,912,972
Less:    minority interest                                        3,713                    3,713
                                                             ----------               ----------
Net income available to common shareholders                  $9,169,405               $7,909,259
Weighted average shares outstanding                           9,666,653                9,721,453
Plus: effect of stock options as dilutive securities             79,132                 151,744
                                                             ----------               ----------
Adjusted weighted average shares assuming dilution            9,745,785                9,873,196

EPS - Basic                                                  $     0.95               $      .81
EPS - Diluted                                                $     0.94               $      .80

================================================================================================
</TABLE>

                                       19
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule  contains summary  financial information extracted from SEC
     Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
     statements as of and for the nine months ended September 30, 1998.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000883946           
<NAME>                        TREEV INC
<MULTIPLIER>                               1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           4,291
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,187
<ALLOWANCES>                                    (1,043)
<INVENTORY>                                        827
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                12,806
<PP&E>                                           7,581
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (5,836)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  17,827
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,920
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             3
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,844
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    17,827
<SALES>                                         19,655
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                19,655
<CGS>                                           10,821
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,821
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                16,192
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  58
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (7,416)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (7,416)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (7,416)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.28)
        


</TABLE>
**Officer Certification** Exhibit 31.1
I, L. Dick Buell, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Catalina MarketingCorporation; 2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untruestatement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary tomake the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered bythis quarterly report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this quarterly report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations and cashflows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisquarterly report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand we have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this quarterly report is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, asof the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and c) Disclosed in this quarterly report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s boardof directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
Date: August 16, 2004      By: /s/ L. Dick Buell     Chief Executive Officer and Director  
27
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-22-00050-CV

Robert Joseph Yezak, Appellant

v.

Benitia J. Yezak, Appellee

FROM THE 296TH DISTRICT COURT OF COLLIN COUNTY

NO. 296-52069-2020, THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ROACH, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In January 2022, this Court received appellant Robert Joseph Yezak’s notice of 

appeal purporting to appeal from the trial court’s order “granting nonsuit in cause number 36,677 

in Milam County.” The district clerk from Milam County has provided this Court with a copy of 

an August 2020 order transferring the underlying suit from Milam County to Collin County.

On April 8, 2022, this Court notified appellant that it appeared that this Court 

does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because it arises out of a case from Collin County.

See Tex. Gov. Code § 22.201(d) (listing counties within Third Court of Appeals District), 

(f) (listing counties, including Collin County, within Fifth Court of Appeals District). We 

requested a response from appellant, asking him to explain how we may exercise jurisdiction 

over this appeal. Appellant has filed a response, but he has failed to demonstrate this Court’s

jurisdiction over this appeal. Appellant states that he is appealing “the decision of the Milam 
2

County Court to transfer the case out of Milam County,” but he concedes that the case was 

transferred. Because the underlying suit was pending in Collin County when appellant filed his 

notice of appeal, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

1

 See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

__________________________________________

Melissa Goodwin, Justice

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Triana

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: June 10, 2022

1

 We further observe that to the extent appellant seeks to appeal the Milam County trial 

court’s transfer order as an interlocutory appeal, his notice of appeal would not be timely, 

see Tex. R. App. P. 26(b) (requiring notice of accelerated appeal to be filed within 20 days after 

order is signed), and even if it had been timely filed, the transfer order is not subject to 

interlocutory appeal, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.064(a) (providing that there is no 

interlocutory appeal from trial court’s venue determinations); Tex. R. Civ. P. 87(6) (providing 

that “[t]here shall be no interlocutory appeals from [a determination on a motion to transfer 

venue]”).
#### Luis JARAMILLO, also known as Luis Alberto Jaramillo, also known as Luis Alberto Sifuentiz, also known as Luis Alberto Velasquez, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Ross RENNER, Amarillo Police Department; Johnny Bermea, Amarillo Police Department; Robert Woodard, Amarillo Police Department, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-10359 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 6, 2017

Luis Jaramillo, Pro Se

Bryan Scott McWilliams, Amarillo, TX, for Defendants-Appellees

• Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges,

PER CURIAM: *

Luis Jaramillo, Texas prisoner # 2003081, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He alleged that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by illegally detaining, searching, and arresting him for possession of a controlled substance. He also asserted a claim of malicious prosecution.

First, the district court did not err in finding that his claims of false arrest and illegal search and seizure were time barred. On the date of the search and seizure, that is, May 5, 2008, there was no “extant conviction” but merely an “anticipated future conviction”; consequently, the statute of limitations began to run for those claims on that date. *Wallace v. Kato,*549 U.S. 384, 393, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). As for his claim of false arrest, the limitation period began to run when he was detained pursuant to legal process, that is, no later than August 26, 2008. *See Wallace,*549 U.S. at 388, 397, 127 S.Ct. 1091. His § 1983 complaint, filed no earlier than April 7, 2015; was thus untimely as to his claims of false arrest and illegal search and seizure. *See*Tex. Civ. Prac. *&*Rem. Code § 16.003(a); *see also Pete v. Metcalfe,*8 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1993) (borrowing two-year statute of limitations period from Texas law for § 1983 case).

Jaramillo contends that he is nevertheless entitled to tolling' under’ state law for the period during which he challenged his conviction. We need not decide this question because, even with the benefit of that tolling, his claims would still be untimely. Jaramillo was convicted in March 2009, and the conviction was set aside in August 2013. At least 27 months elapsed before he filed suit: seven months expired from the time he was detained pursuant to legal process until he was convicted, and another 20 months expired after the conviction was set aside but before he filed suit.

Second, the district court did not err in its determination that Jaramillo’s malicious prosecution claim failed as a matter of law. *See Castellano v. Fragozo,*352 F.3d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

*327Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.