* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate recor d, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. Se e Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause is therefore ordered s ubmitted without oral argument. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAY 19 2000 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTOPHER JACKSON, Petitioner - Appellant, vs. DAYTON J. POPPEL, Warden, Defendant - Appellee. No. 00-6016 (D.C. No. 99-CV-1183-L) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , KELLY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges. **
Christopher Jackson, an inmate appearing pro se, se eks to appeal from the denial of his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. T he district court dismissed the petition as time-barred and we affirm. Mr. Jackson was convicted on various drug charges i n Oklahoma state court, and his conviction became final on October 1 0, 1995. Under §- 2 -

2244(d)(1)(A), Mr. Jackson had one year from the date on which his conviction became final to file the instant petition. However , because his conviction became final before the effective date of AEDPA, this one year statute of limitations did not begin to run until April 24, 1996. See United States v. Simmonds , 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th Cir. 1997). The instant petition wa s not filed until August 12, 1999. Although Mr. Jackson filed several state pos t-conviction applications which tolled the one year period, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), these applications were only pending for slightly over a year. Mr. Jackson admits that his petition is untimely but argues that the one year limitation period should be equitably tolled. See Miller v. Marr , 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that § 2244(d) li mitations are not jurisdictional and are subject to equitable tolling). First, he a lleges that the prison law library did not have a copy of the Oklahoma appellate rules describing how to properly file an appeal from the denial of a post-conviction application. The district court refused to toll the limitations period in two insta nces where Mr. Jackson had improperly filed state post-conviction appeals. Se cond, Mr. Jackson alleges that the prison facility in which he was housed was on c ontinued lockdown status from December 1996 to August 12, 1997. During this peri od, he was not allowed access to the law library or any legal materials. Even assuming that these facts are true and warrantequitable tolling, Mr.- 3 -

Jackson’s petition is still untimely. His first st ate post-conviction application was not brought until June 10, 1996 (i.e., 47 days afte r April 24, 1996 when the limitations period began to run). Mr. Jackson has not alleged that any properly or improperly filed state petitions were pending from August 12, 1997 (after the lockdown ended) until January 22, 1998 (i.e., 163 d ays); or from April 9, 1998 until January 5, 1999 (i.e., 271 days). These thre e periods total some 481 days, far in excess of the one year limitation period. T herefore, the district court’s dismissal of this petition as time-barred was prope r. We DENY the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, DENY a certificate of appealability and DISMISS the appeal.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge