United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 18, 2010

Decided November 29, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

No. 10-2601

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States 

Plaintiff-Appellee, District Court for the Central 

District of Illinois.

v.

No. 1:00-cr-10089–MMM-JAG

CHARLES WOODS,

Defendant-Appellant. Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

O R D E R

Charles Woods was convicted on two counts of distribution of five or more grams of

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Based on the amount of cocaine base

attributable to Mr. Woods, and adjusted for Mr. Woods’s role in the offense, the district court

concluded that Mr. Woods’s offense level was 38. The district court also determined that Mr.

Woods was a career offender; under the career offender guidelines, Mr. Woods’s offense level

was 37. Because the offense level for the drug quantity guideline was greater, the court

employed an offense level of 38, which yielded a corresponding sentencing range of 360

months to life. The district court sentenced Mr. Woods to 360 months’ imprisonment on each

count. On appeal, this court affirmed Mr. Woods’s conviction.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 10-2601 Page 2

On May 23, 2008, relying on the amendment reducing the offense levels for crack

cocaine offenses, Mr. Woods filed an initial motion for a sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3852(c). The district court denied the motion on the ground that the amendment did not

have the effect of lowering Mr. Woods’s applicable guideline range because application of the

career offender guideline yielded the same sentencing range. 

On May 6, 2010, Mr. Woods filed a second motion under § 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c) in which

he sought reduction of his sentence based on this court’s decision in United States v. Corner, 598

F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010). Mr. Woods argued that Corner permitted the district court to disagree

with the Sentencing Guidelines policy statements that had precluded the district court from

reducing Mr. Woods’s sentence during the initial proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). The

district court held that Corner did not apply retroactively and therefore did not provide a basis

for granting Mr. Woods relief.

On appeal, Mr. Woods renews his argument that our decision in Corner provides a basis

for granting relief under § 3582(c). We disagree. Based on the language of § 3582(c)(2) and the

Supreme Court’s interpretation of that statutory language in United States v. Dillon, 130 S. Ct.

2683 (2010), we believe that the district court properly denied Mr. Woods’s motion.

Mr. Woods seeks a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, which

provides in relevant part:

[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of

imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been

lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o),

upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,

or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment,

after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that

they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has made clear that the intent of

§ 3582(c)(2) is “to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not

a plenary resentencing proceeding.” Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691. Additionally, the Court has

established a procedure for evaluating motions brought pursuant to this section: “A court

must first determine that a reduction is consistent with § 1B1.10 before it may consider

whether the authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part, according to the

factors set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. 

Turning to § 1B1.10, Application Note 1(A) states:

Eligibility for consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is triggered only
No. 10-2601 Page 3

by an amendment listed in subsection (c) that lowers the applicable

guideline range. Accordingly a reduction in the defendant’s term of

imprisonment is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and is not

consistent with this policy statement if: . . . .(ii) an amendment listed in

subsection (c) is applicable to the defendant but the amendment does not

have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range because

of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision . . . . 

U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual § 1B1.10, cmt n.1(A) (2010) (emphasis added).

Here, there is no question that, after Mr. Woods’s sentencing, the Sentencing

Commission lowered the sentencing range for crack cocaine convictions. However, it also is

the case that, if Mr. Woods had not been sentenced based on the amount of crack cocaine

attributable to him, he would have been sentenced under the career offender guideline. If the

district court had employed the career offender guideline instead of the crack cocaine

guideline, the same sentencing range would have resulted. According to application note

1(A)(ii), it would be inconsistent with the policy statement for the court to entertain Mr.

Woods’s motion to reduce his sentence because the amendment does not have the effect of

lowering Mr. Woods’s guideline range. Thus, although Corner now allows a district court to

disagree with the policy inherent in the career offender guideline and to sentence a defendant

below that guideline range, the statute under which Mr. Woods seeks relief still requires that

reductions be granted only when consistent with policy statements. Here, the policy statement

allows for a modification under § 3582(c)(2) only when the presumptive guideline range is

affected. That has not occurred here.

AFFIRMED