United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-2798

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Alice Frisby; Laquestia Frisby, *

 *

Appellees, * 

 *

v. *

 *

Jim Crow, Individually and in his *

official capacity as the Sheriff of Ashley * Appeal from the United States

County, Arkansas; Greg Sanson, * District Court for the

Individually and in his Official Capacity * Western District of Arkansas.

as a Deputy Sheriff of Ashley County, *

Arkansas, and; Randy Padgett, * [UNPUBLISHED]

Individually and in his Official Capacity *

as a Deputy Sheriff of Ashley County, *

Arkansas, *

 *

Appellants. *

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 Submitted: July 21, 1997

 Filed: July 29, 1997

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Before McMILLIAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.
 The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge for the Western

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District of Arkansas.

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Defendants appeal the district court's denial of qualified immunity in plaintiffs' 1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We affirm.

Alice Frisby and her daughter, Laquestia Frisby, filed this action against Jim

Crow, the Sheriff of Ashley County, Arkansas, and Deputy Sheriffs Greg Sanson and

Randy Padgett, in their official and individual capacities. During a search of the

Frisbys' residences, defendants Sanson and Padgett seized a small amount of marijuana

and drug paraphernalia from Laquestia's residence, prescription drugs belonging to

another family member from Alice's residence, and cash from both residences. Both

women were arrested and held for five hours; Alice was charged with intent to deliver

and unlawful possession of a narcotic drug, but the charges were later dropped. The

Frisbys have not challenged the constitutionality of the searches or their arrests. The

Frisbys alleged, however, that defendants tampered with the money they seized by

contaminating it with drug residue in an effort to confiscate their property and assure

their conviction on drug charges. The money has not been returned. The Frisbys

claimed that defendants' conduct violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by

depriving them of their liberty, privacy, and property interests without due process.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they had not violated the

Frisbys' constitutional rights, because the money was seized after the officers

discovered drugs pursuant to valid search warrants, and the Frisbys had not been

injured by the evidence tampering, as the charges against them were dropped.

Defendants also argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court

denied summary judgment.

In an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on

qualified immunity, we have jurisdiction to review, de novo, the abstract issues of law
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relating to the existence of qualified immunity. See Sisneros v. Nix, 95 F.3d 749, 753

(8th Cir. 1996) (denial of qualified immunity reviewed de novo); Eagle v. Morgan, 88

F.3d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1996) (whether facts constitute constitutional violation is

abstract issue of law over which this court has jurisdiction). Looking at the conduct

that the district court deemed adequately supported for purposes of summary judgment,

see Allison v. Department of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 1996), we must

determine whether plaintiffs asserted a violation of a federal right, whether that right

was clearly established, and whether a reasonable official in defendants' position would

have known that his conduct violated that right, see Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d

1021, 1028 (8th Cir. 1996).

If, as the Frisbys alleged, the evidence tampering resulted in the deprivation of

the Frisbys' property, the officers' conduct could amount to a violation of the Frisbys'

clearly established due process rights. Cf. Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951, 954 (8th

Cir. 1996) (inmates entitled to due process for deprivation of money received from

outside sources). Defendants did not show otherwise. Although it appears that

adequate state post-deprivation remedies would satisfy due process, see Parratt v.

Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-44 (1981) (post-deprivation remedies adequate when loss

is result of random, unauthorized act by state employee); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 533 (1984) (Parratt applies to intentional deprivations), defendants have not

demonstrated the existence of such a remedy. Thus, the denial of summary judgment

based on qualified immunity was appropriate.

We may not address in this interlocutory appeal appellants' arguments that Crow

was not liable in his individual or official capacity, or that the Frisbys' pendent state tort

claims should fail. See Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 78 F.3d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir.)

(denial of summary judgment on claim against city for failure to train not appealable on

officers' appeal of denial of qualified immunity), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 178 (1996);

Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 103 F.3d 637, 649-50 (8th Cir. 1996) (in appeal

from denial of qualified immunity, no jurisdiction to address issues not immediately 
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appealable unless inextricably intertwined with qualified immunity determination).

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.