NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0541n.06 

 No. 16-4334 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

FATIN GAPPY, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney 

General, 

 Respondent. 

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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW 

FROM THE UNITED STATES 

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION 

APPEALS 

 BEFORE: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges. 

 PER CURIAM. Fatin Gappy petitions this court for review of an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from the denial of her motion to reopen 

removal proceedings. As set forth below, we deny Gappy’s petition for review. 

 Gappy is a native and citizen of Iraq. In June 1994, after the Gulf War ended, Gappy left 

Iraq and relocated to Jordan to find a better job. Relatives introduced Gappy to United States 

citizen Mike Anton, who traveled to Jordan to meet her. They decided to marry, and Anton 

returned to the United States and filed a petition for a fiancée visa on Gappy’s behalf. After the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) approved the petition, Gappy entered the United 

States as a non-immigrant fiancée in December 1996. Gappy and Anton married in a civil 

ceremony in March 1997. Gappy applied to adjust her status, and the INS granted her 

conditional permanent resident status based on her marriage to Anton. In March 1998, after one 

year of marriage, Gappy and Anton were divorced. 
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Gappy v. Sessions 

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 Gappy subsequently petitioned for removal of the conditions on her residence and 

requested a waiver from the joint-filing requirement on the basis that she had entered into the 

marriage in good faith, but the marriage was terminated. Finding that she had failed to establish 

that she married Anton in good faith, the INS denied Gappy’s petition, declined to waive the 

joint-filing requirement, and terminated her permanent-resident status. 

 In June 2001, the INS served Gappy with a notice to appear in removal proceedings, 

charging her with removability: (1) for termination of her conditional permanent-resident status, 

see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i); (2) for marriage fraud in that the marriage through which she 

obtained her admission was entered into less than two years prior to her admission and was 

terminated within two years after her admission, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)(i); and (3) for 

marriage fraud in that she failed or refused to fulfill her marital agreement which, in the opinion 

of the Attorney General, was made for the purpose of procuring her admission, see 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(1)(G)(ii). Gappy denied these charges before an immigration judge (IJ). To avoid 

removal, Gappy sought review of the INS’s denial of a good-faith waiver and filed an application 

for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that 

she would be treated poorly in Iraq because she is a Chaldean Catholic. After a hearing, the IJ 

denied Gappy’s request for a good-faith waiver and found her removable as charged. Pointing 

out that Gappy and Anton never shared a residence, never consummated the marriage, and had 

no shared assets or liabilities, the IJ determined that Gappy had failed to rebut the statutory 

presumption that a marriage terminated within two years after admission is fraudulent and found 

that she had entered into the marriage for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. The 

IJ granted Gappy’s application for withholding of removal based on current country conditions 

establishing a pattern and practice of persecution of Iraqi Christians. 
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 Eighteen months later, in July 2008, Gappy filed a motion to reopen her removal 

proceedings to apply for asylum pursuant to the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act. Gappy asserted that 

she was eligible for asylum based on changed country conditions, citing attacks by Islamic 

extremists against Christians in Iraq and the Iraqi government’s inability to protect the Christian 

minority. The IJ initially granted Gappy’s motion to reopen but, after a hearing, reconsidered 

and denied the motion. The IJ determined that the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act did not apply to 

Gappy because she had not been denied relief based on a finding of changed country conditions 

in Iraq following the ouster of Saddam Hussein. The IJ further found that Gappy had not 

presented any evidence establishing sufficient equities to overcome the serious adverse 

consequences of her immigration violations. On appeal, the BIA upheld the denial of Gappy’s 

motion to reopen on the basis that she had failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum. 

 In October 2014, over four years after the BIA’s order dismissing her appeal, Gappy filed 

another motion to reopen her removal proceedings to apply for asylum, asserting that the 

conditions for Chaldean Christians in Iraq had significantly worsened since 2007 when she was 

granted withholding of removal. The IJ denied Gappy’s motion to reopen. The IJ determined 

that the persecution of Chaldean Christians was a continuation of ongoing violence in Iraq rather 

than a material change in country conditions. In the alternative, the IJ found that Gappy had 

failed to establish that she merited asylum in the exercise of discretion, stating that her marriage 

fraud was an adverse factor that outweighed the positive factors presented by her. Gappy 

appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. Dismissing the appeal, the BIA upheld the IJ’s alternative 

denial on discretionary grounds. Upon consideration of the positive equities acquired by Gappy, 

the BIA agreed with the IJ that those equities were insufficient to overcome the seriousness of 

Gappy’s sham marriage and false application for adjustment of status. The BIA further observed 
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that there was no current risk of persecution, given that Gappy had been granted withholding of 

removal. 

 This timely petition for review followed. “Where, as here, the BIA issues its own 

decision rather than summarily affirming the IJ, the BIA decision is reviewed as the final agency 

decision, but the IJ’s decision is also reviewed to the extent that the BIA adopted it.” Harmon v. 

Holder, 758 F.3d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 2014). We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an 

abuse of discretion. Bi Feng Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2009). We “will find an 

abuse of discretion if the denial of the motion to reopen ‘was made without a rational 

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis 

such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.’” Id. at 490 (quoting 

Allabani v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2005)). 

 In a case “in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary,” the agency may deny a 

motion to reopen if “the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief.” INS v. 

Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988). The discretionary relief of asylum “involves a two-step 

inquiry: (1) whether the applicant qualifies as a ‘refugee’ as defined in 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(42)(A), and (2) whether the applicant ‘merits a favorable exercise of discretion by the 

Attorney General.’” Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Perkovic v. 

INS, 33 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 1994)). “[T]he applicant ‘has the burden of establishing that the 

favorable exercise of discretion is warranted.’” Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 

2007) (quoting Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 474 (BIA 1987)). In determining whether a 

favorable exercise of discretion is warranted, the agency considers the totality of the 

circumstances. Id. If the applicant engaged in fraud in seeking admission or status, “the 

seriousness of the fraud should be considered.” Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 474. 
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 The BIA did not abuse its discretion in upholding the denial of Gappy’s motion to reopen 

on the basis that she had failed to satisfy her burden of establishing that she warranted asylum in 

the exercise of discretion. In making this determination, the BIA considered all of the equities, 

including Gappy’s long residence in the United States, her ties to her lawful-permanent-resident 

mother and United States citizen siblings, her employment and tax payment history, her 

volunteer work, and her role as the primary caregiver for her aging mother. The BIA went on to 

agree with the IJ that Gappy’s equities were “insufficient to overcome the seriousness of her 

sham marriage and her false application for adjustment of status to remain in the United States.” 

See Htun v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[O]ther circuits to address this issue 

have considered marriage fraud a significant negative factor that supported discretionary denial 

of asylum.”). Because the BIA considered the totality of the circumstances and provided a 

rational explanation for its decision, we can discern no abuse of discretion. 

 Gappy argues that the BIA abused its discretion in failing to take administrative notice of 

the U.S. Department of State Iraq Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996. Gappy contends 

that this report puts into context her motivation to engage in marriage fraud to evade persecution 

on account of her Christian religion and that the BIA failed to consider whether the seriousness 

of her fraud was mitigated by country conditions at that time. But Gappy was not living in Iraq 

in 1996. Gappy testified that she left Iraq in 1994 because of the general conditions after the 

First Gulf War and that she had no problems practicing her religion in Iraq. The record does not 

support her claim that she entered into the sham marriage to evade persecution in Iraq. 

Furthermore, Gappy is precluded from relitigating the IJ’s final determinations that she did not 

suffer past persecution in Iraq and that she engaged in marriage fraud. See United States v. Utah 

Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966). 
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 Gappy also asserts that other circuits have found an abuse of discretion and remanded 

cases in which the applicant was granted withholding of removal but denied asylum in the 

exercise of discretion. See Shantu v. Lynch, 654 F. App’x 608 (4th Cir. 2016); Zuh v. Mukasey, 

547 F.3d 504 (4th Cir. 2008); Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2006); Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 

F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2004); Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999). In those cases, the 

applicant initially sought both asylum and withholding of removal and received only 

withholding. Here, Gappy applied for withholding of removal only (an asylum application being 

untimely), received withholding, and later moved to reopen her removal proceedings to apply for 

asylum. This procedural posture distinguishes Gappy’s case. See Patpanathan v. Att’y Gen. of 

the U.S., 553 F. App’x 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Unlike in Huang, Kalubi, and Zuh, where the 

IJs were considering withholding and asylum applications together, Patpanathan had already 

received withholding when he moved to reopen his immigration proceedings, and the IJ and BIA 

were aware of that. This matters because it speaks to how the IJ and BIA should have 

considered the danger of persecution as a positive factor that could outweigh the negative factors 

weighing against Patpanathan’s asylum application.” (footnote omitted)). The BIA did not abuse 

its discretion in considering that Gappy faced no current risk of persecution, given that she had 

been granted withholding of removal. 

 For these reasons, we DENY Gappy’s petition for review.