alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ALASKA SEAFOOD CBI REPL AC EME NT PAG E

EPA- HQ

- OW -2013- 0652

DCN: 00447 CBI

THE FO LL OW ING H AS BEEN REMOVED BE CAUSE IT

CONT AINS CONF ID ENT IAL B USIN E SS IN FO RMA TIO N

(CB I) PER 40 CFR P ART 2, SU BP ART B

.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1420 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1420

To amend title 37, United States Code, to authorize the basic allowance 
    for housing for members of the uniformed services in the Virgin 
                                Islands.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 26, 2021

 Ms. Plaskett introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 37, United States Code, to authorize the basic allowance 
    for housing for members of the uniformed services in the Virgin 
                                Islands.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. APPLICATION OF BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING TO MEMBERS OF THE 
              UNIFORMED SERVICES IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS.

    (a) In General.--Section 403(b) of title 37, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) in the heading, by inserting ``and the Virgin Islands'' 
        after ``the United States'';
            (2) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``and the Virgin 
        Islands'' after ``the United States''; and
            (3) in paragraphs (2), (3)(A), and (6), by inserting ``or 
        the Virgin Islands'' after ``the United States'' each place it 
        appears.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 403(c) of title 37, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) in the heading, by inserting ``or the Virgin Islands'' 
        after ``the United States''; and
            (2) in paragraphs (1), (2), (3)(A)(i), and (3)(B), by 
        inserting ``or the Virgin Islands'' after ``the United States'' 
        each place it appears.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to 
payments under section 403 of title 37, United States Code, beginning 
on January 1, 2022.
                                 <all>
```
#### Roosevelt REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eleanor VERNELL; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35497

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 17, 2017

Roosevelt Reed, Pro Se

Haley Beach, Assistant Attorney General, State Attorney General’s Office—Corrections Division, Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Washington state prisoner Roosevelt Reed appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations by prison officials. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Reed’s procedural due process claim concerning deductions from *234his prison postage subaccount because Reed failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he lacked an adequate post-deprivation remedy under Washington law. *See Hudson v. Palmer,*468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (“[A] ... deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”); *Wright v. Riveland,*219 F.3d 905, 918 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Washington State Department of Corrections’ grievance process and Washington State’s tort claim process are adequate post-deprivation remedies for allegedly improper deductions from a prisoner’s account).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Reed’s substantive due process claim because Reed failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ conduct was egregious or shocks the conscience. *County of Sacramento v. Lewis,*523 U.S. 833, 845-49, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (substantive due process challenge must establish “egregious official conduct” that “shocks the conscience”).

Defendants’ request, set forth in the answering brief, that this court determine that the appeal is frivolous and constitutes a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), (g), is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth-Circuit Rule 36-3.
Mark PORTER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-5003

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 16, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Granted.
i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 16 3- CV MANN DEVELOPMENT, LTD. ,

Appellant
v . CI TY OF SAN AN TON IO , Appellee Fr om the 73rd Judi cial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2005-CI -05367 Honora ble Ba rbar a Ha nson Nellermoe , J udg e Presiding PER C URI AM Sitt ing: Alma L . L ópez, Chief J ustice

Catherine Stone, Justi ce Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Aug ust 13, 2008 DI SMI SSED Appellant has f

iled a motion t o d i smiss t his appea l. The motion contains a ce rtificate of service to appellee , and the a ppellee ha s not opposed the motion. There fore , we g rant the motion
a n d d is mi s s th e appea l. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 42 .1 (a )( 1) . Co sts of the a pp e a l a re ta xed

a g a ins t
a pp e lla nt. PER C URI AM
MAST CAPITAL, INC., Appellant, v. WHITEHALL REALTY ADVISORS, LLC, Appellee.

No. 3D17-1394

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 2, 2018.

Hall, Lamb Hall & Leto, P.A. and Matthew P. Leto, Miami, for appellant.

Pathman Lewis, LLP and Peter L. Meltzer and John A. Moore, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Before SALTER, EMAS and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *Rotemi Realty, Inc. v. Act Realty Co., Inc.*, 911 So.2d 1181, 1189 (Fla. 2005) ("[T]o earn a commission a broker must perform two essential tasks: First, the broker must 'initiate[ ] negotiations by doing some affirmative act to bring buyer and seller together.' Second, the broker must remain 'involved in the continuing negotiations between the seller and the buyer,' unless 'the seller and buyer intentionally exclude the broker from the negotiations.' " (citation omitted) ); *Burchfield v. Realty Execs.*, 971 So.2d 138, 140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ("In summary, we hold that section 475.278, Florida Statutes, replaces the common law fiduciary duty owed by a transaction broker to its clients with a more narrowly-defined set of statutory duties.").
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Oct-3-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 Sep-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   Jun-27-1998
<CASH>                                         25,271
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  189,347
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    180,946
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               414,678
<PP&E>                                         500,383
<DEPRECIATION>                                 88,374
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,039,583
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          166,017
<BONDS>                                        686,740
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       122
<OTHER-SE>                                     114,794
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,039,583
<SALES>                                        640,089
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               640,089
<CGS>                                          558,915
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  558,915
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             35,940
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                14,837
<INCOME-TAX>                                   6,130
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            8,707
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                524
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   8,183
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .70
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .67
        


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,934,577
<ALLOWANCES>                                   540,599
<INVENTORY>                                     60,109
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,738,431
<PP&E>                                      14,208,382
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,289,090
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              14,248,091
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       10,610,513
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     77,500
<COMMON>                                        92,329
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,478,652
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                14,248,091
<SALES>                                      4,726,168
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,726,168
<CGS>                                        3,354,343
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,354,343
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,249,044
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    50
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             228,921
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (106,190)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (106,190)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (106,190)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.01)
        

</TABLE>
#### IN RE: William P. CHENG; Janet Cheng, Debtors. William P. Cheng; Janet Cheng, Appellants, v. Arthur Osterback; et al., Appellees.

No. 16-15759

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

FILED OCTOBER 5, 2017

*384William P. Cheng, Sacramento, CA, pro se.

Janet Cheng, Sacramento, CA, pro se.

Peter Nixon Brewer, Esquire, Henry Chuang, Esquire, Law Office of Peter N. Brewer, Palo Alto, CA, for Appellees.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Chapter 7 debtors William P. Cheng and Janet Cheng appeal pro se from the district court’s order dismissing the Chengs’ bankruptcy appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. We affirm.

In their opening brief, the Chengs fail to address how the district court erred by dismissing their appeal for failure to comply with the court’s order and as moot. As a result, the Chengs have waived their challenge to the district court’s order. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim .... ”).

Because we affirm the district court’s order dismissing the Chengs’ bankruptcy appeal, we do not consider their arguments challenging the bankruptcy court’s orders.

AFFIRMED,

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6184 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6184

 To conduct or support further comprehensive research for the creation 
           of a universal influenza vaccine or preventative.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 2, 2023

 Ms. DeLauro introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To conduct or support further comprehensive research for the creation 
           of a universal influenza vaccine or preventative.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Flu Vaccine Act''.

SEC. 2. RESEARCH FOR THE CREATION OF A UNIVERSAL INFLUENZA VACCINE OR 
              PREVENTATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The Director of the National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases shall conduct or support comprehensive research 
for the creation of a universal influenza vaccine or preventative.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--To carry out this section, 
there are authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2024 through 2029.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Lee BATES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6126

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 26, 2017

Richard Lee Bates, Appellant Pro Se. Ronald Andrew Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia; Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Richard Lee Bates seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untime*108ly his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Bates has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Marko CAPERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-2397

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### Christopher Earl PEEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUNTRUST BANK MORTGAGE, INC., In subsidiaries, affiliates, and Assigns, BWW Law Group, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1330

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 24, 2017

Christopher Earl Peek, Appellant Pro Se. Maurice Francis Mullins, Jr., Elizabeth Scott Turner, SPOTTS FAIN, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*232PER CURIAM:

Christopher Earl Peek appeals the district court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss and denying as moot Peek’s motion to consolidate or remove the foreclosure action from D.C. superior court. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Peek v. SunTrust Bank Mortg., Inc.,*No. 1:16-cv-01415-LMB-IDD (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT
 PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, the undersigned, David Scoglio, Chief Financial Officer, of Asure Software, Inc. (the “Company”), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 1.           The quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended September 30, 2010 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended, and
 
 2.           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date November 9, 2010
By:
/s/ DAVID SCOGLIODavid ScoglioChief Financial Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Asure Software, Inc. and will be retained by Asure Software, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.  The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
Exhibit 99.1


                           LOGIO, INC.

                 CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT
    Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
                      18 U.S.C. Section 1350

     I, Kenneth W. Bell, Principal Executive and Financial Officer of Logio,
Inc. certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  the annual report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the year ended
     December 31, 2002, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
     or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  the information contained in the Form 10-KSB fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
     the Company.



Date:    April 14, 2003
                             /s/ Kenneth W. Bell
                            ____________________________________
                            Kenneth W. Bell
                            Principal Executive and Financial Officer
STATE EX REL. Andrew D. WETZEL v. STATE of Louisiana

NO. 2017-KH-1298

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 18, 2018

Denied.
================================================================================


Exhibit 32: Certifications Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934



                                CERTIFICATION OF
                           CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
                             CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the  accompanying  annual report on Form 10-KSB of Rocketinfo
Inc. for the year ended  December  31,  2006,  I certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, to my knowledge, that:

1.       the  Annual  Report  on Form  10-KSB of  Rocketinfo  Inc.  for the year
         ended  December  31,  2006  fully  complies  with the requirements of
         Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       the  information contained in the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the
         year ended December 31, 2006, fairly  presents  in all  material
         respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of
         Rocketinfo Inc.

                /s/ Bill Ganz
By:             -----------------------
Name:           Bill Ganz
Title:          President
Date:           March 28, 2007

                /s/ Carol Laws
By:             -----------------------
Name:           Carol Laws
Title:          Chief Financial Officer
Date:           March 28, 2007
#### SANJIV GOEL, M.D., INC., a California corporaiton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY PENSION AND HEALTH PLAN, a California corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-56345

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 7, 2017 * Pasadena, California

Filed March 14, 2017

Brian Donald Boydston, Esquire, Pick & Boydston, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Jean Pierre Nogues, Jr., Esquire, Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: PAEZ, BERZON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*643MEMORANDUM **

Sanjiv Goel appeals the district court’s ruling that the Motion Picture Industry Pension and Health Plan did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the subject services he provided were not eligible for reimbursement as emergency room services.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The Plan gives its directors discretion to decide eligibility for, and the extent of, benefits provided by the Plan. For billing purposes, the Plan distinguishes between “Emergency Room Services” and other services. The Plan reimburses for non-emergency room services at a different rate than emergency room services.

Here, the disputed services were not provided in the emergency room but in a separate location in the hospital, and were provided after the patient was admitted to the hospital via the cardiac catheterization lab. It was not an abuse of discretion for the plan administrators to conclude that the disputed services were not entitled to reimbursement at the emergency room services rate. *See Gatti v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,*415 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. The parties are familiar with the facts so we do not repeat them here.