alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Angel LABRA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41520 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 20, 2017

Traci Lynne Kenner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Tyler, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Angel Labra, Pro Se

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Angel Labra has moved for leave to withdraw and has. filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Labra has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assess'ment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw *148is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cíe. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JAMES BATTLE,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 418 WAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
Exhibit
10.1


 


AMENDMENT
TO CONVERTIBLE LOAN AGREEMENTS


 


This
Amendment to Convertible Loan Agreements (this “Amendment”) dated this 4th day of March, 2019,
by and among Wize Pharma Ltd. Private Company 520033259 (the “Company”), Wize Pharma, Inc., Rimon Gold Assets
Ltd., Private Company, 514819424 (“Rimon Gold’’), Ridge Valley Corporation (“Ridge Valley”),
and Shimshon Fisher (“Fisher”).


 


W
I T N E S S E T H:


 


WHEREAS,
the Company is party to a convertible loan agreement with Rimon Gold, dated March 20, 2016 (as amended, the “First Convertible
Loan Agreement”), as amended by (i) the addendum dated March 30, 2016, between the Company and Rimon Gold, (ii) the
second convertible loan agreement (as amended, the “Second Convertible Loan Agreement”) , dated January 12,
2017, among the Company, Rimon Gold, and Ridge Valley, (iii) an amendment to the First Convertible Loan Agreement, dated December
21, 2017, and (iv) an amendment to convertible loan agreements, dated October 19, 2018;


 


WHEREAS,
pursuant to an assignment and assumption, Fisher is party to the Second Convertible Loan Agreement;


 


WHEREAS,
the parties desire to amend the First Convertible Loan Agreement and the Second Convertible Loan Agreement as more particularly
set forth below;


 


WHEREFORE,
the parties do hereby agree as follows:


 


1.
This Amendment will be effective immediately.


 


2.
The maturity date (the “Maturity Date”) of the loans under each of the First Convertible Loan Agreement and
the Second Convertible Loan Agreement is hereby amended and extended to be May 31, 2019.


 


3.
The expiration date of the investment right under the First Convertible Loan Agreement and the investment option under the Second
Convertible Loan Agreement is hereby amended and extended to be 180 days after the Maturity Date (for the sake of clarity, as
amended hereby, i.e., to expire on November 30, 2019).


 


4.
Except as modified herein, the terms of the First Convertible Loan Agreement and the Second Convertible Loan Agreement shall remain
in full force and effect.


 


5.
This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which when so executed shall be deemed to be an original
and shall be binding upon all parties, their successors and assigns, and all of which taken together shall constitute one and
the same Amendment. A signature delivered by facsimile shall constitute an original.


 


[Signature
Page Follows]


 






     


     


    

 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the date first written above.





 


	WIZE PHARMALTD. PRIVATE COMPANY
    520033259	 	WIZE PHARMA, INC.
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:	/s/ Or Eisenberg	 	By:	/s/ Or Eisenberg
	Name:  	Or Eisenberg	 	Name:  	Or Eisenberg
	Title:	CFO & Acting CEO	 	Title:	CFO & Acting CEO






 


	RIMON GOLD ASSETS LTD.	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:	/s/ Abir Raveh	 	 	 
	Name:  	Abir Raveh	 	 	 
	Title:	 	 	 	 



 


	RIDGE VALLEY CORPORATION	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:	/s/ PRISCILLA JULIE	28/2/2019	 	 
	Name:  	PRISCILLA JULIE	 	 	 
	Title:	DIRECTOR	 	 	 






 


	/s/ Shimshon
    Fisher	 	 	 
	Shimshon Fisher
Kamal WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-2168

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 16, 2018

Kamal Williams, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and LUCK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
BAYER RETAIL CO. v. EASTWYNN THEATERS, INC., and Carmike Cinemas, Inc.

1130681

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 10, 2017

Reh. denied.
Tylo M. MULLINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2409

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed December 6, 2017.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and MORRIS and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
Eduardo HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D12-5952

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 28, 2018

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Charles R. McCoy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

ON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

Per Curiam.

*1026This court previously affirmed Eduardo Hernandez's convictions and sentences for use of a computer online service to solicit a person believed to be a child to engage in unlawful sexual conduct in violation of section 847.0135(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), and for thereafter traveling for the purpose of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct with a person believed to be a child in violation of section 847.0135(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). *See* *Hernandez v. State* , 135 So.3d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). After issuance of that opinion, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy principles prohibit separate convictions for solicitation and traveling based on the same conduct. *State v. Shelley* , 176 So.3d 914, 919 (Fla. 2015).

In light of *Shelley* , the Florida Supreme Court quashed our opinion in *Hernandez* . *See* *Hernandez v. State* , No. SC14-2008, 2016 WL 3185141 (Fla. June 8, 2016). Therefore, in accordance with the mandate from the supreme court, this cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate Hernandez's conviction and sentence for the lesser-included offense of solicitation as prohibited by section 847.0135(3)(a).

REMANDED with instructions.

Lewis, Osterhaus, and Jay, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          42,479
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,651,061
<ALLOWANCES>                                   308,389
<INVENTORY>                                     97,002
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,326,191
<PP&E>                                      14,205,997
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,997,800
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,976,511
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        8,463,717
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     77,500
<COMMON>                                        92,329
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,442,095
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,976,511
<SALES>                                      8,626,537
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             8,626,537
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,774,072
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,143,087
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             445,073
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                264,305
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   264,305
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .02


</TABLE>
Richard BRACCIA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D16-3804

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 3, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Madison Duane MCRAE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7662

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 27, 2017

Madison Duane McRae, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Madison Duane McRae seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the *242denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that McRae has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A22D0304. TIMOTHY LITTLEJOHN v. JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS

COMMISSION et al.

On February 2, 2022, TimothyLittlejohn filed this application for discretionary

review of the trial court’s December 23, 2021 order denying his filing of a civil suit.

1

We lack jurisdiction because the application is untimely.

To be timely, an application for discretionary review must be filed within 30

days of entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). As

Littlejohn filed this application 41 days after entry of the order at issue, the

application is untimely and is hereby DISMISSED. See Crosson v. Conway, 291 Ga.

220, 220 (1) (728 SE2d 617) (2012); see also Boyle v. State, 190 Ga. App. 734, 734

(380 SE2d 57) (1989) (“The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional and

this [C]ourt cannot accept an appeal not made in compliance therewith.”).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

1 Littlejohn filed his application in the Georgia Supreme Court, which

transferred it here.

April 01, 2022

04/01/2022
Raymond Donovan WILLIAMS v. STATE

2160577

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 19, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6289 

To provide that Executive Order 14027 shall have no force or effect. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 8, 2023 

Mr. BRECHEEN (for himself, Mr. GROTHMAN, and Mr. BURLISON) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To provide that Executive Order 14027 shall have no force 

or effect. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Climate Hysteria 

5 in Diplomacy Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXECUTIVE ORDER 14027. 

7 Executive Order 14027 (86 Fed. Reg. 25947; relat8 ing to establishment of the climate change support office) 

9 shall have no force or effect. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
Joel THEODORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-2180

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 25, 2018]

Joel Theodore, Perry, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

Joel Theodore appeals an order summarily denying his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion.

After receiving a notice from the state that DNA evidence in his case may have relied on improper statistical calculations, Theodore moved to withdraw his plea. He alleged in part that he would not have entered the plea and would have proceeded to trial if he had known that the DNA evidence was inaccurate.

The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Theodore failed to show prejudice and his claim was conclusively refuted by a DNA inquiry form signed by Theodore and the attorneys at the time of the plea. On the form, the defense attorney and the prosecutor confirmed that they were unaware of any physical evidence *789for which DNA testing could exonerate Theodore. This statement does not mean that there was no DNA evidence in his case. The form does not refute his claim that the state's DNA evidence was inaccurate and that the faulty DNA statistical calculations induced his plea.

Despite some equivocal language, Theodore's rule 3.850 motion states a facially sufficient claim that is not conclusively refuted by the attached DNA inquiry form. Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of the motion and remand for further proceedings.

*Reversed and remanded.*

Damoorgian, Ciklin and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.
Michael JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1272

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 10, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6161 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6161

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow amounts paid for 
 over-the-counter naloxone to be taken into account in determining the 
                    deduction for medical expenses.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 1, 2023

 Mr. Molinaro (for himself, Ms. Pettersen, Mr. LaHood, Mr. Carey, Mr. 
    Trone, and Mr. Pappas) introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow amounts paid for 
 over-the-counter naloxone to be taken into account in determining the 
                    deduction for medical expenses.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Supporting Access to Vital and 
Affordable Care for Everyone Act of 2023'' or as the ``SAVE Act of 
2023''.

SEC. 2. AMOUNTS PAID FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER NALOXONE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT 
              IN DETERMINING THE DEDUCTION FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES.

    (a) In General.--Section 213(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by inserting ``or naloxone'' after ``insulin''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to taxable years ending after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6197 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6197

 To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to establish a program to 
  provide grants to certain surviving spouses of veterans to pay for 
                                housing.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 2, 2023

  Mr. Neguse introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to establish a program to 
  provide grants to certain surviving spouses of veterans to pay for 
                                housing.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS PROGRAM TO PROVIDE GRANTS TO 
              CERTAIN SURVIVING SPOUSES OF VETERANS TO PAY FOR HOUSING.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall 
establish a program to provide grants to eligible surviving spouses to 
pay for housing.
    (b) Applications.--An eligible surviving spouse desiring a grant 
under this section shall submit to the Secretary an application in such 
form and containing such information and assurances as the Secretary 
determines appropriate.
    (c) Priority.--In making grants under this section, the Secretary 
shall give priority to eligible surviving spouses on the basis of need.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary $250,000,000 for fiscal years 2025 
through 2029 to carry out this section.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) The terms ``dependency and indemnity compensation'' and 
        ``surviving spouse'' have the meanings given such terms in 
        section 101 of title 38, United States Code.
            (2) The term ``disabled veteran'' has the meaning given 
        such term in section 3741 of such title.
            (3) The term ``eligible surviving spouse'' means a 
        surviving spouse--
                    (A) of a disabled veteran; and
                    (B) who is in receipt of dependency and indemnity 
                compensation.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Raul RODRIGUEZ-CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51310 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 1, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Judy Fulmer Madewell, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Maureen Scott Franco, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

*195PER CURIAM: *

Raul Rodriguez-Cervantes pleaded guilty to being found in the United States after having been removed and was sentenced to 41 months in prison, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Rodriguez-Cervantes argues on appeal that his indictment charged a violation of only 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and failed to invoke the sentencing enhancement in § 1326(b)(2). He contends that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty for a conviction under § 1326(a) and violates his due process rights.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, because Rodriguez-Cervantes’s argument is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). As Rodriguez-Cervantes concedes that his argument is foreclosed and is raised only to preserve it for further review, summary judgment is appropriate. *See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,*406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). Accordingly, the Government’s motion for 'summary affirmance is GRANTED. The judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2015

- 305

DECEMBER TERM, 2015

Shawn Foster } APPEALED FROM:

}

v. } Superior Court, Chittenden Unit

, } Civil Division

Andrew Pallito, Commissioner, Vermont

Department of Corrections }

} DOCKET NO. 65

- 1

- 15

In the above

- entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Considering the parties’ memoranda of law filed in response to this Court’s show cause

order, we dismiss as moot the above appeal, currently scheduled for the January 6, 2016 term

before a three

-

justice panel. In the above appeal, the incarcerated plaintiff challenged a

programming decision that required him to complete a special program before being eligible for

furlough. He alleged that the decision was based on false facts. The Department o f Corrections

(DOC) agreed that the decision indicated it was based on certain facts and that those facts were

indeed inaccurate, but argued that the decision was actually based on other , accurate facts. The

superior court ruled that there was a more than sufficient basis for the decision, putting aside the

false facts. Defendant appealed this ruling. On August 5, 2015, however, defendant was

furloughed back into the community. Because he was re

- incarcerated on October 16, 2015, he

argues that his claims are not moot because they are “capable of repetition yet evading review.”

State v. Rooney , 2008 VT 102, ¶ 11, 184 Vt. 620 (mem.). We disagree. This narrow exception

to the mootness doctrine applies only when the challenged action is too short in duration to be

fully litigated before its expiration and there is “a reasonable chance that the same complaining

party would be subjected to the same action again.” Id . (quotation omitted). Here, the notion

that DOC would rely on the same false facts again in making a program decision i s highly

speculative at best and not reasonably possible, given that DOC acknowledged that the facts in

question were false.

BY THE COURT:

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

Beth Robinson, Associate Justice