P.3 

r — - -f . , • 'TT' 

Risk Management Plan Rule: Summary and Response to Comments 

May 24, 1996 
C ITABLE OF CONTENTS 

P.4 

Introduction i 

1. Comments on Tiering 

A. Adoption 1-1 

B. Criteria 1-34 

C. Requirements for each Tier 1-64 

D. Other 1-110 

E. Eligibility for Program 1 1-117 

F. Eligibility for Programs 2 and 3 1-140 

2. Comments on Definitions 2-1 

3. Comments on Significant Accidental Release 

A. Overall Definition of Accidental Release 3-1 

B. Inclusion of Environmental Impacts 3-12 

C. Endpoint Criteria 3-24 

D. Inclusion of Sheltering in Place and Evacuation 3-28 

E. Additional Comments 3-29 

F. Alternative Definitions 3-30 

4. Comments on Worst-Case Release 

A. Credible Release Scenario 4-1 

B. Mitigation Systems 4-119 

C. Consideration of Environmental Damage 4-140 

D. Weather Conditions 4-142 

E. Other 4-153 

5. Comments on Offsite Consequence Analysis 

A. Number of Scenarios 5-1 

B. Default Criteria for Modeling (Endpoints) 5-27 

C. Guidance 5-55 

D. Consideration of Environmental Impacts ..... . v 5-106 

E. Miscellaneous 5-141 

6. Comments on Risk Management Plan 

A. Summary vs Full Report 6-1' 

B. Contents of RMP 6-16 

C. Availability of the RMP 6-54 

D. Availability to the Public 6-69 

E. Miscellaneous 6-89 

7. Comments on Management System 7-1 
P.5 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

Comments on Process Safety Information j 8-1 

Comments on Process Hazard Analysis 

A. Coordination with OSHA 9-1 

B. Techniques j 9-10 

C. Requirements of § 68.240) | 9-14 

D. Other Comments , 9-21 

Comments on Standard Operating Procedures . 10-1 

Comments on Training ' 11-1 

Comments on Maintenance 

Comments on Pre-Startup Review . . . 

Comments on Management of Change 

Comments on Compliance Audits 

Comments on Incident Investigation 

12-1 

13-1 

14-1 

15-1 

A. Types of Accidents 1 16-1 

B. Report 16-7 

C. Other ' 16-11 

17. Comments on Accident History 

A. 

B. 

C. 

Types of Releases to Cover 

Types of Release Data to Include 

17-1 

17-6 

Other 17-8 

18. Comments on Emergency Response Program 

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

Drills 18-1 

Redundancy with Other Federal Rules 18-5 

Relationship to HAZWOPER 

Other 

19. Comments on Registration 

A. Timing 

B. Data 

C. Use of Other Forms 

D. Other 

18-27 

18-31 

19-1 

19-9 

19-18 

19-24 

20. Comments on Model RMPs 20-1 
P.6 

21. Comments on Audits 

A. Agency Procedures 21-1 

B. Facility Response 21-17 

C. Other Issues 21-23 

D. Third-Party Audits 21-28 

22. Comments on OSHA PSM Overlap 

A. Overlap in RMP and PSM Rules 22-1 

B. Enforcement / 22-31 

C. OSHA PSM Provisions Omitted from the RMP Rule 22-38 

D. Other Issues 22-47 

23. Comments on Public Participation 23-1 

24. Comments on Trade Secrets 24-1 

25. Comments on Altemative Technology Analysis 25-1 

26. Comments on Coverage by Other Regulations 

A. Federal Programs 26-1 

B. State and Local Programs 26-53 

C. Voluntary Programs 26-77 

27. Comments on Specific Industries 

A. Oil and Gas Industry 27-1 

B. Propane and Agricultural Chemical Retailers 27-31 

C. Other Industries 27-49 

28. Comments on State Implementation 

A. _ State Agency 28-1 

B. Local Agency as Implementing Agency 28-15 

C. Other Program Delegation and Implementation Issues 28-21 

D. Interaction between CAA Section 112(r) and Title V Program 28-39 

29. Comments on State and Local Burden 29-1 

30. Comments on Costs 30-1 

31. Comments on Recordkeeping 31-1 

32. Comments on General Duty Clause 32-1 

33. Comments on Other Issues .„ 33-1 
34. Comments Beyond the Scope of the Notice 34-1 

35. Comments on Accident Reporting 35-1 

Exhibits 

Exhibit 1: Comments by Issue Category iii 

Exhibit 2: List of Acronyms v 

Attachments 

Attachment 1: Alphabetical List of Commenters 

Attachment 2: List of Commenters by Commenter Number 
P.8 

INTRODUCTION 

In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, signed into law on November 15, 1990, Congress 

amended section 112 and added paragraph (r) for the prevention of chemical accidents. The intent of 

section 112(r) is to prevent chemical accidental releases to the air and mitigate the consequences of 

such releases by focusing prevention measures on chemicals that pose the greatest risk to the public 

and the environment. Section 112(r)(3) of the Clean Air Act, as amended, requires the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate a list of at least 100 substances ("regulated 

substances") that are known to cause, or may be reasonably expected to cause, death, injury, or serious 

adverse effects to human health or the environment if accidentally released. This section requires EPA 

to set threshold quantities for each listed substance. This list of regulated substances serves to define 

the stationary sources that will be subject to accident prevention regulations mandated by section 

112(r)(7). EPA promulgated its list of substances on January 31, 1994 (59 FR 4478) ("List Rule"). 

Petitioners and other members of the regulated community raised a number of issues following 

EPA's promulgation of the List Rule. In response to these concems, EPA is proposing the following 

modifications to List Rule: delisting explosives; exempting from threshold determination regulated 

flammable substances in gasoline and in naturally occurring hydrocarbon mixmres prior to initial 

processing; clarifying the provision for tiireshold determination of flammable substances in mixtures to 

exempt mixtures that do not have a National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) flammability hazard 

rating of 4; modifying the definition of stationary source to clarify the exemption of transportation and 

storage incident to transportation and to clarify that naturally occurring hydrocarbon reservoirs are not 

stationary sources or parts of stationary sources; and clarifying that the chemical accident prevention 

provisions do not apply to sources located on the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS sources"). EPA 

proposed these amendments on April 15, 1996 (61 FR 16598). At the same time (61 FR 16605), EPA 

proposed a short-term stay of effectiveness so that sources that EPA has proposed not be subject to 

part 68 would not be subject to part 68 until EPA has determined whether to proceed with the 

proposed List Rule amendments. 

Section 112(r)(7) mandates that EPA promulgate regulations and develop guidance to prevent, 

detect, and respond to accidental releases. Stationary sources covered by these regulations must 

develop and implement a risk management program that includes a hazard assessment, a prevention 

program, and an emergency response program. Information about the risk management program must 

be documented in a risk management plan (RMP) that must be registered with EPA, submitted to state 

and local authorities, and made available to the public. On October 20, 1993, EPA published a Notice . 

of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the section 112(r)(7) regulations (58 FR 54190). 

Following publication of the proposed mle, EPA held four public hearings and received 757 

written comments in the docket (A-91-73). Because of these comments, EPA issued a supplemental 

notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) on March 13, 1995 (60 FR 13526), and set the period of 

submission for this SNPRM at 60 days. In the SNPRM, EPA requested comments on: approaches for 

setting different requirements for sources that pose different levels of hazard (tiering); worst-case 

releases and other hazard assessment issues; accident information reporting; public participation; 

inherently safer approaches; and implementation and integration of section 112(r) with state programs, 

particularly state air permitting programs. EPA held a public hearing on March 31, 1995, in 

Washington, DC, and received an additional 283 written comments. 

In total, EPA received 1220 letters, including 180 relevant comments transferred from the List 

Rule docket (A-91-74). Refer to Attachment 1 for a list of the commenters in alphabetical order and 
P.9 

n 

Attachment 2 for a list of the commenters arranged by commenter number. The commenters 

represented 92 chemical manufacturers, 81 other chemical users, 111 petroleum industry companies, 

174 industry trade associations, 40 other trade associations, 58 agricultural supply retailers, 102 

propane retailers, 132 explosives users, 29 water treatment facilities, 26 utilities, 66 state agencies, 63 

local governments, 8 other Federal agencies, 52 academics and consultants, 61 environmental groups, 

6 labor unions, and 31 private citizens. The remaining 88 letters were requests for extensions of the 

comment period, interim or duplicate sets of comments, or had been sent to the incorrect docket; these 

letters are distinguished by an asterisk in the appendices. 

As indicated in the table below, EPA assigned consecutive numbers to the letters received by 

the docket. Each letter was reviewed to identify distinct issues of concern ("comments") raised by the 

commenter; the comments were numbered sequentially throughout each letter. A total of 

approximately 8800 individual comments were identified by EPA in the 1220 letters. This document 

cites specific comments in the format commenter number-comment number. That is, 233-10 

represents the tenth comment identified in the letter from commenter 233. 

Assigned Letter Number 

001-736 

753-942 

943-947 

1001-1016 

2001-2266 

2301-2316 

Docket/Notice 

A-91-73/RMP Rule NPRM 

A-91-74/List Rule NPRM 

A-91-73/RMP Rule NPRM 

A-91-73/RMP Rule NPRM 

A-91-73/RMP Rule SNPRM 

A-91-73/RMP Rule SNPRM 

Status 

late letters 

late letters 

Number of Letters 

736 

180 

5 

16 

267l 

16 

This document presents summaries of the comments received on the NPRM and SNPRM and 

EPA's responses to these comments, organized by the issue raised in the comment. EPA classified the 

individual comments into 35 issue categories; many of these categories were further divided into a 

number of sub-categories (e.g., Chapter 1: Tiering). The categories and sub-categories are identified 

in the Table of Contents of this document. Each chapter is individually numbered; the entire 

document is 1753 pages. Exhibit 1 identifies the number of comments identified in each issue 

category from the NPRM and the SNPRM. 

For categories and sub-categories where EPA substantially revised a particular provision, the 

comments (and EPA's responses) received on the NPRM and the List Rule have been segregated from 

those received on the SNPRM. The issue categories and sub-categories themselves are sub-divided 

into sections (marked with bold text in the document) to segregate comments on the same theme (e.g., 

support for the definition of worst-case release). Headings in italics are further sub-divisions and often 

distinguish commenters who were in general agreement, but with differing reasons (e.g., we support 

this approach as protective ofthe environment from we support this approach as cost-effective). 

The 125th and 126th letters received in this category were assigned numbers 2125a and 2125b. 
P.10 

• 

• 

• 

iii 

Exhibit 1: Comments by Issue Category 

Issue Category 

1. Tiering 

2. Definitions 

3. Significant Accidental Release 

4. Worst-Case Release 

5. Offsite Consequence Analysis 

6. Risk Management Plan 

7. Management System 

8. Process Safety Information 

9. Process Hazard Analysis 

10. Standard Operating Procedures 

11. Training 

12. Maintenance 

13. Pre-Startup Review 

14. Management of Change 

15. Compliance Audits 

16. Incident Investigation 

17. Accident History 

18. Emergency Response Program 

19. Registration 

20. Model RMPs 

21. Audits 

22. OSHA PSM Overlap 

23. Public Participation 

24. Trade Secrets 

25. Altemative Technology Analysis 

26. Coverage by Other Regulations 

27. Specific Industries 

NPRM Comments 

295 

25 

183 

630 

735 

610 

26 

33 

235 

41 

67 

106 

33 

44 

39 

130 

98 

184 

238 

68 

200 

380 

73 

38 

86 

409 

489 

" T T"r 

SNPRM Comments 

629 

2 

7 

377 

378 

75 

12 

0 

2 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

31 

0 

7 

81 

114 

114 

1 

105 

29 

20 

> 

i 
IV 

p.11 

Issue Category 

28. State Implementation 

29. State and Local Burden 

30. Costs 

31. Recordkeeping 

32. General Duty Clause 

33. Other Issues 

34. Beyond the Scope of the Notice 

35. Accident Reporting 

NPRM Comments 

68 

68 

224 

34 

17 

224 

244 

0 

SNPRM Comments 

232 

14 

46 

1 

0 

29 

45 

88 
T T" 

Exhibit 2: List of Acronyms 

AA 

AAEC 

ACGIH 

AEGL 

AHM 

AIChE 

AIHA 

AIRS 

ALOHA 

ANSI 

APA 

APA 

AQD 

AQRV 

ARCHIE 

ARIP 

ARPP 

ASHRAE 

ASME 

ASTM 

ATC 

ATD 

BACT 

BATF 

BLM 

BTU 

CAA 

CAAA 

CAD 

CAMEO 

CAS 

CBI 

CCPS 

Administering Agency, a compliance agency under California's Risk Management and 

Prevention Program 

Any Adverse Effect Concentration 

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 

Acute Exposure Guideline Levels, emergency exposure levels for the general public 

under development by EPA 

Acutely Hazardous Material, a chemical regulated under California's Risk Management 

and Prevention Program 

American Institute of Chemical Engineers 

American Industrial Hygiene Association 

Aerometric Information Retrieval System, an EPA database 

Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres, an air dispersion modeling system 

developed by NOAA 

American National Standards Institute 

Administrative Procedure Act 

American Planning Association 

Air Quality District 

Air Quality Related Values 

Automated Resource for Chemical Hazard Incident Evaluation, a software program 

developed by FEMA, DOT, and EPA 

Accidental Release Information Program, a release data collection effort by EPA 

Accidental Release Prevention Program 

American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers 

American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

American Society for Testing and Materials 

Acute Toxicity Concentration, defined by New Jersey for its Toxic Catastrophe 

Prevention Act 

American Table of Distances, a table that sets safe separation distances between 

locations of explosives and the public and between explosives magazines; included in 

BATF regulations for explosives 

Best Available Control Technology 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the U.S. Department of Justice 

Bureau of Land Management of the U.S. Department of the Interior 

British Thermal Unit 

Clean Air Act 

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 

Computer-Aided Design 

Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations, an emergency management 

software program developed by EPA and NOAA 

Chemical Abstracts Service; the CAS number is a unique number for chemical 

identification 

Confidential Business Information 

AlChE's Center for Chemical Process Safety 
P.13 

vi 

CHEI, 

CEEL-PEAK 

CEI 

CEPPO 

CERCLA 

CFC 

CFR 

CIA 

CIMAH 

CSE 

CSHIB 

CSI 

CSI 

CWA 

DDESB 

DEGADIS 

DOD 

DOE 

DOI 

DOT 

E&P 

E.O. 

EA 

EC 

EC 

EEGL 

EHA 

EHS 

EIA 

EIS 

EPA 

EPCRA 

ERNS 

ERPG 

FEMA 

FR 

FTE 

GRI 

HACS 

Community Emergency Exposure Levels, ceiling exposure levels for the public; 

guidelines for their development were published by NAS, but no levels were 

developed 

a CEEL representing a maximum concentration applicable to a short exposure time 

Chemical Exposure Index developed by Dow 

U.S. EPA's Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 

(Superfund) 

Chlorofluorocarbon 

Code of Federal Regulations 

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 

Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards, accident prevention regulations in UK 

Chemical Safety Engineers 

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, a federal investigatory body 

authorized under the Clean Air Act 

Chemical Substances Inventory 

Compliance Sampling Inspection (CWA) 

Clean Water Act 

a DOD explosives standard board 

Dense Gas Dispersion, a program developed by the U.S. Coast Guard to predict 

contaminant movement of heavier-than-air gases 

U.S. Department of Defense 

U.S. Department of Energy 

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

oil and gas exploration and production 

Executive Order 

Environmental Assessment (NEPA) 

Emergency Coordinator 

European Community (European Union) 

Emergency Exposure Guidance Level, developed by NRC as a level acceptable for 

performance of specific tasks by military personnel under during emergency 

conditions, usually for one hour 

Enhanced Hazards Analysis 

an Extremely Hazardous Substance regulated under EPCRA section 302 

Economic Impact Analysis 

Environmental Impact Statement 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 

Emergency Response Notification System, a database of information on accidental 

releases of hazardous chemicals 

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines, developed by AIHA 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Federal Register 

Full-Time Equivalent, a means of approximating the number of employees at a source 

that includes part-time employees 

Gas Research Institute 

Hazard Assessment Communication System (NRC) 
1 • • ! • - 1 

• 

• 

-

• 

HAZCOM 

HAZMAT 

HAZOP 

HAZWOPER 

HG 

HGSYSTEM 

HMTA 

HRGVS 

ICR 

ICRC 

IDLH 

IDPG 

INPUFF 

IRIS 

ISEE 

kW 

LC 

LC 

LEPC 

LFL 

LGFSTF 

LNG 

LOAEL 

LOC 

LP 

LPG 

MACT 

MFL 

MIDAS 

MHIDAS 

MMS 

MOC 

MOU 

MPCA 

MPL 

MSDS 

MSHA 

~ ' ' '~ r^ -rj?.<**"-.<? .'•--.,.- ^—-°-mrr*; '"^p" ~- ' -.,••, , 

vii 

OSHA Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) 

hazardous material 

Hazard and Operability Study, a formal technique for evaluating hazards 

OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard (29 CFR 

1910.120) 

mercury 

Modeling system developed by the Industry Cooperative HF Mitigation/Assessment 

Program to simulate the consequences of hydrogen fluoride (HF) releases and assess 

the effectiveness of mitigation systems 

Hazardous Materials Transportation Act 

Health Risk Guidance Values 

Information Collection Request 

Increased Cancer Risk Concentration 

Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health, concentrations developed by NIOSH for 

respirator selection 

Industrial Disaster Prevention Group (Delaware) 

a Gaussian Puff Dispersion Model 

Integrated Risk Information System developed by EPA for health risk assessment 

information 

International Society of Explosives Engineers 

Kilowatt 

Lethal Concentration; LC50 is the concentration lethal to 50 percent of test animals, 

LCL0 is the lowest concentration reported to have caused death in test animals 

Liquid Chromatography 

Local Emergency Planning Committee 

Lower Flammability Limit, the lowest concentration of a flammable vapor or gas/air 

mixture that will ignite and bum 

Liquified Gaseous Fuels Spills Test Force 

Liquified Natural Gas 

Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level 

Level of Concern, the concentration of an EHS in air above which there may be 

serious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a 

relatively short period of time 

Liquified Petroleum 

Liquified Petroleum Gas 

Maximum Achievable Control Technology 

Maximum Foreseeable Loss 

gas dispersion modelling system 

Major Hazard Incident Data Service, a world-wide databank of ha2ardous material 

incidents that resulted in or had the potential to cause offsite impacts 

Minerals Management Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior 

Management of Change 

Memorandum of Understanding 

Minnesota Pollution Control Act 

Maximum Probable Loss 

Material Safety Data Sheet, a compilation of information required for hazardous 

chemicals under the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard 

Mine Safety and Health Act 

P.14 

T 

i 

; 

i 

i 

t 

i 

i 

> 

1 

i 

i 
P.15 

vm 

MSHA the U.S. Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration 

MW Molecular Weight 

NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standard under section 109 of the CAA 

NAS National Academy of Sciences 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 

NESHAP National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (CAA) 

NFPA National Fire Protection Association 

NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 

NJ DEPE New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy 

NOAA the U.S. Department of Commerce's National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

NOAEL No Observed Adverse Effect Level 

NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (CWA) 

NPR National Petroleum Reserve 

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

NRC National Response Center 

NRT National Response Team 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSPS New Source Performance Standard 

OAQPS the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Air Quality Planning and 

Standards 

OCA Offsite Consequence Analysis 

OCS Outer Continental Shelf 

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 

OES California Office of Emergency Services 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPA Oil Pollution Act of 1990 

OPS Office of Pipeline Safety of the U.S. Department of Transportation 

OSC On-Scene Coordinator - the pre-designated local, State, or Federal officieal responsible 

for the coordination of a hazardous materials response action 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor 

OSMRE Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation, and Enforcement of the U.S. Department of 

the Interior 

P&LD Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 

PEL Permissible Exposure Limit, enforceable occupational exposure limits for airborne 

contaminants established by OSHA 

PHA Process Hazard Analysis 

PHAST Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool, a system for modeling accidental releases 

PLC Potentially Life-Threatening Concentration 

POTW Publicly Owned Treatment Works 

ppm parts per million 

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 

PREP National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program 

PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration 

PSI Process Safety Information 

psi pounds per square inch 

PSM OSHA Process Safety Management Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) 

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment 
P.16 

' RCRA 

REL 

RIA 

RMP 

RMPP 

RQ 

RRT 

RSPA 

SAFER 

SAFER 

SARA 

SCBA 

SCI 

SERC 

SHI 

SIC 

i 

SLAB 

SMCRA 

SNPRM 

SOP 

SPCC 

SPEGL 

SPR 

SQ 

STEL 

TCPA 

TIGER 

TLV 

TNO 

TNT 

> 

ir 

/ 

ix 

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

Recommended Exposure Limit developed by NIOSH for hazardous substances or J 

conditions in the workplace < 

Regulatory Impact Analysis ! 

Risk Management Plan j 

Risk Management Prevention Program, the California accident prevention program , 

Reportable Quantity, the chemical-specific quantity that triggers reporting under [ 

CERCLA or EPCRA section 304 • 

Regional Response Team, the regional federal planning and response entity created ( 

under the National Contingency Plan \ 

Research and Special Programs Administration of the U.S. Department of < 

Transportation 

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration j 

Computer system developed by DuPont for real-time modeling of accidental releases 

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (Title III of SARA is also j 

known as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act) j 

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 

Sensitive Compartment Information j 

State Emergency Response Commission i 

Substance Hazard Index, the equilibrium vapor concentration of a substance divided by ' 

a concentration based on toxicity of the substance; used by New Jersey and to identify 

toxic substances for regulation j 

Standard Industrial Classification, a four-digit code that classifies public and private 

activities 

A dense gas model developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

Standard Operating Procedure 

Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures plan, a plan covering the releases of 

hazardous substances as defined under authority of the Clean Water Act 

Short-term Public Emergency Guidance Level (NRC), a suitable concentration for 

unpredicted, single, short-term emergency exposure of the general public 

Strategic Petroleum Reserve 

Sufficient Quantity under Delaware's Regulation for the Management of Extremely 

Hazardous Substances; defined as the quantity that would create a potentially lethal 

concentration at the facility boundary if released over a period of one hour 

Short-term Exposure Limit, usually a 15-minute TWA workplace exposure level; 

STELs adopted by OSHA are enforceable limits; NIOSH and ACGIH publish 

recommended STELs 

the New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act, which created the state's accident 

prevention program 

Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing, a type of electronic 

file containing U.S. Census data 

Threshold Limit Value, airborne concentrations published by ACGIH representing 

levels to which all workers may be exposed repeatedly without adverse effects 

Bureau for Industrial Safety of the Netherlands 

Trinitrotoluene 
P.17 

TOA Technology Options Analysis, an approach to accident prevention that attempts to 

reduce the hazard, rather than the risk 

TPQ Threshold Planning Quantity, a quantity established for each EHS listed under EPCRA 

section 302 

TQ Threshold Quantity, a quantity specified for each regulated substance under section 

112(r) of the Clean Air Act 

TRI Toxic Chemical Release Inventory, the annual emissions inventory required under 

EPCRA section 313 

TSCA Toxic Substances Control Act 

TSCREEN A model for screening toxic air pollutants developed for EPA to assist state and local 

agencies in analyzing toxic emissions and dispersion 

TSDF Transportation, Storage, and Disposal Facility 

TWA Time-Weighted Average 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USGS United States Geological Survey 

UST Underground Storage Tank 

VOC Volatile Organic Compound 

VPP Voluntary Protection Program 

VZ Vulnerable Zone, the estimated area that may be subject to concentrations of an 

airborne hazardous substance at levels that could cause specified effects of concern 

WEEL Workplace Environmental Exposure Level (AIHA), airborne chemical exposure limits 

to which it is believed all employees could be exposed repeatedly without adverse 

health effects 

WHAZAN World Bank Hazard Analysis, a series of computer programs for performing rapid 

estimates of hazardous consequences of accidental releases 
P.31 

3. SIGNIFICANT ACCIDENTAL RELEASE 

Of the 114 commenters who submitted comments on the definition of significant accidental 

release, only four supported EPA's proposed definition. Many raised objections to the definition as 

proposed on the grounds that it exceeded the intent of Congress and statatory authority, both by not 

limiting coverage to catastrophic air releases and by including environmental damage. Many 

commenters sought more specific descriptions of terms used within the definition. Some commenters 

objected to the inclusion of evacuation and sheltering-in-place as criteria. Many commenters 

suggested alternative definitions. 

A. OVERALL DEFINITION OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASE 

Commenters support the definition for the following reasons: 

• Evacuations, injuries, and environmental damage are deplorable and should be avoided. 

A broad definition of accident is more protective of the public. (154-3, 158-2, 1011-3) 

• The definition largely conforms to existing industry practice. Some further definition 

of "potential" would be useful. (489-7) 

• The definition for significant accidental release should be based on these 

considerations: serious and significant adverse human health effects (deaths or 

multiple hospitalizations) to the public resulting from exposure to an accidental release 

of a regulated substance to the air, significant adverse impact at a public gathering 

place such as a residence or place of business, and adverse environmental impact only 

within the context of acute adverse impact to the health and safety of persons. Equally 

important, the definition for significant accidental release should be based on these 

considerations: inconvenience to the public, including precautionary evacuations, 

impact to other industrial stationary sources, impact to roads and other transportation 

routes that may be traversed by the public from time to time, and environmental 

impacts that do not result in significant, adverse impact to the health and safety of 

persons. (2171-4) 

• For clarification, a definition should be provided for "public or environmental receptor 

of concern." This seems to indicate uiat there are elements of the public and the 

environment in which EPA is not concerned; we do not believe this is conect or 

appropriate. (2197-5) 

Agency Response 

Although some commenters endorsed EPA's definition of significant accidental release, EPA 

decided that a single general definition was inappropriate for all affected sections of the rale. In some 

cases, such as accident history, the covered accidents can be dictated by impacts; in other cases, such 

as the offsite consequence analysis, toxic concentrations, overpressures, or heat radiation above the 

endpoints can be used to define the releases that need to be considered. Consequently, EPA has 

decided to drop the general definition and define the types of releases that should be covered for each 

requirement. To support these individual requirements, EPA has added definitions of the terms 

"environmental receptor," "injury," "medical treatment," "public receptor" and "environmental receptor" 

and adopted (with statutorily necessary modifications) the OSHA definition of catastrophic release. 
3-2 

EPA believes it is necessary to limit public and [environmental receptors to those that can be 

specifically identified. Public receptor is limited to residences, institutions, commercial or industrial 

buildings, parks or recreational areas inhabited or occupied by the public. The unlimited definition the 

commenter is seeking would make it almost impossible !for any process to qualify for Program 1, no 

matter how remote the site was from the public because a public road would probably be near the site. 

Environmental receptors are defined as state and national parks, forests, and monuments; officially 

designated wildlife refuges, preserves, sanctaaries, or areas; and federal wilderness areas. EPA limited 

the areas to those that can be easily identified on USGS maps. EPA notes that for the purpose of the 

five-year accident history, reportable environmental damage is not limited to environmental receptors. 

! 

Commenters oppose the definition for the following reasons: 

The definition should cover only releases with catastrophic potential 

• Congress intended the scope of the regulations to prevent catastrophic chemical 

accidents; the proposed rule covers accidents that are far less than catastrophic. (76-

16, 89-2, 314-8, 388-1, 392-1, 413-2, 425-3, 443-11, 464-2, 565-2, 565-7, 565-14, 

667-5, 700-1) 

• By potentially applying the proposed RMP regulation to non-catastrophic releases, 

EPA goes beyond the statute and makes the rule too broad. In so doing, EPA has 

expanded the content of the rale, which will dilute the overall effort, significantly 

increase the cost of the regulation, and provide few if any safety benefits. (392-1) 

Congress only intended that the RMP rule cover "worst-case" scenarios. EPA, by 

adding the definition of "significant accidental release," expands the rule's scope 

beyond the intent of Congress because the proposed provision requires planning for 

any offsite injury, regardless of the severity, and for adverse effects to human health or 

the environment, regardless of the degree of severity. (499-11, 499-20, 499-25) 

The proposed rale goes beyond the requirements necessary to address serious 

accidental releases that could impact thej community by defining "significant accidental 

release" to include less than catastrophic^ incidents. (685-2) 

EPA should focus the list of regulated substances and its subsequent proposal for risk 

management plan (RMP) regulations on the prevention of catastrophic releases. The 

legislative history clearly indicates Congress' intent to direct the nation's resources to 

address the prevention of catastrophic accidents. For example, U.S. Senate bill No. 

816, a precursor to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, was described as a bill "... to 

control the release of toxic air pollutants, to reduce the threat of catastrophic chemical 

accidents..." Furthermore, Senator Durenberger introduced S. 816 on April 18, 1989, 

using the following language, "itihe purpose of this bill is to prevent chemical 

accidents like uiat which occuned at Bhopal and require preparation to mitigate the 

effects of those accidents that do occur." 

Representatives, H. 2585, was titled, "A 

Pollutants, to Reduce the Threat of Catastrophic Accidents..." 

A companion bill in the U.S. House of 

Bill to Control the Release of Toxic Air 
P.33 

3-3 

EPA clearly acknowledges in the Preamble to the proposed list that the focus of 

section 112(r) is the prevention of catastrophic releases, " ... the development of the 

list under CAA Section 112(r), which focuses on the prevention of catastrophic 

accidental releases." 58 FR 5105. In addition, OSHA supports this appropriate focus in 

their companion workplace standard, Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous 

Chemicals (PSM), the purpose of which is "... preventing or minimizing the 

consequences of catastrophic releases..." 29 CFR 1910.119. 

CMA supports EPA's continued focus of their accident prevention regulatory 

initiatives on catastrophic releases. This focus will help ensure that the nation's 

resources are devoted to the potential problems that pose the greatest risk to the public. 

(884-5) 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees with commenters that the CAA intended to cover only catastrophic releases. 

The hazard assessment requirement (section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I)) cites "estimate of potential release 

quantities." The Conference Report states the hazard assessment shall include a range of releases 

including worst case. The CAA defines accidental release broadly and limits the impacts only when it 

sets the criteria for selecting substances for the list; the definition, however, is not limited to listed 

substances. In CAA section 112(r)(3), the Act states that substances shall be listed if they cause or 

may be reasonably anticipated to cause death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or the 

environment. EPA based its listing on the potential to cause these effects offsite. To define distances, 

the offsite consequence analysis uses toxic and flammable endpoints that reflect the potential to cause 

severe effects from acute exposures. 

EPA decided that a single definition of significant accidental release was inappropriate for all 

affected sections of the rale. In some cases, such as accident history, the covered accidents can be 

dictated by impacts; in other cases, such as the offsite consequence analysis, toxic concentrations, 

overpressures, or heat radiation above the endpoints can be used to define the releases that need to be 

considered. Consequently, EPA has decided to drop the definition and define the types of releases that 

should be covered for each requirement. To support these individual requirements, EPA has added 

definitions of the terms "environmental receptor," "injury," "medical treatment," and "public receptor" 

and adopted (with statutorily necessary modifications) the OSHA definition of catastrophic release. 

EPA notes that the meaning of "catastrophic" is not clear. OSHA defined a catastrophic 

release as one that has the potential to cause serious danger, not as one that caused specific effects. 

EPA did not attempt to define the term further because the Agency does not believe it is useful to 

engage in a debate about, for example, how many injuries of certain types need to occur before an 

accident would be considered or whether a certain number of lesser injuries would be the equivalent of 

a single serious injury. In any event, industry has applied the concept in implementing OSHA's PSM 

standard, and the term apparently is commonly understood. 

The definition should be limited to air releases 

• The rale should cover only releases to ambient air; other regulations address releases 

to water and soil. (76-17, 86-10, 117-6, 119-8, 289-2, 382-40, 392-1, 393-1, 408-21, 

470-1, 565-14, 671-1) 
P.34 

3-4 

• CAA section 112(r) defines an accidental release as the unanticipated emission of a 

regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance into the ambient air from a 

stationary source. Therefore, the definition should reflect the Act's intent and specify 

that accidental releases are to the ambient air, not water or ground contamination. 

(687-4) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees. The definition of accidental release, as provided in CAA section 112(r)(3), 

already limits the releases of concern to releases to the ambient air. EPA notes, however, that air 

releases could cause contamination of water or ground (e.g., deposition on crops). 

The definition should cover acute impacts only 

• Other regulations are already in place to address the less acute incidents including air 

toxics regulations under CAA section 112 (d), (0, (h), and (k). By applying the 

proposed RMP regulation to these chronic incidents. EPA misreads the statute and 

makes the rule too broad and duplicative. In doing so, EPA has expanded the content 

of the rule, which will dilute the overall effort, significantly increase the cost of the 

regulation, and provide few if any safety benefits. (32-2, 393-1, 565-14, 667-5, 671-1, 

700-1) 

• The definition does not say whether it applies only to acute effects. The commenter 

assumes that the rule is not meant to apply to very minor effects, such as transient 

nasal irritation, or to effects that would occur only in extremely rare cases where a 

person has a hypersensitivity. It is not that these injuries do not matter, but rather that 

a meaningful planning process has to draw the line somewhere. Yet this definition 

does not draw that line. When the definition speaks of "adverse effects" to the 

environment, the meaning is even less clear. The definition should be limited to 

substantial acute human injury. (117-6, 382-42) 

• If EPA limits the definition's scope to incidents with potential acute effects as the law 

intended, facilities can best use their investment in personnel and equipment to reduce 

the number and severity of incidents, thereby providing an incentive for continuous 

improvement. (119-8) 

• As EPA has acknowledged, section 112(r)(7) is not intended to cover long-term 

releases of hazardous substances where potential public health effects are similar to 

those associated with "chronic" exposures over long periods of time, nor is section 

112(r>(7) intended to cover "routine" releases of even large volumes that do not 

present the potential for potentially catastrophic offsite impacts to public health or the 

environment from "short-term exposures." (59 FR 4481-4482; January 31, 1994.) 

Other provisions of section 112, as well as other sections of the CAA, address the 

potential impacts of such releases to ambient air. (413-2) 

• To establish tiering criteria, GE urges EPA to modify its definition of "significant 

accidental release" to reflect the original congressional intent of addressing serious 

releases, and to exclude evacuation and shelter in place events. EPA's regulatory 
P.35 

3-5 

definition strays from the statatory language of "serious adverse effects." EPA has 

dropped the word "serious" in its proposed criteria, with the effect that a facility 

experiencing less significant releases may be precluded from Tier 1 status or be 

required to unnecessarily comply with a more stringent tier. We propose that 

significant accidental release should be modified to mean "any accidental release of a 

regulated substance that has caused or had the potential to cause serious offsite 

consequences to human health such as death or hospitalization." (2162-13) 

Agency Response 

EPA decided that a single definition of significant accidental release was inappropriate for all 

affected sections of the rale. In some cases, such as accident history, the covered accidents can be 

dictated by impacts; in other cases, such as the offsite consequence analysis, toxic concentrations, 

overpressures, or heat radiation above the endpoints can be used to define the releases that need to be 

considered. Consequently, EPA has decided to drop the definition and define the types of releases that 

should be covered for each requirement. To support these individual requirements, EPA has added 

definitions of the terms "environmental receptor," "injury," "medical treatment," and "public receptor" 

and adopted (with statutorily necessary modifications) the OSHA definition of catastrophic release. 

The final rale does not (nor did the proposed rale) address long-term effects from chronic 

exposures or any impacts from non-accidental releases. The final rule defines injury to mean any 

effect to a human being that results from direct exposure to toxic concentrations, radiant heat, or 

overpressures from accidental releases or from the direct consequences of a vapor cloud explosion 

from an accidental release and that requires medical treatment or hospitalization. For the most part, 

the minor, transient effects cited by the commenter will not meet these criteria. 

EPA has not defined "adverse effect to the environment" directly. For the offsite consequence 

analysis and accident investigation, the source need only consider whether one of the listed 

environmental receptors could be exposed. EPA recognizes that attempting to define the nature and 

extent of potential impacts to the environment would impose a substantial burden and may, in most 

cases, not be feasible because of the lack of data on environmental impacts. For accident histories, the 

owner or operator must report on any known environmental effects, but is not required to carry out 

research to find or otherwise detail these effects. For Program 1 eligibility, environmental damage 

from an accident release may make a process ineligible for Program 1, if the damage required 

restoration or response activity at an environmental receptor. EPA believes that only significant 

environmental damage will lead to such activities. EPA has not included evacuation and sheltering in 

place as criteria for releases that would disqualify a process from Program 1, but releases that result in 

such actions must be reported in the five-year accident history. 

In regard to Program 1 eligibility, the final rale restricts this tier to sources that can 

demonstrate that there are no public receptors within the distance to an endpoint from their worst-case 

release. Theoretically, it should not be possible for such a source to have had an accidental release 

that affected such receptors. 

Adverse health impacts must be defined 

• EPA needs to carefully define what is meant by an adverse effect to human health. 

Does EPA intend to mandate that zero-risk be the measure of acceptable risk? Or IO"6 
P.36 

3-6 

as is currently the practice? Or IO"4 or even IO"3, which may be more reasonable as a 

practical measure of public health outcomes? A good definition of acceptable risk, 

and by extension adverse health effect, is critical because the results of any risk 

assessment performed under this proposed rule will be made public. Companies will 

be forced to defend acceptable risk levels and significant releases; at a minimum, EPA 

must provide prudent guidance that companies can use in a practical manner. (28-1) 

Comparisons of potential health impacts from different facilities are made nearly 

impossible if consistent definitions of those impacts (i.e., the translation of predicted 

concentrations into significant adverse health effects) do not exist. (43-17) 

Adverse can be broadly interpreted. EPA should offer some guidance to assist 

compliance. (177-7) 

Adverse impacts should be limited to major/significant conditions. (328-16) 

EPA does not define what constitutes "adverse effects," and, therefore, any impact of 

any kind, regardless of degree of harm, could potentially trigger all the requirements of 

new Part 68. Is a release's contribution to acid rain a "significant accidental release"? 

What about an accidental release that discolors some leaves on a few trees a mile 

away? What if the release made someone nervous but did not otherwise cause 

physical injuries? These are not rhetorical questions, and they will inevitably arise and 

foster protracted disputes if the definition is finalized as proposed. Therefore, the 

Agency should revise the proposed definition to add the following language: "death, 

physical injury, or other serious adverse effects." Adding this new language to the 

definition of "significant accidental release" would provide more objective criteria to 

determine whether a significant release has occurred. (372-5) 

EPA should consider the offsite consequences to sensitive populations in its 

determination of the term "significant accidental release." (461-13) 

The word "serious" should be added to the phrase "adverse effects." (524-3) 

The definition of "significant accidental release" is too vague. What constitutes 

adverse effects to human health or the environment needs to be more clearly defined. 

Otherwise temporary, non-threatening conditions might need to be addressed 

unnecessarily. For instance, exposure to a low concentration of a gas for a brief 

period could cause eyes to water for a couple of minutes. Peeling onions has the same 

effect. Exposure to the same gas could cause the leaves on a tree to turn yellow, but 

the same thing happens in autumn. As a suggestion, adverse effects to human health 

could include exposures which require medical aid. including overnight hospitalization 

for observation. (695-3) 

Adverse effects suffered by first responders should be considered. (702-5) 

EPA should provide a definition or criteria for what constitutes an adverse effect. 

(946-8) 
3-7 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with commenters that the language used in the proposed definition of significant 

accidental release was too vague. EPA has deleted the definition and replaced it with more specific 

requirements for the types of releases that-need to be considered under different sections. The final 

rale defines injury to mean any effect to a human being that results from direct exposure to toxic 

concentrations, radiant heat, or overpressures from accidental releases or from the direct consequences 

of a vapor cloud explosion from an accidental release and that requires medical treatment or 

hospitalization. The minor, transient effects cited by the commenter will not meet these criteria. EPA 

has adopted a definition of medical treatment used by OSHA in reporting occupational illness and 

injuries. This definition does not limit injuries to those requiring hospitalization, which the Agency 

believes is too stringent a requirement. A release that leads people to seek medical treatment may 

have the potential to cause serious impacts, especially among vulnerable populations. 

EPA has not defined "adverse effect to the environment" directly. For the offsite consequence 

analysis and accident investigation, the source need only consider whether one of the listed 

environmental receptors could be exposed. EPA recognizes that attempting to define the nature and 

extent of potential impacts to the environment would impose a substantial burden and may not be 

feasible, in most cases, because of the lack of data on environmental impacts. For accident histories, 

the owner or operator must report on any known environmental effects, but is not required to carry out 

research to find or otherwise detail these effects. Of the examples cited by the commenter, a 

contribution to acid rain would not be considered as environmental damage; discoloring or defoliation 

of leaves might be considered if the impact was widespread enough to be reported. EPA notes, 

however, that the rale imposes no requirements on sources for such accidents beyond inclusion in the 

five-year accident history. For Program 1 eligibility, environmental damage from an accident release 

may make a process ineligible for Program 1, if the damage required restoration or response activity at 

an environmental receptor. EPA believes that only significant environmental damage will lead to such 

activities. 

EPA has not defined effects based on their probability. EPA recognizes that defining the 

likelihood of a specific impact occurring is not feasible in most cases because many factors beyond the 

quantity and duration of a release affect the chance that it will impact humans or the environment. 

For the offsite consequence analysis, EPA is defining the distance of concern based on the distance to 

specified endpoints, which are associated with potential effects, using conservative assumptions on 

other factors, such as wind speed and stability, for worst-case analyses. The endpoints do not imply 

that specific impacts will occur, but that these impacts are possible when people are exposed to these 

toxic concentrations, overpressures, or heat radiation. 

The endpoints that have been selected are based, to the extent possible, on effects to the 

general public, whose members are not trained in protective action, do not have protective equipment, 

and may be more vulnerable than working adults, such as first responders. Responder injuries, 

hwoever, trigger inclusion of a release in the five-year accident history. 

Injury must be defined 

• EPA should define the number and severity of injuries that trigger the definition. (32-

2, 76-16, 388-1, 526-5) 
P.38 

3-8 

• Only significant injuries should be covered. (77-1, 117-6. 328-16, 382-142) 

• Without a more specific definition of "injury," a large number of releases may be 

categorized as "significant accidental releases." The commenter recommends that for 

clarity injury should be further defined to eliminate any doubt that minor injuries, or 

those not requiring medical attention, are not to be considered as an "injury" for the 

purpose of defining offsite consequence. This point is important because under the 

hazard assessment the proposed rule requires analysis of "other more likely significant 

accidental releases" without guidance on what would be considered an adequate 

number of scenarios to be analyzed. With the terms not defined, the number of 

potentially significant scenarios could be infinite. (361-3, 701-3, 701-5) 

• "Injury" is vague and needs to be defined. (295-7) 

• Injuries suffered by first responders should be considered. (702-5) 

• EPA should provide a definition or criteria for what constitutes an adverse effect. 

(946-8) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees that injury should be defined and has, therefore, added a definition. The final rule 

defines injury to mean any effect to a human being that results from direct exposure to toxic 

concentrations, radiant heat, or overpressures from accidental releases or from the direct consequences 

of a vapor cloud explosion from an accidental release and that requires medical treatment or 

hospitalization. EPA has adopted a definition of medical treatment used by OSHA in reporting 

occupational illness and injuries. This definition does not limit injuries to those requiring 

hospitalization, which the Agency believes is too stringent a requirement. A release that leads people 

to seek medical treatment may have the potential to cause serious impacts, especially among 

vulnerable populations. EPA disagrees with the commenter that injuries should be limited by the 

number that occur. A single serious injury to the public indicates the potential for greater harm, and 

the accidental release that caused the injury should be covered by this rule. 

The endpoints that have been selected are based, to the extent possible, on effects to the 

general public, whose members are not trained in protective action, do not have protective equipment, 

and may be more vulnerable than working adults, such as first responders. Responder injuries, 

hwoever, trigger inclusion of a release in the five-year accident history. 

Thresholds should define covered releases 

• The rule should be limited to releases that are greater than the threshold quantity. This 

will distinguish between minimal unplanned releases of regulated substances (such as 

an explosives misfire) that is unlikely to cause any offsite injuries or damage, but 

might be so interpreted in the EPA's "worst case scenario" approach. Misfires of 

previously undetonated material do occasionally occur at mines, and such incidents are 

regulated by MSHA and have reporting requirements under the Mine Act. However, 

there is no need to require mine operators to report these as accidental releases to EPA 
3-9 

as well, because the environmental impact is no different from what occurs in a 

planned detonation of explosives at mines or quarries. (110-5) 

• The definition of significant accidental releases as proposed by EPA for determining 

the need for an accident investigation is much too broad. It would be more 

appropriate to limit "significant accidental releases" to those releases that are in excess 

of the reportable quantity as defined in the Community Right-to-Know regulations. 

(689-4) 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees with the comment that covered releases should be defined by release quantity. 

EPA notes that many reportable quantities are based on effects other than acute effects; many of the 

quantities are low, based on other effects, and, in some cases, may not cause acute effects. Using the 

threshold quantity also is not appropriate. Releases of smaller quantities, in some cases, may cause 

offsite impacts; in other cases, larger releases may result in no impacts because mitigation technologies 

confined the release to the site or because of weather conditions and lack of receptors of concern. 

EPA believes it is better to define the accidents that need to be included in the five-year accident 

history by the actaal impacts. This approach will limit the reporting to releases of concern, rather than 

covering minor releases that had no effects and may not have migrated offsite because of response and 

mitigation efforts. The accident investigation requirement is limited to releases that caused or had the 

potential to cause a serious danger to public health or the environment. Depending on location, these 

releases may include quantities above or below the thresholds. Finally, the worst-case release scenario 

is defined as the release of the largest quantity of a regulated substance in a vessel or pipe. If a source 

can demonstrate that the distance to die endpoint under worst-case conditions is less than the distance 

to any public receptor, the process may be eligible for Program 1. 

Potential to cause should be defined or deleted 

• The definition of "significant accidental release" at §68.3 needs more clarification 

regarding potential offsite consequences. The phrase "with potential for offsite 

consequences" is redundant as cunently contained in §68.15(f). How will this 

potential be determined? (172-9) 

• There is no mention in the legislative history or section 112(r) of the Act that refers to 

the phrase "or the potential to cause.' This requirement far exceeds the statutory 

authority of section 112(r). This phrase should be deleted from the definition. (177-7) 

• The definition of "significant accidental release" should not be changed to include near 

misses. Such situations do not constitute releases covered by the Clean Air Act. (374-

21) 

The definition largely conforms to existing industry practice. Some further definition 

of "potential" would be useful. (489-7) 

Using the word "potential" in this definition is too broad and easily misunderstood. 

EPA should modify this definition to either omit use of this term entirely or replace it 

with the term "likely potential". For example, does EPA consider a release of a liquid 
3-10 

i 

from a tank into a diked area a potential release even though all the material was 

contained? Or, is a leaky valve (where only a small amount is actually released) 

considered a significant release, because if the leak was not detected for a long time it 

may be significant? Under this definition, virtually any release would have the 

"potential" for causing a significant release. (573-2) 

• The concept of "potential" must be evaluated in the minds of the first response 

personnel as they are the ones who must determine the nature of the response and 

whether steps to protect the public are necessary. (702-5) 

• The phrase "potential to cause" may be too vague to be used for quantitative 

evaluations, because even the smallest release may have a "potential" to cause death, 

injury or adverse effect. Even a best guess may not be sufficient to make the 

evaluations. Therefore, it is suggested that the phrase, "potential to cause" be 

eliminated from the definition of "significant accidental release." (1005-3) 

Agency Response 

EPA has deleted the definition of significant accidental release and, therefore, has deleted the 

phrase "potential to cause" and adopted OSHA's language "reasonably have resulted in" in the 

accident investigation sections (§§ 68.60 and 68.81) to describe the kind of incident that an owner or 

operator must investigate. EPA suggests that the results of the PHA or hazard review will help 

sources identify the kinds of releases that could reasonably result in a catastrophic release. In many 

cases, a leaky valve may not reasonably result in a serious release; in some cases, however, a leak may 

be caused by factors such as conosion or high pressure that could lead to a large-scale failure. The 

hazard evaluations should assist sources in defining which small releases pose significant risks. 

In other requirements, the potentially affected populations are defined as being within the 

distance to an endpoint. The dispersion modeling that produces the distance to the endpoint in effect 

defines the potential to cause. The offsite consequence analysis results are intended to create a 

dialogue between the source and the community and help determine planning needs. They are not 

time, response personnel and source staff will 

protective actions. 

intended to provide direction during a response. At that 

be able to consult to determine appropriate response and 

EPA disagrees with the commenter who stated that the CAA does not mention potential 

releases. The hazard assessment requirement in CAA section 112(r)(7)(b)(ii)(I) states that sources 

must analyze potential effects of accidental releases. Because serious accidental releases are relatively 

rare events, these analyses, of necessity, deal with potential releases. In addition, EPA notes that the 

accident history covers only accidents that had specific effects. The accident investigation language 

was adopted from the OSHA PSM standard, which covers releases that may reasonably result in 

serious danger. EPA believes it is important to maintain 

therefore, has retained OSHA's language. 

consistency with the PSM standard and, 

Other 

Accidents involving on-site deaths and injuries should be covered; without them, the 

five-year accident history will be missing crucial information. (49-1) 
P.41 

3-11 

The determination of who makes the decision of when an accidental release is a 

significant accidental release is not clear. It appears EPA will allow the facility to do 

this. We disapprove of this method. Facilities will always try to minimize their 

releases by defining them out of regulatory control. We believe EPA's definition 

needs to very clearly tell what amounts are considered significant for each chemical, 

keeping in mind worst-case weather and other scenarios. Otherwise you have the 

regulated community defining what is significant. (128-3) 

The risk management plan should address only "significant" accidental releases, rather 

than all releases and near misses. By specifying "significant" releases, EPA reinforces 

that the focus of this standard is process safety, not merely unplanned emissions. 

Moreover, by specifying the potential significant releases, LEPCs will be able to focus 

on the information necessary to effectively allocate resources for emergency planning. 

(382-122) 

Accidents that do not cause on-site injuries and have no offsite impact should not be 

covered. (538-1) 

In light of the changes proposed in the notice, SOCMA recommends that EPA update 

the definition of significant accidental release. The definition is not consistent with the 

preamble discussion under Section C. Accident Information Reporting, which refers to 

accidental releases which result in "death, injury, evacuation, property damage, or 

offsite environmental impacts." SOCMA prefers the latter language of the re-proposed 

rale as it is more definitive and less subjective. Because the five-year history of 

significant accidental releases is an essential determinant of whether a facility could be 

subject to a Tier I RMP, it is very important that a significant accidental release be 

unambiguously defined. If the determination were to be based on estimations, which 

might vary, of whether the potential to cause an adverse effect might have taken place, 

another area of controversy could be introduced into the application of the rale. 

(2012-5, 2109-5) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with the commenter who states that the definition of significant accidental release 

needed more precision. EPA decided that a single definition was inappropriate for all affected sections 

of the rule. In some cases, such as accident history, the covered accidents can be dictated by impacts; 

in other cases, such as the offsite consequence analysis, toxic concentrations, overpressures, or heat 

radiation above the endpoints can be used to define the releases that need to be considered. 

Consequently, EPA has decided to drop the definition and define die types of releases that should be 

covered for each requirement. EPA believes that this approach will provide sources, and other 

interested parties, with a clear definition in each case of the types of accidents that must be considered 

under the specific elements. To support these individual requirements, EPA has added definitions of 

the terms "environmental receptor," "injury," "medical treatment," and "public receptor" and adopted 

(with statutorily necessary modifications) the OSHA definition of "catastrophic release." 

EPA has listed information on on-site deaths and injuries in the criteria for including an 

accident in the five-year accident history. Such information is relevant because it may reflect safety 

practices at the source. EPA has not included on-site injuries or deaths in other requirements because 
P.42 

3-12 , 

the focus of this rule is to protect public health and thei environment. Consequently, on-site injuries 

and deaths are not included in the criteria for the accident record that is used to determine Program 1 

eligibility. Program 1 provides reasonable requirements for processes from which a worst-case release 

could not affect public receptors. If no additional prevention steps are needed to protect these 

receptors, it would be unreasonable to impose the more stringent requirements of Programs 2 or 3 on 

these processes. OSHA regulations should be sufficient to protect worker health and safety. EPA 

will, however, require submission of information in the 

releases that have had serious on-site impacts. 

five-year accident history on any accidental 

B. INCLUSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 

Three commenters supported the inclusion of environmental impacts in defining significant 

accidental releases; 59 commenters opposed covering environmental impacts. Those opposing the 

inclusion of environmental impacts cited a number of reasons, including Congressional intent, statutory 

language, the burden and lack of benefits, the inadequacy of existing data to conduct analysis of 

environmental impacts, and coverage by other rales. A 

language was too vague and suggested alternatives to c 

number of commenters stated that the rale 

arify and nanow the scope of the rale. 

Commenters support the inclusion of environmental impacts for the following reasons 

The more restrictive language proposed 

actaal severe accidents in which no one 

by New Jersey and CMA would exempt many 

was killed. Evacuations, injuries, and 

environmental damage are deplorable arid should be avoided. A broad definition of 

accident is more protective of the public. (154-3, 158-2) 

Opponents of this definition do not take into account the fires that could start outside 

their plant site and bum native grassland, brash, or forest ecosystems because of an 

explosion or other release. Air pollution (e.g., acid rain) can travel long or short distances and kill vegetation and wildlife (213-6) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees that environmental impacts of accidental releases need to be considered. 

However, EPA decided that a single definition of significant accidental release was inappropriate for 

all affected sections of the rule. Consequently, EPA has decided to drop the definition and define the 

types of releases that should be covered for each requirement. For accident histories, owner or 

operator must report on any known environmental effects, but is not required to carry out research to 

find or otherwise detail these effects. Fires, such as those cited by one commenter and exposure to 

toxics from an accidental release that kills wildlife or vegetation, would have to be reported in the 

accident history. For Program 1 eligibility, environmental damage from an accident release may make 

a process ineligible for Program 1, if the damage required restoration or response activity at an 

environmental receptor. EPA believes that only significant environmental damage will lead to such 

activities. EPA believes that this approach is consistent with the statatory mandate. 
3-13 

Commenters oppose the inclusion of environmental impacts for the following reasons: 

EPA has exceeded the intent of Congress to focus on accidents affecting public health and 

safety 

• Congress' intent was for the RMP regulation to focus on the prevention and mitigation 

of catastrophic releases that could impact public health and safety. Based on the 

legislative history of the CAAA, it is clear that Congress intended for releases to the 

environment to be addressed within that context, i.e., only to the extent that they could 

cause serious human health effects. Congress' intent to focus on public health and 

safety was made very clear in section 112(r)(4) where it directs EPA to consider three 

factors in listing regulated substances. (48-2, 76-16, 90-2, 124-1, 313-2, 371-5, 382-

41, 382-141, 390-30, 392-1, 393-1, 396,1, 425-2, 437-2, 464-2, 470-1, 509-6, 545-7, 

565-16, 629-4, 667-5, 671-3, 674-6, 685-2, 693-1, 2020-17, 2068-24, 2252-3) 

• Nowhere in CAA section 112(r) have we been able to find any reference to the 

assessment of the environmental factors specified in § 68.15 of the RMP proposal. (48-

2, 90-2, 124-1, 565-16, 671-3, 693-1) 

• The three criteria to be used to select chemicals for the listing of regulated substances 

do not include environmental impact. Environmental impact is not mentioned when 

describing how to set thresholds. (117-5, 123-2, 371-5, 382-54, 388-2, 392-1, 423-2, 

512-5, 557-13) 

• Congress clearly directed EPA not to address environmental effects in the RMP rule. 

In fact, in section 112(a) of the statate, "Definitions", Congress specifically excluded 

the definition of "Adverse Environmental Effect" for purposes of section 112(r). (371-

5, 545-7) 

• The first mention ofthe environment occurs in section 112(r)(7)(B)(i). The Act says 

that "the regulations shall include procedures and measures for emergency response 

after an accidental release of a regulated substance in order to protect human health 

and the environment." This is the only reference to the environment in paragraph 

(B)(i), and clearly refers only to post-release emergency response activities. 

Next, in section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii), Congress specified, in relevant part, that the plan 

must provide a prompt emergency response to any such releases in order to protect 

human health and the environment. Thus, the statute is consistent in identifying 

environmental harms as a topic which this rale must address only in the context of 

emergency response. 

The hazard assessments should include a determination of downwind effects, 

"including potential exposures to affected populations." Thus, Congress was referring 

to people. 

Paragraph (B)(ii)(III) once again refers to the environment, in describing "a response 

program providing for specific actions to be taken in response to an accidental 

release." Thus, there is total consistency in placing environmental effects exclusively in 
3-14 

the "emergency response" arena. There is no further mention of the environment 

anywhere else in section 112(r)(7) of the Act. (382-54, 382-141, 557-13) 

The requirement to determine whether the environment has been adversely affected in 

a "significant accidental release" is unduly harsh because the environment can mean 

everything in the sunoundings. The Senate Committee Report indicated that the term 

accidental release means "... cause or may cause immediate (or near-term) death, 

serious injury or substantial property damage." (387-3) 

The legislative history of CAA section 12(r) supports the conclusion that injury to 

human health, or damage to the environment that results in such injury, is the primary 

concern. In the Report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

accompanying S. 1630, one of the legislative vehicles for CAA section 112(r), the 

Committee stated that the accidental release provision "addresses substances which, 

when released into the air in significant quantities, may, even in periods of limited 

exposure, cause death or illness. " S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 205-206 

(1989). Every release cited by Congress in the legislative history (and EPA in the 

preamble to the proposed rale) focuses on the number of people killed or injured as a 

result of the release. In conjunction with the accidental release program, Congress did 

not discuss environmental damage unless that damage threatened human health and 

safety. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 

490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 154-157 (1990). (423-2, 425-2) 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees with the proposition expressed by these commenters, because the Agency finds 

no ambiguity in section 112(r) that requires resort to extra-legislative sources to discern whether 

Congress meant to address environmental impacts in the accidental release prevention program. In 

section 112(r)(l), Congress unambiguously states that "the objective ofthe regulations and programs 

authorized under this provision" is to prevent the accidental release of any 112(r)-listed (or other 

extremely hazardous substance) and to minimize the consequences of any accidental release of these 

categories of substances. In section 112(r)(3), Congress states with equal clarity that the substances of 

concern for section 112(r) regulations are those that "are known to cause or may reasonably be 

anticipated to cause death, injury, or serious adverse effects on human health and the environment." 

(Emphasis added.) Section 112(r) is clear on its face as an expression of Congressional intent to 

protect both human health and the environment from dangerous accidental releases to air. 

Section 112(r)(7)(B)(i) and (ii) mention effect on the environment in conjunction with 

emergency response, but the only time these paragraphs mention protection of human health is also in 

conjunction with emergency response. Congress did not 'intend to limit concern about either impact to 

emergency response procedures; Congress may not have mentioned either impact in relation to 

prevention steps because the act of preventing an accident eliminates the impact. When accidents 

occur, human health and the environment need protection. By mentioning both impacts in this 

context, Congress was stressing its concern for the environment as well as human health. In addition, 

EPA notes that emergency actions in response to a release to air are of limited effectiveness in 

addressing the environment. Where people can be evacuated or sheltered, the environment cannot. 

Consequently, prevention is critical to environmental protection. In addition, section 112(r)(9) 

provides authority for EPA to take emergency action when an actual or threatened accidental release of 
P.45 

3-15 

a regulated substance may cause imminent and substantial endangerment to human health, welfare, or 

the environment. Clearly, section 112(r)(9) allows EPA to take action to prevent, as opposed to 

simply respond to, accidental releases to protect the environment. Given that section 112(r)(7) is 

intended to prevent situations that could lead to emergency orders under section 112(r)(9), it is logical 

to conclude that Congress meant EPA to develop regulations that would prevent accidental releases 

that could cause environmental damage. 

EPA does not agree that Congress's decision to make the general 112(a) definitions applicable 

to section 112(r) means that Congress has precluded EPA from considering adverse environmental 

impacts in creating the 112(r) regulatory program. Indeed, the Agency believes that a reasonable 

interpretation of Congress's action is that it wanted to avoid applying a nanow 112(a) definition of 

environmental impacts to the section 112(r) rales. 

EPA disagrees that impacts on the environment need only be considered if they could result in 

human injury. It is highly unlikely that any release to ambient air could damage the environment in a 

way that would then lead to human injuries except in those cases where the effects are from 

overpressures or fires, where the presence of an environmental receptor is inelevant to the harm to 

humans. If a person is injured by a fire or explosion from a source, the location of the person is not 

relevant. For air toxics, the likely environmental damage would be destraction of wildlife or plant life, 

neither of which will lead to human health impacts under all but the most unusual circumstances, such 

as deposition on crops that are not subsequently removed from the food chain. To accept the 

commenters' definition would be to eliminate any consideration of the environment. That was not the 

intent of Congress. 

EPA recognizes the accidents that both it and Congress cited resulted in human deaths and 

injuries. Serious accidents are relatively rare events; accidents with serious environmental impacts are 

even rarer given the location of most industrial facilities. Nonetheless, EPA believes it is important to 

consider the possibility of such impacts. EPA notes that processes will not be denied Program 1 status 

if the only receptors of concern are environmental unless the process has had a release that resulted in 

response or restoration activities at an environmental receptor. The list of such receptors is limited. 

The focus of the rule should be public health and safety 

• Emergency planners deal with people, not vegetation or fish. It is not that 

environmental effects are unimportant, but in times of emergency, we deal with people 

first. Thus, a requirement to consider environmental effects would place an undue 

burden on facilities with little or no benefit to a community's health and safety. (382-

41, 382-141) 

• Any inclusion of environmental impacts, other than those that would cause direct 

human injury, would create an insupportable burden in the rale and diminish the rule's 

effectiveness. (382-54, 119-1, 313-2, 390-36, 392-1, 423-2, 532-9, 565-16) 

The definition of significant accidental release should not include environmental 

impacts and other end points that are not within the purview of public safety planning 

and emergency response; the definition within the rale should be focused on public 

safety. (437-2, 627-4) 
3-16 

EPA's proposed definition of significant accidental release is much too broad and 

exceeds the intent of Congress. The definition should not include environmental 

impacts and other endpoints not related to public safety and emergency response 

purposes. The CMA definition is specific and better focuses on the impact on public 

health and safety, which is the intent of the Act. (437-2) 

• The definition of significant accidental release should be limited to acute exposures 

and effects on human health. (462-10) 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees that rale should focus solely on public health and safety. The CAA clearly 

requires that the regulations address both public health and the environment. The focus of the rule is 

prevention of accidents that could have offsite impacts. Although EPA believes that impacts on the 

environment are important, the Agency recognizes the difficulty of predicting the potential impacts on 

environmental receptors. EPA has, therefore, limited the criteria for Program 1 eligibility to impacts 

on public receptors. Sources will be required to list the 

distance to an endpoint for a worst-case release, but the 

will not disqualify a process from Program 1. 

presence of environmental receptors within the 

presence of those receptors within the distance 

To limit the burden on sources, EPA has not required sources to analyze potential 

environmental impacts; under the rale, sources must note the presence of environmental receptors 

when they report on their offsite consequence analyses. For accident histories, sources must report on 

any known environmental effects, but are not required to carry out research to find or otherwise detail 

these effects. EPA believes that this approach provides natural resource agencies with information 

they may need to identify potential environmental problems without burdening sources. 

Other regulations cover environmental impacts 

• Other regulations already address the less acute incidents, including air toxics 

regulations under section 112 (d), (f), (h), and (k). By applying the proposed RMP 

regulation to these chronic incidents, EPA misreads the statate and makes the rale too 

broad and duplicative. In doing so, EPA has expanded the content of the rale, which 

will dilute the overall effort, significantly increase the cost of the regulation, and 

provide few if any safety benefits. (32-2,1 382-54) 

The inclusion of environmental effects unrelated to public health effects is an 

unauthorized trespass on the domain of other environmental statutes, is duplicative of 

other EPA regulations, is not supported by Executive Order 12866, and is an 

unwananted burden. Such a requirement will be very costly, and these costs have not 

been adequately considered in the Regulatory Impact Analysis. Its retention will divert 

resources from concerns that have a direct bearing on community safety, health, and 

emergency preparedness. (544-1) i 

The proposed rale also reaches to include far less than catastrophic environmental 

effects such as "soil, groundwater, or drinking water contamination, fish kills, and 

vegetation damage" and consideration of "sensitive ecosystems, migration routes, 

vulnerable natural areas, and critical habitats for threatened or endangered species". 
'TT" ' 

3-17 

Events such as these are managed under a variety of other rales and regulations. (388-

2, 393-1, 532-9, 674-6) 

• EPA should eliminate unenforceable language and diversions from the core purpose of 

this regulation, the prevention of human injury. It is hard to imagine an accidental 

release to the air that would pose a serious, long-term threat to the environment, but 

not threaten human health or safety. In any event, there are adequate sanctions and 

prevention programs under other laws: CERCLA, EPCRA, and the Clean Water Act. 

(2315-4) 

Agency Response 

The commenters have misunderstood EPA's rale. The rale does not apply to chronic 

incidents, but is limited to accidental releases of listed substances. EPA disagrees with the commenter 

who states that the rule trespasses on the domain of other environmental statutes. The CAA 

specifically mandates that section 112(r) rales on accidental releases consider impacts on the 

environment. 

In the final rule EPA has eliminated the list of environmental impacts. To limit the burden on 

sources, EPA has not required sources to analyze potential environmental impacts; under the rule, 

sources must note the presence of environmental receptors when they report on their offsite 

consequence analyses. For accident histories, sources must report on any known environmental effects 

(or effects about which a source should reasonably have known), but are not required to carry out 

research to find or otherwise detail these effects. EPA believes that this approach provides natural 

resource agencies with information they may need to identify potential environmental problems 

without burdening sources. 

Commenters suggest changes to and clarifications of environmental impact language: 

• EPA should limit environmental impacts to "serious adverse effects to the environment 

that could lead to such death or hospitalizations." (32-2) 

• Sections of the rale that refer to "adverse effects to human health and the 

environment" and "environmental damage" are not well defined. The preamble is not 

consistent as to the degree of protection sought: Section III.C. defines "significant 

release" as one that could cause "adverse effects to human health or the environment", 

whereas Section ELD. of the preamble refers to a significant release as one that could 

cause "serious adverse effects..." (emphasis added). The difference between these two 

definitions is not trivial. (43-17) 

• Inclusion of provisions such as those listed in § 68.15(e) and (f), addressing 

significantly less than catastrophic environmental events (fish kills, vegetation damage, 

etc.), is inappropriate. (58-6) 

• The terms "environmental damage" and "adverse effects" to the environment are never 

defined, permitting endless interpretations, including something as insignificant and 

minor as temporary vegetation damage or insect kills. Section 112(r)(7) was intended 

to cover only significant or ineversible environmental damage. (375-16, 670-5) 
3-18 

Executive Order No. 12866 requires agencies to draft regulations "with the goal of 

minimizing the potential for uncertainty and litigation arising from such uncertainty." 

Accordingly, EPA must define "environmental damage" to promote predictability in 

the regulations and in a way that is consistent with the purpose of section 112(r)(7). 

EPA should define "environmental damage" as including only "significant" and/or 

"ineyersible" environmental damage, and specify examples of the types of damage that 

might constitute "significant" and/or "irreversible" damage. (375-16) 

EPA should define what is meant by the serious adverse environmental effects to be 

considered. The breadth of environmental impact considerations can significantly 

influence the direction and complexity of the hazards assessments that industry must 

provide. The ancillary costs for this protection should be weighed carefully as 

facilities are considering worst-case scenarios, i.e., those which could theoretically 

occur, but whose probability of occunence is remote. Environmental considerations 

without acute human impact should be weighed differently than those which cause 

acute human impacts. If EPA does not address this issue, small businesses may be 

forced to spend extensive and precious resources for theoretical protection of the 

environment from improbable accidental releases. These resources might otherwise 

have been applied to the prevention of acute human impacts or to the protection of the 

environment from known or more likely chemical discharges or emissions. 

In the final rale, EPA should specify, by definition, what comprises "serious adverse 

impacts to the environment" and describe an illustrative methodology for assessing the 

value of environmental impacts in a worst-case release scenario vis-a-vis human 

impacts. It is the expectation that the human impact always reflects the "worst case." 

(380-8) 

The cunent definition is too general, contradictory and subject to interpretation. Under 

the cunent definition, a release that has ho potential for harming humans, but that 

deposits a minimal amount of a regulated substance offsite can be considered a 

significant accidental release. It can be argued that this minimal amount will have 

adverse effects on the environment because the term "adverse" has not been explicitly 

defined. To defend this position, industry would be burdened with performing 

comprehensive environmental impact studies for all regulated substances as they may 

adversely affect all flora and fauna sunounding the facility. (390-30) 

Section 112(a)(7) provides the definition for the term "adverse environmental effect." 

This definition should be incorporated into the risk management rales, but is not. This 

additional definition is extremely important because it evidences an intention by 

Congress that die term "adverse environmental effect" not be simply a negative effect. 

Rather, under the terms of this section, it is meant to attach only to those effects that 

are widespread and result in significant degradation. The proposed rales fail to take 

this concept into account at all. (394-1) ! 

I 

All references to environmental effects should be confined to § 68.45, on emergency 

response. However, if EPA rejects this position and keeps any other references to 

environmental effects, it is vitally important that the following concepts be clearly 

stated in the rale: I 
P.49 

3-19 

1. Owners and operators are required only to consider readily available information. 

They are not required to conduct exhaustive tests of direct toxic effects and effects on 

behavior for every regulated substance on every species of plant and animal life. 

2. In evaluating and assessing environmental effects, owners and operators may use 

general qualitative terms without having to quantify the numbers or identify the species 

that might be affected. For example, we would not have to say how many blades of 

grass might wither, or define which species of trees would be more sensitive. Instead, 

it would be sufficient to note that a major release of a chemical "could harm 

vegetation" or "could cause a fish kill," in addition to the impact on humans. 

3. If a release scenario would not cause human death, or injury requiring 

hospitalization, it is not a "significant accidental release" — regardless of any potential 

environmental effects. Thus, environmental harm would rise to the level of a 

"significant accidental release" only if the environmental consequences would lead to 

human death or hospitalization from acute exposure. This approach will allow owners 

and operators to focus their efforts on preventing releases that would affect humans. 

4. In comparing hazards and releases under this rale, owners and operators shall 

assume that any human death, or any human injury requiring hospitalization, is a more 

severe offsite consequence than any environmental effect. 

If these principles are clearly stated, we may be able to minimize unnecessary burdens 

and maintain the appropriate focus of this rale. People must be paramount, and 

protecting human health must be the undisputed, unquestionable priority of this rule. 

(382-55) 

The RMP rale should focus only on releases that have potentially catastrophic impacts 

on the environment, e.g., large fish kills or severe vegetation damage. (413-5) 

Some facets of the regulations need more specificity. For example, the definition of 

"environmental damage" should be limited to that which is significant and ineversible. 

(471-5,478-6) 

The agency should limit the substances to be evaluated to only those with recognized 

aquatic and tenestrial data available for making reasonable determinations of damage 

that could be expected. (537-8) 

We agree with EPA that less-than-catastrophic accidental releases, including those 

which cause soil contamination, vegetation damage,, and property damage, etc., are 

events that industry must (and does) act to prevent and mitigate in meeting other 

regulatory requirements. However, we have serious concerns that EPA, in "casting too 

broad a net" in this regulation, will dilute and misdirect the overall effort that must be 

mounted by industry, EPA, and other agencies in meeting these new regulatory 

requirements. (565-16) 
P.50 

3-20 

EPA should define "environmental damage" as including only "significant" or 

"ineversible" damage and specify which types of damage constitute "significant" or 

"ineversible" damage. (623-6) | 

The commenter would welcome EPA's expertise in defining objective standards for 

adverse environmental and human health effects to assure uniform implementation and 

to avoid time-consuming controversy over the adequacy of analysis. Similarly, the 

amount of information required to "detail environmental damage" and to identify all 

"affected populations" is potentially burdensome. Again, EPA should specify the level 

of detail expected in this analysis. (701-4) 

Agency Response 

EPA decided that a single definition of significant accidental release was inappropriate for all 

affected sections of the rule. In some cases, such as accident history, the covered accidents can be 

dictated by impacts; in other cases, such as the offsite consequence analysis, toxic concentrations, 

overpressures, or heat radiation above the endpoints can be used to define the releases that need to be 

considered. Consequently, EPA has decided to drop the definition and define the types of releases that 

should be covered for each requirement. To support these individual requirements, EPA has added 

definitions of the terms "environmental receptor," "injury," "medical treatment," and "public receptor" 

and adopted (with statutorily necessary modifications) the OSHA definition of catastrophic release. 

EPA has not defined "adverse effect to the environment" directly. For the offsite consequence 

analysis and accident investigation, the source need only consider whether one of the listed 

environmental receptors could be exposed. EPA recognizes that attempting to define the nature and 

extent of potential impacts to the environment would impose a substantial burden and may, in most 

cases, not be feasible because of the lack of data on environmental impacts. Sources, therefore, are 

not required to assess potential impacts. For accident histories, they must report on any known 

environmental effects (of effects about which a source should reasonably have known), but are not 

required to carry out research to find or otherwise detai 

from deposits of a released substance are unlikely to be 

these effects. Potential long-term damage 

reported because the damage would be 

speculative, not actaal. For Program 1 eligibility, only an accidental release from a process that results 

in environmental damage that required restoration or response activity at an environmental receptor 

would make a process ineligible for that tier. EPA believes that only significant environmental 

damage will lead to such activities. Under none of these requirements are sources required to make 

judgments about the relative importance of environmental impacts versus human impacts. 

Although EPA has deleted the list of environmental impacts, it continues to believe that if any 

of these occuned as a result of an accidental release to the ambient air (the releases of concern for this 

rule), they should be noted in the accident history. The source is not required to conduct research to 

determine if any damage occuned, assess the level of damage of which it is aware, or present other 

information on these impacts, but simply has to check off diat environmental damage occuned. 

EPA disagrees that the CAA limits section 112(r) consideration to ineversible damage. In the 

context of the environment, determining that a particular impact is ineversible would be very difficult 

because over time the environment will restore itself to some degree. If EPA were to interpret 

ineversible for environmental impacts in the same way ineversible is applied to humans, any death of 

an animal would be considered ineversible. EPA has established only one standard for assessing the 
P.51 

3-21 

level of damage that affects eligibility: under Program 1, processes must not have had a release that 

required response or restoration activity at an environmental receptor. EPA believes that this standard 

is clear and will not create a basis for disagreements, as attempts to define "significant" or 

"ineversible" might. 

In regard to the comment that sources would be compelled to undertake actions to protect the 

environment, EPA has not required sources to take any specific actions to address potential impacts, 

human or environmental, that may result from a worst-case release. Sources should consider not only 

the potential impacts, but also the likelihood that such a release would occur before taking actions to 

prevent it. In many cases, mitigation systems will already be in place to reduce the potential severity 

of the impacts. 

EPA disagrees that impacts on the environment need only be considered if they could result in 

human injury. It is unlikely that any release to ambient air could damage the environment in a way 

that would then lead to human injuries except in those cases where the effects are from overpressures 

or fires, where the presence of an environmental receptor is inelevant to the harm to human. If a 

person is injured by a fire or explosion from a source, the location of the person is not relevant. For 

air toxics, the likely environmental damage would be destraction of wildlife or plant life, neither of 

which will lead to human health impacts under all but the most unusual circumstances (e.g., deposition 

on crops that are not then removed from the food chain). To accept the commenters definition would 

be to eliminate any consideration of the environment. That was not the intent of Congress. 

Section 112(r)(7)(B)(i) and (ii) mention effect on the environment in conjunction with 

emergency response, but the only time these paragraphs mention protection of human health is also in 

conjunction with emergency response. Congress did not intend to limit concern about either impact to 

emergency response procedures; Congress may not have mentioned either impact in relation to 

prevention steps because the act of preventing an accident eliminates the impact. When accidents 

occur, human health and the environment need protection. By mentioning both impacts in this 

context, Congress was stressing its concern for the environment as well as human health in preventing 

accidents as well as responding to them. EPA notes that emergency actions in response to a release to 

air are of limited effectiveness in addressing the environment. Where people can be evacuated or 

sheltered, the environment cannot. Consequently, prevention is critical to environmental protection. 

In addition, section 112(r)(9) provides authority for EPA to take emergency action when an actaal or 

threatened accidental release of a regulated substance may cause imminent and substantial 

endangerment to human health, welfare, or the environment. Clearly, section 112(r)(9) allows EPA to 

take action to prevent, as opposed to simply respond to, accidental releases to protect the environment. 

Given that section 112(r)(7) is intended to prevent sitaations that could lead to emergency orders under 

section 112(r)(9), it is logical to conclude that Congress meant EPA to develop regulations that would 

prevent accidental releases that could cause environmental damage. 

EPA has not adopted die definition of adverse environmental impacts from CAA section 

112(a) because section 112(a) specifically states that those definitions do not apply to section 112(r). 

The section 112(a) definition is more appropriate for the routine and continuous emissions covered by 

the rest of section 112 than it is for accidental releases where the kind of damage that can be expected 

is likely to be limited in area. 

EPA disagrees that the environmental impacts of substances be limited to those substances for 

which data are available. As discussed above, EPA is not requiring sources to assess the damage. For 
3-22 

the offsite consequence analysis, sources need only note the presence of environmental receptors; they 

are not required to make determinations about the damages that might occur. EPA has not adopted 

endpoints for environmental effects for two reasons. First, few data are available on environmental 

impacts. Second, developing ecotoxicity endpoints is complex because the impacts on various 

receptors must be considered; a level that might be acutely toxic to insects might have lesser effects on 

birds and none on larger mammals. Consequently, EPA has not required sources to assess potential 

environmental damage. Sources are required only to identify potential environmental receptors within 

the distance to a specified endpoint and to report on environmental damage from accidental releases 

when they are aware of the damage. EPA recognizes that the toxic endpoints are not related to 

ecological impacts, but is using them to identify an area that may have such effects. In general, 

toxicity is related to body weight. Although some mammals are heavier than humans and, therefore, 

may be less vulnerable to specific concentrations, many 

these concentrations than humans would be. 

animals and plants may be more sensitive to 

Commenters state that the knowledge does not exist to assess all environmental impacts 

listed in the rule: 

• No one has an encyclopedic knowledge jof the environmental effects of all the 

regulated substances. With so many potential endpoints to look at, such as a multitude 

of possible acute and chronic harms to aquatic life, plants, birds, and all species of 

mammals, there is still a lot that will need to be learned before we can predict 

environmental harms the way we can estimate potential harm to people. Yet the 

proposed rale even goes farther than this, requiring an evaluation of behavioral effects 

such as changes in migration routes. In general, the science just is not here. For any 

given substance, there may be no data to determine direct toxicity to monarch 

butterflies or mallard ducks, let alone effects on their flight paths. Too broad a 

definition would also introduce problems of comparison such as deciding whether a 

risk to spanows is more important that a risk to catfish, and whether the death of fifty 

trees is more serious than hospitalization of two people. Those are decisions that no 

one can make. We do not have encyclopedic knowledge of the location of every 

species of plant and animal for miles in Iall directions. For example, suppose that a 

particular substance was found to damage Kentucky bluegrass but not Bermuda grass. 

To prepare a hazard assessment that included environmental impacts, it appears that we 

would have to examine everyone's lawn! Worse yet, if anyone reseeded, we would 

need a mechanism to find out about that. The same would be true for anyone planting 

or cutting down trees around their houses. This burden would be beyond our ability. 

(117-5,382-141) I 

I 

• There are two potentially significant difficulties with this requirement. The first is that 

the methodology to perform such environmental effects studies, in many cases, is still 

in the development stage. The second is diat clear criteria to evaluate environmental 

effects (i.e., which ecosystems are included, what degree of risk should be considered, 

what emergency response and mitigation action is justified, etc.) are not provided in 

this regulation. (470-1, 627-4) I 
3-23 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with the commenters and has not required that sources assess the environmental 

impacts. For the ,offsite consequence analysis and accident investigation, the source need only 

consider whether one of the listed environmental receptors could be exposed. EPA recognizes that 

attempting to define the nature and extent of potential impacts to the environmental would impose a 

substantial burden and may, in most cases, not be feasible because of the lack of data on 

environmental impacts. Sources, therefore, are not required to assess potential impacts. For accident 

histories, they must report on any known environmental effects, but are not required to carry out 

research to find or otherwise detail these effects. For Program 1 eligibility, environmental damage 

from an accident release may make a process ineligible for Program 1, if the damage required 

restoration or response activity at an environmental receptor. EPA believes that only significant 

environmental damage will lead to such activities. 

Commenters provide the following additional comments: 

• EPA should emphasize the need to protect human health and prevent well-established 

environmental risks first. Expenditures to protect against speculative environmental 

risks should be avoided. (22-16) 

• Requiring assessment of potential environmental impact would not only be extremely 

difficult, but it would not provide significant additional insight into prevention 

programs. These additional requirements would place an undue burden on facilities in 

terms of difficulty and expense with little or no benefit to a community's health and 

safety. (117-5, 382-41, 382-141, 693-1) 

• Environmental and human protection must be considered in the same context, where 

protection of human health and safety will, in most cases, adequately address that of 

the environment as well. (543-8) 

• The proposed hazard analysis approach would require stationary sources to perform a 

National Environmental Protection Act-type analysis of offsite environmental effects, 

including impacts on "sensitive ecosystems," "migration routes," "vulnerable natural 

areas," and "critical habitats for threatened or endangered species." Such an analysis 

would have no nexus,.however, to any potential public health effects caused by an 

accidental release, and thus, is not authorized by the statate. Moreover, such an 

analysis would impose extraordinary burdens, with little conesponding benefit. (557-

13, 558-12, 390-30) 

Agency Response 

Sources are not required to take any specific actions to address potential impacts, human or 

environmental, that may result from a worst-case release. Sources should consider not only the 

potential impacts, but also the likelihood that such a release would occur before taking actions to 

prevent it. In many cases, mitigation systems will already be in place to reduce the potential severity 

of the impacts. 
3-24 i 

EPA has not required that sources assess the environmental impacts. For the offsite 

consequence analysis and accident investigation, the source need only consider whether one of the 

listed environmental receptors could be exposed. EPA recognizes that attempting to define the nature 

and extent of potential impacts to the environmental would impose a substantial burden and may, in 

most cases, not be feasible because of the lack of data on environmental impacts. Sources, therefore, 

are not required to assess potential impacts. For accident histories, they must report on any known 

environmental effects, but are not required to carry out research to find or otherwise detail these 

effects. For Program 1 eligibility, the environmental damage that would make a process ineligible for 

the tier is limited to damage that required restoration or response activity at an environmental receptor. 

EPA believes that only significant environmental damage will lead to such activities. 

EPA disagrees that impacts on the environment need only be considered if they could result in 

human injury. It is highly unlikely that any release to ambient air could damage the environment in a 

way that would then lead to human injuries except in those cases where the effects are from 

overpressures or fires, where the presence of an environmental receptor is inelevant to the harm to 

humans. If a person is injured by a fire or explosion from a source, the location of the person is not 

relevant. For air toxics, the likely environmental damage would be destraction of wildlife or plant life, 

neither of which will lead to human health impacts under all but the most unusual circumstances. To 

accept the commenters interpretation would be to eliminate any consideration ofthe environment. 

That was not the intent of Congress. 

C. ENDPOINT CRITERIA 

A number of commenters believed EPA's proposed definition of significant accidental release 

was too broad; several suggested specific endpoints EPA could use to limit the definition, including 

Community Emergency Exposure Levels (CEELs) developed by the National Academy of Sciences 

and Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) developed by the American Industrial Hygiene 

Association. One commenter maintained that a significant accidental release involving explosives, as 

indicated by exposure of the public to a defined blast overpressure level, is not possible because of 

existing regulations and industry practices. | 

i 

Commenters recommend the following endpoint criteria to define significant accidental 

releases for toxic substances: 

National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Community Emergency Exposure Levels (CEELs) 

• EPA should provide guidance on toxicological endpoints for evaluation of the impact 

of a significant accidental release on the public, addressing chemical-specific 

toxicological endpoints in terms of hazard, potency, and exposure duration. The rale 

should establish procedures for developing critical inhalation exposure levels that 

incorporate both chemical concentration] and exposure duration information. EPA 

should incorporate by reference a modified version of the CEELs developed by the 

National Research Council as well as the Guidelines for Developing Community 

Emergency Exposure Levels for Hazardous Substances. Without such guidance on 

toxicological endpoints, serious inconsistencies in the determination of impact on 

communities will result. (43-16 & 18) | 
3-25 

• CEELs (specifically CEEL-3) are appropriate endpoints because they are chemicalspecific ceiling exposure values for the public applicable to emergency exposures of 

foreseeable magnitade and duration. They are scientifically rigorous, incorporate the 

latest technical information, and address explicitly each of the four factors essential for 

such exposure levels, i.e., the population potentially exposed; the degree and pattern of 

exposure; the nature, severity, and reversibility of the anticipated effects; and the 

proportion of those exposed who are subject to toxic effects. Because there are three 

CEELs for each substance, a wide range of human responses to toxic substances are 

taken into consideration. The development process is explicit, subject to review by a 

committee of experts, and available for public review and comment. CEELs are 

designed to protect community populations, including sensitive populations, from rare 

chemical exposures. (43-18) 

• CEELs are applicable for exposure durations of 1 to 8 hours; however, accidental 

catastrophic releases are typically characterized by peak exposure concentrations that 

may last no more than five minutes. EPA is considering the five-minute peak 

concentration scenario for modeling the worst-case release. If the CEEL value is 

assumed to conespond to an "instantaneous" exposure, then the hazard assessment will 

be overly conservative. Therefore, EPA should add an additional value of CEELPEAK that addresses five-minute exposures. EPA and others should jointly sponsor 

research to collect the necessary data for developing these limits. (43-18) 

Agency Response 

EPA plans to adopt the Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs), as the CEELs have been 

renamed, when they are available. EPA agrees that these levels, which will be developed for 

accidental release exposures, will be the most appropriate endpoints. At present, however, the process 

of developing the AEGLs has just begun. Because sources need to make decisions about Program 

levels and begin the offsite consequence analysis, EPA had to adopt available toxic endpoints to define 

distances. EPA selected ERPG-2s, where available, and the levels of concern EPA developed for the 

Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis, both of which have been widely used by the response 

community. When the AEGLs are developed, EPA will propose their adoption as endpoints for this 

rale and solicit public comment about their appropriateness. 

American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) Emergency Response Planning Guidelines 

(ERPGs) 

• The definition of significant accidental release should be limited to substantial acute 

human injury based on ERPGs. (117-6) 

• EPA should define significant accidental release as a release that could cause death or 

serious injury requiring hospitalization. ERPGs could be used to determine whether an 

accidental release was significant. If modeling a potential release indicated that the 

highest concentration to which the public would be exposed was less than the ERPG-2, 

then that release would not be a significant accidental release with respect to acute 

toxicity. If the concentration was higher than the ERPG-2, it would be a significant 

accidental release. (382-68 & 70) 
3-26 

• EPA should not incorporate the ERPGsl into the law, but should indicate that ERPGs 

are among the criteria EPA would accept. (382-68 & 70) 

i 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with the commenters that, at this time, the ERPGs are appropriate toxic endpoints. 

The rale specifies toxic endpoints based on ERPG-2 for all substances that have ERPG-2 values. 

These endpoints will be used to determine "distance to an endpoint" for worst-case and alternative 

release scenarios under the offsite consequence analysis'. EPA decided that it was important to 

incorporate specific endpoints in the rule to ensure that dispersion modeling conducted by sources 

would have a consistent basis and could be compared among sources. Without specified endpoints, 

sources would have been able to select an endpoint that produced a particular result. Because the 

distance to the endpoint is used to determine Program 1 

the same endpoint. Without such consistency, sources' 

eligibility, it is essential that every source use 

decisions on their Program 1 status would be 

open to challenge based on disagreements over the endpoint selected. 

The Agency has deleted the definition of significant accidental release and, instead, describes 

the types of releases that should be covered for each requirement. 

Other levels 

• The definition of significant accidental release should include a standard for 

calculations (e.g., the STEL). (477-7, 669-8) 

EPA should define the level of concern 

IDLH). (627-3) 

for significant accidental releases (e.g., 1/10 

• The definition of significant accidental release is too broad and vague; EPA should 

provide criteria for determining which consequences of a release constitute "adverse 

effects." EPA should establish, for each regulated substance, an "action guide"; i.e., an 

offsite concentration at which adverse effects would be expected to occur. (467-1) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees that specific endpoints are needed and has adopted them in Appendix A to the 

rule. The endpoints are based on ERPG-2, when available; for substances without ERPG-2 values, the 

endpoints are those used in the Technical Guidance for\Hazards Analysis, which were based on l/10th 

the IDLH or toxicity data. 

The Agency has deleted the definition of significant accidental release and, instead, describes 

the types of releases that should be covered for each requirement. 

Other comments on toxics \ 

i 

• In an accidental release, acute toxicity should be the focus of immediate concern. 

Other possible health effects, such as chronic, teratogenic, and mutagenic impacts upon 

the population, belong in a separate study (e.g., restrictive zoning around industrial 

facilities). (460-5) 
'

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3-27 

• The definition of significant accidental release should be limited to acute exposures. 

Including adverse effects to human health in the definition is too broad (e.g., criteria 

pollutants' concentrations exceeding National Ambient Air Quality Standards will 

cause adverse effects to human health). (462-10) 

Agency Response 

EPA has deleted the definition of significant accidental release. The toxic endpoints specified 

in the rale are related to acute health effects; ERPG-2s are defined as the concentration belwo which 

almost all people could be exposed for one hour without ineversible or other serious health effects or 

symptoms that would impair their ability to take protective actions. 

Commenters recommend the following endpoint criteria to define significant accidental 

releases for flammable substances: 

• For explosions, EPA should use a peak overpressure of 1.6 psig to define a significant 

accidental release that could cause death or serious injury requiring hospitalization. 

This overpressure level can break windows and may cause partial demolition of 

houses; serious injury may occur from flying glass and falling debris. (382-68 & 70) 

• To define situations where serious injury may be anticipated from fires, EPA should 

use the following: 

> For pool fires and jet fires, radiation heat flux of 5 kilowatts per square meter 

(the threshold of second-degree burn based on a 90-second exposure); 

> For fireballs, radiation heat flux of 4 kilowatts per square meter (the threshold 

of second-degree burn); and 

> For flash fires, one-half of the lower flammability limit (estimate of the flame 

and heat radiation envelope that could seriously impact public safety and 

health). (382-68 & 70) 

Agency Response 

EPA has adopted 1 psi as the overpressure endpoint. For fires, EPA has specified 5 kw/m , 

which represents the threshold for second degree burns from a 40-second exposure. EPA did not 

select a different level for fireballs because the exposure time from such events is very short, which 

would indicate that if a different level were used, it should be higher. For vapor cloud fires, EPA has 

specified the lower flammability limit (LFL). EPA considered the commenter's suggestion, but 

decided that it was too conservative. Dispersion modeling already includes a number of conservative 

assumptions in analyzing the distance to the LFL. The modeling assumes that the cloud will disperse 

to the maximum distance, when it could ignite much sooner. 
P.58 

3-28 

Commenter makes the following comment on endpoint criteria to define significant 

accidental releases for explosives: 

• In an accidental explosion of Division 1.1 explosives, no inhabited building or member 

of the public will ever be exposed to 3 psi because of the effective regulation of other 

agencies and long-standing industry practices regarding siting of storage and 

manufacturing buildings. Any exposures that occur will take place at considerably 

lower blast overpressures, with no significant risk of harm to the public or to property. 

(23-6) 

Agency Response 

EPA has not adopted an endpoint for explosives because the Agency is proposing to delist 

explosives from § 68.130. Consequently, the concerns of the commenter have been addressed. 

D. INCLUSION OF SHELTERING IN PLACE AND EVACUATIONS 

Commenters support or oppose inclusion of sheltering in place: 

• The phrase "or to cause the public to shelter-in-place or be evacuated to avoid such 

consequences," should be removed for the following reasons: (1) the definition of 

"significant accidental release" can be improved by defining the release in terms of the 

serious harm that might occur, rather than the protective measures taken in the event 

of a release; (2) sheltering in place can be a conservative, protective practice that 

should not be discouraged by EPA making it a criterion for scope/application of this 

regulation; (3) it is unnecessary, because any "significant accidental release" as defined 

above already includes any event that would "... cause the public to shelter-in-place or 

be evacuated to avoid such consequences." (76-17, 115-2, 371-26, 371-172, 470-1. 

565-15, 2162-13) 

• This is a procedure [sheltering in place] that is not always recognized by emergency 

response personnel. (87-7) 

• The agency has gone too far by including "shelter in place" events and "evacuation" 

events within the definition. Both provisions should be deleted. (374-21, 425-1) 

• If the rule says that every time we recommend sheltering in place, that makes the 

release "significant," there will be a disincentive for companies to make the 

recommendation. This could very well result in an increase in the risk to the public. 

We feel that the inclusion in the definition of "the potential to cause acute offsite 

consequences" adequately captures EPA's intent when they included sheltering in 

place. (382-42) 

• EPA should revise, or even delete, that part of the definition which includes events 

that have "the potential to cause .. . the public to shelter-in-place or be evacuated to 

avoid such consequences." This wording could be subject to a myriad of conflicting 

interpretations. For example, the word "public" is ambiguous. This could include one, 

ten, or hundreds of people. In addition, merely advising people to remain off the 
P.59 

3-29 

streets in the area of a site could qualify as causing people to "shelter-in-place" when 

it might be simply a matter of convenience to authorities. Also, evacuation to "avoid 

such consequences" could be applied to any potential consequences ranging from 

serious adverse health effects to minor physical initation. (413-2) 

• The EPA definition of significant release is one that has potential to cause off-site 

consequences such as death, injury, or adverse human health effects, or cause the 

public to shelter in place. The proposed definition is too broad and goes beyond the 

intent of Congress in the Clean Air Act Amendments. Subjective descriptions such as 

"shelter in place" must be deleted. (511-15) 

• Sheltering in place is a method undertaken to prevent adverse consequences such as 

human death, ineversible health effects, or hospitalization and, therefore, should be 

considered to be a mitigation strategy for reacting to a significant accidental release. 

Its inclusion in this definition may result in facilities being more hesitant to 

recommend sheltering in place following a release. The inclusion of this term in the 

definition may have the effect of penalizing a facility for acting in a proactive manner. 

(674-7) 

Agency Response 

Although EPA recognizes the importance of sheltering in place, EPA decided to delete public 

evacuations or shelterings-in-place as criteria for Program 1 eligibility, but to retain it as a trigger for 

inclusion of a release in the five-year accident history. EPA is concerned that inclusion of these 

criteria in Program 1 eligibility may create a perverse incentive not to report releases and it may 

encourage sources and local emergency officials to take more chances during an event when there may 

be potential exposures that do not rise to the endpoint specified in this rale but would otherwise be 

worthy of precautionary actions by the source or by local officials. If the evacuation or sheltering 

takes place because of a concern for public exposure to an endpoint as specified in this rale, then 

public receptors necessarily would be under the worst case distance and the process would not be 

eligible for Program 1 under the criteria of the rale. Owners or operators of processes that meet 

Program 1 eligilibility requirements are required to report a five-year accident history for that process. 

If local emergency planners, first responders or the public have concerns about processes in Program 1 

because of a past evacuation or sheltering-in-place event, then mechanisms under EPCRA could be 

used to gather more information from the source about its prevention program (such as EPCRA 

sections 302(b)(2) [designation of a facility if it does not already handle extremely hazardous 

substances listed under section 302] and 303(d)(3) [provision of information to the emergency 

planning committee]) and involve the source in emergency planning. Sources and local first 

responders should be discussing evacuation and sheltering-in-place criteria and decisions as part of 

emergency response planning. 

Sheltering in place covers actions taken to protect people from exposure to the substance; it 

does not include actions taken simply to clear a route for response equipment. 

E. COMMENTERS PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 

On page 54194 of this regulation EPA does not include the full definition of 

significant release when it talks about the worst-case scenario. The part that says, "Or 
P.60 

3-30 

to cause the public to shelter in place or be evacuated to avoid such consequences" 

was omitted. Is EPA doing this so that fewer significant releases will be looked at 

regarding worst-case scenario information and as a basis for developing such 

scenarios? (128-4) 

• EPA should use with care the term "accidental release." There is no such thing as an 

"accidental" release. In every instance an unintended release of chemicals is a failure 

of the mechanisms in place to prevent the release. (147-9) 

Agency Response 

EPA has deleted the definition of significant accidental release. The worst-case scenario is 

defined in § 68.25. The rule defines the worst-case release in terms of the distance to a specified 

endpoint, not in terms of potential impacts, which would be hard to predict. 

EPA understands the argument that all accidents can be prevented, but the statute uses the 

phrase "accidental release," and the Agency must be consistent with the statutory language. 

F. ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS 

Commenters propose the following alternative definitions: 

• Any accidental release of a regulated substance to the ambient air that has caused or 

could be expected to cause acute offsite consequences such as deaths, multiple 

hospitalizations, or releases to the environment that could lead to such deaths or 

hospitalizations. (32-2, 48-6, 90-6, 129-5, 143-2) 

• Significant accidental release means an unanticipated emission of a regulated substance 

into the ambient air from a stationary source which could produce a significant 

likelihood that persons exposed offsite may suffer acute health effects resulting in 

significant injury or death. (77-1) 

• "Significant accidental release" means any accidental release of a regulated substance 

to the ambient air that has caused or could be expected to cause acute offsite 

consequences such as death, multiple hospitalizations, or serious adverse effects to the 

environment that could lead to such deaths or hospitalizations. (76-16, 115-2, 137-5, 

313-2, 314-8. 388-2, 390-30, 392-1, 396-1, 424-2, 509-6, 510-4, 667-5, 671-1) 

• Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance 

above the threshold quantity that has caused or has the potential to cause offsite 

consequences such as death, injury, or adverse effects to human health or the 

environment or to cause the public to shelter-in-place or be evacuated to avoid such 

consequences. (110-5) 

• Any accidental release of a regulated substance to the ambient air that has caused or 

has the potential to cause acute offsite impact such as human death, or serious injury 

of a type requiring people to be hospitalized. (117-7, 627-4) 
P.61 

3-31 

Any accidental release of a regulated substance to the ambient air that has caused or 

could be expected to cause acute offsite consequences such as deaths, hospitalizations, 

or adverse health effects to the public or environment that could lead to such health 

effects. (123-2) 

Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance 

where there is a reasonable belief that the release has caused or has threatened to cause 

offsite consequences such as death, injury requiring medical attention, or adverse 

effects to human health or the environment or to cause the public to shelter-in-place or 

be evacuated to avoid such consequences. (295-7) 

Any accidental release of a regulated substance to the ambient air that has caused or 

could be expected to cause acute offsite consequences such as human deaths, multiple 

hospitalizations, or releases to the environment that could lead to such deaths or 

hospitalizations. (371-5, 371-25, 371-171) 

Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance to 

the ambient air that has caused or has the potential to cause human death, or serious 

injury, of a type requiring people to be hospitalized, due to acute exposure. (382-42) 

Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance to 

the ambient air that: 

(a) Is shown to impact areas regularly occupied by the general public such as schools, 

residences, businesses, or public recreation areas, and; 

(b) Has caused or could reasonably be expected to cause acute offsite human health 

consequences such as death, multiple hospitalizations, or serious adverse effects to the 

environment that could lead to such deaths or hospitalizations. (393-1) 

Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance to 

the ambient air that has caused or could reasonably be expected to cause acute offsite 

consequences, such as death, multiple hospitalizations, or serious adverse effects to 

human health or the environment that could lead to such deaths or hospitalizations. 

(425-3, 443-11, 526-5, 565-14) 

Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance 

that has caused or has the potential to cause offsite consequences such as death, injury, 

or to cause the public shelter in place or be evacuated to avoid such consequences. 

(438-15) 

An accidental release of a regulated substance to the ambient air that has caused, or 

could be expected to cause, adverse acute health consequences offsite, such as death, 

injury requiring hospitalization, or serious adverse effects to the environment that 

could lead directly to such deaths or injuries. (446-8, 667-5) 

Significant accidental release means an unanticipated emission of a regulated substance 

into the ambient air from a stationary source which could produce a significant 
3-32 ' 

likelihood that persons exposed off-site jmay suffer acute health effects resulting in 

significant injury or death. (464-2) j 

Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance to 

the ambient air that has caused or could, be expected to cause adverse acute health 

consequences offsite, such as human death, ineversible health effects, multiple 

hospitalizations, or serious adverse effects to the environment that could provide a 

direct pathway to such consequences. (470-1, 629-4)) 

Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance 

that has caused or has the potential to cause offsite consequences such as death, injury, 

or adverse affects to human health or the environment or to cause the public to shelterin-place or to be evacuated to avoid such consequences. (495-3) 

A release of a regulated substance into the ambient air that may cause adverse acute 

health effects or serious adverse effects to the environment. (511-15) 

A significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance 

to the ambient air that has caused or could reasonably be expected to cause acute 

offsite consequences, such as death or multiple hospitalizations, or serious adverse 

effects to the environment that could lead to acute offsite consequences, such as deaths 

or hospitalizations. (545-7) 

Significant accidental release means a release of a regulated substance to the ambient 

air that causes or has the potential to cause acute offsite impact, such as death or 

injury/adverse effects to human health sufficient to require medical treatment as 

defined by the OSHA 200 Log. (693-1 j 

i 

Any accidental release of a regulated substance that has caused or has the potential to 

cause offsite consequences such as death, injury, or adverse effects to human health 

such as would be expected if the IDLH concentrations were exceeded at the fenceline. 

(693-19) 

Any accidental release of a regulated substance that has caused or has the potential to 

cause, from the reasonable perspective of first response personnel, on-site 

consequences such as death, injury or adverse effects to the health of persons 

responding to the release, or offsite consequences such as death, injury, or adverse 

effects to human health or the environment or to cause the public to shelter in place or 

be evacuated to avoid such consequences. (702-5) 

Significant accidental release means any accidental release of a regulated substance to 

the ambient air that has caused or has the potential to cause offsite consequences, such 

as death, injury, or acute adverse effects to human health that could lead to death or 

injury. (707-9) ' 
P.63 

3-33 

Agency Response 

EPA decided that a single definition of significant accidental release was inappropriate for all 

affected sections of the rale. In some cases, such as accident history, the covered accidents can be 

dictated by impacts; in other cases, such as the offsite consequence analysis, toxic concentrations, 

overpressures, or heat radiation above the endpoints can be used to define the releases that need to be 

considered. Consequently, EPA has decided to drop the definition and define the types of releases that 

should be covered for each requirement. To support these individual requirements, EPA has added 

definitions of the terms, "environmental receptor," "injury," "medical treatment," and "public receptor" 

and adopted (with statutorily necessary modifications) the OSHA definition of catastrophic release. 

EPA has not defined effects based on their probability. EPA recognizes that defining the 

likelihood of a specific impact occurring is not feasible in most cases because many factors beyond the 

quantity and duration of a release affect the chance that it will impact humans or the environment. 

For the offsite consequence analysis, EPA is defining the distance of concern based on the distance to 

specified endpoints, which are associated with potential effects, using conservative assumptions on 

other factors, such as wind speed and stability, for worst-case analyses. The endpoints do not imply 

that specific impacts will occur, just that they are possible when people are exposed to these toxic 

concentrations, overpressures, or heat radiation. 

The final rule defines "injury" to mean any effect to a human being that results from direct 

exposure to toxic concentrations, radiant heat, or overpressures from accidental releases or from the 

direct consequences of a vapor cloud explosion from an accidental release and that requires medical 

treatment or hospitalization. EPA has adopted a definition of medical treatment used by OSHA in 

reporting occupational illness and injuries as one commenter recommended. This definition does not 

limit injuries to ineversible effects or those requiring hospitalization, which the Agency believes would 

be too stringent a requirement. A release that leads people to seek medical treatment may have the 

potential to cause serious impacts, especially among vulnerable populations. EPA disagrees with the 

commenter that injuries should be limited by the number that occur. A single serious injury to the 

public indicates the potential for greater harm, and the accidental release that caused the injury should 

be covered by this rale. 

Although EPA is concerned about injuries to first responders, the rule is not directed toward 

these injuries because they are addressed by OSHA rales on worker safety. The endpoints that have 

been selected are based, to the extent possible, on effects to the general public, whose members are not 

trained in protective action, do not have protective equipment, and may be more vulnerable than 

working adults. 

EPA did not define covered accidental releases based on concentration at the fenceline. For 

accident reporting, defining covered releases by concentration at the fenceline would be difficult for 

sources to implement. Most sources covered by this rule are unlikely to have monitoring equipment at 

the fenceline. The only way in which they could determine potential concentration at the fenceline 

would be to do dispersion modeling. Even if this approach were economically reasonable, which EPA 

believes it is not, most dispersion models do not predict concentrations at less than 100 meters from 

the release point. Many smaller sources will have considerably less distance than this to their 

fenceline. For the offsite consequence analysis, sources will use specific endpoints and the distance to 

those endpoints. For other requirements, releases are covered if they caused (or in the case of accident 

investigation, had the potential to cause) certain impacts. 
•T*f»T T"i • 

16. INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 

Many commenters agreed that significant releases should be investigated, while other 

commenters argued that investigating only significant releases was not adequate. Numerous 

commenters argued that near misses should be investigated, but many other commenters opposed 

their inclusion in this requirement. Other commenters discussed the requirements for the 

accident investigation reports and the requirement for a written accident investigation plan. 

A. Types of Accidents to Investigate 

Commenters agree that significant releases should be investigated: 

• As EPA proposes, accident investigation should occur after each significant 

accidental release. (451-24) 

• Investigations help bring reality to the planning process and result in improved 

plans and a greater level of accident prevention. (702-11) 

Agency Response 

EPA has changed the rule language regarding incident investigation to be consistent with 

OSHA's PSM standard. The new language reads, "The owner or operator shall investigate each 

incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release." Under 

EPA's definition, catastrophic release means a major uncontrolled emission, fire, or explosion, 

involving one or more regulated substances that presents imminent and substantial endangerment 

to public health and the environment. The term "significant accidental release" has been dropped. 

EPA agrees that incident investigation improves the planning and accident prevention process, 

and believes that the new requirements ensure that incidents that resulted in, or could have been 

expected reasonably to result in a catastrophic release will be investigated and corrective action 

taken in a timely manner. 

Commenters argue that only certain types of releases should be investigated: 

• Only significant releases should be investigated; there is no statutory authority for 

any other investigations. Requiring any other investigations could subject industry 

to a wide range of litigation. (177-5, 394-11, 511-16) 

• Investigations should only be mandatory for releases in excess of the reportable 

quantity as defined in the community right-to-know regulations. (319-10) 

• In the interest of economy and feasibility, EPA should require only that significant 

accidental releases be investigated. (375-17,381-19,382-113) 

Agency Response 

EPA is mandated by the CAA to promulgate reasonable regulations for prevention and 

detection of accidental releases and responses to such releases. The Agency has included 

requirements for accident investigations in its regulation because such investigations can provide 

useful information about hazards and the steps needed to prevent an accidental release. EPA is 

requiring investigation only of catastrophic or potentially catastrophic releases because the Agency 
16-2 

believes these will provide the most useful information*, and this requirement will not be unduly 

burdensome to the regulated community. To be consistent with OSHA's PSM standard, EPA has 

changed the rule language to read, "the owner or operator shall investigate each incident which 

resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release." The term "significant 

accidental release" has been dropped. EPA is not requiring that accident investigation reports be 

made public; therefore, EPA does not believe accident investigations are likely to lead to 

litigation. ' 

EPA has not required investigation of releases; above the reportable quantity (RQ). The 

RQ is a reporting trigger; it is not intended to indicate the potential for offsite impact. For CAA 

112(r) regulated substances also regulated under CERCLA, RQs are lower, usually much lower, 

than the threshold quantities under CAA section 112(r), and release of an RQ would likely not 

be catastrophic. In addition, EPA does not believe that a release of any specific quantity of a 

regulated substance can be used as an indicator of potential for a catastrophic impact because of 

the many site-specific factors involved. As noted, the -owner or operator shall investigate each 

incident that resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release. 

Commenters argue that investigating only significant releases is inadequate: 

• The owner or operator should investigate all accidental releases. If only significant 

releases are reported, the value of reporting accidents becomes less important for 

public safety. The purpose of reporting should be to assist in preventing accidents 

before they occur. Reporting all accidents would allow EPA to see if patterns 

develop that could suggest the potential for more serious releases. (461-8) 

• EPA and industry will have a difficult time agreeing on .which incidents, beyond 

those that result in catastrophic effects, require investigation. A system of incident 

reports should be established as part of the prevention program. Incident reports 

should be filed with management for any abnormal occurrences or observations as 

part of the normal operations at a facility. Once a simple system of incident 

reports is established, it becomes much easier to expand the investigation for all 

accidents because the tools and skills are ingrained. (664-43) 

Agency Response 

EPA has adopted OSHA PSM language on incident investigation to ensure consistency 

between the two rule. The Agency believes that requiring investigation of incidents which 

resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release will satisfy EPA's 

objectives of investigating incidents to gather information about the hazards and the steps needed 

to prevent accidental releases while not unduly burdening facilities by requiring investigation of all 

incidents. EPA believes it would be unduly burdensome to require investigation of all accidental 

releases. There are no incident reporting requirements under this rule. 

Commenters argue that near misses should be investigated: 

• Investigations of near misses should be required because they are a proven risk 

reduction management tool that provides important information for correcting 
^?^W®£W*~rFT^*'-" 

• 16-3 

problems that might otherwise lead to significant accidental releases. (4-1, 8-6, 87-

36, 147-7, 154-11,494-17,498-24, 537-17, 587-4, 669-20, 1011-11) 

• Not including near misses in the investigation would weaken the effectiveness of 

the program. (128-11) 

Near misses should be investigated. (128-26, 218-15, 363-34,451-26, 566-48,606-

10,663-12,664-42) 

• Near misses should be investigated, but the reports should not be made public. 

(321-5) 

• Near misses should be investigated to preserve consistency with OSHA 

requirements. (390-10) 

• Because the definition of significant accidental release includes the phrase "or has 

the potential to cause," near misses must to be investigated. (392-21) 

• Near misses should be investigated using a more streamlined procedure than that 

adopted for significant releases. (482-18, 533-33) 

Agency Response 

Under the requirement to investigate each incident which resulted in, or could reasonably 

have resulted in a catastrophic release, owners or operators will need to investigate those 

incidents that create or reasonably could have created imminent and substantial danger to public 

health and the environment offsite had the situation been different (e.g.,unfavorable weather 

conditions). This requirement is consistent with OSHA requirements. EPA also encourages, but 

does not require, owners or operators to examine closely and appropriately investigate incidents 

that were prevented from occurring or from having a catastrophic release for reasons other that 

process design controls. Such incidents could be considered near-misses regardless of whether 

there was a release and should be examined to determine why they occurred and whether action 

can and should be taken to prevent recurrence. If an owner or operator determines that a 

situation requires investigation, then that investigation should follow the procedures described in 

the rule. 

Commenters oppose mandatory investigations of near misses: 

• Investigations of near misses should not be required because they are impossible to 

adequately identify. (30-7,486-8,531-3,623-7,679-8,680-17,946-7) 

• Investigations should only be required for actual releases; requiring other 

investigations will divert attention away from the Congressional goal of ensuring 

that industrial facilities deal with real releases. (374-30, 556-13) 

• Investigations of near misses should not be required because OSHA already 

requires their investigation. (54-9, 371-173, 383-8) 
16-4 

• Investigations of near misses would be burdensome and serve no real puipose. 

(319-10,531-3,689-5) 

• Encouraging the investigation of near misses is sufficient. Because these 

investigations are beyond the scope of the congressional mandate and enforcement 

of a mandatory provision would be nearly impossible, the investigation of near 

misses should not be mandatory. (357-!l7, 412-17,413-16,453-21, 687-9) 

• Investigations of near misses should not be required. (471-6, 478-7, 570-18) 

Agency Response 

The range of incidents that reasonably could have resulted in a catastrophic release is very 

broad and cannot be specifically defined. EPA decided to leave it up to the discretion of the 

owner or operator to .determine whether an incident could reasonably have resulted in a 

catastrophic release and to investigate such incidents. ! Investigation of such incidents is an 

important; part of good prevention practices and will help to ensure that facilities are dealing with 

and reducing unnecessary risks. EPA believes that investigation of incidents that reasonably could 

have resulted in a catastrophic release will not overly burden facilities. EPA decided to adopt 

OSHA's requirements and interpretations for incident) investigation, and compliance with EPA's 

RMP rule should not impose additional requirements on sources that are already in compliance 

with OSHA's PSM rule. EPA does not agree that investigation of near-misses is beyond the 

scope of the Congressional mandate. EPA was required under the CAA to promulgate 

reasonable regulations to prevent and detect accidental releases and respond to such releases. 

Thus, EPA has authority to require investigation of accidental releases because of the valuable 

information these investigations can provide for prevention and mitigation of future releases. 

Commenters propose additional triggers for requiring an investigation: 

• Investigations should be required if releases cause worker deaths or injuries, 

regardless of the potential for offsite consequences. Risk management planning 

will be seriously compromised if this provision goes uncorrected. (25-9, 363-34) 

• Releases with only onsite consequences should be included in the significant 

releases that require investigation. (290-6, 566-48) 

• Accident investigations should be required of facilities whenever first response 

agencies are called to respond or when automatic accident prevention systems are 

triggered. (702-12) ' 

Agency Response 

EPA is required by the CAA to promulgate regulations to prevent accidental releases of 

regulated substances and to reduce the severity of releases that do occur. EPA's mandate is to 

protect public health and the environment, while OSHA is required to protect worker health and 

safety. EPA's definition of catastrophic release includes events that present imminent and 

substantial danger to public health and the environment, while OSHA's definition includes events 

that present serious danger to employees in the workplace. EPA believes this distinction is 
•r r16-5 

appropriate and is not requiring investigation of accidents with the potential to have only on-site 

effects and to affect only workers rather than public health and the environment. Such accidents 

would be under OSHA's jurisdiction. 

EPA does not believe that it is necessary to require facilities to investigate every incident 

where first response agencies respond or when accident prevention systems are triggered. Sources 

implement accident prevention systems to prevent an incident, and EPA does not believe it is 

necessary to burden sources by requiring that they investigate incidents that were prevented by 

process design controls. EPA also does not want to provide a disincentive for calling first 

response agencies for aid as a precautionary measure. EPA has left it up to the discretion of the 

owner or operator to determine whether an incident could reasonably have resulted in a 

catastrophic release and to investigate such incidents. 

Commenters make additional comments about types of accidents to investigate: 

• The words "potential to cause" offsite consequences, and "adverse effects to human 

health" both leave too much up to the judgement of the investigator. A more 

precise definition of these terms is needed. (8-14) 

• EPA excluded near misses from investigations, but required that all significant 

accidental releases ("potential to cause") be investigated — this is somewhat 

confusing wording which might lead one to believe that near misses are in fact 

included if there is any release. If this is EPA's intent, then the definition should 

be made less vague. (55-1,7) 

• EPA needs to define how it is determined that "incidents that had the potential for 

offsite consequences" are chosen. Without definition, industry will minimize these 

events, leading to inadequate reporting. (128-9) 

• The term "near miss" needs definition. A possible definition is that near misses are 

releases of a regulated substance to the ambient air that did not exceed the release 

quantity/rate that would have caused a significant accidental release, due to nonroutine human intervention. (693-2) 

• The definition of significant accidental release should be revised to mean an 

accidental release of a regulated substance that has caused or has the potential to 

cause (from the reasonable perspective of first response personnel) onsite 

consequences such as death, injury, or adverse effects to the health of persons 

responding to the release. (702-5) 

Agency Response 

EPA changed the incident investigation requirements to be consistent with OSHA's PSM 

standard, dropping the terms "potential to cause," "adverse effects to human health," and 

"significant accidental release." The incident investigation requirements in the final rule are 

adopted directly from the OSHA PSM standard. The owner or operator must investigate each 

incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a 

regulated substance. EPA has defined a catastrophic release as a major uncontrolled emission, 
P.70 

16-6 

fire, or explosion, involving one or more regulated substances that presents imminent and 

substantial endangerment to public health and the environment. The rule language ensures that 

owners or operators will investigate each incident that! had offsite consequences resulting in 

imminent and substantial danger to public health and the environment. Owners or operators will 

also investigate those incidents that reasonably could have resulted in offsite consequences 

resulting in imminent and substantial danger to public; health and the environment had the 

situation been different (e.g.,unfavorable weather conditions). EPA also encourages owners or 

operators to examine closely and appropriately investigate incidents that were prevented from 

occurring or from having catastrophic results for reasons other than process design controls. Such 

incidents could be considered near-misses regardless of whether there was a release and should be 

examined to determine why they occurred and whether action can and should be taken to prevent 

recurrence. If an owner or operator determines that a situation requires investigation, then that 

investigation should follow the procedures described in the rule. 

OSHA's PSM standard is concerned with investigating incidents with onsite consequences 

such a death or injury to workers. EPA's RMP rule is concerned with the consequences to public 

health and the environment. EPA does not have the (authority to require investigation of 

incidents that could have consequences such as death,[ injury, or adverse effects to the health of 

persons responding to the release. 

Finally, this requirement does not include reporting of releases. The final rule does not 

require accident reporting beyond the five-year accident history, which has different reporting 

triggers. ' 
P.71 

"Tr" 

16-7 

B. Accident Investigation Reports 

Commenter agrees with the proposed recipients of accident investigation report 

information: 

• Only employees whose job tasks are relevant to the release should be given the 

information in the accident investigation reports. (382-112) 

Agency Response 

The final rule states the report should be reviewed with personnel whose job tasks are 

affected by the findings of the incident investigation, including contract employees. However, this 

does not prevent .a source owner or operator from reviewing the report with personnel at the 

source that are not directly affected by the investigation findings. 

Commenters propose additional recipients for accident investigation report information: 

• The accident investigation section could be improved by requiring a shared 

database of information about significant accidental releases to improve industrial 

experience. (4-4, 482-18, 553-32) 

• All of the workers at the relevant facility should get to learn about the accident 

investigation findings. (128-27) 

• The recipients of the RMP should receive a copy of the accident investigation 

report. Because this rule does not appear to require submission of the accident 

investigation report to anyone, a paragraph listing the Board, the appropriate 

SERC, and the affected LEPC would be an appropriate addition. (669-51) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees that personnel affected by the incident and by changes resulting from the 

investigation should receive information about the incident investigation and is requiring that 

incident investigation findings be reviewed with personnel, including contract personnel, whose job 

tasks are affected by the findings. However, it may not be necessary to share that information 

with personnel at a source who are not involved in the process where the incident occurred or 

affected by any changes resulting from the accident investigation. Although the Agency agrees 

that all workers could benefit from the shared knowledge and encourages source owners and 

operators to train and educate their employees about changes at the source, the Agency believes 

that it is unnecessary to burden facilities by requiring them to review incident investigation 

findings with unaffected personnel. 

Information about accidents that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property 

damage on site, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property 

damage, or environmental damage must be included in the five-year accident history required for 

the RMP. Incidents subject to the accident investigation requirements should be included if they 
16-8 

meet these criteria. The five-year accident history data in the RMPs will constitute a shared 

database of publicly available information about accidental releases. 

EPA is not requiring submission of incident investigation reports. EPA recognizes the 

public's interest regarding this information, however, EPA must consider the sensitivity of these 

data. The Agency believes sensitive information should remain on-site and available to EPA and 

the implementing agency for review and auditing purposes. Because the purpose of the 

investigations is to assist the source in identifying and addressing problems, it is important that the 

source do as thorough a review as possible, without concern for the use that might be made of 

the information by others. If these reports were made public, it is likely that many sources would 

not include any information that could be used against the source and, therefore, might produce 

reports that were of little use to anyone. ' 

Commenter .agrees with the response to findings requirements: 

• The requirement to address and resolye the findings of the accident investigation 

report is appropriate. Industry should not be required to automatically implement 

the findings and recommendations ofthe accident investigation report. (382-111) 

Agency Response 

EPA acknowledges the commenter's support. ; Owners and operators must establish a 

system to address and resolve the accident investigation report findings and recommendations and 

document resolutions and corrective actions. 

Commenters argue that the response to findings should be expanded: 

• The accident investigation section could be improved by requiring further 

assessment of corrective action effectiveness to improve programs rather than 

allowing them to become stagnant. (4f3, 482-18) 

• Follow-up reports on a scheduled basis should be required to ensure 

implementation of corrective actions within specified time frames. (87-35, 566-52) 

• Procedures for implementing investigation report recommendations should include: 

(1) management review of accident reports that results in evaluation of 

recommendations of actions or alternatives associated with preventing accident 

recurrence; (2) a listing of responsible personnel; (3) establishment of a timetable; 

(4) methods to ensure that the recommendations are implemented, such as the use 

of status reports in accordance with set schedules; (5) evaluation of the need for 

employee retraining or reassignment based on employee errors; and (6) accidentreport review as part of operator and maintenance training to ensure proper 

communication of lessons learned to facility personnel. (566-49) 

Agency Response 

In the final rule, EPA states that, "the owner or operator shall establish a system to 

promptly address and resolve the incident report findings and recommendations. Resolutions and 
" ^r^-o-.y^K,' XTWT- 1 

16-9 

corrective actions shall be documented." EPA believes that there may be situations where it is 

not necessary or appropriate to implement all of the report recommendations; however, it is 

necessary to document the resolution of the report findings and recommendations to ensure that 

they have been adequately considered. 

EPA is requiring incident investigation reports to be retained for five years, but does not 

require further assessment once the report recommendations have been reviewed and resolutions 

documented. EPA expects owners or operators to take necessary steps to ensure that the 

incident does not recur and believes that the final rule will accomplish that goal. EPA is not 

specifying a specific timeframe for review and implementation of report recommendations and 

resolutions, although it is contemplated that there will not be unnecessary delay between initiation 

and completion of the incident investigation. 

Regarding employee training, the final rule states that, "The report shall be reviewed with 

all affected personnel whose job tasks are relevant to the incident findings including contract 

employees where applicable." This should ensure that owners and operators communicate with 

affected employees about the incident and changes at the facility due to corrective action taken. 

Under the Management of Change provision of the final rule, owners or operators must 

communicate and retrain personnel whose job tasks are affected when any changes are made to 

process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures, or changes are made that affect a 

covered process. 

Commenter argues that additional data should be included in the reports: 

• ' The written accident investigation plan should include: (1) the identification by 

title or position of personnel responsible for investigating the accident and 

reporting thq investigation findings, and (2) the schedules for initiating accident 

investigations, key milestones, and projected completion dates. (566-49) 

• The following should be required in the accident investigation reports: (1) time 

and location of the accidental release; (2) identity, amount, and duration of the 

release; (3) equipment, materials, procedures, and personnel involved; (4) 

determination as to whether the accidental release was caused by human error, a 

procedural inadequacy, or equipment failure; (5) detailed description of the 

accidental release in chronological order giving all accident facts; and (6) the 

consequences of the accident including the number of evacuees, injured, and 

fatalities and the impact on the community. (566-51) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees that incident investigation reports should include all important information 

about an incident. In the final rule EPA is requiring that the report contain, at a minimum, the 

date of the incident, the date the investigation began, a description of the incident, factors that 

contributed to the incident, and any recommendations resulting from the incident. EPA expects 

incident investigation reports to detail all important information, but is leaving it to the discretion 

of the owner or operator to determine the specific details that should be included in the report 

based on the characteristics of the incident. Also, EPA expects incident investigations to be 

completed in a timely manner, but does not believe it is necessary to require the owner or 
P.74 

16-10 

operator to document the investigation's schedule. The purpose of conducting an incident 

investigation is to determine how and why an incident | occurred and to recommend and implement 

corrective action to prevent recurrence of the incident. EPA believes that this goal will be 

achieved by the final rule. 
P.75 

16-11 

C. Other Accident Investigation Issues 

Commenters oppose a written accident investigation plan: 

• Because requiring a written plan for accident investigations imposes significant 

document burdens and is inconsistent with OSHA's PSM standard, the 

requirement must be deleted. (382-85, 423-17) 

• Requiring a written accident investigation plan is inconsistent with OSHA's PSM. 

(449-12, 545-15) 

• EPA should eliminate the requirement to prepare a written plan for accident 

investigations because it is not important to state who should investigate and how 

many people should investigate. (482-18) 

• The requirements for an accident investigation plan should be deleted. (659-5) 

Agency Response 

EPA is not requiring the owner or operator to establish and implement written procedures 

to investigate incidents. To be consistent with OSHA, EPA has adopted the OSHA PSM 

standard incident investigation requirements in the final rule. 

Commenters agree with the requirement to identify the root cause of the accident: 

• The requirement to identify the root cause(s) of an accident is necessary. (87-35) 

• The requirement to identify root causes of incidents is an improvement over the 

OSHA PSM standard. (180-11) 

• Requiring identification of the root cause of the accident is beneficial. EPA 

should require root cause identification of all events in accidental releases, which 

will significantly reduce the probability and the consequences of future releases. 

(482-18, 553-31) 

Agency Response 

EPA has adopted OSHA's PSM standard accident investigation requirements. In the final 

rule, EPA dropped the term "root cause" for consistency with OSHA. The incident investigation 

team is required to identify the factors that contributed to the incident. Knowledge of these 

factors should provide information needed to understand how and why an incident occurred. 
16-12 

Commenters oppose the emphasis placed on identifying the root cause of the accident: 

• The preamble to the proposed rule should not imply that root cause analysis is 

more important than understanding the events that led to an accident. However, 

it should highlight the need to fully understand the sequence of events, the 

barriers in place that failed, and the root causes of the failed barriers. (4-2) 

• The requirement to identify the factors that contributed to the release, including 

the initiating event and the root cause that may have increased the likelihood of 

the initiating event, is burdensome and inconsistent with OSHA's PSM standard 

and, therefore, must be deleted. (423-17) 

• The term "root cause" is subjective and inconsistent with the OSHA PSM standard 

and, therefore, should be changed. (425-44) 

• The term "root cause" has a variety of meanings in industry and should be replaced 

by the term "contributing factors." Furthermore, the use ofthe term "root cause" 

could have the effect of creating or increasing unwarranted civil and criminal 

liability for the owners. (447-18) 

• EPA should adopt the language in the OSHA PSM regulation requiring employers 

to investigate "the factors that contributed to the incident." (449-12, 545-16) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with the commenters. EPA has adopted OSHA's PSM standard accident 

investigation requirements. In the final rule, EPA dropped the term "root cause." The incident 

investigation team is required to identify the factors that contributed to the incident. The 

accident investigation reports do not need to be made public, and EPA does not believe questions 

of liability are likely to arise. 

Commenters express concern over conflicts with existing regulations: 

• Accident investigations are already required by OSHA. Definitions for accident, 

near-miss, etc., should be the same as those established by OSHA to simplify 

compliance and reduce duplication ofeffort. (78-13) 

• Because § 68.40 serves no purpose and is over and above the corresponding 

OSHA requirement, it should be deleted. (438-27) 

• If implemented as proposed, this provision would put EPA in the position of 

supplanting accident investigation and future prevention efforts administered by 

other federal, state, and local agencies, or of supervising and directing what those 

agencies do, and, possibly in issuing rules that will either duplicate or conflict with 

the existing rules of these other agencies. (499-49) 

• Similar criteria to the present OSHA standard should be used as criteria for 

required investigation of accidental releases. (541-2) 
16-13 

Agency Response 

EPA has adopted OSHA's PSM standard accident investigation requirements in the final 

rule. A source that is in compliance with OSHA's PSM standard accident investigation 

requirements will also be in compliance with EPA's accident investigation requirements. Both 

EPA and OSHA are responsible for working to prevent accidental releases and to reduce the 

consequences of any accidental releases that do occur. Consistency between the RMP rule and 

the PSM standard ensures that both agencies will be able to meet their statutory requirements 

while placing a minimum burden on sources complying with the rules. EPA does not believe 

these requirements will supplant other accident investigation or prevention efforts by other 

agencies. EPA also notes that if states are granted delegation of this rule, they are free to 

include accident investigation requirements that are more stringent than EPA's. 

Commenters make additional comments on accident investigations: 

• The public must be reminded that these rules are not meant to create documents 

that can then be used for purposes of litigation. Rather, the rules are being 

proposed and implemented for purposes of preventing and minimizing the 

consequences of accidental releases and to encourage an aggressive approach to 

safety management and enhancement. (394-21) 

• A definition for root cause is needed, such as "the most basic cause that can 

reasonably be identified." Should EPA choose not to include a definition, the 

words root cause should be deleted. (671-31) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees that the puipose of the rule is to prevent accidental releases and lessen the 

consequences of those releases that do occur. EPA is not requiring submission of the incident 

investigation reports. These reports may, however, be subject to discovery proceedings if 

litigation is filed. EPA has deleted reference to "root cause" in the final rule. 
P.78 
17. ACCIDENT HISTORY 

A. TYPES OF RELEASES TO COVER 

Eight commenters argued for the inclusion of near misses in the accident histories, while 

others argued for the exclusion of all near misses. Many commenters argued that only accidental 

releases with actaal consequences should be included in the accident history, not releases with the 

potential for offsite consequences. Several commenters argued for the reportable accidental releases to 

be tied to covered processes and thresholds. A number of commenters discussed the inclusion of 

accidental releases with on-site consequences only; many were in favor of this inclusion, but some 

commenters disagreed. A number of commenters argued that accident histories should only include 

significant releases. Finally, several commenters wrote requests for clarification in the requirements of 

the accident histories. 

Commenters agree that near misses should be included in .accident histories: 

• Near miss incidents should be reported in the accident histories. (93-5, 94-3, 128-20, 

140-2) 

• Near misses should be included in accident histories as they provide information 

critical to preventing accidental releases in the futare. (147-7, 564-7) 

• Near misses should be included in accident histories to provide information on 

problems that need to be addressed. However, detailed reporting on near misses 

should not be required to reduce the amount of work for industry. (500-10) 

• If EPA uses accident histories as a criterion for selecting facility RMPs for an 

audit near misses should be included. (692-1) 

Agency Response 

At this time, EPA has decided not to require near misses in the accident history. EPA believes 

that identifying and documenting information regarding near misses would be difficult and that 

requiring their reporting would be more burdensome than beneficial. Most of the data being collected 

on accidents (e.g., release quantity, durations, consequences) would not be applicable to near misses 

and, therefore, their inclusion would add limited information. In addition, EPA has limited the 

accident history to accidents that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on-site, or 

known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental 

damage. Identifying near misses that could have resulted in such impacts would be problematic and 

would create considerable uncertainty about the appropriateness of decisions to include or exclude. 

Commenters oppose the inclusion of near misses in accident histories: 

• The reporting of near misses places a burden on industry that is disproportionate 

to any gains for the environment and, therefore, should not be required in the 

accident histories. (382-66) 

Near misses should not be included in accident histories because the statutory basis for 

this requirement addresses actaal releases only. (394-7, 511-8) 
17-2 

• Near misses should not be included in accident histories. (502-18, 570-21) 

• Near misses should not be included in accident histories because it is impossible for 

the owner or operator of a facility to identify all near misses. (505-11) 

• Near misses should not be included in accident histories because it is impossible to 

' document near misses in the detail required for actaal releases. (537-6) 

• The term "near miss" is too subjective, forcing operators to report all abnormal 

incidents in accident reports. Because this would place undue burden on industry, near 

misses should not be included in accident reports. (697-4) 

Agency Response 

The Agency agrees with the commenters that near miss incidents are difficult to identify and 

document; decisions would often be subjective. Inclusion of near misses would prove more 

burdensome than beneficial. The Agency disagrees, however, that it lacks the authority to require the 

inclusion of near miss incidents. The Agency proposed the inclusion of near misses in response to the 

Clean Air Act section 112(r)(B)(ii)(I), which authorizes the Administrator to promulgate requirements 

regarding a hazard assessment, which should assess the potential effects of an accidental release of any 

regulated substance. Despite its authority, however, at this time the Agency has decided not to require 

near misses in the final rule based on the above rationale. 

Commenters argue against the inclusion of releases with potential for offsite consequences 

in accident reports: 

• The reporting of releases with the potential for offsite consequences places a burden on 

industry that is disproportionate to any gains made for the environment and, therefore, 

should not be required in the accident histories. (382-66) 

• Releases with potential for offsite consequences should not be included in accident 

histories because the statutory basis for the requirement addresses actual releases only. 

(394-7,511-8) 

• Releases with potential for offsite consequences should not be required in accident 

histories. (502-21) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with the commenters that reporting of releases with the potential for offsite 

consequences would prove more burdensome than beneficial. EPA disagrees, however, that it lacks 

the authority to require their inclusion. EPA proposed Ithe inclusion of releases with potential for 

offsite consequences in response to the Clean Air Act section 112(r)(B)(ii)(I), which authorizes the 

Administrator to promulgate requirements regarding a hazard assessment, which should assess the 

potential effects of an accidental release of any regulated substance. At this time, however, EPA has 

decided not to require releases with potential for offsite consequences and has clarified the final rale 

text by specifying that only accidents from covered processes that resulted in deaths, injuries, or 
17-3 

significant property damage on-site, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, 

property damage, or environmental damage will be included. 

Several commenters argue that releases required in accident reports be tied to a covered 

process and threshold quantities: 

• Accident histories should only be developed for regulated substances held at the 

stationary source above threshold levels. (21-7, 110-9, 382-60, 526-6, 569-13) 

• Only accidental releases involving chemicals exceeding threshold quantities in a 

process covered by the risk management regulations should be included in accident 

histories. (494-13) 

• Only accidental releases involved in a process covered under this program should be 

included in accident histories. (557-20, 558-18) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with commenters that it should limit accident history requirements to accidental 

releases of regulated substances from covered processes. The text in the final rale clearly states this 

limitation. 

Commenters argue that accident releases having only on-site consequences be included 

in accident reports: 

• Accidental releases that have only on-site consequences should be included in accident 

histories because they provide invaluable information for risk management. (49-1, 

147-7, 358-3, 564-7, 736-4) 

• Accidental releases that have only on-site consequences should be included in accident 

histories. (93-5, 94-3, 140-2, 307-1, 309-2, 311-2, 359-3, 452-11, 613-7, 947-2) 

• All releases that harm workers have undeniable offsite consequences and 

should, therefore, be included in accident histories. (330-9) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with commenters that accidental releases having only on-site consequences provide 

valuable information about the safety of the process. Thus, the Agency specifically requires inclusion 

of accidental releases that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on-site in the 

final rale. 

Two commenters oppose the inclusion of accidental releases having only on-site 

consequences: 

• There is no statutory authority to include accidental releases having only on-site 

consequences in accident histories. (557-19, 558-17) 
P.82 

17-4 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees with the commenters that it lacks the authority to include accidental releases 

having only on-site consequences. Clean Air Act section 112(r)(B)(ii)(I) authorizes the Administrator 

to promulgate requirements regarding a hazard assessment which should assess the potential effects of 

an accidental release of any regulated substance. The Agency believes accidental releases from 

covered processes which resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on-site, involve 

failures of sufficient magnitude that they have the potential to affect offsite areas. These accidents 

need to be documented and addressed to prevent further accidents. 

Commenters agree that accident histories should only include significant releases: 

• Recording only significant releases limits information collected to that which is 

relevant and will best facilitate the search for common factors involved in catastrophic 

releases. (382-66, 438-16, 509-18) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees that it should limit information collected to significant and relevant incidents. 

Because EPA received numerous comments opposing the proposed definition of "significant accidental 

release," however, the Agency has dropped the definition from the final rale. To clarify the 

requirements for accident history and limit the information collected to that which is relevant, the 

Agency has specified that only accidental releases from i covered processes that resulted in deaths, 

injuries, or significant property damage on-site, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, 

sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage will be required. 

i 

Commenters argue that more clarification is needed for the accident history 

requirements: 

• Minimum characteristics for reporting a release as "significant" should be developed. 

(128-20) 

• EPA needs to define how to determine if incidents had the potential for offsite 

consequences, or industry will ignore important incidents. (128-9) 

• The term "releases with potential for offsite consequences" needs clarification. 

(382-59, 462-7) 

• The requirement to develop an accident release history does not state that the report 

should apply solely to the facility; to require a facility to have a history of worldwide 

releases of the regulated substances used at that facility is an undue burden. (408-17) 

• The term "significant" needs clarification, so that sources know what to include in 

accident histories. (482-12, 553-22) 
r , r „ r 

17-5 

Agency Response 

The Agency agrees with commenters that its proposed accident history provision was too 

vague and subject to a variety of interpretations. Based on the comments received, EPA revised the 

provision and removed "significant accidental release," and "releases with potential for offsite 

consequences" from the text. The final rule focuses the requirements for accident history to releases 

that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on-site, or known offsite deaths, 

injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage. In the proposed 

and final rale, EPA specifies that the accident history provision applies to releases at the stationary 

source. The final rale goes further to state that only accidental releases from covered processes that 

result in the specified consequences must be included in the accident histories. The required data 

elements are listed in the final rule to clarify what information is required and to relieve the burden. 
17-6 

B. TYPES OF RELEASE DATA TO INCLUDE 

Several commenters argued that more data should be included in accident histories, while 

others argued that the data reported should be limited. 

Two commenters argue that more data should be included in accident histories: 

i 

• More specifics about the accidental releases should be required in accident histories, 

including a brief description of the accident, the cause(s), and the mitigating steps 

taken to prevent further accidents. (87-21) 

• Details about the cause and conective measures taken should be included in accident 

histories. (569-15) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with the commenters that descriptiori of the release(s) (i.e., date, time, chemical(s) 

released), causes (i.e., initiating event and contributing factors), and mitigating steps (i.e., operational 

or process changes that resulted from the release) should be included in accident histories. The 

Agency requires source owners or operators to report these elements in the RMP. 

i 

Commenters argue that less data should be included in accident histories: 

Environmental data should not be recorded: 

• Gathering information on environmental; effects should not be required, because the 

focus of this rale is to protect people. (382-61) 

• It is not reasonable to expect a small facility to reconstruct information on vegetation 

damages for an incident that occuned 5 years ago. (695-11) 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees with the commenter that gathering information on environmental effects should 

be excluded because the rale focuses on protection of people. CAA section 112(r)(3) charges EPA to 

select substances that could impact human health and the environment, clearly indicating that Congress 

considered both impacts of concern. When accidents occur, human health and the environment need 

protection. Thus, the Agency requires owners or operators to document known offsite impacts, which 

includes environmental damage. The Agency has provided great flexibility to source owners or 

operators by not requiring them to conduct research on the subject; instead EPA requires that impacts, 

of which they are aware, or should reasonably have been aware, be reported. The rale does not 

require sources to specify particular environmental damage or to evaluate the extent or severity of the 

damage. Sources are required only to check that environmental damages occuned. Environmental 

damages include any known adverse environmental impacts (e.g., animal kills or contamination, 

defoliation). This information may be based on media reports, claims filed, or public agency 

information. Further, EPA is not requiring source owners or operators to verify the accuracy of public 

or media reports. 
""IT" 

17-7 

Other data should not be included: 

Gathering detailed information on past releases should not be required because it 

is burdensome and has no environmental benefits — the damage has already been 

done. (382-61) 

Near misses should be recorded in descriptive categories; they should not be as 

detailed as actual releases in accident histories. (500-10) 

Agency Response 

The Agency disagrees with the commenter that it should not require information on past 

releases because the damage has been done and no environmental benefits would be gained. The 

purpose of the accident history is to develop a record of information regarding serious accidental 

releases for the stationary source to prevent further accidents from occurring. Section 

112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I) of the CAA requires the Administrator promulgate regulations that include a 

previous release history of the past 5 years. 

EPA has assessed the comments regarding near misses and has removed the requirement from 

the accident history provision. The final rale specifies the data elements owners or operators must 

include and targets information requirements to releases that resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant 

property damage on-site, or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property 

damage, or environmental damage. 
P.86 

17-8 

C. OTHER COMMENTS RELATED TO ACCIDENT HISTORIES 

A number of commenters discussed the issue of five-year accident histories; many felt five 

years was too strict, while others felt that 5 years was not sufficient. Several commenters argued that 

environmental impacts should be eliminated from accident histories. Many commenters argued that 

accident histories should be available on-line through electronic filing. Several commenters wrote 

about the relationship to other existing requirements. 

Commenters discuss the requirement to keep accident histories for the past 5 years: 

Commenters feel that the five-year requirement is too strict: 

• Provisions should be made for facilities that have either stopped or just began to 

use a regulated substance or process. Five-year accident histories, in these cases, 

would be inelevant and burdensome. (34-12, 679-6) 

• The five-year requirement should be chariged to three years as this is easier for 

facilities and reflects more accurately a business's cunent operating condition. -

(38-4) 

• The five-year requirement should include provisions for facilities that cease regulated 

operations or close down entirely. (412-14, 413-11) 

• The five-year requirement should only apply to ongoing operations. (556-10) 

Agency Response 

EPA maintains its five-year accidental release history requirement, which is the timeframe 

Congress mandated in section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I) of the CAA. The Agency requires accident histories 

for regulated substances in covered processes in the RMP on the compliance date. Thus, even if these 

substances are decommissioned the day after compliance, the Agency still requires a five-year accident 

history. Processes not covered on the compliance date are not included in the accident history. 

Clearly, if a covered process has been in operation that has contained a regulated substance above the 

threshold quantity for less than 5 years only the period bf operation with the regulated substance 

would be included. 

Commenters feel that the five-year requirement is too lenient: 

• Any serious accidents that occuned in the past ten years should be included in 

accident histories because operations and equipment may change slowly over time. 

(250-8, 655-13) 

• Catastrophic accidents beyond the previous five-year period should be included in 

the accident histories. (569-16) 
17-9 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees with the commenters that accidents in the past ten years or beyond the five-year 

period should be included in accident histories. Although the Agency acknowledges that serious 

accidents occur relatively infrequently, the Agency believes that extending the time period beyond 5 

years would yield little benefit. Congress specifies a five-year history for previous accidental releases 

of regulated substances in section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I) ofthe CAA. 

Commenters oppose the inclusion of environmental impacts in accident histories: 

• Unless directly affecting public safety, environmental impacts should be excluded 

from accident histories because their inclusion trespasses on the domain of other 

statutes, is duplicative of other EPA regulations, is not supported by Executive 

Order 12866, and is an unwananted burden. (137-4) 

• Only catastrophic environmental events should be included in accident histories. 

(187-1) 

• It is beyond the scope of Congress' intent to include environmental effects other 

than air pollution. Soil, groundwater, or drinking water contamination, fish kills, 

and vegetation damage should not be included in accident histories. (446-15) 

• Data on soil, groundwater, or drinking water contamination should not be included 

for gaseous substances. (477-15) 

• References to environmental impacts in the proposed accident history provision 

should be eliminated. (557-21, 558-19) 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees with the commenter that environmental impacts should be excluded from 

accident histories. CAA section 112(r)(5) links the threshold quantity calculations to impacts on 

human health, but in section 112(r)(3) the Act charges EPA to select substances that could impact 

human health and the environment, clearly indicating that Congress considered both impacts of 

concern. Section 112(r)(7)(B)(i) and (ii) mention effect on the environment in conjunction with 

emergency response, but the only time these paragraphs mention protection of human health is also in 

conjunction with emergency response. Congress did not intend to limit concern about either impact to 

emergency response procedures; Congress may not have mentioned either impact in relation to 

prevention steps because the act of preventing an accident eliminates the impact. When accidents 

occur, human health and the environment need protection. By mentioning both impacts in this 

context, Congress was stressing its concern for the environment as well as human health. In addition, 

section 112(r)(9) provides authority for EPA to take emergency action when an actual or threatened 

accidental release of a regulated substance may cause imminent and substantial endangerment to 

human health, welfare, or the environment. Clearly, section 112(r)(9) allows EPA to take action to 

prevent, as opposed to simply respond to, accidental releases to protect the environment. Given that 

section 112(r)(7) is intended to prevent sitaations that could lead to emergency orders under section 

112(r)(9), it is logical to conclude that Congress meant EPA to develop regulations that would prevent 

accidental releases that could cause environmental damage. 
17-10 

As stated in the NPRM, EPA acknowledges that many releases with environmental impacts 

will already be reported to Federal or state governments under CERCLA and EPCRA. The overlap of 

these rales does not indicate trespassing on each others' domains but instead indicates that little 

additional burden will be imposed on owners or operators of stationary sources already maintaining 

records (See 58 FR 54195.) 

In section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I) ofthe CAA, Congress requires the Administrator promulgate 

regulations including a five-year history for previous accidental releases of regulated substances. 

Section 112(r)(3) ofthe CAA indicates Congress' intent ;to include environmental impacts in 

preventing accidental releases. The Agency disagrees that it should require only catastrophic 

environmental events in accident histories. Limiting the [impacts to catastrophic events poses the 

danger of failing to capture important prevention information gained from accidental releases that 

resulted in environmental damage. Further, the Agency disagrees with the comment that it is beyond 

the scope of Congress' intent to include environmental effects other than air pollution. In CAA 

section 112(r)(3), Congress clearly indicates that substances posing risks to human health or the 

environment, not just air pollution, be listed. Although only releases to air are covered, these releases 

may result in other environmental damage either from direct exposure (dead animals, defoliation) or 

from deposition (fish kills, contamination). In the final rule, EPA does not require specific data on 

soil, groundwater, or drinking water contamination. The Agency will require owners or operators 

report that they know of offsite environmental damage. iThus, any environmental damage known to 

the source (e.g., dead birds, defoliation), not limited to environmental receptors, must be considered. 

Details of the type and extent of damage are not required. The Agency has given source owners or 

operators great flexibility by not requiring research or investigation on the subject but instead simply 

requiring impacts, of which they are aware, be reported.! Further, EPA does not require source owners 

or operators verify the accuracy of public or media reports. 

Because Congress intended the rale to include environmental impacts and because of their 

importance in managing risk, the Agency maintains references to environmental impacts in the final 

rule. 

Commenters argue that accident histories should be available electronically: 

• A summary of accident histories should he available on-line through EPA or the 

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. (452-10) 

• Because the purpose of accident histories is not only to provide the facility with 

insight into its own operation, but also to allow industry and EPA to categorize 

and analyze these data to identify and facilitate industry-wide safety improvements, 

accident histories should be available on-line. (680-13) 

Agency Response 

EPA agrees with the commenters that accident histories should be available electronically and 

has decided to work towards electronic submission of RMPs. The Agency will make RMPs, which 

include accident histories, available electronically and believes electronic submission to a central point 

will facilitate access to information and is consistent with the goal of standardizing RMPs. The 

Agency further notes that the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board has not been 

constituted. 
P.89 

17-11 

Several commenters argue that the rule overlaps with other existing requirements: 

• The requirement for an accidental release history separate from the PHA does not 

carry out the intent of "the Congressional mandate. To meet its statutory obligation, 

EPA would require size, concentration, and duration for those incidents with the 

potential for offsite impact documented in the PHA. (76-10) 

• Because several mining industry regulations require accidents to be reported, the rale's 

accident reporting requirement should be integrated with existing mining regulations. 

(412-15) 

• This is unnecessary and duplicative paperwork as all facilities subject to the Oil 

Pollution Act of 1990 must already develop such a history. (499-27) 

• Proposed requirements to maintain accident histories is duplicative of CERCLA 

requirements, making the proposed requirement unduly burdensome. (531-13, 

592-5) 

• This is a duplication of CERCLA requirements. At the least, facilities should have the 

option of noting in the plan other submissions that meet this requirement. (537-6) 

• By requiring development of a hazard analysis for potential accidental releases separate 

from the parallel OSHA PSM effort, additional burden is added to the facilities with 

no significant benefit. Therefore, two separate documents should not be prepared. 

(565-38, 571-51) 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees with the commenter that separating the accidental release history from the PHA 

fails to carry out Congress' intent. Section 112(r)(B)(ii)(I) of the CAA discusses requirements for a 

five-year accident history with the hazard assessment. To maintain consistency with OSHA's PSM 

and to facilitate industry compliance with the risk management program rule, EPA addresses offsite 

consequences in the hazard assessment, not in the PHA. The risk management program rule in total, 

which includes hazard assessment, prevention program elements, and emergency response, carries out 

Congress' intent. EPA does require data on size and duration in accident histories. Although the 

Agency has dropped the requirement that the concentration of the released substance be reported, 

concentration is addressed by assuming 100 percent concentration at the point of release, except for 

substances in solution, where the concentration at the point of release is assumed to be the percentage 

of the solution as held or processed. 

EPA acknowledges that many existing regulations require accident reporting. Many of these 

reports, however, are specifically for emergency notification and do not provide details on causes, 

impacts, and responses to these incidents. Because these reports are usually documented at the time 

the incident occurs, they are often incomplete, potentially inaccurate, and fail to provide the 

information EPA seeks in the accident history requirement. As stated in the NPRM, EPA believes that 

for releases of toxic substances, most of the releases that meet the criteria are already reported to 

Federal or state governments under CERCLA arid EPCRA. The overlap of these rales does not allow 

exemption from submission for the risk management program rale. Data from similar documents, 
17-12 

however, may be transfened to satisfy the accident history requirements. The Agency believes overlap 

will not create additional burden, but instead indicates that little additional burden will be imposed on 

sources already maintaining records (See 58 FR 54195.) 

Under section 311(j) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) as amended by OPA 90, EPA notes that 

federal agencies with authority for response planning (including EPA) have issued rales for tank 

vessels and certain on-shore facilities to develop response plans for accidental releases of oil. EPA has 

not issued response planning requirements for CWA hazardous substances. In any event, CWA 

hazardous substances subject to 31 l(j) response plan requirements generally do not substantially 

overlap with the list of regulated substances subject to the risk management program rale. EPA notes 

that section 311 (j) of the Clean Water Act, as amended hy OPA 90, does not require source owners 

and operators to document a five-year accident history. 

Congress requires EPA's risk management program rule to include elements in its regulation 

that are not mandated for OSHA. The hazard assessment provision, which includes accident history, is 

separate from the prevention program elements, which parallel OSHA's PSM. Accident history 

addresses offsite and environmental impacts - elements! not addressed in the prevention program. 

Because Congress requires the inclusion of these impacts and because of their importance to the rale, 

EPA maintains the requirement for separate documentation for the hazard assessment. Measures taken 

by sources to comply with OSHA PSM for any process! that meet OSHA's PSM standard, however, 

are sufficient to comply with the prevention program requirements. 

Commenters discuss miscellaneous issues: 

• Accident histories should be company-specific, not site-specific. (155-5) 

• Although the rale, appropriately, does not require owners or operators to investigate 

every alleged effect, the Agency should! revise the rale to indicate that keeping a 

record of an alleged consequence does hot constitute an admission. The rale should 

allow owners or operators to include ori exclude unsubstantiated allegations. The rale 

should be limited to consequences and other information of which the facility becomes 

aware. Facilities often lack the expertise necessary to validate; each consequence and 

not all alleged consequences are immediately brought to the attention of the facility. 

(382-62) 

• Recipients of the RMP should receive a copy of the accident investigation report. 

(477-24) 

• The requirement for a five-year history of accidents should be inserted in process 

safety information provisions. (664-27) 

• EPA should modify its language to specify that the release history be based on the past 

5 years. (674-10) 

The requirement for an accident history to be prepared as part of the risk management 

program provides valuable information. (702-2) 
P.91 

ifFv^m^^sn-». *m •<« .<"»?«•* - 'T' l "" 

17-13 

Agency Response 

EPA disagrees with the commenter that accident histories should be company-specific and 

maintains its site-specific focus. Because the impacts of accidents are generally site-specific, involving 

results such as deaths, injuries, and property damage, information regarding the relationship between 

accidents to sites is more pertinent. The electronically available RMPs will make it possible for 

people to compile company histories using RMPs from company sites. 

EPA agrees with the commenter that source owners or operators should not be required to 

investigate alleged effects. EPA requires owners or operators report damages of which they are aware, 

in the final rale. The Agency does not require research on this subject. Further, the Agency does not 

require owners or operators to verify the accuracy of public or media reports. The Agency has no 

authority to state what constitutes an admission in private tort lawsuits. 

EPA disagrees with the commenter that recipients of the RMP should receive a copy of the 

accident investigation report. Although EPA and the implementing agency will have access to 

accident investigation reports, they will not be required in the RMP. EPA does require source owners 

or operators to include information regarding accident histories in the RMP. Thus, accident history 

information will be publicly available information. 

The Agency disagrees with the commenter that accident histories should be inserted in process 

safety information provisions. Accident histories deal with events in the past and offsite and 

environmental damage, where as process safety information pertains to conditions in their cunent state. 

Further, to maintain consistency with OSHA's PSM, EPA has decided to keep these provisions 

separate. 

EPA believes the language in the NPRM clearly indicated that release histories be based on 

the past 5 years. "The owner or operator shall prepare a five-year history of significant accidental 

releases and releases with potential for offsite consequences for each regulated substance handled at 

the source." (See 58 FR 54214.) To clarify its requirements, the Agency modified the text in the final 

rale. The Agency continues to believe that the language used indicates, clearly, that accident histories 

be based on the 5 years immediately prior to RMP submission. 

EPA agrees with the commenter that accident histories provide valuable information. The 

Agency maintains the requirement and includes its documentation in the RMPs.