alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*Pursuant to 5

TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5

TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-51210

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GERALD WAYNE HOWARD, SR., also

known as Gerald Howard,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(W-98-CR-71-ALL)

August 26, 1999

Before POLITZ, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Gerald Wayne Howard, Sr. appeals his conviction and sentence after a jury

trial for wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. He contends that the district

court erred in enhancing his sentence for more than minimal planning, in denying

his motion for a judgment of acquittal, and in denying his motion for a mistrial

based on an improper remark by the prosecutor during closing arguments.
 

1 United States v. Barndt, 913 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990).

 

2 United States v. Aggarwal, 17 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Greenwood,

974 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1992).

 

3 United States v. Andrews, 22 F.3d 1328 (5th Cir. 1994).

2

Our review of the record and briefs of the parties persuades that the district

court did not clearly err in determining that Howard engaged in more than minimal

planning.1 The record contains sufficient evidence upon which a rational juror

could find all of the elements of wire fraud proven beyond a reasonable doubt and

the district court did not err in denying Howard’s motion for a judgment of

acquittal.2 We further conclude that the improper remark made by the prosecutor

during closing arguments did notsubstantially affect Howard’sright to a fair trial.3

AFFIRMED.
#### In the Matter of T’challa D. Angel Guardian-St. Mary’s Children and Family Services, Respondent; Shavonne R., Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 649]

In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and permanent neglect, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Elkins, J.), dated June 20, 2003, which denied her motion to disqualify her daughter’s Law Guardian.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The facts of this case are fully set forth in *Matter of T’Challa D.*(196 Misc 2d 636 [2003]). In brief, the Law Guardian, who was employed by the Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society, has represented the child since 1998, first, in an abuse and neglect proceeding, and then in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. During the fact-finding hearing of the latter proceeding, the Law Guardian learned that an attorney from the Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid Society was representing the mother in a criminal matter in Bronx County, where she was charged with assault, resisting arrest, and obstructing government administration. Upon learning of the dual representation, the attorney from the Criminal Defense Division immediately withdrew from the criminal case. The Law Guardian avers that the attorneys did not exchange any information during or after the period of simultaneous representation.

Contrary to the mother’s contention, the simultaneous representation did not warrant the drastic remedy of removing the *570Law Guardian. It is well settled that where an attorney or a law firm has an ongoing relationship with a client whose interests may conflict with those of another current client, the adverse representation is “prima facie improper . . . and the attorney [or law firm] must be prepared to show, at the very least, that there will be no actual or *apparent*conflict in loyalties or diminution in the vigor of . . . representation” *(Cinema 5, Ltd. v Cinerama, Inc.*528 F2d 1384, 1387 [1976]; *see Aerojet Props. v State of New York,*138 AD2d 39 [1988]). In this case, the Legal Aid Society met the heavy burden of demonstrating the absence of any conflict in loyalties or impediments to a vigorous representation of each client during that period *(see Siroty v Nelson,*200 AD2d 617 [1994]; *Aerojet Props. v State of New York, supra).*

As for the issue of whether the Legal Aid Society could continue to represent the child against the mother, who was a former client, the mother failed to satisfy the three-part test for disqualification *(see Tekni-Plex, Inc. v Meyner & Landis,*89 NY2d 123 [1996]; *Solow v Grace & Co.,*83 NY2d 303 [1994]; *Matter of Destiny D.,*2002 WL 31663251 [2002], 2002 NY Misc LEXIS 1509 [2002], Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the mother’s motion to disqualify the Law Guardian, who had a long-standing attorney-client relationship with the child. Smith, *J.P.,*Goldstein, Luciano and Adams, JJ., concur. *[See*196 Misc 2d *636.]*
Daniel JOSEY v. STATE

CR-16-0594

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, William A. Montgomery, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the
Annual Report of AlphaCom Corporation on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December
31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such 10KSB
fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of
operations of AlphaCom Corporation.


                                   By: /s/ William A. Montgomery
                                       -------------------------
                                   Name: William A. Montgomery
                                   Title: Principal Executive Officer

<PAGE>
Cite as 2013 Ark. App. 614



## ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II No. CV-13-487 ST. JOHN’S REGIONAL HEALTH CENTER and SISTERS OF MERCY HEALTH APPELLANTS V.

GREGORY D. BARTLETT APPELLEE Opinion Delivered October 30, 2013 APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION [NO. G202264]

REBRIEFING ORDERED
ROBIN F. WYNNE, Judge
Appellee Gregory D. Bartlett worked for appellants as a paramedic when he injured his right knee on the evening of January 4, 2012. The Commission found that Bartlett had proved that he had sustained a compensable injury and that he was entitled to medical and temporary total-disability benefits; the employer now appeals, arguing that substantial evidence does not support the Commission’s decision. We cannot reach the merits of appellants’ arguments because we must order rebriefing. First, the addendum does not include appellee’s medical records, which are instead abstracted. Rule 4-2(a)(8) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals requires that the addendum include “any document essential to an understanding of the case and the issues on appeal.” We hold that the medical records in a workers’ compensation case in which compensability is at issue are essential to an understanding of the case and must beCite as 2013 Ark. App. 614

included in the addendum. In addition, we note that the abstract is not in first person, as required by Rule 4-2(a)(5)(B). Appellants have fifteen days from the date of this order to file a substituted brief that conforms with our rules. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)(3). We emphasize that the examples we have noted are not to be taken as an exhaustive list of deficiencies; counsel should carefully review the rules and ensure that no other deficiencies exist. Rebriefing ordered. G LOVER and V AUGHT , JJ., agree. McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.C. , by: Patricia L. Musickand Christopher S. Moberg , for appellants. Tolley & Brooks, P.A. , by: Evelyn E. Brooks , for appellee.

2
jcap_Ex10_28



		

			Exhibit 10.28

		





		
			SECOND AMENDMENT TO TERM LOAN AGREEMENT
		

		
			This Second Amendment to  Term Loan Agreement (“Second Amendment”) is made as of the 18th day of January, 2019, by and among MCGINNIS FERRY OWNER, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company (the “Borrower”), and FIRSTBANK, a Tennessee state bank, whose address is 6815 Poplar Avenue, Suite 100, Memphis, Tennessee 38138 (hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”). 
		

		
			WHEREAS, the parties entered into a certain Term Loan Agreement, dated as of August 17, 2018, with respect to a Loan from Bank to Borrower in the amount of Eight Million Six Hundred Twenty Five Thousand and No/100ths Dollars ($8,625,000.00), as amended by that certain Amendment to Term Loan Agreement dated August 17, 2018 (collectively, the “Loan Agreement”); 
		

		
			WHEREAS, the Borrower has entered into an amended and restated credit agreement, and the parties desire to update the Loan Agreement to reference this new credit agreement.
		

		
			NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto agree as follows:
		

			
	
			
				 1.
			

			
	
			
			Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Loan Agreement, from the date of this Second Amendment forward, the term “Credit Agreement”, as defined in the Loan Agreement, shall mean “the First Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated as of December 28, 2018 by and among Guarantor, Jernigan Capital, Inc., KeyBank National Association, Raymond James Bank, N.A., Trustmark National Bank, FirstBank, Triumph Bank, Renasant Bank, Pinnacle Bank, and BMO Harris Bank N.A.”




			
	
			
				 2.
			

			
	
			
			As modified hereby, the Loan Agreement is ratified and confirmed and shall remain in full force and effect.




		
			[Signature page follows]
		

		
			


		 


 


[Signature Page to Second Amendment to Term Loan Agreement]
		

		
			IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Borrower and the Bank have executed this Second Amendment, or have caused this Second Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized officers, all as of the day and year first above written.
		

		
			BORROWER:
		

		
			 
		

		
			MCGINNIS FERRY OWNER, LLC,  
		

		
			a Georgia limited liability company
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: MCGINNIS FERRY PARENT, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, its sole member and manager
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: JERNIGAN CAPITAL OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, its managing member and manager
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: JERNIGAN CAPITAL, INC., a Maryland corporation, its managing member
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: /s/ Kelly Luttrell
		

		
			Name: Kelly Luttrell
		

		
			Title: SVP CFO
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			BANK:
		

		
			 
		

		
			FIRSTBANK, a Tennessee state bank
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: /s/ Bill Harter
		

		
			Name: Bill Harter
		

		
			Title: Senior Vice President
Bryan ACEVEDO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-2799

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 6, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### Lonzie L. Colbert et al., Plaintiffs, *v.*James Hill, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Monroe County,

June 4, 1973.

*Dorando J. Cerulli*for plaintiffs. *David 8. Jordan*for defendant and Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation.

Emmett J. Scechbpp, J.

On November 25, 1967 plaintiffs, passengers in an automobile owned by James Hill and operated by James Willie Smith, were involved in a one-car accident At the time a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by the Glens Falls Insurance Company was in effect. Thereafter, the Glens Falls Insurance Company instituted an action for a declaratory judgment and on May 1, 1972 after trial, it was determined that the policy provisions requiring written notice of the accident were breached and that the insurance carrier was entitled to disclaim coverage. On June 15, 1970 plaintiffs filed notice of intention to make claim against the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation and their demands for arbitration dated September 21, 1972 were permanently stayed as to MVAIC on November 10, 1972.

MVAIC interposed an answer to the complaint herein and raised the affirmative defense that plaintiffs are “qualified” persons, who failed to file a notice of intention to make claim in compliance with article 17-a of the Insurance Law of the *259State of New York. MVAIC now moves to dismiss the complaint upon such ground and for such other and further relief as to the court may seem just and proper.

Plaintiffs at the time of the accident were “insured” persons and the holding that the insurance carrier gave proper notice of disclaimer would not operate to change their status to “qualified” persons. The Glens Falls Insurance Company policy necessarily contained the New York automobile indemnity indorsement (Insurance Law, § 167, subd. 2-a), under which plaintiffs were defined as “ insured ” persons and the insurance responsibility under the automobile accident indemnification indorsement exists independently of the standard policy provisions and plaintiffs cannot be deprived of this coverage by the act of the named insured in failing to give proper notice of the accident. It is through the medium of this indorsement of the Glens Falls policy that plaintiffs must look for indemnity, and it is from this contract that they derive their rights in these circumstances. *(Matter of Knickerbocker Ins. Co.,*22 N Y 2d 554.) Accordingly the motion must be granted and the complaint dismissed against MVAIC.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Demaine Diwan BENJAMIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6480

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 25, 2017

Demaine Diwan Benjamin, Appellant Pro Se. Carrie Fisher Sherard, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee. ■

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Demaine Diwan Benjamin appeals the district court’s orders denying relief on his motion for reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) and denying his motion for reconsideration.* We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. *See United States v. Muldrow,*844 F.3d 434, 437 (4th Cir. 2016) (providing standard). Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

*

 Although a district court lacks authority to reconsider a ruling'on a § 3582(c)(2) motion, “this prohibition [is] non-jurisdictional, and thus waived when the government fail[s] to assert it below.” *United States v. May,*855 F.3d 271, 274 (4th Cir. 2017). Here, "Re-cause the government failed to raise this non-jurisdictional limitation below, it is waived on appeal.” *Id.*at 275. We therefore analyze Benjamin's § 3582(c)(2) motion and motion for reconsideration together.
STATE of Louisiana v. Elijah MEALANCON

NO. 2017-K-1777

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 25, 2018

Denied.
Dominique D. SCOTT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0379

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 16, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Exhibit 10.3


 





 


 


February 27th, 2019


 


RE: Bonus Restructure and Equity Increase


 


Christopher Tedford






Dear Mr. Tedford,


 


Congratulations! We are very pleased to
offer you an updated Bonus Structure and Equity Increase effective March 1st, 2019 to recognize your efforts in your
role as a Chief Financial Officer.


 


Following six (6) months from your Commencement Date
with KushCo Holdings, you will be eligible to receive $50,000.00 in guaranteed bonus compensation based on KPIs outlined.


 


Additionally, you will be eligible to earn up to
50% of your base salary and any other discretionary incentives as approved by the Board and the KushCo Holdings' Leadership Team
based on the standard fiscal year bonus cycle. Following fiscal year 2019, all bonuses will be paid in accordance with the standard
annual schedule.


 


Subject to the approval of the Company's
Board of Directors and any other necessary approvals, you will be granted options to purchase 100,000 shares of the Company's common
stock at a per share price equal to the closing price of the common stock on the date of grant, as determined by the Company's
Board of Directors (the "Grant Date").


 


The options granted to .you shall vest
or accrue, as applicable, over a three-year period as follows: (i) 33% shall be deemed vested or accrued, as applicable, on the
date which is twelve (12) months following the Grant Date and none before such date; and (ii) the balance of the Option Shares
will be vested in a series of twenty-four (24) successive equal monthly installments. Should your employment terminate before the
date which is twelve (12) months following the Grant Date, the options granted to you shall not be deemed vested, accrued, or exercisable.
No right to any stock is earned or accrued until such time that vesting occurs, nor does the grant confer any right to continue
vesting or employment.


 


Notwithstanding anything to the contrary,
all terms and conditions of any stock options granted to you shall be governed by the terms and conditions of the applicable option
agreement (as may be amended from time to time), which you will be required to sign.


 







    	 	1	 



     


    


 


We
look forward to your continued contribution to the team. Congratulations!


 


Yours
sincerely,


 





	/s/ Nicholas Kovacevich	/s/ Chris Tedford
	 	 
	Nicholas Kovacevich	Chris Tedford
	Chief Executive Officer	CFO
STATE of Louisiana v. Marvin ACEVEDO

NO. 2018-KK-0922

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 25, 2018

Stay denied. Writ denied.
#### IN RE: Loren MILLER; Sarah Miller, Debtors, Loren Miller, Appellant, v. Andrew D. Geller; Andrew D. & Eileen B. Geller, Trustees of the Geller Trust Dated September 2, 1987, Appellees.

No. 16-55732

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 21, 2017

Loren Miller, Pro Se

Howard Camhi, Attorney, Ervin Cohen & Jessup LLP, Beverly Hills, CA, for Ap-pellees

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

**The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Chapter 7 debtor Loren Miller appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing for failure to prosecute his appeal from the bankruptcy court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review for an abuse of discretion. *Pagtalunan v. Galaza,*291 F.3d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Miller’s appeal because Miller failed to comply with the district court’s orders instructing him to prosecute the appeal, including filing the designations of record, statement of issues on appeal, and notice regarding the ordering of transcripts with the bankruptcy court. *See id.*at 642-43 (discussing the five factors for determining whether to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order); *Ferdik v. Bonzelet,*963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (although dismissal is a harsh penalty, the district court’s dismissal should not be disturbed absent “a definite and firm conviction” that it “committed a clear error of judgment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Miller’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his appeal because Miller failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. *See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,*5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth grounds for relief from judgment under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

We reject as meritless Miller’s contentions regarding alleged judicial bias.

Miller’s request to take judicial notice of the underlying proceedings, set forth in his opening brief, is denied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
p.1 

OAR Box 1830 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

71) IV-C-37 

Docket Number: 

A-87-11 

Printed 11/13/2008 7:20:54 AM Sheet 71 of 232 
x<&° SrA> 

use 

\ mfi^ :t 

P.2 

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 

•3»N l> /98I 

OFFICE OF 

AIR AND RADIATION 

Mr. Michae l Cams, Sr. 

Mike Cam s Ford 

Box Q Route 11 

Hallstead , PA 18822 

Dear Mr. Cams: 

Thank you for your comments concerning EPA's proposal to 

require onboard refueling emission controls. Be assured that 

your comments will be considered in the next phase of our 

rulemaking. We will also be placing them in the public docket 

for the Rulemaking. 

Thank you again for your concern in this matter. 

SincerD. Wilson 

Director, Office of Mobile Sources 

cc: Docket A-87-11 

Honorable Arlen Specter 

U.S. Senate