alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# V&V \ of z. 

# (2IS-/3
COA # 10-12-00100-CR 

### STYLE: ThP stateofTexas v. Rolando Barragan TRIAL COURT: TRIAL COURT#: 

## TRIAL COURTJUDGE: Hon. RalphT. Strother 

## DISPOSITION: reversed & remanded 19th District Court 2011-1161-C1


### July 25, 2013 

## OFFENSE: Indecency with aChild COUNTY: McLennan FOR REHEARING IS: DATE: JUDGE: MOTION

DATE: JUSTICE: PUBLISH: ChiefJustice Gray PC 

### dnpT S YES YES CLK RECORD: RPT RECORD: STATE BR: APE BR: May 8, 2012 June 26, 2012 August 14, 2012 November 15, 2012 SUPP CLK RECORD: SUPP RPT RECORD: SUPP LTR BR: SUPP LTR BR: 

### i.m.arY-ll. 2013 &June 20, 2013 June 21, 2013



## IN THE COURTTM CRIMINALAPPEALS CCA # 

### appbll££^_ Petition 

## FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS: 

# DATE:_P_----^--2^^ JUDGE: /^ .

CCA IS:. JUDGE: 

### MOTION FOR REHEARING IN ON

_____ Disposition: DATE: JUDGE:. SIGNED:. PUBLISH:. PC. DNP:. 

## MOTION FOR STAY OF MANDATE IS: ON JUDGE: = 

# Vol. Iof2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6443

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ALEJANDRO REYES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, District Judge. (3:03-cr-00195-MHL-RCY-3; 3:16-cv00379-JRS)

Submitted: November 14, 2018 Decided: November 21, 2018

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ, Circuit Judge, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit 

Judge. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alejandro Reyes, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Alejandro Reyes seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on the 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion he filed after obtaining authorization from us to file his 

successive motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the 

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner 

must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the 

motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 

484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Reyes has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
### Supreme Court ofthe United States Office ofthe Clerk 

### Washington, DC 20543-0001 May 28, 2015 Scott S. Harris Clerk of the Court (202) 479-3011
Clerk Court of Criminal Appeals ofTexas P.O. Box 12308 Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711 

# COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS M 05 2Qn
Re: Hiram Miles v. Texas No. 14-9983 (Your No. WR-46, 247-12) , vsferlt

Dear Clerk: 

### The petition for a writ ofcertiorari in the above entitled case was filed on May 21, 2015 and placed on the docket May 28, 2015 as No. 14-9983.
Sincerely, Scott S. Harris, Clerk 

# by ^^{^ // Redmond K. Barnes Case Analyst
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jay Bernard RIVERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4532

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 24, 2017

Decided: May 3, 2017

Theodore D. Bruns, BLACKBURN, CONTE, SCHILLING & CLICK, P.C.,' Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Michael C. Moore, Thomas A. Garnett, Assistant *188United States Attorneys, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jay Bernard Rivers appeals his convictions for bank fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and theft of United States mail. On appeal, Rivers contends that the district court erroneously admitted evidence of his attempted flight from law enforcement. He also argues that the district court erred by refusing to reopen the case after the close of evidence to allow him to testify, after he waived his right to testify. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Byers,*649 F.3d 197, 213 (4th Cir. 2011). “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, such evidence is admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); *see United States v. Queen,*132 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 1997). “To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must be (1) relevant to an issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable.” *Id.*(internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence’s prejudicial effect also must not substantially outweigh its probative value. *Byers,*649 F.3d at 206; *see*Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence. The jury had sufficient evidence from which it could infer that Rivers’ attempted flight resulted from his guilt of the instant offenses, *see United States v. Obi,*239 F.3d 662, 665-66 (4th Cir. 2001), and we do not find the flight evidence so unfairly prejudicial as to require exclusion under Rule 403. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen the case to allow Rivers to testify after he relinquished his right to do so. *See United States v. Nunez,*432 F.3d 573, 579 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22
- 0326 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ROBERT EARL SNYDER,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including January 27, 2023 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

December 22 2022

12/22/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0326
Daniel L. SANDEFUR, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-3369

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

September 27, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

As it appears that the proceedings in the circuit court relative to the petitioner's motion for postconviction relief are progressing, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. Cf Munn v. Fla. Parole Comm'n. 807 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). This denial is without prejudice to the petitioner to file a new petition for writ of mandamus if the postconviction court has not entered a final order on the motion within 90 days of the date of this order, provided that the petitioner is unrepresented by counsel in the postconviction proceeding.

LaROSE, C.J., and CRENSHAW and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6267 

To amend title 5, United States Code, to establish Election Day as a Federal 

holiday. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 7, 2023 

Mr. FITZPATRICK (for himself and Mrs. DINGELL) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To amend title 5, United States Code, to establish Election 

Day as a Federal holiday. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Election Day Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. PATRIOT DAY. 

6 Section 6103(a) of title 5, United States Code, is 

7 amended by inserting after the item relating to Columbus 

8 Day the following: 

9 ‘‘Election Day.’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK126QN23PROD with BILLS
Vidal LAZO, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. KILLIAN INVESTORS CORP., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2346

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

NOVEMBER 29, 2017

Upon the Court's own motion, it is ordered that this appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida is dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's order dated November 7, 2017, and with the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ROTHENBERG, C.J., and EMAS and LUCK, JJ., concur.
Andrew Jerome HARRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-222

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 22, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
S.A.C. v. STATE

CR-16-0056

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Jorge Valvis PAPASTRATI, Appellant, v. Kiriaki PAPASAKELARIOU, Appellee.

No. 3D16-2921

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed April 25, 2018

Kevin Coyle Colbert, for appellant.

Nancy A. Hass (Hollywood), for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, FERNANDEZ and LUCK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

*928We affirm without further discussion and write only to point out the perilous journey undertaken by counsel when they ask the trial court to interpret an order of a foreign jurisdiction without providing the court a proper foundation for interpretation of that order. The trial court was asked to interpret the order of an Aruban appellate court without the benefit of the law of Aruba that rightfully would control that interpretation. Without knowing what is required by the law in Aruba in relation to the appellate court decision, we cannot properly review the trial court's interpretation.

Affirmed.
**THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

**Post Office Box 12248**

**Austin, Texas 78711**

**(512) 463-1312**

December 31, 2004

Mr. Todd S. Gaines

Dabney & Pappas

1770 St. James Place, Suite 408

Houston, TX 77056

Mr. Thomas O. Matlock Jr.

6521 North 10th Street, Suite A 

McAllen, TX 78504

RE:Case Number:  03-0672

Court of Appeals Number:  13-00-00458-CV

Trial Court Number:  C-2251-93-D

Style:HAROLD CALDWELL

v.

ROBERT F. BARNES

Dear Counsel:

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.  The Supreme Court of Texas delivered the enclosed opinion and judgment in the above-referenced cause.  

Encl.

Sincerely,

Andrew Weber, Clerk

by Nancy J. Vega, Chief Deputy Clerk

**Case No. 03-0672Page 2**
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jermaine Clark STEPHENS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-20495 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 13, 2017

Michael Lewis Eaton, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Laredo, TX, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Cynthia Jean-Marie Cline, Esq., Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jermaine Clark Stephens pleaded guilty to interference with commerce by robbery and was sentenced to serve 168 months in prison and a three-year term of supervised release. He argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not challenging the inclusion of certain convictions in his criminal history score. Because he did not raise this issue in the district court, the record is not sufficiently developed to permit a fair evaluation of the claim, and we decline to consider it without prejudice to collateral review. *See United States v. Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).

Additionally, Stephens argues .that the district court’s guidelines calculations were plainly erroneous. The Government argues that consideration of this claim is precluded by the appeal waiver in the plea agree-, ment. To determine whether an appeal of a sentence is barred by a waiver provision in a plea agreement, we analyze whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary and whether the waiver applies to the appeal, based on the plain language of the agreement. *United States v. Bond,*414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005). The record shows that *341the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and the waiver covers Stephens’s sentencing claim. Accordingly, consideration of this claim is barred by the appeal waiver. *See id.*

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Kevin MOORE v. Aisha J. GRIFFIN

2160498

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 12, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
(LOGO) KPMG

401 South Tryon Street
Suite 2300
Charlotte, NC 28202-1911


Independent Accountants' Report

The Board of Directors
First Union Mortgage Corporation:

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying management
assertion,  that First Union Mortgage Corporation (a wholly-owned  subsidiary of
First Union Corporation) complied with the minimum servicing standards set forth
in the Mortgage  Bankers  Association of America's  Uniform  Single  Attestation
Program for Mortgage  Bankers  (USAP) as of and for the year ended  December 31,
1999.   Management  is  responsible  for  First  Union  Mortgage   Corporation's
compliance with those minimum  servicing  standards.  Our  responsibility  is to
express  an  opinion  on  management's  assertion  about  First  Union  Mortgage
Corporation's compliance based on our examination.

Our examination was made in accordance with attestation standards established by
the  American  Institute  of  Certified  Public  Accountants  and,  accordingly,
included  examining,  on a test  basis,  evidence  about  First  Union  Mortgage
Corporation's  compliance  with the minimum  servicing  standards and performing
such other  procedures  as we  considered  necessary  in the  circumstances.  We
believe that our examination  provides a reasonable  basis for our opinion.  Our
examination  does not  provide a legal  determination  on First  Union  Mortgage
Corporation's compliance with the minimum servicing standards.

In our opinion,  management's  assertion that First Union  Mortgage  Corporation
complied in all material  respects  with the  aforementioned  minimum  servicing
standards as of and for the year ended  December 31, 1999 is fairly  stated,  in
all material respects.

KPMG LLP
February 11, 2000


KPMG LLP.KPMG LLP, a U.S. limited liability partnership, is
a member of KPMG International, a Swiss association
Freddie R. PATTERSON III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4914

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 11, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DR. CEA G. MAI a/k/a KELLY E.S. ALIAHMED f/k/a HERMIONE KELLY I. WINTER, Petitioner Below, Appellant,

v. GOVERNOR CARNEY, et al., Respondents Below, Appellee s

. § § No. 234, 2021 § § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware § § C.A. No. S21M-05-003 § § § § § § Submitted: November 12, 2021 Decided: November 18, 2021

Before SEITZ , Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES , Justices. ORDER Upon consideration of the notice to show cause and the appellant’s response, it appears to the Court that: (1) The petitioner below-appellant, Dr. Cea G. Mai a/k/a Kelly E.S. Aliahmed f/k/a Hermione Kelly I. Winter, filed this appeal from a Superior Court order denying her motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing her petition for a writ of mandamus. Mai filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this Court. The appellees opposed the motion, arguing that Mai made false representations in the motion, at least three actions that she previously filed were2 dismissed as frivolous, and she is not in imminent danger of serious physical injury. On September 10, 2021, the Court denied Mai’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis

. (2) On September 15, 2021, the Senior Court Clerk advised Mai that a notice to show cause would issue if she did not pay the filing fee by September 30, 2021. Mai did not pay the filing fee. On October 11, 2021 and October 26, 2021, the Senior Court Clerk issued a notice directing Mai to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for her failure to pay the filing fee. 1 (3) In her response to the notice to show cause, Mai argues that if her appeal is dismissed she is unlikely to seek relief in federal court and would be affected personally. Other than her own conclusory statements, she does not offer anything to support these claims. Mai has not paid the filing fee. This appeal must therefore

be dismissed. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rule 29(b), that this appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT: /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice

1 The October 11, 2021 notice incorrectly stated that Mai had failed to file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis , and was reissued on October 26, 2021 without that statement.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Andrew K. Moller,Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Christopher &Banks Corporation (the “Company”) certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, asadopted pursuant to  Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.  The quarterly report of the Company on Form 10-Q****for the period ended December 1, 2007 as filed withthe United States Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”)fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;  and

 

2.  The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 
| Date: January 10,  2008 |   |                                                                    |
|------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                         |   |                                                                    |
|                         | By:    | /s/ Andrew K. Moller                                                    |   |
|                         |   | Andrew K. Moller*Executive Vice President  and Chief Financial Officer* |

 

# ** **

# ** **

# ****
Jarrod MCDOWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D16-1776

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 3, 2018

Jared McDowell, pro se, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

**ON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT**

Per Curiam.

In accordance with instructions from the Florida Supreme Court, this cause is remanded for resentencing in conformance with sections 775.082, 921.1401, and *530921.1402, Florida Statutes. *See**Kelsey v. State* , 206 So.3d 5 (Fla. 2016).

Roberts, Wetherell, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 September 12, 2017

a0906

Order 

Clerk

September 12, 2017

154363

THE DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 154363

COA: 326793

Wayne CC: 13-015970-NF

MICHIGAN PROPERTY & CASUALTY 

GUARANTY ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellant,

and 

MICHIGAN ASSIGNED CLAIMS FACILITY,

Defendant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 26, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in 

lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 

we REMAND this case to that court for reconsideration in light of Covenant Medical 

Center, Inc v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co, 500 Mich ___ (Docket No. 152758, 

decided May 25, 2017). 

WILDER, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.
Vanisha Vanessa WEIR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-485

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed July 3, 2018

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Alexandra K. Galvin, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See* *Haynes v. State* , 106 So.3d 481, 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ; *see also* *Tucker v. State* , 174 So.3d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

TORPY, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
**THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

**Post Office Box 12248**

**Austin, Texas 78711**

**(512) 463-1312**

May 14, 2004

Mr. Michael P. Young

Davis & Wilkerson, P.C.

P. O. Box 2283

Austin, TX 78768

Mr. Russell J. Bowman

Scott Bowman & Stella

3131 McKinney Ave., Suite 730

Dallas, TX 75204

RE:Case Number:  01-1248

Court of Appeals Number:  03-00-00498-CV

Trial Court Number:  C-99-0510-C

Style:GEORGE ALEXANDER D/B/A ZENTNER'S DAUGHTER STEAKHOUSE

v.

LYNDA'S BOUTIQUE

Dear Counsel:

Today, the Supreme Court of Texas delivered the enclosed opinions and judgment in the above-referenced cause.  

Sincerely,

Andrew Weber, Clerk

by Claudia Jenks, Chief Deputy Clerk

**Case No. 01-1248Page 2**
**Exhibit 32**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connectionwith the Quarterly Report of Zamba Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q forthe three months ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Michael H. Carrel, President andChief Executive Officer of the Company, and Michael H. Carrel, Chief FinancialOfficer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1)              TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2)              Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

IN WITNESSWHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certification as of the 13th day ofAugust 2004.

 
|   | /s/ Michael  H. Carrel            |
|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   | Michael H.  Carrel                     |
|   | President  and Chief Executive Officer |

 

 
|   | /s/ Michael  H. Carrel |
|--------|-----------------------------|
|   | Michael H.  Carrel          |
|   | Chief  Financial Officer    |

 

----