alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
MANDATE

Court of Appeals 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-14-00578-CR

HOMERO YADO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 177th District Court of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 1397026).

TO THE 177TH DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before this Court, on the 30th day of June 2015, the case upon appeal to revise or 

to reverse your judgment was determined. This Court made its order in these words:

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed 

by the trial court on August 6, 2013. After submitting the 

case on the appellate record and the arguments properly 

raised by the parties, the Court holds that the trial court 

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, 

the Court vacates the trial court’s judgment and dismisses the 

case.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below 

for observance.

Judgment rendered June 30, 2015.
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bland.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court 

in this behalf and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

September 11, 2015 

Date CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

 CLERK OF THE COURT
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Marcus Earldale Henslee, * From the 42nd District Court

of Taylor County

Trial Court No. 27279A

.

Vs. No. 11

- 1 7

- 00 1 6 3

- CR * July 31 , 2019

The Sta te of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Bailey, C.J.

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.

, Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.,

sitting by assignment)

(Willson, J., not participating)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there

is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
#### Hubany Aparicio DE LEON LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-71602

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*278Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

Rosana Cheung, Attorney, Law Office of Rosana Kit Wai Cheung, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Melissa Lynn Neiman-Kelting, Senior Litigation Counsel, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Hubany Aparicio De Leon Lopez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his motion to reconsider the denial of his prior motion to reopen removal proceedings conducted in absentia. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying De Leon Lopez’s motion to reconsider for failure to identify any error of fact or law in the IJ’s prior decision denying his motion to reopen. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2). De Leon Lopez did not show that the IJ erred in denying his underlying motion to reopen, where De Leon Lopez had not presented a copy of his notice of hearing to support his claim that it was confusing, and had not established eligibility for relief. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1); *cf. Singh v. INS,*295 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that petitioner established exceptional circumstances where he arrived late to his hearing based on a misunderstanding, had previously appeared at all scheduled hearings, and had “no possible reason to try to delay the hearing” because he was eligible for adjustment of status as the beneficiary of an approved visa petition). In addition, the record does not support his contention that the agency failed to consider relevant factors or evidence. *See Fernandez v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner did noj; overcome the presumption that the BIA did review the record).

We do not reach De Leon Lopez’s contentions regarding equitable tolling and ineffective assistance. *See Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (review is limited to the actual grounds relied upon by the BIA); *Simeonov v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Milady PEQUENO and X.O. #1, Corporation, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. XINZHOU CHEN and Pengfei Sun, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D16-0399

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

JANUARY 10, 2018

ORDERED that appellants' notice of voluntary dismissal is recognized by the Court, and this appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida is hereby dismissed.
Regulatory Evaluation

Docket No. FAA-2016-3696 Directorate Identifier: 2015-NM-113-AD-AD

If you make changes to the values in the table below, you must ensure the totals update accordingly. If 

they do not, click (or Tab) into and then out of the changed cell.

Estimated Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Do not include oncondition costs here

Costs per Product (e.g., aircraft, engine, 

propeller, appliance)

Work-hours

(include 

access, testing, 

and close-up)

Labor 

cost 

(@$85/h

our)

Parts Cost Total Costs 

(labor + 

parts)

Number of 

U.S. 

Registered 

Products

Total Cost 

for U.S. Fleet

Inspection of FC 1.0 $ 85.00 $0 $ 85.00 959 $81,515.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

The known number of products in compliance: 0

Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $81,515

Costs covered under warranty (if known) $0

On-Condition Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Work-hours 

(include access, 

testing, and closeup)

Labor cost 

(@$85/hour)

Parts Cost Cost per Product

Replacement 21.0 $1,785.00 $26,500 $28,285.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

Special considerations for Economic Analysis (Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated Costs table 

that was assumed or might not be obvious. This field can also be used to explain warranty costs):
Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant? 

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Explain for 

either a Yes or No answer.

YES NO 

Explanation: 

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific requirements for 

aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation?

YES* NO 

*Explanation:
#### Kane Anthony FOSNAUGHT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6256

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 26, 2017

*133Kane Anthony Fosnaught, Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin Hyman Katz, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Kane Anthony Fosnaught seeks to appeal the district court’s orders accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition and denying reconsideration. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Fosnaught has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauper-is, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN NO. 03-05-00828- CV Re th a A be r nat hy, App e lla nt

v. Drake Bore r, M.D ., Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN503796 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

ME MO R

A ND UMO P I N I O N The parties have filed a joint motion t o dismiss the appe al, informingthat they have settled their di spute. The appeal is dismiss ed on the j oint motion and costs are assessed a g ainst the pa rt y inc ur ri ngthe m.

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P uryear and Waldrop Dismissed on J oint Moti on Filed: Mar ch 20, 2006
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STEVEN SEIFUDDIN IBN-HAMEED,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 12-1961 (JEB)

MICHAEL MADDREN, et al., 

 Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff Steven Seifuddin Ibn-Hameed has filed this incomprehensible action 

against a series of Pennsylvania judges, police officers, and state officials. The Court has 

previously granted motions to dismiss by the non-judicial Defendants. See ECF No. 15. The 

judges have now filed their own Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 17. On February 14, 2013, 

the Court advised Plaintiff that he must respond by March 7 or face possible dismissal. See ECF 

No. 18. All that Plaintiff has filed are two documents that have nothing to do with the Motion. 

The first is entitled “Notice of International Diplomatic Status” and begins, “Peace. Peace, Peace 

be unto all men and women in this world. The Divine Spirit, Living beneficiary and heir to the 

Divine Estate lives at peace with all men and women.” See ECF No. 19 at 1. The second is a 

UCC Financing Statement from the Delaware Department of State. See ECF No. 20. The Court, 

therefore, will treat the Motion as conceded under LCvR 7(b).

Even if Plaintiff had not conceded the Motion, the Court sees several reasons to grant it,

including judicial immunity. To the extent his allegations against the judges are intelligible at 

all, they concern acts taken within their judicial duties. “Few doctrines were more solidly 

established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts 
2

committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). One 

purpose of the doctrine is to “protect[] judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious 

actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants,” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) 

(citation omitted) – precisely the case here. As a result, “judges of courts of superior or general 

jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess 

of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. 

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (citation and footnote omitted). Such immunity covers 

even suits claiming a deprivation of constitutional rights. See Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 90 

(D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The common law immunity of judges is fully applicable in suits under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivations of constitutional rights.”) (citation omitted).

As the judicial Defendants are immune from suit, a contemporaneous Order will issue 

granting the Motion to Dismiss.

 /s/ James E. Boasberg 

 JAMES E. BOASBERG

 United States District Judge

Date: March 11, 2013
Mary Ellen PORCO, Appellant, v. Michael F. PORCO, 137 West 75th Street, LLC, 123 West 75th Street, LLC, The Porco Family Trust, and The Michael F. and Mary Ellen Porco Trust, Appellees.

No. 4D17-958

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 3, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

*Affirmed.*
The HONORABLE JOHN R. TUNHEIM, United States District Judge for the 1

District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 96-3566

___________

Marlene Fearing, doing business *

as Real Estate by Marlene, Inc., *

*

 Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Burns & Wilcox, Ltd., as general agent *

for Agency Marketing and/or * [UNPUBLISHED]

individually, *

*

 Third Party Defendant-Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: December 19, 1997

 Filed: December 29, 1997

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Marlene Fearing appeals from the district court&s order granting summary

1

judgment to Burns & Wilcox, Ltd. (B&W) in this diversity suit. The district court

concluded that, by operation of Minnesota law, Fearing had no claim to pursue against

B&W. After de novo review, we affirm.
-2-

The relevant facts are not in dispute. A supper club Fearing owned burned

down. Unable to recover losses from her insolvent, out-of-state fire insurer, Fearing

sued her insurance agent, Gary Banick, and the insurer&s general agent, B&W, in state

court. Banick cross-claimed against B&W for contribution. After the state court

dismissed Fearing&s claims against B&W as time-barred, Fearing and Banick settled.

Banick paid Fearing $300,000 and assigned her his contribution claim against B&W.

Fearing released Banick from the lawsuit and indemnified him from any claims made

by B&W or others. 

Fearing then pressed the assigned Banick claim, and B&W removed the case to

federal court. The district court granted B&W&s motion for summary judgment,

concluding that, under Minnesota law, the settlement between Fearing and Banick

included a Pierringer release that extinguished the settling defendant&s contribution

claim against B&W, a non-settling defendant. See Alumax Mill Prod., Inc. v. Congress

Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996, 1010 (8th Cir. 1990); Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918,

923 (Minn. 1978). After careful review of the record and the arguments Fearing makes

on appeal, we agree with the district court that the settlement and release executed by

Fearing and Banick contains the essential elements of a Pierringer release, one effect

of which was to extinguish Banick&s assigned contribution claim against B&W. See

Thompson v. Brule, 37 F.3d 1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994); Alumax Mill, 912 F.2d at

1008. Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
AFS-14-242-E September, 12 2014

Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2014-0242

Mr. James Peters

Merrill Aviation & Defense

1023 South Wheeler Street Saginaw, MI 48602

Dear Mr. Peters:

This is in response to your April 8, 2014, letter sent to the public docket (No. FAA-2014- 0242) petitioning the Federal Aviation Administration behalf of Merrill Aviation & Defense (Merrill Aviation) for an exemption from §§ 91.9(b) and 91.203(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). That exempti on, if granted, would allow Merrill Aviation to operate an unmanned aircraft (UA) that does not carry and display that aircraft’s airworthiness, certification, and registration documents required in part 91.

We have reviewed your reasons for requesting an exemption from 14 CFR §§ 91.9(b) and 91.203(a). Based on our review and consid eration of FAA Memorandum subject “Interpretation regarding whether certain requi red documents may be kept at an unmanned aircraft’s control station”, (copy enclosed) dated August 8, 2014, we find this relief not necessary. Accordingly, Docket No. FAA-2014-0242 is being closed.

Sincerely,

/s/

William E. Crozier Assistant Manager, UAS Integration Office

Enclosure
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 00-3983

___________ Dianne Hercules, * * Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Eastern * District of Missouri. David Brown, Jr.; Jeff Childress; * Robert H. Kelley, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: July 27, 2001 Filed: July 31, 2001

___________ Before HANSEN, FAGG, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. DianneHercules appeals the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal without prejud ice of Hercules's complaint. Having reviewed the record, we conclude the district court properly dismissed Hercules's complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Without even attempting to explain her claim, Hercules simply made reference to multiple attachments. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal. See 8th Cir. R. 47A(a).-2-

A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jackie Lee RATTLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7648

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 25, 2017

Decided: April 27, 2017

Jackie Lee Rattler, Appellant Pro Se. John Daren Pritchard, Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorneys, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

*258Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jackie Lee Rattler seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Rattler has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### IN RE: Nicholas William FERRI, David J. Earley, Appellants

2016-1877

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

February 13, 2017

Daniel P. Homiller, Murphy, Bilak & Homiller, PLLC, Cary, NC, argued for appellants.

Joseph Gerard Piccolo, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by Nathan K. Kelley, Thomas W. Krause, Sarah E. Craven.

(Moore, Taranto, and Chen, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This.Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
[Cite as State v. Wilson, 2012-Ohio-2890.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

DONTE L. WILSON 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 26238 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 2010-09-2537 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: June 27, 2012 

 

WHITMORE, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Donte Wilson, appeals from his conviction in the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas. This Court dismisses for lack of jurisdiction. 

I 

{¶2} On December 16, 2010, Wilson pleaded guilty to failure to notify of a change of 

address, in violation of R.C. 2950.05. On February 1, 2011, the court journalized its entry 

sentencing Wilson to a four year prison term, which it suspended, and two years of community 

control. In August 2011, Wilson was charged with violating his community control. Before the 

violation hearing was held, Wilson filed a motion to withdraw his December 2010 guilty plea 

and to dismiss his indictment. On November 7, 2011, the court denied his motions. Wilson did 

not appeal. On November 29, 2011, Wilson pleaded no contest to the community control 

violation, and the court found him guilty. On December 28, 2011, Wilson filed his notice of 

appeal. He raises one assignment of error for our review. 
2 

 

II 

Assignment of Error

THE COURT ERRORED (sic) WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA[.] 

{¶3} In his sole assignment of error, Wilson argues that the court erred in denying his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We do not reach the merits of Wilson’s assignment of error 

because his appeal is untimely.

{¶4} The trial court denied Wilson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on November 

7, 2011. That denial was a final appealable order. State v. Kerns, 9th Dist. No. 11CA0051-M, 

2011-Ohio-6788, ¶ 7; State v. Damron, 4th Dist. No. 10CA3375, 2011-Ohio-165, ¶ 7; State v. 

Kramer, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-633, 2004-Ohio-2646, ¶ 8. 

{¶5} Wilson had 30 days after November 7, 2011, to file his notice of appeal. See

App.R. 4(A). Wilson, however, did not file his notice of appeal until December 28, 2011. 

Because Wilson’s notice is untimely, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

III 

{¶6} Wilson’s appeal is dismissed as untimely. 

Appeal dismissed. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 
3 

 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 BETH WHITMORE 

 FOR THE COURT 

MOORE, J. 

BELFANCE, J. 

CONCUR

APPEARANCES:

RHONDA L. KOTNIK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
TAM HOAI TRUONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-148

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed January 31, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.