[Cite as State v. Jones , 2021-Ohio-2601.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HOCKING COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, : : Case Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, 20CA4 Plaintiff-Appellee, : : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY JEFFERY W. JONES, : : RELEASED: 07/26/2021 Defendant-Appellant. :

____________________________________________________________ _ APPEARANCES: Kathryn Cornelius-Blume, Lancaster, Ohio, for Appellant. Ryan R. Black, Hocking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ryan W. Stickel, Assistant Hocking County Prosecutor, Logan, Ohio, for Appellee.

_____________________________________________________________ Wilkin, J. {¶1} This is a consolidated appeal from three Hocking County Court of Common Pleas judgments memorializing jury verdicts that found a ppellant, Jeffery W. Jones, guilty of multiple criminal offenses, and the accompanying entries that sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 20 to 28 1⁄2 years. {¶2} In case no. 20CA2, the trial court imposed a 12-month prison sentence for aggravated possession of drugs to be served concur rent to the prison sentences in case nos. 20CA3 and 20CA4. Appellant asser ts a single assignment of error in this case: appellant’s conviction for ag gravated possession of drugs is against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶3} In case no. 20CA3, the trial court imposed a 12-month prison sentence for breaking and entering to be served consecutive to the prisonHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 2 sentence in case no. 20CA4. Appellant has not asserted any ass ignments of error in this case. {¶4} In case no. 20CA4, the trial court imposed a 19 to 28 1⁄2 year p rison sentence for kidnapping and attempted rape to be served consecu tive to the 1-year prison sentence in case no. 20CA3, for an aggregate pris on term of 20 to 28 1⁄2 years. Appellant asserts five assignments of error in thi s case: (1) the trial court violated appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights when it faile d to merge appellant’s attempted rape and kidnapping convictions, (2) ther e was insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict appellant of kidnapping, (3) appellant’s convictions for attempted rape, kidnapping, and abduction were against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial, (4) the tri al court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence to impeach the alleged vic tim, and (5) the trial court erred as a matter o f law, whereas appellant’s sente nce was contrary to law. {¶5} Having reviewed the record, appellant’s arguments, and the applicable law, in case no. 20CA2, we overrule appellant’s sole assignment of error. In case no. 20CA4, we sustain appellant’s first assignm ent of error and remand for resentencing, overrule his next three assignments of error, and decline to rule on his fifth assignment of error because it has been rendered moot by our decision sustaining appellant’s first assignment. There fore, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the trial court’s judgment entries h erein, and remand this cause for the trial court to merge appellant’s convictions for attempted rape and kidnapping and to resentence appellant accordingly.Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 3 {¶6} We will address appellant’s appeal by case number, starting wit h case no. 20CA2 and then case no. 20CA4. 1. Case No. 20CA2 BACKGROUND {¶7} The state charged appellant with aggravated possession of drug s (Methamphetamine) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) & (C)(1)(a), a fifth-degree felony. During appellant’s trial, Officer Scott Mingus, of the Logan Police Department, testified that on the evening of December 11, 2018, he stopped a blue Pontiac because its license plate indicated that it belong ed to a silver Honda. The stop was recorded on both the officer’s cruiser cam eras and his body camera. There were four individuals in the car. Appellan t was sitting in the right rear passenger seat. Mingus learned that the driver had an outstanding warrant, as did appellant. Mingus called for backup. He state d that when Officer Alford arrived, he informed the occupants of the vehicle that a drug-detecting canine was going to circle the vehicle. Mingus testified that the canine “indicated on the right rear passenger door.” The officers removed the dr iver, Jeremy Haybron, and appellant from the vehicle. Mingus did a pat-down search of Haybron for weapons, and then placed him in the back seat of hi s cruiser. Officer Mingus’ body camera recorded this conversation after ap pellant was out of the vehicle: Officer Mingus: What’s this, a flashlight? Appellant: Flashlight. In [the vehicle] is drug paraphernalia in that blue case. It is mine. Officer Mingus: Okay. The blue case has drug paraphernalia and it is yours? Appellant: It is mine.Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 4

* * * Officer Mingus: Go ahead and just put your hands behind your b ack. Appellant: All right. * * * Officer Mingus: Here’s what I want you to do. Turn – turn your wrists like you are praying. I think it will be more comfortable that way. Okay. What just fell out of your pocket there, partner? Appellant: Out of my pocket? There’s nothing in my pocket. Officer Mingus: No, it just fell because I got it on camera so let’s not – it’s not the time to lie. What’s in the pink baggie? Appellant: Ice. 1 Officer Mingus: Ice? Appellant: Yeah. It didn’t fall out of my pocket, though, but that’s what it looks like. Officer Mingus: Okay. Appellant: I – I didn’t have – I got holes in my pockets. After he finished handcuffing a ppellant, Mingus picked up the p ink baggie, and placed appellant in the back seat of his cruiser with Haybron. {¶8} The video from the rear-facing camera in Officer Mingus’ cruise r was then played for the jury, which recorded the appellant and Hayb ron having the following conversation: Appellant: Fucking fell out of my jacket. I couldn’t get it st opped. Fuck. Did they find yours? Haybron: Don’t say anything here. Appellant: Man, being recorded.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED POSSESSION OF DRUGS IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE {¶9} Appellant alleges that his conviction for aggravated possession of drugs was against the manifest weight of the evidence because t he state did not prove that he possessed the methamphetamine found in the pink b aggie.

1 “ ’Ice’ means crystal methamphetamine.” State v. Anderson , 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 17CA6, 2018-Ohio-2013, ¶ 11.Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 5 Although the officers were operating body cameras as well as a dash camera on a cruiser, there was no video of appellant dropping the pink ba ggie. Appellant claims that other passengers were less than truthful regarding their ownership of illegal substances found in the car. He states that he was “ho nest” in admitting that a blue bag of drug paraphernalia inside the vehicle was hi s; therefore, his statement that the pink baggie was not his should be interprete d truthfully as well. Appellant also cites the fact that he had various holes in the pockets of his pants and thus could not have possessed the baggie. {¶10} In response, the state argues that the officer’s drug-detecting canine indicated that drugs were present outside of the rear passenger door, which is where appellant was seated. Office r Mingus testified that when he was patting down appellant he heard something smack the ground and saw a pi nk baggie that was not there previously and it contained methamphetamine. Finally, the state asserts that appellant admitted that he dropped the baggi e that Mingus had recovered. Law and Analysis {¶11} “ ‘When an appellate court considers a claim that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court must dut ifully examine the entire record, weigh the evidence, and consider the credibility of witnesses.’ ” State v. Griffith , 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 17CA4, 2017-Ohio-8855, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Topping, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 11CA6, 2012-Ohio-5617, ¶ 60. “ ‘The reviewing court must bear in mi nd, however, that credibility ge nerally is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve.’ ” Id. , quoting State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67,Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 6 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001). A “ ‘court may reverse the judgment of conviction only if it appears that the fact-finder, when resolving the conflicts i n evidence, clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Id. , quoting Issa at 67. “ ‘A reviewing court should find a c onviction against the manifest w eight of the evidence only in the exceptional case in which the evidence wei ghs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Id. , quoting Issa at 61. {¶12} Appellant was convicted of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), which states: “No person shall kn owingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substanc e analog.” Possession is defined as “having control over a thing or substa nces, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance t hrough ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing is found.” R .C. 2925.01(K). {¶13} The evidence shows that a drug-detecting canine indicated the presence of drugs outside the right rear passenger door of the vehicle where appellant was sitting. Further, based on Officer Mingus’ testi mony, as well the audio from his body and cruiser cameras, it is reasonable to in fer that appellant dropped the pink baggie that contained methamphetamine while be ing searched. Finally, it appears that appellant admitted the baggie was his when he told Haybron, “fell out of my jacke t. I couldn’t get it stopped. * * * Did they find yours?” {¶14} Appellant alleges that he could not have possessed the baggie because he had holes in his pockets. However, having holes in his pockets mayHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 7
be the reason why the baggie dropped to the ground during the p at-down search. Furthermore, the mere fact that appellant was “honest” regardin g ownership of drug paraphernalia is not necessarily indicative of whether he would be honest in also admitting he possessed methamphetamine, which is a more se rious offense. {¶15} Having examined the entire record, weighed the evidence, and considered the credibility of witnesses, we conclude that this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against c onviction. Instead, we find a significant amount of evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that appellant did possess the pink baggie of methamphetamine b efore it was dropped onto the ground thereby supporting his conviction for a ggravated possession of drugs. Therefore, because appellant’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we overrule his sole assig nment of error. 2. Case No. 20CA4 BACKGROUND {¶16} On August 26, 2019, the state charged appellant with five crimi nal counts: (1) attempted rape in violation of R.C. 2923.02, 2907.0 2(A)(2) and (B), a second-degree felony; (2) attempted sexual battery in violation R.C. 2923.02, 2907.03(A)(1) and (B), a fourth-degree felony; (3) attempted gr oss sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2923.02, 2907.05(A)(1) and (C)( 1), a fifth-degree felony; (4) kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and ( C)(1), a first-degree felony; and (5) abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02(B) and ( C), a third-degree felony. The case went to trial and the state presented several witnesses.Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 8 {¶17} The state’s first witness was a sexual assault nurse who examin ed the victim C.E. The nurse testif ied that C.E. told her she hea rd a noise in the basement of her apartment complex and when C.E. investigated, s he encountered appellant who demanded she perform fellatio. The n urse further testified that when C.E. refused, appellant slapped her in the face several times. The nurse explained to the jury that C.E. said she managed to g et out of her basement and ring a neighbor’s doorbell, but while waiting for an answer, appellant pinned her against the stairs and ejaculated on her h ead. The nurse took samples from C .E., including her hair to check for DNA. T he nurse indicated that she did not see any physical injuries but she di d notice red welts on C.E.’s face, which she noted as hives. She further noted th at the doctor who examined C.E. issued a report that described her face as having “redness and edema.” The nurse also stated that in her opinion C.E.’s “ment al capabilities of what was happening to her [while in the basement] were slowed d own.” {¶18} The state’s next witness was C.E. She testified that she heard a noise in the basement of her apartment complex and she discover ed her friend at the time, S.B., and appellant. C.E. stated that after S.B. wen t to the bathroom, appellant told her to “suck his dick” three times, and if she r efused he would “hit” her. She refused appellant’s demand, and S.B. returned from th e bathroom and stopped appellant from slapping C.E. C.E. went on to say that she “got away from [appellant] and was starting to go up the steps, he follow ed me, pinned my knees together where I couldn’t move and then he proceeded to e jaculate on me” and also “touched my breast.” C.E. called 9-1-1 to report the assault, but whenHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 9
police arrived she did not initi ally mention that the assault w as sexual in nature because she was embarrassed. {¶19} On cross-examination, C.E. confirmed that after denying appella nt’s initial demand for fellatio, she walked over to the stairs and sat down. When asked why she did not just continue up the stairs after appella nt’s assault, C.E. said she was “freaked out.” She further stated that it wasn’t until police informed her appellant could potentially return to the apartment that sh e told officers his assault was sexual in nature. {¶20} Next to testify was Officer Stum p, who responded to C.E.’s 9-1- 1 call. Stump testified that the re port C.E. filled out indicate d appellant “hit” her. However, he could not recall what word she used in describing h ow appellant struck her in the face, but did describe her cheek as being red . Stump stated that when he arrived it seemed unusual that C.E. was standing n ear appellant, but he also said that it appeared she did not completely unders tand what was going on at the time. When asked how C.E. “presented” to him, Stump testified “she was a little unsure of her self. Kind of slow. I don’t kn ow if she just wasn’t processing what was going on very fast.” {¶21} Next to testify was Officer Burchfield, who also responded to appellant’s call. Burchfield te stified that C.E. said appellan t punched or hit her. Burchfield admitted that he used the word “punched” in his repo rt; however, he also stated that he was not sure whether he heard C.E. actually use the word “punch.” But he did testify that C.E. said her face hurt and s he went to the hospital.Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 10 {¶22} The state’s next witness was Timothy Augusback, a forensic scientist for the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation. Augus back testified that a “head-hair-comb” sample taken from C.E. tested positive for app ellant’s DNA. {¶23} The jury convicted appellant of attempted rape, attempted sexua l battery, kidnapping, and abduction, but found appellant not gui lty of attempted gross sexual imposition. At sen tencing, the trial court merged the attempted sexual battery into attempted rape and abduction, and merged th e abduction into kidnapping. The court then sentenced appellant for both kidnap ping and attempted rape for an aggregate prison term of 19 to 28 1⁄2 years

. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN IT FAILED TO M ERGE APPELLANT’S ATTEMPTED RAPE AND KIDNAPPING CONVICTIONS II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF KIDNAPPING III. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR ATTEMPTED RAPE, KIDNAPPING, AND ABDUCTION WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT EXCLUDED EVIDENCE TO IMPEACH THE ALLEGED VICTIM

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEREAS APPELLANT’S SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO LAW

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I {¶24} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not merging his attempted rape and kidnapping convictions under R.C. 2941.25. AppellantHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 11
claims that when a kidnapping is committed during the commissio n of another crime they are committed with the same animus if the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to the underlying offense. In this instance, appellant asserts, because the kidnapping was committed during the attempted rape, they are allied offenses of similar import and must merge , which means that he can only be sentenced for one offense or the other, but not both. {¶25} In response, the state claims that the kidnapping is a separate incident from the attempted rape. Therefore, the state argues that the kidnapping and attempted rape were committed with a separate an imus and the kidnapping in the stairs caused an increased chance of harm to C.E. Accordingly, the state maintains that the trial court did not e rr in failing to merge appellant’s attempted rape and kidnapping convictions. Law and Analysis {¶26} “R.C. 2941.25 ‘codifies the pr otections of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitutio n, which prohibi ts multiple pu nishments for the same offense.’ ” State v. Osman , 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA22, 2014-Ohio-294, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 23. R.C. 2941.25 states: (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied of fenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one. (B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committedHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 12
separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and th e defendant may be convicted of all of them. “By its enactment of R.C. 2941.25(A), the General Assembly has clearly expressed its intention to prohibit multiple punishments for al lied offenses of similar import.” State v. Whitfield , 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 8, citing State v. Rance , 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699 (1999), paragraph three of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds , 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 942 N.E.2d 1062. “By contrast, the General Assembly exercised its power to permit multiple punishments by enacting R.C. 2941.25(B).” Id . at ¶ 9, citing State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 17. {¶27} “An appellate court should apply a de novo standard of review in reviewing a trial court's R.C. 2941.25 merger determination.” State v. Williams , 134 Ohio St. 3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 28. A de novo standard of review means we “ ‘ “independently determine, witho ut deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy th e applicable legal standard.” ’ ” State v. Gillman , 2015-Ohio-4421, 46 N.E.3d 130, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Williams , 134 Ohio St. 3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. {¶28} The Ohio Supreme Court has set out a tripartite test to determi ne when multiple criminal offenses must merge under R.C. 2941.25 i n State v. Ruff , 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892. In making a merger determination under Ruff “within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts mustHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 13
evaluate three separate factors - the conduct, the animus, and the import.” Id . at paragraph one of the syllabus. The tripartite test is as follo ws: Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses [i.e. th ey do not merge] if any one of the following is true : (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissim ilar import, (2) the conduct show s that the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed with separate animus. (Emphasis added.) Id . at paragraph three of the syllabus. Ruff explains that “[t]wo or more offenses of dissimilar import exi st within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant's conduct constit utes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from eac h offense is separate and identifiable.” Id . at ¶ 23. {¶29} In 1979, years before Ruff was decided, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of merger of kidnapping and rape conviction s in State v. Logan , 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979). The Court recogni zed that “implicit within every forcible rape R.C. 2907.02(A)(1) is a ki dnapping.” Id. at 130. In determining whether the rape and kidnapping conviction s should merge, the court stated: The primary issue * * * is whether the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to a separate underlying crime or, instead, whether it has a significance independent of the other offense. In the instant case, the restraint and movement of the victim had no significance apart from facilitating the rape. Th e detention was brief, the movemen t was slight, and the victim wa s released immediately following the commission of the rape. In such circumstances, we cannot say that appellant had a separate animus to commit kidnapping. Id. at 135.Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 14 The Court adopted the following guidelines for determining when a kidnapping conviction and another similar offense are committed should mer ge: (a) Where the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to a separate underlying crime, there exists no separate animus sufficient to sustain separate convictions; however, where the restraint is prolonged, the confinement is secretive, or the movement is su bstantial so as to demonstrate a significance independent of the other offense, there exists a separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate convictions; (b) Where the asportation or restraint of the victim subjects t he victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm separate and apart from that involved in the underlying crime, there exists a separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate convictions. Id . at syllabus. {¶30} “Ohio courts still apply the test found in [ Logan ] to determine whether rape and kidnapping convictions merge for sentencing ev en though this test predates Ruff. ” State v. Thacker , 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 18CA21, 2020- Ohio-4620, ¶ 125, appeal not accepted , 161 Ohio St. 3d 1408, 2021-Ohio-106, 161 N.E.3d 687. Consequently, this Court adopted the “guidelin es” set out in Logan to determine when kidnapping and similar offenses - like rape - are committed with the same animus and must merge. Id ., quoting Logan at syllabus. Therefore, kidnapping and rape convictions merge if the restraint of the victim is merely incidental to the rape, but do not merge if th e restraint subjected the victim to a harm beyond that of the rape. {¶31} The evidence indicates that while in the basement of the apartm ent complex, appellant threatened he would hit C.E. if she did not perform fellatio, and when she refused, he struck her several times. C.E., on he r own volition,Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 15 then immediately proceeded to the stairs that lead out of the b asement, and sat down. However, appellant followed C.E., pinned her in the stai rs, then masturbated and ejaculated on her head. The evidence also show s that while pinning her in the stairs, appellant again demanded she perform fellatio while also threatening to hit her. {¶32} We find that this evidence indicates that the appellant pinned C.E. by force in the stairs thereby restraining her liberty, and dem anded C.E. perform fellatio by threat of force. We further find that the kidnappi ng involved only a relatively brief restraint with no asportation, was committed t o facilitate appellant’s attempt to rape C.E., and did not subject C.E. to a dditional danger aside from the rape. Therefore, under Logan, the offenses must merge. {¶33} We reach the same result in applying the tripartite test from Ruff. First, the kidnapping and attempted rape convictions involved a single victim and the harm caused by the two offenses was not separate and identi fiable, so the offenses are not dissimilar. Sec ond, both offenses were also c ommitted at the same time, not separately. Lastly, the kidnapping was committe d merely to facilitate the attempted rape, so the conduct did not show that these offenses were committed with a separate animus. Therefore, under Ruff, the offenses must merge. {¶34} In conclusion, we find that under both Logan and Ruff , appellant’s kidnapping and attempted rape convictions must merge, and the t rial court erred in failing to do so. For this r eason, we sustain appellant’s f irst assignment of error. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's imposition of separate sentencesHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 16

on these counts and remand this matter to the trial court to merge the attempte d rape and kidnapping convictions for purposes of sentencing. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II {¶35} Appellant alleges that there is insufficient evidence that the victim was “restrained” to support his kidnapping conviction. Appella nt argues that there were two incidents of potential restraint. The first was when he slapped
C.E. after she refused to perform fellatio, and the second was when C.E. was on the stairs. But he alleges that under both scenarios, C.E. was not restrained because she testified that she wa s free to leave at any time. As a result, appellant maintains that there is insufficient evidence to supp ort his kidnapping conviction. {¶36} In response, the state claims that when appellant pinned C.E.’s knees on the stairs that was evidence of restraint to support t he kidnapping conviction. Thus, the state argu es that there is sufficient ev idence of restraint to support appellant’s kidnapping conviction. Law and Analysis {¶37} “A claim of insufficient evidenc e * * * raises the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Benge , 4th Dist. Adams No. 20CA1112, 2021-Ohio-152, ¶ 25, citing State v. Blanton , 2018-Ohio-1278, 110 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.); State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The standard of re view of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is “after viewing the probati ve evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorab le to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all th e essential elementsHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 17 of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id ., citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). “A reviewing court will not overturn a conviction on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim unless reason able minds could not reach the conclusion that the trier of fact did.” Id . at ¶ 26, citing State v. Tibbetts , 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 162, 749 N.E.2d 326 (2001). {¶38} Appellant was convicted of kidnapping under R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), which in pertinent part requires proof that “by force, threat, or deception,” the offender did “ restrain the liberty of [the victim] * * * [t]o facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter.” (Emphasis added). The Ohio Revised Code does not define “restraint,” but the Tenth District Court of Appeals has stated that “[r]estraining an individual's liberty means limiting or restra ining their freedom of movement.” State v. Williams , 2017-Ohio-5598, 93 N.E.3d 449, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.) {¶39} The evidence indicates that appellant used force by pinning C.E.’s knees together on the stairs, which restrained her liberty for the purpose of committing attempted rape, which is a felony. In viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that any rational tr ier of fact could have found appellant guilty of kidnapping. Therefore, we overru le appellant’s second assignment of error. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III {¶40 } Appellant’s third assignment of error alleges that his kidnappi ng, attempted rape, and abduction convictions are against the manif est weight of the evidence. Specifically, appellant argues that there is insuffi cient evidence that heHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 18 used “force” to support his kidnapping or abduction convictions , or used “force” or “threat of force” to support his attempted rape conviction. It appears that appellant claims that a slap is insufficient to constitute forc e for purposes of these offenses. He maintains that slapping C.E. did not restrain her liberty and she testified that she was free to leave. Appellant also asserts t hat there was insufficient evidence to prove that he restrained C.E. for purposes of his kidnapping or abduction convictions. {¶41} In response, the state argues that while there is conflicting t estimony as to how the force was applied (punch, hit, slap), the testimo ny was sufficient for the jury to conclude that appellant used force in committing th e attempted rape, kidnapping, and abduction. The state also asserts that appella nt’s act of pinning
C.E. in the stairs restrained her liberty for purposes of abduction and kidnapping. Therefore, the state argues that these convictions are not agai nst the manifest weight of the evidence.
Law and Analysis {¶42} Because we set forth the manifest weight of the evidence standard of review earlier in this dec ision, we will not repeat the stan dard or accompanying citations here. Appellant challenges the manifest weight of ev idence regarding his kidnapping, abduction, and attempted rape convictions. We first note that the trial court merged abduction with the kidnapping conviction. T herefore, if sufficient evidence supports appellant’s kidnapping conviction and if the conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, then an erroneous abduction finding of guilty by the jury would be harmless. See State v.Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 19

Wickersham , 4th Dist. Meigs No. 13CA10, 2015-Ohio-2756, ¶ 21, citing Stat e v. Powell, 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 263, 552 N.E.2d 191 (1990). As such, we wi ll review appellant’s evidentiary challenge to abduction only if we find that appellant’s kidnapping conviction is against the manifest weight of the evi dence. {¶43} The offense of kidnapping required the state to prove the appel lant used “force” “by any means” to “restrain the liberty of the [vi ctim]” for the purpose of committing a felony . R.C. 2905.01(A)(2). The offense of at tempted rape requires the state to prove that the offender attempted to “eng age in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the ot her person to submit by force or threat of fo rce.” R.C. 2903.02 and R.C. 290 7.02(A)(2). R.C. 2901.01(A)(1) defines “force” as “any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thi ng.” {¶44} C.E. testified that shortly after appellant initially demanded she perform fellatio and struck her for refusing to comply, he “pin ned” her legs in the stairs, and again demanded she perform fellatio. We find that the jury could have reasonably construed this evidence as indicating that appellant used “force” by physically constraining C.E.’s liberty for purposes of finding appellant guilty of kidnapping. We further find the jury could have reasonably fou nd appellant’s threat to slap, and then actually slapping C.E., was “force” be cause it was “violence” that he used in an attempt to compel her to perform fellatio, which is attempted rape. {¶45} Nevertheless, appellant cites State v. Pierce , 3rd Dist. Seneca No. 13-87-27, 1989 WL 86258 (Aug. 3, 1989) apparently for the propo sition that aHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 20
slap is insufficient to constitute force for purposes of his co nvictions. [Appellant’s brief p. 19] In Pierce , the court of appeals affirmed an adult offender’s rape conviction of a 13-year old c hild, reasoning that the appellant ’s threat to slap the child was sufficient to constitute force. (Emphasis added.) Id . at *2. And, the court in Pierce further stated that “[a] slap in the face is, in any event, ‘v iolence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means * * * against a person.’ ” Id . at *2. Pierce simply does not support appellant’s argument that a slap is insufficient to constitute a use of force for purposes of R.C. 2901.01(A)(1). {¶46} Because we find that the jury did not lose its way in finding appellant guilty of kidnapping and attempted rape so as to crea te a manifest injustice requiring a reversal of his convictions, we hold that appellant’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence . Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV {¶47} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the tr ial court violated his due process rights when it precluded admission of Officer Burchfield’s police report. Appellant claims that the trial co urt abused its discretion in refusing to admit Officer Burchfield’s police rep ort to impeach C.E.’s testimony under Evid.R. 613(B). Appellant asserts that Burchfi eld’s police report, which indicated that appellant “punched” C.E., would have impea ched C.E.’s testimony that appellant “slapped” her. {¶48} The state argues that the report does not impeach C.E.’s testim ony because the report did not include a direct statement from C.E. The report was aHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 21

recitation of what Burchfield re called C.E. saying. Burchfie ld testified about his report and nowhere in his testimony does he claim C.E. used the word “punch.” Therefore, the state contends that the trial court did not abus e its discretion in denying appellant from using the report to impeach C.E. Law and Analysis {¶49} “A trial court has broad discretion in the admission or exclusi on of evidence, and so long as such discretion is exercised in line w ith the rules of procedure and evidence, its judgment will not be reversed absen t a clear showing of an abuse of discretion with attendant material preju dice to defendant.” State v. Ward , 4th Dist. Gallia No. 3CA2, 2003-Ohio-5650, ¶ 32, citing Rigby v. Lake Cty. , 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). “[T]rial wit nesses may be impeached pursuant to Evid.R. 613(B) through the use of their own prior inconsistent statements.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Byrd , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 96CA2427, 1998 WL 2403, *2 (Jan. 6, 1998), citing State v. Hill , 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 207, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996). {¶50} Officer Burchfield’s police report does state that appellant “p unched” C.E. And C.E. testified that she told officers that appellant “hit” her with “his palm,” but did not “punch” her. She further testified that to the extent an officer indicated that appellant “punched” her, he was wrong. However, Officer Burchfield could not verify that his use of the word “punched” in his report was directly attributable to C.E. Consequently, it does not appear that the report contains a prior statement from C.E. that conflicted with her t rial testimony. Therefore, we find that the tria l court’s exclusion of the poli ce report from beingHocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 22 used to impeach C.E.’s testimony was not unreasonable, arbitrar y, or unconscionable. Accordingly, because we find that the trial co urt did not abuse its discretion in precluding admission of the police report, we overrule appellant’s fourth assignment of error. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V {¶51} Finally, appellant argues that his aggregate sentence of a 20-y ear minimum and 28 1⁄2 years maximum in prison, received in case nos. 20CA3, and 20CA4, violates R.C. 2929.144 (The Reagan Tokes Law). The stat e agrees that appellant’s sentencing does not conform with the requirements o f R.C. 2929.144. However, appellant admits that if we find that his kidnapping a nd attempted rape convictions merge, as we have held, this assignment of error be comes moot because the trial court will need to resentence him. Therefore , we decline to address appellant’s fifth assignment of error as it has become moot. CONCLUSION {¶52} In case no. 20CA2, we overrule appellant’s sole assignment of error. In case no. 20CA4, we sustain appellant’s first assignm ent of error, reversing his sentences for kidnapping and attempted rape, and remand the matter for the trial court to merge those convictions and re-se ntence appellant accordingly. On remand, the st ate will have the option of deci ding whether the trial court sentences appellant for kidnapping or attempted rap e. Additionally, we overrule appellant’s second, third, and fourth assignments of e rror in case no. 20CA4, and we decline to address his fifth assignment of error, which is moot.Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 23

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR MERGER AND RESENTENCING.Hocking App. Nos. 20CA2, 20CA3, and 20CA4 24

JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR MERGER AND RESENTENCING and costs be split equally between the parties. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special m andate issue out of this Court d irecting the Hocking County Common Pleas Cour t to carry this judgment into e xecution. IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 6 0 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay d uring the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this e ntry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the fail ure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 4 5-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the S upreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date o f such dismissal. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pu rsuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. For the Court,

BY: ______________________________ Kristy S. WIlkin, Judge NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, t his document constitutes a fin al judgment entry and the time peri od for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.