alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benjamin SANJURJO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6152

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 26, 2017

Benjamin Sanjurjo, Appellant Pro Se. Stephen Wiley Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Benjamin Sanjurjo appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Sanjurjo,*No. 3:98-cr-00338-REP-RCY-2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 1, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Ira E. Garr, P.C., Respondent, v Sara Kinberg, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 883]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Faula Oman-sky, J), entered November 8, 2002, upon a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, in the principal amount of $28,639.35, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

In this action to recover legal fees, the jury was entitled to credit plaintiff attorney’s testimony concerning his compliance with 22 NYCRR 136.5 (a) and, based upon that testimony, to conclude that defendant client had been afforded the requisite notice of her right to arbitrate the fee dispute. Nor, under the circumstances presented, in which plaintiff substantially complied with 22 NYCRR 1400.2 and 1400.3, rendered substantial services and achieved a reasonably favorable result, is plaintiffs recovery of legal fees precluded by his late filing of the parties’ retainer agreement *(see Flanagan v Flanagan,*267 AD2d 80 [1999]). Finally, the trial evidence, fairly considered *(see Nicastro v Park,*113 AD2d 129, 136 [1985]), amply supported the jury verdict awarding plaintiff the full amount of legal fees requested.

We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Williams and Friedman, JJ.
Kevin J. JOLICOEUR, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-3662

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

October 31, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### Jerome WANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steven Mark FREI, Attorney; Sickles, Frei & Mims, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1229

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 25, 2017

Jerome Want, Appellant Pro Se. Laurie Kirkland, BLANKINGSHIP & KEITH, PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jerome Want appeals the district court’s orders in this diversity action granting summary judgment for Appellees and declining to issue subpoenas. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the. district court. *Want v. Frei,*No. 1:16-cv-00660-LMB-IDD, 2017 WL 342048 (E.D. Va. Nov. 2, 2016; Jan. 23, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
Jose Angel LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D17-4682

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 17, 2018

David M. Robbins and Susan Z. Cohen of Epstein & Robbins, Jacksonville, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Amanda D. Stokes, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

DENIED .

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.
Exhibit



Exhibit 10.29



KEANE GROUP, INC. 
EQUITY AND INCENTIVE AWARD PLAN


AMENDMENT TO 
DEFERRED STOCK AWARD AGREEMENT


This Amendment (this “Amendment”) is made and entered into on [●], 2018, by and between Keane Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and [●] (the “Participant”).  Capitalized terms not otherwise defined shall have the meanings provided in the Keane Group, Inc. Equity and Incentive Award Plan (the “Plan”)


W I T N E S S E T H:


WHEREAS, the Company maintains the Plan;


WHEREAS, the Company granted a Deferred Stock Award under the Plan to the Participant pursuant to an Award Agreement dated as of March 17, 2017 (the “Award Agreement”); and


WHEREAS, the Company and the Participant desire to amend the Award Agreement as set forth herein.


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements herein contained and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows:


1.    The reference to “February 15, 2019” in Section 1(a) of the Award Agreement is replaced with “March 5, 2019” where it appears therein.


2.    Except set forth in this Amendment, all of the other provisions of the Award Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Amendment as of the date first above written.
	
			
	 
	KEANE GROUP, INC.

	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	 

	 
	By:
	 

	 
	 
	Name: 

	 
	 
	Title: 

	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	 

	 
	PARTICIPANT

	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	 

	 
	Name:
Richard L. DANIELS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2797

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 21, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Air permit Sanitized
Deny and Opinion Filed August 7, 2014 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00968-CV 

No. 05-14-00969-CV 

No. 05-14-00970-CV 

No. 05-14-00971-CV 

No. 05-14-00972-CV 

IN RE WILLIE OTIS HARRIS, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 304th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F91-45092; F91-45093; F91-45123; F91-70666; F91-70667 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices FitzGerald, Francis, and Lewis 

Opinion by Justice Francis 

Relator filed this petition for writ of mandamus requesting that the Court order the trial 

court to rule on his motion for new trial. The facts and issues are well known to the parties so we 

do not recount them here. To demonstrate entitlement to a writ of mandamus in a criminal case, a 

relator must establish that (1) the trial court failed to perform a purely ministerial duty, and (2) 

relator has no other adequate legal remedy. State ex rel. Hill v. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Dist., 34 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). A trial court has no obligation to rule on a 

motion for new trial because it is overruled by operation of law if the trial court fails to rule 

within seventy-five days. TEX. R. APP. P. 21.8; In re Boykin, No. 09-12-00361-CR, 2012 WL 

4033333, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 12, 2012, orig. proceeding); In re Bullock, No. 12-
 –2– 

11-00258-CR, 2011 WL 5420842, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 9, 2011, orig. proceeding). 

Accordingly, relator has not demonstrated that the trial court has failed to perform a ministerial 

duty. We DENY the petition for writ of mandamus. 

140968F.P05 /Molly Francis/ 

MOLLY FRANCIS 

JUSTICE
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy James ULTSCH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6046

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 26, 2017

Nicholas John Xenakis, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Eric Matthew Hurt, Lisa Rae McKeel, Assis*128tant United States Attorneys, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Timothy James Ultsch seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ultsch has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Mark Greenfield, Respondent, v Macherich Queens Limited Partnership et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[771 NYS2d 498]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.), entered February 25, 2003, which, insofar as appealed from, granted plaintiff laborer’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants’ liability under Labor Law § 240 (1), and denied defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the section 240 (1) claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

It appears that plaintiff, employed by third-party defendant general contractor as a “project superintendent,” was on a “walk-through” of a newly built store leased by defendant mall • owner to defendant store owner; that such a walk-through is performed for the purpose of compiling a “punch list” of small unfinished items and last minute changes; and that the manager *430of the mall asked plaintiff to cover the store’s windows with opaque brown sisal paper to prevent shoppers from seeing an empty store. It further appears that plaintiff then borrowed a ladder from the storeroom of defendant store owner, and, while he was attempting to tape the paper to the store’s windows, the ladder collapsed, causing him injury. Construing section 240 (1) liberally so as to accomplish its purpose of protecting workers *(see Martinez v City of New York,*93 NY2d 322, 326 [1999]), we hold that compiling a punch list is work that falls under the “erection” category of that statute *(cf. Campisi v Epos Contr. Corp.,*299 AD2d 4, 6 [2002]), and that plaintiff is therefore protected thereby even if he was not directly involved in compiling a punch list when injured *(cf. Reinhart v Long Is. Light. Co.,*91 AD2d 571 [1982], *appeal dismissed*58 NY2d 1113 [1983]). Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Ellerin, Williams and Gonzalez, JJ.
jcap_Ex10_29



		

			Exhibit 10.29

		





		
			SECOND AMENDMENT TO TERM LOAN AGREEMENT
		

		
			This Second Amendment to  Term Loan Agreement (“Second Amendment”) is made as of the 18th day of January, 2019, by and among FRANKLIN OWNER, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company (the “Borrower”), and FIRSTBANK, a Tennessee state bank, whose address is 6815 Poplar Avenue, Suite 100, Memphis, Tennessee 38138 (hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”). 
		

		
			WHEREAS, the parties entered into a certain Term Loan Agreement, dated as of August 17, 2018, with respect to a Loan from Bank to Borrower in the amount of Seven Million One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand and No/100ths Dollars ($7,125,000.00), as amended by that certain Amendment to Term Loan Agreement dated August 17, 2018 (collectively, the “Loan Agreement”); 
		

		
			WHEREAS, the Borrower has entered into an amended and restated credit agreement, and the parties desire to update the Loan Agreement to reference this new credit agreement.
		

		
			NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto agree as follows:
		

			
	
			
				 1.
			

			
	
			
			Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Loan Agreement, from the date of this Second Amendment forward, the term “Credit Agreement”, as defined in the Loan Agreement, shall mean “the First Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated as of December 28, 2018 by and among Guarantor, Jernigan Capital, Inc., KeyBank National Association, Raymond James Bank, N.A., Trustmark National Bank, FirstBank, Triumph Bank, Renasant Bank, Pinnacle Bank, and BMO Harris Bank N.A.”




			
	
			
				 2.
			

			
	
			
			As modified hereby, the Loan Agreement is ratified and confirmed and shall remain in full force and effect.




		
			[Signature page follows]
		

		
			


		 


 


[Signature Page to Second Amendment to Term Loan Agreement]
		

		
			IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Borrower and the Bank have executed this Second Amendment, or have caused this Second Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized officers, all as of the day and year first above written.
		

		
			BORROWER:
		

		
			 
		

		
			FRANKLIN OWNER, LLC,  
		

		
			a Georgia limited liability company
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: FRANKLIN PARENT, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, its sole member and manager
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: JERNIGAN CAPITAL OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, its managing member and manager
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: JERNIGAN CAPITAL, INC., a Maryland corporation, its managing member
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: /s/ Kelly Luttrell
		

		
			Name: Kelly Luttrell
		

		
			Title: SVP CFO
		

		
			
		

		
			 
		

		
			BANK:
		

		
			 
		

		
			FIRSTBANK, a Tennessee state bank
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: /s/ Bill Harter
		

		
			Name: Bill Harter
		

		
			Title: Senior Vice President
Thavish Eugene DAVIS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-1671

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 23, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

This appeal is dismissed for failure of the Appellant to comply with this court's April 30, 2018 order to show cause.

NORTHCUTT, LUCAS, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Michael Wesley JOHNSON, also known as Mike Jones, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11486 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 21, 2017

Brian W. Portugal, Assistant U.S. Attorney, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Peter Christian Smythe, Smythe, P.C., Fort Worth, TX, James Warren St. John, Esq., Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Michael Wesley Johnson appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). He argues that the district court erred in accepting the statements of his co-defendants when determining the drug quantity used to calculate his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Government moves to dismiss the appeal as frivolous or, alternatively, for summary affirmance or an extension of time to file a brief.

As correctly noted by the Government, during the sentencing hearing, Johnson expressly withdrew his objection to the district court’s drug quantity calculation. Johnson’s objection was therefore waived, and “[wjaived errors are entirely unreviewable[.]” *United States v. Musquiz,*45 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1995).

Because Johnson withdrew his objection to the drug quantity determination, the sole issue raised on appeal is unreviewable. Accordingly, the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. *See*5th Cik. R. 42.2. The Government’s alternative motions for summary affir-*156manee or an extension of time to file a brief are DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Roger Earl COLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Frank PERRY, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6261

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 31, 2017

Roger Earl Coley, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Roger Earl Coley seeks to appeal the magistrate judge’s order and recommendation denying Coley’s request for counsel and recommending the action be construed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition and dismissed without prejudice. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Coley seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for *100lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are- adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officers of
1-800-FLOWERS.COM, Inc. (the "Company") hereby certifies, to the best of such officers' knowledge, that:

(1)   the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended July 1, 2012, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; as amended; and

(2)   the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: September 17, 2012

/s/ JAMES F. MCCANN James F. McCann
Chief Executive Officer and
Chairman of the Board of
DirectorsDated: September 17, 2012

/s/ WILLIAM E. SHEA William E. Shea
Senior Vice President of Finance
and Administration and
Chief Financial Officer


These
certifications are furnished pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"). Such certifications will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference in to any filing under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates them by reference.

---



QuickLinks
(LOGO) BOk Mortgage
7060 South Yale
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74136-5716


Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A.
11000 Broken Land Parkway
Columbia, MD 21044-3562
Attention: Master Servicing


RE: Officer's Certificate


Dear Master Servicer:

The undersigned Officer certifies the following for the 1999 fiscal year:

(A) I have reviewed the  activities and  performance of the Servicer  during the
    preceding  fiscal  year under the terms of the  Servicing  Agreement,  Trust
    Agreement,  Pooling and Servicing Agreement and/or Seller/Servicer Guide and
    to the best of these Officer's knowledge,  the Servicer has fulfilled all of
    its  duties,   responsibilities   or  obligations   under  these  Agreements
    throughout  such  year,  or if there has been a default  or  failure  of the
    Servicer to perform any of such duties,  responsibilities or obligations,  a
    description of each default or failure and the nature and status thereof has
    been reported to Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A.;

(B) I have  confirmed  that the Servicer is currently an approved  FNMA or FHLMC
    Servicer in good standing;

(C) I have confirmed that the Fidelity Bond, the Errors and Omissions  Insurance
    Policy  and any  other  bonds  required  under  the  terms of the  Servicing
    Agreement, Trust Agreement, Pooling and Servicing Agreement and/or
    Seller/Servicer Guide are in full force and effect;

(D) All premiums for each Hazard  Insurance  Policy,  Flood Insurance Policy (if
    applicable),  and Primary Mortgage  Insurance  Policy (if applicable),  with
    respect  to each  Mortgaged  Property,  have  been  paid  and  that all such
    insurance policies are in full force and effect;

(E) All real  estate  taxes,  governmental  assessments  and any other  expenses
    accrued and due, that if not paid could result in a lien or  encumbrance  on
    any  Mortgaged  Property,  have been paid,  or if any such costs or expenses
    have not been paid with respect to any  Mortgaged  Property,  the reason for
    the nonpayment has been reported to Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A.;

(F) All Custodial Accounts have been reconciled and are properly funded; and

(G) All annual  reports of  Foreclosure  and  Abandonment  of Mortgage  Property
    required per section  6050H,  6050J and 6050P of the Internal  Revenue Code,
    respectively, have been prepared and filed.



Certified By:

Cathy Bralter
Officer

Vice President
Title

7-10-00
Date
IN RE: Sean C. BRAZIL

NO. 2018-B-0932

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 15, 2018

ORDER

Considering the Joint Petition for Interim Suspension filed by respondent, Sean C. Brazil, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Sean C. Brazil, Louisiana Bar Roll number 36810, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.3, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Donnell BARROW, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6670

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 17, 2017

Decided: August 22, 2017

William Donnell Barrow, Appellant Pro Se. Lawrence Jason Cameron, Denise Walker, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KEENAN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*124PER CURIAM:

William Donnell Barrow appeals the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for reduction of sentence.* We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Barrow,*No. 2:11-cr-00029-D-1 (E.D.N.C. May 12, 2017). We deny Barrow’s motion for a transcript at government expense and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

*

 The district court's order also denies Barrow’s motion for review of his case for harmless and plain error, Barrow confines his appeal to the district court's denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion.
Randal Thomas ROSADO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0139

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 14, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.