1

Filed 1/29/20 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

XAVIER BECERRA, as Attorney General, etc., et al. Petitioner s ,
v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO , Respondent; FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION et al
., Real Parties in Interest. A157998
( City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. CPF

- 19

- 516 5 45)

The California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) enshrin es the value this state has long placed on government transparency and public access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business. More recently, in acknowledgment of the extraordinary authority vested in peace officers and the serious harms occasioned by misuse of that authority, the Legislature amended Penal Code
section 832.7 1 to recognize the right of the public to know about incidents involving
sh ootings by an officer or the use of force by an officer that results in death or great bodily injury, a s well as sustained findings of sexual assault or dishonesty by an officer. (Stats. 2018, ch. 988, § § 1, 2 (Sen. Bill No. 1421), eff. Jan. 1, 2019.) As amended,
section 832.7 specifies that records pertaining to such incidents and findings are no t confidential and must be made available for public inspection pursuant to the CPRA.

1 All unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.2

In this case, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra and the Californi a Department of Justice ( collectively
, the Department) have filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking to ove rturn the trial court’s order in favor of First Amendment Coalition and KQED, Inc. (KQED) over two aspects of the Department’s disclosure oblig ations
under section 832.7. We conclude, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that section 832.7 generally requires disclosure of all responsive records in the possession of the Department , regardless whether the records pertain to officers employed by the Department or by an other public agenc y and regardless whether the Department or
another public agency created the records

. Although we also determine , as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the so

- called “ catchall exemption ” of the CPRA , cod ified at Government Code section 6255, may apply to records that are subject to disclosure under
section 832.7 , our independent review leads us to conclude the Department did not adequately demonstrate that the public interest served by nondisclos ure of the records at
issue clearly outweighs the public interest in their disclosure

. The petition for writ of
mandate is denied

. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Petitioner Xavier Becerra is the Attorney General of the State of California and the
chief law officer of the State. Petitioner California Department of Justice is a state agency that employs sworn peace officers and possesses certain records relating to the
officer s it employs and to officers who are employed by other state and local agencies

. Real party in interest First Amendment Coalition is a non

- profit corporation dedicated to advancing free speech rights, ensuring open and accountable government, and promoting public participation in civil affairs. Real party in interest KQED is a community

- supported media orga nization providing coverage of news and culture to Northern California via radio, television, and digital media. In January 2019, pursuant to the CPRA , First Amendment Coalition requested from the Department all records within its possession subject to di sclosure under newly amended section 832.7. Specifically, it asked for “records relating to a report, investigation or finding .

. . of any of the following: (1) An incident involving the3

discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer; [¶] (2) An incident in which the use of force by a peace officer or custodial officer against a person resulting in death or in great bodily injury; and/or [¶] (3) An incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in sexual assault involving a member of the public.” It sought records for incidents that occurred in 2016, 2017, and 2018. In February 2019, pursuant to the CPRA and section 832.7 , KQE D requested from the Department “[r]ecords from Jan. 1, 2014 to Dec. 31, 2018 of sustained findings that a peace officer, including those employed by the Ca. Dept. of Justice, committed sexual assault or dishonesty

- related misconduct.” KQED also sought “[ r]ecords from Jan. 1, 2014 to present relating to the report, investigation, or findings of incidents in which the use of force by a peace officer or custodial officer against a person resulted in death, or in great bodily injury.” The Department partial ly denied the requests of First Amendment Coalition and KQED (collectively, real parties) , agreeing to produce “only those non

- exempt records, if any, relating to peace officers employed by the Department of Justice” subject to applicable redactions. The Department explained its partial denial as follows : “To the extent that the Attorney General has obtained records from other state and local law enforcement agencies, the Attorney General is not the agency that ‘maintains’ those documents. A requester ma y properly seek disclosure from the employing agency, which not only maintains the records, but will be best situated to assess any applicable exceptions to the disclosure requirement and any statutorily required redactions concerning sensitive and private information. Further, to the extent that the Attorney General has obtained such records in relation to investigations or proceedings that the Attorney General is conducting, the disclosure provisions in section 832.7 do not apply to the Attorney General, under section 832.7, subdivision (a).” 2

2 The scope of potentially responsive records in the Department’s possession, and how the Department obtains or creates these records, is not clearly or completely presented in the record on appeal. We make the following observations :4

In March 2019, real parties jointly petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the Department’s compliance with their CPRA requests. Real parties asked the trial court to command the Department to “immediately search for and promptly disclose all non

exempt records in [its] possess ion” sought by their CPRA requests. This included “records that were created by or involve another state or local agency” and “records that concern the Attorney General’s own investigations.”
In its answer to the petition , the Department admitted that it possessed “certain records sought by [ real parties ], likely totaling many thousands of such records if not

1. The Department maintains certain records for peace officers it employs. As indicated, to the extent such records are responsive and not subject to any other objections, the Department represents it will produce them subject to proper redaction. 2. At a trial court hearing on May 17, 2019, the Department’s counsel represented that the Department “is not a central storehouse for all of the peace officer records for the state and every local agency . There is in fact no centralized agency that exists that contains all of those records.” 3. The Department possesses records concerning officers employed by other state or local agencies. According to the Department’s petition, “The Department obtains files from law enforcement agencies across the state when it reviews an agency’s decision not to file charges in connection with an incident, or when it conducts an independent investigation of a law enforcement agency. The Department often obtains such materials or information using the subpoena power authorized by Government Code section 11181. [Fn. omitted, citation.] Some of that information relates to peace or custodial officers employed by other agencies that are subject to independent review and investigation by the Department and falls into one of the four categories of Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b)(1).” In addition, the record on appeal includes a joint status report, prepared after the trial court granted the writ, which states: “The Department sometimes procures confidential records or information that could have been subpoenaed or demanded via interrogatory under Government Code section 11181 by way of stipulated agreements among agencies. These agreements are made under the c ondition and understanding that the materials will remain confidential as contemplated by Government Code section 11181.” 4. It is unclear whether the methods described in paragraph 3 above are the only ways in which the Department comes to possess reco rds involving officers employed by other state and local agencies. 5. There is no indication what kinds of records, if any, the Department may generate when it conducts an independent investigation of a law enforcement agency or when it reviews an agency ’s decision not to file charges in connection with an incident.5

more” and that it “created some but not all of those records.” The Department reiterated
that neither section 832.7 n or the CPRA required or auth orized the disclosure of records it obtained from other state or local law enforcement agencies and further asserted that such records can be requested directly from those agencies. In July 2019, the trial court granted real parties’ writ petition. The c ourt ordered the Department to produce
, by January 4, 2020 , “all requested records except those records or parts thereof that this court determines may be lawfully withheld or redacted.” The Department now petitions for extraordinary writ relief to compel the trial

court to vacate the portion of its order requiring disclosure of records regarding other agencies’ officers. W e granted the Department’s request for an immediate, temporary stay of trial court proceedings, pending further order of this court. We also issued an order to show cause why the relief requested by the Department should not be granted. Real parties requested that their previously filed informal opposition to the petition be deemed a written return to the order to show cause, and the D epartment filed a traverse/reply. We received briefing from amicus curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, joined by six other media and transparency organizations , and the Department’s response thereto

. We also requested and received supplemental briefing on one of the Department’s grounds for nondisclosure

. The parties appeared for oral argument.
D ISCUSSION A. Standard of Review
A trial court order directing disclosure of public records held by a public agency

“ shall be i mmediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for the issuance of an extraordinary writ. ” (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c).) This court “conduct[s] an independent review of the trial court’s ruling; factual findings made by the trial court will be upheld if based on substantial evidence.” ( Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1336 ( Times Mirror ) .)6

B. Statutory Background
1. The CPRA
Enacted in 1968
, the CPRA grants public access to public records held by state and local agencies. ( Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) “ Modeled after the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.), the [C PRA ] was enacted for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving m embers of the public access to records in the possession of state and local agencies. [Citation.] Such ‘ access to information concerning the conduct of the people ’ s business, ’ the Legislature declared, ‘ is a fundamental and necessary right of every perso n in this state. ’ ” ( Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5 th 2 8 2, 290.)
Pursuant to the California Constitution , the CPRA must be “broadly construed”
because it s statutory scheme “furthers the people’s right of access

. ” (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 3, subd. (b)(2)

. ) Nevertheless, the act does not confer an absolute right of access. As part of the CPRA, the Legislature included a provision declaring it was “mindful of the right of individuals to privacy.” (Gov. Code, § 6250.) T his express policy declaration

“ ‘bespeaks legislative concern for individual privacy as well as disclosure.’ [Citation.] ‘In the spirit of this declaration, judicial decision s interpreting the [CPRA] seek to balance the public right to access to information, the government ’ s need, or lack of need, to preserve confidentiality, and the individual ’ s right to privacy. [Citations.]’ ” ( Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1282 ( Copley Press ) .)
T he CPRA balances the dual concerns for privacy and disclosure by providing for
various exemptions that permit public agencies to refuse disclosure of certain public
records. (Gov. Code, §§ 6254

– 6255.) For instance , the CPRA does not require agencies to permit public inspection of records that are exempted or prohibited from public disclosure pursu ant to federal or state law, including Evidence Code provisions relating to privilege . ( Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k) (h ereafter Gov. Code
, § 6254(k) .) Also, as discussed post , law enforcement investigatory files were , until recently, categorically exempted from the CPRA’s general requirement of disclosure. (Gov. Code, § 6254,
subd. (f) (hereafter Gov. Code, § 6254(f) ) .) “ ‘ In large part, these exemptions are7

designed to protect the privacy of persons whose data or documents come int o governmental possession.’ ” ( Copley Press
, supra , 39 Cal.4th at p. 1282.) CPRA exemptions are narrowly construed ( American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5 th 1032, 1042 ( ACLU Foundation ) , and the agency opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving an exemption applies

. ( Long Beach Police Officers Assn

. v. City of Long Beach (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 70; County of L os A ngeles v. Superior Court (2012) 2 11 Cal.App.4th 57, 63 .)

2. Section 832.7 and S enate Bill No. 1421 In 1978, the Legislature enacted section s 832.7 and 832.8 to mandat e confidentiality of peace officer personnel records. (Stats. 1978, ch. 630, §§ 5, 6, p. 2083.) These statutes, along with certain amendments to the Evidence Code, also codified Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 ( Pitchess ) , which recognized the right of a criminal defendant to compel the discovery of evidence in a law enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal charge upon a sufficient showing of goo d cause . (See Assn. for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Super ior C ourt (2019) 8 Cal.5 th 28, 40

– 41 ( ALADS ).) Historically, the so

- called Pitchess statutes were considered an exemption to disclosure under the CPRA. (See Copley Press
, supra , 39 Cal.4th at p. 1283 [recognizing § 832.7 as an exemption under Gov. Code, § 6254(k)].) Before it s amendment in 2018
, section 832.7 ma de certain peace officer records and information confidential and
nondisclosable in any criminal or civil proceeding except pursuant to discovery under certain provisi ons of the Evidence Code . (See § 832.7, subd. (a) , as amended by
Stats. 2003, ch. 102 , § 1 ( hereafter fmr. § 832.7)

. ) Th e first category of confidential
records pertained to “ [ p ] eace officer or custodial officer personnel records ,” which
include d among other things certain records that relate to employee discipline or certain complaint s and to investigatio ns of complaints p ertaining to how the officer performed
his or her duties. ( Ibid

. ; § 832.8 ) The second category consisted of “records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to section 832.5 ” ( f mr. § 832.7 , subd. (a)) , which required “ [e]ach department or agency in [California] that employs peace officers [ to]8

establish a procedure to investigate complaints by members of the public against the personnel of these departments or agencies” and further require d s uch “[c]omplaints and any reports or findings rel ating” to them be retained for “ at least five years” and “maintained either in the peace or custodial o fficer’s general personnel file or in a separate file” (§ 832.5, subd s

. (a)(1), (b); see also § 832.5, subds. (c), (d)(1 ))

. The third category extended confidentiality to “information obtained from” the prior two types of
records. ( F mr. § 832.7 , subd. (a).) Th us, th e Pitchess statutes “ ‘ reflect[] the Legislature’s attempt to balance a litigant’s discovery interest with an officer’s confidentiality interest. ’ ” ( ALADS , supra , 8 Cal.5th at p. 41.)
I n 2018, the Governor signed S enate B ill No. 1421 ( hereafter SB 1421) , which
amended section 832.7. (§ 832.7, as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 988, § 2, eff. Jan. 1,
2019 .) Under SB 1421 , s ection 832.7 retains the provision that “ personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers and records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5, or information obtained from these records , are confidential
and shall not be disclosed ” in any criminal or civil proceeding except pursuant to discovery under certain portions of the Evidence Code

. (§ 832. 7 , subdivision (a) (hereafter § 832.7(a)) ; see also § 832.7, subd. (h) .) As amended, however, section 832.7(a) now provides that the confidentiality of officer personn el records is subject to a newly added subdivision (b) (hereafter § 832.7 (b)) , which states in relevant part :

“ Notwithstanding subdivision (a) [of section 832.7] , subdivision (f) of S ection 6254 of the Government Code, [ 3 ] or any other law, the following peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pur suant to the California

3 Government Code section 6254(f) is a CPRA provision that exempts disclosure of “[r]ecords of complaints to, or investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures of, the office of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, the Office of Emergency Services and any state o r local police agency, or any investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local police agency, or any investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes.”9

Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of
Title 1 of the Government Code ) ” (§ 832.7 , subd. (b)(1) (hereafter § 832.7 (b)(1) ) , namely
, records “relating to the report, investigation, or findings” of an incident falling into any of the following three categories: (1) an incident in which an officer discharged a firearm at a person or used force against a person resulting in death or great bodily injury (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(1)(A) (i), (ii) ) ; (2) “an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency” that an officer “engaged in sexual assault involving a member of the public” ( § 832.7, subd. (b)(1 )(B)(i)

– (iii) ) ; and (3) “an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency of dishonesty by a peace officer or custodial officer directly relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime, or directly relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, another peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, any sustained finding of perjury, false statements, filing false reports, destruction, falsifying, or c oncealing of evidence ” (§ 832.7,
subd. (b)(1)(C))

. This opinion will hereafter refer to these three categories of records collectively as “officer

- related records.”
Even though the se officer

- related records are now subject to disclosure
, section
832.7 re flect s continuing legislative concern for certain privacy and safety interest s and competing public interests . Specifically, section 832.7 (b) provides that a n agency responding to a record request “shall redact ” disclosed records for the following purposes only : to remove personal data or information outside the name and work

- related
information of the officers ; to pr es erve the an o nymity of complaina n ts and witnesses ; to protect confidential medical, financial , or other informati on whose disclosure is specifically prohibited by federal law or would cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy that outweighs the public’s interest in the records; and where there is

reason to believe that disclosure of the record would pose a si gnificant danger to the physical safety of the officer or another person. (§ 832.7 , subd. (b)(5)(A)

– (D) .) Subdivision (b) also provides that, notwithstanding subdivision ( b )(5) , an agency “ may redact a record disclosed pursuant to this section

. . . where , on the facts of the particular10

case, the public interest served by not disclosing the information clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the information

. ” (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(6).) Additionally, an agency “may ” tempora rily withhold records of incidents involving an officer’s discharge of a firearm or use of force resulting in death or great bodily injury by delay ing disclosure when the i ncident s are the subject of an active criminal or administrative investigation. (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(7) (A), (B), (C) .)
C. Scope of Disclosure Under the CPRA and Section 832.7
Th is case present s issues of first impression concern ing the scope of a public agency’s disclosure obligations under the CPRA and sect ion 832.7

. The first issue is
whether section 832.7 contemplates disclosure of officer

- related records in the Department’s possession if such records concern officers who are not employed by the Department or if such records were not created by the Department. This is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. ( Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5 th 1241, 1247.)

“ ‘ “ When we interpret a statute , ‘ [o]ur fundamental task .

. . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuat e the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose an d to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language perm its more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislat ive history, and public policy.’ [Citation.] ‘ Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire
statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose. ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ” ( Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5 th 844, 856

– 857 ( Meza ) .)11

As a court, we have a “limited role in the process of interpreting enactments from the political branches of our state government.” ( California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632 ( California Teache rs ).) Our role is “not to establish policy” ( Carrisales v. Department of Corrections (1999)
21 Cal.4th 1132, 1140) or to question legislative policy choices ( People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1, 17)

. Rather, “we follow the Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law, ‘ “ ‘ whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the act. ’ ” ’ ” ( California Teachers , at p. 632 .)
W ith these principles in mind, w e begin our analysis by examining the language of
section 832.7 and the CPRA

. T he language of section 832.7 (b) (1) states in relevant part : “Notwithstanding subdivision (a) [of section 832.7], subdivision (f) of Section 6254 of the Government Code, or any other law, the following peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code) .” (I talics added .) Read together with its subpart s, section 832.7 (b) (1) deems as
nonconfidential

— and subject to public inspection pursuant to the CPRA

— all records maintained by a state agency relating to reports, investigations, or findings from incidents involving an officer’s discharge of a weapon; an officer’s use of deadly force or force resulting in great bodily injury; and incidents involving a sustained finding of a sexual
assault or dishonesty by an officer . (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(1) (A)

– ( C ) .) Because section 832.7(b)(1) specifies that the identifie d officer

- related records are now nonconfidential public records that “ shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to the [ CPRA ],” we look to t he CPRA provisions governing the disclosure of public records . The CPRA stipulates that “[p]ublic records are open to inspection at all times during the office hours of the state or local agency and every person has a right to inspect any public record , except as hereafter provided.” (Gov. Code, § 6253, subd. ( a), italics added.) The CPRA defines the term “public records” broadly as including “ any12

writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public’s business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of phy sical form or
characteristics. ” (Gov. Code, § 6252, subd. (e) , italics added.) A plain reading of these two CPRA statutes and the italicized language therein leads to the conclusion that, ordinarily, members of the public may inspect “any” public record “retained by” or in the

posses sion of a state agency such as the Department, even if the record was not “prepared, owned, [or] used” by the particular agency. (See also Gov. Code, § 6253,
subd. ( c ) [contemplating disclosure of “public records in the possession of the agency”].)
Wheth er section 832.7 is considered on its own or in conjunction with the CPRA, the statutory language appears unambiguous in contemplating disclosure of the records in dispute

. Standing on its own, section 832.7’s statutory phrase “ peace officer .

. . personn el records and records maintained by any state or local agency ” (italics added)
make s clear that officer

- related records in the Department ’s possession are subject to
disclosure , regardless whether such records concern peace officers employed by the Department or by another state or local agency (hereafter non

- Department officers) , and
no matter wh ich agency created them

. Such a reading is only reinforced when considered together with the CPRA, which exp licitl y states that , e xcept as provided by the CPRA, a member of the public has the right to inspect “ any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public’s business

. . . retained by” a state or local agency. (Gov. Code, § 6252, subd. (e)

. ) In disputing t his construction, the Department argues that when read as a whole and in context, section 832.7 “ plainly requires an officer’s employing agency

— but no other agency

— to disclose records

. ” The Department reasons as follows. When subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 832.7 are considered together , the records made nonconfidential by subdivision (b) are regulated by subdivision (a) , which inform s the
universe of record s that are subject to disclosure under section 832.7

. Section 832.7(a) explicitly shields “records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to section
832.5 ,” which in turn require s employing agencies to establish procedures for investigating public complaints against its officers and to maintain records of those13

complaints and any related investigation. (§§ 832.5, 832.7 (a).) Thus, i n the Department’s view, section 832.7 (b)’s command that “records maintained by any state or local agency shall not be confidential” is limited to records maintained pursuant to section 832.5, i.e., those in the possession of an officer’s employing agency

. We are not persuaded. The flaw in the Department’s analysis is that section 832.7(b) , on its face, explicitly states its provi sions are not circumscribed by subdivision (a)

. (§ 832.7 (b)(1) [“Not withstanding subdivision (a)”] .) Accordingly, the records made nonconfidential in subdivision (b) are neither restricted nor regulated by subdivision (a). Moreover, h ad the Legislature intended to limit its disclosure amendments to records maintained by an officer’s employing agency or to records created by a public agency, it easily could have. Significantl y , section 832.7 (a) is explicit in imposing confidentiality over “records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to section
832.5

. ” (§ 832.7 (a), italics added.) If the Legislature had wanted to restrict a ccess to officer

- related records maintained by an employing agency, it could have repeated in
subdivision (b) the same “pursuant to section 832.5” qualification it used in subdivision (a)

. Alternatively, it could have utilized the phrase “ and employee

- related r ecords maintained by any state or local agency
, ” or other similar wording. But the Legislature
did n either , and we will no t add words it has chose n to omit. (See Hampt on v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 350 ( Hampton ) [ “ [o] rdinarily we are not free to add text to the language selected by the Legislature” ]; Rojas v. Superior Court (2004)
33 Cal.4th 407, 423 .) Finally , as indicated above, the Department’s construction is at odds with the
CPRA , which provides in no uncertain terms th at , barring an applicable exemption, a member of the public has the right to inspect any nonexempt “ public record s , ” defined as “any writing” containing information relating to the public’s business that is “retained by” a state or local agency. (Gov. Code, § 6252, subd. (e) ; see id ., § 6253 , subd. (a).)14

Although we need not go further because the statutory language is unambiguous,

we will “ look to legislative history to confirm our plain

- meaning construction of [the] statutory language.” ( Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1046 ( Hughes ) .) Here, t he legislative history of SB 1421 discloses that, at the time the proposed
amendments to section 832.7 were pending, the Legislature perceived California as “one of the most secretive states in the nation in terms of openness when it comes to officer
misconduct and uses of force. ” ( Sen. Rules Com.
, Off. of Sen. Floor Analys e s , Sen. Bill
No. 1421 (2017

– 2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 23 , 2018 , p. 8 ( hereafter Sen. Floor Analysis)

. ) In particular, the Legislature pointed to a 2006 Supreme Cour t ruling interpret ing 832.7 as “prevent [ ing ] the public from learning t he extent to which officers
have been disciplined as a result of misconduct, and

. . . clos [ing ] to the public all independent oversight investigations, hearings and reports .” ( Sen

. Floor Analysis
, p. 8 , italics added

. ) Thus, it appears the Legislature viewed the then

- existing lack of public access to records involving independent oversight investigations as a significant impediment to transparency regarding officer misconduct and us e of force incidents

. In the Legislature’s view, greater transparency would promote important public policies

. As one legislative committee comment ed, SB 1421’s author urged the bill’s passage because it “benefits law enforcement and the communities they serve by helping
build trust. Giving the public, journalists, and elected officials access to information about actions by law enforcement will promote better policies and procedures that protect

everyone. We want to make sure that good officers and the public have the information they need to address and prevent abuses and to weed out the bad actors. SB 1421 will help identify and prevent unjustified use of force, make officer misconduct an even rarer occurrence, and build trust in law enforcement.” ( Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep.

on Sen. Bill No. 1421 (2017

– 2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19 , 2018 , p. 4 ( hereafter Assem. Com. on Public Safety Rep.) .) In contemplating the bill’s effects , a nother legislative analysis stated : “SB 1421

opens police officer personnel records in very limited cases, allowing local law enforcement agencies and law enforcement oversight agencies to provide greater15

transparency around only the most seri ous police complaints.” ( Sen. Rules Com., third reading analysi s of Sen. Bill No. 1421 (2017

– 2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 7 , italics added ( hereafter Sen. Rules third reading ). ) A t least one A ssembly

c ommittee report highlighted the language in SB 1421 providing that “ notwithstanding any other law
, [c ertain enumerated] peace

- officer or custodial

- officer personnel records are not confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to the [CPRA]

. ” ) (Assem. Com. On Public Safety Rep., supra , p. 1.) Underscoring this desire
for greater access and transparency
, including access to records maintained by law enforcement oversight agencies, t he Legislative Counsel’s Digest for SB 1421 explained : “This bill would require, notwithstanding any other law, certain peace officer or custod ial officer personnel records and records relating to specified incidents, complaints, an d investigations involving peace officers and custodial officers to be made available for public inspection pursuant to the California Public Records Act. ” (Legis. Co unsel’s Dig.,
Sen. Bill No. 1421 (2017

– 2018 Reg. Sess.) italics added .) The legislative findings accompanying SB 1421 further emphasize the public
interest in making serious officer misconduct records accessible : “(a) Peace officers help to provide one of our state’s most fundamental government services. To empower peace officers to fulfill their mission, the people of California vest them with extraordinary authority

— the powers to detain, search, arrest, and use deadly force. Our society depends on peace officers’ faithful exercise of that authority. Mi suse of that authority can lead to grave constitutional violations, harms to liberty and the inherent sanctity of human life, as well as significant public unrest. [¶] (b) The public has a right to know all about serious police misconduct, as well as abo ut officer

- involved shootings and other
serious uses of force. Concealing crucial public safety matters such as officer violations of civilians’ rights, or inquiries into deadly use of force incidents, undercuts the public’s faith in the legitimacy of law enforcement, makes it harder for tens of thousands of hardworking peace officers to do their jobs, and endangers public safety.” (Stats. 2018 ,

c h

. 988, § 1 ( S en

. B ill No

. 1421).)16

As the foregoing demonstrates
, the legislative intent behind SB 1421 was to provid e transparency regarding instances of an officer’s use of significant force and sustained findings of officer misconduct by allowing public access to officer

- related records maintained either by law enforcement employers or by any state or local agency with independent law enforcement oversight authority

. Moreover, i n am ending section
832.7 , the Legislature sought to afford the public “the right to know all about seriou s police misconduct ,” to stop concealing incidents where an officer violated civilian rights
, and to “address and prevent abuses and weed out the bad actors

. ” ( Stats. 2018, ch. 988, § 1 (Sen. Bill No. 1421) ; Assem. Com. on Public Safety Rep.
, supra , p. 4. ) These legislative a ims are best advanced by a construction that authorizes disclosure of all responsive officer

- related records in the possession of a state agency , regardless whether they pertain to officers employed by the agency and no matter which agency created
the m

. T he Department contends otherwise. In its view, the legislative history
demonstrates that SB 1421 “ was only intended to require employing agencies to make the required disclosures.” But the only portion of the legislative history the Department cites
is t he report of the Assembly Committee on Public Safety , observing that SB 1421 “loosens the protections afforded to specified peace officer records relating to use of force, sexual assault on a member of the public and pertaining to dishonesty in reporting, investigating, or prosecuting a crime.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Rep., supra , p. 5 .)
It is unclear how t hat comment provides any support for the Department’s position
, particularly in view of the actual language of section 832.7 and the CPRA and the other legislative history cited above

. The rest of the Department’s legislative history analysis focuses for the most part on the history of the original 1978 enactment of se ction 832.7
, which reve als nothing regarding the Legislatur e’s intent in approving SB 1421 in 2018. Contrary to the Department’s contentions, t he legislative history does not even remotely suggest that disclosure obligations should be limited to an officer’s employing

agency. Rather, as we have discussed, the h istory is replete with evidence of the Legislature’s intent to promote greater transparency with respect to the officer

- related17

records specified in section 832.7 , whether such records are maintained by officer employers or by other agencies exercising ind ependent law enforcement oversight responsibilities

. Finally, the Department contends that e mploying agencies “ are in the best possible position to ensure that records regarding their own officers, investigations, prosecutions, or other actions are proper ly reviewed and redacted to remove sensitive, confidential information that subject officers and third parties to a risk of danger or unnecessary
disclosure of confidential informat ion.” That may be so, but such a policy argument affords no ground for a j udicial interpretation that shields responsive records in the Department’s possession, especially in light of statutory allowances for consultation with other agencies in processing CP RA requests. (See Gov. Code, § 6253, subd. (c)(3) [time
for respond ing to request s may be extended where “ need for consultation

. . . with another agency having substantial interest in the determination of the request ” arises].) Our interpretation of the CPRA and section 832.7 not only promotes the purposes
reflected in the statutory language and legislative history
, i t harmonizes with the constitutional principle that the people have a right to access information concerning the conduct of the people’s business and that restrictions on this right are narrowly construed. ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(1)

– (2).)
Our construction also aligns with case law reje cting the notion that a record ’s location, rather than its content, determines its confidentiality. In Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superio r Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278 ( CPOST ), a newspaper sought the release of information in a database collected by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, a state agency that sets minimum selection and training standards for peace officers. ( Id. at pp. 285

– 286.) The database

— which included employment data on all peace officers appointed in California starting in the
1970s

— was compiled from information provided by local law enforcement agencies obtained from the officers’ personnel records. ( Id. at p. 286.) The Commission argued certain employment information (a peace officer’s name, employing agency, and employment dates) was exempt from disclosure under the CPRA because it was based on18

records that had been placed in confidential personnel files. ( Id. at pp. 286

– 287.) The
CPOST court held this otherwise nonconfidential information does not become confidential for purposes of sections 832.7 and 832.8 merely because it was derived from a personnel file that also contains confidential informa tion. ( Id. at pp. 289

– 293.) In rejecting an interpretation that made confidentiality turn on the type of file in which records are located, the court found it “unlikely the Legislature intended to render documents confidential based on their location, ra ther than their content.” ( Id. at p. 291.) The conclusion we reach here with respect to the disclosure of officer

- related records is similarly driven by the content of the record, not other factors such as which agency employed the officer or created the record.
D

. The CPRA Catchall Exemption
The second issue before us is whether officer

- related records that are subject to disclosure under section 832.7 may nonetheless be withheld pursuant to the catchall exemption set forth in the CPRA

. T his exemption , codified in Government Code section
6255 , subdiv i sion (a) ( hereafter Government Code section 6255(a))
, permits a public agency to withhold a public record under the CPRA if the agency demonstrates “that on the facts of the particular case the pu blic interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the rec ord.” (Gov. Code, § 6255 (a).) The catchall exemption “ ‘ contemplates a case

- by

- case balancing process, with the burden of proof on the proponent of nondisclosure to demonstrate a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality.’ ” ( ACLU Foundation
, supra , 3 Cal.5th at

p. 1043.)
1. Availability of the CPRA Catchall Exemption
The trial court declined to decide whether the catchall exemption is available to a public agency that receives a CPRA request for section 832.7 officer

- related records

. The parties’ original and supplemental briefs , however, address this issue. 4 The

4 On November 13, 2019, this court ordered the parties to file simultaneous supplemental letter briefs addressing the following two questions that touch on the issue: “1. Can the redaction provision in Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b)(6), be19

Department contends that requests for section 832.7 record s may be subject to this CPRA exemption , while real parties argue that section 832.7’s newer and more detailed provisions for redacting or withholding records must be deemed to prevail over the more general CPRA exemption. We c o nclude , as a matter of statutory co nstruction, that the
CPRA catchall exemption may apply to requests for section 832.7 officer

- related recor ds

. A s before
, we begin as we must with the statutory language. ( Meza , supra , 6 Cal.5 th at pp. 856

– 857 .) Also, w hen construing the interaction of two potentially conflicting statutes, we must, where reasonably possible, harmonize them
, reconcile their seeming inconsistencies , and adopt a construction that gives “ ‘ force and effect to all of their provisions. ’ ” ( Pa cific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 805.) If that cannot be done, then as a general rule, “ ‘later enactments supersede earlier ones [citation], and more specific provisions take precedence over more gene ral ones.’ ” ( Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 634.) The parties contend, and we concur , that we should again focus on the language of
section 832.7 (b)(1), which states in relevant part : “ Notwithstanding subdivision (a),
subdivision (f) of Section 6254 of the Government Code, or any other law, the following peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspectio n pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code) .

. . .” Taken as a whole, that language reasonably reflects the Legislature’s intent to

preser ve , not override
, the CPRA but for its investigatory files exem ption (Gov. Code, § 6254 (f))

. S pecifically, s ection 832.7(b)(1) starts off by stat ing plainly that officer

-

har monized with the catchall provision in Government Code section 6255, subdivision (a), and if so, how? If not, which provision prevails over the other? [¶] 2. Is the balancing test referenced in Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b)(6), performed in t he same manner as the balancing test referenced in Government Code section 6255, subdivision (a)? If not, please address the differences.”20

related records are nonconfidential and disclosable notwithstanding the CPRA investigatory fi les exemption, then concludes by stating equally plainly that such records “shall be made available .

. . pursuant to the California Public Records Act.” By including th ese two express reference s to the CPRA in th is one sentence
, the Legislature signaled it s intent that officer

- related records are no longer confidential under the CPRA’s investigatory files exemption but that the CPRA is otherwise essential to section
832.7’s operation. At the same time, there is nothing in the balance of the statutory tex t giv ing any indication that the CRPA as a whole was displaced by section 832.7. Indeed, setting
aside for the moment the language referencing the CPRA at the end of section
832.7 (b)(1) , its beginning phrase “ [ n ] otwithstanding .

. . any other law” cannot reasonably be read to do away with the entire CRPA. Th at particular phrase has been deemed a “ ‘ “ term of art ”

. . . that declares the legislative intent to override all contrary law.’ ” ( Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 983 .) Thus, “only those provisions of law that conflict with” section 832.7(b)

— “not

. . . every provision of
law”

— are inapplicable. ( Ibid. ) As we discuss
, post , Government Code section 6255(a) is not directly contrary to th e discl osure or redaction provisions in section 832.7 . I t therefore survives

. Highlighting the prefatory “[n]otwithstanding .

. . any other law” language
, real parties argue that all responsive officer

- related records are nonconfidential regardless of

any contrary law, includ ing the CPRA and its catchall exemption

. But this sweeping construction of the prefatory language render s its express abrogation of one particular CPRA exemption

— Government Code section 6254 (f)

— superfluous in violation of the
fundamen tal principle that “ ‘[c]ourts should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage.’ ” ( Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1155.) B ecause the prefatory l anguage references this single CPRA exemption, it seems unlikely that the Legislature contemplated the clause as encompassing other CPRA exemptions. (See
CPOST , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 294 [ “ w hen a statute contains a list or catalogue of items,21

a court sh ould determine the meaning of each by reference to the others

. . . . In accordance with this principle of construction, a court will adopt a restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a more expansive meaning would make other items in the
list unnecessary or redundant ”].) Indeed, h ad the Legislature intended for section 832.7
to override the CPRA catchall exemption , it could have exp licitl y said so, as it did for
Government Code section 6254 (f) and in other statutes

. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 54957.5 , subd. (a) [“ [n] otwithstanding Section 6255 or any other law, agendas of public meetings and any other writings, when distributed to all, or a majority of all, of the members of a legislative body of a local agency by any person in connection with a matter subject to discussion or consideration at an open meeting of the body, are disclosable public records under the California Public Records Act, and shall be made available upon request without delay ”].) It is not our role to add an exemption to a statute that the Legislature chose not to include. (See Hampto n , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 350 .)
W e again look to the legislative history of the section 832.7 amendments for confirmation of the appropriate construction. ( Hughes
, supra , 46 C al.4th at p. 1046.)
Here , t he legislative history reflect s the Legislature’s awareness of the CPRA catchall exemption, as well as several other CPRA exemptions apart from the law enforcement investigatory files exemption set forth in Government Code section 6254 (f). (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety Rep., supra , pp. 3, 4, 5, 7.) Despite such awareness, none of the committee reports or analyses made any mention of an intent to nullify or override the

catc hall exemption via the amendments to sec tion 832.7

. That both the language and legislative histor y of the section 832.7 amendments are silent as to the abrogation of any CPRA exemption

— except for the investigatory files exemption

— strongly suggest s that requests seeking section 832.7 officer

- rel ated records remain otherwise subject to the
CPRA catchall ex emption

. Real parties counter that the Legislative Counsel’s Digest include s statements that
SB 1421 “would define the scope of disclosable records
, ” that the amendments to section
832.7 “would require, notwithstanding any other law, certain [records]

. . . be made available for public inspection
, ” and that discussed in detail the specific redactions and22

withholdings permitted by the amendments. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1421 (2017

– 2 018 Reg. Sess.) ¶ 2.) But nothing in these statements or in the Legislative Counsel’s Digest as a whole suggests the Legislature intended to limit application of the
entire CPRA when it amended section 832.7. Because t he language of section 832.7(b) is to the contrary

— expressly requir ing that records be made available “pursuant to the
California Public Records Ac t ” while specifically abrog ating only one particular CPRA

exem ption (Gov. Code, § 6254 (f) )

— it appears more reasonable to construe the Digest’s
reference to the “scope of disclosable records” as encompassing both the detailed redaction and withholding provisions of section 832.7 and any otherwise applicable CPRA exemption . (See Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 383, 400

– 401 [“disclosable” records are those “not subject to any one or more of the [CPRA’s] many exemptions from disclosure”].)
M oreover, construing t he CPRA catchall exemption as apply ing to requests for
section 832.7 records honors the Legislature’s longstanding recognition that there may be competing pub lic interes ts at stake in a public records request and that public records ar e properly withheld if a n agency can demonstrate , on the facts of the particular case, that
the public interest served by non disclosure “clearly outweighs” the public interest served by disclosure

. (Gov. Code, § 6255 (a) ; see Times Mirror , supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1339 .) In this regard
, the catchall exemption has been used to justify withholding documents based on a range of public interests
, including the “ ‘expense and inconvenience involved in segregating nonexempt from exempt information

. ’ ” ( ACLU Foundation
, supra , 3
Cal.5 th at p. 1043. ) As the Supreme Court has explained, a refusal to place public concern with the cost and efficiency of government “ on the section 6255 scales would make it possible for any person requesting information, for any r eason or for no particular reason, to impose upon a governmental agency a limitless obligation. Such a result23

would not be in the public interest. ” ( American Civil Liberties Union v. Deukmejian (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 453 ( Deukmejian ) .) 5
T rue, none of t he redaction and withholding provisions of section 832.7 explicitly

account s for the public interest in government cost and efficiency, or any other public interest that may fall within the scope of the CPRA catchall exemption. But s ubjecting

req uests for section 832.7 officer

- related records to potential application of this catchall exemption simply mean s that otherwi se responsive records may be withheld only in those
instances where the public agency adequately demonstrates that, due to the fact s of a particular case, the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest
in disclosure. Notably, Government Code section 6255 has not, to our knowledge, been criticized as an unworkable or overly broad exemption that unduly impai rs government transparency or meaningful public access to information. We see no statutory or legislative policy basis for concluding that SB 1421 intended to extinguish this longstanding exemption that permits withholding only where the public interest predominates in favor of nondisclosure

. Real parties further observe that section 832.7 has a catchall provision of its

own

— codified in subdivision (b)(6) ( hereafter section 832.7(b)(6))

— that allows an agency to “redact a record disclosed pursuant to this section, including personal identifying information, where, on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the information clearly outweighs the public interest served by

5 Indeed, our construction benefits from the consistency of harmonizing aspects of the two statutes wherever possib le. It would seem anomalous to construe section 832.7 as requiring that records be made available pursuant to the CPRA but disregarding the CPRA’s contemplation that records should be withheld when the public interest in doing so clearly outweighs the pub lic interest in disclosure.24

the disclosure of the i nformation.” (§ 832.7 (b)(6).) In real parties’ view, this provision is
rendered superfluous if the CPRA catchall provision applie s

. 6 We cannot agree

. The CPRA catchall exemption authorizes the nondisclosure of a record when a determination is made by t he public agency (or the court if the agency’s determination is challenged) that “on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.” (Gov. Code, § 6255 (a).) As discussed, t his exemption permits withholding based on various considerations, including public fiscal and administrative concerns regarding the “ ‘expense and inconvenience involved in segregating no nexempt from exempt information’ ” ( ACLU Foundation
, supra , 3 Cal.5 th at p. 1043 ) , and is an integral part of the CPRA framework that , at the outset, allows a determination that the
interest of the public is best served by the nondisclosure of otherwise responsive records

. ( E.g., Deukmejian
, supra , 32 Cal.3d at pp. 453

– 454.) Meanwhile, s ection 832.7(b)(6)

may appl y once the agency or the court determines that responsive record s are not exempt from disclosure . That is, after the agency or the court determines that responsive

recor ds may not be withheld u nder the CPRA catchall exemption (or any other applicable exemption)
, the purpose that section 832.7(b)(6) serves is to authorize redaction of specific information contained in th ose record s when redaction best serves the public
int erest

. 7 Real parties further argue that Government Code section 6255 directly conflicts
with two other of section 832.7’s subdivisions that more specifically restrict record

6 In response to this court’s request for supplemental briefing, the parties appear to agree that the section 832.7(b)(6) balancing test is performed in the same manner as the CRPA catchall exemption balancing test.

7 In thei r supplemental briefing, real parties emphasize that subdivision (b)(6) was added to section 832.7 late in the legislative process at a time when the proposed statute contained only the redaction provisions in subdivision (b)(5). In response to the reques ts of both parties, we take judicial notice of the legislative history materials for SB 1421. Contrary to real parties’ suggestion, however, the late addition of that subdivision did not reflect a legislative intent to disallow redaction or withholding un der the CPRA catchall exemption, and the two provisions are reasonably harmonized.25

withholding or redaction The first identified subdivision allows a public entity to withhold record s due to a pending investigation or prosecution
, but only temporarily and subject to certain reporting requirements to explain the delay

. (§ 832.7 , subd. ( b )(7)(A)(i)

- (iii). ) The s econd identified subdivision provides that a n agency “ shall
redact ” a record disclosed p u rsuant to section 832.7 only with regard to an officer’s non

work

- related personal d ata or information ; p reservation of complainant or witness anonymity ; confidential medical, financial , or other information under certain enumerated circumstances; and where there is reason to believe that disclosure “would pose a significant danger ” to the safety of the officer or another person. (§ 832.7,
subd. (b)(5) ( A)

– (D) .) We conclude the statutes are reasonably harmonized to effectuate their respective

purposes. Again, b ecause the CPRA catchall exemption contemplates a variety competing public interests including privacy, public safety, and public fiscal and
administrative concerns ( ACLU Foundation
, supra , 3 Cal.5 th at p. 1043 ) , it may apply more broadly than the withholding provision in section 832.7, subdivision (b)(7)(A), which is limited to active investigations. It also has a broader reach than section 832.7,
subdivis ion (b)(5), which appl ies to nonexempt officer

- related records and focuses on personal data and information and other specific situations triggered by information
within those records. Real parties have identified no irreconcilable conflict in the
simulta neous operation of these provisions. On a final note, we observe that operation of the CPRA catchall exemption should
not frustrate section 832.7’s aim to provide greater transparency around officer
misconduct issues . Although Government Code section 625 5(a) allows for nondisclosure upon a proper showing , t he CPRA requir es that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion of the portions that are exempted by law” (Gov . Code, § 6253, subd. (a))

. Thus, while responsive record s may be and have been entirely withheld under the CPRA catchall exemption, a public agency remains otherwise obligated to redact exempt information from a nonexempt record when the exempt and nonexempt materials are not “inextricably26

intertwined” and are “otherwise reasonably segregable.” ( Deukmejian
, supra , 32 Cal.3d at p. 453, fn. 13 ; see CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 652

– 653 .)

2. The Balance of Interests in This Case Having determ ined that the CPR A catchall exemption is available in response to a request for the officer

- related records specified in section 832.7 , we next consider
whether the Department has sufficiently demonstrated that the records sought by real parties may be wit hheld under th at exemption

. Here, the Department’s princ ipal

ar gument for withholding records concerning non

- Department officers is the “onerous burden of reviewing, redacting, and disclosing records regarding other agencies’ officers, which involves “potentially millions of records

. ” In the Department’s view, this burden outweighs the public interest in obtaining those records fr om the Department rather than the other state and local agencies that employ those officers. Although the CPRA catchall exemption may be invoked based on the concern that segregating nonexempt from exempt information would be unduly burdensome ( ACLU
Found ation , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043; State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1188 ( State Bd. Of Equalization ) , the withholding of responsive records is not permitted unless the Department demonstrate s “ ‘a clear
overbalance o n the side of confidentiality.’ ” ( ACLU Foundation
, at p. 1043.) In balancing the competing public inte rests in this case , we review the public interest factors de novo but accept the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by substantial
evide nce. ( Ibid .) Here, the trial cour t assumed the CPRA catchall exemption was available but
determined the Department ’s showing did not justify nondisclosure. Our independent
review l eads us to likewise conclude that , at this juncture, the Department has not demonstrated “ ‘a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality.’ ” ( ACLU Foundation
, supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) In making its showing, t he Department offered the two

- page declaration of Michael Newman, Senior Assistant Atto rney General of the Department’s Civil Rights
Enforcement Section

. Newman represented there were six separate matters within that27

section that were “likely” to include records potentially responsive to real parties’ requests, noting each matter includes “voluminous materials, including reports, transcripts, audio and video files, and photographs.” As the first of two examples,
Newman cite d the Department’s inde pendent investigation into a local law enforcement

agenc y that includes over 109,000 records , which he estimate d would take a minimum of 3,600 attorney hours to review , “assuming a very optimistic rate of review of 30 records per hour

. ” According to Newman, the second matter includes over 26,000 items that

wou ld take approximately 860 attorney hours to review. In assessing whether an agency has satisfied its burden in invoking the CPRA catchall exemption, courts may accept expert and other predictions based on solid foundations (see Los Angeles Unified Sch ool Dist. v. Super ior Court (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 222, 244

– 246) and may consider certain estimates that quantify the
burden and cost of production (see State Bd. of Equalizati ion , supra , 10 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1183 & fn. 6)

. Because Newman’s declaration wa s lacking in meaningful detail, we
conclude it fell short of d emonstrating that public fiscal and administrative concerns over
the expense and inconvenience of respon ding to real parties’ records request clearly outweigh the public interest in disclosure. In particular, Newman referred to the existence of six matters in the Civil Rights
Enforcement Section that “are likely to include records that are potentially responsive.”
But Newman offer ed no indication whether the two matters involving 10 9,000 and 26,000 items are representative examples or outliers. While it seems reasonable to
assume that these are the Depart ment’s two most voluminous matters , Newman pr offered no information regarding the records in the other four matters or the potenti al burden in reviewing them

. Newman additionally allude d to other unidentified sections in the Department that he “ understand[s] .

. . have also handled matters that would include potentially responsive records,” but again, he provide d no specifics or est imates as to the
number of sections implicated , the number of matters in each of those sections, or the

scope o f records in each of those matters

. There is also a disconnect between the28

hundreds of thousands of records suggested by Newman and the “ potenti ally millions of records” that the Department ’s petition claims it will be burdened with reviewing. The paucity of information regarding the Department ’s costs of compl ying with real parties’ request is notable in light of certain SB 1421 legislative materials reflect ing
that t he Department had reported to the L egislature estimated “costs of $263,000 in
2018

– 19, $437,000 in 2019

– 20, and $422,000 in 2020

– 21 and ongoing” in order to “implement the new requirements, handle an increase in [C PRA ] requests, and potential increased litigation

. ” ( Sen. Floor Analysis, supra , at p. 8 .) 8 These materials do not
indicate such costs pertain solely to records for Department employees. In addition, the record does not offer any basis for ascertaining how these Department

- specific estimated costs might relate to the Department’s review of its officer

- related records involving non

Department officers. At the very least, however, we may infer that the Legislature chose
to enact SB 1421 despite its awareness that the Department’s compliance would entail significant expense. 9
A dditionally , while Newman acknowledge d his Civil Rights Enforcement S ection has records potentially responsive to the pending requests, the Department made no showing that these same records are held by other state and local agencies. For instance,
Newman indicated that the matter with 109,000 records pertains to the Depar tment’s independent investigation of a local law enforcement agency

. B ut b ecause Newman

8 Real parties request we take judicial notice of these particular legislative materials, which the Department does not appear to oppose. We grant the request. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)

9 At oral argument, the Department contended the legislative materials focused on S.B. 1421’s fiscal impacts on state and/or local agencies only in their capacity as officer employers. Certain materials do appear to reflect that . (E.g., Sen. Rules third reading, supra , at p. 8; Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1421 (2017

– 2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 2, 2018.) Those materials, however, cannot be viewed as limiting the Department’s disclosure obligations to employee records, given section 832.7’s language and other legislative materials establishing the statute’s application to all officer

- related records maintained by state and local agencies, including those maintained by independent investigatory bodies. (See part C, ante .)29

offered no information establishing or estimating the extent to which the local agency
maintains the same records
, there appears no basis for determining whether and t o what

extent the Department’s assertions about duplicative efforts are merited. Of course, t o the extent the Department is in possession of unique records , no duplicative burden is
threatened

. The Department contends it “need not actually gather and r eview the entire universe of potentially responsive records to provide evidence of the extraordinary
burden

. ” That is, because estimates are the only way to provide insights into the burdens posed by a records request, and because Newman’s declaration ref lected “the basic generalized knowledge that a fact finder possesses regarding human affairs, and the way
the world works
, ” the Department posits that his declaration “is precisely the kind of
evidence ” that courts have typically accepted in assessing burdens under section 6255 (a). (See Cal. First Amend. Coalition v. Supe rior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 174.)
W e do not doubt that public agencies and others may have some generalized knowledge regarding the onerous burdens posed by certai n types of CPRA requests. But
officer

- related records were exempt from disclosure before the passage of SB 1421. Consequently , the nature and scope of responsive records in the Department’s possession are relatively unknown to litigants and the courts, a nd the burden of making such records available for inspection must, at this juncture, be established through expert testimony
, or at the very least, with a more thorough showing t hat substantiate s the Department’s
burden. Nor are we persuaded

— on this reco rd

— by the Department’s claim that it faces a n

“ extraordinary burden” in “having to coordinate with numerous state and local agencies
across the state to determine whether there is material that must not be disclosed
, ” and
that this burden tips the balance against disclosure. O n this score, t he Department appears to be concerned with making the redactions necessary to ensure the continued confidentiality of information that either pos es a risk to the safety of individual citizens or
officers or potentially imperil s ongoing investigations about which the Department has no knowledge. Newman’s declaration , however, offered no facts that allow for a30

meaningful understanding of the scope and type of coordination nec essary for the Department and local agencies to meet such concerns

. W hile it could be inferred from Newman’s declaration that the Department would have to coordinate with the one local law enforcement agency under investigation , Newman did not say whether the five other matters in the Civil Rights Enforcement Section involve similar independent investigations. Absent a more thorough showing by the Department, we are hard

- pressed

to assume such tasks are overly burdensome in view of the circumstance that t he C PRA
allows for extensions of time when “[t]he need for consultation” arises

. ( S ee Gov. Code, § 6253, subd. (c)(3)).
T he Department’s reliance on Deukmejian
, supra , 32 Cal.3d 440, is misplaced

. There, the petitioner made a request to the California Department of Justice seeking index cards compiled by a network of law enforcement agencies that listed persons suspected of being involved in organized crime. ( Id. at p. 444.) The cards included information such
as the identities of the family members and known associates of organized crime members, who may or may not have had any connection to organized crime. ( Id. at
p. 453.) The Supreme Court examined the index cards in camera and observed that the
cards did not indicate “which mater ial [was] confidential, might reveal a confidential source, or identify the subject of the report .” ( Ibid .) The court also commented that “in many instances” the state agency defendants would be required “ to inquire from the law enforcement depart ments s upplying the information.” ( Ibid. ) In reversing the judgment insofar as it required disclosure of the cards, the Supreme Court “reject[ed] the suggestion that in [weighing the benefits and costs of disclosure under section 6255] the courts should ignore any expense and inconvenience involved in segregating nonexempt from exempt information.” ( Id. at pp. 452

– 453.) Determining that redacted disclosures

were of questionable utility, the c ourt concluded the cost and burden of segrega ting the exempt and none xempt information on the cards outweighed the public interest in disclosure. ( Id. at pp. 453

– 454.)
The Deukmejian decision does not compel the conclusion that nondisclosure is similarly warranted based on the showing made here. As Deukmejian observed, the31

CPRA catchall exemption “ requires the courts to look to ‘ the facts of the particular case ’ in balancing the benefits and burdens of disclosure under the [ CPRA]

. ” ( Deukmejian
, supra , 32 Cal.3d at p. 454, fn. 14.) Thus
, while the particular facts in that decision justified nondisclosure, Deukmejian cautioned that “ in another case, with different facts, the balance might tip in favor of disclosure of non exempt information. ” ( I bi d .) The facts
here are different. Unlike the situation in Deukm ejian , where the index cards in dispute were available for court review, here there is nothing in the record showing that working
in coordination with stat e and local agencies threatens a “limitless obligation ” ( id . at
p. 453) such that the public interest predominates in favor of withholding all responsive records pertaining to non

- Department officers

. In s hort
, the Department ’s showing below fails to establish “ ‘a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality.’ ” ( ACLU Foundatio n , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043.)
C ONCLUSION AND D ISPOSITION To summarize , we hold that: (1) as a matter of statutory interpretation, section 832.7 generally requires disclosure of all responsive officer

- related records in the possession of the Department, regardless whether the records pertain to officers employed by the Department or by another public agency and regardless whether the Department or another public agency created the records ; (2) as a matter of statutory interpretation, the CPRA catchall exemption may apply to officer

- related records subject
to disclosure under section 832.7 ; and ( 3) the Department fell short of demonstrating that the public interest served by nondisclosure of the records at issue clearly outweighs the public interest in their disclosure. Although we essentially affirm the trial court’s
determination on this third point, we emphasize that nothing in our opinion should be understood as barring the trial court from reconsidering the applicability of the CPRA catchall exemption as to any of the requested records upon a proper showing by the Department. The petition fo r writ of mandate is denied, the order to show cause is discharged, and the stay previously imposed is lift ed. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal

. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)32 _________________________ Fujisaki, J

.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Siggins, P. J.

_________________________ Petrou, J.

A15799833

Becerra v. Superior Court ( A157998 )
Trial court: City & County of San Francisco Trial Judges: Hon. Richard B. Ulmer

Attorneys: Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, Stepan A. Haytayan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Amie L. Medley, Deputy Attorney General, Jennifer E. Rosenberg, Deputy Attorney General as Defend ant and Appellant.

Michael T. Risher; David E. Snyder, Glen A. Smith for First Amendment
Coalition for Real Parties in Interest.

Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke, Brendan Charney for KQED,
Inc. for Real Parties in Interest.

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Katie Townsend, Bruce D. Brown, Adam A. Marshall, Daniel J. Jeon; The Associated Press, Karen Kaiser; Calif

ornia News Publishers Association, Jim Ewert; Californians Aware, Terry Francke; The E.W. Scripps Company, David M

. Giles; First Look Media Works, David Bralow; Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, James Chadwick; Fox Television Stations, David M. Keneipp; G annett Co., Barbara W. Wall; Hearst Corporation , Jonathan Donnellan, Ravi V. Sitwala, Diego Ibarguen; Los Angeles Times Communications & The San Diego Union

- Tribune, Jeff Glasser; The McClatchy Company, Juan Cornejo; Covington & Burling, Kurt Wimmer; MNG E nterprises, Marshall W. Anstandig; MPA

– The Association of Magazine Media, James Cregan;34 Ballard Spahr, Charles D. Tobin ; The National Press Photographers Association, Mickey H

. Osterreicher; ProPublica, Richard J. Tofel ; Wiley Rein, Kathleen A. Kirby; Re veal from the Center for Investigative Reporting, Victoria Baranetsky; Baker & Hostetler, Bruce W. Sanford, Mark I. Bailen; VICE Media, Lucinda Treat for amicus curiae on behalf of real parties in interest.