J-A22041-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF J.D., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: F.D., FATHER : No. 501 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): A-87-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 23, 2016

Appellant, F.D. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in the 

Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which involuntarily terminated 

his parental rights to his minor child, J.D. (“Child”). Upon a thorough review 

of the record, we affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Child was born in July 2014 to Father and T.C. (“Mother”). After hospital 

personnel observed erratic behavior from both parents, the Lackawanna 

County Office of Family and Youth Services (“OYFS”) filed a petition for 

emergency protective custody of Child. The court granted the petition on 

July 22, 2014, and OYFS placed Child in kinship foster care immediately 

after her discharge from the hospital. OYFS subsequently filed a 

dependency petition, which the court granted on July 31, 2014. 

The court held numerous permanency review hearings between July 
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2014 and December 2015. At the hearings, the court consistently 

determined that Father demonstrated moderate compliance with his 

permanency plan. The court noted that Father attended weekly visits with 

Child at OYFS’ Visitation Center and participated in some of the treatment 

required by his permanency plan. The court also consistently found that 

Father made minimal to no progress toward alleviating the circumstance that 

led to Child’s placement. The court indicated that Father did not progress 

past line-of-sight supervised visits with Child and had trouble grasping how 

to interact with Child. Due to both parents’ failure to remedy the 

circumstances that led to Child’s placement, OYFS filed a petition for 

involuntary termination of Father’s and Mother’s rights on December 19, 

2015. 

The court held termination hearings on January 19, 2016, and March 

7, 2016. At the hearings, OYFS presented the testimony of various OYFS 

and Scranton Counseling Center caseworkers, who worked with Father and 

Child to help achieve reunification. These witnesses all testified to Father’s 

moderate compliance with his permanency plan and minimal progress 

towards alleviating the circumstances that led to Child’s placement. Father 

also testified and expressed his love for Child and desire to care for Child at 

home. Following the conclusion of testimony at the March 7, 2016 hearing, 

the court terminated Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. On March 28, 

2016, Father timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of errors 
J-A22041-16

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complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Father raises the following issues for our review: 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 

AND/OR MANIFESTLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

DETERMINING [OYFS] PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 

TO SATISFY THE GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF 

FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 2511(A) OF 

THE ADOPTION ACT?

EVEN IF THIS COURT DETERMINES [OYFS] PRESENTED 

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SATISFY THE GROUNDS FOR 

TERMINATION OF FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER 

SECTION 2511(A) OF THE ADOPTION ACT, WHETHER THE 

TRIAL COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW AND/OR MANIFESTLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

DETERMINING TERMINATION OF FATHER’S PARENTAL 

RIGHTS IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF...CHILD OR THAT 

THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO REMOVAL HAVE NOT 

BEEN REMEDIED[?]

(Father’s Brief at 5). 

The standard and scope of review applicable in a termination of 

parental rights case is as follows:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that it would give to a jury verdict. 

We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of 

fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses 

and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by [the] 
J-A22041-16

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finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking 

termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

the existence of grounds for doing so. 

The standard of clear and convincing evidence means 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. 

We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis 

exists for the result reached. If the court’s findings are 

supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

court’s decision, even if the record could support an 

opposite result. 

In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 

See also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (Pa.Super. 

2008) (en banc). 

Section 2511 provides grounds for involuntary termination of parental 

rights in relevant part as follows: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

* * *
J-A22041-16

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(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating 

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors 

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).

“Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the 

subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 

(Pa.Super. 2010). 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 

2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s 

conduct warrants termination of his...parental rights does 

the court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re 
J-A22041-16

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A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are required to make 

diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities.” Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of 

parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of 

In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the 

petitioner for involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 

719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998). 

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination 

will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability 

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The 

court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, 

paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

bond.” Id. at 520. Significantly: 

In this context, the court must take into account whether a 

bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. 

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 
J-A22041-16

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required to use expert testimony. Social workers and 

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, 

Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines 

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide 

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements 

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be 

considered unfit and...have his... rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 

1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be 

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the 

child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation 

is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association 

with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental 

duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and 

maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his...ability, even in difficult circumstances. 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 
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are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical 

and emotional needs.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of 

his...child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his...parental duties, to the 

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of...her potential in a 

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856. 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Margaret 

Bisignani Moyle, we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The trial court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 26, 2016, at 8-10) (finding: 

(issues 1-2) OYFS placed Child in kinship foster care immediately after her 

birth, and Child has remained in foster care ever since; Father’s has had 

only supervised visits with Child at OYFS’ Visitation Center; Father is 

extremely slow to learn needs of Child and caseworker often has to prompt 

Father to interact with Child during visits; Father has failed to meet several 

of his permanency plan goals, which are necessary for Father to achieve 

reunification with Child; specifically, Father has failed to follow through on 

his mental health and anger management counseling; Father requires life 

services through Scranton Counseling Center due to his diagnosed 
J-A22041-16

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intellectual disability and bipolar disorder; Scranton Counseling Center helps 

Father with most basic tasks of daily life including money management and 

shopping; at termination hearing, Father expressed his belief that he does 

not need his prescribed bipolar disorder medication and informed court that 

he had stopped taking it; due to Father’s intellectual disability and bipolar 

disorder, Father is unable to care for himself and Child without assistance 

regarding basic life tasks; these facts support termination of Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2); with respect to Section 

2511(b), kinship foster care has provided Child permanency, and Child’s 

foster home is only home Child has ever known; kinship foster home meets 

all of Child’s emotional, physical, and developmental needs; Child has 

noticeable bond with foster parents; since Child’s placement, Father’s only 

contact with Child has been through line-of-sight supervised visits; there is 

no evidence of existing bond between Father and Child; thus, termination of 

Father’s parental rights is in Child’s best interest). Accordingly, we affirm on 

the basis of the trial court’s opinion. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/23/2016
1 

took off a hospital window. Id. Hospital personnel also reported Mother and 

1/19/16 at pg. 20). Mother and Father had wrapped the child in a curtain they 

indicating they felt Mother and Father were unable to care for the child. (N.T. 

hospital; due to a report received by the agency from hospital staff member 

.Jv.\'-/ 1- o \4, The child was first placed by the agency directly from the 

Father and Mother have ope biological child, J.D., whose date of birth is 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

March 28, 2016. This Court will address each issue raised on appeal. 

filed a Notice of Appeal and Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on 

T. C · ("Mother") did not file an appeal in this matter. 'f. t>. ("Father") 

March 7, 2016, terminating the rights of both parents to the minor child. 

was rendered from the bench by this Court at the conclusion of the hearing on 

Family Services filed a termination petition on December 9, 2015. A decision 

· 7, 2016 for a Termination of Parental Rights hearing. The Office of Youth and 

The instant matter was before this Court on January 19, 2016 and March 

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Bisignani Moyle, J. 

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MEMORANDUM ~·- 

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RE. J. D. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON 

OFLACKAWANNACOUN~Y 

IN THE INTEREST OF: 

PLEAS 

Circulated 08/11/2016 11:29 AM
Father soiled themselves in the hospital room. Id. There was also a report that 

Mother and Father were smoking inside of the hospital. Id. at 55. J.D. was 

placed in kinship care of C. lv\. uo4 1). M. > cousins of Mother, upon 

discharge from the hospital. Id. at 12. 

At the time of the TPR hearing caseworker Valarie Perry was called to 

testify. (N.T. 1/19/16 at pg. 9). Ms. Perry said she was the caseworker assigned 

to the child from:ra11ua.r'! 'l.O\S until October 6, 2015. Id. at 10. At the time the 

child was placed, the agency set up a permanency plan for Father which 

included several goals. Under the plan Father was required to attend parenting 

classes, obtain a mental health evaluation and comply with any and all treatment 

recommendations, attend anger management classes, and obtain a drug and 

alcohol evaluation. Id. at 21. 

Caseworker Perry testified that Father did attend some parenting classes, 

but he never completed the program. Id. at 22. Father also went to Scranton 

Counseling Center at times sporadically. Id. He also completed a drug and 

alcohol assessment. Id. at 23. Caseworker Perry set up several appointments for 

Father with Carol Hempt for dual diagnostic counseling for mental health and 

anger management. Id. at 24. Father did not follow through with this treatment. 

Id. He missed several appointments. Id. Father would schedule appointments 

and then not show up. Id. 

Father had weekly visits with the child at the Office of Youth and Family 

Services visitation center. Id. at 23. Father's visits never progressed beyond 

supervised visits. Id. Therefore, all contact Father has ever had with the child 

2 
3 

has been in a supervised capacity. Id. In January of 2015, Mother's visits with 

J.D. were suspended due to safety concerns, but Father's visits continued. Id. at 

44. Ms. Perry testified that during the visits Father would need to be redirected. 

Id. at 51. The supervisor would get down on the floor and show Father how to 

interact with the child. Id. After a while, Father would begin to initiate 

interaction with J.D. but by that time she had developed further and her needs 

had changed. Id. Father did not adapt fast enough and was always behind in 

appreciating what requirements existed at each stage in a child's life. Id. Ms. 

Perry rated Father's compliance and progress as "none to minimal." Id. at 50. 

Next, the agency called Lisa Kanavy to testify. Id. at 58. Ms. Kanavy was 

the visit supervisor for seven months. Id. at 60. She testified that Father 

generally attended all of his scheduled visits with the child. Id. Ms. Kanavy 

stated Father needed to be redirected during the visits. Id. She said Father would 

sit on the couch and look as ifhe did not know what to do. Id. at 87. Father had 

some progress over the many months, but progress was slow and minimal. Id. at 

92; In Ms. Kanavy's opinion, there is no bond between the child and Father. Id. 

She stated that the child does not recognize Father as a paternal figure. Id. at 80. 

She testified the child displays excitement when she sees and is picked up by 

her foster father. Id. at 65. Ms. Kanavy testified she is basing her opinion on her 

experience with other children who are similarly situated but demonstrate 

different behavior than J.D. Id. at 81. 

Ms. Kanavy also explained how Father showed little or no ability to plan 

ahead for his visits with J.D. Id. at 66. Father was supposed to bring lunch to the 
4 

visit for himself and the child, so that they would be able to have a meal 

together. Id. Father would consistently forget to bring a snack or drink for J.D. 

Id. Also, on one visit Father wanted to give J.D. an energy drink. Id. Ms. 

Kanavy stated Father was accompanied on most visits. Id. at 68. About twice a 

month Father would bring his EIHAB volunteer to the visit. Id. He would also 

often bring his mother, the paternal grandmother, to the visits with J.D. Id at 84. 

The TPR hearing continued on March 7, 2016, with of Dr. Muhammed 

Rahman called to testify. (N.T. 3/7/16 at pg. 7). Dr. Rahman testified that he is a 

licensed psychiatrist and the medical director of the Scranton Counseling 

Center. Id. at 8. He testified that he has diagnosed Father with a two-tiered 

diagnosis: Bipolar Disorder and a mild Intellectual Disability. Id. at 21. Dr. 

Rahman testified that Father is bi-polar based on his violent mood swings. Id. at 

33. For his bi-polar disorder Father has been prescribed Depakote. Id. at 21. 

Father was an outpatient of the Scranton Counseling Center for eight (8) month 

ending in December of 2015. Id. While at an outpatient status, Father was 

receiving no services. Id. Father only went to the Scranton Counseling Center to 

pick up his medication. Id. During these eight (8) months, Dr. Rahman testified 

that Father's compliance with picking up and taking his prescribed medication 

was poor. Id. at 22. 

In December of 2015, Dr. Rahman transferred Father to a partial program 

for more intensive management. Id. This partial program was supposed to help 

Father with intellectual disability. Id. At the time of the TPR hearing, Father had 

been in this program for three (3) months. Id. at 22. Dr. Rahman also testified 
5 

that Father is a major support to Moth~r in her life. Id. at 34. He also stated that 

it was often Father who would make sure that both he and Mother took their 

medication. Id. at 19. 

Next, Ellen Sechler, the Scranton Counseling Center Intellectual Disability 

Department Supervisor, testified to the services SCC provides to Father. Id. at 

41. She testified that Father receives companion services, support coordination 

services, a bus pass, and a YMCA membership. Id. at 53. Ms. Sechler testified 

when Father goes to the YMCA he needs help using the facilities from 

companion services. Id. at 54. She also testified that Father needs help shopping 

for groceries and clothes. Id. Ms. Sechler stated, in her opinion, that it would be 

hard for him to take care of someone else without the services provided by her 

department. Id. at 56. She also testified that Father needs help managing money. 

Id. at 59. His money is managed by the Advocacy Alliance. Id. 

Megan Saul, OYFS caseworker, testified about the living conditions of 

both Mother and Father. Id. at 67. She stated that Mother and Father had a new 

apartment as of January, 2016, which was an improvement over their last 

apartment. Id. at 69. She testified the last apartment had two (2) other people 

living in it with only one bedroom in the apartment. Id. at 68. The agency had 

· some coricems with their roommates. Id. at 70. They would smoke and make a 

mess. Id. OYFS also had concerns the roommates would agitate Mother, yet 

Father and Mother continue to let them remain in the apartment. Id. OYFS 

feared that these relationships are not conducive to the type of lifestyle Mother 

and Father are trying to achieve. Id. 
6 

( 5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court 

or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six 

months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions 

within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of 

the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions· and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

( 1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties. 

"(a) General Rule - The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be 

terminated after a petition [is] filed on any of the following grounds: 

2511, which provides in pertinent part as follows: 

The statutory grounds for termination of parental rights are set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. 

DISCUSSION 

it. Id. 92-93. 

had not taken his medication in two (2) weeks and felt that he no longer needed 

never been to a doctor's appointment. Id. at 89. Father further testified that he 

know who his daughter's doctor was, or if she even had one, and that he had 

examination about his ability to care for his daughter, he stated that he did not 

setting up as a nursery for his daughter. Id. However, when asked on cross 

apartment he and Mother had moved into had a second bedroom which he was 

his daughter and is eager to take her home. Id. Father testified the new . 

Father also testified at the TPR hearing, Id. at 85. He stated that he loves 
7 

rounds for termination exist for both parents pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(b). 

he Agency has alleged Father's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to 23 

arental rights should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(a),(1),(2),(5), and (8). 

In the case at hand, with respect to the first prong, the Agency has alleged Mother's 

eeds of the child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(b); In Re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511. 

o determine whether terminating the parent's rights would properly serve the welfare and 

nee this burden has been met, the Court must then engage in a "best interests" analysis 

arental rights. 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(a); In Re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). 

lear and convincing evidence, that the parent's conduct warrants the termination of 

do tion of J.M. 991 A.2d 321, 323 (Pa.Super. 2010). First, the Court must find, by 

ennsylvania case law require a two-pronged analysis. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511; In Re 

In determining whether to terminate the rights of a parent, both the statute and 

(b) Other considerations -- The court, in terminating the rights of a parent, 

shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not 

be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if 

found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed ... the court shall not consider any effort by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving notice of the filing of the petition." 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court 

or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, twelve months or more 

have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of 

the child. 

time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. · 
8 

APPLICATION 

F. o. (FATHER) 

This Court finds the Agency has satisfied its burden of proof by 

establishing, by clear and convincing evidence; Father's parental rights should 

be terminated pursuant to each subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(a) alleged. The 

facts in this case clearly support the Agency's petition. The minor child was 

placed in foster care by the Office of Youth and Family Services directly from 

the hospital following her birth. She has remained in kinship 

foster care ever since. Therefore, as of this date J.D. has been in care for over 

twenty (20) months. 

Further, Father has only ever had contact with J.D. in a supervised 

capacity at the OYFS visitation center. Father is extremely slow to learn the 

needs of J.D. and often had to be prompted to interact with her during the visits. 

By the time Father would grasp the needs of the child, she had already 

progressed developmentally. Additionally, Father has failed to meet several of 

the goals of the permanency plan, which he was supposed to be following in 

order to achieve reunification with J.D. Father consistently failed to follow 

through on his mental health and anger counseling. At the time of the TPR 

hearing Father stated that he was no longer taking his prescribed medication 

because he felt he did not need it. This testimony establishes a clear and 

continued incapacity and/or refusal on the part of Father to cause J .D. to be 

"without proper parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for her 

emotional and physical well-being." 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 la(2). 
9 

I Haing found that the agency satisfied its burden of proof by clear and convincing 

evidence for 25 l l(a)(2), this Court will not address the other subsections alleged. 

entire life. Furthermore, there is no evidence that a bond exists between Father 

allow her to achieve permanency and end the uncertainty that has consumed her 

child's emotional well-being. Termination of her father's parental rights will 

him. It is clear the delays and lack of permanency are clearly harmful to the 

been in her father's care and has only had contact through supervised visits with 

noticeable bond with her foster parents. Since her placement, the child has never 

her emotional, physical, and developmental needs are being met. J.D. has a 

permanency and is the only home she has ever known. In the foster home all of 

discharged from the hospital. This placement has afforded the child the 

testimony established J.D. has resided in her current foster home since she was 

and emotional needs and welfare of the child. As already stated above, the 

interest analysis," giving primary consideration to the developmental, physical, 

In regard to 23 Pa.C.S. §251 l(b), this Court is required to make a "best 

respect to 2511 ( a)(2). l 

mentioned facts it is clear the agency has satisfied its burden of proof with 

diagnosed mental health conditions. Based on this analysis and the aboveimpossible for Father to take care of himself and a minor child due to his 

money and shopping. Through testimony presented it is clear it would be 

services help Father with the most basic tasks of daily life such as managing 

he requires life services provided through Scranton Counseling Center. These 

diagnosed with an intellectual disability, as well as bipolar disorder, for which 

Throughout the testimony it was also established Father has been 
10 

By the Court, 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the above mentioned reasons, it shall be the order of this Court 

that the parental rights of Father, ' F · D · r, be terminated with respect to the 

minor child J.D. 

and J.D. Therefore, it is in the be~t interest of the child for the parental rights of 

Father be terminated. 

t Bisignani Moyle