FILED 

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 January 18, 2005 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[PUBLISH]

 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

___________________________

No. 03-15884

___________________________

D.C. Docket Nos. 03-21642-CV-PAS; 03-21643-CV-PAS; 03–21644-CV-PAS;

03-21645-CV-PAS; 03-21646-CV-PAS; 03-21647-CV-PAS; 03-21648-CV-PAS;

03-21649-CV-PAS; 03-21650-CV-PAS; 03-21651-CV-PAS

RIZALYN BAUTISTA, Individually and as 

Personal Representative of the Estate of Mari–John 

Bautista, and all claiming by and through her, 

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.

__________________________________________________________________

PAUL PERALTA,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.
2

__________________________________________________________________

RAYMOND LOVINO,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.

__________________________________________________________________

RONALDO MARCELINO,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.

__________________________________________________________________

ROLANDO TEJERO,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.
3

__________________________________________________________________

ABDI COMEDIA,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.

__________________________________________________________________

CRISTINA L. VALENZUELA, Individually and 

as Personal Representative of the Estate of Candido 

S. Valenzuela, Jr. and all those claiming through her, 

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.

__________________________________________________________________

MARILEN S. BERNAL, Individually and as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Ramil G. Bernal, 

and all those claiming by and through her 

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.
4

__________________________________________________________________

WILLY I. VILLANUEVA, Individually and as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Rene Villanueva, 

and all those claiming through him,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.

__________________________________________________________________

MARIA GARCIA L. ROSAL, Individually and as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Ricardo B. Rosal, III, 

and all those claiming by and through her,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

STAR CRUISES,

NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, LTD.,

Defendants–Appellees.

___________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

___________________________

(January 18, 2005)
 Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade,

*

sitting by designation.

 The injured crewmembers are plaintiff–appellants in this case along with personal 1

representatives of the decedents. In the interest of precision, this opinion refers to

plaintiff–appellants collectively as “Plaintiffs,” and refers to the injured and deceased

crewmembers collectively as “crewmembers” when discussing those who were employed by

NCL. 

5

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, WILSON, Circuit Judge, and RESTANI ,

*

Judge.

RESTANI, Judge:

The S/S Norway’s steam boiler exploded on May 25, 2003, while the cruise

ship was in the Port of Miami. Six of the crewmembers represented in this action

were killed and four were injured. Each crewmember’s employment agreement

1

with Defendant NCL includes an arbitration clause, which the district court

enforced pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21

U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (the “Convention”), and its implementing legislation,

9 U.S.C. §§ 202–208 (2002) (the “Convention Act”). See Bautista v. Star Cruises,

286 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Plaintiffs’ appeal presents an issue of first

impression in this Circuit: whether the crewmembers’ employment agreements

were shielded from arbitration by the seamen employment contract exemption

contained in section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2002) (the
 This opinion uses “FAA” to refer to the statute contained in chapter 1 of title 9 and 2

“Convention Act” to refer to chapter 2 of title 9. Courts often refer to the entirety of title 9 as the

Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH,

141 F.3d 1434, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998). As demonstrated in the Part I of the discussion below,

however, the relationship between the two statutes is determined by their terms rather than

nomenclature. 

6

“FAA”). Because the FAA seamen exemption does not apply and the district 2

court had jurisdiction to compel arbitration, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. THE SUITS AGAINST STAR CRUISES AND NCL

Following the explosion aboard the Norway, Plaintiffs filed separate but

nearly identical suits in Florida circuit court against Defendant–Appellee NCL,

owner of the Norway, and Defendant–Appellee Star Cruises, alleged by Plaintiffs

to be the parent company of NCL. The complaints sought damages for negligence

and unseaworthiness under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and for failure to

provide maintenance, cure and unearned wages under the general maritime law of

the United States. 

 NCL removed the ten cases to federal district court pursuant to section 205

of the Convention Act, which permits removal before the start of trial when the

dispute relates to an arbitration agreement or arbitral award covered by the
 After removal to federal district court, the ten cases were consolidated for pretrial

3

purposes on July 14, 2003. Bautista, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 1355 n.1. 

7

Convention. See 9 U.S.C. § 205. In the notices of removal filed with the district 3

court, NCL described how the crewmembers were bound by employment

agreements that include an arbitration provision covered by the Convention. 

II. THE CREWMEMBERS’ EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS INCORPORATE AN

ARBITRATION PROVISION

At the time of the explosion, each crewmember’s employment was governed

by the terms of a standard employment contract executed by the crewmembers and

representatives of NCL in the Philippines between August 2002 and March 2003. 

The Philippine government regulated the form and content of such employment

contracts, as well as other aspects of the seamen hiring process, through a program

administered by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (“POEA”), a

division of the Department of Labor and Employment of the Republic of the

Philippines (“DOLE”). 

Each crewmember signed a one–page standard employment agreement

created by the POEA, with some variations according to the position for which the

crewmember was hired. Each agreement sets forth the basic terms and conditions

of the crewmember's employment, including the duration of the contract, the

position accepted, and the monthly salary and hours of work. Additional terms
 The employment agreements refer explicitly to the Standard Terms in paragraph 3. 4

 The full text of Section 29 of the Standard Terms follows:

5

In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered

by a collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the

original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of

arbitrators. If the parties are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the

parties may at their option submit the claim or dispute to either the original and

exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),

pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers

and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of

the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If there is no provision as to the

voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the parties, the same shall be appointed

from the accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and

Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment.

Standard Terms, sec. 29; R.3.60, p. 1.

8

and conditions are incorporated by reference: Paragraph 2 provides that the

contract’s terms and conditions shall be observed in accordance with POEA

Department Order No. 4 and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9. Department

Order No. 4, in turn, incorporates the document containing the arbitration clause: 

The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino

Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels (the “Standard Terms”). Section 29 of 4

the Standard Terms requires arbitration “in cases of claims and disputes arising

from [the seaman's] employment,” through submission of the claims to the

National Labor Relations Commission (“NLRC”), voluntary arbitrators, or a panel

of arbitrators. Standard Terms, sec. 29; R.3.60, p. 1.5
9

A POEA official verified and approved the execution of the employment

contract by the crewmembers and NCL representatives. Although Plaintiffs

dispute that the crewmembers saw the arbitration provision or had it explained to

them, see Pls.’ Mot. for Remand, Exs. 1–8, copies of the Standard Terms provided

to the district court by NCL indicate the crewmembers initialed or signed the

Standard Terms. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Remand, Exs. D–F; R–3–60. 

NCL also provided affidavits from managers at various manning agencies licensed

by the POEA to recruit seamen. In the affidavits, the managers attest that (1) they

explained the employment documents to the seamen in their native language; (2)

the seamen had an opportunity to review the documents; and (3) the seamen were

required to attend a Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar for seamen, which was

conducted in both the English and Filipino languages and which reviewed, among

other subjects, the Standard Terms and the dispute settlement procedures provided

for in the employment contract. Id. at Exs. C–F; R–3–60.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT COMPELS ARBITRATION

In an order issued on October 14, 2003, the district court granted NCL’s

motion to compel arbitration and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to

state court. In disposing of the case, the district court ordered that the parties

submit to arbitration in the Philippines pursuant to Section 29 of the Standard
 We certified the appealability of this action prior to oral argument. Order (11th Cir. 6

Mar. 2, 2004). 

10

Terms and retained jurisdiction to enforce or confirm any resulting arbitral award. 

Plaintiffs appeal. 

JURISDICTION

A case covered by the Convention confers federal subject matter jurisdiction

upon a district court because such a case is “deemed to arise under the laws and

treaties of the United States.” 9 U.S.C. § 203. Defendants removed these cases

from state court pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 205, which permits removal of disputes

relating to arbitration agreements covered by the Convention. See, e.g., Notice of

Removal, R1–1–3. Plaintiffs claim that this case is not covered by the

Convention, and thereby challenge the district court’s jurisdiction. We discuss

this challenge below. Assuming the district court exercised jurisdiction

appropriately, its order is final and appealable because, by compelling arbitration

of the dispute, it “dispos[ed] of all the issues framed by the litigation and [left]

nothing for the district court to do but execute the judgment.” See Employers Ins.

v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001). 

6

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s order to compel arbitration. 
 These four require that (1) there is an agreement in writing within the meaning of the 7

Convention; (2) the agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the

Convention; (3) the agreement arises out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not,

which is considered commercial; and (4) a party to the agreement is not an American citizen, or

that the commercial relationship has some reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. 

Std. Bent Glass Corp., 333 F.3d at 449. It is beyond dispute that the second and fourth

conditions are fulfilled in this case. The crewmembers’ arbitration provisions provide for

arbitration in the Philippines, a signatory of the Convention. The crewmembers are not

American citizens, but are citizens of the Philippines. 

11

Employers Ins., 251 F.3d at 1321. 

DISCUSSION

In deciding a motion to compel arbitration under the Convention Act, a

court conducts “a very limited inquiry.” Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293

F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1030, 123 S. Ct. 561, 154 L.

Ed. 2d 445 (2002); DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins.’ PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 74 (1st

Cir. 2000); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186 (1st Cir. 1982). A

district court must order arbitration unless (1) the four jurisdictional prerequisites

are not met, Std. Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir.

2003); or (2) one of the Convention’s affirmative defenses applies. DiMercurio, 7

202 F.3d at 79; see also Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286,

1292 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (“jurisdictional prerequisites to an action confirming an

award are different from the several affirmative defenses to confirmation”). 

Two jurisdictional prerequisites are at issue here. First, we must determine
12

whether the arbitration agreement arises out of a commercial legal relationship. 

Second, we ask whether there exists an “agreement in writing” to arbitrate the

matter in dispute. Lastly, we consider Plaintiffs’ purported affirmative defenses

that the arbitration provision is unconscionable under U.S. law and incapable of

being arbitrated under the law of the Philippines. In analyzing these arguments,

we are mindful that the Convention Act “generally establishes a strong

presumption in favor of arbitration of international commercial disputes.” Indus.

Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1440 (11th

Cir. 1998) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473

U.S. 614, 638–40, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3359–61, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1985)). Plaintiffs’

arguments fail.

I. PLAINTIFFS’ EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ARE COMMERCIAL LEGAL

RELATIONSHIPS UNDER THE CONVENTION ACT, REGARDLESS OF THE

FAA SEAMEN EXEMPTION

We have yet to determine whether the FAA exemption for seamen’s

employment contracts applies to arbitration agreements covered by the Convention
 The seamen employment contract exemption appears in section 1 of the FAA: 

8

§ 1. “Maritime transactions” and “commerce” defined; exceptions to operation of 

 title

[. . .] "commerce", as herein defined, means commerce among the several States

or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District

of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such

Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and

any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply

to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of

workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.

9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).

13

Act. The district court determined that it does not. This conclusion is consistent 8

with that of the Fifth Circuit—the only court of appeals to decide this issue—and

several district courts. See Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d

327 (5th Cir. 2004); Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270 (5th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1030, 123 S. Ct. 561, 154 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2002);

Acosta v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2003);

Adolfo v. Carnival Corp., No. 02–23672, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24143 (S.D. Fla.

Mar. 17, 2003); Amon v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 02–21025, 2002 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 27064 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2002). 

As we take up this issue of statutory interpretation, the first step is to

determine whether the statutory language has a plain and unambiguous meaning

by referring to “the language itself, the specific context in which that language is
14

used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil

Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S. Ct. 843, 846, 136 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1997). The

inquiry ceases if the language is clear and “the statutory scheme is coherent and

consistent.” Id. at 340 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489

U.S. 235, 240, 109 S. Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1989)). Such is the case

here. The statutory framework of title 9 and the language and context of the

Convention Act preclude the application of the FAA seamen’s exemption, either

directly as an integral part of the Convention Act or residually as a

non–conflicting provision of the FAA. 

A. The FAA Seamen Exemption Does Not Apply to the Convention

Act Directly 

1. Overview of the Convention and the Convention Act 

The Convention requires that a Contracting State “shall recognize an

agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all

or any differences which have arisen . . . between them in respect of a defined

legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable
 The full text of Article II provides as follows: 

9

1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under

which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences

which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined

legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter

capable of settlement by arbitration. 

2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a

contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in

an exchange of letters or telegrams. 

3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in

respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning

of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to

arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,

inoperative or incapable of being performed.

Convention, art. II. 

 Article I(3) of the Convention permits any State party to apply the Convention “only to 10

the differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered

as commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration.” Convention, art.

I(3). 

15

of settlement by arbitration.” Convention, art. II(1). When the United States 9

acceded to the Convention in 1970, it exercised its right to limit the Convention’s

application to commercial legal relationships as defined by the law of the United

States: 

The United States of America will apply the Convention only to

differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or

not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the

United States. 

Convention, n. 29. Plaintiffs assert that the United States national law definition 10
16

of “commercial” resides in section 1 of the FAA, which defines “commerce” and

provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of

seamen.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. Although section 1 clearly exempts seamen’s employment

contracts from the FAA, see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109,

121 S. Ct. 1302, 1306, 149 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2001), the exemption’s application

outside the FAA is restricted by the second and third chapters of title 9. 

2. The Statutory Framework of Title 9 of the United States

Code

The three chapters of title 9 are closely interrelated, but, contrary to

Plaintiffs’ argument, they are not a seamless whole. As indicated, the FAA and

the Convention Act comprise Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, respectively. Chapter 3

contains the legislation implementing the Inter–American Convention on

International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 336 (entered into

force June 16, 1976). 9 U.S.C. §§ 301–307 (the “Inter–American Act”). Within

the general field of arbitration, each act has a specific context and purpose. 

Congress, as it added the Convention Act and then the Inter–American Act to title

9, anticipated conflicts among these treaty–implementing statutes and the FAA. 

Congress addressed potential conflicts in two ways, each of which limits the

degree to which title 9 may be considered a single statute. 
17

The first is general in nature. The FAA applies residually to supplement the

provisions of the Convention Act and the Inter–American Act. Rather than put the

Convention Act and the Inter–American Act on equal footing with the FAA in the

field of foreign arbitration, Congress gave the treaty–implementing statutes

primacy in their fields, with FAA provisions applying only where they did not

conflict. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (the Convention Act residual provision); 9 U.S.C. §

307 (the Inter–American Act residual provision). This hierarchical structure

accords with our understanding that, “[a]s an exercise of the Congress’ treaty

power and as federal law, ‘the Convention must be enforced according to its terms

over all prior inconsistent rules of law.’” Indus. Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1440

(quoting Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat’l Oil Co., 767 F.2d

1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985)). 

The second technique for reconciling title 9’s chapters is more specific. 

Certain provisions of the Convention Act and the Inter–American Act refer

explicitly to specific sections of other chapters of title 9. Section 302 of the

Inter–American Act, for example, directly incorporates several sections of the

Convention Act: “[s]ections 202, 203, 204, 205, and 207 of this title shall apply to

this chapter [9 U.S.C. §§ 301–307] as if specifically set forth herein.” 9 U.S.C. §

302. Most relevant for the instant case is the reference in section 202 of the
18

Convention Act to section 2 of the FAA. 

3. Section 202 of the Convention Act

In contrast to the Inter–American Act’s direct incorporation of several

Convention Act sections, section 202 does not incorporate section 2 of the FAA as

an exhaustive description of the Convention Act’s scope. Rather, section 202 uses

section 2 as an illustration of the types of agreements covered by the Convention

Act. 

In articulating the Convention’s commercial scope under the laws of the

United States, section 202 of the Convention Act provides that an agreement falls

under the Convention if it “aris[es] out of a legal relationship, whether contractual

or not, which is considered as commercial, including a transaction, contract, or

agreement described in section 2 of this title [9 U.S.C. § 2].” 9 U.S.C. § 202
 The full text of § 202 is as follows:

11

§ 202 Agreement or award falling under the Convention 

An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship,

whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a

transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title [9 U.S.C. §

2], falls under the Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a

relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be

deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property

located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other

reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section

a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its

principal place of business in the United States.

9 U.S.C. § 202. 

19

(emphasis added). Section 2 of the FAA makes valid and enforceable “[a] 11

written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a

transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis

added). 

The Convention Act’s reference to section 2 does not indicate an intent to

limit the definition of “commercial” to those described in section 2 of the FAA as

modified by section 1; the expansive term “including” would be superfluous if the

FAA provided the full and complete definition. “Including” demonstrates that, at

the very least, Congress meant for “commercial” legal relationships to consist of

contracts evidencing a commercial transaction, as listed in section 2, as well as

similar agreements. See Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S.
 Plaintiffs emphasize that the heading to Section 1 of the FAA reads “exceptions to 12

title.” A section heading may be helpful in construing a statute’s meaning, but “it may not be

used as a means of creating an ambiguity when the body of the act itself is clear.” 2A Norman J.

Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:07 (6th ed. 2000). The

Convention Act is clear. 

20

95, 100, 62 S. Ct. 1, 4, 86 L. Ed. 65 (1941) (“the term ‘including’ is not one of

all–embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the

general principle.”); Argosy Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968)

(“The word ‘includes’ is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation . . . .

It therefore conveys the conclusion that there are other items includable, though

not specifically enumerated by the statutes.”). 

We therefore understand the reference to section 2 of the FAA to be

generally illustrative of the commercial legal relationships covered by section 202. 

The illustration rendered by section 2 includes employment agreements and makes

no mention of the section 1 seamen exemption. Cf. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S.

at 113, 121 S. Ct. at 1308 (construing section 2 and rejecting the proposition that

an employment contract is not a “contract evidencing a transaction involving

interstate commerce”). Accordingly, the terms of the Convention Act do not

provide that we read section 1 into section 202. 

12

Plaintiffs cite committee testimony in the legislative history in the hope of

demonstrating that Congress intended section 202 of the Convention Act to
21

incorporate the FAA seamen exemption. Ambassador Richard Kearney, Chairman

of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law,

testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that 

the definition of commerce contained in section 1 of the original

Arbitration Act is the national law definition for the purposes of the

declaration. A specific reference, however, is made in section 202 to

section 2 of title 9; which is the basic provision of the original

Arbitration Act. 

S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Rep. No. 91-702, at 6

(1970). Although it is plausible to infer from Ambassador Kearney’s comments

that he believed the section 1 exemptions should apply to the Convention Act, his

views as a single State Department official are a relatively unreliable indicator of

statutory intent. See Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 120, 121 S. Ct. at 1311

(“Legislative history is problematic even when the attempt is to draw inferences

from the intent of duly appointed committees of the Congress.”); Francisco, 239

F.3d at 276 (quoting Circuit City Stores to discount Ambassador Kearney’s

testimony). Plaintiffs nevertheless claim that, according to Udall v. Tallman, 380

U.S. 1, 16, 85 S. Ct. 792, 801, 13 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1965), his views are entitled to

“great deference.” Pls.’ Op. Br. at 27. Udall, however, accords such deference

only to “the officers or agency charged with [the statute’s] administration,” 380

U.S. at 16, 85 S. Ct. at 801, and there is no indication that the State Department is
22

so charged. Even if the above testimony were owed some deference, it could not

alter the plain terms of the Convention Act. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534

U.S. 438, 457, 122 S. Ct. 941, 954, 151 L. Ed. 2d 908 (2002) (“Floor statements

from two Senators cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a

statute.”). Rather than directly incorporate an FAA provision that Congress did

not, we adhere to the framework Congress provided and evaluate the applicability

of an unmentioned FAA section according to the Convention Act’s residual

application provision. 

B. The FAA Seamen Exemption Does Not Apply Residually

As noted above, section 208 of the Convention Act provides that

non–conflicting provisions of the Arbitration Act apply residually to Convention

Act cases: 

Chapter 1 [9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.] applies to actions and proceedings

brought under this chapter [9 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.] to the extent that

chapter is not in conflict with this chapter [9 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.] or

the Convention as ratified by the United States.

9 U.S.C. § 208 (emphasis added); cf. 9 U.S.C. § 307 (providing for residual

application of the FAA to the Inter–American Act). Under this residual provision,

the issue is whether the FAA seamen exemption conflicts with the Convention Act

or the Convention as ratified by the United States. 
23

A conflict exists between the FAA seamen exemption, which is narrow and

specific, and the language of the Convention and the Convention Act, which is

broad and generic. Plaintiffs, under the impression that an FAA term may only be

contradicted by name, argue that no conflict exists because section 202 of the

Convention Act is silent as to seamen’s employment contracts. According to this

logic, a statutory provision pertaining to persons above the age of eighteen would

not conflict with a provision that exempts thirty year-olds. Because the

Convention Act covers commercial legal relationships without exception, it

conflicts with section 1, an FAA provision that exempts certain employment

agreements that—but for the exemption—would be commercial legal

relationships. The Fifth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Francisco: 

In short, the language of the Convention, the ratifying language, and

the Convention Act implementing the Convention do not recognize

an exception for seamen employment contracts. On the contrary, they

recognize that the only limitation on the type of legal relationship

falling under the Convention is that it must be considered

“commercial,” and we conclude that an employment contract is

“commercial.” 

293 F.3d at 274. We see no reason to diverge from the sensible reasoning of our

sister Circuit. 

Indeed, to read industry–specific exceptions into the broad language of the

Convention Act would be to hinder the Convention’s purpose:
24

The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying

American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the

recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in

international contracts and to unify the standards by which

agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced

in the signatory countries. 

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15, 94 S. Ct. 2449, 2457 n.15,

41 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Indus. Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d

at 1440 (identifying additional purposes of the Convention, such as relieving

congestion in the courts and providing an expedient alternative to litigation). In

pursuing effective, unified arbitration standards, the Convention’s framers

understood that the benefits of the treaty would be undermined if domestic courts

were to inject their “parochial” values into the regime:

In their discussion of [Article II(1)], the delegates to the Convention

voiced frequent concern that courts of signatory countries in which an

agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be

permitted to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of

parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would

diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements. 

Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15, 94 S. Ct. at 2457 n.15. This concern is addressed by

the broad language of section 202 of the Convention Act. Considering the

language of the Convention Act in the context of the framework of title 9 and the

purposes of the Convention, we find no justification for removing from the

Convention Act’s scope a subset of commercial employment agreements. The
25

crewmembers’ arbitration provisions constitute commercial legal relationships

within the meaning of the Convention Act. 

II. PLAINTIFFS’ EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS WERE AGREEMENTS IN

WRITING, WHICH VESTED THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Finding no error in the district court’s determination that instant arbitration

provisions are commercial legal relationships, we turn to the other relevant

jurisdictional prerequisite, i.e., that the party seeking arbitration provide “an

agreement in writing” in which the parties undertake to submit the dispute to

arbitration. Convention, art. II(1); see also Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1291. 

Agreements in writing include “an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration

agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or

telegrams.” Convention, art. II(2). 

NCL supplied the district court with copies of the employment agreement

and the Standard Terms signed by each crewmember. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’

Mot. for Remand, Exs. D–F; R–3–60. Although Plaintiffs claim the crewmembers

did not have an opportunity to review the entirety of the Standard Terms before

signing, Plaintiffs do not dispute the veracity of the signatures. See Pls.’ Op. Br.

at 36 n.1. Accordingly, this documentation fulfills the jurisdictional prerequisite

that the court be provided with an agreement to arbitrate signed by the parties. 
26

Plaintiffs try in vain to identify three reasons why the signed documents fail to

constitute agreements in writing. 

First, Plaintiffs impugn the incorporation of the Standard Terms into the

employment agreement, citing decisions of other Circuits that interpret Article

II(2) to require inclusion of an arbitration provision in a signed agreement or an

exchange of letters or telegrams. See Std. Bent Glass, 333 F.3d at 449; Kahn

Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 1999); cf.

United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. West Point Constr. Co., 837 F.2d 1507, 1508

(11th Cir. 1988) (finding that, under the FAA, the incorporation of an arbitration

provision expressed an intent of the parties to arbitrate). This argument fails to

address the fact that the crewmembers signed the Standard Terms, the document

containing the arbitration provision. 

Second, Plaintiffs assert that, in order to satisfy the agreement–in–writing

requirement, NCL bears an “evidentiary burden” of establishing that the

crewmembers knowingly agreed to arbitrate disputes arising from the employment

relationship. See Pls.’ Op. Br. at 42. The parties disagree as to whether the

crewmembers were specifically notified of the arbitration provision, and each side

supports its position with affidavits. See Pls.’ Mot. for Remand, Exs. 1–8; Defs.’

Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Remand, Exs. C–F; R–3–60. Plaintiffs also emphasize the
27

general solicitude for seamen reflected in the Jones Act and Garrett v.

Moore–McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 243–50, 63 S. Ct. 246, 249–50, 87 L. Ed.

239 (1942). Plaintiffs, however, offer no authority indicating that the Convention

or the Convention Act impose upon the party seeking arbitration the burden of

demonstrating notice or knowledgeable consent. To require such an evidentiary

showing in every case would be to make an unfounded inference from the terms of

the Convention and would be squarely at odds with a court’s limited jurisdictional

inquiry, an inquiry colored by a strong preference for arbitration. See Francisco,

293 F.3d at 273. It is no better to style Plaintiffs’ defective notice claim as an

affirmative defense, as virtually every case would be susceptible to a dispute over

whether the party resisting arbitration was aware of the arbitration provision when

the party signed the agreement. In the limited jurisdictional inquiry prescribed by

the Convention Act, we find it especially appropriate to abide by the general

principle that “[o]ne who has executed a written contract and is ignorant of its

contents cannot set up that ignorance to avoid the obligation absent fraud and

misrepresentation.” Vulcan Painters v. MCI Constructors, 41 F.3d 1457, 1461

(11th Cir. 1995). 

Third, Plaintiffs’ argue that the agreement–in–writing prerequisite remains

unfulfilled because NCL did not attach the signed copies of the Standard Terms to
28

its notices of removal to the district court. NCL was under no such obligation. 

The agreement–in–writing prerequisite does not specify when a party seeking

arbitration must provide the court with the agreement in writing. The Convention

Act’s removal provision states that “[t]he procedure for removal of causes

otherwise provided by law shall apply, except that the ground for removal

provided in this section need not appear on the face of the complaint but may be

shown in the petition for removal.” 9 U.S.C. § 205. Section 205 does not require

a district court to review the putative arbitration agreement—or investigate the

validity of the signatures thereon—before assuming jurisdiction: “The language

of § 205 strongly suggests that Congress intended that district courts continue to

be able to assess their jurisdiction from the pleadings alone.” Beiser v. Weyler,

284 F.3d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 2002); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (requiring only “a short

and plain statement of the grounds for removal”). NCL’s notices of removal met

procedural requirements by identifying the relevant documents and describing

how they bind the Plaintiffs to arbitration. See, e.g., R1–1–3; see also Whole

Health Chiropractic & Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Medical Plan, Inc., 254 F.3d

1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The law disfavors court meddling with removals

based upon procedural—as distinguished from jurisdictional—defects”). 
29

III. PLAINTIFFS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES FAIL

The Convention requires that courts enforce an agreement to arbitrate unless

the agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” 

Convention, art. II(3). Plaintiffs do not articulate their defenses in these terms,

claiming instead that the arbitration provision is unconscionable and the

underlying dispute is not arbitrable. For purposes of analysis, we style the former

as a “null and void” claim and the latter as an “incapable of being performed”

claim. 

A. The Arbitration Provision Is Not Null and Void

“[T]he Convention’s ‘null and void’ clause . . . limits the bases upon which

an international arbitration agreement may be challenged to standard

breach–of–contract defenses.” DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 202 F.3d

71, 79 (1st Cir. 2000). The limited scope of the Convention’s null and void clause

“must be interpreted to encompass only those situations—such as fraud, mistake,

duress, and waiver—that can be applied neutrally on an international scale.” Id. at

80. 

Plaintiffs do not claim fraud, mistake, duress or waiver. Instead, Plaintiffs,

allege that the crewmembers were put in a difficult “take it or leave it” situation

when presented with the terms of employment. See Pl’s Op. Br. at 43. Plaintiffs
30

argue that state–law principles of unconscionability render the resulting

agreements unconscionable. They support this position by citing the Supreme

Court’s opinion in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944,

115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995) (“courts generally . . . should

apply ordinary state–law principles that govern the formation of contracts”). In 

Kaplan, however, the Court applied the FAA, not the Convention. See id., 514

U.S. at 941, 115 S. Ct. at 1922. Domestic defenses to arbitration are transferrable

to a Convention Act case only if they fit within the limited scope of defenses

described above. Such an approach is required by the unique circumstances of

foreign arbitration: 

concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign

and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the

international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of

disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even

assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic

context.

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629, 105

S. Ct. 3346, 3355, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1985) 

While it is plausible that economic hardship might make a prospective

Filipino seaman susceptible to a hard bargain during the hiring process, Plaintiffs

have not explained how this makes for a defense under the Convention. It is
 This is not to say that the crewmembers were at the complete mercy of NCL. As noted 13

above, the government of the Philippines, through the POEA, regulated the hiring process with

the stated purpose of protecting the interests of seamen. Because we decide this case on other

grounds, we do not reach Defendants’ argument that the involvement of the POEA in the hiring

process implicates the Act of State doctrine or concerns of international comity. See Defs.’ Br. at

11–13. 

31

doubtful that there exists a precise, universal definition of the unequal bargaining

power defense that may be applied effectively across the range of countries that

are parties to the Convention, and absent any indication to the contrary, we decline

to formulate one. 

13

B. The Arbitration Provision is Not Incapable of Being Performed

Plaintiffs argue that, under the law of the Philippines, the seamen's claims

are not considered “claims arising from this employment” pursuant to Section 29

of the Standard Terms and therefore are not subject to arbitration in that country. 

To support this claim, Plaintiffs rely on Tolosa v. N.L.R.C. (2003) G.R. No.

149578 (Phil.). Tolosa involved a claim against a deceased seaman’s employer for

the grossly negligent acts of his shipmates when the he fell ill. Id. at 6. Because

the complaint focused primarily on the tortious conduct of the shipmates rather

than a claim “arising from employer-employee relations,” the Philippine Supreme

Court held that neither the labor arbiter nor the national labor relations body had

jurisdiction. Id. 

Here, a similar result is not foreordained. Plaintiffs have options beyond
32

tort claims; they complain that NCL failed in one of its central duties as an

employer and shipowner, i.e., to provide a seaworthy vessel. Accordingly, the

holding in Tolosa is an insufficient basis from which to conclude that this dispute

cannot be arbitrated in the Philippines. 

CONCLUSION

The district court properly granted NCL’s motion to compel arbitration. 

The plain language of the Convention Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208, precludes

application of the exemption for seamen’s employment agreements set forth in 9

U.S.C. § 1, and there are no impediments to the district court’s jurisdiction to

compel arbitration. Furthermore, the agreement to arbitrate is not null and void or

incapable of being performed. 

AFFIRMED.