2005 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

12-2-2005 

# U S A v . Lor e

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
D ock e t N o . 03-3043

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s a t : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. I t h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2005 D e c i sion s b y a n a uthor i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. F or mor e infor m a t ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du

. R e c omme nde d C it a t ion

" U SA v . L or e " (2005). 2005 D e cisio n s . P ape r 28. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005/28PREC EDENTIAL
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E T H IRD C IR C U IT

Nos. 03-3043, 03-3217, 03- 4349, 03-4350

UN I TE D ST AT ES O F AM ERI CA

v. J OSEPH L ORE,

Appellant in No. 03-3043

UN I TE D ST AT ES O F AM ERI CA

v. DENI SE BOHN ,

Appellant in No. 03-3217

UN I TE D ST AT ES O F AM ERI CA

v. J OSEPH PEL L I CCI A,

Appellant in No. 03-4349

UN I TE D ST AT ES O F AM ERI CA

v. WI L L I AM HURL EY,

Appellant in No. 03-43502 On Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of NewJ erse y (D.C. Crim. No. 99- cr -00292-4/3/6/5) Ho n o rab l e M ary

L i t t l e C o o p er , Di s tri ctJ u d ge

Submit ted under

Third Circuit L AR 34.1(a) October 28, 2005
BEF ORE: SL OVI TER, FI SHER, and GREENB ERG, Circuit J udg es

(F iled Dec ember

2, 2005)

Marc Fe rnich 570 L exington Avenue 16th Floor New Y ork, NY 10022 Attorney

for Appe llant J oseph L ore in No. 03- 3043

Michae l P. Koribanics Koribanic s & K oribanics 685 Van Houte n Avenue Clifton, NJ 07012 Attorney

for Appe llant Denise B ohn in No. 03-3217
Jose phPe lli c c ia 50 West 48 Street

th Ba y onne, NJ 07002 Attorney

pro se in 03-4349
L eonar d Mey erson Miller, Mey erson, Schwa rtz & Corbo 955 West S ide Avenue J erse y City , NJ 07306 Attorney

for Appe llant Wi lliam Hurley In No. 03-43503 Chr ist op he r J. C hr ist ie United States Attorney Geor g e S. L eone Chief, Appea ls Division Attorney s for Appe llee David B . L at Assistant U.S. Attorney 970 Br oad Stree t Newa rk, NJ 07102-2535 Attorney s for Appe llee

OPI NI ONOF TH E CO UR T

GREENB ERG, Circuit J udg e.

I . I NTRODUCTI ON
Th e se matte rs c ome on

be fo re thi s c ourt

on pa rt ia lly consolidated a

ppeals followingconvictions at a jury trial in the district c ourt on De c e mbe r 1 7, 20 01 , a

nd the su bs e qu e nt e ntr

y of jud g me nts of c onvic tio ns and

se nte nc e s o n July

10 , 2 00 3, a s to Jose phL or e , July 25, 2003, as to Denise B ohn, and Oc tober 31, 2003, a s to J oseph Pelliccia and William Hurley . The c ase or iginated on J une 2, 1999, when a g rand jury

returne d an indictment ag ainst Bohn, Eug ene G’ Se ll a nd JohnAn g e lon e c ha

rg ingthe m w ithc on sp ir a c y to e mbe zzle funds from L ocal 1588 of the International L ong shoremen’ s Association (the “ union” or “ L ocal 1588" ), contra ry to the L aborManag ement Reportingand Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U .S.C. § 501(c) (“se ction 501(c) ”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Subsequently , a g rand jury returne d a super sedingindictment on Dec ember

19, 2000, char g ing de fenda nts-appellants, L ore, B ohn, Pelliccia and H urley

(collec tively , “def

endants” ), alongwith Thomas Ra c kle y , who is n ot a

pa rt y on the se a pp e a ls, amon goth e r t

hin g s, wi th conspirac y

to embezzl e and e mbezz lement of funds f rom L ocal 1588. In these proc eeding s, defe ndants appe al from their convictions by challeng ing nume rous ruling s by the district court made prior to, during , and af

ter their thr ee- wee k trial that beg an in Novembe r 2001. L or e and B ohn, but no t Pe lli c c ia

and Hurl e y , a lso c ha lle ng e the ir se nte nc e s in

light o f Unit e d St ate s v . B oo ke r, 54 3 U .S. , 1 25 S.Ct

. 738 (2005).Thoug h we se t forth the fa cts on t h e b as i s of the testimony 1 favor able to the g overnme nt as t he verdict winner, see United States v. Pun g ito re , 9 10 F .2 d 1 08 4, 10 97 (3 d Ci r. 19 90 ), the re is no r e a l di sp ute reg ardingsome but not all of the fa cts we r efe renc e. In this opini on we re f e r to th e jo int a

p p e n d ix B o h n f

il e d a s “ J. A

. ” Sh e a ls o filed an addendum to her appendix, and the other defe ndants and the g overnme nt fi le d a dd iti on a l a

pp e nd ic e s. S ee al so United States v. Carson, 52 F .3d 1173, 1176-80 (2d 2 Cir. 1995) (providingbackground information reg ardingL ocal 1588)

. 4 I I . F AC TU AL

AN D PR OC ED UR

AL HI STO RY
A. The Par

ties and Conduct at I ssue L o c a l 1 5 8 8 , w h i c hi s h e a d qu art e r e d i nB ayo n n e , N e wJ e r s e y, is a labor or g anization comprised of long shoremen, doc kworke rs and others who se rvice the shipping industry

. In 1990, the g overnme nt 1 a s s e rte d th at i ts p r e s id e n t a

n d s e c r e ta r y - tr e a s ur e r , r e s p e c ti v e ly

B la ze Te rr a c iano and

Do min ic Sanzo , h a d a llo we d o rg anize d c ri me e le me nts int o th e un ion . A s a re su lt, the g ov e rnme nt i nit iate d a c ivi l RI CO a c tio n a g a ins t L oc a l 15 88 se e kin gto p ur g e the un ion of the se elements. The c ivil R I CO action culminated in a consent orde r by 2 which the e x ecutive boa

rd of L ocal 1588 a g ree d, inter alia, that the un ion ’s of

fi c e rs and e mpl oye e s w ou ld n ot a sso c iate wi th L or e wi th reg ard to a

ny union business. The orde r wa s unusual inasmuch as L ore w as not an off

icer or member

of L ocal 1588 but rather wa s the hir inga g e nt f

or Inte rn atio na l T e rm ina l O pe ra tio ns , a wate rf ro nt e nti ty that employ ed many

L ocal 1588 membe rs. In that capa city L ore controlled the w ork assig nments of many union members.
In Dec ember

1990, L ocal 1588 e lected G ’Sell and Ang elone as its president and se cre tary -trea surer , respe ctively , to replac e Te rr a c iano and

Sanzo , who ha d b e e n im pli c ate d in

the c ivi l RI CO a c tio n. L or e e xer

te d s ig nif ic ant i nf lue nc e ov e r t

he ir e le c tio n, but hi s inf lue nc e ov e r L oc a l 15 88 wa s n ot l imi te d to the se le c tio n o f i ts leade rship for he exercised sig nificant c ontrol over its pay roll by dir e c tin gthat th e un ion

pla c e c e rt a in i nd ivi du a ls, inc lud ingPe lli c c ia and Hurl e y , o n it

. Bohn, who was Te rra ciano’ s daug hter, a nd was involved ro manti c a lly

wi th L or e , s ta ff

e d th e L oc a l 15 88 of

fi c e . A c c or din gto Ang elone, she g ave he rself the title “Administrator.” B ohn wasTh e su pe rc e din gind ic tme nt in c lud e d th e fo llo wi ngc ounts : 3 Count One, ag ainst L ore, B ohn, Hurley , Pelliccia and Ra ckley char g ed a conspira cy

ag ainst th e v i ct i m u nion in violation of 18 U.S.C . § 371, c on tr ary to se c tio n 50 1( c ). Count T wo , a g a ins t L or e , c ha rg e d h im w ith makingfalse statements to obtain worke r’s disability benef its under the L ong shore a

nd Har bor Workers’ Compensation Act, in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 931. Count Thr ee, ag ainst L ore a nd Hurley , char g ed a se ction 501(c) violation for diverted salary pay ments. Count Four, ag ainst L ore and Pelliccia, c harg ed a se ction 501(c) violation fo r diverte d salary pay ments. Count Five, ag ainst L ore a nd R ac k ley , char g ed a se ction 501(c) vio l at i o n for diverted salar y pay ments. Counts S ix , Seven and Eig ht, ag ainst Bohn, c harg ed sec tion 501(c) violations in various sp e c if ie d amou nts re latin gto a

n a lle g ed ven do r kic kb a c k s c he me . A ll of the substantive c harg es (Counts Two throug h Ei gh t ) also cha rg ed violations of the aidingand abe tting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2.
5 responsible for

L ocal 1588' s day -to-day

financ ial operations, a power that she exercise d to give herse lf complete c ontrol over its books and rec ords. Thus, she dra fted pa y chec ks, paid bills, and conducted ba nk tr ans a c tio ns fo r t

he un ion . H e r c on tr ol w a s so c omp le te that sh e did not allow anyone else acc ess to the union’s financ ial rec ords and ch ec k b o o k

– n o tev en An gel o n e, wh o re p l ac edS an z o as L o ca l 1 5 8 8 's secr etar y -trea surer . Bohn e njoy ed numer ous benef its incidental to her employ ment, including the use of a lease d BMW, the expenses for which L ocal 1588, at L ore’ s prompting, pa id. Furthe rmore, B ohn r e c e i v e d a C h r i s t m a s b o nu s i nanam o un to f h e r c h o i c e
. C l e ar l y, Bohn w as sec ure in he r position for L ore suc cessf ully intervene d on her be half whe n Ang elone sug g ested ter minating he r employ

ment. As we ha ve indicate d, on J une 2, 1999, a grand jury returne d an indictment cha

rg ing G ’Sell, Ang elone, a nd Bohn w ith conspiring to embezzl e funds f

rom L ocal 1588. In particula r, the indictment char g ed them with abusingunion cre dit cards by improperly

char g ing persona l expenses and obtainingkickbac ks from vendor s and ser vice providers who perf

ormed ser vices for L ocal 1588. G’ Sell and An g e lon e ple a de d guil ty

to o ne c ount o f t

he ind ic tme nt p ur su ant t o c oo pe ratin gple a

a g re e me nts , a

nd , a s a re su lt, the y

te sti fi e d o n b e ha lf of the g overnme nt at the trial in this case.
In the superse ding indictment r eturne d on Dec ember 19, 2000, the g rand jury

char g ed, inter a lia, that L ore, B ohn, Pelliccia, Hur ley and Rac kley

embezzled larg e sums of money from L ocal 1588 ove r a period of year s. These de fenda nts pleaded not guilty

following which 3De fe nd ants c la im that th e pa y e e s e arn e d the ir

sa lari e s so thi s 4 point is di sputed. 6 there was a

three -we ek trial on the supe rce ding indictment at which the g overnme nt alleg ed and de monstrated that they used three methods to embezz le union funds: (1) a salary diversion sche me; (2) cre dit card a

buse; and (3) service provider kic kbacks.
B . Sa lary Di ve rs ion

Sc he me Th e sa lary

div e rs ion sc he me a pp e ars to h ave be e n d e fe nd ants ’ most lucrative method of e mbezz lement. The sc heme wa s uncomplicated but e ffe ctive. To c arr y it out Bohn prepa

red pa y chec ks for union member s who wer e off icer s or employ ees of

L ocal 1588, independe ntly

of and in a ddition to t heir primar y employ ment on the water front. She did not, howeve r, deliver the che cks to the desig nated pa y e e s. Rathe r, in a

ty pic a l c a se G’ Se ll w ou ld e nd or se a c he c k w ith the payee’ s name, a

nd G’Sell or B ohn then would take the chec k to a ba nk to b e c a sh e d. Th e re a ft e r, the c a shwa s r e tur ne d to the un ion

ha ll fo r d isb ur se me nt, wh e re ha lf wa s d e liv e re d to L or e , u su a lly by G’ Se ll, and the other

half we nt to the desig nated pa y ee. G’Sell testified that, af

ter be ing e lected pr esident of L ocal 1588 in 1990, he under stood that half of his and Ang elone’ s salarie s wo uld be div e rt e d to L or e . G ’S e ll f ur the r t e sti fi e d th at he sim ila rl y div e rt e d to L or e ha lf

of Pe lli c c ia ’s and

Hurl e y ’s sa lari e s, a lon gwi th the salar ies of other

persons, at various times while L ocal 1588 e mpl oye d th e m. A c c or din gto G ’S e ll, he inf or me d e a c h p art ic ipa

nt i n the sche me of the sa lary

diversion to L ore, a

nd they all acquie sced. G’ Se ll t e sti fi e d th at B ohn w a s a wa re of the sa lary

div e rs ion sc he me and, on at lea st one occ asion, helped him count the mone y . Even though it may

seem stra ng e that the pa

y ees w ould permit the diversion of such sig nificant portions of their pay ments from the union, eve n without reg ard f

or L ore’ s undoubted hold over the union a nd the e ff e c t th at th at po we r h a d o n th e un ion of fi c ia ls, the ir

a c qu ie sc e nc e in the sche me is actua lly

not so surprising when it is considere d that testimony at the trial indicated that at lea st some of the payees pe rf or me d li ttl e or

no us e fu l se rv ic e s f

or L oc a l 15 88

. Thus , it

4 appea rs that the payees sometimes we re g iving up somethingto which they wer e not entitled. Ther efor e, in at lea st those instances, the union and its me mbe rs hip , a

nd no t th e pa

y e e s, c ou ld b e re g ard e d a s th e so leWe do not sugg est that our ou t come turns on this point as our 5 re su lt w ou ld b e the s ame regard le ss o f whe the r t he pa y e e s e arn e d a ll, so me , o r n on e of

the ir sa lari e s. 7 victims of the scheme

. In total, the g overnme nt alleg ed that L ore a nd 5 h i s co -c o n s p i ra t o rs d i v ert edo v er $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 fr o mL o ca l 1 5 8 8 th ro u gh the salar y diversion sche me. C. C re dit Card Ab us e As union office rs, G’Sell and Ang elone obtaine d Americ an Ex press c ards f

or union purcha ses and L ocal 1588 pa id the Americ an Ex press bills. Through the use of the se ca rds G’Sell and Ang elone incurre d approximately

$20,000 and $10,000, re spectively , in char g es unrelated to the union. Bohn, thoug h not issued a union cre dit card, also participated in the cr edit car d abuse by using G ’Sell’s ca

rd. F or instance, she spent at lea st $11,000 in union funds on li quor and on merc handise fr om a music store, dispatchingG’Sell to retrie ve her items and to pay

for them with his union cre dit card. Shar on Carballo, who had be en a c lose frie nd of B ohn duringthe time of the c riminal conduct in this case , testified re g ardingBohn’ s spendinghabits and stated that she witnesse d Bohn use G’Sell’s union cre dit card f or purcha ses unre lated to L ocal 1588' s business at a depa rtment store.
D. Se rv ic e Pr ov ide r K ic kb a c ks
L ore, B ohn, G’Sell and Ang elone or chestrated the kickba ck scheme with vendors and se rvice providers. F or example, one kic kb a c k invo lve d Jac k D or is who fu rn ish e d th e un ion

wi th a pp are l– hats, ja c ke ts, sw e atsh ir

ts a nd oth e r c lot

hin gite ms. After

rec eiving chec ks from B ohn for a

ppare l, he would ca sh the che ck at a bank and re tur n to the un ion

ha ll w iththe kic kb a c k in c a sh , whic h h e wo uld g ive to Bohn or

G’Sell or both.
The ve ndor kickba ck sche me also involved var ious renovation and construc tion projects at the union hall. F or instance , on sever al occa sions the union commissi oned the se rvice s of a f ence company that L ore’ s longtime fr iend, J oe Tosca no, owned. In one instance , Toscano’ s company

constructe d an eight-foot fe nce a long one side of the union hall parkinglot and then construc ted an identica l eig ht-foot fenc e a me re thre e inche s in front of the f irst. Ang elone testified that the se c on d f

e nc e wa s unn e c e ssa

ry , a nd c os t do ub le the c os t of

the fi rs t fe nc e . T he g ov e rnme nt a lle g e d th at T os c ano su bs tanti a llyWe are setting fo rt h the net custodial ter ms without breaking 6 them down to s how that the sente nces e ncompassed c oncurr ent c omp on e nts

. Eac h defe ndant filed a separ ate brief, but L ore, Bo h n and 7 Pe lli c c ia a dopted by re fe re nc e the argume nts of the ir c o- de fe nd ants to the extent such arguments might be a pplicable to them and were not inconsistent with their own contentions. 8 overc harg ed the union on the f ence projec t, and that he kicke d back the ov e rc ha

rg e to L or e . In a

no the r i ns tanc e , th e un ion hir e d V ito B ilo tta to p e rf or m pa vin gand ro of ingwo rk . In h is d e a lin g s w ith L ocal 1588, B ilotta dealt exclusively with Bohn, with whom he ma y have be en involved roma ntically . She draf

ted wee kly

chec ks for Bilotta’s ser

vices, totalingapproximately $70,000, but there w ere no work orde rs or invoice s supporting the expenditures. In descr ibing L ore’ s influence over the construction and r enovation at the union ha ll, An g e lon e re c ounte d h owL or e ins tr uc te d h im t o c e a se neg otiating f

or lower price s on union hall construction and remode ling.
E. Procee dings in the D istrict Court The trial on the supe rce ding indictment be g an Oc tober 9, 20 01 , b ut t

he c ourt de c lare d a

mis tr ia l th e fo llo wi ngda y a ft e r c e rt a in jurors obser

ved L ore making a

threateningg esture towa rd the g overnme nt’s first witness, G’Sell. Consequently , the cour t selecte d a new jury following which the tria l beg an ag ain on Novembe r 7, 2001. After three wee ks of testimony , the cour t submit ted the ca se to the jur y on De c e mbe r 1 2, 20 01 . T he jur y re tur ne d a ve rd ic t of

g uil ty a s to all defe ndants on all counts on Dec ember 17, 2001. Subsequently

the c ourt se nte nc e d L or e , B ohn, Pe lli c c ia , H ur le y and Ra c kle y to custodial terms of 70 months, 38 months, 24 months , 18 months and 13 months, respec tively , followed by appropr iate per iods of su pe rv ise d r e le a se
. De fe nd ants (n ot i nc lud ingRa c kle y ) h ave tim e ly 6 a pp e a le d. Thus , a s w e have ind ic ate d, Ra c kle y is n ot a pa rt y to t he se proce eding s. The district cour t had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jur isdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

I I I . DI SCUS SI ON 7Def endants challeng e the applicability of section 501(c) to the 8 salary diversion sche me but do not challeng e it s applicability to the other means underlying the conspirac y to e mbezz le– i.e., cre dit card a buse and service providers kic kbacks. 9 A. Section 501(c ) Convictions 1. Statutory

Interpre tation
Def endants ra ise two arguments conce rningthe re ach of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c). The y

argue that the sa lary

diversion sche me was beyond the scope of the c onduct that sec tion 501(c) pr ohibits, and Bohn a dds that she is not within t he cla ss of persons the se ction c ov e rs . T he dis tr ic t c ourt re je c te d b oth

argume nts . We e xer c ise plenar y revie w over

defe ndants’ cha lleng e to the district cour t’s interpre tation of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c). See United States v. Urba n, 404 F.3d 754, 762 ( 3d Cir. 2005).
a. Conduct Covere d by

Section 501(c)
L ore, Pellicc ia and Hur ley contend that the sa lary

diversion scheme underlying the ir convictions is beyond the re ach of section 50 1( c ) whic h p ro vid e s in

pe rt ine nt p art : Any person who e mbezz les, steals, or unlaw fully and willfully abstrac ts or conver

ts to his own use, or the us e of ano the r, any

of the mon e y s, fu

nd s, se c ur iti e s, proper ty , or other a ssets of a labor org anization of which he is a

n office r, or by

which he is e mploy ed, direc tly or indirec tly , shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five y ear s, or both. 29 U.S.C. § 501(c). In United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 ( 2d 8 Cir . 1 97 0) , th e c ourt

e xpla ine d th e c ri me that Co ng re ss i nte nd e d to establish in enac ting se ction 501(c) : [Con g re ss h a s] g on e be y on d th e c omm on law o ff e ns e of larc eny and the old statutory

crime of embezzlement beca use ‘g aps or c revic es have separ ated pa rticular crimes of this ge nera l class and guilty men have10 esca ped throug h the bre ache s,’ Morissette v. United S t at e s , 3 4 2 U

. S

. 2 4 6 , 2 7 1

- 7 2 , 7 2 S

. C t

. 2 4 0 , 2 5 4 , 9 6 L. Ed. 288 (1952). B ut, as was ther e held, de spite minor variations in l anguag e the c ommon thread is that the defe ndant, at some stag e of the g ame, ha s taken another person’ s proper

ty or ca used it to be taken, knowingthat the other pe rson would not have w anted that to be done. . . .
I t is easy to understand how a

union employ ee doe s this when he ‘unla

wfully and willfully ’ uses union funds in a manne r that works to the pe rsonal bene fit of himself or the pa

y ee a nd does not bene fit the union, whether or not the union went through the form of authorization; the ‘union’ presuma bly would have o b j e c t e d i f i th a d b e e na b l e t o s p e ak

f r e e l y. I d. at 12 6- 27 (i nte rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) . A s a no the r c ourt

of a pp e a ls ha s e xpla ine d, the br oa d la ngua g e of se c tio n 5 01 (c ) “ wo uld

se e m to cover almost every

kind of taking .” United States v. Ha rmon, 339 F.2d 354, 357 ( 6th Cir. 1964); see also United States v. Robinson, 512 F.2d 491, 494 ( 2d Cir. 1975) (“T he statutory languag e conde mns the e mbe zzle me nt o r c onve rs ion no t on ly of mon e y s, fu

nd s a nd se c ur iti e s, but also of ‘prope rty , or other a ssets of a labor org anization . . . direc tly or indirec tly . . . .’”)

. De fe nd ants a sse rt

that th e ir c on du c t c ann ot b e re g ard e d a s a takingof union funds bec ause “ lawfully ear ned sala ry pay ments are not union funds within the scope of se ction 501(c) .” L ore B r. at 15. The a rgument contends that the pa y ments to L ore c ame f

rom bona fi de , a uth or ize d s a lari e s and

thu s th e sc he me inv olv e d p ri vate transac tions rather tha

n the embezzlement of union funds. In support of this argument they

cite United States v. B rill, 350 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1965) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted), for the proposition that “sec tion 501(c) doe s not prohibit any union office r or e mploy ee from usinghis bona fide sa lary in any manner he or she may

see f it.” L ore B r. at 15; see also Hurley Br . at 22 (“ I t is ax iomatic that one cannot stea l, embezzl e money s from onese lf.”). I n addition, defe ndants devote muc h space in their brief s to their asser

tion that L ocal 1588 be nefitted fr om the salarie d officia ls’ service s. Def endants’ a

ttempts to recast the e vidence , howeve r, ar e unpersua sive. The g overnme nt’s proof e stablished that theIndeed, it is rathe r disinge nuous for defe ndants to a ssert that the 9 salary diversion sche me was mere ly a series of private transac tions and to d e c ry a “ na rr owfo c us on

wh at th e S alari e d O ff

ic ia ls d id w iththe ir mon e y ,” L or e B r. at 20 . In r e a lity , the pa y e e s o f t he un ion ’s c he c ks did not rea liz e, possess or othe rwise be nefic ially enjoy their salarie s for, a s the district court noted at a hea ringon post-tr i al m o t ions, the evidenc e demon s tr ate d

th at t h e c h e c k s r e p r e s e n ti n gth e d iv e rte d f un d s d id n ot rea ch the pay ees but, instead, wer e “immediate ly cashe d out and divvied up,” with half of

the salar y g oing to L ore. J.A. at 5107-08. 11 desig nation of funds a s “salar y ” wa s merely

a cle ver sc heme f

or routing union funds to L ore, who direc ted that the union place the pa y e e s o n th e pa

y ro ll. L or e e ve n c on tr oll e d th e amou nts of wh at, i n rea lity , wer e nominal “sa laries,” dictatingthat the union g rant ra ises for sa laried of

ficials whe n he wa

nted to incre ase the amount of money diverted to him. Fina lly , there was no e vidence that L ore, who was not a union member, muc h less one of its offic ials, provided any service s or bene fits to L ocal 1588 in exchang e for the funds diver

ted to h im. In f

a c t, t he pa rt ie s st ipu late d at tr ia l th at th e c on se nt o rd e r i n 9 the civil RI CO action we discussed above barr ed L ocal 1588 f rom a sso c iatin gwi th L or e . B ut r athe r t ha n h e e din gthe c on se nt o rd e r, it appea rs that L ore r eg arde d the union trea sury as a pe rsonal money acc ess machine available for his use.
We rec og nize that the fraudule nt scheme involved he re w as novel. Indeed, a s the district court noted in its sentencing memorandum, “ there are no repor ted ca ses in this or any

circ uit that involve a sala

ry diversion embezzlement scheme similar to that pe rp e tr ate d in

thi s c a se .” L or e Ap p. at 30 . B ut t his is n ot t

he fi rs t time that a cour

t has bee n tasked with asse ssing whe ther unconventional c hicane ry falls within the ambit of section 501(c ). See, e.g ., Robinson, 512 F.2d 491. In Robinson, a jury convicted a union official a

nd two union employ ees of violating se ction 501(c) by conver ting union for

ms normally

rese rved f

or union members to g rant them priority

status in reg ard to promotions, and sellingthem to new rec ruits. On appea l, the court re jected the defe ndants’ ar g ument that they had not violated sec tion 501(c) be cause the forms that they co n v ert edh adn o i n tri n s i c v al u e a n d th e u n i o n , ra th er

th an s u ff er i n g a loss, actually

profited f rom the def

endants’ a ctivities. I d. at 494-95. Th e c ourt e xpla ine d:
Al tho ug h a

pp e lla nts c la im that th is i s a

c a se of fi rs t impression, that is true only to the extent that the factW e do not sug g est that we predic ate our result on the l ar ge 10 amount of money

involved. The Court of Appe als for the Seventh Circuit has explained that 11 e ve n whe n e xpe nd iture s are a uth or ize d, the a

uth or izatio n is a

nu lli ty if obtained “w ithout the disclosure of materia l inf ormation.” United States v. Carlino, 143 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Butler , 954 F.2d 114, 119 ( 2d Cir. 1992) (af firmingsection 501(c ) conviction and noting “[a]n authoriz ation obtained without disclosure of 12 pattern is unusual. . . . In our view, the activities of the de fe nd ants fa ll w ith in [the c ourt ’s ] de sc ri pti on [in Silverman] of the crime Cong ress intende d to establish. They utiliz ed the pr operty

of the union in a wa

y which benef itted themselves and not the union. The ir ac tion wa s n ot a uth or ize d a

nd pr e suma bly the [uni on ] an d it s membership would have objected ha d it been made known.
I d. at 495-96 (c iting Silverman, 430 F .2d at 126-27). Her e, de fe nd ants ’ s c he me sim ila rl y fa lls wi thi n th e de sc ri pti on of the c ri me Congr ess intended to esta blish: t he diver sion of hundreds of thousands of dollars in union funds disg uised as “sa lary” wa s an unlawful a

nd willful misus e of union funds “ that works to the persona l benef

it of . . . the payee a

nd does not bene fit the union.” See Silverman, 430 F.2d at 127. 10 We also find unpersua sive defe ndants’ asse rtion that they could not have violate d section 501(c ) bec ause the diverted sa laries wer e “duly

authorized by

the union or its president” or beca use the union benef

itted from the ser

vices of the salarie d officia ls. See, e.g ., Hurl e y B r. at 21 . We have re c og nize d th e “ ob vio us pr ob le ms” concomitant with any

approa ch to sec tion 501(c) that plac es too much weig ht on authorization and union benefit. United States v. Oliva, 46 F .3 d 3 20 , 3 23 -2 4 ( 3d

Cir . 1 99 5) . In O liv a , w e e xpla ine d th at th e re is “p o t en t i al fo r ab u s i n g” au th o ri z at i o nb y th o s e d o i n g th e au th o ri z i n g, wh o th e n a

re “ in t he str on g e st p os iti on

to j us tif y [co nd uc t] a s a be ne fi t to the union in way s that are not easily disproven.” I d. at 324. Instead, we held that authorization and bene fit are “mer ely fac tors that may be conside red a s bear ing on intent.” I d.; acc ord United States v. Vande nberg en, 969 F .2d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1992) (“ We can imag ine case s in which forma lly

authorized expenditures violate sec tion 5 0 1 (c ). ”)

. T hu s , i td o es n o tm at t er wh et h er th e u n i o n“w en tth ro u gh 11. . . materia l information is obviously a nullity ”).
I t is significan t that, notwithst andingthe purporte d 12 authorizations a

nd union be nefits, the jury here conclude d that de fe nd ants a c te d k

no wi ngly , w ill fu lly , a

nd un lawf ull y , “ wi th i nte nt t o deprive L ocal 1588 of

the use of its funds.” See J.A. at 4959. W e know the jury made that finding because the di strict court in its char g e told the j ury th ati th adt o d o s o t o co n v i ctd ef en d an t s o nC o un t s T hre e t h ro u gh Ei g ht, and

the jur y did e xac tly that. Thoug h we a cce pt the court’s opinion in Capane g ro, and thus 13 rely on it, we do not join in it s char acte rization of the positions i nvolved as “me nial.” 13 the fo rm of a uth or izatio n, ” be c a

us e the un ion , whic h a

dis tr ic t c ourt

in a c on se nt o rd e r h a d e njo ine d p e rm ane ntl y fr om e ve n a sso c iatin gwi th L ore, “ presumably

would have obje cted if it had be en able to speak fre ely .” Silverman, 430 F .2d at 127. 12
Acc ording ly , we r ejec t defe ndants’ construc tion, which elevates form ove r substance to allow their “e scape [ ] throug h the br e a c he s” of

g a ps and c re vic e s w hic h Co ng re ss s ou g ht t o c los e wi th section 501(c )’s broa d prohibition on pil fer ing union f unds.
b. Persons Covere d by

Section 501(c)
Bohn a sserts that she is not amongthe class of persons sec tion 50 1( c ) c ov e rs be c a

us e sh e did

no t ha ve a fi du c iary re latio ns hip wi th L ocal 1588. We find that this argument lacks mer it.
Se c tio n 5 01 (c ) d oe s n ot l imi t it s c ov e ra g e to f idu c iary of fi c ia ls and employ ees. Instead, the c lear text cover s “any

person” employ ed by a union, without reg ard to a ny other statute se tting for

th fiduciary obligations of union officer s. See United States v. Capa neg ro, 576 F.2d 973, 978 ( 2d Cir. 1978) (“We have her etofore aff irmed the convictions under se ction 501(c) of def endants who he ld such relatively menial positions as Patrolman and Master -at-Arms of a labor org anization.”). Neither the statutory

definition of “pe rson” 13 nor that of “ employ ee” ref ere nces f iduciary relationships. S ee 29 U. S.C. § 4 02 (d ), (f

). Mo re ov e r, B ohn mi sa pp re he nd s o ur

op ini on in Ol iva , 4 6 F .3 d 3 20 , whic h s he c ite s f or he r f idu c iary re latio ns hip argument, beca

use in Oliva we neither w ere prese nted with nor ruled on the issue of whe ther a

section 501(c ) violation require s a fiducia ryThe g overnme n t asserts that Hur ley ’s and Pelliccia ’s sec tion 14 501(c) -re lated arguments, “while c ast as a suf ficienc y challeng e, [are] proper ly viewed as prese nting the sa me statutory

interpre tation as L or e ’s .” Go v’ t. B r. at 21 . We dis a g re e . A lth ou g h th e bu lk o f t he ir argument challeng ing the section 501(c )-r elated c onvictions mirrors the statutory ar g ument, they

also cha lleng e the suff iciency of evide nce establishing intent. S ee Pellicc ia B r. at 3-3C (a sserting“insuffic ient e vid e nc e ” tha

t he “ kn e w that hi s a c tio ns , o f g iv in g [mone y ] ba c k to G’ Se ll .

. . wa s f

ur the ri nga c ri me ” ); Hurl e y B r. at 28 (“ Th e e vid e nc e did no t sh ow kn ow le dg e and

fr a ud ule nt i nte nt. ” ). Ac c or din g ly , w e a dd re ss their insufficie ncy

claim insofar

as it relate s to intent. 14 relationship. W e now make clea r that it does not have suc h a re qu ir e me nt. 2. Sufficienc y

of Evidenc e Bohn, Pellicc ia and Hur ley unsucce ssfully

filed post-trial motions for judgme nt of ac quittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, arguin gthat th e g ov e rnme nt f a ile d to a dd

uc e su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to su pp or t th e ir se c tio n 5 01 (c )- re late d c onvic tio ns . M or e ov e r, in addition to contendingin a less foc used wa y that there was insufficient e vidence to support her c onspiracy conviction, B ohn argues that she wa s convicted solely on the basis of he r assoc iation wi th L or e . Se e B ohn B r. at 26 (“ B a sic a lly , th e Go ve rnme nt’ s c a se a g a ins t D e nis e B ohn w a s e sse nti a lly ba se d o n h e r r e latio ns hip wi th J oe L ore.” ). Pelliccia a

nd Hurley contend that the e vidence that they ha d a fr a ud ule nt i nte nt w a s p ur e ly

c ir c ums tanti a l and

ins uf fi c ie nt. 14
“The burden on a

defe ndant who ra ises a cha lleng e to the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence is ex tremely high.” United States v. Seraf ini, 233 F.3d 759, 770 (3d Cir. 2000). In revie winga jury ve rd ic t f or su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , “ we de te rm ine wh e the r t he re is su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e that, whe n v ie we d in the light m os t f

avo ra ble to the g overnme nt, would allow a rational trier of f act to convic t.” United States v. Helbling , 209 F.3d 226, 238 ( 3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gov’t of the V irg in I slands v. Charles, 72 F .3d 401, 410 (3d Cir. 1995)). In other wor ds, we “ must consider the e vidence in the light mos t f avo ra ble to t he g ov e rnme nt a

nd a ff ir m th e jud g me nt i f t

he re is substantial evidence from which a ny rational trier

of fa ct could find g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” United States v. F rorup, 963 F .2d 41, 42 (3d Cir. 1992) (c iting Glasse r v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct . 457, 469 (1942)) . Moreove r, we revie w both direc t and15 circ umstantial evidence wher e ther e ar e suff iciency of the e vidence questions. See United States v. Ka pp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 ( 3d Cir. 1986). None of the de fenda nts can sustain this heavy burden on the sufficie ncy

of evide nce issue.
The re cord is re plete with evidenc e with re g ard to B ohn sufficie nt to support her convic tion. I n denying B ohn’s motion for a judgme nt of ac quittal, the district court chronic led much of the evidenc e esta

blishing her

g uilt. This evidence include d, but was not limit ed to, testimony

linking B ohn to all three me thods alleg ed in the conspirac y : (1) neg otiating a nd endorsingchec ks associate d with the salary diversion sche me, the proc eeds of which she he lped divide; (2) proce ssing a ll inflated bills associated with the vendor kickbac k scheme ; and (3) usinga union cr edit car d for pe rsonal use a nd spendingunion funds to purcha se liquor. Thus, contra ry to Bohn’s contention, the jury

did not convict her solely on the basis of he r a sso c iatio n w ithL or e . Ind e e d, he r c ri min a l c on du c t w ithre sp e c t to L ocal 1588 wa s uncabine d and demonstrated that she ha d no more interest in ensuringthat the union’s funds we re spe nt properly than did L ore. Pelliccia’s a

nd Hurley ’s cha lleng es to the suffic iency of e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh ingint e nt, wh ic h th e y de sc ri be a s la

rg e ly circ umstantial, are a lso devoid of merit. We have held that all the elements of a

conspirac y

char g e, includingintent and knowledg e of illicit purpose, “may

be prove n entirely

by circ umstantial evidence .” United States v. Schramm, 75 F .3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1996) (inter nal citation omitted); see also United States v. Kle in, 515 F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1975) (“ Circumstantial evidenc e is clea rly proper
. . . espec ially in a conspira cy

case wher e dire ct evidenc e is likely to be scant.” ); United States v. Stubin, 446 F.2d 457, 461 (3d Cir. 1971) (h old ingthat c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e may su pp or t f ind ingof int e nt i n a prose cution under se ction 501(c) ). Ther e wa s compelling evidenc e from which to infe r Pellicia’s a nd Hurley ’s intent and knowledg e of ill ic it p ur po se , in c lud inge vid e nc e that th e y pa rt ic ipate d in

the sc he me with knowledg e that half

their salar ies would be diver ted to L ore. F or example, G’Sell testified that he e x plained the sa lary diversion scheme to Pelliccia and Hur ley . I t does not matter that the c oconspirator s did not discuss the fraudulent nature of the ir ac tions. S ee United States v. Ander skow, 88 F.3d 245, 254 ( 3d Cir. 1996).

B. D enial of Seve ranc e16 Bohn a nd Hurley asser t that the spillover of evide nce r elating to L ore a nd, in particular , the evidenc e on Count Two which c harg ed L or e wi th m akin gfa lse state me nts to o bta in w or ke r’ s d isa bil ity benef its under the L ong shore a nd Har bor Workers’ Compensation Act, in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 931, prejudiced the m. This posit ion, howeve r, is in tension with “the fundame ntal principle that the f eder al sy stem pref

ers joint trials of def

endants who a

re indicte d toge ther beca use joint trials promote eff iciency and ser ve the inter ests of justice by avoidingthe sca

ndal and inequity

of inconsistent verdic ts.” United States v. Urba

n, 404 F.3d at 775 (quoting Z afiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537, 113 S.C t. 933, 937 (1993) (inter nal qu ota tio n ma rk s o mitte d) ). F or

thi s r e a so n th e c ho ic e of

wh e the r t o sever defe ndants’ trials re sts in the sound discretion of the district c ourt s. Ac c or din g ly , w e re vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of

a mot ion to sever for a buse of discr etion. I d. A cour t should gra

nt severa nce under F ed. R. Crim. P. 14 “only if there is a serious risk that a joint tr ia l w ou ld c omp ro mis e a sp e c if ic tr ia l r ig ht o f o ne of

the de fe nd ants , or pre vent the jury

from makinga re liable judg ment about guilt or innocenc e.” I d. (citingZ afiro, 506 U .S. at 539, 113 S.C t. at 938). De fe nd ants se e kin ga

se ve ra nc e be ar a

“ he avy burd e n” and

mus t de mon str ate no t on ly

that th e c ourt

wo uld a bu se its dis c re tio n if

it de nie d s e ve ra

nc e , “ but a lso that th e de nia l of se ve ra nc e wo uld

le a d to clea r and substantial pre

judice re sulting in a manife stly unfair tr ial.” I d. (interna l citations and quotations omitt ed).
Neither Bohn nor Hurley can me et the burde n to show that the district court er

red unde r this standard. The fac t that L ore ma y have be e n th e on ly

de fe nd ant t

he g ra nd jur y c ha rg e d in c onne c tio n w ith makinga fa lse worke r’s disability claim is not determinative. We see no rea son why , in a joint trial of defe ndants cha rg ed with par

ticipating in a conspira cy , the fa ct that the g rand jury char g ed one de fenda

nt separ ately with an additional cr iminal act somehow would interf ere with the petite jury ’s ability to consider the e vidence ag ainst eac h defe ndant on ea ch count se parately . See United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 ( 3d Cir. 1989). Notably , the g overnme nt’s proof reg ardingCount Two consisted larg ely of testimony

of G’Sell and Ang elone, c o-conspirators in the embezzlement scheme. In fac t, there wa s n oth ingunus ua l in

the joi nd e r o f c ha

rg e s a nd de fe nd ants in t

his case for, a s we have re cog nized, “undoubtedly , there are many criminal ca ses in which def endants a re trie d toge ther on diff

ere nt c ounts , s o th at a ll the e vid e nc e is n ot g e rm ane to a ll the c ounts a g a ins t eac h defe ndant.” I d. Indeed, the Fe dera l Rules of Criminal P roce dure in a llo wi ngjoi nd e r o f d e fe nd ants e xpre ssl y c on te mpl ate a s mu c h:17 “ Al l de fe nd ants ne e d n ot b e c ha rg e d in e a c h c ount. ” F e d. R. C ri m. P

. 8(b).
Bohn a nd Hurley claim pre judice fr om the spillover of evidenc e portra

ying L ore in a

more ne g ative lig ht than they or re lating to t he fa lse a c c ide nt c ha

rg e , b ut t he ir argume nts in t

his re g ard a lso fail. We long have he ld that “a de fenda nt is not entit led to a sever ance mere ly

beca use evide nce a g ainst a co- defe ndant is more damag ing tha

n the evidenc e ag ainst the moving pa rty .” United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 730 ( 3d Cir. 1974). Instead, the r eleva nt inquiry is “whethe r the jury

will be able to compa

rtmentalize the evidenc e as it re lates to separ ate de fenda nts in view of its volume and limit ed admissibility .” United States v. Da vis, 397 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir . 2 00 5) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . In th is c a se the fa lse a c c ide nt c la im c ha

rg e un de rl yingthe c la im o f p re jud ic e wa s r e lativ e ly straig htforwa

rd and discr ete, not involving ove rly technica l or scientific issues. In these c ircumstance s we do not doubt that the jury rea sonably

could have been e x pecte d to compartmenta liz e the evidenc e as it re lated to L ore a nd actua lly

did so. See id. Moreove r, th e d is tr ic t c o urt i n s tr

u c te d th e ju r y s e v e r a l t im e s to c o mp artm e n ta li ze the evidenc e by

consideringthe evidenc e sepa rate ly as to ea ch defe ndant and e ach c ount. We presume that the jury followed the instructions, and thus we re g ard the instructions as “per suasive evidenc e that re fusals to sever did not prejudice the defe ndant[s.] ” Urba n, 404 F.3d at 776 (citing United States v. Voig t, 89 F.3d 1050, 1096 (3d Cir. 1996)). Finally , defe ndants do not satisfy their hea vy burden by c la imi ng that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de nyingthe ir rene wed motions to sever a fter a n incident duringthe trial in which cer tain jurors re ported that L ore ha d walked c loser to them outside of the c ourt ro om t ha n th e y wo uld have e xpe c te d. Th ou g h thre ats m a de to a jur or in s ome ins tanc e s c ou ld u nd e rm ine a

de fe nd ant’ s r ig ht t o a

fa ir and impartial trial, we have no r eason to c hara cter ize L ore’ s conduct in w a lki ng

ne ar j ur or s a s a

thr e at to the jur or s o r t o b e lie ve that it un de rm ine d d e fe nd ants ’ r ig ht t o a fa ir tr ia l. I n th is r e g ard

we po int to the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de sc ri pti on of the inc ide nt:
Severa l of the jurors mentioned to [the Court] t oday that th e y fe lt that Mr . L or e wa s w a lki ngin t he ir vic ini ty at an unc omf

or ta bly c los e ra ng e . H e sa id n o th i n g t o th em
. He d i d

n o tey eb al l th em o r a n y

th i n g, but th e y no tic e d it to t he de g re e that th e y

me nti on e d it18 to [ the Court]. They

hastene d to add that they didn’t fee l any thing imprope r had be en done. And it didn’t a ff e c t th e ir a bil ity to, y ou kn ow , p e rc e ive the e ve nts in the cour troom without bias at all.
J .A. at 4461 (e mphasis added) . In denying the motion for sever ance , the cour t expl ained that the inc ident did not involve any communication, either

verba l or non-ver

bal, and that the oc curr ence was the ine vitable re sult of persons involved in the ca se occ upy ing common are as, like sidewa lks. Moreover , “out of e x treme c aution,” the c ourt ins tr uc te d d e fe ns e c ouns e l to ke e p th e ir c lie nts “ in t ow , at a ll times.” J .A. at 4487. On this rec ord, we cannot hold that the district court a bused its discretion in denying the motions t o sever
. C. Bohn’ s Fifth Amendme nt Challeng e B ohn c on te nd s th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt c omm itt e d r e ve rs ibl e err or in denying he r two motions for mistrial based upon pe rce ived Fifth Ame ndment violations stemmi ngfrom two sourc es: (1) a statement made by

the prosec ution in it s opening ; and (2) a n answe r g iven by a witness duringtrial. In this reg ard w e obser ve that B ohn did not testify . Our re view of the rec ord satisfies us that the district court prope rly

denied the motions for mistrial. 1. Statement by

Prosecution
The standa

rd of r eview f

or alleg edly

prejudicia l comments by the prosec ution in it s openingstatement var ies depe nding upon wh et h er th e e rr o r i s co n s t i tu t i o n al o r n o n -c o n s t i tu t i o n al

. He l b l i n g, 209 F.3d at 241. “I f the e rror is non-constitutional, we will affirm when it is highly

probable that the er

ror did not contribute to the judgme nt”; but “if the e rror is constituti onal, we w ill affirm if we find that the er ror is har mless beyond a re asonable doubt.” I d. (interna l citations and quotations omitted). Here we a re satisfied that even under the most stringent ha rmless err or ana ly sis, we ca nnot conclude that the statement to which B ohn points in t he prose cution’s opening prejudice d her. The alleg edly prejudicia l comment to which she points was in the prosec utor’s discussion of the ser vice pr ovider fr aud and wa s a s f oll ow s: I ’m g oing to c all as witnesses two of the contra ctors [i nvolved in the sche me], Mr. Vito Ballotta [sic] and Mr. J oe Tosca

no. Wait unti l y ou hear

J oe Tosca

no’sBohn did not object to the statement at the time the pr osecutor 15 made it. B ut counsel for L ore did objec t, and his objection prese rved the ob je c tio n f or a ll d e fe nd ants ina smu c h a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt deem e d “ a ll de fe ns e c ouns e l [to] joi n in e ve ry ob je c tio n in e ve ry a pp lic atio n, un le ss [counsel] expressly

opt[ ed] out.” J .A. at 586.

19 scam. Joe Toscano ha s a fe nce c ompany in Ba y onne. Pe rs on a l f

ri e nd of Joe L or e ’s . In f

a c t, M r. G’ Se ll w ill tell y ou that he, Mr. G’ Sell and his wife, Mr. Tosc ano and his wife a

nd Mr. L ore a

nd his girlf

riend we nt out to dinner. Mr. Tosc ano come s onboard to put up a fenc e ar ound– actua lly

around pa

rt of the pa

rkinglot. No w a g a in, re me mbe r what it is, 20 by 60 or 70 fe e t, $57,000 to put a fenc e. He didn’t put one fenc e. And I ’ll show y ou photogr aphs. He put up a fe nce a nd then was told to put up another f ence three inches fr om it. Three inches. Chainlink fenc e, thre e inche s apar t. The first cha inlink fence cost the Union $9,000. He put up the exact same f

ence three inches a

part fr om the other one and c harg ed them $20,000. Where did the money g o? They have some explaining to do.
J .A. at 444 (e mphasis added) . Specifica lly , Bohn c laims that the prosec utor’s statement in the f inal sentenc e that we have quote d, “The y have some explaining to do,” violated he r F ifth Amendment protec tions. Bohn B r. at 36-37. But, a s the district court explained 15 wh e n it de nie d th e mot ion

fo r a mis tr ia l pr e dic ate d o n th e state me nt, when the statement is considere d in context i t refe rs not to Bohn but to the contra ctors, B ilotta and Toscano, whom the prosec utor said he would call as w itnesses. Indeed, the most natural re adingof “the y ” at the end of this remark is to treat it as refe rringto the witnesses the prosec ution identified at the outset of the r emar k, as opposed to B ohn, whom the prosec utor did not even name. 2. Statement by

Ang elone
Bohn’ s claim that her F ifth Amendment rig hts were violated when, in re sponse to questioning by counsel for

L ore a bout why cer tain chec ks were not supported by invoices, Ang elone r eplied,

“ Yo u’ d h ave to a sk

De nis e . Sh e ha

nd le d th e c he c kb oo k, ” is s imi larl y un ava ili ng . J.A . at 26 73 . B ohn c la ims thi s r e mark c a us e d th e jur

y to pe rc e ive he r a s “ the be st p e rs on
. . . to c ome fo rw ard

to e xpla in f in an c ia l i r r e g u la r it ie s o r p ur p o rte d c r im in a li ty

. ” B o h nB r
. at 3 9

. We20 revie w the denia l of a motion for a mistrial based on a w itness’s alleg edly prejudicia l comments for a n abuse of

discretion. United States v. Xavier , 2 F.3d 1281, 1285 ( 3d Cir. 1993). In revie wingthe de nia l of he r m oti on

on that st and ard , thre e fa c tor s guid e our a na ly sis : (1 ) whe the r Ang e lon e ’s re mark s w e re pr on ounc e d a nd pe rs ist e nt, cre atinga likelihood they would mislead and pre

judice the jury ; (2) the streng th of the other e vidence ; and (3) c urative a ction taken by the dis tr ic t c ourt . Se e id. He re , a sin g le state me nt b y

a wi tne ss who se testimony spanned f

ive day s hardly

can be deeme d “pronounc ed and persistent,” a

nd the re cord c ontains strong evidenc e of the extent of Bo h n ’s p art i ci p at i o ni nth e i l l ega l s ch em es
. M o re o v er , ev en th o u gh Bohn de clined the district cour t’s offe r to issue a spec ific cur ative instruction at the time of Ang elone’ s statement, the cour t su bs e qu e ntl y

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y re g ard ingthe de fe nd ants ’ r ig ht t o re fr ai nfr o mt es t i fy i n g. D. Bo h n ’s S i x thAm en dm en tC o n fr o n t at i o nC l au s e C h al l en ge Ne xt B ohn c la ims that th e dis tr ic t c ourt vio late d h e r S ixth Amendment Confrontation Cl ause r ights be cause it placed limitations on her c ross-examination of a prose cution witness, Sharon Carba llo, reg ardingCarballo’s dr

uguse over

a dec ade e arlier

and her prese nt rec overy treatment. The Supreme Court longhas re cog nized that “the Con fr on tatio n Cl a

us e g ua ra nte e s a n o pp or tun ity fo r e ff e c tiv e c ro sse x am i n at i o n , n o tc r o s s - e x am i n at i o nth ati s e f f e c t i v e i nw h at e v e r

w ay, and to whate ver e x tent, the def ense mig ht wish.” Dela

war e v. F e ns te re r, 47 4 U .S. 15 , 2 0, 10 6 S. Ct. 29 2, 29 4 ( 19 85 ) (pe r c ur iam) (empha sis in original). B ut a district court “ reta ins wide latitude ins of ar a s th e Con fr on tatio n Cl a us e is c on c e rn e d to imp os e re a so na ble lim its ” on c ro ss- e xami natio n to avo id, amon goth e r t hin g s, ha ra ssm e nt, pr e

jud ic e , c on fu sio n o f i ssu e s, or int e rr og atio n th at is only marg inally

rele vant or is re petitive. United States v. Mussare , 405 F.3d 161, 169 ( 3d Cir. 2005) (interna l citation omitt ed). Ac c or din g ly , a

c ourt of a pp e a ls r e vie ws lim itatio ns on c ro ssexamination for an abuse of discre tion. I d. I f we deter mine that there wa s an a bu se of dis c re tio n, we the n mu st r e vie w the e rr or to s e e if it i s harmless. United States v. Casoni , 950 F.2d 893, 902 ( 3d Cir. 1991).
We a re satis fi e d th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in limiti ngBohn’ s cross-e x amination of Carba llo. The prosec ution called Carba llo to demonstrate B ohn’s abuse in the use of union cre dit cards. In order to determine the permissible scope of c ro ss- e xami natio n th e dis tr ic t c ourt a llo we d B ohn’ s c ouns e l toWe believe that the c ourt was r efe rringto proce ssing 16 “information” though it did not use that word. 21 question Carballo at a

voir dire outside of the prese nce of the jury . At that time Carballo explained that she wa s a re cover ing he roin addict who has be en on a tr eatment pr og ram unde r the super vision of a phy sician and c ounselors. She fur ther e x plained that within that prog ram she ta

kes methadose , a mild form of metha done that her phy sician pre scribed. Ca rballo also admitted that she ha d used coca ine eleve n y ear s ear lier and she acknow ledg ed that she ha d been convicted of

the offe nse of c ocaine possession in 1989, for which she had bee n place d on probation. The district c ourt ruled that the conviction could not be use d on cross-e x amination and dete rmined that her pa st druguse and pr esent metha dose treatment did not affec t he r d e me ano r, me tho d o f e xpre ssi on , o r a pp are nt a bil ity to p ro c e ss. 16
In r e a c hin gits c on c lus ion s th e dis tr ic t c ourt a c te d w e ll w ith in its discretion in lim iting the sc ope of B ohn’s cr oss-examination of Carballo. More over, the court prope rly adher ed to its ruling in denying B ohn’s counse l’s subsequent attempt to impeac h Carballo’s acc ount of rec eivingg ifts of champag ne fr om Bohn pre dicated on the attorney ’s statement that, “ in his ex perie nce r ecove ringdrugusers should remain alc ohol-fre e as w ell as drug -fr ee.” Bohn B r. at 42-43. Con sid e ri ngthat Ca

rb a llo ’s pa st d

ru gus e and

pr e se nt r e c ov e ry

e ff or ts had no conne ction to her testimony conce rningBohn’ s spending ha bit s and us e of un ion c re dit c ard s, a nd did no t a ff e c t he r c re dib ili ty as a w itness, the district court did not abuse its discre tion by limit ing the c ro ss- e xami natio n o f C arb a llo to e xclu de re fe re nc e to t he se matters.
E

. L o re ’s S i x thAm en dm en tC o n fr o n t at i o nC l au s e C h al l en ge L ore c laims that the admission and misuse of g rand jury t e s t i m o n y o f

d e f e n d an t s H ur l e y an d

R a c k l e y, w h o d i d

n o tt e s t i f y, violated his Six th Amendment rig hts. Specifically , L ore a sserts that the g rand jury

testimony

was testimonial hear say

inadmissible under Cr a w f o r d v . Wa s h in g to n , 5 4 1 U

. S. 3 6 , 1 2 4 S. Ct

. 1 3 5 4 ( 2 0 0 4 )

. We exercise plena

ry revie w over

Confrontation Clause cha lleng es. United States v. Tra la, 386 F.3d 536, 543 ( 3d Cir. 2004) (interna l citation omitted). I f evide nce w as admitted in contravention of L ore’ s c on fr on tatio n r ig hts , w e mus t c on sid e r whe the r t he e rr or wa s h arm le ss beyond a re asonable doubt. See L illy v. Virg inia, 527 U.S. 116, 140, 119 S.Ct . 1887, 1901 (1999); United States v. Hinton, 423 F .3d 355,22 362 (3d Cir. 2005).
The Confrontation Cl ause of the Six th Amendment af fords a n acc used the funda

mental rig ht to confront the witnesse s ag ainst him. Crawf ord, 541 U.S. at 42, 124 S.Ct. at 1359. The ce ntral func tion of thi s r ig ht i s to pr ote c t th e a c c us e d f ro m th e us e of

e x part e examinations as evidence ag ainst him in a criminal trial. I d. at 50, 12 4 S. Ct. at 13 63 . A c c or din g ly , th e Con fr on tatio n Cl a us e pr oh ibi ts the admission of testimonial statements made by witnesses outside of court, unless the w itnesses are unavailable and the de fenda nt had a previous opportunity

to cross examine him or her. I d. at 59, 124 S.Ct . at 1369; United States v. Hendr icks, 395 F.3d 173, 178- 79 (3d Cir. 2005). Hurley ’s and Rac kley ’s g rand jury testimony

was unquestionably

“testimonial” within Crawfor d. See id. at 64, 124 S.Ct . at 1372 (listing grand jury testimony

amongexamples of “plainly testimonial statements”). None theless, a c onclusion that the g ra nd jur y te sti mony

wa s a dmi tte d p ro pe rl y

is n ot i nc on sis te nt w ith Cr a wf or d. As we he ld i n T ra la , te sti mon ia l st ate me nts are a dmi ssi ble without prior cross-e x amination if they are not offer ed for

their truth. 386 F.3d at 544 (“Cra

wford doe s not apply

wher e the r eliability

of te sti mon ia l e vid e nc e is n ot at is su e [.]” ); se e a lso Cr awf or d, 54 1 U .S. at 59 n. 9, 12 4 S. Ct. at 13 69 n. 9 ( “ Th e [Con fr on tatio n] Cla us e a lso does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other

than establishing the truth of the matter asser ted.”) . As the district court observe d, the g rand jury

testimony

contains self- exculpatory state me nts de nyinga ll wro ng do ing . T hu s, a s in Tr a la , th e se statements “we re a dmitted because they wer e so obviously

false.” 386 F.3d at 544-45. In addition to self-exculpatory statements, the district court desc ribed the ba lance of the stateme nts as fac tual statements “totally

innocuous as to the co- defe ndants based upon what’s a lrea dy

in the rec ord.” J.A. at 5221-22.
In any event, a ssuming, but not deciding , that the admission of these stateme nts violated L ore’ s Six th Amendment rig hts, the err or was ha rmless beyond a re asonable doubt inasmuch as ther e wa s overwhelming e vidence of L ore’ s participation in the conspira cy
. Th is e vid e nc e inc lud e d te sti mony fr om o the r w itn e sse s w ho se t f or th in convincingdetail L ore’ s participation in the sala ry diversion and kic kb a c k s c he me s, and

thi s te sti mony

wa s c or ro bo rate d in de pe nd e ntl y of the c halleng ed g rand jury statements. Moreove r, the que stioned g rand jury

testimony

did not name L ore, a

nd the testimony

wasAs we disc u s s edab o v e, th e d i s tri ctco urtal s o i n s tru ct edth e j ury 17 to compartm entalize the evidenc e and to c onsider the e vidence separ ately as to ea ch def

endant a nd eac h count. 23 “totally innocuous” a

nd duplicative of othe r re cord e vidence

. F ina lly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y ins tr uc te d th e jur

y to consider H urley ’s g rand jury testimony

only in connec tion with the g overnme nt’s case ag ainst him and likewise to consider Ra ckley ’s g r an d j ur y t e s t i m o n y

o n l y w i thr e s p e c tt o th e c a s e a g a i n s th i m
. In 17 acc ordanc e with the instruction, in summation the prosecution discussed the g rand jury

testimony

only in the way

that the cour

t instructed the jury

that it could be used.
F . Purp or

te d Pr os e c uto ri a l Mi sc on du c t
L ore c ontends that he is entitled to a new trial bec ause of

the prosec utor’s “pe rvasive . . . misconduc t” duringhis summation and rebuttal a rguments. See L ore B r. at 40. Spec ifically , L ore c laims: (1) that the prosec ution mis repr esente d the contents of a stipulation; (2) eng ag ed in improper vouc hing; ( 3) impermissibly shifted the burde n of proof to him; and (4) g ratuitously attacke d defe nse counse l.
In revie wingthe statements under lying L ore’ s claim of prosec utorial misconduct, we a re mindful of the Supreme Court’s a dmo nit ion

that:

a cr iminal conviction is not t o be lig htly overturne d on the basis of a

prosec utor’s comments standingalone, fo r t he state me nts or

c on du c t mu st b e vie we d in context; onl y

by so doing c an it be dete rmined whe ther the prosec utor’s conduc t affe cted the f airne ss of the tr ia l. United States v. Young , 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.C t. 1038, 1044 (1985). Acc ording ly , we r eview the district court’s rulingon any contempora

neous objec tions for an a

buse of discr etion. United States v. Br ennan, 326 F .3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003). I f an a ppellate c ourt fi nd s th at th e re ha s b e e n p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t, i t sh ou ld r e ve rs e unless the er

ror is har mless. I d. (citingUnited States v. Z ehrba ch, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 ( 3d Cir. 1995) (en ba nc)) . An er

ror is dee med harmless if the c ourt possesses “a sure c onviction that [ it] did not prejudice the def

endant.” Z ehrba ch, 47 F .3d at 1265 (interna lL ore a sserts that all i n stance s of purporte d prosec utorial 18 misconduct must be revie wed to determine if the y wer e har mless error s beca use he “ duly

objec t ed ” t o them. L ore B r. at 41. Though L ore p r o v id e s c it ati o n s to th e r e c o r d to d e mo n s tr ate th at the re w ere contempora

neous objec tions for three bases t o support his claim of misconduct, see J.A. at 4664 (use of stipulation), 4665 -6 7 (shifting burd e n) , 490 3- 04 (atta c ks on c ouns e l) , he fa ils to provide a re fer ence as requ ire d b y

Th ir d Ci rc uit

L oc a l App e llate Rul e s to ind ic ate “ sp e c if ic pag es of the a

ppendix or place in the proceeding s at which [ his objection to v ou c hin g ] wa s r a ise d, ob je cte d to and ru le d u

po n. ” 3d Cir . L .A .R. 28.1. Neve rtheless, while a non-conte mporane ous objection is reviewe d fo r p la in e rr or , B re nn an, 32 6 F .3 d at 18 2, thu s su g g e sti ng that w e sh ou ld us e tw o d if

fe re nt sta nd ard s of re vie w on the mis c on du c t c la im, in r e a lity the standard of revie w makes no differ ence in this case for the vouching claim fa ils under either

standard. 24 quotation marks omitted). “Any non-conte mporane ous objections are subject to plain err or re view.” Br ennan, 326 F .3d at 182. Afte r our 18 revie w, we f

ind L ore’ s various cha lleng es to the prose cution’s summation and rebuttal unper suasive. 1. Represe ntation of Stipul ation
L or e c la ims that th e pr os e c uti on mis re pr e se nte d th e c on te nts of a stipulation related to the 1990 civil RI CO action that the g overnme nt broug ht ag ainst L ocal 1588. The parties a g ree d on the stipulation after de fenda

nts’ counsel soug ht to impeach G’ Sell and An g e lon e wi th i nc on sis te nt d e po sit ion te sti mony

in c onne c tio n w ith the RI CO action that alleg ed a ba ckg round of or g anized crime a nd c or ru pti on in L oc a l 15 88 . T he g ov e rnme nt a sse rt e d th at th is impeachme nt opened the door to the underlying subje ct matter of the civil RI CO action. In lieu of evide nce c oncer ning the civil suit, t he parties a g ree d on a stipulation which the prose cutor re ad to the jury

. But be fore the prosec utor rea d it, the district court explained to the jur y that: [A sti pulation] is a long word that mea ns that the parties ha ve agree d that a ce rtain fa ct or fa cts exist

. So, the Governme nt and ea ch of the defe ndants have e n t e r e d i n t o th i s a s a

s t i p u l at e d

f a c t

. A n d yo um ay, the re fo re , r e g ard

the se fa c ts t

hat [th e pr os e c uto r] i s g oing to r ead to you as prove n in the case

.25 J .A. at 3735. The prosec utor then re ad the f ollowing stipulation to the j ur y: The pa

rties her eby

stipulate in 1992 and there afte r, the Ex ecutive B oard of

L ocal 1588 a g ree d with the Fe dera l Gover nment that the offic ers a

nd employ ees of

the L ocal we re not pe rmitted to associate w ith J oseph L ore who was ne ither a me mber nor a n employ ee of

the L ocal with re g ard to a

ny business of the L ocal. The B oa rd fu rt he r a g re e d th at it

wo uld no t pr oh ibi t pu

re ly social conta ct betwe en De nise Bohn, who was then a n employ ee of

the L ocal[,] and Mr. L ore. A s long a s that c on ta c t di d n ot o c c ur

in o r a bo ut t he wate rf ro nt, including the L ocal’ s office s. J.A. at 37 35 -3 6. De fe nd ants a g g re ssi ve ly c ro ss e xami ne d G ’S e ll conce rninghis prior deposition testimony in the civil RI CO liti g ation in which he de nied that L ore ha d been involved in the a ffa irs of L ocal 15 88 . A t tr ia l, G ’S e ll e xpla ine d th at he lie d d ur inghis de po sit ion s to protec t L ore. L ore move d for a

mistrial based on the prose cution’s repr esentation in sum mation that the stipulation supported the infere nce that L ore ha d been involved in the a ffa irs of L ocal 1588. Th is c ha lle ng e la c ks me ri t. A s th e c ourt e xpla ine d to the jur

y , it c ou ld reg ard the fac ts contained in the stipulation “as prove n in the case .” Def endants do not point to lim itations that the parties plac ed on the stipulation. Absent lim itations, itwas not improper for the prosec ution to draw fa ir infer ence s from the stipulation. United States v. Sulli van, 803 F .2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1986) (“ [T] he prose cution may ask the jury

to draw pe rmissible infere nces f rom any thing that a

ppear s in the rec ord.”) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). It was rea sonable a

nd permissible to infer that L ore’ s participation in the aff airs of L ocal 1588 pr ecipitated its agree ment with the g overnme nt to bar L ore f

rom its affa irs. Moreove r, eve n if there had bee n an er ror stemming fr om the prosec utor’s ar g ument, it would have bee n harmless unde r eve n the most ex actingstandard in lig ht of the extensive testimony

that defe ndants elicited fr om G’Sell that he lied in connec tion with the civil R I CO investigation to obscure L ore’ s involvement in union affa irs.
L ore a lso challeng es ce rtain re marks fr om the rebuttal summation relatingto the stipulation. However, c ontrary to L ore’ s26 argume nt, it d oe s n ot a

pp e ar t hat any de fe nd ant c on te mpo ra

ne ou sly objected to the pur

ported misrepr esentations he now cites in his brief. Acc ording ly , we r eview the se comments for plain err or. B renna

n, 326 F .3 d at 18 2 ( “ Any

no n- c on te mpo ra

ne ou s o bje c tio ns are su

bje c t to plain err or re view.”) . Our re view of the se re marks in the conte x t of th e f u l l tri al d o es n o tre v ea l “e gre gi o u s erro r o r am an i fe s tm i s ca rr i age of justice” ne cessa

ry to support a findingof plain er ror, or indeed a ny err or at a ll, warra

nting a new tria l. Rather, as w ith its orig inal summation remarks, the pr osecution wa s askingthe jury to draw infere nces f

rom the stipulated fa cts in evidenc e that we re e ntere d without lim itation.
2

. Vo u ch i n g L ore submits that the prosec ution improperly vouched f

or the cre dibilit y

of the g overnme nt’s key

witnesses, G’Sell and Ang elone. A prosec utor improperly

vouches when he ( 1) assure s the jury that the te sti mony of a g ov e rnme nt w itn e ss i s c re dib le , a nd (2 ) h e ba se s h is assura nce on e ither his claimed pe rsonal knowledg e or othe r information not contained in the r ecor d. Br ennan, 326 F .3d at 183 (citingUnited States v. Walker, 155 F .3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998)). B ut whe n w e de te rm ine wh e the r s tate me nts to t he jur y imp ro pe rl y vo uc he d f or a wi tne ss’ s c re dib ili ty

we c on sid e r t

he m in the c on te xt in which they

wer e g iven. I d. at 186. In the context of this case we conclude that the cha lleng ed re marks did not constitute improper vouching

. The fir st statement to which L ore points ar ose duringthe pr os e c uti on ’s summatio n. Th e pr os e c uto r f ra me d h is c omm e nt a s a response to a “pa

rticular r emar

k” made by

the def ense in its opening that the prosec utor perc eived a s sugg esting impropriety in using G’ Se ll a nd An g e lon e a s p ro se c uti on wi tne sse s: And I sug g est to y ou, ladies and g entlemen, that that particula r re mark indicates that not only – not the Gover nment is stupid, but the Gover nment was c orrupt in putting up these w itnesses just to win the case. So corrupt or stupid or both, in order to win, would the Go ve rnme nt s ub or

n p e rj ur y ? Or am I sim ply stu pid be c a us e Idid n’ t bo the r t o c or

ro bo ra te wh at Mr . G ’S e ll sa id i n a ny of his dis c los ur e of

thi s st or y or bo the r t o chec k on the story

that Mr. Ang elone told subsequent27 to Mr. G’Sell? But a s we g o along , ladies and g entlemen, you’ll see that not only was the story

that Mr. G’Sell told with reg ard to this embezzlement c or ro bo rate d b y

Mr . A ng e lon e , b ut i t w a s a lso corr oborate d by

other witnesse s, other docume ntation and other phy sical evide nce. And that the ca se wa s prese nted to y ou not as a c ollection of lies, per jured testimony and fa bricated documents, but in fac t was simply the truth based upon the testimony and base d upon the evidenc e that wa s prese nted.
J .A. at 4676-77 ( emphasis adde d). Althoug h the prosec utor asked rhetoric al questions imply ing that he would not suborn per jury and that G’Sell was c redible, he did not base his assura nce on c laimed p e r s o n a l kn o w l e d g e o r

e v i d e n c e o u t s i d e th e r e c o r d

. O nth e c o n tr ar y, following the rhe torical que stion the prosecutor e x plained that he based his asse rtion on the evidenc e of r ecor d, namely “cor roborat[ ion] by Mr. Ang elone . . . [and] by other witnesse s, other docume ntation and other phy sical evide nce.” Rather than invoke information not contained in the r ecor d, the prosec utor urg ed the jury to consider “ the evidenc e that wa s prese nted.”
L or e a lso po int s to se le c te d r e fe re nc e s b y the pr os e c uti on

to the fa ct that the g overnme nt had subpoena ed business re cords of L ocal 1588 pr ior to G’Sell’s coope ration, thus eliminating a ny o p p o rtun i ty t o f

a s h i o nh i s t e s t i m o n y t o th e b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s
. N o t a b l y, as the district cour

t expl ained, the f

act that the g overnme nt had obtained business re cords by subpoena w as bef

ore the jury . Viewe d in context, t hese c omments amounted to nothing more than an attempt to dismi ss the sug g estion that G’Sell could have fabr icated the version of eve nts that he rec ounted at trial, pa rticularly beca use his version of events wa s consistent with the documentar y evidenc e the g overnme nt ob ta ine d thro ug h it s su

bp oe na . M or e ov e r, thr ou g ho ut t he c omm e nts L ore c ites, the prosec utor ref ere nced the corr oboratingevidenc e of rec ord. Ove rall, there was no sug g estion in the prosec utor’s comments that he ha d materia l personal knowle dg e or othe r information not contained in the r ecor d. Finally , L ore points to the prosec ution’s comment that “[S] tupid or not, the Governme nt might like blind squirrel [sic] might have f ound a fla w in [G’Sell’s version of eve nts] , may be over the course of seve n or eig ht y ear s.” L ore B r. at 52 (c iting J.A. at 4680). But c onsidered in c ontext , this statement merely called attention to the28 a bs e nc e of e vid e nc e c on tr a dic tin gG’ Se ll’ s v e rs ion of e ve nts and

to th e i n tr i c a c i e s o f

th e t e s t i m o n y

th ath e w a s i n c a

p a b l e o f f a b r i c at i n g
. It is s ig nif ic ant t hat th e pr os e c uto r f

oll ow e d imme diate ly

wi th s pe c if

ic examples drawn f

rom the evide nce r elatingto the participation of the co-de fenda

nts to butt ress the notion that G’Sell wa s incapa ble of fabr icatingthe par

ticulars of the conspirac y . Thus, consideringthat d e f e n d an t s v i g o r o u s l y c h a l l e n g e d G ’ S e l l ’ s an d

A n g e l o n e ’ s t e s t i m o n y, the prosec utor’s re marks should be unde rstood as an a rgument that any sug g estion that G’Sell was ly ing w as not supported by

the evidenc e of rec ord– an a

rgument that does not amount to vouching . See United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d at 187 (“A pr osecutor ma y argue in the ne g ativ e that th e a sse rt ion s ma de by de fe ns e c ouns e l th at a

wi tne ss i s lying a re not supporte d by

the testimony

in the rec ord.”)

. 3. Shifting B urden of

Proof
Acc ordingto L ore, the prosec utor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the de fense in his summ ation by stating that “the defe nse has se vera l dilemmas that they are burdene d with here ” and ref err ing to va

rious “dilemmas” the defe ndants fac ed af ter the prese ntation of evidenc e. This ar g ument lacks mer it. As we have ex p l ai n ed , th er e i s n o th i n g i mp ro p er ab o u ta p ro s ec u t o r “ at t em p t [ i n g] to focus the jury ’s attention on holes in the def ense’ s theory .” United States v. Ba lter, 91 F .3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996). “Such a comment does not implicate any

of the burde n-shifting conce rns that ar e ra ised when a prosec utor points to a defe ndant’s fa ilure to testify or improperly

sug g ests that the def

endant ha s the burden of

producing e vid e nc e .” I d. Suc h is the c a se he re– th e pr os e c uto r’ s r e fe re nc e s to “dilemmas” that “burde ned” the defe nse we re attempts to focus the jur y ’s atte nti on

on pe rc e ive d d e fi c ie nc ie s in the de fe nd ants ’ t

he or y in light of the evidenc e pre sented at trial. Acc ording ly , the district court did not abuse its discretion in reje ctingthis challeng e. 4. Atta c k o n D e fe ns e Couns e l
L ore c ontends that the prose cutor made a “gratuitous persona l attack” on defe nse counse l by posing a rhetoric al question during re butta l summatio n a sk ingwh e the r t he c ro ss- e xami natio n o f G ’S e ll was “ disinge nuous” or “ cleve r lawyering .” L ore B r. at 55-57. Th ou g h p e rs on a l atta c ks on the c ha ra c te r o f d e fe ns e c ouns e l in so me instances c an rise to the le vel of misconduct, the sing le re mark he re reg ardingdefe nse tac tics falls far short of that leve l. See United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 343- 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (holdingthat29 prosec ution’s refe renc e to def ense a s “hogwash” and a “ smoke scre en” did not wa

rra nt new trial); United States v. Santiag o, 46 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1995) (holdingthat there was no e rror in permitting prosec ution comments that defense was de valuingthe victim and “dirtying up” witnesses); United States v. Ha rtmann, 958 F .2d 774, 785 (7th Cir. 1992) (holdingthat there was no e rror in allowing prosec ution remark that defe nse told a “whopper” and tried to mislead the jury ); cf. United States v. Frie dman, 909 F.2d 705, 709 ( 2d Cir. 1990) (holdingthat it was plainly improper f

or prose cutor to re mark, “[w]hi le some people . . . prosec ute drugdeale rs and try to see them broug ht to just ice, ther e ar e other s who defe nd them, try to ge t them off, pe rhaps e ven for

high f ees” ). Ha rtmann is particula

rly instructive for, a s the Court of Appea ls for the Seve nth Circuit has expl ained, there is a distinction between c omments directed at the tactics a nd arguments advanc ed by

defe nse counse l and those aimed at the c ha ra c te r o f t he atto rn e y s th e mse lve s, wi th n oth inginh e re ntl y improper a

bout the former . See Ha

rtmann, 958 F .2d at 785. Our revie w of the tra

nscript convince s us that the comments at issue her e amount to the former

. Moreove r, whe n L ore’ s counsel’s e arlier rema rks ar e considere d, it is evident that the prosec utor’s summation demonstrates that “the pr osecution wa s only meetingthe def

ense on a level of the defe nse’s own c hoosing.” United States v. L aSorsa, 480 F .2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1973). Af

ter a ll, prior to the rebuttal summation he now challeng es, counse l for L ore implied that the prose cution may have su bo rn e d p e rj ur

y or wi llf ull y pe rm itt e d th e pr os e c uti on wi tne sse s to testify falsely . See Supp. App. at 88-89 ( “This idea of suborning pe rj ur y . . . . ” ). In th is c on te xt, th e pr os e c uti on ’s c ri tic ism of de fe ns e tactics a ppear s to be more of

a def ensive re sponse rather than a n aff irmative attac k. See United States v. Pung itore, 910 F .2d 1084, 1126-27 (3d Cir. 1990) ( explaining the “invited r esponse doc trine,” wher eby “a pr osecutor ma

y neutra liz e improper

defe nse ar g uments but may not rely on them as a ‘ springboard’ for the la unchingof aff irmative attac ks upon the defe ndants.”). T hus, the rema rk about “dising enuous” or

“cle ver” lawy ering

– mildly inappropriate, at wor st– does not rise to the leve l of sever ity sufficie nt to require r ever sal.
G. Se nte nc ingCha lle ng e s The district cour

t sentence d the def

endants prior

to the Supreme Court’s de cision in United States v. Booke r, 543 U.S. __ , 125 S.Ct . 738, holding that mandatory enhanc ement of a

sentenc e30 under the SentencingGuidelines base d on fac ts found by the cour t a lon e , in the a bs e nc e of a wa ive r o f a

jur y tr ia l, v iol ate s th e Sixth Amendment. I d. at , 125 S.Ct. at 756. To remedy the constitutional infirmity of the Guide lines, the Court sever ed that portion of the statute makingapplication of the Guidelines mandatory , rende ring them eff ectively advisory . I d. at , 125 S.Ct. at 764. Bohn and L ore challeng e their se ntence s in light of B ooker. The g overnme nt does not op po se B ohn’ s c ha lle ng e but c on te nd s th at w e sh ou ld n ot v a c ate L ore’ s sentence beca

use “the District Court offer ed an a lternative se nte nc ingratio na le , in

wh ic h it e xpre ssl y state d it s inte nti on

to achie ve the same Guidelines ra ng e through a diffe rent a

naly sis.” Gov’t B r. at 85. The g overnme nt, however , overstate s the district court’s “alter native sente ncingrationale .” While the district court off ere d an alternative to its l oss calculation, the gove rnment points to nothing that sug g ests that it contemplated a f rame work that wa s advisory rathe r than mandatory . Nor a re w e able to “asc erta in whether the District Court would have imposed a g reater or le sser sente nce unde r an advisory

fra mework,” and ther efor e pre judice in a plain e rror analy sis “can be presumed.” See United States v. Da vis, 407 F.3d 162, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2005) ( en banc ). More over, notwithstandingthe alternative to the loss calculation, the pr oblem of enha nceme nts based upon fac ts found by

the district court by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e still remains. See L ore A pp. at 267-77 (district c ourt imposing enha

nceme nt for obstruction of justice ba sed upon a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e).
Inasmuch a s we have conc luded that sentenc ing issues that arise in lig ht of Booke r best ar e dete rmined by the district court in the first instance, D avis, 407 F.3d at 165-66, we a re satisfied that the dis tr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld r e se nte nc e B ohn a nd L or e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt , howeve r, nee d not resente nce Pellicc ia or Hur ley as neither

challeng es his sentence

. I V. CONCLUSI ON
For the fore g oing r easons, we will affirm the judg ments of conviction and se ntence of Pelliccia a nd Hurley and will aff

irm the judgme nts of conviction of L ore a nd Bohn, but we will vacate the sentenc es imposed on them and will re mand their c ases to the district co urtfo r r es en t en ci n g.