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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 8, 2016 

v No. 324617 

Mecosta Circuit Court 

DUNCAN ERIC WILLIS II, LC No. 14-008175-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: METER, P.J., and BOONSTRA and RIORDAN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 A jury found defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); two 

counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(e) (armed with a 

weapon); carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226; and possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court 

sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, 

and to prison terms of 50 to 100 years for each CSC I conviction, 40 to 60 months for the 

carrying a dangerous weapon conviction, and two years for the felony-firearm conviction. 

Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm. 

I. FACTS 

 On November 21, 2013, defendant retrieved a shotgun from his home and went across the 

street to the home of JS at approximately 7:00 p.m. in an effort to determine whether JS or one of 

the other two adult women present at the home had called Child Protective Services (CPS) to 

report that defendant had left his children home alone. According to the testimony, defendant 

demanded to know who had called CPS and, while armed with the gun, forced the women to 

undress and sexually assaulted them while holding them hostage in the home. While defendant 

had the women in a bedroom with the door closed, JS’s mother, KH, entered the home. 

According to JS, defendant stated that if anyone came through the door he would “blow their 

head off.” KH opened the bedroom door and defendant shot her in the face; she died instantly. 

Defendant continued to sexually assault the three women over the course of several hours before 

allowing them to leave the home the following morning. 
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 Defendant did not deny shooting KH, but alleged that the shotgun accidentally fired as he 

was raising it with one hand after he heard a voice in the house. Defendant denied sexually 

assaulting the three women. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. JURY COMPOSITION 

 Defendant first argues that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated because 

the jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community and that his trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the composition of the jury venire. 

Because defendant did not challenge in the trial court the composition of the jury venire or jury, 

review is for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763, 764; 

597 NW2d 130 (1999). Review of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is “limited to 

mistakes apparent on the appellate record.” People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 

94 (2002). 

 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must demonstrate 

that counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of 

professional reasonableness, and that it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s ineffective 

assistance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v Jordan, 275 Mich 

App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). 

 A criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the 

community. Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 538; 95 S Ct 692; 42 L Ed 2d 690 (1975). To 

establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant has the burden 

of proving the following: 

 “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the 

community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries 

are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in 

the community; and (3) that this under-representation is due to systematic 

exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” [People v Bryant, 491 Mich 

575, 581-582; 822 NW2d 124 (2012), quoting Duren v Missouri, 439 US 359, 

364; 99 S Ct 58 L Ed 2d 589 (1979).] 

 With respect to the first element, the prosecutor concedes that, as an African American, 

defendant is a member of a distinctive group for purposes of the fair cross-section requirement. 

With respect to the second and third elements, defendant refers to the 2014 United States Census 

of Mecosta County, which, according to defendant, indicates that Mecosta County is 93% 

Caucasian and about 3% African-American. He also refers to the 2010-2011 United States 

Census of the city of Big Rapids, which, according to defendant, indicates that Big Rapids is 
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about 6.8% African-American.1 Defendant also relies on the statement of one potential juror

during a colloquy with the prosecutor in which the juror stated, “I would think that there would 

be a more diverse pool to choose from in lieu of the situation in regards to the race.” The juror’s 

statement suggests that the jury venire had fewer African-Americans than the juror would have 

expected, but does not establish how many African-Americans were in the jury venire.2 

 “A systematic exclusion is one that is inherent in the particular jury-selection process 

utilized.” Bryant, 491 Mich at 615-616 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hen 

applying the relevant statistics, a court must examine the composition of jury pools and venires 

over time using the most reliable data available to determine whether representation is fair and 

reasonable.” Id. at 599-600. Defendant has failed to set forth any evidence with respect to the 

composition of jury pools over time in Mecosta County or to a systematic exclusion of AfricanAmericans in Mecosta County’s jury-selection process. See id. at 595-597. 

There being no evidence in the record to support his allegations on appeal, defendant has 

not shown that plain error occurred with respect to the composition of the jury venire. Further, 

because the record does not show any reason to suspect a Duren violation, defendant has failed 

to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury venire. See People v 

Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998). 

B. PHOTOGRAPHS 

 Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by the admission into evidence of two 

photographs of KH’s body. He contends that the photos were gruesome and were more 

prejudicial than probative because defendant did not deny shooting KH and the evidence of guilt 

was not otherwise overwhelming. To preserve an evidentiary issue for review, a party opposing 

the admission of evidence must object at trial and specify the same ground for objection that it 

asserts on appeal. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Defendant 

not only failed to object to the admission of the photos, but stipulated to their admission. 

Because defense counsel stipulated to admission of the challenged photos, defendant is 

precluded from assigning error to their admission. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 219; 612 

NW2d 144 (2000); People v McDonald, 293 Mich App at 292, 295; 811 NW2d 507 (2011). 

Defendant, however, argues that counsel was ineffective for stipulating to admission of the 

photos. 

 

1

 Defendant concedes that this Court has said that when challenging the racial makeup of the jury 

panel, it is the county, not the city, that must be examined. See People v Wilson, 95 Mich App 

93, 95; 290 NW2d 89 (1980). Thus, defendant’s suggestion that the jury pool should have 

consisted only of residents of the city of Big Rapids because Big Rapids is more diverse is 

misplaced. 

2

 In addition, we note that the juror acknowledged that the clerk’s office randomly selects the 

jury venire, that the community did not have a large black population, and that the juror could be 

“color blind.” 
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 Relevant evidence is evidence that has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more 

or less probable, MRE 401, but the trial court must exclude relevant evidence if the probative 

value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, MRE 403. This can 

occur when the evidence is only marginally probative and there is a danger that the trier of fact 

may give it undue or preemptive weight. See People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462; 751 

NW2d 408 (2008). 

 The trial court must weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect of gruesome 

photographs before admitting them. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), 

mod on other grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995). A pertinent question is whether the sole purpose 

of the photographs is to inflame the jury. Id. at 76-77. In this case, the record reveals that the 

prosecutor showed two photographs depicting the shotgun wounds on KH’s body and the 

location of her body to demonstrate the condition and location of the body in relation to JS when 

defendant was forcing her to perform oral sex on him, and to identify KH as the person shot by 

defendant. The photographs are gruesome, but the trial court need not “protect the jury from all 

evidence that is somewhat difficult to view.” Id. at 79. “[I]f photographs are otherwise 

admissible for a proper purpose, they are not rendered inadmissible merely because they bring 

vividly to the jurors the details of a gruesome or shocking accident or crime, even though they 

may tend to arouse the passion or prejudice of the jurors.” Id. at 77 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise a meritless objection. Fike, 228 Mich 

App at 182. 

C. EXTRANEOUS INFLUENCE 

 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to develop a record and inquire into 

the possibility that the jury was influenced by the slogan on a T-shirt worn by the father of one of 

the victims while he was in the courtroom. Defendant makes the bare assertion that the 

spectator’s “clothing was an unsubtle attempt to intimidate the jury into convicting defendant.” 

 The pertinent questions are whether the jury was exposed to extraneous influences and 

whether the extraneous influences created a real and substantial possibility that they could have 

affected the jury’s verdict. People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 540; 679 NW2d 127 (2004). 

 The record establishes that on the third day of trial, a bench conference of less than one 

minute was held off the record while the jury was out of the courtroom. The trial court then 

spoke with the spectator about his shirt that stated, “Talk sh_t, get dead” on the front, and “Say it 

to my f__kin’ face” on the back; according to the spectator, the shirt was from an MMA (mixed 

martial arts) fight. The trial court informed the spectator that he was “wearing an inappropriate 

shirt” and stated, “You are not welcome here. Leave and don’t come back.” The record reveals 

that the spectator immediately left the courtroom and that the jury returned to the courtroom ten 

minutes later. 

 The record provides no indication that the jury was exposed to the slogan on the 

spectator’s T-shirt or that, if it was, the shirt was prejudicial to the defense or the jury was 

affected by it. Defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights. 

Carines, 460 Mich at 763. 
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D. SENTENCING 

 Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court scored the 

guidelines using factors that were not objective and verifiable, because the court did not have 

substantial and compelling reasons for its departure from the guidelines on his CSC I 

convictions, because the trial court imposed consecutive sentences, and because the sentences 

imposed for CSC I rendered his punishment cruel or unusual. However, defendant’s sentencing 

issues are moot in light of defendant’s mandatory sentence of life without parole on the firstdegree murder conviction. People v Watkins, 209 Mich App 1, 5; 530 NW2d 111 (1995); People 

v Passeno, 195 Mich App 91, 102; 489 NW2d 152 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds by 

People v Bigelow, 229 Mich App 218; 581 NW2d 744 (1998). 

E. STANDARD 4 BRIEF 

 Defendant contends in his Standard 4 brief that trial counsel was ineffective for advising 

defendant to waive the preliminary examination, by failing to object to the prosecutor’s 

comments that defendant was a liar and that the prosecution witnesses were believable, by failing 

to object when the prosecutor allegedly badgered defendant on the stand and told the jury that the 

fact that defendant was being argumentative showed that his story was not believable, and by 

failing to move for a change of venue at defendant’s request. Defendant does not, however, 

provide any citation to the record in support of his claims of error, and provides no detailed 

assertions or analyses in support of his contentions of error. “It is not enough for an appellant in 

his brief to simply announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to 

discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, 

and then search for authority to either sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v Detroit, 355 

Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959); see also People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 389; 639 

NW2d 291 (2001). “An appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of his assertion of error 

constitutes abandonment of the issue.” Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 356; 683 

NW2d 250 (2004).3

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

 

3

 Defendant also includes a number of additional issues in the statement of questions presented in 

his Standard 4 brief, but has failed to address any of these issues in the argument of his brief. 

These issues are also abandoned. Thompson, 261 Mich App at 356.