alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rudra SABARATNAM, Defendant-Appellant, and Mufthiha Sabaratnam, Defendant.

No. 15-56463

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 20, 2017

*615Valerie Larissa Makarewicz, Charles Parker, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Regina S. Moriarty, Attorney, Joan I. Oppenheimer, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rudra Sabaratnam, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed.' R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Rudra Sabaratnam appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for the United States in its action to reduce to judgment Sabaratnam’s tax liabilities. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Baccei v. United States,*682 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Sabaratnam’s trust fund penalties for tax year 2000 because Sabaratnam failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the assessments of these penalties were untimely. *See*26 U.S.C. § 6601(a) (Internal Revenue Service must assess a tax liability within three years after a return is filed); *id.*at § 6672(b)(3)(B) (where a protest to a notice informing taxpayer of penalties is made, the statute of limitations is extended until 30 days after the final administrative determination with respect to that protest); *FTC v. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc.,*104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.”).

In light of our disposition, we do not reach Sabaratnam’s remaining contentions.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorenzo Deshon STEPHENS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6147

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 26, 2017

Lorenzo Deshon Stephens, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Calvin Moore, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lorenzo Deshon Stephens seeks to appeal the district court’s order treating his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” ' 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Stephens has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Stephens’ notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a sepond or successive § 2255 motion. *United States v. Winestock,*340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims based on either:

> (1) newly discovered evidence that ... would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or

> (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Stephens’ claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before *132this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
T.G. v. RUSSELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2160456

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 31, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
DIAMANTE ENTERPRISES, LLC v. Paul BRACKNELL and Connie Bracknell

2160592

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Transferred to Sup. Ct. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Yak Communications Inc. (the
Company) Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Charles Zwebner, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1). | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | ---- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2). | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |     |  |                        
|------------------ |  | --- |  | -----------------------
|Date: May 26, 2005 |  | By: |  | /s/ Charles Zwebner    
|                   |  |     |  | Charles Zwebner        
|                   |  |     |  | Chief Executive Officer
#### Joseph Stackpole, Appellant, *v.*Henry Robbins et al., Commissioners, etc., Respondents.

(Argued September 21, 1871;

decided January term, 1872.)

This action was brought to restrain defendants, as loan commissioners, from foreclosing a mortgage executed to their predecessors upon lands owned by plaintiff. A prior attempt had been made to foreclose the same mortgage by defendants’ predecessors. The premises were sold and deeded by the loan commissioners, and a new mortgage taken back. Plaintiff brought suit against all .the parties, asking to have the sale and all the subsequent transfers and the second mortgage set aside and canceled, on the ground of irregularities, and that the sale was collusive and fraudulent as against him. He succeeded in that suit, and judgment was rendered therein as asked for. Defendants thereupon recommenced foreclosure of the first mortgage, which this action is brought to restrain; plaintiff claiming that the prior foreclosure exhausted the power of sale and rendered the -mortgage void, and that the vacation of the sale did not revive the extinguished lien. *Feld,*that the judgment in the former suit left the parties in •the precise position occupied by them before the first foreclosure was attempted; that it did not affect the validity of the original mortgage, and that defendants had the right to foreclose the same.

*666
      *John H. Reynolds*for the appellant.

*M. I. Townsend*for the respondents.

Gray, 0., reads for affirmance.

All concur. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
-82 -80 -78 -76 -74

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★ at 39.44 N 77.04 W Meters AGL
#### Juan Jose ARIAS-GONZALEZ, AKA Juan Carlos Castaneda, AKA Luis Garcia-Rodriguez, AKA Juan Amar Gutierrez, AKA Jonthon Mandiville Osuna, AKA Miguel Angel Portillo, AKA Diego Saradegui, AKA Diego Emillio Saradegui, AKA Diego Saradegui-Torres, AKA Jose Lozano Zamora, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-70205

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

Douglas Jalaie, Esquire, Attorney, The Law Office of Douglas Jalaie, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner

Todd J. Cochran, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Juan Jose Arias-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Ecuador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigrations Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, *Silaya v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008), and we deny the petition for review.

As to withholding of removal, even if the evidence compels a finding that the harm in 1994 rose to the level of persecution, the record does not adequately demonstrate a likelihood of future persecution as of the time of the hearing. See *Nagoulko*v. *INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (possibility of future harm “too speculative”).

As to CAT relief, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Arias-Gonzalez failed to demonstrate it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Ecuador. *See Silaya,*524 F.3d at 1073.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule  contains summary  financial information extracted from SEC
     Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
     statements as of and for the nine months ended September 30, 1999.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000883946
<NAME>                        TREEV INC
<MULTIPLIER>                               1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                             528
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,110
<ALLOWANCES>                                    (1,216)
<INVENTORY>                                      1,093
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                15,497
<PP&E>                                           7,748
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (6,588)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  20,460
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,929
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                       6,510
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    20,460
<SALES>                                         22,157
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                22,157
<CGS>                                           11,633
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   11,633
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,372
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 178
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (3,026)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (3,026)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (3,026)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.32)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.32)



</TABLE>
Order filed May 19, 2016

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 15

- 00854

- CR NO. 14

- 15

- 00855

- CR

____________ JOHN M. ENARD , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 178th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . 1375416 & 1439251



### CORRECTED ORDER

On April 27, 2016, this court issued an order to the trial court for amended certifications of the defendant’s right to appeal and requested a supplemental clerk’s record containing the amended certifications to be filed on or before May 11, 2016. As of today, the court has not received the supplemental clerk’s record containing
the amended certifications of the defendant’ s right to a ppeal signed May 5, 2016.The Harris County District Clerk is directed to file a supplemental clerk’s

record on or before May 26, 2016, containing amended certifications of the defendant’ s right to appeal signed May 5, 2016.

PER CURIAM
Danny Michael TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-802

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 24, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### IN RE: Ronald GOTTSCHALK, Ronald Gottschalk, attorney disciplinary matter, Appellant.

No. 12-55304

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

Ronald Gottschalk, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ronald Gottschalk, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s order imposing reciprocal discipline on him after his disbarment from the California State Bar. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, *In re Corrinet,*645 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing reciprocal discipline against Gottschalk because he failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was deprived of due process, that there was insufficient proof of the misconduct that led to his. disbarment, or that grave injustice would result from the imposition of reciprocal discipline. *See In re Kramer,*282 F.3d 721, 724-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the limited circumstances under which an attorney subject to discipline by another court can avoid a federal court’s imposition of reciprocal discipline, and setting forth attorney’s burden of proof).

We reject as unsupported by the record Gottschalk’s contention that the district court improperly destroyed documents. Gottschalk’s request for counsel, raised in his opening brief, is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Bernard A. Hettrick, Appellant, v James R. Stark et al., Respondents.

[771 NYS2d 133]

In an action, inter alia, pursuant to Executive Law § 296 to recover damages for employment discrimination, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Emerson, J.), dated October 21, 2002, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

*472The plaintiff brought this action, inter alia, pursuant to Executive Law § 296 to recover damages for employment discrimination. After the plaintiffs job at the Riverhead municipal landfill was abolished due to the closure of the landfill, he was not rehired to a comparable job following his return from nonworkrelated sick leave. In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants established, prima facie, that the reason the defendant was not rehired for a comparable job was that he never applied for any replacement employment with the Town of Riverhead *(see Arendt v General Elec. Co.,*305 AD2d 762, 765 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 513 [2003]). Rather, the plaintiff sought, and obtained, a disability retirement. Generally, before a plaintiff can complain of discrimination in not being hired, he must have first applied for a job *(see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green,*411 US 792, 802 [1973]; *Arendt v General Elec. Co., supra).*In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact that he was the victim of discrimination due to his age or disability. Therefore, the Supreme Court correctly granted the defendants’ motion.

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Ritter, J.P., S. Miller, Adams and Cozier, JJ., concur.
Florian JIMENEZ-JIMENEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-3791

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 17, 2018]

Florian Jimenez-Jimenez, Mayo, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Gerber, C.J., May and Kuntz, JJ., concur.
----- Forwarded by Melanie King/RTP/USEPA/US on 08/10/2010 02:30 PM

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|Melanie King/RTP/USEPA/US

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| To: |

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|Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov

|

>---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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|------------>

| Cc: |

|------------>

>---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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|Fred Talcott/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Michael Horowitz/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, RobertJ

Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA |

>---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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|------------>

| Date: |

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|08/10/2010 02:15 PM

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| Subject: |

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|SI RICE NESHAP preamble/reg

|

>---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------|

Hi Cortney,

Attached is the latest version. It shows the changes we have made since

yesterday based on OMB's comments, and also some edits to correct typos and

other minor errors that we found.

(See attached file: Final SI RICE NESHAP Preamble-Reg 8-10-10 redline.doc)(See

attached file: Final SI RICE NESHAP Preamble-Reg

8-10-10.doc)

Melanie King

Energy Strategies Group

Sector Policies and Programs Division

Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency

Mail Code D243-01

RTP, NC 27711

Phone: (919) 541-2469

Fax: (919) 541-5450

king.melanie@epa.gov
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Reminico ZHANGAZHA, also known as Boss Remy, also known as Martin V. Masters, also known as Roy Daniel Black, Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-10862 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Date Filed: 12/20/2016

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Reminico Zhangazha, Pro Se

Before DENNIS, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Reminico Zhangazha has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Zhangazha has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s *917assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED: *See*5th Cíe. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 32.1

        CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 906 of the SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Joseph A. Turek, Chief Executive Officer of M-Wave, Inc. (the "Company"),
certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:

(1)      the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly
         period ended September 30, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the
         requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
         of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

(2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

Dated: November 12, 2003                                 /s/ Joseph A. Turek
                                                         -----------------------
                                                         Joseph A. Turek
                                                         Chief Executive Officer

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

                                       64