alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Allen J. Bernstein,certify that:

 

1.               I havereviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Morton’s Restaurant Group, Inc.;

 

2.               Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.               Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.               Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a) Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b) Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(c) Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.               Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a) Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

(b) Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 
| Date:  November 14, 2005 |
|------------------------------------|
|                               |
|                               | /s/ ALLEN J.  BERNSTEIN |   |
|                               | Allen J.  Bernstein |
|                               | Chief  Executive Officer |

 

----
Exhibit 10.13.1


 





DocuSign Envelope ID: 76DDFD05 - C690 - 479E - 9696 - BAEA10803213



    	 



    	 



    



DocuSign Envelope ID: 76DDFD05 - C690 - 479E - 9696 - BAEA10803213



    	 



    	 



    



DocuSign Envelope ID: 76DDFD05 - C690 - 479E - 9696 - BAEA10803213 1/2/2019
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joshua Brandon MAJOR, a/k/a Joshua Brandon Tart, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7279

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 11, 2017

Decided: July 26, 2017

Joshua Brandon Major, Appellant Pro Se. Michelle Rita Pascucci, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Kimberly Riley Pedersen, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Joshua Brandon Major appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion, in which he contended that the district court erred in finding that his prior Virginia burglary convictions constituted violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). We granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) whether, in light of *Castendet-Lewis v. Sessions,*855 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2017), Virginia statutory burglary is a violent felony for ACCA purposes; and (2) whether Major’s appeal is moot in light of his release from prison during the pen-dency of this appeal. After further briefing and consideration, we conclude that the district court erroneously determined that Major’s burglary convictions were violent felonies supporting his armed career criminal classification. Although precedent at the time the district court sentenced Major supported this classification, intervening decisions by the Supreme Court and this Court have altered the landscape. We also *268find that Major’s release from prison does not render moot his appeal as he remains on supervised release, and the district court may, in its discretion, alter any aspect of a defendant’s otherwise statutorily mandated sentence, including supervised release terms. *See United States v. Doe,*810 F.3d 132, 143 (3d Cir. 2015).

Thus, we vacate the district court’s denial of Major’s § 2255 motion and remand for further consideration. We deny Major’s request that we terminate the unserved portion of his supervised release term, without prejudice to his ability to seek relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). We dispense with oral argument' because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*VACATED AND REMANDED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jesus RIVERA-NAVA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41548 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 20, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jesus Rivera-Nava, Pro Se

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jesus Rivera-Nava has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Rivera-Nava has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir, R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Mark S. AMAR, Vera Amar a/k/a Veronica Amar, Appellants, v. Clarence BODEN, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3271

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 13, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 9, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM XIRCOM,
INC.'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         129,835
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   51,945
<ALLOWANCES>                                     7,674
<INVENTORY>                                     11,218
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               202,162
<PP&E>                                          60,118
<DEPRECIATION>                                  29,808
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 237,147
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           60,299
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                            24
<OTHER-SE>                                     167,708
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   237,147
<SALES>                                        103,073
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               103,073
<CGS>                                           56,835
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   56,835
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                30,169
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   1
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 16,782
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,699
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             12,083
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<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.50
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</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: 

APPOINTMENT TO THE CIVIL

PROCEDURAL RULES COMMITTEE

:

:

:

:

:

NO. 735

CIVIL PROCEDURAL RULES DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 13th day of June, 2022, Kimberly A. Brown, Esquire, Allegheny 

County, is hereby appointed as a member of the Civil Procedural Rules Committee for a 

term of six years, commencing July 1, 2022.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 ADOPTED
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report of Excalibur
Industries, Inc., a Delaware corporation, (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the
year ending December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Matthew C. Flemming, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify the following pursuant to Section 18,
U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.



/s/ Matthew C. Flemming
------------------------
Matthew C. Flemming, Chief Financial Officer
July 21, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ANGELA D. BIESECKER,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 15 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 27th day of May, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### Marvin MUDD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. E. R. BARKSDALE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-7517

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 26, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

Marvin Mudd, Appellant Pro Se.

Before KING, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Marvin Mudd seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 822, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 164 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Mudd has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.3

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

            We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements listed below of Digex, Incorporated of our report dated March 28,
2002, with respect to the financial statements of Digex (UK) Limited, included
in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) of Digex, Incorporated for the year ended
December 31, 2001.

      .     (Form S-8 No. 333-84025) pertaining to the registration of 9,000,000
            shares of Digex's Class A Common Stock reserved for the Digex
            Incorporated Long Term Incentive Plan.

      .     (Form S-8 No. 333-34506) pertaining to the registration of 650,000
            shares of Digex's Class A Common Stock reserved for the Intermedia
            Communications Inc. 401 (k) plan

      .     (Form S-8 No. 333-39098) pertaining to the registration of 6,000,000
            shares of Digex's Class A Common Stock reserved for the Digex
            Incorporated Long Term Incentive Plan.

      .     (Form S-8 No. 333-40240) pertaining to the Digex Incorporated 401(k)
            Plan.


                                        /s/  ERNST & YOUNG LLP

London, England
March 28, 2002
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-02-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-04-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-02-1998
<CASH>                                       9,106,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               27,465,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,001,000
<INVENTORY>                                 12,676,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            49,615,000
<PP&E>                                      22,457,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               9,155,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              79,200,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       14,843,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       121,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  64,044,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                79,200,000
<SALES>                                     42,796,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            42,796,000
<CGS>                                       31,413,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               40,334,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             (143,000)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,779,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,085,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,694,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,694,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.14
        


</TABLE>
Terry L. LEWIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D18-41

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 19, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

*Affirmed.*
Steven T. HUMPHREY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0986

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 18, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

This appeal is dismissed on account of appellant's failure to comply with this court's order dated March 15, 2018, requiring appellant to submit a copy of the circuit court order or orders being appealed. Appellant's motion for clarification of sentence and notice of inquiry are dismissed as moot.

BLACK, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
Jamarcus Marquis MAHONE v. STATE

CR-16-0365

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 3, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Rolando Uriel ARAGUZ-AGUILLON, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40528 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 20, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rolando Uriel Araguz-Aguillon, Pro Se

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Rolando Uriel Araguz-Aguil-lon has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Araguz-Aguillon has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-*142lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cíe. R. 42.2.

*

**Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Patrick L. KING v. STATE of Mississippi

2016-CT-00203-COA

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Filed: January 29, 2018 Closed: April 5, 2018

Motion Desc: Motion For Writ Of Certiorari From The Court Of Appeals Of Mississippi.

Certiorari - Denied.
Dennis SOCHOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC17-929

Supreme Court of Florida.

[March 1, 2018]

Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Rachel Day, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Jessica Houston and Jason Kruszka, Staff Attorneys, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Donna M. Perry, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee

PER CURIAM.

We hereby affirm the denial of Appellant's third successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the motion was legally insufficient on its face and refuted by the record, we find that the trial court's failure to hold a case status conference was harmless error, and that no evidentiary hearing was required. *See* *Marek v. State* , 14 So.3d 985, 999 (Fla. 2009) ; *Rutherford v. State* , 926 So.2d 1100, 1108 (Fla. 2006).

Additionally, the trial court did not err by summarily denying his claim based on newly discovered evidence and *Brady v. Maryland* , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Sochor alleges that a recent declaration obtained from Marvin Droste details a confession from Gary Sochor, Appellant's brother, that Gary was actually "more responsible than anyone else" for the murder of Patricia Gifford. However, the declaration itself is inadmissible because it does not fall within a hearsay exception. *See* *196*Robinson v. State* , 707 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1998) ; § 90.804(2), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the declaration from Marvin Droste would not "probably produce an acquittal on retrial or yield a less severe sentence." *Kormondy v. State* , 154 So.3d 341, 353 (Fla. 2015). Therefore, the newly discovered evidence claim was properly denied. *See id.* Further, the new information obtained from Droste is not material under the *Brady* standard. *See* *Strickler v. Greene* , 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Viewing the declaration by Droste in the context of the entire record, the content of the impeachment evidence against Gary Sochor does not undermine our confidence. *See* *Mordenti v. State* , 894 So.2d 161, 172 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that the materiality prong of *Brady* is satisfied if "there is a reasonable probability that this evidence 'put[s] the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.' " (quoting *Kyles v. Whitley* , 514 U. S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
EX PARTE Jamarcus MAHONE

CR-16-0477

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 3, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed.