NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MICHAEL L. LEVINSON,

Petitioner

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent

______________________ 

2023-2277

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CB-7521-17-0023-T-1.

______________________ 

Decided: July 30, 2024

______________________ 

MICHAEL L. LEVINSON, Atlanta, GA, pro se.

 MEEN GEU OH, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.

BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, SCHALL, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

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2 LEVINSON v. SSA

PER CURIAM.

Michael L. Levinson, appearing pro se, challenges the 

Merit Systems Protection Board’s decision that the Social 

Security Administration proved its charges of misconduct 

and that good cause existed for removal from his position 

as an administrative law judge. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm.

I 

Since his appointment in 2004, Mr. Levinson has been 

an administrative law judge in the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Office of Disability Adjudication and Review at the Macon, Georgia hearing office. S.A. 2.1 Between 

January 2008 and May 2015, Mr. Levinson was detailed to 

the Birmingham, Alabama hearing office, but returned to 

the Macon hearing office in June 2015. S.A. 45. On June 

28, 2017, the SSA filed a complaint charging Mr. Levinson 

with neglect of duties, failure to follow directives, and conduct unbecoming of an administrative law judge. S.A. 2–3.

Based on these charges, the MSPB concluded the SSA established good cause for Mr. Levinson’s removal and authorized the SSA to remove him. S.A. 26. The conduct

relevant to each charge is described below. 

A 

Mr. Levinson was first charged with neglect of duty

based on the content of his decisions as an administrative 

law judge. S.A. 5 (final MSPB decision); S.A. 53–54 (initial 

MSPB decision). In 2015, the Office of Appellate Operations Division of Quality randomly sampled a collection of 

Mr. Levinson’s decisions for “a focused quality review.” 

S.A. 46. This review “identified deficiencies in multiple areas of [Mr. Levinson]’s decisions, including amended 

1 Citations to “S.A.” refer to the Supplemental Appendix accompanying the SSA’s response brief.

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LEVINSON v. SSA 3

alleged onset dates, evaluation of opinion evidence, application of the five-step sequential process, evaluation of residual functional capacity, vague or incomplete 

hypothetical questions at hearings, and bench decisions.” 

S.A. 46. The Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law 

Judge (HOCALJ), Amy Uren, met with Mr. Levinson about 

the results of the review and in 2016, directed Mr. Levinson to complete a 25-day training course to address the 

identified deficiencies. S.A. 45–46. Mr. Levinson completed 

the training course in 2016. S.A. 46. Subsequently, the 

agency re-reviewed Mr. Levinson’s more recent 2016 decisions, and concluded that the previously identified deficiencies persisted. See S.A. 46. The Associate Chief 

Administrative Law Judge for Field Procedures and Employee Relations, Mark Sochaczewsky, then reviewed additional decisions, which he “identified as non-compliant 

with agency regulations, policy, and interpretations of 

law,” and Mr. Sochaczewsky issued a written report “identifying deficiencies in all 25 decisions” that he reviewed. 

S.A. 46–47. Reviewing this evidence, the MSPB determined that the SSA had shown, by preponderant evidence, 

that Mr. Levinson had neglected his duties. S.A. 53; see 

also S.A. 5 & n.3, 10. 

B 

Mr. Levinson was next charged with failure to follow 

three specific directives from his supervisors at the Macon 

and Birmingham hearing offices. S.A. 6–9 (final MSPB decision); see also S.A. 54–59 (initial MSPB decision). 

First, on November 12, 2014, while Mr. Levinson was 

detailed to the Birmingham hearing office,

HOCALJ Edward Zanaty “issued a directive to [Mr. Levinson] instructing him to cease directly contacting expert witnesses and avoid any off the record discussions with expert 

witnesses regarding their availability to provide testimony.” S.A. 45, 47. Instead, as required by office policy, 

Mr. Levinson was instructed “to have hearing office staff 

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4 LEVINSON v. SSA

select and contact medical experts on a rotational basis as 

mandated by [the SSA’s Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation 

Law Manual].” S.A. 55–56. Nonetheless, Mr. Levinson 

“continued to directly contact medical experts to determine 

their availability for hearings.” S.A. 47. Based on these 

facts, the MSPB determined that the SSA had proven that 

Mr. Levinson violated HOCALJ Zanaty’s November 12 directive. S.A. 6–9; see also S.A. 54–56.

 Second, on June 28, 2016, HOCALJ Uren issued a directive to Mr. Levinson based on his failure to “comply with 

agency policy and correct issues identified in the focus 

quality review.” S.A. 56. Mr. Levinson was specifically directed to “comply with the Social Security Act, as well as 

agency regulations, rulings, policy statements, and other 

interpretations of the law in hearing and deciding cases.” 

S.A. 56. The MSPB determined that Mr. Levinson’s continued failure to issue compliant decisions, as evidenced by 

the results of the re-review and Mr. Sochaczewsky’s review, constituted preponderant evidence that Mr. Levinson 

violated HOCALJ Uren’s June 2016 directive. S.A. 58; see 

also S.A. 6. 

Third, during the summer of 2016, HOCALJ Uren repeatedly directed Mr. Levinson to attend sensitivity training based on “conduct unbecoming” of an administrative 

law judge. S.A. 47. On October 24, 2016, HOCALJ Uren issued her third directive to Mr. Levinson to attend sensitivity training on October 26, 2016. S.A. 47. Mr. Levinson 

refused to attend any sensitivity training. S.A. 47–48. The 

MSPB found that the SSA had proven that Mr. Levinson 

violated a third directive given by HOCALJ Uren on October 24, 2016. S.A. 9; see also S.A. 58–59. 

C 

Finally, Mr. Levinson was charged with conduct unbecoming of an administrative law judge due to his “outbursts 

over the course of 5 days between August 2016 and January 2017.” S.A. 9 (final MSPB decision); see also S.A. 59–64 

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LEVINSON v. SSA 5

(initial MSPB decision). After HOCALJ Uren advised 

Mr. Levinson of a scheduled Weingarten2 meeting regarding “his possible violations of multiple agency directives . . . 

as well as conduct unbecoming [of] an [administrative law 

judge],” Mr. Levinson went to her office on August 24, 

2016. S.A. 48. While there, Mr. Levinson “became upset 

and was shaking,” telling “HOCALJ Uren in a raised voice 

that she was harassing him, [that she] can’t hide her actions behind other people, and [that she] is responsible for 

her actions.” S.A. 48. Then Mr. Levinson “got close to 

HOCALJ Uren’s face and said she was like a Nazi and 

worse than a Nazi.” S.A. 48. On September 6, 2016, during 

the Weingarten meeting, Mr. Levinson accused 

HOCALJ Uren of being “a liar” and said that “everything 

[she said was] a lie.” S.A. 48.

Several months later, on December 13, 2016, 

HOCALJ Uren approached Mr. Levinson to organize a 

time to discuss medical expert invoices. S.A. 48. Mr. Levinson “became upset, was physically shaking, and red faced,” 

said that he “would not answer a single question that 

[HOCALJ Uren] ask[ed] of” him, and “shouted [that]

. . . [HOCALJ Uren] was the worst.” S.A. 48–49. Another 

administrative law judge intervened to separate 

HOCALJ Uren and Mr. Levinson. S.A. 49.

On January 9, 2017, HOCALJ Uren informed Mr. Levinson that he was subject to an administrative investigation, and while she was speaking, Mr. Levinson “got up, 

stated he was not going to listen to anything [she] had to 

2 Union employees are entitled “to have a union representative present at an investigatory meeting[, known as 

a Weingarten meeting,] if the employee believes that there 

might be disciplinary action.” Baker v. Dep’t of Interior, 243 

F.3d 566 (Table), 2000 WL 1681219, at *3 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 

2000) (non-precedential) (citing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 

Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 262 (1975)).

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6 LEVINSON v. SSA

say, and left the office.” S.A. 49. When HOCALJ Uren attempted to serve Mr. Levinson with a written directive on 

January 11, 2017, he went into a hearing room and refused 

to allow her to enter. S.A. 49. When HOCALJ Uren eventually entered the hearing room, Mr. Levinson refused to 

take the written directive and stated he would “not . . . read 

it.” S.A. 49. When HOCALJ Uren gave Mr. Levinson the 

written directive, he tore it up and left the hearing room.

S.A. 49.

The MSPB determined that the SSA proved by preponderant evidence that Mr. Levinson engaged in conduct unbecoming of an administrative law judge on August 24, 

2016; September 6, 2016; December 13, 2016; January 9, 

2017; and January 11, 2017. S.A. 9–10; S.A. 59–64. 

 The SSA requested that the MSPB (1) suspend 

Mr. Levinson from the date of the SSA’s complaint until 

the MSPB issued its final decision and (2) ultimately remove Mr. Levinson from federal service. S.A. 17. After concluding that the SSA met its burden on each of its charges 

against Mr. Levinson, the administrative law judge, in the 

MSPB’s initial decision, determined that “there was good 

cause to suspend the respondent for 2 years and demote 

him.” S.A. 17. Mr. Levinson petitioned for review by the full 

MSPB of the administrative judge’s decision sustaining the 

charges. S.A. 4–5. The SSA petitioned for review by the full 

MSPB, arguing the administrative judge erred when it approved a lesser penalty than removal. S.A. 4–5. In its final 

decision, the MSPB found good cause for the penalty of removal, considering the applicable Douglas3 factors, and

3 The Douglas factors are used to determine the reasonableness of a penalty imposed on a federal employee. 

Torres v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 88 F.4th 1379, 1383 (Fed. 

Cir. 2023) (citing Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 

313, 331–33 (1981)).

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LEVINSON v. SSA 7

affirmed the administrative law judge’s initial decision as 

modified. S.A. 1, 17–24.

Mr. Levinson timely appealed. We have jurisdiction to 

review the final decision of the MSPB under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).

II

We will set aside the MSPB’s decision only if it is 

“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see also Edenfield v. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affs., 54 F.4th 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Further, “we are 

bound by the [administrative judge’s] factual determinations unless those findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” See Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 

1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “Substantial evidence means 

‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Torres v. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 88 F.4th 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

“Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we do

not reweigh evidence on appeal.” Jones v. Dep’t of Health & 

Hum. Servs., 834 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cleaned 

up).

III

 We begin by considering whether the MSPB erred in 

finding that Mr. Levinson neglected his duties, failed to follow three directives, and engaged in conduct unbecoming 

of an administrative law judge. Then, we turn briefly to the 

MSPB’s determination that good cause existed for Mr. Levinson’s removal.

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8 LEVINSON v. SSA

A 

On appeal, Mr. Levinson focuses on the neglect-of-duty 

charge. See, e.g., Pet. Br. 3–6, 12–13. In particular,

Mr. Levinson argues that the MSPB did not “cite or illustrate . . . one legally insufficient decision” written by him. 

Pet. Br. 12–13; see also Pet. Reply Br. 3–4, 13. We disagree.

First, the MSPB identified several inadequate decisions, issued by Mr. Levinson while he was an administrative law 

judge, in its initial decision, albeit in its discussion of his 

failure to follow directives. See S.A. 57–58. The MSPB’s final decision did not explicitly mention those identified decisions because Mr. Levinson did not dispute the neglectof-duty charge or the related finding that “he failed to follow a directive when he continued to issue decisions that 

did not comply with the Macon HOCALJ’s June 28, 2016 

directive to issue legally sufficient decisions.” S.A. 6; see 

also S.A. 5 & n.3. Further, the same conduct (issuing noncompliant decisions) was the basis for both his neglect-ofduty charge and his failure to follow directives charge. 

Compare S.A. 46–47 (discussing “Neglect of Duties” and

making findings regarding “identified deficiencies in multiple areas of [Mr. Levinson’s decisions]”), with S.A. 47 (discussing “Failure to Follow Directives” and finding “[o]n 

June 28, 2016, HOCALJ Uren issued a second directive requiring [Mr. Levinson] to demonstrate significant improvement by issuing policy compliant decisions and correcting 

errors identified in the focus quality review”). Therefore, 

the MSPB did cite legally insufficient decisions in connection with Mr. Levinson’s neglect-of-duty charge. To the extent Mr. Levinson cites to contrary evidence in the record, 

we nonetheless are persuaded that substantial evidence 

supports the MSPB’s finding on the neglect-of-duty charge.

Regarding the other charges, Mr. Levinson does not 

meaningfully dispute that he committed the acts he was 

charged with committing or even argue that no substantial 

evidence supports the MSPB’s findings on each charge. Instead, his arguments on appeal are focused on the agency’s 

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LEVINSON v. SSA 9

alleged wrongdoing, its attempts to silence him, or other 

incidents that were not the basis for his removal based on 

the MSPB’s final decision. See Pet. Br. 6–12, 13–15; see also 

Pet. Br. 1–4, 13. But our review of the MSPB’s decisions is 

limited by statute, and after reviewing the entire record, 

we conclude that the MSPB’s findings that Mr. Levinson 

neglected his duties, failed to follow directives, and engaged in conduct unbecoming of an administrate law judge, 

are supported by substantial evidence. 

B 

Finally, we consider the MSPB’s determination that 

the SSA established good cause for Mr. Levinson’s removal.

Under 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a), “action may be taken against 

an administrative law judge . . . by the agency in which the 

administrative law judge is employed only for good cause 

established and determined by the [MSPB] on the record 

after opportunity for hearing before the Board.” “We may 

overturn a penalty imposed by the [MSPB] for an [administrative law judge’s] misconduct ‘[o]nly in the exceptional 

case in which the penalty exceeds that permitted by statute 

or regulation[] or is so harsh that it amounts to an abuse of 

discretion.’” Long v. Social Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 526, 538 

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Brennan v. Dep’t of Health & 

Hum. Servs., 787 F.2d 1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (first, 

second, and fourth alterations added). 

In its final decision, the MSPB considered Mr. Levinson’s largely successful work history with SSA and credited 

his feelings of mistreatment. See S.A. 22. Nonetheless, the 

MSPB concluded that “these factors do not outweigh those 

that support [Mr. Levinson’s] removal, particularly the nature of the offenses and their impact on the [SSA], as well 

as [Mr. Levinson’s] lack of rehabilitative potential.” S.A. 

22.

On appeal, Mr. Levinson does not challenge the 

MSPB’s penalty determination. Mr. Levinson does, 

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10 LEVINSON v. SSA

however, request reinstatement and compensation. Pet. 

Br. 14–15; Pet. Reply Br. 13. Considering the record, we 

conclude that the MSPB thoroughly analyzed the relevant 

Douglas factors in concluding there was good cause for 

Mr. Levinson’s removal and we affirm.

IV

To the extent Mr. Levinson has made additional arguments, we have considered them and find them unpersuasive. The MSPB’s findings on each charge are supported by 

substantial evidence and its decision authorizing Mr. Levinson’s removal from his position as an administrative law 

judge is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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