alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7114

JOHN MARVIN OVERMAN, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus MARY STEVENS, Defendant - Appellee, and JUANITA H. BAKER; THEODIS BECK, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (CA-03-126-5-BO) Submitted: November 30, 2004 Decided: December 20, 2004 Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John Marvin Overman, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth F. Parsons, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: John Marvin Overman, Jr., appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. Overman challenges certain facts contained in the file relied on by the North Carolina Parole Commission. The district court ruled against Overman on the ground that his complaint was time-barred. Claims under § 1983 arising in North Carolina have a three-year statute of limitations. Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh , 947 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (4th Cir. 1991). The cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences “when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr. , 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). We conclude that Overman filed his complaint within three years of obtaining sufficient facts to provoke his reasonable inquiry, and the action is therefore timely filed. However, we hold that judgment was properly entered in favor of Baker, Stevens, and Beck. The information in Overman’s file that he contends was false was not relied on to a constitutionally significant degree. SeePaine v. Baker , 595 F.2d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 1979) (“We hold . . . that in certain limited circumstances a claim of constitutional magnitude is raised where a prisoner alleges (1) that information is in his file, (2) that- 3 - the information is false, and (3) that it is relied on to a constitutionally significant degree.”). Therefore, we affirm the decision of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
Dexter Lee BOGGS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-640

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 3, 2018]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph D. Coronato, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Levine, Conner and Forst, JJ., concur.
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BY 

ELIZABE A BROWN 

CLE F R E 

No. 82187 

FILED 

SEP 1 2021 

DEPUTY CLERK 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

1(1) 1947A 

Pickering 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

SHAD COTTELLI, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; 

AND THE HONORABLE JACQUELINE 

M. BLUTH, DISTRICT JUDGE, 

Respondents, 

and 

CHIEH-SHENG LIN, 

Real Party in Interest. 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

This original petition for a writ of prohibition challenges a 

district court order denying without an evidentiary hearing a motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Having considered the petition and 

its supporting documentation, we are not persuaded on this record that our 

extraordinary and discretionary intervention is warranted at this time. See 

Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 

(2004) (observing that the party seeking writ relief bears the burden of 

showing such relief is warranted); Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 

Nev. 674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 853 (1991) (recognizing that writ 

relief is an extraordinary remedy and that this court has sole discretion in 

determining whether to entertain a writ petition). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

Cadish 

, J. 

4'45•,•‘"(k 

• 

Herndon 

' 

-2 

, 
cc: Hon. Jacqueline M. Bluth, District Judge 

Garg Golden Law Firm 

Anderson McPharlin & Conners LLP/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

I 947A 

•-• 

•
#### Thomas J. COFFELT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Keith YORDY, Warden; Davidson, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-36078

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*304Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 15, 2017

Thomas J. Coffelt, Pro Se

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Idaho state prisoner Thomas J. Coffelt appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims and claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and we affirm.

In his opening brief, Coffelt fails to address any of the grounds for dismissal and has therefore waived his challenge to the district court’s order. *See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington,*350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief.”); *Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle,*7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived); *see also Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (‘We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim....”).

We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations

West Building Ground Floor, Room w12-140 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. Washington, DC 20590

Application to Amend Section 333 Exemption No. 11770 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-0895

June 16, 2015

Petitioner: Crosstimbers Video Partners, LLC
Jeff Holt - Partner 2801 Surveyors Lane Flower Mound, TX 75022

Greetings,

By letter from the FAA dated June 8, 2015, an exemption was granted to Crosstimbers Video Partners for relief under Section 333. That letter was marked Section 333 Exemption No. 11770 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-0895.

Crosstimbers Video Partners hereby requests that the exemption so granted be amended to include DJI Phantom 3 models and the DJI Inspire 1. Relevant facts and reasoning are: • DJI has announced they will discontinue the Phantom 2 model which was approved in Crosstimbers Video Partners Exemption No. 11770. • Size, weight and performance specification of the DJI Phantom 3("P3") are substantially similar to those of the DJI Phantom 2("P2") in all relevant respects: • Gross Weight: P3=1280g; P2=1242g. • Diagonal Size (including propellers): P3=590mm; P2=579mm • Maximum Ascent Speed: P3=5m/sec; P2=6m/sec. • Maximum Descent Speed: P3=3m/sec; P2=2m/sec. • Vertical Hover Accuracy: P3=+/-10cm; P2=+1-80cm. • Horizontal Hover Accuracy: P3=+/-1 m; P2=+/-2.5m. • Maximum Speed: P3=16m/sec; P2=15m/sec. • The DJI Inspire 1 will allow us to progress in our business opening new capabilities and added safety through the segregation of duties between the PIC and Camera Operator. • Gross Weight: 2935g. • Diagonal Size (including propellers): 559mm to 581 mm. • Maximum Ascent Speed: 5m/sec. • Maximum Descent Speed: 4m/sec.• Vertical Hover Accuracy: 0.5m. • Horizontal Hover Accuracy: 2.5m. • Maximum Speed: 22m/sec. • Flight Time: 18 Minutes • Dual Controllers allowing the PIC to focus on safe flight and the Camera Operator focus on image quality.

• The findings, rationale and conclusions contained in the FAA's Exemption No. 11770 apply without modification to this application to include the DJI Phantom 3& DJI Inspire 1 models in Exemption No. 11770.

Thank you for your consideration of this important request. Please advise us of any additional information that is required.

Sincerely,► I/
Jeff Holt Partner, Crosstimbers Video Partners, LLC
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Jeffrey Lawrence MacDonald, Appellant

No. 06

- 15

- 00195

- CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 188th District Court of Gregg County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 44,604

- A ). Memorandum Opinion deliv ered by Chief Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find there was partial error in the judgment

of the court below. Therefore, we modify the trial court’s judgment to delete the assessment of

attorney fees

. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We note that the appellant, Jeffrey Lawrence MacDonald, has adequately indicated his

inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED JUNE 27, 2016

BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jose Guadalupe TELLO-SEGUNDO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-41474 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 13, 2017

Andrew R. Gould, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, *332Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, H. Michael Sokolow, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Jose Guadalupe Tello-Segundo, Pro Se]

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jose Guadalupe Tello-Segundo appeals the 32-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry. He contends that the district court plainly erred by imposing a 16-level enhancement under the crime of violence provision .of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a)(l)(A)(ii) (2014) based on his prior Texas conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weap-. on.

For the first time on appeal, Tello-Seg-undo argues that Texas aggravated assault does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(a)(l)(A)(ii) (2014) because it is broader than generic aggravated assault and does not have as an element the use or threatened use of force. *See*§ 2L1.2, comment. (n.1(B)(iii)) (2014). He contends that § 22.02 is broader than generic aggravated assault because it can be violated with merely a reckless mens rea, and that, under *Mathis v. United States,*— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), the statute is indivisible with respect to the various applicable mentes reae. Tello-Segundo acknowledges *United States v. Guillen-Alvarez,*489 F.3d 197, 200-01 (5th Cir. 2007), which held that the Texas offense of aggravated assault qualifies as generic aggravated assault and is thus a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2 (2014), but he argues that *Guillen-Alvarez*was wrongly decided. Because Tello-Segundo did not raise this argument in the district court, we review for plain error only. *See United States v. Wikkerink,*841 F.3d 327, 331 (5th Cir. 2016).

We recently held that *Guillen-Alvarez’&*holding remains valid after *Mathis. United States v. Shepherd,*848 F.3d 425, 427-28 (5th Cir. 2017). Moreover, we are bound by our own precedent unless and until it is altered by the Supreme Court. *See Wicker v. McCotter,*798 F.2d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1986). We therefore need not consider whether Tello-Segundo’s prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence under the use-of-force prong. *See United States v. Castro-Alfonso,*841 F.3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 2016).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir, R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Agreements Adopted by the Traffic 

Conferences of the International Air 

Transport Association 

OST-2011-' 00^,1 

APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS 

BY THE 

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION 

lATA AGREEMENT APPROVED & IMMUNIZED ^ ^ 

DOCKETOST-./^-._-$.£££! _ ^ATE >^-*^ ' ^^ f "^^I f 

This approval unci ^nwA of anti'rust imn-.;: iject, where appiicable, 

to conditions previousiy i.iiposod. 

Tirir, action is effective after 7 days unless a petition is filed u.inicr 

14 CFR 385.30 or a review is undertai'.es; nn the Department's O-VP. jv.otion. 

In view of the agreement's noncontroversiai nature and the avaiiabi'iiy of 

the above^r^cedure, the^-^y^g^ojj in 14 CFR 303.42 is waived. 

irector, Office of International Aviation 

15 February 2011 

Communications with respect to 

this document should be sent to 

Douglas E. Lavin 

Regional Vice President - North America 

International Air Transport Association 

1776 K.St. N.W. #12"'Floor 

Washington DC 20006
#### James W. PLAYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35933

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*609Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 20, 2017

James W. Player, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

James W. Player appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments arising from defendants’ restriction on his access to the University of Idaho campus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim. *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Player’s claims against the University of Idaho and the other defendants in their official capacities because the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. *See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,*465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

To the extent that Player sued any defendant in his individual capacity, the claims are barred by qualified immunity. *See Pearson v. Callahan,*555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,*563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because the district court properly dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, Player had no right to a jury trial.

We reject as without merit Player’s contention that Magistrate Judge Bush and District Judge Lodge should have recused themselves from this case solely because they graduated from the University of Idaho. *See United States ex rel. Hochman v. Nackman,*145 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that recusal is not required when judge has “minimal alumni contacts” with a defendant university).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EX PARTE Deanna Perryman SCHOFIELD

(In re: Deanna Perryman Schofield v. Jonathan Shawn Schofield)

2160552

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed.
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.**

 

**SECTION 1350, ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

 

**SECTION 906 OFTHE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned certifies that:

 

(1)                                  ThisQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Option Care, Inc. for the period endedMarch 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission onthe date hereof (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                 The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of Option Care, Inc.

 

 
| Date: May  14, 2003 | By:    | /s/ Rajat  Rai           |   |
|---------------------|--------|--------------------------|--------|
|                |   |                     |
|                |   | Rajat Rai                |
|                |   |                     |
|                |   | Chief  Executive Officer |

 

----
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.



# United States **Court of Appeals** 
**for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

SUPERIOR COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Appellant

v.

VOLTSTAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Appellee

______________________

2016

- 1204

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 95/002,365.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

S ID L EACH , Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Phoenix, AZ, argued for appellant

.

J EROLD I. S CHNEIDER , Schneider Rothman IP Law Group, Boca Raton, FL, argued for appellee. Also repr esented by J OEL B. R OTHMAN

.

______________________

T HIS C AUSE having been heard and considered, it is

O RDERED and A DJUDGED :P ER C URIAM (W ALLACH

, H UGHES

, and S TOLL

, Circuit Judges ).

AFFIRMED

. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

February 13, 2017 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Date Peter R. Marksteiner

Clerk of Court
| Texas                                                         | 93-1207631                       |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| (Stateor other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization) | (IRSEmployer Identification No.) |

| 440 NorthCenter, Arlington, TX          | 76011     |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------|
| (Addressof principal executive offices) | (ZipCode) |

| Signature                                                                                                     | Title                                                        | Date           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| /s/ L. KellyJones                                           | chief executive officer, chief financial officer anddirector | April 23, 2003 |
| L. Kelly Jones                                                                                                |                                                              |                |
| /s/ BobFerris                 | president and director                                       | April 23, 2003 |
| Bob Ferris                                                                                                    |                                                              |                |
| /s/ LanceLoesberg                                                     | executive vice-president and director                        | April 23, 2003 |
| Lance Loesberg                                                                                                |                                                              |                |
| /s/ John F. Aleckner, Jr.                                                                                     | director                                                     | April 23, 2003 |
| John F. Aleckner, Jr.                                                                                         |                                                              |                |
| /s/ L. Andrew Wells                                                   | director                                                     | April 23, 2003 |
| Andrew Wells                                                                                                  |                                                              |                |