1 

2020 IL App (5th) 190067-U 

NO. 5-19-0067 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

________________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

THOMAS WANGELIN, ) St. Clair County. 

 ) 

 Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) No. 14-D-477 

and ) 

 ) 

CYNTHIA WANGELIN, ) Honorable 

 ) Alana I. Mejias, 

 Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 PRESIDING JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Justices Overstreet and Boie concurred in the judgment. 

 

 ORDER 

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s order dismissing the appellant’s first amended motion to 

modify and review maintenance is affirmed where she failed to adequately 

plead that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred since the latest 

maintenance modification; where the court did not err in denying her request 

for discovery; and where the court was not required to conduct a de novo

review of maintenance. 

¶ 2 This is an appeal arising from an order of the circuit court of St. Clair County 

denying the appellant, Cynthia Wangelin’s, amended motion to modify and review

maintenance that the appellee, Thomas Wangelin, was required to pay her under the 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and 

may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 05/21/20. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
2 

parties’ dissolution judgment, marital separation agreement (MSA), and subsequent court 

orders. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 The parties were married in July 1989. On June 18, 2014, citing irreconcilable 

differences, the appellee filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the circuit court of 

St. Clair County. Also on that date, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of 

marriage which, inter alia, ordered the appellee to pay the appellant maintenance in 

accordance with the court-approved MSA. Article II of the MSA provided that the appellee 

would pay to the appellant $4000 in monthly maintenance. Under the MSA, the 

maintenance award would be reviewed annually, and only the appellee’s W-2 and 1099 tax 

forms would be considered in calculating his income for purposes of determining the 

amount of maintenance he would be ordered to pay. 

¶ 5 On July 30, 2015, the trial court entered an agreed order, signed by both parties, that 

modified the maintenance provisions of the MSA. The 2015 modification order did not 

change the amount of monthly maintenance that the appellee was required to pay. 

However, pursuant to the 2015 modification order: 

“Either party may file a Petition to Modify the Maintenance provisions 

herein, pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/510 or other applicable Illinois Statute, upon a 

showing of a substantial change in circumstances. In making a determination as to 

the modification of the maintenance provisions set forth herein, the Court shall 

consider the factors set forth in subsection (a-5) under Section 5/510 of the Illinois 

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.” 

¶ 6 On March 14, 2017, the trial court entered a second agreed order, signed by both 

parties, modifying the maintenance provisions of the MSA and the 2015 modification 
3 

order. The 2017 modification order reduced the appellee’s maintenance obligation to 

$1949 per month, with the amount to be “recalculated each December.” Pursuant to the 

2017 modification order, only the appellee’s “gross income from W-2 or 1099 Non 

Employee Income earnings” would be considered in calculating his income for purposes 

of determining the amount of maintenance he would be required to pay to the appellant. 

The 2017 modification order did not include a provision for a general review of 

maintenance, and it did not change the provision of the 2015 modification order that either 

party could file a petition to modify maintenance pursuant to section 510 of the Illinois 

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2018)). 

¶ 7 On April 13, 2018, the appellant filed a motion to modify maintenance pursuant to 

section 510 of the Act (id.) (hereinafter first motion). The appellant sought to increase the 

amount of maintenance that the appellee had been ordered to pay under the 2017 

modification order. The first motion alleged a substantial change in circumstances in that: 

the appellant had “been victimized by fraud and *** defrauded of over Two Hundred 

Thousand Dollars”; the fraud caused her state and federal tax liability to increase; the 

appellee had transferred control of his business to his sister, who was allegedly winding 

down the business; the appellant’s medical conditions had worsened; the appellee was 

allegedly buying and selling real estate and surreptitiously transferring title to his new wife 

so the profits would not be considered as his income for purposes of maintenance; the 

appellee had not answered the appellant’s discovery requests; and the appellee’s businesses 

had been dissolved and therefore an accounting needed to be made. 
4 

¶ 8 In response, the appellee filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)). The appellee’s motion 

argued that the appellant failed to properly plead a substantial change in circumstances 

because she was aware of the facts supporting her allegations at the time that the last 

maintenance modification order was entered on March 14, 2017. As such, the appellee 

asserted that the facts giving rise to the alleged substantial change in circumstances were 

known and considered by the parties at the time of their previous agreement and court order 

regarding maintenance. 

¶ 9 At a hearing on the appellee’s motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the 

appellant failed to properly plead a substantial change in circumstances because all of the 

issues raised in her first motion were in existence at the time that the 2017 modification 

order was entered. On August 28, 2018, the court entered an order dismissing the 

appellant’s first motion and granting the appellant leave to file an amended motion. The 

appellant did not appeal this order. 

¶ 10 On September 27, 2018, the appellant filed her first amended motion to modify and 

review maintenance pursuant to sections 504(a) and 510 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/504(a), 

510 (West 2018)) (hereinafter amended motion). In the amended motion, the appellant 

restated the factual allegations contained in her first motion in support of an alleged 

substantial change in circumstances. However, the appellant additionally asserted in the 

amended motion that she was entitled to a general review of maintenance under the MSA, 

which does not require a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. 
5 

¶ 11 The appellee subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the 

Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)), which the trial court granted on January 8, 2019, 

finding that the allegations contained in the amended motion were the same as those 

presented by her first motion. The appellant appeals the court’s January 8, 2019, order

dismissing her amended motion. 

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 On appeal, the appellant raises several challenges to the trial court’s rulings. 

However, we are first required to address this court’s jurisdiction. The appellee has filed 

a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which resulted in this court ordering 

the parties to brief the issues raised therein. In her jurisdictional statement, the appellant 

asserts that we have jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 

2017). In contrast, the appellee argues that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because 

the January 8, 2019, order from which the appellee has appealed did not resolve all pending 

claims between the parties and did not contain an express written finding by the court that 

“there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both” as required under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). 

¶ 14 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) provides that “[e]very final 

judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right.” Rule 303 governs the 

timing of an appeal from a final judgment of the circuit court. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. 

July 1, 2017). Subsection (a)(1) of Rule 303 states that a notice of appeal must be filed 

within 30 days after the entry of a judgment appealed from or, if a timely postjudgment 

motion attacking the judgment is filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing 
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of the last pending postjudgment motion. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). “ ‘An 

order is final and appealable if it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits 

or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or a separate part 

thereof.’ ” In re Marriage of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 151 (2008) (quoting R.W. Dunteman 

Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 159 (1998)). 

¶ 15 Rule 304 provides for appeals in cases where multiple parties or multiple claims for 

relief are involved in an action. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Rule 304(a) states 

in pertinent part: 

“If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal 

may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 

parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there 

is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both. *** In the 

absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims 

or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or 

appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment 

adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties.” Id. 

¶ 16 We acknowledge that there is a split amongst Illinois appellate courts as to whether 

a postdissolution judgment constitutes a final, appealable judgment when it does not 

dispose of all postdissolution claims before the trial court. See, e.g., In re Marriage of 

Teymour, 2017 IL App (1st) 161091, ¶ 14 (noting the split in the districts). However, we 

find that it is not necessary for us to rule on the issue in this case because the appellant has 

conceded that she abandoned the remaining postdissolution claim. 

¶ 17 A party who files a motion is responsible for requesting the trial judge to rule on it, 

and when no ruling has been made on a motion, it is presumed to have been abandoned 

absent circumstances indicating the contrary. Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board,
7 

376 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433 (2007). “A subsequently filed notice of appeal following the 

failure by a litigant to obtain a ruling on a motion serves as an abandonment of the 

previously filed motion.” Id.; see also Jackson v. Alverez, 358 Ill. App. 3d 555, 563-64 

(2005) (the party was deemed to have abandoned a motion by filing a notice of appeal

without first ensuring that the motion had been ruled on). The appellant has conceded that 

her failure to obtain a ruling from the trial court on her motion for interim attorney fees 

prior to filing her notice of appeal resulted in the abandonment of her motion. Thus, the 

fact that the January 8, 2019, order did not dispose of the motion will not defeat our 

jurisdiction, and we will consider the merits of the appellant’s appeal. The appellee’s 

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied.

¶ 18 The appellant has raised three arguments on appeal. First, the appellant argues that 

the trial court erred in granting the appellee’s motion to dismiss her amended motion. 

Second, the appellant asserts that the court erred in denying her request for written 

discovery. Third, the appellant contends that the court erred in declining to conduct a de 

novo review of maintenance.

¶ 19 A. Motion to Dismiss

¶ 20 The appellant’s first claim is that the trial court erred in granting the appellee’s 

motion to dismiss her amended motion. Specifically, she claims that (1) she was not 

required to prove a substantial change in circumstances, (2) she adequately pled a 

substantial change in circumstances, and (3) the dismissal of her amended motion violated 

her due process rights. Thus, the first issue raised by the appellant’s claim is whether the 

proceedings instituted by her amended motion were modification proceedings, which 
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required a showing of a substantial change in circumstances, or review proceedings, which 

did not require such a showing. The appellant contends that she was not required to 

establish a substantial change in circumstances. To the contrary, the appellee maintains 

that the appellant was required to plead a substantial change in circumstances, that she 

failed to do so, and that the court properly dismissed the motion. 

¶ 21 We review de novo both the interpretation of a marital settlement agreement and a 

trial court’s section 2-619 dismissal. See Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 33 (2009); In re 

Marriage of Doermer, 2011 IL App (1st) 101567, ¶ 16. We construe a marital settlement 

agreement in the same manner as any other contract and ascertain the parties’ intent from 

the language of the agreement. Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 33. “When the terms of the marital 

settlement agreement are unambiguous, a reviewing court determines the parties’ intent 

solely from the plain language of the agreement.” Doermer, 2011 IL App (1st) 101567, 

¶ 27. An agreement is unambiguous when its language is susceptible to only one 

reasonable interpretation. Id. A disagreement as to meaning, however, does not render 

language ambiguous. Id. 

¶ 22 “Under Illinois law, all maintenance awards are reviewable.” In re Marriage of 

Kasprzyk, 2019 IL App (4th) 170838, ¶ 23. A party may ask the trial court to modify, 

terminate, or review maintenance. Id.; see also 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2018). 

“Review proceedings and modification proceedings are separate and distinct mechanisms 

by which reconsideration of maintenance can occur.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

Kasprzyk, 2019 IL App (4th) 170838, ¶ 23. Review proceedings arise from a court order 

specifically providing for review of maintenance. Id. In such cases, the court typically 
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advises the parties on what issues will be addressed on review and which party has the 

burden of proof. Id. In contrast, when there is no court order providing for review of 

maintenance, a party may seek reconsideration of maintenance through modification 

proceedings under the Act. Id. Unlike review proceedings, modification proceedings 

require the moving party to plead and prove that a substantial change in circumstances 

occurred that would justify modification of a maintenance award. Id. 

¶ 23 In this case, we find that the amended motion instituted modification proceedings 

rather than review proceedings. We acknowledge that the appellant labeled her motion as

an “amended motion to modify and review maintenance.” This appears to be a strategic 

decision in light of the fact that her first motion to modify maintenance was dismissed for 

a failure to allege a substantial change in circumstances, and she filed her amended motion 

arguing that because the 2017 modification order provided for review of maintenance, she 

did not need to allege a substantial change in circumstances. However, we find that the 

appellant’s characterization of her motion is not dispositive. 

¶ 24 Rather, we look to the terms of the 2017 modification order, which explicitly

modified the maintenance provisions of the MSA and the 2015 modification order. 

Specifically, the most recent order provided:

“The amount of maintenance shall be recalculated each December. The amount of 

maintenance shall be calculated by taking 30% of [the appellee’s] gross income 

from W-2 or 1099 Non Employee Income earnings minus 20% of [the appellant’s] 

gross income. Any income or distribution from [the parties’] cash settlement, 

401(K), SEP, and IRA shall not be considered in the calculation since [the parties] 

received cash, 401(K), SEP and IRA division as part of the MSA. The amount 

calculated as maintenance, however, when added to the gross income of [the 

appellant], may not result in [the appellant] receiving an amount that is in excess of 

40% of the combined gross income of [the parties]. [The appellee] shall provide 
10 

[the appellant] with all bank statements showing his income from his business. [The 

appellant] will provide [the appellee] with proof of her income. All disclosures to 

be made by December 1st each year for monthly payments January 1st through 

December 1st for the next year. [The appellee] shall calculate the maintenance and 

provide [the appellant] with the calculation. [The parties] will enter an Agreed 

Order showing the amount to be paid for the upcoming year.” 

¶ 25 The 2017 modification order also stated: 

 “Either party may file a Petition to Modify the Maintenance provisions 

herein, pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/510 or other applicable Illinois Statute, upon a 

showing of a substantial change in circumstances. In making a determination as to 

the modification of the maintenance provisions set forth herein, the Court shall 

consider the factors set forth in subsection (a-5) under Section 5/510 of the Illinois 

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.” 

¶ 26 Based on the preceding language, the 2017 modification order provided for two 

mechanisms by which the maintenance award could be reconsidered. First, the order 

provides for a limited annual review to occur in December of every year and during which, 

the maintenance award would be recalculated based on the process specifically delineated 

in the order. See In re Marriage of Heasley, 2014 IL App (2d) 130937, ¶ 27 (maintenance 

review can be limited or general). Second, the order permits either party to file a petition 

to modify maintenance pursuant to section 510 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2018)) 

based on a substantial change in circumstances. The record reveals that this case arose not 

from the annual review process set out in the order but instead was initiated by the filing 

of a petition to modify maintenance pursuant to section 510 of the Act (id.). As such, the 

statute and the plain language of the order provide that the appellant was required to plead 

that modification was warranted based on a substantial change in circumstances. 
11 

¶ 27 In support of her argument that she was not required to establish a substantial change 

in circumstances, the appellant relies on Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 35-36. The appellant suggests 

that Blum stands for the propositions that “in a provision for periodic review of 

maintenance, a general review is required,” and that “a general review of maintenance does 

not require the moving party to prove a substantial change in circumstances.” We disagree

with the appellant’s broad reading of Blum. Instead, our review of that case reveals that 

the marital settlement agreement at issue there provided for a general review of 

maintenance, that the proceedings involved were review proceedings, and under those 

circumstances, the court found that the movant was not required to prove a substantial 

change in circumstances. See id. at 35-36. Ultimately, the Blum court was applying the 

terms of an agreement to the specific facts involved in that case, and its application to the 

present circumstances is untenable when the maintenance provisions at issue here differ 

from those then before the court. 

¶ 28 In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court properly treated the proceedings 

giving rise to this appeal as modification proceedings in which the appellant was required

to plead a substantial change in circumstances. We will now determine whether the court 

properly found that she failed to sufficiently plead that a substantial change in 

circumstances had occurred to justify modification of the maintenance award. 

¶ 29 A substantial change in circumstances as required by the statute means that there 

has been a change in either the needs of the spouse receiving maintenance or the ability of 

the other spouse to pay the maintenance obligation. In re Marriage of Shen, 2015 IL App 

(1st) 130733, ¶ 132. Where multiple maintenance modifications have been sought, the trial 
12 

court shall consider only the facts that occurred since the last modification and modify the 

award only upon a substantial change in circumstances since that date. In re Marriage of 

Anderson, 409 Ill. App. 3d 191, 198-99 (2011). It is well settled that the party seeking a 

modification of maintenance has the burden of establishing that a substantial change in 

circumstances has occurred. In re Marriage of Bernay, 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 14; 

Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 132; Anderson, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 198; In re Marriage 

of Turrell, 335 Ill. App. 3d 297, 309 (2002); In re Marriage of Neuman, 295 Ill. App. 3d 

212, 214 (1998); In re Marriage of Krupp, 207 Ill. App. 3d 779, 790 (1990). 

¶ 30 In her amended motion, the appellant alleged that a substantial change in 

circumstances had occurred in that: 

“a. [The appellant] has been victimized by fraud and has been defrauded of 

over Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00); 

 b. The fraud has caused [the appellant’s] state and federal tax liability to 

increase, and [the appellant’s] ability to pay state and federal income taxes to 

decrease, resulting in [the appellant] having to enter into installment payment plans 

with the State of Colorado and the Internal Revenue Service; 

c. [The appellant] is informed and verily believes that [the appellee] has 

transferred apparent control of Wangelin Insurance Agency to his sister Lisa Bayer, 

who appears to be winding down the business and working only part-time; 

d. [The appellant’s] various medical conditions of schizoaffective bipolar 1 

disorder, chronic pain, osteoarthritis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 

(COPD) have deteriorated, necessitating more frequent appointments with her 

psychiatrist and additional new medication adjustments which generally involve 

quite high copays. The stress has also worsened her chronic pain, and she has 

required more medical care for these conditions. 

e. [The appellant] is informed and verily believes that [the appellee] is 

buying and selling various parcels in real estate in the State of Florida as investments 

and that [the appellee] may well be surreptitiously transferring the record title to 

these parcels and the income therefrom to his current wife in an effort to conceal 

substantial property and income and evade the letter and spirit of this Court’s orders 

regarding maintenance; 

f. That on March 15, 2018 [the appellant’s] attorney served Financial 

Interrogatories and a Request for Production of Documents on [the appellee’s] 
13 

attorney. It is necessary for [the appellee] to be required to answer these written 

discovery demands in order to fully assess the degree of subterfuge and fraud 

ongoing and recover monies to be applied to maintenance payments. 

g. That unbeknownst to [the appellant], Wangelin Insurance Agency Inc., 

Wangelin Investment Group, Inc.[,] and T.C. Wangelin Jr. Investment, Inc., all 

corporations in which [the appellee] held a controlling interest, have been 

involuntarily dissolved and that therefore an accounting needs to be made as to the 

income, treasuries, holdings and assets of those corporations.” 

¶ 31 With respect to the allegations relating to the appellant being victimized by fraud, 

we find that these circumstances existed at the time of the 2017 maintenance order. The 

record on appeal, as supplemented by the appellee,1 reveals that after the appellee filed a 

motion to modify in November 2015, the appellant submitted answers to interrogatories in 

July 2016, in which she stated that she had lost all of her savings in a scam. The record 

further indicates that although her ENT Credit Union savings account had a maximum 

balance of $100,000 between July 2015 and July 2016, it had a balance of $500 in February 

2016, and by July 2016, it had a zero balance. Notwithstanding the fact that she had lost 

such a significant sum of money as a result of fraud, the appellant agreed to enter the 2017 

modification order providing for a decrease in her maintenance award. Because the 

appellant’s financial loss occurred prior to the latest maintenance modification, the 

appellant has failed to meet her burden of establishing a substantial change of 

circumstances sufficient to further modify the maintenance award beyond the last court 

1

We grant the appellee’s motion to supplement the record, to which the appellant has not filed an 

objection. See Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 347 Ill. App. 3d 176, 180 (2004) (“Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

329 provides that a party may supplement the record on appeal to include omissions, correct errors, and 

settle controversies as to whether the record accurately reflects what occurred in the trial court.”); Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 329 (eff. July 1, 2017) (the record may be supplemented “to present fully and fairly the questions 

involved”). 
14 

order. See Anderson, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 199 (a maintenance award is res judicata as to 

facts that existed at the time the award was entered). 

¶ 32 As to the appellant’s allegations concerning the Wangelin Insurance Agency Inc., 

the record reveals that she had knowledge that “the appellee [planned] to close his business 

and sell the assets when he reaches the age of 62 years” as early as September 2014 when 

she filed a motion to vacate the dissolution judgment and set aside the MSA. Despite such 

knowledge, she subsequently agreed to voluntarily dismiss her motion to vacate under the 

2015 modification order. Because the trial court was aware of these circumstances prior

to the latest modification, we find they do not constitute a substantial change in 

circumstances. See In re Marriage of Reynard, 378 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1005 (2008) (“we are 

reluctant to find a ‘substantial change in circumstances’ where the trial court contemplated 

and expected the financial change at issue”).

¶ 33 Moreover, the record reveals that the appellant’s health issues have been known to 

the parties and the trial court since at least the filing of her 2014 motion to vacate the 

dissolution judgment and set aside the MSA. Thus, that allegation fails to establish a 

substantial change of circumstances sufficient to justify further modification of the 

maintenance award beyond the last court order. See Anderson, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 199 (a 

maintenance award is res judicata as to facts that existed at the time the award was 

entered). 

¶ 34 Regarding the appellant’s allegation about the appellee’s various businesses and 

investments, we find that she specifically waived any claim to his investment income and 

personal investments with respect to calculating his income for purposes of maintenance. 
15 

The MSA as well as both of the agreed modification orders explicitly instruct that only the 

appellee’s W-2 and 1099 forms would be used to calculate the appellee’s income for 

purposes of determining the amount of maintenance he would be required to pay. We 

reiterate that all three of those documents were agreed to and signed by the appellant, and 

under the doctrine of invited error, she cannot complain of an error to which she consented. 

See Colella v. JMS Trucking Co. of Illinois, Inc., 403 Ill. App. 3d 82, 95 (2010) (the 

doctrine of invited error bars a litigant from claiming error on appeal if that party invited 

or consented in the alleged error). 

¶ 35 Finally, the appellant’s allegation about the appellee’s failure to respond to her 

discovery requests does not rise to a substantial change in circumstances, as it does not 

allege a change in her needs or in the appellee’s ability to pay the maintenance award. See 

Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 132 (a substantial change in circumstances means a 

change in either the needs of the spouse receiving maintenance or the ability of the other 

spouse to pay that maintenance). This is especially true in light of our conclusion that the 

remainder of the appellant’s allegations fail to satisfy her pleading requirements. 

¶ 36 In sum, we find that the appellant’s amended motion failed to allege a substantial 

change in circumstances since the 2017 maintenance order. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not err in dismissing the amended motion. Furthermore, we find that the court’s actions 

did not deprive the appellant of due process. Instead, the court properly considered the 

filings before it as well as the parties’ arguments on the motion to dismiss. The court then 

considered the appellant’s allegations and found they were insufficient to establish that a 

substantial change in circumstances had occurred since the last maintenance modification. 
16 

“A trial court may eliminate meritless petitions to modify from its docket by the same 

procedures used in other cases, such as motions to dismiss and motions for summary 

judgment.” In re Marriage of Pedersen, 237 Ill. App. 3d 952, 957 (1992). 

¶ 37 B. Discovery 

¶ 38 The appellant’s second contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying 

her request for written discovery. In support, the appellant cites In re Marriage of Gidlund, 

244 Ill. App. 3d 675 (1993), for the proposition that Illinois courts favor liberal use of 

discovery. There, wife discovered, 14 months after the entry of the dissolution judgment, 

that 2 years before the dissolution, husband had acquired property that he failed to disclose 

during the dissolution proceedings. Id. at 676-77. Wife then filed a petition under section 

2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)) to vacate the property settlement 

agreement contained in the dissolution judgment and to initiate additional discovery based 

on husband’s fraudulent nondisclosure of marital assets. Gidlund, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 677. 

The reviewing court found that wife was “entitled to liberal discovery *** surrounding the 

acquisition of the undisclosed property as well as *** the source of the funds used in such 

acquisition, the stream of any funds obtained in connection with the development, sale or 

disposition of such property,” and other related issues. Id. at 680. 

¶ 39 Based on the procedural posture and the underlying circumstances involved therein, 

we find Gidlund inapposite. As previously stated, the court in Gidlund dealt with a petition 

under section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)), which “invokes the 

equitable powers of the court” and which is granted “upon the facts and equities presented.” 

Gidlund, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 678. In contrast, this case is before us on a section 2-619 (735 
17 

ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)) motion to dismiss, which “raises defects, defenses or other 

affirmative matter which appear on the face of the complaint or are established by external 

submissions which act to defeat the plaintiff’s claim.” Neppl v. Murphy, 316 Ill. App. 3d 

581, 584 (2000). “[A] section 2-619 proceeding enables the court to dismiss the complaint 

after considering issues of law or easily proved issues of fact.” Id. at 585. Therefore, the 

fact that the Gidlund court considered liberal discovery equitable under the circumstances 

then presented does not render discovery necessary under the facts of the case before us. 

Because the trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s amended motion, no further 

discovery was required.2

¶ 40 C. De Novo Review 

¶ 41 The appellant’s third and final contention is that the trial court erred in declining to 

conduct a de novo review of the maintenance award. However, we agree with the appellee 

that the appellant is confused as to which court the de novo standard of review applies. In 

the case relied on by the appellee, In re Marriage of S.D., 2012 IL App (1st) 101876, 

appellant similarly argued that the trial court should have conducted a de novo review of 

the statutory factors to determine the proper amount of maintenance. Id. ¶ 29 n.1. The 

appellate court found that the argument seemingly confused which court was required to 

employ such a standard. Id. Instead, the court clarified, the de novo “standard of review 

2

We note that the record is unclear as to whether the trial court actually denied the appellant’s

request for discovery as she suggests, as she has failed to cite to the record where the court entered an order 

denying discovery. However, even if the court’s dismissal of her amended motion can be construed as an 

implicit denial of further discovery, we find that it was not improper.
18 

is what [a reviewing] court uses to review the trial court’s determination and address the 

parties’ issues on appeal.” Id. 

¶ 42 Moreover, we find that the arguments presented in support of the appellant’s third 

claim are mere restatements of her previous assertions that she should not have been 

required to establish a substantial change in circumstances and that the trial court erred in 

dismissing her amended motion. As such, we find that they are similarly without merit. 

¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 44 Based on the foregoing, the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County is hereby 

affirmed. 

¶ 45 Affirmed.