## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 12

- 3746 GE B ETZ, I NC ., a Pe nns y l va ni a co r po r at i o n, Plai nt i f f

-Appe l l ant, v. Z EE C OMPAN Y, I NC ., a Te nne ss ee c o r po r at i o n, D efend a nt-A pp ellee, an d B MO H ARRIS B ANK, A pp ellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the N o rthernDi stricto f Illino is, Eas tern Div isi on. No . 1:12- cv-07302

—Mi lt on I . Sh adur , Judge .
A RG UE D F EB RU AR Y 27, 2013

— D ECI DE D M AY 3, 2013

Befo re F LA UM, S YKES, a nd T INDER, C ircu it Judges. T INDER, C ircu it Judge. A fterwinni ng a m ult i

- m i l l i on do l l arj udg m en t a g ains t Ze e Co m pan y i n a Nor thCa r o l i na2 N o. 12

- 3746 st at e co ur t, GE Be tz di scov er ed th atZe e ha d t i ed up vi r tu al ly all of i ts a ss et s i n a c r edi t f ac i l i tya g r ee m en t w i th BM O H ar ri s Bank b efor e the ent ryo ffi nalj ud gm en t. As a r es ul t, GE Be tz r egi ste r ed th e N o r thCa r o l i na fi nalj ud gm ent in the Cir cui t C ou rt o fCookCounty, I ll i noi s, H ar ri s’ s princi pal pl ace ofbusi ness, and ser ved H ar ri s with a c ita tio n to di sco verZee’ s a sse ts. Zee subsequ en tly r em oved the C ook C o u nt y case to fed eral court bas ed on d iversity j urisd iction un d er 28 U .S
. C
. § 1441(b). Bu t GE Betz obj ecte d to Zee’ s r em ova l, ar gui ng tha t i t r ana f o ulo f( 1) s ubj ec t- m at te r j ur i sdi ct i o n, a nd (2) the f or um - defe nd ant r ule
. The di str i ct c ourt r ej ecte d both rem oval argu m en ts, an d l ess th an three m ont hs l ater, di s mi sse d G E B e t z ’ s c a s e e nt i r e l y . GE Be t z fi l e d a ti m el y a pp eal
. Contr ar y t o the di str i ct c ou rt, we fi nd that G E Be tz raised a ti m ely and soun d o b j ection to Zee’s r em oval unde r the f o r um - defen dan t r ul e, a nd the dist ri ct c ourtsho uld have r em anded the case bac k t o th e C o o kC o u nt y C i r c u i tC o u r t
. Wi th o u ta n y o v e r wh e l mi n gc o n c e r n s o ffi n a l i t y, e ffi c i e n c y, o r j ud i c i a le c o n o my stan d ing in our w ay, w e n o w v aca te th e d istri ct cou rt’s dism i ssa lo rderand re m and the c as e to the dist ri ct c ourtwith instr ucti ons to send GE Betz’ s ca se backto the Coo k County Cir cui t Cour t.

I The com pli cate d his tory o fthi s ca se bega n i n A pri l20 06, whe n the CE O a nd s o l e s ha r e ho l de r o fZ e e Com pany, Rober t Bul l ar d, deci ded to expand his chem ica l sa l es bu sine s s i n to the w ater treatm en t ind us try. I n an effortN o. 12

- 3746 3 to beco m e co m peti ti ve i n w ate r tr eat m ent, an a re a i n whi c h he l a c k e d e xp e r i e nc e , Bu l l a r d h i r e d s e ver al new em plo yee s who w er e cur re n tly w or ki ng o r had previ ousl y work ed f oro therco m pan ies i n the i nd ustr y. Fouro fthe new em plo yee s ca m e fro m GE Betz, a w hol l yown ed subsi diary o fGenera lEl ect ri c thatspeci al i zes i n w ate r tr eat m ent t echnol ogy . Un f o r t u na t e l y f o r B u l l a r d a n d Z e e , th e s e f o u r e mplo yee s were s ti l lbo und bynon- com pete agr eem ents that they had si gned w hi l e e m plo yed at G E Betz. A s a re sul t, i n A p ril 200 7, GE Betz sued both Zee a nd i ts f or m erem plo yee s in N or th Caro l i na st ate co urt f or bre ach o fco ntra ct, to rt i ous inter fer ence w i th co ntra ct, an d unfa i r tr ade prac ti ces. Fr om the sta rt, the N or th C a r o l i n a l i t i g a t i o n d i d n o t g o we l l f o r Z e e an d t he f o r merGE Be t z em plo y e e s . T he s t a t e c o ur ti s s ue d a tem pora ryr est ra in i ng o rderand a pr el i m i naryi nj uncti o n a g ains t Ze e an d the f o urem p loy ee s wi th i n a m o nth a fter th e ca se was fi l ed. In F eb r ua r y 2 01 0, the st at e co ur t f o und a l lf o urno n- com p et e ag r ee m en ts e nf o rceab le. In J ul y 2 01 1, the s ta te c o ur t he l d Ze e an d the four em plo yee s j oi ntl y a nd s eve ra l l y l i abl e for $288 , 297. 00 i n com pensato rydam age s a s a r esul t o f u n fair an d d ec e p t i v e t r a d e p r ac tic es . Fin ally , in M ay2 01 2, the Nor thCa ro l i na c o ur t f o und Ze e an d the four em plo yee s j oi ntl y a nd se verallyl i abl e for $5, 769, 903. 10 i n att or n ey fees, $8 64, 891. 00 i n pun i ti ve da mag es, a nd $ 2 5 7, 9 3 1
. 4 4 i n c o s t s . T he s e l a r g e a wa r ds cam e as a re sul t of the sta te cour t fi nd i ng th at Z ee h a d “ [ n ] o to n l y . . . el i c i t [ e d ] , e n c o u r a g e [ d ] , a n d c o mpen sa te [ d] the i l l eg alc o nduc t o fthe Indi vi dualDe fen -4 N o. 12

- 3746 dants, b u t
. . . [ al so had] l i ed abo ut i ts em plo yee s a cti vi t i e s b e f o r e the l i t i g a t i o n a nd thr o ugho ut the c o ur se of th e la w su it, in c lu d in g b efo re th is C ou rt .” Ye t st i l lthe pl o t th i ck en s: a fte r the N orth Ca r o l i na s t a t e c o ur th a d de t e r mi ne d tha tZ e e wa s l i ab l e t o GE Betz a nd h ad awarded com pensato rydam age s

—but bef or e the st ate co urt had determ i ned p u n iti ve dam age s and atto rneyfees

— Zee enter ed i nto a fi nanci alar ra ngem ent wit h B M O H ar ri s Bank. On Decem ber1, 20 11, H ar ri s a gr eed t o ex tend a $22 m i l l i on cr edi t f aci l i ty to Zee and i ts thi rt een s i ste r com panie s, w hi ch ar e a l so so l e l y o wn e d b y B u l l a r d
. As p a r to fi t s c o mmi t men t to H ar ris , Zee ag re ed to pay a fi nalj ud gm ent o fup to $2 mil l i o n in the GE Be tz c as e, a nd i fthe fi na lj udg m en t exceeded $2 m i l l i on, Bull ar d perso n al l y guarant eed th e amoun t ex ce eding$ 2 m i l l i o n. In ex ch an g e f o r e xte n d in g t h e c re d it fa c ility , H ar ris p lac ed a lien on all fou rt een b or ro w er s’ “a ccounts, i nstr um ents, docum ents, ch attel pa p e r , gene ral intan gibles .
. . , l etter-ofcre ditr i ghts, i nvest m ent pr oper ty , deposi t a ccounts, i nventory, equi pm en t, com m er ci alto rtcl ai m s, fi xtures , and rea les tat e. ” Late r i n Dec em b er 20 11, H ar ri s fi l ed a UC C fi n a n c i n g s t a t e me n t i n T e n n e s s e e , wh e r e Z e e an d i ts co-bor ro w er s a re head q u ar ter ed, i n an at tem pt to per fec t i ts l i en . GE Betz d id n ot beco m e a w ar e o fZee’ s cr edi t a rr angem en t an d Har r i s’ s en su i ngl i enunt i lmany months l ate r. A fterthe N or th Caro l i na st ate co urt enter ed fi nal j ud gm ent of m or e than $7 m i l l i on dol l ar s i n fav or o f GE Bet z i n May 20 12 , Z ee fi l ed a ti m ely a ppea lwi ththeN o. 12

- 3746 5 N o r thCa r o l i na Co ur t o f A p pea l s. None th el es s, e ve n a ti m el y appeal “does not sta y the executi on of th e j ud gm en t” in N or th C ar olin a “u n les s a w rit te n u n d er ta kin g . . . by one orm or e s uret i es, ” s uch as a bond , “i s e xecuted on the p art of th e ap p ell an t.” N
. C
. G en . Stat. § 1 -2 8 9 (a). Despit e i ts tim ely appeal, Zee neverpost ed a b ond, nor d id Z ee d o anyt hin g else r esem bli nga “w ritten u nd ertak i ng . . . byo ne o r m or e s uret i es” to st ay the j ud gm ent. I n i ts bri ef to our cour t, Zee offer s no expla nati on fo r i ts f ai l ur e to s ta y the Nor thCa r o l i na j udg m en t, s ta ting onl y that “ [ f ] orvar i ous r eas ons, Zee w as unabl e t o secur e a bo nd on a p p eal
. ” N orwas Zee’ s e xplanat i on at oral argum en t any m ore satisfactory: d esp ite Zee’s “attem pt to bo nd thi s m att er, ” Zee bl am ed GE Betz f or i ts f ai l ure, ar guin g th at GE Betz had repeat edl y obj ecte d to th e c h o s e n s u r e t y c o mpa n i e s . Y e t i n s t e a d o fa sk i ng the North Carol i na Courtto approv e the bo n ds ove r GE Bet z’ s o bj ec ti o n, Ze e dec i ded to do n oth i ng, o ffer i ng o nl y thi s ex cus e: “ Given th e va g ar i es o fthe de ci si o ns c om in g out o fthe cour t in N or th Caro l i na, we fel t that it w ou ld h ave be en fu t ile to have gone be fore the cou rt to h av e t h e b on d s a p p ro ve d .” W ha t e v e r Z e e ’ s r eas ons f o r f a i l i ngt o p o s ta b o nd , wi th o uta s ta y o fthe ex ecut i o n o fthe j udg m en t, no th i ng sto od i n GE Betz’ s way fro m i ni ti ating t h e co l l ecti on pr oc es s a gainst Zee
. On J uly6, 20 12, GE Betz obt ai ned tw o ex part e o rder s from a N or th Caro l i na tr i alco urt, w hi ch pro hibi ted Zee fro m d i sposi ng o fany N or th Carol i na pro pertyand furthe r re quir ed Zee t o pay any p ro c ee d s fro m its N or th C ar olin a a c c ounts6 N o. 12

- 3746

re c eiv ab le in to th e c ou n ty cle rk ’s o f f i c e. O n ly th en d id GE Betz disc ove r Zee’ s cr edi t f aci l i ty agr eem ent with BM O H ar ri s. A s p ar t of thi s a gr eem ent, Zee had tra nsfer re d i ts fi nanci alas set s, i n cl ud i ng i ts acco unts r ecei vabl e, to BM O H ar ri s, and H ar ri s had pl aced a l i en on s eem i ngl y a l lo fZee’ s a sse ts. Concerned that i t m ay never c olle ct a nythi ng fro m Zee

— and that i t would l ose cr edi torpri ori ty

— GE Betz re gi ste re d the North Carol i na j ud gm ent in the Cook C ou n ty , I llin ois , C irc u it C ou r to n A u gu st 24 , 201 2. A lth ou gh B M O H ar ris is a D ela w ar e c or p or a t i o n, I llin ois is H ar ri s’ s princi pal pl ace ofbusi ness. Thus, I l l i noi s was the n e w h o me o fsom e o r a l lo fZ e e ’ s a s s e t s a nd a pla ce

— ifnotthe onl y pl ace

— w h er e G E B et z b elie ve d it had a ny chance of col l ecting the j ud gm ent. I n ad d iti on to re gi ste ring the N or th Caro l i na j ud gm ent, GE Betz se r v e d Ha r r i s wi th a c i t a t i o n t o di s c o v e r Z e e ’ s a s s e ts, w hi ch i n I l l i noi s has the effect offre ezing al lo f Z ee ’s p ro p er ty in H ar ri s’s p os se ss ion
. See 7 3 5 I l l
. Co mp. Sta t. 5/2- 1402
. H ar ri s m ove d to quash the ci tat i on fi ve d a y s l a t e r i n C o o kC o un t y Ci r c u i tC o u r t, a n d o n S e p t e mber12 , 20 12, H ar ri s a nd GE Betz ( w i thout Zee’ s par ti ci pati on) set a b rie fi ng sc hedu l e a nd a hear i ng date on th e ci ta ti o n a ct i o n. B ut a t the s ame t i m e th atGE Be tz a nd Har r i s were set tin g th e br i efi ng sc hedu l e a nd hear i ng date i n Cook C o u n ty C i r c u i t Co ur t, Z e e wa s b u s y p u r s u i n gi t s o wn en d s in fed eral court

— unbeknown st to ei therGE B etz or H arris
. Zee al one fi l ed a no ti ce o fr em ova lo fthe Cook C ou nt y cas e t o t h e federa l d istri ct cou rt i n th e N orthe rnN o. 12

- 3746 7 Dist ri ct o fI l l i noi s o n Se pte m ber12 , 20 12. Zee al l ege d th a tr e mov a lwa s p r o pe r b a s e d o n di v e r s i t y j ur i sdic

tio n, un d er 28 U .S.C . § 1 44 1(b ), b ec au se G E B et z (a P en n sy lvani a co rpor ati on with i ts pri nci p alpl ace ofbusi ness i n Pennsyl vani a) was a c i ti zen o f Pennsyl vani a, Zee (a T e n n e ss ee co rp or at ion w ith its p rin c ip al p lac e o f bu sine ss in T enne ss ee ) was a c i ti ze n o fTe nne ss ee , a nd the a m ount in contr ove rs y wel lexceeded $75, 000

— $7,60 4,0 83 .00 atth e t im e o f rem ov al, to be ex ac t. H ar ris nei therj oi ned i n norco nsented t o Zee’ s no ti ce o frem ova l
. On the s am e day that Zee fi l ed the n ot ice , Zee al so fi l ed an em er gencym oti on in the fed er al di str i ct c ou rtfo r re lief fro m th e c ita tio n iss u ed to H ar ris in the Coo k County Cir cui t Cour t. Tw o days l ate r, o n the m or ni n g o fS eptem ber14, 2012 , GE Betz , Z ee, and H ar ri s a l lappeare d i n federa l di s t r i c t c o ur t, a nd GE Be t z mad e a n o r a l moti on t o rem an d the ca se bac k to the C ook C ou nt y C ircuit Cou rt b as ed on i m properr em ova l
. The di str i ct c ourtj ud ge ask ed the parti es t o subm i t ca se l aw o n the propri etyo f the r em ova land seta ti m e forthe m t o re turn t o cour t that a fternoon. In a m att ero fa few hour s, GE Betz scr am bl ed to as sem bl e a wri tte n m em orandum , wh i ch f ocuse d sol el y o n the i ssue ofsubj ect- m att erj uri sdic

ti o n ( an d no t th e f o r um - defen dan t r ul e, whi chi s a st atuto ry p ro b lem , see H u rley v. M otor Coa ch Indus. , Inc. , 22 2 F. 3d 377, 37 8- 80 ( 7th Ci r. 20 00) )
. GE B et z fi l ed the bri ef lat er th at m or n in g. W h en th e p ar tie s re tu rn ed in the aft e r no o n, the di s t r i c tc o ur tj ud g e o r a l l y de ni e d G E B etz’s m otion to rem an d , find ing Z ee’s r e m oval prop er. T h e d ist ric t c ou rtbe liev ed th atth e c as e w as p ro p er ly8 N o. 12

- 3746 chara cter i zed as “a n i n depend ent pr oce edi ng, ” instea d ofan a nci l l ar y pr oce edi ng, wh i ch ga ve the federa l co ur t su bj ect- m at te r j ur i sdi ct i o n o ve r the c as e as l o ng as th e o th er req u ire m en ts for d ive rs ity w er e m et
. Even though G E B etz had not subm i tte d case l aw o n the fo r um - defen dan t r ul e i n i ts l at e- m o r ni ngfi l i ng, the dist ri ct c ourtj ud ge bro ught up th e pot enti alpro bl em pose d by the r ule d u ring the afternoon he ar i ng o n Se ptem ber14, 20 12. The f or um - defe nd ant r ule pro hibi ts re m ova lto federa lco urt i f“a ny o fth e p ar ti es i n i nter est proper l y j oi ned and ser ved as d efe n d an ts i s a ci ti zen o f the S t a te i n whi c h s uc h a c t i o n i s b r o ught
. ” 2 8 U. S
. C. § 1 44 1(b )(2) . W ith its p rin c ip a l p lac e o f bu sin es s in I l l i no i s, BM O Har r i s would runi nt o a pr o bl em wi ththe f or um - defe nd ant r ule i fi t were proper l y c hara c ter i zed as a de fen d ant ( sinc e th e ca se was r emov ed to the N o r th ern Di st r i cto fI l l i no i s)
. Ins te ad o fha vingthe p arties sub m it add iti o n a l briefing on B M O H arris’ s sta tus in th e c ase, however, the dist ri ct c ourtj ud ge sua s pontea ddr es se d the matt erfr om the b en cha t th e S ept embe r 14th h earing. T he jud g e o r al l y c o ncl ud ed

— w i thout expla nati on

— th a tHa r r i s wa s n o tp r o per l y c ha r ac te r i ze d a s a defen dan t

— oreven as a “party” to the c ase . H ar ri s, acc or ding to th e d i str i ct c ourtj ud ge, w as m erely a third-p arty citation resp ond e n t, so Z ee’s re m ova lo fthe c as e to federa lco urt did notr un af oulo f the for um - defe nd ant r ule
. Gi ve n tha t th es e r athe r c o m pl ex j ur i sdi ct i o na la nd s t a t ut o r y de t e r mi na t i o ns we r e ma de o r a l l y, i n the c o urse o fa da y, a nd wi thout m uch b r i e fi ng, GE Be t z fi l e d aN o. 12

- 3746 9

m oti on t o re consi der tw o w ee ks l ate r on S eptem ber28 , 2012
. I n i ts m em or andu m acco m panyi ng the m ot i on to r ec o ns i der, GE Be tz mor e cl ea r l y a r ti cul at ed i ts a r g um en ts for re m an d ba c k t o th e C oo k C ou n ty C irc u it C ou rt. Fi rst, G E Be tz argu ed th a t th e federa l cou rt l ac ke d s ubj ect- m att erj uri sdic ti on o verthe case , as i t was m er el y a n anci l l ar y pr oce edi ng “to re gi ste r and enf or ce sta te court j ud gm ents. ” S eco nd , GE Betz ar gued that eve n i fthe proce edi ng were i nd epende n t, H ar ri s was “t h e t r u e p ar ty in in te re st ” t o th e c as e. A s s u c h, H ar ris w as proper l y c hara c te riz ed as a defendant, and re

m ova lr an afoulo fthe f or um - defe nd ant r ule
. Des pi te the c l ea r era r ti cul at i o n o fGE Be tz ’ s two a r g um en ts, the dist ri ct c ourtdeni ed the m oti on t o re consi der on O ctob er 2, 2012. Rej ectin g b o t h of G E Be tz’s ar gum ents, the dist ri ct c ourtj ud ge hel d that Harr i s was “a new and i nd epend en t p arty” but not“ a par tyi n inter est
. ” As a new and independen t p ar ty thathad not p ar tic ip at ed in t h e N or th C ar olin a p ro c ee d in gs , H ar ris m ade the federa lcas e s uffi ci entl y di ffer ent fro m th e No r th Ca r o l i na c a s e , a c c o r di ngt o the di s t r i c tc ourt
. H ar ri s’ s pre sence re nd er ed th e fe deralcas e m or e than j u st a su p p lem en ta l p ro c ee d in g a n d , s in c e t h e d iver si ty re quir em ents w er e s ati sfi ed, ga ve the federa l co ur ts ubj e c t
- mat t e r j ur i s di c t i o n. No ne the l e s s , e v en though the di str i ct c ourtr eco gni zed H ar ri s a s a party, i t di d no t r ec o g ni ze Har ris as a pa r tyi n int er es t. The d istri ct cour t re aso ned that Zee w as the onl y party in in te re st (be sid es G E B et z) b ec au se Z ee w as th e s ole partythatco uld be h ar m ed by an adver se deci si on o f the dis tr ict cour t. A ccor ding to the c ourt, H ar ri s was10 N o. 12

- 3746 prot ecte d fr om har m becau se any m oneyi n i ts posse ssio n t h at w as “drain[e d] o ff ” a s a r esul t o fthe ci tat i on ac tio n w ou ld r es u lt in Z ee ’s “ in d eb te d [n es s] t o H ar ris i n the fullam ount. ” The di strict c ourtdi d not co nsi der th e so m ewha t l i k ely e vent th atZe e woul d de f au l t an d neverbe abl e t o sat i sfy i ts i nd ebte dn ess to H ar ri s. M ean w h ile, as GE Betz w as unsuccessfully t ry i ng to ge t t h e c as e re m an d ed b a c k t o th e C oo k C ou n ty C irc u it C ou rt, Ze e a n d H ar ris

— no w appa r en tly c o l l ab o r at i ng on t h eir l ega lst ra tegy

— we r e busy purs uing an e mer g e nc y mot i o n f o r r e l i e f fr o m the c i t a t i o n s e rv ed on H ar ris w h ile th e c as e w as in t h e C oo k C o u n t y C irc u it Court. On S eptem ber20 , 20 12, the dist ri ct c ourtgr anted a t e mpo r a r y r e s t r a i n i n go r d e r ( T R O ) mo d i fy i n gt he Cook County ci tat i on, wh i ch part i al l y l i fted the fre eze on Zee’ s a ccoun ts a t H ar ri s a nd al l owed Zee to pay its em p loy ee s a n d n ec es sa ry su p p liers . B ec au se H ar ris ha d fil ed U C C finan cing sta tem en ts cove ring allof Z ee’s ass ets in Decem ber20 11

—be f o r e th e N o r thCa r o l i na cour t e nter ed fi nalj ud gm ent in the GE Betz case

— th e dist ri ct c ou rt judge be l i eve d that the “fi rs t in ti m e, fi rs t i n ri ght” rul e co ntro l l ed, a n d H ar ri s had a pri or i ty secu rit y pos iti on ove r GE Be tz w ith regard to Zee’s ass ets
. U nl ess GE B etz co uld e stabl i sh an e xcepti on t o th is gener alr ule , the dist ri ct c ourttho ught that Harr is and Zee w er e l i kel y t o succee d on the m er i ts. Over the cour se of the next seve ra l m onths, G E Betz, Z ee , an d H ar ris co n tin u ed t o figh t ru th les sly in th e fede r aldi st r i ctc o urto ve r b o ththe pr i o r i tya nd the pr opri etyo f H arri s’ s cr edi t a gr eem ent with Zee.N o. 12

- 3746 11 I nd eed, the dist ri ct c ourt d ock et dem onst ra tes ni netye i g h te n t r i e s i n th e t wo - a n d

- a - h a l fmo n th s f o l l o wi ng the c ase ’ s r em ova l on Se ptem ber12 , 20 12. In additi on to th e exi sting ci tat i on that GE Betz had se rv ed on BM O H ar ri s Bank whil e the cas e was i n Cook Co unty, GE Betz ser ved a s eco nd ci tat i on di re ctl y o n Zee. M or eo ve r, GE Be tz a g g r es si ve l y s o ug htdi sc o ve r y abo ut the c re ditar ra ngem ent b etween Zee a nd H arris, i n an eff or t t o gather evi dence to support i ts m u ltip l e theor i es ofwh y i ts N or th Caro l i na j ud gm ent s hould ju m p ahead of H arris’ s li en i n te r m s of cred itor p rior ity. GE Be tz’s theo ri es i ncl ud ed that paym ent o fthe GE Betz j ud gm ent was a sti pu l ati on o fthe cre ditag re em ent, that H ar ri s had f ai l ed to per fect i ts l i en o veral lZee’ s a sse ts, that H ar ri s l osti ts pri or i ty sta tus o nce i t declined to en f o r c e i t s r i g ht s a nd r e med i e s a g a i ns tZ e e , a nd that the a rr angem ent b etween H ar ri s a nd Zee const i tuted a fra ud ule nt tr ansfer . I n re sponse, H ar ri s a nd Zee argu ed th atGE Be tz ’ s th eo r i es wer e g r o undl es s, a nd add i ti onaldi sco ver y was unw ar ra nted
. In the m i dst o f th es e ba tt l es o ve r di sc overy, i t appe ar s th e o nl y thi ng that the par ti es coulda g r ee o n was an o r dert o e xt en d t h e S ep te m b er 20 th T R O u n til th e d ist ric t c ou rtco u ld “a c tu ally se t up a s c h ed u le for m ea n in gfu l d et er m in at ion .” T h a t“ me a n i n g fu ld e t e r mi n a t i o n ” c a me o n N o v e mber28 , 20 12

— les s th an thr ee m onths afterZee re m ove d th e ca se t o fede r aldi st r i ctc o ur t. At a s ta tu s he ar i ng th at m or ni ng, the dist ri ct c ourtdecl ar ed, “[ I ] t i s t i m e t o c a l la h a l tt o a l lth i s . . . . B e t z . . . b e g i n s wi th a f a l s e p r e mi se . And gue ss what ? Tha t en ds wi th a f al se co nc l usi on. ” The dist ri ct cour t j ud ge did not bel i ev e t hat12 N o. 12

- 3746 GE Be t z h a d a de qu a t e l y estab l i s he d a nyo fthe e xc e ptio n s t o th e g en er al ru le of “ firs t in ti m e, firs t in righ t.” Dism i ssing GE B etz ’ s theor i es as “f al l aci ous, ” the j ud ge ch aract erized them as requ iring H arris “to act con trary to i ts own eco nom i c i nter est
. ” Furtherm or e, the d istr i ct cou rt j ud ge f ound “nothi ng to sugg est
. . . anythi ng o ther th an arm ’s le n gt h arr an ge m en ts
. . . b et w ee n H ar ris and Zee
. ” A l l i n al l, the j ud ge f ound GE Be tz ’s a tte m pts to j um p ahead o fH ar ri s “ absur d,” and as a r esul t, qua sh ed bo ththe c i ta ti o n s er ve d o n Har ris an d the ci ta ti o n s er ve d di rectly o n Ze e, a nd di smi ss ed th e case . GE Betz fi l ed a t i m el y a pp ealo fal lthe dist ri ct cour t’ s deci si ons. Befo r e we c a n a ddr e s s a nyo fthe di s t r i c tc o ur t ’ s l ate r m er i ts-base d decisi ons, we m ust fi rs t r evi ew the dist ri ct court’s ear l i erdeni alo fGE Betz’ s m oti on t o re m and, as thi s m oti on quest i oned the basi s forsubj ect- m att erj uri sd ict ion in fe d er al c ou rt
. Sc hu r v. L.A . Weigh t Lo ss C trs., Inc. , 5 77F. 3 d 7 5 2 , 7 5 8 ( 7 th C i r . 2 0 0 9 )
. We r e v i e w a di s t r i c tc o ur t ’ s de ni a lo fa mo t i o n t o r e man d deno vo . Id
.
II G E B e t z a d v a n c e s tw o a r g u me n t s r e g a r d i n gth e i mpropri etyo f Z ee’ s r em ova l
. Fi rs t, GE Betz ar gues that the federa lco urt l acks subj ect- m atterj uri sdic ti on o ver su cha n a ct i o n. S ec o nd, GE Be tz a r g ue s th ate ve n i fthe fede ral cou rt had sub j ect-m atter j urisd iction, Z ee’s r emov alv i o l at ed th e f o r um - defen dan t r ul e, a nd the acti on s houl d have be en r em ande d b ack to the Coo k C o u n ty C i r c u i tC o u r tu p o n G E B e t z ’ s t i me l y o bj e ct i o n.N o. 12

- 3746 13 S u bj e c t
- ma t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n i s o u r f o r e mo s t c o n c e r n ; wi th

ou t i t, “the cour t cannot proce ed at al l i n any ca u se .” Ste el Co
. v. Citize n s fo r a B et te r E nv’t, 52 3 U.S
. 83 , 94 ( 1998 ) ( quoti ng E x parteM cCa rdle, 7 W all
. 506, 514 (1868 ))
. A ccord ingl y, we begin by add re ssing GE B etz ’ s s ubj ectm att erj uri sdic ti on a rgum ent. G E B et z’s su bj ec t-m at te r j u ris d ict ion arg u m en t is , in re a l i t y, t wo f o l d. Al tho ugh GE Be t z a dmi t s tha t the cas e c o mpl i e s wi th the r e qu i r e men t s o fdi v e r s i t y j ur i sdic

ti on under 2 8 U.S
. C. § 1 441(b) , i t a rgues that the cas e r uns i nt o t r o ubl e wi tht wo o th ers tatu te s th atl i m i t th e su bj ec t-m at te r j u ris d ict ion of fed er al c ou rt s, n am ely 28 U
. S. C . § 14 41( a) and 28 U
. S. C. § 1 963. W i th r espect to 28 U
. S. C. § 1 441( a) , GE B etz co ntends thatthe Cook County Ci rcui t Cour t ca se w as not a “ ci vi lact i on bro ught in a S tat e co urt ofwh i ch the dist ri ct c ourt s o f the Unite d Sta tes have o ri gi nalj uri sdic ti on, ” a nd th eref or e, was not re m ovabl e. W e h ave l ong i nter prete d § 14 41 ( a) “ to a l l o w rem o va lo nl y o f‘ i nde pen den t su its ’ bu t n otan c illary or ‘s u p p lem en ta r y’ p ro c ee d in gs .” Trav e l e rs Prop e r ty Cas. v. G ood, 68 9 F
. 3d 714, 72 4 ( 7th Ci r . 2 0 1 2 ) ( qu o t i ng Fed. Sa v. & Lo an Ins . Corp. v. Q ui nn , 419 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th C ir. 1969) ). Th is pru d en tial interpreta ti on o f§ 1441 ( a) , wh i ch da te s back as ear l y a s B ar r ow v. H unt on , 99 U
. S. 80 , 83 ( 1878 ) , “s eek s t o avo id the waste ofhavin g fe deralco urts ente rt ai n sat el l i te el em ents ofpending sta te sui ts and j ud gm ents. ” Trav elers , 689 F
. 3 d a t7 2 4 ( qu o t a t i o ns a nd c i t a t i o ns o mi t t e d)
. Accor ding to GE Betz, the Cook County Ci rcui t Cour t ca se was no th i ngmor e th ana s at el li te e l emento fthe pe ndi ng N or th Carol i na sta te cour t sui t; i t w as m er el y an ac tion14 N o. 12

- 3746 to enf or ce the N or th Ca ro lin a j ud gm ent. A s a r esul t, G E B et z argues that § 14 41( a) pro hibi ted r em ova lto federa lco urt. G E B e t z ’ s fi r s tj u r i s d i c t i o n a la r gu me n th a s s o me m er it

— es pec i al l y c onsi der i ngtha t th e N o r thCa r o l i na s ui t r e ma i n s p e n d i n g i n th e s t a t e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s , a nd a d ec i s i on va c at in g G E B et z’s j u d gm en t t h er e w ou ld re nd erthe i nstant m att er m oo t. To b e s ure, thi s pro ce edingi s si m i l art o the N orth Ca r o l i na c as e, a nd o ur cour t has neve r devel oped a “ bri ght- l i ne f or m u l a . . . f or separ ating the i nd ependent and re m ovable sheep fro m the a nci l lar y and nonr em ovabl e g oat s. ” Trav elers , 68 9 F
. 3d at7 24. S ti l l, we be l i ev e th atthe matt erb efo r e us co nt ains o ne di st i nc ti o n tha t pl ac es i t squa r ely o n the si de ofthe re m ovabl e sheep: the prese nce ofBM O H ar ri s. B M O H ar ris h as be en h e a v ily in vo lve d in t h is m at te r sin c e it s i n c e p tio n in t h e C oo k C ou n ty C irc u it Court. I t fi rs t ca m e into the pr oce edi ng wh en GE B etz ser ved i t with a c ita tio n to di sco verZee’ s a sse ts. S i nce th en , H ar ris h as so u gh t t o q u as h th e c ita tio n, vigo ro u sly assert ing “th e priority ofi ts secu rity intere s t in Z ee’s as se ts an d its righ t o f se to ff.” Inco n tr as t, B M O H ar ris is whol l y uninv o l ve d i n th e unde r l y i ngNor thCa r o l i na case . H ar ri s’ s pre sence al so re nd er s the s ubj ect of th e di spu te i n thi s ca se c o m pl et ely differ en t fr o m the su bj ec t o f t h e d i s p u te in t h e N or th C ar olin a c as e. In N o r thCa r o l i na , GE Be tz a nd Ze e ar e fi g ht i ngabo ut c o v e na nt s n o tt o c o mpe t e a nd t r a de p r a c t i c e s . H er e , GE B etz, Zee, and BM O H arris a r e fighting ab ou t H arris’ s p rior ity as Z e e ’ s se c u re d cr ed ito r. A s w e p oin te d ou t inN o. 12

- 3746 15 Tr a velers , 68 9 F
. 3d at 724 ( quoti ng B ufo rd v . Stroth er, 10 F. 406, 407 (C. C.D. Io w a 1881) ) , “ ‘ w here the supp l em ental p roceed ing is n o t m e rely a m od e of ex ecu tion or rel ief, butwh ere it, i n f ac t, i nv o l ve s ani nde pen den t co ntr ov er sy w ith so m e n ew an d d iff e r e n t p ar ty , i t m ayb e r em oved i nt o the fede r alc o ur t. ’ ” I n the i ns ta nt p r o c e e di ng, w e h a v e a n e w a n d d i ffe r e n tp a r t y ( B MO H ar r i s) a s wel la s ani nde pen den t con tr o ve r sy( th e p rior ity ofH arris’ s l ie n). T he refore, un d er Trav elers , we ha v e a n a c t i o n tha t wa s r e mov ab l e un de r 28 U
. S
. C. § 1441 (a). A lth ou gh we rej ect the a rgum ent that Zee ’ s r em ova l vi ol ate d 28 U.S
. C. § 1441 ( a) , Zee “i s no t o ut o fthe j uri sdic

ti onalwoods. ” A bbott Labs. v. C VS Ph arm acy, Inc. , 29 0 F
. 3d 85 4, 8 58 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 2)
. F o r GE Be tz make s a se co nd j uri sdic ti onalar gum ent base d o n 28 U
. S. C. § 1 963. S ecti on 1963 p ro vid es that a “j ud gm ent in an ac ti on f orthe re cove ryo fm oneyo r proper ty en te re d i n any cour t o f ap p eals, d istri ct court, ban krup tcy court, or in th e C o u rt of I nter nati onalTra de m a y be registered ” i n a fe deral c ou rt (em p h as is ad d ed ). G E B et z arg u es th a t t h is l anguage o n ly perm i ts a federa lco urt to re gi ste r f or eign j ud gm ents fro m o therfedera lco urts
. J ud gm ents fro m st ate co urts , acc or ding to GE B etz ’ s inter preta ti on o f§ 1 96 3, may no t be r eg i st er ed i n a fede r alc ou rt
. To supp or t i ts i nter preta ti on, GE Betz ci tes a h os t of d i s t r i c tc o u r td e c i s i o n s , i n c l u d i ng P o l o Re al ty Inc . v. Kru se, 2 010 W L 30874 17, at* 2, * 5 ( N
. D. I nd
. A ug. 2, 20 10) ( concl ud i ng tha t fe deralco urts “ca nnot e nfo rce a sta te c ourt j ud gm ent, ” eve n though ther e i s “no authority in th e Se ve n th C irc u it a d d re ss in g t h is q u es tio n ”); M a rbury16 N o. 12

- 3746 La w G rou p, P LL Cv. C a rl , 7 2 9 F
. Sup p. 2d 7 8 , 8 3 ( D. D. C. 20 1 0 ) ( fi nd i ngtha ta fe de r a lc o ur t“ l a c k s j ur i s di cti on t o e nfo r c e s t a t e c o ur tj ud gm e nt s ” ) ; a nd Eur o-Am Coal Trading, Inc. v. Jam es Ta ylor M ining, Inc. , 43 1 F. Supp. 2d 705, 70 7 ( E.D. Ky. 20 06) ( hol ding that “the re gi str ation proce du re s of 28 U
. S. C. § 1963 conta i n j u ri sdic ti onal l i m i tat i ons that prohibi t fe deral co ur ts fr o m r eg i st er i ng stat e cour t j ud gm ents” )
. S i nce 28 U
. S. C. § 14 41 (a) l i m i ts r emov alt o a ct i o ns i n “ which th e di st r i ctc o ur ts o fthe U ni ted Stat es have or i gi nalj uri sdic ti on, ” par ti es can onl y r e mov e ma t t e r s tha tc o ul d h a v e o r i g i na l l y b e en bro ught i n federa lco urt. GE Betz ar gues that thi s ca se i s, at he ar t, the r egi str ati on o fa f or ei gn st ate
- cour t j ud gm en t, whi chunde r s ev er aldi st r i ctc o ur ts ’ i nt er pr et at i o ns of 2 8 U .S .C . § 19 63 , cou ld n oth av e b ee n orig in ally b r o ughti n fe de r a lc o ur t
. As a r e s ul t, GE Be t z c onte nds th at rem oval w as im p rop er. GE Betz’ s argum ent invi tes us t o j oi n sev er aldi str i ct cour ts

— at lea st on e o fw h i c h is inou r ow n circ u it

— in hol di ngtha t2 8 U. S
. C. § 1 9 6 3 b a r s fe de r a lc o ur t s fro m e n f o r c i n gj u d g me n t s r e n d e r e d b y s t a t e c o u r t s . We d ec lin e t h is in vit at ion . A lth ou gh t h e lan gu ag e o f § 19 63 is som ew h at am bi guous, GE Betz’ s inter preta ti on r equi re s re ading addit i onalwords i nto the s tatute. GE Betz i nsi sts that§ 1963 expl i ci tl y a l l ows f orthe re gi str ati on o ffede r alc o ur t j udg m en ts, a nd thus , i m pl i ci tly b ar s th e re gi str ati on o fst ate co urt j ud gm ents. But w e no te th at n eit h er th e w or d “s ta te ” n o r t h e w or d “fe d er al” appear in the text of§ 1963
. I t is true that onl y the fe deralsyste m h as a “b ankr up tcy cou rt” an d a “C ou rt of I nt erna tional Trad e.” Bu t everyN o. 12

- 3746 17 st at e sy st em ha s th e equi va l en t o fa “ di st ri ctc o ur t” a nd a “ cour t o fappeal s”

— ev eni fthe s ta te
- co ur t versions o fth e s e c o u r t s go b y a d i ffe r e n tn a me . Mo r e o v e r, s o me st at e- co ur t sy st ems a ctua l l y us e the s ame n ames a s th e federa l

- court s yst em ; M i nnesot a a nd Vi rg i ni a, f or ex ampl e, r efert o th ei r t r i alc o ur ts a s “di st r i ctc o ur ts ” an d thei r appell ate co urts a s “courts ofappeal s. ” See, e.g., M in n es ot a Ju d icia l B ra n c h, M in n es ota D is tr ictCo urts , ava il ableat http: //w w w . m ncourt s. gov/? page=2 38 ( l ast visited M ay 1, 2013 ); Offi ce of the E xe cu t iv e Secretary of th e Su p re m e C ou rto f V irg in ia, Virgin ia ’s Jud icia l Sy stem , ava il ableat h t t p : //ww w. c o u r t s . s t a t e . v a . u s / c o u r t s / g d
. h t ml ( l astvi si ted M ay 1, 2013 )
. Thus, i t i s no t cl earthat the l an gu ag e of§ 1963 r efer s s ol el y t o j ud gm ents re nd er ed by federa lco urts
. A nd ev en i f§ 1963 di d refero nl y t o j ud gm ents re n d er ed by fed er al c ou rt s, th e s t a tu te d oe s n otco n ta in any othe r l anguage ba rrin g fe d er al c ou rt s from en for c in g s ta te -c ou rtj u d gm en ts . Sec tio n 19 63 m er ely s t a t e s th a t a “ j u d g me n t
. . . e n t e r e d i n a n y c o ur t o fa ppeal s, di str i ct c ourt, bank ruptcy cour t, o r i n the C ou rto f I nter nati onalTra de m ay be r egi ste red .” Se cti on 1 963 c ou ld h av e s a i d , “ O nly a j udg m en t
. . . e nt er ed i n a ny fe deral cour t o fappeal s, dist rict co urt, bank ruptcy cour t, ori n the C ou rto fInter nati onalTra de m ay be r egi st e r e d”

—but i t doe s n ot. N ori s there any othe r l anguage i n § 1 96 3 th ats ug g es ts tha t a s ta te
- co ur t j udg m en t m eet i ng the o therr equi re m ents f orfedera lj uri sdic ti on m ay not be e nfo rce d by a federa lco urt. Rea d in g a ba r aga i n st t he enf or cem ent o fst ate
- cour t j ud gm ents by federa lco urts r equi re s r eadi ng add itio nalwords i nto18 N o. 12

- 3746 § 19 63 th a t a r e n o t th e r e . A c o u r t h a s “ ‘ n o r i g h t, i n t he gui se of c onst ructi on o fan a ct, to ei theradd w or ds to o r elim in at e w or d s fro m th e la n gu ag e u se d by co n gr es s.’ ” Kin g v . I
. R. S. , 6 88 F
. 2d 48 8, 4 91 ( 7th Ci r . 1 98 2) ( quo ting D eSoto Sec. C o. v. C om m ’r, 2 35 F.2d 409, 41 1 (7th C ir. 1956)). W e hav e no r i ght t o add wo rd s in to the t ext o f§ 1963 , and w e ce rt ai nl y hav e no r i ght t o add a re str i cti on that i s no t a l re ady ther e. A s a res u lt, w e c on c lu d e t h at § 1 9 6 3 d oe s n otp ro h ibit the rem ova lo fal lm att er s r el ate d to the r egi str ati on o f s t a t e - c o ur tj ud g men t s ; mo r e s pe c i fi c a l l y, we c o nc l ud e that § 1 963 does not prohibi t the r em oval o f the ci tati on pro ceedi ng i ni ti ate d by GE B etz
. W e a cknowle dge that thi s co ncl usi on r uns contr ar y t o previ ou s inter preta
ti ons by seve ra ldi str i ct c ourt s. But w e n ote that GE Betz has no t ci ted, norhave we been abl e t o l oca te, any deci si ons by si ste r ci rcui ts that i nter pret § 1 963 as barring p ost-j ud gm en t proc eed in g s of th e sort prese n ted her e. M or eov er, we are notco ncer ned that our re fusalto r ead a barag ai nst th e en for cem ent o fst ate
c o ur tj ud g men t s i nt o 2 8 U. S
. C. § 1 9 6 3 wi l lo pe n the fl o o dgat es t o ne w l i t i g a t i o n i n fe de r a l c o ur t
. I n o r de r t o be en f o r ce ab l e bya fede r alc o ur t, a s ta te
- co ur t j udg m en t enf or cem ent pr oce edi ng m ust sti l lm eetthe othe r re quir em en ts f o r fede r alj ur i sdi ct i o n, i nc l udi ngthe a m o unt i n contr ove rs y a nd the dive rs i ty re quir em ents und er 28 U. S
. C. § § 13 32 a nd 1 44 1( b) a s wel la s th e i nde pen den t p roceed ing requ irem en t un d er 28 U
. S. C
. § 144 1 (a). W e b e l i e v e th a tth e § 1 4 4 1 ( a ) i n d e p e n d e n tp r o c e e di ng re quir em ent par ti cul ar l y l i m i ts the num bero fst ate
c o ur t j ud g men t s tha t a fe de r a l c o ur t may e nfo r ce, asN o. 12

- 3746 19

m ost stat e-cou rt j ud gm e n ten forcem en t proc eed ings are m ore pr oper l y c hara cter i zed as anci l l ar y o r supp l em en tary su i ts
. As a r es ul t, we ex pec t th atthe i ns ta ntmatt eri s no t th e no r m , b utr ather o ne o fthe rare j ud gm en t-enforcem en t proc eed ings th at is su ff i ci ent l y i nd e pendent f ro m the und er l yi ng st ate
cour t pr oce edi ngs t o gi ve th e federa lco urt j uri sdic ti on un d er § 1441(a).

III H avi ng sa ti sfi ed our sel ves that federa l court j uri sdic

ti on i s s ecure under 28 U
. S. C. § 1441( a) and not precl ud ed by2 8 U
. S. C
. § 1 96 3, we no w turn t o GE Be tz ’ s se co nd a r gu me n tw h y Z e e ’ s r e mo v a lt o fe d e r a lc o u r tw a s i mproper : the f or um - defe nd ant r ule
. Codifi ed u n d er 28 U
. S. C. § 1 441(b) ( 2) , the forum

- defe nd ant r ule pro hibi ts re m ova l “ ifany ofthe parti es i n i nter estpro perl y j oi ned an d se rv ed as d efe n d an ts is a c iti z e n of th e St at e in w h ich su c h ac tio n is br ou gh t.” T h e p u rp os e o f th is ru le i s “ t o p r e s e r v e th e p l a i n t i ff’ s c h o i c e o fa ( s t a t e ) f o r u m, unde r c i r cumst an ce s wher e i t i s ar g uabl y l es s ur gen t to provi de a federa lf or um to p re vent prej ud i ce a gainst an o ut- of

- sta te party
. ” H urley, 22 2 F
. 3d at 380. A l though the f o r um- de fe nd a ntr ul e a r i s e s u nd e r 2 8 U. S
. C. § 1 441

— w h ich , a s we know f ro m the disc ussi on above , conta i ns so m e j uri sdic ti onalr equi re m ents

— th e f o r u md efe n d an t ru le its elf is n onj u ris d ict ion al. See H urley, 222 F. 3d at 380 ( end or sing “the l ongs tandi ng l i ne o f au th or ity th at h old s t h at t h e fo ru m d efe n d an t ru le is no nj ur i sdi ct i o na l ”)
. As a r es ul t, no nc o m pl i an ce wi ththe20 N o. 12

- 3746 for um - defe nd ant r ule i s a st atuto ry, nota j uri sdic tion al, d efe c t. Hol m s t r om v. Pe t e rs on , 4 9 2 F
. 3 d 8 3 3 , 8 3 8

- 4 0 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 7) ( dis cus singthe r ea so ns why th e f o r um - defen d an t rule i s a statu tory d efect). This disti ncti on be tw een s tatutor y a nd j uri sdic ti onal d e fe c t s i s i mpo r t a n tb e c a u s e i td e t e r mi n e s wh en a p lai nt iff m ay obj ect to rem ova l. O f cou rse, a p lai nt iff m ay obj ec t to rem ova lbas ed on a j uri sdic ti onaldefect at an y t im e. Se eR uh rga s AG v. M arat hon O i l Co. , 52 6 U
. S. 574, 58 3 ( 1999 ) ( re m i nd i ng tha t “ subj ect-m att er d e l i n e a t i o n s m u s tb e p o l i c e d b y th e c o u r t s o n th e i r o wn i n i t i a t i v e e v e n a tth e h i g h e s tl e v e l ” )
. B u tth e t i me fr a me for ob j ec tin g t o re m ov al b as ed on a s t a t u to ry d efe c t is m uc h sm all er. U nd er 28 U
. S. C . § 1 447(c), a p lai nt iff’ s “m oti on t o re m and the ca se on the bas i s o fany defe ct othe r than l ack of su bj ect- m att erj uri sdic ti on m ust be m ade wi thin 3 0 da y s a ft e r the fi l i ng o f the no t i c e ofr em ov al.” T h e re as on be h in d th is th irty-d ay tim e lim it is “t o ‘p re ve n t a p ar t y w h o is a w ar e o f a d efe c t in re m ova lpro cedure fro m usi ng the d efect as i nsurance aga i nst l ate r unfav or able devel opm ents i n federa l cour t. ’ ” Hol m s t r om , 49 2 F.3 d at 8 38- 39 ( quoti ng In re Shell O i l Co. , 93 2 F
. 2d 1518 , 1522 ( 5th Ci r. 19 91) )
. Consequentl y, i f a pla i nti ff f ai l s to ra i se a f or um - defe nd ant o b j ecti on wi th i n thi r tyda y s o fr emov al, the pl aint i ffwai ves the rig h t t o ra ise t h e o bj ec tio n lat er . H urley, 22 2 F
. 3d at 378- 80. Wi th th i s g e n e r a l o v e r v i e w o f th e r u l e i n mi n d , we tu r n t o the s pec i fi cs o fGE Be tz ’ s f o r um - def en dan t ar g um ent. GE Be tz as ser ts that Zee’ s r em ova lto the federa l dist ri ct c ourti n the N or ther n Dis tr i ct o fI l l i noi s v i ol ate dN o. 12

- 3746 21 the for um - defe nd ant r ule b ecause BM O H ar ri s was bo th a defe nd ant and a ci ti zen of the f or um . ( Recal lthat H arris’ s p rincipa l p lace of bu siness i s Il linois.) GE Be tz’s f o r um- de fe nd a nto bj e c t i o n wa s t i mel y u nd e r 2 8 U. S
. C. § 1 447( c) ; i t r ai sed the ar gum ent in i ts m oti on t o re c on sid er , fi led six te en d ay s a fte r Z ee ’s re m ov al. St ill, G E B e t z ’s a rg u m en t o n ly h old s w at er if (1) B M O H ar ris i s pr o per ly consi der ed a defen dan t to thi s ac ti o n, a nd ( 2) the f or um - d efe n d an t r ule can pose a probl em ev en when a no n- f o r um de fen dan t r emov es the c as e wi th o ut the par ti ci pa tion ofthe f or um defendant. W e a dd re ss ea cha r g um en t i n tur n.
A Ze e an d BM O Har r i s spe ntmuch o fo r ala r g um en t add re ssing the fi rs t i ssue, i nsi sting tha t Harr i s is n ot a “d efend an t” for th e p urp oses of 28 U
. S. C
. § 1 4 4 1(b)(2)
. A ccor ding to them , H arris i s m er el y a “thi rd- party ci tat i on r espondent” under I l l i noi s l aw . H ar ri s a nd Zee adm i t that thi s s tatus m ake s Harr i s a “par ty i n i nter est ” t o the s uit, but they con te n d t hat Harr i s’ s s tatus does not r i s e t o the l e v e lo fa defe nd a nt
. In o r de r t o de c i de wh e th e r H a r r i s i s p r o p e r l y c l a s s i fi e d a s a d e fe n d a n t, we now co nsi der the go ver ni ng l aw , and how th i s l aw i nf o r m s H ar r i s’ s st atus i n the pr es en t ac ti o n. B e c a u s e we s i ti n d i v e r s i t y i n th e p r e s e n ta c t i o n, “ we ar e r equi r ed to apply the s ubs ta nt i ve l aw o fthe f o r um st at e . . . as w e b elie ve th e h igh es t c ou rtof th e s ta te w ou ld apply i t. ” Wo lverin e M ut. Ins. v. V a nc e ex rel. Tinsley, 32 5 F.3 d 9 3 9 , 9 4 2 (7 th C ir. 20 03 ); s e eal s o Er i eR. R. Co. v.22 N o. 12

- 3746 Tom pki ns , 30 4 U.S
. 64, 78 ( 1938). Ther ef or e, we are r equi r ed to a ppl y th e su bs ta nt i ve l aw o fI l l i no i s th atg o ve r ns c i t a t i o n a c t i o n s t o di s c o v e r a s s e t s . Atth e s a me t i me , we m u st ap p ly fed er al p ro c ed u ra l law t o t h i s c as e. SeeErie, 304 U
. S. at78 ; Wi n dyCi ty M e t al F ab r i c at ors & Su pp l y, Inc. v. C IT Tech . F in . Servs. , Inc. , 536 F.3d 663 , 670 (7th C ir. 2008 )
. A l though for m al l y t i tl ed as a ci tat ion a cti on t o disc ove r ass ets , thi s ca se i s, at botto m , an e nfo rce m en t acti on t o col l ect a m oneyj ud gm ent. Fe d. R. Ci v. P. 69 ( a) ( 1) , wh i ch gove rns the e nfo rce m ent o fm oney j ud gm en ts in federal cou rt, prov ides that the “p roced ure on e xecuti on

— and i n proc eedi ngs s up ple m entar y t o and i n ai d ofj ud gm en t o r executi on

— m ust a ccor d w i th th e p ro c e d u re of th e s ta te w h er e t h e c ou rtis loc at ed .” Illino is is t h e s ta te w h er e th e f e d e ra l d ist ric t c ou rtis l oca ted, so we l oo k a gain to I l l i noi s l aw f orthe proce du ra l ri ghts and proces ses acc om panyi ng a c ita ti on t o disc ove r ass ets
. W e e nd eavo r to provi de t h e sam e pr oce du ra l rig h ts an d p r o c e ss es th at th e p ar tie s w ou ld enj oy in I l l i n o i s s t a te co ur th e r e i n fe d e r a lc o u r t ; h o we v e r, we need not “apply [ ] ev er y j ot and tit tle of I l l i noi s pro cedurall aw . ” R esolu tio n Trust C o rp. v. R uggiero , 99 4 F.2 d 12 21 , 122 6 (7 th C ir. 19 93 ); s e eal s o S t arIns . Co. v. R is k M ktg. G rp. Inc. , 56 1 F
. 3d 656, 66 1 (7th Cir
. 20 09) ( hol ding that a “ d ist ri ct c ourtwas cor re ct in turni ng to sta te l aw ” be cause und er R ule 69 , “the Fe deralRule s o f Civi lPro cedure ar e no t s tr i ctl y a pp l i cabl e t o [Illinoi s] su p p lem en ta ry p ro c ee d in gs ”); Vukadi novi ch v. M cCar t hy, 59 F. 3d 58, 62 ( 7th Ci r. 19 95) ( noti ng tha t Rul e 6 9 “go ve rns col l ecti on pro ceedi ngs in the federa lco urts , [ an d] a dop ts what ev erpr o ce dur es a r e f o l l o wed b y theN o. 12

- 3746 23 st at e co ur ts i n the s ta te i n whi chc o l l ec ti o n i s so ught ”). I ns te ad, ou r princ i palo bj ec ti ve unde r Rul e 69 i s to “ co nf or m [ ] co l l ecti on pro ceedi ngs t o sta te l aw . ” St ar, 56 1 F. 3d at 661 ( quoti ng M atos v. Richard A . N el lis, Inc. , 10 1 F.3d 119 3, 1195 ( 7th Cir. 1996)). Wi th th i s fr a me wo r ki n min d , w e tu r n n o w t o s t u dy bo ththe s ubs ta nt i ve a nd pr o ce dur alr i g ht s ac co r ded th e parti es to an I l l i noi s citati on a cti on t o disc ove r ass ets
. Speci fi cal l y, we see k t o deter m i ne the pro cedural ri ghts, the subst an ti ve ri ghts, and the re m edi es to w hi ch part i es to a ci tat i on a cti on a re entitled
. Once we under st an d the s pec i fi cs o fa n I l l i no i s ci ta ti o n a ct i o n, we wi l lb e i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n to a s s e s s wh e the r a thi r dp ar ty c ita tio n res p on d en t like B M O H ar ris is p ro p er ly cl ass i fi ed as a defendant f orpurp os es o ffedera l r e mo v a ll a w. O ften r efer re d to as “supplem entar y pr oce edi ngs,” citations to d iscover asset s are the “d om inan t proc ed ure ofthe m od er n er a” used i n I l l i noi s t o enf or ce m oney j u d gm en ts . Ro b er t G . M ar ko ff, S u r vey of Il l i n ois L aw: E nforce m entof Judgm ents , 33 S
. I l l. L . Rev
. 63 1, 63 9- 40 (Sum m er 2009). T w o prov isi ons of Ill inois l aw govern ci tat i on acti ons. The fi rs t provi si on, 735 I l l
. Com p. S tat
. 5/2- 14 02 , pr ov id es in p ar t: A j u d gm en t c re d it o r , o r h is or h er su c c es so r in i nter estwh en thati nter esti s m ade to app earo f r e c o r d, i s e nt i t l e d t o p rose cutesup p lem en tary proce edi ngs forthe pu rp ose s o fexam i ni ng t he judgm entdeb tor or any other pers on to dis cover asse ts o r i nc o m e o fthe d ebt o r no t ex empt fr o m the24 N o. 12

- 3746

en forcem en t of th e j ud gm en t.
. . . A sup p lem en tary proce edi ng shal lbe c om m enced by the s er vi ce o f a ci tat i on i ssued bythe cl er k. 73 5 I l l
. Co m p. S ta t. 5 /2- 14 02 (a) (e m pha si s adde d)
. The seco nd pro vi si on, I l l
. Com p. S tat
. S
. C t. R . 2 77, o utl i nes the proce du re s of a ci tat i on acti on i n m or e detai l
. It requ i re s the p a r t y t o wh o m t he c i t a t i o n i s di r e c t e d, w hethert h e j ud gm ent debt oro r a thi rd party, “t o appear forexam i nati on . . . co ncer ni ng the pro pertyo r in c om e o f or in d eb te d n es s d u e t h e jud gm en t d eb to r.” I l l
. C o mp. S t a t
. S
. C t
. R
. 2 7 7 ( c ) ( 3 )
. T h e r u l e a l s o a l l o ws the par ty b ringi ng the ci tat i on a cti on t o dem and that th e j ud g m en t deb to r o rthi r d pa r typr o duce “ an y b oo ks , pap er s, o r re cor ds i n hi s o r i ts posse ssi on o r co nt r o lwhi chha ve o r may co nt ain i nform at i o n c o nc e r ningthe p r o pe r t y o r i nc o me o fthe deb t o r . ” I l l
. Co mp. St at. S. Ct. R. 277( c) ( 4)
. Furtherm or e, the rul e p ro vides f o r di sc o ve r y a nd a he ar i ngo n the c i ta tion, al l o wi ng “[ a] ny i nter est ed part y”

— i ncl ud i ng a thi rd- partyci tati o n r es po nde nt

— to “subpoena w i tness es and addu ce e v i de nc e a s u po n the t r i a lo fa nyc i v i lacti on . ” I l l
. Co mp. Stat. S. Ct
. R. 277(e). At th e c o n c l u s i o n o f th e s e c i t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s , t he tr i alco urt m ay or der t h e partyto wh om the ci tat i on i s di re cted t o turn o verthe j ud gm ent de b tor ’ s a sse ts to t h e ju d gm en t cred itor. 735 I ll
. Com p . Stat. 5/2-1402(b); s e eal s o Pys hos v. He a rt-Lan d Deve l opm e ntCo. , 63 0 N
. E.2 d 1054, 10 57 ( I l l
. A pp . Ct. 19 94)
. Rega rdl ess o f w hether the t ri alco u rt d ecides to or der the tur novero f ass ets , the trial c ou rt ’ s fi nalo rderi n a c i tat i on pro -N o. 12

- 3746 25 ceedi ng i s a pp eal abl e bybo th the cr ed ito r and the par ty to wh om the ci tat i on i s di re cted. I l l
. Com p. S tat
. S
. Ct. R
. 304(b)(4)
. N o t su r pr i sing l y, o urc o ur t ha s pr ev i o us l y e nco unt er ed I l l i no i s ci ta ti o n a ct i o ns . Indeed , i n Res ol ut i on Trust, 9 9 4 F
. 2 d a t1 2 2 3 , we e v e n pr o v i de d a b r i ef su m m ar y o fthe r i g ht s o fthe pa r ti es i n a c i ta ti o n a ct i o n: The re l evantpro vi si ons ofI l l i noi s la w . . . [ f or ci tat i on a cti ons: ] Enti tl e the j ud gm ent c re dit or to questi on the j ud gm ent debtor , or anyo ne el se w ho m i ght have re l evanti nfo rm ati on, under o ath re gar ding the e xi ste nce and wh er eabo uts o f ass ets tha tmi g htb e u s e d t o s a t i s fy the j ud gme n t
. . . . E n t i t l e a n y th i r d p a r t y wh o c l a i ms an i nt e r e s t in those assets to ap p ear an d be hea rd o n h i s cl ai m . Em po werthe c o ur t to o r derthe debtorto tur n ove r proper ty to the c red i torto sat i sfy the j ud gm ent. M o r eo ve r, w e h el d i n D exi a Cr édi tLo ca l v. Rogan that a be nch tr i alwas w i thi n “the p ro per sco pe” o fa ci tat i on action since Il linois law “ ‘g iv e[s] th e cou rt broad pow ers t o c o mp e lth e a p p l i c a t i o n o fd i s c o v e r e d a s s e t s o r i n c o me i n or der t o sat isfy a j ud gm ent. ’ ” 6 29 F. 3d 612, 62 4 ( 7th Cir
. 20 10) ( quoti ng D ow li ng v. C hi. O ptions A sso cs . , Inc. , 84 7 N
. E. 2d 74 1, 746 ( I l l
. App. Ct
. 2 00 6) )
. Di st ingu ishing i t fr om “a m er e di sco ver y s tatute, ” we furthero bser ved that 735 I l l
. Com p. S tat
. 5/2-1 402 “perm i t[ s] the cour t to determ ine th e righ ts of th ird p a rties
. ” Id
. (em p ha sis add ed ). Ou r pr e v i o us e xa mi na t i o ns o fI l l i no i s c i t a t i o n pr o c e e di ng s i n R es olu ti o n Trust a nd D exi a ar e ce r ta i nl y he l pful26 N o. 12

- 3746 i n tea si ng o ut the subst an tive and proc eduralr i ghts ac c or d ed th e p ar tie s. B u t p er h ap s t h e m os t h elp fu l ex am inati ons ofthes e proce edi ngs c om e fro m the I l l i noi s s tat e ap p ella te co u rt s. R eg ar d in g t h e s c op e o f p er m i s s ible di s c o v e r y b y the j ud g men tc r e di t o r, mo r e tha n o ne a ppel l ate co urt h as hel d that e xtensi ve sea rchi ng f oras set s

— ev en des cr ibe d as “a ‘ fi sh i ng e xpe di ti o n’ ”

— is per m i ss ibl e ag ains t a th i r d- par tyc i ta ti o n r es po nde nt “ifi t is bas ed on a beliefth a t s u ch assets are in th e third party ’ s pos ses si on. ” R egan v. Ga rf ie ld Ridge Trust& Sav. Bank, 617 N
. E.2 d 8 18, 820 ( I l l
. A pp . Ct . 1993) ( quoti ng Federal Loan C orp. v . Harris , 30 8 N
. E.2 d 125, 12 7 ( I l l
. A pp . Ct. 19 74) )
. In additi on t o these exte nsi ve discove ryr i ghts, the part ies to a ci tat i on a cti on a re enti tl ed to broad pro ceduralsa feguar ds. A ccor ding to Workforce So lutio ns v . U rba n S ervs. , 9 7 7N. E. 2 d 2 6 7, 27 5- 7 6 ( I l l
. App
. Ct. 20 12) ( em phasi s a dd ed), bo th 73 5 I ll. Com p. S tat
. 5/2- 1402 ( a) and I l l
. Com p. S tat
. S
. Ct. R. 27 7 im p os[e] a requirem ent o n th e cou rt t o c ondu cta t r i al or e vi de nt i a ry he ar i ngto det erm ine ow ne rship of a th ird p ar ty ’ s as se ts wher e bo ththe j udg m en t cr edi to r and the thi r d- par tyc i ta ti o n r es po nde nt c laim en tit lem en t to th os e a ss et s. . . . Fa ilure to do so i s r e ve rsible error
. . . . W e s peci fi cal l y hel d that itis insu fficien t for t h e cou rt to d ecid e the m a tter based sol ely o n th e arg um ents o f cou nsel wi th o utheari ng evi dence o n a fra ud ule nt co nveya nce al l ega t i o n. . . . In o r de r f o r a di s pu t e t o a r i s e , the thi r dpa r t y c i t a t i o n re spo nd e nta l s o mus th a v e ma de a c l a i m o n the ass e ta ts o me po i nti n the p r o c e e di ngs. Reso l vi ng tha t di spute r aises a questi on o fN o. 12

- 3746 27 f act re quir i ng an ev identi ar y hea ring r ega rdl ess of w h ich p a r t y ra ise s it
. C f. Ha rm o n v . Lad a r C o rp., 55 7 N .E .2d 1 2 9 7, 12 99 (Ill . A p p . C t. 19 90 ) (“if th e j u d g me n tc r e d i t o r c l a i ms e n t i t l e me n tt o the ass ets o fa thi rd party an d the thi rd party c on te st s t h e c laim , a tr ial m ustbehel d ”). I n sum , the abov e r ule s a nd cas es tel lus th at a j ud gm ent c re dit ori n I l l i noi s, l i ke GE B etz , is enti tl ed to “pro secute” a ci tat i on a cti on t o disc ove r ass ets ag ai nst a thi rd party, l i ke B M O H ar ri s, as l ong as the c re dit or re aso nabl y b el i eve s that the thi rd party ho l ds a j ud gm en t d ebtor’s asse ts. 735 Il l. Com p . Stat. 5/2-1402(a). A fte r bringi ng the ci tat i on a cti on, the cre dit ori s e nti tl ed to s ea r chthr o ug h the thi r d p ar ty ’ s bo o k s, pa per s, a nd r ec o r ds to l o ca te the de bt o r ’ s as se ts a nd t o de termi ne the v al i dity o fthe thi rd party’ s cl ai m to tho se ass ets
. Reg an , 61 7 N
. E.2 d at 8 20. T h e c redito r i s then enti tl ed to a tr i alo r e vi den ti ar y he ar i ngo n the e vi den ce i t o bt ains fro m its d isc ov er y e ffor ts
. Workforce, 97 7 N
. E.2 d at 2 75- 76. I fth e cre dit orsucce ssfully pr ove s a t t ri althati t has th e s u p er ior c laim to th e d eb to r’s as se ts , th e c ou rtis empower ed to o r derthe thi r d pa r tyt o tur n o ve r the debtor ’ s ass ets to the cre dit or . 735 I l l
. Com p. St at . 5 /2

- 14 02 (b ); R esolu tio n Trust, 9 94 F.2d a t 12 23
. And i fa ny party

— w he th er the j ud gm en t cred itor or the th ird party

— i s di ssa tisfi ed w i th the o utcom e o fthe ci tat i on proce edi ngs, thatparty has the right t o appeal the outcom e. I ll
. Com p . Stat. S. Ct
. R. 304(b)( 4). Wi th th i s b a c k g r o u n d o n I l l i n o i s c i ta ti o n a c t i o n s , we now r etur n to the iss u e at hand : i s a thi rd- partyci tat i on28 N o. 12

- 3746

re spondent i n such an a cti on pro perl y c hara cter i zed as a “d efen d a n t ” un d er 28 U
. S. C
. § 1441(b)(2)? U nfortu n at ely , th e t er m “d e fen d an t” is n otd efin ed w ith in § 1 441, and, sur pri si ngl y, ve ryfew c ou rt s hav e had to g r a p p l e w i th i t s d e f i ni t i o n i n th e p a s t
. T h e S u p r e me Cou r t ha s o nl y b r i efl y c o ns i der ed th e m ea ni ngo fthe te r m a s u sed w ithin § 1441 , conc lud ing tha t “th e w ord

‘ d e fe n d a n t ’ a s th e r e u s e d i s di r e c t e d t o wa r d mo r e i mpo r t a n t ma t t e r s th a n th e b u r d e n o f p r o o f o r th e r i g ht to open and cl ose . ” Chic ago, R. I
. & P. R. Co. v. St ude, 34 6 U
. S. 574, 57 9 ( 1954 ) ( hold in g th at the l abel s a ssi gned to parti es by sta te law d o not m att erbec ause “federa l l aw deter m i nes who i s pl ai nti ffand w h o i s defendant” f or t h e pu rpos es ofr em ova l )
. In additi on, the Ele venth Cir c ui t ha s s ug g e s t e d tha t a de fe nd a nt un de r § 1 4 4 1 i s a p arty w hos e intere sts are in op p ositi on to th e plaintiff’s in te re st s. Se eCi ty of

Ve s t avi a Hil l s v. Ge n. Fid . In s. Co. , 67 6 F.3d 131 0 , 1 314 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting th at “[w ]here the par ti es’ i nter est s a re the sam e, we have he l d that thos e par ti es m ust be al i gn ed t oge ther[ f orthe pu rpos es of r em oval] an d hav e reversed a district cou rt’s f ail ure t o do s o , e v e n whe r e the p a r t i e s ’ i nt e r e s t s we re i n o pp ositi on ou tsid e of th e issues raised i n th e sub j ect ac tion”). Wi th o u tmu c h d i r e c t i o n fr o m e i th e r th e S u p r e me C ou rt o r our si ste r ci rcui ts, we turn t o dict i onar i es f or addi ti o na l g ui dan ce o n the mean i ngo fthe wor d “ defen dant. ” Bl a c k ’s L a w Di c t i o n a ry does no to ffe r muc h he l p, defini ng a ci vi l defe nd ant as a “pers on sued i n a c ivil proce edin g. ” B la ck ’s La w D ictio na ry, “ De fe nd a nt ” ( 9 th e d. 20 09 ); see also B la ck ’s La w D ictio na ry, “ Su e” (9th ed. 20 09) ( defi ningt o “ s ue ” a s “ [ t ] o i ns t i t ut e a l a ws ui ta g a i ns tN o. 12

- 3746 29 ( anothe r party ) ”)
. The M erri a m -Webster D ictio na rypro vi d es sli ghtl y m or e a ssi sta nce, descr ibi ng a defe nd ant a s “a perso n re quire d t o m ake answer in a l ega lact i on o r sui t. ” M e r r i a m- We b s t e rDi c t i o n a ryOn l i ne, avai l ab l eat ht tp: // ww w. m er r i am- webs te r . co m/ d i c ti o na r y / def en dan t (l ast visited M ay 1, 2013 ). Altho ugh the g ui dan ce pr o vi ded bydi ct i o na r i es a nd pr i o r c a s e l a w i s n o t s u b s t a n t i a l, i t a l l p o i n t s i n t he sam e di re cti on

— i nd i cating tha t a thi rd- partyci tat i on re sp ondent i n an I l l i noi s ci tat i on a cti on i s a defendant. The S upr eme Co ur t i ndi ca te d i n Chic ago , R .I. & P. R. Co. , 346 U
. S. at57 9, thata partycan be a “defend ant” f or the pu rpos es of § 1441 eve n i f sta te l aw l abel s the party w ith an ot h er n am e. A s a res u lt, th e fa c t t h at Il lin ois law refer s t o parti es l i ke H ar ri s a s “ thi rd- partyci tat i on re spondents” instea d o f“defendants” i s no t dete rm i nati ve ofa party ’ s s tatus un d er federa lr em ova ll aw . W hat i s dete rm i nati ve

— as th e E lev en th C irc u it h as p re vio u sly he l d i n Vest avia H il ls , 67 6 F
. 3d at 1314

— i s th e al i g nm en t of the p a r t ie s’ int erests. H ere, H arris’ s interests are c l e a r l y i n o pp o s i t i o n t o the i nt e r e s t s o fthe p l ai nt i ff, GE Bet z. M o r eo ve r, w e n o te tha t th i r d- par tyc i ta ti o n r es po ndents l i ke B M O H ar ri s fi t a l ldi cti onar y defi ni ti ons of the word defendant. W hen GE Betz ser ved H ar ris with a ci tat i on t o disc ove r ass ets , i t ins ti tuted a l ega lact i on to r ec o ve r as se ts fr o m H ar r i s. As a r es ul t of bei ng ser ved w i th the ci tat i on, H ar ri s was r equi red to m ake answ er in the l eg ala ct i o n in o r dert o r et ain the c o ntes ted as set s. Fu rthe rm ore, th roug hou t our inq uiry into w he th er a thi rd- party ci tat i on re spondent i n an I l l i noi s citati on30 N o. 12

- 3746 acti on i s a “defendant” f orthe pu rpos es of 28 U
. S. C. § 1 441, w e have been continually re m i nd ed of the f am ous du ck tes t: “i fi t wal ks l i ke a duck, swim s l i ke a duck, and quacks l i ke a duck, i t’ s a duck. ” Lakev. Ne al , 585 F. 3d 10 59 , 1 059 ( 7th Cir
. 2009 )
. I f som ethi ng has al l of the qua litie s of a d u c k , th en ind u c tiv e re as on in g t ells u s t h at it m u st, in f act, be a duck. S i m i l ar l y, i fa parti ci pant i n a j ud i ci al proce edi ng has al lthe qualitie s ofa defe nd ant, then i nd ucti ve re aso ni n g te l l s us that the par ti ci pant m ust, i n f act, be a defendant. A n d ind ee d , a th ird -p ar ty cit at ion res p on d e n t in I l l i noi s has al l o f the quali ti es tr adit i onal l y a sso ci ate d w ith a d efe n d an t. A th ird -p ar ty cit at ion res p on d en t is in itia lly s er ve d w ith n ot ice of th e a c tio n ag ain st it; it is i n dir ect opposi ti on t o th e partybr i ngi ng the act i on ( the j ud gm ent c re d itor) ; i t has the opportunity t o vi nd i cate i ts ri ghts at tr i al ; and it h as the ri ght t o appe ala ny a dve r se j udg m ent a gains t i t. The r e i s no re as on t o thi nk tha t, i n drafti ng § 1441 , Congr ess in te n d ed th e w or d “d efe n d an t” to be u n d e r s t o od in s o me u n u s u a lo r e x t r a o r d i n a r y wa y . Th e r e f o r e , we h old th at a th ird -p ar ty cit at i o n r es p on d en t in an Il lin ois ci tati on a cti on i s a “defendant” f orthe pu rpos es of28 U. S
. C. § 1 44 1. ( N o te th at, in s pi te o fo urpa i ns ta k i ng eff or ts to re ach thi s ho l ding, i t i s no t a far cr y fro m our previ ous c hara cter i zati ons ofthi rd

- partyci tati on r espondents under I l l i noi s l aw . In fa c t, we have pr ev i o us l y r efer r ed to a thi r d- par tyc i ta tion r es po nde nt as “a p ar ty to the pos tj ud gm ent pr oce edi ng. ” Se eRe s ol ut i o n Trust, 9 9 4 F
. 2 d a t1 2 2 4 ( fi nd i nga thi r d- par ty ci tat i on r espondent’ s m oti on t o i nter vene i n the ci tat i onN o. 12

- 3746 31 acti on unneces sar y s i nc e “she w as al re ady a partyto the pos tj ud gm ent pr oce edi ng and had been fro m th e o u ts et ”).) D es p ite th e fa c t t h at B M O H ar r i s cle ar ly p os se ss es all the qual i ti es ofa defe nd ant, ato ra lar gu m ent, bo th Zee a nd Ha r r i s l i k e ne d Ha r r i s ’ s s t a t us t o tha to fa thi r dpar tyde fen dan t, who

— ac co r di ngt o o urpr ec ede nt

— i s no t gen era lly auth orized to rem ove a cas e to fed eral court u n d er 28 U .S.C . § 14 41 (c ). See Th o mas v . S h e l t on , 740 F
. 2 d 4 7 8 , 4 8 7 ( 7 th C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) ( c o n c l u d i n g th a t “ i n t he br o ad r un o f th i r d- par ty ca se s . . . th e th i r d- par ty d efe nd an t can not rem ove th e case u nd er section 14 41(c)”). W e no te, as an ini ti alm att er, thatthi s a rgum ent i s no t on p oint. T he ins tan t a ction w as rem oved u nd er § 1441(a), n ot § 14 41 (c ), sin c e all c laim s in th is cas e c a m e w ith in the o ri gi nalj uri sdic ti on o fthe federa lco urt. E v e n if Tho m a s we r e o n po i nt, i t mak e s no s e ns e t o li ken Harr i s t o a thi rd- partydefendant. A thi rd- party defen dan t i s a “pa r tyb r o ug hti nt o a l aws ui t bythe or i gi naldefendant. ” B la ck ’s La w D ictio na ry, “Thi rd- Party Defen dan t” ( 9th e d. 2 00 9)
. ButHar r i s was no t br o ug ht i n t o th i s s u i tb y th e d e fe n d a n t, Z e e ; Ha r r i s wa s b r o ug ht i nt o th is sui t bythe pla i nti ff, GE Betz

— i n th e s a me m anner that a pl ai nti ffwould br i ng anyo ri ginal d efe n d an t in to a l a w su it. Sim ilar ly, as w e n ot ed in Thom as , “[ t] he m ostco m m on thi rd- part y cl ai m i s a cl ai m f ori nd em ni ty, thati s, a cl ai m thatsho uld the defen dan t ( th i r d- par typl aint i ff ) b e he l d l i ab l e to the pl aint i ff, the thi r d- par tyde fen dan t m us t r ei m bur se the defe nd ant forthe c osto fsa ti sfyi ng the pl ai nti ff’ s j ud g-32 N o. 12

- 3746

men t
. ” 74 0 F
. 2 d a t4 8 6
. A thi r d- pa r t y de fe nd a nts t a nd s i n oppo s i t i o n t o the o r i g i na lde fe nd a nt( the thi r dpa r t y p l a i nt i ff )
. Ha rr i s, i n c o nt r a s t, s t a nd s s i de

-b y - s i de w i th Zee. H ar ri s a nd Zee appea r to be i n com ple te agr eem ent with re spect to thi s ca se; theyar e work i ng to
get her

— eve n coo rdi nati ng l i t i g a t i o n s t r a t e gi es

— to fi ght o ffGE Betz. H ar r i s an d Z ee ’ s r el i an ce o n Tho m a s is c lea rly m i spl ac ed, b ut th eymake o th era r g um en ts a s to why H ar ri s i s no t a “d efendant” to the prese nt sui t. They i g no r e th e S upr eme Co ur t’ s ho l di ngi n C hic ago , R.I. & P.R. C o. , 34 6 U.S
. at57 9, thatthe l abelas si gned by sta te l aw to a partyi s no t di sposi ti ve as to w hetherthatparty i s a defendant f orthe purposes of28 U .S.C . § 14 41. H ar r i s an d Ze e i ns te ad po i ntt o o urho l di ngi n S h a w v. D ow Brand s, Inc. , 9 94 F
. 2d 36 4, 3 69 ( 7th Ci r . 1 99 3) , a r g ui ng th at t h e defi ni ti on o f“defendant” i n 28 U
. S. C. § 1 441(b) i s v er y nar ro w and does not i ncl ud e “[n ] om i nalo r f or m alpart ies .” A ccor ding to Shaw , a “d efe n d an t is nom i na li fthe r e i s no r ea so nabl e ba si s f o r pr edi ct i ng that i t wil lbe hel d l i abl e. ” Id
. The r e ar e two r ea so ns w hy H ar ris is m or e than j ust a “no m i nalo r f or m al ” par ty t o thi s s ui t
. F i r s t, Ha r r i s do e s n o tfi tthe S ha w d efi ni ti on ofa nom i na lp a r t y . Onthe c o nt r a r y, the r e i s a v e r y r easo n ab l e b as is for p re d ict in g t h at H ar ris w ill be h eld l i abl e t o GE Betz. I f, f orex am p le, G E Betz were to prove its frau d u len t t ra n sfe r c laim su c c es sfu l l y , t h en H ar ris w oul d b e liabl e forthe fund s that Zee fra ud ule ntl y t ra nsfer re d to i t. S eco nd , r ecal l i ng o ur di scussi on fro m Se c tio n II, H ar ris ’s p re se n c e i s t h e o n ly re as on w h y t h is case w as r em ovabl e t o federa lco urt i n the fi rs t pl ace.N o. 12

- 3746 33 W ith ou t H ar ris , th is m at te r w ou ld h av e b ee n a p u re ly a nc i l l a ry m a t t e r t o the No r th Ca r o l i na s ui t, a nd 2 8 U. S
. C. 14 41 (a) w ou ld ba r re m ov al t o fe d er al c ou rt
. Trav elers , 689 F. 3d at 724. Consequentl y, it i s di ffi cul t t o re du ce H ar ri s t o a m er e no m i nalparty in thi s s uit
. A lon g t h es e lin es , w e a r e t ro u b led by th e w ay in w hi ch Zee a nd BM O H ar ri s a re ta l ki ng o ut o f b ot h si des ofthei r m ouths. They pl ay up H ar ri s’ s s tatus as a “new and i nd ependent party ” t o supp or t r em ova lunder § 14 41 ( a), b ut i n the s ame b r ea th, the y di sc o unt H ar ri s’ s s tatus as a “nom i nalpart y” to avo i d a co nfl i ct wi th § 1 4 4 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) a n d k e e p th e c a s e i n fe d e r a l c o u r t
. An exam i nati on o fZee’ s br i efto this c ou rtdem onst ra tes j us t ho w c ont r adi ct o r y the i r a r g um en ts a r e. On o ne pag e, Ze e ar g ue s th at“ H ar r i s i s st i l la ne w par tywi tha new cl ai m and a new co n tr ove rs y

— w hi ch party has l i enpr i o r i tyo ve r Ze e’ s a ssets, ” i n o r dert o g eta r o und th e § 14 41 (a) ju ris d ict ion al p ro b lem
. B ut on theve ry n ext page, Zee argu es t h at “Zee was the o nl y nam ed defendant .
. . and the onl y par ty aga i nst whom l i abi l i ty c o u l d b e f o u n d , ” i n o r d e r t o a v o i d th e § 1 4 4 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) f o r u mdefe nd an t r ule pro bl em . A s we have sta ted be f or e, parti es “c an not have i t bo th ways” in or der t o ensure a case r em ai ns i n thei r desi re d fo rum ; al l owing parti es to h ave i t bo th ways “woul d be unj ust. ” Osh an a v. Co c a- C ola Co. , 4 72 F
. 3d 50 6, 5 12

- 13 (7th C i r . 2 00 6) ( r ej ec tinga pl ainti ff’ s a t t e mpt t o a r g ue tha t the v a l ue o f her case w as les s t h an $7 5,0 00 in o rd er to d efe at rem ov al, w h i le si m ult aneously see kin g t o prese rv e herr i ght t o re cove r m or e t h an $7 5,0 00 u p on rem an d to th e s ta te co u rt ). In34 N o. 12

- 3746 spi te ofthe att em pts to charact er i ze H ar ri s o ther w i se, H ar r i s i s a defen dan t to thi s ac ti o n.
B W i thr eg ar d t o the s ec o nd i ss ue

— whethe r i t m atters that onl y the non- f or um defendant, Zee, consented to the re m ova l of this c ase

— the par ti es spend a gr eatdeal ofti m e arguingabo ut the i m port ance o fwh o re m ove d t h e c a se , as t h ou gh it m ak es a d iffer en c e n ow . I t c ou ld h a ve m ad e a d iffer en c e d u rin g t h e firs t t h irt y d ay s fo ll owing Zee’ s r em ova l
. 28 U
. S. C. § 1441( a) “r equi re [ s] th at all d efe n d an ts (or n on e) joina n o t i c e of re m ov al.” M cM a h o n v . Bu n n - O-M a t i cC o rp. , 1 50 F. 3d 651, 65 3 ( 7th Ci r . 1 99 8)
. Her e, the r e wer e two defen dan ts , Ze e an d BM O Har r i s, b uto nl y o ne de fen dan t, Ze e, j o i ne d the not ice ofrem oval. H arris’s f ail ure to conse nt to Zee’s re m ov a l co n st itu te d a re m ov al d efe c t. Id
. Buts ucha d efe c t is st at u to ry , no t jur i s d ict ion al. Id
. Because GE Betz f ai l ed to ra i se thi s defe ct i n ei ther i ts i ni ti al m oti on to re m and ori ts m oti on t o re consider, GE Betz w ai ved it a fte r th irt y d ay s. D oev. GTE Corp. , 34 7 F.3d 6 55, 65 7 ( 7th Ci r. 20 03)
. N eve rthel ess , ev en i fBM O H ar ri s had pr o p e r l y c o n s e n t e d t o Z e e ’ s r e mo v a lo fth i s c a s e , t he f or um - defe nd ant r ule would st ill stand i n the w ay of r emov al
. I t i s true tha t o nl y Ze e r emove d th e ca se , a nd Z ee is n ota for u m d efe n d an t. B u t, as ou r an aly sis in Se cti on I I I
. A dem ons tr ate d, H ar ri s i s a f or um defendant. 28 U
. S. C
. § 1441(b)(2) clearly p rohibit s rem oval “if any ofthe pa r t i e s i n i nt e r e s tp r o pe r l y j o i ne d a nd s e r v e d a sN o. 12

- 3746 35 defe nd ants i s a ci ti zen o fthe St ate i n w hic h s u ch act i on is bro ught” ( em phasi s a dd ed). H ar ri s a nd Zee cannot r un a r o und the forum - defen dan t r ul e byha vingo nl y the non- f or um defendant r em ove the case . I n sum , thi s c as e w as suffi ci entl y ind ependent of the No r th Car o l i na s ui tt o b e r e mov ab l e u nd e r 2 8 U. S
. C. § 14 41 ( a)
. I fne i th erHar r i s no r Ze e had b een c i ti ze ns of Illino is, th en th is c as e w ou ld h av e b ee n p ro p er ly re m ove d to fed er alco urt. But H ar ri s i s a ci ti zen o f I ll inois, an d rem oval to the fed eral district court viol ates th e forum -defen d an t rule, 28 U
. S. C
. § 1441(b)(2). Because GE Betz p ointed out Harri s’ s ci ti zenshi p to the d istri ct c ourtwithi n thi rty days

— and thus, r ai sed a t i me l y o bj e c t i o n t o r e mo v a lb a s e d o n th e f o r u m- d ef en d an t ru le

— the federa ldi str i ct c ourtsho uld have re m anded thi s ca se back to the Coo k County Cir cui t Cour t.

IV A s w e k n ow f r o m th e p ro c ed u ra l p os tu re of th is ca se , h o we v e r, th e fe d e r a ld i s t r i c tc o u r td i d n o tr e mand th e c as e b a c k t o th e C oo k C ou n ty C irc u it C ou rt . I t retained the ca se for tw o m ont hs after den ying G E Be tz’s m oti on t o re consi der. Duri ng tha t t i m e, the d ist ri ct cour t gra nted a TRO that parti al l y l i fted the fre eze o n Zee’ s a ccounts at BM O H ar ri s, and t h e th re e par ti es fi l ed an abundance o fdi sco ver y- re l ate d m oti ons. The cas e concl ud ed o n N ove m ber28 , 20 12 w i thout the di str i ct co ur t j udg e addr es singmany o fthe se m oti o ns . De ci di ng that t h e “fir st i n ti m e, fi rs t in ri ght rule ” was di sposi ti ve36 N o. 12

- 3746 ofal l is su es i n the case , the dist ri ct c ourtj ud ge quashed the c i tat i ons and dism i sse d the ca se. D esp ite the fac t t ha t the fed eral district court im p ro p er ly re ta in ed th is c as e, Z ee an d B M O H ar ris urge thatwe need not re m and the ca se backto Cook Cou nty no w. Re l y i ngo n C aterpill ar Inc. v. Le w is , 51 9 U
. S. 61 , 7 5 ( 19 96 ) , Ze e and Har r i s ar g ue tha t “c o ns i der at i o ns o ffi na l i ty, e ffi ci en cy, a nd e co no m y ” o ve r whel m the dist ri ct c ourt ’s inco rr ect deci si on o n the m oti on t o re m and because the c ase has subsequentl y pr oce eded to a fin al d et er m in at ion on th e m er its . B u t t h e w ay in whi ch Cate rpi l l arp ro c ee d ed to a fin al d et er m in at ion is ver y di ffer ent fro m the w ay i n w hi c h t h e prese nt cas e pr o ce ede d t o a fi na lde te r m i na ti o n. I n Cate rpi l l ar, a di st r i ct co ur t i m pr o per l y den i ed a pl ainti ff’ s mo t i o n t o r e man d the c a s e b a c kt o s t a t e c o urt. The pla i nti ffco rr ectly a rgued that the par ti es l acke d com ple te dive rs i ty: o ne o fthe i ni ti aldefen dants was a c itiz en of th e s am e s ta te as th e p lain tiff. D es p ite th is rath ero bv i o us fl aw i n s ubj ec t- m at te r j ur i sdi ct i o n, the di s t r i c tc o ur tde ni ed the p l a i nt i ff’ s mo t i o n t o r e man d, an d th e ca se re m ain ed in fed er a l c o u r t. Id
. at64

- 66. D uring the cou rse of th e nex t four years, th e plaintiff se tt l ed wi ththe no n- di verse defen dan t. Onc e th e no ndive rs e defendant dropped out o fthe case , di ver si ty w as com plete
. Id
. at 65-67. T he case p roceed ed to a j ury tr i al, a nd the j ur y r etur ned a v erdi ctf o r the r emai ni ng defen dan t. The pl aint i ff appe al ed, ar g ui ng th atthe d i str i ct c ourtl acke d subj ect- m att erj uri sdic ti on t o enterj ud gm ent forthe defe n d an t si nce the co urt hadN o. 12

- 3746 37 l ac k ed su bj ec t- m at te r j uri sdi ct i o n a t th e ti m e o fthe c as e’s rem ov al. Id
. at67
. The S up re m e Cour t r ej ec ted th e plaintiff’s argum en t, hold ing tha t “a d istri ct cou rt’s er ro r infailin g t o re m an d a c as e im p ro p er ly re m ov ed is not f atalto the ensui ng adj ud i cati on i ffedera lj uri sd ict ion al re q u ire m en ts are m et atth e t im e jud gm en t is en ter ed. ” Id
. a t 6 4
. Gi v e n tha t the c a s e ha d g one to a j ury tr i al

— n ot t o m en tio n th at th e c as e h ad be en in fed er al c ou rtfor m or e t h an se ve n y e a r s b y t h e t im e it reach ed the Su p rem e C ou rt

— the S up re m e Cour t be

l i ev ed th at“ co ns i der at i o ns o ffi na l i ty, e ffi ci en cy, a nd eco nom y [ w er e] o ver w hel m i ng. ” Id
. a t 75
. Em p ha si zing that “no j uri sdic ti onaldefect [ had] l i n gered thr ough j ud gm ent, ” th e C ourtnot ed re m anding the c ase bac k t o sta te c o ur t “wo ul d i m po se a n e xo rbi ta ntc o sto n o ur d u al c ou rtsy st em , a co st inc om p at ible w ith th e fa ir and unp ro tr acte d adm i ni str ati on o fj usti ce. ” Id
. at77
. Cate rpi l l arst ands f orthe propos i ti on th at wh en r emand to s ta te co ur t woul d “ i m po se a n e xo rbi ta nt cos t, ” a federa lco urt m ay ove rl oo k a j uri sdic ti onaldefect a tthe t i me o fr e mov a ltha th a s s ub s e qu e nt l y b e e n c ur e d. Id
. Ze e an d BM O H ar r i s as k us to ex te nd the hol di ng of C a terpilla r to fi nd thata federa lco urt m ay ove rl oo k a s tatutor y defect at the t i m e o fr em ov al that has not subsequentl y b een c ured. W e decl i ne to m ake such a n e xt e ns i o n i n the c a s e a th a nd
. The s i tu at i o n f ac ed bythe S upr eme Cour t i n Cate rpi l l ar i s di sting u ish abl e fro m the si tuati on we f ace here f or f our re aso ns. Fi rs t, and m ost o b vi ousl y, thi s ca se has been i n federa lco urt f oro n ly a fra cti on o fthe ti m e that38 N o. 12

- 3746 the C a te rp illa r case w as in federa l cou rt. Th e fina l d eterm inat i o n in C a terpilla r co ns i st ed o f a j ur y tr i alm ore th an fou r ye ar s a f t e r re m ov al t o fe d er al c ou rt . B u t in thi s ca se, the fi naldeter m i nati on co nsi sted ofa dism i ssa l les s th an th re e m on th s afte r re m ov al to fed er al co u r t . It i s t rue that du ring the co urse o fthes e three m onths, G E Be tz, Zee, and BM O H arris flooded t h e d istri ct cou rt j udg e wi tha “ pape r b l i zz ar d. ” Ye t th e f ac t r emai ns that, ev en now, the case has been in federa lco urt f or l ess than one year, weakeni ng anyco nsi derat i ons of fi nal i ty, effi ci ency, and eco nom y. Further w eak eni ng anyco nsi derat i ons of fi nal i ty, effi ci ency, an d e c onom y i s the way i n w hi ch the distr i ct c ourtj ud ge dism i sse d G E Betz’ s c as e. On a day th at th e p ar tie s t h ou gh t t h ey w er e m er e l y g o i n g in fr o nto fthe j udg e to a r g ue abo uta prote ct i ve o r der, the j u d ge i nstea d decided fro m the bench “t o cal la hal t t o al lthi s. ” Altho ugh w e ce rt ainl y un d er sta nd the distr i ct c ourtj ud ge’ s fru strat i on with al lthe “ga rba ge” that the par ti es have fi l ed i n thi s case , t h e j ud ge did notadequatel y ad d re ss at l eas t tw o ofGE Betz’ s a rgum ents i n hi s di sm i ssa l
. Fo r exam ple , the dist ri c t co urt j ud ge f a i l e d t o a d d r e s s G E B e t z ’ s a r g u me n tth a tB MO H ar ri s’ s UC C fi l i ng di d not per fect i ts secu ri ty i nter est i n al lo fZee ’s assets, and i n part i cul ar, i ts re alpro perty
. Addi t i o nal l y, wh i l e the j ud g e b r i e fl y a ddr e s s e d G E Betz’ s fra ud ule nt- tr ansfercl ai m , the j u dge m i sst ate d th e cl ai m ’ s r equired el ement s. The j udg e f o und the fra ud ule nt- tr ansfercl ai m m er i tl ess bec ause “H ar ri s has no s tak e in pursui ng r em edi es that w oul d som eh owN o. 12

- 3746 39 j eopar dize i ts own i nterest, ” s ugges ti ng tha t GE Betz woul d ne ed t o pr o ve tha t H ar r i s ha d fr au dul en t i nt en t when i t en te r ed i nt o the c r edi t f ac i l i ty
. Butfr au dul ent tra n sferr equi re s pro vi ng tha t Zee

— not Harris

— had “actuali ntent to hi nd er, del ay, o r defr aud” w hen i t e nt er ed i nto the c re ditf aci l i ty. 74 0 I l l
. Com p. S tat
. 160/5( a) ( 1)
. Fur ther m or e, nei therthe fra ud ule nt- tr ansfer ar gum ent no r the r eal

- proper ty ar gum en t is auto
m ati cal l y r eso l ved by the “ fi rs t in ti m e, fi rs t in ri ght” ru le, w h ich form ed th e b as is of t h e jud ge ’s d ism iss al. The w ay i n w hi ch the dist ri ct cour t j ud ge d ism i sse d the c ase part i cul ar l y weake ns any consi derat i ons of fi nali ty, effi ci ency, and eco nom y in l i ght o fthe disc ov er y a n d p ro c ed u ra l r igh ts to w h ich G E B et z w ou ld have been enti tl ed had the ca se re m ai ned i n the Cook C ou n ty C irc u it C ou rt . A s d et aile d in Sec tio n II I.A , i t is
“ r e v e r s ib l e e r r o r ” f o r a n I l l i n o i s s t a t e c o u r t “ t o de c i de [ a ci ta ti o n a ct i o n] b as ed so l ely o n th e a r g um en ts o fc o unse l”

— w h ich is p re c ise ly w h at oc c u rre d h er e. Workforce, 977 N
. E.2 d at 2 76. In thi s ca se’ s o ri gi nalve nue, GE Betz w oul d have been e n ti tl ed to addit i onal, exte nsi ve discove ry, i ncl u d i ng the di sco ver y o fal l“bo oks , papers , o r re cor ds i n [ H ar ri s’ s] poss ess i on o r contr olwh i ch have orm ay conta i n i nfo rm ation co ncer ni ng the pro pertyo r in c om e of [Z ee ].” Ill. C om p . St at
. S. C t. R
. 27 7( c ) ( 4 ) . T h is ad d itio n al d isc ov er y w ou ld h av e b ee n p ar tic u lar ly us eful on th e issues of fra u d u le nt trans fer and the p erfecti on of H ar ri s’ s secur i ty i nter est
. M or e i m port antl y, G E Be tz w ou ld h ave be en entitled to an evid en t ia ry he a r i ng o r t r i a l, i n whi c h i t c o ul d ha v e “ sub po e na [ e d]40 N o. 12

- 3746

w i tness es and add uce[ d] ev id ence as up on the tr i alo f any c i vi lact i on. ” I l l
. Com p. S tat
. S
. Ct . R. 277( e)
. GE Betz enj oye d none o fthes e be nefi ts i n the federa ldi str i ct c ourt
. The fi nalr eas on wh y we ar e unm ov ed by consi derations of finali ty, effi cienc y, an d ec onom y i s tha t the un d erlyin g re m ov al d efe c t re m ain s u n c u re d in t h is c as e. In the C a terpilla r case , the Suprem e Cour t was m ove d by such cons i derat i ons because “no j uri sdic ti onaldefect l i nger ed thr ou gh ju d gm ent. ” 5 19 U
. S. at77
. Yet the r emo v a ld e f e c tl i n g e r s o n i n th e p r e s e n tc a s e . B MO H ar ri s was a f or um defendan t w h en the case was re m ove d; B M O H ar ri s i s s ti l la f or um defendant to day. Tr ue , the r emoval d ef ec t i n Cate rpi l l arw as j u ris d ict ion al; th e defec t he r e i s o nl y s ta tu tory. Butc o ns i der i ngthe d istri ct cou rt’s l ig h tn ing-fast resolution of this very com pli cate d case

— m ade poss ibl e, i n part , byi ts re fusal to l et GE Betz conduct the fullexpl or ati on that a c i t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n ga l l o ws o n a tl e a s tt wo o fi t s c l a i ms ag ain stZ ee an d H ar ris

— the f act that a statutor y defect re m ai ns uncured o nl y s tr engthe ns o ur co ncl usi on that con side rations of finality, effi cienc y, an d econ om y are vi rtual l y no nexi ste nt her e.
V I n a l ast
- dit ch att em pt to ke ep thi s ca se i n fed eral co ur t, Ze e an d BM O Har r i s m ak e o ne finala r g um en t w h y w e s h ou ld ign or e t h e s ta tu t o r y d efe c t in rem ov al: wai ve r . Acco r di ngt o the m , GE Bet z wai ve d the re m ova l d efe ct c re ate d by the f or um - defe nd ant r ule f orN o. 12

- 3746 41 t wo r e a s o n s : ( 1 ) G E B e t z f a i l e d t o me n t i o n th e f o r u mde fe nd a nt r ul e i n i t s i ni t i a l fi l i ng t o s up po r tr e man d, an d ( 2) GE Be tz pro ce ede d t o l i ti g at e th e ca se o n the m er i ts despit e th e fo rum - defe nd ant r em ova ldefect. We c o n s i d e r b o th wa i v e r a r g u me n t s i n d e t a i lb e l o w.
A Zee and H ar ris ’s fi rs t wai verar gum ent c enter s o n G E B et z’s failu re to m en tio n th e fo ru m - d e f e n d an t ru le in i ts initi al m em oran d um to the d istri ct cou rt ad d re ss in g t h e p ro p rie ty of re m ov al. Z e e a n d H ar ris con ce de th atGE Be tz r ai se d the f o r um - defen dan t i ss ue we l lwi thin the thi r t y- dayp e r i o d r e qu i r e d b y 2 8 U. S
. C. § 14 47 ( c)
. But th e fi r stt i m e th atGE Be tz ment i o ne d the f or um - defe nd ant r ule i n a wri tte n fi l i ng wa s in i ts m ot ion to rec o n s id er . A s a res u lt, Z ee an d H ar ris argu e tha t un d er Brooks v. Ci ty of C hic ago , 56 4 F
. 3d 830, 83 3 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 9) , GE Be tz a ut o m at i ca l l y wai ve d the for u m - d e fen d an t a rg u m en t b ec au se “a n y a rg u m en ts
. . . ra i sed f orthe fi rs t t i m e in [a] m oti on t o re consi der ar e wai ved. ” This ar gum ent i gnor es w hat t ra n sp ire d i n the cour troom prior to GE Be tz fi ling a m otion to recon s ider. Technica l l y, thi s a rgum ent was notr ai sed f orthe fi rs t ti m e in GE Betz’ s m oti on t o re consider; i t was r ai sed ear l ier, duri ng the hear i ng o n GE Betz’ s ini ti alo ra l m otion to rem an d
. A t this he a r ing, th e d istri ct cou rt j u d g e , o n h i s o wn, b r o u g h tu p th e f o r u m- d e fe nda nt probl em , st ating:42 N o. 12

- 3746 There i s, o fco urse , a com plica ting f acto r, i fyo u w ai t j ust a m i nute, and thathas to do w i th l oo king a t 1 441(b) ( 2) , . . . i fH ar ri s par tak es of Illino i s c itiz en sh ip
. . . . So u n d er 14 41 (b )(2) , i f H ar ri s were a par ty as such, the ac tio n coul d not be re m ove d b ecause . . . w e . . . perm i t re m ova l b y for eig n co rp or at ion s b u t n otby a d om es tic co r po r at i o n. Evidentl y, the f or um - defe nd ant rul e gave the distri ct c o u r tj u d g e s o m e pa us e a tth a tfi r s th e a r i n g . B u t, a s we kn ow , the j ud ge ultim ately de cid ed not t o t a ke m ore ti m e co nsi deri ng H ar ri s’ s s tatus i n th e ca se and ask the par ti es f oraddit i onalbr i efing. Instea d, the j ud ge d ism iss ed th e fo ru m -d efe n d an t p ro b lem as a n on iss u e. Ind ec id in g w h et h er an arg u m en t h as be en p ro p er ly pr es er ved, on e f ac to r we ev alua te i s when th e o ppo sing p ar ty w as on n ot ice of th e a rg u m en t. See, e. g ., Herna nd ez v. C ookCnty. She rr if

f’s O ff ice, 634 F. 3d 906, 913 (7th Cir. 2011 ) (expl ai ni ng tha t the “underl yi ng co ncer n [ w i th wa i v e r ] i s t o e n s u r e th a tth e o p p o s i n gp a r t y i s n o tp r ej udi ce d b y b eing d eni ed su ffi ci en t no ti ce t o r es po nd to a n a r g um en t” )
. Gi ve n the j ud g e’ s di sc us si o n o fthe f or um - defe nd ant r ule a t th e hea ring o n the i ni ti al m oti on t o re m and, Z ee and H ar ri s s houl d have be en on not i ce o fa potenti alf or um - defe nd ant proble m fro m the o utset
. A notherf acto r w e e val uate i s whether th e d i str i ct cour t “ effecti vel y c onsi dered” the ar gum ent d uri ng i ts in itia l d et er m in at ion
. SeeKun z v. D eFe li ce, 53 8 F
. 3d 667,N o. 12

- 3746 43 681 (7t hC ir. 20 08 ) (fin d in g a n arg u m en t w aiv ed if it “r eq u i re [ d] the appli cati on o fa novell ega ltheo ry ” that w as “not fully deve l oped” duri ng the i ni ti aldeter m i natio n ); se e also Bloch v. Frisc hho lz , 58 7 F
. 3d 771, 78 4 ( 7th Ci r . 2 0 0 9 ) ( fi n d i n ga n a r g u me n twa i v e d b e c a u s e the di st r i ct“ co ur t ne ve r c o ns i der ed” the pl aint i ff s’ a r g um en t bef or e the m oti on t o re consi der)
. Per haps the d ist ric t co ur t j udg e did no t ev alua te the f o r um - defen dan t ar g um en t a s t h or ou g h l y as h e s h ou ld h av e, bu t t h er e is no que st i o n tha t th e j udg e effec ti ve l y c o ns i der ed th e i m pl i c a t i o n s o f th e f o r u m- d e fe nda nt r ul e att he fi rs t hea ring. Furtherm or e, w e fi nd thi s wai verar gum ent e ven m o r e u n p e r s u a s iv e g iv e n t h e c ir c u m s t a n c e s surro und i ng tha t fi rs t h eari ng. On Septe m ber12 , 20 12, Zee fi l ed both a no tic e of re m ova land an e m er gencym oti on for relie f from th e c ita tio n se rv ed on B M O H ar ris . On ly t wo da y s l a t e r, o n S e pt e mbe r 1 4 th, a l lthr ee par t i e s a ppea r ed be f o r e th e di st r i ct cou rta t 9: 15 a . m . t o a r g ue th e em erg en cymot i o n. At tha t ti m e, GE Be tz o r al l y c o ntes ted t h e p ro pri etyo fZee’ s r em ova l, ci ti ng se ver al case s t o supp or t i ts posi ti on, i ncl ud i ng Tra v e l e rs , 68 9 F. 3d at 7 14 . The j ud ge had his l aw cl er k pr i nt the se ca se s an d, a fte r b r i efl y g lancin g at th em o n the b en ch, tol d G E Betz “that the ca ses thatyo u have provi ded m e wi thdon’t crea te a v ery i ns pi r i ngpo si ti o n fo r y o ur ar gu m en t.” G E B et z t h en be gg ed th e jud ge t o d e l a y h is deter m i nation u nti lthe afternoon, not i ng tha t i t had not re cei ved Zee’ s no ti ce o fr em ova land em er gen cy m ot ion un ti l3: 30 p. m . o n Se ptem ber13 th and had44 N o. 12

- 3746 “wo r k ed dur i ngthe ni g htt o t r y t o pul l[ i ts a r g um ent] to gether. ” The j ud ge al l owed GE Betz m or e t i m e, in st ru c tin g t h e p ar tie s t o c om e b ac k a t 2 :30 p .m . I twas during those fe w hours of rec es s tha t G E B etz fi le d its wri t t e n m e m orandu m t o s upp or tre m and. W hen the parti es r etur ne d a t 2: 30 p. m . , the di st r i ctc o ur t den i ed r emand o n the b as i s o fb o ths ubj ec t- m at te r j ur i sdi ct i o n a nd the f or um - defe nd ant r ule
. U nd oubte dly, thi s en tir e ca se w as adj ud i cate d at l i ghtni ngs pee d, b utGE Be tz ’ s i ni ti almot i o n t o r em an d wa s d e c i de d p a r t i c u l a r l y r a p i d l y . Y e tZ e e a n d B MO H ar r i s as kus t o fi nd tha t GE Bet z wai ve d a n a r g um en t i n the mem o r an dum s uppo r tingi ts ini ti almot i o n, d esp ite the fact th at it had l es s t ha n tw en ty-four hou rs t o r e s e a r c h i ta n d o n l y a fe w h o u r s t o w r i t e i t
. We r emi nd Ze e an d Har r i s th atthe “ [ r ] ul es of p r ac ti ce a nd proce du re ar e devi sed to prom ote the ends of j usti ce, not defe at them
. ” Hor m e l v. He l ve r i ng, 3 12 U
. S. 5 52, 557 ( 1941 ). Because GE Bet z h ad a l m ostno ti m e t o col l ect i ts th o ug ht s o r ev en fi nd i ts be st ar g um en t before fi l i ng thi s ini ti alm em orandum , we decl i ne to hol d G E Betz to th e e x c ep tio n ally st ric t w aiv er ru le th at Z ee an d H ar ris ad vo c at e. Cf. Fl e i s hm an v. Cont ’ l C a s . Co. , 69 8 F
. 3d 598, 60 8 (7 th C ir. 20 12 ) (n ot in g t h a t w e e n for c e t h e a p p ell at e wai ve r r ul e “u nl es s . . . ‘ th e equi ti es he av i l y pre po nderat e in fa vor o fco rr ecting i t’ ” ( quoti ng Judg ev. Q ui nn , 62 4 F.3 d 35 2, 36 0 (7 th C ir. 20 10 ))); Johns on v. Ar t i m Tr ans p. S y s., Inc. , 8 26 F
. 2d 53 8, 5 48 ( 7th Ci r . 1 98 7) ( ex pl aini ng th at in the cont ex t o f t h e ap p ell ate w aiver rule, “[t] he re a r e n a r r o w e x c e p t i o n s , ” i n c l u d i n g“ ‘ e x c e p t i o n a lc i r c u m-N o. 12

- 3746 45 st an ce s wher e j us ti ce demands mor e fl ex ibi l i ty ’ ” ( quo ting Zbaraz v . Har t igan , 763 F.2d 153 2, 1544 ( 7th Cir. 1985))). I n cl osing o ur di scussi on o fH ar ris and Zee’ s fi rs t w ai verar gum ent, we note that i t i s not ou r intent to c r i t i c i z e the s pe e d wi th whi c h the ab l e di s t r i c tj ud ge add re s s e d thi s l i t i g a t i o n. In f a c t, h i s p r o mpt ne s s i n a tt e mp t i n gt o s o r to u tth i s me s s y c a s e i s t o b e c o mm en d ed . Ou r on ly d isa gr ee m en t w ith h is c re d ita b le eff or ts i n thi s m att eri s with the concl usi on s he re ached o n the r emand r eq ue st, s ec ur i tyi nt er es t per fec ti o n, a nd fra ud ule nt tr ansferi ssues .
B E v e n th o ug h th e i r fi r s tw a i v e r a r g u me n tf a i l s , B MO H ar ri s a nd Zee cl ai m thattheyhave a seco nd , “br i ghter b u lb ” r e a s o n f o r fi n di ngth a tG E B e t z w a i v e d th e f o r u mdefen dan t ar g um en t ( des pi te f o r m al l y pr es en ting the ar gum en t o nl y s i xt ee n da y s afte r rem ova l )
. Har r i s an d Zee ar gue th at G E Betz “c onse nted” to being i n federa l court by l i ti gat i ng the cas e o n the m er i ts afterl osing i ts i ni ti almot i o n t o r emand. In f ac t, Ze e to l d us a t o r ala r g um ent that “ bef or e [ GE Betz] pre sente d [i ts] m oti on t o r ec o ns i der, [ i t] ha d a s epa r at e ci ta ti o n issu ed b y the dist ri ct c ou rt t o Zee.
. . . [ GE Betz] fi l ed a m oti on t o m o di fy the T R O
. . . f o r [ i ts ] o wn be ne fi t wi ththe d ist ric t c ou rt . A n d th en [it] iss u ed a d elu ge of d isc ov er y.” Zee and H ar ris t h en ci te Ber ns t e i n v . Li nd- Wal doc k & C o. , 738 F. 2d 179, 18 6 ( 7th Ci r. 19 84) , f orthe propos i ti on th at a p lai nt iff can not “thr[o]w i n th e tow e l” a n d start46 N o. 12

- 3746 l i t i g a t i ng the c a s e o n the mer i t s a ft e r l o s i ng a mot i on t o r emand; i ns te ad, a pl aint i ff m us t “s t[ i ] ck byhis guns an d
. . . [be ] vin d ica te d
. . . on ap p ea l.” Thi s ar g um en t m i sc o ns true s th e ho l di ngi n B er n st ei n . The pla i nti ffi n that case br ought sui t in an I ll i noi s s tat e cour t a l l eging tha t the defenda n ts had vi ol ate d stat e l aw . The defendants r em ove d the a cti on t o federa l cour t, cl ai m i ng tha t federa lla w , n ot sta te l aw , go ver ned the pl ai nti ff’ s r i ghts ( the und er l yi ng fac ts i nvol ved unsucc es sfu l tra n sa c tio n s in se c u rit ies ). Id
. a t 18 1- 82
. The pl a i nt i ffdi s put e d the de fe nd a nt s ’ c l a i m a nd fi l e d a m oti on t o re m and the ca se backto st ate court base d on l ack of subj ect- m att er j uri sdic ti on. The federa ldi str i ct c ou rtinc or r e c t l y d en ied th e p lain tiff’s m ot ion
. Id
. at18 2. A t that poi nt, the pla i nti ff then deci ded to am end h is co m pl ainta nd a dd a fede r alc au se o fa cti o n a g ains t o ne of th e d efe n d an ts
. Id
. at18 5. Even tho ug h t h e fe deral dist ri ct c ourthad l acke d subj ect- m att erj uri sdicti on over th e p lai nt iff’ s fi rst com p lai nt, the d istri ct cou rt n o w h a d o r i g i n a lj u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r hi s a me n d e d c o mp l a in t. Id
. Under th es e ci r cumst an ce s, o urcou rt he l d tha t“ o nc e [ the p l a i nt i ff ] de c i de d t o t a k e a dvantag e o fh is invol untarypre sence i n federa lco urt to add a fede r alc l ai m t o his c o m pl ainthe was b o und to re m ai n ther e. ” Id
. U nl i k e th e pl aint i ffi n B er nst ei n , G E B e t z h a s d o ne nothi ng to ta ke advantage o fi ts i nvol untaryp re se nce i n federa lco urt. I t has neve r add ed a federa lcl aim to i ts or i gi nalr egi str ati on an d ci tat i on a cti on. N orhas GE Bet z ta k ena ny a ct i o ns tha t r es o l ve the unde r l y i ng p roble m wi thr emov al
. The r e was a f o r um - defen dan tN o. 12

- 3746 47 p ro b lem atth e t im e o f rem ov al b ec a u s e B M O H ar ris w as a defendant; ther e i s a f or um - defe nd ant pr obl em now bec ause BM O H arri s i s s ti l la defe nd ant. Contr ast th e pl aint i ff’ s ac ti o ns i n Be r n st ei n , whi chr es o l ve d the und er l yi ng probl em with r em ova l
. W h en the B er nst ei n defe nd an ts fi l ed a no ti ce o fr em ova l, the federa ldi str i ct co ur t di d no t ha ve s ubj ec t- m at te r j uri sdi ct i o n o ve r the cont rol l i ng co m pla i nt. But once the B er nst ei n plaintiff am ended his com pla i nt to i ncl ud e afedera lcause o f ac ti o n, the di st r i ctc o ur t g aine d j ur i sdi ct i o n. Bes i des mis co ns trui ngthe ho l di ngi n B er nst ei n , H ar ris an d Z e e ’ s a rg u m en t a lso m isc on st ru es th e re c or d in thi s ca se. Zee’ s s ta tem ent a t o ra lar gum ent that GE Betz ha d a citation i ssu ed to Zee, file d a m otion to m od ify th e TR O, and i ssued di sco ver y r equests befo re p r e s e n t i ng its m o tio n to recon sider i s not tr ue. I n the fou rteen- day per i o d b etwee n the de ni alo fth e m o ti o n t o r emand an d the fi l i ng o fthe m ot ion t o re consi der, the onl y thi ng tha t GE Bet z fi l ed w as an at to r ne y a ppea r an ce f o r m . M ea nw hi l e, duri n g that s am e fourt een- day per i od, Zee an d B M O H ar ris filed an em er ge n c y m ot ion for a p re lim ina r y i nj un c t i o n, s e ta h e a r i ngf o r a T RO , dr a ft e d a T RO , and fi l ed another m oti on t o quash the ci tat i on s er ved on B M O H ar ri s. Eventual l y, GE Betz w oul d i ssue a seco nd c i t a t i o n t o Z e e , fi l e a mo t i o n t o mo di fy the T RO , and i ssue disc ove ryr equests

—but o nl y a fterfi l i ng i ts m otion to recon side r. U pon re vi ew i ng the r eco rd, i t i s cl earthatGE Betz has no t “inv oke[d ] the j ur i sdi ct i o n o fthe fede r alc o ur t, a nd then di scl ai m [ ed] i t when [it] l os[ t]
. ” B er nst ei n , 73 8 F
. 2d48 N o. 12

- 3746 at 18 5-8 6. T w o d ay s a fte r Z ee filed a n ot ice of re m ov al, GE Betz b egan ask i ng the federa ldi str i ct c ourtto re m and the ca se b ac k to Cook County w here i t be l ongs . Onl y a fte r i t pr o per l y pr es er ve d i ts f o r um - def en d ant ar gum en t di d GE Be tz b eg i n l i ti g at i ngthe c as e o n the m er i ts. N orhas G E Betz ev er“thr[ own ] i n the towel ” o n its f o ru m -d efe n d an t a rg u m en t. Id
. a t 18 5. On th e co ntr ar y, GE Betz ra i sed the ar gu m en t again i n i ts fi rs t fi l i ng w ith o urc o ur t, a nd i t ha s co nt i nue d t o r ai se the ar gum ent in eve rysubse quent fi l i ng. Cl ear l y, GE Betz ha s stuckt o i ts g uns o n the f o r um - defen dant ar g um en t th roug hou t this l iti gation. N ow , un d er B er nst ei n , 73 8 F
. 2 d a t1 8 6 , i ti s t i me f o r u s t o v i n d i c a t e G E B e t z ’ s f o r u md efe n d an t a rg u m en t o n ap p ea l.

VI N o m atter h ow m an y w ays Z ee a nd BM O H arris try to re chara cter i ze w hat happene d in thi s ca se, the fund am entalfac ts a re as f ol l ows: Zee re m ove d thi s ca se to fe d e r a lc o u r te v e n th o u g h i t s c o - d e fe n d a n t, B MO Ha r r i s , wa s a f o r um- de fe nd a nt, i n v i o l a t i o n o f2 8 U. S
. C. § 1 441(b) ( 2)
. GE Betz obj ecte d t o the r em ova lbas ed on the f o r um- de fe nd a nt r ul e wi thin the thi r t y da y s pre sc rib ed by 28 U .S.C
. § 1 4 47 (c ). D es p ite G E B et z’s tim ely obj ecti on, the federa ldi str i ct c ourti m prop er ly re tained the c ase and eve ntual l y di sm i sse d i t on the m er i ts. Because the di str i ct c ourtsho uld nev erhave r eached th e m er i t s o fth i s c a s e , we n o w V ACATE its d ism iss al. Furtherm or e, we R EMA ND the case to th e d istri ct cou rt w i th in st ructi ons to R EMA ND the c ase bac k t o i ts or i gi nalN o. 12

- 3746 49
venue, the pla ce where i t pr op er ly bel ongs : CookCounty Cir cui t Cour t.

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