alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 1245

STEVEN FARR , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Defendant

- Appellee , and UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, a branch of the United States Government; DJALMA A. BRAGA , Defendants

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Columbia

. Cameron McGowan Currie , Senior District Judge. ( 3:18

- cv
- 02061

- CMC )

Submitted : November 30, 2020 Decided: January 19, 2021

Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
John S. Keffer, KEFFER LAW FIRM, Sumter, South Carolina, for Appellant. A. Lance Crick, Acting United States Attorney, Christie V . Newman, Assistant United States2 Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM Steven Farr appeals the district court’s orders dismissing as untimely his suit under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671

- 2680 , and denying
reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error

. We therefore
affirm for the reasons stated by the district court

. Farr v. United States , No. 3:18

- cv
- 02061

- CML (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2018 & Feb. 25, 2019)

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisi onal process.
AFFIRMED
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

Written Statement of Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned,  the Chief Financial  Officer of W Holding  Company,  Inc. (the
"Company"), hereby certifies that to his knowledge on the date hereof:

     (a)  the Form 10-K/A of the Company  for the Year Ended  December  31,
          2002, filed on the date hereof with the Securities  and Exchange
          Commission (the "Report")  fully complies with the  requirements of
          Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (b)  information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material
          respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
          Company.

                                          /s/ Freddy Maldonado
                                          -------------------------------------
                                          Freddy Maldonado
                                          Chief Financial Officer
                                          May 12, 2003


A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to W Holding  Company,  Inc. and will be retained by W Holding Company,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its staff upon
request.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**33 CA 11-01598**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

ALBERT G. FRACCOLA, JR. AND PLAYTIME BOUTIQUE, INC., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

V ORDER
PHYLLIS FRACCOLA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SOLE SHAREHOLDER OF HYDRANIA, INC., AND HYDRANIA, INC., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

ALBERT G. FRACCOLA, JR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT PRO SE.
FELT EVANS, LLP, CLINTON (JAY G. WILLIAMS, III, OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (Samuel D. Hester, J.), entered May 18, 2011. The order, among other things, granted the motion of defendants to dismiss the complaint.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Entered: February 10, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Mark HARDY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-41598

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Date Filed: 03/08/2017

Ernest Gonzalez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Plano, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

David Mark Hardy, Pro Se

ORDER:

JERRY E. SMITH United States Circuit Judge

David Hardy, federal prisoner # 14486-078, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of metham-phetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Hardy seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.

Hardy contends that the statute of conviction was void for vagueness, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to argue to the jury that Hardy could not be convicted for conspiracy to distribute a counterfeit substance, and that Hardy was denied due process because his attorney conspired with the prosecution in a fraud upon the court and prevented the testimony of a favor-able witness.

Hardy has not shown that jurists of reason would find the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong. *See Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). The-motion for a COA is DENIED.
Nathaniel J. BRANTLEY v. HSBC BANK, USA

2150630

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 3, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### Gurpreet SINGH, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 17-1399

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 25, 2017

Decided: August 9, 2017

Gurpreet Singh, Petitioner Pro Se. Evan Paul Schultz, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Gurpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of his requests for asylum and withholding of removal.* We-have thoroughly reviewed the record, including the transcript of Singh’s merits hearing and all supporting evidence. We conclude that the record evidence does not compel a ruling contrary to any of the administrative factual findings, *see*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012), and that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. *See INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In re Singh*(B.I.A. Mar. 9, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*

*

 Singh does not challenge the denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture. Accordingly, review of that issue is waived. See *Ngarurih*v. *Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 182, 189 n.7 (4th Cir. 2004).
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-40176 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

JESUS LUCAS TRUJILLO-LUESA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

(M-98-CR-180)

March 14, 2000

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jesus Lucas Trujillo-Luesa appeals from his conviction of

various d rug-trafficking offenses. Trujillo contends that the

district court denied him his right to confront a Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) agent who testified at his trial by quashing

his subpoena for the DEA field agents’ manual and by denying

counsel the opportunity to question the agent about the manual.

Neither the denial of Trujillo’s request to question the agent

about the manual nor the grant of the Government’s motion to quash

the subpoena was an abuse of discretion. U nited States v. Wilson

,

732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hawkins , 6612

F.2d 436, 444 (5th Cir. 1981). The field agents’ manual was

irrelevant to the agent’s testimony; "[t]here is no right to

impeach a witness wit h respect to collateral or irrelevant

matters." Hawkins , 661 F.2d at 444.

AFFIRMED

.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk April 28, 2009

s0420 

# Order

April 28, 2009

137650

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 137650 COA: 279515 Wayne CC: 07-006716-01 MALCOLM WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the September 16, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### Franklin D. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Governor Lawrence J. HOGAN, Jr., in his individual capacity, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-2403

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 24, 2017

Decided: June 5, 2017

Franklin D. Jackson, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew John Fader, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

*122Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Franklin D. Jackson appeals the district court’s order granting Governor Hogan’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and dismissing Jackson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. Given the ambiguity of the statutory scheme contained in Md. Code, Art. 2B, § 15-101 (West 2014), the historical practice of Maryland Senate confirmation for appointments to the Prince George’s County Board of License Commissioners, and the presumption that Senate confirmation is necessary for civil officers under Md. Const., Art. II, § 10, we agree with the distinct court that a reasonable official would not have understood that the conduct at issue violates clearly established law. *See Mullenix v. Luna,*— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015). We therefore conclude that Governor Hogan is entitled to qualified immunity, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

*

 Jackson’s argument on appeal improperly defines the alleged clearly established right at a high level of generality. *See Mullenix,*136 S.Ct. at 308.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 23.2



                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in CFX Corporation's December 31,
1997 Annual Report on Form 10-K of our report dated January 22, 1996, relating
to the consolidated balance sheets of The Safety Fund Corporation and
subsidiaries as of December 31, 1995 and 1994, and the related consolidated
statements of operations, stockholders' equity, and cash flows for the years
then ended, which report appears in the December 31, 1995 annual report on Form
10-KSB of The Safety Fund Corporation.




                                                 /s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
March 27, 1998





                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in CFX Corporation's December 31,
1997 Annual Report on Form 10-K of our report dated January 22, 1997, relating
to the consolidated balance sheets of Community Bankshares, Inc. and
subsidiaries as of December 31, 1996 and June 30, 1995, and the related
consolidated statements of income, changes in stockholders' equity and cash
flows for the year ended December 31, 1996, the six months ended December 31,
1995, and for each years in the three year period ended June 30, 1995, which
report appears in the December 31, 1996 annual report on Form 10-K of Community
Bankshares, Inc.




                                                 /s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP


Boston, Massachusetts
March 27, 1998
EX PARTE Kenneth Leon MORROW

1160289 (CR-15-1207)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

3-10-2017

Cert. denied.
Rogelio Castillo DE JESUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3693

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 1, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jay SANDIFER, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-31053 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 23, 2017

Carol Mignonne Griffing, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Cristina Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jeremy B. Gordon, Jeremy Gordon, P.L.L.C., Mansfield, TX, Joey W. Hendrix, Shreveport, LA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jay Sandifer appeals his sentence for receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). The district court’s guideline calculation reflected a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 3E1.1(a), but the Government did not move for an additional one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b). The court sentenced Sandifer within the advisory guideline range to 108 months of imprisonment, a $15,000 fine, and five years of supervised release. Sandifer argues that we should remand the case to the district court to rule out the possibility that the Government had improper motives in refusing to move for the additional one-level reduction.

We review the issue for plain error. *United States v. Garcia-Carrillo,*749 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). After Sandifer was sentenced, the Sentencing Commission amended § 3E1.1’s commentary to clarify that the Government should not withhold a motion for the third-level reduction “based on interests not identifled in § 3E1.1, such as whether the defendant agrees to waive his or her right to appeal.” U.S.S.G. app. C amend. 775 at 43 (2013) (codified at U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6). The amendment applies to cases pending on direct appeal. *United States v. Villegas Palacios,*756 F.3d 325, 326 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).

Sandifer’s speculation that the Government may have had improper motives in withholding the motion falls short of a showing of clear or obvious error. *See Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). Moreover, the record indicates that Sandifer did not plead guilty until three days before trial, after the Government had engaged in significant trial preparation and after the trial date had been continued at his request.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
1 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the

Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound

volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 1 9

- BG

- 1 141

IN RE KENNETH S. KAUFMAN

201 9 D DN 2 7 5

A Member of the Bar of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bar Reg. No. 4 0 1 1 3 9

BEFORE: Glickman and Fisher

, Associate Judge s , and Nebeker, Senior Judge

.

O R D E R

(FILED

– January 30, 2020)

On consideration of the certified order of the Court of Appeals of Maryland

disbarring respondent from the practice of law in that jurisdiction ; this court’s

December 9 , 2019

, order suspending respondent pending resolution of t his matter

and directing h im to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed;

and the statement of Disciplinary Counsel ; and it appearing that res pondent failed to

file either a response to this court’s order to show cause or his D.C. Bar R. XI, §14(g)

affidavit, it is

ORDERED that Kenneth S. Kaufman is hereby disbarred from the practice of

law in the District of Columbia

. See In re Sibley , 990 A.2d 483 (D.C. 2010) ; In re

Fuller , 930 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 2007) (rebuttable presumption of identical

reciprocal discipline applies to all cases in which the respondent does not

participate). It is2 FURTHER ORDERED that for purposes of reinstatement the period of

respondent’s disbarment will not begin to run until such time as he files a D.C. Bar

R. XI, § 14(g) affidavit.

PER CURIAM
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Pedro Francisco HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-10214 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Date Filed: 12/20/2016

*918James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Pedro Francisco Hernandez-Garcia, Pro Se

Before DENNIS, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Pedro Francisco Hernandez-Garcia has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2011). Hernandez-Garcia has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*6th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Joshua WREN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Officer Jimmy CURTIS; Officer NFN Mendez; Officer NFN Prado; Officer NFN Vandam; Sergeant NFN Alcantar; Sergeant NFN Miller; Sergeant NFN Lozano; Lieutenant NFN Cantrell; Medical Personnel Jones; John Doe; Brian Collier, TDCJ, Executive Director, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-11710 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 1, 2017

Joshua Wren, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Joshua Wren, Texas prisoner # 01982778, appeals the magistrate judge’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel. This court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction on its own motion if necessary. *Mosley v. Cozby,*813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). Although an order denying the appointment of counsel in a civil rights action is immediately appealable, *Robbins v. Maggio,*750 F.2d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 1985), if that order was issued by a magistrate judge and the parties have not consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, the order must first be appealed to the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),(c)(1),(c)(3); *see Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB,*205 F.3d 208, 219-20 (5th Cir.2000). Otherwise, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge’s order. *United States v. Renfro,*620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980).

The record does not indicate that the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge or that the district court ruled on Wren’s objections and issued its own order on the motion for appointment of counsel. Therefore, we dismiss Wren’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
jcap_Ex10_25



		

			Exhibit 10.25

		





		
			AMENDMENT TO TERM LOAN AGREEMENT
		

		
			This Amendment to  Term Loan Agreement (“Amendment”) is made as of the 17th day of August, 2018, by and among MCGINNIS FERRY OWNER, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company (the “Borrower”), and FIRSTBANK, a Tennessee state bank, whose address is 6815 Poplar Avenue, Suite 100, Memphis, Tennessee 38138 (hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”). 
		

		
			WHEREAS, the parties entered into a certain Term Loan Agreement, dated as of August 17, 2018, with respect to a Loan from Bank to Borrower in the amount of Eight Million Six Hundred Twenty Five Thousand and No/100ths Dollars ($8,625,000.00) (the “Loan Agreement”); and
		

		
			WHEREAS, Section 8.1(g) of the Loan Agreement contained a capitalized term, "Key Bank Line," which had not been defined in the Loan Agreement.
		

		
			NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto agree as follows:
		

			
	
			
				 1.
			

			
	
			
			Section 8.1(g) of the Loan Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 




		
			(g)A default under the Credit Agreement, as it may be amended from time to time, that results in an acceleration of the outstanding obligations of the Guarantor, as borrower under the Credit Agreement, as the Credit Agreement may be amended from time to time.
		

			
	
			
				 2.
			

			
	
			
			As modified hereby, the Loan Agreement is ratified and confirmed and shall remain in full force and effect.




		
			[Signature page follows]
		

		
			


		 


 


[Signature Page to Amendment to Term Loan Agreement]
		

		
			IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Borrower and the Bank have executed this Amendment, or have caused this Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized officers, all as of the day and year first above written.
		

		
			BORROWER:
		

		
			 
		

		
			MCGINNIS FERRY OWNER, LLC,  
		

		
			a Georgia limited liability company
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: MCGINNIS FERRY PARENT, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, its sole member and manager
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: JERNIGAN CAPITAL OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, its managing member and manager
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: JERNIGAN CAPITAL, INC., a Maryland corporation, its managing member
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: /s/ Kelly Luttrell
		

		
			Name: Kelly Luttrell
		

		
			Title: SVP CFO
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			BANK:
		

		
			 
		

		
			FIRSTBANK, a Tennessee state bank
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: /s/ Bill Harter
		

		
			Name: Bill Harter
		

		
			Title: Senior Vice President