NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0496n.06 No. 08-1630 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, Plaintif f-Appellee , v. RAY BRUC E CULBERT SON, De fe nd an t- Ap pe lla nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON A PP E A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

THE EA STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: KEITH, COLE, an d GIBBONS , Ci r c uitJudg e s. COLE, Circ uit Jud ge. Def endant- Appellant Ray

Br uce Culber

tson appea ls his conviction and sente nce for being a felon in posse ssion of a fire arm. While being chase d by law enf orce ment office rs, Culbertson tossed awa y a dar k-colore d object. Minutes later , police re cover ed a gun wher e the tos se d o bje c t li ke ly

wo uld have land e d. Cul be rt so n n owc ha lle ng e s th e lim itatio ns pla c e d o n h is

cross-e x amination of a police office r, among other issues. We AF F IRM Culbertson’s conviction bu t VA CA TE his sentence and REMAND fo r r es en t en ci n g. I. BACKG ROUND On J une 19, 2004, Of

fice rs CraigSchrame ck and K eith McC loud were assig ned to work Detroit’s 4th Prec inct (“Pre cinct”) , which cove rs the ar ea of Electric and Glea son streets. Of fice rs Detric h Spidell and Paulo Herna ndez also wer e assigned that day to work the same Prec inct, known fo r p lay ingho st t o f

re qu e nt n arc oti c sa le s. Tw o patr ol c ars us ua lly mon ito r t he Pr e c inc t in

tand e m,No. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 2 - due to its isolated nature. At approximately 6:30 that evening , Spidell and Herna ndez noticed two vehicl es blocking Gleason Stree t. An individual later identified a s Culbertson was lea ning inside the dr iv e r ’ s s id e w in d o w o f o n e o f th e c ar s , a b la c k Po n ti a c . Ro u g h ly f iv e to te n s e c onds after McCloud a

nd Schrame ck pulled behind the Pontiac in their mar ked police c ar, Mc Cloud caug ht the driver’ s ey es and Culbertson “took off running ” north on Electric Street. (Dist. Ct. Docke t No. 103 at 43.) Spidell testified that he immediately started to r un afte r Culbertson, who had a look of “panic ” as he beg an to flee . (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 102 at 138.) Cul be rt so n r a

n u p E le c tr ic and

tur ne d w e st be tw e e n the thi rd and fo ur th hou se s o n th e str e e t, with Spidell in pursuit on foot. Spidell testified t hat he then s aw Cul bertson “throw a da rk-c olored object.” ( Id. a t 14 0. ) A t th e tim e , Sp ide ll w a s tr a ili ngCul be rt so n b y a pp ro xima te ly

tw e nty -f ive to thirty fee t, w ith a

n unobstructed view of Culbertson’s action. Culbertson then ran throug h an open

a lle y , at w hic h ti me Sc hr a me c k jo ine d th e c ha se . Cul be rt so n jump e d o ve r a fe nc e and

e nd e d u p in the bac ky ard of the fourth house on Edsel S tree t, wher e he was apprehe nded and handcuf fed. The whole orde al lasted only

a fe w minutes, with C u l b er t son ending up in the custody of Spidell and Schrame ck. On c e Spi de ll and Sc hr a me c k a pp re he nd e d Cul be rt so n, Mc Clo ud and Spi de ll ba c ktr a c ke d to

rec over the object that Culbertson had thrown away

. The two spotted a dark-color ed handgun in the g rass in the ba cky ard of

3210 Electric . They

rec overe d the g un approximately three to four minutes afte r appr ehendingCulbertson. Culbertson was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a fire arm following thr e e se ri ou s f

e lony of fe ns e c on vic tio ns , in

vio la tio n o f 1 8 U.S. C. §§ 922 (g ) an d 924 (e ). Af te r t ri a l,No. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 3 - a jur y fo un d Culb e rt so n g uil ty
. Con c lud ingthat Cu lbe rt so n w a s an A rm e d Ca re e r C ri min a l w ith in the meaningof 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the district court sentenc ed him to the mandatory minimum of fiftee n y ear s incarc eration. Culbertson now appe als both his conviction and sentenc e. II. AN AL YSI S A. Co nfro nt at ion Cl aus e Culbertson argues that the district court limi ted his ability to cross-e x amine Of

fice r Schrame ck by prohibiting a direc t compar ison of Schrameck’ s police re port with McCloud’s repor t in v iol a tio n o f h is Si xth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o c on fr on ta tio n. W e revie w C on fr on ta tio n Cl a us e challeng es de novo, but e videntiary ruling s for a buse of discr etion. United States v. J ohnson , 440 F.3d 832, 842 ( 6th Cir. 2006).

“ ‘[T ]he ma in a

nd e sse nti a l pu

rp os e of c on fr on ta tio n is to secur e for the opponent the opportunity of c ross-exam ination .’” De law ar e v . V an Ar sd all , 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alask

a , 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974)) (empha sis in orig inal). “[A] criminal defe ndant states

a vio la tio n o f t

he Con fr on ta tio n Cl a

us e by sh ow ingthat he wa s p ro hib ite d from engag ingin otherwise a

ppropriate cross-e x amination desig ned to show a pr ototy pical for m of bias o n the par

t of the wi tne ss, and

the re by ‘t o e xpos e to t

he jur y the fa c ts fr om wh ic h jur or s . . . c ou ld a pp ro pr ia te ly draw infere nces r elating to the reliability of the witness.’” Id. at 6 8 0 (q u o t i n g Da v is , 4 1 5 U. S . at 318). We have found that the ke y “is whethe r the jury h ad en o ug h information to assess the defe nse’s theor

y of the c ase de spit e the lim its placed on c ross-examination.” United States v. Holden , 557 F.3d 698, 704 ( 6th Cir. 2009).No. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 4 - He re , th e jur

y ha d e no ug h in fo rm a tio n to a sse ss t he de fe ns e ’s theo ry

of the c a se . B oth Schrame ck and Mc Cloud testified that the ir police repor ts contain an e rror

reg ardingthe addr ess at wh ic h Cu lbe rt so n w a s a

pp re he nd e d o n Jun e 19 , 20 04

. Th e re po rt s lis t an a dd re ss o f 3 21 7 E le c tr ic Str e e t, b ut b oth

of fi c e rs te sti fi e d on dir e c t exam inatio n tha t the c or re c t add re ss is 321 7 E ds e l Str e e t. While th e e r

r o r w a s r e le v an t— “ if

D e f e n d an t h a d

b e e nar r e s te d o nE le c tr ic , it

w o u ld h a v e b e en impossibl e for

him to have tossed the g un wher e it h ad b een f ound”—De fense counsel ha d an op po rt un it y to cro ss- e xami ne the wi tne sse s r e g ard ingthe e rr or and the po ssi bil ity

of c oll us ion in prepa ration of the r eports. (B r. of De f.-Appe llant C u l b er t s on 40.) Counsel specif ically asked S c h r a m e c k : “ D i d

y o uan d M c C l o u d g e t t o g e t h e r an d c o l l a b o r a t e i n t h e p r e p ar a t i o no f y o u r r e p o rt ?” (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 103 at 163.) Counsel also asked: “How do y ou know it was a mistake if y ou and y our par

tner both said the same stree t? ” ( Id. at 161.) Whil e the district cour

t fo re cl o s ed line-by -line compa rison of the two re ports—since Mc C l o u d ’ s r e p o r

tw a s n o ta d m i t t e d

i n t o e v i d e n c e

—t h e j u r

y h a d i n f o r m a t i o ns u f

f i c i e n tt o a s s e ss Schrame ck’s reliability

. The jury was aware that Schrame ck’s testimony and police r eport did not match up with re g ard to the address at which C ulbertson was arr ested and that Schrame ck’s r eport omitted the fac t that Spidell and McCloud ha d sear ched for the gun toge ther. And the jury knew that McCloud’s police re port was inconsistent i n t h e s ame manne r. The jur y hear d Schrame ck’s explanation: “We use the same computer. I ty ped my narr ative over

the computer

[McCl oud] was using and that could be how t he ty po ended up on there.” (

Id. at 148.) And when asked on dire ct examination, “[ w]ould t here still be perha ps some portion of his repor t that would stil l remain a s y ou sat down to ty

pe y our re port,” Schra

meck r esponded, “ [p] ossibly , y eah if it didn’t all clear out or

–No. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 5 - y eah.” ( Id. at 148.) F urther, the jury was a war e that S chra

meck; McCloud; Her

nandez; the Assistant U.S. Attorney ; and a F eder al Bur eau of Alcohol, Tobac co, F irea rms, and Explosi ves off

icer had met a fe w day s prior to trial and discusse d the errors in the pol ice reports. The district court’s limitation on the scope of def

ense c ounsel’s cr oss examination of S chra meck, ther efor e, did not amount to a Confrontation Clause violation. B. Vehicular Manslaugh terConviction and Arm ed Care er C rim inal Act Culbertson also argues that his 1996 M i ch i gan conviction for manslaug hter with a motor vehicle does not constitute a “violent felony” withi n the m eaning of t he Armed Care er Criminal Ac t (“the ACCA” or “ the Act” ), 18 U.S .C. § 924(e) , and that there fore the di strict court erre d in finding that he had co m mitted three pre vious “violent felon[ies] ” and w as subject to the Ac t’s mandatory minimum sentenc e. The g overnme nt ag ree s. We r eview questions of statutory interpre tation de novo. United States v. Shafer , 573 F.3d 26 7, 27 2 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 9) . T he AC CA state s, in r e le va nt p art : (e) (1) In the ca se of a

person who violate s section 922(g ) of this title and has thre e previous convic tions by

any court re fer

red t o i n s ec tion 922(g )(1) of this titl e for a violen t felony

or a se rious drug offe nse, or both, committed on occ asions differ ent fr om o ne ano the r, su c h p e rs on sh a ll be fi ne d un de r thi s tit le and imp ri so ne d n ot l e ss than fiftee n y ear s . . . . (2) As use d in this subs ection– . . . (B ) the ter

m “violent felo n y ” mea

ns any crime punishable by

imprisonment for a te rm e xce e din g on e y e ar . . . that – (i) has a s an ele ment the use, attempted use, or thre at en ed u s e of phy sical for ce ag ainst the person of

another ; or (ii) is burg lary , arson, or

extorti on, involves use of e x plosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pr esents a se rious potential risk of phy sical injury to another . . . .No. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 6 - 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Two pr ovisions, therefor e, def ine the ter m “violent felony ,” the latter including

a re sidual clause. I n Michig an, the de finition of manslaug hter is set out in the c ommon law. People v . Datema , 5 3 3 N. W

. 2 d

2 7 2 , 2 7 6 (M i ch

. 1 9 9 5 ). M an s l au gh t er wi t h a m o t o r v eh i cl e i s d ef i n edas “o p er at [ i n g]

a vehicle in a g rossly neg lige nt ma nner and substantially caus[ing] the death of anothe r.” People v

. Swi ft , No

. 2 7 1 1 0 5 , 2 0 0 7 W L 3 0 3 3 9 4 4 , * 4 (M i ch

. C t
. Ap p . Oc t
. 1 8 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Pe op le v . La rd ie , 551 N.W.2d 656, 664 n.28 (Mich. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Pe ople v. Sc haefer , 70 3 N .W. 2d

77 4 ( Mic h. 20 05 )) . G ro ss n e g lig e nc e oc c ur s w he n th e de fe nd ant: (1) kne w the situation require d the exercise of ordinary car e and dilig ence to aver t injury to another, ( 2) had the ability to a void the harm by exercising ordinary car e and diligenc e, and ( 3) fa il ed t o exercise the c are and dilige nce ne cessa ry “to ave rt the thr e a te ne d d ang e r w he n to the or din ary min d it mus t be a

pp are nt t hat th e resul t is likely to prove disastrous to anothe r.” Id. (q u o t i n g People v . McCoy , 5 66 N. W.2 d 667 , 669 (M ic h. Ct. Ap p. 19 97 )) . I n o the r w or ds , g ro ss neg lige nce doe s not involve purposef ul conduct. As such, m anslaug hter with a motor vehicle does not fall within 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)( B) (i) b ec ause the “use, attempted use, or thre atene d use of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of another ” is not an elem en t o f t he off ense. 18 U .S.C. § 92 4( e )( 2) (B )( i) ; se e Le oc al v . A sh c ro ft , 5 43 U. S. 1 , 9 (2 00 4) (“ ‘[U ]se ’ r e qu ir e s a c tiv e e mpl oy me nt.

. . . W h i l e o n e m a y , i nt h e o r y, a c t i v e l y e mp l o y something in a n a c c ide nta l ma

nn e r, it i s mu c h le ss

n at u ral to say

that a per son actively

employ s phy sical for ce a g ainst another pe rson by acc ident.”). Nor is manslaug hter with a motor ve hicle one of the enumer ated offe nses in § 924(e) (2)( B) (ii). 18 U.S.C

. § 9 2 4 (e)(2)( B) (ii) (listing bur g lary , arson, e x tortion, and crimes involving the use ofNo. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 7 - explos ives). At issue, then, is whether Culbertson’s previous c onviction for manslaug hter “other wise i nvolves conduct that prese nts a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” Id. We p re vio us ly

have he ld t

hat in vo lun tary

mans la ug hte r a nd e qu iva le nt c ri me s c on sti tut e “violent fe lon[ ies]” within the ACCA. See, e .g. , Un ite d Stat es v . Za ba wa , 13 4 F . App ’x 60 , 6 6 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (finding Michig an off ense of attempted involuntary

manslaug hter qua lifies as “violent felony ” under

the ACCA). Howeve r, subsequent to the se dec isions, and subsequent to Culbertson’s sentenc ing, the Supreme Court dec ided Begay v. United States , 553 U.S. 137 (2008), and Cha mb e rs v. United States , 129 S. Ct . 687 (2009). In Begay , the Supreme Court found that a co n v i ct i on for driving under the influence of alc ohol or drug s differ s from the crimes listed in § 924(e) (2)( B) (ii), in that “the listed crimes a ll ty pically involve purposef

ul, ‘violent,’ and ‘ ag g ressive’ conduct.” 553 U. S

. at 1 4 4-45 (c itation omit ted). “ By way of contra st, statutes that forbid driving under the influence

. . . are , or are most ne arly compar able to, c rimes that impose strict liability , criminalizing conduct in re spect to which the offe nder ne ed not have had any cr iminal intent at all.” Id. at 145. I n Cha mb e rs , the Court he ld that the crime of “fa ilure to r eport” is not a “violent felony” within the meaningof the ACCA. 129 S. Ct. at 691. The C o u rt fo und that “the c rime amounts to a for m of inaction, a f

ar cry from the purposef

ul, violent, and ag g ressive conduct potentially at issue when an off ender uses explosi ves ag ai n st property , commits arson, burg les a dwe lling or r esidenc e, or eng ag es in ce rtain for

ms of extorti on.” Id. at 692 (quotation marks omitted). I n Un ite d S

tat es v . F or d , w e de te rm ine d th a t Begay and Cha mb e rs indic ate that two que stions g uide application of the ACCA’s residual clause

. 560 F.3d 420, 421 (6th Cir. 2009) (c onstruing the sent encingenhanc ement for car eer offe nders, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manua l§ 4B1.1(a )No. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 8 - (2002), whic h define s “cr ime of violence ” in lang uag e virtually identical to the ACCA’s def inition of “violent fe lony ”). F irst, “d o es t he cr ime prese nt a serious potential risk of violenc e akin to the listed crimes? ” Id. And s econd, “does the crime involve the same kind of ‘ purposef ul, violent, and ag g ressive c onduct’ a s th e l isted crimes? ” Id. In an s w e r i n g t h e s e qu e s t i o n s , w e a p p l y a

“ c a te g or ic a l” a

pp ro a c h: “ [W]e lo ok

a t th e statut or

y de fi nit ion

of the c ri me of

c on vic tio n, no t th e fa c ts underlying that conviction, to de termine the nature of the c rime.” Id. a t 422. I n ca se s suc h a s th is one, whe re a

crime is def

ined by common law rather than by statute, we l o o kat the common law definition. Zab awa , 134 F. App’ x at 65. Apply ing t h i s analy sis, we find that the c rime of mansla ug hter with a motor ve hicle is not a “violent f

elony .” The crime doe s prese nt a serious potential risk of violence akin to that posed by the listed c rimes. Yet, manslaug hter with a motor vehicle involves g ross neg lige nce, not pur poseful int e nt. Th e re fo re , it

is d if fi c ult to c on str ue it a s p ur

po se fu l, vio le nt, and a g g re ssi ve . I n r e a c hin g thi s

co n cl u s i o n , we ar e n o tal o n e; o t h er C i rc u i tC o u rt s h av e h el d s i m i l ar l y fo l l o wi n g Begay

. See, e .g. , United States v. He rrick , 545 F.3d 53, 59 ( 1st Ci r. 2 0 0 8 ) (holding that Wis consin’s vehic ular ho mic ide fe lony is not a c ri me of vio le nc e un de r U .S. S.G . § 4B 1. 2( a )) ; Un ite d Sta te s v . S mi th , 544 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008) (“ [T] hose cr imes with a mens rea of neg lige nce or rec klessness do not trig g er the enhanc ed pena lties mandated by the ACCA.”). There fore , we va cate Culbertson’s sentenc e and re m an d fo r r es en t en ci n g. C. Suf

fi ciency of Evid ence C u l b er t s o nn ex tar gu es i n s u ff i ci en tev i d en ce ex i s t edt o s u s t ai n h i s co n v i ct i o nfo r b ei n g a felon in possession of a f irea rm in violation of Fede ral Rule of Criminal Pro ce d u re 29. HeNo. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 9 - specific ally

claims there was insuffic ient evidenc e to prove the possession element of the offe nse. I n revie wing a suff

iciency of the evidenc e cha lleng e, we ask whe ther, a fter r eviewingthe evidenc e in the light most favor able to the pr osecution, any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United Sta te

s v . G uth rie , 557 F.3d 243, 253 ( 6th Cir. 2009). “We do not inde pendently assess the

cre dibilit y of witnesses or the we ight of the evidenc e.” Gu thr ie , 557 F.3d at 253. “Circumstantial evidenc e alon e is sufficient to sustain a convic tion and such evide nce ne ed not re move eve ry

rea sonable hy

poth es i s ex ce p t that of g uilt.” Un ite d S tat es v . B ar

ne tt , 398 F.3d 516, 522 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (c itation and quotation marks omitted). Ba rn e tt he lps g uid e our a

na ly sis

. I n that c a se we fo un d the fo llo wi ng e vid e nc e su ff ic ie nt t o sustain a fe lon in possession of a fire arm c onviction: Offic er Jeffe rson t est ified at trial that he saw [defe ndant] crouche d outside the residenc e at 661 Shel L ane, holdinga long black object t h at l ooked like a shotgun [but he wa s not sur e]. He further testified that he sa

w B arne tt throw the object to the g round as B arne tt beg an to flee from the r esidenc e. F urthermore, Off icer Crowe testifie d th a t u p o ninv e s ti g a ti n g th e r e s id e n c e a f te r B ar n e tt w a s a p p r e h e n d e d , she found a bla ck and chrome rifle in the front y ard. This e vidence is sufficient evide nce to s up po rt

the jur y ’s g uil ty ve rd ic t. Id. We dismi ssed the def

endant’ s challeng e that Of fice r Jeffer son’s testimony was inconsistent and unreliable , as “attacks on witness cr edibility are simply

challeng es to the quality of the g overnme nt’s evidenc e and not to the sufficie ncy of the e vidence .” Id. (quotation marks a nd citation omitted). He re , to o, c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in Culb e rt so n’ s convic tio n. Spi de ll te sti fi e d th a t he saw C ulb e rt so n thr ow awa y a “ da rk -c olo re d o bje c t” a s h e c ha se d Cu lbe rt so n o n f oo t.No. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 10 - (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 102 at 140.) McCloud testified that Spidell t o l d h i m t h at S pidell saw Culbertson throw something , althoug h he was not sure what it was. McCloud asked Spidell if the thrown objec t could have be en a gun, and Spidell replied that it could have been. Mc Cloud further testified th at t h e two office rs bac ktrac ked throug h the ar ea Spidell cove red dur ing the chase and could “c lear ly

see a g un” lying in the g rass ther e. (D ist. Ct . Docke t N o. 103 at 22.) Nothing else wa s in the immediate ar ea w here the g un was found. Her nandez testified that Spidell stated that he saw Culberts o n t h row something, “whic h he thoug ht looked like a g un,” duringthe cha se and that the office rs re cover ed the gun mer e minutes after Culbertson was appr ehende d. ( Id. at 109.) And Schrame ck testified that Spidell said he saw Culbertson toss something awa y during the cha se. This evidence is sufficien t fo r a rational trier of f act to infe r that the gun the offic ers

rec overe d was indeed the obj ect Cul bertson tos sed whil e beingchase d. Sufficient evide nce the ref ore

e xiste d to fi nd

Cul be rt so n guil ty

of be inga fe lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 922(g )(1)

. D. Speedy Trial Act Cul be rt so n f

ina lly argue s th a t w e sh ou ld r e mand his c a se to t

he dis tr ic t c ourt , becau se it failed to de termine the ex act date of his fe dera l arre st for purpose s of deter mining whe ther ther e wa s a violati o n o f t he Speedy Trial Ac t, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). After an ora l hear ing, the district court

a do pte d th e ma g istrate jud g e ’s re po rt and re c omm e nd a tio n d e nyingCul be rt so n’ s mo tio n to dis mis s on g rounds of a

Speedy Trial Ac t violation. The Spee dy

Trial Ac t states, in releva nt part: “Any

information o r i n d i ct m ent charg ing a n individual with the commi ssion of an offe nse shall be filed within thirty day s from the date on whichNo. 08-1630

United States v. Culbertson

- 11 - su c h in div idu a l w a s arr e ste d o r s e rv e d w itha su mmo ns in c on ne c tio n w ithsu c h c ha rg e s. ” 18 U. S.C. § 3 16 1( b) . We re vie w the d is tr ic t c ourt ’s int e rp re ta tio n o f t he Spe e dy

Tr ia l A c t de no vo and

its fac tual finding s for c lear

err or. Un ite d S

tat es v . Ca rro ll , 26 F.3d 1380, 1390 ( 6th Cir. 1994). A def endant is not arr ested for

purposes of the S peedy Trial Ac t until he is t aken into fe dera l

c u s to dy f o r th e p u r p o s e o f r e s p o n d in g to a f e d e r a l c h arg e. S

ee United States v. Copley , 774 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1985). I n this case , a fe dera l complaint char g ing Culber tson with being a

felon in possession of a firea

rm was filed on J uly 1, 2004, but, due to a state parole hold, he was not take n into fede ral custody

until J anuar

y 10, 2005. Although the J anuar y 10, 2005, date wa s not noted by the dis tr ic t c o u rt in it s d e c is io n , it s u b s e qu e n tl y w a s id e n ti f

ie d b y th e p r o b a ti o n o f

f ic er in the Presentenc e Investig ation Report. A re mand there fore is unnece ssary . Culbertson was indicted on J anuar y 15, 2005, well within the rang e provide d for by the Speedy

Trial Ac t. We t he re fo re a ff

ir m the de c isi on of

the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nyingCul be rt so n’ s mo tio n to dis mis s purs ua nt t o th e Spe e dy

Tr ia l A c t. III . C ON CL USI ON For these re asons, we AF F IRM Cul be rt so n’ s c on vic tio n, bu t VA CA TE his sentence and REMAND fo r r es en t en ci n g.