NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH DONG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

BEN CARSON, Secretary, United States 

Department of Housing and Urban 

Development, a federal agency; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-55603 

D.C. No. 

2:15-cv-03539-GHK-AJW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 12, 2018**

Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and SIMON,*** District 

Judge.

Joseph Dong appeals the district court’s denial of relief under Federal Rule 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the 

District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

FILED

AUG 22 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and affirm.

First, Rule 60(b)(1) allows courts to “relieve a party or a party’s legal 

representative from a final judgment on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, 

surprise, or excusable neglect.” Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1223 

(9th Cir. 2000). When determining whether to grant relief for late filings or 

failures to appear under Rule 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect, we apply the test set 

forth in Pioneer and Briones. See Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick 

Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 394 (1993); Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 

116 F.3d 379, 381–82 (9th Cir. 1997). We evaluate four factors: “(1) the danger of 

prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact 

on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted 

in good faith.” Bateman, 231 F.3d 1223–24 (citing Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395). 

Ignorance and carelessness do not quality for Rule 60(b)(1) relief. See Engleson v. 

Burlington N. R.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1043 (1992). 

Here, the district court properly applied the four Pioneer-Briones factors

when Dong’s counsel failed to oppose a motion to dismiss. The district court

concluded that the first factor weighed slightly against relief because six years had

passed since the alleged discriminatory events. As to the second factor, the oneyear delay before Dong filed the Rule 60 motion weighed heavily against relief. 
3 

The district court also thoroughly discussed the third factor, concluding that the

delay in filing the Rule 60 motion and Dong’s counsel’s ability to do other work 

during that time period weighed against relief. As to the final factor, Dong 

appeared to act in good faith which weighed slightly in his favor, but not enough to 

overcome the other factors.

Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all rule sparingly allowing for relief from a final 

judgment in “extraordinary circumstances” to prevent “manifest injustice.” See 

Community Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2002); United 

States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (1993). Here, Dong 

has failed to show extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60 motion.1 

AFFIRMED.

1 We do not reach the merits of the underlying judgment. See Floyd v. Laws, 929 

F.2d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1991) (“An appeal from a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion 

brings up only the denial of the motion for review, not the merits of the underlying 

judgment”).