J-S10016-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.D.W., JR., 

A MINOR

APPEAL OF: N.A.O., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2946 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered August 8, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0001185-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: Y.N.S.O.-P., 

A MINOR

APPEAL OF: N.A.O., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2948 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered August 8, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0001186-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2018

N.A.O. (“Mother”) appeals the decrees entered August 8, 2017 that 

granted the petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(“DHS” or the “Agency”) seeking to involuntarily terminate her parental rights 

to her children, Y.N.S.O.-P. (a female born in October 2005) and T.D.W., Jr.,

(a male born in March 2011) (collectively the “Children”) pursuant to the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and to change 
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the Children’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.1

We affirm.

In its opinion, the trial court set forth the following procedural history 

and factual background regarding this appeal.

On September 5, 2014, [DHS] received a General Protective 

Services (“GPS”) report which alleged that the Children were 

fearful of T.D.W., Jr.’s father[, T.W.,] (“Father”) and that Father 

was physically abusive towards the Mother (“Mother”) and 

Children. (Statement of Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph A). On or 

around September 9, 2014, DHS visited the family’s home. 

During this visit, Y.N.S.O.-P. told DHS that Father was abusive

towards Mother. (Statement of Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph 13).

On November 6, 2014, DHS held a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) 

meeting. The goal identified for the Children was to remain in the 

home. The objectives identified for Mother were (1) to participate 

in individual, marital and family counseling; (2) [to] not use 

physical violence or threats to resolve family conflicts; (3) to 

participate in a mental health evaluation; (4) to comply with all 

treatment recommendations including therapy and/or medication 

as prescribed and (5) to sign authorizations to allow the Children 

and Youth Division (“CYD”) to obtain copies of evaluations and 

progress reports. (Statement of Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph I).

On April 1, 2015, DHS received a GPS report alleging that during 

a family outing on March 28, 2015, Mother hit Y.N.S.O-P. 

(Statement of Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph Q). On April 7, 2015, 

DHS sought to interview Y.N.S.O.-P[.] to discuss the alleged 

incident. Thereafter, DHS received verbal threats from Mother 

____________________________________________

1 On August 8, 2017, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of 

T.W., the putative father of T.D.W., Jr., and provided that the goal was 

changed to adoption. In a separate decree entered on that same date, the 

trial court terminated the parental rights of W.S.J.P., the putative father of 

Y.N.S.O.-P., and provided that the goal was changed to adoption. Neither 

T.W. nor W.S.J.P., nor any other putative father, is a party to the present 

appeal, nor has any such putative father filed a separate appeal. 
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and Father about DHS[’] involvement. (Statement of Facts 

Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph S).

On April 13, 2015, an emergency motion was submitted by DHS 

resulting in DHS obtaining an Order for Protective Custody for the 

Children. (Statement of Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph X.) 

Thereafter, on April 13, 2015, DHS took protective custody of 

Y.N.S.O.-P. at her school with police assistance. (Statement of 

Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph X). When Mother arrived at the 

school to learn that Y.N.S.O.-P. was being taken into protective 

custody by DHS, Mother refused to tell DHS the whereabouts of 

[the] [c]hild[’s] [s]ibling T.D.W[., Jr.] and became combative with

DHS and the police. She eventually bit a police officer. 

(Statement of Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph Y).

On April 13, 2015, Father provided false information to school 

about the whereabouts of T[.]D[.]W., Jr. Thereafter, DHS learned 

that T.D.W., Jr. was at the family home with Father. Father 

refused to allow DHS and the police access to the family home. 

DHS obtained a break down order and removed T.D.W., Jr. from 

the home. (Statement of Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph Z). 

Thereafter, on April 14, 2015, Mother was arrested and charged 

with Aggravated Assault, Terroristic Threats, Recklessly

Endangering Another Person and Resisting Arrest for biting the 

police officer on April 13, 2015. (Statement of Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. 

Paragraph BB).

On June 23, 2015, Mother and Father appeared before the 

Honorable Judge Jonathan Irvine for an adjudicatory hearing after 

which the Children were adjudicated dependent. (Statement of 

Facts Y.N.S.O.-P. Paragraph GG)[.] Thereafter, on August 3, 

2015, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) revised the Single

Case Plan (“SCP”). The objectives identified for Mother were (1) 

to continue attending individual therapy sessions; (2) to address 

anger management; (3) to resolve issues of domestic violence; 

(4) to confirm and attend weekly visits with the Children; (5) to 

participate in a Family Group Decision Making (“FGDM”); and (6) 

to participate in a Parenting Capacity Evaluation (“PCE”). 

(Statement of Facts T.D.W., Jr. Paragraph EE).

On February 9, 2016, Dr. Erica Williams, Psy.D.[,] and Samantha 

Peterson, M.A. conducted a PCE with Mother that recommended: 

(1) Mother attend weekly therapy with an individual trained in 

providing trauma focused [counseling]; (2) Mother develop a 
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financial plan to provide for herself and the Children to include the

provision of housing separate from the [f]ather; (3) Child, T.D.W.,

Jr. to enroll in individual therapy; (4) and that visitation between 

the Mother and Children be supervised. (Statement of Facts 

T.D.W., Jr. Paragraph LL).

In May 2016, CUA learned that Mother uploaded a GoFundMe 

account asking for money. Mother stated on social media that she 

was in an abusive relationship. (Statement of Facts T.D.W., Jr.

Paragraph QQ). On September 9, 2016, CUA revised SCP for 

Mother. The objectives identified for Mother were (1) to continue 

attending individual therapy sessions; (2) to engage in family 

therapy upon [sic]; (3) to follow all recommendations of the . . . 

[PCE]; (4) to continue to participate in the domestic violence 

program known as Women in Transition; (5) to attend weekly 

individual and group trauma therapy; (6) to have no contact with 

the Children until further action of the [c]ourt; (7) to attend the 

Women’s Empowerment Program and (8) to attend Anger 

Management Counseling. On August 18, 2016, following a 

permanency review hearing [the trial c]ourt issued an order 

stipulating that Mother was to not visit the Children based on her 

ongoing anger issues and abusive behavior towards [C]hildren, 

DHS, CUA Workers and foster parents.

On or about December 5, 2016, DHS filed the underlying [p]etition 

to [t]erminate the [p]arental [r]ights of Mother and Father.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/17, at 1-5.

On August 8, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the termination/goal

change petitions. Mother was present at the hearing, and was represented by 

counsel, Attorney James Demarco. Additionally, Attorney Michael Graves was 

present as the Child Advocate for the Children, and Attorney Lee Kuhlmann 

was present as the guardian ad litem for the Children. Father’s counsel, 

Ashley Sullivan, was present, as well.

On August 8, 2017, the trial court entered the decrees terminating

Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
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(2), (5), (8), and (b), and changing their permanency goal to adoption 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.

2

 Also on August 8, 2017, Mother, acting pro 

se, timely filed her notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

3

 On September 

20, 2017, Mother’s counsel filed supplemental concise statements on her 

behalf. On October 3, 2017, this Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated the 

appeals.4

In her brief on appeal, Mother raises one issue:

[w]hether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a 

matter of law in [ruling that the] termination of parental rights 

[was] warranted under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(2), 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) in that the judge’s decision was against the 

weight of the evidence[?]

Mother’s Brief, at 7.5 

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2 See Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/17, at 1. 

3 See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139, 1141 (Pa. 1993)

(stating that there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation either at 

trial or on appeal).

4 On October 16, 2017, T.W.’s trial counsel, Attorney Ashley Sullivan, filed a 

motion to withdraw as counsel. This Court, acting per curiam, granted the 

motion on December 8, 2017. 

5 Mother waived any challenge to the goal change to adoption by failing to 

raise that issue in her concise statement and brief. See Krebs v. United 

Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised in both his or her 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the statement of 

questions involved in his or her brief on appeal).
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In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, [the]

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 

1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) 

(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court 

might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel 

Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); 

Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As [] discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an 

abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. [Our 

Supreme Court] observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts 

are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a 

cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties 

during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous 

other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite 

result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, 

an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial 

court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; 

instead [appellate courts] must defer to the trial judges so long 

as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s 

legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 

(Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 
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rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id., quoting In re J.L.C., 

837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination 

of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will 

consider section 2511(a) and (b) together, as did the trial court. Section 2511 

provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 
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parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements: 

(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 

1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights 

under section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, 

are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re 

A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).

This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under 

section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section 

2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under 

section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 
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physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], 

[our Supreme Court] held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be 

paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing 

the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and 

make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where 

direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not 

necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis: 

concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply 

because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only 

dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the 

dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be 

reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who, 

after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through 

the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor 

are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the 

parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when 

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to 

establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological 
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aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the 

development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional 

health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs 

of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary 

termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where 

placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A] 

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child 

is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s 

right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a 

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

With regard to the argument that the trial court improperly terminated 

the parental rights of Mother because the weight of the evidence did not 

support a finding that the requirements of section 2511(a) and (b) were met, 

the trial court stated the following:

The Children were adjudicated dependent on June 23, 2015. The

record demonstrates an ongoing unwillingness of Mother to 

provide care or control for the Children or to perform any parental 

duties. Her failure to remedy the conditions that brought the 

Children into care were obvious to [the trial c]ourt. Throughout 

the entire case history Mother was abusive to [C]hildren, DHS 

workers, CUA personnel and foster parents.

Furthermore, Mother interfered with the efforts of DHS, CUA and 

[the trial c]ourt to facilitate the reunification of Mother and 

[C]hildren. This was demonstrated by the fact that recent 

improvement as to the Children’s behavior and health was the
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direct result of proper foster care and DHS involvement, which 

had nothing to do with Mother’s parenting efforts. On the 

contrary, Mother sought to dismantle the very foster parent and 

DHS involvement which so benefitted [C]hildren by her own 

abusive and erratic behavior. The documents and testimony 

discussed below provided [the trial c]ourt evidence that 

termination of the parental rights of the Mother would be in the 

best interest of [] Children. Consequently, the [trial c]ourt found 

clear and convincing evidence to terminate the parental rights of 

[] Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1),(2)[,] (5) and 

(8)[,] and 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Throughout the involvement of the DHS and CUA, the court held 

regularly scheduled Permanency Review hearings to monitor the 

family’s compliance with all court orders and the Single Case Plan 

(“SCP”). These SCP meetings were held to assist the family with 

obtaining any and all appropriate services as an aid to facilitate 

reunification. On September 9, 2016, CUA revised SCP for 

Mother. The objectives identified for Mother were (1) to continue 

attending individual therapy sessions; (2) to follow all 

recommendations of the [PCE]; (3) to follow through with family 

therapy and to comply with all recommendations; (4) to ensure 

Mother communicated verbally with CUA; (5) to continue to 

participate in the domestic violence program known as Women in 

Transition; (6) to attend weekly individual and group trauma 

therapy; (7) to have no contact with the Children until further

action of the [c]ourt: (8) to attend the Women’s Empowerment 

program and (9) to attend Anger Management Counseling.

The CUA Representative testified that after the suspension of 

visitation between the Mother and Children there was a marked 

improvement with the behavior of the Children. (N.T., 8/8/17, at

38-40). The CUA Representative also testified that Mother 

violated [c]ourt orders by communicating with hospital staff while 

V.N.S.O.[-]P. was hospitalized and visiting the Children while they 

were in care. (N.T., 8/8/17, at 40-41). Although Mother had

completed anger management courses, the CUA Representative 

testified that Mother had continued to exhibit erratic and 

aggressive behavior. Specifically, Mother consistently sought to 

intimidate CUA workers. On one occasion, Mother brought other 

women to a private meeting with CUA workers solely to intimidate

CUA personnel. (N.T., 8/8/17, at 48-52). Mother also interfered 

with the Children’s foster care placement resulting in multiple 

reassignments. As result of Mother making unfounded allegations 
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against foster parents, T[.]D[.]W[., Jr.] had been reassigned to 

ten (10) separate placements. (N.T., 8/8/17, at 60-64). The CUA 

representative also testified that Y.N.O.S.[-]P[.] was bonded to 

her foster parent. (N.T., 8/8/17, at 55-56). The CUA 

Representative testified [that] T.D.W., Jr. was happy with [his]

foster parents. (N.T., 8/8/17, at 58-59). The CUA Representative 

testified that it would be in the best interest of the Children if 

[M]other’s parental rights were terminated. (N.T., 8/8/17, at 60). 

At the hearing, Dr. Williams testified that she conducted a PCE 

evaluation of Mother in February 2016 where she opined that 

Mother failed to address underlying domestic violence in the home 

and was unable to control her own aggression. (N.T., 8/8/17, at 

105-107). Dr. Williams also testified that Mother’s attempts to

sabotage the Children’s placement indicated that she lacked 

parental capacity or the ability to provide safety for the Children. 

(N.T., 8/8/17, at 111-114).

Although Mother alleges that her attorney failed to provide 

adequate assistance of counsel[,] the record indicates that he was 

not passive during the course of the hearing[.] Mother’s counsel 

engaged in an aggressive cross[-]examination of the CUA 

Representative and Dr. Williams. The testimony of the CUA 

Representative and Dr. Williams was deemed to be credible and 

accorded great weight. Based upon their testimony elicited at the 

Termination Hearing as well as the documents in evidence, th[e 

trial c]ourt found clear and convincing evidence to terminate 

parental rights of Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 2511(a)(1)[,] (2)[,] (5)[,] and (8)[,] finding she had failed to 

remedy the conditions that brought the Children into care based 

upon her [continuing] unwillingness to cooperate with social 

services and mental health treatment. The [c]ourt also found that 

termination of [] Mother’s parental rights would be in the best 

interest of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/17, at 6-11.

After a careful review of the record, this Court finds the trial court’s 

decision to terminate the parental rights of Mother under section 2511(a)(2) 

and (b) is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the 

record. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827. Thus, we find no abuse 
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of discretion in the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights to the 

Children.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date:4/24/18