J-S42004-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DREW PRITCHETT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1106 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 12, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0001813-2008, 

CP-02-CR-0016115-2007

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: February 2, 2023

Drew Pritchett appeals from the order dismissing his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

The underlying cases stem from a gang-related shooting. Briefly, 

Appellant and Dorian Peterson were members of the Manchester OGs. On 

September 13, 2007, Appellant stated that he wanted to do some “G-Shit” on 

the North Side, which was controlled by a rival gang, the Crips. To that end, 

Appellant drove a vehicle into the North Side while Peterson pointed a sawedoff shotgun out the front passenger window. Peterson first shot 

Maurice Johnson, who was able to flee the scene and was treated at a hospital. 

Next, Peterson shot Terrence Monroe twice, killing him. Just prior to the 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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shootings, Appellant had picked up Carl Richardson and Jamal Younger to give 

them a ride home, so they were in the backseat during the shootings. 

Appellant was ultimately charged in connection with the shootings and

proceeded to a jury trial with co-defendant Peterson. Docket No. CP-02-CR0001813-2008 related to the shooting of Johnson (“Johnson Docket”), while 

Docket No. CP-02-CR-0016115-2007 related to the shooting death of Monroe 

(“Monroe Docket”). At the Johnson Docket, the jury convicted Appellant of 

conspiracy to commit murder, aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering 

another person. At the Monroe Docket, the jury found Appellant guilty of 

conspiracy to commit murder and possession of a prohibited offensive 

weapon, and not guilty of first-degree murder and third-degree murder.

Instead of recording that verdict, the trial court conducted an off-the-record 

discussion with counsel because it found the jury’s verdict legally inconsistent 

and because the jury had failed to indicate which degree of murder was the 

object of the conspiracy. After polling the jury to confirm that each juror found 

Appellant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, the court instructed the jury 

to correct the verdict slip. The revised verdict slip did not clarify the degree 

of murder for the conspiracy charge. However, the jury crossed out the “not 

guilty” verdict for first-degree murder and changed their verdict on that count 

to “guilty.” The court accepted this revised verdict slip.

Appellant was sentenced at the Johnson Docket to a term of 

incarceration of ten to twenty years for aggravated assault. At the Monroe 

Docket, Appellant was sentenced to life without parole for first-degree murder 
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and ten to twenty years of incarceration for conspiracy. All terms of 

incarceration were set to run consecutively. 

Appellant timely filed a direct appeal to this Court at both dockets. Upon 

review, we held that the trial court erred in directing the jury to revise the 

verdict slip on the Monroe Docket because it “was required to accept the 

verdicts as entered, notwithstanding the legal inconsistency.” 

Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 53 A.3d 923 (Pa.Super. 2012) (unpublished 

memorandum at 14) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we vacated Appellant’s 

conviction for first-degree murder, reversed Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

in part, and remanded for the trial court to resentence Appellant on the 

Monroe Docket pursuant to the original verdict slip, i.e., “on criminal 

conspiracy to commit homicide and possession of a prohibited offensive 

weapon only.” Id. at 15.

On remand, the trial court imposed a new sentence at the Monroe 

Docket of twenty to forty years of incarceration for conspiracy followed by two 

and one-half to five years of incarceration for possession of a prohibited 

weapon.1 Appellant did not file a direct appeal on the Monroe Docket as to 

this new sentence. Instead, Appellant initiated PCRA proceedings at both 

dockets by timely filing a PCRA petition, with the assistance of counsel, in 

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1 We observe that the trial court also purported to impose a new sentence at 

the Johnson Docket. While it did not change the originally imposed sentence, 

we note that this “new sentence” exceeded the scope of our remand, which 

solely pertained to the Monroe Docket. See Pa.R.A.P. 2591(a) (“On remand 

of the record the court . . . below shall proceed in accordance with the 

judgment or other order of the appellate court[.]”).
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November 2012. Therein, Appellant raised several claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied 

Appellant’s petition. On appeal, this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order 

and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

See Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 134 A.3d 496 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 141 A.3d 480 (Pa. 2016).

On June 9, 2020, Appellant filed pro se the instant PCRA petition at both 

dockets. According to Appellant, this second petition was timely pursuant to 

the governmental interference and newly-discovered facts exceptions to the 

PCRA’s one-year time bar. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss based 

on Appellant’s petition being untimely. On August 17, 2020, the PCRA court 

issued notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to dismiss the petition 

without a hearing because it was untimely filed. Within the order, the court 

stated that the petition was “barred by the sixty day provision and one year 

statute of limitations.” Notice of Intention to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907, 8/17/20 (parenthetical numbers omitted). Appellant filed a response, 

arguing that the PCRA court had failed to apply the 2018 amendment 

expanding the time frame for invoking an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar 

from sixty days to one year. See Response to Notice of Intention to Dismiss 

Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 9/10/20, at unnumbered 1. The PCRA court 

dismissed Appellant’s petition on August 17, 2021.
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This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2 Of note, Appellant filed a single notice of appeal listing 

both dockets, in apparent violation of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 

969 (Pa. 2018) and Pa.R.A.P. 341. Accordingly, this Court issued an order 

directing Appellant to show cause as to why the appeal should not be quashed. 

In his response, Appellant indicated that he had limited access to the law 

library and was unaware of the requirement to file separate notices of appeal. 

This Court discharged the show-cause order and referred the matter to the 

merits panel. Appellant presents the following issues for our consideration:

1. Did the Superior Court of Pennsylvania commit judicial error by 

quashing Appellant[’]s PCRA based on a timely but defective 

notice of appeal based on [Walker, supra?]

2. Did the PCRA court commit legal error or abuse its discretion 

by applying a sixty-day jurisdictional time-bar to Appellant[’]s 

second and subsequent filing of his PCRA when 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(2) has been amended to provide for a one-year 

jurisdictional timeliness bar for second and subsequent PCRA 

petitions?

3. Did the PCRA court commit legal error or abuse its discretion 

in denying Appellant[’]s request for discovery where the 

Commonwealth is in possession of pre-trial statements made 

by the Appellant[’]s co-defendant, resulting in governmental 

interference and Brady violations that prejudiced Appellant 

and violated his due process rights?

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2 We note that the Honorable David R. Cashman presided over the PCRA 

proceedings until his retirement, which occurred shortly after Appellant filed 

his Rule 1925(b) statement. Thereafter, the matter was reassigned to the 

Honorable Elliot C. Howsie, who issued the Rule 1925(a) opinion. We use 

“PCRA court” to refer to both judges involved in the PCRA proceedings. 
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4. Did the PCRA court commit legal error or abuse its discretion 

in not ordering an evidentiary hearing to supplement the record 

establishing the timeliness of Appellant[’]s PCRA petition where 

a hearing was necessary to determine the merits of 

Appellant[’]s claim of newly discovered facts resulting in 

governmental interference and due process violations?

5. Did the PCRA court commit legal error or abuse its discretion 

in not allowing Appellant to amend his PCRA petition where 

doing [sic] the process of filing the government and 

Department of Corrections went on lockdown severely 

impacting Appellant[’]s ability to make amendments, research 

claims properly and his ability to present perfected claims and 

arguments to the courts?

6. Did the PCRA court commit legal error or abuse its discretion 

in denying Appellant[’]s request for appointment of counsel 

where Appellant can further establish that an evidentiary 

hearing is warranted also to establish the merits of his claims 

and present a perfected petition to the court in violation of his 

constitutional rights?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

Contrary to Appellant’s assertion in his first issue, this Court has not yet 

quashed Appellant’s appeal for non-compliance with Walker, and upon 

review, we decline to do so now. The Note to Rule 341 and the holding in 

Walker “require a bright-line rule that where one or more orders resolves 

issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, 

separate notices of appeal must be filed.” Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 

A.3d 350, 352 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc) (cleaned up). However, this Court 

“may overlook the requirements of Walker where. . . a breakdown occurs in 

the court system, and a defendant is misinformed or misled regarding his 

appellate rights.” Id. at 354. Here, the PCRA court’s dismissal order advised 
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Appellant that “he ha[d] the right to appeal from this final Order and that 

such appeal must be taken within thirty (30) days from the date of this 

Order.” Order of Court, 8/17/21 (emphasis added). Since the PCRA court 

misadvised Appellant that he only needed to file one appeal from the order 

dismissing his PCRA petition as to both dockets, we find that there was a 

breakdown in the PCRA court with respect to this issue and decline to quash.

Turning to the substance of Appellant’s issues, our well-settled standard 

of review from the denial of PCRA relief “is limited to ascertaining whether the 

evidence supports the determination of the PCRA court and whether the ruling 

is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Andrews, 158 A.3d 1260, 1263 

(Pa.Super. 2017). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA 

court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 

157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). Instantly, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s petition on the grounds that it was untimely filed. As neither the 

PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition, 

we begin by addressing this threshold issue. See Commonwealth v. 

Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1030-31 (Pa.Super. 2019). 

All PCRA petitions, including second or subsequent petitions, must be 

filed within one year of the date that the underlying judgment of sentence 

becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The PCRA statute provides that 

“a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, . . . or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). 
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Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence at the Johnson Docket 

became final on July 2, 2012,

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thirty days after this Court affirmed that 

judgment of sentence and the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal 

with our Supreme Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113. As to the Monroe 

Docket, the judgment of sentence became final on August 20, 2012,4thirty 

days after the trial court imposed a new sentence and the time for filing a 

direct appeal in this Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Thus, to be timely, 

any PCRA petition had to be filed within one year, or by July 2, 2013 and 

August 20, 2013, respectively. The instant petition, filed in June 2020, was 

patently untimely. 

Since the petition was untimely filed, Appellant had the burden to plead 

and prove one of the enumerated exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar before 

the PCRA court could consider the merits of any of his claims. In this respect, 

the PCRA statute provides as follows:

Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the 

petitioner proves that:

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3 Since the thirtieth day fell on a Sunday, we utilize the next business day for 

computation purposes. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (“When any period of time is 

referred to in any statute, . . . [and w]henever the last day of any such period 

shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the 

laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted 

from the computation.”). 

4 Since the thirtieth day fell on a Saturday, we again use the next business 

day for computation purposes. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908.
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States 

or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 

period provided in this section and has been held by 

that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner invoking one of these exceptions must 

file a petition “within one year of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). 

In the case sub judice, Appellant invoked the governmental interference 

and newly-discovered facts exceptions in his June 2020 petition. As to the 

governmental interference exception, “[t]he proper question . . . is whether 

the government interfered with [the petitioner’s] ability to present his claim 

and whether [he] was duly diligent in seeking the facts on which his claims 

are based.” Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 218 A.3d 963, 975 (Pa.Super. 

2019) (cleaned up). With respect to the newly-discovered facts exception, a 

petitioner must plead and prove that:

(1) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown

and (2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence. Due diligence requires reasonable efforts by a 

petitioner, based on the particular circumstances, to uncover facts 

that may support a claim for collateral relief, but does not require 

perfect vigilance or punctilious care.
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Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up, 

emphases in original).

Appellant invoked these exceptions based on two pieces of evidence. 

Regarding the governmental interference exception, Appellant averred that

“[t]he Commonwealth failed to disclose post arrest statements made 

by . . . Peterson to detectives[.]” Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 6/9/20, 

at unnumbered 2. He did not elaborate as to the date of these alleged 

statements or their content. As to the newly-discovered facts exception,

Appellant cited psychological evaluations of Peterson that were conducted in 

2013 and 2015. According to Appellant, the evaluations were exculpatory 

because Peterson stated therein that he planned the shooting with someone 

other than Appellant and he possessed the gun “for months” for “retaliation”

purposes. See id. at unnumbered 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, Appellant argues the PCRA court committed legal error by applying 

the outdated sixty-day time frame for invoking exceptions as opposed to the 

current time frame of one year. 

While we agree with Appellant that the one-year time frame applies, we 

do not find that the PCRA court erred in dismissing Appellant’s petition as 

untimely. At the outset, it is unclear from the notice of intent to dismiss which 

time frame the PCRA court used since it mentioned both sixty days and one 

year. Regardless of which metric the PCRA court used, though, Appellant 

failed to first meet his burden of pleading and proving one of the exceptions 
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and establishing that he had invoked the exceptions within one year of when 

the claims could have been presented.

Critically absent from Appellant’s PCRA petition is any evidence 

establishing when Appellant discovered the evaluations and statements. 

Appellant claims in his brief to this Court that he included a June 4, 2020 email 

from his attorney on a federal matter, Chris Rand Eyster, Esquire, regarding 

the discovery of the psychological evaluations. See Appellant’s brief at 18. 

The referenced email included a statement from Attorney Eyster that he had 

received and turned over the evaluations to Appellant “last June.” Email from 

Attorney Eyster to Appellant, 6/4/20. While this email was supplemented to 

the certified record during the pendency of this appeal, the record does not 

support Appellant’s assertion that it was enclosed with his PCRA petition. 

Contrarily, the petition itself is silent as to this alleged enclosure and as to the 

date of discovery. With respect to Peterson’s statements to detectives, 

Appellant baldly claimed in his petition that Attorney Eyster “recently 

discovered” the statements. See Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 6/9/20, 

at unnumbered 2. These self-serving statements were insufficient to establish 

when Appellant discovered the evaluations and statements, and, as a result,

whether he invoked the exceptions within one year of when the claims could 

have been presented. 

Moreover, Appellant neglected to establish in his petition that he acted 

with due diligence in discovering the statements, as was required to prove the 
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governmental interference exception, or that the evaluations could not have 

been obtained through the exercise of due diligence, as was required to prove 

the newly-discovered facts exception. See Chimenti, supra; Hart, supra. 

Rather, Appellant baldly claimed in his petition, with respect to the 

statements, that “[a]ll prior counsel attempted to obtain this information but 

was told that it did not exist.” Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 6/9/20, at 

unnumbered 2. As to the psychological evaluations, he proffered nothing in 

terms of why he was unable to discover them earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence. 

We acknowledge that Appellant provided more detail in his response to 

the PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss with regard to his discovery of the 

psychological evaluations. See Response to Notice of Intention to Dismiss 

Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 9/10/20, at unnumbered 1 (claiming that 

Attorney Eyster discovered the psychological evaluations on June 18, 2019). 

However, the PCRA statute “clearly and unambiguously requires any petition 

filed pursuant thereto to ‘be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves’ one of 

the three exceptions quoted above. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa.Super. 2007)

(cleaned up, emphasis in original). In other words, it is solely to the petition

that a PCRA court looks to determine if a petitioner has pled and proved an 

exception to the PCRA’s time bar. See id. (affirming dismissal of Derrickson’s 
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PCRA petition as untimely where he failed to allege an exception in his petition, 

alleged an exception for the first time in response to the court’s notice of intent 

to dismiss, and did not seek leave to amend his petition to include an 

allegation that one of the exceptions applied). 

In the case sub judice, Appellant alleged exceptions within his petition 

but failed to plead therein the facts necessary to prove the exceptions. While 

Appellant moved summarily in his petition for the PCRA court “to grant a[n] 

evidentiary hearing, motion for discovery, appointment of counsel, leave to 

amend, [and] motion to proceed in forma pauperis[,]” he never filed a 

purported amended petition that would prove the exceptions. See Petition for 

Post Conviction Relief, 6/9/20, at unnumbered 2 (capitalization omitted). In 

fact, in his response to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss, Appellant asked 

the court, inter alia, to “grant [Appellant’s] plea to amend said petition and to 

include what to be amended[.]” Response to Notice of Intention to Dismiss 

Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 9/10/20, at unnumbered 2. Thus, while 

Appellant asked for leave to amend, he simultaneously asked the court to 

advise him of what to include in such an amendment. Even if we were to 

consider the more detailed contentions in Appellant’s response as an amended 

petition, they were still insufficient to warrant a hearing on the questions of 

discovery or due diligence. 

We are cognizant of Appellant’s complaint that he should not have been

held to the same standards as an attorney with respect to these rules because 
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he is an incarcerated, pro se litigant. See e.g., Appellant’s brief at 16-17. 

However, it is well established that Appellant’s pro se status, as with all pro 

se litigants, confers no special benefit upon him. 

Under Pennsylvania law, pro se defendants are subject to the 

same rules of procedure as are represented defendants. Although 

the courts may liberally construe materials filed by 

a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon 

a litigant, and a court cannot be expected to become 

a litigant’s counsel or find more in a written pro se submission 

than is fairly conveyed in the pleading.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014) (cleaned up).

Based on the foregoing, Appellant failed to meet his burden of 

establishing one of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar within his petition. 

Since the petition was untimely filed and Appellant failed to prove one of the 

exceptions, the PCRA court was without jurisdiction to entertain the merits of 

Appellant’s claims, and so are we. Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing 

Appellant’s petition because it was untimely filed without an exception and do 

not reach the remainder of Appellant’s issues on appeal. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/2/2023
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