COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Frank and Clements 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

KEITH WILLIAMS, S/K/A KEITH N. WILLIAMS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2262-00-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS 

 FEBRUARY 5, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Gregory W. Franklin, Assistant Public 

Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Keith Williams appeals from a judgment of the trial court 

revoking a portion of his previously suspended sentences. On 

appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

revoking his suspended sentences because no evidence was presented 

showing any underlying wrongdoing. We agree and reverse the 

revocation of his previously suspended sentences. 

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case, and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential 

value, this opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
proceedings as necessary to the parties' understanding of the 

disposition of this appeal. 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, 

we review the evidence "in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom." Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 

250, 356 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1987). "In so doing, we must discard 

the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the 

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence 

favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be 

drawn therefrom." Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 349, 

494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998). We are further mindful that the 

"credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and 

the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely 

for the fact[ ]finder's determination." Keyes v. City of Virginia 

Beach, 16 Va. App. 198, 199, 428 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1993). 

 When the defendant has failed to comply with the conditions 

of a suspended sentence, the trial court has the power to revoke 

the sentence in whole or in part. Russnak v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. 

App. 317, 321, 392 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1990). "A trial court has 

broad discretion to revoke a suspended sentence and probation 

based on Code § 19.2-306, which allows a court to do so 'for any 

cause deemed by it sufficient.'" Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 

App. 81, 86, 402 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1991). 

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"The cause deemed by the court to be 

sufficient for revoking a suspension must be 

a reasonable cause. The sufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain an order of revocation 

'is a matter within the sound discretion of 

the trial court. Its finding of fact and 

judgment thereon are reversible only upon a 

clear showing of abuse of discretion.' The 

discretion required is a judicial discretion, 

the exercise of which 'implies conscientious 

judgment, not arbitrary action.'" 

Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 327, 228 S.E.2d 555, 556 

(1976) (quoting Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 220, 116 

S.E.2d 270, 273 (1960) (quoting Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 

357, 367, 38 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1946))). 

 Williams argues the trial court abused its discretion because 

there was no evidence of new charges while he was on probation. 

Further, he contends, the evidence was not sufficient to show he 

attempted to rape or rob Sharon Drummer or wrongfully possessed 

her property. We agree. 

 Here, the Commonwealth alleged that Williams had violated the 

conditions of his previously suspended sentence of August 26, 

1999, by "having charges of possession of cocaine and felony 

obstruction of justice pending in the Richmond Circuit Court II" 

and by attempting to rape and rob Sharon Drummer. 

 At the commencement of the revocation proceeding, the 

Commonwealth stated that Williams had new charges for possession 

of cocaine and obstruction of justice and that he had been 

convicted of each. Subsequently, Williams' attorney and the trial 

judge had the following exchange: 

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THE COURT: They're two convictions? 

MR. STALLARD: Well, Your Honor, I would say 

the possession of cocaine and felony 

obstruction referred to in this letter are 

charges which he pled guilty to in July or 

August of last year. He was indicted again 

in April of this year on charges he had 

previously been convicted of. Those charges 

were nol prossed Monday last week because the 

other court realized they were, in fact, 

duplicate charges that he had previously been 

convicted. 

THE COURT: Well, it helps the case. Okay. 

Go right along. 

Neither the Commonwealth nor Williams presented any evidence about 

these charges. During the closing argument, Williams' attorney 

and the trial judge had the following exchange: 

MR. STALLARD: Your Honor, again, the two 

charges, the possession of cocaine and felony 

obstruction charged — 

THE COURT: You don't need to worry about 

that. 

 Officer Carlos Collins, the Commonwealth's only witness, 

testified that, when he responded to the scene at 2704 Midlothian 

Turnpike, he met Sharon Drummer.1 Collins stated that, when he 

entered the residence, Williams was coming down the stairs with a 

television in his hand. Williams agreed to be searched and 

Officer Collins recovered two watches, a necklace, and a 

television remote control from Williams' right front pocket. From 

Williams' left front pocket, Collins recovered sunglasses and 

 1

 Sharon Drummer committed suicide several days later. 

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keys. In Williams' right rear pocket, Collins found a purse 

containing a female's Virginia identification card. Williams told 

Collins that Drummer had given him the purse and that he had 

bought the watches as a gift for her but was "taking them back."

 Testifying in his own defense, Williams stated that he did 

not know Drummer but knew her boyfriend, Todd. Williams added 

that he had earlier loaned the boyfriend and Drummer $200 to pay 

their rent and that, upon seeing them, asked them for his money. 

Drummer's boyfriend, according to Williams, gave him the items, 

"their stuff," in payment of the debt they owed. Williams also 

testified that, when Drummer balked at giving the items to 

Williams, her boyfriend said that he could do what he wanted and 

handed the necklace to Williams. Williams further testified that 

he did not remember the identification card and denied that the 

officer found a wallet in his pocket. Furthermore, according to 

Williams, the boyfriend was present when the police came. A 

witness called on Williams' behalf testified she had taken him to 

the couple's home several times to attempt to collect the $200 

Williams had lent them. 

 The trial judge made no findings of fact to support his 

judgment that there was sufficient cause to revoke Williams' 

suspended sentences. Our review of the record convinces us that 

there was no evidence of new charges pending against Williams 

during his probation and the suspension of his sentences. 

Furthermore, in his remarks to Williams' attorney, the trial judge 

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discounted this allegation as a basis for his judgment. Likewise, 

there was no evidence of attempted rape or attempted robbery of 

Drummer. In drawing inferences from all the circumstances, the 

most the fact finder could conclude was that Williams was merely 

in possession of property owned by or previously owned by Drummer. 

 We hold, therefore, that there was no reasonable cause to 

revoke Williams' suspended sentences. The trial court's judgment 

was arbitrary and a clear abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the 

revocation of Williams' previously suspended sentences is 

reversed. 

 Reversed and dismissed.

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