alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Florence Cuomo-Perez, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[770 NYS2d 799]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed December 30, 2002, which, inter alia, ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

*778Claimant left her employment as a principal administrative accountant in order to take advantage of an early retirement incentive package. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that claimant voluntarily left her employment without good cause. Leaving one’s employment to accept an early retirement incentive package, when, as here, continuing work is available, does not constitute good cause for leaving employment *(see Matter of Moisides [Commissioner of Labor],*264 AD2d 879 [1999]; *Matter of Joseph [Sweeney],*246 AD2d 944 [1998]). Although claimant testified that she was strongly encouraged to take the retirement package and there were discussions regarding possible layoffs, she was never told that she would be fired or laid off in the event that she declined the retirement offer. Inasmuch as substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, it will not be disturbed. In view of the forgoing, we also find no reason to disturb the Board’s finding that claimant made willful false statements to obtain benefits when she indicated that her employment ended due to lack of work.

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Carpinello, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.6


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

          In connection with the Annual Report of Brookfield Properties
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2002,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Steven J. Douglas, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
my knowledge:

1.   The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the securities exchange act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the company.




                                        By: /s/ Steven J. Douglas
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Name:  Steven J. Douglas
                                            Title: EVP & Chief Financial Officer

Date: May 20, 2003
454 A.2d 164

#### Commonwealth v. Hileman, Appellant.

Submitted June 23, 1981.

Peter J. O’Donnell, for appellant; William A. Helm, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before PRICE, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.

The order denying P.C.H.A. relief is affirmed.
STATE EX REL. Thierry WOODS v. STATE of Louisiana

No. 17-KH-0173

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 27, 2018

**ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF WEBSTER**

PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator's sentencing claim is not cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3 ; *State ex rel. Melinie v. State* , 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. It is also repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. In addition, relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of *Strickland v. Washington* , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). *See also* *State v. Thomas* , 2008-2912 (La. 10/16/09), 19 So.3d 466. As to his remaining claims, relator *558fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.
#### Mark MORRIS Plaintiff-Appellant v. Benny NETTLES, Principal, Grimes Unit; Tracey Dowell, Assistant Principal, Grimes Unit; Grimes Correctional Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-3401

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 23, 2017

Filed: April 3, 2017

Mark Morris, Pro Se

Michael Cantrell, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office, Civil Litigation, Little Rock, AR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before SHEPHERD, MURPHY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Arkansas inmate Mark Morris appeals after the district court1 partially dismissed his com*524plaint preservice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and then adversely granted summary judgment. After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that the district court properly disposed of the claims that have been addressed by Morris on appeal. See Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1051 n.2 (8th Cir. 2013) (claim was abandoned where appellant did not brief court on why dismissal was improper); Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012) (grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo); Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (§ 1915A(b) dismissal is reviewed de novo); see also Robinson v. Hager, 292 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing deliberate indifference standard); Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 304 *&*n.8 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing equal protection standard for inmate who has not alleged he is member of suspect class).

1

. The Honorable D.P. Marshall Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the recommended dispositions of the Honorable J. Thomas Ray, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
#### Anthony Lorenzo COLEMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6416

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 25, 2017

Anthony Lorenzo Coleman, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Lorenzo Coleman seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition, and its order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration. The orders are not ap-pealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Coleman has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Thomas N. Gibbs et al., Respondents, *v.*John Van Buren, Jr., Appellant.

(Argued September 20, 1871;

decided January term, 1872.)

Action to recover the value of a quantity of wheat, which defendant, as common carrier, had contracted to transport for plaintiff from Oswego to Albany, to deliver to consignees, who had an office upon the pier within the city of Albany. Upon the arrival of the boat at Albany, the master reported to the consignees, who directed him to proceed with his boat and cargo across the channel of the Hudson river to a railroad elevator at East Albany, within the port of Albany. The master complied with the directions, and, while waiting to discharge his cargo, a fire, originating in the elevator, nearly destroyed the cargo. The consignors, by direction of the defendant, sold the damaged cargo, and paid over the avails to plaintiffs’ agent. Defendant claimed that the master, in crossing the river, was not acting under his employment or authority, and that his liability as common carrier had ceased when the fire occurred. *Held,*that the fact that defendant continued his control of the property after the fire, with other facts, afforded a legitimate inference that the parties, in contracting, had reference to the port and not alone to the city of Albany; also, that there was not sufficient delivery before the fire to discharge the carrier, and that defendant was liable.

*O.*jV.. *Kennedy*for the appellant.

*AXberims Perry*for the respondents.

Gray, 0., reads for affirmance.

All concur, except Lott, Ch. C., dissenting. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
No. 28,496.

#### H. M. Foust, *Appellee,*v. J. H. Mills, *Appellant.*

(278 Pac. 745.)

Opinion filed July 6, 1929.

*Clad Hamilton*and *Tinkham Veale,*both of Topeka, for the appellant.

*J. J. Schenck*and *W. E. Atchison,*both of Topeka, for the appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Marshall, J.:

The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover for the alienation of the affections of the former’s wife. Trial was had, verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff, and special questions were answered. A motion for judgment on the answers to the special questions and a motion for a new trial were filed by the defendant. The motion for judgment on the answers to special questions was denied, and the one for a-new trial was sustained. From the ojrder denying the motion for judgment on the answers to the special questions the defendant appeals.

*The Peoples Nat’l Bank v. Casey,*127 Kan. 581, 274 Pac. 286, was an action on a promissory note which the plaintiff asked to have corrected by writing into the note a word which had been omitted. Verdict was rendered in favor of one of the defendants. On the motion of the plaintiff a new trial was granted as to that defendant. From the order granting the new trial he appealed. There was evidence to prove that the word sought to be inserted had been omitted by mistake. The plaintiff cross appealed and argued that the court should have made the correction, and that it was error not to do so. In that case this court said:

> “The plaintiff who, in an action on a promissory note, alleged that it contained a mistake and asked to have the mistake corrected cannot complain of the failure of the court' to correct the mistake where after verdict against him the court on his motion grants a new trial.” (Syl. ¶ 1.)

> *472“The issues were submitted to the jury, which in answer to a special question found that the word ‘at’ had not been omitted by mistake. In view of the finding of the jury and of the fact that a new trial has been granted on the motion of the plaintiff, its contention that the note should have been corrected cannot be sustained.” (p. 582.)

In *Smart v. Mayer,*103 Kan. 366, 175 Pac. 159, the following language is found:

> “The jury found a general verdict for the plaintiff and answered four special questions ‘We do not know,’ which answers were in effect adverse to the plaintiff. The defendants on the same day filed a motion for judgment on the findings and a motion for a new trial, and on a later day the former was denied and the latter granted. *Held,*that there remains no final judgment or order from which the defendants can appeal.” (Syl. ¶ 3.)

When the new trial was granted the verdict of the jury was set aside. That carried with the verdict the answers to the special questions. After the order granting the motion for a new trial had been made, there was no verdict, there were no answers to special questions, and there was no judgment against the defendant. The action stood for trial on the issues made by the pleadings. The defendant could not have both a new trial and judgment in his favor on the answers to the special questions.

The judgment is affirmed.
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</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Joseph VOTH, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30084

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 17, 2017

Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, Timothy John Racicot, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Joseph E. Thaggard, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USMI—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee

Colin M. Stephens, Attorney, Smith & Stephens, P.C., Missoula, MT, for Defendant-Appellant

*233Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

William Joseph Voth, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Voth contends that he is entitled to a sentence reduction under Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. We review de novo whether a district court had authority to modify a sentence under section 3582(c)(2). *See United States v. Leniear,*574 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 2009). The record makes clear that the district court imposed Voth’s sentence for reasons unrelated to the guideline range lowered by Amendment 782. Voth is, therefore, ineligible for a sentence reduction because his sentence was not “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); *United States v. Rodriguez-Soriano,*855 F.3d 1040, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2017).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Alphonso JAMES, Sr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-3371

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

August 29, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus is denied without prejudice. Petitioner is required to make an express and distinct demand for performance before mandamus will be considered. See Al-Hakim v. State. 783 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

LaROSE, C.J., and WALLACE and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
EX PARTE Leon Frederick WILLIAMS

CR-16-0626

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 9, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

O. L., 

 

 Appellant,

v.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY 

AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-14-00184-CV

Appeal from the

65th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 2012DCM09529)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS D’Anne Asleson’s second request for an extension of time within 

which to file the Reporter’s Record until July 21, 2014. NO FURTHER REQUESTS FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THE REPORTER’S RECORD WILL BE CONSIDERED 

BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that D’Anne Asleson, Official Court Reporter for the 65th Child 

Protection Court for El Paso County, Texas, prepare the Reporter’s Record and forward the same 

to this Court on or before July 21, 2014.

If the Reporter’s Record is not filed with this Court by July 21, 2014, this Court will 

find it necessary to send this case back to the trial court for a hearing as to why the Reporter’s 

Record has not been filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 9

th day of July, 2014.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera and Rodriguez, JJ.
EPA Registration Jacket 

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Page _ is not included in this copy. 

Pages 161 through 164 are not included in this copy. 

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The material not included contains the following type of 

information: 

_____ Identity of product inert ingredients. 

_____ Identity of product impurities. 

_____ Description of the product manufacturing process. 

_____ Description of quality control procedures. 

_____ Identity of the source of product ingredients. 

_____ Sales or other commercial/financial information. 

_____ A draft product label. 

__X__ The product confidential statement of formula. 

_____ Information about a pending registration action. 

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_____ The document is a duplicate of page(s) _______. 

_____ The document is not responsive to the request. 

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_____ Attorney-Client Privilege. 

_____ Claimed Confidential by submitter upon submission to the 

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_____ Internal Deliberative Information. 

 

 

* The information not included is generally considered confidential by product 

registrants. If you have any questions, please contact the individual who 

prepared the response to your request. 

_________________________________________________________________
14410

#### RICHLAND SUPPLY CO. v. WILSON, COUNTY TREASURER

(189 S. E., 223)

*247
      *Mr. James H. Fowles,*for appellant,

*Mr. J. G. Dinkins,*for respondent,

*248January 8, 1937.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Bonham.

Upon the petition of the appellant, the Court of Common Pleas for Clarendon County issued a rule requiring the respondent, as treasurer of Clarendon County, to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue compelling her, as such county treasurer, to pay a certain judgment from money belonging to School District No. 35 in Clarendon County.

The respondent made return to the effect that the judgment referred to was based upon certain school warrants issued by the trustees of Gable School District, but that the warrants had never been signed and approved by the county superintendent of education, without which signing and approval she was without authority in law to pay them. Further that she is informed that such warrants were not approved by the superintendent of education because when the warrants were presented for payment there were not sufficient funds available for the purpose. Further, the return states, that respondent is without funds at this time with which to pay petitioner’s claims.

At the hearing upon the return to the rule, there was put in evidence, in addition to the verified petition and return to the rule, judgment roll No. 7543 of the case of *Richland Supply Company v. Gable School District No. 35 of Clarendon County, and E. D. Player and N. R. Cousar, as trustees,*which judgment was based on three warrants, which are in the judgment roll, on each of which appears the following indorsement: “Approved as a valid and binding claim against Gable School District No. 35, Clarendon County, to be paid when funds are available.” This indorsement is signed by the county superintendent of education, the county treasurer, and county auditor.

*249The appellant contends that this indorsement is sufficient authority for the county treasurer to pay the claims. The respondent contends that this indorsement merely validates the claims, but that before she can pay them, they must be approved for payment and ordered paid by the county superintendent of education.

The order of Judge Stoll, which disposes of the matter, meets the approval of this Court and is affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Stabler and Messrs. Justices Carter, Baker and FishburnE, concur.