This divisi on was for merly known as the Institut ional Division. 1 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00038- CR

St e r ling She par d, A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 147TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 90341 24, H ONO RAB LE CHARLES F . CAMP B ELL, JR., JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Sterling Shepa

rd appe als from his convictio n f o r possession of a c ontrolled substance (coc aine) in an amount of four g rams or more but less than two hundred g rams. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115 (West 2003). The indictment c ontained two enha nceme nt para g raphs that alleg ed seque ntial prior fe lony convictions. A j u ry fo u nd appellant guilty , found the enhanc ement al l egations t rue, a nd assessed punishment at forty -eig ht y ear s’ conf inement in the Tex as De p ar t m en to f C ri m i n al J u s t i ce -C o rr ec t i o n al I n s t i tu t i o n s Di v ision. We affir m the trial court’ s 1 jud g me nt.Th is unma rk e d v e hic le did

no t ha ve any div ide r b e tw e e n th e fr on t and ba c k s e a ts. 2 2 Bac kgr ound I n M arc h 2003, Austin Pol ice De partment Of fice rs Alejandr o Torre s and Jason Ace vedo stopped a

ppell an t ’s v eh i cle to ex ecute an ar rest wa rra nt for an of

fense unrelated to the
curr ent offe nse. Appellant had been under surveillance by another office r, who transmit t ed t he
ne c e ssa ry inf or ma tio n c on c e rn ing a

pp e lla nt’ s c ar to To rr e s and Ac e ve do , wh o we re tr a ve lin g in Torre s’s unmarke d v eh i cl e. Af t er a n unspecifie d but appar ently fairly short amount of time of following appellant with lig hts on but no s i re n , ap p el l ant pulled over into a parkinglot. Torres
arr ested a ppellant, per formed a

frisk for wea pons, place d appellant in the f ront seat of

the unmarke d
ve hic le , a nd fa ste ne d a

pp e lla nt’ s se a t be lt. Duri ngthe arr e st a nd fr isk , a pp e lla nt a sk e d T or

re s to 2 retrie ve his wallet from his back pocket because his identification was in it. Torre s did so. Torre s drove the police ca

r to an Austin Police Depa rtment substation while Ace vedo drove appellant’ s vehicle to that substation.

On the drive to the substation, appellant turned in the front seat so that his torso fac ed Torre s. Appellant, who wa s descr ibed as “ a fa irly larg e individual,” blocke d Torre s’s view of any thing be hind appellant’s ba ck or in his hands. Appellant said his handcuff s were too tight and be g an to mov e awa

y fr om T or re s. To rr e s to ld a

pp e lla nt t o s it w ithhis ba c k a g a ins t th e se a t and tol d appellant that he did not think the handc uffs c ould be too tight bec ause of the way he had loc ked the h an d cu ff s wi t h s p ac e e n o u gh fo r T o rr es ’s fi n ger t o go i n s i d e t h e c u ff

. Ap p el l an tco n t i n u edwi ggl i n g; Torre s ag ain aske d appellant to sit with his back ag ainst the seat. Appe llant finally complied.3 Upon arriving at the substation, Torres r emoved a ppellant from the c ar, loc ked the
car , and took appe llant into the substation. Acevedo, who was maintaining control over appellant’ s vehicle in the pa

rking lot, neede d to retrie ve his cell phone from the police vehic le so Torre s went to unlock the vehicle . Torre s, acc ompanied by Offic er Miestes, opened the passeng er side door of the vehicle . Torre s observe d a larg e sandwich bag containing sever al smaller ba g s with white rocklike substances inside. The bagwas located at the rear of the fr ont passeng er se at, ag ainst the side of the re ar po rt ion

of the se a t, n ot o n th e fl oo rb oa rd of the re ar s e a t. T or

re s h a d c he c ke d th e ve hic le befor e ser vice that da

y and there was no such bag in the vehicle. Tor res r etrieve d the contra

band, p l ac edi ti n t o an ev i d en ce b ag, s ea l edi t , an d tu rn edt h e e v i d en ce o v er fo r w ei gh i n g an d

t es t i n g. Ace vedo stay ed with appe llant’s car and waited until he r ece ived the information that appellant ha d consen t ed to a sea rch of the vehicle . A ca

nine offic er a lerted on the vehicle. Ace vedo’s sear ch found sever al empty small ba g g ies that wer e loose in the trunk. He pla ced the m into an evidenc e bagand turne d them over to the de tective on the c ase.

Austin Pol ice De partment fore nsic che mist Mary Villarre al weig hed and te sted the white roc k-like substance s. She testified that the contra band seized from the police car contained a total of fif

ty rocks of coca ine base , commonly

known on the stree t a s cra ck, in the amount of 21.91 g ra ms a g g re g a te we ig ht, inc lud ingany a du lte ra nts or dil uta nts
. To rr e s te sti fi e d th a t, b a se d o n h is tra ini nga nd e xpe ri e nc e , it wa s com mon fo r m a le suspects to hide drug s underne ath their penis near their scrotum and for all suspects to hide nar cotics close to the rec tum or in be tween their buttocks. He testified that stree t-level de aler s understand that of fi c e rs wi ll not c he c k ce rt a in a re a s. He a lso sa id t

hat a ft e r a we a po ns fr isk , it

is n ot p ra c tic a l to a skAppellant tried to e stablish that the Austin Police Depa rtment’s standard proce dure called f or 3 a mor e tho ro ug h s e arc h th an T or res de sc ri be d; T or

re s r e sp on de d th a t th e re wa s c on sid e ra ble dis c re tio n in

ho w tho ro ug h to be , d e pe nd ingon the c ir c ums tanc e s. 4 a subjec t to drop his pa

nts out on the street to chec k for dr ug s betwee n the buttocks. He state d that there is no need to do a f

ull searc h at t he scene of an arrest because police ca n conduct a

full sear ch back at the police station.

Torre s testified that his w eapons pat-down had be en cur sory . Torre s testified that 3 althoug h appellant wa s handcuf fed, he had enoug h fre edom of moveme nt that he would have been able to re move something from inside his pants or pocke ts, although Tor res did not think appellant would have be en able to retrieve drug s as far forward as near his penis. Howeve r, Torr es thoug ht
a pp e lla nt w ou ld h a ve be e n a

ble to r e tr ie ve dr

ug s f ro m th e re ar o f h is und e rw e ar o r f ro m be tw e e n h is bu tto c ks wi tho ut T or

re s de te c tin g the dr

ug s and pu sh so me thi ng of f the e dg e of

the pa sse ng e r s e a t.
Discussion I n h is f ir st is su e , a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o support his conviction. I n his se cond issue, he contends that the evidenc e was fa ctually insufficient to support his conviction. W e will discuss both issues togethe r.
Stan dard of Revie w

When deciding the leg al suffic ienc y o f t h e evidenc e to support a c onviction, a revie wing court must assess all the evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to the ve rdict to deter mine wh e the r a ny ra tio na l tr ie r o f fa c t cou ld f

ind the e sse nti a l e le me nts of

the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble5

doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U.S . 307 , 3 18 -1 9 ( 19 79 ); J oh ns on v . S

tate , 2 3 S. W. 3 d

1 , 7 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). Th e tr ie r o f f a c t is e nti tle d to re so lve any c on fl ic ts i n th e e vid e nc e , to e va luate the cr edibility

of the witnesse s, and to deter mine the weig ht to be given any particula r evide nce. See J on es v . S tat e , 944 S.W .2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). I n a fac tual-suffic iency

revie w, the re viewing court “ views all the e vidence without the pr ism of ‘i n th e lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the pr os e c uti on ,’ ” and se ts a sid e the ve rd ic t on ly if it i s “so contra

ry to the overw helming w eig ht of the evide nce a s to be clearl y wr o n g and unjus t.” J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 2 3 S. W.3 d at 7; se e Cle wis v . S tat e , 922 S.W .2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). I n such a r eview, the court a sks whether a neutr al re view of a ll the e vidence , both f or and a g ainst the finding , demonstrates that the proof of g uilt is too weak or t hat t he contrary evidenc e is too strong to rationally

support a finding of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. Zun iga v . S tat e , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

To convict a defe ndant of drug possession, the S tate must prove that the de fenda nt exercised c are , custody , control, or mana g ement over the drug s, and that h e k n ew h e p o ssessed a controlled substanc e. Br own v . S tat e , 91 1 S.W. 2d 74 4, 74 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); Martinets v. Sta te , 8 84 S.W. 2d

18 5, 18 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 94 , n o p e t.) . Wh en the d e fe nd ant i s n ot i n
e xclu siv e po sse ssi on or

c on tr ol o f t

he pla c e wh e re the dr

ug s are fo un d, the State mus t a ff ir ma tiv e ly li n k th e d e f e n d an t w it

h th e dr ug s. Br own , 91 1 S. W.2 d at 74 7- 48 ; Ma rti ne ts , 884 S.W .2d at 187. Whether this evidence is direct or c ircumstantial, “it m u s t es tablish, to the requisite level of confide nce, that the acc used’s connec tion with the drugwas more than just fortuitous.” Br own , 911 S.W .2d at 747. Circumstantial evidenc e ofte n has equa l or eve n g reater probative value than directTo rr e s te sti fi e d th a t a pp e lla nt w a s w e ari ngje ans . App e lla nt’ s c ouns e l a sk e d if

a pp e lla nt c ou ld 4 have be en wea

ring blue jean shorts; Torr es said he w as not completely sure whic h one appe llant was we ar i n g. 6 evidenc e. Go od

ma n v . S tat e , 6 6 S
. W
. 3 d

2 8 3 , 2 9 6 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Br own v . S tat e , 911 S.W .2d 744, 745-46 (Te x . Crim. App. 1995)). The aff irmative links ne ed not be so strong as to exclude ever

y other reasona

ble alternative hy

pothesis except the def

endant’ s g uilt. Br own , 911 S.W .2d at 748. Some possible affir mative links are w hether : the drug s were in plain vi ew ; the defe ndant owned or

had a r ight to possess the plac e whe re the drugs wer e found; the dr ug s were easily acc essible t o the defendant; ot her drug s or drug paraphe rnalia were found; or the de fenda nt made f u rt i v e gestures or

incriminating statements. Se e Br y an t v . S tat e , 9 8 2 S. W. 2 d

4 6 , 4 9 ( T e x. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. re f’d) . The number of af firmative links is not as important as the log ical for ce the y

have in e stablishing the of fense
. Se e Gi lbe rt v . S

tat e , 8 7 4 S. W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1994, pet. re f’d) . Thus, there is no set formula of fac ts nece ssary to support an infer ence of knowing possession. Hy e tt v. S tat e , 5 8 S. W. 3 d

8 2 6 , 8 3 0 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2001, pet. re f’d)
. Anal y sis Appellant wa s removed f rom the ca

r he w as driving immediately afte r beingstopped,
arr ested, handcuf

fed, frisked for wea

pons, place d into the f

ront seat of

Torre s’s ca

r, and se atbelted in. Al tho ug h ap pe lla

nt’ s jea ns we re no t e xtre me ly

ba g g y , th e y

we re no t ti g ht. Ap pe lla

nt m ov e d in 4 the ca r’s fr ont seat in suc h a way as to bloc k Torre s’s view of his ha nds. Appellant complaine d that his handcuff

s were too tight; the office r told a ppellant that he had locked the handcuf fs in suc h a wa

y7

that they could not tighten up, a

nd that there had been a fing er’ s width of room betwe en the c uff a nd
a pp e lla nt’ s w ri sts
. Upon re achingthe station and re moving a ppellant from the car , the office r locke d the
car . On re turning to the car to retrie ve a cell phone, Torre s noticed the drug s in the car , toward the
rea r of the side of the fr ont pa sseng er seat. Torre s testified that he ha d thoroug hly chec ked out the
car befor e going into service that day , and there had be en no drug s in the car . Torre s further testified to a common pra ctice of hiding drug s betwee n the buttocks, close to the r ectum, or unde rneath the penis close to the sc rotum. He testified that he d i d n o t t hink appellant could have re ache d as fa r forwa rd as his scrotum, but had enoug h fre edom of moveme nt to remove something from the r ear of his un de rw e ar o r f

ro m in be tw e e n h is b utt oc ks
. To rr e s te sti fi e d th a t he ha d b e e n a sk e d, be fo re g oin g int o s e rv ic e , to ass is t w ith
a pp e lla nt’ s arr e st, wh ic h oc c ur

re d a t a bo ut 9:0 0 a .m. Th e fa c t fi nd e r c ou ld h a ve dr awn a re a so na ble i n f e r e n c e t h a t a

p p e l l an t w a s T o r

r e s ’ f i r s t ar r e s t o f t h e d ay , an d n o o n e e l s e h a d t h e o p p o rtu n i t y to drop d ru gs i n the location in which the dr ug s were found. Torr es’s testimony provided a

n explanation for how it would have been possibl e for appellant to conc eal the dr ug s, using c ommon prac tices o f drug de aler s. The drug s were found in the ca r in a location consistent with Torres’s descr iption of appellant’s moveme nts duri n g the drive. The trier of fac t is entitl ed to re solve any
c on fl ic ts i n th e e vid e nc e , to e va luate the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, and to d e te rm ine the we ig ht t o be g iven any

particula r evide nce. See J

ones , 944 S.W .2d at 647. The trie r of f act c ould have b e li e v e d T o r r e s ’ s e xp la

n a ti o no f th e c o n tr a

b an d ’ s p r e s e n c e an d

c o n c lu d e d

th a t a p p e ll ant’s
connec tion with the drug s was more than just fortuitous. Se e Br own , 911 S.W .2d at 747.The bag g ies wer e introduced in e vidence
. The State a rg ued that they

wer e the same and invited 5 the jur y to l oo k at th e m and

c omp are the m. 8 Appellant also c ontends that the evide nce that he kne w th e s u b s ta n c e w as coc aine wa s insufficient. I n a suff

iciency revie w, the jury ’s infer ence of intent is affor ded more defe renc e than the evidence supporting proof of conduc t. Se e Ma rg ra v es v . S tat e , 3 4 S. W.3 d 9 12 , 9 19 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2000). Ci rcumstantial evidence of a defenda nt’s g uilty

knowledg e does not have to meet the same rig orous cr iteria for sufficie ncy as circumstantial proof of other offensive e lements. Id .; see Br own v . S

tat e , 9 11 S.W. 2d

74 4, 74 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ). Ap pe lla nt de lib e ra

te ly c ha ng e d h is position whil e in the police c ar a nd ref used for quite some time to put his back ag ainst the ca r seat as instructed by

the offic er. H is ex planation for the movement was c ontested by t h e o ff i cer. The small plastic bag g ies the coca ine was divided into appear ed to match the sma ll plastic bag g ies found in the car that appellant wa s driving. The jury could have rat i o n al l y co n cluded that appellant’s 5 behavior indicated guilty

knowledg e. We conclude that the evidenc e wa s leg ally sufficie nt to support a rational trier of fa ct in finding be y ond a rea sonable doubt that a ppellant exercised c are , custody , control, or mana g ement over the drug s and knewthat he possessed a contr olled substance. See J ackson , 443 U.S. at 318-19; Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 7. We overr ule the first issue. I n his second issue, appe llant contends that the e vidence was fa ctually insufficient to s up po rt his c on vic tio n. Ap pe lla

nt f oc us e s o n the po ssi bil ity that some on e e lse wa s in the ve hic le befor e appe llant’s arr est and that he could not have r emoved a ny ob j ec t s fr o m his pants without9

Torre s seei n g h im

d o s o . A p p e ll an t o f

f e r e d n o c o n tr ar

y e v id e n c e a s s u c h ; r a th e r , a p p e ll an t o f

fer s
co m peting infere nces f

rom the evide nce. A s expl ained a bove, Torr es’s testimony cre ated a

n infere nce that appella n t wa s t h e fi rst arr est of the da y . Appellant’s moveme nts in the car w ere explained in gr eat de tail. The drug s wer e found in a location consistent with Torre s’s descr iption of appe llant’s movements. The pr oof of guilt is not too weak nor the contra

ry evidenc e too strong to fail to support a finding of guilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. Zun iga v . S tat e , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We overrule the sec ond issue.
Admiss ion of

e xp e rt t esti mony I n his third issue, appellant contends tha t t h e t ri al cour t abused its discretion by permitting the testimony

of Austin Police Depa rt m ent che mist Mary Villarre al. The tria l court g rante d appellant’ s motion t hat expert witnesses be desig nated by the State. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(b) (West Supp. 2005). Appellant contends that Villarre al should not have bee n
a llo we d to te sti fy be c a

us e sh e wa s no t pr op e rl y

de sig nate d. Vi lla

rr e a l w a s li ste d in

the State ’s lis t of witnesses a s an Austi n Police Depa rtment witness, but not desig nated as an expert. Howe ver, the po lic e re po rt ma de a va ila

ble to a pp e lla nt i nd ic a te d th a t sh e wa s th e c he mis t w ho pe rf or me d th e te sts
and ana ly se s o f c oc a ine in the c a se . Thus , altho ug h the State did no t pro du c e a pie c e of pa pe r w ith appellant’ s name followe d by “expert,” ne ither wa s her identity and func tion concea led. The trial c ourt’s dec ision to allow a witness to testify is review ed for an abuse of discretion. Ha rd

in v . S tat e , 20 S.W .3d 84, 88 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 20 0 0 , p et. re f’d) (citing Ma rti ne z v . S tat e , 8 67 S.W. 2d

30 , 3 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 )) (e xpe rt wi tne ss t e sti mony

); Laf ay e tte10

v . S tat e , 835 S.W .2d 131, 132-33 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 1992, no pet.). The abuse of discretion
s t an d ar d ap plies to a trial cour t’s decision to allow an unlisted witness to testify over obje ction. Appellate r eview e ncompasses two f actor s: whether the State’s ac tions constitut ed bad f aith, and whether the defendant could rea sonably have a nticipated that the witness would testify
. Barnes v. Sta te , 8 76 S.W. 2d

31 6, 32 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Ha rd in , 2 0 S. W.3 d at 88 ; L a

fay e tte , 835 S.W. 2d a t 13 2- 33 . U nle ss t

he de fe nd ant m a ke s the ne c e ssa ry sh ow ing , the tr ia l court ’s de c isi on to allow t he testi mony will not be disturbed on a ppeal. Cas tan e da v . S

tat e , 2 8 S. W. 3 d

2 1 6 , 2 2 3 ( T e x. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. re f’d)
.

The e x treme sa

nction of exclusion should not be imposed absent wilfulness on the part of the prosec ution. Os bo ur n v . S tat e , 59 S.W .3d 809, 816 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001), aff’d on other grounds , 5 9 S.W.3 d 531 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); State v. W right , 8 3 0 S. W. 2 d

3 0 9 , 3 1 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 1 99 2, no pe t.) . A ny e rr or in a llo wi ngthe wi tne ss t o te sti fy ov e r a c la im o f s ur

pr ise is made ha rmless by the def endant’ s failure to move for a continuance
. B a rnes , 876 S.W .2d at 328 (objec tion and reque st for m i s t rial, in absenc e of r equest for continuance , inadequate to prese rve
e rr or ); Ha rd

in , 20 S.W .3d at 88. Appellant ar g ues that a diff ere nt sta ndard of revie w should apply to desig nations of experts. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . a rt . 3 9. 14 (b ). Ho we ve r, a

pp e lla nt in e sse nc e do e s n ot p ro po se
or ar ticulate a dif

fer ent standar d of appellate revie w; he proposes a trial-cour t sanction of mandatory
e xclu sio n. Un de r t

he fa c ts o f t his c a se , h ow e ve r, he ha s n ot e xpla ine d w hy the ana ly sis g e ne ra llyWe do not say that there are no circ umstances in which a witness’s s tatus as an e x pert mig ht 6 be a c onsideration. Se e He rn an de z v . S tat e , No
. 03 -0 4- 35 6- CR, 20 06 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 72 2 ( me m. op.) (not desig nated f

or publication) ( challeng e to qualifications of expert; court did not find waiver based on unobje cted to admission of same e vidence from other source s; applied E

. I. d

u P o n t de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. R obinson , 923 S.W .2d 549, 553 (Tex. 1995) to conclude expert testimony may have be en viewe d by

jury as inhere ntly

more c redible)
. 11 applied to the trial c ourt’s decision to a llow or exclude witnesses’ testimony should not be applied to t his pa rt ic ula r e xpe rt wi tne ss. 6 Ap pe lla nt’ s ma in c omp la int

se e ms t o b e that h e w a s n o t g ive n a n a dv anc e op po rt

un ity to investigate Villare al’s cr edentials, a co m p l ai n t that a continuanc e could have re medied by allowing additional time to revie w Vil lare al’s qualifications. (The trial court noted that appellant’ s defe nse wa s not that the matter found in the bag g ie was not c ocaine , but that he did not possess the substance, no matter what it was.) No evidence was produce d that the State ac ted wilfully or in bad faith. See B arnes , 876 S.W .2d at 328 (showingof bad f aith fac tor is showing a

buse of discr etion). Ap pe lla nt s ho uld have re a so na

bly anti c ipate d that the State wo uld be c omp e lle d to c a ll a n e xpe rt to identify the controlled substanc e. I f appe llant were surprised, or otherwise put at a disadvantag e, he should have re quested a

continuance
. Se e id .; Os bo ur n , 59 S.W .3d at 816. We hold tha t the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in admitting Villarre al’s testimony . Appellant wa s unable to establish bad f aith or show that he could not have a nticipated Villarre al’s testi mony , the abuse of discre tion factors discusse d in Barnes
. Ne ith e r did he re qu e st
a continuance to r emedy the situation. Se e Ra mi re z v . S tat e , 815 S.W .2d 636, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (State f

ailed to produc e evide nce in r esponse to discove ry order but appellant did not show
su rp ri se and

did no t mo ve fo r c on tin

ua nc e ); De pe na v . S

tat e , 1 4 8 S. W. 3 d

4 6 1 , 4 6 7
- 6 8 ( T e x.12

App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (althoug h appellate court held State acte d in bad fa ith in failing to disclose identity

of expert, neve rtheless he ld trial court did no t abuse its discre tion in allowing expert testimony

beca use def endant should have anticipated testimony and fa iled to ask for continuance ). Os bo ur

n , 5 9 S. W.3 d at 81 6 (no e vid e nc e that State a c te d in ba d f a ithin f a ili ngto disclose evidenc e or willfully failed to r espond to tr ial court’s or der; Osbour n could have anticipated evidenc e, and f

ailed to re quest a re cess, postponeme nt, or continuanc e). We ove rrule the third issue.
Admiss ion by

pa rty -o pp one nt I n his fourt h i s s ue, appe llant contends that the trial c ourt err ed in deny ing the admission into evidenc e of an admission of a party -opponent. See Te x. R. Evi d. 80 1( e )( 2) . At tr ia l, appellant c alled Torr es to testify as a de fense witness. Appellant aske d Torre s about the discover y of the c ocaine when he and Miestes re turned to the c ar. Tor res t es t i fied that he believed he had previously

testified that he and Miestes saw the coca ine as they wer e looking for Ac evedo’ s phone. W h e na s k e d

w h o s aw t h e c o c a i n e f

i r s t , T o r r e s s a i d t h a t h e b e l i e v e d i tw a s a l m o s ts i m u l t an e o u s l y, bu t h e d id

n o t r e a ll y

r e c a ll
. O nd ir e c t e xa mi n a ti o nb y th e St a te d

u r in g th e St a te ’ s c a s e in

c h ief, T o rr es h adt es t i fi edt h at wh en h e an d M i es t es o p en edt h e c ar

d o o r, “t h at ’s wh en Io b s er v eda l ar ge bagwith severa l off-w hite rock- like substances inside of that bag .” Appellant then que stioned the wi t n es s based on a police re port, asking : “Are y ou
awa re that Off

ic e r Mie ste s sai d tha t he fir st saw the dr ug s and po int e d th e m out to y ou ? ” Th e State
o b j e c t e d o nt h e b a s i s o f

h e ar s ay; a

p p e l l an tc o n t e n d e d

t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t w a s an a d m i s s i o n b y a p art yop po ne nt. Th e c ourt

su sta ine d the State ’s he ars ay ob je c tio n. Al tho ug h a

pp e lla nt g a ve the wi tne ss13

so me thi ngto rea d ( a

pp a re ntl y the re po rt ), he a sk e d n o f ur the r q ue sti on s, did

no t c a ll M ie ste s to testify , and did not offe r the re port itself or Miestes’s suppleme nt into evidence.

Th e a d m i s s i b i l i t y

o f e v i d en ce i s wi t h i n

t h e t ri al co u rt ’s d i s cr et i o nan d wi l l be re verse d only on a showing of an a

buse of discr etion. Po we ll v. Sta te , 63 S.W .3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 01 ); Gr e e n v . S

tat e , 934 S.W. 2d 92 , 101 -0 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). A r e vie wi ngc ourt sh ou ld not reve rse the trial court’s ruling if it falls within the “zone of re asonable disag ree ment.” Po we ll , 63 S.W .3d at 43 8; Gree n , 934 S.W .2d at 102. The e rrone ous admission or exclusi on of evide nce does not result in reve rsible er ror unless it aff

ects a substantial rig ht of the de fenda nt. See Te x. R. App . P . 4 4. 2( b) ; se e Pr ibl e v . S tat e , 1 7 5 S. W. 3 d

7 2 4 , 7 3 7 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 5 )
. A s u b s ta n tial rig ht is affe cted whe n the er ror ha d a substantial and injurious e ffe ct or influenc e in deter mining the jury ’s verdic t. Kin g v . S

tat e , 9 5 3 S
. W
. 2 d

2 6 6 , 2 7 1 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Kotteakos v. U.S. , 328 U.S. 750 (1946)).

The pa rties disag ree over the applicable harm a naly s is. Appellant urg es that har m should be eva luated under t h e s t andard for c onstitut ional err or. See Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(a)
. Constit utional error

is an err or that direc tly

offe nds the United S t at es C o n s t i tution or the Texas Constit ution, without reg ard to any statute or rule that might apply
. Se e Tate v . S tat e , 988 S.W .2d 887, 890 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref ’d). Appe llant argues that he was depr ived of his rig ht to cross-e x amine a State’ s witnes s re gar d i n g any matter re flec ting on the w itness’s cre dibilit y , as g uara nteed by the Six th Amendment. Se e Vi rts v. Stat e , 739 S.W .2d 25, 28-29 (Te x . Crim. App. 19 87 ); LaH

oo d v . S tat e , 171 S.W .3d 613, 622 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The State c on te nd s th a t th e e rr or sh ou ld b e e va luat e d und e r R ule 44 .2 (b ): “ any

oth e r e rr or , d e fe c t,Appellant wa s ag ain sug g esting that Torre s did not follow proper pr ocedur es, did not sear ch 7 the ca r ea rlier, a nd would not have “ discovere d” the dr ug s on his own. 14 irregularity , or var iance that does notaff ect substantial rig hts must be disreg arde d.” Te x . R. App. P. 4 4. 2( b) ; se e Se lls v . S

tat e , 121 S.W .3d 748, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003 ) (because violation of Te xas C od e of

Cr imi nal P roce dure art . 3 8. 22 § 3 (a )( 5) is s ta tut or y , a pp ro pr ia te ha

rm ana ly sis is 44 .2 (b )) ; P o t i e r

v . Stat e , 68 S.W .3d 657, 662-63 (Te x . Crim. App. 2002) (er roneous e videntiary ruling s rar ely

rise to level of

denying fu n d amental c onstitut ional rig hts to present mea ningf ul defe nse). Appellant conte nds he wa s harmed beca use he was not allowed to dispute Torre s’s testimony as to which off

icer saw the c ocaine firs t , a m att er of Torre s’s cre dibilit y . Howeve r,
a p p e ll an t d id n o t a tt e mp t to c a ll M ie s te s a s a w it n e s s to d is p u te T o r

r e s ’ s te s ti mo n y , n o r d id he attempt to offer

into evidence the orig inal police re port or Mi es t es ’s s u p p lement with the var y ing state me nt. I n a

ny e ve nt, the inf

or ma tio n th at app ell ant wa nte d th e jur

y to h e ar a bo ut a po ssi ble discrepa ncy in w ho first saw the coca ine was in f ront of the jury

throug h appellant’ s statement about Miestes’s re port in his question to appellant. Offic er Tor res ha d just testified that he was not sure who saw the contra

band first. The dispute is not ove r the location of the drug s, which would have been ve ry signific ant g iven the manner by which appe llant was said to have been a ble to hide and
remove the drug s. Acc ording ly , even if the cour t erre d in denying a d m i s s i o n , we h old that the 7 reque sted ruling was not c onstitut ionally mandated nor did it aff ect a substantial r ight of the ac cused. We overrule the fourth issue.15 Conclusion We h a ve ov e rr

ule d a pp e lla nt’ s f ou r i ssu e s. We a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Apr il 6, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh