IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Caine Pelzer, :

:

Appellant :

:

 v. : No. 471 C.D. 2019

: Submitted: January 17, 2020

Global Tel Link Corporation :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

PER CURIAM FILED: April 27, 2020

Caine Pelzer (Inmate) appeals the order of the Fayette County Court 

of Common Pleas (trial court) denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis

(IFP),1 and dismissing Inmate’s complaint within 30 days in the absence of his 

payment of the filing fees and the class action count of Inmate’s complaint, based 

upon the court’s determination that Inmate is an “abusive litigator” under the 

provisions of Section 6602(f)(1) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),2

commonly known as the “three strikes rule.” We affirm.

 

1 Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1) states, in relevant part, “If, simultaneous with the 

commencement of an action or proceeding . . . a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed 

[IFP], the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action . . . if it is satisfied that 

the action . . . is frivolous.” 

2 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(f)(1). Subsection (f)(1) states, in pertinent part:

If the prisoner has previously filed prison conditions litigation and

[] three or more of these prior civil actions have been dismissed 

pursuant to subsection (e)(2) [(relating to the filing of prison 

conditions litigation that is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

Inmate is housed at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette. On 

March 7, 2019, he filed a four-count complaint against Global Tel Link 

Corporation (GTL) relating to a tablet that he and other prisoners purchased from 

GTL. In the complaint, he asserted fraud and breach of contract claims, including 

a class action claim based on unfair trade practices, consumer protection law 

violations, fraud, false advertising, misrepresentation, negligence, and interference 

with contractual relations. That same day, Inmate filed a motion to proceed IFP in 

the trial court. On April 8, 2019, the trial court filed the instant order denying 

Inmate’s motion to proceed IFP, dismissing the complaint within 30 days in the 

absence of his payment of the filing fees, and dismissing the class action count of 

the complaint. Inmate then filed this appeal of the trial court’s order,3 and the trial 

 

(continued...)

claim upon which relief may be granted or in which the defendant 

may assert a valid affirmative defense precluding relief),] the court 

may dismiss the action. The court shall not, however, dismiss a 

request for preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary restraining 

order which makes a credible allegation that the prisoner is in 

imminent danger of serious bodily injury.

“Section 6602(f) is commonly referred to as the ‘three strikes rule,’ pursuant to which a trial 

court may dismiss a prisoner’s [IFP] complaint where the prisoner has a history of filing 

frivolous litigation.” Brown v. Bradford, 194 A.3d 1141, 1145 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

3

“Appellate review of a decision dismissing an action pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 

240(j)(1) is limited to determining whether an appellant’s constitutional rights have been violated 

and whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Jones v. Doe, 

126 A.3d 406, 408 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment 

exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as 

shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” Commonwealth v. Burns, 988 A.2d 

684, 689 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted).
3

court issued an order stating that it was relying on its April 8, 2019 order and that 

no further opinion would be issued. See Trial Court 6/18/2019 Order.

On appeal,4Inmate first claims that the trial court abused its discretion 

in dismissing the first two counts of the complaint against GTL sounding in fraud 

and breach of contract under Section 6602(f)(1) of the PLRA because no civil 

rights claims are raised, and no governmental party is being sued. Specifically, 

Inmate asserts that, at a minimum, the trial court should have conducted a hearing 

or explained in an order or opinion why Inmate does not fall within an exception to 

the “three strikes rule” of the PLRA or how the instant contract action constitutes 

“prison conditions litigation” under the PLRA.

However, Section 6601 of the PLRA defines “prison conditions 

litigation,” in relevant part, as “[a] civil proceeding arising in whole or in part 

under Federal or State law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the 

effects of actions by a government party on the life of an individual confined in 

prison,” 42 Pa. C.S. §6601 (emphasis added). Counts I and II of the complaint 

allege,5in relevant part:

26. Upon information and belief, GTL is illegally using 

a third-party beneficiary to interfere with business 

licenses and contracts.

 

4 On December 23, 2019, GTL indicated that it did not participate below and will not 

participate in this appeal.

5 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained, “Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading 

state. ‘At a minimum, a pleader must set forth concisely the facts upon which his cause of action 

is based.’ The complaint must not only apprise the defendant of the claim being asserted, but it 

must also summarize the essential facts to support the claim.” McShea v. City of Philadelphia, 

995 A.2d 334, 339 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).
4

27. Upon information and belief [the Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections (DOC)] is acting as an agent 

of [GTL] even though the [DOC] is immune from 

liability or acted and continues to act at [GTL’s] instance.

28. Upon information and belief, GTL and third-party 

actors continue to benefit substantially in [the] millions 

of dollars from an increase in prisoners being enrolled in 

the tablet program and being prevented from asserting 

their rights as a consumer.

29. Upon information and belief, [GTL] engaged the 

[DOC] in contracts that conflict with the Terms and 

Agreement set out to [Inmate] and similarly situated 

prisoners.

30. As a matter of law and upon information and belief 

[GTL] made the [DOC] direct beneficiaries of the tablet 

program resulting in kickbacks when GTL makes over 

$4.3 million in revenue.

31. Upon information and belief, GTL knows that the 

[DOC] has no policy governing the tablet program.

* * *

43. [GTL] is fraudulently and deceptively selling 

defective products (GTL Tablets) to prisoners such as 

[Inmate] and similarly situated individuals, then 

absolving [itself] from liability through agreements 

prisoners in PA don’t know they entered into due to 

third-party interference.

* * *

51. [GTL], its partners, affiliates, agents, 

subsidiaries/agents, employees or representatives 

fraudulently sold a GTL Tablet to [Inmate] and similarly 

situated prisoners in Pennsylvania with the intent of 

defrauding [Inmate] of the tablet’s quality, capability, 

operation and performance of the software and 

equipment.
5

* * *

54. [GTL] has contracted with both [Inmate] and 

similarly situated prisoners and the [DOC], a third-party 

entity that GTL knows is a part of the executive branch 

of the Commonwealth and is immune from being sued in 

this context[.]

* * *

56. [GTL] then provides the GTL tablet to the [DOC, 

which] syncs the tablet and withholds the tablet from 

[Inmate] and similarly situated prisoners which is done at 

the direction of GTL to interfere with prospective 

contractual relations between GTL and prisoners enrolled 

as consumers.

57. [GTL] provides the [DOC] with annual revenue for 

music, e-messaging, games, lobby deposit fees and ebooks up to $4,350,000 in commission per month which 

continually increases in commission when revenue per 

month reaches $4,850,000 and beyond.

58. [GTL’s] own language of [its] contractual relations 

state[s,] “YOU ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT 

THE FACILITY, AND NOT GTL, WILL BE 

RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER 

YOUR GTL DEVICE WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU 

FOLLOWING YOUR RELEASE OR TRANSFER 

FROM THE FACILITY. . . .”

59. [GTL’s] own language of [its] contractual relations 

state[s,] “THERE IS A RISK THAT YOUR GTL 

DEVICE WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO YOU BY 

THE FACILITY. . . .”

* * *

61. [GTL] created incentives for the [DOC], an immune 

third party to stop [Inmate] and similarly situated 

prisoners from doing business with GTL, includ[ing] the 

following:
6

 (a) Directing the [DOC] to withhold tablets after 

prisoners purchased them to toll contractual timeframes;

 (b) [GTL’s] failure to provide policies stopping the 

[DOC] from interfering with business relations of 

[Inmate] and [GTL];

 (c) Failure to remove specific language enabling the 

[DOC] to prevent [Inmate] and similarly situated 

prisoners from having their GTL Tablets once the Tablets 

are purchased;

 (d) [GTL’s] failure to stop the [DOC] from keeping 

[Inmate] and similarly situated prisoners away from 

kiosk machines to enter timely tickets, or tickets 

whatsoever;

* * *

 (f) [GTL’s] failure to inform [Inmate] and similarly 

situated prisoners of the [DOC’s] possible interference 

before [GTL] tablets were purchased;

 (g) [GTL’s] failure to inform [Inmate] and similarly 

situated prisoners of the existing conflict of interest 

between the [DOC’s] lucrative kickbacks and [Inmate’s] 

rights as [a] consumer[] which was orchestrated by GTL;

 (h) [GTL’s] directing the [DOC] to intercept incoming 

and outgoing e-mails of [Inmate] and similarly situated 

prisoners discussing personal business deals without 

notification;

 (i) [GTL’s] collectively directing the [DOC] through 

acts or omissions to engage in conduct that prevents 

[Inmate] and similarly situated prisoners from asserting 

rights regarding the tablet program, including services 

purchased through the same.

Complaint ¶¶26-31, 43, 51, 54, 56-59, 61(a)-(d), (f)-(i).

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Inmate bases liability in Counts 

I and II, at least in part, on the actions of the DOC and its employees at the 
7

facilities in which he has been housed acting in concert with GTL. In asserting his 

claim in this appeal, Inmate “overlooks the disjunctive ‘or’ in [S]ection 6601, 

which provides for two separate ways in which a civil proceeding can be 

considered prison conditions litigation.” Brown v. PA. Dept. of Corrections, 58 

A.3d 118, 124 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). “The first is where the lawsuit involves ‘the 

conditions of confinement,’ and the second concerns actions by a ‘government 

party’ that affect a prisoner.” Id. 

Likewise, as alleged herein, Inmate’s fraud and contract claims raised 

in Counts I and II are based, in part, on the actions of the DOC and its employees. 

These allegations are clearly encompassed within “the effects of actions by a 

government party on the life of an individual confined in prison” portion of the 

definition of “prison conditions litigation” contained in Section 6601 of the PLRA. 

See, e.g., Brown v. Bradford, 194 A.3d 1141, 1146 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (“Clearly, 

these actions are those of government parties affecting [the inmate’s] life while 

confined in prison and as such, fall within the definition of prison conditions 

litigation.”). Moreover, it is undisputed that Inmate qualifies as an abusive 

litigator.6 As a result, Counts I and II of Inmate’s complaint fall squarely within 

that definition and the “three strikes rule” of Section 6602(f)(1), and the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying his application for IFP status with respect to 

these counts on this basis.7

 

6 See, e.g., Pelzer v. Wolf (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 472 C.D. 2019, filed March 9, 2020), slip op. 

at 3 (“On April 8, 2019, the trial court denied [Inmate’s] motion because it determined he was an 

‘abusive litigator.’ In reaching its decision, the trial court relied on Pelzer v. Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 309 C.D. 2017, filed October 16, 2017) [] in 

which this Court concluded [Inmate] was an abusive litigator.”).

7 As this Court has stated:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
8

Inmate next claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

his motion for IFP status without inquiring into whether he could pay to prosecute 

the case. Again, Inmate asserts that “at a minimum, the Court should have either 

conducted a hearing or explained in an order or an opinion that [Inmate] does not 

fit into an exception of the PLRA three strikes rule or why the trial court seemingly 

deemed a complaint regarding contract claims ‘prison conditions litigation.’” Brief 

of Appellant at 10. However, as outlined above, Counts I and II of Inmate’s 

complaint clearly fall within the “three strikes rule” of Section 6602(f)(1) of the 

PLRA and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on 

this basis.

Finally, Inmate claims that the trial court abused its discretion in 

dismissing the class action claim in Count III of the complaint prior to a motion for 

certification of the class. However, as this Court has explained:

 

(continued...)

Under [S]ection 6602(f)(1) of the [] PLRA, commonly 

referred to as the “three strikes rule,” a court can revoke a 

plaintiff’s [IFP] status if the plaintiff filed three or more civil 

actions involving prison conditions and these civil actions have 

been dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failure to state a 

claim. When a plaintiff’s [IFP] status is revoked, a court may 

dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint if the plaintiff thereafter fails to 

pay the filing fees and costs associated with the litigation. Because 

[the inmate] already has “three strikes” for purposes of the [] 

PLRA, the only way [that] he can avoid [the] revocation of his 

[IFP] status is if his complaint seeks injunctive relief and sets forth 

“a credible allegation that [he] is in imminent danger of serious 

bodily injury.”

Brown, 58 A.3d at 121 (citations and footnote omitted). Inmate does not seek injunctive relief in 

the instant matter and there is no allegation that he paid the required filing fees and costs 

associated with this litigation.
9

[T]he federal courts in addressing substantially similar 

class action requirements have held that a prisoner 

proceeding pro se, such as [the inmate], may not 

commence a class action lawsuit. See, e.g., Awala v. 

New Jersey [Department] of Corrections, 227 [F. App’x]

133, 134 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming the District Court 

where the District Court dismissed [the inmate’s]

complaint and amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 

§§1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) concluding that a pro se

prisoner without formal training in the law would not be 

able to adequately represent the interests of the class and 

maintain the suit as a class action); Caputo v. Fauver, 

800 F. Supp. 168, 170 (D. N.J. 1992), aff’d, 995 F.2d 216 

(3d Cir. 1993) (stating that “[e]very court that has 

considered the issue has held that a prisoner proceeding 

pro se is inadequate to represent the interests of his 

fellow inmates in a class action.”). Hence, any putative 

class action claims should be dismissed.

Mobley v. Coleman, 65 A.3d 1048, 1050 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). As a result, the 

trial court also did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Count III of Inmate’s 

complaint.

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Caine Pelzer, :

:

Appellant :

:

 v. : No. 471 C.D. 2019

: 

Global Tel Link Corporation :

PER CURIAM

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 27th day of April, 2020, the order of the Fayette 

County Court of Common Pleas dated April 8, 2019, is AFFIRMED.