alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

YONG I. FENLON,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

Respondent.

______________________ 

2014-3145

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-0432-04-0076-X-1.

______________________ 

ON MOTION

______________________ 

PER CURIAM. 

O R D E R

This court received Yong I. Fenlon’s reply brief in this 

petition for review on August 29, 2014. On September 2, 

2014, this court received an additional brief from Fenlon, 

which we construe as a motion to file a supplemental

reply brief. 

Upon consideration thereof, 

 IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

Case: 14-3145 Document: 21 Page: 1 Filed: 09/26/2014
2 FENLON v. NAVY

The motion is granted. Fenlon’s supplemental reply 

brief received on September 2, 2014 is accepted for filing.

 FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole 

Daniel E. O’Toole 

Clerk of Court

s30

Case: 14-3145 Document: 21 Page: 2 Filed: 09/26/2014
#### Caroline BIRK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROYAL CROWN BANCORP, INC.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16737

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

FILED OCTOBER 3, 2017

Caroline Birk, Mt. Shasta, CA, pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Caroline Birk appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims relating to her loan and a subsequent foreclosure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C.,§ 1915(e)(2)(R)(ii). *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Birk’s action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Birk’s claims arose from the same transactional nucleus of facts and could have been raised in her prior action, which resulted in a final judgment. *See Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys.,*430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements for res judicata and ■requirements for identity of claims and final judgment on the merits).

Birk’s challenge to the district court’s denial of her motion for a temporary restraining order is moot. *See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan,*954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary injunctive relief would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EX PARTE Deverett Lavon MACK

1160153 (CR-15-0752)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

January 13, 2017

Cert. denied.
SENTECH EAS CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Saul POZENSKY, Appellee.

No. 4D17-2288

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 17, 2018]

Daniel M. Schwarz of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.

Jason Ari Smith and Michael P. Hamaway of Mombach, Boyle, Hardin & Simmons, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Damoorgian, Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.
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<ARTICLE> 5
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<NAME> M-WAVE, INC.
       
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<CASH>                                       4,240,941
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,879,416
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  1,401,492
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,259,759
<PP&E>                                       9,576,725
<DEPRECIATION>                             (4,529,526)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              16,546,938
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,325,529
<BONDS>                                      2,040,803
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
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<OTHER-SE>                                  11,831,961
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                16,546,938
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,709,925
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (13,748)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
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Julius J. HALYARD, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-2920

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

August 10, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Laguan WARD, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2498

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

NOVEMBER 21, 2017

Following review of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, it is ordered that said petition is hereby denied.

SALTER, EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT
32.1


Certification
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


As
Adopted Pursuant To


Section
906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002








In
connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of M~Wave, Inc.
for the quarter ended September 30, 2008, I, Joseph Turek, Chief Executive
Officer of M~Wave, Inc. do hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1) such
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008, fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) the
information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended September 30, 2008, fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of M~Wave, Inc.







Dated:  November
      13, 2008
                /s/ Joseph TurekJoseph
      TurekChief
      Executive Officer
jfourtf) Court of

limn Antonio,

September 3,2014

No. 04-14-00142-CV

Flavio Alvarez, M.D.,

Appellant

v.

Martha G. Garcia, Judith Rocha, Rosalinda Gonzales, Sylvia Gonzales, Minerva Gonzales,

Individually and as Heirs of the Estate of Dalia Hernandez, Deceased,

Appellees

Trial Court Case No. 2012-CI-10242

ORDER

The Court has reviewed the record and briefs in this appeal and has determined that oral

argument will not significantly aid it in determining the legal and factual issues presented in the

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 39.8. Therefore, all requests for oral argument are denied, and the

cause is advanced for ON BRIEFS submission on October 8, 2014, to the following panel:

Justice Marion, Justice Barnard, and Justice Chapa. All parties will be notified of the Court's

decision in this appeal in accordance with Tex. R. App. P. 48.

Either party may file motion requesting the Court to reconsider its determination that

oral argument will not significantly aid the Court in determining the legal and factual issues

presented in the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 39.8. Such motion should be filed within ten (10)

days from the date of this order.

It is so ORDERED on September 3, 2014.

Sandee Marion,#ustice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, have hereunto set my hand and a/fixed the seal o/the said

court on this September 3,2014.
#### Raghvendra SINGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-15577

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

Raghvendra Singh, Pro Se

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Raghvendra Singh appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action seeking to enjoin the collection of taxes and for damages. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal of an action as frivolous. *Denton v. Hernandez,*504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. *Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP,*534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Singh’s claims for injunctive relief was proper because Singh’s claims were barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (“the Act”), 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), as Singh seeks to restrain, the government’s tax assessment and collection activities, and no exception to the Act applies. *See Elias v. Connett,*908 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district court must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction any suit that does not fall within one of the exceptions to the Act,”); *see also id.*§ 7421(a) (listing statutory exceptions to the Act); *Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,*370 U.S. 1, 7, 82 S.Ct. 1125, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962) (discussing limited judicial exception to the Act).

Dismissal of Singh’s claim for damages was proper because Singh failed to allege a violation of a statute or regulation entitling him to damages, *See*26 U.S.C. § 7433(a), (d) (discussing scope of right to file civil action for damages for unauthorized collection actions); *Miller v. United States,*66 F.3d 220, 222-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (taxpayer cannot seek damages under § 7433 for improper assessment of taxes).

To the extent Singh attempted to plead a refund claim by alleging that he paid taxes for the 2008 and 2009 years in full and the IRS rejected his refund claim, dismissal of this claim was proper because Singh failed to allege facts sufficient to state a refund claim. *See Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); *see also*26 U.S.C. §§ 6532(a)(1) *&*7422(a) (setting forth administrative remedy requirements for refund actions); *Holloman v. Watt,*708 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1983) (waiver of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally expressed,” and “[t]he party who sues the United States bears the burden of pointing *253to such an unequivocal waiver of immunity” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
Kristen Ann LUNGARINI, Appellant, v. Frank IRIZARRY, Appellee.

No. 4D17-2774

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 3, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
W.K., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-1017

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 2, 2018

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Howard K. Blumberg, Special Assistant Public Defender, and Jessica Vega, Certified Legal Intern, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Eric J. Eves, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LAGOA, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric Wilford MORRISON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-6141

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: June 2, 2017

*118Eric Wilford Morrison, Appellant Pro Se.

Erin Elizabeth Comerford, Thomas A. O’Malley, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Eric Wilford Morrison seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial- of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must démonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Morrison has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Justin NELSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0657

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 17, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Petitioner's petition for belated appeal is dismissed for petitioner's failure to respond to this court's order of March 29, 2018.

BLACK, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
#### Cleveland BRANDON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David R. WILSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6267

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 27, 2017

Decided: November 1, 2017

Cleveland Brandon, Appellant Pro Se. Helen Campbell Altmeyer, Erin Carter Ti-son, Assistant United States Attorneys, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Cleveland Brandon, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order adopting *284the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Brandon has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) is an inadequate or ineffective means of challenging the validity of his detention. *See Rice v. Rivera,*617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010); *United States v. Poole,*531 F.3d 263, 267 n.7 (4th Cir. 2008). As such, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Brandon’s petition. *Rice,*617 F.3d at 807. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis; modify the order, *Brandon v. Wilson,*No. 3-16-cv-00142-GMG-JES, 2017 WL 707490 (N.D.W. Va., Feb. 22, 2017), to reflect a dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction; and affirm the dismissal as modified, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012). We deny Brandon’s motion to remand. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Travis Deshon MCNEIL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6708

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

Travis Deshon McNeil, Appellant Pro Se. Rudy E. Renfer, Seth Morgan Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Travis Deshon McNeil seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than 60 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*651 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on December 19, 2014. The notice of appeal was filed on May 15, 2017.* Because McNeil failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*

*

 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988).
Victor HICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1178

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 6, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Glen M. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. WARDEN, RECEPTION AND MEDICAL CENTER OF the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.

No. 1D15-1048

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 30, 2018

Glen M. Williams, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee; Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wolf and Ray, JJ., concur.
EX PARTE Demetrius BOWIE

CR-16-0399

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 3, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed.
EX-10.21





 EXHIBIT 10.21 

AMENDMENT #1 TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 

This AMENDMENT #1 (“AMENDMENT #1”) to the RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (the “AGREEMENT”) is
effective upon execution of the NEW RESEARCH PROGRAM by and among THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS M.D. ANDERSON CANCER CENTER (“UTMDACC”), INTREXON CORPORATION (“INTREXON”) and ZIOPHARM ONCOLOGY, INC. (“ZIOPHARM”). Capitalized
terms used herein and not defined shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the AGREEMENT. 
 Whereas,
INTREXON, ZIOPHARM, and UTMDACC have a mutual interest in amending the AGREEMENT as follows with respect to INVENTIONS arising from the performance of certain NEW RESEARCH PROGRAMS: 

Notwithstanding Sections 6.1 and 6.3 of the AGREEMENT, for any NEW RESEARCH PROGRAM wholly funded by INTREXON and/or ZIOPHARM,
INTREXON shall solely own all INVENTIONS solely or jointly made by employees, other agents and consultants of UTMDACC that are conceived or reduced to practice in the performance of any of the attached Research Work Plan(s). All such INVENTIONS are
hereby assigned to INTREXON. For any NEW RESEARCH PROGRAM that is not wholly funded by INTREXON and/or ZIOPHARM, Sections 6.1 and 6.3 shall remain in effect with respect to such NEW RESEARCH PROGRAM. Each Research Work Plan will identify the
specific ownership rights of the parties in INVENTIONS as set forth in this AMENDMENT #1 
 All other terms and conditions
of the AGREEMENT remain in full force and effect. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have duly executed this AMENDMENT #1 to
the AGREEMENT by duly authorized representatives. 
  

											
	THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS M.D. ANDERSON CANCER CENTER

  

											
						
	By:	 	     /s/ Chris McKee
	 	        	  	Date:	  	    8/30/2016            	  	                                      
              


											
	Name:	 	Chris McKee, MHA	 	        	  		  		  	                                      
              


											
	Title:	 	Vice President, Business Operations	  		  	                                      
              
		
	INTREXON CORPORATION	  	                                      
              

  

											
						
	By:	 	     /s/ Jeffrey Perez
	 	        	  	Date:	  	    8/25/2016            	  	                                      
              


											
	Name:	 	Jeffrey Perez	 	        	  		  		  	                                      
              


											
	Title:	 	Senior Vice President	 	        	  		  		  	                                      
              














											
	ZIOPHARM ONCOLOGY, INC.	  	

  

											
						
	By:	 	     /s/ Caesar Belbel
	 	        	  	Date:	  	    8/29/2016            	  	                                      
              


											
	 Name:
	  	 Caesar Belbel
	  		  		  		  	


											
	 Title:
	  	 EVP, COO, Chief Legal Officer
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<ARTICLE> 5
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