Opinion issued February 11, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-17-00945-CR

———————————

CHRISTIAN SHAWN WILLIAMS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 434th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 15-DCR-070091B

OPINION ON REHEARING

Christian Shawn Williams was convicted of murder. On appeal, he raises

three issues: (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction;

(2) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony; and (3) the trial court erred
2

in admitting statements made by a codefendant to his cellmate. We affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.1

Background

On the evening of May 28, 2015, Stephanie Peña was shot and killed in a 

retail pharmacy parking lot while she sat in the driver’s seat of her car. A witness

in the parking lot heard a gunshot and saw a young African-American man run 

from a black car to a white car. The white car sped away, and the witness called 

911.

Responding officers found a spent cartridge casing on the floorboard of 

Peña’s car. They also found a small amount of marijuana and a beer can that was 

still cold to the touch. They recovered Peña’s cell phone and extracted its contents

to a separate drive. Cell phone data records showed that before her death, Peña was

communicating with a phone number registered to Solitaire Williams, Christian

Williams’s mother. The number was the same number he had given to the Fort 

Bend County probation department as his own. The records associated with that 

phone number showed multiple communications with Peña, including more than 

75 text messages and two calls, between the afternoon and evening of May 28, but 

1 We issued a memorandum opinion on August 1, 2019, in which we affirmed 

Williams’s conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting expert 

testimony or admitting statements made by a codefendant. We declined to reach 

sufficiency of the evidence because it was filed in a supplemental brief. Williams 

moved for rehearing. We deny the motion, withdraw our August 1, 2019 

memorandum opinion and judgment of the same date, and issue this substitute 

opinion and judgment in their stead. 
3

not after the time Peña died. Police tried to locate Williams’s phone after the 

murder, but it was turned off throughout the entire investigation. 

Investigators discovered other phone numbers associated with Williams by

contacting his probation officer. They obtained a warrant to “ping,” or connect 

with, a number associated with him, providing law enforcement with the phone’s 

location every 15 minutes. The phone was located in an apartment complex in 

Houston. Simultaneously, detectives investigated another person, Robert Dike,

based on leads they had gathered. Dike lived in the same apartment complex where 

Williams’s phone pinged. After surveillance, officers obtained an arrest warrant for 

Williams and went to the apartment. When they arrived, Williams jumped from the 

third-floor balcony to the second-floor balcony and surrendered. Dike was in the 

apartment and was arrested on traffic warrants. 

Detectives later obtained the actual text messages between Williams and 

Peña. The text messages demonstrated that Williams contacted Peña to purchase 

marijuana. The two negotiated a price for two ounces of marijuana and debated 

where to meet for the purchase. Eventually, they agreed on a location near the 

pharmacy parking lot. The last communication between them was a 90-second 

phone call, the details of which are unknown. 

Williams was charged with capital murder. At trial, the jury heard testimony

consistent with the above facts. Additionally, Peña’s friend testified that he had 
4

met up with Peña shortly before her death. He met her in the parking lot of a fast 

food restaurant and got into the passenger seat of her dark Lexus sedan. They met 

so that the friend could view and possibly purchase some marijuana. While they 

were in Peña’s car, she received a phone call from a man. The friend believed that 

he heard the name “Christian” during the conversation.

Demond Walton testified that he was cellmates with Robert Dike, who 

eventually was also charged with the murder. While in the Fort Bend County jail, 

the two men became friends, and Dike told Walton why he was in jail. Dike said

that he and Williams intended to rob a drug dealer for marijuana. 

The jury found Williams guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder and

sentenced him to 23 years’ imprisonment. 

Analysis

We address three issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to 

support Williams’ conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting testimony from 

a cell phone analyst because her methods were unreliable; (3) the trial court erred 

in admitting Walton’s testimony because it was inadmissible hearsay and violated 

his right to confrontation. We affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Williams claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder 

conviction. 
5

A. Standard of Review 

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences 

therefrom, the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). We consider all evidence in the 

record, whether it was admissible or inadmissible. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d

763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The jury is the sole judge of credibility and 

weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d

699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The jury may accept or reject all or any part of a 

witness’s testimony. Id. 

A person commits the offense of murder if he: (1) intentionally or 

knowingly causes the death of an individual; (2) intends to cause serious bodily 

injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of 

an individual; or (3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than 

manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or 

attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or 

attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of 

an individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b).
6

B. Analysis 

The evidence was sufficient to support Williams’s conviction. The record 

reflects that a witness in the retail pharmacy parking lot heard a gunshot that killed 

Peña and described seeing a man fitting Williams’s general description running 

from a dark Lexus sedan where the victim was shot and getting into the back of a 

white car. The witness called 911. Peña’s friend testified that he met up with her on 

the day she died to consider purchasing some marijuana. He testified that Peña 

brought the marijuana, they met in a fast food restaurant parking lot, and he got 

into the passenger side of her dark-colored Lexus sedan. While he was viewing the 

marijuana, Peña received a call from a man wanting to purchase the same 

marijuana. The friend believed he heard the name “Christian” in the conversation. 

The friend left without purchasing the marijuana Peña showed him. 

Demond Walton, a man who was incarcerated with Williams’s codefendant, 

testified that the codefendant told him that he and Williams planned to rob their 

victim of her drugs. The police did not discover any marijuana in Peña’s car, 

corroborating the testimony that she had been robbed of her marijuana. 

Peña’s phone contained communications with a phone number that Williams

had given to the Fort Bend County probation department as his number. The phone 

records showed that the two were communicating up until the time of Peña’s death, 

but not after it. When police tried to ping the phone after the death, it was always 
7

turned off. When the police arrived to arrest Williams at Dike’s apartment 

complex, he jumped off a third-floor balcony in an attempt to escape, but he was 

caught. 

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence and can be 

sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007). The jury heard that Williams communicated with the victim numerous 

times until the time of her death, and then he turned his phone off. He fit the 

description given by the witness to the shooting. When police tried to arrest him, 

he jumped off a balcony to try to escape. His codefendant, Dike, told someone in 

jail that he and Williams intended to rob the victim of marijuana. The evidence 

showed that Peña had marijuana in her possession immediately before her death 

but had very little after, suggesting she had been robbed.

We hold that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find Williams 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule Williams’s first issue. 

II. Admissibility of Expert Testimony

In his second issue, Williams asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 

testimony from a Department of Public Safety analyst about cell phone location 

tracking. He argues that the court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony 

because the analyst did not know her methodology’s error rate. The State responds 

that the analyst was qualified to opine on the location of cell phones, and her lack 
8

of knowledge regarding error rates in the underlying software did not impact the 

reliability of her opinion that the cell phone was near the pharmacy around the time 

of the murder. 

A. Standard of Review

We review the trial court’s decision to allow expert testimony for an abuse 

of discretion. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We 

will uphold a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of an expert witness as long as 

it falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 

571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial 

court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be disturbed. Wyatt

v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

The court considers three conditions in admitting a witness as an expert: 

“(1) the witness qualifies as an expert by reason of his knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education; (2) the subject matter of the testimony is an 

appropriate one for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert testimony will 

actually assist the fact-finder in deciding the case.” Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 

525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1992); see also TEX. R. EVID. 702. These conditions are commonly 

referred to as qualification, reliability, and relevance. Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 
9

128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Before admitting expert testimony, the trial court 

must determine that all three conditions are met. Id. 

B. Analysis

The State called Elizabeth Buhay, an analyst with the Department of Public 

Safety’s Telephone Records Analysis Center (TRAC) as an expert to testify on the 

approximate location of Peña’s cell phone and a cell phone linked to Williams 

based on historical phone records and a list of the coordinates of Houston area cell 

phone towers provided by carriers to law enforcement. The cell phone records 

were admitted into evidence without objection during a detective’s testimony. The 

detective testified that he sent the records to the TRAC analyst for mapping.

The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to consider 

Williams’s motion to exclude Buhay’s testimony. At the hearing, Buhay testified 

about her qualifications to opine on these subjects. She stated that she had worked 

as a crime analyst for three years and was trained in cell phone mapping by the

FBI, the Department of Public Safety, and an outside company. During her career, 

she had worked on hundreds of cases to identify the location of a cell phone using 

records. Buhay testified that cell phones ping a nearby tower when in use and cell 

phone records include the coordinates for the tower. Her job is to map the tower 

locations using the coordinates provided in the cell phone records. The records are 
10

uploaded digitally to a mapping software. She uses the software to create a map of 

calls or texts over time or in a specific area. 

Buhay testified that she employs these techniques on a daily basis. For this 

particular investigation, she received a request from Texas Ranger P. Luna to 

review phone records for three different cell phones. Although Luna provided her 

with the records from the carrier, Buhay also requested the original records from 

the carrier to verify her work. She determined the location of the phone when it 

pinged a cell phone tower. She attached details from the call or text to each point, 

including the time and the person the phone was contacting,

2

and she plotted the 

data on maps, showing where a particular phone was located throughout the day 

and what cell tower it contacted when it was being used. 

Williams argues that Buhay’s opinion was unreliable because she admitted 

that there were newer software programs available to plot the data, and she was 

unaware of the current program’s error rate. Texas Rule of Evidence 705(c)

governs the reliability of expert testimony. It states that “[a]n expert’s opinion is 

inadmissible if the underlying facts or data do not provide a sufficient basis for the 

opinion.” TEX. R. EVID. 705(c). The reliability inquiry is flexible, at times focusing 

on the reliability of scientific knowledge, at other times on the expert’s personal 

knowledge and experience. Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 134. Experience alone may 

2 The investigator testified earlier in the trial that the cell phone records do not 

include the substance of the text messages. 
11

provide a sufficient basis for an expert’s testimony. Id. The proponent of the expert 

must establish some foundation for the reliability of the expert’s opinion. Id.

To be considered reliable, evidence from a scientific theory must satisfy

three criteria: “(a) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (b) the technique 

applying the theory must be valid; and (c) the technique must have been properly 

applied on the occasion in question.” Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 273 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573). When “soft” sciences are at 

issue, the trial court must inquire “(1) whether the field of expertise is a legitimate 

one, (2) whether the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of 

that field, and (3) whether the expert’s testimony properly relies upon and/or 

utilizes the principles involved in the field.” Id. (quoting Nenno v. State, 970 

S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). “This inquiry is somewhat more 

flexible than the Kelly factors applicable to Newtonian and medical science.” 

Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 273. The general principles announced in Kelly apply, but 

the specific factors may, or may not apply depending on the context. Id. Under

both Kelly and Nenno, reliability should be evaluated with reference to the 

standards applicable to the particular professional field in question. Id. 

The task Buhay was called upon to perform was not complex and it was 

verifiable. See Thompson v. State, 425 S.W.3d 480, 489 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (“The complexity of the technique employed in this case to 
12

interpret the [cell phone] records is not great—[the witness] only needed to know 

how the records were produced and what the data in each column signified.”); 

Robinson v. State, 368 S.W.3d 588, 601 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. ref’d) 

(“The analysis is straightforward and not particularly complex.”). Buhay was 

tasked with mapping the location of cell phones using the location of towers 

identified in each phone’s records. She testified that she was trained in cell phone

mapping, employed the techniques daily, and had three years of experience doing 

it. The plotting software’s error rate did not impact the reliability of her opinions. 

The cell phone records showed the exact tower to which the phone connected, and 

Buhay testified that she checked the records for accuracy. See Thompson, 425 

S.W.3d at 488–89 (rejecting challenge to expert opinion based on argument it was 

possible defendant’s cell phone was located miles away from tower shown in 

records). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

determined that Buhay’s opinion on the general location of Williams’s and the 

victim’s cell phones was reliable. We overrule William’s second issue. 

III. Admissibility of Coconspirator’s Statements

Williams asserts that the trial court erred when it overruled his objections to 

introduction of certain statements made by Robert Dike to Demond Walton. 

Walton testified about what his cellmate, Robert Dike, told him while they were 
13

incarcerated. Williams argues that the statements violated his rights under the 

Confrontation Clause and were inadmissible hearsay.

A. Confrontation Clause

The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of “testimonial hearsay” 

unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior 

opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 

53, 68 (2004); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Texas Rule of Evidence 801(d) defines 

hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a 

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. TEX.

R. EVID. 801(d). Testimonial statements include, at a minimum, “prior testimony at 

a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial” and “police 

interrogations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Whether a statement is testimonial and therefore subject 

to the accused’s right to confrontation is a question of law we review de novo. See 

Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In making the 

determination whether a particular statement is testimonial, we consider whether 

the statement was (1) ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent, 

(2) extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, or 

(3) statements that were made under circumstances that would lead an objective 

witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
14

later criminal prosecution. Melendez v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309–10 

(2009) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52); Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 576. 

The Supreme Court specifically distinguished a defendant’s statements to 

police from his statements to friends, noting that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal 

statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who 

makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 

Further, the Court has ruled that a statement is not testimonial if its primary 

purpose is not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Michigan v. 

Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011) (noting that “the most important instances in 

which the [Confrontation] Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court 

statements are those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court 

interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial”).

Williams argues that his coconspirator’s statement to Walton should be 

considered testimonial based on a generalized idea that all statements one inmate 

makes to another about a case are made with the knowledge that the statement 

could be available for potential use at a later criminal prosecution. But the fact that 

Dike and Walton were incarcerated at the time of their conversations did not make 

the statements testimonial.3 Walton testified that he and Dike became friends while 

3 See Rodriguez v. State, Nos. 07-15-00412-CR & 07-16-00124-CR, 2016 WL 

7439189, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 21, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (noting that incarcerated declarant’s knowledge that 
15

in jail and as friends, they shared information about why they were in jail. Here, 

the primary purpose of Walton’s statements to Dike was not to create an out-ofcourt substitute for trial testimony. See Espinoza v. Thaler, No. 2:11-CV-00146, 

2012 WL 774989, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2012) (noting trial court’s finding that 

recorded jailhouse phone conversations were not testimonial statements because 

they were initiated by co-defendant, not by law enforcement, and such 

conversations were co-defendant’s spontaneous statements to private persons). We 

conclude that the statements were not testimonial, and the trial court did not violate 

the Confrontation Clause by admitting Walton’s testimony into evidence. 

B. Hearsay

Williams also argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony 

because it was hearsay. Walton testified that Dike told him he and Williams 

intended to rob Peña of drugs on the day of the murder. 

Generally, the hearsay rule excludes any out-of-court statements offered by a 

party at trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. TEX. R.

EVID. 801(d) (defining hearsay); TEX. R. EVID. 802 (admissibility of hearsay); 

Walter v. State, 267 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). One of the 

phone conversation could be used in later criminal proceeding did not make 

recorded statements testimonial); see also Townsend v. State, No. 03-17-00495-

CR, 2018 WL 3978489, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (recorded statements of defendant, 

co-defendant, and another inmate in three-way jailhouse phone call were not 

testimonial and made between acquaintances);
16

exceptions to the hearsay rule allows the admission of statements made against the 

declarant’s interest. TEX. R. EVID. 803(24). This exception permits admission of a 

statement that: 

(a) a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made 

only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so 

contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so 

great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone 

else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability or to make 

the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace; and 

(b) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate 

its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends 

to expose the declarant to criminal liability. 

Id. The rationale behind admitting these types of statements “stems from the 

commonsense notion that people ordinarily do not say things that are damaging to 

themselves unless they believe they are true.” Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890. “[A] 

reasonable person would not normally claim that he committed a crime, unless it 

were true.” Id. 

Rule 803(24) sets out a two-step foundation requirement for admissibility of

hearsay statements. Id.; Coleman v. State, 428 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). First, the trial court must determine whether 

the statement subjects the declarant to criminal liability and whether the declarant 

realized this when he made the statement. Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890–91. Second, 

the trial court must then determine whether sufficient corroborating circumstances 

exist that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Id. at 891. 
17

Both statements that are directly against the declarant’s interest and 

collateral “blame-sharing” statements that implicate both the declarant and others

may be admissible under Rule 803(24) if corroborating circumstances clearly 

indicate their trustworthiness. Id. at 896. “Blame-shifting” statements that 

implicate another person but minimize the declarant’s culpability are not 

admissible under this rule, absent extraordinary circumstances. Id.; see also Guidry 

v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding statements 

inadmissible under Rule 803(24) because statements were “not so equally against 

both [the declarant’s] and [the defendant’s] interests as [to] reach this level of 

reliability”). The trial court is “obligated to parse a generally self-inculpatory 

narrative and weed out those specific factual statements that are self-exculpatory or 

shift blame to another.” Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 897. 

The determination of whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate 

trustworthiness lies within the trial court’s discretion. Mason v. State, 416 S.W.3d 

720, 734 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (citing Cunningham v. 

State, 877 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). When analyzing the

sufficiency of corroborating circumstances, a number of factors are relevant: 

(1) whether the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant; 

(2) whether the declarant was so situated that he might have committed the crime; 

(3) the timing of the declaration; (4) the spontaneity of the declaration; (5) the 
18

relationship between the declarant and the party to whom the statement was made; 

and (6) the existence of independent corroborative facts. Woods v. State, 152

S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Coleman, 428 S.W.3d at 159. The first 

two factors are not relevant when, as here, the statements are offered by the State 

to inculpate the defendant. Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 113. The trial court may consider 

evidence which undermines the reliability of the statement as well as evidence 

corroborating its trustworthiness. Mason, 416 S.W.3d at 734 (citing Cunningham, 

877 S.W.2d at 312). 

We first consider whether the statements admitted by the trial court subject 

Dike to criminal liability and whether he recognized that at the time he made the 

statements. See Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890–81. Walton testified that Dike told him 

that he and Williams intended to rob the victim of marijuana. The statement places

Dike at the scene of the murder with Williams, and therefore subjects him to 

criminal liability for attempted robbery at a minimum. The statement implicates

both Williams and Dike equally. See Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 899 (“[O]ut-of-court 

statements from a co-defendant that are against the declarant’s penal interest but 

also inculpate the defendant are viewed with some suspicion. That suspicion is 

lessened when the speaker makes no distinction between his conduct and that of 

the defendant—where there is absolute equality.”). The trial court could have 

reasonably concluded that Dike recognized at the time he spoke with his cellmate
19

that admitting he intended to participate in a robbery was against his penal interest. 

See Coleman, 428, S.W.3d at 160 (trial court could conclude that defendant knew 

that telling his girlfriend he had participated in a murder was against his penal 

interest). A reasonable person would have understood that admitting to attempted 

robbery was against his interest. 

We now must determine whether sufficient corroborating circumstances 

indicate the trustworthiness of Dike’s statements to Walton. Dike spoke with 

Walton while both were incarcerated in county jail. He made the statements 

gradually, over time, as they became friends and in a private setting. See Woods, 

152 S.W.3d at 113 (“These were ‘street corner’ statements that Rhodes made to his 

friends without any motive to shift blame to another or minimize his own 

involvement in the murders.”); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 751–52 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1999) (considering, in holding that hearsay statements were 

admissible, that statements were either spontaneously made or made in response to 

casual inquiries from “friends and criminal acquaintances not connected to the 

commission of the offense”). 

The State also presented independent corroborative evidence that verified 

Dike’s statements to Walton. The State introduced phone records that showed that 

Williams was communicating with the victim up to the point of her death regarding 

meeting up with her and purchasing marijuana. A cell record expert explained the 
20

location of William’s phone during that conversation. The expert also opined that 

Williams’s phone and the victim’s phone pinged the same cell tower at the nearest 

time to the shooting. Evidence suggested a robbery was planned, including 

evidence that a gun was involved and that law enforcement did not find two ounces 

of marijuana with the victim. Law enforcement testified that they found less than a 

gram of marijuana, instead of the two ounces that the victim intended to sell to

Williams in the parking lot. Williams and Dike were arrested together ten days 

later. Cell phone tracking evidence showed that their phones were traveling 

together and that they were together the day of the arrest. Finally, Dike and 

Walton’s conversations occurred soon after the murder.

We conclude that the corroborating circumstances indicate the 

trustworthiness of Dike’s statements to Walton. We hold that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it admitted Walton’s testimony concerning the statements 

that Robert Dike made to him. We overrule Williams’s third issue. 
21

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Peter Kelly

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Kelly, and Goodman.

Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).