United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted May 11, 2018*

Decided May 11, 2018 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 17-3269 

TRINA L. CARPENTER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JESSE WHITE, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 17 C 4683 

Harry D. Leinenweber, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Trina Carpenter appeals the dismissal of her suit against employees of the Illinois 

Secretary of State’s office involved in the suspension of her driver’s license. Her 

complaint seems to assert that her license would not have been suspended (for unpaid 

 

*

 The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not 

participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument 

because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral 

argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 17-3269 Page 2 

tickets) had the defendants not failed to intervene in the mortgage fraud, identity theft, 

and other misfortunes that, she says, caused the non-payment—and that have been the 

subject of prior cases before us, see Carpenter v. City of Chicago, No. 17-3046, 2018 WL 

1633471, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2018) (nonprecedential decision) (Carpenter II); Carpenter 

v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 633 F. App’x 346, 347 (7th Cir. 2016) (Carpenter I). At screening 

the district court surmised allegations that Carpenter was deprived of her driver’s 

license without due process of law, but dismissed the complaint in part because 

Carpenter had state-court remedies available. Carpenter then amended her complaint, 

but the district court again concluded that it failed to state a claim on which relief may 

be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). We affirm the judgment. 

As in her prior cases, Carpenter does not discuss any error in the district court’s 

screening order. In fact, her brief is nearly identical to the one she filed in Carpenter II, 

except she has added a paragraph explaining that her daughter has had another vehicle 

impounded and that she has “turned in a great amount of evidence” of the Secretary’s 

negligence to the district judge in this case. She also expands her summary of 

complaints about her troubles that she has brought to various federal agencies, from the 

Department of Justice to the United States Postal Service. To the extent she presents a 

legal argument, it pertains to a dispute with PNC Bank that was addressed in 

Carpenter I. 

Because Carpenter fails to identify any errors committed by the district court, she 

treads closely to the dismissal of her appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8); Anderson 

v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). But we generously construe her pro se 

brief as arguing generally that she stated a claim about the wrongful suspension of her 

driver’s license. 

The attachments incorporated into Carpenter’s amended complaint doom a 

claim that her license was suspended without due process of law. She was notified by 

mail that her license was suspended because she had more than ten unpaid parking 

violations, see 625 ILCS 5/6-306.5(a), and she was offered a hearing to contest that 

conclusion. Nothing more was necessary. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113–15 (1977). 

Carpenter attended a hearing, but she says that the defendants “fail[ed] to follow 

the correct procedures” in that proceeding. Such a failure, however, does not give rise 

to a due-process claim. A state employee’s violation of procedure is not an injury that 

the state is able to foresee and prevent through pre-deprivation process. See Easter House 
No. 17-3269 Page 3 

v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1404–05 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). Because of this, adequate 

post-deprivation remedies are all that is constitutionally required for a person who 

alleges she was deprived of property under those circumstances. See id. Carpenter had 

the opportunity to seek review of the administrative decision by filing an action in the 

Illinois Circuit Court. See 735 ILCS 5/3-103 to -104. Though she had no duty to 

“exhaust” her state remedies before filing this lawsuit, “we do not allow a plaintiff to 

claim that she was denied due process just because she chose not to pursue remedies 

that were adequate.” Veterans Legal Def. Fund v. Schwartz, 330 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 

2003). As Carpenter provides no reason why her right to review in state court was 

inadequate, her complaint was properly dismissed. 

Carpenter also complains that the district court wrongly denied her three 

motions for recruited counsel. But she would be hard-pressed to show a reasonable 

likelihood that having an attorney would have made a difference here. See Pruitt 

v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2007). Her own pleadings show that she received due 

process, and a lawyer could do nothing to revive her bygone claims of mortgage fraud 

and identity theft. 

This is Carpenter’s third appeal from separate cases relating to the same course 

of events. Further repetitious or frivolous appeals to this court may result in sanctions. 

See FED. R. APP. P. 38. 

AFFIRMED