# FILED
December 31, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appe llate Court C lerk IN THE COURT OF AP PEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON JEAN CAROLYN DOTSON, ) ) Pla intiff /A pp elle e, ) Weakley Circuit No. 2661 ) VS. ) Appeal No. 02A01-9804- CV-00117 ) AMANDA B. BLAK

E, DAN BLAKE, ) and the ESTATE OF ELVIS C. ) MADDOX, SR., and MARTIN MANOR ) ASSOCIATES, LTD., ) ) D efe nd an t/Ap pe llan t. ) APPEAL FROM

THE CIRCUIT COUR

T OF W EAKLEY COU

NTY AT DRESDEN, TENNESSEE THE HONORABL E WIL LI AM B. ACREE, JR. , JUDGE

MARIANNA WILLIAMS ANTHONY L. WINCH ESTER ASHLEY, ASHLEY & ARNOLD Dyersburg, Tennessee Attor neys for Appel lant Martin Manor Associat es, Lt d.

DONALD E. PARISH IVEY, PARISH & JOHNS, A TTORNEYS Attor ney for Appel lee

AFFIRMED

ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.

CONCUR: W. FRANK CRAWF

ORD, P.J., W.S. DAVID R. FARMER, J.2

Defendant Martin Manor Associat es (“MMA”) appe als t he ruli ng

of th e tria l co urt th at n o fa ult b e assessed against non-parti es Hnedek, Bobo, G ooch and Associates (“A

rch itec t”) a nd S. W eb ste r H ain ing & Com pany (“C ontra ctor”) w he n a ll cla im s a ga ins t the no n-p artie s w ere ba rre d b y th e a pp lica ble sta tute of repose. D efe nd an t M M A a lso ap pe als the trial c ou rt’s r efu sa l to in stru ct th e jury with Te nne sse e P attern Jury Ins tru ctio n 1 2.1 0 re ga rdin g th e a ge nt/in de pe nd en t co ntr ac tor dis tinc tion an d the tria l co urt ’s refusal to grant a n ew tria l w he re t he jur y a pp ort ion ed ze ro f au lt to t he dri ve rs in vo lve d in the au tom ob ile c ollis ion
.
I. Factual and Procedur al History

Dotson filed a C om pla int in circ uit c ou rt for injuries sh e re ce ive d in an au tom ob ile a cc ide nt. T he ori ginal defendant s were Am anda Blake, the

driver of the vehi cle which str uck the vehicl e in which Dotson was a pa ss en ge r; D an Bla ke , the ow ne r of t he vehicl e A

manda Blake was driving; and the Estate of El vis C. Maddu x, Sr ., the driv er of t he car

in w hic h D ots on w as a p as se ng er. Am an da Bla ke an d D an Bla ke filed an Answer in which t hey plead t hat t he

direc t and proxi mate cause of Plaint if f’ s inj uri es was the negli gence of t he C ity of Martin which at the ti me w as a no n-p arty . C ity o f M artin w as the n a dd ed as a d efe nd an t. Martin Manor Associat es (MMA), the party t hat designed and buil t the r oadway w hich int ersected Harri son

Road, was later ad de d a s a de fen da nt.

The M art in M an or a pa rtm en t co m ple x a cc es s ro ad w as loc ate d ju st over a hil l on Harri son Road. The accident occurred when Amanda B lake was tr aveli ng northbound on H arr iso n R oa d. T he M ad do x v eh icle , in which D ots on w as a p as se ng er, w as tra ve ling so uth bo un d o n H arr iso n ro ad an d M ad do x w as ex ec utin g a left turn across t he northbound l ane of Harri son Road and into the apartment complex. As Am anda Blake drove over the hill o n H arr iso n ro ad , sh e s tru ck the ve hic le as it wa s turn ing a cros s he r lane . Do tson suffer ed s eve re injuries as a re su lt of th e a cc ide nt.

Defendant MM A asserted that Hnedek, Bobo, Gooch and A ssociates desi gned the project on Harrison R oa d a nd tha t S. W eb ste r H ain ing & C om pa ny co ns truc ted it. Pla intiff amended her com

plai nt t o add

these two new defendants but these de fen da nts w ere dis m iss ed as Pla intiff’s cla im ag ain st th os e d efe nd an ts was barred as a matt er of l aw pursuant to t he stat ute ofrepose found at Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-202.3

Defendant MM A fil ed a motionto P

erm it Attribu tion of F ault to N on-P arties re que sting th at the Co urt al l ow the jur y to attr ibu te fa ult to the Ar ch itec t an d th e C on tra cto r. T he tria l co urt de nie d D efe nd an t M M A’s motion. Pr ior to tr ial M M A m ad e s ev era l re qu es ts fo r ju ry in stru ctio ns incl udinga request that the Court uti li ze Tennessee

Pa tter n In stru ctio n 3 .53 “W he re c laim is m ad e A ga ins t O ne N ot J oin e d a s a Pa rty .” Def endant MMA submitted a Request

for Ju ry V erd ict F orm w hic h in clu de d a ttrib utio n o f fau lt to S . W eb ste r H ain ing and Hnedek, Bobo, Gooch and Associates. MM A also request ed

Tennessee

Patter n Jury Ins truct ion 12. 10 “Agent or Inde pen den t Co ntrac tor- D istinction ” and a special inst ructi on

rela ted to th e re latio ns hip be tw ee n D efe nd an t an d S . W eb ste r H ain ing an d H ne de k, B ob o, G oo ch an d A ss oc iate s.

At trial the c ourt re fuse d to c harg e the jury rega rding attribution of fau lt to non -partie s. Fu rther th e co urt did no t ins tru ct th e ju ry o n th e d istin ctio n between independent contract ors and agents. The court di d give an inst ructi on reg ard ing du ty o f ad jac en t lan do w ne rs to pe rso ns trav elin g o n th e h igh w ay . D efe nd an t object ed to that i nstruct ion. The j ury found in f avor of Plai nti ffand assigned 51% fault to MM

A and 49% fault to City of Martin.

D efe nd an ts MM A and City ofMartin each f il ed Motions f or New Trial. Defendant MMA argued that the Co urt erred in f ail ing to permit the att ribut ion of f ault t o non-parti es, in d en yin g M art in M an or’s M otio n to Amend An sw er,in erro neo usly c harg ing the jury on the l aw regarding the dut y of a l andowner with respec t t o a street abutt ing th e la

nd ow ne r’s p rop erty , an d in failin g to ch arg e th e ju ry w ith T en ne ss ee Pa ttern Jury In stru ctio n 12.10, “Ag ent o r Inde pen den t Co ntrac tor-D istinction.” Fur

therm ore, M M A a rgue d tha t, in a ss ign ing no fau lt to Amanda Bla ke or th e la te E lvis C . M ad do x, S r., the jur y’s verdi ct was against the weight of t he evidence. The cou rt denied t hose motions

on Decem ber 5, 1997. This appeal byD efe nd an t M M A f ollo w ed . Th e C ity o f M art in also filed a N otic e o f Ap pe al a nd su bs eq ue ntly pa id its pa rt of t he jud gm en t. An O rde r of Sa tis fact ion and Judgment was entered by

the co urt on Ap ril 1 3, 1 99 8, w ith r eg ard to th e C ity o f M art in. Defendants Amanda Bla ke an d D an Bla ke als o c om pro m ise d a nd se ttled afte r the ap pe als w ere filed
.
II. Attribution o

f Fault to Non-p

arties

At trial, Do tson allege d tha t the d rivew ay to the M artin M ano r A partment co m

plex wa s im prop erly locat ed near the crest of a

hill a nd tha t this cre ate d a ha za rd w ith re sp ec t to a cc es s to an d from Harri son Road.4

Hnedek, Bobo, Gooch & Associates (“ Archit ect”) was the archi tectur al fi rm wh

ich designed t he complex and S. Web ster Hai ning& C

om pa ny (“C on tra cto r”) w as the co ns tru ctio n company w

hich bui lt it . Dotson pr esented exp ert proof t hat t he driv eway was loc ate d in a d an ge rou s lo ca tion an d th at th e d es ign of th e driv eway fail ed to m eet e ngin eerin g req uirem ents . The re was w itne ss tes tim on y th at M M A r elie d u po n th e e xp ertis e o f the Archit ect an d C on tra cto r in bu ildin g th e d rive w ay an d th at M M A h ad no for m al tr ain ing in the fi elds of constr ucti on and design.

Dotson am en de d h er C om pla int to name Architect and Contractor as defendants. How ever, Archi tect and Contract or

suc ces sfully a rgue d tha t Do tson ’s claim aga inst the m wa s ba rred a s a m atter o f law pursuant to the stat ute of r epose found at Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-202. MM A then sought to amend its Answer to ass ert affir m ativ ely the negl igence of the

Ar chite ct a nd C on trac tor in the ev en t the jury fou nd ne glig en ce in th e constr ucti on

or design of the

dri ve w ay . Th e C ou rt d en ied M M A’s m otio n in this reg ard . M M A a lso filed a Motion to P erm it Attr ibu tion of F au lt to Non-Parti es for t he

pu rpo se of in clu din g A rch itec t an d C on trac tor in the po ol of compa rati ve fault since they were no longer part ies t o the su it. Th e tria l co urt d en ied tha t m otio n. M M A contends that the t rial cou

rt err ed in fa iling to a llow the jury to c on sid er th e a pp ortio nm en t of fa ult to nonparti es.

Tennessee

fi rst adopt ed com

parati ve negligence i n the case of M cIn tyre v. B ale ntin e , 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992) based

in large part u pon princ iples o f fairnes s. Th e S upre m e C ourt rec og niz ed tha t the ir d ec isio n would affe ct n um ero us leg al p rinc iple s s urr ou nd ing tor t litiga tion an d t hat h arm o niz ing the se prin cip les w ith comparative

fau lt m us t aw ait a no ther da y. Id . at 5 7. T he C ou rt a lso sta ted tha t the tre atm en t of n on -pa rtie s sh ou ld a w ait a n a pp rop riate co ntro ve rsy . Id . at 6 0.

Such ap pro pria te co ntr ov ers y a ros e fo ur y ea rs la ter in Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co. , 914 S.W.2d 79 (T en n. 1 99 6). R idin gs w as inju red on the job and su bs eq ue ntly filed a to rt a ctio n a ga ins t the res po ns ible thi rd parti es. As Ridings was inju red in th e c ou rse of h is employm ent, hi s only redress agai nst his employer was under thewo

rkers co m pe ns atio n la w . H ow ev er, th e d efe nd an ts s ou gh t to a ss ign a p erc en tag e o f fau lt to Ridings’ employer in t he tort acti on. The Supreme Court was call ed upon to deci de

whether a non-party against whom the pla intiff co uld no t leg ally m ain tain a c au se of a ctio n in tor t co uld no ne the les s b e a pp ort ion ed a percentage of f ault wit h the correspondi ng result of reduci ng the li abil it y of other r esponsible def endants.5

The Supreme Court i n Ridingshe

ld th at s inc e th e p lain tiff’s e m plo ye r co uld no t be m ad e a pa rty to t he pla intiff ’s tort a ctio n fo r pe rso na l injuries su sta ine d in the co urs e o f his sc op e o f em plo ym en t, the rat ion ale of M cIntyre w ou ld n ot p erm it fau lt to b e a ttrib ute d to the pla intiff ’s em ploy er. Ridingsat 82. The Court concluded tha t the pla intiff’s righ t to re co ve r on alle ga tion s o f ne glig en ce an d s trict lia bility must be determined wit hout refer ence to th e e m plo ye r’s co nd uc t. Id . at 84. The Court st ated t hat t he ratio na le o f M cIntyre postul ates t hat fau lt may be attri buted onl y to t hose persons ag ain st w ho m the pla intiff h as a c au se of a ctio n in tort. Id . at 81.

The ca se of Snyder v. Ltg. Luft techni sche Gm bH , 955 S.W.2d 252

(Tenn. 1997) s hed some light upon the Ridingsdecisi on. Snyder was employed at a te xtile fac tor y a nd w as inju red on the job w he n h e p ut h is arm insi de a s talle d m ac hin e. H e filed a p rod uc ts lia bility ac tion ag ain st th e G erm an m an ufa cturer an d s elle r of th e m ach ine. T he d efen dan ts so ugh t to ha ve fa ult app ortione d ag ains t the e m ploy er.

The de fen da nts in Snyder argued tha t Ridingssh

ou ld b e o ve rruled be ca us e it w ou ld fo rce the m to bear that percent age of faul t that would have be en as se ss ed ag ain st th e p lain tiff’s e m plo ye r. T he C ou rt sta ted tha t the y h ad ca ref ully co ns ide red an d re jec ted the sa m e a rgu m en t in Ridings
. [t ]he rat ion ale of M cIntyre postul ates tha t fau lt m ay be attrib ute d o nly to th e persons against w ho m the pla intiff ha s a ca us e o f ac tion in to rt . . . S inc e th e pla intiff ’s em ploy er c anno t be m ad e a pa rty to the pla intiff’s tort a ctio n fo r personal injuri es

sustai ned in t he course and scope of employment, the rat ion ale of M cIntyre , bot h as to p rinc iple an d p roc ed ure , w ill no t pe rm it fau lt to be attribute d to th e pla intiff’s em ploy er. * * * Limit ing the

pa rties to w ho m fa ult may be attrib

ute d to tho se su bje ct to li abil it y accomp

li shes the poli cy objecti ve of fai rness and effi ciency. Snyder at 255-56 ( cit ing Ridingsat 81-83) . The Court went on t o say that there is no que stion th at the Co urt in Ridingsconsider ed the “f air ness” arguments advanced here by the def endants and made a poli cy decisi on to lea ve im m un e e m plo ye rs o ut o f the as se ss m en t of f au lt. T he C ou rt th us de clin ed the de fen da nt’s inv itatio n to reverse Ridings or oth

erw ise de pa rt fro m the rul e a do pte d in tha t de cis ion
. The Court ult imatel y held t hat product l iabi li ty defendants i n a suit based on negli gence and strict li abil it y may introduce relevant evidence at t ri al t ha t the em plo ye r’s a lter atio n, c ha ng e, im pro pe r m ain ten an ce , or ab no rm al u se of th e d efe nd an t’s product was a cause in fact of t he

pla intiff ’s in jurie s bu t the de fen da nts m ay no t as k th e ju ry to as se ss fau lt to the e m ploy er.

In the case at hand, al l cl aims against Archit ect and Contractor were barred by the stat ute of r epose6

foundat Tenn. Code

An n. § 28 -3- 20 2. T he iss ue be fore this C ou rt is w he the r the prin cip les se t ou t in Ridings and Snyder

would simil arl y bar the at tri buti on of fa ult to no n-p artie s im m un e fro m su it pu rsu an t to a stat ute of repose. Fo r the foll ow ing rea so ns , w e h old tha t the rat ion ale fou nd in Ridingsappli es equall y to st atut es of repose.

The

running of a

sta tute of re po se nu llifies bo th th e re m ed y a nd the righ t. W yatt v. A-Best

Pr od uc ts Co., I nc. 92

4 S .W .2d 98 , 10 2 (T en n. A pp . 19 95 ). B ec au se a s tatu te o f re po se se ts th e tr igg erin g e v en t a s somethingother t han accrual , i t can have t he eff ect of barri ng a plaint if f' s clai m before it accr ues, m os t typ ica lly befo re the pla intiff be co m es aw are of h is o r he r inju ry. Id . at 102. A stat ute ofrepose is a substant ive pr ovisi on be ca us e it e xp res sly qu alifie s th e rig ht w hic h th e s tatu te c rea tes by ba rrin g a righ t of a ctio n e ve n b efo re th e injury has occurred if the inj ury occurs subsequent to t he prescri bed ti me pe riod
. Bruce v. Hamilt on , 894 S.W .2d 27 4, 2 76 (T en n. A pp .19 93 ). T his po ss ibility ha s p rom pte d courts to hol d that stat utes of repose affect the su bs tan tive righ t of a pa rty to brin g s uit, a s w ell a s th e re m ed y. W ya tt at 102.

In Agus v. Futur e Chattanooga Development Corporati on , 358 F.Supp. 246 (E. D.Tenn.1973), Judge W ilso n g av e h is in terp reta tion of T en n. C od e A nn. §2 8-3 -20 2 (th en §2 8-3 14 ): The inte nt o f the Te nn es se e L eg isla tur e in pa ss ing T en n. Code A nn. s. 28--314 wa s to ins ulate c ontra ctors , arch itects, en gine ers a nd th e like fro m liab ility for t heir de fec

tive co ns truc tion or d es ign of im pro ve m en ts to rea lty wh ere eith er t he oc cu rre nc e g ivin g ri se to th e c au se of a ctio n or the i nj ury happens more than four years aft er the substant ial com ple tion of t he im pro ve m en t. Id . at 251. The Te nn es se e S up rem e C ou rt lo ok ed at th is s tatu te in Wat ts v. Putnam

County, 525 S.W.2d 488 (Tenn. 197 5).The Co urt not ed that t he legisl ature “i ntended that ar chit ects, engi neers, et c. no t be su bje ct to law su its for the rea so ns co nte m pla ted by the Ac t ex ce pt fo r th es e in jurie s w hic h o cc ur w ithin fou r ye ars afte r su bs tan tial completi on, and such lawsuits m ust b e bro ug ht in an y e ve nt n ot la ter tha n fiv e y ea rs a fter su bs tan tial com pletion of the imp rove m ent.” Id . at 492. This conc lusi on is hars h, but it is dem and ed u nde r the s tatutory sc he m e. Id
.
The legisl ature has the const it uti onal power to enact st atutes of repose which, by def ini ti on, have the po ss ible effe ct o f ba rrin g a cla im be fore it ac cru es . W ya tt at 104. See also Jones v. Fiv e Sta r En g ineeri ng, Inc. , 717 S. W

.2d 882, 88

3 (T en n.1 98 6) ( up ho ldin g c on stitu tion ality of T PL A s tatu te o f rep os e); Harrison v.7

Schrad er , 56

9 S .W .2d 82 2 (T en n.1 97 8); Harm on v. Angus R. Jessup Assoc., Inc. , 619 S.W.2d 522 (Te nn.1 981 ). Th

e L eg isla tur e c rea tes su ch im m un ities for the pu blic good, wit h the goal of making goods and servi ces m ore av aila ble an d m ore affo rda ble . It is a policy de cis ion w hic h b en efits bo th p ote ntia l de fen da nts and po ten tial p lain tiffs. W he n a pla intiff is injured by the fau lt of a no n-im m un e d efe ndant and an i mm

une de fen da nt, the consequence ofthe

im m un ity w ill fall o n e ithe r the pla intiff o r the no n-im m un e d efe nd an t(s) . Th e Tennessee

Su pre m e C ou rt in Ridingsopte

d for s uch con seq uen ce to fall upo n the non -imm une defe nda nt(s).

The sta tu te of re pos e fou nd a t Ten n. C ode An n. §2 8-3-2 02 w as e nac ted fo r the a bov e-s tate d purposes. It the rol e of th

e le gis latu re, n ot th is C ou rt, to pa ss on the w isd om of th at p urp os e. Hargraves v. Br ac ke tt Stri pping Machine Co. , 31 7 F. Su pp. 67 6, 6 83 (E .D.Te nn.19 70 ). A sta tute of re po se is s im ilar to a blanket imm

unity (s uch as th e em ploy ers im m un ity fr om su it in Ridings ) as

bo th c an ac t as a c om ple te b ar to a pla intiff b ring ing su it eve n be fore su ch ca us e o f ac tion ac cru es . In th is a ren a o f attrib utio n o f fau lt to n onparti es, this Court sees no reason to dist inguish bet ween a blanket statut ory immunity and imm unity pur suant to a st atut e of repose.

The Court i n Ridingssta

ted tha t fau lt m ay be attr ibu t ed only t o tho se persons agai nst whom the pla intiff has a cause of acti on in tort. As a statute of repose bars not only t he remedy bu t also t he right , i t can there fore be said t hat a pl aint if f does not have a cause of act ion ag

ain st a de fen da nt im m un e u nd er a sta tute of rep os e. T he ref ore , un de r th e ra tion ale of Ridings , fau

lt m ay no t be attrib ute d to a d efe nd an t immune from su it pu rsu an t to a sta tute of repose. For

the for eg oin g re as on s w e fin d th at th e tr ial c ou rt d id n ot e rr in ref us ing to allow the jury to c

ons ider th e ap portion m ent o f fault to n on-p arties A rchitec t and Co ntrac tor.

This C ou rt w ou ld furth er p oin t ou t tha t sta tute s o f re po se diffe r fro m sta tute s o f lim itatio n a nd this opini on in no way addresses t he issue of w he the r fau lt m ay be attrib ute d to a n on -pa rty a ga ins t w ho m a s tatu te of lim itatio ns ha s ru n.
III. Jury Instructions
Appellant contends t hat t he tri al court err ed in fai li ng to inst ruct the jury w ith Te nne sse e P attern Jury Instr uct ion 12.10 regardi ng the dist inct ion between an independent contract or and an agent. A tri al cour t8

should gi ve a

req ue ste d in stru ctio n if it is support ed by evidence, if it embo dies a party’ s theory of t he case, if it is a co rre ct s tate m en t of th e la w an d if its su bs tan ce ha s n ot a lrea dy be en inc lud ed in o the r pa rts o f the charge. H ay es v. G ill , 21 6 T en n. 3 9, 3 90 S.W .2d 21 3, 2 14 (19 65 ); Austin v. Mem

phis , 684 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn. Ap p. 1 98 4).

The foll owing excerpts are t aken from the tri al court ’s i nstruct ions to t he jury. The pla intiff als o c on ten ds tha t the de fen da nt, M art in M an or Ass ociates, Limit ed, owned and m

aint ained Sout hwood Ap

art m en t D rive an d th at th is dri veway w as in a da ng ero us loc atio n. A s a res ult, the pla intiff is en titled to reco ver a gain st M artin M ano r. * * * A pa rty is at fau lt is y ou find tha t the pa rty w as ne glig en t an d th at th e negligencewa

s a le gal c aus e of th e injury or da m age for w hic h a cla im is made. * * * The al leg atio ns m ad e a ga ins t M artin M an or a re th at it c on stru cte d th e dri veway at a l ocati on

diffe ren t from tha t au tho rize d b y th e City of Martin and that the driv eway w as in a diffe ren t loc atio n b ec au se the re w as no t ad eq ua te visi bil it y of and for vehi cles tur ning int o the dri veway from H arri son Road. An owner of property which abut s a pu bli c str eet and who has created an access way co nn ec ting its p rop erty to th e p ub lic s tre et fo r its pri va te b en efit must exer cis e d ue ca re t o c on stru ct a nd m ain tain the ac ce ss w ay in a rea so na ble an d s afe co nd ition an d is liab le for inj uri es dir ectl y and proximately r esulti ng from its f ail ure to reasonabl y do so. * * * M art in Manor denies that the dri veway is locat ed in a dangerousplace and as se rts thatthe dri veway was built by the contract or who buil t t he apartment co m ple x a t a lo ca tion se lec ted by the arc hite ct. The ac tion s o f the arc hite ct, H ne de k, B ob o, G oo ch an d A ss oc iate s, a nd /or the con tractor , S. Webster Haini ng and Com pany, may be

consider ed by you in assessing whether the pl ainti ffhas m et her bu rde

n o f es tab lish ing fau lt against Martin Manor. You m

ay not in making that determinati on assess fau lt aga inst the arch itect or c ontra ctor. The jur y in stru ctio n o n th e a ge nt/c on tra cto r di stin c ti on would ha

ve be en rele va nt if th e ju ry w as allo w ed to assess fau lt to t he Ar ch itec t an d C on tra cto r. U nd er t ha t sc en ario , the jur y w ou ld nee d to know whether t he acti ons of t he Archit ect or

C on trac tor w ere attrib uta ble to M M A, s o a s to app ortion fault ac

cord ingly. H ow eve r, as the jur y was correctly not permitted t o assess fault to the non-part ies, the issue of contract or versus agent be ca m e irr ele va nt.

The jurywas ins tr uc ted tha t M M A w as a d efe nd an t be ca us e it owned

and maintained the driveway is questi on. The tri al j udge also inst ructed t he jury on the du ty o f a n owner of property which ab uts a publi c str eet and who has created an access way connecting i ts proper ty t o the p ublic s treet for i ts9

priv ate be ne fit. W hile M M A o bje cte d to su ch ins truc tion at tria l, su ch ins truc tion ha s n ot b ee n m ad e an issue on appeal. That i nstruct ion set out MM A’s duti es as

the owner

of th e p rop ert y. T he jur y w as fur the r to ld that MMA de nie s th at th e d rive w ay is lo ca ted in a da ng ero us pla ce an d a ss erts tha t the driveway was built

by the contractor

who built the apartment complex at a location selected by the architect. The tri al j udge then instruc

ted th e jury that the action s of th e A rchitec t and /or the Co ntrac tor m ay b e co nsid ered in assessi ng whether the plai nti ffhas me

t her burden of est abli shing faul t against MM A but that t hey ma

y not assess fau lt aga inst the arch itect or c ontra ctor.

The jury w as in struc ted o n the duties of M M A a s ow ner o f the p ro perty. They were told

of M M A’s content ion tha

t the dri ve w ay w as bu ilt by Contract or and

de sig ne d b y A rch itec t. Th ey w ere the n in stru cte d to consider the act ions of those non-par ti es in assessing whether MMA was in fact a l egal cause of the i njuri es or dama ges. Alt hough jury inst ructi on 12.10 is a co rre ct s tate m en t of th e la w , it do es no t ap pe ar to embody MMA’s the ory of th e c as e. T o th e e xte nt th at M MA’s theory o

f the c ase em bod ied p rohib iting the jury fro m att ri buti ng the no n-p artie s fa ult to M M A, th e tria l jud ge ’s o the r ins truc tion s a de qu ate ly s tate d th e la w . Th e o the r pa rts of the jury c harg e no tified the ju ry that MM A was po intin g th e fin ge r at C on trac tor a nd Ar ch itec t an d th at the jury w as allo w ed to c on sid er th os e n on -pa rties ’ ac tion s in de term inin g c au sa tion
.
For all th e fo reg oin g re as on s, w e fin d th at th e tr ial c ou rt d id n ot e rr in failin g to in str uc t the jury w ith Tennessee Patter n Jury Ins truct ion 12. 10.
IV. Jury Verdict
Ap pe llan t’s fin al a ss ert ion of e rro r is tha t the trial c ou rt er red in fa iling to g ran t a new tri al where t he jury ap po rtion ed ze ro p erc en t fau lt to the dri vers i nvolved i n the

au tom ob ile c ollis ion. Ap pe llan t co nte nd s th at the ve rdic t of th e ju ry w as ag ain st th e w eig ht o f the ev ide nc e. A pp ella nt p oin ts to the evidence t hat

Blake fai led to activa te he r hea dlights on a dark , rainy D ece m ber a fterno on. B lake wa s ha ving difficulty se

eing from her posit ion in t he car that aft ernoon and Blake m ay ha ve be en trav elin g in ex ce ss of th e p os ted sp ee d lim it. Appellant als

o p oin ts to the t esti mony o

f Mr. Snyder that Madd

ox took his eyes

offthe roadway l ong enough to w ave a gre eting to M r. Sn yde r.10

In revi ewing a ju dg m en t ba se d u po n a jury ve rdic t the ap pe llate co urts are no t at lib erty to weigh the evidence or to deci de where the preponderanc e li es, but are lim ited to d ete rm inin g w he the r th ere is m ate rial evidence to su ppo rt the ve rdic t; an d in de ter m inin g w he the r th ere is m ate rial e vid en ce to s up po rt the ve rdic t, the ap pe llate co urt is req uire d to tak e th e s tron ge st le gitim ate vie w of a ll the ev ide nc e in fav or o f the ve rdic t, to assume the trut h of al l t hat t ends to s up po rt it, allo w ing all re as on ab le in fere nc es to s us tain the ve rdic t, an d to dis ca rd a ll the co ntra ry. Crabtree Masonry Co. , Inc . v. C &R C onstruct ion, I nc. , 575 S.W.2d 4, 5 ( Tenn. 197 8).
Upon revi ewing the

ev ide nc e in this ca se un de r the prin cip les ex pre ss ed ab ov e, w e have concluded that the verdi ct of t he jury i s supported by the evi dence. There was testimony that t he presence of a hil l near the l ocati on of

the ac ce ss roa d o bs truc ts th e v isio n o f m oto rists ap pro ac hin g th e inte rse ctio n, o r en ter ing or exit ing the access road. There was testi mony that other accident s took place at the location prior to t he accident giv

ing rise to th is s uit. Th ere w as tes tim on y th at th e p rob lem co uld ha ve be en co rre cte d b y re loc atio n of the access road to t he place origi nall y designated i n the plat submitted to t he City of Marti n. The City of M art in rec eiv ed nu m ero us co m pla ints fro m m em be rs o f the pu blic and even a c

it y Alderman expressi ng con cern about the danger of t he hidden entrance way. Mrs.McM inn and ot her mem

bers of t he apartment comm unity di scussed the dangerous access road with the MMA mana gers.

Th ere w as am ple ev ide nc e c on ce rnin g th e o bs truc tion of v isib ility a t the a cc ident si te, incl uding evidence of p rior ac cid en ts in the sa m e p lac e. T ak ing the stro ng es t leg itim ate view of all the evidence

in f avor of the verdi ct, all owing all r easonab le i nfe ren ce s to su sta in th e v erd ict, a nd dis ca rdin g a ll the co ntra ry, th e jury ’s verdi ct which assessed no fa ult to the drive rs is support ed by the evidence. For t he foregoing r easons, we hold that the trial cou rt did n ot err in failing to g

rant a new trial in this m

atter.

V. Conclusion

The judgment of the tr ial court i s hereby affi rmed. Costs of thi s appeal are taxed t o Appellant, for which execution may issue if necessary.11 HIGH ERS , J. CONCUR:

CRAW FORD, P.J ., W.S.

FAR ME R, J.