alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### NEW SHOW STUDIOS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Greg HOWE, an individual and Does, 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 16-56906

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 17, 2017

*272John David Du Wors, Esquire, Attorney, Nathaniel E. Durrance, Attorney, Newman Du Wors LLP,. Seattle, WA, Le-eor Neta, Attorney, Newman Du Wors, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Greg Howe, Pro Se

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *272*See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellees’ request for oral argument, set forth in the answering brief, is denied.

MEMORANDUM **

Greg Howe appeals pro se from the district court’s entry of default judgment against him in this defamation action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to order default judgment. *Estrada v. Speno & Cohen,*244 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2001). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. *Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP,*534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment against Howe because within one week of trial he attempted to terminate his attorney, failed to retain replacement counsel, and failed to notify in advance the district court and opposing counsel that he would not attend trial, which resulted in substantial prejudice to appellees. *See Ringgold Corp v. Worrall,*880 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that district court has broad latitude to impose the sanction of default for non-attendance at trial).

Denial of Howe’s requests to transfer venue was not an abuse of discretion because Howe unreasonably delayed in seeking transfer until after the date scheduled for the commencement of trial. *See Allen v. Scribner,*812 F.2d 426, 436 (9th Cir. 1987) (setting forth standard of review and upholding district court’s denial of motion to transfer venue “notwithstanding possible inconvenience to the witnesses” because “the transfer of this case undoubtedly would have led to delay”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

JOSE LUIS MANZO, a.k.a. Jose Manzo,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 16

- 30151

D.C. No. 2:07

- cr

- 02071

- LRS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Lonny R. Suko, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11, 2017 **

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Jose Luis Manzo appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his

motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 24 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 30151

Manzo contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for a

sentence reduction under Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. We

review de n ovo whether a district court had authority to modify a sentence under

s ection 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Leniear

, 574 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir.

2009). Contrary to Manzo’s contention, the district court did not conclude that he

was ineligible for a sentence reduction because his sen tence was based on the

parties’ Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement

. Rather,

t he district court correctly held that it lacked the authority to reduce Manzo’s

sentence because Amendment 782 did not lowe r his applicable Guidelines r ange

.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); Leniear , 574 F.3d at 673

- 74.

AFFIRMED.
AFS-11-288-E 

June 28, 2011 

 Exemption No. 6853E 

 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2000-8153 

Mr. William Cavitt 

Vice President 

American Airlines 

P.O. Box 582809 

Tulsa, OK 74159 

Dear Mr. Cavitt: 

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your petition to extend Exemption No. 6853, 

as amended. It explains the basis for our decision and describes its effect. 

The Basis for Our Decision 

By letter dated April 25, 2011, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on 

behalf of American Airlines, Inc. (American) for an extension of Exemption No. 6853, as 

amended. That exemption from § 121.317(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations allows 

American to operate its Boeing 737 and 777 aircraft with “No Smoking” signs that are always 

illuminated. 

In your petition, you indicate that there has been no change in the conditions and reasons 

relative to public interest and safety that were the basis for granting the original exemption. 

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition 

in the Federal Register because the requested extension of the exemption would not set a 

precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to American. 

Our Decision 

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 6853, as 

amended, remains valid with respect to this exemption and is in the public interest. 
 2

Therefore, under the authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA 

Administrator has delegated to me, I grant your petition. 

Although American requests a permanent exemption, the FAA finds that exemptions need to 

be evaluated periodically. 

The Effect of Our Decision 

Our decision extends the termination date of Exemption No. 6853, as amended, to 

August 31, 2013 unless sooner superseded or rescinded. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

John W. McGraw 

Acting Director, Flight Standards 

 Service
Widaey DINNALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3148

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed July 6, 2018

Matthew R. McLain, of McLain Law, P.A., Longwood, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant's conviction following his no contest plea to attempted second-degree murder with a firearm has previously been affirmed by this court and will not be disturbed. Appellant committed the crime when he was seventeen years old. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a twenty-five year term of incarceration with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence. Although we affirm the twenty-five year sentence, we reverse in part and remand for resentencing solely to provide for judicial review after twenty years to allow for the possibility of early release. *See**Kelsey v. State* , 206 So.3d 5, 8 (Fla. 2016) ; *Montgomery v. State* , 230 So.3d 1256, 1263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ; *Burrows v. State* , 219 So.3d 910, 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).

*1303AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with instructions.

PALMER, EVANDER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
Exhibit






EXHIBIT 10(e)(43)


Annual Performance Incentive Plan for 2019 (“2019 APIP”) 
Under the 2019 APIP, executive officers of the Company are eligible to receive performance related cash payments. Payments are, in general, only made if performance objectives established by the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors (the “Committee”) are met.


The Committee approved incentive opportunities for 2019, expressed as a percentage of base salary for each participating officer. The Committee also established overall threshold, target and maximum performance metrics and payout ranges for the 2019 APIP. Financial performance measures and weightings established by the Committee are: Absolute Revenue (unadjusted for currency) (weighted at 25%), Adjusted Operating Margin (weighted at 25%) and Free Cash Flow (weighted at 25%). Additionally, the Committee established an opportunity for an individual, corporate or group non-financial/operational performance component (weighted at 25%). The Committee maintains the authority to increase or decrease an award based on individual performance. 


Individual awards will be subject to the review and approval of the Committee following the completion of the 2019 fiscal year, with payment to be made within the first four months of 2020.
Jesus M. VEGA-MARRERO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-3458

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

September 25, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Derrick JENKINS, Appellant, v. Julie L. JONES, Appellee.

No. 1D17-2135

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 30, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Ricardo RODRIGUEZ-CORDERO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40154 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 24, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Ricardo Rodríguez-Cordero, Pro Se

Before KING, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Ricardo Rodríguez-Cordero has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v.*
      *362
      *Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2011). Rodrí-guez-Cordero has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*6th Cir. R. 42.2.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *362published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Valentin MARTINEZ-OCAMPO; Maria Rios-Reynoso, Petitioners, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 13-72753

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

FILED OCTOBER 2, 2017

Carlos Alfredo Cruz, Esquire, Law Offices of Carlos A. Cruz, Alhambra, CA, for Petitioners.

Kimberly A. Burdge, Esquire, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. Smith, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Valentin Martinez-Ocampo and Maria Rios-Reynoso, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of *371Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order-denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Granados-Oseguera v. Mukasey,*546 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen where they failed to file it prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period, *see 8*C.F.R. § 1240.26(e)(1), and thus were statutorily ineligible for the relief requested, *see*8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(l)(B) (imposing a ten-year bar to certain forms of relief, including cancellation of removal, for persons who fail to depart within the specified time period); *see Granados-Oseguera,*546 F.3d at 1015-16 (BIA is compelled to deny a motion to reopen based on a movant’s failure to depart where ten-year bar applies to the requested relief). We reject petitioners’ contention that the BIA’s decision conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Dada v. Mukasey,*554 U.S. 1, 128 S.Ct. 2307, 171 L.Ed.2d 178 (2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### ERESEARCHTECHNOLOGY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. CRF, INC., DBA CRF Health, Defendant-Appellee

2016-2281

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 17, 2017

Edward Poplawski, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich *&*Rosati, P.C., Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by Olivia M. Kim; Adam William Burrowbridge, Washington, DC.

John C. Thomas, III, Beck & Thomas, PC, Pittsburgh, PA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by Richard T. Ting.

(Prost, Chief Judge, Bryson and Wallach, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
Exhibit 11



                               GALEY & LORD, INC.
                       STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF
                               PER SHARE EARNINGS


Computation of Average Shares Outstanding (In Thousands):

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
<S>  <C>


                                         Three Months Ended                       Six Months Ended
                                         --------------------                     -----------------
                                      Mar. 28, 1998     Mar.29, 1997        Mar. 28, 1998    Mar. 29, 1997
                                      -------------     ------------        -------------    -------------

Basic Average Common
     Shares Outstanding                  11,682            11,598              11,673           11,587

Add Dilutive Options                        406               408                 398              360
                                        --------         --------            --------          --------

Diluted Average Shares                   12,088            12,006              12,071           11,947

</TABLE>
-84 -82 -80 -78 -76 -74

 36

 38

 40

 42

★

▲

▲

▲

▲

★ ▲

▲

▲

▲

 500

 1000

 1500

 500

18 12 06 00

07/18

NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

 Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 18 Jul 06

 EDAS Meteorological Data

Source

★ at 39.41 N 76.30 W Meters AGL
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK> 0000883946                        
<NAME> NETWORK IMAGING CORPORATION                       
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                               1,845
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       14,038
<ALLOWANCES>                                         (556)
<INVENTORY>                                          1,602
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    19,194
<PP&E>                                               9,119
<DEPRECIATION>                                     (6,680)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      29,439
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               14,648
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                6,357
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                 3
<OTHER-SE>                                           2,907
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        29,439
<SALES>                                             18,453
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    18,453
<CGS>                                               11,972
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       11,972
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    12,593
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                      33
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (6,145)
<INCOME-TAX>                                            55
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                (6,200)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (8,106)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       (0.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0
        


</TABLE>
STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth MOORE

No. 2018-KK-1051

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 23, 2018

**ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS**

Stay denied. Writ denied.

CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

I additionally concur in the denial of the State's writ application because the trial court has not made a final judgment on the motion *in limine* that is the subject thereof, thus rendering the application premature.
#### Mark A. MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David EVERETT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16745

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 20, 2017

Mark A. Miller, Pro Se

D. Randall Gilmer, Deputy Attorney General, AGNV—Office of the Nevada Attorney General (Las Vegas), Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Mark A. Miller appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). We review for an abuse of discretion. *Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble,*753 F.3d 905, 911 (9th Cir. 2014). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. *Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa,*49 F.3d 583, 584 (9th Cir. 1995). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller’s request for in-junctive relief after concluding that, on the record before it, Miller did not establish a likelihood that he would succeed on his medical deliberate indifference claim. *See Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc.,*753 F.3d at 911 (plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish, among other things, that he is likely to succeed on the merits); *see also Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion regarding the course of treatment is not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference).

Miller was not entitled to injunctive relief regarding his retaliation claim because, on the record presented to the district court, he did not establish a likelihood that he would succeed on that claim. *See Brodheim v. Cry,*584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (elements of retaliation claim in prison context).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This Disposition Is Not Appropriate for Publication and Is Not Precedent Except as Provided By Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
MICHAEL JOSEPH NILIO,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

___________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D15-0022

Opinion filed March 20, 2015.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus -- Original Jurisdiction.

Michael Joseph Nilio, pro se, Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied without prejudice to presenting the 

argument set forth therein in the pending appeal of the order denying petitioner’s 

motion for post-conviction relief. See Noack v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, 

Inc., 872 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (where an adequate remedy can be afforded 

on plenary appeal, mandamus relief is unwarranted).

THOMAS, CLARK, and WETHERELL, JJ., CONCUR.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, March 15, 2016.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of

the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, March 15, 2016

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A16D0272. OSCAR REYES v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be

hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this

order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record

transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

LC NUMBERS:

85R009
#### Pedro BALDOVINOS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Paul COPENHAVER, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15-16537

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 14, 2017

Pedro Baldovinos, Pro Se

Audrey Benison Hemesath, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USSAC—Office of the US Attorney, Sacramento, CA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Pedro Baldovinos appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his *64128 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a section 2241 petition de novo, *see Tablada v. Thomas,*533 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

Baldovinos challenges the finding of the disciplinary hearing officer (“DHO”) that he committed riot-like conduct and contends that the disciplinary proceedings violated his right to due process. The record reflects that Baldovinos’s disciplinary hearing comported with due process and “some evidence” supports the DHO’s findings. *See Superintendent v. Hill,*472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (requirements of due process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports disciplinary decision); *Wolff v. McDonnell,*418 U.S. 539, 563-71, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings). We reject Baldovinos’s claim that the DHO, a Bureau of Prisons employee, lacked authority to impose disciplinary sanctions against him for conduct that occurred at a contract facility. *See*28 C.F.R. § 541.10(a) (2007). Finally, we reject Bal-dovinos’s double jeopardy claims. *See United States v. Brown,*59 F.3d 102, 104-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (“the prohibition against double jeopardy does not bar criminal prosecution for conduct that has been the subject of prison disciplinary sanctions,” and loss of good conduct time does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes).

We decline to consider Baldovinos’s claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that he is actually innocent of his 2010 criminal convictions in the Western District of Texas. *See Taniguchi v. Schultz,*303 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.