alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### A&J MANUFACTURING, LLC, A&J Manufacturing, Inc., Appellants v. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Appellee Char-Broil, LLC, Outdoor Leisure Products, Inc., Intervenors *786Outdoor Direct Corporation, Third-Party

2015-1494

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

December 9, 2016

Robert J. Carlson, Lee *&*Hayes PLLC, Seattle, WA, argued for appellants. Also represented by Lance Donald Reich, Kevin Edward Regan, Han Santos Reich PLLC, Seattle, WA.

Cathy Chen, Office of the General Counsel, United States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by Dominic L. Bianchi, Wayne W. Herrington, Sidney A. Rosenzweig.

John W. Harbin, Meunier Carlin *&*Curfman, LLC, Atlanta, GA, argued for intervenor Char-Broil, LLC. Also represented by Warren James Thomas.

Michael R. Dzwonczyk, Sughrue Mion PLLC, Washington, DC, for intervenor Outdoor Leisure Products, Inc. Also represented by Mark Boland, Brian K. Shelton.

(Dyk, Plager, and Reyna, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 21.1

SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                       Country or State of Incorporation
                         Subsidiary                                           or Organization
---------------------------------------------------------            -------------------------------------
<S>                                                                   <C>
AdKnowledge Inc                                                                 California
ADSmart Corporation                                                              Delaware
Engage Asia Ltd.                                                                 Hong Kong
Engage Australia Pty Limited                                                     Australia
Engage Canada Company                                                             Canada
Engage Canada Holdings Corp                                                      Delaware
Engage Canada Holdings II Corp                                                   Delaware
Engage France SAS                                                                 France
Engage Italia srl                                                                  Italy
Engage Japan, KK                                                                   Japan
Engage Securities Corporation                                                  Massachusetts
Engage Sverige AB                                                                 Sweden
Engage Technologies GmbH                                                          Germany
Engage UK Ltd.                                                                United Kingdom
Flycast Communications Corporation                                               Delaware
Flycast Deutschland GmbH                                                          Germany
Focalink Communications Corp.                                                   California
Internet Profiles Corporation                                                   California
InterStep, Inc.                                                                Massachusetts
MediaBridge Technologies, Inc.                                                   Delaware
MediaBridge UK Limited                                                        United Kingdom
Midsystems UK Limited                                                         United Kingdom
Space Ad Network Sdn Bhd                                                         Malaysia
Space Asia Media Pte. Ltd.                                                       Singapore
Space Media Holdings Limited                                              British Virgin Islands
</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
                                       EXHIBIT 27

                   NEUREX CORPORATION FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE

                                    ARTICLE 5


         This schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted from
financial  statements for the nine month period ending September 30, 1996 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.

</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000884065
<NAME>                        Neurex Corporation

<CURRENCY>                                     US Dollars
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1.00
<CASH>                                         33,461,274
<SECURITIES>                                   54,503,653
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               88,345,619
<PP&E>                                         4,607,702
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2,835,902
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 93,558,860
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          5,563,166
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       220,283
<OTHER-SE>                                     85,882,305
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   93,558,860
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               2,777,608
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               15,480,654
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (2,365,072)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (10,337,974)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (10,337,974)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (10,337,974)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.51)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.51)
        




</TABLE>
Ralph Martin BILLINGSLEY v. Amy Diane BILLINGSLEY

2015-CT-01134-COA

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Filed: February 6, 2018 Closed: April 19, 2018

Motion Desc: Appellants Petition For Writ Of Certiorari.

Certiorari - Denied.
AAM

- 13

- 048

- E November 28, 2012

Exemption No. 10239A

Regulatory Docket No. : FAA

- 20 11

- 0247

Mr. James Harvilchuck

Drug Program Manager

Better Living Aviation, Inc.

130 South Clow International Parkway, Suit e B

Bollingbrook, IL 60490

Dear Mr. Harvilchuck :

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your petition to extend Exemption No.

10239 , as amended. It explains the basis for our decision , describes its effect, and lists the

conditions and limit ations.

The Basis for Our Decision

By letter dated October 20, 2012 , you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

on behalf of Better Living Aviation (BLA ) for an extension of Exemption No. 10239 , as

amended. That exemption from part 120 of T itle 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR)

allows BLA to cover its safety sensitive employees under one testing program while operating

under separate parts of the regulation

.

In your petition, you indicate that there has been no change in the conditio ns and reasons

relative to public interest and safety that were the basis for granting the original exemption.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition

in the Federal Register because the requested extensi on of the exemption would not set a

precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to BLA

.

Our Decision

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 10239 , as

amended, remains valid with respect to this exemption and is in the public interest. Therefore,2

under the authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator

has delegat ed to me, I grant your petition, subject to the following conditions and limitations.

Condition s and Limitations

1. Employees of Better Living Aviation, Inc. are subject to the drug and alcohol

regulations at all times while conducting operations under part 135 or part 91.

2. The drug and alcohol program must be implemented under the auspices of the Bette r

Living Aviation, Inc. part 135 operation, not under part 91.

The Effect of Our Decision

Our decision extends the termination date of Exemption No. 10239 to April 30, 2015 unless

sooner superseded or rescinded.

Sincerely,

/s/

Fredrick E. Tilton, M.D.

Federal Air Surgeon
W.J.O., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-1601

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 17, 2018]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Virginia Murphy, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Paul Patti, III, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Damoorgian, Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.
#### Jan Marchevka, Respondent, v DeBartola Capital Partnership et al., Appellants. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[771 NYS2d 524]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Golia, J.), dated August 26, 2002, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

Although the point is uncontested, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the law of the State of New Jersey should apply to the plaintiff’s causes of action since the site of the injury was located in New Jersey *(see Castrillon v ERM-*
      *478
      *Northeast, Inc.,*242 AD2d 654 [1997]; *see also Padula v Lilarn Props. Corp.,*84 NY2d 519 [1994]). Under New Jersey law, a landowner has no duty to protect an employee of an independent contractor from the very hazard created by the doing of the contract work, provided that the landowner does not retain control over the means and methods of the execution of the project *(see Muhammad v New Jersey Tr.,*176 NJ 185, 821 A2d 1148 [2003]; *Mitchell v Route 21 Assoc.,*233 AD2d 485 [1996]). The plaintiffs employer, Bucks Environmental, Inc. (hereinafter Bucks), subcontracted an asbestos abatement project from Bristol Environmental, Inc. (hereinafter Bristol). Under the terms of the subcontract, Bucks, as an independent business, was carrying out its work independent of either the appellants or Bristol. Accordingly, the plaintiff was an employee of an independent contractor *(see Muhammad v New Jersey Tr., supra; Bahrle v Exxon Corp.,*145 NJ 144, 678 A2d 225 [1996]).

The appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they did not violate any duty which they owed to the plaintiff as an employee of an independent contractor. Contrary to the plaintiffs contention in opposition to the motion, he was injured while performing duties in furtherance of the asbestos abatement operation in which the appellants exercised no control over the means and methods of the execution of the project *(see Muhammad v New Jersey Tr., supra; Mitchell v Route 21 Assoc., supra; Majestic Realty Assoc. v Toti Contr. Co.,*30 NJ 425, 153 A2d 321 [1959]). Therefore, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the appellants’ establishment of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Ritter, J.P., Florio, Smith and H. Miller, JJ., concur.
STATE of Florida, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Steven SHAW, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-1474

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 28, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Elijah NELSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1660

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 10, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
CHURROMANIA INTERNATIONAL HOLDING, LLC, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. CHURROMANIA W-5932, LLC, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2209

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

NOVEMBER 07, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### Thomas NGUYEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eduardo LOPEZ, San Diego Police Officer (#6654); David Valdez, San Diego Police Officer (#6562), Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56996

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 20, 2017

Thomas Nguyen, Pro Se

Christina Milligan, Kathy J. Steinman, Deputy City Attorney, Carmen Anne Brock, Deputy City Attorney, San Diego *621City Attorney’s Office, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Thomas Nguyen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment following a bench trial in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging unlawful detention and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s conclusions of law and for clear error the district court’s findings of fact. *Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd.,*402 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

The district court did not clearly err in its credibility determinations, and, based upon those findings, the district court properly concluded that defendants had probable cause to detain Nguyen Under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150, and used reasonable force in doing so. *See Bias v. Moynihan,*508 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing and applying the probable cause standard under § 5150); *see also Graham v. Connor,*490 U.S. 386, 395-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (setting forth the objective reasonableness standard for excessive force determinations).

The district court did not clearly err in entering judgment for defendants on Nguyen’s First Amendment claim because defendants submitted credible testimony that deterrence of Nguyen’s speech was not a substantial or motivating factor in their decision to detain him under § 5150. *See Lacey v. Maricopa County,*693 F.3d 896, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edeogochineme AGBUGBA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6205

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 24, 2017

Edeogochineme Agbugba, Appellant Pro Se, Christopher Lee Andrew Flagg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Christopher John Romano, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge,

*239Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

. Edeogochineme Agbugba seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Agbugba has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Donna WARD, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. LEE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-1173

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

October 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### William TEZAK, individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Geoffrey T. GLASS, individually and in his official capacity; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-56899

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 24, 2017

William Tezak, Pro Se

Kevin Michael McCormick, Attorney, Benton, Orr, Duval *&*Buckingham, Ventu-ra, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Geoffrey T. Glass, Fredrick P. Horn, Derek W. Hunt, Kirk Nakamura, William F. Ryla-arsdam, Raymond J. Ikola, Richard D. Fybel, Kathleen O’Leary

Jason Michael Fodrini, Esquire, Hickey & Petchul, LLP, Irvine, CA, Jonathan H. Eisenman, Robert Axel Olson, Esquire, Attorney, Greines, Martin, Stein & Rich-land LLP, Los Angeles, CA, David Allen Wankel, Esquire, Iger Wankel fe-Bonkow-ski, LLP, Laguna Hills, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Greenbrook Fountain Valley Homeowners Association

Kevin E. Monson, Law Office of Kevin E. Monson, Fountain Valley, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Max B. Johnson, Kevin E. Monson

Jason Michael Fodrini, Esquire, Hickey & Petchul, LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees George Kallas, Cathrine Lesnick, Jimmy Patopoff, Shirley Vogt, Bruce Richardson, Keith Webb

Kevin E. Monson, Pro Se

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

William Tezak appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine. *Noel v. Hall,*341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Tezak’s action as barred by the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine because Tezak’s claims constitute a de facto appeal of prior state court judgments. *See id.*at 1163-65*(Rook-er-Feldman*bars de facto appeals of a state court decision and constitutional claims “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decision); *see also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,*525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (a de facto appeal is one in which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tezak leave to amend his complaint because amendment would have been futile. *See Lopez v. Smith,*203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en *556banc) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett*v. *Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations 

West Building Ground Floor, Room w12-140 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington, DC 20590 

Application to Amend 

Section 333 Exemption No. 11770 

Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-0895 

June 16, 2015 

Petitioner: 

Crosstimbers Video Partners, LLC 

Jeff Holt - Partner 

2801 Surveyors Lane 

Flower Mound, TX 75022 

Greetings, 

By letter from the FAA dated June 8, 2015, an exemption was granted to Crosstimbers Video 

Partners for relief under Section 333. That letter was marked Section 333 Exemption No. 11770 

Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-0895. 

Crosstimbers Video Partners hereby requests that the exemption so granted be amended to 

include DJI Phantom 3 models and the DJI Inspire 1. Relevant facts and reasoning are: 

• DJI has announced they will discontinue the Phantom 2 model which was approved in 

Crosstimbers Video Partners Exemption No. 11770. 

• Size, weight and performance specification of the DJI Phantom 3("P3") are substantially 

similar to those of the DJI Phantom 2("P2") in all relevant respects: 

• Gross Weight: P3=1280g; P2=1242g. 

• Diagonal Size (including propellers): P3=590mm; P2=579mm 

• Maximum Ascent Speed: P3=5m/sec; P2=6m/sec. 

• Maximum Descent Speed: P3=3m/sec; P2=2m/sec. 

• Vertical Hover Accuracy: P3=+/-10cm; P2=+1-80cm. 

• Horizontal Hover Accuracy: P3=+/-1 m; P2=+/-2.5m. 

• Maximum Speed: P3=16m/sec; P2=15m/sec. 

• The DJI Inspire 1 will allow us to progress in our business opening new capabilities and 

added safety through the segregation of duties between the PIC and Camera Operator. 

• Gross Weight: 2935g. 

• Diagonal Size (including propellers): 559mm to 581 mm. 

• Maximum Ascent Speed: 5m/sec. 

• Maximum Descent Speed: 4m/sec. 
• Vertical Hover Accuracy: 0.5m. 

• Horizontal Hover Accuracy: 2.5m. 

• Maximum Speed: 22m/sec. 

• Flight Time: 18 Minutes 

• Dual Controllers allowing the PIC to focus on safe flight and the Camera 

Operator focus on image quality. 

• The findings, rationale and conclusions contained in the FAA's Exemption No. 11770 

apply without modification to this application to include the DJI Phantom 3& DJI Inspire 

1 models in Exemption No. 11770. 

Thank you for your consideration of this important request. Please advise us of any additional 

information that is required. 

Sincerely, 

► 

I/ 

Jeff Holt 

Partner, Crosstimbers Video Partners, LLC