IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30643

PANAGIOTA HEATH, also known as Penney Heath

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MOSTAFA ELAASAR, in his official and personal capacities;

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR THE SOUTHERN 

UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL 

COLLEGE,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:13-CV-4978

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges,

PER CURIAM:*

Dr. Panagiota Heath is an associate mathematics professor at Southern 

University at New Orleans (SUNO). Dr. Mostafa Elaasar became Heath’s 

supervisor in 2003. Since that time, Heath alleges that Elaasar has harassed

her continuously, creating a hostile work environment. She claims that the 

harassment was due to her race, religion, sex, or national origin, in violation 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 1, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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of Title VII and 28 U.S.C. § 1983. She seeks to hold both the university and 

Elaasar liable for the harassment under Title VII and Elaasar responsible 

under section 1983. Heath is a Christian female of Greek descent, while 

Elaasar is a male, and he is Muslim and of Egyptian descent. 

The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of the 

defendants, concluding that while Heath’s alleged harassment was potentially 

hostile, she had not demonstrated that the harassment occurred because of a 

protected characteristic.1 Because Heath has not presented evidence raising a 

genuine issue of material fact on this issue, we AFFIRM.

I.

To begin, this appeal concerns only Heath’s hostile work environment 

claim under Title VII based on sex and her hostile work environment claim 

under § 1983 based on sex, race, religion, and national origin, as she has 

abandoned her Title VII claims based on other protected grounds. See Heath 

v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 850 F.3d 731, 736 (5th 

Cir. 2017).

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Howell 

v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment will be 

granted where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

Summary judgment is also appropriate where the nonmovant fails to establish 

an essential element of his case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322-23 (1986). However, if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party,” summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

 

1 The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge.

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Title VII prohibits an employer’s “discriminat[ion] against any 

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “The creation of a hostile work environment 

through harassment . . . is a form of proscribed discrimination.” EEOC v. Boh 

Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2013). To establish a prima facie 

case of discrimination under Title VII, Heath must demonstrate that (1) she 

“belongs to a protected class,” (2) she “was subject to unwelcome . . .

harassment,” (3) “the harassment was based on a protected characteristic,” and 

(4) “the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” Id.

at 453 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Because § 1983 and 

Title VII are parallel causes of action, Heath must establish the same elements 

to succeed on either claim. Whiting v. Jackson St. Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 

(5th Cir. 1980). 

Heath has alleged a myriad of hostilities, including that Elaasar did not 

allow her to participate in committees, humiliated her during meetings, and 

undermined her to her students and faculty members. Elaasar’s treatment of 

Heath was apparently severe enough to attract attention from students, one of 

whom submitted an affidavit stating that Elaasar’s treatment of “Heath 

bordered on the barbaric” and that the student had “never observed such open 

hatred and contempt exhibited by one teacher toward another at a university.” 

A group of students signed a petition to protest Elaasar’s unprofessional 

treatment of Heath, which garnered hundreds of signatures.

Under both Title VII and § 1983, Heath must show not only that she was 

harassed, but also that the harassment occurred because of a protected 

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characteristic—either her sex under Title VII,2 or her sex, race, national origin, 

or religion under § 1983. Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 453. 

The magistrate judge thoroughly analyzed the facts of this case and 

found that while Heath alleged numerous hostilities, the evidence, even viewed 

in the light most favorable to Heath, was insufficient to prove that such 

hostilities occurred because of a protected characteristic.3 See Tolan v. Cotton, 

134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (“[A] court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the opposing party.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Accordingly, the magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of the 

defendants on Heath’s claims under Title VII and § 1983 based on sex, and her 

§ 1983 claims based on national origin, religion, and race. We discuss each in 

turn.

II.

Regarding Heath’s claim of sex discrimination through the creation of a 

hostile work environment, Heath’s only arguably direct evidence that Elaasar’s 

conduct toward her was motivated by her gender is a remark made to her by 

Dr. Joe Omojola some time before April 2010. Omojola4 said to Heath: “You 

 

2 While Title VII covers discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or 

national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), the only Title VII claim at issue in this case is 

Heath’s claim of sex discrimination through the creation of a hostile work environment. See 

Heath, 850 F.3d at 736. She has abandoned her Title VII claims based on other protected 

grounds. Id.

3 A panel of this court previously reversed and remanded the magistrate judge’s grant 

of summary judgment in this case, finding that the continuing violation doctrine applied to 

Heath’s hostile work environment claims and the magistrate judge erred in failing to 

“evaluate the full scope of the allegedly harassing conduct.” See Heath, 850 F.3d at 739, 741. 

On remand, the magistrate judge followed this court’s instructions and “evaluate[d] the full 

scope of the allegedly harassing conduct,” id., and considered many of Heath’s allegations 

dating back to 2003 as relevant background information.

4 Dr. Omojola’s job title is unclear from the record. He is described alternatively at 

various points in the record as the Dean of Science and a professor of physics and math. 

Because the record does not reveal the date of the remark, it is unclear what position Omojola 

held at the time he made the remark.

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know why they don’t let you work, participate in meetings? . . . Because you 

talk too much for a woman.” Heath contends that the remark is attributable

to Elaasar because Elaasar and Omojola had a close relationship. The 

magistrate judge found that while that statement might be “[t]he closest thing” 

to direct evidence of sex-based harassment, it alone was not enough to show 

that Elaasar’s actions were gender-based. Heath also relies on the 

observations of one of her students, Donald Anderson, to show that the 

allegedly hostile work environment arose because of her sex. In an affidavit, 

Anderson explained that he met with Elaasar and asked for an explanation of 

his hostile behavior toward Heath. Anderson stated that he “concluded from 

[Elaasar’s] attitude and state of mind that he was unhappy that [Heath] was 

not more submissive to his authority, and that he felt that she was 

disrespectful of him, and failed to acknowledge his role as her superior.” The 

magistrate judge found Anderson’s statement insufficient to create a genuine 

issue of material fact because Anderson conveyed only his interpretation of 

Elaasar’s state of mind and “[did] not convey his recollection of any statements 

made by Elaasar during this meeting.” Ultimately, the magistrate judge 

concluded that “Heath has, at best, demonstrated that she suffered from an 

ongoing interpersonal conflict with Dr. Elaasar, but the evidence cannot 

support a finding that Dr. Elaasar’s conduct was motivated by Dr. Heath’s sex.”

“Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the 

workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.’” Oncale 

v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (emphasis omitted). 

To prove that the alleged harassment was because of her sex, Heath must 

establish “that but for the fact of her sex, [she] would not have been the object 

of harassment.” Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1986). 

Though Heath’s factual allegations suggest that her workplace was indeed 

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unpleasant, we agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that she has failed 

to demonstrate that Elaasar’s alleged harassment was motivated by her sex. 

See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) 

(“Title VII, we have said, does not set forth ‘a general civility code for the 

American workplace.’” (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80)). Heath has therefore 

failed to establish an essential element of her case, and summary judgment on 

her sex-based claims under Title VII and § 1983 is appropriate. See Celotex 

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

III.

In addition to her sex discrimination claims, Heath appeals the 

magistrate judge’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on her § 1983 

claims alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. 

Aside from one 2005 remark, Heath relies exclusively on her subjective beliefs 

to support her claims. We agree with the magistrate judge that Heath has 

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to her claims of discrimination 

based on race, religion, and national origin. See Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 

F.3d 563, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1998) (“A subjective belief of discrimination, however 

genuine, cannot be the basis of judicial relief.” (alterations omitted) (quoting 

Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1991))); Weller v. Citation 

Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he ‘mere utterance of an 

. . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee,’ is insufficient, 

without more, to support Title VII liability.” (quoting DeAngelis v. El Paso 

Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1995)).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the magistrate judge is 

AFFIRMED.

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