In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-23-00010-CR

KENDRICK LADELL STARLING, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 71st District Court

Harrison County, Texas

Trial Court No. 21-0357X

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin

Concurring Opinion by Justice van Cleef
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A Harrison County jury convicted Kendrick Ladell Starling of continuous sexual abuse of 

a child. After a punishment trial to the bench, Starling was sentenced to twenty-five years’

imprisonment. On appeal, Starling argues that the trial court erred (1) by overruling his 

objections to the State’s improper remarks about his counsel during closing argument and (2) by 

overruling his motion for a mistrial. 

Assuming without deciding that the trial court should have sustained Starling’s objections 

to the State’s remarks during closing argument, we conclude that Starling was not harmed by the 

remarks. We also find that Starling failed to preserve his remaining complaint for our review. 

As a result, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

I. Starling Was Unharmed by Improper Closing Argument

In his first point of error, Starling argues that the trial court erred by overruling his 

objections to the State’s closing argument. In support, Starling cites the following portion of the 

transcript:

[BY THE STATE:] Now in law school, we learn certain tricks, and that’s 

that when the facts are in your favor, you argue the facts. When the law is in your

favor, you argue the law. When neither are in your favor, you bang on the table, 

and that’s what defense did in this case.

[BY THE DEFENSE]: Your Honor, that -- I’m going to object. That’s 

striking at the shoulder of counsel. That’s not a summation of the evidence.

THE COURT: Overruled. This is a closing argument . . . .

[BY THE DEFENSE]: But to talk about another attorney is inappropriate, 

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled . . . .
3

[BY THE STATE]: And, like I said, that’s what [defense counsel] did in 

this case.

[BY THE DEFENSE]: Once again, striking at my shoulder, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled . . . .

[BY THE STATE]: He tried to make noise out of nothing. He tried to 

make irrelevant, seemingly really nothing to do with these cases, seem like big

deals because he wanted to distract you from the facts, from the law, and that is 

his job, but that doesn’t focus on what truly matters.[1]

Starling argues that, because the State’s comments struck at him over the shoulders of his 

defense counsel, the trial court should have sustained his objections. 

The standard of review is abuse of discretion. “Generally, the bounds of proper closing 

argument are left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Milton v. State, 572 S.W.3d 234, 240 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2019). However, rather than deciding whether the trial court’s rulings 

constituted an abuse of discretion, we have the option of deciding the case on whether there was 

any harm. See Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Assuming, as the 

trial court did, that the prosecutor’s comment was inappropriate, we next turn to the question of 

harm.”); see also Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“Assuming that 

the trial court should have sustained appellant’s objection, we must determine whether the error 

warrants reversal.”). That is the option we take here. 

1

“Texas courts have held that in some circumstances, a defendant is not required to constantly repeat an objection.” 

Lampkin v. State, 470 S.W.3d 876, 901 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Cardenas v. State, 787 

S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)). “One such circumstance is when the objection 

would be futile because the court has just overruled a valid objection . . . .” Id. (quoting Cardenas, 787 S.W.2d at 

162). 
4

“Improper-argument error of this type is non-constitutional in nature, and a nonconstitutional error ‘that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.’” Freeman v. 

State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b)). In 

addressing whether Starling was harmed by the prosecutor’s comments, we “look to [the 

following] three factors: (1) severity of the misconduct (the magnitude of the prejudicial effect 

of the prosecutor’s remarks), (2) measures adopted to cure the misconduct (the efficacy of any 

cautionary instruction by the judge), and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct 

(the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction).” Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259. Because 

the first part of the harm analysis is an assessment of the seriousness of any alleged improper 

jury argument, we begin by reviewing the authorities on jury argument. Id.; Hawkins v. State, 

135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Even closing argument has limits. “Permissible jury argument falls into one of four 

areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) an answer 

to the argument of opposing counsel; or (4) a plea for law enforcement.” Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at

767 (citing Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “[A] prosecutor 

runs a risk of improperly striking at a defendant over the shoulder of counsel when the argument 

is made in terms of defense counsel personally and when the argument explicitly impugns 

defense counsel’s character.” Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259 (emphasis added). That said, the 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has assumed error where the statements were not explicit, but,

rather, attacked defense counsel via intimation and innuendo. Id. Regarding such arguments,
5

Mosley found “it is impossible to articulate a precise rule regarding” where the line should be 

drawn. Id.

Here, the State’s comments fall on the milder side of things. The comments did “not 

directly accuse the defense attorney[] of lying, and . . . do not suggest that any evidence was 

manufactured.” Id. at 260. Also, they did “not inject new facts into the record, and the jury 

[wa]s in a position to evaluate the truthfulness of the prosecutor’s assertion.” Id. As a result, 

while “[w]e do not condone the prosecutor’s actions, . . . the severity of the misconduct [wa]s 

relatively small.” Id. Because the severity of the misconduct was mild, the first factor does not 

favor Starling.

The second factor also does not favor Starling. “Instructions to the jury are generally 

considered sufficient to cure improprieties that occur during trial.” Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 

574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Here, the jury was instructed that “[s]tatements made by the 

lawyers are not evidence” and that “[e]vidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses and 

materials admitted into evidence.” Because we presume that the jury followed the trial court’s 

instructions, we conclude that the second factor weighs against a finding of harm. See id.; De La 

Fuente v. State, 432 S.W.3d 415, 425 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. ref’d) (finding a 

similar instruction “sufficient to cure any error” from prosecutor’s improper comment). 

The last factor—certainty of conviction absent the misconduct—requires us to examine 

the strength of the evidence. Starling argues that this factor tips the scale in his favor because 

this was “a classic ‘he said/she said’ case.” We disagree. 
6

“The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for . . . 

[continuous] sexual assault.” See Allen v. State, 436 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2014, pet. ref’d); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07. The child victim in this case, 

Karmen,2 was fifteen years old at the time of trial and testified that she was sexually abused by 

Starling from the time she was nine years old. Karmen testified that, when she was nine, Starling 

would touch her vagina with his fingers while she was sleeping. When she was ten, Starling 

showed her “porn videos of things he wanted to try” and “would start putting his mouth on [her] 

chest.” When she was “[a]round ten, going into 11,” Karmen said that Starling made her 

perform oral sex on him and performed oral sex on her “[t]oo many [times] to count.” Karmen 

testified that, when she was “[e]leven, going on 12,” Starling began having sex with her, 

sometimes more than once a week. When she was fourteen, Starling penetrated her anus with his 

fingers and penis. Karmen described Starling’s abuse in detail for the jury. 

Although Starling denied the allegations, Karmen’s testimony was supported by Detriece 

Fisher, an eighth-grade counselor at Marshall Junior High School, who testified that Karmen said 

she had been having sex with Starling. Christie Glenn-Moore, a Children’s Advocacy Center

(CAC) program director, testified that Karmen made the following statements during her CAC 

interview:

She stated that she was raped by Kendrick Starling. 

She stated that there were different incidences of his penis entering in her 

vagina. There were incidences of his penis entering her mouth. There were 

instances of his penis in her anus. There were instances of her being made to put 

-- to do oral sex, you know, which was her mouth to his penis.

2To protect her identity, we use a pseudonym for the child victim. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10. 
7

According to Glenn-Moore, Karmen testified that the different forms of sexual abuse occurred 

more than once and “started when she was nine.” Susan Camazine, a sexual assault nurse 

examiner (SANE), also testified that Karmen said she was raped by Starling “more than 100 

times since [she] was nine until 13” and testified about the details given to her by Karmen during 

the SANE examination.

3

 Tracy Moore, a licensed professional counselor at the CAC, testified 

about Karmen’s detailed statements of sexual abuse by Starling and her treatment plan. 

Here, given the relatively mild nature of the State’s remarks, the trial court’s curative

instruction, and the strength of the State’s evidence, we find that Starling did not suffer nonconstitutional harm. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). As a result, we overrule his first point of error. 

II. Starling Failed to Preserve His Remaining Point of Error 

The record in this case shows that one of the jurors, Terri Sparks, remained in the jury 

room after a verdict was reached due to a medical issue. The trial court announced that the jury 

had reached a verdict of guilt, which prompted Starling to request that the jury be polled. All of 

the jurors, except for Sparks, answered that they had found Starling guilty of the offense beyond 

a reasonable doubt. As for Sparks, counsel agreed to allow the trial court to question her in the 

jury room and report her answer in open court. Then, the following occurred:

THE COURT: For the record, the Court has questioned Ms. Sparks, and 

she is unable to respond at this time. She indicates I can’t do this, so we have 

EMT’s checking on her health at this time.

We’ll be in recess.

3

In support of his defense, Starling hired an expert witness who had not met Karmen to contradict Camazine’s

methodology and SANE report. 
8

(Recess taken.)

THE COURT: All right. We are back on the record.

Ms. Sparks indicated that is not her verdict, and as such, we do not have a

verdict in this case, and so based on what the EMT’s have indicated, we will be 

recessing, and I will allow her some time to recuperate, and then they will begin 

deliberations again in this matter.

. . . .

[BY THE DEFENSE]: Your Honor, I would ask the Court to declare a 

mistrial. She -- and I understand they still need to deliberate; unfortunately, the

medical issue she is unable to continue.

You would be asking them to put -- it could be days, hopefully not weeks, 

but it could be a significant amount of time before she may be able to participate 

again.

That would be -- I do not believe that would be fair and due process, and 

so I ask the Court to declare a mistrial based upon you would be ordering them to 

deliberate again and continue to deliberate, and she cannot do that.

THE COURT: Actually I think we’re -- I’m going to deny your motion 

for a mistrial, and I’m going to -- I mean, I think we’re going to start again

Monday. I’ll give her through the weekend, and we’ll see how she’s doing at that 

time, and we’ll resume deliberations at that time.

The trial court discharged the jury with instructions to return after the weekend.4 When the trial 

reconvened, the trial court instructed the jury to resume deliberation because its prior verdict was 

not unanimous. Following those deliberations, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilt, as 

indicated by a second jury poll. 

4

“The State and the defendant each have the right to have the jury polled, which is done by calling separately the 

name or identification number of each juror and asking the juror if the verdict is the juror’s.” TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 37.05(a) (Supp.). “[I]f any juror answers in the negative, the jury shall retire again to consider its 

verdict.” Id. 
9

At trial, Starling sought a mistrial on the ground that a lengthy delay in the trial would be 

unfair and could violate his due process rights. On appeal, Starling argues that the trial court’s 

failure to grant a mistrial was an act that had a coercive effect on jury deliberation. The State

argues that Starling did not preserve his appellate argument for our review, and we agree. 

A “point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.” Wilson v. 

State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 368 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). As stated in Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009),

Rule 33.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a complaint 

is not preserved for appeal unless it was made to the trial court “by a timely 

request, objection or motion” that “stated the grounds for the ruling that the 

complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make 

the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent

from the context.” 

Id. at 312 (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A)). 

“The purpose of requiring a specific objection in the trial court is twofold: (1) to inform 

the trial judge of the basis of the objection and give him the opportunity to rule on it; [and] (2) to 

give opposing counsel the opportunity to respond to the complaint.” Id. As explained in 

Resendez, 

Although there are no technical considerations or forms of words required to 

preserve an error for appeal, a party must be specific enough so as to “let the trial 

judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and do so clearly 

enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a 

proper position to do something about it.” 

Id. at 312–13 (quoting Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). 

Because Starling’s trial objection did not notify the trial court of any complaint regarding a 
10

coercive effect on jury deliberation, we find that Starling’s remaining appellate argument is 

unpreserved. As a result, we overrule it.5

III. Disposition

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Jeff Rambin 

Justice

CONCURRING OPINION

In Section I of the majority opinion, we assume that defense counsel’s objections should 

have been sustained and turn to the question of harm. The majority then addresses the three 

Mosely factors. I agree with the majority’s analysis of the first and third factors. Regarding the 

second factor, I do not find a curative instruction. The State’s comments, in sum, accused 

defense counsel of misdirection, twice. There was no curative instruction from the trial court in 

direct response to the State’s statements because Starling’s objections were overruled. The later, 

standard instructions to the jury that “[s]tatements made by the lawyers are not evidence” and 

that “[e]vidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses and materials admitted into evidence” 

did not address the improper argument because that argument had nothing to do with facts or 

evidence.

5To the extent that Starling’s brief raises a challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial, it is 

overruled because “[t]he trial court is not bound to declare a mistrial at the first sign of jury impasse, and there is no 

set time for jury deliberation.” Fryer v. State, 580 S.W.3d 300, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no

pet.).
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Nonetheless, the majority correctly analyzes the first and third factors, and the third 

factor weighs heavily against Appellant’s point of error. I therefore join in the majority’s 

conclusion.

I also join in the balance of the majority opinion.

Charles van Cleef

Justice

Date Submitted: August 29, 2023

Date Decided: August 30, 2023

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