1

Filed 1/29/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

XAVIER BECERRA, as Attorney 

General, etc., et al.

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY 

AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Respondent;

FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION et 

al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

 A157998

 (City & County of San Francisco

 Super. Ct. No. CPF-19-516545)

The California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) enshrines 

the value this state has long placed on government transparency and public access to 

information concerning the conduct of the people’s business. More recently, in 

acknowledgment of the extraordinary authority vested in peace officers and the serious 

harms occasioned by misuse of that authority, the Legislature amended Penal Code 

section 832.71to recognize the right of the public to know about incidents involving 

shootings by an officer or the use of force by an officer that results in death or great

bodily injury, as well as sustained findings of sexual assault or dishonesty by an officer. 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 988, §§ 1, 2 (Sen. Bill No. 1421), eff. Jan. 1, 2019.) As amended, 

section 832.7 specifies that records pertaining to such incidents and findings are not

confidential and must be made available for public inspection pursuant to the CPRA.

 

1 All unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

In this case, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra and the California 

Department of Justice (collectively, the Department) have filed a petition for a writ of 

mandate seeking to overturn the trial court’s order in favor of First Amendment Coalition 

and KQED, Inc. (KQED) over two aspects of the Department’s disclosure obligations 

under section 832.7. We conclude, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that section 

832.7 generally requires disclosure of all responsive records in the possession of the 

Department, regardless whether the records pertain to officers employed by the 

Department or by another public agency and regardless whether the Department or 

another public agency created the records. Although we also determine, as a matter of 

statutory interpretation, that the so-called “catchall exemption” of the CPRA, codified at 

Government Code section 6255, may apply to records that are subject to disclosure under 

section 832.7, our independent review leads us to conclude the Department did not

adequately demonstrate that the public interest served by nondisclosure of the records at 

issue clearly outweighs the public interest in their disclosure. The petition for writ of 

mandate is denied. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Xavier Becerra is the Attorney General of the State of California and the 

chief law officer of the State. Petitioner California Department of Justice is a state 

agency that employs sworn peace officers and possesses certain records relating to the 

officers it employs and to officers who are employed by other state and local agencies.

Real party in interest First Amendment Coalition is a non-profit corporation 

dedicated to advancing free speech rights, ensuring open and accountable government, 

and promoting public participation in civil affairs. Real party in interest KQED is a 

community-supported media organization providing coverage of news and culture to 

Northern California via radio, television, and digital media.

In January 2019, pursuant to the CPRA, First Amendment Coalition requested 

from the Department all records within its possession subject to disclosure under newly 

amended section 832.7. Specifically, it asked for “records relating to a report, 

investigation or finding . . . of any of the following: (1) An incident involving the 
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discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer; [¶] (2) An 

incident in which the use of force by a peace officer or custodial officer against a person 

resulting in death or in great bodily injury; and/or [¶] (3) An incident in which a sustained 

finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace 

officer or custodial officer engaged in sexual assault involving a member of the public.” 

It sought records for incidents that occurred in 2016, 2017, and 2018. 

In February 2019, pursuant to the CPRA and section 832.7, KQED requested from 

the Department “[r]ecords from Jan. 1, 2014 to Dec. 31, 2018 of sustained findings that a 

peace officer, including those employed by the Ca. Dept. of Justice, committed sexual 

assault or dishonesty-related misconduct.” KQED also sought “[r]ecords from Jan. 1, 

2014 to present relating to the report, investigation, or findings of incidents in which the 

use of force by a peace officer or custodial officer against a person resulted in death, or in 

great bodily injury.” 

The Department partially denied the requests of First Amendment Coalition and 

KQED (collectively, real parties), agreeing to produce “only those non-exempt records, if 

any, relating to peace officers employed by the Department of Justice” subject to 

applicable redactions. The Department explained its partial denial as follows: “To the 

extent that the Attorney General has obtained records from other state and local law 

enforcement agencies, the Attorney General is not the agency that ‘maintains’ those 

documents. A requester may properly seek disclosure from the employing agency, which 

not only maintains the records, but will be best situated to assess any applicable 

exceptions to the disclosure requirement and any statutorily required redactions 

concerning sensitive and private information. Further, to the extent that the Attorney 

General has obtained such records in relation to investigations or proceedings that the 

Attorney General is conducting, the disclosure provisions in section 832.7 do not apply to 

the Attorney General, under section 832.7, subdivision (a).”2

 

2 The scope of potentially responsive records in the Department’s possession, and 

how the Department obtains or creates these records, is not clearly or completely 

presented in the record on appeal. We make the following observations:
4

In March 2019, real parties jointly petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the 

Department’s compliance with their CPRA requests. Real parties asked the trial court to 

command the Department to “immediately search for and promptly disclose all nonexempt records in [its] possession” sought by their CPRA requests. This included 

“records that were created by or involve another state or local agency” and “records that 

concern the Attorney General’s own investigations.” 

In its answer to the petition, the Department admitted that it possessed “certain 

records sought by [real parties], likely totaling many thousands of such records if not 

 

1. The Department maintains certain records for peace officers it employs. As 

indicated, to the extent such records are responsive and not subject to any other 

objections, the Department represents it will produce them subject to proper redaction.

2. At a trial court hearing on May 17, 2019, the Department’s counsel represented 

that the Department “is not a central storehouse for all of the peace officer records for the 

state and every local agency. There is in fact no centralized agency that exists that 

contains all of those records.”

3. The Department possesses records concerning officers employed by other state 

or local agencies. According to the Department’s petition, “The Department obtains files 

from law enforcement agencies across the state when it reviews an agency’s decision not 

to file charges in connection with an incident, or when it conducts an independent 

investigation of a law enforcement agency. The Department often obtains such materials 

or information using the subpoena power authorized by Government Code section 11181. 

[Fn. omitted, citation.] Some of that information relates to peace or custodial officers 

employed by other agencies that are subject to independent review and investigation by 

the Department and falls into one of the four categories of Penal Code section 832.7, 

subdivision (b)(1).” 

In addition, the record on appeal includes a joint status report, prepared after the 

trial court granted the writ, which states: “The Department sometimes procures 

confidential records or information that could have been subpoenaed or demanded via 

interrogatory under Government Code section 11181 by way of stipulated agreements 

among agencies. These agreements are made under the condition and understanding that 

the materials will remain confidential as contemplated by Government Code section 

11181.” 

4. It is unclear whether the methods described in paragraph 3 above are the only 

ways in which the Department comes to possess records involving officers employed by 

other state and local agencies.

5. There is no indication what kinds of records, if any, the Department may 

generate when it conducts an independent investigation of a law enforcement agency or 

when it reviews an agency’s decision not to file charges in connection with an incident.
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more” and that it “created some but not all of those records.” The Department reiterated 

that neither section 832.7 nor the CPRA required or authorized the disclosure of records 

it obtained from other state or local law enforcement agencies and further asserted that

such records can be requested directly from those agencies.

In July 2019, the trial court granted real parties’ writ petition. The court ordered 

the Department to produce, by January 4, 2020, “all requested records except those 

records or parts thereof that this court determines may be lawfully withheld or redacted.”

The Department now petitions for extraordinary writ relief to compel the trial 

court to vacate the portion of its order requiring disclosure of records regarding other 

agencies’ officers. We granted the Department’s request for an immediate, temporary 

stay of trial court proceedings, pending further order of this court. We also issued an 

order to show cause why the relief requested by the Department should not be granted. 

Real parties requested that their previously filed informal opposition to the petition be 

deemed a written return to the order to show cause, and the Department filed a 

traverse/reply. We received briefing from amicus curiae Reporters Committee for 

Freedom of the Press, joined by six other media and transparency organizations, and the 

Department’s response thereto. We also requested and received supplemental briefing on 

one of the Department’s grounds for nondisclosure. The parties appeared for oral 

argument.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A trial court order directing disclosure of public records held by a public agency 

“shall be immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for the issuance of an 

extraordinary writ.” (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c).) This court “conduct[s] an 

independent review of the trial court’s ruling; factual findings made by the trial court will 

be upheld if based on substantial evidence.” (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 

53 Cal.3d 1325, 1336 (Times Mirror).)
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B. Statutory Background

1. The CPRA

Enacted in 1968, the CPRA grants public access to public records held by state 

and local agencies. (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) “Modeled after the federal Freedom of 

Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.), the [CPRA] was enacted for the purpose of 

increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public access to records in 

the possession of state and local agencies. [Citation.] Such ‘access to information 

concerning the conduct of the people’s business,’ the Legislature declared, ‘is a 

fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.’ ” (Los Angeles County Bd. 

of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 290.)

Pursuant to the California Constitution, the CPRA must be “broadly construed” 

because its statutory scheme “furthers the people’s right of access.” (Cal. Const., art. 1, 

§ 3, subd. (b)(2).) Nevertheless, the act does not confer an absolute right of access. As 

part of the CPRA, the Legislature included a provision declaring it was “mindful of the 

right of individuals to privacy.” (Gov. Code, § 6250.) This express policy declaration

“ ‘bespeaks legislative concern for individual privacy as well as disclosure.’ [Citation.] 

‘In the spirit of this declaration, judicial decisions interpreting the [CPRA] seek to 

balance the public right to access to information, the government’s need, or lack of need, 

to preserve confidentiality, and the individual’s right to privacy. [Citations.]’ ” (Copley 

Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1282 (Copley Press).)

The CPRA balances the dual concerns for privacy and disclosure by providing for

various exemptions that permit public agencies to refuse disclosure of certain public 

records. (Gov. Code, §§ 6254–6255.) For instance, the CPRA does not require agencies 

to permit public inspection of records that are exempted or prohibited from public

disclosure pursuant to federal or state law, including Evidence Code provisions relating 

to privilege. (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k) (hereafter Gov. Code, § 6254(k).) Also, as 

discussed post, law enforcement investigatory files were, until recently, categorically 

exempted from the CPRA’s general requirement of disclosure. (Gov. Code, § 6254, 

subd. (f) (hereafter Gov. Code, § 6254(f)).) “ ‘In large part, these exemptions are 
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designed to protect the privacy of persons whose data or documents come into 

governmental possession.’ ” (Copley Press, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1282.) CPRA 

exemptions are narrowly construed (American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. 

Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032, 1042 (ACLU Foundation), and the agency 

opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving an exemption applies. (Long Beach 

Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 70; County of Los 

Angeles v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 57, 63.)

2. Section 832.7 and Senate Bill No. 1421

In 1978, the Legislature enacted sections 832.7 and 832.8 to mandate

confidentiality of peace officer personnel records. (Stats. 1978, ch. 630, §§ 5, 6, p. 2083.) 

These statutes, along with certain amendments to the Evidence Code, also codified 

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess), which recognized the right of 

a criminal defendant to compel the discovery of evidence in a law enforcement officer’s 

personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal 

charge upon a sufficient showing of good cause. (See Assn. for Los Angeles Deputy 

Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 40–41 (ALADS).)

Historically, the so-called Pitchess statutes were considered an exemption to 

disclosure under the CPRA. (See Copley Press, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1283 [recognizing 

§ 832.7 as an exemption under Gov. Code, § 6254(k)].) Before its amendment in 2018, 

section 832.7 made certain peace officer records and information confidential and 

nondisclosable in any criminal or civil proceeding except pursuant to discovery under 

certain provisions of the Evidence Code. (See § 832.7, subd. (a), as amended by 

Stats. 2003, ch. 102, § 1 (hereafter fmr. § 832.7).) The first category of confidential 

records pertained to “[p]eace officer or custodial officer personnel records,” which 

included among other things certain records that relate to employee discipline or certain 

complaints and to investigations of complaints pertaining to how the officer performed 

his or her duties. (Ibid.; § 832.8) The second category consisted of “records maintained 

by any state or local agency pursuant to section 832.5” (fmr. § 832.7, subd. (a)), which 

required “[e]ach department or agency in [California] that employs peace officers [to] 
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establish a procedure to investigate complaints by members of the public against the 

personnel of these departments or agencies” and further required such “[c]omplaints and 

any reports or findings relating” to them be retained for “at least five years” and

“maintained either in the peace or custodial officer’s general personnel file or in a 

separate file” (§ 832.5, subds. (a)(1), (b); see also § 832.5, subds. (c), (d)(1)). The third

category extended confidentiality to “information obtained from” the prior two types of 

records. (Fmr. § 832.7, subd. (a).) Thus, the Pitchess statutes “ ‘reflect[] the 

Legislature’s attempt to balance a litigant’s discovery interest with an officer’s 

confidentiality interest.’ ” (ALADS, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 41.)

In 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 1421 (hereafter SB 1421), which

amended section 832.7. (§ 832.7, as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 988, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 

2019.) Under SB 1421, section 832.7 retains the provision that “personnel records of 

peace officers and custodial officers and records maintained by any state or local agency 

pursuant to Section 832.5, or information obtained from these records, are confidential 

and shall not be disclosed” in any criminal or civil proceeding except pursuant to 

discovery under certain portions of the Evidence Code. (§ 832.7, subdivision (a)

(hereafter § 832.7(a)); see also § 832.7, subd. (h).) As amended, however, section 

832.7(a) now provides that the confidentiality of officer personnel records is subject to a 

newly added subdivision (b) (hereafter § 832.7(b)), which states in relevant part: 

“Notwithstanding subdivision (a) [of section 832.7], subdivision (f) of Section 6254 of 

the Government Code, [3] or any other law, the following peace officer or custodial officer 

personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency shall not be 

confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to the California 

 

3 Government Code section 6254(f) is a CPRA provision that exempts disclosure of 

“[r]ecords of complaints to, or investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence 

information or security procedures of, the office of the Attorney General and the 

Department of Justice, the Office of Emergency Services and any state or local police 

agency, or any investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local police 

agency, or any investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local agency 

for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes.”
9

Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of 

Title 1 of the Government Code)” (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(1) (hereafter § 832.7(b)(1)),

namely, records “relating to the report, investigation, or findings” of an incident falling 

into any of the following three categories: (1) an incident in which an officer discharged 

a firearm at a person or used force against a person resulting in death or great bodily 

injury (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(1)(A)(i), (ii)); (2) “an incident in which a sustained finding was 

made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency” that an officer “engaged in 

sexual assault involving a member of the public” (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(1)(B)(i)–(iii)); and 

(3) “an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency 

or oversight agency of dishonesty by a peace officer or custodial officer directly relating 

to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime, or directly relating to the 

reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, another peace officer or custodial officer, 

including, but not limited to, any sustained finding of perjury, false statements, filing 

false reports, destruction, falsifying, or concealing of evidence” (§ 832.7, 

subd. (b)(1)(C)). This opinion will hereafter refer to these three categories of records 

collectively as “officer-related records.”

Even though these officer-related records are now subject to disclosure, section 

832.7 reflects continuing legislative concern for certain privacy and safety interests and 

competing public interests. Specifically, section 832.7(b) provides that an agency 

responding to a record request “shall redact” disclosed records for the following purposes

only: to remove personal data or information outside the name and work-related 

information of the officers; to preserve the anonymity of complainants and witnesses; to 

protect confidential medical, financial, or other information whose disclosure is 

specifically prohibited by federal law or would cause an unwarranted invasion of 

personal privacy that outweighs the public’s interest in the records; and where there is 

reason to believe that disclosure of the record would pose a significant danger to the 

physical safety of the officer or another person. (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(5)(A)–(D).) 

Subdivision (b) also provides that, notwithstanding subdivision (b)(5), an agency “may 

redact a record disclosed pursuant to this section . . . where, on the facts of the particular 
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case, the public interest served by not disclosing the information clearly outweighs the 

public interest served by disclosure of the information.” (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(6).) 

Additionally, an agency “may” temporarily withhold records of incidents involving an 

officer’s discharge of a firearm or use of force resulting in death or great bodily injury by 

delaying disclosure when the incidents are the subject of an active criminal or 

administrative investigation. (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(7)(A), (B), (C).)

C. Scope of Disclosure Under the CPRA and Section 832.7

This case presents issues of first impression concerning the scope of a public 

agency’s disclosure obligations under the CPRA and section 832.7. The first issue is 

whether section 832.7 contemplates disclosure of officer-related records in the 

Department’s possession if such records concern officers who are not employed by the 

Department or if such records were not created by the Department. This is a matter of 

statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247.)

“ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the 

Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory 

language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language 

in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to 

determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If 

the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal 

interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the 

statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider 

other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ 

[Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire 

statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, 

phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” ’ 

[Citation.]” (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856–857

(Meza).) 
11

As a court, we have a “limited role in the process of interpreting enactments from 

the political branches of our state government.” (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing 

Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632 (California Teachers).) 

Our role is “not to establish policy” (Carrisales v. Department of Corrections (1999) 

21 Cal.4th 1132, 1140) or to question legislative policy choices (People v. Bunn (2002) 

27 Cal.4th 1, 17). Rather, “we follow the Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain 

meaning of the actual words of the law, ‘ “ ‘whatever may be thought of the wisdom, 

expediency, or policy of the act.’ ” ’ ” (California Teachers, at p. 632.)

With these principles in mind, we begin our analysis by examining the language of 

section 832.7 and the CPRA.

The language of section 832.7(b)(1) states in relevant part: “Notwithstanding 

subdivision (a) [of section 832.7], subdivision (f) of Section 6254 of the Government 

Code, or any other law, the following peace officer or custodial officer personnel records 

and records maintained by any state or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be 

made available for public inspection pursuant to the California Public Records Act

(Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government 

Code).” (Italics added.) Read together with its subparts, section 832.7(b)(1) deems as 

nonconfidential—and subject to public inspection pursuant to the CPRA—all records 

maintained by a state agency relating to reports, investigations, or findings from incidents 

involving an officer’s discharge of a weapon; an officer’s use of deadly force or force 

resulting in great bodily injury; and incidents involving a sustained finding of a sexual 

assault or dishonesty by an officer. (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(1)(A)–(C).)

Because section 832.7(b)(1) specifies that the identified officer-related records are 

now nonconfidential public records that “shall be made available for public inspection 

pursuant to the [CPRA],” we look to the CPRA provisions governing the disclosure of 

public records. The CPRA stipulates that “[p]ublic records are open to inspection at all 

times during the office hours of the state or local agency and every person has a right to 

inspect any public record, except as hereafter provided.” (Gov. Code, § 6253, subd. (a), 

italics added.) The CPRA defines the term “public records” broadly as including “any 
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writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public’s business prepared, 

owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or 

characteristics.” (Gov. Code, § 6252, subd. (e), italics added.) A plain reading of these 

two CPRA statutes and the italicized language therein leads to the conclusion that, 

ordinarily, members of the public may inspect “any” public record “retained by” or in the 

possession of a state agency such as the Department, even if the record was not 

“prepared, owned, [or] used” by the particular agency. (See also Gov. Code, § 6253, 

subd. (c) [contemplating disclosure of “public records in the possession of the agency”].)

Whether section 832.7 is considered on its own or in conjunction with the CPRA, 

the statutory language appears unambiguous in contemplating disclosure of the records in 

dispute. Standing on its own, section 832.7’s statutory phrase “peace officer . . . 

personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency” (italics added) 

makes clear that officer-related records in the Department’s possession are subject to 

disclosure, regardless whether such records concern peace officers employed by the 

Department or by another state or local agency (hereafter non-Department officers), and 

no matter which agency created them. Such a reading is only reinforced when considered 

together with the CPRA, which explicitly states that, except as provided by the CPRA, a 

member of the public has the right to inspect “any writing containing information relating 

to the conduct of the public’s business . . . retained by” a state or local agency. (Gov. 

Code, § 6252, subd. (e).)

In disputing this construction, the Department argues that when read as a whole 

and in context, section 832.7 “plainly requires an officer’s employing agency—but no 

other agency—to disclose records.” The Department reasons as follows. When 

subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 832.7 are considered together, the records made 

nonconfidential by subdivision (b) are regulated by subdivision (a), which informs the 

universe of records that are subject to disclosure under section 832.7. Section 832.7(a) 

explicitly shields “records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to section 

832.5,” which in turn requires employing agencies to establish procedures for 

investigating public complaints against its officers and to maintain records of those 
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complaints and any related investigation. (§§ 832.5, 832.7(a).) Thus, in the 

Department’s view, section 832.7(b)’s command that “records maintained by any state or 

local agency shall not be confidential” is limited to records maintained pursuant to 

section 832.5, i.e., those in the possession of an officer’s employing agency. We are not 

persuaded.

The flaw in the Department’s analysis is that section 832.7(b), on its face, 

explicitly states its provisions are not circumscribed by subdivision (a). (§ 832.7(b)(1)

[“Notwithstanding subdivision (a)”].) Accordingly, the records made nonconfidential in 

subdivision (b) are neither restricted nor regulated by subdivision (a).

Moreover, had the Legislature intended to limit its disclosure amendments to 

records maintained by an officer’s employing agency or to records created by a public 

agency, it easily could have. Significantly, section 832.7(a) is explicit in imposing

confidentiality over “records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to section 

832.5.” (§ 832.7(a), italics added.) If the Legislature had wanted to restrict access to 

officer-related records maintained by an employing agency, it could have repeated in 

subdivision (b) the same “pursuant to section 832.5” qualification it used in subdivision 

(a). Alternatively, it could have utilized the phrase “and employee-related records 

maintained by any state or local agency,” or other similar wording. But the Legislature

did neither, and we will not add words it has chosen to omit. (See Hampton v. County of 

San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 350 (Hampton) [“[o]rdinarily we are not free to add 

text to the language selected by the Legislature”]; Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 407, 423.)

Finally, as indicated above, the Department’s construction is at odds with the 

CPRA, which provides in no uncertain terms that, barring an applicable exemption, a 

member of the public has the right to inspect any nonexempt “public records,” defined as 

“any writing” containing information relating to the public’s business that is “retained 

by” a state or local agency. (Gov. Code, § 6252, subd. (e); see id., § 6253, subd. (a).)
14

Although we need not go further because the statutory language is unambiguous, 

we will “look to legislative history to confirm our plain-meaning construction of [the] 

statutory language.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1046 (Hughes).)

Here, the legislative history of SB 1421 discloses that, at the time the proposed 

amendments to section 832.7 were pending, the Legislature perceived California as “one 

of the most secretive states in the nation in terms of openness when it comes to officer 

misconduct and uses of force.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Sen. Bill 

No. 1421 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 23, 2018, p. 8 (hereafter Sen. Floor 

Analysis).) In particular, the Legislature pointed to a 2006 Supreme Court ruling

interpreting 832.7 as “prevent[ing] the public from learning the extent to which officers 

have been disciplined as a result of misconduct, and . . . clos[ing] to the public all 

independent oversight investigations, hearings and reports.” (Sen. Floor Analysis, p. 8, 

italics added.) Thus, it appears the Legislature viewed the then-existing lack of public 

access to records involving independent oversight investigations as a significant 

impediment to transparency regarding officer misconduct and use of force incidents.

In the Legislature’s view, greater transparency would promote important public 

policies. As one legislative committee commented, SB 1421’s author urged the bill’s 

passage because it “benefits law enforcement and the communities they serve by helping 

build trust. Giving the public, journalists, and elected officials access to information 

about actions by law enforcement will promote better policies and procedures that protect 

everyone. We want to make sure that good officers and the public have the information 

they need to address and prevent abuses and to weed out the bad actors. SB 1421 will 

help identify and prevent unjustified use of force, make officer misconduct an even rarer 

occurrence, and build trust in law enforcement.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. 

on Sen. Bill No. 1421 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19, 2018, p. 4 (hereafter 

Assem. Com. on Public Safety Rep.).)

In contemplating the bill’s effects, another legislative analysis stated: “SB 1421 

opens police officer personnel records in very limited cases, allowing local law 

enforcement agencies and law enforcement oversight agencies to provide greater 
15

transparency around only the most serious police complaints.” (Sen. Rules Com., third

reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1421 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 

2018, p. 7, italics added (hereafter Sen. Rules third reading).) At least one Assembly 

committee report highlighted the language in SB 1421 providing that “notwithstanding 

any other law, [certain enumerated] peace-officer or custodial-officer personnel records 

are not confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to the 

[CPRA].”) (Assem. Com. On Public Safety Rep., supra, p. 1.) Underscoring this desire 

for greater access and transparency, including access to records maintained by law 

enforcement oversight agencies, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for SB 1421 explained:

“This bill would require, notwithstanding any other law, certain peace officer or custodial 

officer personnel records and records relating to specified incidents, complaints, and 

investigations involving peace officers and custodial officers to be made available for 

public inspection pursuant to the California Public Records Act.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., 

Sen. Bill No. 1421 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) italics added.)

The legislative findings accompanying SB 1421 further emphasize the public 

interest in making serious officer misconduct records accessible: “(a) Peace officers help 

to provide one of our state’s most fundamental government services. To empower peace 

officers to fulfill their mission, the people of California vest them with extraordinary 

authority—the powers to detain, search, arrest, and use deadly force. Our society 

depends on peace officers’ faithful exercise of that authority. Misuse of that authority 

can lead to grave constitutional violations, harms to liberty and the inherent sanctity of 

human life, as well as significant public unrest. [¶] (b) The public has a right to know all 

about serious police misconduct, as well as about officer-involved shootings and other 

serious uses of force. Concealing crucial public safety matters such as officer violations 

of civilians’ rights, or inquiries into deadly use of force incidents, undercuts the public’s 

faith in the legitimacy of law enforcement, makes it harder for tens of thousands of 

hardworking peace officers to do their jobs, and endangers public safety.” (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 988, § 1 (Sen. Bill No. 1421).) 
16

As the foregoing demonstrates, the legislative intent behind SB 1421 was to 

provide transparency regarding instances of an officer’s use of significant force and 

sustained findings of officer misconduct by allowing public access to officer-related 

records maintained either by law enforcement employers or by any state or local agency 

with independent law enforcement oversight authority. Moreover, in amending section 

832.7, the Legislature sought to afford the public “the right to know all about serious 

police misconduct,” to stop concealing incidents where an officer violated civilian rights, 

and to “address and prevent abuses and weed out the bad actors.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 988, 

§ 1 (Sen. Bill No. 1421); Assem. Com. on Public Safety Rep., supra, p. 4.) These 

legislative aims are best advanced by a construction that authorizes disclosure of all 

responsive officer-related records in the possession of a state agency, regardless whether 

they pertain to officers employed by the agency and no matter which agency created 

them.

The Department contends otherwise. In its view, the legislative history 

demonstrates that SB 1421 “was only intended to require employing agencies to make the 

required disclosures.” But the only portion of the legislative history the Department cites 

is the report of the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, observing that SB 1421 

“loosens the protections afforded to specified peace officer records relating to use of 

force, sexual assault on a member of the public and pertaining to dishonesty in reporting, 

investigating, or prosecuting a crime.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Rep., supra, p. 5.) 

It is unclear how that comment provides any support for the Department’s position, 

particularly in view of the actual language of section 832.7 and the CPRA and the other 

legislative history cited above. The rest of the Department’s legislative history analysis 

focuses for the most part on the history of the original 1978 enactment of section 832.7, 

which reveals nothing regarding the Legislature’s intent in approving SB 1421 in 2018. 

Contrary to the Department’s contentions, the legislative history does not even 

remotely suggest that disclosure obligations should be limited to an officer’s employing 

agency. Rather, as we have discussed, the history is replete with evidence of the 

Legislature’s intent to promote greater transparency with respect to the officer-related 
17

records specified in section 832.7, whether such records are maintained by officer 

employers or by other agencies exercising independent law enforcement oversight 

responsibilities.

Finally, the Department contends that employing agencies “are in the best possible 

position to ensure that records regarding their own officers, investigations, prosecutions, 

or other actions are properly reviewed and redacted to remove sensitive, confidential 

information that subject officers and third parties to a risk of danger or unnecessary 

disclosure of confidential information.” That may be so, but such a policy argument 

affords no ground for a judicial interpretation that shields responsive records in the 

Department’s possession, especially in light of statutory allowances for consultation with 

other agencies in processing CPRA requests. (See Gov. Code, § 6253, subd. (c)(3) [time 

for responding to requests may be extended where “need for consultation . . . with 

another agency having substantial interest in the determination of the request” arises].)

Our interpretation of the CPRA and section 832.7 not only promotes the purposes 

reflected in the statutory language and legislative history, it harmonizes with the 

constitutional principle that the people have a right to access information concerning the 

conduct of the people’s business and that restrictions on this right are narrowly construed. 

(Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(1)–(2).)

Our construction also aligns with case law rejecting the notion that a record’s 

location, rather than its content, determines its confidentiality. In Commission on Peace 

Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278 (CPOST), a 

newspaper sought the release of information in a database collected by the Commission 

on Peace Officer Standards and Training, a state agency that sets minimum selection and 

training standards for peace officers. (Id. at pp. 285–286.) The database—which 

included employment data on all peace officers appointed in California starting in the 

1970s—was compiled from information provided by local law enforcement agencies 

obtained from the officers’ personnel records. (Id. at p. 286.) The Commission argued 

certain employment information (a peace officer’s name, employing agency, and 

employment dates) was exempt from disclosure under the CPRA because it was based on 
18

records that had been placed in confidential personnel files. (Id. at pp. 286–287.) The 

CPOST court held this otherwise nonconfidential information does not become 

confidential for purposes of sections 832.7 and 832.8 merely because it was derived from 

a personnel file that also contains confidential information. (Id. at pp. 289–293.) In 

rejecting an interpretation that made confidentiality turn on the type of file in which 

records are located, the court found it “unlikely the Legislature intended to render 

documents confidential based on their location, rather than their content.” (Id. at p. 291.)

The conclusion we reach here with respect to the disclosure of officer-related records is 

similarly driven by the content of the record, not other factors such as which agency 

employed the officer or created the record.

D. The CPRA Catchall Exemption

The second issue before us is whether officer-related records that are subject to 

disclosure under section 832.7 may nonetheless be withheld pursuant to the catchall 

exemption set forth in the CPRA. This exemption, codified in Government Code section 

6255, subdivision (a) (hereafter Government Code section 6255(a)), permits a public

agency to withhold a public record under the CPRA if the agency demonstrates “that on 

the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record 

clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.” (Gov. Code, 

§ 6255(a).) The catchall exemption “ ‘contemplates a case-by-case balancing process, 

with the burden of proof on the proponent of nondisclosure to demonstrate a clear 

overbalance on the side of confidentiality.’ ” (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 

p. 1043.)

1. Availability of the CPRA Catchall Exemption

The trial court declined to decide whether the catchall exemption is available to a 

public agency that receives a CPRA request for section 832.7 officer-related records. 

The parties’ original and supplemental briefs, however, address this issue.4 The 

 

4 On November 13, 2019, this court ordered the parties to file simultaneous 

supplemental letter briefs addressing the following two questions that touch on the issue: 

“1. Can the redaction provision in Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b)(6), be 
19

Department contends that requests for section 832.7 records may be subject to this CPRA 

exemption, while real parties argue that section 832.7’s newer and more detailed 

provisions for redacting or withholding records must be deemed to prevail over the more 

general CPRA exemption. We conclude, as a matter of statutory construction, that the 

CPRA catchall exemption may apply to requests for section 832.7 officer-related records.

As before, we begin as we must with the statutory language. (Meza, supra, 

6 Cal.5th at pp. 856–857.) Also, when construing the interaction of two potentially 

conflicting statutes, we must, where reasonably possible, harmonize them, reconcile their 

seeming inconsistencies, and adopt a construction that gives “ ‘force and effect to all of 

their provisions.’ ” (Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles 

(2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 805.) If that cannot be done, then as a general rule, “ ‘later 

enactments supersede earlier ones [citation], and more specific provisions take 

precedence over more general ones.’ ” (Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 

627, 634.)

The parties contend, and we concur, that we should again focus on the language of 

section 832.7(b)(1), which states in relevant part: “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), 

subdivision (f) of Section 6254 of the Government Code, or any other law, the following 

peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by any state 

or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection 

pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 

6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code) . . . .”

Taken as a whole, that language reasonably reflects the Legislature’s intent to 

preserve, not override, the CPRA but for its investigatory files exemption (Gov. Code, 

§ 6254(f)). Specifically, section 832.7(b)(1) starts off by stating plainly that officer-

 

harmonized with the catchall provision in Government Code section 6255, subdivision 

(a), and if so, how? If not, which provision prevails over the other? [¶] 2. Is the 

balancing test referenced in Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b)(6), performed in 

the same manner as the balancing test referenced in Government Code section 6255, 

subdivision (a)? If not, please address the differences.”
20

related records are nonconfidential and disclosable notwithstanding the CPRA 

investigatory files exemption, then concludes by stating equally plainly that such records

“shall be made available . . . pursuant to the California Public Records Act.” By 

including these two express references to the CPRA in this one sentence, the Legislature 

signaled its intent that officer-related records are no longer confidential under the 

CPRA’s investigatory files exemption but that the CPRA is otherwise essential to section 

832.7’s operation.

At the same time, there is nothing in the balance of the statutory text giving any

indication that the CRPA as a whole was displaced by section 832.7. Indeed, setting 

aside for the moment the language referencing the CPRA at the end of section 

832.7(b)(1), its beginning phrase “[n]otwithstanding . . . any other law” cannot 

reasonably be read to do away with the entire CRPA. That particular phrase has been 

deemed a “ ‘ “term of art” . . . that declares the legislative intent to override all contrary 

law.’ ” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 983.) Thus, “only those 

provisions of law that conflict with” section 832.7(b)—“not . . . every provision of 

law”—are inapplicable. (Ibid.) As we discuss, post, Government Code section 6255(a) 

is not directly contrary to the disclosure or redaction provisions in section 832.7. It 

therefore survives.

Highlighting the prefatory “[n]otwithstanding . . . any other law” language, real 

parties argue that all responsive officer-related records are nonconfidential regardless of 

any contrary law, including the CPRA and its catchall exemption. But this sweeping 

construction of the prefatory language renders its express abrogation of one particular 

CPRA exemption—Government Code section 6254(f)—superfluous in violation of the 

fundamental principle that “ ‘[c]ourts should give meaning to every word of a statute if 

possible, and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage.’ ” (Big Creek 

Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1155.) Because the 

prefatory language references this single CPRA exemption, it seems unlikely that the 

Legislature contemplated the clause as encompassing other CPRA exemptions. (See 

CPOST, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 294 [“when a statute contains a list or catalogue of items, 
21

a court should determine the meaning of each by reference to the others . . . . In 

accordance with this principle of construction, a court will adopt a restrictive meaning of 

a listed item if acceptance of a more expansive meaning would make other items in the 

list unnecessary or redundant”].) Indeed, had the Legislature intended for section 832.7 

to override the CPRA catchall exemption, it could have explicitly said so, as it did for 

Government Code section 6254(f) and in other statutes. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, 

§ 54957.5, subd. (a) [“[n]otwithstanding Section 6255 or any other law, agendas of public 

meetings and any other writings, when distributed to all, or a majority of all, of the 

members of a legislative body of a local agency by any person in connection with a 

matter subject to discussion or consideration at an open meeting of the body, are 

disclosable public records under the California Public Records Act, and shall be made 

available upon request without delay”].) It is not our role to add an exemption to a statute 

that the Legislature chose not to include. (See Hampton, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 350.)

We again look to the legislative history of the section 832.7 amendments for 

confirmation of the appropriate construction. (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1046.) 

Here, the legislative history reflects the Legislature’s awareness of the CPRA catchall 

exemption, as well as several other CPRA exemptions apart from the law enforcement 

investigatory files exemption set forth in Government Code section 6254(f). (See Assem. 

Com. on Public Safety Rep., supra, pp. 3, 4, 5, 7.) Despite such awareness, none of the 

committee reports or analyses made any mention of an intent to nullify or override the 

catchall exemption via the amendments to section 832.7. That both the language and 

legislative history of the section 832.7 amendments are silent as to the abrogation of any 

CPRA exemption—except for the investigatory files exemption—strongly suggests that 

requests seeking section 832.7 officer-related records remain otherwise subject to the 

CPRA catchall exemption.

Real parties counter that the Legislative Counsel’s Digest includes statements that 

SB 1421 “would define the scope of disclosable records,” that the amendments to section 

832.7 “would require, notwithstanding any other law, certain [records] . . . be made 

available for public inspection,” and that discussed in detail the specific redactions and 
22

withholdings permitted by the amendments. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1421 

(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) ¶ 2.) But nothing in these statements or in the Legislative 

Counsel’s Digest as a whole suggests the Legislature intended to limit application of the 

entire CPRA when it amended section 832.7. Because the language of section 832.7(b) is 

to the contrary—expressly requiring that records be made available “pursuant to the 

California Public Records Act” while specifically abrogating only one particular CPRA 

exemption (Gov. Code, § 6254(f))—it appears more reasonable to construe the Digest’s 

reference to the “scope of disclosable records” as encompassing both the detailed 

redaction and withholding provisions of section 832.7 and any otherwise applicable

CPRA exemption. (See Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 222 

Cal.App.4th 383, 400–401 [“disclosable” records are those “not subject to any one or 

more of the [CPRA’s] many exemptions from disclosure”].)

Moreover, construing the CPRA catchall exemption as applying to requests for 

section 832.7 records honors the Legislature’s longstanding recognition that there may be 

competing public interests at stake in a public records request and that public records are 

properly withheld if an agency can demonstrate, on the facts of the particular case, that 

the public interest served by nondisclosure “clearly outweighs” the public interest served 

by disclosure. (Gov. Code, § 6255(a); see Times Mirror, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1339.) In 

this regard, the catchall exemption has been used to justify withholding documents based 

on a range of public interests, including the “ ‘expense and inconvenience involved in 

segregating nonexempt from exempt information.’ ” (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 

Cal.5th at p. 1043.) As the Supreme Court has explained, a refusal to place public 

concern with the cost and efficiency of government “on the section 6255 scales would 

make it possible for any person requesting information, for any reason or for no particular 

reason, to impose upon a governmental agency a limitless obligation. Such a result 
23

would not be in the public interest.” (American Civil Liberties Union v. Deukmejian

(1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 453 (Deukmejian).)5

True, none of the redaction and withholding provisions of section 832.7 explicitly 

accounts for the public interest in government cost and efficiency, or any other public 

interest that may fall within the scope of the CPRA catchall exemption. But subjecting 

requests for section 832.7 officer-related records to potential application of this catchall 

exemption simply means that otherwise responsive records may be withheld only in those 

instances where the public agency adequately demonstrates that, due to the facts of a 

particular case, the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest 

in disclosure. Notably, Government Code section 6255 has not, to our knowledge, been 

criticized as an unworkable or overly broad exemption that unduly impairs government 

transparency or meaningful public access to information. We see no statutory or 

legislative policy basis for concluding that SB 1421 intended to extinguish this 

longstanding exemption that permits withholding only where the public interest 

predominates in favor of nondisclosure.

Real parties further observe that section 832.7 has a catchall provision of its 

own—codified in subdivision (b)(6) (hereafter section 832.7(b)(6))—that allows an 

agency to “redact a record disclosed pursuant to this section, including personal 

identifying information, where, on the facts of the particular case, the public interest 

served by not disclosing the information clearly outweighs the public interest served by 

 

5

Indeed, our construction benefits from the consistency of harmonizing aspects of 

the two statutes wherever possible. It would seem anomalous to construe section 832.7 

as requiring that records be made available pursuant to the CPRA but disregarding the 

CPRA’s contemplation that records should be withheld when the public interest in doing 

so clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
24

the disclosure of the information.” (§ 832.7(b)(6).) In real parties’ view, this provision is 

rendered superfluous if the CPRA catchall provision applies.

6

We cannot agree. The CPRA catchall exemption authorizes the nondisclosure of a 

record when a determination is made by the public agency (or the court if the agency’s 

determination is challenged) that “on the facts of the particular case the public interest 

served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by 

disclosure of the record.” (Gov. Code, § 6255(a).) As discussed, this exemption permits 

withholding based on various considerations, including public fiscal and administrative 

concerns regarding the “ ‘expense and inconvenience involved in segregating nonexempt 

from exempt information’ ” (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043), and is an 

integral part of the CPRA framework that, at the outset, allows a determination that the 

interest of the public is best served by the nondisclosure of otherwise responsive records. 

(E.g., Deukmejian, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 453–454.) Meanwhile, section 832.7(b)(6) 

may apply once the agency or the court determines that responsive records are not 

exempt from disclosure. That is, after the agency or the court determines that responsive 

records may not be withheld under the CPRA catchall exemption (or any other applicable

exemption), the purpose that section 832.7(b)(6) serves is to authorize redaction of 

specific information contained in those records when redaction best serves the public 

interest.

7

Real parties further argue that Government Code section 6255 directly conflicts

with two other of section 832.7’s subdivisions that more specifically restrict record 

 

6

In response to this court’s request for supplemental briefing, the parties appear to 

agree that the section 832.7(b)(6) balancing test is performed in the same manner as the 

CRPA catchall exemption balancing test.

7

In their supplemental briefing, real parties emphasize that subdivision (b)(6) was 

added to section 832.7 late in the legislative process at a time when the proposed statute 

contained only the redaction provisions in subdivision (b)(5). In response to the requests 

of both parties, we take judicial notice of the legislative history materials for SB 1421. 

Contrary to real parties’ suggestion, however, the late addition of that subdivision did not 

reflect a legislative intent to disallow redaction or withholding under the CPRA catchall 

exemption, and the two provisions are reasonably harmonized.
25

withholding or redaction The first identified subdivision allows a public entity to 

withhold records due to a pending investigation or prosecution, but only temporarily and 

subject to certain reporting requirements to explain the delay. (§ 832.7,

subd. (b)(7)(A)(i)-(iii).) The second identified subdivision provides that an agency “shall 

redact” a record disclosed pursuant to section 832.7 only with regard to an officer’s nonwork-related personal data or information; preservation of complainant or witness

anonymity; confidential medical, financial, or other information under certain 

enumerated circumstances; and where there is reason to believe that disclosure “would 

pose a significant danger” to the safety of the officer or another person. (§ 832.7, 

subd. (b)(5)(A)–(D).) 

We conclude the statutes are reasonably harmonized to effectuate their respective 

purposes. Again, because the CPRA catchall exemption contemplates a variety 

competing public interests including privacy, public safety, and public fiscal and 

administrative concerns (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043), it may apply 

more broadly than the withholding provision in section 832.7, subdivision (b)(7)(A), 

which is limited to active investigations. It also has a broader reach than section 832.7, 

subdivision (b)(5), which applies to nonexempt officer-related records and focuses on 

personal data and information and other specific situations triggered by information 

within those records. Real parties have identified no irreconcilable conflict in the 

simultaneous operation of these provisions.

On a final note, we observe that operation of the CPRA catchall exemption should 

not frustrate section 832.7’s aim to provide greater transparency around officer 

misconduct issues. Although Government Code section 6255(a) allows for nondisclosure 

upon a proper showing, the CPRA requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a 

record shall be available for inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion 

of the portions that are exempted by law” (Gov. Code, § 6253, subd. (a)). Thus, while

responsive records may be and have been entirely withheld under the CPRA catchall 

exemption, a public agency remains otherwise obligated to redact exempt information 

from a nonexempt record when the exempt and nonexempt materials are not “inextricably 
26

intertwined” and are “otherwise reasonably segregable.” (Deukmejian, supra, 32 Cal.3d 

at p. 453, fn. 13; see CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 652–653.)

2. The Balance of Interests in This Case

Having determined that the CPRA catchall exemption is available in response to a 

request for the officer-related records specified in section 832.7, we next consider 

whether the Department has sufficiently demonstrated that the records sought by real 

parties may be withheld under that exemption. Here, the Department’s principal 

argument for withholding records concerning non-Department officers is the “onerous 

burden of reviewing, redacting, and disclosing records regarding other agencies’ officers, 

which involves “potentially millions of records.” In the Department’s view, this burden 

outweighs the public interest in obtaining those records from the Department rather than 

the other state and local agencies that employ those officers.

Although the CPRA catchall exemption may be invoked based on the concern that 

segregating nonexempt from exempt information would be unduly burdensome (ACLU 

Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043; State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court

(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1188 (State Bd. Of Equalization), the withholding of 

responsive records is not permitted unless the Department demonstrates “ ‘a clear 

overbalance on the side of confidentiality.’ ” (ACLU Foundation, at p. 1043.) In 

balancing the competing public interests in this case, we review the public interest factors 

de novo but accept the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by substantial 

evidence. (Ibid.) 

Here, the trial court assumed the CPRA catchall exemption was available but 

determined the Department’s showing did not justify nondisclosure. Our independent 

review leads us to likewise conclude that, at this juncture, the Department has not 

demonstrated “ ‘a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality.’ ” (ACLU Foundation,

supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043.)

In making its showing, the Department offered the two-page declaration of 

Michael Newman, Senior Assistant Attorney General of the Department’s Civil Rights 

Enforcement Section. Newman represented there were six separate matters within that
27

section that were “likely” to include records potentially responsive to real parties’

requests, noting each matter includes “voluminous materials, including reports, 

transcripts, audio and video files, and photographs.” As the first of two examples, 

Newman cited the Department’s independent investigation into a local law enforcement 

agency that includes over 109,000 records, which he estimated would take a minimum of 

3,600 attorney hours to review, “assuming a very optimistic rate of review of 30 records 

per hour.” According to Newman, the second matter includes over 26,000 items that 

would take approximately 860 attorney hours to review. 

In assessing whether an agency has satisfied its burden in invoking the CPRA 

catchall exemption, courts may accept expert and other predictions based on solid 

foundations (see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2014) 

228 Cal.App.4th 222, 244–246) and may consider certain estimates that quantify the 

burden and cost of production (see State Bd. of Equalizatiion, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1183 & fn. 6). Because Newman’s declaration was lacking in meaningful detail, we 

conclude it fell short of demonstrating that public fiscal and administrative concerns over 

the expense and inconvenience of responding to real parties’ records request clearly 

outweigh the public interest in disclosure.

In particular, Newman referred to the existence of six matters in the Civil Rights 

Enforcement Section that “are likely to include records that are potentially responsive.” 

But Newman offered no indication whether the two matters involving 109,000 and 

26,000 items are representative examples or outliers. While it seems reasonable to 

assume that these are the Department’s two most voluminous matters, Newman proffered 

no information regarding the records in the other four matters or the potential burden in 

reviewing them. Newman additionally alluded to other unidentified sections in the 

Department that he “understand[s] . . . have also handled matters that would include 

potentially responsive records,” but again, he provided no specifics or estimates as to the 

number of sections implicated, the number of matters in each of those sections, or the 

scope of records in each of those matters. There is also a disconnect between the 
28

hundreds of thousands of records suggested by Newman and the “potentially millions of 

records” that the Department’s petition claims it will be burdened with reviewing. 

The paucity of information regarding the Department’s costs of complying with 

real parties’ request is notable in light of certain SB 1421 legislative materials reflecting

that the Department had reported to the Legislature estimated “costs of $263,000 in 

2018–19, $437,000 in 2019–20, and $422,000 in 2020–21 and ongoing” in order to 

“implement the new requirements, handle an increase in [CPRA] requests, and potential 

increased litigation.” (Sen. Floor Analysis, supra, at p. 8.)8 These materials do not 

indicate such costs pertain solely to records for Department employees. In addition, the 

record does not offer any basis for ascertaining how these Department-specific estimated 

costs might relate to the Department’s review of its officer-related records involving nonDepartment officers. At the very least, however, we may infer that the Legislature chose 

to enact SB 1421 despite its awareness that the Department’s compliance would entail 

significant expense.9

Additionally, while Newman acknowledged his Civil Rights Enforcement Section 

has records potentially responsive to the pending requests, the Department made no 

showing that these same records are held by other state and local agencies. For instance, 

Newman indicated that the matter with 109,000 records pertains to the Department’s

independent investigation of a local law enforcement agency. But because Newman

 

8 Real parties request we take judicial notice of these particular legislative materials, 

which the Department does not appear to oppose. We grant the request. (See Evid.

Code, § 452, subd. (c).)

9 At oral argument, the Department contended the legislative materials focused on 

S.B. 1421’s fiscal impacts on state and/or local agencies only in their capacity as officer 

employers. Certain materials do appear to reflect that. (E.g., Sen. Rules third reading, 

supra, at p. 8; Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1421 (2017–2018 

Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 2, 2018.) Those materials, however, cannot be viewed as 

limiting the Department’s disclosure obligations to employee records, given section 

832.7’s language and other legislative materials establishing the statute’s application to 

all officer-related records maintained by state and local agencies, including those 

maintained by independent investigatory bodies. (See part C, ante.)
29

offered no information establishing or estimating the extent to which the local agency 

maintains the same records, there appears no basis for determining whether and to what 

extent the Department’s assertions about duplicative efforts are merited. Of course, to 

the extent the Department is in possession of unique records, no duplicative burden is 

threatened. 

The Department contends it “need not actually gather and review the entire 

universe of potentially responsive records to provide evidence of the extraordinary 

burden.” That is, because estimates are the only way to provide insights into the burdens 

posed by a records request, and because Newman’s declaration reflected “the basic 

generalized knowledge that a fact finder possesses regarding human affairs, and the way 

the world works,” the Department posits that his declaration “is precisely the kind of 

evidence” that courts have typically accepted in assessing burdens under section 6255(a).

(See Cal. First Amend. Coalition v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 174.)

We do not doubt that public agencies and others may have some generalized 

knowledge regarding the onerous burdens posed by certain types of CPRA requests. But 

officer-related records were exempt from disclosure before the passage of SB 1421. 

Consequently, the nature and scope of responsive records in the Department’s possession

are relatively unknown to litigants and the courts, and the burden of making such records 

available for inspection must, at this juncture, be established through expert testimony, or 

at the very least, with a more thorough showing that substantiates the Department’s

burden.

Nor are we persuaded—on this record—by the Department’s claim that it faces an

“extraordinary burden” in “having to coordinate with numerous state and local agencies 

across the state to determine whether there is material that must not be disclosed,” and 

that this burden tips the balance against disclosure. On this score, the Department 

appears to be concerned with making the redactions necessary to ensure the continued 

confidentiality of information that either poses a risk to the safety of individual citizens or 

officers or potentially imperils ongoing investigations about which the Department has no 

knowledge. Newman’s declaration, however, offered no facts that allow for a 
30

meaningful understanding of the scope and type of coordination necessary for the 

Department and local agencies to meet such concerns. While it could be inferred from 

Newman’s declaration that the Department would have to coordinate with the one local 

law enforcement agency under investigation, Newman did not say whether the five other

matters in the Civil Rights Enforcement Section involve similar independent 

investigations. Absent a more thorough showing by the Department, we are hard-pressed 

to assume such tasks are overly burdensome in view of the circumstance that the CPRA 

allows for extensions of time when “[t]he need for consultation” arises. (See Gov. Code, 

§ 6253, subd. (c)(3)).

The Department’s reliance on Deukmejian, supra, 32 Cal.3d 440, is misplaced.

There, the petitioner made a request to the California Department of Justice seeking index 

cards compiled by a network of law enforcement agencies that listed persons suspected of 

being involved in organized crime. (Id. at p. 444.) The cards included information such 

as the identities of the family members and known associates of organized crime 

members, who may or may not have had any connection to organized crime. (Id. at 

p. 453.) The Supreme Court examined the index cards in camera and observed that the 

cards did not indicate “which material [was] confidential, might reveal a confidential 

source, or identify the subject of the report.” (Ibid.) The court also commented that “in 

many instances” the state agency defendants would be required “to inquire from the law 

enforcement departments supplying the information.” (Ibid.) In reversing the judgment 

insofar as it required disclosure of the cards, the Supreme Court “reject[ed] the 

suggestion that in [weighing the benefits and costs of disclosure under section 6255] the 

courts should ignore any expense and inconvenience involved in segregating nonexempt 

from exempt information.” (Id. at pp. 452–453.) Determining that redacted disclosures 

were of questionable utility, the court concluded the cost and burden of segregating the 

exempt and nonexempt information on the cards outweighed the public interest in 

disclosure. (Id. at pp. 453–454.)

The Deukmejian decision does not compel the conclusion that nondisclosure is 

similarly warranted based on the showing made here. As Deukmejian observed, the 
31

CPRA catchall exemption “requires the courts to look to ‘the facts of the particular case’

in balancing the benefits and burdens of disclosure under the [CPRA].” (Deukmejian, 

supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 454, fn. 14.) Thus, while the particular facts in that decision

justified nondisclosure, Deukmejian cautioned that “in another case, with different facts, 

the balance might tip in favor of disclosure of nonexempt information.” (Ibid.) The facts 

here are different. Unlike the situation in Deukmejian, where the index cards in dispute 

were available for court review, here there is nothing in the record showing that working 

in coordination with state and local agencies threatens a “limitless obligation” (id. at 

p. 453) such that the public interest predominates in favor of withholding all responsive

records pertaining to non-Department officers.

In short, the Department’s showing below fails to establish “ ‘a clear overbalance 

on the side of confidentiality.’ ” (ACLU Foundation, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1043.)

CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION

To summarize, we hold that: (1) as a matter of statutory interpretation, section 

832.7 generally requires disclosure of all responsive officer-related records in the 

possession of the Department, regardless whether the records pertain to officers 

employed by the Department or by another public agency and regardless whether the 

Department or another public agency created the records; (2) as a matter of statutory 

interpretation, the CPRA catchall exemption may apply to officer-related records subject 

to disclosure under section 832.7; and (3) the Department fell short of demonstrating that 

the public interest served by nondisclosure of the records at issue clearly outweighs the 

public interest in their disclosure. Although we essentially affirm the trial court’s 

determination on this third point, we emphasize that nothing in our opinion should be 

understood as barring the trial court from reconsidering the applicability of the CPRA 

catchall exemption as to any of the requested records upon a proper showing by the 

Department.

The petition for writ of mandate is denied, the order to show cause is discharged, 

and the stay previously imposed is lifted. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)
32

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Siggins, P. J.

_________________________

Petrou, J.

A157998
33

Becerra v. Superior Court

(A157998) 

Trial court: City & County of San Francisco

Trial Judges: Hon. Richard B. Ulmer

Attorneys: Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Stepan A. Haytayan, Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General, Amie L. Medley, Deputy Attorney General, Jennifer E. 

Rosenberg, Deputy Attorney General as Defendant and Appellant. 

Michael T. Risher; David E. Snyder, Glen A. Smith for First Amendment 

Coalition for Real Parties in Interest. 

Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke, Brendan Charney for KQED, 

Inc. for Real Parties in Interest. 

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Katie Townsend, Bruce D. 

Brown, Adam A. Marshall, Daniel J. Jeon; The Associated Press, Karen 

Kaiser; California News Publishers Association, Jim Ewert; Californians 

Aware, Terry Francke; The E.W. Scripps Company, David M. Giles; First 

Look Media Works, David Bralow; Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, 

James Chadwick; Fox Television Stations, David M. Keneipp; Gannett Co., 

Barbara W. Wall; Hearst Corporation, Jonathan Donnellan, Ravi V. 

Sitwala, Diego Ibarguen; Los Angeles Times Communications & The San 

Diego Union-Tribune, Jeff Glasser; The McClatchy Company, Juan 

Cornejo; Covington & Burling, Kurt Wimmer; MNG Enterprises, Marshall 

W. Anstandig; MPA – The Association of Magazine Media, James Cregan; 
34

Ballard Spahr, Charles D. Tobin; The National Press Photographers 

Association, Mickey H. Osterreicher; ProPublica, Richard J. Tofel; Wiley 

Rein, Kathleen A. Kirby; Reveal from the Center for Investigative 

Reporting, Victoria Baranetsky; Baker & Hostetler, Bruce W. Sanford, 

Mark I. Bailen; VICE Media, Lucinda Treat for amicus curiae on behalf of 

real parties in interest.