IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 17, 2018 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL. CLAIBORNE COUNTY v.

DELINQUENT TAXPAYER, ALBERTANO ALVAREZ ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Claiborne County

No. DT-6018666 Elizabeth C. Asbury, Chancellor

No. E2017-01683-COA-R3-CV

This appeal arises from a delinquent taxpayer action. The appellants were lienholders on 

a parcel of real property sold to a separate purchaser during a delinquent tax sale. 

Following the tax sale, the lienholders filed a petition for redemption. In response, the 

purchaser filed a motion to protest the validity of the lien or, alternatively, a claim to 

recover $8,579.60 in “lawful charges” that he and a friend had incurred to clear debris 

and personalty from the real property. The lienholders then filed a “cross claim” against 

the purchaser, alleging conversion and trespass to chattels. The lienholders sought an 

award of actual damages for removal of personalty and a “steel building” from the real 

property, as well as punitive damages for the purchaser’s allegedly malicious actions. 

The purchaser filed an answer, denying all substantive allegations. The purchaser 

subsequently withdrew his objection to the validity of the lien. Following a bench trial, 

the trial court granted the lienholders’ petition for redemption upon the conditions that 

the lienholders pay all delinquent taxes, penalties, and fees; reimburse the purchaser and 

his friend in the amount of $8,579.60 for expenses incurred in the removal of debris and 

personalty; and reimburse the purchaser and his friend in the amount of $600.00 for 

storage of personalty. The lienholders have appealed. Having determined that the order 

appealed from fails to resolve the lienholders’ claims of conversion and trespass to 

chattels, we conclude that it is not a final order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., joined.

Lewis S. Howard, Jr., and Erin J. Wallen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, E.G. 

Meek, Sr., and Shirley T. Meek.

07/24/2018
2

David H. Stanifer, Tazewell, Tennessee, for the appellees, Nathan Earl Gilliam and 

Shane Evans.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The State of Tennessee ex rel. Claiborne County filed the instant delinquent 

taxpayer action in the Claiborne County Chancery Court (“trial court”) against several 

owners of real property and various corresponding lienholders on March 9, 2016, 

including the owner, Albertano Alvarez, and the corresponding lienholders of the parcel 

of real property at issue here. The subject parcel, comprised of approximately one and 

three-tenths acres, is located on Old Highway 63 in Speedwell, Tennessee (“the 

Property”).1 The attachment to the complaint named as the lienholder, “Sandra E. 

Morris, Trustee, c/o JM Properties & Auction Co.,” but did not name the appellants, E.G. 

Meek, Sr., and Shirley T. Meek (“the Meeks”). The applicable deed of trust, which was 

subsequently presented by the Meeks as an exhibit to a pleading in this matter, reflects 

that while Ms. Morris had been named as the trustee, the deed of trust memorialized Mr. 

Alvarez’s indebtedness to the Meeks in the amount of $30,000.00.

2

 The deed of trust had 

been executed on August 20, 2011, and recorded by the Claiborne County Register of 

Deeds on January 23, 2013. The deed of trust includes a statement that it had been 

prepared by “GM Properties & Auction Co.,” with the same address as that listed for “JM 

Properties & Auction Co.” in the complaint. 

The State filed a motion for default judgment on December 8, 2016. On January 

26, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting the motion for default judgment against 

Mr. Alvarez and ordering a sale of the Property by auction set for April 1, 2017.3 

According to the statement of the evidence before us, approved by the trial court in the 

absence of a transcript, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(e), coappellee Nathan Earl Gilliam purchased the Property at the delinquent tax sale for 

$1,300.00. 

 

1 Although photographs presented as exhibits during trial reflect that the Property may have had a home 

on it, the record is otherwise silent as to whether the Property is improved or unimproved.

2 Ms. Morris is not a party to this appeal.

3

The record contains no indication that Mr. Alvarez appeared or filed a pleading in this matter, and he is 

not a party to this appeal.
3

On April 11, 2017, Mr. Meek filed a motion to redeem the Property, asserting his 

status as a lienholder.4 It is undisputed that on April 13, 2017, Mr. Gilliam came onto the 

Property with his friend, Shane Evans, and cleared it of what Mr. Gilliam and Mr. Evans 

later testified was debris, placing what they considered to be potentially valuable personal 

property in storage. On April 26, 2017, the trial court entered a decree confirming the 

sale of the Property to Mr. Gilliam and specifically including the Meeks in its certificate 

of service related to the decree.

On May 10, 2017, Mr. Gilliam filed a form pleading entitled, “Redemption Protest 

Waiver or Motions,” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2701 (2013 & Supp. 

2017).5In protest of the motion to redeem, Mr. Gilliam alleged that the Meeks did not 

have a proper lien on the Property. In the alternative, Mr. Gilliam asserted a claim for 

“lawful charges,” averring that he had spent $8,579.60 to “preserve the value of the 

property” and was entitled to compensation prior to any redemption of the Property. 

Within the total reimbursement requested, Mr. Gilliam itemized amounts he had 

purportedly paid to a landfill, a lumber company, a construction hauling company, and to 

individuals for labor. He also included payments made to “Evans Contracting” for 

“Bobcat work” and to Shane Evans for labor. Mr. Gilliam attached invoices from the 

businesses and receipts from the individuals listed. The majority of the invoices and 

receipts detailing the clean-up efforts were dated on or about April 13, 2017.

On June 22, 2017, the Meeks filed a “cross claim” against Mr. Gilliam, alleging 

conversion and trespass to chattels.6 In their claim, the Meeks alleged, inter alia, that Mr. 

Gilliam had intentionally removed “a number of items of valuable personalty from the 

Property, including, but not limited to, tools and a steel building.” The Meeks also 

alleged that what Mr. Gilliam described as a “clean-up” was “accompanied by malice, 

insult, and reckless and willful disregard for the Meeks’ rights such that the Meeks are 

 

4 Although Mr. Meek did not expressly include Ms. Meek as a co-lienholder in the motion to redeem, she 

was included in subsequent pleadings and is a named party on appeal.

5

The statement of the evidence mistakenly lists the date of filing as May 9, 2017, rather than May 10. 

The protest and motion would have been timely on either date. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2701(d)

(Supp. 2017). 

6

The Meeks stated in their pleading that their “cross claim” was filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil 

Procedure 13.07, which provides for a cross-claim made by a party against a co-party. We note that as 

the purchaser of the Property, Mr. Gilliam was not a co-party to the Meeks, who were defendant

lienholders. See coparty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2014) (“A litigant or participant in a legal 

transaction who has a like status with another party; a party on the same side of a lawsuit.”). The trial 

court appears to have treated the Meeks’ claim as a permissive counterclaim pursuant to Tennessee Rule 

of Civil Procedure 13.02. See generally Stewart v. Schofield, 368 S.W.3d 457, 462 (Tenn. 2012) 

(“[C]ourts must give effect to the substance, rather than the form or terminology of a pleading.”).
4

entitled to an award for punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.” Mr. 

Gilliam filed an answer to the Meeks’ cross-claim, denying all substantive allegations. 

The trial court conducted a bench trial on July 19, 2017, hearing testimony from 

Mr. Gilliam, Mr. Evans, and a neighbor to the Property. At the beginning of trial, Mr. 

Gilliam withdrew his protest of the redemption, solely arguing his motion for 

reimbursement of expenses. The statement of the evidence summarizes testimony 

regarding the purchase of and clean-up efforts on the Property as follows in relevant part:

Mr. Gilliam testified that he attended the Claiborne County tax sale for the 

purpose of acquiring a piece of property for the benefit of his friend, Shane 

Evans (“Mr. Evans”). Mr. Gilliam testified that he mistakenly purchased 

the Property rather than the piece of property he intended to purchase. Mr. 

Gilliam testified he paid $1,300.00 for the Property.

Upon visiting the Property, Mr. Gilliam and Mr. Evans testified that 

they were concerned about the condition of the property supported by the 

independent testimony of [F.R.], a neighbor downstream, [who] had 

previously contacted the EPA and the Claiborne County Sheriff’s 

Department regarding dead animals in the creek and live animals caged or 

chained and was concerned about a health hazard. Mr. Gilliam and Mr. 

Evans further testified [that] upon contacting the Sheriff’s Department they

began to clean up the subject property as to the debris and what was 

considered to be of no value was taken to the Claiborne County Landfill 

and what personal property was considered of any value was put in storage 

by Mr. Evans. Mr. Gilliam and Mr. Evans both testified that they 

undertook the clean-up after contacting the Claiborne County Sheriff’s 

Department. Several dozen photographs were offered into evidence 

showing the condition of the Property and after contacting the Claiborne 

County Sheriff, they began to clean-up the Property. It was undisputed at 

trial that Mr. Alvarez had failed to properly maintain the Property. The 

Meeks only had a lien hold interest and had no possessory interest because 

[Mr. Meek] had not foreclosed upon his Deed of Trust.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.)

The trial court entered an order on July 31, 2017, granting the Meeks’ motion to 

redeem the property upon certain conditions, including payment of a money judgment to 

Mr. Gilliam and Mr. Evans. We note that the record does not contain a pleading 

requesting the joinder of Mr. Evans or an order directing his joinder. However, in its 

order, the trial court appears to have attributed the claim for reimbursement of “lawful 
5

charges” in part to Mr. Evans and termed him a “purchaser” of the Property, along with 

Mr. Gilliam. The Meeks included Mr. Evans as a party on their notice of appeal, and 

counsel for the appellees states on the cover of the appellees’ brief that he represents both 

Mr. Gilliam and Mr. Evans.

In entering its judgment, the trial court stated the following in pertinent part:

Upon the testimony of witness[es] and argument of counsel; it appearing to 

the court that the expenditures incurred by the purchasers, Nathan Gilliam 

and Shane Evans in removing debris and personal property from the subject 

property pursuant to T.C.A. § 67-05-2701 were reasonable and shall be 

reimbursed by the Defendant Meeks in order to exercise the Right of 

Redemption to property sold at the Delinquent Tax Sale on April 1, 2017

and confirmed on April 26, 2017.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1. In order for the [Meeks] to exercise the Right of Redemption 

of the Delinquent property . . . [they] will pay to the Clerk & 

Master the following sums of money:

a. All delinquent taxes for all years owed on said 

property as calculated by the Claiborne County Clerk 

& Master’s Office.

b. All penalties, interest, expense and fees as calculated 

by the Claiborne County Clerk & Master.

c. Reimbursement for expenses by Nathan Gilliam and 

Shane Evans in the amount of Eight Thousand Five 

Hundred Seventy Nine dollars and ($8,579.60) Sixty 

Cents.

d. A storage fee to Nathan Gilliam in the amount of Six 

Hundred ($600.00) Dollars.

2. Upon full payment of the above described sums, the [Meeks] 

shall be permitted to redeem the property.

3. Furthermore, upon payment of the costs to the Claiborne 

County Clerk & Master’s Office, the [Meeks] shall be 
6

permitted to obtain from Nathan Gilliam and Shane Evans the 

property that is being held in storage at an agreed upon 

location.

In its order, the trial court did not expressly dismiss or otherwise address the Meeks’ 

claims of conversion and trespass to chattels. The Meeks filed a notice of appeal on 

August 24, 2017.

II. Issues Presented

The Meeks present two issues on appeal, which we have restated as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by finding that Mr. Gilliam and Mr. 

Evans were entitled to reimbursement for expenses purportedly 

incurred by them in removing debris and personalty from the 

Property and in storing items of personalty when the removal and 

commencement of storage occurred prior to entry of the decree 

confirming the sale to Mr. Gilliam and when no judicial or 

administrative order had mandated clean-up of the Property.

2. Whether the trial court erred by finding that the Purchasers were not 

liable to the Meeks for actual and punitive damages associated with 

the removal of personalty from the Property.

III. Standard of Review

We review a non-jury case de novo upon the record, with a presumption of 

correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is 

otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 

2000). We review questions of law, including those of statutory construction, de novo 

with no presumption of correctness. Bowden, 27 S.W.3d at 916 (citing Myint v. Allstate 

Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998)). The trial court’s determinations regarding 

witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be disturbed absent 

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 

(Tenn. 2002).

IV. Finality of Trial Court’s Judgment

As a threshold matter, we address, sua sponte, the issue of whether the trial court’s 

July 31, 2017 order constitutes a final judgment over which this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (“Unless 
7

an appeal from an interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by statute, appellate 

courts have jurisdiction over final judgments only.”). The trial court made no express 

findings regarding the Meeks’ claims of conversion and trespass to chattels. When 

questioned during oral argument before this Court, the Meeks’ counsel stated that counsel 

had understood the trial court’s ruling to mean that the conversion and trespass to chattels

claims were dismissed. However, we have no documentation in the record before us 

indicating that the trial court dismissed the Meeks’ tort claims. Furthermore, the trial 

court has not certified the July 2017 order as a final judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule 

of Civil Procedure 54.02.

The sole indication in the record from which a finding on the tort claims could be 

inferred is the trial court’s determination that the expenditures incurred by Mr. Gilliam 

and Mr. Evans in removing debris and items of personalty from the Property were 

“reasonable” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2701, which, in pertinent 

part, concerns reimbursement to a delinquent-tax-sale purchaser from the party seeking 

redemption of the real property at issue. We conclude that we cannot extrapolate from 

this finding regarding Mr. Gilliam’s and Mr. Evans’s expenditures that the trial court 

resolved the claims of trespass to chattels and conversion of the private property 

removed. 

We therefore conclude that the judgment is not final. An order that does not 

adjudicate all of the claims between all of the parties is “subject to revision at any time 

before entry of a final judgment” and is not appealable as of right. See Tenn. R. App. P. 

3(a). See also In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tenn. 2003) (“A final 

judgment is one that resolves all the issues in the case, ‘leaving nothing else for the trial 

court to do.’”) (quoting State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode, 968 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1997)). Inasmuch as this appeal was taken from an order that was not final, we lack 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Bayberry Assocs., 783 S.W.2d at 559. Accordingly, we 

must dismiss the appeal. 

V. Conclusion

The appeal of this matter is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new 

appeal once a final judgment has been entered. This case is remanded to the trial court 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are taxed to the 

appellants, E.G. Meek, Sr., and Shirley T. Meek.

_________________________________ 

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE