NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 18a0137n.06
Case No. 17-1423
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CLIFTON WALKER; LATASHIA HAYES, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. RDR REAL ESTATE; JENNIFER LEWARCHIK; RANDY LEWARCHIK; ALEJANDRO PARRA; JAMES MILLER; DONALD R. FARRIS, Defendants-Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: MOORE, COOK, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges. COOK, Circuit Judge. Clifton Walker and La tashia Hayes sued their former landlords and their on-site building managers (together, the “RDR defendants”) as well as three law enforcement officers (the “officer defendants”), claiming that the defendants unlawfully evicted them from their Detroit apartment. Their claims ultimately resulted in dismissal or judgment in favor of all defendants. Following trial, Walker and Hayes moved for a new trial and for relief from judgment. The district c ourt denied both motions. For th e reasons explained below, we
AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND During their tenancy, Walker and Hayes cons istently ran into trouble with the RDR defendants, eventually prompting eviction procee dings. Walker and Hayes finally vacated theCase No. 17-1423, Walker, et al. v. RDR Real Estate, et al.

2 apartment after a confrontation with law enfor cement. Following their departure, Walker and Hayes sued the defendants. After the district court granted the RD R defendants summary judgment, the case proceeded to trial and a jury found for the offi cer defendants on all claims. Walker and Hayes then moved for a new trial and for relief from su mmary judgment, pointing to what they viewed as newly-discovered evidence. The district co urt denied the new-trial motion as untimely and denied the motion for relief from summary judgme nt because the proffered “new evidence” had actually been in their possession before trial. Walker and Hayes a ppeal those rulings.
II. ANALYSIS We review for abuse of discre tion the district court’s deni al of both a motion for a new trial and a motion for relief from judgment. Wesley v. Campbell , 864 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2017); Franklin v. Jenkins , 839 F.3d 465, 472 (6th Cir. 2016). “We recognize an ‘abuse of discretion’ when our review leaves us with ‘a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.’” Franklin , 839 F.3d at 472 (quoting Burrell v. Henderson , 434 F.3d 826, 831 (6th Cir. 2006)). A. Motion for New Trial Rule 59 affords parties twenty-eig ht days after entry of judgment to move for a new trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b). No extensions are permitte d. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). In this case, the twenty-eighth day after the court entered judgment against Walker and Hayes was Monday, May 27, 2013. Because this was a legal holiday (Memor ial Day), the rules allowed Walker and Hayes an extra day, making the filing deadline Tuesday, May 28. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1). They filed on May 29.Case No. 17-1423, Walker, et al. v. RDR Real Estate, et al.

3 Despite the clear deadline, Walker and Hayes argue that the district court failed to consider the circumstances giving rise to their tardiness. Sp ecifically, they contend defense counsel made a “bogus” report to the state atto rney grievance commission “solely to undermine the effort and ability [of] Plain tiffs’ counsel to prepare and br ing Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial within 28 days,” and that th e court wrongfully failed to take judicial notice of this “fact.” They also claim the defendants forfeited th eir untimeliness argument because of their purportedly inequitable conduct. But these ar guments provide no basis to avoid the hard deadline imposed by the rules. Th us, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny this untimely motion.
B. Motion for Relief from Judgment The district court also denied Walker a nd Hayes’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from summary judgment. As an initial matter, we dispense with the RDR defendants’ argument that this motion too was untimely. Motions for relief under Rule 60( b)(1)–(3) must be made “no more than a year after th e entry of the judgment or order.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The district court entered summary judgment on Septembe r 20, 2012. Walker and Hayes moved for relief from this judgment on June 10, 2013. The court eventually dismissed their motion without prejudice due to an intervening bankruptcy stay. Walker and Hayes then re-filed their motion on August 1, 2014, following modification of the stay. Because they filed the original Rule 60(b) motion on time and then re-filed within thirty days of the stay modification, the motion was timely. See Walker v. RDR Real Estate , 640 F. App’x 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[M]oreoever, [the bankruptcy code] gave Walker and Hayes 30 da ys in which to refile the post-trial motions following modification of the stay.”).Case No. 17-1423, Walker, et al. v. RDR Real Estate, et al.

4 As to the merits of the motion, Walker and Hayes claim that a tran script prepared by defense counsel of audio on a CD constitutes newly discovered evidence warranting relief from the summary judgment entered against them. Th e CD’s audio content included interactions between Walker and the defendants. But the tran script was not new evidence. It is undisputed that the transcript represents the typed versio n of words a hired court reporter discerned in listening to the CD. Walker and Hayes received a copy of the same CD more than a year before trial and were free to transcribe it for themselves . Notably, the plaintiffs nowhere allege that the defense created the transcript from a copy with better sound quality. What is more, defense counsel sent the transcript to th e attorney for Walker and Hayes on the Friday of the week before trial. Counsel simply failed to fi nd the transcript in his unread em ail until after trial. And given that the transcript was not new evidence—just th e earlier-provided CD’s contents in transcript form—defense counsel’s failure to share it earlier with Walker and Hayes cannot amount to fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. The dist rict court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion.
III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Walker and Hayes’s posttrial motions.