alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence GONZALEZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10307

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

Erica McCallum, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU- Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Lawrence Gonzalez, Jr., appeals from the revocation of supervised release and the 12-month sentence imposed upon revocation. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Gonzalez’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record.

Because Gonzalez has fully served his sentence and is not subject to a term of supervised release, we dismiss this appeal as moot. *See Spencer v. Kemna,*523 U.S. 1, 14, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998); *United States v. Palomba,*182 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1999).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Brandon Scott COLE v. STATE

CR-16-0228

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017 Reh. denied May 26, 2017

Affirmed.
#### Derrick SONNIER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Colonel Charles HONEYCUTT; Major Eric Hinyard; Captain Larry Simon; Lieutenant Robert Rowe; Lieutenant Clinton Reid, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-30149

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 12, 2017

Donna Unkel Grodner, Esq., Grodner *&*Associates, A.P.L.C., Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Babatunde Mobolade Animashaun, Esq., Assistant Attorney, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Derrick Sonnier, Louisiana prisoner # 390403, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in his appeal of the jury trial judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. By seeking leave to proceed IFP in this court, Sonnier is challenging the district court’s certification that this appeal is not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

Sonnier argues that “evidence at trial” showed that after he “followed procedures *329and opened his two lockers” in compliance with prison guards’ orders during a shakedown of his cell, he was “subjected to beatings and uses of excessive force.” He argues further that he did not receive a fair trial “[d]ue to blatant lies and other inflammatory statements” and that “he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants used excessive force against him and-that the jury’s verdict was in error. Sonnier does not provide any specific facts or legal analysis in support of these arguments. Because he has inadequately briefed these issues in his attorney-prepared IFP motion and memorandum in support, they are deemed to be waived. *United States v. Scroggins,*599 F.3d 433, 446 (5th Cir. 2010); *Beasley v. McCotter,*798 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, even if we were to consider Sonnier’s presumed challenge to the jury’s assessment of trial testimony and evidence, we do not reweigh a jury’s credibility determinations. *See Cavazos v. Smith,*565 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4, 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011); *Ramirez v. Dretke,*398 F.3d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 2005).

Sonnier has not shown that he will raise a legal point on appeal that is arguable on its merits. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5tii Ciu, R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47,5.4;
# 12-17285 Laura Flam v. Marshall Flam 

O'SCANNLAIN and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges; and RAKOFF (New York Southern), Senior District Judge

null

2015

768.21606

eng - iTunPGAP0��

eng - iTunNORM 0000014F 00000000 00005CCD 00000000 0007D51A 00000000 000083D6 00000000 0000CC49 00000000�

eng - iTunSMPB 00000000 00000210 00000570 0000000001026C00 00000000 002EDF2F 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000�
Christopher NEWCOMBE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D16-4769

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 5, 2018

Mark V. Murray, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

*1298AFFIRMED . *See**Lee v. State* , 223 So.3d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), *rev. granted* , 2018 WL 2065542 (Fla. Feb. 8, 2018).

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Lewis and Makar, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                       2,287,000
<SECURITIES>                                 4,837,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                8,604,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   173,000
<INVENTORY>                                  8,926,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            26,372,000
<PP&E>                                      18,531,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,797,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              42,029,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,160,000
<BONDS>                                        183,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        79,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  30,682,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                42,029,000
<SALES>                                     12,043,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            12,043,000
<CGS>                                        7,060,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               11,512,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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##### 



Exhibit 4.21
 REGEN BIOLOGICS, INC.
NONQUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT
          REGEN BIOLOGICS, INC.By:Title:OPTIONEE[Insert Name]




---



##### 



EXHIBIT A
TO
REGEN BIOLOGICS, INC.
NONQUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT
 Grant of Option
 Vesting and Expiration
  th th th
 Exercise Following Termination of Employment, Consulting or Director Relationship




---



##### 



Exercise




---



##### 



Nontransferability of Option
 Adjustments Upon Reorganization or Changes in Capitalization
 Acceleration of Exercisability




---



##### 



Change in Control
 Termination without Cause
 Miscellaneous
 Notices
 (i)
    
    if to the Corporation, at:
 
 (ii)
    
    if to Optionee, at the address set forth on the Cover Page,
  Compliance with Law and Regulations
 No Rights as Stockholder
 No Consulting, Employment or Director Relationship Rights
 Withholding




---



##### 



Reservation of Shares; Certain Costs
 Plan Governs
 Choice of Law
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Allen J. Bernstein, certify that:

 

1.               I have reviewed this quarterly report onForm 10-Q of Morton’s Restaurant Group, Inc.;

 

2.               Based on my knowledge, this report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3.               Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

 

4.               The registrant’s other certifyingofficer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and

 

5.               The registrant’s other certifyingofficer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions):

 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.

 

Date:  August 15, 2005

 
|   | /s/ ALLEN J.  BERNSTEIN  |   |
|--------|--------------------------|--------|
|   | Allen J.  Bernstein      |
|   | Chief  Executive Officer |

 

----
Exhibit 32.2
                                                                    ------------

                Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                             As Adopted Pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Switchboard
Incorporated (the "Company") for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
the undersigned, Robert P. Orlando, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

                                              /s/ Robert P. Orlando
                                              ---------------------
                                              Robert P. Orlando
                                              Chief Financial Officer
Dated: March 29, 2004
Exhibit



Exhibit 10.12





Chubb Limited
Outside Directors Compensation Parameters
February 2019




	
		
	 
	 

	•
	Annual Retainer Fee of $305,000. Paid $180,000 in restricted stock and $125,000 cash or, at the election of the director, $305,000 in restricted stock. Includes expectation of service on up to two committees (not counting service on Executive Committee). No fees are payable for regular board or committee meetings.








	
		
	 
	 

	•
	Annual premiums for committee chairs and lead director:






—     Audit–$35,000        
—     Compensation–$25,000    
—     Nominating & Governance–$20,000        
—     Risk & Finance–$20,000
—     Lead director–$50,000


	
		
	 
	 

	•
	Annual premiums for selected committee service (non-chair): None.






	
		
	 
	 

	•
	Committee chair and lead director service premiums are payable in cash quarterly or, at the election of the director, in restricted stock annually.






	
		
	 
	 

	•
	Meeting fees for “special” meetings (required to consider transactions or other special circumstances, as determined jointly by the Lead Director and Chairman): $2,000 per telephone meeting, $3,000 for ‘in person’ meetings. Payable in cash quarterly. Meeting fees as described in this paragraph shall be payable as determined by the Nominating & Governance Committee, but in all cases subject to availability, taking into account paid and allocable Retainer Fees and premiums described above, within the annual compensation cap approved by shareholders.








	
		
	 
	 

	•
	Restricted stock will be awarded at beginning of the plan year (i.e. the date of the Annual General Meeting) and become non-forfeitable at end of the plan year, provided that the grantee has remained a Chubb director continuously during that plan year. Increases shall be paid on a pro-rated basis, based on date of award.
David ROMERO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-2774

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

August 29, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Calvin Levester CHAMBERS v. STATE

CR-16-0089

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. ZIBO LI Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4238

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 29, 2017

Filed: October 4, 2017

Steven L. Schleicher, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Manda M. Sertich, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Zibo Li, Pro Se

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Zibo Li was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to traffic in unauthorized access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of possessing unauthorized access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), (c)(l)(A)(i). Counsel appeals in a brief filed under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493*313(1967), challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the sentence imposed by the district court.1 Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

The evidence at trial included the testimony of cooperating witnesses who participated at various levels in a scheme that involved selling fraudulently obtained cellular telephones for a profit. Testimony established that law enforcement officials searched Li’s home and seized unauthorized access devices and other incriminating evidence after intercepting boxes containing fraudulently obtained cellular telephones sent by Li from Minnesota bound for Hong Kong. This evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict, notwithstanding Li’s denial of knowledge of the fraudulent means used by others to obtain the cellular telephones. *See*18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3) (possession of unauthorized access devices); *United States v. Jenkins-Watts,*574 F.3d 950, 959-60 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review and required proof for conspiracy conviction). Li’s due process rights were not violated by the district court’s application of a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in sentence enhancements. *See United States v. Mustafa,*695 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

This court finds no nonfrivolous issues after reviewing the record in accordance with *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988).

The judgment is affirmed, and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

1

. The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 34 (Friday, February 18, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9405-9406]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03507]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11653]


Notice of Determinations; Culturally Significant Objects Being 
Imported for Exhibition--Determinations: ``Igshaan Adams: Desire 
Lines'' Exhibition

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: I 
hereby determine that certain objects being imported from abroad 
pursuant to agreements with their foreign owners or custodians for 
temporary display in the exhibition ``Igshaan Adams: Desire Lines'' at 
the Art Institute of Chicago, in Chicago, Illinois, and at possible 
additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, are of cultural 
significance, and, further, that their temporary exhibition or display 
within the United States as aforementioned is in the national interest. 
I have ordered that Public Notice of these determinations be published 
in the Federal Register.

[[Page 9406]]


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chi D. Tran, Program Administrator, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-
632-6471; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6d1e080e190402035f5958542d1e190c1908430a021b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="89faeceafde0e6e7bbbdbcb0c9fafde8fdeca7eee6ff">[email protected]</span></a>). The mailing address is U.S. 
Department of State, L/PD, 2200 C Street NW (SA-5), Suite 5H03, 
Washington, DC 20522-0505.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The foregoing determinations were made 
pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), E.O. 12047 of March 27, 1978, the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681, 
et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of Authority No. 234 
of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236-3 of August 28, 
2000, and Delegation of Authority No. 523 of December 22, 2021.

Stacy E. White,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Professional and Cultural Exchanges, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2022-03507 Filed 2-17-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P


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</html>
#### Rodney T. KRALOVETZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marion SPEARMAN; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15615

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 20, 2017

Rodney T. Kralovetz, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Rodney T. Kralovetz, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising out of the investigation of allegedly false allega*633tions that he sexually assaulted another inmate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *Belanus v. Clark,*796 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). We vacate and remand.

The district court dismissed Kralovetz’s action for failure to state a due process claim after considering the allegations in the complaint but not the attachments to the complaint, and denied leave to amend as futile. However, we conclude it is not absolutely clear that amendment would be futile. *See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr.,*66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect ... a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). For instance, Kralovetz alleges, including in his motion for reconsideration, that he was held near naked in a booth near an open window in 30 to 40 degree weather for close to three hours, after having been taken from a medical triage unit where he was registering a lower than normal body temperature. We vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to provide Kralovetz with leave to amend his complaint.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
454 A.2d 154

#### Commonwealth v. Jackson, Appellant.

*592Submitted October 13, 1981.

John H. Corbett, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before HESTER, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
#### Olive Howard *versus*Apollos Howard.

An action of debt lies for alimony decreed by this Court, on a sentence of divorce.

The plaintiff was formerly the wife of the defendant, and was divorced, *a vinculo,*in 1814, for the cause of adultery committed by the husband. In addition to the decree of divorce, a decree passed, ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, for alimony, the sum of fifty dollars yearly, in quarter-payments of 12 dollars 50 cents; and the present action was brought to recover two years and three quarters of the said annuity — the plaintiff declaring in debt, as upon a judgment of the Court. The defendant demurred generally to the declaration, and the plaintiff joined in demurrer.

*Baylies*and *Eddy,*for the defendant,

contended that an action of debt would not lie for the plaintiff in the present case, there being no judgment according to the course of * the common law. A writ of error would not lie to reverse it; (1) and of course debt will not lie to enforce it. The proper mode of pursuing the plaintiff’s right, if she has any, is shown in *184the case of *French*vs. *French.**(2)**A*rule to show cause was there issued, and execution might then be obtained, or an attachment for a contempt.

*Winslow*and *Brown*for the plaintiff.

(1)

13 *Mass. Rep.*264

(2)

4 *Mass.*Rep. 588.

*Per Curiam.*

The only question made in this case is, whether an action of debt will lie, to recover the sum ascertained to be due by the decree of this Court for alimony ; and there seems to be no reason why it should not. The debt is certain, and it is proved by record ; and the decree is, in effect, as much a judgment, as if rendered on the common-law side of the Court.

It was once doubted whether an execution could issue, to carry into effect such a decree, and whether the only remedy should not be an action of debt; but there seems no good reason why both the remedies may not exist, *(a)*

*Declaration adjudged good.*

(a)

*Storer*vs. *Storer & Al.*6 *Mass. Rep.*390
Leo RAINS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D17-3138

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 18, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

DISMISSED.
Brents Harper BULLOCK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1188

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 15, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.