alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>



                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Chronimed Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 26, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Henry, F. Blissenbach, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.



                                               /s/ Henry F. Blissenbach
                                               ---------------------------------
                                               Henry F. Blissenbach
                                               Chief Executive Officer
                                               November 5, 2003
Kafele CLARKE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-201

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 2021 KW 1539

VERSUS

LUCAS RODDY FEBRUARY 25, 2022

In Re: Lucas Roddy, applying for supervisory writs, 23rd

Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension, No. 

14, 222. 

BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C. J., PENZATO AND HESTER, JJ. 

WRIT DENIED. 

VGW

AHP

CHH

COURT OF APPEAL, F RST CIRCUIT

DEP Y C ERK OF COURT

F R THE COURT
orbc-ex104_400.htm



 

Exhibit 10.4

Schedule identifying agreements substantially identical to the form of Indemnity Agreement constituting Exhibit 10.3 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2018 entered into by ORBCOMM Inc. and each of the following persons:

Jerome B. Eisenberg

Didier Delepine

Marco Fuchs

Denise Gibson

Karen Gould

Timothy Kelleher

John Major

Gary M. Ritondaro

Marc Eisenberg(1)

Michael W. Ford

Christian G. LeBrun

Craig Malone

Constantine Milcos

John J. Stolte, Jr.

 

(1)Marc Eisenberg has also entered into indemnification agreements in substantially the same form as Exhibit 10.3, in his capacity as director with the following subsidiaries of ORBCOMM Inc.: Satcom International Group Plc. and MITE Global Communications S.A. de C.V.

 

AmericasActive:13117589.1
#### Montee' MERRITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Corey GAY, Defendant-Appellee, City of Waycross, Georgia, Defendant.

No. 16-15913 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed (February 23, 2017)

Reginald Greene, William T. Jones, Greene Legal Group, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Gregory L. Lattimer, Law Office of Gregory L. Lattimer, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Mary Katz, Frances L. Clay, Chambless Higdon Richardson Katz & Griggs, LLP, Macon, GA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before TJOFLAT, HULL, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Monteé Merritt appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Corey Gay on Merritt’s claims against Gay individually under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Merritt claimed that Gay, a City of Way-cross police officer, violated his Fourth Amendment rights and state law when Gay conducted a traffic stop of Merritt’s vehicle and briefly detained him. As to the § 1983 claims, the district court concluded that Merritt failed to show that Officer Gay violated his Fourth Amendment rights or, alternatively, that those Fourth Amendment rights were clearly established. As to the state law claims, the district court concluded that Gay enjoyed official immunity because he was performing discretionary acts during the traffic *638stop and Merritt had not shown that Gay-acted with actual malice.1

After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Gay on the basis of the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned order of August 9, 2016.

Merritt’s argument that the district court failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to him is without merit. The district court’s 44-page order meticulously reviewed the summary judgment facts and, in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and (e), relied upon either undisputed facts or, where there was a dispute about a material fact, Merritt’s version of the facts.

Furthermore, the district court properly considered Officer Gay’s perspective, including Gay’s mistaken belief that Merritt was not wearing a seatbelt, when it evaluated whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion supported the traffic stop. As the district court explained, a police officer’s reasonable but incorrect assessment of the facts may provide the objective basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, under the Fourth Amendment, the propriety of a traffic stop does not depend on whether the driver actually committed a traffic offense, but whether it was reasonable under the circumstances for the officer to believe a traffic offense had been committed).

AFFIRMED.

1

. Merritt does not appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of Waycross on all of Merritt’s claims or to Gay on Merritt's claims against him in his official capacity.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,007,211
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,017,211
<PP&E>                                         531,171
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,242
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,558,152
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          100,587
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       130,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,327,565
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,558,152
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  856,261
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (857,249)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (857,249)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (857,249)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.07)


</TABLE>
Linda PEDROZA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-2151

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 30, 2018]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Matthew Steven Ocksrider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*1129The defendant appeals the circuit court's denial of her motion to correct sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), challenging the forty-year sentence imposed following a second-degree murder conviction. She has not shown that her sentence, imposed when she was a juvenile for the murder of her mother, violates the Eighth Amendment as construed by any decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. Nor has she identified any clear, binding Florida Supreme Court decision that requires resentencing. We note the Florida Supreme Court's recent decisions in both *Morris v. State* , --- So.3d ----, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S223a, 2018 WL 2146786 (Fla. May 10, 2018) and *Williams v. State* , --- So.3d ----, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S183, 2018 WL 1870518 (Fla. Apr. 19, 2018), involved concessions of error by the state.

Thus, we affirm based on *Hart v. State* , --- So.3d ----, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D970a, 2018 WL 2049668 (Fla. 4th DCA May 2, 2018) (en banc). As we did in *Hart* , we certify conflict with *Cuevas v. State* , 241 So.3d 947, 2018 WL 1219720 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 9, 2018), *Blount v. State* , 238 So.3d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018), *Mosier v. State* , 235 So.3d 957 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), *Alfaro v. State* , 233 So.3d 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), and *Burrows v. State* , 219 So.3d 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). We also certify conflict with *Katwaroo v. State* , 237 So.3d 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) and *Tarrand v. State* , 199 So.3d 507 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).

*Affirmed; conflict certified.*

Ciklin, Levine and Kuntz, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hugh EPPS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6335

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 26, 2017

Hugh Epps, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Calvin Moore, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Hugh Epps appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Epps,*No. 3:07-cr-00420-JRS-1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6062 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6062

   To restore the ability of the people of American Samoa to approve 
amendments to the territorial constitution based on majority rule in a 
democratic act of self-determination, as authorized pursuant to an Act 
of Congress delegating administration of Federal territorial law in the 
territory to the President, and to the Secretary of the Interior under 
      Executive Order 10264, dated June 29, 1951, under which the 
Constitution of American Samoa was approved and may be amended without 
requirement for further congressional action, subject to the authority 
  of Congress under the Territorial Clause in article IV, section 3, 
              clause 2 of the United States Constitution.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 25, 2023

Mrs. Radewagen introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To restore the ability of the people of American Samoa to approve 
amendments to the territorial constitution based on majority rule in a 
democratic act of self-determination, as authorized pursuant to an Act 
of Congress delegating administration of Federal territorial law in the 
territory to the President, and to the Secretary of the Interior under 
      Executive Order 10264, dated June 29, 1951, under which the 
Constitution of American Samoa was approved and may be amended without 
requirement for further congressional action, subject to the authority 
  of Congress under the Territorial Clause in article IV, section 3, 
              clause 2 of the United States Constitution.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF RESTRICTION ON AMENDMENTS TO OR MODIFICATIONS OF 
              THE CONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN SAMOA.

    Section 12 of Public Law 98-213 (48 U.S.C. 1662a) is repealed.
                                 <all>
```
STATE of Louisiana v. Justin D. GRANIER

No. 2018-KP-0690

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 18, 2018

**ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ASCENSION**

PER CURIAM:

Granted. Defendant's complaint regarding the seating of the now-deceased juror fails to allege a claim which, if established, would entitle him to relief. La.C.Cr.P. art. 928. *See also* *Burton v. Johnson* , 948 F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1991) ("A party who seeks a new trial because of non-disclosure by a juror during voir dire must show actual bias, either by express admission or proof of specific facts showing a close connection to the circumstances at hand that bias must be presumed."). In addition, defendant has failed to show the state withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of *Brady v. Maryland* , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Therefore, we grant the State's application to vacate the district court's ruling setting this matter for an evidentiary hearing, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

Defendant has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Defendant's claims have now *577been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, defendant has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.
Bryan DIXON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-2870

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

August 16, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Bruce Alan COWART, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-0264

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 11, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
D.R.W. v. T.L.L.

2160166

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 12, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
CITY OF MIAMI GENERAL EMPLOYEES' AND SANITATION EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT TRUST, et al., Appellants, v. Jose RODRIGUEZ, et al., Appellees.

No. 3D17-2802

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed June 13, 2018

Klausner, Kaufman, Jensen & Levinson, and Robert D. Klausner, Adam P. Levinson, and Paul A. Daragjati (Plantation), for appellants.

No appearance for appellees.

Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SUAREZ and SCALES, JJ.

ROTHENBERG, C.J.

The defendants below, City of Miami General Employees' and Sanitation Employees' Retirement Trust, et al. (collectively, "the defendants"), appeal from a non-final order which granted their motion to dismiss Counts I and III of the operative complaint, but denied their motion to dismiss Count II. Following our review of the non-final order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants' response to this Court's order to show cause, we dismiss this non-final appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendants moved to dismiss all counts of the plaintiffs' operative complaint, raising several arguments, including sovereign immunity. During the hearing held on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the issue of sovereign immunity, among others, was raised by the defendants' counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the defendants' motion to dismiss under advisement, and thereafter, the trial court issued a twenty-eight page order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss as to Counts I and III of the operative complaint, but denying the motion to dismiss as to Count II.

Despite the length of the non-final order, the order fails to address the issue of sovereign immunity and there is nothing in the order which reflects that the trial court has ruled on the immunity issue. Thus, this non-final order is not appealable pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(x), which permits the appeal of a non-final order that determines "that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes," or rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(xi), which permits the appeal of a non-final order that determines "that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to sovereign immunity." *See**generally**Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Calonge*, 246 So.3d 447, 2018 WL 1832325 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 18, 2018) ; *Miami-Dade Cty. v. Pozos*, 242 So.3d 1152, 2017 WL 621233 (Fla. 3d DCA Feb. 15, 2017). Accordingly, we dismiss the defendants' appeal of the non-final order as we lack jurisdiction.

Dismissed.
R.C., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-1503

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 07, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

This appeal is dismissed for failure of the appellant to comply with this court's April 18, 2018, order to show cause.

CASANUEVA, KHOUZAM, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lavance PALMER, a.k.a. Rasta, a.k.a. Sean Grant, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-12342 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed (February 13, 2017)

Wifredo A. Ferrer, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, Rinku Talwar Tribuiani, U.S. Attorney’s Office, West Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal.Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, Lavance Palmer, McRae, GA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

*628PER CURIAM:

Robert E. Adler, appointed counsel for Lavance Palmer in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, 'and Palmer’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
Christine JOHNSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. FLETCHER MEDICAL CENTER PHARMACY, INC. and Fletcher Medical Center Associates, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-1196

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
SARASOTA MANATEE JEWISH HOUSING COUNCIL, INC., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. O'KEEFE-PAINTER ARCHITECTS, LLC & Dennis O'Keefe, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-1490

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

May 27, 2009 

s0518 

Order 

 

May 27, 2009 

137849 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137849 

 COA: 278740 

Wayne CC: 06-009547-02 

MAKARRA SANDERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 14, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Gerald DORMEVIL, Appellant, v. Rachelle DORMEVIL O/B/O H.D., a Child, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-4037

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 24, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
IT ALL, INC., It All Leasing, L.L.C., Roller Knights, L.L.C., and Jim Wilhelm v. Austin HINDS, Randall Ferguson, Jacqueline Hinds, and Ferguson Properties, LLC

2160154

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 28, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Louis LAVARIS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-10311 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 6, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Brandon Elliott Beck, David E. Sloan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Louis Lavaris, Jr., appeals his conviction and the 96-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possession of a fee-arm by a convicted felon. He asserts that the Government failed to state a federal offense in his indictment because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face in that the element “in or affecting commerce” cannot be satisfied merely by the possession of a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce at some point in time.

As Lavaris concedes, his argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Daugherty,*264 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2001), in which we held that “the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question,” *id.*at 518 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and *United States v. Luna,*165 F.3d 316, 319-22 (5th Cir. 1999), in which we concluded that § 922(j) was similar to § 922(g) and the phrase “shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce,” provided “the requisite nexus to commerce” to allow Congress to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, Lavaris’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED and the' judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cíe. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.