## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Board of Education of Du Page High School Dis trict 88 v. Pollastrin i ,

2013 IL App (2d) 120460

Appellate Court Caption THE BO ARD OF E DUC ATI ON OF Du PAGE HI GH SCHOOL DI STRI CT 88 and THE BO ARD OF EDUCATI ON OF SAL T CREEK S C H O O L D IS T R IC T 4 8
, P l a i n t i f f s

- A p p e l l e e s , v

. LA U R A POL L ASTRI

NI
, in h er o fficia l capa city ; TI MOTHY WHELAN, in his officia l capacity ; J AMES SHEHEE, in his officia l capa city ; GENE CA M PB E L L
, in h is o f

f ic ial capa city ; J OSEPH WOZN I AK, in his officia l
capa city ; MARTHA J

. RODGERS, in her officia l capa city ; GL ORI A SCI GOUSKY, in her officia l capa city ; THE Du PAG E C OUNTY R E G IO N A L B O A R D O F S C H O O L T R U S T E E S ; N A N C Y BA RNHARDT, SHEL L Y BL EDS OE, STEVEN BO UCHER, J OHN GEAREN, BEN J AMI

N KL OSTERMAN, EL L I OT L EWI S, KE I TH L OPA TKA, KATHL EEN OCZ AK, ANN SCOTT, and BRETT SI MONS, Collectively Known as the Commi ttee of Ten; THE BO ARD OF EDUCATI ON OF BU TL ER SCHOOL DI STRI CT 53; and THE BO ARD OF EDUCATI ON OF HI NS DAL E TOWNSHI P HI GH SCHOOLDI STRI CT 86, Defe ndants-Appe llants.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-12-0460

Filed August 29, 2013

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab u s

con st it ut e s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) A trial court’s rev ersal of plaintiff school boards’ order s g ranting defe ndants’ petition to detac h their subdivision fr o m p la in ti f f d is tr icts and

annex the subdivision to two other districts was aff irmed, since defe ndants failed to f

ile the requisite number of sig nature s substantially complying with the statutory mandate that the signe rs’ signatures match the sig nature s on the voters’ r eg istration car ds.Dec ision Under

Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Du Pag e County
, Nos. 11-MR-152, 11- MR-897; the Hon. Bonnie M. Wheaton, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.

Counsel on Appea l J

. Timothy Eaton and Patricia S. Spratt, both of Shefsky & Fr oelich, L td., of Chicag o, and Christopher J

. Stull
, of L aw Offic e of C h ri s t o pher J

. Stull , P.C., of W est Chicag o, for a ppellants.

Wil liam F. Gleason and Daniel M. Boy le, both of Srag a Hause r, L L C, of Flossmoor, for appellee Boa rd of Education of Du P age Hi g h School District 88.

P eter K. Wil son, J r., of Mickey
, Wil son, Weiler, Renzi & Ander ss o n , P.C., of Aurora
, for appellee Boa rd of Education of Salt C re ek S ch ool District 48.

Panel J USTI CE SCHOSTOK deliv e r e d th e ju d gme n t of the court, with opinion.
J ustice Hutchinson spec ially concur red, w ith opinion.
J ustice B irkett specia lly

concur red, w ith opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 This case involves a detac hment p et i t i o n af fe ct i n g t h e T imber Trails-Me rry L ane Subdivis io n (Tim ber Trails) in Oak Br ook. The subdivision is located direc tly south of Roosevelt Road and is border ed by the Yorkshire Woods to th e ea s t and the Oak Br ook shopping cente r to the west. The subdivision has been sending children to Salt Creek School District 48 (District 48) and Wil lowbrook Hig h School District 88 (District 88) for more than 30 y ear s. On September 8, 2010, pursuant to the I llinois School Code (105 I L CS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2010)), the petitioners, Nanc y Ba rnhar dt, S h el l y Ble dsoe, Steven Bouc her, J ohn Gea ren, Be njamin Klosterman, Elliot L ewis, Keith L opatka, Kathlee n Ocz a k
, Ann Scott, and Br ett Simons
, filed a petition with the Reg ional Boa rd of School Trustee s of Du Pag e County (the Boa rd) for detac hment. The petitioners soug ht to detac h the Timber Trails are a from Districts 48 and 88 and have the are a annexed into Butler School District 53 (District 53) and Hinsdale Central Hig h School District 86 (District 86). On J une 3, 2011, the Boa rd enter ed

an order g ranting the petition for detac hment. On April 6, 2012, the circ uit court of Du Pag e County reve rsed the B oard’ s order . The pe titioners appea l from that orde r. We aff irm.

-2-¶ 2 BA CKGROUND

¶ 3 On September 8, 2010, the petitioners filed the petition for detac hment. In support of the petition, the petitioners attache d 256 signatures. In respons e, Districts 48 and 88 (the Districts) filed a motion to dismiss
, arguing that 97 of the signatures filed in suppor t of the petition wer e not valid, b ec au s e t h ey did not match the officia l signa tures on file with the Du P ag e C ounty elec tion authority

. Be cause the petit ioners had filed onl y 159 (256 m inus 97) valid signatures, the Districts argued, the petitioners had not f iled enoug h signatures to confe r jurisdiction on the Boa rd. ¶ 4 On J an u ar y 1 0
, 2 0 11, the Boa rd conducte d a hear ing on the motion to dismiss

. T h e petitioners’ attorney made an offe r of proof that all of the people who circ ulated the petition would testify that all the people who had signe d the petiti o n we re re gistered voters who resided in the petitioning territory and had g iven their valid signatures. Fur ther, all the people who had circ ulated the petition had sworn and attested to a circ ulator’s oath in the prese nce of a nota ry public. One of

the B oard me mbers stated:
“I don’t understand why we don’t trust the circ ulator, the circ ulator’s signature for all of the names on the sheet. And so, just compar e the circ ulators’ signatures that the Notary Public has attested to.”
In response , the Districts’ attorney s argued that, under the applicable statute, it did not matter wh at t h e circ ulators would testify to; what mattere d was whether the voters’ purporte d signatures on the petition matched their officia l signatures with the Du Pag e County elec tion authorit y

. At the close of the hear ing, the Boa rd denied the motion to dismiss

. The Boa rd explained that it had “conside red the challeng ed sig nature s and dete rmined that there wer e enoug h v a li d s ig

n a tu r e s c o nta in e d w it

hin the Petition to meet the jurisdictional require ments” of the School Code. ¶ 5 On J une 3, 2011, the Board entere d an order gra nting the petition for detachment. The Districts there afte r filed a timely complaint for administrative revie w in the circ uit court of Du Pag e County

. On April 6, 2012, the circ uit court reve rsed the Boa rd’s order

. The petitioners appe al from that or der.

¶ 6 ANALYSI S ¶ 7 T h e Di s t ri ct s argue that 97 of the signatures on the petition did not match the ver ified
voter reg istration signatures on file at the Du Pag e County Election Commi ssion. I f those 97 signatures ar e re moved, only 159 rema in, which is insufficient for the petition to procee d. ¶ 8 Section 7-1(a ) of the School Code provides that two-thirds of the reg istered voters in a ny territory to be detac hed must sign the underlying pe tition. 105 I L CS 5/ 7-1(a ) (West 2010). Eac h signature contained on the petit ion “shall m atch the officia l signatu re and address of the reg istered voters as rec orded in the office of the elec t i o n au thority having jurisdiction

over the county .” Id. The number of signatures called for by the statute is a jurisdictional require ment for detac hment. Board of E ducation of Comm unity High School District 94 v

. Regional Board of School Trustees , 242 I ll. App. 3d 229, 237-39 (1993).

-3-¶ 9 Acc ording to the pet i t i o n , t h er e wer e 362 reg istered voters residing in the proposed

detac hment territory at the time the detac hment petition was filed. Thus, in order to comply with section 7-1(a ) of the School Code, the petition neede d to be supported by the signatures of 242 re g istered voter s. The pe tition contained 256 signatures. 1 ¶ 10 “The fundame ntal principle of statutory construction is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the intention of the leg islature by g iving the languag e of the statute its p l ai n and ordinary meaning .” Board of

Education of Chenoa Community Unit School District No. 9 v. Regional Board of S

ch o o l Trustees
, 266 I ll. App. 3d 461, 465 (1994). “The sections of the School Code are in pari materia
, and they must be construed with ref ere nce to one another in order
to g ive harmonious meaning to the act as a whole.” Maiter v. Chicago Board ofEducation
, 82 I ll. 2d 373, 389 (1980). ¶ 11 The term “shall” ty pically indicates a mandatory rathe r than a d ire c to r y provision. Schultz

v. Performance Lighti ng, Inc.
, 2013 I L App (2d) 120405, ¶ 13. A mandatory provision does
not alway s require strict compliance and might be satisfied throug h substantial compliance

. Id

. S t rict compliance will be require d if the term “shall” is acc ompanied by some sort of penalty or conseque nce. Id. ¶ 14. Where the term is not acc ompanied by some sort of penalty

or conseque nce, substantial compliance is sufficie nt. Id. Our courts have interpre ted section 7-1 of the School Code to require on l y s ub stantial compliance

. See Ambrose v. Thornton Townshi p School T

rustees , 274 I ll. App. 3d 676, 684 (1995). The term “match” is defined

as a “thing equal or simil ar to another .” www.mer riam-we bster.com/dictionar y /match (last visited Feb. 28, 2013)

. ¶ 12 The issue thus bec o m es wh et h er the signa tures on the petition substantially complied with the statutory mandate that they match the signatures on the voter reg istration c ards. In finding that t h e s i g nature s matched, the Boa rd nece ssarily deter

mined that there was substantial compliance. ¶ 13 In re v i ew i n g t h e Bo ar d ’s d ecision, the parties disag ree as to the proper standard of revie w. The petitioners argue that the Boa rd’s findingas to the validity of the sig nature s is

no differ ent from any other finding that the Boa rd m akes; thus, its decision is entitled to defe renc e an d s h o u l d be reve rsed only if ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. See Board of Education of Marquardt School District No. 15 v. Regional Board of School Trustees
, 2012 I L App (2d) 110360, ¶ 20 (fa ctual deter minations by an administrative ag ency

are held to be prima facie true and co rr ec t an d wi ll stand unless contra ry to the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e). Relying on Addison Insu r a n ce Co

. v. Fay
, 232 I ll. 2d 446, 453 (2009), the Districts insist that the standard of revie w should be de novo beca use this c ourt

can revie w as well as the Boa rd whether the signatures on the detac hment petition match the signatures on the ve rified r eg istration signature for ms. ¶ 14 In Fay
, at issue was what standard of revie w the court should employ in revie wingcer tain fac tual finding s that the trial cour t had made. Id. at 451. The supr eme c ourt stated:
“In this case , the trial court hear d no live testimony

. Both parties acknow ledg ed at

T wo- thi rds of 362 is 241. 33. T hus
, the pet i t i on nee ded to have at le ast 242 si gnatur es to 1 comply with th e s ta tut e.

-4-oral argument that all testimony was submitt ed by admitting discovery depositions into evidenc e. The trial court was not requ i red to g aug e the demea nor and cre dibilit y of witnesses. [C itation.] Instead, the trial court made fac tual finding s based upon the exact

rec ord prese nted to both the appellate court and to this court. Wit hout having hear d live testimony , the trial cour

t was i n no superior position than any revie wing court to make finding s, and so a more defe rential standard of revie w is not war rante d. Thus, althoug h this court has not done so rec ently
, we reiter ate that wher e the evidenc e befo re a t rial
court consists of depositions, transcr ipts, or evidenc e otherwise documentar y in nature , a revie wing court is not bound by the trial court’s finding s and may revie w the rec ord de

novo .” Id. at 453.
Her e, t h e Boa

rd’s decision as to the validity of the signatures was not based on any live testimony but rathe r was based on the exact rec ord that has been pres en t ed to this court. Thus, it is proper for this cour t t o em p l o y a de novo standard of revie w. See id. ; see also Ambrose
, 274 I ll. App. 3d at 681 (a revie win g court may evaluate de novo documentar y evidenc e pre sented in an a dminist rative pr ocee ding)

. ¶ 15 In so ruling
, we find the petitioners’ relianc e on Hoxha v. LaSalle National Bank
, 365 I ll. App. 3d 80, 85 (2006), to be misplaced. In Hoxha
, at i s s u e wa s whether the dece dent had signe d a d o cu m ent that provided for the sale of cer tain proper

ty to the plaintiffs upon her death. The plaintiffs prese nted the testimony of a fore nsic document examiner who testified that the signature o n t h e d o cument was the dece dent’s. There was also evidenc e that, althoug h the document had been notarized, the notary had backda ted the document. Fur

ther, the executor of the dece dent’s estate testified that, althoug h she had been the dece dent’s friend for over 25 y ear s, she was not awa re of the document until the plaintiffs sent it to her afte r the dece dent’s death. At the cl ose of the trial, the trial court deter mined that the plaintiffs had failed to p ro v e that the decedent had executed the document. The revie wing
court aff irmed, explaining that the trial court’s deter mination that the signature at issue was not a uthentic was not a g ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e in lig ht of the suspicious circ umstances of the case

. Id. The revie wing court further stated that “[t] he trial court, as finder of fac t, had the rig ht to make its own handwr iting sample compar isons when deciding whether the signature was authentic, expert opinion or not.” Id. As “the trial court had more than compar isons; it had circ umstances that led it to the conclusion [t hat the plaintiffs] wer e not worthy of belief,” the revie wing court would not dis t u rb i t s decision. Id. Thus, as live testimony was at issue in Hoxha , that case is not applicable to the c ase be fore us. 2 ¶ 16 We there fo re turn to a consideration of the signatures that the petitioners submitt ed in support of their detac hment petitio n

. W e n o t e that there is a dear th of I llinois law on the subject of how such signatures should be analy zed. Howeve r, in considering exis ting I llinois law as well as fore ign authorities, cer tain standards emer g e. Substantial compliance will be

We not e tha t ei the r par ty cou ld have sou ght to have the peo ple who purpor te dly si gned the 2 pet it ion s tes ti fy tha t the si gnatur es app ear ing on the pet it ion wer e in fact (or wer e not in fac t) the ir si gnatur es. I f the re had bee n suc h test imony , we woul d neces sar il y def er to the Boar d’s cr edi bil it y det erm ina ti ons and employ a m ani fe st

- wei ght- of-the- eviden ce st and ar d of re view.

-5-found if the signature transposes the first name and middle initi al (B oard of Education of

W apella Community Unit Sc hool D istrict No. 5 v. Re gional Board of School Trustees
, 247 I ll. App. 3d 555, 560 (1993))
, if the middle initial is omitted ( People ex rel. Owen v. Dunn
, 247 I ll. 410, 413 (1 9 1 0)), if a suffix, such as J unior, is omitted ( Morton v. State Officers Electoral Board , 311 I ll. App. 3d 982, 985 ( 2000)), or if a c ommon shortened ver sion of a first name (such as Ray

) is use d instead of the full first name (such as Ray mond) ( Bonardo

v. People
, 182 I ll. 411, 424 (1899); In re Nomination Petition of Gales
, 54 A.3 d 855, 859 (Pa. 2012)). Substantial compliance will not be found if one uses an initial for a first or last

name. In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty
, 770 A.2d 327, 332 (Pa. 2001). S i m i l arly
, if using an initial instead of a full first name is not substantial compliance
, then omitti ng a first

or last name completely is not substantial complia n c e

. Se e id

. F u r th e r , substantial compliance will not be found if the signature is printed ra t h er t han in cursive as it appea rs on the

corr esponding reg istration form. State ex rel. Rogers v. Taft
, 594 N.E.2d 576, 579 (Ohio 1992). ¶ 17 Ba sed on the above standards, the petitioners d i d n o t s u b m it sufficie nt signatures to confe r jurisdiction on the Boa rd. Six teen of the people signing the petition use d initials for either their first names or both their first and last names instead of spelling out their first and last names as they

did on their voter r eg istration car ds. Moreove r, four of t he si g nature s at issue, in contra st to the voter reg istration car ds, did not g ive any first name at all. One of the people signing the petition wrote i n cu rs i v e rather than printing as she did on her voter reg istration car d. Thus, these 21 signatures must be subtracte d from t h e 2 56 that the petitioners submitt ed, which means that the petitioners submitt ed only 235 valid signatures. As this was less than t he st atut o ry m i nimum (242) to confe r j urisdiction on the Board, we need not consider the other signatures that the Districts complain of on appea l. Acc ording ly
, the circ uit court proper ly reve rsed the Boa rd’s decision g ranting the petitioners the relief they
soug ht. ¶ 18 In so ruling
, we note this court’s disag ree ment with some o f t h e analy sis set forth in Ambrose

. In Ambrose
, at issue was whether the signature sheets that wer e submitt ed in favor of a d e ta chment petition wer e insufficient beca use the addre sses listed on the signature sheets did not perf

ectly match the addre sses listed on the signe rs’ officia l voter reg istrations car ds. Ambrose
, 274 I ll. App. 3d at 683. Specifica lly
, the addre sses at issue omitted such words as “ave nue,” “stree t,” and “roa d.” Id. The Ambrose court deter mined that the word “match” in section 7-1 meant “that the identity of the reg istered voter mu s t b e capa ble of being deter mined.” Id. at 684. Ba sed on this interpre tation o f section 7-1, the Ambrose court conclude d that the signatures at issue did not have to be stricken, beca use the discrepa

ncies betwee n th e s i gn at u re sheets and the officia l reg istration car ds wer e minor and it was possible to deter

mine whether there was a “match” so that the identities of the signe rs could be asc erta ined. Id. ¶ 19 W e d o n o t disag ree with the result in Ambrose as it is appar ent that the addre sses in dispute in that case wer e in substant i al compli ance with section 7-1. Howeve r, we believe that the Ambrose court’s definition of the term “match” is too narr ow, in that this definition does not promote the principle that signature require ments are incorporated int o v arious
statutes so as to deter fra

ud and to protec t the integ rity of the political proce ss. See DeFabio

-6-v. Gumme rsheimer
, 192 I ll. 2d 6 3
, 6 8 -6 9 (2000). In DeFabio
, an elec tion judge failed to

comply with the statute and write his initials on ballots t h at h ad b ee n cast in a particula r prec inct. The c ircuit court invalidate d all of the ba llots t hat had not bee n proper ly initialed and the supre me cour

t subsequently

aff irmed, explaining:
“ ‘As our s t at u t e makes it absolutely nece ssary that ever y ballot shall bear the officia l endorse m en t in the manner afor esaid, we must hold that the elec tion in this case was void, althoug h there is no evidenc e in the rec ord that discloses any fra ud or intended fra ud upon the part of the elec tion judge s. We think it would be a very dang erous rule to establish that the elec tion judges ma y disreg ard the plain provisions of this statute, and there by defe at the intention of the law to preve nt actua l fra uds from being committed in elec tions and to disarm the constituted authorities of the eff icient means provided by the
statute for detec ting such fra uds. Such salutary laws should not be repe aled, in eff ect, by th e ac t i o n o f elec tion judge s simply beca use t heir mi stakes are innocent or because an honest voter may lose his vote by holding such mistakes fata l. I t is more pref era ble that

a voter should lose his vote by the innocent action of the judge s and by his own neg lect
to see it that he v o t es a b allot proper ly endorse d by a judge
, than to open the doors to wholesale fra

ud and corr

uption. Every voter is presumed to know the law, and by proper

car e o n h i s p art he can know, and should know, that the ballot delivere d to him is
proper ly endorse d by o n e o f t h e elec tion judge s with his own initials.’ ” Id. (quoting Laird v. W

illiams , 281 I ll. 233, 241-42 (1917)). ¶ 20 Her e, as stated above, the plain languag e of section 7-1 provides that the signature in the petition sha ll matc h the officia l sig nature on file. Not only is this to ensure that the identity of the reg istered voter can be deter mined, it is also to ensure that the doors to fra ud and dece it are not opened. See id. As t h e p etitioners failed to file the requisite signatures, the Boa rd di d not have jurisdiction to consider their petition. To h o l d o t herw ise would thwart the clea r purposes of the statute. Acc ording ly
, the circ uit court proper ly reve rsed the Boa rd’s decision g rantingthe petitioners the r elief the y soug ht. ¶ 21 In so ruling
, we reje ct J ustice Birke tt’s asser tion that the circ ulators’ proff ere d testimony

was sufficie nt to establish the validity of the signatures in question. Initially
, we disag ree with his deter

mination that, by not objecting to the petitioners’ offe r of proof that the circ ulators would testify that the signatures they had collecte d wer e authentic, the Districts somehow “stipulated” that the petitioners had submitt ed enoug h valid signatures. In making this argument, J ustice Birke tt relies extensively on criminal law authority

. Such authority has limit ed rele vance in the civil dispute befor e us. See Board of Educati o n o f In dian Prairie School District No. 204 v. Du Page County Election Co mm ’n
, 341 I ll. App. 3d 327, 334 (2003) ( criminal liability

and civil liability

are very differ ent things a s criminal defe ndants

are ty pically provided more protec tion than civil defe ndants). Fur ther, to the extent that such authority is applicable
, it is clea r that an o ff

er o f p roof is not equivalent to a stipulation. People v . W

illiams , 329 I ll. App. 3d 846, 856 (2002). ¶ 22 Most importantly
, even if the Dis tricts somehow st ipulat ed what the circulators would have testified to, that testimony would not have been sufficie nt to establish that the signatures at issue wer e valid. The circ ulators could testify only that the people who signe d the petition
repr esente d that they wer e elig ible to sign the petition. The circ ulators could not testify that

-7-a p er s o n signing the petition was indeed the person he or she claimed to be. To fin d

otherwise would open t h e d o ors to fra ud and dece it. See DeFabio
, 192 I ll. 2d at 68-69. I t would also rende r the signature require ment of section 7-1(a ) meaning less as a circ ulator’s testimony coul d t ru m p t h e fac t that a signature on a petition bore no rese mblance to the voter’s officia l signature. This court, of course , must not interpre t any statutory provision as meaning less. See Madison Two Associates v. Pappas , 227 I ll. 2d 474, 493 (2008) (I llinois courts must construe statutes so that no pa rt is rende red a

nullity). ¶ 23 Finally
, I note that I do not disag ree with any thing that Justi ce H utchinson states in he r specia l concur

renc e. Howeve r, as there wer e not enou gh v ali d signatures to confe r jurisdiction on the Boa

rd, this court may not addre ss any of the other issues that the Districts raise. See People v. W

hite
, 2011 I L 109689, ¶ 153 (the appellate court should not eng ag e in

an ana ly sis of issues that are unnece ssary to its resolution of the appea l).

¶ 24 CONCL USI ON ¶ 25 For th e fo re go i n g re as o n s , t h e j udg ment of the circ uit court of Du Pag e County is aff irmed.

¶ 26 Affir

med.

¶ 27 J USTI CE HUTCHI NSON, spec ially

concur ring

. ¶ 28 I ag ree with J ustice Schostok that the petitioners failed to submit enoug h valid signatures to confe r jurisdiction on the Boa rd. Even if enough signatures had been submitt ed, howeve r, Inote that the trial c ourt corr ectly deter mined that the petition f

or deta chment wa s without merit. This conclusion become s inesca pable once the applicable law and the evidenc e in this

case are considere d. ¶ 29 School district boundary chang es are g overne d by section 7-1 et seq. of the School Code (105 I L CS 5/7-1 et seq. (West 2010)). Section 7-6(i) of the School Code provides that, at a hear ing on a petition f

or detac hment and anne x ation, the re g ional board of school trustees: “shall hear evidenc e as to the school needs and conditions of the territory in the area within and adjac ent there to and as to the ability of the districts aff ecte d to meet the standards of rec og nition as presc ribed by the State Boa rd of Education, and shall take into c onsideration the division of funds and assets which will result from the chang e of boundarie s and shall deter mine whether it is in the best interests of the schools of the are a and the educational welfa

re of the pupils that such chang e in boundarie s be g rante d.” 105 I L CS 5/ 7-6(i) ( West 2010). ¶ 30 The parties seeking annexation and detac hment have the burden o f p ro v i ng that “the

overa ll benef

it to t h e an nexing district and the detac hment are a clea rly outweig hs the resulting detriment to the losing district and the surrounding community as a whole.” Carver

v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees
, 146 I ll. 2d 347, 356 (1992). Petitioners must prove their case by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. See 5 I L CS 100/10-15 (West 2010). The pa

rty bear ing the burden of proof reta ins throughout the pr ocee dings the

-8-burden of persua sion as to th e fa ct s underly ing its claim. Ambrose v. Thornton Townshi p School Trustees
, 274 I ll. App. 3d 676, 680 (1995). The party also bear s initially the burden of production, which it satisfi es by prese nting sufficie nt evidenc e on eac h element of its

cause of action to establish a prima facie case

. Ambrose
, 2 7 4 I l l

. Ap p

. 3d at 680. A prima facie case is established by evidenc e that would enable the trier of fac t to find eac h element

o f t h e ca u se of action more probably true than not. Anderson v. Departme nt of Public Property
, 140 I ll. App. 3d 772, 778 (1986). I f the opposing party produce s no evidenc e that
contra dicts or impeache s this evidenc e, the trier of fac t m u s t rule for the burdene d party

. Anderson , 140 I ll. App. 3d at 778. ¶ 31 The reg ional board of school t ru s t ee s ’ d ec i s i o n o n a p eti tion for detac hment and annexation is an administrative decision for p u rp o s es of the Administrative Review L aw (735 I L CS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2010)). A revie wing court considers the fac tual finding s of

an administrative ag ency to be prima facie true and corr ect. 735 I L CS 5/3-110 (West 2010). The reve rsal of an administrative ag ency ’s fac tual findi n g i s wa rr anted only wher e the finding is ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e, i.e.
, it is clea rly evident that the ag ency should have rea ched the opposite conclusion. City of Freeport v. Illinois S tate Labor Relations Board
, 135 I ll. 2d 499, 507 (1990); Pochopien v. Regional Board of School Trustees of the Lake County Educational Servic e Region
, 322 I ll. App. 3d 185, 193 (2001). When we revie w an administrative order that involves mix ed questions of fac t and law, the
proper standard of revie w is “cle arly er ro neous.” City of Belvide re v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board
, 181 I l l

. 2 d 191, 205 (1998). Dec isions of an administrative ag ency on questions of law, such as the interpre tation of a statute, are revie wed de novo. City of Freeport , 135 I ll. 2d at 507. ¶ 32 In applying the “bene fit/detriment test,” re g ional boards a nd the courts revie wingtheir actions shoul d consider the following fac tors: (1) the differ ence s betwee n school fac iliti es and curr icula; (2) the distances from the petitioners’ homes to the respe ctive schools; (3) the eff ect detac hment would have on the ability of either district to meet the state’s standards of

rec og nition; (4) the impact the proposed boundary chang e will have on the tax re venues of both districts; and (5) whe ther a detac hing district will rema in financia lly healthy and able
to meet state standards of rec og nition. Carver
, 146 I ll. 2d at 356; Duke tt v. Regional Board

o f S ch o o l Trustees
, 342 I ll. App. 3d 635, 641 (2003). The mere absenc e of substant i al detriment to either district is not sufficie nt to support a petition for detac hm en t and annexation. Carver
, 146 I l l

. 2d at 358. Howeve r, petitioners need not demonstrate a particula r benef it to the annexing district as l o n g as the overa ll benef it to the annexing district and the detac hment are a considere d toge ther outweig hs the resulting detriment to the losing district and the surrounding community as a whole. Carver
, 146 I ll. 2d at 358 (citing Board of Education of Golf School District No. 67 v. Regional Board ofSchool Trustees
, 89 I ll. 2d 392, 400-01 (1982)). I n the absence of substanti al d et ri m ent to either district, some benef i t t o t h e educational welfa re of the students in the detac hment are a is sufficie nt to

war rant the grantingof a pe tition for detachme nt. Carver , 146 I ll. 2d at 358. ¶ 33 The Carver court offe red s o m e ad v i ce reg arding the balanc ing test and the re levant fac tors. The loss of reve nue is not a deter minative fac tor in detac hment proce ed i n gs an d alone will not preve nt a boundary chang e if the district subject to detac hment is not levying

-9-at the maxi mum tax rate

. Carver
, 146 I ll. 2d at 356-57. Although financ ial loss to the

detac hing district is not irrele vant, i t ca n n o t s er v e as the basis for a denial of detac hment unless it is serious. Carver , 146 I ll. 2d at 357. ¶ 34 Educational welfa re is broadly i n t er

p re t ed

. Ca r ve r , 1 4 6 I l l

. 2d at 359. Students’ educational welfa

re is bettere d not just throug h improved educa tional prog rams or fac iliti es. Carver
, 146 I ll. 2d at 359-60. I mprovement may occu r by way of a shortened distance betwee n students’ homes and their school. Carver
, 146 I ll. 2d at 359-60; see Pochopien
, 322 I ll. App. 3d at 194 (citingexamples of educa tional welfa

re)

. ¶ 35 In addition to the fac tors set forth above, courts m ay co n s i der the “whole child” and “community of interest” fac tors. Carver
, 146 I ll. 2d at 356. These fac tors examine “the identification of the petitioning territory with the district to which annexation is soug ht and the corr esponding likelihood of participation in school and extracurr icular activities.” Carver , 146 I ll. 2d at 356. ¶ 36 Iturn to a consider ation of ea ch of the Carver fac tors.

¶ 37 DI FF ERENCES BETWEEN SCHOOLFACI L I TI ES AND CURRI CULA ¶ 38 Caroly

n Shield, an expert witness on school curr iculum, testified that she had compa red the curr icula of Wil lowbrook Hig h School (District 88) and H insdale Central Hig h School (District 86). She conclude d that the curr icula in both schools wer e “substantially the same,” althoug h the test score s in District 86 were highe r than those in District 88. ¶ 39 Ann Scott, one of the petitioners, testified t h at s h e h ad 1 0 y ea rs ’ ex p erience in developing y outh prog rams and curr icula. Relying on the same documents that Shields had, Scott deter

mined that District 86 offe red 26% more advanc ed place ment and honors course s and 31% more total courses tha n District 88. ¶ 40 No expert testimony reg arding the differ ence in curr iculum betwee n Districts 48 and 53

was prese nted. There was evidenc e that District 53 had better standardized test score s than District 48. The petitioners extrapolate that Di s t ri ct 53 must be better than District 48 b ec au se “there is nothing else in the R ecor d to explain the t est score differ entials betwee n children in th e two Districts other than the method of instruction and the quality of the
teac hing staff.” To this point, Districts 48 and 88 respond that there was no evidenc e in the

rec ord to demonstrate that the differ ence s in the test score s will provide any educational benef it to the students. ¶ 41 District 88 further argues t hat t her e was evidence (the testim ony of Darryl Thompson) that many of the students at Hinsdale Central have their education supplemented by private tutors, which undoubtedly leads to greater a cade mic succe ss and hig her school test scores. Fur ther, District 88 had 31% of its students i dentified a s low income in compar ison to 4%
at Hinsdale. At District 88, 3.5% of the students wer e identified as h av i n g E n glish as a second languag e while 0.9% had that identification at Hinsdale. At District 88, there was a 7.9% mobilit y rate (students who would transfe r in or out of school) while the mobilit y rate at Hinsdale was only 3.2%. These fac tors demonstrate that there are more socioec onomically disadvantag ed students at District 88 than Hinsdale, a s well as more students who enter or leave the school af

ter fr eshman y ear

.

-10-¶ 42 In its finding s the Boa rd found that “the evidenc e showed that if the Petition was grante d, the fac iliti es of the aff

ecte d districts would be substantially the same, and that the curr iculum would be subst antially the s ame.” Such a finding cannot be said to be a g ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. Such a finding would also weig h ag ainst g ranting the detac hment petition.

¶ 43 DI STANCE FROM PROPOSED DETACHMENT AREA TO SCHOOL S ¶ 44 The evidenc e showed that the distances from the detac hment ar ea t o t h e s ch o o l s in District 48 wer e somewhat simil ar to the distance to the Butler school. Howeve r, the distance from the detac hment are a to H insdale Central Hig h School is considera bly longe r than it is
to Wil lowbrook High S chool. According to a school bus driver (Patricia W udi), the t rave l from the are a to Willowbrook Hig h is betwee n 14 and 15 miles a nd takes 27 to 33 minutes (including bus stops). I f she did not make any bus stops and drove direc tly to Wil lowbrook Hig h from the are a, the trip would be about 61⁄2 miles a nd would take her 12 to 14 minutes. I f she drove straig ht to Hi n s d al e Central High S chool, i t would take her approx imately 27 minutes. Given her experience in planning and driving bus routes, she thought that, beca use of the cost, it would be highly doubtful that a bus to Hinsdale Central Hig h School would be dedicated solely to the children of the detac hment are a. She testified that, if regular bus stops

wer e made, it would take much longe r than 27 minutes t o re ac h Hi n sdale Central Hig h School. ¶ 45 Fur

ther, acc ording to the sc hool bus driver, the route to Hinsdale Central has sig nificantly

more safe ty hazards than the route to W i llowbrook Hig h School, including sever al major i n t er s ections, exit s from the expressway , and roug h railroa d crossing s. The route to Wil lowbrook Hig h School has minimal exposure to major highw ay s, no railroa d crossing s, and far few er safet y o b s tacles than the route to Hinsdale Central. The reg ional superintende nt’s repor

t stated that “new and y oung drivers will be driving far ther distances for those times bus transpor tation is not provided for af ter school sports a

nd activities.” ¶ 46 The Boa

rd found that “issues such as distance of the petit i o n i n g t er ri t o ry to all of the

s ch o ols and school bus availability to be relatively equal in terms of any eff ect on the districts.” This finding w as ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidence. W udi’s testimony clea rly indicated that Hinsdale C en t ra l Hig h School was approximately twice as far awa y from the Timber T ra ils subdivision as Wil lowbrook Hig h School was. This fac tor weig hs
ag ainst detac hment.

¶ 47 EFF ECT BOU NDARY CHANG E WOUL D HAVE ON TAXREVENUE ¶ 48 District 48 prese nted evidenc e that it is having financ ial strug g les. For the 2011-12 fiscal
y ea r, it was projec ting a $209,000 defic it, even without the detac hment. District 48 is at maxi mum tax rate s (under the proper ty tax extension limit ation law) and has a history of five failed ref ere ndums to incre ase its tax rate s. I f the detac hment petition wer e approve d, using the ca lculations of the petitioners’ witness, J im Scott, the deta chment would pre sent a loss of at least $442,519 annually in tax reve nues. I f District 48 wer e to lose that much reve nue, it would have to cut specia l service s for low income people as well as service s for its g ifted

-11-prog ram.

¶ 49 District 88 would lose approximately $614,503 if the detac hment petition wer e g rante d. Distri ct 8 8 pointed out that, the y ear befor e the detac hment hear ing, it had reduc ed its
teac hing staff by 30, reduc ed the supplies that it was purchas i n g, re d uced travel ex penses, reduc ed contra ctual obligations with outside vendors, and reduc ed the number of custodians, clerical staff, and office assistants in order to save approximately $3 milli on. District 88
argued that it was alre ady operating on a sever ely lean budg et; any future cuts will be to teac hers. ¶ 50 T h e Bo ar d found that the “loss of tax reve nue to the detac hing districts was m i n i m al when compar ed to the schools’ overa ll budg ets.” (The rec ord reveal s t h at the loss of tax

reve nue at issue made up about 2% of District 48 and District 88’s respe ctive budg ets.) The Boa rd fur ther stated that it had “conside red the cre dibilit y of the financ ial testimony and evidenc e prese nted by t h e objecting school districts and found that evidenc e to be flawe d, prese nti n g a s k ew ed calc ulation of the possible financ ial loss to the districts. [W e] found that the explanation for these inacc urac i es wa s less than sufficie nt to support the objectors’ claim of dire
conseque nces if the Petition was gr anted.” ¶ 51 The loss of tax reve nue must be considere d in the context of the detac hing district’s tax
rate s; if the district is levying the maxi mum rate s and thus cannot incr ease its revenue , the detac hment might be unduly sever e. Richmond v. County Board of School Trustees , 93 I ll. Ap p

. 2 d 1 4 2
, 145 (1968). A substantial reduc tion in tax reve nue to the detac hing district
, with a corr esponding adver se financ ial impact, can repr esent a signific ant rea son to reje ct a detac hment petition. Oakdale Community Consolidat ed S ch o o l District No. 1 v. County Board of School Trustees , 12 I ll. 2d 190, 193 (1957). ¶ 52 The Boa

rd’s decision on this point was ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. Eve n if District 48 overstate d how much money it would lose and its overa ll p o o r financ ial condition (there is no alleg ation that District 88 overstate d its poor financ ial condition), the fac ts rema in that both Districts 48 and 88 would lose a signific ant amount of money (at least $442,519 for District 48 and $614,503 for District 88) at a time when both w ere strug g ling financ iall y

. This fac tor weig hed ag ainst detac hment. See Oakdale
, 12 I ll. 2d at 193; Richmond , 93 I ll. App. 2d at 145.

¶ 53 AB I L I TY TO MEET STATE STANDARDS OF RECOGN I TI ON ¶ 54 The Boa

rd found that “the evidenc e showed that the eff ect of the detac hment would have littl e impact on the ability to meet state standards of rec og nition.” District 88 does not specific ally

ref ute this finding. District 48 argues t hat, i n light of its recent budg etar y cuts, if it had to make additional cuts due to the detac hment petition, it would have a difficult time in the future meeting state standards. District 48 ra i s es a seeming ly valid conce rn; at the least, it would mean that this fac tor weig hs ag ainst detac hment.

¶ 55 WHOL E CHI L D AND COMMUN I TY I NTEREST FACTORS

-12-¶ 56 The Timber Trails subdivision is in an isolated are a. All of the students in the subdivision

g o to the same school sy stem. Fr om the testimony at the hear ing, it could be deduce d that the residents do not have a lot of interac tion with Oak Br ook (the are a wher e Districts 48 and 88

are ) or the Hins dale area
, wher e the students would attend i f the detachment petit ion wer e g rante d. Kelly Schmidtke, the only aff ecte d student to testify
, s t ated that her friends and community are tied to Districts 48 and 88. She fur t h er testified that the majority of her friends are from Villa Park. She believed that this was beca use there are not a lot of schoolag ed children in t h e T imber Trails are a and most of the school-ag ed children do not g o to public school with her. ¶ 57 The B oard f

ound: “[I ]n considering evidence re l at ed to the community interest fac tors, the community cohesive ness of the Petitioners with the Oakbr ook are a and the ability to connec t families and children with the are a they live in, pa rticipate in car

pooling with neig hbors, library and park district use, and other fac iliti es they use was a strong ly con s i d er ed fa ctor in favor of g rantingthe Petition.” ¶ 58 The “whole child” fac tor rec og nizes that extracurr icular participation in social, relig ious, and commerc ial activities is important in a child’s development as a benef icial supplement to the child’s aca demic involvement. Golf , 89 I ll. 2d at 398. I f a c hild attends school in his

or her natura l community
, it enhanc es not only hi s o r h er ed ucational opportunity but

encour ag es his or her participa tion in social and oth er extracurr icular activities that fig ure importantly

in the “whole c hild” idea. Golf
, 89 I ll. 2d at 397. The “c ommunity of intere st” fac tor looks at whether the petitioning are a is i d en t i fied with the school district and the community to which annexation is reque sted. Golf
, 89 I ll. 2d at 397-98. This f actor fig ures importantly with the “whole child” conce pt in deter mining the benef

its and detriments to the

s chool districts involved in a section 7-6 detac hment petition. Pontiac Townshi p H ig h S c h o o l District No. 90 v. Region a l B o a r d of School T rustees , 183 I ll. App. 3d 885, 890 (1989). I t is also appropr iate to consider the persona l pref ere n ce s or convenie nce of the petitioning
pare nts and their children; howeve r, more than the persona l pref ere nces on the par t o f the petitioners is r equire d for a chang e in sc hool district boundarie s. Board of Education of St. Charles Community Unit School District No. 303 v. Regional Board of School Trustees of the Kane County Educational Servic e Re gion , 261 I ll. App. 3d 348, 364 (1994). ¶ 59 Her e, r e g a

r d le s s o f whether the detac hment petition wer e g rante d, the residents of Timber Trails would continue to live in an isolated subdivision. Their connec tions to the new school
sy stem community would not be that differ ent from those with their exis ting school sy stem community

. Most likely
, their connections to the new school sy stem community would be

weaker since i t is far

ther away than t he ex isting school sy stem community

. As such, si nce these fac tors show no improvement over the status quo, th ey d o n o t weigh in favor of detac hment.

¶ 60 CONSI DERATI ON OF FUT URE CHI L DREN ¶ 61 In its findings, the B oard state d:

“[I ]f the Petition was not g rante d, it would neg atively impact future ch i l d re n i n the

-13-neig hborhood by sending them to differ ent s chools than t heir neigh b ors and that some neig hborhood children could join the same T-ball team or participate in other library and park district programs as the ir neig hbors bec ause of the school district separ ation.” ¶ 62 In reve rsing the Boa rd’s decision, the circ uit court specific ally stated that the Boa rd err ed in c onsidering the impact on future children over the children who wer e prese ntly living in the proposed de tachment a rea

. ¶ 63 Eac h detac hment case should be deter mined on the basis of t h e fa ct s an d t h e record
prese nted as opposed to speculative observa tions. W heele r v. Co u n t

y Board of School Trustees
, 62 I ll. App. 2d 467, 476 (1965). The eff ect of the detac hment petition on children

curr ently attending school should be considere d over the possible impact on future children. Fixme r v. Regional Board of School Trustees
, 146 I ll. App. 3d 660, 665-66 (1986); see also Phillips v. Special Hearing Board
, 154 I ll. App. 3d 799, 807 (1986) (the pref ere nces of the most directly

impacted pe rsons should be strong ly considere d). ¶ 64 Her e, the vast majority of p eo p l e who wer e sending their children to public school, or

who themselves wer e public school students, testified ag ainst th e d e ta c hme nt p e ti ti o n

. K a r e n 3 S ch m i d t ke testified that she had a son attending Salt Creek elementa ry school and t h at requiring him to chang e schools would adver sely aff ect him. Kelly Schmidtke testified that she was attending Wil lowbrook Hig h School and that it would be v er y d i ff i cu l t for her to switch schools. Diana Kaye testified that her son was extremely depre ssed over the thought of having to switch schools and that she believed a switch would be devastating to him. J ohn L apinski testified that it would not be in his children’ s best interests to be remove d from the only school sy stem that they

have e ver known. ¶ 65 As such, even if future students w ould a rguably benef

it f rom chang ing school districts, it is clea r that such a chang e would neg atively impact curr ent students. Thus, this fa ct o r weig hs ag ainst detac hment. See Duke tt v. Regional Board of School Trustees
, 342 I ll. App. 3d 635, 642 (2003) ( the benefit of m aintaining the same e ducational se tting for children is considera ble as disruptingchildren’ s lifestyles would not serve to benef it any one).

¶ 66 SUMMARY OF CARVER FACTORS ¶ 67 Most, if not all, of the rele vant fac tors indicated that the detac hment petition should not be g rante d. The Boa

rd’s decision to g rant the pet i t i on was there fore ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evide nce.

¶ 68 CONSI DERATI ON OF I MPROP ER EVI DENCE ¶ 69 I also note that the Districts complain that, at the hear ing on the detac hment petition, the

Only two par ent s of publ ic sch ool stude nt s te st if ied in fa vor of det ach m ent : Ma ry Ols zewski 3 and Robe rt Ludwi ak. However, Ols zewski te st if ie d tha t she was not unha ppy wit h Sal t Cre ek sch ool s and had no con cer ns wit h the dis tr ic t. Ludwi ak te st if ie d tha t he tho ught Hins dal e was m ore int er est ed in working wit h par ent s, but he had never b e en to the Wi ll owbr ook High Scho ol and had no knowled ge conc er nin g its cur ri cul um of fe ri ngs.

-14-Boa rd allowed 27 people to “testify” during public comment without being sworn under oath

or subject to cross-e x amination. Some of the people who “testified” had s i gned the detac hment petition and there fore wer e actua l parties to the proce eding

. The Districts acknow ledg e t h at t h e Bo ard stated on the rec ord that it did not consider the comments at issue. Howeve r, as the comments wer e “per vasive,” the Districts contend that it was “human
nature to r eca ll a

nd proce ss the statements made at the beg inning of eac h hear ing session.” Thus, as it was impossibl e for the Boa rd not to consider all the prejudicia l evidenc e that was prese nted at the h ea ri n g, t he Districts insist that the Boa rd’s consideration of improper evidenc e is another

basis to reve rse its dec ision. ¶ 70 Fundamental due proce ss principles apply to administrat i v e h ea ring s. Abrahamson v. Illinois Departme nt of Professional Regulation
, 153 I ll. 2d 76, 92 (1992). When revie wing an administrative or der, the court ha s a duty to examine the proce dural methods employ ed
at the administrative hea ri ng , to ensure that a fair and impartial proce dure was used. Abrahamson
, 153 I ll. 2d at 92-93. “A fair hear ing befor e an administrative ag ency includes the opportunity to be hear d, the rig ht to cross-e x amine witnesses, and impartiality in ruling upon the evidenc e.” Abrahamson , 153 I ll. 2d at 95. ¶ 71 “It is fund amental that a decision pursuant to an administrative hear ing must be base d
upon testimony and other evidenc e rec eived at the hear ing and that a conclusion influence d by extraneous considerations must be set aside.” Des Plaines Currency Exc hange, Inc. v. Knight
, 29 I ll. 2d 244, 247 (1963). Parties bef ore a n administrative body exercising quasijudicial power s are entitled to have that body b ase its decision upon the facts disclosed by the evidence, and a failure o f such body to acqua int itself with the facts as reveale d by the evidenc e, if proved, is sufficie nt g rounds to war rant setting aside its order

. Knight
, 29 I ll. 2d at 247-48. ¶ 72 Her e, the extensive c omments that the Boa rd allowed during the public comment stag e of the hear ing wer e clea

rly improper. As “[t] he overa rching objective of [an administrative hear ing] should be to cre ate a proce dure that provides for and safe g uards the due proce ss rig hts o f the i ntere sted parties” ( People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisl e , 202 I ll. 2d 164, 188 (2002))
, I encour ag e the Boa rd to adopt a proce dure that allows all s u b s t an tive comments made at an evidentiar y hear ing to be subject to cross- examination. ¶ 73 For

these re asons, I

specia lly concur

.

¶ 74 J USTI CE BI RKETT, spec ially concur ring

. ¶ 75 I ag ree wi t h m y co l l ea gu es t h at t he order of the Boa rd g ranting the petition for detac hment must be reve rsed. Howeve r, I respe ctfully disag ree with their fin d i n g t h at petitioners failed to f

ile the requisite number of valid signa tures to confe r jurisdiction. The Bo ar d ’s decision on the questi oned si g nature s is a factual matter that does not permit a de

novo assessment of the evidenc e. Having deter mined that the Boa

rd had jurisdiction, I would

rea ch the meri t s an d hold that the Boa rd’s decision to g rant the petition was ag ainst the manifest we ight of

the evidenc e.

¶ 76 ADDI TI ONAL BA CKGROUND

-15-¶ 77 The Districts filed “Objec tions to and Motion to Dismiss Petition for Detac hment and

Annexation” i n which they argued that 97 signa tures on the petition “should be deeme d invalid beca

use the signe r’s signa

ture is not genuine when compar ed with his or her signature

on file at the Commi ssion.” (Emphasis added.) In their reply to the petitioners’ response , the Districts reque sted that the Boa rd deleg ate the task of conducting “ signature verification ”
to the Election Commi ssion beca use the Commi ssion has experience in compar ing disputed sign at u res with “ver ified voter reg istration car ds to deter mine authenticity of the disputed signatures.” (Emphase s added.) The Districts also pointed out that this proce ss of deleg ating the task to the Commi ssion would save time and expense. The Districts maintained that, by providing the pag es of the petition c ontaining the questioned signa tures, alongwith copies of the corr esponding voter reg istration signatures, they had “provide d evidenc e to rebut any presumptio n that the signatures on the petition are genuine .” (Emphasis added.) The Districts cited section 8-1501 of the Code of Civil Procedur e for the proposition that “it is proper for the trier of fac t to deter

mine whether handwr iting is g enuine, without expert opinion, based
upon proven a

nd disputed handwritingsamples.” See 735 I L CS 5/ 8-1501 (West 2010). ¶ 78 The “Comm i t t ee o f T en ” o b j ec t ed to the Districts’ proposal to deleg ate sig nature verific ation to the Election Commi ssion. Citi ng to section 7-2.6 of the Sc h ool Code (105 I L CS 5/7-2.6 (West 2010)), the Commi ttee of Ten reque s t ed a hear ing on the Districts’ motion before the Boa

rd. ¶ 79 On J anuar

y 10, 2011, the Boa

rd conducte d a hear ing on the Districts’ motion to dismiss. The Districts indicated that they had no witnesses. The petitioners announce d that they had 14 witnesses. There was a discussion as to whether the Boa rd would hear testimony

. Boa rd member Ms. Pollastrini indicated that the decision had been mad e t o l imit testimony and “basic ally ” g o on the briefs. Boa rd member Mr. Whelan then called upon the attorney for the Commi ttee of Ten, Mr. Stull
, to make an offe r of proof so the Boa rd could deter

mine if they wanted to acc ept i t. Mr. S tull then provided an off er of proof that the 14 c irculators would testify to the following : “We would have prese nted these circ ulators, wh o w o u ld h a v e p r o v id e d testimony this evening that they
, in fac t, wer e the circ ulators of these signature petit i o n s t hat wer e attache d to the p ac k et i n the orang e-c overe d volume, Pag es 1 throug h 90; that, in fac t, they swore and attested to a circ ulator’s oath, in the prese nce of an I llinois Notary Public; that all of the individuals that signe d those various sheets wer e, in fac t, reg istered voters that resided in the petitioning territory ; that all of the signatories signe d in their prese nce; that all of those signatures wer e, in fac t, valid; that they witnessed those signatures; and that they so attested as pa

rt of their nota

rial oath.
That would be the sum and substance of their testimony
, that all of the 256 signatures that wer e submitted were , in fac t, valid.
We w ould f

urther offe r testimony that the strike-throug h signatures, of which there

are seven on the sheets–ther e are seven that are identified by a line striking them throug h

* **; and that those seven signatures wer e not counted in the total 256, which can b e verifie d simply by counti n g t he number of valid signatures on the sheets numbere d 1 throug h 90. Fur

ther, we would not offer

testimony

of these w itnesses.”

-16-¶ 80 Bo ar d p resident Ms. Roge rs then asked whether the Boa rd wished to hear

testimon y reg arding the signatures. Mr. Whelan then made a motion “that we acc ept the offe r of proof

as proff ere d.” Ms. Pollastrini seconde d the motion. I t was then explained by Mr. Whelan and the assistant State’s Attorney that acc epting the offe r of p roof means that “we don’t hear witnesses” and “you’ll just, basica lly
, take what Mr. Stull said here at fac e value.” Mr. Whelan then indicated that “[t] he only cave at that I would ask is the Chair to g ive the responde nts the opportunity to respond to that, if they want, y ou kn o w, i n any form or fashion .” (Emph asi s added.) The motion to acc ept the offe r of proof was approve d by unanimous vote. The Districts’ attorney s raised no objection to this proce dure. Instead, Mr. Wil son, on behalf of District 48, simply argued that “ther e should not be witnesses at this ty pe of he aring .” He arg

ued that “it’s a fairly

straightforwa

rd proc ess–look and see if there is a match.” Mr. Boy

le, on behalf of District 88, argued that “the School Code does not allow for the consideration of witness testimony .” Neither Mr. Wil son nor Mr. Boy le cited any case law in support of the c ontention that live testimony was not pe rmissible on the question of whether signa

tures on the petition “match the officia l signature and addre ss of the reg istered
voters as rec orded in the office of the elec tion authority .” See 105 I L CS 5/7-1(a) (West 2010). Mr. Wil son argued that “the testimony of the circ ulators rea lly has no bear ing in this particula r proce eding .” He argued that “[i] f, when I sign a petition a nd I ’m left-ha

nded, if I decide to sign it rig ht-hande d and my signature doesn’t match the signature car d, it’s not g onna [ sic ] be counted.” ¶ 81 Boa

rd member Ms. Scigousky asked why the Districts wer e “not trusting th e c irculators.” In response , Mr. Boy

le stated that “[t] he School Code is stra ightf orwa rd. The School Code require ment doesn’t depend on any witness testimony . So, whether I trust the circ ulator or
not is immaterial.” M r. Whelan indicated that the Boa rd would look at the signa tures but would also consider the proff er made by Mr. Stull for “whatever consideration that it’s due.” ¶ 82 In response to the Districts’ arguments, Mr. Stull argued that the Districts had the burde n to rebut the presumption of the validity of th e s i gn at u res. He argued that the Districts provided “no evidenc e at al l

– n o witness testimony .” Mr. Stull pointed out that signatures chang e over time and that “[s] ome of the reg istered voters have been reg istered voters for

over 30 y ear s.” Mr. Stull pointed out that the cir cu l ators’ testimony also would have descr ibed their re view of the petition, which included striking out a ny signa tures that wer e questionable. Mr. Stull argued that “[a]ll 256 of our signatures are valid.” L astly
, he argued that “[i] f there was a l egi t i mate question raised by the Districts, why didn’t they contac t a single signatory

or a sing le circ ulator, if they had a que stion? ” ¶ 83 In response to Mr. Stull ’s argument, the Districts argued ag ain that t h e Bo ar d d i d not need testimony and that the Boa rd could make the decision simply by compar ing the disputed signatures with the signatures on file with the Election Commi ssion. Mr. B oyle also added that the notarized sig nature s on the petition were the sig nature s of onl y the circ ulators, not the people whose signatures “appe ar on that pag e of the petition.” Mr. Stull pointed out that the circ ulator’s oath disclosed the verific ation that the “sig nature s on this sheet wer e signe d in my prese nce on the date indicated and are g enuine.” Mr. Boyle a d d ed that the oath also included this sentenc e: “And to the best of my knowledg e and belief, that the p er s o n s so signing wer e, at the time of signing the petition, reg istered voters residing in the petitioning

-17-territory
, based upon information obt ai ned from the Election Commi ssion of Du Pag e

County .” After deliberating in closed session, the Boa rd voted unanimously to d en y t he Districts’ motion to dis miss.

¶ 84 ANALYSI S ¶ 85 I disag ree with my coll ea gu es t h at our revie w of the Boa rd’s decision reg ardingthe requisite number of valid signatures is de novo

. In I llinois
, as in the majority ofjurisdictions, the deter mination of g enuinene ss/authenticity of handwr iting an d/or a signature is for the finder of fac t. “F indings of fac t are deter minations from the evidenc e of a case , either by

a court or an administrative ag ency , conce rning fac ts aver red b y o n e p ar ty and denied by another .” (Interna l quotation m ar k s o m itted.) Perez v. Illinois Departme nt of Children & Family Serv ices , 384 I ll. App. 3d 770, 774 ( 2008). In their plea dings be fore the B oard, the Districts maintained that the Boa rd could deter

mine whether the signa

tures wer e “g enuine” or “authentic” by compar ing them to the s igna tures on file wit h the El ection C ommissi on. “An administrative ag ency ’s finding s and conclusions on questions of fac t are deeme d prima facie true and corr ect. In examining an administrative ag ency ’s fac tual finding s, a revie wing
court does not weigh the evidenc e or substitut e its judgme nt for that of the ag ency

. Instead, a reviewing court is limit ed to as certaining whether such findings are ag ainst the m anife st weig ht of the evidenc e. An administrative ag ency ’s fa ctual deter minations are ag ainst the

m anife st weig ht of the evidenc e if the opposite conclusion is clea rly evident.” C i n ku s v. Village of Stickney

Municipal Officers Elec toral Board , 228 I ll. 2d 200, 210 (2008). ¶ 86 The Districts we re c orre ct in arguing that the Board could make its own deter mination whether the signatures wer e g enuine (or a match). The Districts wer e incorre ct, howeve r, in
arguing that the Boa

rd could consider only the signa tures. The Commi ttee of Ten, on behalf of the petitioners, corr ectly pointed out that the Boa rd had the authority to take testimony on the issue of a

uthenticity

/ge nuineness or “ match.” T here is nothing in the S chool C ode that restric ts the Boa

rd to simply compar ing the questioned signatures to the voter signatures on file with the Election Commi ssion, and the Districts have cited no authority to support such

a restric tion. District 48 cites Hoxha v. LaSalle National Bank
, 3 6 5 I l l

. Ap p. 3d 80, 85 (2006), for the proposition that “it i s p roper for the trier of fac t to deter mine whether handwr iting is g enuine, without expert opini o n , b as ed upon a compar ison of proven and disputed handwr iting.” L ikewise, District 88 cites Hoxha for the same proposition, but then cites Addison Insurance Co. v. Fay
, 232 I ll. 2d 446 (2009), and argues that our revie w of the signatures is de novo beca

use the evidenc e was documentar y

. Id. at 453. My colleagues agree with this argument and have conclude d that, beca use a number of signe rs used only an initial for a first or last name instead of their full names as ref lected on their voter reg istration car ds, their si g nature s are invalid. The Districts did n o t m ake this particula r arg ument befor e the Boa rd or in their briefs befor e this court. Rather, their arg ument is simply that the signatures do not match. In their pleading s below, althoug h the Districts maintained that 97 signatures

wer e bad, the y

then listed 25 that, they

said, clearly do not matc h

. ¶ 87 Most states, including I llinois , have adopted evidentiary standards to g uide t rial courts in de termining whether a writing is sufficie ntly authenticated. “A finding of authentication

-18-is mere ly a finding that there i s s u fficient evidenc e to justify prese ntation of the offe red

evidenc e to the trier of fac t and does not prec lude the opponent from contesting the
g enuinene ss of the writing afte r the basic authentication require ments are satisfied.” People

v. Downin
, 357 I ll. App. 3d 1 93, 202-03 (2005). I llinois Rule of Evidence 901(b) (Require ment of Authentication or I dentification) provides a nonexhaustive list of methods of authe ntication, which include the following : “(1) Testimony of Wit ness Wit h Knowledg e. Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be. (2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwr iting. Nonexpert opinion as to the g enuinene ss of handwr iting, base d upon familiarity not acquire d for pur

poses of the litig ation. (3) Comparison by Trier or Ex pert Wit ness. Comparison by the trier o f fa ct or by expert witnesses with specimens whic h have be en authe nticated. (4) Distinctive Chara c te r is ti c s a n d th e L ik e

. A

p p e a r a n c e, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other dist inctive cha rac teristics, taken in conjunction with circ umstances.” I ll. R. Evid. 901(b) (eff

. J an. 1, 2011). ¶ 88 I llinois revie wing courts have historically held that the issue of authorship of a docume nt is for the trier of fac t to deter mine. Downin
, 357 I ll. App. 3d at 203 (citing People v. Munoz
, 70 I ll. App. 3d 76, 86 (1979))

. Fur ther, when the issue of authorship is befor e the revie wing court, that issue ha s been r eviewe d under a manifest-w eig ht-of-the -evide nce sta ndard. See S helby Loan & Trust Co. v. Mill igan
, 372 I ll. 397, 408 (1939) (in a will contest whe re t h e evidenc e as to a

uthenticity

was c onflicting , no reve rsal unless the ve rdict is contra ry to the manifest weight of the evi d ence ). In Krueger v. Dorr
, 22 I ll. App. 2d 513 (1959), the appellate court held that the mere fac t that evidenc e is conflicting in some respe cts does not

mean that the finding s are ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. The court in Dorr also observe d that a notary public has the duty to asce rtain the truth of the matters about which he or she is to cer

tify

. Also, “[p] arties a ct on the fa ith of that cer tificate, a nd public policy
, the secur ity of titles, and the peac e of society require that i n t h e ab s en ce of fra ud and collusion it i s entitled to full credit.” Id. at 528. ¶ 89 In Canter v. Cook County Officers E l ec t o r a l B o a r d
, 170 I ll. App. 3d 364 (1988), the
ap p el late court aff

irmed the decision of the trial court that upheld the board’ s decis i o n invalidating three sheets of petition signatures. The court said, “in an administrative revie w proce eding
, it is not the function of either the trial court or the appellate court to rew eig h the

ev idence or assess the cre dibilit y of the witnesses. [C itation.] Rather, the findin gs an d decision of the elec toral board will not be disturbed unless those finding s are aga i n s t the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. at 368-69. The b o ard in Canter found t hat on one of the sheets the signatures on “lines 18 throug h 25 appea red to be writt en in the same handwr iting.” Id. at 367. On another sheet, the board found, “six names appea red twice, and lines 10 throug h 25 also appea red to be written in the s ame hand as t hat o f Ha m i l t o n

. ” Id. Hamilton was the purpor

ted circulator of these sheets. He was subpoenae d to testify at the hear ing but r efuse d to do so, invoking the fifth amendment. The objectors in Canter called witnesses at the hear ing. These wi t n esses wer e the purported signe rs, who testified that

sever al of the sig nature s on the petition were not valid. Id. at 366. In Benjamin v. Board of

-19-E l ection Commissioners
, 122 I ll. App. 3d 693 (1984), the appellate court stated that

“[w]hether a person is a reg istered voter and whether he or she is reg istered at the residenc e addre ss indicated on the nominating petition are both questions of fac t.” Id. at 696. The court also commented that the petitioner did not “produc e any aff idavits from signatories nor did h e ca l l an y witnesses to testify that they wer e reg istered voters in the 46th Ward and h ad signe d his petition.” Id. at 695. ¶ 90 The Districts acknow ledg ed before the Boa rd, bef ore the trial court, a

nd befor e us that they made no independe nt eff ort to prove that any of the 97 signatures that they challeng e are invalid beca

use they do not match. The Districts did not hire an expert witness to express an opinion as to whether th e qu es t i oned signatures wer e in the same handwr iting as the signatures on the voter reg istration car ds. Acc ording to the Districts, they eff ec ti vely rebutted the presumpti o n that the signatures wer e g enuine by prese nting the questioned signatures along with the voter reg istration car ds for compar ison. In my view, this is t h e t y pe of “hy perte chnica l” argument that we should be reluc tant to em b ra ce in order to avoid the merits. I t is clea

r from the Districts’ arguments befor e the Boa rd that their objection had nothing to do with any contention that the signatures wer e not g enuine. R at h er , their
arguments wer e simply that y ou can look only at the signa tures, that even a voter’s own words ca nnot save a

nonmatch. ¶ 91 Contrary to my colleagues’ conclusion, the petitioners prese nted u n re b u t t ed evidenc e from the 14 circ ulators by way of an offe r of proof, which was acc epted by the Boa rd without objection from the Districts, that the sign ature s on the petition wer e g enuine. Mr. Whelan made clea r to e very one that, by acc epting the offe r of proof, the Boa rd would consider this evidenc e as if the circ ulators testified. The Boa rd has the authority to deter mine how it will

rec eive evidenc e. 105 I L CS 5/7-2.6 (West 2010) (“The Hea ring Boa rd may administer oaths, deter mine the admissibili ty of evidenc e and issue subpoenas for the attendanc e of witnesses and subpoena duces tecum for the p ro d u ct i o n of documents.”); see Board of Education of Community High School District No. 94 v. Regional Board ofSchool Trustees
, 242 I ll. App. 3d 229, 234 (1993). I t was made clea r to the parties that the Boa rd rec eived in evidenc e and would consider the ag ree d testimony of the 14 circ ulators during its delib erations. The Districts did not object to this evidenc e at the time it was rec eived and their failure to do so results in forf

eiture. Prior to deliberations it was m ade clea r ag ain that the Boa

rd would consider the proff

er. I llinois Rule of Evidence 901(b)( 1) provides that testimony of a witness with knowledg e is a p roper method of authentication. I ll. R. Evid. 901(b)( 1) (ef f. J an. 1, 2011). My colleagu es say in footnote 2, “[w]e note that either party could have soug ht to have the people who purportedly signe d the petitions testify that the signatures appea ring on the petition were in fac t (or wer e not in fac t) their signatures.” Supra ¶ 15 n.2. That is
prec isely what happene d here

. The Commi ttee of Ten prese nt ed the testimony of the circ ulators by way of stipulation. Whil e Mr. Whelan used the term “off er of proof” and stated that it would be acce pted “as p ro ff er ed” and would be considered, the Districts, by failing
to object, stipulated to this evidenc e beca use to them it made no differ ence what the circ ulators said. A “stipulation” is an ag re em en t b etween parties or their attorney s with
respe ct to an issue befor e the court, and courts look with favor upon stipulations beca use they tend t o promote di spositions of cases, si mplif i ca t i o n s of i ssues, and the saving of ex pense

-20-to litigants. People v. W oods
, 214 I ll. 2d 455, 468-69 (2005). “A stipulation is conclusive as to all matters nece ssarily included in it ***.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 469. Her e, there is no question that the Districts knew that the Boa rd would consider the proposed
t es t i m ony and they failed to object. S tipulation by silence will be found to exis t in sim i l ar circ umstances. See People v. Blankenship
, 406 I ll. App. 3d 578, 597-98 (2010) (stipulation by silence to street- value fine). The Districts’ arg ument was not direc ted to the substance of the circ ulators’ testimony b u t ra t h er to the leg al eff ect. They mistakenly assumed that the Boa rd could consider only the signatures themselves. As such, even if my co l l ea gu es’ de

novo revie w ar g ument is otherwise c orre ct, since the Boa rd’s deter mination wa s not based entirely on documentar

y evidenc e, we must “def

er to the Boa

rd’s cre dibilit y deter

minations and em p l o y a manifest-w eig ht-of-the -evide nce standard of revie w.” Supra ¶ 15 n.2. As District 48 points out in its statement of fac ts, “[t] he purported reasoni n g fo r this decision

was set forth in th e R egi onal Boa rd’s J anuar

y 25, 2011 order .” Paragraph 4 of that order

rea ds:
“That after hearing the arguments and rec eiving the evidenc e, the Boa rd moved to enter into executive session to revie w the challeng ed signatures and deliberated in closed session to consider testimony and evidenc e pursuant to 5 I L CS 120/2(c)( 4) of the I llinois Open Me eting s Act.” The only testimony

rec eived wa s the stipulation to t he cir culators’ testimony

. ¶ 92 I have no quarr el with my colleagues’ observation that an offe r of proof is not equivalent
to a stipulation. They cite Peo p l e v. W illiams
, 329 I ll. App. 3d 846 (2002), for this proposition. In W

i l l i ams there was an oral stipulation betwee n defe nse counsel and the
prosec utor. Howeve r, “[t] he police repor ts mentioned in the oral stipulation wer e not made

a part of the common law rec ord.” Id. at 856. The stipulation there fore lacke d “cla rity ” and

was “an inadequa t e s u b stitut e for impeachme nt testimony by the police.” Id. No such problem exis ts in this case

. The stipulation was clea r. The Districts did no t co n t es t the proposed testimony that formed the stipulation. Instead, they argued that the only thing that
mattere d was the side- by -side compa rison to determine whether there was a

“match.” ¶ 93 This court rec ently stated in People v. Valle
, 405 I ll. App. 3d 46 (2010), that “the rule in Addison Insurance is inapplicable when, as h er e, the trial court has hear d live testimony relating to a disputed issue of fac t.” Id. at 56. In Valle
, the defe ndant maintained that, beca use

we had video of his interrog ation, we wer e equally situated with the trial court for deciding the issue of voluntarine ss and there fore our re view should be de novo

. ¶ 94 Wit h all due respe ct to my colleagues, I do not believe that the rule in Addison I nsurance

was ever meant to apply to handwr iting/sig nature compar isons. I believe that, unlike the situation in Addison Insurance
, the Boa rd was in a superior position to make fac tual finding s reg arding the validity of signatures. It has more experience in weig hing such evidenc e. Fur ther, duplication of the fac t f inder’s e ffor

ts w ill contr ibute neg ligibly to the acc urac y of fac tual deter

minations and divert ou r scar ce judicial resour ces. See Anderson v. City of Bessem er City, North C

arolina , 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985). ¶ 95 Her e, the Districts took the position that the testimony of the circ ulators was irr eleva nt to the Board’ s deter

mination of whether the signa tures matched. T h ey even went s o far as

-21-to say that, even if the voter who signe d his or her name testified that he or she signe d, if the

signature is differ ent in any materia l respe ct it is not a match. For example, they argued that if a person signe d his voter reg istration car d with his rig ht hand and the petition with his left hand there would be no match. Such a position is at odds with rea lity

. The Districts had the opportunity to cross-e x amin e the circ ulators instead of simply acc epting the proposed testimony as true. The Boa rd proper ly considere d the evidenc e in rea ching its finding s. The rol e o f the circulator ensures fairness and honesty in the petit ion proce ss. See Canter
, 170 I ll. App. 3d at 369. ¶ 96 As the Boa

rd arg ues in its reply brief, the proce ss s u gges t ed b y the Districts would require us to rew eig h the evidenc e and substitut e our judgme nt for that o f t h e Boa rd, a proce ss that is not countena nced in the law. Board of Education of Golf School District No. 67 v. Regional Board of

School Trustees
, 89 I ll. 2d 392, 397 (1982). The question of whether the signatures “match” is a question of fac t. I believe that we should apply the same standard of revie w that has historically been applied in revie wing decisions reg arding the g enuinene ss of signatures, including in elec tion case s, which is the manifest-w eight-of-the -evide nce standard. Benjamin , 122 I ll. App. 3d at 696. ¶ 97 Whil e I disag ree with my colleagues on the s tand ard of revie w reg arding the sig nature finding s by the Boa

rd, I ag ree with m y co l l ea gu es that we have a duty to examine the evidenc e in an im partial manner and set aside a finding that is ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. I ag ree with my colleagues that section 7-1 of the School Code require s only substantial compliance. I

n support of this view that we should a pply a de novo standard of revie w to “the Boa

rd’s decision as to the validity of the signatures,” my colleag ues use a “see also” citation to Ambrose v. Thornton Townshi p School Trustees
, 274 I ll. App. 3d 676, 681 (1995). Supra ¶ 14. The Ambrose court was discussing its revie w of a specific document, a map, which I submit is far differ ent from the task of compar ing a questioned signature to a known standard. Ambrose also involved a question of the signature and addre ss require ments of section 7-1. Wit h respe ct to the decision o f t h e T h o rnt on trustees on that issue, the Ambrose court applied the manifest-w eig ht-of-the -evide nce s ta n d a r d

. A m b ro s e , 2 7 4 I ll. App. 3d at 683. ¶ 98 Under either standard of review
, t o d et er m i n e wh et h er the Boa rd’s decision on the validity of the signature s was prope r, we must determine the mea ning of the t erm “ match” in section 7-1. 105 I L CS 5/7-1 (West 2010). My colleagues disag ree with the interpre tation of this term by the Ambrose court. They are corr ect that the prec ise issue in that case was the addre ss component of the “sig nature an d ad d ress” match require ment. The court said in Ambrose : “Rea ding the School Code as a whole, we conclude that the word ‘match’ in section 7-1

means that the identity of the reg istered voter must be capa ble of being deter

mined. Her e, using the signe rs’ names and addre sses listed in the petition sheets and the officia l voter reg istration lists, it is possible to deter mine whether they m at ch

. We do not require a ‘per fec t match’ a s the defe ndants sug g est.” Ambrose , 274 I ll. App. 3d at 684. ¶ 99 In arr iving at this interpre tation, the Ambrose court relied u p o n B o a rd of Education of W apella Community Unit Sc hool D istrict No. 5 v. Re gional Board of School Trustees
, 247

-22-I ll. App. 3d 555 (1993). I n W apella
, a petiti on wa s fi l ed wi th the reg ional board of school trustees, seeking dissoluti on of t he W apella district. Obj ec tions wer e filed challeng ing the validity of 109 signa

tures on the petition and other aspec ts of the petition. The reg ional board held a hear ing on the petit ion. The reg ional board recited various s teps that it had taken to chec k the validity of the petition and the signatures, but it denied the objectors’ reque st to be hear d on t h ei r o b

jections. On appea l, the appellate court aff irmed the reg ional board’ s decision in all respe cts, except the decision to deny the rig ht of the objectors to be hear d. The

case was rema

nded for that hear ing. Board of Education of W

apella Community Unit School District No. 5 v. Regional Board of School Trustees
, 245 I ll. App. 3d 776, 779 (1993). Upon

re m and, a hear ing was held and the reg ional board found that, althoug h a few of the signatures wer e invalid, the petition contained enoug h valid signatures to cons t itute a majority of the reg istered voters of the district. W apella Community Unit School District No. 5 , 247 I ll. App. 3d at 557. ¶ 100 One of the objectors’ complaints conce rned the execution of cer tificates by a circ ulator named Marg are t Marlene Spray

. Ms. Spray was reg istered to vote as M. Marlene Spray

. She signe d a petition circ ulated by another person as Marlene M. Spray an d s i gn ed the

cer tification on three sheets she h ad ci rc u l at ed as M. Marlene Spray

. The court said that “[t] he evidenc e was undisputed that she was one and the same person who perf ormed all the
acts involved.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 560

. As t he court noted, Ms. Spray signe d the circ ulator’s c ertifica

tes the same a s her voter

reg istration car d. The c ourt then said:
“M o re o v er, presumption of identity of a person has been held to exis t when two used

surnames are identical but one of the initials in the g iven name is transposed. (65 C.J .S. Names § 15(b)( 2), at 47 (1966).) No signature to the petition was invalidated by Spray ’s use of slig htly

differ ent names.” (Emphasis adde d.) Id. ¶ 101 As the court in Ambrose said, i n as ce rt ai n i n g an d g iving eff ect to the intent of the leg islature, while we g ive languag e in the statute its plain and ordinary meaning
, we also rea d sections of the School Code in pari materia in order to g ive harmonious meaning to the act

as a whole. Ambrose
, 274 I ll. App. 3d at 683. The first para g raph of section 7-1(a ) provides that “[r]egister ed voters shall be deter mined by the officia l vote r registration lists as of the date the pet i t i o n i s filed. No signature shall be added afte r the date the petition is filed.” (Emphasis added.) 105 I L CS 5/7-1(a) (West 2010). Paragraph 2 of section 7-1(a ) descr ibes what the pag es of the petition “shall” includ e. Id

. T o m e it is clea r that the term “match”

means that the circ ulator in the first instance must make sure that the signatures match up with the names an d ad d resses on the “off icial voter reg istration list.” I doubt that the circ ulator of a

ny petition would be in possession of voter re g istration car ds. ¶ 102 We should avoid hy perte chnica l rea sons for avoiding decisions made on the merits when neither party suffe red an y delay or harm as the result of the hy perte chnica l violation. See Seelhoe fer v. Regiona l B o a r d o

f School Trustees
, 266 I ll. App. 3d 516, 519 (1994). In Seelhoe fer
, the appellants argued that the amende d petition failed to comply with section 7-1 of the School Code beca

use (1) the circ ulator did not sign eac h pag e of the petition a nd (2) the full prayer was not on eac h pag e of the petition. The appellate court fo u n d t h at t h e “appe llees subs t antially fulfilled the require ments of the School Code” and reje cted the
argument that the re g ional board a nd circ uit court lacke d jurisdiction. Id.

-23-¶ 103 There is no question that signatures of the requisite number o f v o t ers are essential to

jurisdiction. Howeve r, not ever y irregularity in a petition is fata l to jurisdiction. Id. Her e, the Districts’ objection to the petition’s s igna tures is technica l. The Districts acknow ledg ed at oral argument that they had an opportunity to investigate t he authenticity of t he si g nature s and to prese nt such evidenc e at the hear ing. They chose not to do so, rely ing instead on visual

co m p ar i s o ns of the signatures on the petition with the signatures on the voter reg istration

car ds. This technica l challeng e was reje cted by the Boa rd. I t appea

rs that the Bo ar d m u st have reje cted the Districts’ interpre tation of the statutory term “match” in finding that there

wer e a sufficie nt number of valid signatures. I believe that the Boa rd’s deter mination on this issue should not be disturbed unless from our revie w of the evidenc e, including the signe rs’

names a nd addre sses, the voter r eg istration list s, the voter r eg istration car d signa tures, and the ag ree d testimony of the circ ulators, the identities of the signe rs are not “ca pable of being deter mined.” Ambrose , 274 I ll. App. 3d at 684. ¶ 104 Requiring a perf ect match, for example invalidating any signature that used an initial as opposed to a full first name, is inconsistent with the leg islative intent, which is to deleg ate to the local level the discretionar y power to decide issues of detac hment and annexation. See Hepne r v. County Board of School T rustees , 8 I ll. 2d 235, 240-42 (1956). “[T] he int ent of the signature and addre ss r equire ments is to guara ntee that petitioners are supported by the require d number of voters in a g iven are a.” Ambrose
, 274 I ll. App. 3d at 684 (citing Gree ne v. Board of Election Commissioners
, 112 I ll. App. 3d 862 (1983))

. I f t he requisite number of voters is “ca

pable of being deter

mined” we should reje ct the Districts’ argument and decide the ca se on the mer its. ¶ 105 This definition rec og nizes the rea lity that people are not machines. Our handwr iting and signatures chang e from one mom ent t o the nex t. Interna l phy siologica l fac tors, along wit h external influence s, constantly aff ect our writing proce sses. See 27 Am. J ur. Proof of Fa cts 3d § 41 (1994). ¶ 106 As my colleagues point out, the Boa rd must not have ag ree d with the Districts’ position

so it there fore m u st have determined that an ini tial used i n combination with a first or l ast

name was acc eptable as long as from the evidenc e prese nted the identity of the voter could be deter mined. The Boa

rd’s interpre tation of the statute is not binding on this cou rt as we revie w questions of law de novo

. “Howe ver, courts ‘must g iv e s u b s t an t ial weig ht and defe renc e to statutory interpret ati ons made by an administrative ag ency char g ed with administratio n o f a particular statute.’ ” Boylan v. Matejka
, 331 I ll. App. 3d 96, 98 (2002) (quoting Oregon Co mmunity Unit School Dis trict No. 220 v. Property Tax Appeal Board
, 285 I ll. App. 3d 170, 175 (1996)). “W h en a s t at ute is ambig uous, it will be g iven a constructio n t h at i s rea sonable and that will not produce absurd, unjust, or unrea sonable results which the leg islature could not have intended.” In re Application of the Cou n t y Collector of

Du Page County for Judgme nt for Taxes for the Y ear 1993
, 187 I ll. 2d 326, 332 (1999) (citing Colli ns v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’ s Annuity & Bene

fit Fund
, 155 I ll. 2d 103, 110 (1993))

. In discerning the meaning of the term “match” we should consider which interpre tation better eff ectuates the leg islative intent a nd is more consistent with the
g oals of the leg islation of which this provision is a part. Id. ¶ 107 The leg islative intent of section 7-1 is to leave to the resident voters the settlement of all

-24-questions involving school district territory

. People ex rel. Smail v. Board of Education of

Community Unit School District No. 202
, 343 I ll. App. 362, 3 7 0 (1951) (citing People v. Deatherage
, 401 I ll. 25, 41 (1948))

. The second para g raph of section 7-1(a ), which includes the questi oned langua g e, was added in 1983 by Public Act 83-733 (ef f. S ept. 23, 1 9 8 3 ). I t appea rs clea r to me that the leg islature added the provision in order to pr ovide a method of authenticat i o n to local boards, much the same as the languag e in our Election Code that provides that voter signatures on absente e ballot envelope s “match” the signatures on file with the elec tion authority

. 10 I L CS 5/19-8(g ) (West 2010). I f a ballot is reje cted, the voter is notified of the rea sons f or reje ction and he or she is g iven an opportunity “to show cause

as to why the ballot should not be reje cted.” 10 I L CS 5/19-8(g -5) (West 2010). This proce ss safe g uards the integ rity of the voting proce s s and at the same time protec ts the individual voter’s r ight to vote. I view the petition process in sec tion 7-1 of the School Code in much the same way

. 105 I L CS 5/7-1 (West 2010). The Districts made their g ener al objection that 97 signatures did not match. The petitioners throug h the C ommitt ee of Ten were provided

an opportunity to s h o w cause why the challeng ed signa tures should be deter

mined to be valid. This proce ss safe g uards the resident voters’ rig hts to participa te in disputes reg arding school boundarie s and it deter s fra ud. My colleagues’ conce rns as expressed in para g raph 19

are satisfied by the proce ss followed by the Boa rd in this case

. As the court stated in Shelby Loan
, “[t] he g ener al rule is that wher e forg ery and fra ud are char g ed, courts permit evidenc e to take a wide rang e and ever y fac t and circ umstance, no matter of how littl e probative value, which throws a

ny light on the issue, is admissible.” Shelby Loan , 372 I ll. at 407. ¶ 108 Be fore discussing my view of the Boa rd’s finding that there wer e a sufficie nt number of

v al i d s i g nature s, I will comment on the out-of-state case s the majority relies upon to conclude that variations in signature do not meet the substa n t i al compliance require ment. Both case s are distinguishable. The majority cites In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty
, 770 A.2d 327 (Pa. 2001), from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, for the proposition that “[s] ubstantial compliance will not b e fo u n d if one uses an initial for a first or last name.” S u p r a ¶ 16; see Flaherty
, 770 A.2d at 332. Actually
, the Flaherty court struck signatur es beca use they wer e printed rathe r than cursive as they appea red on the voter reg istration car ds. Ho we v er, my colleagues fail to note that the court struck these signatures beca use, in the absenc e of “substantial proof that the person intended her printed name to be her signature,

a person may not validly print her name upon a nomination petition.” Flaherty
, 770 A.2d at 332. ¶ 109 The Flaherty court noted that other signatures were s t ri ck en “base d on the following

re as o ns: the signa

tures wer e illegible, the signature on the petition did not match th e signature on the elec tors’ reg istration car d, the signatures wer e printed and Candidate did not offer any rehabilitati ng testimony
, or the elec tors wer e not re g istered and Candidate failed
to present rehabilitati ng testimony .” (Emphase s added.) Id. at 331 n.4. Her e, the petitioners did offer “re habilitating” testimony from the c irculators. ¶ 110 Next, my colleagues cite State ex rel. Rogers v. Taft , 594 N.E.2d 576 (Ohio 1992), for the proposition that “substantial compliance will not be found if the signature is pri nted rathe r than in cursive as it appea rs on the corr esponding reg istration form.” Supra ¶ 16. The Supreme Court of Ohio made this deter mination beca

use, based on t h e languag e in the

-25-rele vant Ohio statute, “the Ge n era l Assembly obviously did not mean to include printing

within the term ‘sig nature ’ as used in the statute, since the rele vant law clea rly distinguishes the two.” Taft
, 594 N.E.2d at 5 7 9

. Un d er t h e Ohio statute at issue, “[s] igna tures shall be aff ix ed in ink. Eac h signe r may also print his name, so as to clea rly identify his sig nature .” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court noted that in State ex rel. Gree n v. Casey
, 554 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (Ohio 1990), it held that this provision “implicitly require s a cursive signature.” Taft
, 594 N.E.2d at 579. The provision at issue in this case does not provide this distinction. Wit h respe ct to one of the contested signatures, the Casey court also noted that there was “no proof offe red that the signe r and the reg istered voter wer e the same persons.” Id. Ag ain, in this ca s e t h ere was proof that the signe rs and the reg istered voters wer e the
same pe rsons. ¶ 111 I also note that, in both out-of-state case s that my colleagues rely upon, the courts applied

a more defe rential standard of revie w. In Flaherty
, the court stated, “our standard of revie w is whether the finding s of fac t a re supported by

substantial evidence , whether there was a

n abuse of discretion, or whether

err ors of law wer e commit ted.” Flaherty
, 770 A.2d at 331. In Taft
, the court, in aff

irming the elec tion board’ s ref usal to acc ept a candidate’s nominating petition, state d: “ we find no fra ud, corr uption, abuse of discretion, or clea r disreg ard of the law in the boar d’s re

jection of these signa

tures.” Taft , 594 N.E.2d at 580. ¶ 112 I have revie wed the q u es t i o n ed s i gn at u re s , along with the addre sses and the other information on the petition sheets, and compar ed the signatures to the signatures on file with the election commission. There is no question that the 21 signatures identified by my colleagues leave a lot to be desired. Circulators, whether they are working to g et a candidate

on the ballot or to raise a public question, would b e we l l ad v i s ed to remind voters to sign their full names. A s an aside, I also note that the State B oard of Education provides public education online and in print reg arding“School District Deta chment/Annexation” but that

no information co n cerning the “match” require ment for signe rs is contained there in. That said, I woul d hold that the Boa rd’s decision that the petition had met the signature require ment is not ag ainst the m anife st weight of t he evid en ce , as t he opposi te conclusion is not clearly

evident. Cinkus , 228 I ll. 2d at 210. ¶ 113 I t is important to reme mber that m ar k s o f d i ffe rent sorts may qualify as signa tures, as long as the m ark “manifests that the i nstrument has been executed or adopted by the party to be cha rg ed by it.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Roti v. Roti
, 364 I ll. App. 3d 191, 196 (2006). The petitioners, throug h the Commi ttee of Ten, prese nted a prima facie case for jurisdiction to be found. The burden of p roduction shifted t o the Dis tricts to show that the petitioners did not prese nt the requ i s i te number of signatures. The Districts prese nted the questioned signa

ture pag es along with the officia l voter reg istration car d signatures. In order
to counter the Districts’ claims, the Commi ttee o f Ten prese nted the testimony of the circ ulators by way of an ac ce p t ed proff er, which has the leg al eff ect of a stipulation. The Districts’ arguments ag ainst the rele vance of the stipulated evidenc e are not evidenc e. As my colleagues acknow ledg e, testimony as to the g enuinene ss of the signatures is admissible on the question of whe ther they match the of

ficial sig nature s. ¶ 114 Ad d i t i onally
, it appea rs from the petit ion sheets that they wer e the product of door-t o

door canva ssing by the circ ulators. Many of the signatures that my colleagues invalidate due

-26-to the use of an initial appea r on the same petition sheets as signa tures of other voters in the

same househol d wh o s i gned on the same date as the purported bad signe r. Even in those instances wher e an initial is used, in most ca s es t h e signature in its entirety bear s a strong

rese mblance to the signature on the vo ter reg istration car d. I t would be rea sonable for the Boa rd to conclude that the petition corr oborate d the circ ulators’ agreed testimony that the signatures were ge nuine. I n my revie w of the s ignat u re s I saw nothi ng that would indicate fra ud or forg ery

. This perha ps explains wh y the Districts made no attempt whatsoeve r to independe ntly as certain from the signe rs whether their signatures on the petition wer e “g enuine,” the term they repe at edly used in their initial pleading s. I t also helps to explain why the jurisdictional argument is the last argument raised in the Districts’ briefs a nd why they never bothere d to touc h upon the signature issue during the arguments befor e the tria l
court. For all of the fore g oing rea sons I would aff irm the Boa

rd’s finding that the signature and addr ess re quirement wa s met and move on to the mer its.

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