alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Lance WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D. JUST, Correctional Officer, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16210

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 17, 2017

Lance Williams, Pro Se

Jaime Ganson, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Lance Williams, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to pay the filing, fee after revoking his in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status because he had three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *Andrews v. King,*398 F.3d 1113, 1118 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

The district court properly revoked Williams’ IFP. status because at the time Williams filed the complaint, he had filed three actions that qualified as “strikes,” and he did not plausibly allege that he was “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time he lodged the complaint. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1916(g); *Coleman v. Tollefson,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1759, 1763, 191 L.Ed.2d 803 (2015) (“[Pjrior dismissal on a statutorily enumerated ground counts as a strike even if the dismissal is the subject of an appeal.”); *Belanus v. Clark,*796 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissal for failure to state a claim because claims were time barred properly counted as a strike); *Andrews v. Cervantes,*493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) *262(discussing the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g)).

We reject as unsupported Williams’ contention that he was not a California state prisoner at the time he filed the complaint.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not consider documents and facts- not presented to the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

Williams’ request for judicial notice, set forth in his opening brief, is granted.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 12

- 00289

- CV

David Scot Lynd

v.

Lea Cox §

§

§

§ From the Probate Court

o f Denton County (PR

- 2011

- 00093 )

August 25

, 2014

Per Curiam



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

PER CURIAM
#### Miguel SOTO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Randy WHITE, Warden Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-5252

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Filed December 06, 2016

*894Dennis J. Burke,- Department of Public Advocacy, La Grange, KY, for Petitioner-Appellant

Jason Bradley Moore, Office of the Attorney General of Kentucky, Frankfort, KY, James Hays Lawson, Law Office, Louisville, KY, for Respondent-Appellee

BEFORE: McKEAGUE, KETHLEDGE, and STRANCH Circuit Judges,

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Miguel Soto filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he asserts claims of juror bias and denial of the right to self-representation in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides relief to a habeas petitioner if the state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If fair minded jurists could disagree as to the correctness of the state court’s decision, then Soto would not be entitled to relief. *Harrington v. Richter,*562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). The district court found that Soto failed to meet his burden of showing the Kentucky Supreme Court unreasonably, applied federal law on both of his claims. R. 23, Dist. Ct. Op., PID 139, 141.

This court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and any factual findings for clear error. *Magana v. Hofbauer,*263 F.3d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 2001). Having duly considered the district court’s opinion in light of Soto’s appellate arguments, we find no error. His arguments are unavailing and are fairly and adequately addressed in the magistrate court’s review and recommendation as fully adopted by the district court. To issue another opinion reiterating the analysis would be duplicative and unnecessary. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Soto’s habeas corpus petition on these two claims.
S.E., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-1691

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 16, 2018

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Hemmendinger, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kayla H. McNab, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, LAGOA and SCALES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Anthony Tyrone GURLEY v. STATE

CR-16-0177

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 21, 2017 Reh. denied May 26, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### IN RE: Brian M. BURMASTER, Petitioner.

No. 16-1825

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 17, 2016

Decided: November 21, 2016

Brian M. Burmaster, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Brian M. Burmaster petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed in ruling on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. We conclude that the present record does not reveal undue delay in the district court. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
Juan NUNEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-541

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 6, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 23.1



KPMG LOGO

        KPMG LLP
        Chartered Accountants

        Box 10426 777 Dunsmuir Street                  Telephone (604) 691-3000
        Vancouver BC  V7Y 1K3                          Telefax (604) 691-3031
        Canada                                         www.kpmg.ca





                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


The Board of Directors
E*Comnetrix Inc.

We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  to  the  Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (Registration Number 333-10826,  333-12078 and 333-12916)
of E*Comnetrix  Inc.  (formerly,  USV  Telemanagement  Inc.) of our report dated
March 2, 2001 relating to the  consolidated  balance sheets of E*Comnetrix  Inc.
(formerly  USV  Telemanagement  Inc.) as at December 31, 2000 and 1999,  and the
related  consolidated  statements of  operations  and deficit and cash flows for
each of the years in the  three-year  period ended  December 31, 2000,  1999 and
1998 which report appears in the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended
December 31, 2000.



/s/ KPMG LLP

Vancouver, Canada
May 9, 2001
Exhibit 31.1
**Officer Certification**
I, L. Dick Buell, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Catalina MarketingCorporation; 2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untruestatement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary tomake the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered bythis quarterly report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this quarterly report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations and cashflows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisquarterly report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand we have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this quarterly report is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, asof the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and c) Disclosed in this quarterly report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s boardof directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
Date: August 16, 2004   By:      /s/ L. Dick Buell      Chief Executive Officer and Director
25
#### IN RE: Franklin C. SMITH, Petitioner.

No. 17-1020

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 25, 2017

Franklin C. Smith, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Franklin C. Smith petitions for a writ of mandamus compelling Charter One Bank to recognize a power-of-attorney document and to allow Smith access to certain funds, and he has filed a motion to recuse the judges of this court due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from the disposition of a prior, unrelated appeal. With regard to the mandamus petition, Smith presents no evidence that “there are no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,” such as an ordinary civil suit. *See In re Braxton,*258 F.3d 250, 261 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (setting forth standard for granting writ of mandamus). Furthermore, Smith has not identified any valid grounds for recusal. *See*28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (listing grounds for recusal).

Accordingly, we deny Smith’s motion to recuse and deny his mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
#### Daniel WATTS, Petitioner-Appellant v. Robert C. TANNER, Warden, B. B. Rayburn Correctional Center, Respondent-Appellee

No. 16-31015 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 23, 2017

Justin Caine Harrell, Esq., H2 Law, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Petitioner-Appellant

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Following a jury trial, Daniel Watts, Louisiana prisoner # 437719, was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. After his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition was dismissed as untimely, he filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging his conviction. The district court construed this motion as an unauthorized successive § 2254 petition and transferred the matter to this court. The district court’s transfer order is an appealable collateral order over which this court has jurisdiction. *See In re Bradford,*660 F.3d 226, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2011); *see also United States v. Fulton,*780 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 2015).

Watts argues that the district court erred by construing his § 2241 petition as a successive § 2254 application. According to Watts, he was convicted of an illegal, nonresponsive verdict, and,' as such, he asserts that he is not challenging his conviction under § 2254 because there is no valid conviction to challenge.

As the record shows, Watts’s petition challenges the validity of the same Louisiana conviction for attempted second-degree murder that was the subject of his first § 2254 petition, and this challenge could have been raised in that petition. *See Leal Garcia v. Quarterman,*573 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2009); *In re Cain,*137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the district court properly construed the petition as a successive § 2254 petition, over which it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred it to this court. *See Felker v. Turpin,*518 U.S. 651, 662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996); *United States v. Key,*205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s transfer order.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Jose RODRIGUEZ, etc., Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellee.

No. 3D17-272

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 16, 2018 Rehearing Denied July 2, 2018

Jacobs Keeley, PLLC, and Bruce Jacobs and Court Keeley, Miami, for appellant.

Liebler, Gonzalez & Portuondo, and Dora F. Kaufman, Miami, and Alan Michael Pierce, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, LAGOA, and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See**HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n v. Buset*, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D305, 241 So.3d 882, 2018 WL 735265 (Fla. 3d DCA Feb 7, 2018).
**Exhibit 31(a)**

 

CERTIFICATION 

 

I, John D. Bair, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Pinnacle Data Systems, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterlyreport is being prepared; 

 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this quarterly report based on suchevaluation; 

 

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report); and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal controls over financial reporting. 

 

Date: April 27, 2005
EX PARTE TTR CONSTRUCTION, LLC, et al.

(In re: Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. TTR Construction, LLC, and Carolyn Robinson)

2160678

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 9, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed.
Willie HULL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-54

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 22, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2023-1039 

_____________________________

KIMBERLY ROSE JORDAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Joshua M. Hawkes, Judge.

February 21, 2024

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROWE, NORDBY, and LONG. JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Jessica Yeary, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001085254
<NAME> GLOBAL REALTY MANAGEMENT GROUP INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,733
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 4,233
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  34,733
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           14,587
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        10,550
<OTHER-SE>                                       9,596
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    34,733
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                45,668
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (45,668)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (35,330)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (.004)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (.004)


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Vivek Y. Ranadive, President and Chief Executive Officer of TIBCO Software Inc. (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | (a) |  | the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended November 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: January 20, 2004



By:

/s/    VIVEK Y.
RANADIVÉName:

Vivek Y. RanadivéTitle:

President, Chief Executive Officer andChairman of the Board of Directors
## S IXTH 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________ Case No. 6D2 3

- 974 Lower Tribunal No. CF20

- 005761

- XX

_____________________________ E RNESTO P AGAN R ODRIGUEZ , Appellant
,

v.
S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee

.

_____________________________ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County

.

Olin W. Shinholser , Judge.
January 23, 2024

PER CURIAM

.
AFFIRMED

.
NARDELLA , WOZNIAK and WHITE , JJ., c oncur.

Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig , II, Public Defender, and Jean

- Jacques Darius, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING

AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED