[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-10501

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-00042-BAE-RSB

STEVEN JACOB SEIBERT, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS, 

COASTAL SP WARDEN, JOHN DOE, 

COASTAL SP WARDEN, JANE DOE, 

JANE DOES, Prison Intake Computer Input

Personnel at Coastal S.P. Diagnostics (2007), 

COSTAL STATE PRISON, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

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(February 23, 2017)

Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Steven Jacob Seibert, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. He brought suit against Brian Owens, Commissioner of the 

Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”); Cynthia Nelson, Warden at 

Central State Prison (“Central”); Betty Lance, Deputy Warden at Central; Brad 

Hooks, Warden at Rogers State Prison (“Rogers”); Captain Jones; Milton Smith;

Steven DuPree; James Deal; John/Greg Brown; Lieutenant Anderson; Lieutenant 

Wimberly; Sergeant Phillips; Ms. Dees; Mr. Sikes; Mrs. Ford; André Bateman;

and various unnamed John/Jane Doe prison officials, employees and volunteers at 

Central, Rogers and Coastal State Prison (“Coastal”). According to the complaint,

the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to harass him, falsely imprisoned him, 

destroyed his business interests and personal and business property, and restricted

his access to the courts in violation of his constitutional rights and federal, Georgia, 

Florida, and Ohio law. On appeal, Seibert argues that the district court: (1) erred in 

finding that the statute of limitations barred his claims; (2) erred in finding that his 

claims against supervisory defendants were conclusory; and (3) abused its 

discretion in failing to appoint Seibert counsel. After careful review, we affirm.1

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state 

a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), using the same standards that govern 

 1 Nevertheless, we GRANT Seibert’s motion for leave to correct and supplement his existing 

brief.

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dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 

1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001). We accept as true the facts alleged in the 

complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Randall v. 

Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). We likewise review de novo a district 

court’s application of a statute of limitations. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 

Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006). We liberally construe a pro se

party’s pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 

1998). But we generally do not allow fictitious-party pleadings, even pro se ones. 

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). 

First, we are unpersuaded by Seibert’s argument that the district court erred 

by dismissing his claims on statute-of-limitations grounds, by failing to apply the 

continuing violation doctrine, and by failing to toll the statute of limitations until 

his release. Constitutional claims brought under § 1983 tort actions are subject to 

the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which, in 

Georgia, is two years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 

(11th Cir. 2003). The statute of limitations does not start to run “until the facts 

which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a 

person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Lovett, 327 F.3d 1182

(quotation omitted). In considering whether a continuing violation analysis 

applies, we ask if the plaintiff is complaining of “the present consequence of a oneCase: 15-10501 Date Filed: 02/23/2017 Page: 3 of 9 
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time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, or the continuation of 

that violation into the present, which does.” Id. at 1183 (quotation omitted). We 

deem a pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint filed when it has been delivered to a 

prison official for mailing, and assume it was delivered to prison authorities on the 

day he signed it. United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012). 

We look to state law for statutory tolling rules in § 1983 actions. Wallace v. 

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007). Georgia law tolls the limitations period for 

certain disabled individuals, but excludes prisoners from the list of persons entitled 

to statutory tolling. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90; Giles v. Garwood, 853 F.2d 876, 877-78 

(11th Cir. 1988). Equitable tolling may be used when the plaintiff shows that “an 

inequitable event prevented a plaintiff’s timely action.” Booth v. Carnival Corp., 

522 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir. 2008). For § 1983 claims that “necessarily imply 

the invalidity of [a] conviction or sentence,” plaintiffs have no cause of action and 

cannot file suit until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 

Seibert’s § 1983 complaint, filed on May 2, 2014, contained all but two 

claims barred by the statute of limitations. For instance, his original complaint 

alleged that state and county employees harassed him and caused damage to his 

business interests and theft of his property from 1997-1999, well outside the twoyear statute-of-limitations period. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. To the extent Seibert 

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alleged ongoing harassment from 1997 to 2005, these instances are also outside the 

statute of limitations, as is his allegation that his one-time transfer to Rogers State 

Prison in 2009 was done in retaliation and to harass him. Id. He did not provide 

any specific dates for the mail and other items he alleged were stolen in prison, but 

he says these violations took place at Rogers before and during his time in 

segregation. He adds that after he left segregation, he was housed in Building A, 

and then, on May 3-4, 2012, he was transferred to Hays State Prison. Drawing all 

reasonable inferences in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, we are compelled to 

conclude that all of the theft occurred sometime before May 2, 2012, the operative 

cut-off date for purposes of the two-year statute-of-limitations period. And Seibert 

has never argued otherwise. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that 

his theft-related claims fell outside the two-year statute of limitations. See Hughes 

v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To dismiss a prisoner’s complaint 

as time-barred prior to service, it must ‘appear beyond a doubt from the complaint 

itself that [the prisoner] can prove no set of facts which would avoid a statute of 

limitations bar.’”). Moreover, because Seibert is a prisoner, Georgia’s tolling 

provisions do not apply to him and he does not allege that equitable tolling based 

on an inequitable event is warranted. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90; Booth, 522 F.3d 1150. 

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Seibert’s complaint for failure to 

state a claim as to the time-barred claims.

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As for Seibert’s false imprisonment claim, his original complaint alleged 

numerous false imprisonments from 1997 until the present date. But even if these 

false imprisonments could somehow be construed as continuing violations, his 

claims turn on the validity of his conviction and he has no cause of action because 

that conviction has not been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. To the extent 

Seibert has also raised an ongoing false imprisonment based on incorrect 

information in his file, Seibert alleges this claim against unnamed and unidentified 

individuals. Fictitious party pleading is not proper in federal court, so the district 

court did not err in dismissing this claim. Richardson, 598 F.3d at 738. 

Next, while Seibert’s claim based on his alleged retaliatory transfer to Hays 

State Prison was not barred by the statute of limitations, we find no merit to 

Seibert’s argument that the district court erred in dismissing this claim and others 

against the supervisory defendants as conclusory. A § 1983 claim against a 

supervisor must show the supervisor participated in the “alleged constitutional 

violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising 

official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 

667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff must allege grounds for relief other than 

“labels and conclusions” devoid of facts and a complaint containing “conclusory 

allegations” will not survive dismissal for failure to state a claim. Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss . . . [t]hreadbare 

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recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice . . . . A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ . . . 

will not do.” (quotation omitted)); Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 

1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2010) (dismissing a claim where the allegations were 

“conclusory”).

Of the claims Seibert alleged against specific, discernable, supervisory 

defendants, the original complaint was almost entirely comprised of conclusory 

allegations. In his original complaint, Seibert alleged that Commissioner Owens 

failed to enact, enforce or maintain sufficient training and supervision to prevent 

mistakes when inputting prisoner information in the GDOC system, without 

putting forth specific facts about Owens’s alleged involvement. In his amended 

complaint, Seibert alleged that from 1997 to 2005, Owens personally directed 

some of the harassment, encouraged it, and did not stop it. But Seibert otherwise 

did not add anything related to Owens and the failure to properly supervise GDOC 

employees, nor did he assert any specific facts about Owens’s involvement or any 

causal connection between his actions and alleged constitutional violations. 

Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. Additionally, Seibert’s allegations against “GDOC 

supervisors” were properly dismissed since they are fictitious-party names. 

Richardson, 598 F.3d at 738. 

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As for Seibert’s claim about his alleged retaliatory transfer to Hays State 

Prison, he alleged in his original complaint that defendants Hooks, DuPree and/or 

Brown were responsible for the transfer. In his amended complaint, Seibert added 

additional injuries stemming from the transfer, but he did not elaborate on the 

allegations against Hooks, DuPree and Brown. Because Seibert did not include 

any facts and instead stated mere conclusions about the defendants’ responsibility, 

his complaint was too conclusory to survive the motion to dismiss stage. Thus, for 

all of the reasons we’ve discussed, the district court did not err in dismissing 

Seibert’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

Finally, we reject Seibert’s claim that the district court abused its discretion 

by failing to appoint him counsel. Prisoners raising civil rights claims have no 

constitutional right to counsel. Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993). 

Appointment of counsel in civil cases must be justified by “exceptional 

circumstances,” such as the presence of “facts and legal issues [which] are so novel 

or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner,” and may be 

warranted if the pro se litigant needs help presenting the merits of a claim to the 

court. Id. (quotation omitted). The district court has broad discretion in making 

this decision, and the fact that a plaintiff would be helped by counsel does not 

alone require the appointment of counsel. Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 

(11th Cir. 1999). 

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As a civil litigant, Seibert was not entitled to counsel for his claims. Kilgo, 

983 F.2d at 193. He did not file a separate motion in the district court requesting 

counsel, but rather requested counsel as a form of relief in his complaint. 

Although the district court did not address the request, that omission was harmless 

because this case does not present exceptional circumstances that necessitate the 

appointment of counsel. Id. Seibert presents no reasons that appointment of 

counsel would have been necessary other than to restate the facts in his complaint, 

presumably to highlight either the density or magnitude of his claims. Although 

appointment of counsel may have been helpful to Seibert, that is true for many pro 

se litigants and does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. Bass, 170 F.3d at 

1320. Therefore, any error committed by the district court in failing to address 

Seibert’s request for counsel was harmless because the appointment of counsel was 

not warranted. 

AFFIRMED.

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