NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEEPAK LAMA,

Petitioner,

v. ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 19

- 71375 Agency No. A202

- 130

- 884

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted February 12, 2021 San Francisco, California Before: HURWITZ and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and FEINERMAN, * * District Judge. Deepak Lama, a citizen of Nepal, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an I mmigration J udge

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

FEB 24 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

(IJ) order denying his claims for asylum and withholding of removal

. 1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition and remand.
The IJ found that Lama had suffered past persecution on account of his political activity and was entitled to a presumption of a well

- founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)

. But , the IJ also found that the government had rebutted the presumption , and the BIA then dismissed Lama’s appeal on the sole basis that Lama could safely and reasonabl y relocate within Nepal ,
to Chitwan, where he previously resided for five years without incident

. Our review
is limited to the ground on which the BIA relied. Qiu v. Barr , 944 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2019). When the presumption of a well

- founded fear of future persecution applies, the government bears the “burden of showing that relocation is both safe and
reasonable under all the circumstances” by a preponderance of the evidence. Afriyie
v. Holder , 613 F.3d 924, 934 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Bringas

- Rodriguez v. Sessions , 850 F.3d 1051, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017). “Relocation analysis consists of two ste ps: (1) ‘whether an applicant could relocate safely,’ and (2) ‘whether it would be reasonable to require the applicant to do so.’” Singh v.
Whitaker , 914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Afriyie , 613 F.3d at 934) . We

1 The BIA f

ound that Lama forfeited his claim under the Convention Against Torture. Lama does not challenge that ruling in this court.3

conclude that the BIA’s limited relocation analysis does not satisfy the applicable legal requirements.
First , the agency “failed to take into account the numerous factors for determining reasonableness outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3).” Knezevic v. Ashcroft , 367 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9 th Cir. 2004). Relying on Lama’s stay in Chitwan
between 200 3 and 2008, the agency provided no analysis of whether it would be reasonable for Lama to relocate there at the time of his hearing , in 2017. Lama demonstrated that he experienced persecution in Nepal both in his hometown and
later in Kathmandu , and that this persecution took place both before and after he
lived in Chitwan . While his time in Chitwan appears to have been without incident,
he last lived there many years ago. The government presented no evidence that Lama could safely and reasonably return there now, considering both the current political situation in Chitwan and Lama’s personal circumstances. See Singh , 914
F.3d at 661.
Second , the BIA’s an alysis rests on an apparent misapprehension of the
record. The BIA stated that “[t]he record contains no evidence that it would no longer be safe or reasonable for [Lama] to once again return to [Chitwan] where he had previously voluntarily relocated and resided for approximately 5 years without
incident

. ” (Emphasis added

. ) But the record contains a 2016 letter written to Lama
from his uncle , with whom he lived in Chitwan , indicating that Lama would not be4

safe there. The BIA did not consider this evide nce. And to the extent the BIA “erroneously presumed that relocation was reasonable and improperly assigned the burden of proof to [ Lama ] to show otherwise,” Afriyie , 613 F.3d at 93 5 , it erred in that respect as well. See also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii ) (burden of proof)

. Gomes v. Gonzales , 429 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2005), does not support the government’s position that because Lama once resided in Chitwan without incident, “it is axiomatic that he can do so again.” In Gomes , unlike this case , the petitioners had not shown past persecution and thus bore the burden to show that relocation was
unreasonable. Id. at 1266

– 67 & 1266 n.1. In addition, u nlike Lama, it appears that the petitioners in Gomes had safely resided in the area in question im mediately prior to entering the United States. See i d. at 1267. Gomes also did not involve the BIA failing to address evidence (here the letter from Lama’s uncle) indicating that
relocation to the designated area c ould be unsafe. For the foregoing reason s, we grant the petition and remand this matter to the
BIA for further proceedings consistent with this decision . Any relocation analysis must comport with the governing regulations and this court’s precedents. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3); Singh , 914 F.3d at 659

– 61. We also dismiss as moot the portion of Lama’s petition challenging the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART; REMANDED.