Appointment of Vice Chair of Federal Reserve Board to Serve

Concurrently as Chair of the District of Columbia Financial

Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority

The Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board may also serve as Chair of the District o f Colum bia

Financial Responsibility and M anagement Assistance Authority without violating sections 205 or

208 o f title 18. Her dual service would also have to comply with the Federal Reserve A ct’s “ entiretim e” requirement.

June 1, 1998

M e m o r a n d u m O p in io n f o r t h e C o u n s e l t o t h e P r e s i d e n t

You have asked for our views on whether the President may appoint Alice 

Rivlin to be Chair of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and 

Management Assistance Authority (the “ Authority” ), while Dr. Rivlin continues 

to serve in her current capacity as Vice Chair and a member of the Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “ Federal Reserve Board” ). Upon 

review of the federal conflict of interest statutes,1 the prohibition on compensation 

for dual offices, and the requirements of the Federal Reserve Act, we conclude 

that the relevant statutory authorities do not prohibit the proposed appointment, 

but that Dr. Rivlin must continue to perform her duties as Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board on a full-time basis. She would thus have to work with the 

Federal Reserve Board and its General Counsel to ensure compliance with the 

Federal Reserve Act.

I. Background

Congress created the Authority in 1995,2 pursuant to its constitutional authority 

over the District of Columbia.3 The Authority is “ an entity within the government 

of the District of Columbia.” § 101(a), 109 Stat. at 100. It consists of five members appointed by the President, in accordance with specific statutory criteria,4 

one of whom is designated by the President to be the Chair of the Authority.

1 We have consulted with the Office of Government Ethics with regard to the application of the conflict of interest 

statutes to this matter

2 District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-8, 

109 Stat 97 (the “ D.C. Financial Responsibility Act” or the “ Act” ). Subsequent to its 1995 enactment, the Act 

was amended several times in respects not material to the analysis below, unless otherwise citcd.

2Id § 2(c)(2), 109 Stat. at 98 (citing U.S Const art 1, §8, cl 17)

4 The Act provides that a member of the Authonty must be an individual who1 “ (I) has knowledge and expertise 

in finance, management, and the organization or operation of business or government, (2) does not provide goods 

or services to the District government [and does not have a close relative who does soj, (3) is not an officer or 

employee of the District government, and (4) maintains a primary residence in the District of Columbia or has 

a primary place of business in the District of Columbia ” § 101(c), 109 Stat at 101 We understand that you have 

determined that Dr. Rivlin would meet all of these cntena Accordingly, we do not address her qualifications for 

appointment

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Id. § 101(b), (c). Congress intended for the Authority to assist the government 

of the District of Columbia in combating its financial and management problems 

by developing a “ comprehensive approach to fiscal, management, and structural” 

issues. Id. § 2(a)(5), 109 Stat. at 98.

Dr. Rivlin was appointed by the President in 1996 as Vice Chair and a member 

of the Federal Reserve Board for a term of fourteen years. See generally 12 U.S.C. 

§§241-242(1994).

II. Conflict of Interest Laws

A. Section 208 and the Prohibition on Acts Affecting a Personal Financial

Interest

Section 208 of title 18 prohibits participation in any “ particular matter” that 

may affect an individual’s personal financial interest. The statute applies to any

officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States 

Government, or of any independent agency of the United States, 

a Federal Reserve bank director, officer, or employee, or an officer 

or employee of the District o f Columbia ....

18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1994). A personal financial interest is imputed to an individual 

if “ his spouse, minor child, general partner, organization in which he is serving 

as officer, director, trustee, general partner or employee” has a financial interest 

in a matter covered by § 208. Id. Thus, the question arises whether the financial 

interest of the District of Columbia would be imputed to Dr. Rivlin by service 

on the Authority concurrent with her service in the Federal Reserve Board.

In fact, the statute is not implicated in this circumstance because, for purposes 

of § 208, the interests of the United States include those of the District of 

Columbia.5 By grouping the District of Columbia together with the executive 

branch, independent agencies and Federal Reserve banks, § 208 effectively defines 

the interests of the United States that are protected under the statute as including 

those of the District of Columbia. See Applicability o f 18 U.S.C. § 208 to the

Federal Communications Commission’s Representative on the Board of Directors

o f the Telecommunications Development Fund, 21 Op. O.L.C. 95, 96 (1997) 

(“ FCC Opinion” ) (§ 208(a) applies only to conflicts between the federal government and outside organizations and does not encompass intra-govemmental conflicts between entities covered by the provision).

The inclusion of the District of Columbia along with executive branch entities 

is not incidental. Before 1989, §§203, 205, and 207 of title 18, like §208, all 

included the District of Columbia among the federal entities comprising the 

interests of the United States to be protected by the provisions. See generally

5 Section 208, of course, would apply to Dr. Rivlin in her personal capacity.

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18 U.S.C. §§203, 205, 207 (1988). In 1989, however, Congress amended §§203, 

205, and 207 to separate the District of Columbia and specifically treat the 

interests of the District as distinct from those of the United States.6 Although 

Congress made other changes to § 208 at that time, it did not alter the treatment 

of the District. Thus, we may infer that Congress has intentionally treated the 

interests of the United States and the District as identical for the purposes of 

§ 208.7

In addition, our interpretation of § 208 in this circumstance is reinforced by 

opinions of this Office in connection with the earlier version of § 205 that included 

that the District of Columbia with the executive departments and agencies. Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist concluded that because the District of Columbia 

was included with executive departments and agencies in § 205, matters involving 

the District of Columbia were ones in which the United States had an interest 

within the meaning of the statute. Letter for Anthony L. Mondello, General 

Counsel, United States Civil Service Commission, from William H. Rehnquist, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Mar. 26, 1970). This Office 

reiterated that conclusion on subsequent occasions before the 1989 amendments. 

See e.g., Memorandum for James L. Byrnes, Associate Deputy Attorney General, 

from Margaret C. Love, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Request

fo r Approval o f Outside Employment at 1 n.l (Sept. 24, 1987); Government Lawyers’ Pro Bono Activities in the District o f Columbia, 4B Op. O.L.C. 800 (1980); 

Memorandum for Daniel Skoler, Director, Office of Law Enforcement Programs, 

from Thomas E. Kauper, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, Re: Determination of Property o f Federal Lawyers Representing Children in Juvenile Court Proceedings (Apr. 7, 1970).

Finally, our conclusion is consistent with the general observation in an earlier 

opinion that the government ethics rule provide that “ employees owe their duty 

to the government and its citizens, . . . not to the particular bureaucratic interests 

of their agency.” Memorandum for Philip B. Heymann, Deputy Attorney General, 

from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re:

Creation o f an Office o f Investigative Agency Policies at 6 (Oct. 26, 1993). Thus, 

we need not examine here the particular interests of the Authority and the Federal 

Reserve System; for purposes of §208, it is sufficient that Congress has treated 

the interests of the United States and the District of Columbia as singular.8 See

FCC Opinion, 21 Op. O.L.C. at 96.

t'See generally Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub L No 101-194, 103 Stat 1716

7 See generally CFTC v Schor, 478 U S 833, 846 (1986)

8 Nonetheless, we understand that in order to avoid even the appearance of a conflict between her obligations 

as Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board and Chair of the Authonty. it is the intention ot the President and 

Dr Rivlin that in the event that she is appointed as Chair of the Authonty, she would recuse herself from all 

matters relating to the issuance ot District of Columbia bonds and the timing and nature of any other investment 

decisions by the Distnct

Appointment o f Vice Chair o f Federal Reserve Board to Serve Concurrently as Chair o f the District

o f Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority

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Opinions o f the Office o f Legal Counsel in Volume 22

B. Section 205 and the Prohibition of Representation of Non-Federal

Interests

Section 205 of title 18 prohibits any “ officer or employee of the United States 

in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government or in any agency 

of the United States” from, inter alia, acting as an

agent or attorney for anyone before any department, agency, court, 

court-martial, officer, or civil, military, or naval commission in 

connection with any covered matter in which the United States is 

a party or has a direct and substantial interest.

18 U.S.C. § 205(a)(2) (1994). Unlike §208, as we have already noted, §205 treats 

the District of Columbia separately from the United States and, thus, for purposes 

of this statute, the interests of the District and the federal government are not 

identical. The separate treatment of the United States and the District of Columbia 

under § 205 raises the question whether Dr. Rivlin, as an officer of the United 

States covered by § 205(a) in her capacity as Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve 

System, may represent the interests of the Authority before any “ department [or] 

agency” of the federal government, because the Authority is identified in the 

statute creating it as an entity of the District of Columbia government. § 101(a), 

109 Stat. at 100.

We understand, as a preliminary matter, that the duties of the Chair of the 

Authority will invariably involve the kinds of activities that, if done on behalf 

of a truly non-federal entity, would constitute acting as an agent before departments and agencies of the executive branch.9 Indeed, an express purpose of the 

Authority is to assist the District of Columbia in “ achieving an appropriate relationship with the Federal Government,” § 2(b)(4)(B), 109 Stat. at 98, and the 

Authority is directed by statute to make recommendations to, among others, the 

President. § 207(a), 109 Stat. at 133.

In addition, we assume for purposes of this analysis that the matters in which 

the Chair may engage in covered representational activities are ones in which 

the United States has a “ direct and substantial interest.” An express duty of the 

Authority is to examine, and make recommendations regarding, the “ programmatic and structural relationship between the District government and the 

Federal Government.” Id. §§2(b)(7), 109 Stat. at 99, 207(a)(2). The D.C. Financial Responsibility Act also observes that the problems of the District affect the 

“ efficient operation of the Federal Government.” Id. § 2(a)(9), 109 Stat. at 98. 

Moreover, the Authority is a creature of Congress’s Article I power over the District and, we assume that any matters that might require or impel the Chair to

9 Although the Chair is also likely to represent the Authority before members of Congress, §205 does not cover 

such representational activities and, thus, this important aspect of the Chair’s duties is not implicated here

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represent the Authority before any executive department or agency would, in all 

reasonable likelihood, be ones that involved the interests of the United States.

Our analysis of § 205 turns on the nature of the interests to be represented by 

the Chair of the Authority. Notwithstanding that the Authority was established 

as an “ entity within the government of the District of Columbia,” the D.C. Financial Responsibility Act, taken as a whole, reflects the peculiarly federal nature 

of the Authority and leads to the conclusion that the interests to be represented 

by the Chair and members of the Authority are, for purposes of § 205, the interests 

of the United States. Thus, Dr. Rivlin’s service as Chair of the Authority would 

not be inhibited by § 205.10

As we have observed, the Authority is a product and instrument of Congress’s 

constitutional authority over the District of Columbia. The statute itself and its 

legislative history indicate clearly that the Authority was “ created as part of the 

federal government’s responsibility for governing the District of Columbia,” and 

that “ [wjhile the Authority is established as part of the District of Columbia 

government,” it was Congress’s “ strong” intention that it “ function and operate 

in an independent oversight capacity’ ’ separate and apart from the existing District 

government. H.R. Rep. No. 104-96, at 34, 52 (1995); see §2(b), 109 Stat. at 

98-99.

For example, it is significant that the statute defines the government of the District of Columbia to exclude the Authority. §305(5), 109 Stat. at 152. Among 

the principle functions of the Authority is overseeing the creation of, and compliance with, a financial plan and budget for the District. See generally id. §§201- 

204, 109 Stat. at 108-19. In this regard, the Authority must approve any financial 

plan and budget before it is effective, id. § 201, and no bill passed by the District 

of Columbia Council and signed by the Mayor (or passed over the Mayor’s veto) 

may take effect without the approval of the Authority. Id. §203. The Authority 

is subject only to those District of Columbia laws that Congress has specified 

in the Act and, in general, “ [n]either the Mayor nor the Council may exercise 

any control, supervision, oversight, or review of the Authority or its activities.” 

Id. § 108(b)(1), 109 Stat. at 107. In any action brought by or against the Authority, 

the Authority is to be represented by counsel of its choosing and “ in no instance 

may the Authority be represented by the Corporation Counsel of the District of 

Columbia.” 11 Id. § 108(c).

Appointment o f Vice Chair o f Federal Reserve Board to Serve Concurrently as Chair o f the District

o f Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority

10Of course the requirements of § 205 would continue to apply to Dr Rivlin in her personal capacity

11 There are additional features that reflect the separation of the Authonty from the Distnct of Columbia For 

example, no officer or employee of the District government is eligible for appointment to the Authority. § 101(c)(3), 

109 Stat. at 101. The staff of the Authonty may be appointed and paid without regard to the provisions of the 

D C Code and the procurement laws of the Distnct do not apply to the Authonty Id § 102(c)(2), 109 Stat at 

102 The Authonty is not liable for any obligations or claim against the Distnct of Columbia. Id. § 104, 109 Stat. 

at 105, amended by Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropnations Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-134, 110 

Stat 1321-106 The Distnct may not borrow money, in certain circumstances, without the consent of the Authonty 

§204, 109 Stat at 119

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In addition to being distinct from the District government, the federal nature 

of the Authority is evidenced by the fact that the Authority’s powers are delegated 

and vested by federal statute, pursuant to specific constitutional authority, in 

individuals who are appointed by the President of the United States. Within this 

rubric of federal authority are specific provisions further reflecting the federal 

character of the Authority, as well as its separateness from the District. For 

example, the annual Federal payment to the District is, pursuant to the Act, deposited into an escrow account held by the Authority, to then be allocated to the 

District government in the Authority’s discretion. Id. § 205(a)(1), 109 Stat. at 131.

Furthermore, any action brought against the Authority or otherwise arising, in 

whole or in part, out of the D.C. Financial Responsibility Act, must be brought 

in federal, rather than District of Columbia, court. Id. § 105(a), 109 Stat. at 105. 

The Authority is vested also with federal subpoena power. It may issue subpoenas 

and enforce them in the district courts of the United States under the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. § 103(e), 109 Stat. at 103. A review of the D.C. 

Financial Responsibility Act reveals a host of other examples.12

We also observe that our conclusion here is in accord with the interpretation 

that this Office has applied to § 205 in an analogous circumstance. This Office 

has previously concluded that § 205 does not prohibit a federal employee who 

is detailed to a state agency from representing the state agency before the federal 

agency from which he was detailed, where the detail and the representation of 

the state’s interests are made in connection with a statutory scheme the purposes 

of which would be furthered by such representational conduct. See generally

Application o f 18 U.S.C. §§203 and 205 to Federal Employees Detailed to State

and Local Governments, 4B Op. O.L.C. 498 (1980). Here, the D.C. Financial 

Responsibility Act provides for extensive cooperation between the Authority and 

federal agencies, including the provision of federal data and the detailing, even 

on a non-reimbursable basis, of federal employees to assist that Authority. In addition, although the Act prohibits employees of the District of Columbia government 

from serving on the Authority, it applies no such limit to the service of federal 

officials and employees. The general purposes of the Act and certain of its specific 

provisions suggest that the appointment of a federal official to the Authority and 

her representation of the Authority before federal agencies is consistent with, and 

would effectuate the purposes of, the Act.

]2See e.g., § 102(d), 109 Slat at 102 (upon request of the Chair, any Federal department or agency may detail 

its personnel to the Authority on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis to assist the Authonty); id. § 102(e), 

amended by 110 Stat. at 1321-103 (federal employees who are employed by the Authonty are treated as continuing 

their federal employment for purposes of the federal retirement system); id. (those Authonty employees who join 

in the federal government upon leaving the Authonty are entitled to credit for the full penod of the individual’s 

service with the Authonty for purposes of determining federal leave); id § 103(f), amended by 110 Stat at 1321 — 

102 (the Authonty is authonzed to procure from the General Services Administration any administrative support 

services that it may need); id § 103(c)(1), 109 Stat at 103 (the Authonty is empowered to “ secure directly” from 

any federal department or agency, with consent, any information it deems necessary to carry out its duties).

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Because the Authority is an instrument of Congress’s constitutional authority 

over the District of Columbia, a creature of federal law, vested with material 

attributes of federal authority, clearly and expressly distinct from the District of 

Columbia government, and composed of members appointed by the President, we 

conclude that the interests to be represented by the Authority are, for purposes 

of §205, federal interests. Thus, if appointed as Chair of the Authority, Dr.

Rivlin’s dual service would not implicate § 205.

III. Dual Office-Holding

The fact that Dr. Rivlin would serve concurrently as Vice Chair of the Federal 

Reserve Board and Chair of the Authority raises the question whether this dual 

office-holding violates federal law. As a statutory matter,13 a federal official is 

precluded from receiving compensation from more than one office. 5 U.S.C.

§5533 (1994 & Supp. IV 1997). This Office has previously observed that the 

repeal in 1964 of earlier legislation that prohibited dual office-holding, coupled 

with the enactment of the current provision barring only dual compensation, 

impliedly permits the concurrent holding of two offices so long as there is no 

dual compensation involved. Memorandum for James H. Thessin, Deputy Legal 

Advisor, from Randolph D. Moss, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Re: Dual

Office-Holding at 2 (Dec. 3, 1997) (“Dual Office-Holding Opinion” ); Memorandum for Philip B. Heymann, Deputy Attorney General, from Walter Dellinger, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Creation of an Office

of Investigative Agency Policies (Oct. 26, 1993) (“ Investigative Agency 

Opinion” ); Dual Office o f Chief Judge o f Court of Veterans Appeals and Director

of the Office o f Government Ethics, 13 Op. O.L.C. 241, 242 (1989). The proposed 

appointment of Dr. Rivlin would not violate the prohibition on dual compensation 

because the Chair and all members of the Authority serve without pay. § 101(d),

109 Stat. at 101.

Nor would Dr. Rivlin’s dual office-holding run afoul of the incompatibility doctrine, which precludes dual office-holding arrangements when a single individual 

would be authorized by virtue of one office to review her own actions taken in

-----the-capacity- of- her- other- office.L4 See generally Investigative-Agency Opinion-----------

at 6-8. Here, the two offices in question are not connected by any review authority 

that would implicate the incompatibility doctrine. See Memorandum for Arnold 

Intrater, General Counsel, Office of White House Administration, from John O.

13 The Incompatibility Clause of the Constitution, U S Const art I, §6, cl 2, forbids members of Congress from 

holding any office under the United States Neither the Incompatibility Clause nor any other constitutional provision 

bars an executive branch official from holding two offices

14 While this Office has continued to refer to the incompatibility doctrine in its opinions, we have reorganized 

that “ li]t is arguable that it has either fallen into desuetude or been repealed by statute ” Memorandum for Edward 

C Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, from Theodore B Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, Re Appointment o f D Lowell Jensen as Associate Attorney General at 3, 4 (June 14, 1983) (“ Associate 

Attorney General Opinion” ); see Dual Office-Holding Opinion at 4 (quoting Associate Attorney General Opinion)

Appointment o f Vice Chair o f Federal Reserve Board to Serve Concurrently as Chair o f the District

o f Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority

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McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Dual

Office o f Executive Secretary o f National Security Council and Special Assistant

(Mar. 1, 1988) (no incompatibility problem where office was not designed as 

check on the other); Memorandum for Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, 

from Ralph W. Tarr, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 

Re: Availability o f Hatch Act Exemption fo r Individual Holding Dual Appointments as a M ember o f the White House Staff and Director of the White House

Conference on Productivity at 4 (Aug. 22, 1983) (finding no incompatibility 

problem because neither office is “ formally subordinate to the other” ); Appointment o f Deputy Director of the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP)

by Its Executive Director, 1 Op. O.L.C. 28 (1977) (finding offices incompatible 

where official would be required to review his own actions).

IV. Requirement that Federal Reserve Board Members Devote Their “ Entire

Time” to the Business of the Board

As a member of the Federal Reserve Board, Dr. Rivlin is required under §241 

of title 12, to “ devote [her] entire time to the business of the Board.” On its 

face, this requirement would not necessarily prohibit Dr. Rivlin from serving on 

the Authority, although her performance of the responsibilities of her dual offices 

must comply with the “ entire-time” requirement. “ This provision has not been 

interpreted so literally as to preclude Board members from serving as members 

of commission or committees of a governmental or quasi-govemmental nature 

established by statute or by Executive Order.” Memorandum for Governor 

Brimmer, Re: Service as member o f Advisory Committee on Regional Economic

Development (July 21, 1967) (“ Opinion of Federal Reserve Board” ).

This Office has previously reviewed a comparable requirement in another statute 

in circumstances similar to those addressed here. Memorandum for the Attorney 

General, from W. Wilson White, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, Re: Appointment of University Dean as member o f Tennessee Valley

Authority (Nov. 8, 1957) (“TVA Opinion” ) (whether university dean, on leave 

from university, could serve concurrendy on the TVA and an advisory board to 

the Department of Agriculture). There, a federal official was subject to a prohibition that he not “ be engaged in any other business” outside of official duties. 

TVA Opinion at 1 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 831a(f)). The analysis of the TVA Opinion 

turned on the determination, principally a factual one, whether the second position 

is part-time and may be performed without impairing the full-time responsibilities 

imposed by the primary office. TVA Opinion at 2; see also Memorandum for 

Larry Eugene Temple, Special Counsel to the President, from Frank M. 

Wozencraft, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Dual

service as an Executive Director o f the Inter-American Development Bank and

a D irector o f the Export-Import Bank o f Washington (Feb. 16, 1968) (“ Export116
Import Bank Opinion” ) (analyzing, on factual grounds, whether service on an 

advisory committee was compatible with full-time nature of federal official’s 

duties).

As we have already noted, the Chair of the Authority is an uncompensated 

position, § 101(d), 109 Stat. at 101, suggesting that it may be filled on a parttime basis. Moreover, we understand that the President and Dr. Rivlin intend that 

the position of Chair of the Authority be treated as a part-time position, emphasizing the temporary nature of the Authority and its role in shifting responsibility 

to the District government. See id. § 107, 109 Stat. at 106. You have explained 

that Dr. Rivlin would seek adequate support and staffing to ensure that hers is 

an oversight role compatible with part-time responsibilities.15

This Office did not interpret the comparable full-time requirement for service 

on the TVA as “ an absolute bar” to any outside activities. TVA Opinion at 2.

Rather, because the duties of the second, part-time position would be “ occasional” and “ intermittent,” the TVA Opinion treated these features as evidence 

suggesting that the position would be compatible with the official’s full-time 

obligations. In addition, the TVA Opinion treated the uncompensated nature of 

the secondary position as prima facie evidence that it is a part-time position 

compatible with full-time duties. TVA Opinion at 2; see also Export-Import Bank 

Opinion at 2.

The Federal Reserve Board analyzes its entire-time requirement based upon 

whether (1) the duties of the additional position would “ substantially affect the 

Board member’s ability to give full attention to the affairs of the Board,” (2) 

whether the second position was “ completely foreign or unrelated to the Board’s 

work,” and (3) whether the duties of the second position “ would in any way 

involve a conflict of interest, i.e., duties inconsistent with [the] duties [of] a Board 

member.” Opinion of Federal Reserve Board at 1. The first of these factors is 

similar to that which this Office used in assessing the application of a comparable 

full-time requirement, and the third factor, concerning conflicting duties, is 

addressed above in this memorandum. The second factor has been applied by 

the Federal Reserve Board to permit a Board member to sit on the National Public 

Advisory Committee on Regional Economic Development, based on the reasoning

-------that, inter alia,-the functions of the regional economic-committee-“ m ay-not-be---------

directly related to the functions of the [Federal Reserve] Board, but, on the other 

hand, they are obviously not unrelated to the Board’s functions, since the basic 

purpose of the Economic Development Act [creating the committee] is to maintain 

the national economy at a high level and particularly to alleviate unemployment 

in certain areas of the country through Federal financial assistance for public 

works and development facilities.” Opinion of Federal Reserve Board at 2. Simi15 Although we understand that the current Chair of the Authority has performed his functions in a full-time 

capacity, our conclusion is not altered. The Export-Import Bank Opinion observed that notwithstanding the fact 

that the previous occupant had treated the office as full-time, there was sufficient evidence that the position could 

be performed on a part-time basis Export-Import Bank Opinion at 2

Appointment o f Vice Chair o f Federal Reserve Board to Serve Concurrently as Chair o f the District

o f Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority

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Iarly, the Authority is charged with modifying and managing the District’s fiscal 

policies, see § 2, 109 Stat. at 98, and Congress regarded such fiscal change as 

necessary to the “ long-term economic health” of the region. Id. § 2(a)(8). Ultimately, however, this analysis is factual and forward looking and Dr. Rivlin would 

need to work with the Federal Reserve Board and its General Counsel to comply 

with the “ entire-time” requirement.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, we conclude that Dr. Rivlin’s dual service as Vice Chair 

of the Federal Reserve Board and Chair of the Authority would be consistent 

with 18 U.S.C. §§ 205 and 208. Her dual service would also have to comply with 

the Federal Reserve Act’s “ entire-time” requirement.

TODD DAVID PETERSON 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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