United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 17-3044

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Justin Joseph Halter

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport

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Submitted: September 24, 2018

Filed: December 6, 2018

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Justin Joseph Halter appeals his 24-month revocation sentence, arguing that the

district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm. 1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

1

the Southern District of Iowa. 
I. Background

In 2004, Halter pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment

and 48 months of supervised release. 

After his release from prison, Halter began his term of supervised release. In

May 2014, the district court revoked Halter’s supervised release for drug and alcohol

use, leaving the jurisdiction without permission, and failing to report to his assigned

residential re-entry center. The district court sentenced Halter to 9 months’

imprisonment and 36 months of supervised release. As a special condition of

supervision, the court ordered Halter to spend up to 120 days in a residential re-entry

center upon his release from prison.

The district court again revoked Halter’s supervised release in June 2015

because he failed to follow the residentialre-entry center’s rules and committed a new

crime. The court sentenced Halter to 24 months’ imprisonment and 6 months of

supervised release. The court again ordered him to spend up to 120 days in a

residential re-entry center upon his release from prison.

Halter began his most recent term of supervised release in February 2017. The

government sought revocation of his supervised release in March 2017, alleging

Halter failed to comply with the residential re-entry center’s rules. The petition stated

that Halter, when accused of drug use by facility staff, left the facility for several days

without permission. The government then filed a supplemental memorandum

additionally alleging that Halter’s conduct constituted the crime of escape, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), and was a Grade B violation, meaning that the district

court had to revoke his release.

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Initially, a deputy federal public defender represented Halter. However, that

attorney sought leave to withdraw as counsel, citing a conflict with Halter. The

magistrate judge granted the motion and appointed Halter new counsel. Halter’s

second defense attorney also moved to withdraw on the basis of a conflict with

Halter. Apparently, Halter unsuccessfully attempted to get the second defense

attorney to provide him with the home address of the public defender who had

previously represented him. The record reflects Halter’s attempted contact stemmed

from a possible desire to threaten his former counsel. The district court granted the

second defense attorney’s motion to withdraw and appointed Halter new counsel. 

The day before the revocation hearing, Halter filed a notice admitting that he

had failed to follow the rules of the residential re-entry center and that such conduct

qualified as an “escape” for revocation purposes. At the hearing, the government

presented testimony about Halter’s behavior toward his two prior attorneys. The

government then acknowledged that Halter had attempted to provide cooperation

against two defendants charged in an unrelated state homicide investigation. But the

government had made no promises to Halter in return for his cooperation. The

government ultimately decided not to recommend a downward variance for Halter’s

cooperation in light of his criminal history, history of violations on supervised

release, delayed admission to violating supervised release, and threatening conduct

toward his prior counsel. The government requested a sentence of 27 months’

imprisonment with no supervised release to follow.

Halter sought a sentence of imprisonment for 12 months and one day, with no

supervised release to follow. Halter’s counsel stated his belief that the court was not

empowered to impose a sentence of more than 24 months. Counsel emphasized

Halter’s cooperation in the state homicide case and the substantial time he had already

served in prison for supervised-release violations. Further, defense counsel noted that

Halter was not amenable to supervision after two prior revocations. Counsel

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attributed Halter’s late admission to the violation allegations to not having certain

pertinent documents until shortly before the hearing.

The district court found that Halter had violated the terms of his supervision

and revoked his supervised release. In determining a final sentence, the district court

stated that it had considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically,

it considered Halter’s recalcitrance while on supervised release, his threatening

behavior toward prior counsel, and his cooperation with the state homicide

investigation. The court concluded that Halter’s abscondment was a Grade B

violation and that his criminal history category was VI. The court calculated a

Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment and determined that this range

adequately addressed Halter’s circumstances. The court concluded that a 24-month

sentence with no supervised release to follow was sufficient, but not greater than

necessary, to address the essential sentencing considerations of Halter’s case.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Halter argues that his 24-month sentence is substantively

unreasonable because the district court (1) failed to award him any reduction in

sentence for his cooperation in the state homicide investigation; (2) imposed a

sentence that issubstantially greater than the sentence that would have been imposed

had his escape offense been independently prosecuted; (3) made no specific finding

that he intended to threaten his previous counsel; and (4) imposed an excessive

amount of imprisonment.

“We review a district court’s sentence on revocation of supervised release for

substantive reasonableness under the same reasonableness standard that applies to

initial sentencing proceedings.” United States v. Robinson, 713 F. App’x 514, 517

(8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (cleaned up). We review for an abuse of discretion

Halter’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Id. “A district

court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence when it fails to

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consider a relevant and significant factor, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or

improper factor, or considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of

judgment in weighing those factors.” Id. (quoting United States v. Kreitinger, 576

F.3d 500, 503 (8th Cir. 2009)). Our review “is narrow and deferential” in sentencing

cases, and “it will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court

sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as

substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir.

2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir.

2008)). 

“To determine if the district court sufficiently explained the sentence imposed,

we note that the court need not respond to every argument made by defendant or

recite each section 3553 factor.” United States v. Keatings, 787 F.3d 1197, 1202 (8th

Cir. 2015). But “[t]he sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the

appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis

for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551

U.S. 338, 356 (2007). “Nonetheless, when a judge decides simply to apply the

Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy

explanation.” Id. “Sentences within the Guidelines range are presumptively

reasonable.” United States v. Bjerke, No. 17-1832, 2018 WL 3752143, at *4 (8th Cir.

Aug. 7, 2018) (per curiam). 

“We presume the within-range [24-month] sentence to be reasonable subject

to [Halter’s] opportunity to rebut that presumption.” Id. Based on our review of the

record, we conclude that the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors

raised by the parties and weighed them appropriately. First, the court considered

Halter’s recalcitrance while on supervised release. Second, the court considered

Halter’s threatening behavior toward prior counsel. The court credited the testimony

of a supervisory deputy U.S. Marshal who testified about the information he received

concerning Halter’s threats toward counsel, as well as a report from Halter’s second

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defense attorney about the threats. Third, the court considered Halter’s cooperation

with the state homicide investigation. The district court’s consideration of these

factors came after it heard argument from the parties concerning Halter’s poor

compliance record, troubling statements he made to his then-current attorney about

his former attorney, and his assistance to authorities in a state homicide investigation.

We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing

factors. See Robinson, 713 F. App’x at 517. Halter’s within-range 24-month sentence

is substantively reasonable.

III. Conclusion

 Accordingly, we affirm.

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