alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Ernest Andrew BRITTEN, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-2087

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: November 28, 2016

Filed: December 1, 2016

Michelle Nahon Moulder, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Springfield, MO (Laine Cardarella, Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO, on the brief), for appellant.

Ami Harshad Miller, Asst. U.S. Atty., Springfield, MO, for appellee

Before SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Ernest Britten appeals the sentence the district court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to a child-pornography charge. His counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

Britten pleaded guilty after entering into a written plea agreement containing an appeal waiver. We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable. See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion and dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 30 (Monday, February 14, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 8252]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03013]



[[Page 8252]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention


Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended, and the Determination of the Director, Strategic 
Business Initiatives Unit, Office of the Chief Operating Officer, CDC, 
pursuant to Public Law 92-463. The grant applications and the 
discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial 
property such as patentable material, and personal information 
concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: Disease, Disability, and Injury Prevention 
and Control Special Emphasis Panel (SEP)--CE22-009, Research Grants 
for Preventing Violence and Violence Related Injury (R01).
    Date: May 10-11, 2022.
    Time: 8:30 a.m., EDT-5:30 p.m., EDT.
    Place: Web Conference.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    For Further Information Contact: Aisha L. Wilkes, M.P.H., 
Scientific Review Official, National Center for Injury Prevention 
and Control, CDC, 4770 Buford Highway NE, Mailstop S106-9, Atlanta, 
Georgia 30341, Telephone (404) 639-6473, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2a6b7d4346414f596a494e49044d455c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="92d3c5fbfef9f7e1d2f1f6f1bcf5fde4">[email protected]</span></a>.
    The Director, Strategic Business Initiatives Unit, Office of the 
Chief Operating Officer, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
has been delegated the authority to sign Federal Register notices 
pertaining to announcements of meetings and other committee 
management activities, for both the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.


Kalwant Smagh,
Director, Strategic Business Initiatives Unit, Office of the Chief 
Operating Officer, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
[FR Doc. 2022-03013 Filed 2-11-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4163-18-P


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C.V., Mother of B.V. and M.V., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-307

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 25, 2018

Ryan Thomas Truskoski and Jeffrey Deen, of Office Of the Criminal and Civil Regional Counsel, Casselberry, for Appellant.

Stephanie C. Zimmerman, of Children's Legal Services, Bradenton, for Appellee.

Heather McDonald Kolinsky, of Law Office Of Chad A. Barr, P.A., Altamonte Springs, Thomasina Moore and David P. Krupski, of Guardian ad Litem Program, Sanford, for Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

TORPY, WALLIS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6693

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT W. WAZNEY, a/k/a Robert William Wazney,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Columbia. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:18-cv-00921-HMH)

Submitted: August 23, 2018 Decided: August 28, 2018

Before DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Wazney, Appellant Pro Se. Nicholas Andrew Charles, Sarah Beth Nielsen, B. 

Rush Smith, III, NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Robert Wazney appeals from the district court’s order adopting the report and 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and remanding the underlying foreclosure 

proceeding back to state court. We dismiss the appeal. Remand orders are generally “not 

reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012). The Supreme Court 

has explained that the appellate restrictions of “§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia 

with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) [i.e., lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction and defects in removal procedures] are immune from review 

under § 1447(d).” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995). 

Whether a remand order is reviewable is not based on a district court’s explicit citation to 

§ 1447(c); “[t]he bar of § 1447(d) applies to any order invoking substantively one of the 

grounds specified in § 1447(c).” Borneman v. United States, 213 F.3d 819, 824-25 (4th 

Cir. 2000).

Here, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing 

§ 1447(c). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the district court’s 

order. Thus, we grant JP Morgan Chase Bank’s motion to dismiss the appeal. We deny 

Wazney’s motions for a stay pending appeal and for summary judgment, and we dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in 

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Brandon CLEMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-1902

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[March 29, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

*Affirmed.*
Ira Lee PICKETT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D18-180

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 23, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
G.G., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-2302

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 02, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Brenda Lee WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Robert A. McDonald, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35208

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

Brenda Lee Williams, Pro Se

Kevin C. Danielson, Esquire, Kelly A. Zusman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Ap-pellee

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Brenda Lee Williams appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her employment action alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Ambat v. City & County of San Francisco,*757 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Williams failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she exhausted her administrative remedies by timely contacting an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor, or contacting an agency official logically connected with the EEO process and exhibiting an intent to begin the EEO process. *See Sommatino v. United States,*255 F.3d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 2001) (exhaustion requires that “a federal employee must notify an EEO counselor of discriminatory conduct within 45 days of the alleged conduct”); *see also Kraus v. Presidio Tr. Facilities Div./Residential Mgmt. Branch,*572 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (counselor contact requirement can be satisfied by, “initiating contact with any agency official logically connected with the EEO process, even if that official is not an EEO Counselor, and by exhibiting an in*616tent to begin the EEO process” (citations, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that equitable es-toppel did not apply to Williams’ action. *See Leong v. Potter,*347 F.3d 1117, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for equitable estoppel).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’ motion for appointment of counsel because Williams failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. *See Cano v. Taylor,*739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).

Because we affirm the dismissal on the basis of failure to exhaust, we do not consider Williams’ arguments regarding the merits of her claim.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Juan R. MIRANDA, Appellant, v. Rachel E. SPACAL, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1948

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 22, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                      EXHIBIT 99

REVIEW REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

To Catalina Marketing Corporation:

We have reviewed the accompanying condensed consolidated balance sheet of
Catalina Marketing Corporation (a Delaware corporation) and subsidiaries as of
June 30, 2000, and the related condensed consolidated statements of income and
cash flows for the three-month periods ended June 30, 2000 and 1999. These
financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's management.

We conducted our review in accordance with standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A review of interim financial
information consists principally of applying analytical procedures to financial
data and making inquiries of persons responsible for financial and accounting
matters. It is substantially less in scope than an audit conducted in accordance
with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States, the objective
of which is the expression of an opinion regarding the financial statements
taken as a whole. Accordingly, we do not express such an opinion.

Based on our review, we are not aware of any material modifications that should
be made to the financial statements referred to above for them to be in
conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States.

We have previously audited, in accordance with auditing standards generally
accepted in the United States, the consolidated balance sheet of Catalina
Marketing Corporation and subsidiaries as of March 31, 2000, and the related
consolidated statements of income, stockholders' equity and cash flows for the
year then ended (not presented herein), and, in our report dated April 19, 2000,
we expressed an unqualified opinion on those financial statements. In our
opinion, the information set forth in the accompanying condensed consolidated
balance sheet as of March 31, 2000, is fairly stated, in all material respects,
in relation to the consolidated balance sheet from which it has been derived.


                                                 /s/ ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Tampa, Florida,
July 12, 2000
N.E., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-1251

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 23, 2018

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Stephen J. Weinbaum, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kayla H. McNab, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SALTER, FERNANDEZ, and LOGUE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Shane Cheyanne FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D16-4040

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 6, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
STATE of Florida, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Anthony STRONG, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-1913

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 06, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Magdaleno RODRIGUEZ, also known as Gordo, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41584 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 14, 2017

Andrew R. Gould, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Magdaleno Rodriguez, Pro Se

*83Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Magdaleno Rodriguez, federal prisoner # 61992-079, appeals the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion-for a reduction of his sentence based on Amendment 782 to United States Sentencing Guidelines and the denial of his motion for appointment of counsel. He contends that the district court erred in failing to evaluate the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and his postsentencing rehabilitation. We review the district court’s denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Evans,*587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 2009). If a defendant is eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2), the district court must consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors to decide whether a sentence reduction is merited in whole or in part under the specific circumstances of the case. *Dillon v. United States,*560 U.S. 817, 827, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010).

Contrary to Rodriguez’s assertion, the district court stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors. *See United States v. Cooley,*590 F.3d 293, 297-98 (5th Cir. 2009). With respect to Rodriguez’s argument that the court did not consider his postsentencing conduct, the record shows that he documented his rehabilitation efforts in his motion and that the district court thus had that information before it. *See Evans,*587 F.3d at 672-73.

To the extent Rodriguez seeks to reliti-gate the appropriateness of the district court’s original findings regarding his role in the offense, he is not entitled to relief because a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not a full resentencing or an opportunity to challenge the original sentence. *Dillon,*560 U.S. at 825-26, 130 S.Ct. 2683; *United States v. Hernandez,*645 F.3d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 2011). Rodriguez has not shown that the denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.

Rodriguez also has not shown that the interests of justice required the appointment of counsel for his § 3582(c)(2) motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint counsel. *See Baranowski v. Hart,*486 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant To 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court Has Determined That This Opinion Should Not Be Published and Is Not Precedent Except Under the Limited Circumstances Set Forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Robert Elmer PURCHASE, IV, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D16-4223

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Rashid Joncar STRODE v. STATE

CR-16-0537

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### In the Matter of Javier F., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 601]

*494In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Weinstein, J.), dated March 17, 2003, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court (Pearce, J.), dated December 16, 2002, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated December 16, 2002.

Ordered that the order of disposition is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the fact-finding order is vacated, and the petition is dismissed.

The appellant was arrested early one morning after the police observed him leaning partially inside the open door of a parked vehicle with a broken passenger side window. Various property items had been removed from the vehicle and placed on the sidewalk.

The presentment agency correctly concedes on appeal that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree. The vehicle remained in the same location where the owner’s son had parked it the previous afternoon, and there was no evidence that the appellant had the means of operating the vehicle. Under the circumstances, the presentment agency failed to establish that the appellant exercised the requisite dominion or control over the vehicle *(see Matter of Archangel O.,*157 AD2d 729 [1990]; *People v Gray,*154 AD2d 547 [1989]; *Matter of Ruben P,*151 AD2d 485 [1989]; *cf. People v Roby,*39 NY2d 69 [1976]; *People v McCaleb,*25 NY2d 394 [1969]). Accordingly, we reverse the order of disposition, and dismiss the petition. Ritter, J.P., S. Miller, Luciano and Townes, JJ., concur.
#### Cristallee Carrero et al., Appellants, v 266 Himrod Associates, LLC, et al., Respondents.

[770 NYS2d 747]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin, J.), dated September 4, 2002, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff Wyomi Carrero, the mother of the infant plaintiffs, alleged that the infant plaintiffs sustained lead poisoning as a result of exposure to lead paint in their apartment located within a building owned by the defendants. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

*517Based upon proof that the apartment had been completely renovated prior to the mother’s occupancy, as well as an inspection conducted by the New York City Department of Health subsequent to the birth of the infant plaintiffs, the defendants established that no lead paint was present in the plaintiffs’ apartment. In any event, even assuming the presence of a hazardous lead-paint condition, there was no evidence that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of such a situation. Accordingly, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact *(see Saunders v Baker,*285 AD2d 497, 498 [2001]).

In order to prevail, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to lay bare their proof as to the defendants’ actual or constructive notice of the alleged lead-paint hazard *(see Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team,*88 NY2d 628 [1996]; *Andrade v Wong,*251 AD2d 609 [1998]). The plaintiffs failed to discharge this burden *(see Brown v Marathon Realty,*170 AD2d 426, 427-428 [1991]). There is no evidence in the record that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of a chipped or peeling paint condition inside the apartment, which would have triggered a presumption that a hazardous lead-paint condition existed *(see Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, supra*at 647). Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether the defendants should have known of a lead-paint condition, and the Supreme Court properly granted the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint *(see Chapman v Silber,*97 NY2d 9, 22 [2001]).

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Santucci, J.P., Schmidt, Adams and Crane, JJ., concur.
EX-10.26





 Exhibit 10.26 

FIRST AMENDMENT 
 TO THE

 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 

2014 INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN 

(As approved by the shareholders April 15, 2014) 

Pursuant to the reserved power of amendment contained in Article 16 of the Fifth Third Bancorp 2014 Incentive Compensation Plan (the
“Plan”), the Plan is hereby amended effective December 17, 2018 by changing Section 2.1(g) of the Plan to read as follows: 

(g)    “Change in Control” shall be deemed to have occurred if the conditions set forth in any
one of the following paragraphs shall have been satisfied: 
 (i)    any Person (other than a trustee or
other fiduciary holding securities under an employee benefit plan of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries, or a corporation owned directly or indirectly by the common shareholders of the Company in substantially the same proportions as their
ownership of Stock of the Company), as a result of acquiring, or during any 12-month period having acquired, voting securities of the Company, is or becomes the Beneficial Owner, directly or indirectly, of
securities of the Company representing 30% or more of the combined voting power of the Company’s then outstanding securities; or 

(ii)    during any 12-month period (not including any period prior
to the Effective Date), individuals who at the beginning of such period constitute the Board and any new Director, whose election by the Board or nomination for election by the Company’s shareholders, was approved by a vote of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Directors then still in office who either were Directors at the beginning of the period or whose election or nomination for election was previously so approved, cease for any reason to
constitute a majority thereof; or 
 (iii)    the consummation of (1) the sale or disposition of all
or substantially all the Company’s assets; or (2) a merger or consolidation of the Company with any other corporation, other than a merger or consolidation which would result in the voting securities of the Company outstanding immediately
prior thereto continuing to represent (either by remaining outstanding or by being converted into voting securities of the surviving entity), at least 60% of the combined voting power of the voting securities of the Company (or such surviving
entity) outstanding immediately after such merger or consolidation; or 
 (iv)    the shareholders of the
Company approve a plan of complete liquidation of the Company. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Fifth Third Bancorp has caused this Amendment to be
executed by its duly authorized representative the 17th day of December, 2018. 
  

			
	 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP

		
	By:	 	 /s/ Robert P. Shaffer

		 	Robert P. Shaffer, Chief Human Resources Officer, EVP