alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

Daniels, Nia (FAA)

From: Daniels, Nia (FAA)

Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2015 9:19 AM

To: 'Todd@upaerialmedia.com'

Cc: '333exemptions@faa.gov'

Subject: Peition for Exemption: Up Aerial, LLC (FAA-2015-0330)

May 28, 2015 

Dear Mr. Chikasawa: 

This letter is to inform you that the following information is missing from your petition (Docket No. FAA2015-0300). This information is necessary for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to process your 

petition. 

 Provide a copy of the Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM) which is required by 

Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 1. If you wish for us to proceed without this manual and 

remove closed-set filming from your proposed operation please inform of us of your intention by the 

requested response date listed below. 

Please submit the additional information (non-proprietary) to your docket at www.regulations.gov and submit 

any proprietary information to the FAA Headquarters or electronically via e-mail to 

333exemptions@faa.gov. If you want us to process your request any further, we must receive the information 

described above by June 11, 2015. If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without 

notifying you further. 

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

Nia Daniels 

Program Analyst 

Nia Daniels, ARM‐108

Federal Aviation Administration

Office of Rulemaking, Airmen & Airspace Rules Division

800 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20591

PH: (202) 267 ‐ 7626

Fax: (202) 267 ‐ 5075

nia.daniels@faa.gov
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of RAE Systems Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Joseph Ng, Chief Financial Officer and Vice President, Business Development of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Section 906"), that:



|                     |  |                                                                                       
|-------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                     |  | /s/JOSEPH NGJoseph Ng Chief Financial Officer and Vice
President, Business Development
|Date: March 23, 2004 |  |                                                                                       

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---

QuickLinks
Patricia BLOM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3326

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Dexter KEMP, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D18-0523

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 2, 2018

Ana M. Davide, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SALTER, EMAS, and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court's order summarily denying Appellant's petition for writ of error coram nobis. The trial court properly treated the petition as a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which has supplanted the need for the writ of error coram nobis. *See* *Wood v. State*, 750 So.2d 592, 594-95 (Fla. 1999). Accordingly, Appellant's postconviction motion is untimely pursuant to Rule 3.850(b) as it was filed more than nine years after his guilty plea and sentence were entered on August 15, 2008. *See* *Medina v. State*, 919 So.2d 566, 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting *Wood*, 750 So.2d at594 ) ("[A] petition for writ of error coram nobis must satisfy the two-year limitation of rule 3.850."). Moreover, Appellant's claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him that a guilty plea could be used against him in the future is misplaced. *See* *Major v. State*, 790 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), *approved*, 814 So.2d 424, 431 (Fla. 2002) ("[W]e hold that neither the trial court nor counsel has a duty to advise a defendant that the defendant's plea in a pending case may have sentence enhancing consequences on a sentence imposed for a crime committed in the future.").

Affirmed.
#### Michael Harrison HUNT, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-7660

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 27, 2017

Decided: May 9, 2017

Michael Harrison Hunt, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Before TRAXLER, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Harrison Hunt seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012). The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the petition as successive and advised Hunt that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation.

*233The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. *Wright v. Collins,*766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see *also Thomas v. Arn,*474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Hunt has waived appellate review by failing to file objections. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Sathish Modugu, Respondent, v Continuum Health Partners, Inc., et al., Appellants.

[771 NYS2d 118]

*423Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Bertram Katz, J.), entered June 24, 2003, which denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of discovery and directed that the parties stipulate to a deposition schedule, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff, who voluntarily resigned his position as a doctor in Beth Israel Medical Center’s faculty practice group, contends that the hospital, as a punitive measure, reduced, then eliminated, his supplemental compensation during the period between his resignation and the termination of his employment 120 days later, by changing its policies and delaying its billing for his work.

Although ordinarily the question of whether unpaid compensation constitutes a discretionary bonus or nonforfeitable earned wages is a question of fact *(see Mirchel v RMJ Sec. Corp.,*205 AD2d 388 [1994]), here the parties’ agreement unambiguously provides that the practice group had the discretionary authority to decide if the supplemental salary is to be paid and how it is to be computed. The faculty practice group’s policies and procedures further provide that such policies may be amended at any time, without prior notice to its participants, in the sole discretion of the practice group. They further provide that nothing in any of these policies or procedures shall be deemed to create vested rights of any kind in its participants.

“[A] written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” *(Greenfield v Philles Records,*98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]). Applying this standard, the foregoing provisions unambiguously demonstrate that the supplemental compensation was expressly made discretionary under the parties’ agreement.

Although plaintiff may ascribe a bad motive to defendants’ discretionary choices, this does not suffice to warrant the denial of the motion due to a purported need for further discovery in view of plaintiff’s failure to submit an opposing affidavit, thereby failing to offer any facts to support his claim of bad faith so as to require further discovery. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Rosenberger, Williams and Lerner, JJ.
#### Ly NGUYEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RTS PACKAGING LLC CONSOLIDATED PENSION PLAN; RTS Packaging, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-55688

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 16, 2016 *

Filed November 21, 2016

Michael I. Goode, Michael I. Goode, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ian Hugh Morrison, Esquire, Attorney, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Chicago, IL, Sheryl L. Skibbe, Esquire, Attorney, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ly Nguyen appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in her action alleging that defendants RTS Packaging LLC Consolidated Pension Plan (the “Plan”) and RTS Packaging, LLC, violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) by denying her claim for surviving spouse benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Tremain v. Bell Indus., Inc.,*196 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1999). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nguyen’s claim that the Plan’s duration-of-relationship requirement for survivor benefits was discriminatory because Nguyen failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were state actors. *See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,*457 U.S. 922, 923-24, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state action); *George v. Pac.-CSC Work Furlough,*91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (actions against private parties for violation of constitutional rights require a showing that the private parties’ conduct constituted state action).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Emmitt HERRERA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-10704 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 1, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Emmitt Herrera, Jr., Pro Se

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Emmitt Herrera, Jr., has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief and a supplemental brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Herrera has filed a response. The record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of Herrera’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore decline to consider the claims without prejudice to collateral review. *See United States v. Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014). The motion for appointment of substitute counsel is DENIED as untimely. *See United States v. Wagner,*158 F.3d 901, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1998).

We have reviewed counsel’s briefs and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Herrera’s response, We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47,5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-6635

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

BERNARD GIBSON, SR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CR94-454-PJM)

Submitted: June 15, 2000 Decided: June 26, 2000

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bernard Gibson, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Sandra Wilkinson, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Bernard Gibson, Sr., appeals from the district court’s order

denying his motion for discovery of the commencement and termination dates of the grand jury that indicted him; the discovery

motion was filed in connection with his motion for a new trial

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. We dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may

exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291

(1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is

neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral

order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Gregory HARRIS, Petitioner, v. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Respondent.

No. 1D18-1391

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 10, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 21, 2018

Gregory Harris, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied as premature. *See**1198*Smartt v. First Union Nat'l Bank* , 771 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Neptali SANTOS-REYES, Also Known as Jose Neptali Santosreyes, Also Known as Jose Santos, Also Known as Jose Neptali Santos, Also Known as Jose Reyes, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-11479 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 21, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jose Neptali Santos-Reyes, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jose Neptali Santos-Reyes has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Santos-Reyes has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review.

Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the appeal is DISMISSED. This dismissal is in part as frivolous, *see*5th Cir. R. 42.2, and in part as moot based on Santos-Reyes’s completion of the prison term and the absence of a term of supervised release, *see United States v. Heredia-Holguin,*823 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
[Civ. No. 3166.

First Appellate District, Division One.

December 31, 1919]

#### LUCY E. KIBBEE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM DURFLINGER et al., Defendants; C. S. MAUPIN, Appellant.

[1] Mortgages — Deeds op Trust — Priority — Fraud — Estoppel.— Judgment reversed on the authority of *Burrows*v. *Durflinger et al., ante,*p. 366.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. John W. Shenk, Judge. Reversed.

The facts, in all essential respects, are the same as in *Burrows*v. *Durflinger et al., ante,*p. 366, [187 Pac. 752].

L. G. Shelton and A. W. Ashburn for Appellant.

Muhleman & Crump for Respondent.

KERRIGAN, J.

The record on appeal in this case has been brought here in the same transcript as the ease of *Burrows*v. *Durflinger et al., ante,*p. 366, [187 Pac. 752], and the points and arguments of the respective parties in the two cases have been presented in one set of briefs, but in the interest of clearness we have deemed it advisable to consider them separately.

The facts in the two cases differ in a number of immaterial matters, such as, for example, the price of the lots, the amount óf the mortgages, the condition of the lots so far as improvements are concerned, and the fact that in the present case there were two separate lots involved. In the case now being considered the appellant understood that the loan by him was for the purpose of erecting buildings upon the several lots; and in order to insure that the money would be thus used and in order to improve his security he directed the escrow holder to withhold two hundred dollars from the loan until the foundations of the buildings should be laid. In all essential respects, however, the facts in the two cases are the same, and no discussion of them in this ease would serve any useful end. On the authority of the above-*795mentioned case of *Burrows*v. *Durflinger et al., ante,*p. 366, [187 Pac. 752], the judgment is reversed.

Waste, P. J., and Wood, J., *pro tem.,*concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on February 26, 1920.

All the Justices concurred.
Thodore Roosevelt National Park Calpuff24-hr Delta Deciview* 98th Percentile
2000 2001 2002 3-yrAverage AVS Base Case AVS LNBSOFA AVS Improvement

(Base
- LNBSOFA) 1.508 1.240 0.268 2.083 1.551 0.532 2.581 1.827 0.754 0.518
LOS Unit2 SNCR LOS Unit2 SCR lOS Unit 2 Improvement

(SNCR
- SCR) 0.468 0.197 0.271 0.486 0.238 0.248 0.828 0.335 0.493 0.337



## 0,637



# - -

* Based on single-source BARTtype modeling,

new Improve Equation, annual average natural background.

NDDH 1/6/2011
#### Shelby BYRD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Eric ARNOLD, Acting Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-16366

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 17, 2017

*563Shelby Byrd, Pro Se

David N. Sunada, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Shelby Byrd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging a 2009 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings denying parole and deferring his next parole hearing for three years in accordance with California Penal Code § 3041.5 (“Marsy’s Law”). We dismiss.

This court issued a certificate of appeal-ability (“COA”) on whether application of Marsy’s Law to delay Byrd’s next parole hearing for three years violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, and whether Byrd’s membership in a class action precludes his individual litigation of this claim in habeas. We vacate the COA as improvidently granted and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. *See Nettles v. Grounds,*830 F.3d 922, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding that claims fall outside “the core of habeas corpus” if success will not necessarily lead to immediate or earlier release from confinement), cert. *denied,*580 U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 645, 196 L.Ed.2d 542 (2017); *Phelps v. Alameda,*366 F.3d 722, 727-28, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (merits panel has the power to rule on the propriety of a COA).

The dismissal of this appeal does not preclude Byrd from pursuing conditions of confinement claims in a properly filed civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
J.T.P., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1030

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed May 1, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Jamail D. ZIEGLER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D18-1572

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 27, 2018

Jamail D. Ziegler, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied on the merits.

Wetherell, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.