Present: All the Justices 

ANGELA DENISE ARRINGTON, ADMINISTRATOR, ETC. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

 June 9, 1995 

v. Record No. 941247 

PEOPLES SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court 

erred in sustaining pleas of the statute of limitations. 

 In two actions filed on February 15, 1994, Angela Denise 

Arrington (Angela), administrator of the Estate of Charles E. 

Arrington, deceased (Charles), sued Peoples Security Life 

Insurance Company (Peoples Security), alleging breach of contract 

and seeking recovery of the proceeds under two insurance policies 

issued on Charles' life. Peoples Security filed pleas of the 

statute of limitations, and, after conducting an evidentiary 

hearing, the trial court sustained the pleas and entered 

judgments in favor of Peoples Security. Angela appeals. 

 The facts relating to the pleas are undisputed. On March 

13, 1988, Charles was shot and stabbed to death. At the time of 

his death, he was insured by a policy of life insurance in the 

amount of $50,000 (Policy No. U00095393) and by another policy in 

the amount of $25,000 (Policy No. 0302649180). Both polices had 

been issued by Peoples Security. The named beneficiary under 

both policies was Delores R. Arrington (Delores), Charles' wife. 

 Each policy provided that payment of the policy proceeds to the 

named beneficiary would be made upon Peoples Security's receipt 
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of proof of the insured's death. 

 On March 21, 1988, Delores completed a "Claimant's Statement 

For Death Claims" and forwarded it and a copy of Charles' death 

certificate to Peoples Security. By letter dated March 30, 1988, 

Peoples Security wrote to Delores and acknowledged that it had 

received the claims. However, Peoples Security subsequently 

refused to pay the insurance proceeds to Delores because she was 

a suspect in Charles' murder. 

 On December 28, 1989, Delores filed an action in the Circuit 

Court of the City of Richmond to recover the proceeds under the 

$50,000 policy, and, on November 1, 1990, she filed another 

action in said circuit court to recover the proceeds under the 

$25,000 policy. Delores was awarded a judgment in the amount of 

$50,000 in the first action; however, we reversed that judgment 

and remanded the case for further proceedings. Peoples Security 

Life Ins. v. Arrington, 243 Va. 89, 412 S.E.2d 705 (1992).1 

Thereafter, Delores requested and, by orders entered February 4, 

1992, was granted a nonsuit in each action. 

 On November 19, 1993, Angela qualified as administrator 

d.b.n. of Charles' estate.2

 By letter dated January 12, 1994, 

 

 1In that action, the trial court had ruled that Delores was 

not precluded from recovering the insurance proceeds because she 

was not covered by the definition of "slayer" contained in Code § 

 55-401(1). In reversing the judgment, we ruled that Code § 55-

401(1) did not preclude Peoples Security from attempting to prove 

that Delores "procured, participated in or otherwise directed" 

Charles' death, in violation of the common law. Arrington, 243 

Va. at 92, 412 S.E.2d at 707. 

 2The record shows that Delores previously had qualified as 
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Angela demanded that the insurance proceeds be paid to the 

estate. Peoples Security refused payment, and Angela filed the 

present actions. 

 In sustaining the pleas of the statute of limitations, the 

trial court adopted Peoples Security's contention and ruled that 

the limitation period was five years from the time the causes of 

action accrued, Code § 8.01-246(2), that the causes of action for 

breach of contract accrued on the date of the breach, and that 

the accrual date was March 13, 1988, the date of Charles' death. 

 At trial, Angela agreed that the applicable limitation period 

was five years and that the causes of action accrued when the 

breach of contract occurred. Angela, however, did not agree that 

the causes of action accrued on the date of Charles' death. She 

advanced several arguments below, as she does on appeal, 

regarding when the causes of action accrued. 

 Angela contends that, with respect to Charles' estate, the 

contract was not breached until Peoples Security refused the 

estate's demand for payment, made by the estate's letter dated 

January 12, 1994. Alternatively, Angela contends that it was not 

reasonable for the estate to demand payment until "it became 

clear that there was no other beneficiary under the policy, i.e., 

on March 13, 1993, after Peoples Security had refused payment to 

Delores . . . and the statute of limitations precluded her from 

(..continued) 

administrator of Charles' estate. However, she resigned as 

administrator, and Angela succeeded to the office. 
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pursuing her claim any further." In other words, according to 

Angela, the statute of limitations did not begin to run against 

the estate until the limitation period had expired as to Delores. 

 Finally, Angela contends that the statute of limitations was 

tolled from the time of the entry of the trial court's judgment 

in favor of Delores until this Court's reversal of that judgment, 

a period of 14 months.3

 Statutes of limitations are strictly enforced and exceptions 

thereto are narrowly construed. Consequently, a statute should 

be applied unless the General Assembly clearly creates an 

exception, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the 

enforcement of the statute. Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps 

Unlimited, 237 Va. 543, 547, 379 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1989); Burns v. 

Stafford County, 227 Va. 354, 359, 315 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1984). 

 Code § 8.01-246(2) provides that an action for breach of a 

written contract must be filed within five years after the cause 

of action accrues. Code § 8.01-230 provides that a cause of 

action for breach of contract accrues and the limitation period 

commences to run from the date of the alleged breach. With 

respect to life insurance policies, we have said that, when a 

policy requires a demand for payment and proof of death, the 

statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the demand 

 

 3In oral argument before this Court, Angela contended that 

Peoples Security never has refused to make payment, and, 

therefore, the statute of limitations has not begun to run. This 

argument was not advanced at trial. Consequently, we will not 

consider it on appeal. Rule 5:25. 
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and proof. Page v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 185 Va. 919, 925-

27, 40 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (1947). 

 Applying the foregoing principles of law to the present 

case, we must reject Angela's contentions. We do not agree that 

the causes of action accrued at one time for Delores and at a 

different time for the estate; nor do we agree that the running 

of the statute may be tolled, or an exception applied, in the 

absence of a clear statutory enactment to such effect. 

 In the present case, the life insurance policies provide 

when a cause of action accrues. The express language of the 

policies requires Peoples Security to pay the proceeds when 

Peoples Security "receive[s] proof of [the] Insured's death." 

The record establishes that Peoples Security acknowledged, in its 

letter to Delores dated March 30, 1988, that it had received 

proof of Charles' death. Therefore, at that time, at the very 

latest, the five-year statute of limitations began to run. 

Consequently, Angela's actions filed on February 15, 1994, are 

time barred. 

 Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgments. 

Affirmed.