#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gregory E. HERMAN, Defendant-Appellant.*

16-1370-cr

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

April 27, 2017

FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTINA E. NOLAN (Gregory L. Waples,- on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys for Eric S. Miller, United States Attorney, Burlington, VT.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: BARCLAY T. JOHNSON (David L. McColgin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on the brief), Research and Writing Attorney for Michael L. Desautels, Federal Public Defender, Burlington, VT.

PRESENT: Amalya L. Kearse, José A Cabranes, Raymond J. Lohier, Jr., Circuit Judges.

*

 The Clerk is directed to amend the caption as above.

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Gregory E. Herman appeals his conviction for possessing heroin with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(c). Herman challenges only the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress the heroin, which was discovered when a Vermont police officer, Trooper Richard Slusser, stopped and issued a written speeding warning to a driver, one Francis Putney, and thereafter obtained consent from Put-ney to conduct a canine sniff search of his truck, in which Herman was a passenger. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case.

Herman does not contest the validity of the traffic stop. And, for its part, the Government does not contend that Putney was *48not “seized” during the approximately ninety-second interval between delivery of the speeding warning and his consent to the search. Nor does the Government dispute the District Court’s conclusion that “Trooper Slusser undertook unrelated investigative measures that unquestionably lengthened the duration of the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to issue a written warning for Mr. Putney’s excessive speed.” *United States v. Herman,*No. 2:15-CR-53, 2015 WL 8758971, at *6 (D. Vt. Dec. 14, 2015); *see Rodriguez v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (“Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)); *id.*at 1615 (explaining that while officers can “conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” they “may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual”). Thus the central question on appeal is whether, by the time Trooper Slusser finished issuing the speeding warning and proceeded to prolong the stop, he had a reasonable suspicion of “legal wrongdoing” under the “totality of the circumstances.” *See United States v. Arvizu,*534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the District Court that Trooper Slusser’s brief prolongation of the traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion, substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its opinion of December 14,2015.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Herman on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.