COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ROBIN J. PEARSALL 

AND 

MONUMENT AVENUE PARK ASSOCIATION 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0696-97-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 JANUARY 20, 1998 

THE VIRGINIA RACING COMMISSION, 

COLONIAL DOWNS, L.P. 

AND 

STANSLEY RACING CORPORATION 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

T. J. Markow, Judge 

 Patrick M. McSweeney (John L. Marshall, Jr.; 

McSweeney, Burtch & Crump, P.C., on briefs), 

for appellants. 

 Teresa C. Manning, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General; Michael K. 

Jackson, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 

Donald R. Ferguson, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee Virginia 

Racing Commission. 

 John C. Ivins, Jr. (James L. Weinberg; 

Chandra D. Lantz; Hirschler, Fleisher, 

Weinberg, Cox & Allen, P.C., on brief), for 

appellees Colonial Downs, L.P. and Stansley 

Racing Corporation. 

 Robin J. Pearsall and the Monument Avenue Park Association 

(Association) contend that the trial court erred in ruling that 

the Association was not a "person aggrieved," see

Code § 59.1-373, and that, for that reason, the Association 

lacked standing to appeal from a decision of the Virginia Racing 

Commission, an administrative agency.1

 We disagree. 

 

 1The appellants do not contend that the trial court erred in 
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 The Virginia Racing Commission (Commission) regulates horse 

racing and pari-mutuel betting in the Commonwealth, including the 

issuance of licenses to persons or entities desiring to operate 

race tracks and betting facilities. Code §§ 59.1-364 et seq. On 

October 12, 1994, the Commission licensed Colonial Downs, L.P. 

(Colonial Downs) and Stansley Racing Corporation (Stansley) to 

own and operate a horse race track. On December 20, 1995, the 

Commission issued Colonial Downs and Stansley a license to 

operate a betting parlor at 3200 West Broad Street in Richmond. 

 Colonial Downs and Stansley sought an amendment of the 

Commission's order to relocate the betting parlor at 4700 West 

Broad Street, located in Richmond and Henrico County. On June 

25, 1996, following public notice and a hearing, the Commission 

granted that amendment to the betting parlor license. 

 Pearsall and the Association appealed the Commission's 

decision to the trial court. The Association is a civic group 

composed of individuals residing in the City of Richmond and 

within the vicinity of the betting parlor. 

 The trial court conducted a hearing on the appeal. Landon 

Wellford testified that he was a member of the Association and 

owned a residence located within sight of the betting parlor. He 

stated that he believed that the licensing of the parlor "would 

negatively impact the neighborhood and probably hurt property 

 

dismissing Robin J. Pearsall from their petition for review. 

Accordingly, we confine our review to the trial court's dismissal 

of the Association. 
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values as a result of a negative commercial 

use . . . inappropriately mixed in with a residential use." 

 Robert Goodman, an expert on the effects of the siting and 

operation of gambling facilities on residential neighborhoods, 

testified that the presence of the betting parlor would reduce 

residential property values in the neighborhood. Cecil E. Sears, 

an expert on residential property values in the City of Richmond, 

testified that residences located within view of the betting 

parlor or on streets immediately behind the facility would likely 

suffer a decline in value. 

 The trial court dismissed the Association's petition for 

review. It held that Wellford had standing to bring the appeal, 

but concluded that his membership in the Association did not 

confer that standing on the Association. It ruled that neither 

the Association nor Pearsall was a "person aggrieved." For this 

reason, the trial court dismissed the appeal. 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Association had 

standing to seek review of the Commission's decision on behalf of 

its members. 

 The concept of standing concerns itself with 

the characteristics of the person or entity 

who files suit. The point of standing is to 

ensure that the person who asserts a position 

has a substantial legal right to do so and 

that his rights will be affected by the 

disposition of the case. In asking whether a 

person has standing, we ask, in essence, 

whether he has sufficient interest in the 

subject matter of the case so that the 

parties will be actual adversaries and the 

issues will be fully and faithfully 

developed. 
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Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 589, 318 S.E.2d 407, 

411 (1984) (citation omitted). 

 Standing, in this case, is governed by statute. See

Environmental Defense Fund v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 

12 Va. App. 456, 462, 404 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1991). Code 

§ 59.1-373 expressly limits the right to appeal a decision of the 

Commission. 

 Any person aggrieved by a refusal of the 

Commission to issue any license or permit, 

the suspension or revocation of a license or 

permit, the imposition of a fine, or any 

other action of the Commission, may, within 

thirty days of such action, appeal to the 

Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.2

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the determinative inquiry in this 

appeal is whether the Association is a "person" that was 

"aggrieved" by an action of the Commission. 

 Code § 59.1-365 defines a "person" to include "a natural 

person, partnership, joint venture, association, or corporation." 

 An unincorporated association may sue or be sued. Code 

§ 8.01-15. The Association is an unincorporated civic group 

comprised of persons in a defined region of the City of Richmond. 

 Accordingly, we conclude that the Association is a "person" for 

purposes of this appeal. 

 

 2The General Assembly modified Code § 59.1-373, requiring 

compliance with Article 4 of the Administrative Process Act in 

the review and appeal of the Commission's decisions. 1996 Va. 

Acts ch. 573. However, the amendment does not apply to agency 

actions commenced prior to July 1, 1996. 1996 Va. Acts ch. 573, 

cl. 2. Accordingly, we refer to the statute in this opinion as 

it was written prior to the amendment. 
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 However, the ability to initiate an action does not confer 

upon a party the right to maintain an action involving no direct 

interest of that party. To have standing, the Association must 

demonstrate that it is "aggrieved" under Code § 59.1-373. 

 The term "aggrieved" has a settled meaning in 

Virginia when it becomes necessary to 

determine who is a proper party to seek court 

relief from an adverse decision. In order 

for a petitioner to be "aggrieved," it must 

affirmatively appear that such person had 

some direct interest in the subject matter of 

the proceeding that he seeks to attack. The 

petitioner "must show that he has an 

immediate, pecuniary and substantial interest 

in the litigation, and not a remote or 

indirect interest" . . . . The word 

"aggrieved" in a statute contemplates a 

substantial grievance and means a denial of 

some personal or property right, legal or 

equitable, or imposition of a burden or 

obligation upon the petitioner different from 

that suffered by the public generally. 

Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 

231 Va. 415, 419-20, 344 S.E.2d 899, 903 (1986) (citations 

omitted). 

 The Association neither owns nor occupies any real property. 

 No personal or property right of the Association was adjudicated 

by the Commission. The Commission did not order the Association 

to act or to refrain from acting. Nothing in the record suggests 

that the Association holds any right that will be affected by the 

outcome of this case. We agree with the trial court's finding 

that the Association was not a "person aggrieved" under the 

statute. 

 The Association contends that it has representative standing 
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to assert the rights of its members who have been injured by the 

Commission's action. The Association relies upon Citizens for 

Clean Air v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Air Pollution Control 

Bd., 13 Va. App. 430, 412 S.E.2d 715 (1991), in which we stated, 

obiter dicta: 

 As an association organized to protect 

the interests of individuals who would be 

entitled to bring suit in their own right, 

[the association] may bring suit in its 

representative capacity. 

Id. at 435, 412 S.E.2d at 718. In Citizens for Clean Air, we 

found support for "associational standing" in Lynchburg Traffic 

Bureau v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 207 Va. 107, 108, 147 S.E.2d 744, 

745 (1966), which held: 

 [I]t is well settled that "in order to 

entitle any person to maintain an action in 

court it must be shown that he has a 

justiciable interest in the subject matter in 

litigation; either in his own right or in a 

representative capacity." 

Citizens for Clean Air, 13 Va. App. at 435, 412 S.E.2d at 718 

(emphasis in original). 

 In W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 

478 S.E.2d 295 (1996), a home builders association brought a suit 

for declaratory judgment seeking invalidation of county 

ordinances that increased building permit fees. Id. at 379, 478 

S.E.2d at 297. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in 

Lynchburg Traffic Bureau, stating: 

 A plaintiff has standing to institute a 

declaratory judgment proceeding if it has a 

"justiciable interest" in the subject matter 

of the proceeding, either in its own right or 
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in a representative capacity. 

Id. at 383, 478 S.E.2d at 299. However, the Supreme Court held 

that the association lacked standing because it had failed to 

show that its own rights would be affected by the outcome of the 

proceeding. The Court noted that the association neither built 

houses nor paid building permit fees. Id. Moreover, the Court 

said: 

 This conclusion is not altered by the 

fact that the Association purports to act in 

a "representative capacity" on behalf of its 

members. An individual or entity does not 

acquire standing to sue in a representative 

capacity by asserting the rights of another, 

unless authorized by statute to do so. 

Id. at 383, 478 S.E.2d at 300. 

 This passage in Carnes clarified the Supreme Court's 

recognition of representational standing in Lynchburg Traffic 

Bureau and tacitly overruled our extension of that standing in 

Citizens for Clean Air. Furthermore, the result in Carnes was 

reached despite the provision that the article governing 

administration of declaratory judgments is to be liberally 

interpreted. See Code §§ 8.01-184, 8.01-191; Fairfax County v. 

Southland Corp., 224 Va. 514, 297 S.E.2d 718 (1982). 

 We note that federal courts have permitted organizations to 

pursue legal action on behalf of their members.3 We recognize 

 

 3See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). In 

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 

(1977), the United States Supreme Court: "recognized that an 

association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members 

when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in 

their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are 
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that granting such standing may provide significant benefits in 

judicial economy and for interested parties. See 14A Michie's 

Jurisprudence Parties § 11 (1989). However, Virginia holds that 

an association is not the alter ego of its individual members. 

The mere fact that its members have an interest in litigation 

does not, per se, vest the association with a justiciable 

interest in the litigation. 

 Virginia recognizes representational standing only when it 

is specifically authorized by the legislature. See Carnes, 252 

Va. at 383, 478 S.E.2d at 300. Code § 59.1-373 contains no such 

authorization. Furthermore, this suit, brought against a state 

agency, is a suit against the Commonwealth and requires strict 

adherence to the statutes waiving sovereign immunity. See

Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248, 250-51, 467 S.E.2d 783, 

784 (1996); Virginia Bd. of Medicine v. Virginia Physical Therapy 

Ass'n, 13 Va. App. 458, 464-65, 413 S.E.2d 59, 63 (1991), aff'd, 

245 Va. 125, 427 S.E.2d 183 (1993). We must construe the 

Commonwealth's waiver of its sovereign immunity narrowly. See

Virginia Bd. of Medicine, 13 Va. App. at 464-65, 413 S.E.2d at 

63. Thus, the trial court correctly held that the Association 

lacked standing to maintain this suit. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the 

appellants' petition for review. 

 

germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim 

asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the participation of 

individual members in the lawsuit." Id. at 343. 
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 Affirmed.