alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR PLATINUM
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. AND THE ACCOMPANYING NOTES THERETO FOR THE PERIOD INDICATED
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
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<CASH>                                               7
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<RECEIVABLES>                                   20,475
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<DEPRECIATION>                                 (1,091)
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           54,313
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    69,335
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (726)
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</TABLE>
John TISBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-3366

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[March 1, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### George H. SPIKER, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-7064

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 17, 2016

Decided: November 22, 2016

George H. Spiker, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. John Watkins Blanton, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee,

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

George H. Spiker, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition and denying his motion for reconsideration. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Spiker has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal con*831tentions are adequately presented 'in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Nexity Financial Corporation (the Company), hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that the Companys annual report on Form 10-K for the period ended
December 31, 2006 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated March 14, 2007



By:

/s/ Greg L. LeeGreg L. LeeChairman and Chief Executive Officer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

____________________________________ 

 ) 

DOME PATENT, L.P., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil Action No. 07-1695 (PLF) 

 ) 

ANDREI IANCU, Director, ) 

United States Patent and Trademark Office, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

____________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Claim for Expenses Under 35 

U.S.C. § 145 (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No 132]. On September 8, 1980, Russell A. Neefe filed an 

application with the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) for a patent covering his method of 

making a contact lens. Mot. at 2. The PTO granted this request on December 15, 1981, but 

subsequently overturned this decision. Id. at 3. As a result, Plaintiff filed this action. Id. After 

a three-day bench trial, this Court entered a judgment in favor of the PTO affirming the Board’s 

unpatentability decision. See Dome Patent, L.P. v. Rea, 2014 WL 2943587 (D.D.C. 

July 1, 2014). The Federal Circuit affirmed this decision on appeal. See Dome Patent L.P. v. 

Lee, 799 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

Defendant then filed, and this Court granted, several motions for an extension of 

time to submit a claim for expenses while the Supreme Court decided a separate pending case 

related to expenses, Peter v. Nantkwest, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 365 (2019). See Mot. at 4. In Peter v. 

Nantkwest, Inc., the Supreme Court “reviewed the question of whether ‘all expenses’ in 
2 

section 145 also included an award of a pro rata share of the salaries of PTO attorneys and 

paralegals who worked on this case.” Mot. at 4. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the 

term “does not authorize the PTO to recover a pro rata share of the salaries of attorney and 

paralegal employees of the PTO.” Mot. at 4 (quoting Peter v. Nantkwest, Inc., 140 S. 

Ct. at 365). 

On February 21, 2020, Defendant filed Defendant’s Claim for Expenses Under 35 

U.S.C. §145. See Mot. As a result of the Supreme Court decision in Peter v. Nantkwest, Inc., 

Defendant’s claim for expenses does not seek the “salaries of attorney and paralegal employees” 

of the agency. Id. at 4. 

On April 3, 2020, this Court issued an order directing Plaintiff to file its 

opposition to Defendant’s motion for expenses by April 20, 2020. To date, Plaintiff has not filed 

any opposition. 

Therefore, because Defendant’s motion is unopposed and because this Court 

entered a judgment in the PTO’s favor, this Court finds the Defendant’s motion for expenses is 

warranted. Accordingly, it is hereby 

ORDERED that Defendant’s Claim for Expenses Under 35 U.S.C. §145 [Dkt. 

No. 132] is GRANTED; and it is 

FURTHER ORDERED that, within 30 days of this Order, Plaintiff shall remit the 

amount of $47,729.65 payable to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 

SO ORDERED. 

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN 

United States District Judge 

DATE: May 15, 2020 

/s/
# Erik K. Raven

##                 Under Secretary of the Navy            

The Honorable Erik K. Raven assumed the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of the Navy on 13 April, 2022. He serves as the Department of Navy’s Chief Operating Officer and Chief Management Officer. He is responsible for providing oversight and policy for defense and naval strategy, intelligence and intelligence-related activities, sensitive activities, special access programs, space activities, critical infrastructure, small business programs, and the naval audit service. Additionally, he is responsible for business operations, performance management, and risk management within the Department.

Mr. Raven has served in a variety of legislative senior leadership positions in the federal government. Before his nomination, Mr. Raven was the principal advisor to the Democratic Chairs and Vice-Chairs of the Committee on Appropriations and Subcommittee on Defense on budget matters relating to the Department of Defense and intelligence community.

Mr. Raven also served as an advisor in the offices of Senators Feinstein, Kennedy, and Byrd, advising on defense, foreign affairs, homeland security, veterans, space, and transportation policy issues.

Mr. Raven holds a master’s degree in the History of International Relations from the London School of Economics, and a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from Connecticut College.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         283,938
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          14,187
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                70,993
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     69,937
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                      1,672,882
<ALLOWANCE>                                     31,792
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,325,312
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,711,397
<SHORT-TERM>                                    40,544
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             58,002
<LONG-TERM>                                    289,847
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       128,711
<OTHER-SE>                                      96,784
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               2,325,312
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                149,227
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               19,294
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 4,844
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               173,365
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              62,253
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              89,473
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           83,892
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                   16,800
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 87,453
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (113,500)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                    (80,279)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (80,279)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.07)
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                     52,030
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                38,047
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                   30,320
<RECOVERIES>                                     2,015
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               28,305
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            31,792
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
CL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0142

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v. 

CHEYENNE LEILANI-AMBER ZIELIE,

Defendant and Appellant. 

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30-day extension of time, 

and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is granted an extension of time to

and including October 4, 2024, within which to prepare, file, and serve the State’s

response brief.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 27 2024

08/27/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0142
Roderick EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D18-321

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 17, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Frances RUIZ, as Personal Representative of Estate of Luis Ruiz, deceased, Appellant, v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, LTD., Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-301

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 11, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tony Russo, Also Known as Alfonso Rizzutto, Appellant.

[770 *588NYS2d 654]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Ort, J.), rendered July 5, 2000, convicting him of obstructing governmental administration by means of a self-defense spray device, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631 [1976]; *cf. People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606 [1979]). Florio, J.P., Krausman, Luciano, Townes and Rivera, JJ, concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. SS.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Accident Prevention Plus, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Jennifer Swanson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:

     1.   The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

                                               /S/Jennifer Swanson
                                               -----------------------
                                               Jennifer Swanson
                                               Chief Financial Officer
                                               April 26, 2004

A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, an other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
required by Section  906,  has been  provided to Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.
#### Carlos CORTINA, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 16-60156 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 5, 2017

*192Carlos Cortina, Pro Se

Michael Christopher Heyse, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before BARKSDALE, GRAVES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Proceeding *pro se,*Carlos Cortina, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) order of removal and denial of discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Cortina contends the IJ and BIA erred in finding he did not satisfy the exceptional-and-extremely-unusual-hardship standard for cancellation of removal. He contends: the IJ failed to consider all the factors in his case; his case does present a compelling case of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children; and the IJ applied a different standard of unconscionable hardship, Cor-tina further asserts the IJ failed to: inquire about the health of his children; consider the “separation of family” factor; or allow him to fully present his evidence.

Our jurisdiction over immigration proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)© strips us of jurisdiction to review an immigration court’s discretionary decision to deny cancellation of removal under § 1229b or the findings of fact made in support of that decision. *Sung v. Keisler,*505 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir. 2007). We have jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D), however, to consider *de novo*any “constitutional claims or questions of law” raised in a petition for review of such a decision. *Id.*

Cortina has not raised any claim of constitutional or legal error in connection with the denial of his request for cancellation of removal. His contentions merely disagree with the weighing of the factors underlying the discretionary decision whether he merited cancellation of removal. As noted, § 1252(a)(2)(B)© prohibits us from reviewing that decision or its factual-findings bases. *See Sattani v. Holder,*749 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 2014); *Rueda v. Ashcroft,*380 F.3d 831, 831 (5th Cir. 2004). Cortina’s attempt to convert his challenge to the non-reviewable, discretionary decision into a question of law does not create jurisdiction. *See Sung,*505 F.3d at 377.

DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Richard SANDERSON v. TULANE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL AND CLINIC, et al.

NO. 2018-CC-0588

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 15, 2018

ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM

In the absence of any allegations that the medical review panel superceded its statutory authority, the panel's opinion is subject to mandatory admission. La. R.S. 40:1231.8(H) ; *McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hospital* , 10-2775 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1218. The mere fact that a member of the panel may not have disclosed a potential conflict of interest is not a ground for automatic exclusion of the panel's opinion. *See* *Elledge v. Williamson* , 48, 644 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 132 So.3d 432 ; *see also* *Derouen v. Kolb* , 397 So.2d 791 (La.1981). Plaintiff will have an adequate opportunity to explore any potential bias on the part of the panel member through cross examination, and the trier of fact may assign any appropriate weight to the opinion in light of such testimony. *See* *Whitt v. McBride* , 94-896 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 3/01/95), 651 So.2d 427, *writ denied* , 95-0357 (La. 3/30/95), 651 So.2d 851. Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the district court striking the panel opinion is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny.

HUGHES, J., recused.

GENOVESE, J., would deny.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-27-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-29-1996
<CASH>                                       3,890,000
<SECURITIES>                                 7,219,000
<RECEIVABLES>                               22,695,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   990,000
<INVENTORY>                                 13,626,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            47,622,000
<PP&E>                                       9,528,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,732,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              74,122,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       16,596,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       125,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  57,401,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                74,122,000
<SALES>                                     28,506,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            28,506,000
<CGS>                                       20,757,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               20,757,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               369,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,955,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   708,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,247,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,247,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .09
        


</TABLE>
#### Maurice SHEPHERD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harvey CLAY, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6456

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

*165Maurice Shepherd, Appellant Pro Se.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Maurice Shepherd seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Shepherd has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*