J. A21001/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

U.S. NATIONAL BANK ASSOCIATION :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MARIA RAMOS A/K/A 

MARIA D. RAMOS AND 

JUAN RUGLIANCICH A/K/A 

JUAN CARLOS RUGLIANCICH

:

:

:

: No. 3037 EDA 2015

:

APPEAL OF: MARIA RAMOS :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 1, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Civil Division at No. 2014-03471

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2020

Maria Ramos a/k/a Maria D. Ramos appeals from the September 1, 2015 

judgment entered in favor of appellee, U.S. National Bank Association 

(“U.S. Bank”), in this mortgage foreclosure action, following the trial court’s 

order granting U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment. After careful 

review, we affirm.1

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

A complaint in mortgage foreclosure was filed in the 

above captioned matter on May 16, 2014.

 

1 Juan Rugliancich a/k/a Juan Carlos Rugliancich, appellant’s husband, is not 

a party to this appeal.
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Appellant’s counsel entered his appearance on her 

behalf on August 1, 2014. A motion for substituted 

service of the complaint was filed on August 25, 2014, 

and on September 18, 2014, th[e trial c]ourt entered 

an order granting substituted service by posting a 

copy of the complaint at the subject property and 

sending a copy to the subject property address by 

certified and regular mail. Unfortunately, th[e trial 

c]ourt was unaware of [appellant’s] counsel’s entry of 

appearance when the motion was forwarded to it for 

signature. The complaint was reinstated by praecipe

on September 30, 2014. An October 7, 2014, 

certificate of service was filed stating that the

complaint was sent by certified and regular mail in 

accordance with the order. On October 15, 2014, an 

affidavit of service was filed asserting that the 

complaint was posted at the property on October 10, 

2014. On October 3, 2014, appellant filed a motion 

for reconsideration of the court order of 

September 18, 2014, and th[e trial c]ourt scheduled 

a hearing on November 21, 2014. In the interim, on 

October 30, 2014, appellant filed preliminary 

objections to [U.S. Bank’s] complaint in the nature of 

a motion to quash service. At the conclusion of the 

November 21, 2014[] hearing an order was entered 

denying the motion for reconsideration as well as 

appellant’s preliminary objections.

Appellant filed an answer and new matter to 

[U.S. Bank’s] complaint on December 19, 2014, and 

[U.S. Bank] filed a reply to [appellant’s] new matter 

on January 8, 2015. [U.S. Bank] filed a motion for 

summary judgment on April 6, 2015, and appellant 

filed a memorandum of law in opposition to 

[U.S. Bank’s] motion for summary judgment on 

May 4, 2015. A May 4, 2015[] certificate of service 

was filed stating that [appellant’s] response to the 

motion for summary judgment with [appellant’s] 

cross-motion for summary judgment was served by 

regular mail on [U.S. Bank’s] counsel. (The actual 

cross-motion was never filed with the [trial] court.) 

An affidavit of service was filed on May 21, 2015, 

stating that a copy of the response to [appellant’s]

interrogatories and request for production of 
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documents was sent by overnight mail and email to 

appellant’s counsel on May 15, 2015. [U.S. Bank’s] 

response to [appellant’s] motion for summary 

judg[]ment was filed on June 3, 2015.

Trial court opinion, 2/2/16 at 1-2 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

On September 1, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting 

U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment and entering judgment in its favor 

in the amount of $126,782.93, plus interest from January 31, 2015 to the 

date of the Sheriff’s Sale. (See trial court order, 9/1/15.) Appellant filed a 

notice of appeal on September 30, 2015. On October 15, 2015, the trial court 

directed appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), within 21 days. Appellant filed 

her Rule 1925(b) statement on November 3, 2015, and the trial court filed its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion on February 2, 2016. Appellant’s appeal was stayed 

pending the resolution of bankruptcy proceedings, which concluded on 

February 12, 2019. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in [sic] 

procedurally in granting a motion for alternative

service as the presentation of the motion to the 

[trial c]ourt occurred on [an] ex parte basis to 

[appellant]?

2. Whether the trial court erred substantively in 

granting a motion for alternative service posited 

on the false proposition that [appellant’s] 

whereabouts were unknown not that [appellant] 

was willfully evading service?
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3. Whether the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment when written discovery

remained open and un-concluded in the case[?]

4. Whether the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment when the credibility of the 

affiant [was] Rule of Civil Procedure 

1035.3(a)(1)[?]

Appellant’s brief at 5.2

Appellant’s first two claims allege that the trial court erred as a matter 

of law in granting U.S. Bank’s motion for substituted service of the complaint. 

In support of this contention, appellant argues that “the presentation of the 

motion [for substituted service] to the [trial] court occurred on [an] ex parte

basis.” (Id. at 10.) Appellant further avers that U.S. Bank’s motion was 

improperly predicated on the false proposition that appellant’s whereabouts 

were unknown. (Id. at 10-13.) For the following reasons, we disagree.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 430 governs alternative methods 

of service and provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) If service cannot be made under the applicable 

rule the plaintiff may move the court for a 

special order directing the method of service. 

The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit 

stating the nature and extent of the 

investigation[,] which has been made to 

determine the whereabouts of the defendant 

and the reasons why service cannot be made.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 430(a).

 

2 For the ease of our discussion, we elect to address some of appellant’s claims 

concurrently.
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The explanatory note to Rule 430 further provides that

[a]n illustration of a good faith effort to locate the 

defendant includes (1) inquiries of postal authorities 

including inquiries pursuant to the Freedom of 

Information Act [. . .], (2) inquiries of relatives, 

neighbors, friends, and employers of the defendant, 

and (3) examinations of local telephone directories, 

voter registration records, local tax records, and 

motor vehicle records.

Sisson v. Stanley, 109 A.3d 265, 269-270 (Pa.Super. 2015), citing 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 430(a), note, appeal dismissed as having been improvidently 

granted, 141 A.3d 1238 (Pa. 2016).

“The adequacy of this notice, as applied to substituted service, depends 

upon whether it is reasonably calculated to give the party actual notice of the 

pending litigation and an opportunity to be heard. Due process, reduced to 

its most elemental component, requires notice.” Bank of New York Mellon 

v. Johnson, 121 A.3d 1056, 1061 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citations omitted).

Instantly, U.S. Bank filed a motion for substituted service of the 

complaint on August 25, 2014. Contrary to appellant’s contention, 

U.S. Bank’s motion for alternative service was not presented ex parte. The 

record reflects that on July 23, 2014, U.S. Bank’s counsel contacted

appellant’s counsel via email to inquire whether he would accept service of 

the complaint on appellant’s behalf and notified counsel that U.S. Bank was 

considering filing a motion for substituted service. Appellant’s counsel 

responded to that email stating that he was not authorized to accept service 

and confirmed that appellant resided at the mortgaged premises. (See 
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“Motion for Substituted Service Under [Rule] 430(a),” 8/25/14 at Exhibit A.) 

A certificate of service indicates that said motion was served on appellant’s 

counsel on August 22, 2014, by first-class mail. 

The record further belies appellant’s contention that U.S. Bank did not 

engage in a good faith effort to ascertain her whereabouts and effectuate 

proper service. (See appellant’s brief at 11-12.) U.S. Bank noted in its 

motion that the Bucks County Sheriff unsuccessfully attempted to serve 

appellant at the mortgaged premises no less than four times between May 19 

and June 16, 2014. (“Motion for Substituted Service Under [Rule] 430(a),” 

8/25/14 at ¶ 4, Exhibit A.) The motion further indicates that the Sheriff left 

notice for appellant at the mortgaged premises to contact him to arrange 

service, but appellant failed to respond. (Id.) U.S. Bank also stated that it 

conducted a good-faith investigation to locate appellant, including a search of 

military service records, death records, employment history, and business 

records; a Department of Motor Vehicle records search; a creditor header 

inquiry; and an inquiry of relatives, neighbors, and friends. (Id. at ¶ 5, 

Exhibit A.) U.S. Bank also sent a Freedom of Information Act request to the 

United States Postal Inspector, the results of which indicated that appellant’s 

mail was being delivered to the mortgaged premises – 2598 Daniels Lane, 

Emerald Hollow, Quakertown, Pennsylvania 18951. (Id. at ¶ 4, Exhibit A.) 

Consequently, U.S. Bank requested that the trial court enter an order 

pursuant to Rule 430(a), directing service of the complaint and all future 
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pleadings by first-class mail and posting of the mortgaged premises. (Id. at 

¶ 6.) The trial court granted U.S. Bank’s motion for substituted service on 

September 18, 2014. Specifically, the trial court permitted U.S. Bank to serve 

the complaint and all future pleadings by posting a copy of the complaint at 

the mortgaged property and sending a copy to the mortgaged premises by 

certified and regular mail. (Trial court order, 9/18/14.)3 Based on the 

foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err as matter of law in 

granting U.S. Bank’s motion for substituted service.

Appellant’s final two claims allege that the trial court erred in granting 

U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment. Our standard of review of a trial 

court’s order granting summary judgment is well settled:

A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial 

court only where it is established that the [trial] court 

committed an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

with all questions of law, our review is plenary. 

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter 

summary judgment, we focus on the legal standard 

articulated in the summary judgment rule. The rule 

states that where there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as a 

matter of law, summary judgment may be entered. 

 

3 The record reflects that U.S. Bank fully complied with the trial court’s order 

granting its motion for substituted service. Specifically, on September 26, 

2014, U.S. Bank filed an affidavit of service indicating it had mailed a copy of 

the complaint to appellant’s counsel, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 440. (See

certified record at No. 9.) Thereafter, on October 15, 2014, U.S. Bank filed a 

second affidavit of service indicating that the Sheriff had personally served 

the complaint by posting it at the mortgaged premises, as well as a certificate 

of service indicating that it had mailed a copy of the complaint to the 

mortgaged premises by certified and regular mail. (See certified record at 

No. 12.) 
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Where the non-moving party bears the burden of 

proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his 

pleadings or answers in order to survive summary 

judgment. Failure of a non-moving party to adduce 

sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case 

and on which it bears the burden of proof establishes 

the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a 

matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all 

doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact must be resolved against the moving 

party.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1261-1262 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2. 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting U.S. Bank’s motion 

for summary judgment because “discovery has not been concluded.” 

(Appellant’s brief at 13.) The record belies this contention.

In Pennsylvania, “parties must be given reasonable time to complete 

discovery before a trial court entertains any motion for summary judgment[.]” 

Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Assoc., 866 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 governs 

motions for summary judgment and provides, in relevant part, as follows:

After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within 

such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party 

may move for summary judgment in whole or in part 

as a matter of law

(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any 

material fact as to a necessary element of 

the cause of action or defense which 
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could be established by additional 

discovery or expert report, or

(2) if, after the completion of discovery

relevant to the motion, including the 

production of expert reports, an adverse 

party who will bear the burden of proof at 

trial has failed to produce evidence of 

facts essential to the cause of action or 

defense which in a jury trial would require 

the issues to be submitted to a jury.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2 (emphasis added). 

This court has unequivocally stated that the purpose of Rule 1035.2 “is

to eliminate cases prior to trial where a party cannot make out a claim or 

defense after relevant discovery has been completed; the intent is not to 

eliminate meritorious claims prematurely before relevant discovery has been 

completed.” Burger v. Owens Illinois, 966 A.2d 611, 618 (Pa.Super. 2009) 

(citation omitted). “The adverse party must be given adequate time to 

develop the case and the motion [for summary judgment] will be premature 

if filed before the adverse party has completed discovery relevant to the 

motion.” Id.

However, “[t]he Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure do not give 

[parties] an unlimited amount of time to conduct discovery.” Fort Cherry 

School Dist. v. Gedman, 894 A.2d 135, 140 (Pa.Super. 2006). “[T]he party 

seeking discovery is under an obligation to seek discovery in a timely 

fashion.” Anthony Biddle Contractors, Inc. v. Preet Allied Am. St., LP, 

28 A.3d 916, 928 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted; emphasis added).
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Here, the record supports the trial court’s determination that discovery 

was not ongoing at the time it entered its order granting summary judgment 

in favor of U.S. Bank. (Trial court opinion, 2/2/16 at 8-9.) The record reflects 

that over eight months elapsed between the date appellant filed her answer 

and new matter to U.S. Bank’s complaint (December 19, 2014) and the date 

the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in U.S. Bank’s 

favor (September 1, 2015). The record further reflects that appellant waited 

until April 16, 2015, after U.S. Bank filed its motion for summary judgment, 

to serve U.S. Bank with discovery. Nonetheless, on May 15, 2015, U.S. Bank

timely responded to all of appellant’s interrogatories and requests for 

documents. (See affidavit of service, 5/15/15.) Appellant, in turn, did not

file any motions or send any correspondence to U.S. Bank suggesting that the 

discovery was deficient or that additional responses were needed. 

Accordingly, appellant’s claim of trial court error must fail. 

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in granting U.S. Bank’s

motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact 

existed with respect to “the credibility of U.S. Bank.” (Appellant’s brief at 14.) 

In support of this contention, appellant relies on the long-standing prohibition 

against relying solely upon oral testimony in deciding a motion for summary 

judgment, as set forth in Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. of New York, 
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163 A. 523 (Pa. 1932) and Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3(a)(1).

4

 (Appellant’s brief at 

14.)

This court has summarized the Nanty-Glo rule as follows: 

The Nanty-Glo rule prohibits summary judgment 

where the moving party relies exclusively on oral 

testimony, either through testimonial affidavits or 

deposition testimony, to establish the absence of a 

 

4 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.3(a)(1) provides as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), the 

adverse party may not rest upon the mere 

allegations or denials of the pleadings but must 

file a response within thirty days after service of 

the motion identifying

(1) one or more issues of fact arising 

from evidence in the record 

controverting the evidence cited in 

support of the motion or from a 

challenge to the credibility of one or 

more witnesses testifying in support 

of the motion, or

Note: If the moving party 

has supported the motion 

with oral testimony only, 

the response may raise the 

defense that there is a 

genuine issue of material 

fact because the cause of 

action is dependent upon 

the credibility and 

demeanor of the witnesses 

who will testify at trial. 

See Nanty-Glo[, supra]; 

Penn Center House, Inc. 

v. Hoffman, [] 553 A.2d 

900 ([Pa.] 1989).

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3(a)(1) (citation formatting amended).
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genuine issue of material fact except where the 

moving party supports the motion by using 

admissions of the opposing party or the opposing 

party’s own witness.

Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 149 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

Here, the record reflects that Nanty-Glo did not prohibit entry of 

summary judgment in this case because U.S. Bank provided evidence other 

than oral testimony to prove a prima facie case in mortgage foreclosure. 

This evidence included a copy of the mortgage and note, appellant’s 

transaction history, a notice of its intent to foreclose, and an affidavit 

confirming the amount due and unpaid. (See “[U.S. Bank’s] Motion for 

Summary Judgment,” 4/6/15 at Exhibits B, E, G, H; “Affidavit in Support of 

[U.S. Bank’s] Motion for Summary Judgment,” 1/13/15 at 3.) The record 

further reflects that appellant has failed to provide any evidence in either her 

December 14, 2019 “Answer and New Matter” or her May 4, 2015 

“Memorandum of Law in Opposition to [U.S. Bank’s] Motion for Summary 

Judgment” to refute U.S. Bank’s allegations. As recognized by the trial court, 

“[a]ppellant in the Answer admitted to averments in the Complaint by general 

denials to the claims . . . [and] does not specifically identify any factual 

assertions that would require a credibility finding.” (Trial court opinion, 2/2/16

at 10; see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1029(b) (stating, inter alia, “[a] general denial 

or a demand for proof, except as provided by subdivisions (c) and (e) of this 

rule, shall have the effect of an admission.”).) Accordingly, we discern no 
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error of law on the part of the trial court in concluding that there were no 

genuine issues of material fact in this case and granting U.S. Bank’s motion 

for summary judgment. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s September 1, 

2015 judgment. 

Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/24/20