alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO**
 **18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Pacific Continental Corporation (the
“Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we,
Hal M. Brown, Chief Executive Officer, and Michael A. Reynolds, Chief Financial
Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1)
    The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 
 (2)
    The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company. 
 
 /s/
Hal M. Brown       /s/
Michael A. Reynolds
 Hal M.
Brown       Michael
A. Reynolds
 Chief
Executive Officer      Chief
Financial Officer
EX PARTE Vantwain LaShun STOKES

1160305 (CR-15-0887)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 10, 2017

Cert. denied.
#### TQP DEVELOPMENT LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. NEWEGG, INC., Defendant-Cross-Appellant

2016-1262

2016-1297

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

February 27, 2017

Maro Aaron Fenster, Russ August & Rabat, Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by Adam S. Hoffman, Paul Anthony Kroeger, Benjamin T. Wang.

Daniel H. Brean, The Webb Law Firm, Pittsburgh, PA, argued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also represented by Kent E. Baldauf, Jr.; Mark A. Lemley, Durie Tangri LLP, San Francisco, CA; Edward R. Reines, Weil, Gotshal *&*Manges LLP, Redwood Shores, CA.

(Newman, Moore, and O’Malley, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

*684AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.

No costs.
Steven Mark HAYDEN v. William B. CASHION et al.

2160242

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

January 18, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Transferred to Sup. Ct. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Wilfredo PEREIRA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1096

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed April 20, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 30, 2018

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and David M. Dixon, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

*379We affirm the judgment and sentence entered against Wilfredo Pereira after a jury found him guilty of dealing in stolen property. However, because the trial court failed to enter a written competency order after independently determining Pereira was competent to proceed, we remand for entry of a nunc pro tunc written order finding him competent. *See* Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(b), (c)(7) ; *Dougherty v. State*, 149 So.3d 672, 678-79 (Fla. 2014) (finding trial court may by stipulation decide issue of competency based on written reports alone but must enter written order if defendant is found competent to proceed); *Ortiz v. State*, 55 So.3d 724, 724 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (affirming judgment and sentence but remanding for entry of written competency order).

AFFIRMED; REMANDED with directions.

BERGER, WALLIS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Michele O. Miller and Robert H. Steelhammer v. Green Bank, N.A.

Appellate case number: 01

- 18

- 00070

- CV

Trial court case number: 2016

- 25547A

Trial court: 281st Dis trict Court of Harris County

On January 21, 2019, appellant Michele O. Miller filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this appeal. She represented that “[a]ll other parties have agreed to this dismissal,” and she
included a certificate of conference with the same representation.

Our review of the record in this case indicates that appellant Robert H. Steelhammer filed for bankruptcy on January 31, 2018 in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division (Case
No. 18

- 30385). * Therefore, this appeal is stayed b y the operation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

The automatic stay in bankruptcy “deprives state courts of jurisdiction over the debtor and his property until the stay is lifted or modified.” Houston Pipeline Co. LP v. Bank of Am.,
N.A. , 213 S.W.3d 418, 428 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (quoting Baytown
State Bank v. Nimmons

, 904 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) ). “A n action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void, not me rely voidable. ” Cont ’ l Casing Corp. v. Samedan Oil Corp. , 751 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. 1988) . At this time, the Court is without jurisdiction to rule on the unopposed motion to dismiss this appeal. See id.

Until the parties notify the Court that the bankruptc y has been concluded or the bankruptcy trustee has lifted the stay for the purposes of this appeal and move to reinstate the case, the Court will take no further action other than to receive and hold any documents tendered during the period of suspension. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 8.2.

* See Docketing Statement (Feb. 15, 2018), Miller’s Third Unopposed Motion to Extend Briefing Deadline (June 11, 2018), Miller’s brief (July 11, 2018), Green Bank’s Unopposed M otion to Extend Briefing Deadline (Aug. 3, 2018), Green Bank’s Second Unopposed Motion to Extend Briefing Deadline (Sept. 6, 2018), and Green Bank’s brief (Nov. 9, 2018).Unless a party successfully moves to reinstate or sever, this appeal will be an inactive

case on the Court’s docket. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 8.3.

It is so ORDERED

.

Judge’s signature:

____

/s/ Peter Kelly

___  Acti ng individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __ February 5, 2019

__
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-03-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-01-1999
<CASH>                                       1,230,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               44,450,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,382,000
<INVENTORY>                                  9,652,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            56,785,000
<PP&E>                                      27,078,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              15,418,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              85,582,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       18,825,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       121,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  66,636,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                85,582,000
<SALES>                                     58,950,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            58,950,000
<CGS>                                       46,898,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               58,390,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               748,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              23,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                537,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   209,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            328,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   328,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.03



</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 31.1




CERTIFICATION





PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I, Gerald E. Bisbee, Jr., Ph.D., certify that:





1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ReGen Biologics, Inc. (the “registrant”);





2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;





4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a – 15(e) and 15d – 15(e)) for the registrant and have:





a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this
report is being prepared;





b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and





c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s
internal control over financial reporting; and





5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):





a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and





b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.





Date: August 11, 2009





By:
/s/ Gerald E. Bisbee, Jr., Ph.D.Name:
Gerald E. Bisbee, Jr., Ph.D.Title:
President and Chief Executive Officer
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-07-00383-CV

Ralston Outdoor Advertising, Ltd., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Transportation, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-06-002119, HONORABLE SCOTT H. JENKINS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Ralston Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. has filed an unopposed motion

to dismiss this appeal. Accordingly, we grant the motion to dismiss this appeal. See

Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1).

____________________________________________

Bob Pemberton, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Pemberton and Waldrop

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: January 17, 2008
Richard K. INGLIS, as Special Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of Rosa B. Schweiker, dated February 2, 1961; and Richard K. Inglis, as Special Trustee to the Frederick W. Berlinger Marital Trust and the Frederick W. Berlinger Family Trust under the Frederick W. Berlinger Revocable Deed of Trust, dated January 06, 1989; the Rose S. Berlinger Trust, dated October 17, 1991, as Amended and Restated; the Heather Anne Berlinger Trust, dated December 15, 1998; the Brian Bruce Berlinger Trust, dated December 15, 1998; and the Stacey Sue Berlinger Trust, dated December 15, 1998, who are non-parties, Petitioner, v. Roberta Sue CASSELBERRY, f/k/a Sue C. Berlinger, Respondent.

Case No. 2D17-4518

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 4, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
November 5, 2014 

# manatt
inanatt I phelps I phillips 000 1 ‘ ., A 71, 

## V P0 000.1 

# 362528 S James G. Votaw Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP Direct Dial: (202) 585-6610 E-mail: JVotaw@manatt.com 

### RECEIVED OPPT CBIC 2014 NOV. 06 AM 11:37 

### CBIC Control Number p. 1 ** SANITIZED VERSION**

Document Control Office (7407M) Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics U.S. Invironmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20460-0001 Re: Docket No. EPA-HQ-OPPT-2014-0390 Notice of Intent to Submit Adverse Comments Ladies and Gentlemen: Please accept this letter as notice of intent to submit adverse comments on the direct final rule issued with respect to 40 CFR 10776 at 79 FR 63,837 col. 2 (Oct. 27, 2014). [
In light of this notice, I understand the Agency now will withdraw the direct final rule applicable to 40 CFR 10776 and issue a proposed rule for public comment.

202870770.1

700 12th Street, N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, District of Columbia 20005 Telephone: 202.585.6500 Fax: 202.585.6600 Albany I Los Angeles I New York I Orange County I Palo Alto I Sacramento I San Francisco I Washington, D.C.
EXHIBIT 23.1











Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm











The Board of Directors


Natural Gas Services Group, Inc.


Midland, Texas





We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-147311 and No. 333-110954) and the registration statements (No. 333-119502, No. 333-122687 and No. 333-161346) on Form S-3, of Natural Gas Services Group, Inc. of our report dated March 2, 2009, relating to our audits of the consolidated financial
statements and internal control over financial reporting, which appear in this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Natural Gas Services Group, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2008.








/s/ HEIN & ASSOCIATES LLP





Dallas, Texas


August 26, 2009
Deshawn GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D16-2148

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 2, 2018

Deshawn Green, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.
#### Kurt LEPPING, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dean WILLIAMS, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-35369

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

Darryl L. Thompson, Esquire, Attorney, Law Office of Darryl L. Thompson, P.C., Anchorage, AK, for Petitioner-Appellant

Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, AGAK—Office of the Alaska Attorney General (Anchorage), Anchorage, AK, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P, 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alaska state prisoner Kurt Lepping appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review a district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition de novo, *see Stanley v. Cullen,*633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011), arid we affirm.

Lepping contends that the state trial court deprived him of due process when it *598denied his motion for a continuance of his jury trial on charges of numerous Alaska fish and game violations. The Alaska state court’s rejection of his claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); *Ungar v. Sarafite,*376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964) (trial courts have broad discretion on matters of continuances, and only a “myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay” is constitutionally impermissible).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate, for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 31.1
 CERTIFICATION
      a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control
over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted
in the United States of America;c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
andd) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the
case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and
  a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
Registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  By:
    
    /s/ Frank C. StipesFrank C. Stipes, Esq.
Chairman of the Board, Chief
     Executive Officer and President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN THE QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q OF CHEMTRAK
INCORPORATED FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 ANDIS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       4,672,000
<SECURITIES>                                 1,489,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                  457,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    382,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                84,000
<PP&E>                                       2,894,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,044,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,267,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        11,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,763,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,044,000
<SALES>                                        583,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               583,000
<CGS>                                          920,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  920,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,511,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             239,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,087,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,087,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,087,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.20)


</TABLE>
EX PARTE DIVERSIFIED SOURCING SOLUTIONS, INC., and FrankCrum, Inc.

1160209 (2150341)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 10, 2017

Cert. denied.
EX PARTE Blake COFIELD

CR-16-0446

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 19, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. denied.
Amy SARGENT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D16-3992

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed January 26, 2018

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Robert Jackson Pearce III, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Amy Sargent, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of criminal mischief (a third-degree felony) pursuant to a plea agreement. She was represented by counsel at the time of the plea. She was sentenced to three years' probation. A few days later, Sargent filed a facially insufficient, pro se motion to withdraw her plea. At the time the motion was filed, Sargent was still represented by counsel. *See* *Escobar v. State*, 126 So.3d 277, 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ("[C]ounsel's obligation of representation to his client does not end upon the rendition of a judgment of conviction and sentence, but continues thereafter until either a notice of appeal is filed ... the time for filing the notice has passed, or good cause is shown upon written motion."). The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion. Sargent's counsel did not attend the hearing.

Sargent appeals, contending that her constitutional right to counsel was violated when the hearing was held without her counsel being present. We conclude that the trial court should have stricken the motion because Sargent was represented by counsel and the motion did not allege an adversarial relationship with her counsel. Moreover, the motion did not contain specific allegations that bring it within the ambit of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii). *See* *Escobar*, 126 So.3d at 279. Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand this case to the trial court to enter an order striking the motion.

REVERSED; REMANDED with instructions.

SAWAYA, EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.