alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Faustino ROJAS, also known as Faustino Rojas-Villa, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 16-60660 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 19, 2017

David Howard Stoller, Law Offices of David Stoller, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Petitioner

Rachel Louise Browning, Trial Attorney, Juria L. Jones,-Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/OIL, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. ,

PER CURIAM: *

Faustino Rojas, a native and citizen of Mexico, has filed a petition for review of the order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding, the immigration judge’s determination that he was removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and § 1227(a)(2)(B). Rojas was originally charged in a notice to appear (NTA) in 2005 with removability *330under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) as an arriving alien. In 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) withdrew the charge under § 1182(a)(2)(C) and added the charges under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and § 1227(a)(2)(B) in a Form 1-261.

In his first argument, Rojas contends that DHS used the Form 1-261 to improperly change his status from an arriving alien to an admitted alien. We have jurisdiction to review this argument pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo. *Iruegas-Valdez v. Yates,*846 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 2017). Rojas’s argument is unavailing because the NTA alleged, and he conceded, that he was admitted to the United States as a legal permanent resident in 1983.

Rojas also contends that DHS was required under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(vi) to charge him as an arriving alien following his unauthorized entry into the United States in July 2015. Rojas did not raise this argument before the BIA, and we lack jurisdiction to review it. *See*§ 1252(d)(1); *Omari v. Holder,*562 F.3d 314, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2009).

The petition for review is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Veronika Santha LUSTER v. Bobby Joseph LUSTER

2160049

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 7, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Jennifer CAMPBELL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Gilbert Frank KAMINSKI, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0102

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 08, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

The parties' joint stipulation for dismissal filed June 4, 2018, is treated as a notice of voluntary dismissal and is granted. This appeal is dismissed.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

April 28, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
130118 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 130118 COA: 265211 Saginaw CC: 97-013761-FH

RYAN LANELL McCRAY, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to a ppeal the October 26, 2005 order of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

s0424 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

April 28, 2006

Clerk
Marlon J. TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1997

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed December 6, 2017

Alex R. Stavrou, Tampa, for Appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See**McDonald v. State*, 133 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ; *Hughes v. State*, 22 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; *Henry v. State*, 933 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ; *Shortridge v. State*, 884 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ; *Sampson v. State*, 845 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ; *Brown v. State*, 827 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

NORTHCUTT, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 31.1


CERTIFICATION

I, James Joyce, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-QSB of Aethlon Medical, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

         a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

         b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

         c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

         a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

         b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.

Date: August 8, 2007

                                             /s/ James A. Joyce
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             James A. Joyce
                                             Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.2

                               CERTIFICATION UNDER
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Glacier Water Services, Inc., (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 27, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, W. David
Walters, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to and for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

        (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material respects, the financial condition of the Company as of
                the dates indicated and results of operations of the Company for
                the periods indicated.


/s/ W. David Walters


W. David Walters
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
August 4 , 2004
**EXHIBIT
      32**





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Annual Report of Tasker Capital Corp. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Lanny
      Dacus, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, Stathis Kouninis, Chief
      Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company as of and for
      the periods presented in the Report.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


April
              27, 2007
            
            /s/ Lanny
              DacusLanny
              DacusChief
              Executive Officer




April
              27, 2007
            
            /s/ Stathis
              KouninisStathis
              KouninisChief
              Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 31 (Tuesday, February 15, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 8563]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03174]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[S-18-2022]


Foreign-Trade Zone 123--Denver, Colorado; Application for 
Subzone; Kaiser Premier, LLC; Fort Morgan, Colorado

    An application has been submitted to the Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZ) 
Board by the City and County of Denver, grantee of FTZ 123, requesting 
subzone status for the facilities of Kaiser Premier LLC, located in 
Fort Morgan, Colorado. The application was submitted pursuant to the 
provisions of the Foreign-Trade Zones Act, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-
81u), and the regulations of the FTZ Board (15 CFR part 400). It was 
formally docketed on February 9, 2022.
    The proposed subzone would consist of the following sites: Site 1 
(.77 acres) Factory 2--2550 East Bijou Avenue, Fort Morgan; Site 2 (.11 
acres) Warehouse--2431 East Beaver Avenue, Fort Morgan; and Site 3 (.90 
acres) Factory 3--404 Industry Dr., Fort Morgan. Production activity 
was authorized for Kaiser Premier LLC on August 17, 2021 under now-
lapsed FTZ 293 (Doc. B-33-2021). The proposed subzone would be subject 
to the existing activation limit of FTZ 123.
    In accordance with the FTZ Board's regulations, Qahira El-Amin of 
the FTZ Staff is designated examiner to review the application and make 
recommendations to the Executive Secretary.
    Public comment is invited from interested parties. Submissions 
shall be addressed to the FTZ Board's Executive Secretary and sent to: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#93f5e7e9d3e7e1f2f7f6bdf4fce5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="7c1a08063c080e1d1819521b130a">[email protected]</span></a>. The closing period for their receipt is March 28, 2022. 
Rebuttal comments in response to material submitted during the 
foregoing period may be submitted during the subsequent 15-day period 
to April 11, 2022.
    A copy of the application will be available for public inspection 
in the ``Online FTZ Information Section'' section of the FTZ Board's 
website, which is accessible via www.trade.gov/ftz.
    For further information, contact Qahira El-Amin at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1b4a7a7372697a355e77365a7672755b6f697a7f7e357c746d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="92c3f3fafbe0f3bcd7febfd3fffbfcd2e6e0f3f6f7bcf5fde4">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: February 9, 2022.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-03174 Filed 2-14-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
**Consent
      of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**











We
      consent to the reference to our firm under the caption "Experts" in the
      Registration Statement Form F-3 (No. 333-88248, 333-109837, 333-111731,
      333-111734, 333-117085, 333-131272 and 333-122407) and related Prospectus and
      on
      Form S-8( File No. 333-94995, 333-141177, 333-65532) pertaining to the
      Employees' Stock Option Plan of Commtouch Software Ltd., and to the
      incorporation by reference therein of our reports dated March 31, 2008 with
      respect to the consolidated financial statements of Commtouch Software Ltd.
      and
      the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Commtouch
      Software Ltd., included in its Annual Report (Form 20-F) for the year ended
      December 31, 2007, filed with the Securities and Exchange
      Commission.











Kost,
      Forer, Gabbay & Kasierer


A Member
      of Ernst & Young Global








Tel-Aviv,
      Israel


March
      31,
      2008
#### Anthony Tyrone CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey BEARD; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16464

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 17, 2017

Anthony Tyrone Campbell, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Anthony Tyrone Campbell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging equal protection violations arising from his housing assignment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Campbell’s claims against defendants Beard, Holland, Zamora, Sandor, Nouwels, and Abernathy because Campbell failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants were personally involved or causally connected to the housing assignment. *See Starr v. Baca,*652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a showing that supervisor was personally involved or there is a sufficient causal connection); *Jones v. Williams,*297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In' order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation”).

However, dismissal of Campbell’s equal protection claim against defendant Dickey was premature because the allegation that Dickey assigned Campbell to a cell with a gang-affiliated inmate based on Campbell’s race, liberally construed, is “sufficient to warrant ordering [defendant] to file an answer.” *Wilhelm v. Ratman,*680 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012); *see also Serrano v. Francis,*345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff need only allege that defendant acted at least in part based on a plaintiff’s protected status). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on this claim only.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in *561the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Zachary RICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D15-1955

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 21, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AT MARCH 30, 1997 AND UNAUDITED
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 30, 1997
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,870
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<INCOME-TAX>                                   (8,174)
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<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.36)
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</TABLE>
William G. SNEED, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-4626

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 24, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

The petition for belated appeal is granted in circuit court case number CF-14-911. This order shall serve as a timely notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence, the latter imposed August 25, 2016. Within twenty days the trial court shall consider appellant's eligibility for appointment of appellate counsel, provided appellant files within ten days a motion in the circuit court requesting same accompanied by a financial affidavit, and shall enter an order thereupon, with a copy to appellant and a copy to this court.

The circuit court clerk shall treat this order as a notice of appeal, promptly certify same and return it to this court as with any notice of appeal, accompanied by any order of indigency that may have been entered by the circuit court, and a new appellate case number will be assigned to this appeal and an acknowledgment letter will issue at that time.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
A.R.B. v. TALLADEGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2160134

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 7, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

- - - - - - - -

NO. 19-0901

IN THE INTEREST OF H.J.G. AND

I.S.G., CHILDREN §

§

§

§

§

§ Dallas County,

5th District.

October 18, 2019

Petitioner's petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case,

having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.

         

I, BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE

, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify

that the above is a true and correct copy of the orders of the Supreme Court of Texas in the case

numbered and styled as above, as the same appear of record in the minutes of said Court under

the date shown.

WITNESS my hand and seal of the Supreme Court of Texas, at the City of Austin, this

the 27th day of November, 2019

.

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

By Monica Zamarripa, Deputy Clerk
Gerell George DUNCAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-977

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 3, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Michael Brandon KELLEY v. STATE of Alabama

CR-10-0642.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 3, 2016. Certiorari Denied May 19, 2017

Alabama Supreme Court 1160533.

Jessica Oats, Raoul Dieter Schonemann (withdrew 07/11/2013), and William Robert Montross, Jr., Atlanta, Georgia, for appellant.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Jess R. Nix and Andrew Lynn Brasher, deputy *1077attys. gen., and Megan Arys Kirkpatrick, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

*On Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court*

WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

On September 5, 2014, this Court affirmed Michael Brandon Kelley's two convictions for capital murder, *see* §§ 13A-5-40(a)(1) and 13A-5-40(a)(8), Ala.Code 1975, his sentences of death for those convictions, and his one conviction for sexual torture, *see* § 13A-6-65.1, Ala.Code 1975. **Kelley v. State** , 246 So.3d 1032 (Ala.Crim.App.2014). On February 24, 2015, the Alabama Supreme Court granted Kelley's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether this Court had jurisdiction to affirm his sexual-torture conviction.

On November 6, 2015, the Alabama Supreme Court issued an opinion in which it determined that this Court did not have jurisdiction to affirm Kelley's conviction for sexual torture. **Ex parte Kelley** , 246 So.3d 1068 (Ala.2015). Specifically, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that the circuit court had not pronounced a sentence for Kelley's sexual-torture conviction; therefore, there had been no judgment of conviction under § 12-22-130, Ala.Code 1975, from which to appeal. 246 So.3d at 1071. Because there was no judgment of conviction relating to the sexual-torture charge, any appeal from that charge was not ripe. 246 So.3d at 1071. Consequently, this Court lacked jurisdiction to affirm that conviction. 246 So.3d at 1071.

After determining that this Court lacked jurisdiction to affirm Kelley's conviction for sexual torture, the Alabama Supreme Court "reverse[d] the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirm[ed] Kelley's sexual-torture conviction, and ... remand[ed] the case for proceedings consistent with [its] opinion." 246 So.3d at 1076. In accordance with the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion in **Ex parte Kelley** , 246 So.3d 1068 (Ala.2015), this Court's judgment in **Kelley v. State** , 246 So.3d 1032 (Ala.Crim.App.2014), is vacated to the extent it addressed and affirmed Kelley's conviction for sexual torture, and Kelley's appeal from that conviction is dismissed.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.

WELCH, KELLUM, BURKE, and JOINER, JJ., concur.