[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 12

- 15432 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:09

- cv - 00142

- DHB

- WLB

AYANNA WIGGINS, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Defendant

- Appellee.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia

________________________ (May 29, 2013 ) Before TJOFLAT , PRYOR and B LACK , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

Case: 12-15432 Date Filed: 05/29/2013 Page: 1 of 52 Ayanna Wiggins appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secret ary of the United States Army (Army) in her employment discrimination and retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights A ct of 1964 (Title VII) , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 16. 1 Wiggins claims the Army’s proffered legitimate reasons for terminating her

— f ailure to complete an assigned project and failure to comply with the internal publication deadlines of the magazine for which she s erved as editor

— w ere pretexts for race discrimination or retaliation. Upon review, we affirm. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo , viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the non

- moving party, and drawing all inferences in his favor. Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. , 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). “Summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id

. The plaintiff must present more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence

. . . there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 106 S. Ct. 2505, 251 2 (1986)

.

1 In her amended complaint, Wiggins also alleged discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and a racially hostile work environment. The district court later dismissed the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims and granted summary judgment to the Army with respect to the racially hostile wor k environment claim. As Wiggins does not challenge these rulings on appeal, they are deemed abandoned. See Denney v. City of Albany , 247 F.3d 1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001) (deeming claims that the plaintiff failed to brief on appeal abandoned).

Case: 12-15432 Date Filed: 05/29/2013 Page: 2 of 53 Title VII requires the federal government to make all personnel actions affecting employees in the military departments free of discrimination based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 16(a); 5 U.S.C. § 102. Title VII also makes it unlawful for a private employer to retaliate against an employee because she has opposed an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 3(a). We have noted that § 2000e

- 16 was intended “to make Title VII applicable in the federal workplace to the same extent that it was already applicable in the non

- federal workplace.” Llampallas v. Mini

- Circuits, Lab, Inc. , 163 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 1998). Where the plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence, a court may use a three

- step burden

- shifting framework to analyze her case. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc. , 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying the framework to a Title VII discriminati on case); Goldsmith v. City of Atmore , 996 F.2d 1155, 1162

- 63 (11th Cir. 1993) (applying the framework to a Title VII retaliation case). Under that framework, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, and the employer articulates a legitimate, non

- discriminatory or non

retaliatory reason for its employment action, then the plaintiff must show the reason proffered by the defendant was not the true one, but was more likely a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Mc Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973).

Case: 12-15432 Date Filed: 05/29/2013 Page: 3 of 54 A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory or retaliatory reason “ more likely motivated the employer , ” or indirectly by showing “ the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. ” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. B urdine , 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1095 (1981)

. When considering whether the basis for an empl oyee’s termination was merely pretext, the proper inquiry is whether the decisionm aker believed the employee was guilty of misconduct and whether that belief was the reason for the employee’s discharge. Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Army on Wiggins’ discrimi nation and retaliation claims. Although Wiggins established a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation, the Army proffered legi timate,

non - discriminatory and non

- retaliatory re asons for the adverse actions

. Wiggins has not provided any evidence that her supervisors were motivated by anything other than her failure to complete the project and her inability to meet deadlines. It

w as undisputed that the project was assigned to Wiggins, and that Wiggins did not complete it. 2 Wiggins also concedes she failed to meet several deadlines. Although Wiggins feels unfairly blamed for the missed deadlines and project, our inquiry centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs. Elrod , 939

2 Wiggins disputes the authenticity of an e

- mail sent from her supervisor with regard to the project. Even ignoring the disputed e

- mail, however, the other e

- mails between Wiggins and her supervisor did not forbid Wiggins from getting the materials she needed to c omplete the project

.

Case: 12-15432 Date Filed: 05/29/2013 Page: 4 of 55 F.2d at 1470 . We cannot second

- guess the correctness of the Army’s decision to hold her acc ountable for this conduct. See Rojas v. Florida , 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002) (cautioning that a court “must be careful not to allow Title VII plaintiffs simply to litigate whether they are, in fact, good employees”). Wiggins offers evidence that her supervisor treated her differently than her

co - workers as evidence of pretext. However, t he Army pr ovided evidence that it subjectively believed Wiggins was responsible for completing assigned projects and meeting the internal publication deadlines, and Wiggins admitted to failing to complete an assigned project and to failing to meet the deadlines

. Elrod , 939 F.2d at 1470

. Wiggins’ “scintilla” of evidence is not enough to outweigh the Army’s evidence that her termination was neither discriminatory nor retaliatory. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 106 S. Ct. at 2512. AFFIRMED. Case: 12-15432 Date Filed: 05/29/2013 Page: 5 of 5