alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Form
10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                          14,269
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          46,770
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                   628
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     13,702
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        282,180
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,500
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 428,827
<DEPOSITS>                                     348,726
<SHORT-TERM>                                    14,310
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             14,896
<LONG-TERM>                                     30,616
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               20
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             3
<OTHER-SE>                                      20,256
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 428,827
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 17,315
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,550
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 1,727
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                21,592
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              13,048
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              15,873
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            5,719
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      185
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 226
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  6,345
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    936
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         936
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       970
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .48
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .45
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0<F1>
<LOANS-NON>                                      5,800
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,551
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      116
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,500<F1>
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             1,500<F1>
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>This information is not disclosed in the Form 10-Q
</FN>


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 23



HORWATH ORENSTEIN LLP

Chartered Accountants

A MEMBER OF HORWATH INTERNATIONAL



595 Bay Street, Suite 300

Toronto, Canada

M5G 2C2



(416) 596 1711

(416) 596 7894 Fax

www.hto.com



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS



We consent to the inclusion of our audit of the consolidated audited financial statements of
Yak Communications (USA) Inc. and Subsidiaries as of June 30, 2003 and 2002 as part of this Form 10-KSB.



|                                                            
|------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Horwath Orenstein LLP                                   
|                                                            
|Horwath Orenstein LLP Chartered Accountants Toronto, Ontario
|                                                            
|September 25, 2003
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL JOSEPH BLOOR,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

E. K. M c DANIEL; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 17

- 15072

D.C. No. 3:15

- cv

- 00610

- RCJ

- VPC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 26, 2017 **

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH , Circuit Judges.

Daniel Joseph Bloor, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to exhaus t his administrative

remedies his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process violation . We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C . § 1291. We review de novo. Andres v. Marshall

, 867

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argum ent. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 3 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 17

- 15072

F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2017). We reverse and remand.

The district court screened and dismissed Bloor’s complaint on the basis that

Bloor had not pursued his grievances beyond the first level as required under the

Prison Litigation Reform Act. However, Bloor alleged in his complaint that

defendants refused to respond to his grievance, and he argued in his motion for

reconsideration that h is attempt to file a second

- level grievance was rejected fo r

lack of documentation, which he could not provide because he attached it to his

prior , unanswered grievance

. Thus, the district court erred in concluding at this

early stage of the proceedings, before defendants have appeared, that

administrative remed ies were available to Bloor. See Albino v. Baca , 747 F.3d

1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[O]nly in rare cases will a district court be

able to conclude from the face of the complaint that a prisoner has not exhausted

his administrative remedies an d that he is without a valid excuse.” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 211

- 17

(2007) (failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense which defendants must raise

and prove); Sapp v. Kimbrell , 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion is not

required where administrative remedies are “effectively unavailable”). We reverse

the judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steve DIAS, a/k/a Troy, a/k/a O’Neil Guthrie, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6635

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

Steve Dias, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Arthur Garnett, Katherine Lee Martin, Stephen David Schiller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Heather Hart Mansfield, Olivia L. Norman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Steve Dias appeals the district court’s order construing his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion as a successive § 2255 motion, and dismissing it on that basis. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court correctly determined that Dias’ motion was not a “true Rule 60(b)” motion, but in substance a successive § 2255 motion. *See United States v. McRae,*793 F.3d 392, 397-400 (4th Cir. 2015); *see also Gonzalez v. Crosby,*545 U.S. 524, 531-32, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005) (explaining how to differentiate a true Rule 60(b) motion from an unauthorized successive habe-as corpus motion). Therefore, we conclude that Dias is not required to obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s order. *See McRae,*793 F.3d at 400. The district court also correctly concluded that in the absence of prefiling authorization, it lacked jurisdiction to hear a successive § 2255 motion. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2012).

*176Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Orlando BLACK, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 17-6091

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 26, 2017

Orlando Black, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer Dee Dannels, FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTER, Butner, North Carolina; Robert J. Dodson, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Orlando Black appeals from the district court’s order denying his motions to vacate his civil commitment or to hold a discharge hearing. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s order and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Black,*No. 5:15-hc-02180-BR (E.D.N.C. Jan. 3, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented *130in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
Exhibit 32.2



Certificate Pursuant
to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as
Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Catalina Marketing Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending
December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert D. Woltil, Interim Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant
to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                                             
|-------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Robert D. Woltil                                         
|Robert D. Woltil                                             
|Interim Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)
|February 9, 2005
Exhibit 23.1


                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 No. 333- 333-92176) pertaining to the 1999 Stock Plan, 1998 ACT
Medical Stock Plan and the 2001 Employee Stock Purchase Plan of MedSource
Technologies, Inc. of our report dated July 23, 2002, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) of
MedSource Technologies, Inc. for the year ended June 30, 2002.

     Our audit also included the financial statement schedule of MedSource
Technologies, Inc. listed in Item 14(a). This schedule is the responsibility of
the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion based on
our audit. In our opinion, the financial statement schedule referenced above,
when considered in relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole,
presents fairly in all material respected the information set forth therein.


                                         /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Minneapolis, Minnesota
September 13, 2002
Corey Llewellyn TAYLOR, DOC #114918, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1421

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit








Exhibit 4.3




AGREEMENT TO FURNISH DEBT INSTRUMENTS
Pursuant to Item 601(b)(4)(iii)(A) of Regulation S-K, Criteo S.A. (the “Company”) has not included as an exhibit to its Annual Report on Form 10-K any instrument relating to long-term debt if the total amount of debt authorized by such instrument does not exceed 10% of the total assets of the Company. The Company agrees to furnish a copy of any such instrument to the Securities and Exchange Commission upon request.


                        
	
		
	 
	CRITEO S.A.

	 
	 

	By:
	/s/ Jean-Baptiste Rudelle

	Name:
	Jean-Baptiste Rudelle

	Title:
	Chief Executive Officer

	Date:
	March 1, 2019
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

SHAWN MICHAEL LUTTENAUER,

Appellant,

v.

LISA DEVOS LUTTENAUER,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-3654 

[March 11, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Jessica Ticktin, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2017-DR011630.

Jennifer S. Carroll of Law Office of Jennifer S. Carroll, P.A., Jupiter, 

for appellant.

Stephanie L. Serafin and Jane Kreusler-Walsh of Kreusler-Walsh, 

Vargas & Serafin, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Rosanna Ferrari of 

Rosanna Ferrari, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

LEVINE, C.J., CIKLIN and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Bumgardner Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

SIMON PHILIP POUND

v. Record No. 2148-96-4

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL MEMORANDUM OPINION * PER CURIAM ARNOLD KARL ZINNECKER MAY 5, 1998

v. Record No. 2149-96-4

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN COUNTY Dennis L. Hupp, Judge Franklin B. Reynolds, Jr., for appellants. John B. Arledge, Town Attorney, for appellee.

Simon Pound and Arnold Zinnecker were charged with driving under the influence in violation of a Front Royal town ordinance. Prior to trial, each defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the town council had not enacted the ordinance in compliance with Virginia Constitution Article VII, Section 7. The trial court denied the motions. The evidence was stipulated as sufficient to prove guilt, and the defendants were found guilty. Their appeals were consolidated. The Constitution states, "on final vote on any ordinance or resolution, the name of each member voting and how he voted shall

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - be recorded." Id. When the ordinance was adopted, the minutes of that meeting begin by recording the names of each council member present. The minutes then continue chronologically. When the council considers the ordinance, the minutes state that the vote was unanimous. The defendants argue this manner of recording the action taken by the town council does not fulfill the constitutional mandate. They argue that the minutes must list the name of each council member voting and the member's vote. They argued that this tabulation must appear at each place where a vote is recorded in the minutes. The Supreme Court recently ruled on this issue in Town of Madison v. Ford , 255 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1998). An ordinance enacted in the same manner as that used in this case was held not to comply with the constitutional mandate, and the ordinance was held null and void. Because this case is controlled by that rationale, we reverse the convictions and enter final judgment. Reversed and final judgment

.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7343

JOHN EDWARD SCRUGGS, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GEORGE DEEDS, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

VIRGINIA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CA-97-26-R)

Submitted: February 27, 1998 Decided: March 20, 1998

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John Edward Scruggs, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Eugene Paul Murphy,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 &

Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's

opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

find no reversible error. To the extent that Scruggs alleges cause

for the procedural default of his malicious prosecution claim, we

find that his attorney was not ineffective, and thus that federal

review of this claim is barred. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

262 (1989). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal substantially on the reasoning of the district

court. Scruggs v. Deeds, No. CA-97-26-R (W.D. Va. Sept. 15, 1997).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Milton Ramos RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-70520

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 11, 2017 ** San Francisco, California

SEPTEMBER 13, 2017

*331Emilio Tomas Parker, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Beles and Beles, Oakland, CA,for Petitioner.

Patricia Bruckner, Trial Attorney, Victor Matthew Lawrence, I, Esquire, Assistant Director, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: KOZINSKI and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,*** District Judge.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***

 The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM *

Milton Ramos Rodriguez (“Ramos”), a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, *Ochoa-Amaya v. Gonzales,*479 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2007), and we deny the petition.

“In a motion to reopen, it is the mov-ant’s burden to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought,” *Id.*The BIA determined that, although Ramos was no longer statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal in light of new caselaw, Ramos had not met his burden of establishing prima facie eligibility for relief because his claim was based entirely on testimony and statements that the IJ had found not credible—an adverse credibility determination that had twice been affirmed by the BIA. Ramos has not presented any new evidence or otherwise explained how he would prove his claim for withholding of removal in light of the IJ’s prior credibility findings. Given that, it was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to conclude that he had not made out a prima facie claim for withholding of removal and to deny the motion to reopen on that ground.

Contrary to Ramos’s contentions, the BIA did not make any findings of fact in reaching that conclusion; it simply determined that Ramos had not met his burden of establishing prima facie eligibility for relief, which is the standard a movant must satisfy to reopen immigration proceedings. *See id.*Nor did the BIA run afoul of *Shouchen Yang v. Lynch,*822 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2016), by applying the *falsus*maxim to discredit the evidence supporting Ramos’s claim for withholding of removal. The BIA did not make any new adverse credibility determinations; it simply observed that Ramos’s withholding claim was based entirely on testimony and statements that had already been found not credible and, thus, that he had not proven prima facie entitlement to relief.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Calvin MASSEY v. STATE

1150636

Supreme Court of Alabama.

January 13, 2017

Reh. denied.
Marco Antonio RONGA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Lucia Gabriela NAVARRETE, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-3237

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 25, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

This appeal is dismissed for failure of appellant to comply with this court's order of February 14, 2018, requiring the filing of an initial brief.

LaROSE C.J., and MORRIS and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
Jennifer Renea STOKES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-5044

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 3, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Cletus Fru FOTIBU, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-2176

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 29, 2017

Decided: August 3, 2017

Albert I. Usumanu, ALBERT USU-MANU LAW OFFICE, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Petitioner.

Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director, Jenny C. Lee, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Cletus Fru Fotibu, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for review of a September 12, 2016 order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying his motion to reopen. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the petition for review.

Before this court, Fotibu argues only that he was denied a fair merits hearing on his applications for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal in violation of his due process rights. However, Fotibu did not file a timely petition for review of the Board’s March 18, 2016 order dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s denial of that relief. Fotibu had 30 days from the date of that decision to file a timely petition for review. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2012). This time frame is “jurisdictional in nature and must be construed with strict fidelity to [its] terms.” *Stone v. INS,*514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995). Moreover, the filing of a motion to reopen with the Board does not toll the 30-day period for seeking review of underlying orders. *Id.*at 394, 115 S.Ct. 1537. Thus, Fotibu’s petition for review of the Board’s order of September 12, 2016, cannot be considered timely as to the Board’s March 18, 2016 order.

Fotibu fails to raise any issues relevant to the Board’s September 12, 2016 order denying his motion to reopen. Under Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, “the argument [section of the brief] ... must contain ... appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Furthermore, the “[f]ailure to comply with the specific dictates of [Rule 28] with respect to a particular claim triggers abandonment of that claim.” *Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,*178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999); *see also Ngarurih v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 182, 189 n.7 (4th Cir. 2004) (failure to challenge denial of relief under Convention Against Torture results in abandonment of issue on review).

Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argurpent would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DISMISSED*