[J-72A-2014] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellant 

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JOSE A. CARRASQUILLO, 

 Appellee 

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No. 7 EAP 2014 

Appeal from the judgment of Superior 

Court entered 10/08/2013 at No. 1045 EDA 

2011, vacating the judgment of sentence 

entered on 11/30/10, of the Court of 

Common Pleas, Criminal Division, 

Philadelphia County at Nos. 

CP-51-CR-0009652-2009 and 

CP-51-CR-0009653-2009, Dated 

November 30, 2010, and Remanding 

78 A.3d 1120 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

ARGUED: September 10, 2014 

CONCURRING OPINION 

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS 

I join the majority in its entirety. 

I write separately to emphasize my disapproval with the Superior Court’s 

bright-line rule that prohibited, as a matter of law, trial courts from assessing the credibility 

of an “assertion of innocence” made in the context of a presentence motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea. This per se approach, which was based upon the utterance of “magic 

words,” undermined the trial court’s role as a finder of fact and removed necessary 

discretion from the court. I agree with the majority that such an approach was 

unsatisfactory. Trial courts must be permitted to evaluate the credibility of an accused’s 
[J-72A-2014] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 2 

assertion of innocence, including the evidence of guilt, of delay, and of ulterior or illicit 

motive in ruling upon an accused’s presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 

Moreover, since the majority is reversing the Superior Court as it relates to the first 

issue, I agree with the majority that it is not necessary, for disposition of this particular 

case, to reach the Commonwealth’s second issue, which concerns prejudice to the 

Commonwealth. However, in order to provide guidance to the courts below, it is clear 

the Commonwealth demonstrated it would have been substantially prejudiced by the 

withdrawal of Appellee’s guilty plea. 

I specifically disagree with the Superior Court that the evidence of the 

psychological and emotional harm to the young victim, N.O., was insufficient as a matter 

of law to demonstrate substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth or that it was largely 

irrelevant to the inquiry of prejudice. The Superior Court’s bright-line rule, which 

attributed no value to the interests of the victims of crime, is inapposite to public policy in 

this area of the law and to the value of the criminal justice system generally. Rather, as 

the trial court properly concluded, evidence of the harmful effect of Appellee’s withdrawal 

of his plea upon N.O.’s psychological and emotional well-being was relevant to the trial 

court’s inquiry since it had the tendency to make the Commonwealth’s claim of prejudice 

more or less probable than it would be without that evidence. 

As to whether the Commonwealth adduced substantial evidence of the 

psychological harm to N.O., I agree with the trial court that it did so in this case. The 

Commonwealth relied upon videotaped testimony of N.O., which was corroborated by 

testimony from N.O.’s family and a school principal, to argue the child victim’s 

psychological and emotional well-being would be compromised if the trial court granted 
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Appellee’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Based on the evidence presented, the trial 

court concluded N.O. was emotionally vulnerable and opined harm would be caused by 

denying N.O. closure and threatening to force N.O. to relive the brutal rape she endured 

by testifying at trial. I find no error in the trial court’s conclusion of substantial prejudice in 

this regard. 

Mr. Justice Baer joins this concurring opinion.