FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JORGE AVILA ALBERTO NAVARRO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10245

D.C. No.

2:07 cr-0332

WBS-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

William B. Shubb, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 11, 2015*

San Francisco, California

Filed September 4, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, A. Wallace Tashima,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

* The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Jorge

Avila Alberto Navarro’s motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

for reduction of sentence based on Amendments 782 and 788

to the Sentencing Guidelines.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in granting Navarro’s motion under Fed. R. App.

P. 4(b)(4) for an extension of time to file an appeal, and that

the notice of appeal is therefore timely.

The panel held that a district court cannot apply a

retroactive amendment to reduce an alreadyimposed sentence

prior to that amendment’s effective date. The panel also held

that the Sentencing Commission’s determination of the

appropriate effective date for a retroactive amendment is not

invalid simply because the Commission made reference to

prisoners’ rehabilitative needs.

COUNSEL

Rachel R. Goldberg and Tara Azad Amin, SidleyAustin LLP,

Chicago, Illinois; Robin Eve Wechkin, Sidley Austin LLP,

Seattle, Washington; Heather E. Williams, Federal Defender,

and Hannah Labaree, Assistant Federal Defender,

Sacramento, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO 3

Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney, Camil A.

Skipper and Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorneys,

Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we examine the scope of the United States

Sentencing Commission’s (the “Commission”) authority to

limit the retroactive effect of its amendments to its

Sentencing Guidelines. We hold that a district court cannot

apply a retroactive amendment to reduce an already imposed

sentence prior to that amendment’s effective date. We also

hold that the Commission’s determination of the appropriate

effective date for a retroactive amendment is not invalid

simply because the Commission made reference to prisoners’

rehabilitative needs. We therefore affirm.

I.

A.

In 2008, Jorge Avila Alberto Navarro pled guilty to

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At

sentencing, the district court calculated the appropriate

Guidelines range to be 151 to 188 months. On the

government’s motion, the district court imposed a belowGuidelines sentence of 113 months imprisonment. Under that

sentence, Navarro is scheduled to be released on September

9, 2015.
4 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO

On November 1, 2014, the Commission issued

Amendment 782 to its Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered

the recommended sentences for certain drug crimes, including

the crime of which Navarro was convicted. See United States

Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, (hereinafter

“USSG”), supp. app’x. C, amend 782 (2014). At the same

time, the Commission promulgated another amendment,

Amendment 788, which amended § 1B1.10 of the Guidelines

to authorize district courts to apply Amendment 782

retroactively to reduce the length certain already-imposed

sentences, provided that “the effective date of the court’s

order is November 1, 2015, or later.” See USSG, supp. app’x.

C, amend. 788 (2014); USSG § 1B1.10. In other words,

Amendment 788 allowed district courts to hear motions for

sentence reduction immediately, but instructed that any

reduction based on the new Guidelines could not be effective

until November 1, 2015, at the earliest.

The Commission explained at length both its decision to

amend the Guidelines, and its decision to delay that

amendment’s retroactive effect. In particular, the

Commission was concerned, “[in] light of the large number

of cases potentially involved, . . . that the agencies of the

federal criminal justice system responsible for the offenders’

reentry into society need[ed] time to prepare, and to help the

offenders prepare, for that reentry.” Id. Summarizing its

considerations, the Commission determined that a one-year

delay would be needed:

(1) to give courts adequate time to obtain and

review the information necessary to make an

individualized determination in each case of

whether a sentence reduction is appropriate,

(2) to ensure that, to the extent practicable, all
UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO 5

offenders who are to be released have the

opportunity to participate in reentry programs

and transitional services, such as placement in

halfway houses, while still in the custody of

the Bureau of Prisons, which increases their

likelihood of successful reentry to society and

thereby promotes public safety, and (3) to

permit those agencies that will be responsible

for offenders after their release to prepare for

the increased responsibility.

Id. The Commission ended by reiterating that “offenders

cannot be released from custody pursuant to retroactive

application of Amendment 782 before November 1, 2015.” 

Id.

B.

On March 12, 2015, Navarro filed a motion under

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) asking the district court to reduce his

sentence based on Amendments 782 and 788. Navarro

calculated that, using the amended Guidelines and applying

the same below-range deviation from his earlier sentence, he

would be eligible for immediate release.1 However, Navarro

is currently scheduled to be released on September 9, 2015,

well before Amendment 788’s November 1, 2015, effective

date. Navarro argues that the district court should apply

Amendment 782 as though it were immediately retroactive,

and accordingly order his immediate release. Navarro

1 Because we determine that the date of Navarro’s scheduled release

precludes him from seeking a sentence reduction based on Amendments

782 and 788, we do not address whether and to what extent his sentence

could be reduced were those amendments applicable to him.
6 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO

contends that immediate application is necessary because the

Commission’s decision to delay the effective date of

Amendment 788 was based, in part, on considerations related

to prisoners’ rehabilitative needs, and because the

Commission’s choice of a November 1, 2015, effective date,

rather than an earlier date, was unconstitutionally arbitrary.

On April 21, 2015, the district court issued a written order

denying Navarro’s motion. Under Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), Navarro had fourteen days from the

district court’s final order to appeal the court’s decision. On

May 8, 2015, seventeen days after the order was filed,

Navarro moved under Rule 4(b)(4) for an extension of the

time to file an appeal. He claimed that defense counsel had

incorrectly assumed the court would use a form order, and so

was awaiting that order before appealing. The district court

granted Navarro’s motion on May 11, 2015, reasoning that an

extension was warranted “because defense counsel represents

that he did not file a notice of appeal because he was waiting

for the court to sign a Form 247.” Navarro filed a notice of

appeal that same day. The government argues that the district

court should not have granted the motion, and that this appeal

is therefore untimely.

2

II.

Although the requirement of a timely appeal is not a

jurisdictional rule in criminal cases, where the government

properly objects to an untimely filing, we must dismiss the

appeal. United States v. Sadler, 480 F.3d 932, 941–42 (9th

2 The district court’s order granting Navarro’s motion to extend time was

entered before the government was able to file an opposition to the

motion.
UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO 7

Cir. 2007). Because the government challenges the

timeliness of Navarro’s appeal, we must first determine

whether this appeal is, in fact, timely.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) generally

requires that a criminal defendant file any notice of appeal

within fourteen days of the judgment or order being appealed. 

However, “[u]pon a finding of excusable neglect or good

cause, the district court may . . . extend the time to file a

notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from the

expiration of the time otherwise prescribed.” Fed. R. App. P.

4(b)(4). “We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s

decision to grant or deny a motion for an extension of time to

file a notice of appeal.” Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853,

858 (9th Cir. 2004). “If the court abused its discretion . . . the

notice of appeal is untimely.” Meza v. Wash. State Dep’t of

Soc. & Health Servs., 683 F.2d 314, 315 (9th Cir. 1982).

Rule 4(b)(4) authorizes a district court to extend the time

to appeal based on either of two grounds: “good cause” or

“excusable neglect.” Both are familiar terms in the world of

judicial procedure, and both represent relatively malleable

concepts. The district court did not specifically state on

which of these two grounds it was extending the time to

appeal. An analysis of “excusable neglect” generally requires

a court to analyze the four factors set out by the Supreme

Court. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.,

507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993); see also Lemoge v. United States,

587 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009). Because the district

court did not engage in this analysis, we assume, instead, that

it relied on the more loosely defined “good cause” standard.

“‘Good cause’ is a non-rigorous standard that has been

construed broadly across procedural and statutory contexts.” 
8 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO

Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th

Cir. 2010) (discussing “good cause” in the context of Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(b)(1)). Here, Navarro’s delay was due to an

understandable mistake about the unwritten procedures of the

specific judge before whom he was practicing. As Navarro

explained in his motion to extend the time to appeal,

numerous other judges in the Eastern District of California

have issued orders denying motions for sentence reduction on

a government-issued form known as “Form 247.” In several

of these cases, courts have filed the form following a short

written order.3 Moreover, although use of Form 247 is not

mandatory, the Sentencing Commission has asked district

courts to use the form when either granting or denying

motions for sentence reduction. In this case, defense counsel

mistakenly believed that the order he received on April 21,

2015, was not an appealable final order, but a preliminary

order that would be followed by a final order on Form 247. 

He quickly realized his error, seventeen days after the original

order, but not quickly enough to meet the dictates of Rule

4(b)(1). There is no indication of bad faith, or that the

government was prejudiced by the three-day delay. The

district court recognized the reasonableness of counsel’s

mistake and concluded that it constituted good cause. We

cannot say that was an abuse of discretion. We therefore

conclude that Navarro’s notice of appeal was timely, and

proceed to the merits of this appeal.

3 Navarro has filed with this court a motion to take judicial notice of

several unpublished district court orders using Form 247. That motion is

hereby granted. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); In re Korean Air Lines Co.,

Ltd., 642 F.3d 685, 689 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011).
UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO 9

III.

We begin with Navarro’s argument that the district court

should have treated Amendment 782 as immediately

retroactive because the Commission considered prisoners’

rehabilitative needs in deciding to delay its retroactive effect. 

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that this

argument is unavailing.

A.

Once a sentence of imprisonment has been imposed, that

sentence generally is treated as final. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(b). However, in an “act of lenity,” Congress has

crafted a limited exception for prisoners who were sentenced

based on Guidelines that have since been amended

downward. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828

(2010). In such circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) allows

a defendant to request a reduced sentence based on new

Guidelines and allows district courts to reduce a term of

imprisonment, so long as “such a reduction is consistent with

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission.” As the Supreme Court has explained,

§ 3582(c)(2) thus prescribes a limited, two-step inquiry. 

Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826. First, the court must look to “the

Commission’s instructions in § 1B1.10 to determine the

prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification and the

extent of the reduction authorized.” Id. at 827. Because the

Commission has statutory authority both to amend the

Guidelines and to “determin[e] whether and to what extent an

amendment will be retroactive . . . [a] court’s power under

§ 3582(c)(2) . . . depends in the first instance on the

Commission’s decision not just to amend the Guidelines but

to make the amendment retroactive.” Id. at 826.
10 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO

“At step two of the inquiry, § 3582(c)(2) instructs a court

to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine

whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by

reference to the policies relevant at step one is warranted in

whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the

case.” Id. at 827. This circumscribed inquiry is not to be

treated as “plenary resentencing proceedings.” Id. at 826. 

Stated differently, “the only ‘appropriate use’ of sentence

modification proceedings under section 3582(c) is to adjust

a sentence in light of a Guidelines amendment,” so courts

may not use such proceedings to “reconsider[] a sentence

based on factors unrelated to a retroactive Guidelines

amendment.” United States v. Fox, 631 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2011).

As the district court correctly concluded, Navarro cannot

make it past step one of the Dillon inquiry. The

Commission’s instructions in § 1B1.10 make it perfectlyclear

that a court may not reduce a “term of imprisonment based on

Amendment 782 unless the effective date of the court’s order

is November 1, 2015, or later.” USSG § 1B1.10(e)(1). There

is thus no way to reduce Navarro’s sentence “consistent with

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

B.

Navarro contends that the district court should have

ignored the explicit limitation on the retroactive effect of

Amendment 788, and treated that amendment as immediately

retroactive, because the Commission mentioned rehabilitative

concerns in its statement of reasons for the Amendment. 

In advancing this argument, Navarro relies principally on

the Supreme Court’s decision in Tapia v. United States,
UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO 11

131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), in which the Court held the

Sentencing Reform Act “precludes sentencing courts from

imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an

offender’s rehabilitation.” Id. at 2391. Tapia, in turn, relied

on two related statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(k). Section 3582(a) instructs sentencing courts “in

determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and

. . . in determining the length of the term” to “recogniz[e] that

imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting

correction and rehabilitation.” Section 994(k) instructs the

Commission to “insure that the guidelines reflect the

inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of

imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant

or providing the defendant with needed educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional

treatment.” In Tapia, the Court read these two statutes as

sending the Commission and sentencing judges “the same

message: Do not think about prison as a way to rehabilitate

an offender.” 131 S. Ct. at 2390.

Navarro contends that the Commission – and by

extension, the district court – violated this proscription by

citing to rehabilitative concerns in its stated reasons for

Amendment 788. In particular Navarro cites to the

Commission’s statement that a one-year delay was necessary

to ensure that, to the extent practicable, all

offenders who are to be released have the

opportunity to participate in reentry programs

and transitional services, such as placement in

halfway houses, while still in the custody of

the Bureau of Prisons, which increases their

likelihood of successful reentry to society and

thereby promotes public safety.
12 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO

USSG, supp. app’x. C, amend. 788. The government does

not dispute that this passage indicates a consideration of

rehabilitation, and instead argues that (1) any flaw in the

reasoning of Amendment 788 does not provide Navarro with

a basis to reduce his sentence, and (2) regardless, Tapia is

inapplicable in sentence reduction proceedings.4

We agree with the government on both points. First,

Navarro simply has not explained how a flaw, if any, in the

Commission’s reasoning in Amendment 788 would mandate

an immediate retroactive application of Amendment 782. As

discussed above, a district court is without power to grant a

sentence reduction not “consistent with applicable policy

statements issued bythe SentencingCommission.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2). Amendment 782 itself was not retroactive, and

nothing outside of Amendment 788 would make Amendment

782 retroactive to Navarro. Even were we to conclude that

the Commission fatally erred in promulgating Amendment

788, and that the Amendment was therefore unenforceable,

Navarro would still be left without a basis to have his

sentence reduced.

Moreover, we conclude, as did the district court, that

Tapia does not apply to sentence reduction proceedings. As

the Supreme Court explained in Dillon and as we clarified in

Fox, sentence reduction proceedings should not be treated as

a second round of sentencing. Simply put, the restrictions

4 Because we conclude that Tapia does not apply in sentence reduction

proceedings, we do not address the question of whether the quoted

passage actually represents the sort of consideration of rehabilitation that

Tapia forbids. We note, however, that it is far from clear that arranging

transition and reentry services for currently incarcerated inmates would

constitute treating “prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender.” Tapia,

131 S. Ct. at 2390.
UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO 13

and rules associated with sentencing do not carry over to

sentence reduction proceedings, which are instead governed

by their own set of rules. See Dillon, 560 U.S. at 828

(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to have essential

facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt does not

apply to motions for sentence reduction).

Tapia does not change the distinction discussed in Dillon. 

By its own terms, Tapia does not apply to sentence reduction. 

The Supreme Court specifically held that a court could not

“impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender

to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote

rehabilitation,” but said nothing about reducing (or declining

to reduce) a prison sentence. 131 S. Ct. at 2393 (emphasis

added). And for good reason. The Court’s decision in Tapia

followed directly from its interpretation of two specific

statutory provisions: 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(k). Both address sentencing, not sentence reduction. 

Section 3582(a) presents instructions for a “court, in

determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and

. . . in determining the length of the term.” A separate

subsection, § 3582(c), governs sentence reduction, and that

subsection contains no rule against considering rehabilitation. 

Similarly, § 994(k) instructs the Commission to “insure that

the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a

sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of

rehabilitating the defendant.” (emphasis added). However,

§ 994(k) says nothing about sentence reduction, and the

subsection that authorizes the commission to make

amendments retroactive, § 994(u), places no limit on
14 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO

rehabilitative considerations.5 Thus deprived of any firm

foothold in statutory text, Navarro is left to argue that Tapia

should apply to his sentence reduction motion because

sentence reduction, like sentencing, involves deciding how

long an offender will stay in prison. But importing the rules

of sentencing into sentence reduction is preciselywhat Dillon

instructs us not to do. We thus conclude that Tapia does not

apply in sentence reduction proceedings, and that it therefore

does not provide a basis to challenge the Commission’s

decision to limit the retroactive effect of a Guidelines

amendment.

IV.

Navarro next argues that the Commission’s decision to

delay the effective date of Amendment 788 for a full year –

until November 1, 2015 – was unconstitutionally arbitrary, in

violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of

the Constitution.6 According to Navarro, the Commission

5 Of course, before the Commission can make a Guidelines amendment

retroactive, it must amend the Guidelines in the first place. Even when an

amendment will be applied retroactively, the initial change to the

Guidelines will thus still be governed by all the usual rules, including

§ 994(k). However, Navarro has not challenged the sentencing range

expressed by the amended Guidelines, only the Commission’s failure to

make that amendment immediately retroactive.

6 Technically, the Commission’s Guidelines are not governed by the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies

only to the states, not to the federal government or federal entities. See

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954). However, the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment similarly prohibits unjustified

discrimination by federal actors, and our “approach to Fifth Amendment

equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal
UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO 15

had an insufficient basis to conclude that a one-year delay,

rather than a shorter six-month delay, was necessary to

achieve its stated goals. By choosing the one-year delay,

Navarro argues, the Commission arbitrarily and

unconstitutionally discriminated against those prisoners who

were due for release more than six months, but less than a

year, after Amendment 788 was issued. We find this

argument unpersuasive.

To begin, we note that Navarro never presented this

constitutional argument before the district court. Instead,

citing to cases involving the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”), Navarro argued that the Commission’s decision not

to make Amendment 782 retroactive prior to November 1,

2015, was “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the

statute.” See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). The district court correctly

rejected this challenge, citing our prior holding that “[t]he

Commission is not an agency subject to the requirements of

the APA but ‘an independent entity in the judicial branch.’” 

See United States v. Tercero, 734 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir.

2013) (quoting Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing

Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

Navarro’s constitutional argument is thus before the court

for the first time on appeal. We generally will not entertain

arguments that were not first presented before the district

court. See Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th

Cir. 2015). “This court has discretion to decide whether to

reach such an issue, however, where the issue presented is a

purely legal one and the record below has been fully

protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Weinberger v.

Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
16 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO

developed.” Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 1089, 1094

(9th Cir. 2014). Here, we choose to exercise that discretion

to reach the merits of Navarro’s constitutional claim because,

on the record before us, we have little doubt that Navarro has

failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation.

When the Commission enacts Guidelines treating one

class of offenders differently from another, equal protection

generally requires that the classification be “rationally related

to a legitimate government interest.” United States v.

Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440

(1985)).7 Under this rational-basis review, “[t]he burden falls

on the party seeking to disprove the rationality of the

relationship between the classification and the purpose.” Id. 

Navarro has not met this burden.

As discussed above, the Commission stated three general

reasons for its decision to delay the effective date of

Amendment 788: (1) giving courts time to review the large

number of eligible inmates and make individualized

determinations; (2) arranging for transition and re-entry

programs in order to reduce recidivism and protect public

safety; and (3) permitting affected agencies to prepare for an

increased workload.8 USSG, app’x. C, amend. 788. These

 

7 The Commission’s decisions would, of course, be subject to a higher

level of scrutiny if its classification implicated a fundamental right or a

suspect classification. See United States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 612

(4th Cir. 1994).

8 We focus here on the governmental interests stated by the Commission

because they are most easily addressed. We recognize, however, that

under rational-basis review, the government actor generally need not

“actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its
UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO 17

clearlyconstitute legitimate government interests. See Ewing

v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (recognizing “the

State’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring

recidivist felons”); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw,

486 U.S. 71, 82 (1988) (recognizing “the State’s interest in

conserving judicial resources”). There is also a rational

connection between these interests and the one-year delay: 

The Commission reasonably was concerned that making

Amendment 782 immediatelyretroactive would lead to a rush

to the courts, pressuring the district courts to make release

decisions quickly, and putting pressure on government

agencies responsible for helping prisoners transition back into

outside society. Thus, the Commission’s decision easily

survives rational-basis review.

Notwithstanding the legitimacy of the government

interests at stake, Navarro argues that the Commission’s

decision violated due process because there was insufficient

evidence before the Commission for it to conclude that a

delay of one year was necessary. This argument

misapprehends the scope of rational-basis review. Generally,

“the absence of legislative facts explaining the distinction on

the record has no significance in rational-basis analysis.” 

FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 

Rather, rational-basis review allows for decisions “based on

rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical

data.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he rational basis standard . . . does

not require that the Commission choose the best means of

advancing its goals.” Vermouth v. Corrothers, 827 F.2d 599,

603 (9th Cir. 1987). Instead, all that is needed is some

“rational connection” between the rule and the governmental

classification.” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 132 S. Ct. 2073,

2082 (2012) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992)).
18 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO

interest, regardless of whether that rule is an “exact fit” for

the interest at issue. Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054,

1059–60 (9th Cir. 1999). It was rational for the Commission

to believe that some delay was appropriate, and Navarro has

not demonstrated that a blanket one-year delay bore no

rational connection to any legitimate governmental interest.

Finally, Navarro contends that the one-year delay was

irrational as applied to him because he is an alien who will be

removed from the country upon his release. He thus argues

that the Commission’s concerns about public safety and

transitional services have no weight in his specific case. This

argument again overstates the scope of our review. Under the

rational-basis standard, we accept “generalizations even when

there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A

classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is

not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it

results in some inequality.” Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d

1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Heller v. Doe ex rel.

Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)). The fact that the

Commission’s reasoning will apply with greater force to

some groups of inmates than to others does not invalidate its

otherwise-valid decision. We therefore conclude that

Navarro has not met his “burden ‘to negative every

conceivable basis which might support’” the Commission’s

decision to delay the effective date of Amendment 788 for

one year. Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno Indians

v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Aleman, 217 F.3d at 1201).
UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO 19

V.

Neither the Constitution nor any statute forbade the

Commission from delaying the effective date of Amendment

788.9 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

9 The only other circuit to have addressed the delayed-effective-date

issue also upheld the delay. See United States v. Maiello, No. 15-10532,

2015 WL 4931982 (11th Cir. Aug. 19, 2015).