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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

BRANDON RIFFLE, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:18-cv-547 

 v. Judge James L. Graham 

 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

FAIRFIELD COUNTY DEP’T 

OF PROBATION, 

 Defendant. 

 

ORDER AND 

INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Plaintiff, formerly a state inmate under the supervision of the Ohio Department of 

Rehabilitation and correction, brings this prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

(ECF Nos. 1 & 16.) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is 

GRANTED. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs 

had been prepaid. This matter is also before the Court sua sponte for an initial screen of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to 

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Having performed the initial screen, 

for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this Plaintiff’s 

claims against Defendant for failure to assert any claim over which this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction. 
I.

 Congress has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim 

upon which relief maybe granted. 2 8 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). A 

complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, 

the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th 

Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure 

to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 

 A federal court has limited subject matter jurisdiction. “The basic statutory grants of 

federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for 

‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’ 

jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006). Federal-question jurisdiction is 

invoked when a plaintiff pleads a claim “arising under” the federal laws, the Constitution, or 

treaties of the United States. Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to have diversity 

jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332(a), there must be complete diversity, which means that 

each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant, and the amount in 

controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 

II. 

 According to the Complaint, Defendant Fairfield County Department of Adult Probation 

is responsible for forcing him to attend religiously-based substance abuse programs during the 
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term of his state probation from 2008 until 2013. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5.) Plaintiff also claims that 

some three years after expiration of his term of probation, he was arrested and detained on a 

“verbal probation holder” for more than two months until his appearance before the Fairfield 

County Court of Common Pleas, at which time the court recognized Plaintiff’s probation had 

expired and terminated his case. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s actions violated his 

rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at 5-6.) 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $2,500,000, as well as the 

appointment of counsel. (Id. at 6.) 

III. 

A. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claims 

 Plaintiff purports to bring his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1-2 at 1.).) The 

statute of limitations applicable to claims arising in Ohio under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the two-year 

statute of limitations found in Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10. Boddie v. Barstow, No. 2:14-cv0106, 2014 WL 2611321, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 2, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 

No. 2:14-CV-106, 2014 WL 2608123 (S.D. Ohio June 11, 2014) (citing Browning v. Pendleton, 

869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1989)). 

 “Although the statute of limitations is normally an affirmative defense that must be raised 

by defendants in an answer, if the limitations bar appears on the face of the complaint, the Court 

may apply it during the initial screening process.” Boddie, 2014 WL 2611321, at *3 (citing 

Watson v. Wayne County, 90 F. App’x. 814, at *1 (6th Cir. January 26, 2004)) (“If a statute of 

limitations defense clearly appears on the face of a pleading, the district court can raise the issue 

sua sponte”). This Court has applied that rule in cases screened under § 1915A. Id. (citing 

Smith v. Warren County Sheriff’s Dept., No. 1:10-cv-113, 2010 WL 761894 (S.D. Ohio March 2, 
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2010)). Accordingly, the Court must look to the allegations in the Complaint to determine 

whether the action has been filed within the applicable two-year period. 

 Here, it is clear that Plaintiff’s forced attendance at religiously-based substance abuse 

programs occurred prior to the applicable two-year period. The alleged actions took place nearly 

five years ago, between 2008 and 2013. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5). The Undersigned, therefore, 

recommends that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted. 

B. Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims 

 In order to state a Section 1983 claim against the Fairfield County Adult Parole Board for 

his remaining Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, Plaintiff must plead facts that, if 

accepted as true, show that the County government is responsible both for the alleged due 

process violation in failing to provide Plaintiff with a reasonably prompt detention hearing and 

for Plaintiff’s subsequent unlawful imprisonment in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. 

See Cash v. Hamilton Cnty. Dept. of Adult Probation, 388 F.3d 539, 542-545 (6th Cir. 2004) 

(holding that counties may be held liable under Section 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of 

their probation departments). In other words, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the County is itself 

the wrongdoer. 

 Under Section 1983, counties and other bodies of local government may be sued pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they are “alleged to have caused a constitutional tort through ‘a policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 

officers.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (citing Monell v. New York 

City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). Section 1983 also “authorizes suit ‘for 

constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom 
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has not received formal approval through the body’s official decision making channels.’” Id.

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). Although a Section1983 plaintiff might not be able to 

demonstrate that a written policy exists, he “may be able to prove the existence of a widespread 

practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so 

permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Monell, 

436 U.S. at 691 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, however, Plaintiff has not pleaded 

any facts at all with respect to a county policy or custom that may have caused a constitutional 

deprivation. The Undersigned, therefore, recommends that Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

IV.

 For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to assert any claim over 

which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that 

Plaintiff has not made out viable claims upon which relief may be granted against Defendant. It 

is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Section 

1915A. 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that 

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in 

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 
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 The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge 

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l 

Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [th defendant’s] ability to appeal the 

district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, 

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to 

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation 

omitted)). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

 

 

Date: July 18, 2018 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE