Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 1 of 30

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Lisa Diane Manning

Danville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of J.G., A Child in 

Need of Services,

J.B., Father,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 21, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JC-1319

Appeal from the 

Jefferson Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Donald J. Mote, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

39C01-1611-JC-123

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 2 of 30

[1] J.B. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order adjudicating J.G. (“Child”) 

to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Father raises two issues for our 

review, which we restate as: 

I. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying 

Father’s motion to dismiss because he asserts that his due 

process rights were violated when the fact-finding hearing 

was not held until several years after the petition was filed; 

and

II. Whether the juvenile court’s conclusion that Child should 

remain a CHINS as originally adjudicated because 

Father’s actions and inactions had seriously endangered 

Child, Child’s needs were unmet, and Child’s needs were 

unlikely to be met without State coercion was clearly 

erroneous. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother met in Indiana at some point between 2013 and 2014. Tr. 

Vol. III at 74. At that time, they lived together for a few months, and Mother 

was “in and out” of the home. Id. at 75. Father moved to Massachusetts in 

2014, and Mother remained in Indiana. Id. Sometime in 2014, Father gave 

Mother a plane ticket, and she flew to Massachusetts to visit Father, at which 

time they conceived Child. Id. at 75-76. Mother returned to Indiana, and the 

relationship between Mother and Father ended. Id. at 77. Father later learned 

Mother was pregnant with Child, and he believed Child was his. Id. at 76, 78. 

However, Father chose to remain in Massachusetts because he saw “no
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significant reason to leave.” Id. at 78. He was not involved with Mother’s 

pregnancy with Child and was aware that Mother was “very unstable” due to 

her drug use, but he took no steps to address her drug use. Id. at 76-78. 

[4] Child was born on November 16, 2014. Id. at 63. Although Father was aware 

of Child’s birth, he was not present for it, did not sign a paternity affidavit, and

did not file to establish legal paternity. Id. at 79, 81. On the day Child was 

born, Father posted on social media that “his son” was born, and included 

Child’s height and weight, and some pictures of Child. Id. at 133-34. Father 

claimed he sent money orders to Mother but that he later stopped because he 

thought he was “being taken advantage of.” Id. at 82. 

[5] On November 10, 2016, two years after Child’s birth, the Indiana Department 

of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from Mother’s care and, on 

November 15, 2016, filed a CHINS petition. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 34, 45-47.

In the CHINS petition, DCS alleged Child was a CHINS because of Mother’s 

substance use and because Father, who was only alleged to be Child’s father at 

that time, lived out of state and neither supported nor visited Child. Id. at 45-

46. On November 15, 2016, the juvenile court held an initial hearing, where 

DCS again alleged that Father was uninvolved and had never visited or 

supported Child. Tr. Vol. II at 5, 9. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 

juvenile court found that due to the emergency nature of the situation, no 

reasonable efforts could be made to prevent removal and that it was in the best 

interest of Child to be removed from the home environment and that remaining 

in the home would be contrary to the health and welfare of Child. Id. at 11.
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[6] DCS did not serve Father with a copy of the CHINS petition or notice of the 

hearing dates because his whereabouts were unknown, and there is no 

indication in the record that Father was served by publication. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 2 at 45, 48, 49, 108, 174. When the CHINS case began, Father’s last 

known address was in North Vernon, Indiana, but he no longer lived there. Id.

at 134-35, 184. DCS later learned from Mother that Father had moved to 

Maine. Id. at 54. DCS made a “PPS Investigation referral” in order to try to 

locate Father. Id. at 35. 

[7] On November 21, 2016, Father spoke with family case manager (“FCM”)

Sawyer Beach (“FCM Beach”), and Father stated that he was interested in 

Child being placed with him; FCM Beach informed Father about the need for 

Father to establish paternity. Tr. Vol. II at 15; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 76, 216. 

On November 29, 2016, FCM Ashley Shelton (“FCM Shelton”) called Father 

back and again advised him of Child’s detention and foster care placement and 

of the pending CHINS petition and discussed the importance of establishing 

paternity. Tr. Vol. III at 191-92. 

[8] On January 10, 2017, the juvenile court held the CHINS fact-finding hearing, at 

which Mother, but not Father, was present. Tr. Vol. II at 13-18. The juvenile 

court adjudicated Child a CHINS finding: 

1. [Mother] is the biological mother of [Child]. 

2. [Father] is the alleged biological father of [Child]. 
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3. Alleged father lives in Maine, has not established paternity, 

and neither supports nor visits the child. 

4. Mother admits that she has substance abuse issues, which 

prevent her from providing the necessities for Child, which 

endangers Child’s mental and physical welfare. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 54. At the fact-finding hearing, the family case 

manager (“FCM”) reported that Father had not been in touch with DCS since 

November 2016. Tr. Vol. II at 16. 

[9] On January 11, 2017, FCM Shelton again spoke to Father on the telephone,

and they discussed his taking a paternity test. Tr. Vol. III at 192-93. Father 

stated that there was a fifty-dollar charge for a paternity test and wanted to 

know if DCS would pay for it. Id. at 192-94; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 216. 

Because DCS was not paying for paternity tests at that time, FCM Shelton told 

Father that she would have to ask her supervisor to see if an exception could be 

made. Tr. Vol III at 194. When FCM Shelton attempted to reach Father again 

on January 18, 2017, his phone number was no longer in service. Id.; 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 216-17. 

[10] On February 10, 2017, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing, which 

Father did not attend. Id. at 19-24. At the hearing, DCS stated that Father was 

a presumed father because he had not established paternity. Id. at 21. DCS 

told the juvenile court that Father had been contacted but that he indicated that 

he “has no interest” in participating in services. Id. The juvenile court ordered 
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Mother into services but also included Father as being required to participate in

services. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 92-95. 

[11] In April and May of 2017, FCM Shelton sent letters to Father to establish 

contact with him and received no response from him. Id. at 217; Tr. Vol. III at 

194. In a letter sent on May 10, 2017, FCM Shelton told Father of an 

upcoming change in the FCM, but the letter was returned as undeliverable. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 217; Tr. Vol. III at 194-95. From May 2017 through 

December 2017, the new FCM, Lisa Kiser (“FCM Kiser”), continued to send 

letters to Father, which were returned as undeliverable. Tr. Vol. III at 229. 

Because of this, on March 9, 2018, FCM Kiser submitted a new investigative 

referral to find Father but was never able to make contact with Father. Id. 

[12] Another FCM took the case over in December 2017, FCM Lydia Stepp (“FCM 

Stepp”), and performed another investigative referral. Id. On March 13, 2018, 

FCM Stepp sent “letters to addresses listed for Father and called multiple 

family members to locate Father.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 217. On March 14, 

2018, over a year after DCS lost contact with Father, he responded to FCM 

Stepp and advised that he had not yet had DNA testing to establish paternity

but told her he would like to do so. Id. A DNA screen was scheduled for May 

3, 2018. Id. at 217, 222. 

[13] On May 3, 2018, after a review hearing, the juvenile court found that between 

January 11, 2017 and March 2018 Father failed to maintain contact with DCS 

and did not attempt to be part of the case. Id. at 222. On June 26, 2018, Father 
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appeared telephonically for a termination hearing that had been filed against 

him and Mother, but that was later dismissed and did not proceed further, and

the juvenile court appointed Father legal counsel. Tr. Vol. III at 89-90. Since 

that time, Father appeared regularly by telephone or in person at hearings in the 

CHINS case. Id. at 90-91. 

[14] Father missed the scheduled DNA screen on May 3, 2018, but he later 

completed it on June 4, 2018. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 245. The DNA screen

confirmed he was Child’s father, and paternity was established in June 2018. 

Id. After contact with Father was re-established, DCS took steps for Father to 

have parenting time with Child. Tr. Vol. III at 236-37. In August 2018, Father 

began having supervised telephone calls with Child. Id.; Appellant’s App. Vol. 3

at 13. While DCS had difficulty reaching Father by telephone after the first 

visit, weekly phone visits resumed with Father but were sporadic. Tr. Vol. II at 

116. 

[15] On August 20, 2018, Father appeared by counsel in the CHINS case and 

moved for discovery, requesting the names of witnesses DCS intended to call 

“in the above cause including those witnesses [DCS] intends to call at the 

hearing of the above cause, and including all known or anticipated rebuttal 

witnesses.” Appellant’s App. Vol 2 at 248-49. The motion also moved for the 

discovery order to, “continue to and include the fact-finding hearing in this 

cause and continue until the completion of the case.” Id. at 249. The juvenile 

court granted the motion. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 2.
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[16] A review hearing was held on November 1, 2018, at which the DCS progress 

report was entered into evidence. Id. at 17. The report stated, “[Father] has 

been given the opportunity to complete supervised telephone calls with Child . . 

. [and] had the opportunity to complete face-to-face parenting time with Child.” 

Id. at 13. It further stated, “[t]he visit supervisor has not had contact with 

Father since the face-to-face visit on 09/23/2018. The visit supervisor has 

continued to attempt contact each week to facilitate the phone calls.” Id. The 

report also advised that “FCM has not been able to contact [Father] by phone 

since 09/24/2018, [and] FCM has continued to attempt contact with [Father] 

with no success. FCM sent a letter to Father on 10/16/2018 to establish 

contact.” Id. 

[17] On February 14, 2019, a permanency hearing was held, and the juvenile court 

found that Father had not complied with Child’s case plan. Id. at 44-45. Father 

had missed several of his weekly supervised telephone visits with Child. Id. at 

45. DCS had been trying to arrange a second face-to-face visit with Father and 

Child since September 24, 2018. Id. FCM Stepp attempted to contact Father 

on October 11 and October 16, 2018, by phone and letter, and heard back from 

him on October 19, 2018. Id. FCM Stepp also attempted to contact Father on 

November 16, November 19, and November 26, 2018. Id. DCS was trying to 

arrange to fly Father to Indiana to have another face-to-face visit, but Father 

needed a “valid ID in order to board the plane,” which he did not have. Id.

The juvenile court found that “[r]eunification of the child is being unnecessarily 

delayed due to Father’s failure to comply with DCS’s request.” Id. At the 
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May 16, 2019 review hearing, questions remained as to whether Father had 

valid identification, and he had still not had another face-to-face visit with Child

since September 2018. Id. at 69. The report stated that Father “would really 

like to travel to Indiana to see [Child] but he still is waiting for information 

about outstanding warrants here in Indiana.” Id. Father was still having 

supervised video calls with Child, and thus had partially complied with Child’s 

case plan. Id. at 70. 

[18] On June 20, 2019, Father filed a motion for a trial home visit and for Child’s 

placement with him. Id. at 77-79. He stated that he “currently has seven (7) 

other children living in his care in Maine.” Id. at 78. Father acknowledged in 

the motion that he “has now been a part of the CHINS case since August 2018” 

but stated that he had not yet had a CHINS fact-finding hearing. Id. The 

juvenile court set Father’s motion for hearing on July 18, 2019, but it was 

continued to August 15, 2019 on Father’s motion. Id. at 80-82. 

[19] After the August 15, 2019 hearing, the juvenile court found, among other 

findings, that Father “hasn’t taken up the offer to either let DCS bring [Child]

to him or DCS pay for him to visit [Child] here. It has been one year since 

[Child] and [F]ather had met.” Id. at 97. The juvenile court further found that 

Father “does partially participate with supervised video phone calls twice per 

week. But [the] visit supervisor maintains that it is very hard to get ahold [sic]

of him and really some weeks he is unable to reach [Father.]” Id. A

permanency plan was adopted for Child to be reunified with Father or Mother, 

and a fact-finding hearing was set for August 23, 2019. Id. at 97-98. DCS filed 
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a motion to continue the fact-finding hearing and stated that the parties were in 

agreement as to the continuance, and the juvenile court granted the motion, 

resetting the hearing to September 27, 2019. Id. at 99, 101. On September 17, 

2019, DCS filed another motion to continue the fact-finding hearing, and the 

juvenile court reset the hearing for December 13, 2019. Id. at 106. 

[20] On August 26, 2019, the juvenile court ordered DCS to make a referral for 

Child to have a diagnostic evaluation with Stacey Cornett (“Cornett”) at 

Community Mental Health Center, to help the court make “its determination of 

Father’s motion for a trial home visit, which is currently set for hearing 

September 27, 2019.” Id. at 102. On October 7, 2019, Cornett completed the 

clinical assessment of Child. Tr. Vol. III at 205. Completion of the assessment 

was delayed because Cornett had to reach out to Father several times before he

replied; he contacted her on October 7, the date she completed the assessment. 

Id. at 205, 211-12. In her assessment, Cornett noted that it was conducted in 

order to “determine if there were any clinical conditions relevant to [Child]’s 

functioning, to assess the relationship status between himself and his foster 

mother, in particular, and to then assess the relationship status between he and 

[Father].” Id. at 207. Cornett concluded that Child had a strong attachment

with his foster family. Id. at 208. In her initial assessment, Cornett was not 

able to observe interaction between Father and Child and spoke with Father via 

telephone, noting that he “showed a desire to be connected to . . . Child and 

good intentions towards him.” Id. 
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[21] On December 13, 2019, Father’s attorney requested a continuance of the factfinding hearing, in part to review the assessment. Tr. Vol. III at 45, 46. DCS

agreed to the continuance, and the juvenile court set the CHINS fact-finding for 

February 3, 2020. Id. at 48. Father’s attorney agreed to the hearing date. Id. at 

49. On February 1, 2020, Father filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 

CHINS fact-finding hearing was not timely under Indiana Code section 31-34-

11-1 and that he was never properly served with notice of the proceedings. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 4 at 55-56.

[22] On February 3, 2020, the juvenile court held the combined CHINS fact-finding 

hearing and hearing on Father’s motion for Child’s placement and motion to 

dismiss. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 27. At the hearing, Father testified that he 

lived in Maine with his girlfriend and their combined six children. Tr. Vol. III at 

63-64. He stated he had lived in the same house for about two-and-a-half years. 

Id. at 63. Father stated that he worked approximately fifty hours a week but 

had previously collected workers’ compensation when he could not work due to 

an injury. Id. at 67-68. Evidence was also presented of Father’s criminal 

history, which included a 2005 conviction for robbery as a Class C Felony, in 

which he twice violated the terms of his probation. Id. at 70-72. On August 6, 

2010, a petition for a protection order was filed against and granted against

Father, due to domestic or family violence and stalking. Ex. Vol. 26-31, 35-38. 

Father also had numerous traffic charges and convictions for driving while 

suspended and other infractions. Id. at 8-25. At the time of the CHINS factfinding hearing, Father had an active warrant for failing to appear for trial in
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another case. Tr. Vol. III at 102. Father testified he knew about the warrant, 

but did not worry about being arrested, and did not consider the warrant a 

barrier to his relationship with Child. Id. at 102-03. 

[23] Father testified that, although he knew about Mother’s pregnancy and that 

there was a possibility that he was the father, he did not take steps to establish 

paternity until he was contacted by DCS in November 2016 when Child was 

two years old. Id. at 78, 81. Father also testified that he never believed that the 

CHINS proceedings as they pertained to him were necessary and that there was 

no need for services for him. Id. at 93. He further stated that, although he held 

those beliefs, he never objected to the prior CHINS adjudication, nor did he 

ever previously request a fact-finding hearing be held. Id. at 93-94. At time of 

the CHINS fact-finding hearing, Father had only three face-to-face visits with 

Child since his birth in 2014. Id. at 98. The first took place in September 2018 

when Father drove to Indiana. Id. The second occurred when DCS paid for 

Father’s airfare and hotel accommodations in October 2019. Id. at 98-99. This 

visit was delayed for four months because Father was unable or unwilling to get 

a valid identification to board the plane. Id. at 100-01. The third occurred in

November 2019. Id. at 98-99. The record showed that on November 11, 2019, 

Father appeared in person at a review hearing, and the juvenile court instructed

Father to submit to a drug screen immediately following the hearing. Id. at 39-

40, 104. However, Father left the courthouse and never submitted to the 

ordered drug screen. Id. at 238-40. 
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[24] FCM Stepp testified that, when she first had contact with Father in March 

2018, fourteen months had passed since DCS had last had contact with Father 

and that delay had a profound effect on the CHINS case and where it stood at 

the time of the fact-finding hearing because often CHINS case are closed in that 

amount of time. Id. at 230-32. She also testified that it took three months from 

the date she was able to establish contact with Father to have the DNA test 

completed, and the delay was in part due to Father’s lack of communication 

with DCS. Id. at 233-34. FCM Stepp stated that communication issues 

continued after paternity was proven due to Father’s phone running out of 

minutes or the lack of service at his home. Id. at 235-36. She further stated 

that, in order for Father to be able to have placement of Child with him, Father 

would need to understand the long-term effects that Child would have from 

being in foster care and how to deal with Child’s separation and trauma of 

detention. Id. at 241-42. 

[25] Cornett testified about what Father would have to do in terms of services and 

the likelihood that Child would have difficulties in facilitating a bond between 

Father and Child. Id. at 214-15. Cornett also testified that it was her belief that 

a parent’s absence from a child’s life in the first years of the child’s life would 

play a role in the lack of a bond between them because that is how the 

attachment relationship develops. Id. at 215. She stated further that when a 

child has lived with someone for an extended period of time and has a secure 

attachment with them, as Child does, the child will experience trauma and grief 

when separation occurs and in Child’s case, there are other considerations 
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including, foster sibling relationships, extended family, and community ties. Id. 

at 217. Cornett opined that Child was “behind the eight ball in the fact that he 

would be grieving and has [a] well-established understanding of his relationship 

with his foster parent” and that “because of his cognitive ability, moving into 

preschool and school age years, he understands things at a much more 

complicated level . . . what families are, what loss is, where people are across 

time and space, . . .so it’s more complicated for an older child to manage all of 

that.” Id. at 224. 

[26] In addition, Father was underestimating Child’s weaknesses of entering into a 

caregiver relationship with Father, and Cornett agreed that Father did not 

realize that it would “be very challenging and potentially detrimental to Child.” 

Id. Cornett testified that Child would need a “plethora” of services to address 

detaching him from the foster home and attaching him to Father. Id. at 220, 

221. Due to the length of time from Child’s removal and placement in foster 

care and moving towards reunification, it made it “absolutely” a more 

complicated issue to address Child’s needs. Id. at 223-24. Based on this, she 

recommended a process of reunification that would slowly orientate Child to 

placement with Father and that it be done in a controlled manner with services 

available. Id. at 227. 

[27] Child’s court appointed special advocate Harriet Hoffman (“CASA Hoffman”)

agreed and testified that Father’s consistent pattern throughout the case was to 

be difficult to contact and to keep involved in the case. Tr. Vol. IV at 27. She 

stated that Father’s lack of engagement with her was frustrating because it was 
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her job to gather information in the case, and she was forced to seek out that 

information from other sources. Id. at 20. CASA Hoffman also testified that 

she believed that Child would suffer trauma from being separated from foster

placement and also from Mother if Child were to be placed with Father in 

Maine. Id. at 23. 

[28] On April 8, 2020, the juvenile court issued an order determining that Child 

would remain a CHINS as originally adjudicated and denying both Father’s 

motion to dismiss and for Child’s placement. Appellant’s App. Vol. 4 at 132-50. 

The juvenile court found that, since Child’s removal in 2016, he has been 

placed in a foster home, and has developed a strong attachment with his foster 

family. Id. at 139. The trial court further found that because of this, if that 

relationship were to suddenly terminate, Child would experience “significant 

trauma and grief for the loss of his foster parents and of his mother who 

continues her relationship with Child.” Id. at 140. The trial court also found 

that Child needed ongoing services and meetings with Father to reduce the 

trauma Child will suffer when moving from the care of the foster family to 

Father. Id. 

[29] The juvenile court found that the 

significance of Father’s criminal history to the Court’s ruling here 

is that he is not unfamiliar with court proceedings in Indiana and 

the importance of communication. A phone call from a 

caseworker with [DCS] that you may be the father of a child who 

is in foster care because the mother is battling drug addiction is 

not something to put on the back burner. A “wait and see”
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approach can have significant, and life-changing consequences.

It certainly has in this case. 

Id. at 139. Based on Cornett’s testimony and report, the juvenile court found 

that, “The only way Child can safely be transitioned from foster placement to 

Father’s care is in a controlled scenario with significant therapeutic services in 

place to address Child’s grief of detachment and stress of a new parent.” Id. at

141. 

[30] On June 11, 2020, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing. Tr. Vol. IV

at 44-67. On July 6, 2020, the juvenile court issued its written decree, which 

required among other things, that Father establish paternity, provide Child a 

stable and safe environment, and attend “individual counseling services to 

prepare for Child to be placed with him and to gain an understanding of 

childhood trauma.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 4 at 195-98. Father now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Due Process

[31] Due process requires “‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in 

a meaningful manner.’” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012) (quoting

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). Indiana courts have previously 

stated that the process due in a termination of parental rights action turns on 

balancing three Mathews factors: (1) the private interests affected by the

proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) 

the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged 
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procedure. Id. (citing In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (2011)). Our Supreme 

Court has held that these same factors apply to a due process analysis of a 

CHINS adjudication. Id. Ultimately, the resulting balance of those factors 

must provide “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.” In re L.C., 23 N.E.3d 37, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. 

denied. 

[32] Father argues that he was denied his right to due process because the juvenile

court failed to conduct a fact-finding hearing until 1,174 days after the filing of a 

CHINS petition and 692 days after Father voluntarily engaged in services. He 

contends that he was never served with a copy of the CHINS petition, filed on 

November 15, 2016, nor given an opportunity to appear for the initial hearing

held the same day. Father further asserts that even if his absence from the case 

for the first year justified the court proceeding to a fact-finding hearing as to 

allegations against Mother in his absence, the juvenile court erred when it did 

not conduct a timely fact-finding hearing after Father reengaged in the case. 

When DCS was able to locate him in March 2018, Father maintains that he 

immediately began to engage in services to reunify with Child, but that he was 

denied an opportunity for a fact-finding hearing for another 692 days, which 

was a violation of his right to due process. 

[33] Indiana Code section 31-32-2-3 applies to CHINS proceedings and provides, in 

pertinent part, that during:

(1) Proceedings to determine whether a child is a child in need of 

services [or] 
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(2) Proceedings to determine whether the parent, guardian, or 

custodian of a child should participate in a program of care, 

treatment, or rehabilitation for the child

. . . .

(b) A parent, guardian, or custodian is entitled: 

(1) to cross-examine witnesses; 

(2) to obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory 

process; and 

(3) to introduce evidence on behalf of the parent, guardian, or 

custodian. 

[34] Father initially contends that his right to due process was violated because he 

was not served with a copy of the CHINS petition and because he was not 

given an opportunity to appear for the initial hearing. However, the evidence 

showed that, at the time of the CHINS petition, Father was only alleged to be 

the father of Child as he had yet to take a DNA test, he lived out of state, and 

he had neither supported nor visited Child. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 45-46. 

DCS did not serve Father with a copy of the CHINS petition or notice of the 

hearing dates because his whereabouts were unknown, and he no longer lived 

at his last known address. Id. at 45, 48, 49, 108, 134-35, 174, 184. On the same 

date that the CHINS petition was filed, the juvenile court held an initial 

hearing, where DCS again alleged that Father was uninvolved in Child’s life

and had never visited or supported Child. Tr. Vol. II at 5, 9. DCS was initially 
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able to make contact with Father on November 21, 2016 after locating him in 

Maine and advised him of Child’s detention and foster care placement, of the 

pending CHINS petition, and about the need for him to establish paternity; on 

November 29, 2016, he was again advised of the importance of establishing 

paternity. Tr. Vol. II at 15, 191-92; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 76, 216. Thereafter, 

Father failed to maintain contact with DCS and to establish paternity, and 

when DCS attempted to contact him, his phone number was no longer in 

service and letters were returned as undeliverable. Tr. Vol III at 194-95, 229; 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 216-17. We conclude that there was no due process 

violation in not serving Father with the CHINS petition and in not allowing 

him an opportunity to appear for the initial hearing because, at that time, he 

was only alleged to be the father of Child and his whereabouts were unknown. 

[35] Father next argues that it was a violation of his due process rights to not 

conduct his fact-finding hearing until February 3, 2020. Father relies on In re 

S.A., 15 N.E.3d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on reh’g, 27 N.E.3d 287 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, in his contention that his right to due process was 

violated because of the delay in conducting his fact-finding hearing. In S.A., the 

trial court had already determined the Child’s CHINS status based solely on 

Mother’s admission of the allegations -- notwithstanding the fact that Father 

was involved in the case and had denied the allegations contained in the 

CHINS petition -- and later held a fact-finding hearing as to Father. Id. at 606-

07. This court held that by adjudicating the Child as a CHINS prior to Father’s 

fact-finding hearing, the trial court deprived Father of a meaningful opportunity 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 20 of 30

to be heard. Id. at 609. However, on rehearing this court clarified that the 

opinion stands for the proposition that “[w]hen the [CHINS] adjudication can

involve both parents at the same time, it should involve both parents at the same 

time so there is one adjudication as to all facts pertaining to the entire matter.” 

27 N.E.3d at 292 (emphasis in original). If multiple hearings are unavoidable, 

then the trial court should, if at all possible, refrain from adjudicating the child a 

CHINS until evidence has been heard from both parents. Id. at 292-93. And if 

an adjudication is unavoidable before evidence has been heard from the second 

parent, then the trial court must give meaningful consideration to the evidence 

provided by the second parent in determining whether the child remains a 

CHINS. Id. at 293. 

[36] However, Father’s reliance on S.A. is misplaced. Here, the juvenile court 

followed the procedure set out in the S.A. opinion on rehearing. Multiple 

hearings were unavoidable in the present case because of the emergency nature 

of the situation of Mother’s drug use and lack of other caregivers for Child and 

because Father had not yet established paternity and his whereabouts were 

unknown. Further, the initial CHINS adjudication was also unavoidable 

because Mother wished to admit the allegations, and at that time, paternity had 

still not been proven, and DCS was unable to make contact with Father. 

According to S.A., Father was later given the opportunity for a fact-finding 

hearing, and the juvenile court gave meaningful consideration to the evidence 

provided by Father in its determination as to whether Child remained a 

CHINS. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 21 of 30

[37] Moreover, after DCS was able to re-establish contact with Father in March 

2018, he was appointed counsel, who zealously represented his interest, and he 

became involved in the CHINS case. Indeed, on August 20, 2018, his counsel 

moved for discovery in an anticipated CHINS fact-finding hearing, but it was 

not until about a year later, on June 20, 2019, that Father filed a motion stating, 

among other things, that he had not yet had a CHINS fact-finding hearing. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 244-50; Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 78. Soon after, the 

juvenile court set the fact-finding hearing for August 23, 2019. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 3 at 98. However, after several continuances agreed on or otherwise not 

objected to by the parties, including Father, the fact-finding hearing was held on 

February 3, 2020. Id. at 99, 101, 106, 107, 137; Tr. Vol. III at 45-49. 

[38] By seeking continuances or otherwise not objecting to any of the continuances, 

Father invited any alleged error in any further delays in the fact-finding, and 

relief is not available to Father. The invited-error doctrine is based on the 

doctrine of estoppel and forbids a party from taking advantage of an error that 

she commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of her own neglect or 

misconduct. In re J.C., 142 N.E.3d 427, 432 (Ind. 2020) (citing Durden v. State, 

99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018)). Where a party invites the error, he cannot 

take advantage of that error. Id. (citing Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 

N.E.2d 128, 134 (Ind. 2005)). In short, invited error is not reversible error. Id. 

(citing Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 822 (Ind. 2002); C.T. v. Marion Cnty. 

Dep’t of Child Servs., 896 N.E.2d 571, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 22 of 30

[39] Even under the Mathews analysis, Father’s due process rights were not violated. 

The risk of error created by the juvenile court not conducting a fact-finding

hearing soon after he became involved in the case was minimal given that he 

was provided numerous opportunities to continue to move forward toward

reunification with Child throughout the case and was not denied any 

opportunity to be heard at a reasonable time or place. Further, it is undisputed 

that Father was provided with a fact-finding hearing and the opportunity to 

present evidence and challenge that Child was a CHINS. The record shows 

that Father received all rights contemplated under Indiana Code section 31-32-

2-3. Due process embodies a requirement of “fundamental fairness.” In re D.P., 

27 N.E.3d 1162, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We, therefore, conclude that there 

is nothing in the record to suggest that Father was not provided the process due 

him and deprived of fundamental fairness before the juvenile court determined 

that Child should remain a CHINS as previously adjudicated and issued its 

dispositional order. Father has failed to carry his burden of showing that his 

due process rights were violated.

II. CHINS Adjudication

[40] CHINS proceedings are civil actions, and therefore, it must be proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by statute. In 

re L.C., 23 N.E.3d 37, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 

102, 105 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied. When we review a CHINS determination, 

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. 

We consider only the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 23 of 30

the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. at 39-40. Where the trial court 

issues findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard 

of review. In re R.P., 949 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We consider 

first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings 

support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the trial court’s findings and 

conclusions only if they are clearly erroneous and a review of the record leaves 

us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. “Findings are clearly 

erroneous only when the record contains no evidence to support them either 

directly or by inference.” K.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1001-

02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if 

it relies on an incorrect legal standard.” Id. at 1002. 

[41] Father argues that the juvenile court erred when it found that Child was a 

CHINS. He claims that the CHINS adjudication was not based on his actions 

or inactions but instead upon the harm that removal from foster care would 

cause Child and on Father’s unwillingness to move with Mother to Indiana

during her pregnancy. Father contends that these reasons do not support a 

CHINS adjudication, and DCS failed to present any evidence that Child’s 

needs are unmet and unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the 

court. Father asserts that he completed all services requested by DCS at the 

time of the fact-finding hearing and had visited with Child several times over 

nearly two years before the CHINS adjudication. He further maintains that the 

harm caused by DCS’s unwillingness to remove Child from foster care and 

place Child with Father should not provide the basis for a CHINS 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 24 of 30

determination. He argues that DCS’s continued requirements and delayed due 

process for Father resulted in Child remaining in foster placement for over three 

years before he had an opportunity to be heard on the CHINS allegations and 

the potential trauma caused by removing Child from foster placement was 

caused by this delay. 

[42] DCS had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Child 

was a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 

through 11 specify the elements of the CHINS definition that the State must 

prove:

(1) the child is under the age of 18;

(2) one or more particular set or sets of circumstances set forth in 

the statute exists; and

(3) the care, treatment, or rehabilitation needed to address those 

circumstances is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the 

coercive intervention of the court.

In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105. Here, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a 

CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1,1 which provides: 

1

Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 was amended in 2019, to include the following under subdivision (1): “(A) 

when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or (B) due to the failure, refusal, or 

inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so . . . .” 

This amendment does not have any effect on the outcome of this appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 25 of 30

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes 

eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired 

or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or 

neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the 

child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 

education, or supervision; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive 

intervention of the court.

[43] Therefore, this statute requires “three basic elements: that the parent’s actions 

or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child’s needs are 

unmet, and . . . that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” 

In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). 

[44] Father does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support any of the 

other findings by the juvenile court. As Father does not challenge any of the 

remaining findings of facts by the juvenile court, these unchallenged facts stand 

as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to 

challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the 

findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied; McMaster v. McMaster, 681 N.E.2d 

744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (when father failed to challenge specific findings, 

court accepted them as true). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 26 of 30

[45] “Although the acts or omissions of one or both parents can cause a condition 

that creates the need for court intervention, the CHINS designation focuses on 

the condition of the children rather than on an act or omission of the parent(s).” 

In re K.P.G., 99 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing In re N.E., 919 

N.E.2d at 105), trans. denied. Therefore, “despite a ‘certain implication of 

parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a 

CHINS adjudication is simply that -- a determination that a child is in need of 

services.’” Id. (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105). 

[46] Here, from the time Child was born in November 2014 and until the time of the 

CHINS factfinding finding hearing in February 2020, Father only had three 

face-to-face visitations with Child, with the first happening in September 2018, 

and the next two occurring in October and November 2019. Tr. Vol. III at 98-

99. Therefore, Father saw Child face-to-face for the first time just before Child 

turned four years old and the not again until Child was five years old. While 

supervised visitations via video for Father with Child occurred, they did not 

begin until August 2018, and even then, up until around the fall of 2019, Father

was inconsistent in his participation. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 13, 44-45, 97.

Father’s failure to fully participate in these visitations shows a lack of 

commitment to do what was required to maintain his relationship with Child. 

See Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2007) (stating that, in the context of termination, the failure to exercise the 

right to visit one’s children demonstrates a lack of commitment to complete the 

actions necessary to preserve the parent-child relationship), trans. denied. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 27 of 30

[47] Father chose to absent himself from Child’s life, and the juvenile court did not 

find Father’s reasons explaining his lack of involvement credible. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 4 at 136. The juvenile court found, considering all of Father’s 

involvement in the court system, that receiving a “phone call from a caseworker 

with the Department of Child Services that you may be the father of a child 

who is in foster care because the mother is battling drug addiction is not 

something to put on the back burner” and that delaying action in such a 

situation can have significant, and life-changing consequences, as it has in the 

present case. Id. at 139. Therefore, Father’s failure to reach out and to stay in 

communication with DCS was unreasonable and proved a great detriment to 

Child. 

[48] The evidence showed that Child was attached to his foster family and that 

removing Child from the foster family abruptly would cause trauma to Child 

and that time and services were needed to facilitate a bond between Father and 

Child. Cornett testified that it was her belief that a parent’s absence from a 

child’s life in the first years of the child’s life would play a role in the lack of a 

bond between them because that is how the attachment relationship develops. 

Tr. Vol. III at 215. She stated further that, because Child had lived with his 

foster family for an extended period of time and had a secure attachment with 

them, Child will experience trauma and grief if separated from the foster family. 

Id. at 217. Cornett opined that Child’s separation from foster family would be 

more complicated because of the length of time he had lived with them and his 

older age. Id. at 224. Additionally, Cornett testified that Father was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 28 of 30

underestimating Child’s weaknesses of entering into a caregiver relationship 

with him and that he did not realize that it would “be very challenging and 

potentially detrimental to Child.” Id. Cornett testified that Child would need a 

“plethora” of services to address detaching him from the foster home and 

attaching him to Father. Id. at 220, 221. Based on this, she recommended a 

process of reunification that would slowly orientate Child to placement with 

Father and that was done in a controlled manner with services available. Id. at 

227. However, Father told Cornett that services were not necessary, and he 

indicated that he thought that Child would adjust adequately and disagreed that 

it would likely be very challenging and potentially detrimental. Id. at 224. 

Father’s position posed a threat of harm to Child’s well-being. 

[49] A CHINS adjudication is a determination that a child is in need of services. In 

re K.P.G., 99 N.E.3d at 682. Indeed, a child’s safety and well-being are the 

foremost considerations in a CHINS case. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106 

(“[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish 

parents”). The evidence, here, shows that removing Child from his foster 

placement abruptly and placing him with Father would result in trauma for 

Child due to the strong attachment he had to the foster family and the length of 

time Child has been placed with the family. The evidence also showed that 

Child would require significant services to lessen this trauma and allow for the 

transition to occur. Further, the evidence demonstrated that Father did not 

appreciate or understand the need for these services or the trauma that could 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 29 of 30

occur by abruptly removing Child from the foster family and placing him with 

Father, with whom he did not have a strong bond. 

[50] Father relies on In re D.B., 43 N.E.3d 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, as 

support for his argument that the juvenile court erred in its CHINS 

adjudication. He contends that D.B. supports his position that he was merely 

an absent parent, which alone does not support the CHINS adjudication. 

However, we find D.B. to be distinguishable from the present case. A panel of 

this court reversed the trial court in D.B. and found insufficient evidence to 

support the CHINS adjudication, holding that while the father was absent from 

the child’s life up until the time the mother was murdered, DCS offered no 

proof that the father was unfit, only that he was absent. Id. at 606. Unlike 

Father in this case, the father in D.B. was involved in the pregnancy, he was 

there for the child’s birth, executed a paternity affidavit, and participated in

caring for the child for at least four months until the mother moved to 

Indianapolis. Id. at 601-02. Although the father was absent from the child’s life 

for almost a year, almost immediately after being contacted by DCS, he became 

involved in the CHINS proceedings. Id. 

[51] Here, Father knew Mother was pregnant with Child when she returned to 

Indiana or shortly thereafter and chose to remain in Massachusetts because he 

saw “no significant reason to leave.” Tr. Vol. III at 78. Further, despite 

concerns Mother suffered from a serious drug addiction, Father did nothing to 

help Mother or Child before or after Child’s birth. Father also did not seek 

paternity immediately, and when DCS suggested he do so, Father balked at
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1319 | December 21, 2020 Page 30 of 30

paying the fifty dollars to have the DNA test completed. Father then ceased 

communication with DCS, leaving DCS with no phone number or address to 

reach him, for over one full year while Mother continued to abuse 

methamphetamine and Child remained in foster placement. We, therefore, 

find D.B. is distinguishable from this case and not controlling in the outcome 

here. 

[52] The CHINS statutes do not require that a trial court wait until a tragedy occurs

to a child before intervening. In re C.K., 70 N.E.3d 359, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016), trans. denied. We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence was 

presented at the fact-finding hearing to establish that Father was unable or 

refused to supply Child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 

education, or supervision, and Child’s physical or mental condition was 

seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result and that Child needed 

care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he was not receiving and was unlikely to 

be provided without the coercive intervention of the court. See Ind. Code § 31-

34-1-1. The juvenile court did not err in concluding that Child should remain a 

CHINS as originally adjudicated.

[53] Affirmed. 

Bradford, C.J., and May, J., concur.