No. 2-- 06--0940 Fil ed: 8-13-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPL

E OF TH E STATE ) Appeal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court OF IL LINOIS, ) o f D u P ag e C o un t y. ) Plai ntif f-A ppel lee, ) ) v. ) No. 01-- CF--2075 ) STUA RT W . ROSE, ) Ho no r ab le ) Ro ber t J. And er so n, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CE BOW MA N d el i v ered th e op in i on

of th e c our t: Pu rsu ant t o a p ar t ially negotiated plea agreem ent, defen dant, Stuart W. Rose, pleaded gu i l ty to int ent t o manu fa cture a c ontroll ed s ubstanc e (720 ILCS 570/4 01(a)( 6.6)(B ) (We st 2000 )). In exchange, the State

nol-pross ed two other d r ug charges aga

in st hi m. The trial court sentenced defend ant to 14 y ears ' i

m pri sonm en t. On a ppea l , def en dan t argues that at se nten ci ng th e tri al court (1) impr o pe r ly co nsid er ed ev ide nc e t ha t wa s s up pr es se d in a prior case ag ai n st h im , a n d ( 2) f ai l ed to ad eq ua t ely c o nsid er mit iga t ing fac t o r s. We affir m. I. BACKG

ROUND On Aug us t 16 , 20 01 , de

f en da n t wa s ch arge d w ith

in ten t t o manu facture a controll ed substanc e (720 ILCS 5 70/401( a)(6. 6)(B) ( West 2000)) ; unl awful posse ss i on of a controlled substance wi th in tent t o deliv

er (720 I LCS 570 /4 01( c) (6 .5 ) ( West 200 0) ); a nd co nt ro lled subs t ance t ra ffi cking (720 ILC S 5 70/ 401 .1 (a ) ( West 200 0) ). Dur ing disco ver y, de fendant so ught t o o bt ain the na m es ofNo. 2-- 06--0940

-2-

in f orm an ts to support an

en tra pme nt defen se . T he St at e a r gu ed t ha t t he so le inf o r man t ha d o nly provided defen dant wi th an undercover off

ic er 's pa ger nu mb

er. The parties i

ni tial ly agreed that defend ant would provide a l is t o f peopl

e whom he was l iv in g with a nd ha d bef rien de d. T

h e S tate
wo uld t hen pr ovid e t he t rial co ur t wit h t he infor mant's informat ion fo r a n in cam era inspec t ion, and t he trial court would deter mi n e w h eth er dis cl osure was required b ased on an e ntrapmen t defens e. However, t he St at e lat er moved t o r eco nsider , a rg uing t hat , be cau se d efenda nt was claiming that t he informant could h ave b een one of ma ny people, he w as on a " f

i sh i n g e x pe di

ti on." Th e tri al court deni edt he Stat e's m

ot ion. A fter the State refused to pro vi de the in form ant's i nf ormation to the trial
cou rt, th e tr i al cou rt g ra n ted de f en da n t' s m oti on to di sm i ss th e i ndi ctm en t. On a ppea l , thi s court

he ld that defend ant had no t met hi s bur den o f s howin g that discl

osure of the in

form ant's i dentity was
ne ces sary t o pr ep ar e h is def

en se. Pe o ple v. Rose , 342 Ill . App. 3d 203, 206-07 (2003). We reversed t he tria l court's rul ing a nd r em an ded th e ca se f or fu rther p roceed ings . Rose , 342 Ill . App. 3d at 207. On reman d, defen dant suppl ied fur t he rde t ails o f ho w p ar t icu lar pe o ple ind uc ed him t o co mmit t he crim es wi th whi ch he wa s cha rg ed, and he re newe d his re que st for an in c am era inspec t ion o f the informant 's informat ion. The t rial co ur t or der ed a n in c am era in spection of the inf

ormant's fi le
. The reaf ter, it gr an ted in pa rt d ef en da n t' s m oti on to disc l ose , all owi

n g d ef en da n t to use t he infor mant's
nam e solel y i n the preparation of

hi s case. On February 2, 2006, t he parties

presented a partial

ly negotiated plea

agr eement t o t he trial
cou rt. In exch

ange for def endan t pleadi ng gui lty to in tent t o man

ufacture a controll

ed subs tance, t he Sta te would nol-pros t he rem ai ni ng charges. The trial

court accepted the ple a agreem en t and continued the ma

tt er for sentenc in

g.No. 2--06--0940

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Defendant's sentencing hearing took place on May 23, 2006. The State asked that the trial courttake judicial notice th at the codef endant in this case, Jeremy Doucette, had entered a fully negotiated plea

agreement under which he was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. As part of his plea agreement, Doucette was obligated to testify truthfully against defendant. The parties agreed to the admission of tapes of recorded conversations between defendant and the undercover officer. The State then called Officer Paul Nevara of the Lombard pol ic e department as a witness. Nevara testified that on October 29, 1998, he was assigned to the Du Page Metropolitan Enforcement Group, a narcotics task force team. On that day, the team was working with the Glen Ellyn police department regarding a methamphetamine laboratory in defendant's apartment. At this point in the testimony, the defense objected. Defense coun sel pointed out that the evidence about the 1998 laboratory pertained to prior charges against defendant. He argued that the evidence was inadmissible because it had been suppressed due to the police officers' failure to obtain defendant's consent before entering his apartment, in violation of his fourth amendment rights. The State countered that, even if the evidence was inadmissible for a t r ial, it was admissible at a sentencing hearing. The trial courtoverruled defendant's continuing objection and allowed testimony regarding the 1998 incident into evidence. [ N onpublishable material removed here. ] Based on the factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced defendant to 14 years' imprisonment. The trial court stated that it would have given defendant a greater sentence ifNo. 2-- 06--0940

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not f or t he mit ig ating f

actors and defen

dant's own s tatement. The trial court subsequently

deni ed defen dant's m ot ion to reconsi der, and def endan t t im el y a ppealed. II. AN AL YSIS A. Consi deration of Suppressed Evidence Defend ant fi

rst argues that at s en

ten ci ng the tri al court i m prop erl y con si dered in a ggrav ati on evi dence tha t ha d b ee n supp

res se d i n a pri orca se ag ain st him. Defend ant ar gue s t hat t he t rial co ur t 's al lowan ce of th i s ev i den ce wa s i m proper (1 ) b ased on collat er al es topp el , (2 ) b as ed

on th e f our th amendment excl

usionary rul

e, and (3) becaus e the evi dence was

ot herwi se unrel

ia bl e. We exa mine
eac h of t hese co nt ent ions in t ur n. Coll ateralestoppel, a compo ne nt of doubl e j eopardy, provi des that, where there i s a val id, fi nal judgm ent determi

ni ng an is sue of ul

tim ate fact, the sam

e parties can

not li tigate the sam

e i ssue in a f uture ca se. People v . Sly

wka , 365 Ill . App. 3d 34, 41 (2006). Colla teral estoppel

appl ie s where: (1) t he issue dec ided in t he pr ior suit is ident ical to t he one presented i n the current sui

t; (2) the pri or
su it contain

ed a f ina l j udg m en t on th e m eri ts; an d (3 ) th e p arty

ag ai nst whom estoppel i s asserted was
a party to or was i

n pr i vi ty with a p arty

to the pri

or sui t. Sly wka , 365 Ill . App. 3d at 41. T he ap pl i ca b il i ty of coll ateral estoppel is a questi on of l aw, whi ch we rev ie w de no vo . Peo ple v. Po we ll , 349 Il l . App. 3d 90 6, 909 ( 2004)
. Coll aterales t o pp el is ina pp lica ble he r e b ec au se t he firs t r eq uir eme nt ha s no t be en met , in that the ulti ma te issue s of f

act in the two ca se s a

re n ot i de nti ca l . In de f en da nt' s 1 998ca se , th e g ran

t of t he m oti on to supp

res s w as ba se d on

a dete rm in ati on th at def en da n t' s f our th am endm ent righ ts had been vio lat ed by the poli ce of f i ce rs ' n onc ons en su al

se arch of hi s a pa rtm en t; th e u l timate i ss ue of whether defend ant was guilt y of manufac t ur ing met hamphet amine was t her efo re not re ache d. In t heNo. 2-- 06--0940

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insta nt ca se , tes tim

ony reg ard ing the 199 8 m eth am ph eta m ine l ab wa s provi de d a s evi

de nc e of defend ant 's prior cri

mes. As t he is sues adj udic ated in the two cases are not identical , coll ateral estoppel do es no t ap pl y. Cf. Peop l e v . F ul ton , 68 Ill . App. 3d 915, 92 4- 25 ( 19 79 ) ( alt ho ug h in c ivil f orfe i ture pr oc eed ing the Stat e fai led to present suf

fi ci ent evi dence that the def

endan t's car had been used to comm it an of fen se, the ul

tim ate fact of whe

thert he de fen da nt pa r t icip at ed in t he cr ime was not l i ti ga ted , an d c oll ate ral es toppe l di d not ba r th e Sta te f rom su b sequ en tl y atte m pti n g to pr ove t he def en dan t gui l ty of va ri ous cri m es b ase d on a

n a ccoun tabi l ity th eory ). Defend ant next argues that the tria l court erred in

considerin

g the suppressed ev

ide nce because"imp o r t an t co nst it ut io na l co nsid er at io ns p r o t ec t in g ag ainst unr eas ona ble sear ches and seizures out wei gh the proced ura l rul es governi

ng broader adm

is si bi li ty of ev ide nce duri ng a sent encing hear ing." Defend ant ar gue s t hat , by allow ing such ev ide nce at the sen

tenci ng he arin g, t he "u nconsti tut iona l im pairm ent of [his] righ

ts [was] exacerbated." Whether pre viously suppress e d evi dence is adm issi bl e in a sentencin

g hearin g presents a question of

la w, whi ch we rev ie w de novo . See Pe o ple v. Da nie ls , 187 Ill . 2d 301, 307 (1999) (quest ions of l aw revi

ewed de no vo ). We begi n our anal

ys is of thi s i ssue by c onsiderin g the types of

evi dence t ha t ar e g en er ally ad miss ible in

a se nt encing he ar ing. I t is well set t led t hat t he evident iary st anda rd s us ed in se nt encing
are much less ri gid than those used i

n the gui lt-i nnocen ce pha se of

tria l
. Peop l e v . Ja

ck son , 14 9 I ll. 2d 540, 547 (1992). At sentenci ng, the def

endan t's gui lt has al ready b een settled, and t he se nt encing judge is charged wi

th the task of determi

ni ng the type

and ex ten t o f pu nish men t , wit hin c er t ain statutory an d con sti

tution al l im its. Ja ck son , 149 Ill . 2d at 54 8. " ' Hi gh l y re l ev an t--i f n ot es se n ti al --to his select ion o f an app ro pr iate sent ence is the po ss es sio n o f t he fulle st info r mat io n p o ss ible
conc ern ing th e def en dan t's l i f e an d ch arac teri stics.'

" Peo ple v. Adkins , 41 Il l . 2d 297 , 300 (1 968),No. 2-- 06--0940

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quo t ing Wi

ll i ams v . New Y ork , 337 U.S. 241, 247, 93 L. Ed. 1337, 1 342, 6 9 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 (1949 ). T he t r ial c o ur t may conduct a b ro ad search in to a defendan

t's " 'm oral character , habi

ts,
so cial enviro nment, abno rmal t ende ncies, age , na t ur al inclination o r a ver sion t o c ommit c rime, a nd st imuli mo t iva t ing his co nd uc t , in a dd it io n t o his fa mily lif e, occ upa t ion, and c riminal reco rd .' " Pe o ple v. H arri s , 375 Ill . App. 3d 398, 408-09 (2007), quo ting Peopl e v . Moore , 250 Ill . App. 3d 906, 919 (1993). The source and type of i nf ormation that the s en t en cin g c o ur t may c o nsid er is vir t ua lly wi thout boun

ds. Pe opl

e v . L a P oi

n te , 88 Ill . 2d 482, 496 (1981 ). Fo r e videnc e t o be ad miss ible in

a s en t en cin g h ea r ing , it is r eq uir ed o nly to be rel ia bl e and rel evan t, a det ermi

nation tha t i s wi thi n the tri al court's di scre tion
. Ha r r is , 375 Ill . App. 3d at 409. In ad dit io n t o co nsid er ing a d efe nd an t 's p r ev io us co nvic t io ns, a s en t en cin g c o ur t r o ut ine ly consi derscr imes o f wh ich t he de fen da nt ha s no t be en co nvic t ed , inc lud ing cr imes fo rwh ic h th e defend ant ha s not been

prosec uted. Ja ck son , 149 Ill . 2d at 548. A sentenci ng court may

even considerevi

dence of crim es of wh ic h the def endan t has be en acqu itted. Peop l e v . Del eon , 227 I ll. 2d 322, 340 (2008) . This i s so bec au se a fi nding o f not guilt y is not a co nclusive finding t hat t he defend ant did n ot co m

m it th e cri m e, b ut r ath er m ea n s th at th e S tate wa s un abl e to offer pr oo f beyond
a r ea so na ble do ub t t ha t he did
. T hu s, t he un de r lying fa ct s o f t he pr ev io us cr ime ma y b e consi dered dur ing a s en

ten ci ng he ari ng , wh ere the bu rde n of proof is l ower. Ja ck son , 149 Il

l . 2d at 55 0. The evi dence of p rio r c riminal cond uct need be only re levant , r eliable, and subjec t t o c ro ss- examinat ion. People v . Thomas , 137 Il l . 2d 500 , 547 (1 990). We now d i scu ss d ef en dan t's ri ghtsregar di ng th e su ppres sed evi den ce. The judi

ci al ly created
ex cl usi onary ru le gene ra lly

ser ves t o p re vent evidenc e o bt ained in violat ion o f the fou rt h amendment f rom be i ng u sed in a cri m ina l procee di ng a gai ns t the i ndi vi dual wh ose con sti

tution al ri ghtswereNo. 2-- 06--0940

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vi olated. I llino is v. Kr ull , 480 U.S. 340, 347, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364, 373, 107 S. Ct. 1160 , 1165 ( 1987)
. The ce nt r al p ur po se o f t he ex clu sio na r y ru le is t o de t er t he po lice fr o m ac t ing un law fully in the future, t her ebyeff

ectuating the f

ourt h am endm ent guarantee agai

nst unreasonab

le sea rches a nd seizures. Kr ull , 480 U.S. at 347, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 373, 107 S. Ct. at 1165. The excl usi onary rul

e i s n ot a personal con sti tutiona l righ t of th e a gg ri ev ed pa rty , a n d i ts a pp l i ca ti on i s n ot i n ten de d or abl e to act
as a rem ed y f or th e i nvas i onof th

e party 'sri ghtsthat h as a

l ready taken pl ace . Kr ull , 480 U.S. at 347, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 3 73, 107 S . Ct. at 116 5-66. The excl usionary rule i s not designed to prevent t he use of su ppr es se d e vi de nc e i n a ll ty pe s of proc ee di ng s or agai ns t all peopl e. Peopl e v . Dowery , 62 I ll. 2d 200, 204 (1 975). "[ I ] n d et er mining wh et he rt he 'e xc lus io na r y ru le' sho uld be ex t en de d t o ce r t ain proceedings a bal

anci ng test has b een utili

zedt o limit ap plic at io n o f t he r ule ' to th ose area s wh ere i

ts remedi al ob j ec tiv esare th

oug h t mo st effic aciously

served.' " Dowery , 6 2 I ll. 2d a t 204 , q uo t ing Un i ted States v . Cal

an dra , 414 U .S. 338, 3 48, 38 L . Ed. 2d 56 1, 571, 9 4 S. Ct. 613 , 620 (1 974). Ourresearch has n ot reveal ed any Ill in ois cas e addressi

ng the speci

fi c question of

whether evi dence su pp re ss ed on f our th amendment gr ou nds in a prior case n onetheless m

ay be consi dered at
a sen tenc ing h eari ng on a f uture ch arge. On e ca se, Peo ple v. Eva ns , 125 Ill . 2d 50 (1988), discusses
a sente ncing court' s c ons i derati

on o f pr ev io us ly

suppressed ev

ide nce, but that case i s di stin

guishab le
. In Eva ns , t he de fendant ar gue d o n app eal t hat t he se nt encing c ou rt er re d in co nsider ing t he t est imony of an al l eged prior rape v

i ctim , be caus e duri

ng th e def en dan t's tri al f or that of f en se th e tri al court granted hi s m

otion to suppre ss th

e vi ctim 'si den

tif i cation of hi m . Eva ns , 125 Ill. 2d at 90. The defend ant cl ai

med that t hi s prior suppressi on ma de the evi dence unrel ia bl e at sentenci

ng. Eva ns , 125 Ill. 2d at 91. Our sup re me co ur t held t hat t he de fendant 's ar gument wa s w it ho ut mer it beca use t he defend ant failed t o info rm t he se nt enc i ng cou rt t hat t he ident ifi cat ion had been s upp re ssed andNo. 2-- 06--0940

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becauset he vict im's tes t imony was c umulat ive of the l arge a m ount of evi den ce i n a ggravati on. Eva ns , 125 Ill . 2d at 91-92. The i nstant case, unl

ike Eva ns , in

volv es evi dence suppres sed

un de r th e f our th
am en dm en t, so t h e m ere f ac t th at th e ev i de n ce

wa s sup pres se d d oes

n ot eq ua te to a fin din g t ha t it was unrel ia bl e. Mo re ove r, defend ant pr ese rve d his ar gument in the t rial co ur t , a nd t he intr od uct ion o f the suppressed ev

ide nce would not amount to harm le ss error here. While the re is n o Il l inoi s l awdi rectl y on poi n t, w e n ote th at a ll b ut on e of th e f eder al appe ll ate
c our ts have r eso lved t he issue at hand, and t hey have a ll conclud ed t hat t he exc lusiona ry rule ge ne r ally does not apply

to sentencin

g hearin gs. Uni ted Sta tesv . Acos ta , 303 F .3d 78, 8 6 (1s t Ci r. 2002) ; Uni

ted Stat es v. Ry

an , 236 F.3d 126 8, 1 271 -72 (10 th Cir. 200 1); Uni ted St ates v. Bri

ma h , 214 F.3d 854 , 85 8 (7 th Cir. 200 0); Un ited Sta te s v . Tauil -Hern andez , 88 F .3d 576 , 581 (8 th Ci r. 1996) ; Un it ed St at es v. Kim , 25 F.3d 1426, 143 5 (9 th Cir. 199 4); Un it ed St at es v. Mo nt o ya- Or t iz , 7 F.3d 1171, 1 181-8 2 (5th C i r. 199 3); Unit ed S t at es v. Jenk ins , 4 F.3 d 1338 , 1344- 45 (6th Ci r. 1993) ; Uni

ted S tat es v. T ej ada , 95 6 F.2 d 12 56, 126 3 (2 d Cir. 199 2); Uni ted St ates v. Ly

nch , 934 F.2d1226, 1 236-3 7 (11th Ci r. 1991 ); Un

ited States v . McC

rory , 930 F.2d

63, 69 ( D.C. C i

r. 1991 ); Uni ted St ates v. Torres , 926

F. 2d 3 21, 325 (3r

d C i r. 1 991 ); se e a

l so Un it ed St at es v. Nic ho ls , 438 F.3d437, 441 (4th Cir. 2006) (citi ng A cos ta an d cas es c ited the

rei n w ith approva

l ). Though w e are not required to f oll ow de ci si

on s of f eder al cou rts oth er th an th e Un ited

Sta tesSuprem

e C our t ( Pe o ple
v. Cal ve rt , 326 Ill . App. 3d 414, 424 (20 01)), we may use such deci si ons as gui

dance ( Peo ple v. Criss , 307 Ill . App. 3d 888, 900 (1999)). T he af orementi oned fede ral app ellate co ur t s have noted that a se nten ci ng c ourt may cond uct a ver y bro ad inqu iry into t he def en dan t's b ackg round , ch arac ter, and conduct in

order to ha

ve the l arg es t ran

ge of inf orm ati on av ai l abl e to d ete rm in e th e a pp rop ri ate pu n i sh m en t. A cos ta , 303 F.3d at 85-86. They h ave recogni

zed that evidence that hasbe en illeg allyNo. 2-- 06--0940

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seizedi s n

ot i nh eren tl y un reli able (see , e.g. , Brim

ah , 2 14 F .3 d at 858 ) a nd co nclude d t hat "t he det er re nt ef

f ec t of the excl us i ona ry rul e d oe s not out wei gh t he de t riment al effect s o f excluding
r elia ble evidenc e o n t he co ur t 's abi li ty to meet its goal of proper sent enci ng." A cos ta , 303 F.3d at 85. St ill, so me of t he fede ra l cou rt s have indicat ed t hat t he ex cl usi onary r ule will a pp ly at se nt en cin g if there is evi dence that the poli

ce vi olatedthe defendant's f

our th amendm

ent rights with the purpo se of obtain in g a greater sentence. See A cos ta , 303 F .3d at 85 (cas es c ited the rei n). Al though Il l in oi s h asn ot yet h

ad an opp ortu n ity

to pass jud gme nt o n t his is su e, o ur su pr eme courthas cons ide

red the related question of whet her ev idence sup pr esse d o n fou rt h amendment grounds in

a crim in al pr oceedin g co uld no net heless be use d t o r evo ke p ro bat ion. In Dowery , t he
su pr eme court sta

ted tha t, "[ w]h i l e a de f en da nt is enti tl ed to due proc es s of

l awat p rob ati

on
rev oca ti on proceedings, si gni

fi cant di ssi mi la rities exist between such

proceedings and a c

rimina l tria l ." Dowery , 62

Il l . 2d at 2 04 . Th

e c our t n oted th at th e v as t m aj ori ty of c ase s fro m ot her jurisd ictio ns
ex am ini ng the sa m e i ss ue ha d h el d th at th e e xc l us i ona ry rul e di d not ap pl

y to prob ati

on r ev oca ti on pro ceedings, beca use t he de t er re nt ef f ec t of extendi ng the rul e to such proceedings

would be mi ni ma l and the rul e woul

d i nterf ere wi th th e prob ati

on syste m ' s a b il ity t o g aug e a d efenda nt 's re habilitat ive ef f ort. Dowery , 62 Ill . 2d at 204-05. The Dowery court reached the sa me

resul t, reaso ni ng that
so ciet y's int er es t mus t be su fficie nt ly con si de re d d ur in g a pr ob ati on re v oca ti on h ea ri n g a n d that, "[ m]e r ely b ec au se

th ere m ay ex i st a tech n i ca l de f i ci en cy in pol i ce con du ct, a tri al

courtsho uld no t be forced to relea se a

de f en da n t an d retu rn h im to a probationary

status where there is

patent evidence of a serious pro bation vi

olation." Dowery , 62 Ill . 2d at 206. In People v . Brown , 171 Ill . App. 3d 500 (1988), t he appel la te cou rt con si

dered the m ore sp ec ific question of

whether the ex

cl usi onary rul

e shoul d be appl ied t o t he s ent enc ing p has e o f aNo. 2-- 06--0940

-10-

prob ati on rev oca ti on p roceeding . Re

l ying on Dowery , the a

ppel l ate court h

el d tha t the ex cl usi onary
r ule did n ot appl y a nd that the trial court coul

d con si der the su ppres sed evi den ce. Brown , 17 1 I ll. App. 3d at 503-04. The spe cial co ncur re nce, citing cas e law t hat a se nt encing j ud ge may con du ct a
ve ry br o ad inq uir y int o a d efe nd an t 's b ac kg r o un d, r ea so ne d t ha t t he ex clu sio na r y ru le doe s n ot ap ply to sentenc ing h

eari ngs . Brown , 171 I ll. App. 3d a t 504-05 (McCul

l ough, J ., spe ci al

l y concurri ng)
. Co nsider ing t he r eas oning in Dowery and Brown , a s we ll as the per sua sive au thor ity of t he federal appel la te decisi ons, we li kewi se c onc lude t hat t he exc lusiona ry ru le do es no t app ly to t he sent encing ph as e of

cri m ina l proc eedi ngs . Though def

endan t decries the use

of the suppressed evi dence as exa ce rb at ing t he v io lat io n o f his constitutional righ ts, as discus sed

t he ex clu sio na r y ru le is not d es i gned as a re m ed y f or th e v i ol at io n o f a n ind ivid ua l's c o nst it ut io na l rig ht s, bu t r at he ris designed to deter f uture pol i ce m i scon duct. Kr ull , 480 U.S. at 347, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 373, 10 7 S . C t. at 116 5- 66. Thu s, in d et er mini ng wh eth er th e ex cl us i on ar y ru l e a pp l i es , w e c on du ct a

bal anci ng test weighi ng the pot ential

deter rent effect of apply

in g the rule at sentencing agai nstthe goal

of ha ving t he sentenci

ng j udge consi

derall avai

lab le rel evant and reli

abl e in formation i

n f ashi oning the m

ost ap pr opr i ate sentence . See Brim

ah , 21 4 F .3d

at 8 57 -5 8. W

e a gree wi th t he Se vent h Circu it t hat "t he ap pl i ca ti on of th e ex cl us i on ar y ru l e to the governm

ent's cas e-in

-chi ef *** provi

des strong in

centives f orl awen f orce m en t of f i cial s to f oll ow proper pro cedure i

n order to bui

ld a s strong a case as po ss ible agai nst the defe n dant during the conviction phase of trial " ( Brim ah , 214 F.3d at 859), and we concl ude tha t in a ca se su ch as the instan t one , wh ere the su ppr es se d i nf orm ati on is considered in

an unrelated cas e br ou ght years late r, any increa sed det er re nt effect of e xcluding t he evidence is alm ost
n on ex i ste n t. Tho ugh t he fede ra l cou rt s have re co gni ze d th e a r gu ab le r isk t ha t po lice co uld int en t io na lly

vi ola te a def en dan t's f ourth am en dm en t rights i n orde r to in crea se h i s se nten ce, we areNo. 2-- 06--0940

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in ac co r da nc e w it h t he ir c o nc lus io n t ha t it is d o ub t ful " t ha t t he r e a r e ma ny p o lice o ffice r s w ho wo uld risk the f rui ts of pr io rleg it imat e la w e nfo r ce men t ac t ivit ies in so cyni cal a f ashi on." Tauil

-Hernandez , 88 F.3d at 581. Moreo ver, i n thi s case there can

be n o colorable c l ai

m th at t he pol

ic e vi olated defend ant 's f

ourth am en dm en t righ ts f or th e p urp ose

of enhanci ng an unr elated s en tenc e y earsl ater. Agai nstt he v er y minimal de t er re nt effe ct o f ex clu din g the evidence at sentenci ng we jux

tapo se
so ciet y's br o ad int er es t in

having cr imi

nals ap pr op riat ely sent ence d and t he corresponding de trim ental eff ect of excl

uding rel ev ant and r eliable evidenc e fro m the s ent encing c ou rt 's de t er minatio n of t he proper punishment . T he t est obvio usly weighs in fav or o f al lowi ng the sen tenci ng court t o consider the previ ously suppressed ev

ide nce, as the tri al

court did i

n thi s case. Defend ant notes t hat ou r supreme cour t has stat ed that the exclusi onary rul e a ppl i es to a "cri mi nal pro secution" ( P eo pl e v . Ma yo , 19 I ll. 2d 1 36, 139 (1 960 )) , a nd he a rg ues t hat sent encing is pa rt of a cri m in al pr osecuti on . H owev er , al th oug h th e ex cl us i on ar y ru l e " us ua

ll y " pre v en ts evidenc e su ppr esse d und er t he fo ur t h amendment fro m being used in a cri mi nal pro ceeding agai

nst t he person whose consti

tut iona l ri ghts were vi

olated ( Kr ull , 480 U.S. at 347, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 373, 107 S. Ct. at 1 16 5) , our s up re m e c our t h asre cog n i ze d that, " '

"[ d] es pi te its br oa d de t er re nt pur po se, t he
ex cl usi onary rul e h as n ev er b een interpre ted t o pr osc r ibe t he us e o f illeg ally s eiz ed ev ide nc e in all proceedings or ag ain st all

persons." ' " Dowery , 62 Ill . 2d at 204, quo ting Br o wn v. I llino is , 422 U.S. 590, 60 0, 45 L . Ed. 2d 41 6, 425, 9 5 S. Ct. 225 4, 2260 (1975 ). Defend ant f

ur th er argu esth at Dowery

and Brown are dis tinguishab le bec ause those cases in volv edprobation revocation proceedi ngs, whi ch are ci vi l. Def endan t mai ntains that Dower y
ex pr es sly re co gnized t hat t her e ar e significant differenc es be t wee n a pr oba t ion r evo cat ion p ro cee ding and a "crim

ina l tria l procee di ng." In f act, Dowery

noted significant di

f f ere nc es be twe en a p rob ati onNo. 2-- 06--0940

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rev oca ti on proceeding a nd a " cr imi nal trial." Dowery , 62 Ill . 2d at 204. T hi s case, of course, in volv es a crim in al sentenci ng rather than a c

rim in al trial , and, as di scussed, the ty pes of ev ide nce that
a t r ial c ourt ma

y c onsider vary

greatly between the tri al

and sen tenci ng pha ses of a c

rim in al proceeding. In

an y even t, re ga rdl es s of the ty pe of proceeding, the tes t for ap pl ying th e ex cl usi onary rul e requires we i gh

ing the l i ke l i hood of de terr ing f utur e p ol i ce m i sc ond uc t "aga inst the cos ts of wit hhold ing reliabl

e in formation f

rom the t rut h-seekin

g pro cess." Kr ull , 480 U.S. at 347, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 373, 4 80 S. C t. a t 116 6. We have co nclude d t hat t his te st weighs aga inst a pplying t he excl usionary rule i n crim in al sen tencing proceedings. In hi s f ina l argum en t on t he issue of t he suppressed ev ide nce, def endan t asserts that t he trial courtabused its di scretion in consi dering thi s evi

dence, because it was o t he rw ise unr eliable. T he suppressed

evi dence cons is ted of items sei zedf rom defend ant 's ap ar t ment, namely m et hamphet amine and purp orte d m

ate ri als to manufact ur e t he drug. Defen dant argues that the evi

dence was

tainted and unr el i ab l e b eca use it was obtaine d through

a con sti tution al vi ola tion . However, as wepr ev io us ly stated, evi dence that

ha s be en illeg ally sei

zed is not in

he ren tly unr el i ab l e. Brim

ah , 214 F.3d at 858. Defend ant f

urthe r arg ues t hat t he evide nce w as u nre liable becau se t he St at e did no t intr od uce any evi dence to prov e th

at h e u se d th e m ate rials or made th e m eth am ph eta m in e. W e rei

ter ate th at at sent encing t he St at e is no t re quir ed t o p ro ve b ey on d a re as on abl e d oub

t th at th e def en da n t wa s gui l ty of any previ ous crim es f or which evi dence i s subm

itted, and the sen

tenci ng court may

al so conside

r crim es of whi ch the def en dan t was a cqui tted. Ja ck son , 149 Ill . 2d at 549-50. A sen tenci ng court may go so far as to conside

r hearsay evi dence of unch arged or unconvi

cted crim es as long a s the evi

dence is re levant and r eliable, w ith t he hearsay nature of the evi

dence goi ng toward its wei ght rather than it s adm i ssi bi l ity. People v . Bil

ski , 333 Ill . App. 3d 808, 818 (2002). Here, Offi cer Nevara testif

iedNo. 2--06--0940

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regarding the ma terial s that he and other officers found in defendant's apartment, and Nevara was subject to cross-examination by the defense. The trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion by considering the evidence relevant and reliable. B. Length of Sentence The material in this section is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Du Page County circuit court. Affirmed. HUTCHINSON and GROMETER, JJ., concur.