[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14863

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00260-AT

PIERRE R. CAZEAU, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(June 10, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 1 of 20 
2

Pierre Cazeau, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 

(“Wells Fargo”), in his suit alleging federal claims of retaliation, discriminatory 

pay, and discrimination on the basis of his national origin, disability, and gender. 

On appeal, he raises various challenges to the district court’s judgment. After 

careful review, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted on all 

claims and therefore affirm. 

I. Background

Cazeau, a male of Haitian origin, worked as a teller at a Wells Fargo bank 

branch in Conyers, Georgia. He began working for Wells Fargo in 2004, and had 

been at the Conyers branch since 2006. In December 2009, Chris Williams, an 

African-American female, became Cazeau’s immediate supervisor. Williams, a 

Service Manager, reported to the Store Manager, Mike Peoples, a Caucasian male. 

Cazeau was promoted to Lead Teller in March 2011. 

In January 2012, Cazeau submitted a letter to Peoples complaining about 

harassment and bullying at the Conyers branch. In the letter, Cazeau alleged that 

Williams had accused him of stealing, had talked to him like a child, and had made 

comments about his needing to take medication. He also alleged that two other 

bank tellers bullied him, called him names, made similar comments about 

medication, and made “homosexual remarks.” Cazeau then discussed these 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 2 of 20 
3

allegations with a human-resources representative. At the end of January 2012, 

Peoples met with Williams and Cazeau to discuss the situation.

At his deposition, Cazeau testified that Williams, in addition to other 

bullying and harassing comments, also had made fun of his national origin, telling 

him, “This is America; you need to speak English,” when he spoke Creole with his 

wife or with Haitian customers. Further, Cazeau testified, Williams questioned his 

immigration status and asked him whether he married to get immigration papers. 

In January 2012, Cazeau applied for the position of Service Manager at 

another Wells Fargo branch. Cazeau was not hired or interviewed for the position. 

The Wells Fargo recruiter who reviewed the applications testified that he did not 

select Cazeau to be interviewed because of an internal policy limiting eligibility to 

employees who had been in their current position for at least twelve months, unless 

the requirement is waived by a manager or by human resources. A non-Haitian 

female was hired in February 2012.

Cazeau filed a charge of discrimination based on national origin, disability, 

and retaliation with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (“EEOC”) on 

April 16, 2012. Cazeau alleged that he had been subjected to harassment at work 

and denied the Service Manager position. 

In April 2012, Cazeau went on paid medical leave for anxiety and 

depression. That leave expired in August. Thereafter, he transitioned to unpaid 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 3 of 20 
4

medical leave. He received a letter from Wells Fargo on August 16, 2012, stating 

that he had exhausted his twelve weeks of leave and job-protection rights under the 

Family and Medical Leave Act as of July 6, 2012. He received another letter in 

September stating that he had been approved for unpaid leave through October 15, 

2012, which was the date his physician indicated he could return to work.

Cazeau called Peoples in September 2012 to talk about returning to work. 

During that discussion, Cazeau learned that Wells Fargo had filled his position, 

leaving him without a job to which to return. Peoples told Cazeau to contact 

human resources. 

Cazeau called human resources on October 10, 2012, and was told that 

someone would follow up with him. No one called him back, however, and he 

never followed up. Several days later, Cazeau received a letter from Wells Fargo 

stating that he had been placed on “job search” leave, which would last through 

January 13, 2013, or until he found a position. The letter states that Cazeau would 

be contacted by the “Wells Fargo Career Connection Team” to provide information 

about the job-search process, and it provides details for accessing online 

information about available positions with Wells Fargo. Cazeau did not apply for 

any position. His employment was terminated effective January 15, 2013.

Cazeau filed a second EEOC charge in December 2012, alleging 

discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, disability, and retaliation, 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 4 of 20 
5

based on his position being filled in August and his belief that he was being paid 

less than a female teller. He amended the charge in January 2013 to allege that 

Wells Fargo had failed to provide a reasonable accommodation by placing him into 

another position when he was able to return to work in October 2012. 

After receiving his right-to-sue notices from the EEOC, Cazeau brought suit 

against Wells Fargo in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Georgia. He alleged federal claims of retaliation, discriminatory pay, and 

discrimination on the basis of national origin, gender, and perceived disability. 

Cazeau brought his claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 

(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206. 

He later amended his complaint to allege a libel claim under Georgia state law. 

Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment on all claims.

In a comprehensive report and recommendation, the magistrate judge 

recommended granting Wells Fargo’s summary-judgment motion. Over Cazeau’s 

objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and 

entered judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. Cazeau now brings this appeal.

II. Standard of Review

“We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing 

all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 5 of 20 
6

party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We liberally construe the pleadings and 

briefs of pro se parties. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 

2011); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, 

“issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned. Timson, 

518 F.3d at 874. 

Construed liberally, Cazeau’s brief argues that Cazeau established genuine 

issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on his federal claims under 

Title VII, the ADA, and the EPA. It does not address the district court’s decision 

to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Cazeau’s state-law libel claim, 

so we consider the issue abandoned. See id. 

III. Title VII Claims

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Claims of 

discrimination may be supported by either direct or circumstantial evidence. When 

a claim is based on circumstantial evidence, we generally apply the familiar

burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Vessels, 408 F.3d at 767. Under this framework, 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 6 of 20 
7

the plaintiff must first create an inference of discrimination by making out a prima 

facie case. Id. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 

non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. Id. If the 

employer does so, “the inference of discrimination drops out of the case entirely,”

and the plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that the employer’s proffered 

reasons were pretextual. Id. at 768. The plaintiff’s burden at the pretext stage 

“merges with the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuading the court that the 

employer intentionally discriminated against [him].” Alvarez v. Royal Atl. 

Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010).

A. Failure to Promote, Replacement, and Termination

Generally, an employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination 

under Title VII by showing the following: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) 

he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) his employer treated 

similarly situated employees outside his classification more favorably; and (4) he 

was qualified. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). When the 

claim is based on a failure to promote, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case by 

showing that he applied and was qualified for a position that was filled by someone 

outside of his protected class. Vessels, 408 F.3d at 768.

Here, Cazeau made out a prima facie case of discrimination based on 

national origin with regard to Wells Fargo’s failure to promote him to Service 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 7 of 20 
8

Manager.

1

 Therefore, the burden shifted to the bank to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See id. at 767. Wells Fargo asserted that it

did not promote Cazeau because of its internal policy requiring applicants to have 

worked at least twelve months in their current position and because another 

applicant was more qualified than Cazeau. According to the recruiter who 

reviewed applications for the position, the candidate who was selected, Renee 

Urban, had been in her current position for at least twelve months, had worked for 

Wells Fargo for twelve years, and had previously worked in the banking industry 

for thirteen years. 

We agree with the district court’s determination that Cazeau did not present 

any evidence showing that Wells Fargo’s proffered reasons for not promoting him 

were pretext for discrimination. Cazeau contended before the district court that he 

 1

 In his brief, Cazeau references five other job-promotion denials, which occurred from 

April 2010 to December 2011. And in his complaint, Cazeau also alleged that the bank failed to 

promote him to the Service Manager position based on his sex. The district court, however,

found that these claims were not properly before it because Cazeau had not exhausted his 

administrative remedies by filing EEOC charges relating to them. See Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of 

Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2004). Because Cazeau does not challenge the 

court’s rulings on these points, we consider the issue to be abandoned and therefore address only

the Service Manager failure-to-promote claim based on national-origin discrimination. See 

Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.

We note that, while the denials of the five other positions were distinct adverse actions 

that could not reasonably be expected to grow out of an investigation into the denial of the 

Service Manager position, see Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (“[A] plaintiff’s judicial complaint is 

limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of 

the charge of discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), it is a closer question whether 

Cazeau’s complaint of sex discrimination was inextricably intertwined with his complaint of 

national-origin discrimination, such that it would not be administratively barred. But in any 

case, a claim of discrimination based on sex would also fail because Cazeau has failed to show 

pretext. 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 8 of 20 
9

had received permission from Peoples and Williams to apply for the Service 

Manager position, but there is no evidence to rebut the recruiter’s testimony that he 

had not been contacted by a manager giving Cazeau permission to apply. Cazeau 

cannot establish pretext merely by showing that the decision-maker was mistaken 

about the facts underlying the decision. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (“The 

inquiry into pretext centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs 

and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside of the decision maker’s 

head.”); Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163

(11th Cir. 2006). Cazeau also offered no evidence to rebut Wells Fargo’s other 

reason for not hiring him: Urban was more qualified. Accordingly, Wells Fargo 

was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Regarding Cazeau’s national-origin and sex discrimination claims based on 

the back-filling of his position and his subsequent termination, we agree with the 

district court that, even assuming Cazeau was able to show a prima facie case of 

discrimination based on these actions, Cazeau did not produce any evidence 

showing that Wells Fargo’s proffered explanations were pretextual. See Vessels, 

408 F.3d at 768. Wells Fargo offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its 

decisions. Cazeau’s position was filled, according to Wells Fargo, because the 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 9 of 20 
10

Conyers branch was busy and could no longer function with the vacancy.2 And 

Wells Fargo asserted the Cazeau’s employment was terminated because he failed 

to apply for a position before the expiration of his job search leave. Cazeau did not 

present any evidence rebutting these reasons. While Cazeau may feel that Wells 

Fargo treated him unfairly, “it is not our role to second-guess the wisdom of an 

employer’s business decisions—indeed the wisdom of them is irrelevant—as long 

as those decisions were not made with a discriminatory motive.” Alvarez, 610 

F.3d at 1266. Because Cazeau did not create a genuine issue for trial as to whether 

Wells Fargo’s reasons for its actions were pretextual, the district court properly 

granted summary judgment. 

Cazeau maintains that the district court should have analyzed his Title VII 

claims using a “mixed-motive” framework and that he presented sufficient 

evidence to show that his national origin was a “motivating factor” in Wells 

Fargo’s adverse decisions. He cites to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in White v. 

Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008), in which that court 

held that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does not apply to 

Title VII mixed-motive claims.

 2

 Although Cazeau did not allege a claim of interference with his rights under the Family 

and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a), we note that the evidence indicates that Cazeau’s 

position was filled after he had exhausted his FMLA leave and corresponding job-protection 

rights, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1) & 2614(a)(1).

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 10 of 20 
11

A mixed-motive case under Title VII is one in which a plaintiff alleges that 

an employment decision was motivated by both legitimate and discriminatory 

reasons. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). To prevail against an employer in a mixedmotive case, the plaintiff must “demonstrate[] that race, color, religion, sex, or 

national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 

other factors also motivated the practice.” Id.; see Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 

539 U.S. 90, 94, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2003). 

Cazeau’s claim would not have survived summary judgment under a mixedmotive framework. Cazeau has not presented evidence to permit a reasonable jury 

to conclude that his national origin or sex was a motivating factor for the adverse 

actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Mora v. Jackson Mem’l Found., Inc., 597 

F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2010); see generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 

U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). Although Williams may have made 

discriminatory remarks to him, Cazeau has not shown that Williams was involved 

in the decisions to deny the Service Manager promotion, to hire a replacement for 

his position, or to terminate his employment. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 

Cazeau’s Title VII discrete-action claims.

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 11 of 20 
12

B. Hostile Work Environment

To establish a claim under Title VII for a hostile work environment, an 

employee must show (1) that he belongs to a protected group; (2) that he has been 

subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on a 

protected characteristic; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment; and (5) that the 

employer is directly or vicariously responsible for the hostile work environment. 

Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). 

The requirement that the harassing conduct be severe or pervasive enough to 

alter the terms or conditions of employment contains both an objective and a 

subjective component. Id. at 1276. The behavior “must result in both an 

environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and an 

environment that the victim subjectively perceives . . . to be abusive.” Id. (brackets 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

There is little doubt that Cazeau subjectively perceived the environment at 

the Conyers Wells Fargo branch to be abusive. He complained to management 

about bullying and harassment he faced from co-workers, and the evidence 

indicates that he was reluctant to return to work because of the abuse he faced

there. 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 12 of 20 
13

But the district court properly found that Cazeau had not established an 

objectively hostile work environment. Title VII is not a “general civility code.” 

See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81, 118 S. Ct. 998, 

1002 (1998). Rather, for harassment to be actionable, it must be “because of . . . 

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(2)(1); see Miller, 

277 F.3d at 1275. So limited, the only evidence of harassment on the basis of 

Cazeau’s national origin3 was his testimony that Williams made inappropriate 

comments regarding his national origin “more than once.” While such conduct is

improper and is not to be condoned even if it occurred only once, isolated remarks 

alone are not sufficient to create a severe and pervasive work environment. Based 

on this record, and without additional evidence of the frequency or severity of the 

conduct, including whether it interfered with Cazeau’s work performance, a 

reasonable jury could not have concluded that Cazeau suffered severe and 

pervasive harassment on the basis of his national origin. See Miller, 277 F.3d at 

1276-77; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S. Ct. 

2275, 2283-84 (1998) (occasional teasing and sporadic use of abusive language are 

insufficient to be actionable under Title VII).

 3

 The district court concluded that Cazeau’s claim alleging a hostile work environment 

based on sex was administratively barred, and he does not challenge that ruling on appeal. We 

therefore consider it to be abandoned. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 13 of 20 
14

C. Retaliation

To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must 

show the following: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a 

materially adverse action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the 

protected activity and the adverse action. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 

F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007). “The burden of causation can be met by 

showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected activity and 

the adverse employment action.” Id. at 1364. “But mere temporal proximity, 

without more, must be very close.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Cazeau has not shown that his first EEOC charge, filed in April 2012, 

was causally related to the back-filling of his position in August 2012 or his 

termination in January 2013. Because no other record evidence shows that these 

adverse decisions were related to his April 2012 EEOC charge, the delay of four to 

nine months is too remote, as a matter of law, to show a causal connection. See id.

(“A three to four month disparity between the statutorily protected expression and 

the adverse employment action is not enough.”).

Cazeau’s second EEOC charge, filed in December 2012, may have been 

close enough to his termination to establish causation with respect to his 

termination in January 2013. See id. Therefore, we assume without deciding that 

Cazeau made out a prima facie case of retaliation. As a legitimate non-retaliatory

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 14 of 20 
15

reason for its termination decision, Wells Fargo asserted that Cazeau was 

terminated automatically, without input from any of his managers, because he had 

not found another position with the bank when his job-search leave ended. 

Cazeau’s testimony confirms that he did not apply for a position with the bank 

during his job-search leave. 

Cazeau does not point to any record evidence suggesting that Wells Fargo’s 

reason for terminating his employment was pretext for retaliatory animus. See 

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 976 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that once the 

employer offers a legitimate reason for its employment action, the plaintiff must 

then show that the proffered explanation is pretext for retaliation). Cazeau alleges 

that there were two emails in which Peoples stated that he did not think that he 

could work with Cazeau after all of the discrimination charges and that he wanted 

to change the locks on the bank’s door to prevent Cazeau from returning to work. 

But the district court was unable to locate these documents in the record, and 

Cazeau was unable to produce them when given the opportunity to do so. 

Similarly, they are not in the record on appeal. In any case, we agree with the 

district court that, because the evidence does not show that Peoples was involved 

in the decision to terminate Cazeau’s employment, the emails would not be 

additional evidence of causation even if they were in the record. Accordingly,

summary judgment was properly granted on Cazeau’s retaliation claim.

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 15 of 20 
16

IV. Equal Pay Act

“A prima facie case of an EPA violation is shown if an employer pays 

different wages to employees of opposite sexes for equal work on jobs requiring 

equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar 

working conditions.” Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1995) (ellipsis, 

brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted); see 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Once a 

prima facie case is demonstrated, the employer must prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the pay differential is justified by one of the exceptions set forth 

in the EPA. Irby, 44 F.3d at 954. The four exceptions are “(i) a seniority system; 

(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 

production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” Id.

(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). If the defendant fails to meet its burden of 

showing that sex provided no basis for the wage differential, “the court must enter 

judgment for the plaintiff.” Id. But when the defendant meets its burden under the 

EPA, “the plaintiff must rebut the explanation by showing with affirmative 

evidence that it is pretextual or offered as a post-event justification for a genderbased differential.” Id.

Cazeau alleged that he was paid less for his work as a Teller than two other 

female Tellers, Miranda Chavez and Kathy Hill. The district court first determined 

that any EPA claim based on a disparity of wages with Chavez was time barred.

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 16 of 20 
17

Unless the violation is willful, an EPA action must be commenced within two 

years after the cause of action accrued. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); Alvarez Perez v. 

Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1164 (11th Cir. 2008) (Fair 

Labor Standards Act’s statute-of-limitations provisions apply to EPA claims). 

Cazeau does not challenge the district court’s time-bar determination, and has, 

therefore, abandoned any argument on that point. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. In 

any event, as the district court found, the evidence established that Chavez stopped 

working as a Teller in October 2010, but Cazeau did not file his lawsuit until 

January 2013, by which time the two-year limitation period had expired.4

 See 29 

U.S.C. § 255(a). 

Regarding Hill, Wells Fargo produced evidence showing that she had 

significantly more experience than Cazeau, and experience is a “factor other than 

sex.” Irby, 44 F.3d at 955-56. Specifically, Hill had worked at Wells Fargo since 

1999, whereas Cazeau started in 2004. Cazeau did not offer any evidence to 

suggest that this reason was pretextual or “offered as a post-event justification for a 

gender-based differential.” See id. at 954. Consequently, the district court 

properly granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo on Cazeau’s EPA claims.

5

 

 4

 There is no evidence to support a “willful violation.” See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).

5

 In a response brief to Wells Fargo’s summary-judgment motion, Cazeau also alleged 

that he had been denied annual raises, among other things. The district court found that any 

claims based on these denials were not properly before it because they were not raised in the 

complaint. Cazeau does not challenge this ruling on appeal, so we consider the issue abandoned. 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 17 of 20 
18

V. Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against “qualified 

individual[s] on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Generally, to 

establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff 

must show that (1) he is disabled; (2) he was a qualified individual at the relevant 

time, meaning he could perform the essential functions of the job with or without 

reasonable accommodations; and (3) he was discriminated against because of his

disability. Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003); see 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12111(8) (defining “qualified individual”). The term “disability” means a 

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits at least one major life 

activity of such individual, or being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 

U.S.C. § 12102(1). 

It is unlawful for an employer to fail to provide “reasonable 

accommodations” for a qualified individual’s disability, unless doing so would 

impose undue hardship on the employer. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 

1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). The employee bears the burden of identifying an 

accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential functions of her job. 

Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000). An employer’s “duty 

to provide a reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless a specific demand 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 18 of 20 
19

for an accommodation has been made.” Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, 

Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999).

The district court found that no evidence that Cazeau had, or was regarded 

as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limited one or more 

major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). In other words, Cazeau was not 

“disabled” under the ADA. While he asserts that he was perceived as disabled 

because Wells Fargo placed him on temporary medical leave (or short term 

disability leave), he does not assert, and the evidence does not show, that Wells 

Fargo ever regarded him as substantially limited in any major life activity. 

Assuming, though, that Cazeau was disabled or was perceived as disabled by 

Wells Fargo, there is no genuine issue for trial based on Wells Fargo’s failure to 

provide an accommodation. The accommodation that Cazeau identifies was 

placement in an open position after he returned from medical leave. However, as 

the district court found, Cazeau never requested a specific accommodation. 

Cazeau told Wells Fargo generally that he wished to return to work, and Wells 

Fargo provided Cazeau with resources and information to apply for available 

positions. Cazeau, however, never followed up with Wells Fargo or applied for a 

specific, open position after he was cleared to return to work by his doctor. 

Because no specific demand for an accommodation was made, Wells Fargo had no 

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 19 of 20 
20

duty to provide a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See Gaston, 167 

F.3d at 1363; Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997). 

To the extent that an accommodation was requested, Wells Fargo took 

reasonable steps to offer information about available positions, and any breakdown 

in the process of identifying an accommodation is attributable to Cazeau. See 

Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 

1997) (holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to 

provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the 

process of identifying a reasonable accommodation). In short, the district court 

properly granted Wells Fargo’s summary judgment motion on Cazeau’s ADA 

claim. 

VI. Conclusion

In short, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Wells 

Fargo on all of Cazeau’s claims. Cazeau has failed to show that any challenged 

employment action was because of his national origin, gender, or perceived 

disability, or in retaliation for complaining about such alleged discrimination. See 

Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266.

AFFIRMED.6

 6

 All other issues not explicitly addressed are without merit.

Case: 14-14863 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 Page: 20 of 20