UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4016

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

RENE ALEJO RUIZ-CASTILLO, 

Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00020-WO-2) 

Submitted: November 8, 2010 Decided: May 26, 2011

Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

K.E. Krispen Culbertson, CULBERTSON & ASSOCIATES, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United 

States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Rene Alejo Ruiz-Castillo appeals his jury conviction 

for conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to 

distribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2006). Ruiz-Castillo asserts that the 

district court erred when it admitted into evidence a statement 

made by his co-conspirator and instructed the jury on willful 

blindness. We affirm. 

Although “[r]ulings related to admission and exclusion 

of evidence are addressed to the sound discretion of the 

[district court] and will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

that discretion,” United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 896 

(4th Cir. 2001), we review for plain error where, as here, no 

objection to the evidentiary ruling is made at trial, United 

States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2006). 

A statement is not hearsay if it is offered against 

the defendant and is a statement of a co-conspirator of the 

defendant “during the course and in furtherance of the 

conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). For a statement to be 

admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), there “must be evidence that 

there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the 

nonoffering party, and that the statement was made during the 

course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Bourjaily v. 

United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (internal quotation 
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marks omitted). Accordingly, when the Government shows by a 

preponderance of the evidence that (i) a conspiracy existed of 

which the defendant was a member, and (ii) the co-conspirator’s 

statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of 

the conspiracy, the statement is admissible. United States v. 

Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 905 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. 

Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir. 1992). 

We conclude that the Government’s evidence amply 

demonstrated that a conspiracy to distribute more than fifty 

kilograms of marijuana existed between June and December 2007 

and that Ruiz-Castillo was a member of the conspiracy. 

We further conclude that the admitted statement was made in 

furtherance of the conspiracy, as it pertained to the 

declarant’s plan for obtaining some of the conspiracy’s supply 

of marijuana for further distribution. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the district court committed no error in admitting the 

statement. 

Ruiz-Castillo also contends that the district court 

erred in instructing the jury on willful blindness. We review 

this issue for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jeffers, 

570 F.3d 557, 566 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 645 

(2009). “A willful blindness . . . instruction allows the jury 

to impute the element of knowledge to the defendant if the 

evidence indicates that he purposely closed his eyes to avoid 
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knowing what was taking place around him.” United States v. 

Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 

456, 463 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The record need not contain direct 

evidence . . . that the defendant deliberately avoided knowledge 

of wrongdoing; all that is necessary is evidence from which the 

jury could infer deliberate avoidance of knowledge.”). “A 

willful blindness instruction is proper when the defendant 

asserts a lack of guilty knowledge but the evidence supports an 

inference of deliberate ignorance” on the defendant’s part. 

Ruhe, 191 F.3d at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Ruiz-Castillo’s defense was that he did not know that 

bales of marijuana were hidden inside the pallets of ceramic 

tile a co-conspirator instructed him to break. After review of 

the record, we conclude that the jury could properly infer that 

Ruiz-Castillo closed his eyes to his involvement in a drug 

operation. Moreover, the district court properly instructed the 

jury not to infer guilty knowledge from a mere showing of 

careless disregard or mistake. See United States v. Guay, 

108 F.3d 545, 551 (4th Cir. 1997). We therefore conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing 

on willful blindness. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED