alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### SAT Report PMN Number: P-13-0047 SAT Date: 11/6/2012 Print Date: 2/4/2013

Related cases : Health related cases : Ecotox related cases:

Concern levels : Type of Concern: Health Eco Comments Level of Concern: 2 3

Persistence Bioaccum Toxicity Comments 1 2 2 Linear 2 3 2 Branched

Exposure Based Review : Health: N o Ecotox: Yes
Routes of exposure : Health: Dermal Drinking Water Inhalation Ecotox: All releases to water Fate: ;

P 2 Rec Comments : Comment: N o Commen t
Keywords : Keywords: IRR/POSS CORR-E,S,L,MM LUNG LIVER UNCERT SENS-S,L AQUATOX-A,C
Summary of Assessment :

Fate :Fate Summary: P-13-0044-48 FATE: Estimations for Liquid with MP < 25 C (E) log Kow = 5.24 (E) S = Dispersible / 1.20 mg/L at 25 C (ICB / E) VP < 1.0E-6 torr at 25 C (E) BP > 400 C (E) H < 1.00E-8 (E) log Koc = 5.40 (E) log Fish BCF = 1.75 (E) log Fish BAF = 3.02 (E) POTW removal (%) = 90 via sorption and biodeg Time for complete ultimate aerobic biodeg = Linear wk; Highly branched ≥ mo Sorption to soils/sediments = v.strong PBT Potential: Linear P1B2; Highly branched P2B3 *CEB FATE: Migration to ground water = negl

Health : Health Summary: Absorption is poor through the skin, moderate through the GI tract, and good through the lung, based on analogs. There are concerns for severe irritation/ p ossible corrosion to all exposed tissues, and for cationic binding to lung membranes, based on the of the PMN substance. There also is concern for liver toxicity and uncertain concern for dermal and respiratory sensitization, based on

Ecotox :
Test Organism Test Type Test End Point Predicted Measured Comments

fish 96-h LC50 1.3 aliphatic amine SAR daphnid 48-h LC50 0.21 aliphatic amine SAR green algal 96-h EC50 0.078 amide SAR fish

_ chronic value 0.012 amide SAR daphnid

_ chronic value 0.023 aliphatic amine SAR

algal

_ chronic value 0.038 aliphatic amine SAR

Sewage Sludge 3-h EC50

_ Sewage Sludge

_ Chronic Value _

Ecotox Values Comments: Predictions are based on SARs for aliphatic amines and amides; SAR chemical class = aliphatic amine, amide; ; liquid; log Kow = 4.72 (EPI); S = 6.4 mg/L or dispersible in water at 25 C (P); p H7; effective concentrations based on 100% active ingredients and mean measured concentrations; hardness < 150.0 mg/L as CaCO3; and TOC<2.0 mg/L;

Factors Values Comments Assessment Factor 10 Concentration of Concern ( p pb) 1 amide SAR

SARs aliphatic amines and amides SAR Class aliphatic amine, amide Ecotox Category N one
Ecotox Factors Comments:

SAT Chair: J. Kwiat
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6040 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6040

 To prohibit the use of Federal funds for gender transition in minors.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 25, 2023

  Ms. Boebert (for herself, Mr. Biggs, Mr. Burlison, Mr. Tiffany, Mr. 
 Cloud, Mr. Brecheen, Mr. Ogles, Mr. Nehls, Mr. Good of Virginia, Mrs. 
  Miller of Illinois, and Mr. LaMalfa) introduced the following bill; 
   which was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit the use of Federal funds for gender transition in minors.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Our Kids from Harmful 
Research Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS FOR GENDER TRANSITION IN 
              MINORS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
Federal funds may be used to fund research or publications relating to 
gender transition in individuals under the age of 18, including any 
observational studies that gather evidence on the provision of hormonal 
treatments or surgical procedures on minors, for the purpose of--
            (1) affirming a minor's perception of his or her sex, if 
        that perception is incongruent with such minor's sex; or
            (2) affirming a minor's asserted identity, if the asserted 
        identity is incongruent with such minor's sex.
    (b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term ``sex'' 
shall be recognized based solely on a person's reproductive biology and 
genetics at birth.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

EXIBIT 99.1


                            CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of 3CI Complete Compliance Corporation
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I Otley L. Smith III, President of the Company, and I, James A. Cole, Chief
Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


/s/ OTLEY L. SMITH III
----------------------
Otley L. Smith III
President
February 14, 2003


/s/ JAMES A. COLE
----------------------
James A. Cole
Chief Financial Officer
February  14, 2003
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rashundria J. BURKES, a/k/a Roe, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6399

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 25, 2017

*252Rashundria J. Burkes, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Frank Daley, Jr., Jimmie Ewing, Stanley D. Ragsdale, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina; Carrie Fisher Sherard, Assistant United States Attorney, Andrew- Burke Moorman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina; Mark C. Moore, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Rashundria J. Burkes appeals the district court’s order denying her 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for a sentence reduction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Burkes,*No. 6:10-cr-00296-HMH-11 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT TONY CURTIS KILE, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. No. 98-6555 GEORGE TRENT, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Respondents-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. William M. Kidd, Senior District Judge. (CA-97-97-1) Submitted: July 30, 1998 Decided: August 31, 1998 Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Tony Curtis Kile, Appellant Pro Se. Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Rory Lee Perry, II, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). Appellant's conviction b ecame final on September 12, 1995. On April 23, 1997, Appellant filed a § 2254 petition. The district court denied relief because Appellant filed his petition outside the one-year limitation period imposed by 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2244(d) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). Pursuant to our r ecent decision in Brown v. Angelone , ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 96-7173, 96-7208, 1998 WL 389030 (4th Cir. July 14, 1998), Appellant had until April 23, 1997, in which to file a timely petition. Since Appellant filed his§ 2254 petition on April 23, 1997, it is therefore timely under Brown . Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order and remand this case for consideration on the merits. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
2
Lidale R. KELLUM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-1750

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Walker
Interactive Systems, Inc. quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period ended
March 31, 1998 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           5,818
<SECURITIES>                                    16,276
<RECEIVABLES>                                   26,333
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,133
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                43,040
<PP&E>                                          25,969
<DEPRECIATION>                                  21,546
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  87,956
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           30,438
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            14
<OTHER-SE>                                      52,193
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    87,956
<SALES>                                         23,662
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                23,662
<CGS>                                           10,769
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   22,332
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,638
<INCOME-TAX>                                       589
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,049
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.08<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.07
        

<FN> 
<F1> BASIC EARNINGS PER SHARE ARE REPORTED UNDER EDGAR TAG "EPS-PRIMARY".
</FN>

</TABLE>
GENERAL VOIR DIRE ISSUES

JURORS ERRONEOUSLY EXCUSED FOR CAUSE OVER

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION AND WITHOUT ALLOWING THE

DEFENSE AN OPPORTUNITY TO VOIR DIRE THE JURORS

APPELLANT’S ISSUES NO. 8

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE’S

CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE AGAINST VENIREPERSON MARY BOULOS

APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. 9

THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANTING THE STATE’S CHALLENGE FOR

CAUSE ON JUROR MARY BOULOS DENIED THE DEFENDANT HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER

ART. 1 SEC. 10 TEXAS CONSTITUTION

APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. 10

THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE STATE’S CHALLENGE FOR

CAUSE DENIED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE 5TH

,

6

TH

 AND 14

TH

 AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

APPELLANT’S ISSUES NO. 11

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE’S

CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE AGAINST VENIREPERSON JUDITH

MCDANIEL

APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO.12

THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANTING THE STATE’S CHALLENGE FOR

CAUSE ON JUROR JUDITH McDANIEL DENIED THE DEFENDANT HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER ART. 1 SEC. 10

TEXAS CONSTITUTION
APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. 13

THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE STATE’S CHALLENGE FOR

CAUSE DENIED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE 5TH

,

6

TH

 AND 14

TH

 AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. 14

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE’S 

CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE AGAINST VENIREPERSON JERRY PLANK

APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO.15

THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANTING THE STATE’S CHALLENGE FOR

CAUSE ON JUROR TERRY PLANK DENIED THE DEFENDANT HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER

ART. 1 SEC. 10 TEXAS CONSTITUTION

APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. 16

THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE STATE’S CHALLENGE FOR

CAUSE DENIED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE 5TH

,

6

TH

 AND 14

TH

 AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

APPELLANT’S ISSUES NO. 17

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING STATE’S CHALLENGE ON

JUROR FLOYD STANMORE OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE

DEFENSE
#### Melody L. COCHRAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A.; Western Progressive, LLC; Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56203

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted February 7, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed February 28, 2017

Louis P. Dell, Attorney, Law Office of Louis P. Dell, Burbank, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Emilie K. Edling, Houser & Allison, APC, Portland, OR, Eric D. Houser, Attorney, Houser & Allison, APC, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: SCHROEDER, PREGERSON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Plaintiff-Appellant Melody Cochran appeals the district court’s order dismissing her complaint, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and dependent state law claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA,*720 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

The FDCPA only imposes liability when an entity is attempting to collect a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). In her complaint, Cochran complains of Defendants-Appellees’ conduct related to the initiation of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of her property, i.e., sending three pre-foreclosure notices. Such activity, which is required under California nonjudicial foreclosure laws, is not debt collection activity as defined by the FDCPA. *Ho v. ReconTrust Co.,*840 F.3d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]ctions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice *612of sale, are not attempts to collect a ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the FDCPA claim and the dependent state law claims.

AFFIRMED. The issuance of the mandate in this case is STAYED pending the issuance of the mandate in *Ho v. Recon-Trust,*No. 10-56884. The requests for judicial notice are GRANTED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Richard CALIX, Appellee.

No. 3D16-2784

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed April 25, 2018.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Nikole Hiciano, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Woodward and Reizenstein, P.A., and Philip L. Reizenstein and Bhakti Kadiwar, for appellee.

Before LAGOA, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See**Reid v. State*, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1216, 1217, --- So.3d ----, ----, 2017 WL 2348615 (Fla. 3d DCA May 31, 2017)1 ("[W]e read *Atwell[ v. State*, 197 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2016) ] to reject the notion that Florida's current parole scheme provides the individualized consideration of a defendant's juvenile status required under *Miller[ v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ]. Since *Atwell*, and applying its holding, we have reversed trial court orders denying *Miller* postconviction claims even where, as in Reid's case, the presumptive parole release date was within the defendant's lifetime.") (Citations omitted); *Carter v. State*, 215 So.3d 125, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)2 ("Notwithstanding the fact that he will be reevaluated for the possibility of parole in 2022, we conclude the defendant is correct and that he is entitled to resentencing under sections 775.082(3)(c) and 921.1401.").

1

The Florida Supreme Court has stayed the proceedings in *Reid* pending disposition of *Franklin v. State*, No. SC14-1442. *See**State v. Reid*, SC17-1377.

2

The Florida Supreme Court has stayed the proceedings in *Carter* pending disposition of *Franklin v. State*, No. SC14-1442. *See**State v. Carter*, SC17-768.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank Demetric DICKERSON, Jr., a/k/a Frank Dixon, a/k/a Frankie D, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6119

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 26, 2017

*121Frank Demetric Dickerson, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Christine Manuelian, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; David Ira Salem, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Frank Demetric Dickerson, Jr., appeals the extent of the district court’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) reduction of his sentence based on an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court first reduced the sentence to 240 months, but in response to a timely Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) motion filed by the Government, the district court amended the judgement to 324 months’ imprisonment.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s order granting or denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion. *United States v. Muldrow,*844 F.3d 434, 437 (4th Cir. 2016). We review de novo the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). *See United States v. Olarte-Rojas,*820 F.3d 798, 804 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 232, 196 L.Ed.2d 179 (2016). Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court may reduce the term of imprisonment “of a defendant who has been sentenced ... based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The court cannot reduce the sentence under § 3582(c)(2) to a term less than the minimum of the amended Guidelines range, unless the original sentence was lower than the initial Guidelines range to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10(b)(2), p.s. (2015). Amendment 782 to the Guidelines lowered the offense levels applicable to most drug trafficking offenses by two levels and is retroactively applicable. *See*USSG § 1B1.10(d), p.s.; supp. app. C, amend. 782.

In granting Dickerson’s § 3582(c)(2) motion, the district court ultimately reduced Dickerson’s sentence to 324 months, at the bottom of his amended Guidelines range. The Guidelines make clear that Dickerson’s sentence could be proportionally reduced even further only if the original sentence had been so reduced based on substantial assistance. USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)-(B), p.s, *&*cmt. n.3 (prohibiting reduction below bottom of amended Guidelines range except for departures based on substantial assistance). Because Dickerson’s original sentence was not reduced to reflect substantial assistance, the district court was without authority to reduce Dickerson’s sentence below the amended Guidelines range; therefore, the court properly amended the 240-month sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented.in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Elizabeth Hope NORTH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-55509

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 27, 2017

Elizabeth Hope North, Pro Se

Adam F. Summerfield, Esquire, Attorney, Leslie M. Werlin, Esquire, McGuire-Woods LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Elizabeth Hope North appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismiss*576ing her diversity action alleging state law claims related to foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a denial of leave to amend a complaint. Zu*cco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp.,*552 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing North’s action without granting further leave to" amend because further amendment would be futile. *See id:*at 1007 (explaining that a district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has faded to cure deficiencies by previous amendments).

Appellees’ request for judicial notice, filed on December 4, 2014, is denied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Catherine HITZGES (Cormier), Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., and BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P., Appellees.

No. 4D17-3125

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 18, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### PARUS HOLDINGS INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. SALLIE MAE BANK, Navient Solutions Inc., PNC Bank, N.A., Suntrust Bank, Suntrust Mortgage Inc., Defendants-Appellees

2016-1179

2016-1180

2016-1181

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

February 27, 2017

*683Frank V. Pietrantonio, Cooley LLP, Reston, VA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by Nathan K. Cummings, Jonathan Garwood Graves; Louis James Hoffman, Hoffman Patent Firm, Scottsdale, AZ.

Lionel M. Lavenue, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Reston, VA, argued for all defendants-appellees. ' Defendants-appellees PNC Bank, N.A., Suntrust Bank, Suntrust Mortgage Ine. also represented by Daniel Craig Cooley; Shaton C. Menzie, Atlanta, GA.

Luke Pedersen, Baker Botts, LLP, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee Sallie Mae Bank.

Jason W. Cook, McGuireWoods LLP, Dallas, TX, for defendant-appellee Navient Solutions Inc. Also represented by Brian David Schmalzbach, Richmond, VA.

(Newman, Mayer, and O’Malley, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.