NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

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IN RE NAREN CHAGANTI 

__________________________ 

2011-1344 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 

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Decided: March 9, 2012 

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NAREN CHAGANTI, of Town & Country, Missouri, pro 

se. 

RAYMOND T. CHEN, Solicitor, United States Patent & 

Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for 

appellee. With him on the brief was SYDNEY O. JOHNSON,

JR., Associate Solicitor. 

__________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Naren Chaganti (“Chaganti”) appeals the decision by 

the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) 

affirming the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (“PTO”) 

rejection of all pending claims of U.S. Patent Application 
IN RE CHAGANTI 2

Serial No. 09/307,752 (“the ’752 application”) and the 

Board’s subsequent denial of Chaganti’s Request for 

Reconsideration. Based on the discussion below, we 

AFFIRM. 

BACKGROUND

The ’752 application claims an “invention [] related to 

the area of publicly traded securities and other financial 

instruments.” ’752 Application. Chaganti’s claimed 

invention enables intangible property owners to sell 

shares of the property to the highest bidder. Id. Claim 7 

is representative and reads as follows: 

7. A computer-implemented method of marketing an intangible property interest, the 

method comprising the steps of: 

establishing an electronic marketplace; 

assigning an identifier to said intangible 

property interest; storing the identifier; 

 receiving a bid for purchase of said intangible property interest; and 

 selling said intangible property interest. 

’752 application, claim 7 (emphasis added). 

The Board found that that the term “intangible property” was not clearly defined in the specification and did 

not exclude stocks and bonds; the Board therefore determined that the ’752 application was either anticipated 

under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) by U.S. Patent No. 5,873,071 

(“Ferstenberg”) or rejected as being obvious under 35 

U.S.C. § 103(a) over Ferstenberg. Ex parte Chaganti, No. 

2009-012123 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010).1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4). 

 1 The Board also determined the claims of the ’752 

application to be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 
3 IN RE CHAGANTI

DISCUSSION

We review the PTO’s claim construction de novo. In re 

Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

During examination, the PTO gives claims “their broadest 

reasonable construction consistent with the specification . 

. . . [C]laim language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill 

in the art.” In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1259-

60 (citations omitted). “The specification contains a 

written description of the invention which must be clear 

and complete enough to enable those of ordinary skill in 

the art to make and use it.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.1996). “Thus, 

the specification is always highly relevant to the claim 

construction analysis.” Id. This court reviews the Board’s 

interpretation of disputed claim language to determine 

whether it is “reasonable.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 

1054-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 

The primary argument Chaganti makes on appeal 

challenges the PTO’s interpretation that “intangible 

property” does not exclude “stocks and bonds.” Chaganti 

argues he is able to act as his own lexicographer, having 

defined “intangible property” in the specification so that it 

excludes stocks and bonds; he asserts that the specification clearly illustrates the intent to exclude stocks and 

bonds. Chaganti also argues that the PTO erred in not 

considering the specification. 

Chaganti is correct that “[a] patentee may act as its 

own lexicographer and assign to a term a unique definition that is different from its ordinary and customary 

 

over multiple other prior art references. However, it 

seems that Appellant only challenges the Board’s conclusions regarding Ferstenberg. See Appellant’s Informal 

Reply Brief (“Appellant’s Reply”) at 1-5. 
IN RE CHAGANTI 4

meaning; however, a patentee must clearly express that 

intent in the written description.” Helmsderfer v. Bobrick 

Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 

2008) (emphasis added). Here the specification does not 

clearly define “intangible property” or indicate the patentee’s intent to exclude stocks and bonds from the phrase 

“intangible property.” 

The specification begins: “This invention is related to 

the area of publicly traded securities and other financial 

instruments,” ’752 application at 1, which may be reasonably understood to encompass stocks and bonds. The 

patent then recites a non-exclusive list of what this particular invention is “related to,” offering a wide variety of 

potential subject matters: 

the use of an electronic apparatus to issue, list, 

price and trade property interests in intangible 

forms of property such as patents, trademarks, 

copyrights, goodwill, licenses, leases, easements, 

rights, a seafaring route and others; personal 

rights such as a right to future income of a person; 

special objects such as collectibles; and services 

such as a musician’s concert recital time or a 

babysitter’s time. 

Id. The specification also states: 

It should be noted that though a certain types of 

properties [sic] are discussed in the foregoing, that 

discussion is by no means limited to the actual 

types of properties used as an illustration. Thus, 

the invented method and system should not be 

limited by the discussion provided herein. 

Id. at 6. 

The specification’s list of subject matters relating to 

the invention makes it difficult to determine the defini-
5 IN RE CHAGANTI

tion of “intangible property.” In addition, by its very 

terms, the specification is confusing. It notes that “no 

publicly tradeable stock marketplace exists for the sale of 

certain non-corporate, non-commodity forms of property,” 

citing again to the list above, and adds later that “[t]here 

is a need, therefore, for a system and method to accommodate sales of such tangibles and intangibles in the 

marketplace.” Id. at 1-2. The imprecise and unclear use 

of the terms “stock,” “non-corporate,” “non-commodity,” 

“tangible,” and “intangible,” complicates the meaning of 

“intangible property” and its limitations. 

Chaganti is correct that the specification also states 

that “according to the present invention, trading shares in 

an electronic communication medium involves subject 

matter other than a corporate stock, bond, option, or 

futures contracts to delivery of commodities.” Id. at 9. 

Indeed, the specification states “the invention is directed 

toward a method and system to issue, list, price, and 

trade securities in certain forms of special property for 

which no publicly tradeable marketplaces currently exist,” 

while also drawing a contrast, numerous times, to established systems such as the New York Stock Exchange. Id.

at 1-2.2 Chaganti contends that this disclosure is a clear 

indication that the meaning of “intangible property” as 

used in the specification excludes stocks and bonds. 

However, since the term “intangible property” is not 

clearly defined, nor do the embodiments of the invention 

disclosed in the specification reveal a clear intent to 

exclude stocks and bonds from the scope of the claims, the 

 2 Chaganti also asserts that the PTO erred by not 

separately addressing the dependent claims. Since 

Chaganti does not make distinct arguments with respect 

to the patentability of the dependent claims on appeal, 

however, those claims fall along with the independent 

claims. 
IN RE CHAGANTI 6

Board’s construction of “intangible property” is reasonable 

in view of the written description, and how the written 

description would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill 

in the art. 

CONCLUSION

The Board reasonably determined that the contested 

claim term encompasses stocks and bonds, and we therefore affirm the anticipation and obviousness rejections 

made to the claims. 

AFFIRMED.