Present: All the Justices 

SAMAD ORAEE, M.D., ET AL. 

v. Record No. 050206 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 November 4, 2005 

HARLIS C. BREEDING, JR., 

EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF 

SHERRY E. BREEDING, DECEASED 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge 

In this appeal, we revisit the scope of immunity from 

civil liability afforded a physician under Code § 8.01-

581.18(B) and our decision in Auer v. Miller, 270 Va. 172, 

613 S.E.2d 421 (2005). We conclude that the immunity 

applies only when a physician fails to review, or take 

action in response to the receipt of, a report containing 

the results of a laboratory test or examination conducted 

“not at the request or with the written authorization of a 

physician.” Code § 8.01-581.18(A). Thus, we will affirm 

the judgment of the circuit court refusing to grant 

immunity pursuant to Code § 8.01-581.18(B) to a physician 

who failed to obtain the results of certain laboratory 

tests requested by another physician. In reaching this 

result, we will also overrule our decision in Auer. 

MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS 

The appellee, Harlis C. Breeding Jr., executor of the 

estate of Sherry E. Breeding, deceased, filed a medical 
2

malpractice action against Samad Oraee, M.D., and his 

employer, Samad Oraee M.D., P.C., (collectively, Dr. 

Oraee). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 

plaintiff against Dr. Oraee.1 In a motion for summary 

judgment and in motions to strike the plaintiff’s evidence 

both at the close of that evidence and at the conclusion of 

all the evidence, Dr. Oraee argued that he was immune from 

civil liability pursuant to Code § 8.01-581.18(B). The 

circuit court denied the various motions and entered 

judgment for the plaintiff. 

The events precipitating this medical malpractice 

action commenced on January 3, 2003, when the decedent 

sought treatment at an emergency room for complaints of 

facial drooping. Dr. Oraee was called in for a neurology 

consultation. Because a certain test was not available 

during the weekend hours at the hospital where the decedent 

first went, Dr. Oraee transferred her to a different 

hospital so that she could undergo a test known as a 

 1 Breeding also named as defendants Magnus K. 

Ikhinmwin, M.D., and Mert Kivanc, D.O., along with their 

respective employers, Northern Virginia Nephrology 

Associates, P.C., and Mert Kivanc, D.O., P.C. The jury 

found in favor of the plaintiff against Dr. Kivanc and his 

employer, but it returned a verdict against the plaintiff 

in favor of Dr. Ikhinmwin and his employer. The issue in 

this appeal does not involve these defendants. 
3

magnetic resonance imaging scan (MRI) of her brain.2 The 

MRI revealed that the decedent had suffered a stroke as 

well as prior strokes on both sides of her brain. She had 

not, however, exhibited symptoms of a stroke until she 

experienced the facial drooping associated with the stroke 

that caused her to go to the emergency room. 

As a result of the MRI and other diagnostic tests, Dr. 

Oraee ruled out several possible causes for the decedent’s 

strokes. At that point, he was left with a possible 

diagnosis of a “clotting disorder” perhaps caused by 

“antiphospholipid antibody syndrome.”3

 Consequently, Dr. 

Oraee requested a rheumatology consultation by Dr. Kivanc. 

On January 7, 2003, while the decedent was still 

hospitalized, Dr. Kivanc evaluated the decedent’s condition 

and ordered multiple laboratory tests. Some of the tests 

were specifically for the purpose of determining whether 

the decedent had antiphospholipid antibody syndrome. Dr. 

 2

 Dr. Ikhinmwin was listed as the decedent’s attending 

physician at the second hospital. 

3

 According to one expert witness who testified at 

trial, the term “antiphospholipid antibody syndrome” means 

“a syndrome of probably several different causes in which 

the body inappropriately makes antibodies or has other 

derangements, abnormalities in the clotting system that 

makes it more likely for [a person] to have clots.” 

Another expert witness characterized it as “a hyper 

coagulable state, which means that patients have excessive 

clotting and form small thrombi or little clots 

characteristically in both veins and arteries.” 
4

Oraee knew that Dr. Kivanc had seen the decedent and had 

ordered those particular blood tests. Dr. Oraee also knew 

that it would take five to ten days for the results of the 

tests to be available. 

The next day, January 8, Dr. Oraee discharged the 

decedent from the hospital and told her to follow up with 

him as an outpatient. An appointment was scheduled for the 

decedent to come to Dr. Oraee’s office on January 22. 

Because the decedent’s daughter called Dr. Oraee’s office 

and reported that her mother was not feeling well, the 

appointment was changed to January 17. At that 

appointment, Dr. Oraee knew that the clotting disorder was 

still being considered as the cause of the decedent’s 

strokes, but he did not take any action to obtain the 

results of the blood tests that had been outstanding at the 

time of the decedent’s discharge from the hospital. The 

results of the tests, which were available on January 13, 

confirmed that the decedent had antiphospholipid antibody 

syndrome. Instead, Dr. Oraee discontinued one of the two 

antiplatelet medications that had been prescribed at the 

time of her discharge from the hospital and reported to her 

primary care physician that the decedent was “much better.” 

On January 29, the decedent was again admitted to a 

hospital, having suffered “a second massive stroke.” 
5

During that admission, the diagnosis of antiphospholipid 

antibody syndrome was again confirmed, and the decedent, 

for the first time, was placed on anticoagulant medication. 

As a result of that stroke, the decedent died on March 12, 

2003. 

During the trial of this action, two doctors testified 

as expert witnesses for the plaintiff with regard to the 

allegations against Dr. Oraee. Both witnesses concluded 

that the decedent had antiphospholipid antibody syndrome 

and that she should have been placed on anticoagulant 

medication, as opposed to antiplatelet medication, no later 

than January 17 when Dr. Oraee saw her in his office 

following her discharge from the hospital. Both experts 

also opined that, if the decedent had been placed on 

anticoagulant medication on January 17, she would not have 

suffered the subsequent massive stroke on January 29 and 

would still be alive. 

With regard to the question whether Dr. Oraee breached 

the applicable standard of care, one of the witnesses, Dr. 

Bruce T. Adornato, testifying as an expert in the field of 

neurology, opined that, subsequent to the decedent’s 

discharge from the hospital and the laboratory test results 

becoming available, the standard of care required Dr. Oraee 

to inquire about and obtain the results of the tests. This 
6

is so because the results were abnormal and had 

implications for the decedent’s treatment. Dr. Adornato 

further testified that the standard of care required Dr. 

Oraee to offer the decedent the opportunity to be treated 

with anticoagulant medication, “i.e., Coumadin rather than 

just aspirin.” During cross-examination, Dr. Adornato 

agreed that Dr. Oraee’s treatment of the decedent did not 

fall below the applicable standard of care until January 

17, when Dr. Oraee should have diagnosed antiphospholipid 

antibody syndrome and offered the decedent appropriate 

treatment. But, as Dr. Adornato explained, Dr. Oraee could 

not have made the correct diagnosis without the results of 

the laboratory tests. 

The other witness, Dr. Lee Levitt, an expert in the 

fields of hematology and medical oncology, testified 

similarly. Dr. Levitt opined that, at the time of the 

decedent’s follow-up visit on January 17, Dr. Oraee 

breached the standard of care by not being aware of the 

results of the laboratory tests, which would have made “a 

clear difference in her diagnosis and in management.” As 

Dr. Levitt explained, Dr. Oraee was involved in the request 

for a consultation by a rheumatologist, the appropriate 

laboratory tests were requested to make a diagnosis of 
7

antiphospholipid antibody syndrome, those tests were 

performed, and the results were available. 

ANALYSIS 

The sole question in this case is whether the circuit 

court erred in refusing to grant Dr. Oraee immunity from 

civil liability pursuant to the provisions of Code § 8.01-

581.18(B). The question is one of law, meaning that we 

review the circuit court’s resolution of it de novo. 

Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 Va. 546, 552, 611 S.E.2d 

366, 369 (2005). The statute at issue states: 

Any physician shall be immune from civil 

liability for any failure to review, or to take 

any action in response to the receipt of, any 

report of the results of any laboratory test or 

other examination of the physical or mental 

condition of any person, which test or 

examination such physician neither requested nor 

authorized in writing, unless such report is 

provided directly to the physician by the person 

so examined or tested with a request for 

consultation or by the State Department of 

Health. 

Code § 8.01-581.18(B). 

 As both parties recognize, answering the question 

raised in this appeal implicates our recent decision in 

Auer. There, the trial court granted immunity under Code 

§ 8.01-581.18(B) to a defendant doctor, Nicolas Auer’s 

cardiologist, for his alleged failure to review or to take 

any action in response to the results of a laboratory test 
8

ordered by a cardiovascular surgeon during Auer’s 

hospitalization. Auer, 270 Va. at 175, 613 S.E.2d at 422. 

Auer had undergone surgery to remove his native aortic 

valve and to replace it with a prosthetic valve. Id. at 

175-76, 613 S.E.2d at 423. The surgeon had ordered a 

culture and sensitivity test on the native valve, and the 

results of the test were positive for staphylococcus. Id.

at 176, 613 S.E.2d at 423. The cardiologist saw Auer 

several times during the hospitalization and prepared a 

discharge summary, but he never reviewed the report of the 

test results even though the report had been posted to 

Auer’s chart. Id. The surgeon likewise failed to review 

the report. Id. Consequently, the infection remained 

untreated, and Auer subsequently died from endocarditis. 

Id.

 On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 

Id. at 179, 613 S.E.2d at 423. We found “the language of 

subsection B of Code § 8.01-581.18 to be clear and 

unambiguous” and stated that this subsection 

clearly provides that a physician shall be immune 

from civil liability for any failure to take any 

action in response to a laboratory test or other 

examination that the physician did not request or 

authorize unless the person tested or examined 

provides a copy of the report of the results and 

requests a consultation. 
9

Id. at 177, 613 S.E.2d at 423. We concluded that Code 

§ 8.01-581.18(B) applied to the cardiologist because he 

“neither requested nor authorized” the culture and 

sensitivity test and Auer did not provide him with the 

report of the test results and request a consultation. Id.

at 177, 613 S.E.2d at 424. 

 Dr. Oraee argues that, since the allegations 

concerning his breach of the standard of care were confined 

to his failure to obtain the results of the blood tests 

ordered by Dr. Kivanc and to respond with appropriate 

treatment, our holding in Auer is dispositive of the 

question presented in this case. Dr. Oraee further points 

out that there is no evidence that the decedent provided 

the results of those blood tests to him with a request for 

consultation. Thus, in Dr. Oraee’s view, “all the elements 

for granting immunity were in place and [the plaintiff] 

offered no other theory of liability against [him] 

independent of the test results.” 

 Responding, the plaintiff asserts that Auer is 

factually distinguishable from the present case and thus 

not controlling. The plaintiff points out that the 

cardiologist in Auer did not know about the culture and 

sensitivity test ordered by the cardiovascular surgeon and 

was not involved in the decision to order that test. Id.
10

at 176, 613 S.E.2d at 423. Continuing, the plaintiff 

emphasizes that Dr. Oraee, unlike Auer’s cardiologist, made 

a possible diagnosis of antiphospholipid antibody syndrome 

and consequently requested the rheumatology consultation; 

he knew that Dr. Kivanc had ordered specific blood tests to 

determine whether the decedent had this clotting disorder; 

he knew at the time of the plaintiff’s discharge from the 

hospital that the results of the test would not be 

available for five to ten days; and he scheduled a followup appointment for the decedent. In the plaintiff’s words, 

“[s]imply because [Dr. Oraee] failed to sign the slip for 

the lab work does not mean that he did not authorize or 

intend for the lab work to be completed, thus making [Code 

§ 8.01-581.18(B)], and Auer, inapposite.” The plaintiff 

also claims that Dr. Oraee’s overall breach of the standard 

of care was his failure to properly diagnose and treat the 

decedent’s condition and that it was not merely Dr. Oraee’s 

failure to review and respond to the results of the 

laboratory tests. 

 Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that subsection A 

and subsection B of Code § 8.01-581.18 must be read 

together and that subsection B cannot be viewed in 

isolation. According to the plaintiff, the intent of the 

statute is to direct the appropriate course of action when 
11

an individual, as opposed to a physician, requests a 

laboratory test or examination. The plaintiff contends the 

provisions of subsection A require the report of the 

results of such test or examination to be delivered to the 

individual who was tested or examined and to state in bold 

type that the individual has the responsibility to arrange 

for a consultation with a physician to review the report 

and interpret the results. 

In light of the context in which subsection A applies, 

the plaintiff further argues that subsection B grants 

immunity only when a physician fails to review, or take 

action in response to the receipt of, a report containing 

the results of a test or examination obtained by an 

individual on his/her own initiative. In other words, the 

plaintiff’s position is that subsection B does not come 

into play if the report at issue contains the result of a 

test or examination requested or authorized by a physician. 

This interpretation, in the plaintiff’s view, is consistent 

with the language of the statute when read as a whole, 

including its title “Delivery of results of laboratory 

tests and other examinations not authorized by physician; 

immunity of physician.” Code § 8.01-581.18. 

 We do not agree with the plaintiff’s position that the 

present case is factually distinguishable from our decision 
12

in Auer. Like the cardiologist in Auer, Dr. Oraee failed 

to review an available and critical report reflecting the 

results of a laboratory test that another physician had 

authorized. In both instances, the report contained 

information that directly affected the appropriate medical 

treatment for the patient. For purposes of deciding the 

question before us, it does not matter that Dr. Oraee knew 

about the laboratory tests ordered by Dr. Kivanc. 

Nor are we persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that 

Dr. Oraee implicitly authorized the laboratory tests at 

issue. Dr. Oraee’s request for the rheumatology 

consultation after he suspected that the decedent had 

antiphospholipid antibody syndrome is not the same as 

requesting laboratory tests. Likewise, we do not agree 

with the plaintiff’s assertion that the breach of the 

standard of care at issue was something more than Dr. 

Oraee’s failure to review and take appropriate action in 

response to the report of the laboratory test results. 

 Thus, we turn to the plaintiff’s argument regarding 

the proper interpretation of Code § 8.01-581.18. To adopt 

the plaintiff’s position would require that we overrule our 

decision in Auer, and he asks us to do so. Thus, the 

doctrine of stare decisis is necessarily implicated. 
13

 That doctrine plays a significant role in the 

orderly administration of justice by assuring 

consistent, predictable, and balanced application 

of legal principles. And when a court of last 

resort has established a precedent, after full 

deliberation upon the issue by the court, the 

precedent will not be treated lightly or ignored, 

in the absence of flagrant error or mistake. 

Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 

S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987) (citing Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160, 

169, 112 S.E. 757, 760 (1922)); accord Pulliam v. Coastal 

Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 10, 509 

S.E.2d 307, 312 (1999); Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 

252-53, 492 S.E.2d 126, 128-29 (1997). The question, then, 

is whether our decision in Auer was a “flagrant error or 

mistake.” Selected Risks, 233 Va. at 265, 355 S.E.2d at 

581. 

In Auer, we did not expressly address the argument 

that, when subsection B is read in light of subsection A, 

the immunity granted in subsection B is available only when 

the report at issue is one generated as a result of an 

individual’s request, as opposed to a physician’s request 

or written authorization, for a laboratory test or 

examination. Instead, we focused solely on the provisions 

of subsection B in reaching our decision. 

However, we have a duty, whenever possible, “to 

interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent 
14

and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative 

goal.” Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Board of County 

Supervisors of Prince William County, 226 Va. 382, 387-88 

309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983). Generally, the Court “will 

look to the whole body of [a statute] to determine the true 

intention of each part.” McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 

287, 292, 99 S.E.2d 623, 627 (1957); accord Rockingham 

Coop. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. City of Harrisonburg, 171 Va. 

339, 344, 198 S.E. 908, 910 (1938). “[A] statute should be 

read and considered as a whole, and the language of a 

statute should be examined in its entirety to determine the 

intent of the General Assembly from the words contained in 

the statute.” Department of Medical Assistance Servs. v. 

Beverly Healthcare of Fredericksburg, 268 Va. 278, 285, 601 

S.E.2d 604, 607-08 (2004). “In doing so, the various parts 

of the statute should be harmonized so that, if 

practicable, each is given a sensible and intelligent 

effect.” Colchester Towne Condominium Council of Co-Owners 

v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 266 Va. 46, 51, 581 S.E.2d 201, 203 

(2003) (citing VEPCO v. Prince William Co., 226 Va. 382, 

387-88, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983)).

Applying these principles requires subsection B of 

Code § 8.01-581.18 to be construed together with subsection 

A. As the plaintiff argues, subsection A pertains only to 
15

a laboratory test or examination conducted “not at the 

request or with the written authorization of a physician.” 

Code § 8.01-581.18(A). For example, subsection A is 

applicable when a person elects, on his/her own initiative, 

to be tested for a sexually transmitted disease. In other 

words, the testing would not be done at the request of or 

with written authorization from a physician. In that 

situation, the report stating the results of the test would 

be provided directly to the person who was the subject of 

the test. Id. The individual tested would then have the 

responsibility to arrange for a consultation with a 

physician about the test results. Id. The report itself 

would have to state this responsibility in bold type. Id.

With that understanding of subsection A, it then 

follows that the immunity from civil liability granted in 

subsection B applies only when a physician is charged with 

failing to review, or take action in response to receiving, 

a report of the results of a laboratory test or examination 

conducted “not at the request or with the written 

authorization of a physician.” Code § 8.01-581.18(A). The 

immunity granted in subsection B in essence follows the 

report described in subsection A. Subsection B insulates 

from civil liability any physician who fails to review that 

report or to take any action in response to receiving it. 
16

That immunity, however, is not available if “such report is 

provided directly to the physician by the person so 

examined or tested with a request for consultation.” Code 

§ 8.01-581.18(B). The circumstance eliminating a 

physician’s immunity in subsection B corresponds to the 

provision in subsection A requiring a report of a 

laboratory test or examination “conducted . . . not at the 

request or with the written authorization of a physician” 

to be provided directly to the person tested or examined. 

Code § 8.01-581.18(A). That common requirement reflects 

the General Assembly’s intent that these two subsections be 

“considered as a whole.” Department of Medical Assistance 

Servs., 268 Va. at 285, 601 S.E.2d at 607. Overall, the 

provisions of Code § 8.01-581.18, create a mechanism for 

handling reports of the results of laboratory tests or 

examinations requested by an individual rather than by a 

physician. The statute does not pertain to reports of 

laboratory tests or examinations requested or authorized by 

a physician. 

To grant Dr. Oraee immunity under Code § 8.01-

581.18(B) would lead to consequences the General Assembly 

could not have intended. Assume that a physician orders a 

blood test that preliminarily suggests the need for 

surgery, and the physician then refers the patient to a 
17

surgeon. Assume further that the final report of the blood 

test results demonstrates that surgery is not necessary, 

but the surgeon never reviews the final report and proceeds 

with surgery. Under Dr. Oraee’s interpretation of 

subsection B and our decision in Auer, the surgeon would be 

immune from civil liability for breaching the standard of 

care merely because he did not personally request or 

authorize the blood test. Furthermore, since the patient 

in this hypothetical did not request the blood test, the 

patient would not receive the report with the warning in 

bold type that is it the patient’s responsibility to 

arrange for consultation with a physician about the report. 

Thus, we conclude that our decision in Auer was a 

mistake. While we adhere strongly to the doctrine of stare 

decisis in this Commonwealth, this is one of those rare 

situations in which we cannot perpetuate a clearly 

incorrect application of the law. See Nunnally, 254 Va. at 

253, 492 S.E.2d at 129. It is “this Court’s obligation to 

reexamine critically its precedent” and, by doing so, 

“confidence in the judiciary” and “the importance of stare 

decisis in our jurisprudence” will be enhanced. Id.

CONCLUSION 

 The doctrine [of stare decisis] grows out of 

the necessity for a uniform and settled rule of 

property, and definite basis for contracts and 
18

business transactions. If a decision is wrong, it 

is only when it has been so long the rule of 

action as that time and its continued 

application, as the rule of right between 

parties, demand the sanction of its error; 

because when a decision has been recognized as 

the law of property, and conflicting demands have 

been adjusted, and contracts have been made with 

reference to and on the faith of it, greater 

injustice would be done to individuals, and more 

injury result to society by a reversal of such 

decision, though erroneous, than to follow and 

observe it. But when a decision is not of this 

character, upon no sound principle do we feel at 

liberty to perpetuate an error into which either 

our predecessors or ourselves may have 

inadvertently fallen, merely upon the ground of 

such erroneous decision having been previously 

rendered. 

Burks v. Hinton, 77 Va. 1, 24-25 (1883) (quoting Willis v. 

Owen, 43 Tex. 41, 48-49 (1875)). 

 To reaffirm our decision in Auer would perpetuate a 

mistake. Thus, the holding in Auer pertaining to Code 

§ 8.01-581.18(B) is expressly overruled. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the circuit court did not err in refusing to 

grant immunity to Dr. Oraee under the provisions of Code 

§ 8.01-581.18(B), nor did it err in denying Dr. Oraee’s 

various motions and jury instruction dealing with this 

statutory provision. For these reasons, we will affirm the 

judgment of the circuit court. 

Affirmed. 

JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN and JUSTICE KOONTZ 

join, dissenting. 
19

The majority overrules our recent decision in Auer v. 

Miller, 270 Va. 172, 613 S.E.2d 421 (2005), interpreting 

Code § 8.01-581.18(B), by finding that decision to be a 

"mistake." In doing so, the majority holds that subsection 

A of Code § 8.01-581.18 restricts the application of the 

immunity provision of subsection B to only those laboratory 

tests described in subsection A. I believe subsection B 

clearly provides otherwise and therefore our analysis of 

Code § 8.01-581.18 in Auer correctly applied the statute 

and was not in error. Further, I also believe the majority 

fails to properly observe the long-standing role of the 

doctrine of stare decisis by overruling Auer. 

I. STARE DECISIS

It is a bedrock foundation of our jurisprudence 

that prior decisions of this Court are entitled to 

respect and deference under the doctrine of stare 

decisis. The doctrine is foundational because 

in a well ordered society it is important for 

people to know what their legal rights are, not 

only under constitutions and legislative 

enactments but also as defined by judicial 

precedent, and when they have conducted their 

affairs in reliance thereon they ought not to 

have their rights swept away by judicial decree 

. . . . 

Myers v. Moore, 204 Va. 409, 413, 131 S.E.2d 414, 417 

(1963). 
20

Heralded as “one of the most important principles in 

the structure of our law,” stare decisis entails more than 

a passing reference or fleeting mention. Id.; see also

Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 

S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987). As this Court has stated, 

[stare decisis] plays a significant role in the 

orderly administration of justice by assuring 

consistent, predictable, and balanced application 

of legal principles. And when a court of last 

resort has established a precedent, after full 

deliberation upon the issue by the court, the 

precedent will not be treated lightly or ignored, 

in the absence of flagrant error or mistake. 

Selected Risks, 233 Va. at 265, 355 S.E.2d at 581. 

 In my view, the majority has failed to articulate a 

compelling argument that the unanimous opinion of this 

Court in Auer was of such a degree of error that stare 

decisis can be cast aside. Reversing a prior opinion of 

this court, particularly where the grounds to do so are so 

open to question, lessens the value of stare decisis for 

our jurisprudence as a whole. See Newman v. Erie Ins. 

Exch., 256 Va. 501, 510-11, 507 S.E.2d 348, 353 (1998) 

(Compton, J., dissenting) (“Frequent overruling of an 

appellate court’s decisions tends to bring adjudications of 

the tribunal ‘into the same class as a restricted railroad 

ticket, good for this day and train only.’ ”). 

II. CODE § 8.01-581.18 
21

Code § 8.01-581.18 provides as follows: 

A. Whenever a laboratory test or other 

examination of the physical or mental condition 

of any person is conducted by or under the 

supervision of a person other than a physician 

and not at the request or with the written 

authorization of a physician, any report of the 

results of such test or examination shall be 

provided by the person conducting such test or 

examination to the person who was the subject of 

such test or examination. Such report shall state 

in bold type that it is the responsibility of the 

recipient to arrange with his physician for 

consultation and interpretation of the results of 

such test or examination. The provisions of this 

subsection shall not apply to any test or 

examination conducted under the auspices of the 

State Department of Health. 

B. Any physician shall be immune from civil 

liability for any failure to review, or to take 

any action in response to the receipt of, any 

report of the results of any laboratory test or 

other examination of the physical or mental 

condition of any person, which test or 

examination such physician neither requested nor 

authorized in writing, unless such report is 

provided directly to the physician by the person 

so examined or tested with a request for 

consultation or by the State Department of 

Health.4

The majority maintains that Auer was in error because 

it failed to read subsection B "in light of subsection A." 

The majority opines that because subsection B follows 

subsection A, "[t]he immunity granted in subsection B in 

essence follows the report [prepared by a non-physician] 

described in subsection A." The majority partly bases its 

 4

 Code § 8.01-581.18(C) is omitted as it has no bearing 

on any issues before the Court. 
22

holding on the view that since subsection B follows 

subsection A in the statute, the later subsection should be 

read only as referencing the first subsection. I am aware 

of no rule of statutory construction which directs such a 

reading, and the majority cites none. We have not held 

that a statutory subsection must be read solely in 

reference to the subsection it follows; rather, we are 

always guided by the plain language of the statute as the 

General Assembly has written it. 

As noted below, neither subsection A nor B of Code 

§ 8.01-581.18 are ambiguous. The plain language of each 

subsection establishes a legal duty or action wholly 

independent of the other. Further, the plain language of 

subsection B establishes physician immunity for certain 

laboratory tests which is not dependent upon or 

circumscribed in any way by the provisions of subsection A. 

The General Assembly knows how to write subsection B as the 

majority construes that subsection, but it did not do so. 

Our duty is "to construe the law as it is written." 

Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v. City of 

Chesapeake, 218 Va. 696, 702, 240 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1978). 

"To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to 

alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret." 
23

Faulkner v. Town of South Boston, 141 Va. 517, 524, 127 

S.E. 380, 382 (1925). Thus, 

[w]e presume that the legislature chose, 

with care, the words it used when it enacted the 

statute. Courts cannot add language to the 

statute the General Assembly has not seen fit to 

include. Nor are they permitted to accomplish the 

same result by judicial interpretation. Where the 

General Assembly has expressed its intent in 

clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the 

province of the judiciary to add words to the 

statute or alter its plain meaning. 

Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 

S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

As the majority opinion accurately recites, Code 

§ 8.01-581.18(A) provides that the results of a laboratory 

test made "not at the request or with the written 

authorization of a physician" shall be provided "to the 

person who was the subject of that test." Further, 

subsection A mandates that it is solely the recipient's 

responsibility to arrange for any "such test" to be 

reviewed by a physician. The plain language of subsection 

A does not address any other subject. There is no 

ambiguity in subsection A and the majority cites none. 

Thus, subsection A fulfills a distinct and independent 

purpose to direct the result of non-physician ordered 

laboratory tests to the subject of the test and to place 
24

responsibility solely on that person for any further 

review. Subsection A thus sets forth a substantive 

provision of law in and of itself. 

Subsection A of Code § 8.01-581.18 makes no reference 

to subsection B or to immunity of physicians in any way. 

Importantly, neither does subsection B make reference to 

subsection A. 

Subsection B plainly provides, as we noted in Auer, 

that "[a]ny physician shall be immune from civil liability 

for any failure to review . . . any report of the results 

of any laboratory test . . . which test . . . such 

physician neither requested nor authorized in writing." 

Code § 8.01-581.18(B)(emphasis added). Nothing in the 

straightforward language of subsection B limits the scope 

of its granted immunity only to tests described in 

subsection A. There is no ambiguity in subsection B, and 

the majority cites none. Instead, subsection B provides 

exactly for what the General Assembly wrote: immunity for 

physicians from liability for failure to review any

laboratory test the physician did not order or authorize. 

As in the case at bar and Auer, that immunity encompasses 

laboratory tests ordered by physicians other than the 

defendant physician. 
25

Subsection B thus sets forth a substantive provision 

of law in and of itself. It fulfills a distinct and 

independent purpose, wholly different from that of 

subsection A, by granting immunity to any physician 

regarding any laboratory test the physician "neither 

requested nor authorized in writing." Code § 8.01-

581.18(B). While, a fortiori, this would include a 

laboratory test ordered by a non-physician under subsection 

A, absolutely nothing in Code § 8.01-581.18 limits the 

application of subsection B physician immunity to only 

subsection A non-physician ordered tests. The plain 

language of the statute means what it says, and we have no 

authority to rewrite the statute by judicial decision. 

Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 

365 (2001). 

Although the language of Code § 8.01-581.18 is plain, 

the majority nevertheless maintains that subsection A's 

limitation to tests administered by non-physicians should 

be read into subsection B in order to construe those 

provisions together as a "consistent and harmonious whole." 

But nothing in Auer's construction of Code § 8.01-581.18(B) 

creates an inconsistency within the statute. There is no 

requirement that two sections of the same statute be 

interdependent unless the statute so provides by its terms, 
26

and Code § 8.01-581.18 does not. Acknowledging subsection 

B to have a meaning separate, distinct and independent from 

subsection A does not create an inconsistent statute. As 

noted above, each subsection has a particular purpose 

independent and free standing of the other under the plain 

language of the statute. 

Subsection A simply directs a laboratory to send the 

test results of a non-physician ordered test to the subject 

of that test and imposes responsibility upon that person to 

arrange for any physician review. Separate and distinct 

from this function, subsection B provides physician 

immunity from "any failure to review . . . any report . . . 

of any laboratory test . . . which test . . . such 

physician neither requested nor authorized in writing." 

(Emphasis added). While related, each subsection has a 

distinct and independent focus and stands alone without 

need of the other in establishing a substantive legal 

requirement. 

The majority's contention that the language in 

subsection B which limits physician immunity where a 

laboratory "report is provided directly to the physician by 

the person so examined" somehow limits subsection B 

immunity only to subsection A tests is erroneous. As fully 

discussed above, the plain language of subsection B 
27

immunity encompasses any test not ordered by the physician. 

The fact that subsection B immunity is restricted where the 

patient delivers a copy of his laboratory test to the 

physician cannot be read as circumscribing immunity only to 

those subsection A tests. This is so because "any" report 

includes not only those subsection A tests of the patient 

which that patient or other non-physician ordered and 

delivers to the physician, but also tests ordered by 

another physician which the patient delivers. Thus, the 

language in subsection B cannot be read as the majority 

concludes to limit subsection B immunity to only subsection 

A laboratory tests. 

It is not uncommon for the General Assembly to 

draft a statute which contains independent, though 

related provisions, and this Court has repeatedly 

recognized that successive provisions of a statute may 

function separately. In Greenberg v. Commonwealth, 

255 Va. 594, 597, 499 S.E.2d 266, 267-68 (1998), we 

reversed the trial court's judgment imposing personal 

liability on a check cashing company's majority 

shareholder for making loans in amounts and at 

interest rates prohibited by Code § 6.1-249. Another 

code provision, Code § 6.1-308, set forth the 

penalties for violations of Code § 6.1-249 as follows: 
28

A. Any person and the several members, officers, 

directors, agents, and employees thereof, who 

violate or participate in the violation of any 

provision of § 6.1-249 shall be guilty of a Class 

2 misdemeanor. 

B. Any contract of loan in the making or 

collection of which any act has been done which 

violates § 6.1-249 shall be void and the lender

shall not collect, receive, or retain any 

principal, interest, or charges whatsoever, and 

any amount paid on account of principal or 

interest on any such loan shall be recoverable by 

the person by or for whom payment was made. 

Greenberg, 255 Va. at 599, 499 S.E.2d at 269 (emphasis 

added). 

The shareholder in Greenberg argued that he could not 

be individually liable under Code § 6.1-308(B) because that 

subsection provided for recovery against only the lender. 

Id. at 600, 499 S.E.2d at 269. We agreed, noting that 

though subsection A of that statute provided for individual 

liability, subsection B did not. 

In contrast to subsection (A), Code § 6.1-308(B), 

provides that only the "lender shall not collect, 

receive, or retain any principal, interest, or 

charges whatsoever, and any amount paid on 

account of principal or interest on any such loan 

shall be recoverable by the person by or for whom 

payment was made." (Emphasis added). Absent from 

subsection (B) is the broad category of entities 

found in subsection (A). In other words, 

subsection (B) does not include any individual, 

officer, director, or entity other than the 

lender. 

Id. 255 Va. at 601, 499 S.E.2d at 270. We noted that 

reading the sections of the statutory provision 
29

independently was in accordance with the intent of the 

General Assembly. 

When the General Assembly uses two different 

terms in the same act, it is presumed to mean two 

different things. As evident in subsection (A), 

the General Assembly knew how to broaden the 

range of liability, and the absence of any such 

provisions in subsection (B) indicates the 

General Assembly's intent to limit those from 

whom borrowers may obtain restitution. To 

determine otherwise would be to rewrite the 

statute and to contradict the General Assembly's 

express intent. 

Id. 255 Va. at 601-02, 499 S.E.2d at 270 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Level 3 

Commcn's of Va., Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 268 Va. 471, 

476-78, 604 S.E.2d 71, 73-74 (2004) (reading subsections of 

Code § 56-265.4:4 independently in accordance with the 

plain language of the statute). 

 In Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 262 Va. 

91, 100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001), we noted that the duty 

imposed upon a customer to exercise reasonable promptness 

to examine a bank statement to determine whether any 

payment was unauthorized under Code § 8.4-406(c), existed 

whether or not the bank had paid those items in good faith. 

We declined to adopt the appellant's argument that the 

requirement that a bank pay an item in good faith in order 

to assert a statutory bar against a customer claim under 

Code § 8.4-406(d) and (e), should be read into the 
30

customer's duty to examine his bank statement under Code 

§ 8.4-406(c). Id. at 101, 546 S.E.2d at 702-03. This 

Court specifically noted that "when the General Assembly 

includes specific language in one section of a statute, but 

omits that language from another section of the statute, we 

must presume that the exclusion of the language was 

intentional." Id. at 100, 546 S.E.2d at 702. 

 To accurately represent the majority's interpretation 

of subsection B of Code § 8.01-581.18, the General Assembly 

would have written it as follows: 

Any physician shall be immune from civil 

liability for any failure to review, or to take 

any action in response to the receipt of, any 

report of the results of any [such] laboratory 

test [under Subsection A] or other examination of 

the physical or mental condition of any person, 

which test or examination such physician neither 

requested nor authorized in writing . . . . 

(Emphasis added.) The General Assembly, however, did not 

include any such limitation. Clearly, the General Assembly 

knew how to reference such non-physician ordered laboratory 

tests as it did so specifically five times in subsection A: 

[A]ny report of the results of such test . . . 

shall be provided by the person conducting such

test . . .to the . . . subject of such test 

. . . . Such report shall state in bold type 

that it is the responsibility of the recipient to 

arrange with his physician for consultation and 

interpretation of the results of such test or 

examination. 
31

Code § 8.01-581.18(A) (emphasis added). Had the General 

Assembly wished to limit the scope of subsection B immunity 

to "such" non-physician ordered tests of subsection A, it 

could have done so, but it did not. 

The General Assembly unquestionably knows how to 

connect the various provisions of a statute when it desires 

to make them interdependent. The fact that the Legislature 

did not choose to do so in Code § 8.01-581.18 "represents 

an unambiguous manifestation of a contrary intention." 

Halifax Corp. v. Wachovia Bank, 268 Va. 641, 654, 604 

S.E.2d 403, 408; see also Couplin v. Payne, 270 Va. 129, 

135-36, 613 S.E.2d 592, 594-95 (2005). For example, Code 

§ 2.2-514(A) empowers the Attorney General to "compromise 

and settle disputes . . . involving all interests of the 

Commonwealth . . . ." Subsection B of that statute 

provides that "[n]o settlement under subsection A shall be 

made subject to a confidentiality agreement that prohibits 

the Commonwealth . . .from disclosing the amount of such

settlement." Code § 2.2-514(B) (emphasis added). 

Finally, the majority contends that "grant[ing] Dr. 

Oraee immunity under Code § 8.01-581.18(B) would lead to 

consequences the General Assembly could not have intended." 

What the majority does not recognize is that the 

elimination of unintended consequences is a matter for 
32

legislative, not judicial, remedy. We have repeatedly held 

that 

we determine the General Assembly's intent from 

the words contained in the statute. When the 

language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are 

bound by the plain meaning of that language and 

may not assign a construction that amounts to 

holding that the General Assembly did not mean 

what it actually has stated. 

Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271, 576 S.E.2d 468, 

470 (2003) (citations omitted). As we noted in Auer, 

"Whether a statute is wise is . . . a matter for the 

legislature and not for a court." 270 Va. at 177, 613 

S.E.2d at 423 (citing Horner v. Dept. of Mental Health, 268 

Va. 187, 193, 597 S.E.2d 202, 205 (2004)). 

For these reasons, I believe the construction of Code 

§ 8.01-581.18(B) set forth in Auer was correct and that 

stare decisis dictates that our decision be followed. The 

majority's new construction of the statute does not comport 

with its plain meaning and adds language to the statute not 

written by the General Assembly. If the General Assembly 

chooses to amend the statute it may do so, but we cannot. 

Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority 

opinion, and would reverse the judgment of the trial court 

and enter final judgment for Dr. Oraee.