Supreme Court

No. 2012-125-Appeal. 

(PM 06-1553)

Eddie M. Linde :

v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before 

publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to 

notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 

250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 

222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
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Supreme Court

No. 2012-125-Appeal.

(PM 06-1553)

Eddie M. Linde :

v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on 

September 25, 2013, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the 

issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. This application for postconviction 

relief is Eddie M. Linde’s (Linde or applicant) third attempt to persuade this Court to either 

vacate his convictions for second-degree murder and related firearms offenses or vacate the

mandatory consecutive life sentence that was imposed for the use of a firearm in the commission 

of a homicide. In this postconviction relief appeal, the applicant contends that (1) the mandatory 

consecutive life sentence imposed under G.L. 1956 § 11-47-3.2 for discharging a firearm while 

committing a crime of violence resulting in death violates the Eighth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Rhode Island Constitution; (2) the conviction 

and sentence for second-degree murder and discharging a firearm while committing a crime of 

violence resulting in death violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution 

and article 1, section 7 of the Rhode Island Constitution; (3) trial counsel was ineffective because 

(a) when moving to suppress statements made to the police, he failed to argue that the applicant

was so intoxicated that he was incapable of knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waiving his 
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right to remain silent; and (b) he failed to present a manslaughter defense based on diminished 

capacity at the plea bargaining stage and, again, at trial. After reviewing the memoranda 

submitted by the parties and considering the arguments of counsel, we are satisfied that cause has 

not been shown, and the appeal may be decided at this time. We affirm the trial justice’s denial 

of postconviction relief.

Facts and Travel

The facts of this case were set forth in significant detail in this Court’s decision denying 

defendant’s direct appeal. See State v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115 (R.I. 2005) (Linde I); see also State 

v. Linde, 965 A.2d 415 (R.I. 2009) (Linde II) (holding that defendant’s constitutional claims 

could not be brought under a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35 of the Superior 

Court Rules of Criminal Procedure). We therefore only briefly describe the events leading to 

this senseless killing.

In 2002, applicant was convicted of nine felony counts, including second-degree murder,

for killing his co-worker with a handgun in the parking lot of a motel. Linde I, 876 A.2d at 1118. 

Although there was evidence that applicant had consumed a significant amount of alcohol on the 

night of the shooting, the defense raised at trial was accident. Id. at 1120-21, 1129. The 

applicant was sentenced to forty years imprisonment, twenty years to serve, for second-degree 

murder and to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for discharging a firearm while committing 

a crime of violence resulting in death, consecutive to the sentence for second-degree murder. Id.

at 1118 n.1. In 2006, applicant successfully moved to reduce the prison time for second-degree 

murder to ten years to serve. Next, he sought to challenge his sentence on constitutional grounds 

under Rule 35. Linde II, 965 A.2d at 416. This Court, however, held that constitutional claims 

were not cognizable under Rule 35. Linde II, 965 A.2d at 417.
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In this application for postconviction relief, applicant again asserted his constitutional 

claims and also raised ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for vacating his conviction. 

An evidentiary hearing was held in January 2012 before a justice of the Superior Court, who also 

had been the trial justice. In addition to documentary evidence, Alan Feinstein (Feinstein), a 

forensic mental health consultant, offered expert testimony on applicant’s behalf. The

applicant’s trial counsel was called to testify by the state. Feinstein reviewed trial transcripts, 

witness statements, police reports, and a psychological evaluation of applicant that was prepared

a few months after trial. Based on his review of those materials and multiple interviews with 

applicant, Feinstein concluded that applicant’s level of intoxication before, during, and after the 

events that resulted in the death of his co-worker completely paralyzed applicant’s will and 

deprived him of the power to withstand evil impulses, rendering his mind incapable of forming 

any sane design. Feinstein also opined that at the time he was interrogated, applicant was so

intoxicated that he was unable to provide a police statement with rational intellect and free will. 

Additionally, Feinstein concluded that applicant does not have “any real recollection” of the 

events culminating in the death of his co-worker.

The applicant’s trial counsel testified that Linde’s drug and alcohol use on the night of 

the murder was a serious issue that he carefully considered in formulating a defense. However, 

his client insisted repeatedly that he was not so drunk that he could not remember what happened 

and consistently maintained that the shooting was an accident. Trial counsel also testified that he 

advised applicant about a potential defense of diminished capacity, but applicant rejected his 

advice. Additionally, trial counsel advised applicant to refrain from testifying unless he had a 

good memory of the events. Furthermore, trial counsel testified that he did not receive a plea
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offer from the state nor did he solicit an offer because applicant “wanted to go home and wanted 

complete exoneration.”1

With respect to the motion to suppress his police statements, trial counsel testified that he 

did not think he could establish that applicant was so intoxicated as to suffer diminished 

capacity. It also was his belief that suppression would have been futile because Linde testified at 

trial, and the statements would be available to impeach his credibility if he gave inconsistent 

testimony. Finally, the trial justice asked trial counsel if, even in hindsight, he could “in any way 

have presented a defense of diminished capacity contemporaneously with the defense of accident 

that your client insisted on?” Trial counsel answered “no.”

The trial justice issued a bench decision and denied all relief. First, he disposed of 

applicant’s constitutional challenges to the statute premised on the separation of powers, due 

process, the Eighth Amendment, and double jeopardy by stating that those issues previously had 

been decided by this Court. Next, the trial justice found that trial counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to obtain a plea offer from the state in order to dispose of the case without a trial—first,

because the state made no such offer and, second, because applicant sought complete 

exoneration. 

Finally, the trial justice addressed the defense of diminished capacity. As to the 

suppression issue, he found that the statements applicant made to the police were voluntary and

reflected a “deliberateness and cunning” through which Linde “tried to shift blame or extricate 

himself.” The trial justice also declared that the suppression ruling was of no consequence

because applicant testified at trial and the state presented eyewitness testimony against him. 

 

1

The applicant was an ironworker from Florida; he was recruited to come to Rhode Island to 

work on the Ocean State Baptist Church in Smithfield. State v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115, 1118-19

(R.I. 2005). A six-man crew of ironworkers stayed in three rooms at the Susse Chalet motel in 

Smithfield. Id. at 1119. Only four went home.
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Addressing trial counsel’s failure to present a defense of diminished capacity, the trial justice 

found that “[n]ot presenting a diminished capacity defense was a very sensible tactical decision 

by experienced trial counsel,” noting the logical incompatibility of the defense of accident 

juxtaposed with a plea of diminished capacity. 

Standard of Review

“The statutory remedy of postconviction relief set forth in G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1 is 

‘available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that 

the conviction violated the applicant’s constitutional rights or that the existence of newly 

discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.’” Hall v. 

State, 60 A.3d 928, 931 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1016 (R.I. 2008)). 

“When reviewing the grant or denial of postconviction relief, the trial justice’s factual findings 

and credibility determinations will be upheld ‘absent clear error or a determination that the 

hearing justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.’” Id. (quoting Lynch v. State, 13 

A.3d 603, 605 (R.I. 2011)). “When a postconviction relief decision involves ‘questions of fact or 

mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant’s constitutional 

rights[,]’ we review those issues de novo.” Neufville v. State, 13 A.3d 607, 610 (R.I. 2011)

(quoting Hazard v. State, 968 A.2d 886, 891 (R.I. 2009)). 

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The applicant contends that the mandatory life sentence imposed under § 11-47-3.2

violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the 

Rhode Island Constitution.

2

 This Court has previously declared that a mandatory consecutive 

life sentence imposed under § 11-47-3.2 survives a constitutional challenge. See State v. 

 

2

These two provisions “are identical.” State v. Ouimette, 479 A.2d 702, 706 (R.I. 1984); see

also McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463, 470 (R.I. 2004) (reaffirming).
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Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 795-96 (R.I. 2007) (rejecting the defendant’s contention that 

consecutive life sentences imposed for first-degree murder and discharging a firearm while 

committing a crime of violence resulting in death constitute cruel and unusual punishment). The

applicant’s argument that Monteiro is distinguishable because the defendant in Monteiro was 

convicted of first-degree murder—whereas applicant was convicted of second-degree murder—

is unavailing. The holding in Monteiro did not rise and fall with the classification of murder, but 

rather with the fact that the defendant was convicted of murder and used a firearm. See id.; see

also State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 88-89 (R.I. 2013) (noting that the only difference between 

first-degree and second-degree murder is the duration of premeditation). When this Court 

concluded that the Legislature had the authority to mandate “consecutive sentences for murder 

and using a firearm while committing that murder,” we did not distinguish between first-degree 

and second-degree murder; we decline to draw such a distinction in this case. Monteiro, 924 

A.2d at 794.

The applicant places significant emphasis on State v. Ballard, 699 A.2d 14, 17 (R.I. 

1997), a case of dubious authority in which the Court concluded that consecutive life 

sentences—imposed in the discretion of the trial justice—were “unjustifiably out of proportion to 

the severity of [the defendant’s] crimes.”

3

 In Monteiro, however, this Court held that Ballard “is 

of no assistance in evaluating the constitutionality of mandatory consecutive sentences.” 

Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 794. Because this case involves a mandatory consecutive life sentence, 

Ballard is irrelevant to our analysis.

 

3

The defendant in Ballard was convicted of “conspiracy to kidnap with intent to extort, two 

counts of kidnapping with intent to extort, kidnapping, carrying a pistol without a license, and 

three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon.” State v. Ballard, 699 A.2d 14, 14 (R.I. 1997).
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Finally, applicant attempts to fashion an argument of gross disproportionality under our 

holding in McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463 (R.I. 2004). In McKinney, the Court recognized a 

narrow proportionality principle, holding that “a sentence is disproportionate under either the 

Rhode Island Constitution or the United States Constitution if the sentence itself is unduly harsh 

when compared with the crime.” Id. at 470. While “[t]here are many factors to consider when 

evaluating the gravity of a defendant’s offense[,]” the Court’s nonexhaustive list of factors 

included “the nature of the crime, the defendant’s criminal history, the state legislature’s intent 

when it classified the crime, and the state’s public safety interest in incapacitating recidivists.” 

Id.

We applied the McKinney test in Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 795-96. We held that the 

defendant’s consecutive life sentences did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 

circumstances of a gang-related shooting death of an innocent bystander. Id. The Court 

concluded that the facts in that case were “precisely the type of gun violence that the Legislature 

intended to address when it provided for a mandatory consecutive sentence of life imprisonment 

for using a firearm while committing murder.” Id. at 795. The Court also noted that life 

imprisonment “is not the harshest punishment under our law,” but rather that a sentence of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the harshest. Id.

In this case, although not a gang-related murder, we are nonetheless confronted with yet 

another tragic incident of gun violence, the very crime the Legislature sought to curtail when it 

enacted this statutory scheme. The fatal shooting in this case carried over from an earlier 

altercation. See Linde I, 876 A.2d at 1119-20 (describing weaponless scuffle between applicant 

and co-worker Mosley, resulting in applicant leaving work for the day due to injury). Although 

applicant offered three different versions of the events, each with a different explanation for how 
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he ended up in the parking lot with the gun when his co-workers returned from work, it is clear 

that applicant “instigated the confrontation by stepping into the parking lot carrying a loaded 

weapon * * *.” Id. at 1131. As a result of inciting a second confrontation and introducing a gun

into the dispute, applicant killed his co-worker, Randy Silas, whose only involvement in the 

dispute was that he was in the line of fire. 

Finally, to the extent that applicant contended at oral argument that the mandatory life 

sentence is disproportionate to the ten-year term imposed after the sentence was reduced for 

second-degree murder, that argument distorts the inquiry. First, the test is whether “the sentence 

itself is unduly harsh when compared with the crime,” not whether it is disproportionate to the 

sentence imposed for a different conviction in the same indictment. McKinney, 843 A.2d at 470. 

The mandatory life sentence was imposed for discharging a firearm while committing a crime of 

violence resulting in death. Also, applicant was sentenced to forty years at the Adult 

Correctional Institutions for second-degree murder, with twenty years to serve. The largess of 

the trial justice who reduced the sentence to ten years to serve does not give rise to any 

constitutional infirmity in connection with the mandatory consecutive life sentence for the 

firearm offense.

Therefore, we are satisfied that the mandatory consecutive life sentence for discharging a 

firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death is not unconstitutional.

Double Jeopardy

The applicant contends that judgments of conviction and sentences for the dual offenses 

of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence and second-degree murder (the 

crime of violence) violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution and 

article 1, section 7 of the Rhode Island Constitution. “This Court long has held that ‘[b]ecause of 
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the similar wording and purpose underlying the state and federal constitutional provisions on this 

subject, Rhode Island cases have hewed closely to federal double-jeopardy law when applying 

the analogous clause in the Rhode Island Constitution.’” State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 442 

(R.I. 2010) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 906 (R.I. 2003)). The Double Jeopardy 

Clause protects “a criminal defendant from multiple trials for the same offense * * * and 

prohibits a sentencing court from imposing greater punishment than the legislature has 

proscribed.” Id. (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)). Recently, in Marsich, 

this Court summarized the two double-jeopardy tests:

“The determination of whether a defendant is placed in 

double jeopardy can be made in one of two ways. The first method 

is the ‘same evidence’ test set forth in Blockburger v. United 

States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), and 

adopted by this Court almost forty years ago. * * * Under this 

analysis, ‘where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation 

of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 

determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether 

each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ 

* * *

“The second manner in which an alleged double jeopardy 

violation is analyzed is the test first established in Hunter, 459 U.S. 

at 365-66 * * * and subsequently adopted by this Court. * * * This 

analysis requires the Court to ‘examine the challenged statutes to 

ascertain whether the Legislature intended to authorize cumulative 

sentencing’ for the offenses contained in the indictment. * * * If 

the legislative intent underlying the enactment is clear, consecutive 

sentences upon conviction under both statutes does not offend 

principles of double jeopardy, ‘regardless of whether both statutes 

proscribe the same conduct under Blockburger.’” Marsich, 10 

A.3d at 442.

Here, applicant’s double jeopardy argument fails both tests. In Rodriguez, 822 A.2d at

906, the defendant was accused of both first-degree murder and using a firearm while

committing a crime of violence. The Court held that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive 

life sentences did not violate either federal or state double jeopardy because “[e]ach count 
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required proof of a separate and additional fact that the other did not; to wit: murder and using a 

firearm, respectively.” Id. The same two offenses (murder and using a firearm while

committing a crime of violence) are implicated here; thus, applicant’s constitutional rights were 

not violated by his convictions and resulting sentences for both offenses. Further, under a

Hunter analysis, applicant’s claim also fails because “[i]n this statutory provision, the General 

Assembly clearly has expressed its intent that a guilty defendant should receive consecutive 

sentences.” Rodriguez, 822 A.2d at 908; see also Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 794 (“It is the 

Legislature’s prerogative to authorize cumulative punishments; when it does so, it is the judicial 

task to impose that sentence in due course.”).

Therefore, we conclude that the judgments of conviction and sentence for both seconddegree murder and discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence do not violate the 

Double Jeopardy Clause of either the United States Constitution or the Rhode Island 

Constitution.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The applicant asserts that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because 

(a) trial counsel failed to argue that applicant was too intoxicated to knowingly, intelligently, or 

voluntarily waive his right to remain silent, and (b) trial counsel failed to present a manslaughter 

defense based on diminished capacity at the plea bargaining stage and again at trial. This Court 

evaluates a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the criteria set forth in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Guerrero v. State, 47 A.3d 289, 300 (R.I. 2012). “First, the 

applicant must establish that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient; ‘[t]his 

requires [a] showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

“counsel” guaranteed * * * by the Sixth Amendment.’” Bido v. State, 56 A.3d 104, 110-11 (R.I. 
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2012) (quoting Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610). In making this determination, “we scrutinize the 

performance of counsel in a ‘highly deferential’ manner, * * * affording counsel ‘a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the permissible range of assistance.’” Id. at 111. 

Only if it is determined that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient does the 

Court proceed to the second prong of the Strickland test, in which the applicant “must show that 

the ‘deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors were so serious as to 

amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.’” Guerrero, 47 A.3d at 300-01 

(quoting Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I. 2001)).

A

The Motion to Suppress 

The applicant argues that it was error for the trial justice to focus on the suppression

hearing testimony, rather than Feinstein’s testimony at the postconviction relief hearing, in

concluding that trial counsel’s decision not to seek exclusion of applicant’s statements to the 

police based on diminished capacity did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. The 

trial justice began his analysis by noting that trial counsel did move to suppress the statements, 

“in part because he felt his client was prevented from making a phone call he thought [his client]

was entitled to make.” The trial justice stated that applicant’s purported intoxication when he 

was questioned by the police was an issue in the suppression hearing: “[Trial counsel] didn’t 

speak too much about alcohol or his coherency, but I did.” After summarizing the case law on 

diminished capacity and an accused’s ability to understand and waive his Fifth Amendment 

rights, the trial justice recounted his finding that applicant’s statements to police were “made in a 

totally voluntary fashion.” Later in his decision, after acknowledging Feinstein’s opinion 

testimony, the trial justice concluded that there was “no way” that trial counsel could have 
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successfully sought to suppress the statements based on Linde’s intoxication. He also found that 

the statements would have come into evidence in due course because applicant took the stand in 

his own defense and the statements would be allowable as prior inconsistent statements. See R.I. 

R. Evid. 801(d)(1) (prior inconsistent statements by a witness are not hearsay); see also Harris v. 

New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (holding that impeachment of the defendant testifying 

in his own defense with prior inconsistent statements does not violate Miranda). The trial justice 

found that this trial strategy was the product of applicant’s own statements to his attorney that he 

had a good memory of that evening and that his co-worker’s death was an accident. 

Accordingly, we agree with the findings of the trial justice: we are of the opinion that trial 

counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to specifically seek to suppress Linde’s 

statements to police based on applicant’s alleged diminished capacity, and note that, because he 

testified at trial, a necessary component in a defense of accident, the statements would have been 

used against him.

B

Manslaughter Defense and Plea Bargaining

The applicant points to trial counsel’s failure to present a manslaughter defense based on 

diminished capacity, both at trial and as grounds for a plea bargain as the basis for ineffective 

assistance of counsel. “Under a diminished-capacity defense, a defendant submits that, although 

he is responsible for the prohibited act, ‘his mental capacity may have been diminished by 

intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did not possess the specific mental state or 

intent essential to the particular offense charged.’” Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 101 (R.I. 

2010) (quoting State v. LaCroix, 911 A.2d 674, 679 (R.I. 2006)). 
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The applicant’s trial counsel, who is a senior, well-respected member of the criminal 

defense bar, gave forthright and candid testimony with respect to the dilemmas that he faced in 

formulating a defense in this case. He testified that applicant adamantly and repeatedly insisted

that he had a clear memory of the events that took place and insisted that the shooting was an 

accident. Thus, for trial counsel to present a diminished capacity defense in addition to 

applicant’s contention that it was an accident would require him to convince the jury that 

applicant’s memory of the events was such that they should believe his testimony that the 

shooting was an accident; but, on the other hand, if they did not believe applicant’s version of 

events, then they should find that he was so drunk that he could not form the requisite mental 

state for murder—an intentional killing of another human being. Trial counsel’s decision to 

proceed with the defense of accident without layering an additional diminished capacity defense 

was therefore a sound tactical decision, such that “tactical decisions by trial counsel, even if illadvised, do not by themselves constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rivera v. State, 58 

A.3d 171, 180-81 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 18 (R.I. 2012)). “This Court 

‘will not meticulously scrutinize an attorney’s reasoned judgment or strategic maneuver in the 

context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’” Id. at 181 (quoting Rice, 38 A.3d at 

17). In this case, counsel’s performance reflects not only a reasonable decision by a seasoned 

attorney, but was the only strategy available under the circumstances the client created. 

Turning to the final issue—whether there should have been plea discussions in advance 

of trial—we are satisfied that trial counsel was not ineffective given the instruction from his 

client. It is undisputed that there was no offer from the state to resolve the case. It is also 

undisputed that the applicant notified his lawyer that he “wanted to go home and wanted 

complete exoneration.” Although we are cognizant of recent United States Supreme Court cases 
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that address the importance of the plea bargaining stage in a criminal trial, those cases are 

distinguishable from the case before us because the applicant’s trial counsel was faced with no 

plea offer from the state and a client demanding a complete exoneration, which is incompatible 

with a guilty plea. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012) (“a defendant has no 

right to be offered a plea”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012) (“If no plea offer is 

made * * * the issue raised here simply does not arise.”); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 

(2010) (holding that “counsel must inform [his or] her client whether his plea carries a risk of 

deportation”). Thus, we are of the opinion that counsel’s decision to proceed to trial was in 

accordance with his client’s wishes and did not constitute ineffective assistance.

Conclusion

For the reasons articulated above, we affirm the judgment below. The papers may be 

remanded to the Superior Court.

Justice Indeglia did not participate.
RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE

Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet

TITLE OF CASE: Eddie M. Linde v. State of Rhode Island.

 

CASE NO: No. 2012-125-Appeal.

(PM 06-1553)

COURT: Supreme Court

DATE OPINION FILED: October 31, 2013

JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.

WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court

JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:

 Associate Justice Robert D. Krause

ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:

 For Applicant: C. Daniel Schrock, Esq.

 

For State: Christopher R. Bush

 Department of Attorney General