alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
AFFIDAVIT OF COURT REPORTER

1. My name is Susan Peters Tabaee, C.S.R. and Official Court

Reporter for the Auxiliary Court 7, Dallas County, Texas.

2. I took the stenograph notes of the proceedings in Cause

No.F14-23132-P THE STATE OF TEXAS VS.

GEOFFREY ROSS RIMES.

3. Notice of Appeal was not even filed until after the due date of

the record. Notice was filed late, and the record is already past

due.

4. Because of the volume and complexity of the records I am now

preparing in other cases, I would respectfully request an extension

of 90 days, or until June 26, 2015 to prepare a complete Reporter's

Record in the above case.

DATED this the 29th day of April, 2015.

SJ

SUSAN P. TABAEE, C.S.R.

C.S.R. #2263

 FILED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS 5/4/2015 10:31:31 AM LISA MATZ Clerk
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6139 

To direct the Postal Service to establish a post office at 73 West Stewart 

Road in Lathrop, California, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 1, 2023 

Mr. DUARTE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To direct the Postal Service to establish a post office at 

73 West Stewart Road in Lathrop, California, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ESTABLISH POST OFFICE AT 73 WEST STEWART 

4 ROAD IN LATHROP, CALIFORNIA. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Postal Service, using the au6 thority under section 401 of title 39, United States Code, 

7 shall seek to establish a post office at 73 West Steward 

8 Road in Lathrop, California, not later than one year after 

9 the date of the enactment of this Act. 


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2 

•HR 6139 IH

1 (b) GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS.—In carrying out 

2 subsection (a), the Postal Service shall seek to enter into 

3 good faith negotiations with all owners of the location de4 scribed in such subsection to acquire or lease such location 

5 for the purpose of establishing a post office at such loca6 tion. 

7 (c) BORROWING LIMIT EXCEPTION.—To the extent 

8 necessary to establish a post office at the location de9 scribed in subsection (a) pursuant to this Act, obligations 

10 issued for the costs of establishing such post office shall 

11 be disregarded with respect to limitations under section 

12 2005(a). 

Æ 


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EX PARTE Vincent Lovelace LOWE

1160346 (CR-14-1239)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

3-10-2017

Cert. denied.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

April 10, 2013

N o. 04

- 12

- 00211

- CV

John E. RODARTE

, Appellant

v.

BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS and Sheriff Ralph Lopez, et al.,

Appellee

From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2005

- CI

- 18884

Honorable Fred Shannon, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Patricia O. Alva rez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Appellant’s motion for extension of time is denied as moot because his motion for

rehearing (“Appellant’s Response to Memorandum Decision”) was timely filed on March 28,

2013. The motion for rehearing is pending.

____________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 10 th day of April, 2013

.

____________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

, Clerk of Court
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 600 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 600

  To waive certain provisions in the case of an emergency declaration 
 under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
                                  Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 27, 2023

 Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon introduced the following bill; which was referred 
         to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To waive certain provisions in the case of an emergency declaration 
 under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
                                  Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. WAIVER OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS.

    In the case of an emergency declared pursuant to section 501 of the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 
U.S.C. 5191), the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency shall not require the application of chapter 83 of title 41, 
United States Code, with respect to purchases made or contracts issued 
by Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, or the Virgin 
Islands of the United States.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tyrone Chin, Appellant.

[771 NYS2d 158]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Braun, J.), rendered May 29, 2001, convicting him of criminal sale of marijuana in the third degree and criminal sale of marijuana in the fourth degree (three counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

During the second round of jury selection, defense counsel raised a *Batson*objection *(Batson v Kentucky,*476 US 79 [1986]), claiming that the prosecutor was using his peremptory challenges to systematically exclude both black and Hispanic persons from the jury. After determining that the defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination, the trial court required the prosecutor to offer race-neutral reasons for striking one black and *two Hispanic prospective*jurors in the first round of jury selection, and one Hispanic prospective juror in the second round. The trial court subsequently ruled that the explanation provided by the prosecutor for striking an Hispanic prospective juror during the first round of selection was pretextual, and *575that the defendant was entitled to a remedy. However, since the subject juror had already been excused and was no longer available for service, the trial court concluded that granting the defense one additional peremptory challenge would be an appropriate remedy.

On appeal, the defendant contends that granting him one additional peremptory challenge was an inadequate remedy for the *Batson*violation found by the trial court. We disagree. Although a defendant may raise a *Batson*claim at any point during the jury selection process *(see People v Battle,*299 AD2d 416 [2002]; *People v Ramirez,*295 AD2d 542 [2002]; *People v Campos,*290 AD2d 456 [2002]; *People v Harris,*151 AD2d 961 [1989]), by making his challenge after the first round jurors had already been excused, the defendant limited the remedies available to the trial court. Where, as here, disallowing an improper challenge and seating the subject juror is not a feasible option because the juror has been released from service, several courts have recognized that granting additional peremptory challenges to the defendant may be an acceptable remedy *(see McCrory v Henderson,*82 F3d 1243 [1996]; *Koo v McBride,*124 F3d 869 [1997]; *Caston v Costello,*74 F Supp 2d 262 [1999]). “[B]earing in mind that the *Batson*court specifically ‘declined to express any view on what appropriate action a trial court should take in the event the prosecution fail[ed] to rebut a defendant’s prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges’ ” *(People v Frye,*191 AD2d 581 [1993], quoting *People v Kern,*149 AD2d 187, 228[1993]), we find that the trial court’s remedy of granting the defendant an additional peremptory challenge was proper, and afforded the defendant his right to equal protection. Smith, J.P., Krausman, Luciano and Crane, JJ., concur.
#### Foster TAFT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NABISCO; et al., Defendants-Appellees, and Altria Group Inc.; et al., Defendants.

No. 15-56218

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*797Submitted January 18, 2017 *

Filed January 26, 2017

Foster Taft, Pro Se

Kenneth K. Lee, Jenner *&*Block LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Dean N. Panos, Esquire, Jenner *&*Block LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees Mondelez International, Inc., Kraft Foods Group, Inc.

Vilma Ruth Palma-Solana, Attorney, Perkins Coie LLP, Los Angeles, CA, David Taro Biderman, Esquire, Perkins Coie LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee General Mills

Tony M. Diab, Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendants Altria Group Inc., Philip Morris Int’l Inc., Philip Morris USA, Inc.

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges,

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Foster Taft appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his diversity action alleging a strict liability claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Ileto v. Glock Inc.,*349 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district • court properly dismissed Taft’s claims against defendants Mondelez International, Inc., Kraft Foods Group, Inc., and General Mills, Inc., because Taft failed to allege facts sufficient to “state a claim that is plausible on its face.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,*550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)); *see Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co.,*20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 446 (1978) (product design is defective if “product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,” or (2) “the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Taft’s request to augment the record, filed on May 10,2016, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
*Pursuant to 5THCIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED March 19, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51119 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus
GUILLERMO HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:06-CR-891-ALL

Before GARWOOD, CLEMENT and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * In May 2006, Guillermo Hernandez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation and in August 2006 was sentenced to 46 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, a $500 fine, and a $100 special assessment. Hernandez argues for the first time on appeal that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court employed1 Hernandez did file a motion for downward departure which

the district court denied, but that motion was clearly based only on an asserted ground (that Hernandez had, through his lawyer, unsuccessfully sought permission to re-enter before deciding to reenter without permission) not reurged on appeal and wholly unrelated to the now complained of double counting. Indeed, Hernandez expressly agreed before the district court that the PSR, which the district court accepted (and to which Hernandez made no objection), correctly identified the applicable advisory guideline sentencing range as 46 to 57 months’ confinement (and two to three years supervised released and fine). And, the district court clearly treated the guidelines as advisory only in accordance with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 2 impermissible double counting and thus improperly calculated his guideline range when it increased both his offense level and his criminal history points based on the same prior alien smuggling conviction.1 Citing U nited States v. Henry, 288 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2002), Hernandez further contends that his criminal history should not have been increased based on his prior alien smuggling conviction because it was an element of the illegal reentry offense. The district court did not plainly err in sentencing Hernandez because the Guidelines do not prohibit such double counting, because Henry is distinguishable from the instant case, and because this court has approved of such double counting under similar circumstances concerning U.S.S.G. § 2K1.2. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment. (n.6); Henry, 288 F.3d at 659, 664-65; United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 560 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hawkins, 69 F.3d 11, 14-15 (5th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, Hernandez’s double counting argument fails to counter the rebuttable presumption that3

his properly calculated guideline sentence is reasonable. See United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2006). Nothing in the record compels the conclusion that the sentence imposed is unreasonable. AFFIRMED.
Roger WATTS v. EXCHANGE BANK OF ALABAMA

1150934

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 10, 2017

Affirmed.
# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

July 30, 2018

Before

DIANE P. WOOD
, C hief Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE
, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE
, Circuit Judge

No. 16

- 4217

JERMEL POPE
, Petitioner

- Appellant
,

v

.
J ANET PERDUE Respondent

- Appellee

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Il l inois

.

No. 14

- cv

- 01393

Sara Darrow , Judge

.

O R D E R

It is ORDERED that footnote 1 at page 5 of the original opinion is STRICKEN and replaced with the following revised footnote 1 :

The Government’s reliance on Spencer v. Kemna’s mootness standard is misplaced. See 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). While Pope is no longer incarcerated, he continues to serve his sentence on supervised release

– another form of custody. Trotter , 270 F.3d at 1152. Thus, Spencer , a case in which the petitioner’s sentence had already expired, does n ot apply. See Spenc er , 523 U.S. at 7.No. 16

- 4217 Page 2

It is further ORDERED that the statute referred to on line 2 of the CONCLUSION at page 13 of the original opinion is revised from § 3538(e) to § 3583(e).
Finally, i t is ORDERED that the Respondent’s Petition for Panel Rehearing is DENIED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Derrick Jackson, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 658]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Braslow, J.), rendered June 28, 2002, convicting him of criminal contempt in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree based on his violation of an order of protection directing him to stay away from his wife. The promised sentence was conditioned, inter alia, on the defendant staying out of trouble and having no contact with his wife. The defendant was advised of the enhanced sentence which would be imposed if he violated a condition of the plea. At sentencing, the People advised the County Court that the defendant had been arrested for criminal contempt in the second degree, a charge involving his wife. The defendant admitted that he had contact with his wife and the County Court imposed an enhanced sentence. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the County Court properly imposed the enhanced sentence without conducting an inquiry since the defendant admitted to the conduct constituting a violation of the conditions of his plea *(see People v Outley,*80 NY2d 702 [1993]; *People v Mickens,*267 AD2d 479 [1999]; *People v Wilson,*257 AD2d 674 [1999]; *People v Maupin,*198 AD2d 236 [1993]). Altman, J.P., Cozier, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6156 

To require the Administrator of the Small Business Administration to designate a point of contact for for-profit child care providers, submit 

a report to Congress, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 1, 2023 

Mr. LANDSMAN (for himself and Ms. LETLOW) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Small Business 

A BILL 

To require the Administrator of the Small Business Administration to designate a point of contact for for-profit 

child care providers, submit a report to Congress, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Child Care Small Busi5 ness Insight and Improvement Act of 2023’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REPORT ON FOR-PROFIT CHILD CARE PROVIDERS. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the 

8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of 


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2 

•HR 6156 IH

1 the Small Business Administration shall submit to Con2 gress a study and report on for-profit child care providers 

3 that includes— 

4 (1) an assessment of the challenges and needs 

5 of such providers; 

6 (2) a description of the resources and support 

7 that the Small Business Administration provides to 

8 such providers; 

9 (3) any deficiencies in the resources and sup10 port described under paragraph (2); and 

11 (4) any recommendations for legislative actions 

12 necessary to address any challenges or needs faced 

13 by such providers that are identified by the report 

14 required in this subsection. 

15 (b) DESIGNATED EMPLOYEE DUTIES.—The Admin16 istrator of the Small Business Administration shall des17 ignate a full-time employee within the Administration as 

18 a point of contact for for-profit child care providers. Such 

19 employee shall— 

20 (1) carry out the study required under sub21 section (a); and 

22 (2) provide recommendations to the Adminis23 trator on how to better deliver existing resources 

24 and support to for-profit child care providers. 


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3 

•HR 6156 IH

1 (c) FOR-PROFIT CHILD CARE PROVIDER DE2 FINED.—The term ‘‘for-profit child care provider’’ has the 

3 meaning given the term ‘‘eligible child care provider’’ in 

4 section 658P of the Child Care and Development Block 

5 Grant Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 9858n) and is a provider 

6 that operates— 

7 (1) on a for-profit basis; and 

8 (2) in one or more of the several States or the 

9 District of Columbia. 

10 (d) COMPLIANCE WITH CUTGO.—No additional 

11 amounts are authorized to be appropriated to carry out 

12 this Act. This Act shall be carried out using amounts oth13 erwise appropriated to the Administrator of the Small 

14 Business Administration. 

Æ 


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Charles Lee MOORE, Sr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-1241

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 30, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

This appeal is dismissed because of the appellant's failure to satisfy this court's April 2, 2018 fee order.

SILBERMAN, MORRIS, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
Cleturs SMITH, DOC #R13213, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-131

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Golden Health Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2006 (the Report), I, Shit Yin Wong, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1) The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the Company's financial position and results of operations. February 12, 2009 /s/ Shit Yin Wong Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit
32
  CERTIFICATION
OF THE
 PRINCIPAL
EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO
 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  I, Paul
D. Hamm, the Chief Executive Officer of Endavo Media and Communications, Inc.,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Endavo Media and
Communications, Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on
Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of Endavo Media and Communications, Inc.
  Date: April 15,
2005
    
    /s/ *Paul D.
      Hamm*Paul D. HammChief Executive Officer
 
 I, Paul
D. Hamm, the acting Chief Financial Officer of Endavo Media and Communications,
Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Endavo
Media and Communications, Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December
31, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual
Report on Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of Endavo Media and Communications,
Inc.
  Date: April 15,
2005
    
    /s/ *Paul D.
      Hamm*Paul D. HammActing Chief Executive Officer
Kevin Frederick MCDANIEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4144

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 2, 2018

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.