[Cite as State v. McRae, 2024-Ohio-922.]

COURT OF APPEALS

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.

-vs- :

:

CHARLES MCRAE : Case No. 2023-CA-0039

:

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 2022CR0800

JUDGMENT: Vacated and Remanded

DATE OF JUDGMENT: March 12, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

JODY SCHUMACHER RANDALL E. FRY

38 South Park Street 90 Darby Drive

Mansfield, OH 44907 Lexington, OH 44904
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 2

King, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Charles McRae appeals the June 30, 2023 judgment 

of conviction and sentence of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. PlaintiffAppellee is the state of Ohio. We remand the matter for resentencing.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On November 19, 2022, McRae forced his way into his sister's home and 

savagely assaulted her. The assault left McRae's sister with a broken arm and fractures 

which required surgery, plates and screws to repair. The assault was captured on the 

home's Ring cameras.

{¶ 3} On January 5, 2023, the Richland County Grand Jury returned an 

indictment charging McRae with one count of aggravated burglary, a felony of the first 

degree, two counts of kidnapping, felonies of the first degree, and felonious assault, a 

felony of the second degree. Each of these counts carried a repeat violent offender 

specification. McRae was additionally charged with domestic violence, a misdemeanor of 

the first degree, criminal damaging or endangering, a misdemeanor of the first degree, 

and criminal mischief, a misdemeanor of the first degree.

{¶ 4} On March 19, 2023, McRae entered pleas of guilty to each count of the 

indictment. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation and set the matter over for 

sentencing. 

{¶ 5} McRae appeared for sentencing on June 22, 2023. After the trial court 

merged several counts, the state elected to proceed to sentencing on counts 1, 2, and 4, 

aggravated burglary, kidnapping, and felonious assault, respectively. McRae was 

sentenced to 10-15 years for aggravated burglary, 3 years for kidnapping, and 5 years 
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 3

for felonious assault. The trial court additionally imposed a 2-year term for the repeat 

violent offender specification for an aggregate total of 20 to 25 years incarceration.

{¶ 6} McRae filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for 

consideration.1 He raises two assignments of error as follow:

I

{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DESIGNATING THE APPELLANT A 

REPEAT VIOLENT OFFENDER."

II

{¶ 8} "THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 OF THE 

OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION."

{¶ 9} In his first assignment of error, McRae argues the trial court's sentence for

the repeat violent offender (“RVO”) specification was contrary to law. Specifically, McRae 

contends the only evidence presented at the sentencing hearing to support the RVO 

designation was that fact that he has a 1993 conviction for felonious assault and that no 

details of that conviction are contained in the record. He therefore argues the trial court 

could not have made the necessary analysis to support its RVO designation. While we 

disagree with McRae's argument, we nonetheless remand the matter for resentencing. 

Applicable Law

{¶ 10} R.C. 2929.01 defines a repeat violent offender in relevant part as:

1 The state did not file a response brief.
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 4

(CC) "Repeat violent offender" means a person about whom both of 

the following apply:

(1) The person is being sentenced for committing or for complicity in 

committing any of the following:

(a) Aggravated murder, murder, any felony of the first or second 

degree that is an offense of violence, or an attempt to commit any of 

these offenses if the attempt is a felony of the first or second degree;

* * *

(2) The person previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to an 

offense described in division (CC)(1)(a) or (b) of this section.

{¶ 11} The trial court imposed a discretionary sentence for the RVO specification 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a). That section states:

(2)(a) If division (B)(2)(b) of this section does not apply, the court may 

impose on an offender, in addition to the longest prison term 

authorized or required for the offense or, for offenses for which 

division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of this section applies, in addition to the 

longest minimum prison term authorized or required for the offense, 

an additional definite prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, 

seven, eight, nine, or ten years if all of the following criteria are met:
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 5

(i) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of 

the type described in section 2941.149 of the Revised Code that the 

offender is a repeat violent offender.

(ii) The offense of which the offender currently is convicted or to 

which the offender currently pleads guilty is aggravated murder and 

the court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment 

without parole, murder, terrorism and the court does not impose a 

sentence of life imprisonment without parole, any felony of the first 

degree that is an offense of violence and the court does not impose 

a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, or any felony of the 

second degree that is an offense of violence and the trier of fact finds 

that the offense involved an attempt to cause or a threat to cause 

serious physical harm to a person or resulted in serious physical 

harm to a person.

(iii) The court imposes the longest prison term for the offense or the 

longest minimum prison term for the offense, whichever is applicable, 

that is not life imprisonment without parole.

(iv) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division 

(B)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (B)(1) or (3) of 

this section are inadequate to punish the offender and protect the 

public from future crime, because the applicable factors under 

section 2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating a greater likelihood 
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 6

of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors under that section 

indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism.

(v) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division 

(B)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (B)(1) or (3) of 

this section are demeaning to the seriousness of the offense, 

because one or more of the factors under section 2929.12 of the 

Revised Code indicating that the offender's conduct is more serious 

than conduct normally constituting the offense are present, and they 

outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating that the 

offender's conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting 

the offense.

{¶ 12} An "offense of violence" is defined in R.C. 2901.01(9)(a) and includes 

felonious assault as proscribed by R.C. 2903.11.

McRae's Argument

{¶ 13} McRae never disputed he has a 1993 conviction for felonious assault. He 

argues here on appeal, however, that the record contains no details regarding that 

conviction, nor does it indicate the sentence he received. He asserts, therefore, that the 

"trial court could not possibly have made an analysis that the record contains evidence to 

support the finding of an RVO designation." Appellant's brief at 8. McRae does not 

indicate what analysis the trial court was supposed to make. The only requirements 

placed upon a trial court before imposing sentence for a discretionary RVO are contained 
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 7

in R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a) as set forth above. In determining a trial court's compliance with 

the same, this court has recently quoted the Eighth District Court of Appeals:

Similar to the conclusion that “talismanic” words are not required 

when imposing consecutive sentences under 2929.14(C)(4), there 

are no magic words that must be recited by the trial court when 

making the RVO findings under 2929.14(B)(2)(a). As long as the

reviewing court can discern from the record that the trial court 

engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record 

contains evidence to support the findings, the sentence on the RVO 

specification should be upheld.

{¶ 14} State v. Shaffer, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2021-0023, 2022-Ohio-2006 

¶ 24, citing State v. Watts, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104269, 2017-Ohio-532 ¶ 11.

{¶ 15} However, all of the conditions listed in R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a) must be 

satisfied before the trial court may impose sentence on an RVO specification. Here, the 

trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a)(iii) when it imposed less than the 

longest minimum prison term for aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed a minimum 

prison term of 10 years. The longest minimum prison term for a first-degree felony is 11 

years. R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a). We therefore vacate McRae's sentence and remand the 

matter for resentencing. 

II
Richland County, Case No. 2023-CA-0039 8

{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, McRae argues his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the RVO finding. Given our resolution of 

McRae's first assignment of error, McRae's second assignment of error is moot.

{¶ 17} The judgment of sentence of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas 

is vacated and the matter is remanded for resentencing.

By King, J., 

Hoffman, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.