alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jan Wasilewicz, Appellant, v Village of Monroe Police Department et al., Respondents.

[771 NYS2d 170]

In an action to recover damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, the plaintiff appeals from three orders of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Feter C. Patsalos, J.), all dated December 17, 2002, which granted the respective motions of the defendants Village of Monroe Police Department and Village of Monroe, the defendant Marc M. Miller, and the defendants Orange and Rockland Mason Supply Company and Anthony DiMaulo for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

*562Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.

It is well settled that a plaintiff cannot prevail on causes of action based upon false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against police officers if the police officers had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff committed the underlying crime (see *Gisondi v Town of Harrison,*72 NY2d 280, 283 [1988]; *Kandekore v Town of Greenburgh,*243 AD2d 610 [1997]). “Generally, information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a specific crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest” *(People v Bero,*139 AD2d 581, 584 [1988]; *see Kracht v Town of Newburgh,*245 AD2d 424, 425 [1997]; *Minott v City of New York,*203 AD2d 265, 267 [1994]). Based upon, inter alia, the accusatory instrument signed and sworn to by the defendant Anthony Dimaulo, alleging that the plaintiff committed the crime of issuing a bad check, the defendant Marc M. Miller, a detective in the Village of Monroe Police Department, had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the respective motions of Miller and the defendants the Village of Monroe Police Department and Village of Monroe for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

The Supreme Court also properly granted the motion of the defendants Anthony Dimaulo and Orange and Rockland Mason Supply Company for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, since they, as a civilian complainant and his employer, respectively, cannot be liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution unless they affirmatively induced a police officer to act *(see Cobb v Willis,*208 AD2d 1155, 1156 [1994]; *DeFilippo v County of Nassau,*183 AD2d 695, 696 [1992]; *Viza v Town of Greece,*94 AD2d 965, 966 [1983]). Dimauro merely provided a complaint to the police; there is no evidence that Dimauro or Orange and Rockland Mason Supply Company participated in the plaintiff s arrest or arraignment, or that they gave advice or encouragement to the authorities. Accordingly, the complaint insofar as asserted against them was properly dismissed. Altman, J.P., Krausman, Adams and Townes, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Desiree Ellis, Appellant, v Cleanorama et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

[771 NYS2d 257]

Peters, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed January 14, 2003, which ruled that claimant did not suffer a compensable injury and denied her claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

Claimant began working at the employer’s dry cleaning establishment in March 1999. She maintains that on May 10, 1999, she spilled a dry cleaning chemical known as percethalane on her hands which resulted in swelling and burning of her hands, face and right leg. She stopped working shortly after this incident but returned in February 2000 and continued to work for the employer until April 2000, at which time she was terminated. Thereafter, claimant applied for workers’ compensation benefits for injuries allegedly sustained in the May 10, 1999 incident. The employer controverted the claim. Following a hearing, a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge chose to credit the testimony of the employer’s president and disallowed the claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, resulting in this appeal.

Based upon our review of the record, we find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. Here, conflicting evidence was presented on the issue of whether claimant sustained a work-related injury on May 10, 1999. On the one hand, claimant testified that she was working in the shirt department unit on the date in question when she spilled percethalane on the back of her hand and it started burning. She indicated that although her job entailed sorting and washing shirts and did not involve the use of this chemical, it was stored in the back of the store in a black barrel. The employer’s president, on the other hand, stated that percethalane was a dry cleaning chemical used in a closed dry cleaning machine and was pumped into the machine by an outside company. He testified that it was not a loose material. He further stated that claimant’s job duties did not require her to come into contact with this chemical and that she did not report her alleged exposure. The medical *809documentation, consisting of hospital records and physicians’ reports, did not contain specific information to substantiate claimant’s version of the events. In fact, the emergency room records indicate that claimant had a rash on her face and neck with no mention of any rashing on her hand or legs; Michael Aziz, a physician, reported that claimant told him that *“a*can of cleaning material exploded and fell over her legs.” Inasmuch as the Board “has ‘broad authority to resolve factual issues based on credibility of witnesses and draw any reasonable inference from the evidence in the record’ ” *(Matter of Harris v Revere Copper Prods.,*294 AD2d 792, 793 [2002], quoting *Matter of Myers v Eldor Contr. Co.,*270 AD2d 671, 672 [2000]), it was entitled to credit the testimony of the employer’s president over claimant’s testimony. Therefore, we find no reason to disturb its decision.

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Mugglin and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04

- 22

- 00807

- CV

IN RE Jacklyn DAVIDSON

Original Proceeding 1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Irene Rios , Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela , Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 28, 2022

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

On December 9 , 20 2 2 , relator filed a second first amended petition for writ of mandamus. 2

Relator also filed a motion for temporary relief

. After considering the petition and th is record, this

court concludes relator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of

mandamus is denied. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.8(a). Relator’s motion for temporary relief is denied

as moot.

PER CURIAM

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2022

- PA

- 01621 , styled In the Interest of E.D., et al, Children , pending in

the 438th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Linda A. Rodriguez presiding.

2 Relator’s first filed first amended petition for writ of mandamus was stricken for violat ing Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 9.9.
#### Jason GERAY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. William MUNIZ, Warden Respondent-Appellee

No. 15-16865

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted February 16, 2017 San Francisco, California

Filed February 28, 2017

Carmen Anamaria . Smarandoiu, FPDCA—Federal Public Defenders Office (San Francisco), San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant

Jill M. Thayer, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA—Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, Samuel P. Siegel, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: TASHIMA and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable Lynn S. Adelman, District Judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

*608MEMORANDUM **

Jason Geray appeals the district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition as untimely, arguing that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year filing deadline. .We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and affirm.

1. Geray seeks equitable tolling based on his mental impairment, but he failed to show that he was unable to understand the need to timely file or that it was impossible for him to timely file. *Bills v. Clark,*628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010). As the district court found, that impairment manifested primarily in assaultive behavior, rather than impaired thought process, and did not prevent Geray from filing a variety of documents in the state courts in 2011 and 2012. *Yeh v. Martel,*751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014). And, because the record was “amply developed” regarding Geray's mental impairment, the district court was not obligated to hold an evidentiary .hearing. *Roberts v. Marshall,*627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. Although attorney abandonment can warrant equitable tolling, *Rudin v. Myles,*781 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015), the district court correctly found Geray only entitled to equitable tolling from January 18 to April 13, 2011, when he realized his lawyer was not going to file a direct appeal. The failure of Geray’s trial counsel to perfect a direct appeal did not prevent Geray from filing a habeas corpus petition. *See Randle v. Crawford,*604 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010).

3. Nor has Geray shown that he could not timely file because he was placed in administrative segregation and lacked access to certain state court records. *See Ramirez v. Yates,*571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009); *Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke,*556 F.3d 1008, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2009).

4.Geray argues that the state courts affirmatively misled him regarding the procedures for post-conviction relief, but he waived this argument by failing to raise it below. *Smith v. Richards,*569 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Charlie Joe WILSON, Jr. v. STATE

CR-16-0380

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 28, 2017 Reh. denied May 12, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 7,748<F3>
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,871)<F4>
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<F2>INCLUDES $18,885 MUSIC CATALOG AND $3,529 MUSIC PUBLISHING RIGHTS, BOTH 
NET OF ACCUMULATED AMORTIZATION
<F3>INCLUDES $1,964 OF NON-RECURRING CHARGES
<F4>INCLUDES $2,327 OF NON-RECURRING CHARGES
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</TABLE>
Major ANDERSON v. STATE

CR-16-0467

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 26, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
R.C., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1976

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 16, 2018

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Alisa Smith, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Linsey Sims-Bohnenstiehl, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

*1002We reverse the adjudication of delinquency for two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia and remand for entry of a judgment of dismissal. The evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing failed to establish that the residue on the alleged paraphernalia was a controlled substance. Therefore, the State failed to establish a prima facie case of use or possession with intent to use paraphernalia pursuant to section 893.147(1), Florida Statutes (2016), and the motion for judgment of dismissal should have been granted. *See**M.M. v. State*, 152 So.3d 121, 123-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

Reversed and remanded.

VILLANTI, BLACK, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
#### In the Matter of Anthony B. Jackson, Petitioner, v Bernard B. Kerik, as Police Commissioner of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.

[769 NYS2d 878]

Determination of respondent Police Commissioner, dated on or about December 20, 2001, dismissing petitioner from his position as a police officer, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Jane Solomon, J.], entered August 2, 2001) dismissed, without costs.

The trial commissioner’s findings of guilt were supported by substantial evidence (see *Matter of Berenhaus v Ward,*70 NY2d 436, 443-444 [1987]), including certain hearsay statements *(see Matter of LaFemina v Brown,*194 AD2d 405 [1993]). It is the function of the trial commissioner, rather than a reviewing court, to resolve conflicting evidence *(id.).*In any event, petitioner’s factual claims are unsupported by the evidence.

There is no merit to petitioner’s allegation that one of the specifications was facially defective because it omitted a required element of the prohibited conduct as set forth in an interim order of the Police Commissioner. The specification did not allege a violation of the interim order, but instead alleged a violation *309of the Patrol Guide and properly set forth such violation. Petitioner’s remaining contentions are unpreserved and unavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, Saxe and Williams, JJ.
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Jeremy HENRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-2585

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 27, 2018.

Richard J. D'Amico, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Todd Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SLEET, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
Dolores 

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 26, 2015

No. 04-14-00752-CV

HUMANA INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant

v.

Dolores MUELLER,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 376765

Honorable Tina Torres, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The Appellee’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is GRANTED.

It is so ORDERED on this 26th day of February, 2015

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO:_____________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
EX PARTE Joshua Michael THOMAS

1151207 (2150384)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

January 20, 2017

Writ of cert. quashed.
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EX PARTE S.R.A.

1160103 (CR-15-0910)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

January 13, 2017

Cert. denied.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brenda Trinidad JAIME-SAINZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30248

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted August 9, 2017 *

Filed August 14, 2017

Heather S. Patricco, Raymond Edward Patricco, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Boise, ID, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Matthew G. Gunn, Attorney, Barnum Howell & Gunn PLLC, Boise, ID, for Defendant-Appellant

*264Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Brenda Trinidad Jaime-Sainz appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 210-month concurrent sentences imposed following her guilty-plea convictions for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm,

Jaime-Sainz contends that the district court abdicated its responsibility to conduct an independent inquiry as to the extent of the downward departure she should receive for her substantial assistance to the government under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. To the contrary, the record reflects that the district court considered arguments from both parties and provided a reasoned basis for its acceptance of the government’s two-level downward departure recommendation. *See United States v. Laney,*189 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 1999). The court did not err by giving weight to the government’s assessment of the value of Jaime-Sainz’s assistance. *See*U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a)(1) & cmt. n.3; *Laney,*189 F.3d at 964.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
Patricia GOTTLIEB, Appellant, v. SUNRISE LAKES CONDOMINIUM APTS., PHASE 3 INC. 1, Appellee.

No. 4D17-1321

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 17, 2018]

Richard J. Burton and Daniel J. Poterek of The Burton Firm, P.A., Aventura, for appellant.

E.J. Generotti of Frank, Weinberg & Black, P.L., Plantation, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Damoorgian, Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.
Londarrius Dondrel PADGETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-1382

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 3, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.