alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# ~,pl'~. S10-100302-016 CONTROL NO February 16, 2010 The Honorable Ray LaHood Secretary United States Department ofTransportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, D.C. "".J 20590 Subject: Haneda Combination Services Allocation Proceeding DOT-OST-2010-0018 Dear Secretary LaHood:**1--~-** ..**~.:amwBtiF\g** 

### in**S\;lpfl6ft-G~tlR~Microne-sia~s iq::.p~k;aMR-tQ-{ll'{}\t~~Wv·nmlsto.p-servke** **~tween** . Guam and Tokyo .Haneda airport. New air service to Haneda, which is scheduled to begin later this year, is made possible by the achievements of your office in securing a wide ranging open skies agreement with Japan. I applaud your efforts on the historic open skies agreement and now urge you to select Continental Micronesia to provideservice connecting Guam's tourism and trade industry with Tokyo's central/downtown airport. Gual111s economy in part depends upon tourist traffic from points across the Asian region, with Japan**beJng~critieal** tourist market for the island. Haneda is ideally situated for the Japanese tourist who lives in central and southern/western Tokyo, and obtaining U.S. carrier scheduled service to/from Haneda will be a boost to Guam's travel marketing efforts. As Continental Micronesia is the only carrier operating a hub on Guam Continental Micronesia is the right choice for new Haneda service. Communities around Guam such as Saipan will also benefit from one-stop connections at Guam's airport to Haneda. Increased competition by U.S. carriers and the opportunity to choose among Continental Micronesia service and air services offered by Japanese airlines is important to our island communities.**ConlinentarM1c::ionesi~r'stommifmeht** to·the 

## JifpanesEfmarker"arltf'6Ur Yegion· is. provehby

### theca i' rier's recent addition of flights to Fiji and Hong Kong. Service to Haneda further supplements the airline's growth, and therefore employment and economic benefits for Guam. I urge you to award Tokyo Haneda

### se~vice to Continental Micronesia and my region ofthe U.S. Regards, ,".' .:. : 

# /) -y;;-- .....**!~~**

# ~igT~On', .• President 

### &. CEO MCV Broadband

P.O. Box 24728 GMF, Guam 96921 • Phone: (671) 635-4628 • Fax: (671) 632-6280 • mcvguam.com

: ''''..**~'t**96921 ..**~ ~,~** 

## ''':~~ 

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....

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The Honorable Ray LaHood Secretary**-~.~--** ..

# --------­ .:.;, 

# .--­ t'

0002584313 FEB 18 2010 MAILED FROM ZIP CODE 96921

# .,

United States Department ofTransportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, D.C. 20590


## ill illlil

## HlI,lltlillUtI II

## illI!
<TABLE>
<S>     <C>
                                                                                                       Exhibit 32.1


                                     STATEMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
                               CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350

         In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q for the  period  ended  June 30,  2008 (the "Form
10-Q") of Grayson Bankshares,  Inc. (the "Company"), we, Jacky K. Anderson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
and Blake M. Edwards,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the Company,  hereby  certify  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to our knowledge:

         (a)      the Form 10-Q fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) of the Securities  Exchange
         Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (b)      the  information  contained  in the Form 10-Q fairly  presents,  in all  material  respects,  the
         financial  condition and results of  operations of the Company as of and for the periods  presented in the
         Form 10-Q.



         By:      /s/ Jacky K. Anderson                           Date: August 14, 2008
                  -----------------------                               ---------------
                  Jacky K. Anderson
                  Chief Executive Officer



         By:      /s/ Blake M. Edwards                            Date: August 14, 2008
                  -----------------------                               ---------------
                  Blake M. Edwards
                  Chief Financial Officer



</TABLE>
#### Maynor Joel ALVAREZ-CLOTTER, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-70954

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*756Submitted January 18, 2017 *

Filed January 24, 2017

Maynor Joel Alvarez-Clotter, Pro Se

Lindsay Dunn, Trial Attorney, OIL, Rebecca Hoffberg Phillips, Esquire, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Maynor Joel Alvarez-Clotter, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, *Molina-Estrada v. INS,*293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002), and we review de novo questions of law, *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of cancellation of removal, where Alvarez-Clotter failed to submit to the immigration court sufficient evidence of any qualifying relatives. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

In his opening brief, Alvarez-Clotter fails to address, and therefore has waived any challenge to, the agency’s denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. *See Rizk v. Holder,*629 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (issues not raised in an opening brief are waived).

To the extent Alvarez-Clotter contends the agency violated due process, this claim fails because he has not established error or prejudice. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim).

We do not consider the extra-record evidence submitted for the first time with Alvarez-Clotter’s opening brief. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (judicial review is limited to the administrative record); *Dent v. Holder,*627 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating standard for review of out-of-record evidence).

Alvarez-Clotter’s challenges to his detention and the agency’s denial of bond are not properly before us. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d); *Leonardo v. Crawford,*646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth procedure for challenging bond determinations).

Alvarez-Clotter’s motion to reconsider is denied.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit



        





Exhibit 10(s)


Amendment to Wachovia Corporation Savings Restoration Plan 


RESOLVED that the Wachovia Corporation Savings Restoration Plan (the “SRP”) is amended as follows:


		
	1.
	The last sentence in Section 6.10 of the SRP is amended effective December 31, 2018 to read in full as follows:  




“Whether the Participant is a “key employee” shall be determined in accordance with the Wells Fargo & Company Key/Specified Employee Policy as adopted and amended from time to time by the Human Resources Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors.” 


		
	2.
	Except as herein expressly amended, all the terms and provisions of the SRP shall continue in full force and effect.
#### Horace T. HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., as Trustee FOR WAMU MORTGAGE PASSTHROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-PR-1 TRUST, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1396

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 24, 2017

Horace T. Harris, Appellant Pro Se. Nathan Ira Brown, NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Huntington, West Virginia; Erika Jensene Kar-naszewski Fedelini, NELSON MULLINS RILEY *&*SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Horace T. Harris appeals the district court’s order dismissing his complaint based on res judicata. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Harris v. Wells Fargo*Bank, *N.A.,*No. 3:16-cv-00174-JAG, 2017 WL 838687 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darrin Marcus DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-4104

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 14, 2017

Decided: July 20, 2017

*210William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Beth Drake, United States Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Darrin Marcus Davis appeals the district court’s order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 15 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ supervised release. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” *United States v. Webb,*738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id.. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” *United States v. Thompson,*595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); *Thompson,*595 F.3d at 546-47.

Davis claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not properly consider the applicable policy statements and sentencing factors. He also argues that the district court failed to explain adequately its reasons for the sentence it imposed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we find that the district court thoughtfully applied the proper considerations in determining Davis’ sentence and that its explanation of his sentence was sufficient. *See Thompson,*595 F.3d at 547 (discussing standard). We therefore- conclude that Davis’ sentence is not plainly unreasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny as moot Davis’ motion to expedite. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q
FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,409)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.04)


</TABLE>
#### Betsy NICHOLSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES; Department of the Treasury; Internal Revenue Service, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1733

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 19, 2017

Decided: October 23, 2017

Betsy Nicholson, Appellant Pro Se. Arthur Thomas Catterall, Richard L. Parker, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Tax Division, Washington, D.C.; Andrew Sun Han, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Betsy Nicholson appeals the district court’s order dismissing her complaint in which she sought to enjoin the collection of income taxes, a refund of amounts withheld, and monetary damages. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Nicholson v. United States,*No. 1:16-cv-01531-CMH-TCB, 2017 WL 2793800 (E.D. Va. May 30,2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
STRIPE A LOT OF AMERICA, II, CORP., Appellant, v. Linda RUDOLPH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Betty Evans, Deceased; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; and Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, Appellees.

Case No. 2D17-397

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 18, 2018.

Michael R. D'Lugo of Wicker Smith O'Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.

Marcus W. Viles of Viles & Beckman, LLC, Fort Myers, for Appellee Linda Rudolph, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Betty Evans, Deceased.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, MORRIS, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED July 13, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-11306 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JOSE ALONZO ALVARADO, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 6:05-CR-32-ALL

-------------------- Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Jose Alonzo Alvarado raises arguments that are foreclosed by AlmendarezTorres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Neldwin Adan SANTANA Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-1498

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 19, 2017

Filed: October 3, 2017

John E. Beamer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Neldwin Adan Santana, Pro Se

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Neldwin Adan Santana directly appeals the sentence imposed by the district court1 after he pled guilty to illegally reentering the United States. Santana’s counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the sentence is substantively unreasonable, Santana has filed a pro se brief essentially arguing the same.

After thorough review, we conclude that the district court did not impose an unreasonable sentence, as the court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and sentenced Santana at the bottom of the calculated Sentencing Guidelines range. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (discussing appellate review of sentencing decisions); see also United States v. Petersen, 848 F.3d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2017) (appellate court may apply presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines-range sentence); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir. 2009) (where court makes individualized assessment based on facts presented, addressing proffered information in consideration of § 3553(a) factors, sentence is not unreasonable).

Having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-10486

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee v. DARREN LADELL WADE, Defendant - Appellant

A ppeal from the United States District Court f or the Northern District of Texas U .S.D.C. 3:97-CR-159

Before OWEN, HAYNES, Circuit Judges, and LEMELLE, * District Judge. PER CURIAM: ** Darren Ladell Wade, f ederal pris o n er #29672-077, appeals the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sente n c i n g reduction b a s e d o n Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines. On June 17, 2 0 1 3 , before this case was decided, Wade was released from f ederal custody. “Where

a defendant has b egun s erving a term of supervised release, the appeal of the denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion is moot.” United States v. Booker , 6 45 F.3d 328 U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D J uly 1, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* D is trict Jud ge of

the Eas tern D is trict of Louis iana, s itting by d es ignation.

* * Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R

. 47. 5, the court has d eterm ined that this op inion should not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-10486 Document: 00512292317 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/01/2013No. 12-10486

(5th Cir. 2011) ( citing United States v . Boston , 419 F. App’x 505, 505–07 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). Because Wade’s appeal concerns only the term of his imprisonment, and makes no mention o f h i s t e rm of supervised release, his arguments pertain only to relief under § 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, we conclude, and the parties agree, that Wade’s appeal must be DISMISSED AS MOOT.

2 Case: 12-10486 Document: 00512292317 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/01/2013
Wisner LUBERISSE, Appellant, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 4D17-0638

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 26, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

*Affirmed.*
Hiral V. PATEL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Rodolfo CERVANTES, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-2387

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 21, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
EX PARTE Sidney BAKER

1160365 (CR-15-1022)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 10, 2017

Cert. denied.
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##### 



Exhibit 32.1 Certificate Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as Adopted Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Catalina Marketing Corporation (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, L.
Dick Buell, Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. /s/ L. Dick Buell  
 39