RENDERED: APRIL 5, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-1235-MR

TIMOTHY WARD APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE LAUREN ADAMS OGDEN, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-CI-500129

COURTNEY WARD APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Timothy Ward (Husband) appeals the Jefferson 

Family Court’s October 1, 2021 and October 13, 2021 orders awarding the family 

dog to Appellee Courtney Ward (Wife). Husband argues the family court abused 

its discretion in making the award because it failed to consider all factors as 

required by statute. We detect no error and affirm.
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BACKGROUND

Husband and Wife were married on June 20, 2015. Wife took leave 

from her job as a teacher because of various health problems. The family court 

found, and Wife asserts, the parties decided to adopt a dog named Ruckus to keep 

Wife company while Husband was away at work. However, Husband disputes 

when and, therefore, why the parties acquired Ruckus. 

Wife provided care to Ruckus from his adoption until the parties’ 

separation in December of 2020. On December 31, 2020, Wife moved to Houston, 

Texas. She left Ruckus behind but intended to return for the dog within a few 

weeks. However, she did not do so, and the dog remained in Husband’s care. 

Husband filed his Petition for Dissolution on January 15, 2021, and Wife filed her 

Response on February 2, 2021. 

Wife filed a “Motion for Immediate Return of Dog ‘Ruckus’” on May 

18, 2021. In support of her motion, Wife included a letter from her psychologist, 

Dr. Valerie Fallon, Psy.D, stating Wife requires an emotional support animal as 

part of her living and travel arrangements. Dr. Fallon believed Wife’s emotional 

support animal should be permitted to reside with her. However, Dr. Fallon did 

not state that Ruckus was Wife’s emotional support animal.

The family court heard the motion on May 24, 2021. The court 

denied immediate return of Ruckus and scheduled the motion for an additional 
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hearing. The hearing was held on October 1, 2021, and the family court entered an 

order awarding Ruckus to Wife that day.

In that order, the family court considered Dr. Fallon’s letter, as well as 

Wife’s belief that Ruckus was her emotional support animal. The family court 

noted that Kentucky does not recognize custody of pets and that pets are disposed 

as property in accordance with KRS1 403.190. The family court nevertheless 

concluded it would be equitable to award Ruckus to Wife. The court gave 

Husband 72 hours to comply with its order. 

Husband then filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the October 1, 

2021 order. The family court granted this motion amending the first order to 

include additional findings. These findings include that Ruckus is not a service 

dog, but that Ruckus is a certified emotional support animal. Further, the family 

court found that Wife did not abandon Ruckus when she moved to Texas, that the 

dog’s monetary value is likely nominal, and that Wife had limited financial 

resources when the parties separated. However, the court did not vacate its award 

of Ruckus to Wife.

Despite the family court having not yet entered a final decree of 

dissolution in the case, both orders included the following language: “This is a 

final and appealable order and there is no just cause for delay in its entry.” 

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Appellant filed his notice of appeal with this Court on October 22, 2021, appealing 

both orders and initiating the present appeal – despite the family court having not 

yet entered a final decree of dissolution.

The parties entered into a marital settlement agreement on December 

22, 2021. Therein, the parties agreed as to the disposition of marital property, 

including, but not limited to, real estate, their car, and bank accounts. However, 

the agreement specifically acknowledges the parties’ continued trouble with 

Ruckus. The agreement identifies Ruckus as the sole remaining contention 

regarding personalty between them, states that Ruckus “has been the subject of a 

plethora of litigation[,]” that Husband has sought relief from this Court, and that 

“[t]his matter remains pending at this time.”

The family court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 

and Dissolution of Marriage on February 7, 2022. The court incorporated the 

marital settlement agreement therein. The court also noted that “[t]here is one 

matter currently on appeal before the Kentucky Court of Appeals”; i.e., the dispute 

over Ruckus, and that “[a]ll other matters have been resolved.” The Decree of 

Dissolution also stated that “[t]his is a final order, and there is no just cause for 

delay.”
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ANALYSIS

I. The Court has Jurisdiction to Consider this Appeal.

This case presents us with an unusual threshold inquiry. Wife argues 

that, because Husband appealed from interlocutory pre-decree orders, and because, 

as she asserts, the case lacks a final judgment from which Husband can appeal, this 

Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal and that it must be dismissed. She argues 

the decree of dissolution is not final because it specifically acknowledges the 

dispute regarding Ruckus remains pending. We do not agree.

“Whether a circuit court ruling constitutes a final decision or 

judgment is a question of law.” Chesley v. Abbott, 524 S.W.3d 471, 478 (Ky. App. 

2017) (citing First Nat. Bank of Mayfield v. Gardner, 330 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Ky. 

1959)). Appellate courts review legal issues de novo. Hunter v. Hunter, 127 

S.W.3d 656, 659 (Ky. App. 2003). 

“It is fundamental that a court must have jurisdiction before it has 

authority to decide a case.” Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky. 2005). 

Indeed, “[s]o fundamental is jurisdiction that it is the concept on which first-year 

law students cut their teeth.” Id. As Section 111(2) of the Kentucky Constitution 

provides:

The Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction 

only, except that it may be authorized by rules of the 

Supreme Court to review directly decisions of 

administrative agencies of the Commonwealth, and it may 
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issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, 

or the complete determination of any cause within its 

appellate jurisdiction. In all other cases, it shall exercise 

appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.

KY. CONST. § 111(2). Because our exercise of appellate jurisdiction is “as 

provided by law” per the Kentucky Constitution, the General Assembly defines its 

scope. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Ky. 2002) (emphasis omitted). 

The General Assembly did so in enacting KRS 22A.020, which provides, as 

relevant:

(1) Except as provided in Section 110 of the Constitution, 

an appeal may be taken as a matter of right to the Court of 

Appeals from any conviction, final judgment, order, or 

decree in any case in Circuit Court, including a family 

court division of Circuit Court, unless such conviction, 

final judgment, order, or decree was rendered on an appeal

from a court inferior to Circuit Court.

(2) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 

interlocutory orders of the Circuit Court in civil cases, but 

only as authorized by rules promulgated by the Supreme 

Court.

KRS 22A.020(1) and (2). None of the categories of interlocutory orders which we 

are enabled to review by Supreme Court rule appear in the present case.

Our civil rules define a “final or appealable judgment” as “a final 

order adjudicating all the rights of all the parties in an action or proceeding, or a 
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judgment made final under Rule 54.02.” CR2 54.01. Judgments are made final 

under Rule 54.02 as follows:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 

action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 

third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, 

the court may grant a final judgment upon one or more but 

less than all of the claims or parties only upon a 

determination that there is no just reason for delay. The 

judgment shall recite such determination and shall recite 

that the judgment is final. In the absence of such recital, 

any order or other form of decision, however designated, 

which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and 

liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the 

action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or 

other form of decision is interlocutory and subject to 

revision at any time before the entry of judgment 

adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 

all the parties.

CR 54.02(1). 

Though both orders Husband appeals contain recitations of finality in 

accordance with CR 54.02(1), “[w]here an order is by its very nature interlocutory, 

even the inclusion of the recitals provided for in CR 54.02 will not make it 

appealable.” Hook v. Hook, 563 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Ky. 1978) (citing Hale v. 

Deaton, 528 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1975)). This is the posture in which the two orders 

discussing Ruckus were situated at the time Husband appealed them.

2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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However, this does not mean this appeal must be dismissed 

automatically. In Johnson v. Smith, Kentucky began to apply the federal appellate 

courts’ “relation forward” doctrine: “a premature notice of appeal (absent 

prejudice), in reasonable circumstances, is deemed simply to relate forward and 

become effective on the date the trial court tenders its final judgment.” 885 

S.W.2d 944, 947 (emphasis in original) (citing FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Invs. Mortg. 

Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 111 S. Ct. 648, 112 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1991)). “This rule 

permits a premature notice to be effective to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate 

court upon final judgment where, as here, the circumstances suggest filing a notice 

of appeal would not be unreasonable.” Id. at 950. 

This is exactly what happened in the instant case. Alone, the 

appealed-from orders would be outside of our jurisdiction. However, Husband’s 

notice of appeal relates forward to the entry of the family court’s Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law, and Dissolution of Marriage. Because both orders contain 

CR 54.02(1)’s finality language, it was not unreasonable for Husband to attempt to 

appeal them.

Wife argues that possession of Ruckus remains unresolved before the 

family court. Not so. The family court specifically ordered that Ruckus be 

awarded to Wife in its October 1, 2021 order. The order makes no indication that 

this award was to be temporary pending the final dissolution of the parties’ 
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marriage. The court declined to vacate the award in its October 13, 2021 order. In 

the marital settlement agreement, which the family court incorporated into its 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Dissolution of Marriage, states that “the 

trial court awarded the dog to [Wife]” following a hearing and that Husband has 

sought relief from this Court on that issue. Though the marital settlement 

agreement does say that “[t]his matter remains pending at this time[,]” this 

statement, when read in context of the procedural history of this case, does not 

mean that the issue still remains disputed before the family court. 

We conclude Husband’s notice of appeal relates forward to the filing 

of the family court’s final judgment, and that the award of Ruckus is not a matter 

pending before the family court. The matter is, therefore, properly before us for 

our review.

II. Because Husband failed to object to admission of Dr. Fallon’s letter, he may 

not raise this objection for the first time on appeal.

Husband’s brief seems to challenge the family court’s admission of 

Dr. Fallon’s letter. Husband notes the letter is unsworn, unverified, and hearsay, 

among other arguments. While not explicitly arguing the letter should not have 

been admitted, Husband does, in effect, challenge the family court’s designation of 

the letter as one of Wife’s exhibits.

To the extent this is one of Husband’s arguments, we agree with Wife 

that he failed to preserve any objection to admission of the letter. “It is axiomatic 
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that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.” Sunrise Children’s 

Servs., Inc. v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 515 S.W.3d 186, 192 (Ky. 

App. 2016) (citing Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976), 

overruled on other grounds by Wilburn v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321, 327 

(Ky. 2010)). Not only did Husband fail to object to the letter’s admission before 

the family court, his counsel agreed to the letter’s admission in lieu of Dr. Fallon’s 

testimony, according to the court’s October 1, 2021 order. Indeed, Husband never 

raised any evidentiary objections to the letter at any point before the trial court. He 

cannot do so now.

III. Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Awarding Ruckus to Wife.

We come now to Husband’s argument that the family court abused its 

discretion in awarding Ruckus to Wife. “We review a trial court’s determinations 

of value and division of marital assets for abuse of discretion.” Young v. Young, 

314 S.W.3d 306, 308 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Armstrong v. Armstrong, 34 S.W.3d 

83, 87 (Ky. App. 2000)). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision “was 

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Sexton 

v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272 (Ky. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Husband argues the family court failed to comply with KRS 

403.190(1) when making the award. The statute provides as follows:

(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or for 

legal separation, or in a proceeding for disposition of 
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property following dissolution of the marriage by a 

court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the 

absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the 

property, the court shall assign each spouse’s property 

to him. It also shall divide the marital property 

without regard to marital misconduct in just 

proportions considering all relevant factors including:

(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the 

marital property, including contribution of a 

spouse as homemaker;

(b)Value of the property set apart to each spouse;

(c) Duration of the marriage; and

(d)Economic circumstances of each spouse when 

the division of property is to become effective, 

including the desirability of awarding the family 

home or the right to live therein for reasonable 

periods to the spouse having custody of any 

children.

KRS 403.190(1). 

We agree with Wife that the family court afforded due consideration 

to the above factors. The order noted that Ruckus was adopted from a shelter and 

therefore considered the parties’ acquisition of marital property. The court 

considered the value of Ruckus, noting that his value was likely nominal 

considering he was adopted and that he has no specialized training. The family 

court also considered the duration of the marriage, noting that the parties acquired 

Ruckus two years after they married. And, in its October 13, 2021 order, the 
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family court amended its previous order to note that Wife had limited financial 

resources at the time the parties separated.

Further, family courts are tasked with “considering all relevant factors 

including” but certainly not limited to the four listed in the statute. KRS 

403.190(1) (emphasis added) (see also Johnson v. Johnson, 564 S.W.2d 221, 222 

(Ky. App. 1978) (“The court is directed to consider ‘all relevant factors’ including 

those enumerated within the statute.”)). Accordingly, the family court is permitted 

to consider additional relevant factors when dividing marital property, depending 

on the circumstances of the case. The family court did so here. 

Though Husband disputes the family court’s finding that the parties 

adopted Ruckus because Wife was home alone while Husband worked, it is not 

disputed that Wife was Ruckus’ primary and daily caregiver and that Wife 

considered Ruckus to be her emotional support animal. The court considered Dr. 

Fallon’s letter stating that Wife needed an emotional support animal. While 

Husband invites us to question the evidentiary weight of Dr. Fallon’s letter, 

“judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the 

exclusive province of the trial court.” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 

2003) (citing Bowling v. Natural Res. & Env’t Prot. Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 

App. 1994)). 
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Husband argues the family court abused its discretion in other ways, 

in addition to misapplication of KRS 403.190. For instance, he argues the family 

court failed to afford due weight to Wife’s ability to afford a flight from Texas to 

retrieve Ruckus, and that Ruckus was never prescribed as an emotional support 

animal, among other things. Again, our task is not to reweigh evidence but limit 

our review in these circumstances to determining whether the court abused its 

considerable discretion.

Because the family court’s award of Ruckus was not arbitrary, 

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles, we conclude the 

family court did not err in awarding the dog to Wife.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Jefferson Family Court’s 

October 1, 2021 and October 13, 2021 orders awarding Ruckus to Wife.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

David B. Mour

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

John H. Helmers, Jr.

Melina Hettiaratchi

Louisville, Kentucky