## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . P D - 0493- 09 D O U G LA S M I C H A EL H U BE R T, A ppe l l ant
v. THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON S TATE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE THI RTEENTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

NUECES CO UNTY P RI CE , J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t i n w hi c h K ELL ER , P. J. , and W OMACK , J OHNS ON , K EASLE R , H ERVEY , H OL C OM B and C OCHRAN , JJ . , j oi ne d. M E YE RS , J. , f

i l e d a di s s e nt i ng o pi ni on. O P I N I O N I n t hi s cas e, t he appe l l ant ’ s gr andfa t her al l ow ed the pol i ce t o ent erand s ear ch t he appel l ant ’ s bedr oom i n t he hous e t hey s har ed. T he quest i on i s w het her t he gr andfa t herhad actual aut hor i t y t o cons ent t o t he sea r ch of t he bedr oom and, fai l i ng t hat , w het her t he pol i ce coul d r eas onabl yr el yon h is a ppar ent aut hor i t yt o cons ent t o t he s ear ch. W e hol d t hat t he grandf at her had act ual aut ho ri t yt o co nsent t o a sear ch o f t he ap pell ant’ s bedroo m . B ecause
w e h o ld th a t th e g ra n d f

a th e r h a d a c tu a l au th o rity , w e n e e d n o t ad d re ss w h e th e r th e a p p a re n t-Huber t — 2

1 T EX . P EN A L C ODE § 46.04. authori t ydo ct ri ne w ou l d v al i date hi s consen t t o a sear ch of hi s grandso n’s room . W e revers e t he judgm ent of t he co urt of ap peals
. F AC T S AN D B AC KGROU ND I n 2004, t he appe l l antw as convi ct ed of f el onydr i vi n g whi l e i n t o x i c a t e d a nd s ent ence d t o s even y ear s ’ i m pr i s onm ent
. H e ser ved a por t i on of t hi s s ent ence befor e bei ng r el eas ed on par ol e. I n Sept ember 2007, t he appe l l ant ’ s gran d fat her , M y r on R eed, i nfor m ed t he appel l ant ’ s par ol e offi cer t hatt he appe l l ant had bee n dr i vi ng w i t hout a l i cens e, had l eftt he

s t at e, and w as i n pos s es s i on of fi r ear m s
— al l vi ol at i ons of hi s par ol e condi t i ons . A ct i ng on t hi s i nfor m at i on, t he appe l l ant ’ s par ol e off i cer , A aron G ar ci a, i s s ued a w ar r ant for t he

a p p e llan t’s a rre st. G a rc ia f o rw a rd e d th e a rre st w a rra n t to G ilb e rto C a sa s, Jr ., a n o f f ice r w ith t he N ueces C ou ntyC on st able’ s O ffi ce. A ft er r ecei ving t he w arr ant, C asas w ent t o the hou se t hatt he appel l ant s har ed w i t h R eed, acc om pani ed byO ffi cerV al ver de. W hen t heyar r i ved att he hous e, t he off

i cer s found t he appe l l ant on t he porc h. T hey ar r es t ed t he appel l ant and p lace d h im in t h eir sq u ad ca r b ef o re searc h ing the en ti re ho u se, inclu d ing the a p p e llan t’ s b e d ro o m . T h e o f

f ice rs f o u n d w e a p o n s a n d a m m u n iti o n . T h e a p p e llan t w a s s u b se q u e n tly char ged w i t h unl aw ful pos s es s i on of a f i r ear m bya fe l on. 1 T he appe l l antfi l ed a pr e- t r i al m ot i on t o s uppr es s t he evi dence , ar gui ng t hat t he s ear ch of hi s bedr oom vi ol at ed t he F our t h, Fi ft h, Si xt h, and Four t eent h A m endment s t o t he U ni t ed St at es C ons t i t ut i on, A r t i cl e I , Sect i on 9, of t he Texas C ons t i t ut i on, and A r t i cl e 38. 23 of t heHuber t — 3

2 U. S. C O N ST . ame nd s. IV, V, VI , X IV; T EX . C O N ST . a rt . I , § 9; T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt
. 38.23. T exas C ode of Cri m i nal Pr ocedur e. A t a hea r i ng on t he mot i on t o s uppr es s , G ar ci a t es t i fi ed 2
t hat he h a d i s s u e d a b l u e war r a n t f o r t h e a p p e l l a n t a f

t e r r e c e i v i n g a t i p f

r o m Re e d t h a t t he appel l anthad vi ol at ed his p aro le c ondi t i ons . A s ked w het her R eed w as t he ow ner of t he h o m e in w h ic h th e a p p e lla n t re s id e d , G a rc ia re p lie d , “ T h a t I’m a w a re o f , ye s m a ’ a m .” Of f i c e r Ca s a s t e s t i f

i e d t h a t h e h a d e x e c u t e d t h e b l u e wa r r a n t a n d s e a r c h e d t h e h o u s e . He

s t at ed t hathe s poke w i t h R eed pr i or t o t h e s ear ch and a ffi r m ed t hat he had obt ai ned t he

c o n se n t o f

“ th e o w n e r ” o f

th e h o m e b e f

o re c o n d u c tin g th e se a rc h . H e d id n o t ex p re ss ly t es t i fyw ho t he ow nerw as . O n cr os s - exami nat i on, C as as w as s peci fi cal l yques t i oned about

s ear chi ng t he appe l l ant ’ s bedr oom . C as as t es t i fi ed t hat t he door t o t he appel l ant ’ s bedr oom had bee n cl os ed and t hat R eed had opened t he door for t he offi cer s . O n cr os s - exami nat i on he ac know l edged t hat he had been aw ar e t hat t he bedr oom w as occupi ed by t he appel l ant and t h a t n o t h i n g i n t h e c i r c u ms t a n c e s i nd i c a t e d t h a t Re e d “ l i v e d ” i n t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s b e d r o o m. W h il e se arc h ing the b ed roo m , C asa s d isco v ere d a w ea p o n o n top o f the e n tert ainm en t cen ter,
a w e a p o n in s id e o f

th e c lo s e t, a n d a m m u n itio n in s id e th e d re s s e r. O ffi cerV al ver de al s o t es t i fi ed aboutt he w eapons found duri ng t he s ear ch and s t at ed t hat , as “fa r as [he] knew , [t he hous e] bel onged t o M r . R eed.” O n cros s - exami nat i on, V al verde co nced ed t hat he had been aw are at t he t i m e of t he sear ch, based o n R eed’s cl ai m s, t h a t o n l yt h e a p p e l l a n t a n d o c c a s i o n a l l yt h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s f i a n c é e s l e p t i n t h e b e dr o o m.Huber t — 4

3 Th e State ’s ob

je c tio n that the pr of

fe re d doc ume nts “ we re no t on file 14 da y s b e fo rethi s d ate of tri al as re quired unde r the Rules of Evide nce”was sustained. A ppare ntly the prosec utor was ref erring to Te x as Rule of Evidenc e 902(10) . It se ems more likely that admissibili ty of a c ertified copy of a dee d would be g overne d by Rule 902(4) rather than Rule 902( 10)—in any event, wehave held that the Rules of Evidence do not a pply in a pre- trial suppression hea ring
. Gran ad

os v . S tate , 85 S.W .3d 217, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The appellant did not challeng e the trial court’ s ruling on the State’s objec tion, however , in the court of a ppeals. V al ver de admi t t ed t hathe had a s ked R eed no f ur t her ques t i ons r egar di ng w hat ever per m i s s i on R eed mayhave had t o ent ert he appe l l ant ’ s bedr oom . R eed hi m s el f di d not t es t i fy att he s uppr es s i on hear i ng. A ft er t h e St a t e p r e s e n t e d i t s e v i d e n c e , t h e d e f e n s e c a l l e d Ros e Ca r a b a j a r , t he appel l ant ’ s fi ancé e, t o t es t i fy
. She s t at ed t hat t he appe l l ant co- ow ned t he hous e w i t h R eed, t hatR eed w as “excl u d ed ” fro m t he appe l l ant ’ s bedr oom , not al l ow ed t o ent eri t w i t hout exp res s perm i ssi on , and t hat t he d oo r t o t he bed room w as k ept cl osed. Fi nall y , t he d efen se
c a lled th e a p p e llan t to tes tify th a t h e c o -o w n e d th e h o u s e . T h e d e f e n se a ttem p ted to in tro d u c e w h a t w e re re p re se n ted to b e c e rtifie d c o p ies o f d e e d s re f lec tin g su c h c o -o w n e rsh ip t hr ough bot h of i t s w i t nes s es , but t he t r i al cour t s us t ai ned t he S t at e’ s obj ect i ons and r efus ed t o r ece i ve t he evi dence
. 3 T he t r i al cour t deni ed t he appe l l ant ’ s m ot i on t o su p p ress, and t he appe l l ant
s ubs equent l yent er ed i nt o a pl ea ba r gai n w i t h t he St at e w her eby he pl ed gui l t yt o unl aw ful p o ss e ss io n o f

a f ire a rm in e x c h a n g e f

o r fiv e y e a rs’ im p riso n m e n t. In d e n y in g th e m o tio n to
s uppr es s , t he t r i al cour t di d not fi l e w r i t t en fi ndi ngs of fa ctor con cl us i ons of l aw . T he app el l ant appealed, argui ng t hat t he tr i al cou rthad err ed in d eny i ng his m oti on t o sup pressHuber t — 5

4 In the court of appea ls, the State pointed to la nguag e in the plea agree ment that the appe llant ha d wa ive d “ a ll pr e tr ia l mot ion s on fi le e xcept t

ho se matte rs ru le d o n b y

thec ourt ,” arguin gthat th is constituted a wa iver of the appellant’ s right to appeal. In its opini on on orig inal submissi on, the cour t of a pp e a ls e nti re ly

fa ile d to a dd

re ss t his qu e sti on . O n r e he ari ng , how e ve r, thec ourt of a pp e a ls h e ld that there was no wa iver, a nd the State does not conte st that holding in this Court. 5 Hu be rt v . S

tate , 286 S.W .3d 484, 490-91 (Tex. A pp.—Corpus Christi 2009) ( op. on reh’g ). 6 Id. at 491. 7 State’s Petition for Discre tionary Review, at 3. b ec au se R ee d lack ed ac tual an d ap p are n t au tho ri ty to co n sen t t o a se arc h o f th e a p p ell an t’ s bedr oom . T he cour t of appe al s hel d that t he off i cer ’ s t es t i m onydi d not “amount [] t o any 4 evi dence t hatR eed e xer ci s ed ac t ual cont r ol over [t he appe l l ant ’ s ] bedr oom ” and t hat t he circu m stan ce s tha t t h e o ff icers en co u n tered at t h e a p p ell an t’ s h o u se— a c lose d d o o r, R ee d ’s

s t at ement t hathe di d not s l eep i n t he bedr oom , and R ee d ’s o p en ing t he door t o t he

r oom
— w er e “ambi guous at bes t , and a r eas onabl e per s on i n t he offi cer ’ s pl ace w oul d have i nqui r ed fur t her
. ” A ccor di ngl y , t he cour t of appeal s hel d t hat t he t r i al cour t er r ed i n deny i ng 5 th e a p p e llan t’s m o tio n to su p p re ss a n d re m a n d e d th e c a se to th e trial c o u rt. 6 T h e S tat e f

il ed a p eti ti o n fo r d iscreti o n ary rev iew ch all en g ing the c o u rt o f a p p ea ls’ s hol di ng t hatR eed l acke d actual aut hor i t y t o cons ent “j us t beca us e [he] di d not s l eep i n t he appel l ant ’ s bedr oom ” and t hatt he pol i ce c oul d not r easona bl yr el yon R eed’ s appar ent
a u th o rityto c o n se n t to th e se a rc h a b se n t so m e f u rth e r cla rif

ica tio n . W e g ra n ted re v iew to

7 exami ne t he cour t of appe al s ’ s hol di ng w i t h r es pectt o R eed’ s l ack of aut h o ri ty , r eal orHuber t — 6

8 T EX . R. A PP . P. 66.3(b). The appellant ha s claimed that the se arc h of his bedroom violated his rights unde r the United States C o n stitut ion, the Texas Consti tution, and the Texas Code of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure . A lth ou gh th e a pp e lla nt h a s c on sis te ntly

inv ok e d s tate law t

hr ou gho ut t

his lit ig atio n, ne ith e r p art

y argue s th at any of th e state -l aw p ro vis ion s e xce e ds thesc op e of F ourt h Am e ndme nt p ro te c tio ns . B e c a us e thebrie fs do no t prov idesp e c if ic argume nts or

a uth oriti e s to dis tin guis h the state -l aw c la ims from t he fe de ra l- law c la ims , w e wi ll l imi t ou r a na ly sis to t

he F ourt h Amendment. W

e lc h v . S tate , 93 S.W .3d 50, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 9 St. Ge or gev . S tate , 237 S.W .3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 10 Id
. ; Guzma n v . S

tate , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 11 Oh io v . R ob ine tte , 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996). 12 Th e c ourt

of app eal s’s op ini on

c ite s Ma x we ll v Sta tefor the proposition that “whe ther consent wa s valid is a question of fa ct.” Hu be rt , 2 8 6 S
. W
. 3 d a t4 9 0 (c i t i n g Ma x we ll v . S tate , 73 S.W .3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). Maxwe ll , in stating that “ the validity of an a lleg ed consent to sea

rch is a que stion of fac t to be deter mined from all the c ircumstance s[,] ” over extends the Supreme Court c ase it re lies on for the pr oposition. Ma x we ll , 7 3 S
. W
. 3 d at2 8 1 (c i t i n g Ro bin e tte , appar ent , t o cons entt o t he s ear ch of t he appe l l ant ’ s bedr oom . W e now r ever s e t he j udgm ent 8 of the cou rtof ap peals
. A PP LI C A BLE L AW St andard of R evi ew In re v iew in g a m o tio n to su p p re ss , w e a p p lya b if u rc a ted sta n d a rd o f

re v iew
. W e w ill

9

r e v i e w de novo a t r i al co u rt ’s a p pl i cat i on of l aw t o t he fa ct s , but w e w i l l defe r t o t he t r i al

cour t on det erm inat i ons of cr edi bi l i t yand hi s t or i cal fac t
. W het her cons ent w as gi ven 10 vol unt ar i l yunder t he Four t h A m endment i s a fac t ques t i on t o be gi ven def er ence . T exas

11

c o u rts h a v e n o t ex p licitlyd e c lar e d th a t th e d e ter m in a tio n w h e th e r th ird -p a rtyc o n se n t is v a lid i s a que s t i o n o f l a w o r a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t
. As a ma t t e r o f p r a c t i c e , h o wev e r , t hey have 12Huber t — 7

519 U.S. at 40) . In Ro bin e tte , the S upreme Court held only that the v olu nta rin ess of conse nt give n is a question of pure fac t, and conse nt must be voluntary to be valid. Ro bin e tte , 519 U.S. at 40. 13 Se ee .g., Ri or

da n v . S tate , 905 S.W .2d 765, 770-73 (Te x . App.—Austin 1995, no pet.); Core a v . S

tate , 52 S.W .3d 311, 316-18 (Te x . App.—Houston [1stDist.] 2001, pet. re f’d)
. 14 See United States v. Hudson , 405 F.3d 425, 431 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the question of wh e the r p oli c e ha d a

re a so na bleba sis fo r f

ind ing“ that a

thi rd pa rt y ha d a uth ority to c on se nt t o sear ch” is a

question of law) ; Un ite d S tates v . R ith , 164 F.3d 1323, 1328 ( 10th Cir. 1999) (holding that “whe ther consent was valid under the Four th Amendment” is a

question of law to be r eviewe d de novo ) ; U

nite d S tates v . Kim , 105 F.3d 1579, 1581- 82 (9th Cir. 1997) (de term i n i n g that the question of whethe r fa cts supported a findingof authority

for F ourth Amend ment purposes is “a n inhere ntly leg al one” ). Se eals o Un i t ed Sta t es v. Jam es , 353 F.3d 606, 613, 615 ( 8th Cir. 2003) (h old ingthat th e de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he rewa s jo int

a c c e ss a nd c ontr ol fo r ac tua l autho ri ty is a fa ct question revie wed unde r the plain-e rror standard but a

deter mination of whether

the g overnme nt rea sonably

relied on a

third party ’s conse nt is a question of law to be r eviewe d de novo ) ; Un ite d S tates v . S te war t , 9 3 F .3 d 18 9, 19 2 (5 th Cir
. 19 96 ) (h old ingthat “ [o]bj e c tiv e re a so na ble ne ss is a question of law r eviewe d de novo ” whe n scope of consent g iven is the issue on revie w). an aly ze d the m at t er as a mi xed ques t i on of l aw and fa ct , t o be r evi ew ed de novo , as evi dence d byopi ni ons t hatw ei gh t he fa ct s t hat ar e i n t he r ecor d on appea l and t hen m ake a n i ndepende nt l egal det er m i nat i on. T he fe der al ci r cui t s have been m or e expl i ci t about how 13
t heyr evi ew t hes e i s s ues on appea l , gener al l y concl udi ng t hat w het her i t i s r eas onabl e for t he p o lice to c re d it t h e p u rp o rte d c o n se n t o f a th ird p a rty to c o n d u c t a p a rticu lar se a rc h sh o u ld be t r eat ed as a m i xed ques t i on of l aw and fac t , t o be r evi ew ed by appell ate c o u rt s o n a de

novo b a sis
. B e c a u se w e f in d th a t th e a n a ly sis o f w h e th e r a th ird p a rtyh a d a u th o rityto 14

co n sen t i n v o lves an ap p li ca ti o n o f leg al princ iples to f ac ts, w e n o w h o ld t h at w h ethe r a third par t yhad ac t ual aut hor i t yt o cons entt o a sea r ch of anot her ’ s pr oper t y and w het her an off i cer
w as r eas on ab le i n fi ndi ng t hata t hi r d par t yhad appa r ent aut hor i t yt o cons ent ar e mi xed ques t i ons of l aw and fa ctw hi ch r evi ew i ng cour t s s houl d exami ne de novo
. I f, as i n t hi s cas e,Huber t — 8

15 St. George , su

pra , at 72 5; Sta tev . R oss , 32 S.W .3d 853, 856, n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 16 U. S. C O N ST . amend. IV. 17 Se ege ne ra lly Skinner v . Railway Labor Executive s Ass’n , 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (“ Exc e pt i n c e rt a in w e ll- de fi ne d c ir c ums tanc e s, a se arc h o r s e izur e . . . is no t r e a so na bleun le ss i t is a c c omp lis he d pur su ant to a judi c ia l w arr ant i ssu e d u po n p ro ba blec a us e .” ); Be ll v . W

olf ish , 4 41 U. S. 52 0, 55 8 (1 97 9) (h old ingtha t bo dy-c avit

y se arc he s o f p ri so ne rs areno t unre a so na ble ); Y barra v. Illin ois , 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (holding that it is unre asonable to searc h individuals who are in the same g e ne ra l area a s so me on e be ingse arc he d und e r a va lid wa rr ant w ith out so me thi ngmor e to establish probable cause ).

18 Maryland v. D

yson , 5 2 7 U. S
. 4 6 5 , 4 6 6 (1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g Calif ornia v. Carney , 471 U.S. 386, 39 0- 91 (1 98 5) ); W

ie dev . S tate , 214 S.W .3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 19 Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 20 Sc hn e c k lot h v . B us tam on te , 4 12 U. S. 2 18 , 2 19 (1 97 3) ; Ma x we ll , 73 S.W .3d at 281. a t r i al cour t does n o t ent er fi ndi ngs of fa ct , a r evi ew i ng cour t m us t vi ew t he evi dence i n a l i ght m os t favor abl e t o t he t r i al cour t ’ s r ul i ngs and ass um e t hat t he t r i al cour t r es ol ved any i s s ues of hi s t or i cal fac t or cr edi bi l i t ycons i s t ent l yw i t h i t s ul t i m at e r ul i ng. 15 Thi r d Par t y C ons e nt T he Four t h A m endment pr ovi des p rot ect i on fr om “unr eas onabl e” s ear ches and

s ei zur es bygover nm entoffi ci al s . O ver the y ear s , t he Supr eme C our t has exami ned t he 16 boundar i es of r eas onabl enes s i n a var i et yof cont ext s . G ener al ly , s ear ches conduct ed 17

w i t hout a w arr antar e dee m ed unr eas onabl e. T her e ar e, how ever , s ever al w el l

- s et t l ed 18

exce pt i ons t o t he w ar r antr equi r ement
. O ne s uch exce p t i on ar i s es w hen a pe r s on 19 vol unt ar i l ycons ent s t o a s ear ch. W het her i t i s r eas onabl e undert he Four t h A m endment for 20Huber t — 9

21 Ma x we ll , 7 3 S
. W
. 3 d

at2 8 1 (c i t i n g Ro bin e tte , 519 U.S. at 40). 22 United States v. Matlock

, 415 U. S. 1 64 , 1 70 (1 97 4) ; Be c k ne ll v . S tate , 720 S.W .2d 526, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Fa nc he r v . S tate , 659 S.W .2d 836, 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (explaining that “[i] t is well established in Texas th at t h i rd p arties ha ve authority

to consent to a sea

rch when they have e qual control ove r and e qual use of the premises be ing se arc hed.”)
. 23 Matlock, 4 15 U. S. at 17 1 n .7 ; Ma x we ll , 73 S.W .3d at 281. 24 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. Se e als o Un ite d S tates v . R ith , 164 F.3d 1323, 1330 ( 10th Cir. 1999), cert. de nied

528 U. S
. 8 2 7 (1 999) (notingthat “contr ol for most purposes” is a normative inq uir y wh ic h d e pe nd s o n th e re latio ns hip be tw e en th e conse nti ngthi rd pa rt y and thea pp e lla nt; wh e rethere latio ns hip is o f the kin d th at c re ate s a pr e sumpt ion

of c ontr ol, a s d oe s th e pa

re nt- c hil d relationship, and the presumption is not rebutted, the third party has authority to consent, eve n if the third party

had not bee n using the room). an off i cert o r el yon cons enti s a quest i on t o be det er m i ned byexami ni ng t he t ot al i t yof t he ci rcum st ances. 21 A th ird p a rtyc a n c o n se n t to a se a rc h to th e d e trim e n t o f a n o th e r’s p riv a c yin ter e st if th e th ird p a rtyh a s a c tu a l au th o rityo v e r th e p lac e o r th in g to b e se a rc h e d . T h e th ird p a rty

m ay , i n hi s ow n r i ght , gi ve val i d cons ent w hen he a nd t he abs ent , non- cons ent ing per s on sh are co m m o n au tho ri tyo v er the p rem ises o r p ro p e rty
. A lt h o u g h p rop ertyinterests are 22 relev antt o t hi s det er m i nat i on, t he comm onal i t yof aut hor i t yt o cons ent i s not det er m i ned

s o l e l y b y t h e l a w o f

p r o p e r t y. I n s t e a d , c o m m o n a u t h o r i t y i s s h o w n b y

23

m ut ual us e of t he prope r t y by per s ons gener al l y havi ng j oi nt acc es s or cont r ol for m os t pur po ses, s o t hati t i s r eas onabl e t o r ecogni ze t hat anyof t he coi nhabi t ant s has t he ri ght t o per m i t t he i ns pect i on i n hi s ow n r i ght and t hat t he ot her s have a s s um ed t h e r i s k t hat one of t hei r num ber m i ght per m i t t he comm on ar ea t o be s ear ched. 24 A defe ndant w ho has t hus as s um ed t he r i s k t hat anot her m ayper m i ta s ear ch of t hei r s har edHuber t — 10

25 See U nited States v. Mc

Alpine , 919 F.2d 1461 ( 10th Cir. 1990) (notingthat the def endant’ s “ e xpe c tatio n o f p ri va c y

is, if any thi ng , d imi nis he d as a co ns e qu e nc e of the anta g on ism be tw e e n h im and the [third party]” and empha siz ing that that is “particularly true whe n the occ upant of the premises is prompted to coope rate with the police bec ause the defe ndant has c ommitt ed a c rime u pon that ot he r p e rs on ); Un ite d S

tates v . M oo re , 917 F.2d 215 ( 6th Cir. 1990) (upholding c onsent by defe ndant’s g irlfriend—who lived in the sam e pre mises as defe ndant—and stre ssing that she “assisted the policeto avoid possible criminal implication of herse lf”).

26 Pe op lev . S

an de rs , 904 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Colo.1995). See also Pe ople v. Cosme , 397 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. A

pp. 1979) (upholdingfi an ce e’s consent to sear ch apa rtment share d with defe ndant wher e she took initiative to summon police because defe ndant was storing drug s in a closet used by bo th of the m) ; State v. Frame , 609 P.2d 830 (Or. A pp. 1980) (notingthat a conse nting oc cupant c an act in his own interes t wherehe or she summons the police to seize stolen property kept in the pr e mis e s b e c a

us e thec on se nti ngpa

rt y c ou ld l ate r b e c ha

rg e d w ithpo sse ssi on

of su c h it e ms) ; Pe op le v. Ire land, 348 N.E.2d 277 (I ll. App. 1976) (no t i n g t h at a co-occ upant of pre mises in which contra band is kept runs a

signific ant risk of fa cingcriminal cha rg es and c an, ther efor e, ac t in his own interest in the Matlock

sense)
. 27 Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990). pr oper t yor pr emi s es m aynot compl ai n of t hat sea rch u n der t he Four t h A m endment
. A nd th e f a c t th a t th e re latio n sh ip b e tw e e n th e d e f e n d a n t a n d th e th ird p a rtyh a s g ro w n a n tag o n istic

w i l l not nece s s ar i l yvi t i at e conse nt
. A s expl ai ned i n s ever al cas es , “w her e one co- occupa nt 25 has vi ct i m i zed t he ot her , [t he ci r cumst ance s m aybe s uch as t o]
. . . pr ov ide an addi t i onal

rea so n fo r va li d ati n g a c o -oc cu p an t’ s co n sen t t o a w arran tl ess s ea rch [.]” 26 A ct ual aut hor i t yi s not nece s s ar i l ya prereq u i s i t e fora val i d cons ens ual s ear ch, how ever . T he Supr eme C our t h as ex p la i ned t hat w hen an of fi cerr eas onabl y , t hough

e rro n e o u s ly, b e liev e s th a t a th ird p a rtyp u rp o rtin g to p ro v id e c o n se n t h a s a c tu a l au th o rity

over t he pl ace or t hi ng t o be s ear ched, appar ent aut hor i t y exi s t s and t he pur port ed co n sent fr om t he t hi r d par t y can s er ve t o m ake t he s ear ch r eas onabl e. E ven i f t he t hi r d par t yl acks 27Huber t — 11

28 Rodriguez , 4 97 U. S. at 18 1; Ma lon ev . S tate , 1 6 3 S. W. 3 d 7 8 5 , 7 9 7-98 (T e x. App.—Texarkana

2005, pet. re f’d)
. 29 Ma x we ll , 73 S.W .3d at 281. Under the Texas Constitution, the State must show by clea r and convincingevidenc e that conse nt was validly g iven. Id
. 30 State’s B rief on the Merits, at 4. actual aut hor i t yt o cons ent

— t hati s , he does not actual l yhave j oi nt acc es s t o or cont r ol over th e p re m ise s— h is p u rp o rte d c o n s e n t ca n n e v e rth e les s v a lid a te a se a rc h if it rea so n a b ly

a p p e a r s t o t h e p o l i c e t h a t h e d o e s i n f a c t h a v e a u t h o r i t y. T he St at e has t he bur den t o s how t hat t he per s on w ho cons ent ed t o t he s ear ch had actual or appar entaut hor i t yt o cons ent
. T o m eeti t s bur den, t he St at e must pr ovi de evi dence 28
t hata t hir d p arty ei t herhad mut ual acc es s t o and cont r ol overt he pl ace t hat w as s ear ched,

o r t h a t t h e o f

f i c e r s c o n d u c t i n g t h e s e a r c h r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e d f a c t s p r o v i d e d t o t h e m b y a t hi r d par t yt hatw oul d have be en l egal l ys uffi ci ent t o j us t i fya s ear ch as r eas onabl e. U nder t he Four t h A m endment , t he St at e must s how by a pre ponder ance of t he evi dence t hat i t w as
r eas onabl e foroffi cer s t o pr ocee d on t he i nfor m at i on t heyhad. 29 A PPL I CA T I ON T he St at e ar gues t hatt he cour t of appe al s appl i ed an i ncor r ects t and ard of r evi ew
w hen i t fai l ed t o r evi ew t he evi dence i n t he l i ght m os t favor abl e t o t he t r i al cour t ’ s r ul i ng. 30 H ow ever , t he St at e fa i l s t o i dent i fyanycr edi bi l i t yorfac t det er m i nat i o n s that t he cour t of appea l s di d not r es ol ve i n favor of t he t r i al cour t ’ s deci s i on. T he t r i al cour t , i n deny i ng t he

m o tio n , m a d e im p lied f

in d in g s o f

f a c t th a t th e o f

f ice rs’ tes tim o n y w a s cr e d ib le a n d th e f a c tsHuber t — 12

31 Sta tev . R oss , 32 S.W .3d 853, 856, n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 32 Hu be rt , 286 S.W .3d at 489. w er e as t he offi cer s t es t i fi ed. T he cour t of appe al s cor r ect l yvi ew ed t he evi dence i n a l i ght 31

m os t favor abl e t o t he t r i al cour t ’ s r ul i ng, es s ent i al l ydi s count i ng t he appe l l ant ’ s evi dence and

acc ept i ng al l of t he S t at e’ s , i n r eac hi ng i t s concl us i on t hat t her e w as no aut hor i t yon w hi ch t he sea r ch coul d be deem ed re as onabl e. L i kew i s e, w e al s o acc ept as t r ue and c r edi bl e t he 32 offi c e r s ’ t e s t i mon y a t t h e h e a r i n g . W e b e l i e v e , h o wev e r , t h a t t h e c o u r t o f a ppeal s has

m is c o n s tr u e d th e le g a l s ig n if ic a n c e o f th e f a c ts a s th u s c o n s tr u e d
. A ctu a l A u th o rity O n the b asis o f the test im o n yeli cit ed d u ri n g the s u p p ression h ea ri n g , the tri al co u rt coul d have f

ound, i n s uppor t of i t s ul t i m at e r ul i ng, ( 1) t hat R eed w as t he excl us i ve ow ner of t he hous e, ( 2) t hat the o ff icers knew t hat R eed di d not “l i ve” ors l eep i n t he r oom t hat t he appel l anti nhabi t ed, and ( 3) t hatR eed ope n ed t he door t o t he appe l l ant ’ s bedr oom for t he offi cer s t o s ear ch i t
. T he t r i al cour t coul d al s o have c hos en t o di s bel i eve t he t es t i m onyof t he app el l ant’ s gi rl fri end th a t R eed w as excl ud ed from enter i ng t he room w i t ho ut express per m i s s i on. T hatR eed di d not s l eep i n t he r oom
— a fa ctt hat t he off i cer s pl ai nl yconce ded t heyknew at t he t i m e of t he s earch

— h as so m e t endenc yt o s how t hat R eed di d not have

m ut ual us e of t he appe l l ant ’ s bedr oom . H ow ever , t he det er m i nat i on of w het her a per s on has

a u th o rityto c o n s e n t to a se a rc h o f a n o th e r p e rso n ’s b e d ro o m c a n n o t re st s o lely o n th isHuber t — 13

33 See Sore nsen v. State, 47 8 S.W.2 d 532 (T e x Crim . App . 1 97 2) (h old ingthat tw e nty-ye ar- old appellant’ s mother had a

uthority to consent to a sear ch of son’s bedroom where appellant ha d agree d to pay $10 per w eek a s rent , h e h ad n o t instructed mother to stay out of his room, and mother “i n fre quently”ente red a

ppellant’s room to pick up a fter him); Martinez v. State, 1 7 S. W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (explaining that mother’ s ownership of the house in which a ppellant lived was prima f

acie evidenc e of a

uthority to let police offic ers se arc h the house a nd the fa ct that appellant wa s an adult living in a bedroom within that house did not nece ssarily neg ate the mother ’s authority to consent to search room); Turner v. State, 931 S .W .2 d 5 2 ( Te x.Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th Dist] . 1996) (holdingthat appellant’ s mother had the authority to c onsent to sear ch of de fenda nt’s bedroom; def

endant lived with par ents rent- fre e for four year s, mother owned the house, appe llant’s bedroom door w as open, mother knocked whene ver a ppellant’s door w as locke d, and ther e we re no re strict io ns pla c e d o n mo the r’ s right t o e nte r b e dr oo m) ; Sallings v. State, 7 8 9 S. W. 2 d 4 0 8 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref ’d) ( holding that a

ppellant’s father ha d authority to consent to search of defe ndant’s bedroom wherehouse def endant lived in wa s owned by his parents, room wa s not loc ke d, and de fe nd ant’ s f

amil y wa s n ot d e nie d a c c e ss t o b e dr oo m) ; Grays v. State, 905 S.W .2d 54, (Tex App.—Amarillo, 1995) (holdingthat defe ndant’s mother ha d common authority over de fe nd ant ’s room

in h e r h ou se e ve n th ou gh d e fe nd ant p a id r e nt a nd ins ta lle d a

loc k in his ro om, wher e he sought her pe rmission to i nstall the lock and g ave he r the only other key

to the room); W illard v. State, 682 S.W .2d 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
. Dist.] 1984, pet. grante d) (holdingthat defe ndant’s adult son who was living on defe ndant’s proper ty had equal c ontrol over use of pre mises and ha d a uth ority to c on se nt t o a

se arc h) ; Smith v. State, 79 7 S
. W
. 2 d 2 4 3 (Tex . App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref’d) (holdingthat mother who wa s resident of house share d with adult daughter c ou ld g iveva lid

c on sent to se arc h p re mis e s) ; U. S. v . Li n , 131 Fe d.Appx. 884 (3d Ci r. 2005) (e xpla ini ngthat whe rede fe nd ant a nd land lord ma int a in a

“ fa mil y sty le ” liv ingarr ang e me nt w ith share d acc ess to defe ndant’s living qua rters, la ndlord is deemed to have ac tual authority to consent to a se a rc h o f d e fe nd ant’ s li vin gqu art e rs ); Bumper v . North C arolina , 391 U.S. 543 (1968) ( noting that de fe nd ant a c c e pte d th at hi s gra ndmot he r, a s joi nt te na

nt of the ir ho me and a s owne r of theri fl e in qu e sti on , ha d a

uth ority to c on se nt to a se arc h of the ir ho me ); Pe op lev . G ofo rth , 564 N.W.2d 526 (M ic h. Ap p. 19 97 ) (h old ing that, al tho ugh son wa s eighte e n y e ars old and pa id r e nt, mot he r c ou ld consent to sea

rch of son’s bedroom, whe re nothingsug g ested mother la cked a cce ss to room). 34 Se ee .g., Brou

gh ton v . S

tate , 570 So. 2d 1265 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), cert. de nied, (Nov. 16, 1990) (holdingthat the ac cused’ s grandmother could cons en t t o a sea

rch of the ac cused’ s be dr oo m; gra

ndmot he r o wn e d th e ho me , gr a

n d mot he r l ive d in

theup sta ir s p or

tio n o f t he ho us e wh ile the ac cused slept in the basement, and gra ndmother had not been in ba sement more tha n six times in t he pa st thr e e ye ars ); State v. W oods , 8 06 S.W .2 d 20 5 (Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 90 ) (ho ldi ngthat, fa ctor— i
. e. , w het her t hat t hi r d par t y s l eeps i n t he ot her ’ s bedr oom . T hi s fac t alone, 33 there fo re, do es n o t neg ate R ee d ’s au tho ri tyto c o n s e n t t o a se arc h o f th e a p p ell an t’ s b e d ro o m . A lth o u g h a d e te rm in a tio n o f jo in t a c c e s s , vel

non , is a lw a y s a f

a c t-sp e c if

ic 34Huber t — 14

wher e the ac cused lived in his grandmother ’s home for approximately

three months, paid a portion of the b i l l s , and the grandmother knocked on the door bef ore e nteringthe room, the a ccuse d’s oc c up anc y o f th e r o o m w a s n o t s o e xc l u s i v e a s t o d e p r i v e th e gr an dm o th e r o f h e r a uth or ity to c on se nt t o a

se arc h of th e a c c us e d’ s r oo m) ; Gle nn v . Co mm on we alt h , 633 S.E.2d 205 (Va. App. 2006) (holding that, as owner of the residence, the grandf ather had ac tual authority

to consent to a se arc h o f the de fe nd ant’ s bed ro om; be c a

us e the re wa s no evi de nc e that gr and fathe r l a c ke d a uth ority to enter d efendant’s room a nd beca use def endant’ s bedroom did not have a lock or a

ny thing restric ting a cce s s t o the room, the c ourt found that the grandf ather share d common authority over the bedr oom).

35 P eople v . Bliey , 597 N.E.2d 830, 837 (I ll. Ct . App. 1992). S e e a l so Sta te v . Co le

, 706 S.W .2d 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (e x plaining that a per son living with his fa mily can e x pect more intrusion that an independe nt renter living with non-re latives). 36 Bliey , 597 N.E.2d at 837

. i nqui r y , under t he “c om m on aut hor i t y ” t es t , w her e t he def endantl i ves “w i t h a par ent or ot her

c lo se re lativ e ,” a n d th e re lativ e c o n s e n ts to a se a rc h o f d e f e n d a n t’s b e d ro o m , m o st c o u rts pr es um e t hat t he r el at i ve has s uffi ci ent comm on aut hor i t yover t he bedr oom t o aut hor i ze t he

cons entt o s ear ch. ” T he def endantm ay , how ever , over come t hi s pr es um pt i on bypr es ent i ng 35 evi dence t hatdefe ndant had “e xcl us i ve pos s es s i on o f the s ear ched pr emi s es . ” H er e, 36 how ever , t he appe l l ant ’ s door w as not s how n t o have be en l ocked, and t he t r i al cour t w as ent i t l ed t o di s bel i eve the test i m onyof t he appe l l ant ’ s gi r l fr i end t hat R eed w as “exc l uded” fr om ent er i ng t he bedr oom w i t hout expr es s per m i s s i on. N ot abl y , s ever al cour t s have a ppl i ed a dif fer ent t es t and a di ffe r ent pr es um pt i on. M a in ly , the se c o u r ts h a v e f o llo w e d th e v iew th a t, w h e n tw o a u to n o m o u s a d u lts jo in tly occupya dw el l i ng and have s epar ate bedr oom s , eac h occupa nt gener al l yhas a hi gherHuber t — 15

37 Se ege ne ra lly 4 W AYN E R. LA F AVE , S EA R C H AND S EI ZURE , § 8.5(c) (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2009). 38 See United States v. Jimine z , 419 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the lessee of an apar tment where defe ndant was r esidingcould not consent to a sear ch of the defe ndant’s room whe re the lessee char acte rized defe ndant’s bedroom as “his space ” and said she did not enter the room “a s a re gula r m atte r” ); People v . Mullaney , 306 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holdingthat a def endant’ s sister could consent to a se arc h of only the common ar eas of

their shar ed house a

nd her own bedroom, and expli citly stating that the sister could not c onsent to se arc h the def endant’ s bedroom be cause the def endant ha d a re asonable expectation of privac y in her own be droom); Commonwealth v. O’Neal , 4 29 A. 2d 11 89 , 1 19 0- 91 (P a . 1 98 1) (hol din gthat a le sse e of a ho me c ou ld n ot c on se nt t o a

se arc h o f a

be dr oo m th at w a s u se d e xclu siv e ly by a te mpo ra ry gratui tou s gue st beca use the guest had a

n expectation of privac y

in the bedroom). 39 See U nited States v. Kelley , 9 53 F .2 d 5 62 , 5 66 (9 th C ir . 1 99 2) ( ho ldi ngthat a thi rd pa rt y could consent to a search of her roommate’s bedroom wher e she had permission to use the telephone , which wa s located in the r oommate’s bedroom). expec t at i on of pr i vacy i n hi s or herow n bedr oom . A bs ent s om e s how i ng t hat one occ upant 37 has exer ci s ed cont r ol , r et ai ned cont r ol , or come t o an u n der s t andi ng w i t h ot her occupa nt s t hat cont r ol w i l l be shar ed over t he ot her s ’ bedr oom s , t hes e cour t s s t ar t fr om t he pre s um pt i on t hat

an o ccup ant exerci ses s ole co ntr ol ov er his ow n b edroom and has no j oint access t o o t hers’ b ed roo m s. T h e S tat e ca n o v erc o m e this p resu m p ti o n b yp rese n ti n g fa cts t h at w o u ld su p p o rt

38

a f in d in g th a t th e th ird p a rtyw h o c o n se n ted to th e se a rc h o f a n o th e r’s b e d ro o m d id , in f a c t,
exer ci s e s om e cont r ol over t he bedr oom . H ow ever , abs ent anyfac t s t o i ndi cat e t hat cont r ol 39

overa s epar at e bedr oom w as s har ed or s om ehow r et ai ned, or t hat a thir d par t yhad j oi nt
acc es s t o t he r oom , a fi ndi ng of ac t ual aut hor i t ycannotbe s uppor t ed. U nder t hi s vi ew , even under ci r cu m s t ance s i n w hi ch t he cons ent i ng t hi r d par t yi s r el at ed t o t he per s on bei ng
sear ched , access and co ntr ol ar e t he p aram ou nt fact ors.Huber t — 16 W e re f u se to a p p lysu c h re a so n in g h e re . In o u r v iew it i s m o re re a so n a b le to concl ude, on t he par t i cul ar fac t s of t hi s cas e ( vi ew ed i n t he l i ght m os t favor abl e t o t he t r i al

cour t ’ s r ul i ng) , t hatt he appe l l ant , l acki ng anypr opr i et ar yi nt er es t i n t he house, or even a ny p o ss e ss o ry rig h t o th e r th a n b y t h e g ra c e o f h is g ra n d f

a th e r, as su m e d th e risk th a t h is gr andfa t her m i ght per m i t t he s ear ch of a nyar ea of t he hous e t hat he m i ght r eas onabl ys us pect t he appe l l antw as us i ng for cr i m i nal pur pos es , even i ncl udi ng t he appe l l ant ’ s bedr oom
— at l eas t i n t he abs ence of anyagr eement bet w een t he t w o t hat w oul d expre ssly p rohi bi t t he gr andfa t her fr om m aki ng s uch an i nt r us i on, or s om e ot her obvi ou s i ndi ci um of exc l us i on,
s u c h a s a lo c k o n th e d o o r t o d e m o n s tr a te th a t th e g ra n d f a th e r w a s , d e fa c to , excl uded fr om t he r oom . W e hol d t hat , on t he fa ct s as t he t r i al cour t w as ent i t l ed t o vi ew t hem, R eed ha d

a c t u a l a u t h o r i t yt o c o n s e n t t o t h e s e a r c h o f t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s b e d r o o m. A p p a re n t A u th o rity T he St at e al t er nat i vel ycont ends t hat R eed ha d a p p a re n t aut hor i t yt o cons ent t o t he

sea rch o f th e a p p ell an t’ s b ed ro o m , i. e. , t hat t he off i cer s r eas onabl ybel i eved Reed had

a u th o rityto c o n se n t ev e n if h e d id n o t. B e c a u se w e h o ld th a t R e e d h a d a c tu a l au th o rityto
cons entt o t he s ear ch, t her e i s no need f or us t o det er m i ne w het her t he offi cer ’ s conductw as j us t i fi ed byR eed’ s appar entaut hor i t y . W e l eave t he appar ent - aut hor i t y doct r i ne t o be fur t her devel oped i n a ca s e i n w hi ch i t s appl i cat i on i s , unl i ke her e, det er m i nat i ve of t he out come. C ONC L US I ON B eca us e he pos s es s ed ac t ual aut hor i t yover t he appellant’s bedr oom , R eed ha d t heHuber t — 17 p o w er to c o n s e n t t o a se arc h o f th e a p p ell an t’ s b ed roo m . T h e se arc h o f th e a p p ell an t’ s bed room w as, t herefore, reas on able u nd er t he F ou rt h A m end m ent. A ccordi ng l y , w e revers e t he j udgm ent of t he cour t of appe al s and, as th ere are n o ot her poi nt s of er r or r equi r i ng
re m a n d , w e a f

f irm th e ju d g m e n t o f

th e trial c o u rt.

D el i ver ed: M ay26, 2010 P ub l i sh