COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Bray 

CITY OF NORFOLK 

v. Record No. 0069-95-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

JANET VAUGHAN JULY 5, 1995 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Philip R. Trapani, City Attorney; Cynthia B. 

Hall, Assistant City Attorney; Office of the 

City Attorney, on brief, for appellant.) 

Appellant submitting on brief. 

 No brief or argument for appellee. 

 The City of Norfolk appeals an award by the Workers' 

Compensation Commission to Janet Vaughan for medical benefits. 

The issue on appeal is whether the commission erred by 

determining that Vaughan's injury arose out of her employment. 

For the following reasons, we reverse the commission's decision. 

 The claimant was employed as a telecommunicator for the 

Emergency Services Office of the City of Norfolk. One day after 

roll call, the claimant and a co-worker were told that they had 

been selected for a routine random drug screening. Troy 

Lapetina, the office coordinator, drove both employees to the 

police station for a portion of the test. The vehicle was a 

standard city-owned, four-door "K" car. After performing a 

breath test for alcohol, the claimant, the co-worker, and the 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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supervisor returned to the car. The claimant was bending down 

entering the rear driver side door when she hit her head on the 

back of the door frame. She immediately expressed pain. Both 

the co-worker and the supervisor asked if she was alright. 

 The claimant filed a claim for temporary total disability 

benefits for three days of work missed due to her injury. The 

deputy commissioner denied her application because she did not 

show that the injury resulted from a risk caused by a condition 

of the workplace. The commission, on review, found that the 

injury arose out of the claimant's employment and entered an 

award for medical benefits only. 

 On appeal we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the party prevailing before the commission. R.G. Moore Bldg. 

Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 

(1990). 

 Whether credible evidence exists to support a 

factual finding is a question of law which is 

properly reviewable on appeal. . . . 

Causation is a factual determination to be 

made by the commission, but the standards 

required to prove causation and whether the 

evidence is sufficient to meet those 

standards are legal issues which we must 

determine. 

Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va. App. 357, 361, 412 S.E.2d 185, 

187 (1991) (citing Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 385 S.E.2d 858 

(1989)). 

 In order for an injury to arise out of employment, "a 

claimant [must] show that the conditions of the workplace or that 
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some significant work related exertion caused the injury. The 

mere happening of an accident at the workplace, not caused by any 

work related risk or significant work related exertion, is not 

compensable." Plumb Rite Plumbing Serv. v. Barbour, 8 Va. App. 

482, 484, 382 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1989); see also Richard E. Brown, 

Inc. v. Caporaletti, 12 Va. App. 242, 244, 402 S.E.2d 709, 710 

(1991). 

 An injury that results from a hazard or risk to which the 

employee is equally exposed apart from the employment does not 

arise out of the employment and is noncompensable. United Parcel 

Service v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 258, 336 S.E.2d 892, 892 

(1985). 

 No evidence in the record proves that a particular risk 

associated with the claimant's work caused her injury. See

County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 376 S.E.2d 73 

(1989). There was nothing unusual about the car or its door, and 

the claimant was not performing any significant work-related 

activity when she hit her head on the door frame. Nothing about 

the manner in which she was doing her job or any condition of the 

workplace caused her injury or constituted a risk of injury to 

the claimant. The commission erred by concluding that the injury 

was compensable. We therefore reverse the decision of the 

commission. 

Reversed and dismissed.