* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-10471

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DWIGHT LAMAR SANDERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:95-CR-92-A

____________________________________________

February 28, 1997

Before JONES, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Dwight Lamar Sanders appeals from his conviction for being a

felon in possession of a firearm. Sanders contends that the

prosecutor failed to personally review the personnel files of

police witnesses; that the destruction of a key in his case

violated due process; that he was coerced into possessing a weapon
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because state law allowed him to do so; that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

violates the Commerce Clause; that the district court improperly

took from the jury the issue whether Sanders’s possession of a

firearm affected interstate commerce; and that the district court

failed to make factual findings regarding whether U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4

is unconstitutional.

Sanders has failed to demonstrate error regarding whether the

prosecutor personally inspected the personnel files; the prosecutor

is under no duty to personally inspect such files. See United

States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 1000 (1990). Sanders has failed to demonstrate plain error

regarding whether the Government failed to provide him with the

personnel files; his assertion that they might have assisted him is

speculative and he admits that the probability is low that the

files would yield evidence that would have damaged the credibility

of the police officers.

Sanders raised his contention regarding the key for the first

time in his motion for a new trial; that motion was denied for lack

of jurisdiction as untimely. Sanders does not brief whether that

denial was erroneous; he has failed to brief the relevant issue for

appeal. Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d

744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

Sanders’s contention that state law allowed him to possess a

firearm is unconvincing. Texas’s firearm laws do not implicate the
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federal felon-in-possession statute. United States v. Thomas, 991

F.2d 206, 214-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 (1993). 

Sanders contends that the felon-in-possession statute violates

the Commerce Clause because there is no rational basis for

Congress’s finding that possession of a firearm affects interstate

commerce sufficiently for the activity to be penalized. The law in

this circuit is clear that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not violate

the Commerce Clause. United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th

Cir. 1996). Sanders concedes that the law forcloses his position,

but requests that this court overrule United States v. Rawls, 85

F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1996). He also states that he would like to

have this court reconsider Rawls en banc. One panel of this court

cannot overrule another panel, United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d

307, 313 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991), and Sanders

does not comply with the requirements for seeking initial

determination of his appeal en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(b).

Sanders next contends that the district court improperly

removed from the jury the question whether his possession of a

firearm affected interstate commerce. Sanders’s contention is

unavailing. The district court gave the jury the following

instruction:

If you have found that the defendant possessed the

firearm in question, you may find that such firearm was

in or affecting interstate commerce if you find that it

had traveled, at some time, from one state to another,

prior to the defendant’s possession of the firearm.
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A criminal defendant enjoys the right to have a jury determine his

guilt of every element of his crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2320 (1995). The

district court’s interstate-commerce instruction allowed the jury

to find the interstate commerce nexus satisfied if it found that

Sanders’s firearm had traveled in interstate commerce; the

instruction did not require the jury to do so. The instruction did

not remove the issue from the jury’s consideration. Cf. United

States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2320 (1995). 

Finally, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 does not require district courts

to make factual findings on purely legal issues.

AFFIRMED.