alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Henry J. STEELE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald MOBLEY; Clarence Lee Faulcon; Peter B. Woglom; Caroline Taylor, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-7209

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 17, 2016

Decided: November 22, 2016

Henry J. Steele, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina; John W. Holton, John Walton Minier, YATES, MCLAMB & WEYHER, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina; Kelly Street Brown, Elizabeth Pharr McCullough, YOUNG MOORE *&*HENDERSON, PA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. ■

PER CURIAM:

Henry J. Steele seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing two named defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Steele seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 12, 2016

No. 04-16-00190-CV

John M. DONOHUE,

Appellant

v.

CITY OF BOERNE CHIEF OF POLICE JAMES KOEHLER, Officer Pablo Morales, and 

Martha L. Donohue,

Appellees

From the County Court at Law, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15-003-CCL and 15-003-CCL-A

Honorable William R. Palmer Jr., Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellee Martha Donohue’s brief was due August 8, 2016. Neither the brief nor a 

motion for extension of time has been filed. We order appellee Martha Donohue to file her brief 

by August 22, 2016. If the brief is not filed by the date ordered, we may order the case 

submitted without a brief from this appellee.

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 12th day of August, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
Anne L. MADDOX, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0318

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 07, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
SHAK-20181226_Exhibit 10.9.7








Exhibit 10.9.7




FORM OF 
SUPPLEMEMENT
TO 
RESTRICTED STOCK UNIT AWARD AGREEMENT (EMPLOYEES)
PURSUANT TO THE 
SHAKE SHACK INC. 
2015 INCENTIVE AWARD PLAN


Name of Participant: ________________________________


Effective Date of Award: __________________ (the “Award Date”)


Number of Performance Stock Units: __________________


Dear Participant:


This letter constitutes an “Award Supplement” referred to in that certain Restricted Stock Unit Award Agreement, dated as of _____________ (the “Restricted Stock Unit Award Agreement”), between Shake Shack Inc. and you.  You are hereby notified that the Company has awarded to you the Restricted Stock Units indicated above (the “Restricted Stock Units”).  The Restricted Stock Unit is awarded to you pursuant to and subject to the terms and conditions of (1) the Shake Shack Inc. 2015 Incentive Plan (the “Plan”), (2) the Restricted Stock Unit Award Agreement and (3) this Award Supplement.  Capitalized terms in this Award Supplement that are not defined shall have the meaning set forth in the Plan.


The Restricted Stock Units shall vest over a [_________] [(___)]-year period (the “Vesting Date”); provided, that Participant has not had a Termination of Service at any time prior to the applicable Vesting Date, and provided further, that the following schedule shall be subject to any additional vesting rights granted to Participant by the Company pursuant to an employment letter or agreement or other contractual arrangement between the Company and Participant:
	
		
	Vesting Date
	Number of Issued Restricted Stock Units Vesting 

	[Month] [Day], [Year]
	[# OF RSUs VESTING] (first anniversary of the Award Date)

	[Month] [Day], [Year]
	[# OF RSUs VESTING] (second anniversary of the Award Date)

	[Month] [Day], [Year]
	[# OF RSUs VESTING] (third anniversary of the Award Date) Etc.








By Participant’s signature below, Participant agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions of the Plan, the Agreement, this Award Supplement and all applicable laws and regulations.  This Award Supplement may be electronically accepted by Participant.




	
		
	 
	SHAKE SHACK INC.

	 
	 

	 
	 

	 
	By:   _____________________________________________

	 
	Randy Garutti

	 
	Chief Executive Officer

	 
	 

	PARTICIPANT
	 

	 
	 

	 
	 

	By:   _____________________________________________
	 

	Name:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Protocol
Systems, Inc. Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet as of March 31, 1999 and
Condensed Consolidated Statement of Operations and Comprehensive Income for the
three months ended March 31, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          12,848
<SECURITIES>                                    10,675
<RECEIVABLES>                                   13,398<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                       335
<INVENTORY>                                     11,596
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                40,632
<PP&E>                                          15,044
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,170
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  54,798
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,101
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            83
<OTHER-SE>                                      48,611
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    54,798
<SALES>                                         14,299
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                14,299
<CGS>                                            7,344
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,344
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,988
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0<F2>
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    967
<INCOME-TAX>                                       242
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                725
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       725
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.09
<FN>
<F1>Net of allowance
<F2>The amount of loss provision is not significant and has been included in other
expenses.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
LINE LOUSKY, Appellant, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, etc., Appellee.

No. 3D17-1458

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed May 2, 2018

Wasson & Associates, Chartered, and Roy D. Wasson, for appellant.

Greenspoon Marder, P.A., and Dariel Abrahamy (Boca Raton), for appellee.

Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and LUCK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See**Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee*, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1979) ; *Snowden v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 172 So.3d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                            ------------------------
                         TO CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                         -------------------------------


     Pomeroy  Computer  Resources,  Inc.,  a  corporation organized and existing
under  and  by  virtue  of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware,
does  hereby  certify:

     FIRST:  That  the Board of Directors of said Corporation, at a meeting duly
     -----
convened  and  held,  adopted a resolution proposing and declaring advisable the
following  Amendment  to  the  Certificate of Incorporation of said Corporation:

     "RESOLVED,  that  the Certificate of Incorporation of Pomeroy Computer
     Resources,  Inc.,  be  amended  by  changing Article First so that, as
     amended,  said  Article  First  shall  be  and  read  as  follows:

          ARTICLE  FIRST:  The  name  of  the  Corporation  is  Pomeroy  IT
          Solutions,  Inc."


     SECOND:     That  at  the  next Annual Meeting of Stockholders held on June
     ------
19, 2003, in accordance with Sec.222 of the General Corporation Law of the State
of  Delaware,  at  which  a  quorum was present, either in person or by proxy, a
majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon was voted in favor of
the  aforesaid  Amendment.

     THIRD:     That the aforesaid Amendment was duly adopted in accordance with
     -----
the applicable provisions of Sec.242 of the General Corporation Law of the State
of  Delaware.


                                Page 1 of 2 Pages
<PAGE>

     IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  Pomeroy  Computer  Resources,  Inc.  has caused this
Certificate  to  be  signed  by  Stephen  E. Pomeroy, its president, and Michael
Rohrkemper, its secretary, this ____ day of June, 2003.


                                      POMEROY  COMPUTER  RESOURCES,  INC.



                                      By:
                                         -------------------------------------
                                         Stephen  E.  Pomeroy,  President



                                      By:
                                         -------------------------------------
                                         Michael  Rohrkemper,  Secretary



COMMONWEALTH  OF  KENTUCKY
COUNTY  OF  KENTON

     On  this,  the  ____ day of ____________, 2003, before me, a Notary Public,
personally  appeared  Stephen  E. Pomeroy and Michael Rohrkemper, to acknowledge
that  they  are  the  president and secretary, respectively, of Pomeroy Computer
Resources,  Inc.,  a Delaware corporation, and that as such officers, being duly
authorized  to  do  so,  they executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes
therein  contained.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and official seal.


                                        -------------------------------
                                        Notary  Public

My  Commission  Expires:

------------------------


                                Page 2 of 2 Pages
<PAGE>
Exhibit 99.1





                    STATEMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
             CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350

         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period
ended September 30, 2002 (the "Form 10-Q") of Grayson Bankshares, Inc. (the
"Company"), we, Jacky K. Anderson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
Blake M. Edwards, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to our knowledge:

         (a) the Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (b) the information  contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company as of and for the periods presented in the Form 10-Q.



         By:  /s/ Jacky K. Anderson                  Date:  November 12, 2002
            ----------------------------------            ---------------------
                  Jacky K. Anderson
                  Chief Executive Officer



         By:  /s/ Blake M. Edwards                   Date: November 12, 2002
            ----------------------------------            ---------------------
                  Blake M. Edwards
                  Senior Vice President and
                  Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10Q
FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           4,736
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,735
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (530)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                13,914
<PP&E>                                           5,081
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (3,591)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  16,001
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,379
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        81,254
<OTHER-SE>                                    (72,171)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    16,001
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                29,242
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   14,656
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                16,919
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   816
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  55
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,211)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,211)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,211)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.07)


</TABLE>
John Ellis HARTLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-5202

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 2, 2018

John Ellis Hartley, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.
DISMISS and Opinion Filed September 16, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-24-00983-CV 

IRVINE TEK, LLC, IRVINE TEK (SMC-PRIVATE) LIMITED, AND 

SHEIKH FRAZ TAJAMMUL, Appellants 

V. 

MALIK & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-24-05474 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Pedersen, III, Smith, and Garcia 

Opinion by Justice Garcia 

Stating they no longer desire to pursue this appeal, appellants have filed a 

motion to dismiss. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). We grant the motion and dismiss 

the appeal. See id. 

240983F.P05 

 

/Dennise Garcia/ 

DENNISE GARCIA 

JUSTICE 
 –2– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

IRVINE TEK, LLC, IRVINE TEK 

(SMC-PRIVATE) LIMITED, AND 

SHEIKH FRAZ TAJAMMUL, 

Appellants 

No. 05-24-00983-CV V. 

MALIK & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, 

Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 101st Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-24-05474. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia, 

Justices Pedersen, III and Smith 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal. 

 We ORDER that appellee Malik & Associates, PLLC recover its costs, if any, 

of this appeal from appellants Irvine Tek, LLC, Irvine Tek (SMC-Private) Limited, 

and Sheikh Fraz Tajammul. 

Judgment entered September 16, 2024.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Hector VEGA-MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-3774

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 21, 2017

Filed: April 26, 2017

Daniel C. Tvedt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Iowa, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Hector Vega-Martinez, Pro Se

Before RILEY, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Hector Vega-Martinez directly appeals after he pleaded guilty to identity-theft charges, and the district court1 sentenced him to a within-Guidelines-range prison term and supervised release with special conditions. On appeal, Vega-Martinez’s counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the district court plainly erred in imposing an alcohol ban as a special condition of supervised release.

Upon careful review, we conclude that the imposition of the unobjected-to alcohol ban was not plain error. See United States v. Wisecarver, 644 F.3d 764, 775 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

1

. The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.
#### UNITED STATES v. DE GROOT.

No. 2133-B.

First Division. Janean.

Jan. 8, 1934.

Wm. A. Holzheimer, Dist. Atty., and G. W. Folta, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of Juneau, for the United States.

Geo. Grigsby and H. L. Faulkner, both of Juneau, for defendant.

ALEXANDER, District Judge.

The court has fully considered the various assignments of error cited by defendant’s attorneys as a basis for a new trial, and finds

As to the first. The comment made by the court upon the testimony of the witness, Josephine De Groot, was fully covered by the court’s instruction to the jury at the time and in its final instructions (instruction No. 12).

*469Second. Instruction No. 2 is a correct statement of the law of self-defense. The court is not presumed to know the physical facts surrounding the defendant at the time of the homicide, and the record is barren of any proof of the fact, that it was impossible for defendant to retreat, if such was the fact. I therefore think that instruction No. 2, when read and considered in connection with the other instructions, correctly states the law as based on the testimony in the case, and was neither erroneous nor prejudicial.

Third. Defendant complains that instruction No. 3, in which the height and weight of the deceased were pointed out to the jury, is erroneous because it does not give for comparison the height, weight, physical and mental condition of the defendant, for the purpose of comparison.

The instruction does give the height, weight, and size of the deceased as shown by the testimony, but there was no testimony adduced as to the height, weight, etc., of the defendant. However, since the defendant was present in the courtroom and in full view of the jury throughout the several days covered by the trial, there could have been no doubt or misapprehension in the minds of the jury as to the relative size of himself and the deceased, and the objection is wholly without merit.

Fourth. Defendant claims error in giving instruction No. 4, for the alleged reason that said instruction does not correctly state the law of self-defense and was not justified by the evidence.'

I have carefully gone over this instruction, and, when reád and considered in connection with the other instructions, I think it fully and fairly states the law, and was a proper application of the law to the evidence in this case.

Fifth and sixth. Defendant assigns error in the court’s refusal to give defendant’s requested instructions numbered 12 and 14. Those parts of the above instructions which are applicable and not clearly erroneous are fully *470covered by the other - instructions given by the court in the case, and no error was made in their refusal.

It follows that defendant’s motion for new trial must be denied, and it is so ordered.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joey Lamar WHITE, a/k/a Little Joey, a/k/a Black, a/k/a Savage, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6318

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 5, 2017

Decided: July 18, 2017

Joey Lamar White, Appellant Pro Se. James Bradsher, Shailika S. Kotiya, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Joey Lamar White seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

When the United.States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than 60 days after *204the entry of the district court s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on February 24, 2016. The notice of appeal was filed on March 3, 2017.* Because White failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*

*

 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988).