UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

COMFORT AFRIYIE SARPONG-WARREN,

Petitioner,

v.

No. 98-1254

U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION

SERVICE,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

(A70-670-499)

Submitted: July 31, 1998

Decided: August 13, 1998

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Ana T. Jacobs, ANA T. JACOBS & ASSOCIATES, Washington,

D.C., for Petitioner. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General,

David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, Laura M. Friedman, Office of

Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Comfort Afriyie Sarpong-Warren petitions for review of a final

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying her application for asylum and withholding of deportation. Because substantial

evidence supports the Board's decision, we affirm.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) authorizes the Attorney

General, in her discretion, to confer asylum on any refugee. See 8

U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998). The Act defines a refugee

as a person unwilling or unable to return to her native country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account

of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,

or political opinion." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West Supp.

1998); see M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1990) (in banc).

The "well-founded fear of persecution" standard contains both a

subjective and an objective component. An applicant may satisfy the

subjective element by presenting "`candid, credible, and sincere testimony' demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution." BerroteranMelendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 1992); see Figeroa

v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 79 (4th Cir. 1989). The objective element

requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution. See

Huaman-Cornelio v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 979 F.2d 995,

999 (4th Cir. 1992).

Eligibility for asylum can also be based on grounds of past persecution alone even though there is "`no reasonable likelihood of present persecution.'" Baka v. INS, 963 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir. 1992)

(quoting Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 969 (5th Cir. 1991)). "To

establish such eligibility, an alien must show past persecution so

severe that repatriation would be inhumane." Id.; see Matter of Chen,

20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989).

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We must uphold the Board's determination that Sarpong-Warren is

not eligible for asylum if the determination is"supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as

a whole." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (West Supp. 1998).* We accord the

Board all possible deference. See Huaman-Cornelio, 979 F.2d at 999.

The decision may be "reversed only if the evidence presented by

[Sarpong-Warren] was such that a reasonable factfinder would have

to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed." See INS v.

Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).

Sarpong-Warren, who entered the United States with a visitor's

visa in September 1991, disagrees with the Board's finding that she

failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future

persecution in her home country based on her political opinion or

social group. Our review reveals, however, that substantial evidence

supports the Board's finding that Sarpong-Warren did not satisfy her

statutory burden.

Evidence established that Sarpong-Warren, a native and citizen of

Ghana, worked as a trader of second-hand clothing in one of the markets in her city. The market is owned by the 31st December Women's

Movement which is led by Ghana's first lady, Nanakonadu Agyeman

Rawlings. In January 1991, Sarpong-Warren arrived at her stall to

find twenty men waiting for her. They detained her for six hours,

interrogated her, and asked her to join the 31st December Women's

Movement. She refused and was released.

Sarpong-Warren further testified that she continued doing business

from her stall at the market until February 1991 when she was

arrested, asked again to join the movement, and detained at the central

police station for two days. She was charged with selling in an unauthorized place and beaten with canes and belts. When her family

brought money to the police, Sarpong-Warren was released and given

_________________________________________________________________

*We note that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) was repealed by the Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-128, 110 Stat. 3009 (IIRIRA), effective April 1, 1997. Because

this case was in transition at the time the IIRIRA was passed, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1105a(a)(4) is still applicable under the terms of the transitional rules

contained in § 309(c) of the IIRIRA.

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a court date. She returned to a different stall at the market but never

appeared in court on the charges. Consequently, she was arrested

again in August 1991 and was raped while in jail. She was released

again when her family brought money and given a February 1992

court date. As a result of the rape, Sarpong-Warren and her husband

separated. After her release, Sarpong-Warren found her stall at the

market had been burned. In September 1991, she relocated to the

United States.

Citing her detention, beating, and rape, Sarpong-Warren maintains

that in adopting the opinion of the IJ, the Board erred in finding that

she failed to demonstrate past persecution and a well-founded fear of

future persecution on account of her political opinion or membership

in a particular social group. Specifically, she argues that the IJ failed

to interpret "social group" correctly and incorrectly determined that

she had not tried to change markets or locations for her business. In

addition, she contends that losing a means of livelihood constitutes

persecution and that the rape was on account of her political opinion

because it occurred during detention. She also takes issue with the IJ's

negative credibility finding. Sarpong-Warren raised none of these

specific assignments of error in her appeal to the Board. We therefore

find that they have been waived. See Gandarillas-Zambrana v. INS,

44 F.3d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1995); Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697,

700-01 (4th Cir. 1990).

We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ's finding that Sarpong-Warren's account lacked credibility and that there

was insufficient evidence in the record to support her claim. The IJ

noted that Sarpong-Warren testified inaudibly and often responded

vaguely to questions. While the IJ realized the possibility of language

difficulties, she noted that no interpreter had been requested and that

Sarpong-Warren had ten years of education in English. In addition,

Sarpong-Warren failed to mention her beating or the burning of her

stall in her asylum application and testified inconsistently in several

respects. Most significantly, Sarpong-Warren failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that she was beaten, raped, or denied the

stall to conduct her business because of her social group or political

opinion. The record contains very little information about the 31st

December Women's Movement and does not support SarpongWarren's claim that she was persecuted on account of her Ashanti

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heritage. As the IJ stated, the State Department report acknowledges

the general abuse of women in Ghana and violence against persons

in pretrial detention. The IJ further noted that the arrest warrant presented as evidence by Sarpong-Warren appeared to have been altered

and was thus of dubious authenticity.

Finally, Sarpong-Warren contends that in adopting the IJ's decision, the Board failed to adequately address the issues raised in her

appeal. We find no evidence to support this claim. The Board

squarely addressed the specific issues raised by Sarpong-Warren, but

noted that her objections to the IJ's finding that she did not qualify

for relief were too general to address in that they failed to mention

specific findings of fact or conclusions of law believed to be in error.

The standard for withholding of deportation is more stringent than

that for granting asylum. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,

431-32 (1987). To qualify for withholding of deportation, an applicant must demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution." Id. at 430.

As Sarpong-Warren has not established entitlement to asylum, she

cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of deportation.

We accordingly affirm the Board's order. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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