## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 N O
. 12-0183

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

### R O S S C E R 

### C R A IG 

### T U C K E R 

### , I I , P E T IT IO N E R 

### ,

v . L IZ A B E T H 

### T H O M A S 

### , R E S P O N D E N T

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E F O U R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

J U S T I C E G U Z M A N , joined by J U S T I C E L E H R M A N N , concur ring

.
Trial courts have long strug g led to protec t children from the threa t of ill-willed child custody battles that may lead parties to financ ial ruin. Be cause of the p o t en tial harm to children that

acc ompanies these disputes, there are a number of leg islatively enac ted approa ches to deter parties 1 from pursuing frivolous or hara ssing custody modification suits. R ec en t enac tments clar ify a 2 leg islative policy

choice to allow trial courts the discr etion to awa rd attorney ’s fees as necessa ries

or child support in support enfor ceme nt proce eding s. But the Texas L eg islature has rema ined silent

S e e I n r e S t e p h a n i e L e e , 4 1 1 S

. W

. 3 d 4 4 5 , 4 4 9 ( T e x . 2 0 1 3 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g t h e e m o t i o n a l a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l t o l l 1 t h a t “ c u s t o d y b a t t l e s ” h a v e o n c h i l d r e n i n v o l v e d i n s u c h d i s p u t e s )

.

S e e , e
. g
. , T E X
. F A M
. C O D E § 1 5 6

. 0 0 5 ( “ I f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t a s u i t f

o r m o d i f i c a t i o n i s f

i l e d f r i v o l o u s l y o r i s 2 d e s i g n e d t o h a r a s s a p a r t y , t h e c o u r t s h a l l t a x a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s a s c o s t s a g a i n s t t h e o f f e n d i n g p a r t y . ” )

.as to whether this discretion is also available in modifica tion procee dings, such as the one at issue here

. Although providing trial courts with this authority would further the courts’ ability to protec t the financ ial stability of children caug ht in the middle of acr imonious custody battles, I ag ree with the Court’s holding that the Texas Family Code does not aff ord a trial court such discretion. But the
trea tment of attorney ’s fee s in mo d if ic a ti o n a n d e n f o r c ement proce eding s has been more complicated than the Court might indicate. I write separ ately to briefly explain this history and to illumi nate why this subject has resulted in a lack of uniformity

among the cour

ts of appea ls. I. The Com m on-Law Doct rine of Nece ssaries As the Court notes, the underpinning s of the doctrine of nece ssaries may be trac ed back over three ce n t u ri es to Eng lish courts. __ S.W .3d __, __ (citing Note, The Unnec essary Doctrine of
Nece ssaries , 82 M I C H
. L

. R E V
. 1767, 1767 (1984))

. The doctrine implied a contra ct betwee n a husband and a third party who s upplied nece ssaries to the hus band’s wife and children, providing the third party

with a means of

holding the husba

nd liable for the support of his family

. Id. As ear ly as 1867, this Court expressly rec og nized a fathe r’s liability for nece ssaries furnished
to his child. Fowlkes v. Bake r , 29 Tex. 135, 137 (1867); see also Cunningham v. Cunningham , 40 S.W .2d 46, 48 (Tex. 1931) (noting that a fathe r’s liability for nece ssaries furnished to his minor child “is g ener ally enfor ced in Eng land,

. . . the United States, and alway s in Texas”). Not long afte r, this Court rec og nized attorney ’s fee s incurre d as a result of service s rende red for the benef it of a minor
may be tre ated a s nece ssaries. See, e .g. , Searcy v. Hunter , 17 S.W

. 372, 373 (Tex. 1891) (holding that attorney ’s fee s are nece ssaries in a civil suit to rec over money or proper ty for the minor); Askey

2v. W

illiams , 11 S.W

. 1101, 1101–02 (Tex. 1889) (holding that attorney ’s fee s are nece ssaries for the criminal defe nse of a child); see also In re H.V. , 252 S.W .3d 319, 327 n.55 (Tex. 2008) (noting that

a p ar ent has a duty to pay attorney ’s fee s incurre d by the children for their defe nse o f a cr i m i n al
prosec ution under sec tion 151.001(c) of the Fa mily Code); __ S.W.3d. at __.
But it was not until 1965 that a Texas court expressly applied the doctrine of nece ssaries to hold a fathe r liable for attorney ’s fee s specific ally incurre d in custody modification proce eding s. See Schwartz v. Jacob , 394 S.W .2d 15, 20 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1965, writ ref ’d n.r.e.)

. I n Schwartz , the court was fac ed with a dispute involv i n g b o t h t he enfor ceme nt of a child-support judgme nt and modification o f a custody order

. Id. at 19. The court rec og nized that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 308a it had authority to allow attorney ’s fee s ag ainst a person in defa ult on his child-support obliga tion. Id

. at 20. But beca use the case also involved issues of custody 3 modification, the court turned to common law and applied the doctrine of nece ssaries. Id. at 20–21. 4 The Schwartz court re asoned:

R u l e 3 0 8 a g a v e a c o u r t a u t h o r i t y t o “ e n f o r c e i t s j u d g m e n t b y o r d e r s a s i n o t h e r c a s e s o f c i v i l c o n t e m p t ” a g a i n s t 3
a p e r s o n i n d e f

a u l t i n p a y i n g c h i l d s u p p o r t

. T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 3 0 8 a ( W e s t 1 9 8 9 , a m e n d e d 1 9 9 0 )

. I n E x p a r t e H e l m s , t h i s C o u r t f o u n d R u l e 3 0 8 a p r o v i d e d c o u r t s w i t h t h e a u t h o r i t y t o h o l d a p a r e n t i n c o n t e m p t f o r f a i l i n g t o p a y a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s i n c u r r e d i n a s u i t t o e n f o r c e s u p p o r t o r d e r s . 2 5 9 S

. W

. 2 d 1 8 4 , 1 8 8

– 8 9 ( T e x . 1 9 5 3 )

. B e g i n n i n g i n 1 9 3 5 , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e e m p o w e r e d c o u r t s t o o r d e r e i t h e r p a r e n t t o m a k e p e r i o d i c s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s 4 f o r t h e b e n e f

i t o f h i s o r h e r c h i l d i n t h e e v e n t o f a d i v o r c e . A c t o f M a r . 1 9 , 1 9 3 5 , 4 4 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 3 9 , § 1 , 1 9 3 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s 1 1 1 , 1 1 2 , r e p e a l e d b y A c t o f M a y 2 5 , 1 9 7 3 , 6 3 d L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 5 4 3 , § 3 , 1 9 7 3 T e x . G e n . L a w s 1 4 1 1 , 1 4 5 8

. B u t a t t h e t i m e S c h w a r t z w a s d e c i d e d , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e h a d y e t t o e x p r e s s l y c o d i f y t h e c o m m o n - l a w d o c t r i n e o f n e c e s s a r i e s . T h e C o u r t p r o v i d e s a n o v e r v i e w o f t h e c o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s d o c t r i n e .

_ _ S

. W

. 3 d a t

_ _ . T h e L e g i s l a t u r e c o d i f i e d t h e c o m m o n - l a w d o c t r i n e o f n e c e s s a r i e s b y a m e n d i n g f o r m e r A r t i c l e 4 6 1 4 o f o u r C i v i l S t a t u t e s i n 1 9 6 7 , p r o v i d i n g t h a t e a c h s p o u s e h a d t h e d u t y t o s u p p o r t h i s o r h e r c h i l d r e n a n d m a y b e l i a b l e t o t h i r d p a r t i e s w h o p r o v i d e n e c e s s a r i e s t o t h e c h i l d s h o u l d t h e p a r e n t f a i l t o d o s o . S e e A c t o f M a y 2 7 , 1 9 6 7 , 6 0 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 3 0 9 , § 1 , a r t

. 4 6 1 4 , 1 9 6 7 T e x . G e n . L a w s 7 3 5 , 7 3 6

. S i n c e 1 9 9 5 , t h i s s t a t u t o r y s u p p o r t d u t y h a s b e e n p a r t o f T i t l e 5 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e , f i r s t u n d e r s e c t i o n 1 5 1

. 0 0 3 ( c ) , a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y u n d e r s e c t i o n 1 5 1

. 0 0 1 ( c ) i n 2 0 0 1

.

_ _ S

. W

. 3 d a t

_ _ n . 6

. 3[T] he kind of home in which the children are rea red and the persons with whom they daily associate are most important. There fore , the matter of their custody is of utmost conce rn. For there to be full development of matters bea ri ng on these issues it is nece ssary to employ

counsel to look afte r the c hildren’s intere st. Id. at 21. Thus, beca

use the “re al parties

. . . [are] the children

. . . the furnishing of counsel was the furnishing of nec essar ies to the minor children.” Id. at 20. Following this logic , courts order ed attorney ’s fee s, as nece ssaries furnished to the child, to be paid as child support. E.g. , Daniels v. Allen , 811 S.W .2d 278, 279–80 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 1991,

no writ.); see also In re A

. J. L. , 108 S.W .3d 414, 422 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2003, pet. denied) (stating that an order to pa y attorney ’s fee s as child support has been interpre ted as an order to pay the fee s as nece ssaries for the benef it of the child); Ex parte Kimsey , 915 S.W .2d 523, 526 n.1 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no writ) (noting “[i] f a pare nt ha s an obliga tion to support a child

. . . , and if the court possesses statutory authority to order the paym en t o f at t orney ’s fee s for the safe ty and welfa re of the child, we see no rationale for the conclusion that attorney ’s fee s may not be order ed paid as child support, particula rly wher e the welfa

re of the child is in issue as it is in a suit aff ecting the pare nt-child rela

tionship”). Thus, well befor e the L eg islature amende d the Fa mily Code in 1999
to include the provision at issue today , courts had implied a rig ht to re co v er att orney ’s fee s as

nece ssaries in suits affe cting the par ent-c hild relationship (SAPCR s).

II. Evolu tion of

Attor ney’s F ees in the F am ily Code
Ba sed upon a pare nt’s common-law (and subsequently statutory ) duty to suppor

t his or her child, trial courts conclude d that attorney ’s fee s may be allowed in custody and support proce eding s. Thoug h this Court rec og nized that a pare nt may be held in contempt for failure to pay attorney ’s fee s

4incurre d in a sui t for child-support enfor ceme nt based upon R u l e o f Civil Procedur e 308a, see Ex

parte Helms , 259 S.W .2d 184, 188–89 (Tex. 1953), t he F amily Code did not actually

speak to the
matter of attorney ’s fee s until 1973 when t h e L eg islature adopted Title 2 of the Family Code
g overning “The Parent-Child Relationship a nd the Suit Aff

ecting the Parent-Child Relationship.” Act of May 25, 1973, 63d L eg ., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. L aws 1411, 1411. Specifica lly , the L egi s l at u re included section 11.18(a) , indicating “[i] n any proce eding under this subtitl e, the
court may awa

rd costs as in other civil case s. Reasonable attorney ’s fee s may be taxed as costs, and
may be order ed paid direc tly to the attorney , who may enfor ce the order for fee s in his own name.” Act of May 25, 1973, 63d L eg ., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, sec. 11.18(a) , 1973 Tex. Gen. L aws 1411, 1419. The L eg islature amende d this section in 1981 to clar ify that attorney ’s fee s could be awa rded as costs in case s “including , but not limit ed to, habea s corpus, enfor ceme nt, and contempt proce eding s.” Act of May 31, 1981, 67th L eg ., R.S., ch. 355, § 3, sec. 11.18(a) , 1981 Tex. Gen. L aws 942, 944. Thus, afte r the en ac t m en t o f T i tle 2 in 1973, courts found support in the Family Code for awa rding attorney ’s fe es in SAPCR s. I n 1995, the L eg islatur e a d o p te d s u b s ta n ti a l c h a n g e s to the Family Code provisions g overning SAPC Rs. I t rec odified the Family Code by ree nacting Title 2 as simply “Title 2. Child in Relation
to the Family ” and adding “Title 5. The Parent-Child Relationship and the Suit Affe cting the ParentChild Relationship.” Act of April 6, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1995 Tex. Ge n. L aws 113, 122. Prior to the 1995 amendments, the provisions g overning modification suits and the provisions
go v er n i n g s u i t s for enfor ceme nt of support order s wer e both included in Chapter 14 of Title 2. Notably , the only g uidance i n t h e Family Code reg arding attorney ’s fee s in all SAPC Rs

5(modification and enfor ceme nt alike) until 1995 wa s section 11.18, providing g ener ally that

“attorne y fee s may be taxed as costs.” Courts interpre ted section 11.18 as complementar y —rathe r than contra dictory

—to the prac tice of allowing attorney ’s fee s as nece ss ar i es . E.g. , Drex el v. McCutche on , 604 S.W .2d 430, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1980, no writ) (“[Section ] 11.18(a) , allowing attorney ’s fee s in suits aff ecting pare nt-child rela tionships, does not purport to abolish the

common law rule allowing attorney ’s fee s as nece ssaries for the child. We hold it did not.”). Thus,
courts continued the prac tice of awa rding at t o rn ey ’s fee s as nece ssaries for the child. See, e.g. , Roosth v. Roosth , 889 S.W .2d 445, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1994, writ d en i ed) (“A ttorney fee s rende red in a suit aff ecting the pare nt-child rela tionship may b e aw ar d ed as

nece ssaries to the children.” ); Uhl v. Uhl , 524 S.W .2d 534, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.—For t Worth 1975,

no writ ) (n o ting that “attorne y ’s fee s for the plaintiff should be held to be ‘nec essar ies’ to defe ndant’s minor child”)

. By enac ting Title 5 of the Family Code in 1995, the L eg islature decide dly sepa ra t ed t h e statutory provisions g overning suits for modification and suits for enfor c e ment of support order s into Chapters 156 and 157, respe ctively

. Eac h of these chapte rs also included more specific g uidelines for awa rding attorney ’s fee s. Wit h respe ct to modification suits under Chapter 156, the L eg islature specifie d that the court “shall tax attorney ’s fee s as costs” in those suits frivolously filed or desig ned
to hara ss a party

. Act of April 6, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, sec. 156.005, 1995 Te x . Gen.
L aws 113, 172. Wit h respe ct to enfor ceme nt suits under Chapter 157, the L eg islature provided that 5

S e c t i o n 1 5 6

. 0 0 5 h a s n o t b e e n a m e n d e d s i n c e i t s o r i g i n a l e n a c t m e n t i n 1 9 9 5

. 5 6the court may order a respondent t o pay “re asonable attorney ’s fe es and all court costs in addition
to the arr ear ag es.” Act of April 6, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, sec. 157.167, 1995 Tex. Gen.
L aws 113, 182. The 1995 amendments also ela b o ra t ed on the statute’s g ener al attorney ’s fee s provision, a dding that a judgme nt f or attorney ’s fee s may be enfor ced “by any means available for the enfor ceme nt of a judgme nt for debt.” Act of April 6, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, sec. 106.002(b), 1995 Tex. Ge n. L aws 113, 133. Despite these statutory chang es, courts continued the
prac tice of apply ing the common-law doctrine of nece ssaries to awa rd attorney ’s fee s in SAPC Rs. See, e.g. , Farish v. Farish , 982 S.W .2d 623, 628 (Te x . Ap p . — Ho uston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citing section 106.002 for the proposition that “[a]tt orney ’s fee s rende red in

. . . a suit aff ecting the
pare nt-child rela tionship m ay be aw arde d as nec essar ies to the child”).
I n 1999, the L eg islature amende d section 157.167, providing that “[f]ees and costs order ed under this s ection may be enfor ced by any means available for the enfor ceme nt of child support, including co n t em p t.” Act of May 27, 1999, 76th L eg ., R.S., ch. 556, § 18, sec. 157.167(c) , 1999
Tex. Gen. L aws 3058, 3062. By all o wi n g at t o rn ey ’s fee s in enfor ceme nt proce eding s to be 6 “enf orce d by any means available

. . . including c o n te mp t, ” the amendment expressly provided courts latitude to awa

rd attorney ’s fee s as additional child support, not mere ly as a debt. T E X
. F A M
. C O D E 7

T h i s s e c t i o n h a s b e e n a m e n d e d s e v e r a l t i m e s s i n c e t h e a d d i t i o n o f t h i s k e y s e n t e n c e

— t w i c e i n 2 0 0 3 a n d o n c e 6 i n 2 0 0 5

— b u t e a c h a m e n d m e n t k e p t t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h i s s e n t e n c e i n t a c t w h i l e c h a n g i n g i t s l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e p r o v i s i o n . S e e A c t o f

M a y 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 , 7 8 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 4 7 7 , § 1 , s e c . 1 5 7

. 1 6 7 ( d ) , 2 0 0 3 T e x . G e n . L a w s 1 7 4 3 , 1 7 4 3 ; A c t o f M a y 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 , 7 8 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 2 6 2 , § 1 , s e c . 1 5 7

. 1 6 7 , 2 0 0 3 T e x . G e n . L a w s 3 5 7 2 , 3 5 7 2 ; A c t o f M a y 1 7 , 2 0 0 5 , 7 9 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 2 5 3 , § 1 , s e c . 1 5 7

. 1 6 7 ( a ) , 2 0 0 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s 4 5 2 , 4 5 2

.

S u c h a u t h o r i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s h a d p r e v i o u s l y o n l y b e e n i m p l i e d l y a l l o w e d u n d e r t h e a u t h o r i t y 7
c o n f e r r e d t o c o u r t s i n R u l e 3 0 8 a . S e e H e l m s , 2 5 9 S

. W

. 2 d a t 1 8 8

– 8 9

. A s t h e C o u r t s t a t e s , t h e c o n t e m p t p o w e r s e t f o r t h i n C h a p t e r 1 5 7 i n c l u d e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f i n e m e n t , g a r n i s h m e n t o f t h e o b l i g o r ’ s w a g e s , a n d s u s p e n s i o n o f a n o b l i g o r ’ s l i c e n s e .

_ _ S

. W

. 3 d a t _
_ . T h e T e x a s C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s a c o u r t f r o m u s i n g i t s c o n t e m p t p o w e r t o e n f o r c e 7§ 157.167(a) ; see also T E X
. F A M
. C O D E § 158.0051(a) (“[T]he court may rende r an order that income

be withheld from the disposable ear nings of the obligor to be applied towards the satisfac tion of any order ed attorney ’s fee s and costs resulting from an action to enfor ce child support under this title.”).
I m p o rtantly , this statutory addition, though consistent with the common-law prac tice of awa rdin g attorney ’s fe es as ne cessa ries, appear ed only in Chapter 157, which g overns suits for e nforc ement of support order s. No simil ar provision was m ad e i n C h apter 156, g overning non-enf orce ment modification suits. Thus, following the 1999 amendments, attorney ’s fees in non-enf orce ment modification proce eding s wer e still g overne d by the g ener al provision in section 106.002 allowing for fee s to be enfor ced by “any means available for the enfor ceme nt of a judgme nt for debt.” T E X
. F A M
. C O D E § 106.002(b).
A f te r the 1999 amendment to section 157.167, a split develope d among the courts of appea ls. On one hand, some courts had continued to cite the common-law doctrine of nece ssaries as the basis for awa rding attorney ’s fee s even afte r the L eg islature amende d section 106.002 in 1995 to specify that attorney ’s fee s may be enfor ced “by any means available for the enfor ceme nt of a judgme nt for debt.” E.g. , Farish , 982 S.W .2d at 628. Be cause the 1999 amendments did not expressly alter the rela tionship betwee n C h ap t er 156 and Chapter 106, some courts of appea ls, bound by prec edent, found the doctrine of nece ssaries still applicable in awa rding attorney ’s fee s as ch i l d s u p port in SAPC R proce eding s. See, e.g. , A.J

. L. , 108 S.W .3d at 422 (“I t is settled that attorney ’s fee s rende red in

. . . a [S APCR] may be awa rded as nece ssaries to the child

. . . .”). On the other hand, some courts

a j u d g m e n t f

o r d e b t

. I

d

. a t

_ _ n . 4 ; T E X
. C O N S T
. a r t

. I , § 1 8

. 8found t hat by adding section 157.167(c), t he L eg islature clarified that attorney ’s fe es may only be

taxed as child support when incurre d during enfor ceme nt proce eding s. E.g. , In re Mo ers , 104 S.W .3d 609, 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

III. Separate Statutor y Treatm ent of SAPCR s By amending section 157.167 to expressly allow courts to enfor ce attorney ’s fee awa rds “by
any means available for the enfor ceme nt of child support,” the L eg islature codified the past prac tice of awa rding attorney ’s fee s in SAPC R proce eding s under the common-law doctrine of nece ssaries, but only with respe ct to enfor ceme nt proce eding s. T E X
. F A M
. C O D E § 157.167(a)

. The development of separ ate and distinct provisions for modification and enfor ceme nt suits evince s L eg islative intent that such proc eeding s merit differ ent trea tment. But the development of diverg ent statutory fra m ew o rk s for differ ent SAPC R proce eding s ag ains t a co m m o n -law backdr op has understanda bly led to a lack of uniformity in the courts of
appea ls. Thoug h the Family Code now provides wholly separ ate chapte rs for suits for modification and enfor ceme nt, trial courts are often prese nted with case s in which parties seek both modification and enfor ceme nt of support order s. Considering the inext rica bility of modification and enfor ceme nt issues in many SAPC R proce eding s, it follows that trial courts place d in such circ umstances would maintain simil ar discretion to awa rd attorney ’s fees as child support. On t he facts of this case the Court need not decide whether attorney ’s fee s can be taxed as child support in these bl en ded
proce eding s. But such proce eding s are likely the s ource of conflicting case law among the courts of appea ls. Now, having explained wh et h er attorney ’s fee s can be awa rded as additional child

9s u

p p o rt in non-enf

orce ment modification proce eding s, at least a substantial amount of that conf u s io n should be resolve d. IV. Conclusion The lack o f u niformity in the courts of appea ls afte r the rec ent statutory chang es is attributable to t h e l o n g history in Texas courts of apply ing the doctrine of nece ssaries to awa rd attorney ’s fee s as child support. Permitting trial courts to awa rd such fee s as child support, and thus
expo sing parties to the prospec t of contempt if they should fail to pay , would cer tainly dissuade parties from fi l i n g frivolous or hara ssing lawsuits that serve only to further injure the children involved. Neve rtheless, g iven the curr ent statutory fra mework, I ag ree with the Court’s conclusion that in absenc e of express statutory authority , a t ri al co urt lacks the discretion to char acte rize the attorney ’s fee s incurre d in a suit for custody modification as nece ssaries o r as ad ditional child support. For

these re asons, I

join the Court’s opinion and concur in its j udg ment.

____________________________________ Eva M. Guzman J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: Dec ember 13, 2013

1 0