COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Huff and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER SNYDER 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0187-13-2 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF 

 OCTOBER 15, 2013 

CITY OF RICHMOND POLICE DEPARTMENT 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Malcom Parks (Maloney, Parks & Clarke, P.C., on brief), for 

appellant. 

 (Laura K. Drewry, Senior Assistant City Attorney; Office of the 

Richmond City Attorney, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting 

on brief. 

 Christopher Alexander Snyder (“appellant”) appeals a decision of the Virginia Workers’ 

Compensation Commission (“commission”) holding that appellant’s injury did not arise out of 

his employment with the City of Richmond Police Department (“employer”) and thus was not a 

compensable injury. On appeal, appellant contends that the “Commission erred in finding 

that . . . [his] accidental fall and his right leg injury did not arise out of a risk of his 

employment.” For the following reasons, this Court affirms the commission’s holding. 

I. BACKGROUND 

“On appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence are viewed in the light most 

favorable to the party prevailing below.” Artis v. Ottenberg’s Bakers, Inc., 45 Va. App. 72, 83, 

608 S.E.2d 512, 517 (2005) (en banc) (citing Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Reed, 40 Va. App. 69, 72, 

PUBLISHED 
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577 S.E.2d 538, 539 (2003); Tomes v. James City (County of) Fire, 39 Va. App. 424, 429, 573 

S.E.2d 312, 315 (2002)). So viewed, the evidence is as follows. 

 Appellant was a police officer with the Special Operations Division (City Traffic Unit) 

for the City of Richmond at the fourth precinct office on Chamberlayne Avenue. On July 4, 

2011, appellant was scheduled to work during a holiday fireworks event. Although the event did 

not begin until 7:00 p.m., appellant was required to report to the precinct at 12:30 p.m. His 

standard procedure before beginning a shift was to enter the precinct in his personal vehicle, park 

in the employee lot, and go inside the building to check in with his sergeant. After being cleared 

to begin duty, appellant would then go outside to his patrol vehicle, check the vehicle, turn on the 

vehicle’s laptop, and leave for his assignment. 

 On the day in question, appellant arrived at approximately 12:10 p.m. and parked his 

personal vehicle toward the back of the employee lot, which was accessible by using a card 

issued by the police department. Neither the general public nor officers from other precincts 

were allowed or able to park there. Appellant also indicated that he was expected to park in the 

lot for security purposes, as the fourth precinct was located in a high-crime area. The customary 

entrance to the building was a door located to one side with a stairwell nearby and a short brick 

retaining wall just beyond the stairs. Appellant regularly jumped on and over the retaining wall 

to enter the building, stating that doing so helped him exercise his legs. Although appellant was 

required to maintain good physical fitness as a condition of his employment, employer did not 

require him to go over the retaining wall in order to enter the building. 

 As he walked through the parking lot toward the building, appellant carried his duty belt 

over his shoulder instead of wearing it around his waist. The belt held two sets of handcuffs, a 

radio, a steel retractable baton, a flashlight, a pistol, and two extra magazines, and weighed about 

ten pounds. While walking through the lot, appellant saw a colleague, Officer Kitt, and they 
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began speaking. Appellant complained that he was unhappy he had to report to work at 

12:30 p.m. when the fireworks event did not begin until later that evening, especially given that 

he was not normally scheduled to work on that day. Appellant further complained that he would 

rather be spending time at home with his family, as his wife recently had surgery and was still 

fairly immobilized. 

 As they were talking, appellant continued walking and his right foot clipped a cement 

parking block that was secured to the ground approximately eighteen inches from the brick 

retaining wall. The following photograph of the parking block and retaining wall were admitted 

into evidence. 

Appellant fell forward, striking the edge of the brick retaining wall with his right knee and 

rolling over the wall onto a sidewalk. As a result of the fall, he suffered a contusion to his right 

knee and a ligament tear which ultimately required corrective surgery. Appellant sought 

temporary total disability benefits for the period of July 5, 2011 to October 2, 2011, and 

continuing temporary partial disability benefits. Prior to a hearing on appellant’s workers’ 
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compensation claim, the parties stipulated that appellant’s injury occurred from the fall in 

question and that appellant’s alleged period of disability was accurate. 

 At a hearing before the deputy commissioner on October 13, 2011, appellant testified that 

he fell because “my attention was diverted to . . . Kitt.” He admitted that there was nothing 

unique or irregular about the parking block, but indicated that the short distance between the 

parking block and the retaining wall was strange because the block would not actually prevent a 

vehicle from hitting the retaining wall. He also stated that other parking blocks in the same lot 

were placed farther away from the retaining wall and that if the wall were not so close, he would 

have been able to prevent himself from falling. Appellant further testified that the fact that he 

was carrying his duty belt over his shoulder affected the way he fell because he was trying to 

protect the loaded pistol from accidentally discharging. 

 The deputy commissioner denied appellant’s claim for benefits on the ground that 

appellant’s injury did not arise out of a risk of employment. The full commission affirmed in a 

divided opinion, finding that the injury was not sufficiently causally related to the conditions 

under which employer required appellant’s work to be done. Specifically, the commission 

rejected appellant’s arguments that the configuration of the parking block was unique, that the 

conversation with Kitt was work-related, and that the duty belt affected the severity of his fall. 

This appeal followed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 “Whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment involves a mixed 

question of law and fact, which we review de novo on appeal.” Blaustein v. Mitre Corp., 36 

Va. App. 344, 348, 550 S.E.2d 336, 338 (2001) (citing Norfolk Community Hosp. v. Smith, 33 

Va. App. 1, 4, 531 S.E.2d 576, 578 (2000)). “Accordingly, although we are bound by the 

commission’s underlying factual findings if those findings are supported by credible 
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evidence, . . . we review de novo the commission’s ultimate determination as to whether the 

injury arose out of the claimant’s employment.” Stillwell v. Lewis Tree Serv., 47 Va. App. 471, 

477, 624 S.E.2d 681, 683 (2006). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 On appeal, appellant contends that the commission erred in finding that his injury did not 

arise out of a risk of his employment. Specifically, appellant asserts that he was speaking with 

Kitt about work-related matters when the injury occurred and that the cement parking block was 

irregularly situated on the ground. Responding, employer argues that appellant was merely 

“complaining about having to come to work” and that the parking block contained no defects 

that would make its physical arrangement “unique” from other parking blocks. 

 “For an injury to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act [(“Act”)], the 

claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence three elements: (1) that the injury was 

caused by an accident; (2) that the injury was sustained in the course of the employment; and 

(3) that the injury arose out of the employment.” Southland Corp. v. Parson, 1 Va. App. 281, 

283-84, 338 S.E.2d 162, 163 (1985). In the present case, the parties agree that an accident 

occurred and that the resulting injury was sustained in the course of appellant’s employment. 

Moreover, we hold that the fact findings of the commission were supported by credible evidence. 

 In determining whether appellant’s accidental injury arose out of his employment, 

Virginia adheres to the “actual risk” doctrine. That test “‘excludes an injury which comes from a 

hazard to which the employee would have been equally exposed apart from the employment.’” 

Bernardo v. Carlson Cos. – TGIF, 60 Va. App. 400, 405, 728 S.E.2d 508, 511 (2012) (quoting 

Taylor v. Mobil Corp., 248 Va. 101, 107, 444 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1994)). Thus, “[a]n ‘actual risk 

of employment’ is ‘not merely the risk of being injured while at work.’” Id. (quoting Taylor, 248 

Va. at 107, 444 S.E.2d at 708). Rather, “[u]nder the actual risk test, an injury comes within the 
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Act ‘only if there is a causal connection between the employee’s injury and the conditions under 

which the employer requires the work to be done.’” Simms v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc., 281 Va. 114, 

122, 704 S.E.2d 359, 363 (2011) (quoting Hilton v. Martin, 275 Va. 176, 180, 654 S.E.2d 572, 

574 (2008)). 

“Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a 

natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a 

reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of 

the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it 

arises ‘out of’ the employment. But [the applicable test] excludes 

an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a 

contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to 

which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from 

the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the 

work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental 

to the character of the business and not independent of the relation 

of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, 

but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk 

connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that 

source as a rational consequence.” 

Id. at 122-23, 704 S.E.2d at 363 (alteration in original) (quoting Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 

170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938)). Lastly, distractions that cause the injury may be 

compensable if they are not “‘unrelated to any hazard common to the workplace.’” Marion Corr. 

Treatment Ctr. v. Henderson, 20 Va. App. 477, 480, 458 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1995) (quoting United 

Parcel Service v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 259, 336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1985)) (holding that 

because appellant’s job responsibilities included watching tower guards rather than steps, his 

injury caused by missing a step while watching tower guards did arise out of his employment). 

 Applying the actual risk test to these circumstances, this Court holds that appellant’s 

injury did not arise out of his employment. At the time of the accident, appellant was 

complaining to Kitt that he did not want to report to work at 12:30 p.m. when the fireworks event 

did not start until nightfall. Appellant’s risk of tripping over a curb in the parking lot was not 

caused by his employment but rather presented an equal risk to any person walking inattentively 
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in the parking lot. Moreover, the distraction that caused appellant’s injury is not linked to any of 

his job responsibilities as was the case in Henderson. Furthermore, appellant admitted that the 

physical arrangement of the cement parking block was neither unique nor irregular; he merely 

stated that its proximity to the brick retaining wall was strange. The mere fact that the parking 

block was located at the workplace, in absence of other factors, did not create a causal 

relationship between appellant’s fall and the conditions of his employment. Lastly, the position 

of appellant’s duty belt at the time of the fall was not the origin of the injury; to be compensable 

an injury “must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment.” Simms, 

281 Va. at 123, 704 S.E.2d at 363. Thus, this Court holds that the commission did not err in 

concluding that appellant’s injury did not arise out of his employment. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the commission did not err in holding that 

appellant’s injury did not arise out of a risk of his employment. Accordingly, this Court affirms 

the commission’s holding. 

Affirmed.