T.C. Memo. 2021

- 103

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

DEBORAH C. WOOD , Petitioner v . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No s
. 23239

- 18 , 23260

- 18

. Filed August 18, 2021.

R. Brian Gardner III and Ethan J. Vernon , for petitioner. Christopher D. Bradley , Danielle A. Pollack , Rebeccah L. Bower , and John T. Arthur , for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

LAUBER , Judge : For tax years 2012

- 16 t he Internal Revenue Service (IRS or respondent) determine d Federal income tax deficiencies totaling $ 95,301 , plus additions to tax and accuracy

- related penalties. Petitioner timely petitioned this

Served 08/18/21- 2

- [* 2 ] Court. We consolidated her cases for trial, briefing, and opinion. After

conces sions by both parties , two issues remain for decision: (1) whether p etitioner is enti tled to exclude from gross income, as “foreign earned in come” under sec tion 911(a) (1) , the wages she earned while employed as a contrac tor on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan ; and (2) whether petitioner for 2015 is liable for a late

- filing addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1)

. 1 W e resolve these issues mostly in peti

tioner’s favo r
. FINDINGS OF FACT The parties filed a first stipulation of facts and a supplement to the first stip

ulation of facts, both w ith attached exhibits , that are incorporated by this reference. Petitioner resided in Afghanistan when she filed her petition s
. A

. Petitioner’s Background and Prior Military Service Petitioner grew up and attended high school in Boston, Massachusetts . Her parents, siblings, and other relatives still reside in the Boston area. Petitioner has never been married and has no children.

1 Unless otherwise noted, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round monetary amounts to the nearest dollar.- 3

- [* 3 ] In 2001, during her junior year of high school , p etitioner joined the Army
Reserves

. S he graduat ed from high school the following year , completed specialty military training , and was deployed to Iraq from 2003 to 2005. I n Iraq she special

ized in logistics , coordinat ing transportation for vehicle convoys, rail movements, and air transport

. After her U.S. Army deployment ended in 2005 , she returned to her family in Boston

. In late 2005 petitioner moved to Texas and rented an apartment near Fort Hood

. She started working for Dell Technologies (Dell) in 2006 as an account
manager , working on accounts for small and midsize businesses . She earned a bout $70,000 a year in that job

. In June 2011 she decided to purchase a house in a new develop ment under construction in Pflugerville, Texas, also near Fort Hood . She did so be cause rents were increasing and she regarded real estate as a good long

term in vestment. Pet itioner was an active member of the Army Reserve through 2007 and an inactive member until 2009. In mid

- 2011 she be came increasingly dissatisfied with corporate life. As she testified at trial : “ I just kind of spaced

- out at work one day and I messaged one of my friends and I said, hey, you know, I’m not feeling like I quite belong here.” She began looking for defense contracting jobs overseas.- 4

- [* 4 ] Petitioner explained that she had both person al and financial motivations for investigating these opportunities. S he missed the close bonds that she had form ed with her colleagues

-- mostly young service members about her age

-- while living and working on military bases in Iraq

. By b ecoming a defense contractor , she be

lieved that she c ould put to best use the logistics skills she had learne d during her time in the military

. Foreign d efense contractor jobs paid a much higher salar y than she was then earning. No less importantly, petitioner sought the personal sat

isfaction of advancing her career in a traditionally male

- dominated field. Petitioner received her first offer from a defense contractor operating in Ku

wait . She turned that offer down b ecause Kuwait was no t in a war zone and the sal ary was on the low end of the spectrum. In October 2011 she received an offer from AC First, LLC (AC First) , to work in Afghanistan

. That offer came with a six

- figure salary, and she accepted it at once. Petitioner’s house in Pflugerville was completed in late October 2011. She registered her 10

- year - old car at that address and left it parked in the garage. She departed for Afghanistan one month later. When AC First recruited petitioner , and again during her onboarding in Af

ghanistan , the staff explained that she was eligible for certain U.S. tax benefits. Specifically, she was told th at most of the salary she earned as a contractor would- 5

- [* 5 ] be eligible for the foreign earned income (FEI) exclusion , provided that she
st ayed outside the United States for the requi site amount of time. The staff explained that she could elect to have no U.S. tax withheld from her wages , and she chose that option. Petitioner spent her first four months in Afghanistan at Shindand Air Base before being transferred to Kandahar Airfield , a U.S. military facility, in spring
2012

. At that time , up to 50,000 people worked at Kandahar Airfield , including
U.S. military service members, contractors, and NATO forces

. Petitioner’s first job was as a transportation management coordinator doing work similar to what she had done for the Army in Iraq. She had a one

- year renewable employment contract and was p aid $110,640 her first year. She earned several promotions at AC First and ultimately became a supervisor

. B

. Petitioner’s Li fe as a Contractor in Afghanistan Petitioner typically worked a 12

- hour shift daily . She had a one - hour lu nch break and a half day off every two weeks. The o nly housing available to her was that provided on the base as part of her employ ment

. For the first several months, this housing consisted of a large tent shared with other women. Later petitioner lived in modular housing made of retrofitted shipping containers . She shared a- 6

- [* 6 ] bathroom and often shared her modular housing unit with a roommate

. The
U.S. G overnment provided her three meals a day at the base’s dining facility

. While she lived at Kandahar Airfield , petitioner socialized wit h others on the base and formed close friendships. She enjoyed celebrating holidays and birthdays on the base, as well as traveling internationally with her friends. During 2012

- 16 she visited Thailand, Australia, Monaco, France, Romania, Tanzania, Kenya , the United Arab Emirates, and the Maldives during her vacation periods

. For a pe riod of time, she had a romantic relationship with another contractor who also worked

overseas. Petitioner embraced the diversity o f the base, sharing recipes from her Ja

maican heritage and learning to make dishes from other cuisines. Much of the so

cial life was centered around the “boardwalk” area, which consisted of shops and restaurants surrounding a soccer field and encircled by a running track. The board

walk ha d a cigar club and a beauty parlor, as well as American chain restaurants, including Popeye’s and TGI Fridays. As petitioner explained, this was a popular place to “hang out.” She regularly attended barbecues and dances, w ent to the
gym , watch ed sporting events, and took part in weightlifting competitions

. Petitioner did not carry a weapon as part of her employment . For security reasons, she was not permitted to leave the base except when departing for interna

-- 7

- [* 7 ] tional travel

. She did not, and could not, travel within Afghanistan because it

was a war zone. Petitioner speaks only English. The Afghans with whom she interacted con sisted almost exclusively of day laborers and cleaning staff on the base , and she de

scribed them as reluctant to sp eak with Western women
. Because she had little meaningful contact with local people, learning Pasht o or Dari ( the local lan guages ) would have been of no p ractical use. Petitioner had U.S. bank accounts and credit cards during the years at issue

. She was paid in U.S. dollars , and her paychecks were deposited by her employer directly into her bank account. Business es on the base, such as the restaurants on the boardwalk, uniformly accepted U.S. dollars and generally did not accept Af

ghan currency. Contractors and service members typically paid their bills with

cas h , credit cards, or EagleCas h

-- a stored value card linked to the user’s bank ac

count

-- that is widely used on military bases

. When needing items not available for purchase on the base, petitioner submit ted orders to Amazon .com
. Because she was generally forbidden to leav e the base, it would have been difficult for petitioner to open an account at an Afghan bank. In any event, open

ing a local bank account would hav e afforded her no benefits and complicated her security clearance, which she was required to maintain as a condition of her em

-- 8

- [* 8 ] ployment

. For similar reasons, it would have been impractical and in

advisable for her to purchase real estate or make othe r investments in Afghanistan.
A s a condi tion of her employment , p etitioner was required to maintain a valid driver’s license from the country that issued her passport

. Petitioner’s driver’s license is a Texas driver’s license which lists the Pflugerville house as her address.
P etitioner used some of her vacation time to ma k e trips to the United States. Every trip included a visit to Texas to check on her property

. Some trips inclu ded visit s to Boston to see her family , and in March 2013 she spent five days in Ja

maica attending her grandmother ’s funeral. Sh e usual ly rented a car during her visits to Texas b ecause the registration on her automobile had expired

. She spent 2 2 days in the United States during 2012, 42 days during 2013, zero days during 2014, and 40 days during 2015 (including June 7

- 23). She did not rent out her house in Texas, which remained unoccupied except when she was visiting. Petitioner ’s employment with AC First ended on April 19, 2016 , because of a military drawdown in the region

. Before she left Afghanistan , another defense
contractor , DynCorp International, LLC (Dyn C orp) , orally promised her a position , again at Kandahar Air f ield . But that offer was contingent on the availability of funding, which was uncertain as of A p ril 2016.- 9

- [* 9 ] Petitioner accordingly returned to Texas, arriving on April 21, 2016. She immediately began looking for other defense contracting work in Afghan istan in case the DynCorp offer did not come through . She did not look for any job in the United States. Indeed, when an ex

- military friend suggested job opportunities at

an employer in Georgia , petitioner expressed no interest in pursuing such an offer. While out of work in 2016 she filed for and received Texas unemployment com

pensation. S he was registered to vote in Texas throughout the years at issue ; s he voted in November 2016 but did not vote in U.S. elections wh en living in Afghani

stan. In December 2016 DynCorp secured the funding it needed to hire petitioner and offered her a nother position at Kandahar Airfield

. She accepted the offer and departed for Afghanistan on December 24, 2016. She continued to live and work
at Kandahar Airfield , employed by DynCorp , through the date of trial . She credi

bly testified

-- and we find

-- that she planned to continue working as an overseas
contractor as long as these jobs continue to be available to her

. C. Petitioner’s Tax Returns and Noti ces of Deficiency An IRS revenue agent (RA) contacted petitioner in 2015 about her failure to file returns. On May 26, 2015, the IRS received petitioner’s Form s 1040, U.S. In

dividual Income Tax Return , for 2012

- 14

. She explained in a cover letter that she- 10

- [* 10 ] had been confused about the need to file U.S. tax returns wh ile working on a U.S. military base overseas and that she filed these returns a s soon as she became

aware that they were delinquent. The IR S received petitioner’s Form 1040 for
2015 on October 26, 2017. O n April 3, 2018 , she provided the RA with a copy of her Form 1040 for 2016

. All five returns were prepared by a tax preparation com

pany that specializ ed in work for Americans living abroad. On August 24, 2018, the IRS sent petitioner timely notice s of deficiency for
2012

- 16, and she timely petitioned this Court. After concessions by both par ties, the sole issues remaining for decision are whether petitioner’s wages from AC First qu alified for the FEI exclusion and whether she is liable for a late

- filing addi

tion to tax for 2015. 2
We tried the case remotely via Zoomgov i n February 2021 during the
Court’ s Albuquerque, New Mexico, trial session . Petitioner testified , as did seven other current or former defense contractors who knew her in Afghanistan

.

2 Petitioner has conceded that, for 2012, she received but did not report taxa

ble pension and annuity income of $14,131 and that she is liable for a 10% addi

tional tax under section 72(t). Petitioner has conceded that, for 2016, she received but did not r eport taxable interest of $81 and unemployment compensation of $12,454. Respondent has conceded that petitioner is not liable for any accuracy related penalties under section 6662(a), any additions to tax under section 6651(a)(2) or 6654, or additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for 2012

- 14 or 2016.- 11

- [* 11 ] OPINION
I

. Foreign Earned Income Exclusion Section 61(a) provides that gross income means “all income from whatever source derived.” Citizens of the United States are taxed on their worldwide in

come unless a specific exclusion applies. Specking v. Commissioner , 117 T.C. 95,
101

- 102 (2001) , aff ’ d sub nom. Hae ssly v. Commissioner , 68 F. App ’ x 44 (9th Cir. 2003) , and aff ’ d sub nom. Umbach v. Commissioner , 357 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2003)

. Exclusions from gross income are construed narrowly, and a taxpayer must clearly establish her entitlement to any such exclusion. Id

. at 101

. Section 911(a) (1) provides that a “qualified individual” may elect to exclude from gross income, subject to lim itations set forth in subsection (b)(2), her “foreign earned income.” Foreign earned income is “the amount received by such individ

ual from sources within a foreign country or countries which constitute earned in

come attributable to services performed b y such individual

. ” Sec. 911(b)(1)(A)

. Respondent does not dispute that the compensation petitioner received as a con

tractor in Afghanistan was “foreign earned income

. ” To be a “qualified individual” entitled to this exclusion, a taxpayer must sat

isf y two distinct requirements. First, s he must either be a “bona fide resident” of one or more foreign countries or be physically present abroad for a specified pe

-- 12

- [* 12 ] riod. Sec. 911(d)(1). Second, she must show that her “tax home is in a foreign country

. ” Sec. 911(d)(1) (flush language )

. The foreign residency and tax home re quirements entail overlapping inquires, but we address them in turn

. A

. Foreign R esidency
1. Bona Fide Residence Under se ction 911(d)(1) (A) a taxpayer m ust “ establish [] to the satisfaction of the S ecretary that * * * [she] has been a b o na fide resident of a foreign co u ntry

or countries for an uninterrupted period which includes an entire taxable year. ”
W e have construed this provision “to set a higher

- than

- ordinary standard of proof

-- i.e., ‘ strong proof ’

-- of bona fide resident status in a foreign country. ” Acone v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2017

- 162, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 219, 221 (citing Schoneberger v. Commissioner , 74 T.C. 1016, 1024 (1980) )

. T his standard of proof “is higher than preponderance of the evidence.” I bid

. P etitioner contends that she was a bona fide resident of Afghanistan during 2012

- 15 , a nd we agree. Whether an individual has taken up bona fide residence in a foreign country depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. The factors that courts have consulted in determining bona fide residency include the following: (1) intention of the taxpayer; (2) establishment of h er home temporarily in the foreign country for an indefinite period; (3) participation in the activities of h er chosen community- 13

- [* 13 ] on social and cultural levels, identification with the daily lives of the people , and, in general, assimilation into the foreign e nvironment; (4) physical presence in the for eign country consistent with h er employment; (5) nature, extent , and reasons for temporary absences from h er temporary foreign home; (6) assumption of economic burdens and payment of taxes to the foreign country; (7) status of resident con trasted to that of transient or sojourner; (8) income tax treatment accorded by her employer; (9) marital status and residence of h er family; (10) nature and duration of h er employment and whether assignment abroad could be completed more expe ditiously ; and (11) whether residence abroad refle c ts good faith (as opposed to a tax evasion purpose )

. Sochurek v. Commissioner , 300 F.2d 34, 38 (7th Cir. 1962), rev’g and remanding 36 T.C. 131 (1961) ; Schoneberger , 74
T.C. at 1023

. Th e “ uninterrupted period ” that includes an entire taxable year may be established even if “temporary visits” to the United States or other locations are made during th at time . Sec. 1.911

- 2(c), Income Tax Regs. While all of th e factors listed above may not be present in every case, the applica ble factors should be considered and weighed. Sochurek , 300 F.2d at 38. Several of the se factors weigh strongly in petitioner’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the F ifth C ircuit has observed that “intent plays perhaps the most important part in determining the establishment and maintenance of a foreign resi

-- 14

- [* 14 ] dence

. ” Jones v. Commissioner , 927 F.2d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 1991), rev’g
T.C. Memo. 1989

- 616

. Petitioner testified that she intend s to work as a contractor in Afghanistan for as long as such jobs remain available to her. We found that testi mony entirely credible. Objective indicia of petitioner’s intent include the fact that , after her contract with AC First e nded in April 2016, she secured the promise of another job at Kan

dahar Airfield (contingent on funding) before returning to the United States. Upon arrival in Texas , she did not search for jobs domestically. Rather, while wait ing to

see whether the DynCorp job came through, she looked for work only with other

over seas contractors. She repeatedly turned down opportunities to pursue jobs in the United States, even when offered by ex

- military friends

. Petitioner has not worked in the United States since 2011 . I n cluding her military service , she has spent most of her adult life working in the Middle East , uniformly in war zones

. When th e s e case s w ere tried, she was still working as a de fense contractor in Afghanistan , and she delivered her testimony from K anda har Airfield. This is not the track record of a “ transient or sojourner ” abroad. Sochurek , 300 F.2d at 38. The nature and duration of petitioner’s employment also support her foreign residency. She worked a demanding schedule that necessitated her physical pres

-- 15

- [* 15 ] ence on the base. Although she had a series of one

- year contracts, those contracts were reliably renewed for five years. See Linde v . Commissioner , T.C.
Memo. 2017

- 180, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 314, 319 (finding that a DynCorp contractor in Iraq expected one

- year contracts to be extended indefinitely). How her employer treated her income tax status is another factor in her favor: AC First ad vised that she was eligible for the FEI exclusion and explained how she could elect to have no U.S. tax withheld from her wages. Needless to say, her presence in Afghanistan reflected nothing but “good faith .” Sochure k , 300 F.2d at 38

. Several factors that respondent regards as adverse to petitioner seem neutral to us, given the unique circumstances of her life in Afghanistan. Because Afghani

stan was a war zone, petitioner and other civilian contractors were generally for

bidden to lea ve the base. She was therefore limited in her ability to “participat [ e ] in the activities of * * * [her] chosen community,” see ibid. , to the extent that com

mu nity is understood as the broader Afghan society. However, she did fully assim

i late into the only community she had available to her: the 50,000 people who lived and worked at Kandahar Airfield. As explained supra p. 6, petitioner formed close friendships within this commu nity and participate d in its activities to the full

est ex tent possible.- 16

- [* 16 ] Likewise, although petitioner lived in em ployer

- provided housing and did
not acquire her own space , she had no other housing option available to her. She did not learn Pasht o or Dari or participate in activities with the local Afghan com

munity. But assimilation of this sort was a practical impossibility: She was forbid

den to leave the base, and mos t Afghans with whom she interacted had little inter

est in conversing with her. She could not stay in Af ghanistan legally without em

ployment, and her employment was structured as a se ries of one

- year contracts. But those contracts were renewed regular ly for five years by AC First, and her sub

sequent contracts were renewed regularly by Dyn Corp. Other factors also favor petitioner or seem neutral. During 2012

- 15 she spent the bulk of her time physically in Afghanistan. When she had time off, she had no option to travel within that country . Understandably she selected other travel destinations

-- Thailand, Australia, Monaco, France, Romania, Tan zania, Kenya, the United Arab Emirates, and the Ma ldives

-- which she visited alone or with friends from the base. She was unmarried and had no children ; her trips to Texas were not to visit family but to check on her house. At least one factor is adverse to petitioner. She assumed few economic bur

dens by living in Afghanistan because she did not pay for lodging or most meals, and she paid no tax in Afghanistan. But having weighed all the factors, and giving- 17

- [* 17 ] special consideration to her intent, whi ch we found to be clear, we hold that peti tioner has supplied the “strong proof” necessary to carry her burden of prov ing that she was a bona fide resident of Afghanistan during 2012

- 15.
Our analysis on this point differs for 2016. It is well establishe d that each tax year stands by itself and “must be separately considered.” Pekar v. Commis

sioner , 113 T.C. 158, 166 (1999). In April 2016 petitioner lost her job with AC First because of a reduction in force. She returned to Texas and lived there until
De cember 24, 2016, when she departed for her job with DynCorp in Afghanistan

. While between jobs, she lived at her house in Pflugerville and collected Texas un employment compensation

. She also registered her car and used it while in Texas. She voted in 2016 even though she had not voted while living in Afghanistan. Be

cause t he balance of fact or s weighs against petitioner for 2016 , we find that she
was not a bona fide resident of Afghanistan in that year

. 3
2. Physical Presence Alternatively, a taxpayer c an be a “qualified individual” by meeting the 330

- day physical presence requirement

. This requires that the taxpayer, “during any

3 Petitioner cannot be a bona fide foreign resident on a part

- year basis. See Dawson v. Commissioner , 59 T.C. 264, 270

- 271 (1972). Section 911(d)(1)(A) provides that an individual seeking to meet this re quirement must do so “for an un

interrupted period which includes an entire taxable year.”- 18

- [* 18 ] period of 12 consecutive months , * * * [be] present in a foreign country or

coun tries dur ing at least 330 full days in such period.” Sec. 911(d)(1)(B). Petitioner contends that she satisfies this test for the portion of 2016 during which she was in Afghani stan , and w e agree
. Petitioner’s job with AC First terminated on April 19, 2016 ; sh e d eparted for the United States that same day, arriving in Texas on April 21, 2016. The 12

- month period during which petitioner’s physical presence may be tested thus ran from April 20, 2015, through April 19, 2016. See Struck v. Commissioner , T.C.
Memo. 2007

- 42, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 928, 930 (finding taxpayers eligible for FEI ex

clusion for 2002 using an applicable period from May 16, 2001, to May 15, 2002);
sec. 1.911

- 2(d)(1), I ncome T ax R egs. ( “The twelve

- month period may begin be

fore or after arrival in a foreign country and may end before or after departure.” ). During the 12

- month period beginning April 20, 2015, petitioner was pre sent in the United States for only 17 days, between June 7 and June 23 . She was thus “present in a foreign country or countries during at least 330 full days in such period.” S ec. 911(d) ( 1 )(B ). However, because the applicable period used for the physical presence test does not correspond with petition er’s calendar taxabl e year, a pro rata adjustment to her FEI exclusion for 2016 will need to be made under sec.
1.911

- 3(d), Income Tax Regs. See S truck , 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 932 n.8.- 19

- [* 19 ] B

. F oreign Tax Home In order to be a “qualified individual” as defined by section 911(d)(1), a tax

payer must satisfy not only the “bona fide residency” or physical presence test. She must also show that her “tax home is in a foreign country.” Sec. 911(d)(1) (flush lan guage). Sectio n 911(d)(3) defines the term “tax home” to mean, in the case of an individual, “such individual ’ s home for purposes of section 162(a)(2) .” Under sec tion 162(a)(2) , a person ’ s home is generally considered to be the location of her regular or principal place of business. See Mitchell v. Commissioner , 74 T.C. 578, 581 (1980)

. For petitioner, this is Afghanistan. However, s ection 911(d)(3) goes on to provide that “[ a ] n indivi dual shall not be treated as having a tax home in a foreign country for any period for which * * * [her] abode is within the United States.” Thus, if petitioner’s “abode” during
2012

- 16 was in the United States , she cannot establish that her tax home wa s in Afghani stan

. See Jones , 927 F.2d at 856 ; Harrington v. Commissioner , 93 T.C. 297, 30 3 (1989)

. The “foreign tax home” requirement is evaluated using the “same applica ble period used * * * for the bona fide residence or the physical presence re

-- 20

- [* 20 ] quire ment.” Struck , 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 930; see sec. 1.911

- 2(a), Income Tax Regs. 4 The term “abode” has been “variously defined as one’s home, habitation, residence, domicile, or place of dw elling,” and it “has a domestic rather than [a] vocational meaning.” Bujol v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1987

- 230, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 762 , 763

- 764 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)) , aff’d with

out published opinion , 842 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1988). T o de termine a taxpayer’s “abode” for a particular period under section 911(d)(3), we compare and contrast

“ the taxpayer ’ s domestic ties (i.e., his familial, economic, and personal ties) to the United States with his ties to the foreign country in which he claims a tax home .” Haskins v. Commissioner , 820 F. App ’ x 994, 995 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Har

rington , 93 T.C. at 307

- 308) , aff’g T.C. Memo. 2019

- 87

. Although any taxpayer working in a foreign country will “invariably have some connections” with that country, “if his ties to the United States are stronger, we have held that his ‘abode’

4 Section 911(d)(3) currently provides that the requirement of a foreign abode does not apply if the taxpayer “is serving in an area designated by the President * * * as a combat zone * * * in support of the Armed Forces of the United States.” That proviso was added in 2018 and thus has no application to th e s e case s
. See Bi

partisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115

- 123 , sec. 41116(a) , 132 Stat. at 161

.- 21

- [* 21 ] remains in the United States.” Evans v. Commissioner , T.C. M emo. 2015

- 12, 109 T.C.M. (CCH) 1052, 1055. Considerations for determining the taxpayer’s “abode” include the amount of time spen t in each country, the residence of close family members, community involvement, banking activity, property ownership, and rec reational activities. See Wentworth v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2018

- 194, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 506, 5 10. “Maintenance of a dwelling in the United States by an individual, whether or not that dwelling is used by the individual’s spouse and dependents, does no t nec es sarily mean that the individual ’ s abode is in the United States.” Sec. 1.911

- 2(b), Income Tax Regs. ; s ee , e.g. , Harrington , 93 T.C. at 309 (finding a U.S. abode where the taxpayer spent almost half his time in the United States with his family, maintained bank accounts in the United States, attended church in the United States, and owned vehicles in the United States); Acone , T.C. Memo. 2017

- 162, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 219, 222 ( finding a U.S. abode where the taxpayer spent so much time at his family’s home in New Hampshire that he “continue[d] to be the one who mowed the grass there”); Daly v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2013

- 147, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1850, 1853 ( finding a U.S. abode where the t axpayer worked abroad for fewer than 110 days annually and derived less than half his income from work overseas).- 22

- [* 22 ] We consider petitioner’s ties to Afghanistan in the light of the “nature of the

re gion” and the “unique circumstances” of her work. S ee Wentworth , 116 T.C.M

. (CCH ) at 510. Petitioner ha d a Texas driver’s license , but it was a condition of her employment that she be licensed to drive in the country that issued her passport. She had a U.S. bank account , but that was necessary to enable her employer to make direct deposit of her paychecks. O pening a local bank account or buyin g property in Afghanistan would have been impracticable if not impossible , given the requirements of her security clearance and the ban on leaving the base. Peti

tioner worked 12 hours a day in Afghanistan, with a half

- day off every 14 days. Despite the strenuous demands of her work, she managed to have a full social life, including visiting restaurants and shops on the boardwalk, cooking with friends, and pursuing her weightlifting hobby. Petitioner had limited famil y and personal ties to the United St ates. She was unmarried and had no children ; a lthough she visited her parents in Boston occa

sionally, she spent a significant amount of her vacation time traveling to other for

eign countries. Cf. Cobb v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1991

- 376, 62 T.C.M. (CC H) 408, 412 (discounting the significance of occasional U.S. family visits that were “limited by convenience”). Her house in Pflugerville remained unoccupied , so she did not have to manage any tenants. She often let her car registration lapse- 23

- [* 23 ] and th us rented a car when visiting Texas. She spent fewer than 4 3 days in the United States in 2012, 2013, and 2015, and zero days in 2014. The only wages she earned during these years were derived from he r job in Afghanistan. Most of petitioner’s close friends were other contractors who also lived and worked in Afghanistan . She credibly testified that she felt closer to these col

leagues than she had felt ( for example) to her former co

- workers at Dell. A t one point she dated another contractor working overseas. She planned to work as a contractor in the Middle East for as long as such job s remained open to her. Cf. Haskins , T.C. Memo. 2019

- 87, 118 T.C.M. (CCH ) 63, 65 ( noting that a co ntractor in Afghanistan described herself as “miserable” and asked h ow soon she could re

turn to the United States “without getting in trouble with the IRS”)

. This Court has previously f o und that civilian defense contractors working overseas can have “ abodes ” outside the United States , so long as they have

s tro nger ties to th e foreign country than to t he United States. See Wentworth , 116
T.C.M

. (CCH ) at 510

- 511 (finding that taxpayer’s tax home was in Iraq); Linde , 114 T.C.M. (CCH) at 318 (same ). We find that petitioner’s ties to the United
St ates during the releva nt period were much weaker than her ties to her community
in Afghanistan . We thus find that her tax home was in Afghanistan from the start of 2012 until she left Afghanistan in April 2016. See Struck , 93 T.C.M

. (CCH)- 24

- [* 24 ] at 930 (“The foreign tax home re quirement * * * is to be evaluated during the same applicable period used by a taxpayer for the bona fide residence or the physical presence requirement.”).
II

. L ate

- F iling A ddition to T ax for 2015 Section 6651(a)(1) provides for an addition to tax of 5% of the tax required to be shown on the return for each month or fraction thereof for which there is a failure to file the return, not to exceed 25% in toto. As in effect during 2016, how

ever, secti on 7508 allow ed an extension of time to file to taxpayers who were serv ing in support of the U .S. Armed Forces in an area designated by the President as a combat z one
. The parties agree that petitioner was serving in support of the Armed Forces and that Afghanistan was a combat zone during 2016

. The normal deadline for individual taxpayers to file returns for 2015 was April 18, 20 16

. 5 Under section 7508 (a) (1)(A), petitioner’s “period of service” in the combat zone before the deadline “ a nd the next 180 d ays thereafter” are disre

5 Traditionally, the filing deadline for individual tax returns is April 15. However, the District of Columbia recognizes Emancipation Day, April 16, as a holiday. In 2016, Emancipation Day fell on a Saturday, so the holiday was ob

served the preceding Fri day, April 15. If a filing deadline falls on a weekend or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia, the deadline is extended until the follow

ing business day. See sec. 7503. Accordingly, the deadline for individual taxpay

ers to file returns for 201 5 was extended to April 18, 2016, the following Monday.- 25

- [* 25 ] garded in determining whether her 201 5 return was timely filed

. P etitioner was in a combat zone from January 1 thr ough April 19 , 2016, th e date of her departure from Kandahar Airfield. In determining her filing deadline, therefore,
289 days are disregarded

-- those 109 days plus 180 days

. See Rev. Rul. 76

- 425,
1976

- 2 C.B. 447 (1976); IRS Publication 3, Armed Forces’ Tax Guide 25 (201 5 ).
P etitioner’s extended filing deadline was therefore 2 89 days after April 19 , 2016, or February 2 , 2017. She did not file her 2015 tax return until October 26,
2017. However, she returned to Afghanistan, which remained a combat zone, on
D ecember 24, 2016, before her 201 5 return was due

. Section 7508(a) thus entitled her to another extension of time to file while she remained in th at combat zone

. She remained in Afghanista n continuously through October 2 6 , 2017 (and thereaf

ter). Her 2015 return was thus timely filed, so she is liable for no addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for that year. To reflect the foregoing,

Decision s will be entered under Rule 155

.