FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ABELARDO NIEBLA-TORRES,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10261

D.C. No.

4:14-cr-02037-

RCC-DTF-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Raner C. Collins, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted on September 13, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed January 31, 2017

Before: William A. Fletcher, Morgan B. Christen,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Christen
2 UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for conspiracy to possess

with intent to distribute marijuana, in a case in which the

defendant argued that the district court erred by denying his

motion for a judgment of acquittal because the government

did not introduce sufficient evidence to corroborate his

confession under the corpus delicti doctrine. 

The panel held that the government satisfied both prongs

of the corpus delicti test set forth in United States v. LopezAlvarez, 970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1992), by introducing

sufficient corroborating evidence that the core conduct of the

defendant’s crime actually occurred, and sufficient evidence

to corroborate the reliability of the videotaped confession and

the authenticity of the defendant’s confessed involvement in

the conspiracy.

The panel addressed other issues in a concurrently-filed

memorandum disposition.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES 3

COUNSEL

Roger H. Sigal (argued), Law Offices of Roger H. Sigal,

Tucson, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

Lawrence C. Lee (argued) and Bruce M. Ferg, Assistant

United States Attorneys; Robert L. Miskell, Appellate Chief;

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney; United States

Attorney’s Office, Tucson, Arizona; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

Abelardo Niebla-Torres (Niebla), a native and citizen of

Mexico, appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(D), and 846.1 Niebla argues that the

district court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of

acquittal because the government did not introduce sufficient

evidence to corroborate his confession under the corpus

delicti doctrine. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm Niebla’s conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

Border Patrol Agent Michael Colella arrested Niebla on

Pozo Redondo Mountain in southern Arizona, near the Ajo

Border Patrol station, on November 27, 2014. According to

the government’s expert trial witness, the Ajo area is a

1

In the defendant’s brief to this court, his counsel refers to him as

“Niebla,” so we adopt that convention here.
4 UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES

smuggling corridor. Drug-trafficking organizations control

the majority, if not all, of the smuggling routes, and the drug

traffickers allow individuals to illegally cross into the United

States only if they pay a fee, work as backpackers carrying

drugs, or serve as scouts to look out for law-enforcement

activity. The backpackers typically carry marijuana and

travel in groups of five to ten people. They traverse the

valley floor, instead of walking through the mountains,

because each backpack weighs forty to sixty pounds and the

backpacks are easier to carry on flat ground. Scouts track

law-enforcement movement from mountaintop locations to

help the backpackers avoid detection.

Agent Colella spotted two people on the Pozo Redondo

Mountain for several days in a row leading up to Niebla’s

arrest. The individuals “weren’t standing out in the open like

a normal hiker would,” and “appeared to be concealing

themselves.” Agent Colella could just see the “tops of their

heads, just from their chin up, and every so often their heads

would go back down and then come back up.” Because the

summit provides a relatively unobstructed view of the valley

floor (including the Border Patrol station), Agent Colella

suspected the two people were scouting law-enforcement

activities. Agent Colella had never encountered any hikers or

tourists on the mountain, and described the terrain as very

steep, rocky, and slippery.

On the day of Niebla’s arrest, Agent Colella learned that

other agents had spotted four possible scouts on the mountain

from an aircraft equipped with a camera that detects body

heat. Agent Colella and another Border Patrol agent, Paul

Gallegos, ascended the mountain by helicopter to investigate. 

The helicopter dropped them off near the mountain’s summit,

where they encountered two individuals later identified as
UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES 5

Niebla andAndres Garcia-Espinoza. The agents apprehended

Niebla and Garcia-Espinoza and searched the area where the

men were hiding. They found cellular phones and radio

batteries in a satchel Niebla was wearing, and hand-held

radios, a pair of binoculars, and trash in two nearby caves. 

Both men were wearing camouflage clothing. Agent Colella

arrested Niebla and Garcia-Espinoza on suspicion of

smuggling and arranged for transport to the Ajo Border Patrol

station. There, another Border Patrol agent, Manuel Alonzo,

advised Niebla of his constitutional rights and, two hours

later, interviewed him.

During this interview, Niebla admitted that he was on the

mountain as a scout. He said that he helped two groups of

smugglers carrying suitcases cross the border into the United

States, and stated that he did not know what was in the

suitcases, but that based on his experience, “it must be

marijuana.” Niebla specified that each group contained eight

or ten people carrying roughly one suitcase per person, and

that each suitcase weighed twenty kilograms. He explained

that he knew how much the suitcases weighed because the

smugglers told him before theycrossed into the United States. 

Niebla said that he was on the mountain for three or four days

before Agent Colella arrested him, and that he expected to

remain on the mountain for roughly twenty more days. The

agents did not recover any marijuana.

The government charged Niebla with conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance (Count

One) and illegal reentry (Count Two). He pleaded guilty to

the illegal-reentry count and proceeded to a bench trial on the

conspiracy count. Niebla filed a pretrial motion to suppress

his confession as involuntary, arguing that the agent who

interviewed him, Agent Alonzo, threatened him with seven
6 UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES

years’ imprisonment if he did not confess. According to

Niebla, Agent Alonzo primed him for the interview during

the two-hour gap between the time Alonzo read Niebla his

rights (an event that was not videotaped) and when the

videotaped interview began.

A magistrate judge held a two-day evidentiary hearing on

the motion to suppress, at which both Agent Alonzo and

Niebla testified. Agent Alonzo testified that he advised

Niebla of his constitutional rights and that Niebla willingly

waived them and agreed to speak with the agent. The

government introduced Niebla’s signed rights form into

evidence at the hearing. By contrast, Niebla denied any

involvement in a drug-smuggling operation and testified that

he admitted to helping two groups cross the border because

Agent Alonzo “pressured me that if I didn’t say that . . . I was

going to be there for seven years. That was the reason

because he scared me. He pressured me.”

The magistrate judge credited Agent Alonzo’s description

of the interview over Niebla’s, largely because the court

found Agent Alonzo’s account to be more consistent with the

videotape. Niebla claimed that Agent Alonzo raised his voice

and pressured him into confessing, but Agent Alonzo could

not be heard doing so on the videotape. The magistrate judge

also found that Niebla’s hearing testimony was internally

inconsistent. He testified that he was on the mountain for

several days without knowing why he was there or who he

was with, but also stated on cross-examination that he

expected to be paid for the work he performed on the

mountaintop, that the work probably involved reporting on

the movement of law-enforcement officers, and that he

thought the suitcases being smuggled across the border would

contain marijuana. Despite Niebla’s insistence that he was
UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES 7

not a member of a drug-smuggling operation, the magistrate

judge recognized that, in his hearing testimony, Niebla

ultimately admitted many of the details from his videotaped

confession. The magistrate judge recommended denying the

motion to suppress. The district court adopted the

recommendation in a pretrial ruling.

At trial, the government presented the testimony of

Agents Colella and Alonzo to describe Niebla’s arrest and

confession; an expert witness to explain how drug-trafficking

organizations use scouts in the Ajo corridor; and evidence

that Niebla was previously arrested for scouting in the same

area in 2011. Niebla made an oral motion for a judgment of

acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 after

the government presented its case. He argued that the

government failed to produce sufficient evidence to

corroborate his confession to conspiracy to distribute

marijuana independent of the confession itself. Specifically,

he contended that “the only real evidence presented by the

Government of any agreement to distribute a specific

controlled substance is Mr. Niebla’s post arrest statements.” 

The district court denied the motion, and Niebla chose not to

present a defense. The district court found Niebla guilty, and

explained its verdict:

Based upon the evidence, the Court finds that

the defendant’s guilty on the charge of

conspiracy. The Court finds that being on the

hillside as he was, in the middle of nowhere,

dressed in camouflage clothes with

binoculars, radio, batteries, and a satchel is

sufficient evidence, and with his cohort, is

sufficient evidence to find that there was

agreement. The Court finds from his own
8 UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES

words that the object of the agreement was

marijuana.2

The court sentenced Niebla to nine months’ imprisonment

and three years’ supervised release. Niebla timely appealed

his conviction. He argues that the conviction must be vacated

under the corpus delicti doctrine because the government did

not present sufficient evidence to corroborate his confession.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, “the court

on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal

of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain

a conviction.” We review de novo the denial of a motion for

acquittal. United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 978

(9th Cir. 2000). We “ask whether, ‘after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting

United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 70 F.3d 1071, 1072–73

(9th Cir. 1995)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979).

To obtain a conviction on the drug-conspiracy charge, the

government was required to prove that: (1) there was an

2 Niebla’s co-defendant, Andres Garcia-Espinoza, entered a guilty

plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled

substance before a magistrate judge on February 17, 2015. The district

court accepted the guilty plea on March 4, 2015, the day after Niebla’s

bench trial concluded.
UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES 9

agreement between two or more people to commit the crime

of possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it; and

(2) Niebla joined in the agreement, knowing that it had an

unlawful purpose and intending to help accomplish it. See

United States v. Tran, 568 F.3d 1156, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009);

Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 9.19. 

Niebla’s videotaped confession was compelling evidence of

his guilt, but, under the corpus delicti doctrine, the

“confession standing alone is not necessarily sufficient to

support his conviction.” United States v. Valdez-Novoa,

780 F.3d 906, 922 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.

2913 (2015).

B. The Corpus Delicti Doctrine

The corpus delicti doctrine requires that a convictionmust

rest on more than a defendant’s uncorroborated confession. 

See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 92–94 (1954). 

“Although the government may rely on a defendant’s

confession to meet its burden of proof, it has nevertheless

been long established that, in order to serve as the basis for

conviction, the government must also adduce some

independent corroborating evidence.” Corona-Garcia,

210 F.3d at 978 (citing Opper, 348 U.S. at 89). The

doctrine’s purpose is to protect against the risk of convictions

based on false confessions alone. See United States v. LopezAlvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Warszower

v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 (1941)); see also Opper,

348 U.S. at 89–90 (“In our country the doubt persists that the

zeal of the agencies of prosecution to protect the peace, the

self-interest of the accomplice, the maliciousness of an enemy

or the aberration or weakness of the accused under the strain

of suspicion may tinge or warp the facts of the confession.”).
10 UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES

In Lopez-Alvarez, we articulated a two-part test to

evaluate whether the government has met its burden under the

corpus delicti doctrine. 970 F.2d at 592. First, the

government “must introduce sufficient evidence to establish

that the criminal conduct at the core of the offense has

occurred. Second, it must introduce independent evidence

tending to establish the trustworthiness of the admissions,

unless the confession is, by virtue of special circumstances,

inherently reliable.” Id. The two prongs guard against

distinct types of false confessions. See id. at 590–92. The

first ensures that a defendant is not convicted of a nonexistent crime—that is, a crime that was not actually

committed—and the second reduces the likelihood that a

defendant is convicted based upon a false confession to an

actual crime. See id. The government must satisfy both

prongs for a case to survive a motion for a judgment of

acquittal based on insufficient evidence. Id. at 592.

“[T]he corpus deliciti rule does not require the

government to introduce evidence that would be

independently sufficient to convict the defendant in the

absence of the confession.” Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d at 923. 

Nor does it require that the government “introduce

independent, tangible evidence supporting every element of

the corpus delicti.” Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 591. Instead,

the government must introduce corroborating evidence “to

support independently only the gravamen of the offense—the

existence of the injury that forms the core of the offense and

a link to a criminal actor.” Id.

Niebla contends that the government failed to meet its

burden under both prongs of the Lopez-Alvarez test.
UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES 11

C. The Core of the Offense

First, Niebla argues that the government did not introduce

sufficient corroborating evidence to establish that the criminal

conduct at the core of the offense occurred. The parties

dispute what constitutes the gravamen, or core, of the offense

of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. In the

course of this litigation, the parties have argued for three

different definitions of the core of the offense: (1) an

agreement to assist smugglers; (2) an agreement to smuggle

a controlled substance; and (3) an agreement to smuggle

marijuana.

The government has alternated between arguing that the

conduct at the core of conspiracy is an agreement to do

something illegal, and arguing that, in order to satisfy its

corpus delicti obligation, it must show that Niebla and his coconspirator agreed to help smuggle a controlled substance. 

Niebla has likewise shifted his arguments over time. In the

district court, he maintained that the gravamen of conspiracy

under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 is an agreement to distribute

a specific controlled substance, and that the government

failed to meet its burden because it did not present evidence

to corroborate the existence of a conspiracy to smuggle

marijuana. On appeal, Niebla argues that the government

failed to meet its burden because the evidence was “equally

consistent” with the possibility that the agreement was related

to human trafficking or to evading law enforcement after

illegal reentry into the United States. We need not decide

which definition applies because, even if we define the core

of the offense very specifically, as an agreement to possess

and distribute marijuana, the government satisfied its corpus

delicti burden.
12 UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES

1. Conspiracy to Possess With Intent to Distribute

Marijuana

Using the most specific definition of the core of the

offense, the government had to present corroborating

evidence of a conspiracy to possess with the intent to

distribute marijuana. Niebla argues that the government

failed to offer sufficient corroborating evidence because the

agents did not find any marijuana at the time of Niebla’s

arrest. In Opper, the Supreme Court held that the corpus

delicti doctrine requires the government to introduce

corroborating evidence supporting “the essential facts

admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth.” 

348 U.S. at 93. Our court paraphrased Opper’s “essential

facts” requirement in Lopez-Alvarez: “the state is required to

support independently only the gravamen of the offense—the

existence of the injury that forms the core of the offense and

a link to a criminal actor—with tangible evidence.” 970 F.2d

at 591 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court “has repeatedly said that the essence

of a conspiracy is ‘an agreement to commit an unlawful act.’”

United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003)

(quoting Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975)). 

The defendants in Jimenez Recio were found guilty of

conspiracy to distribute drugs even though the government

had seized the drugs before distribution—thereby making the

object of the conspiracy impossible—and the defendants

joined the conspiracy after the seizure. Id. at 272–74. The

Court reasoned that impossibility is not a defense to

conspiracy because the harm at the center of conspiracy is the

agreement. See id. at 274 (“That agreement is ‘a distinct

evil,’ which ‘may exist and be punished whether or not the
UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES 13

substantive crime ensues.’” (quoting Salinas v. United States,

522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997))).

Our court has applied similar reasoning in the context of

conspiracies to rob stash houses. The stash-house cases

typically involve “reverse sting” operations whereby

government agents suggest to targets that they rob a fictional

stash house containing illegal drugs and money. “Once the

targets have taken steps to rob the fictional house, they are

arrested and charged with conspiracy to violate federal

narcotics laws.” United States v. Pedrin, 797 F.3d 792, 794

(9th Cir. 2015). We have affirmed drug-conspiracy

convictions arising from these scenarios even though the

object of the co-conspirators’ illegal agreement—the drugs in

the fictional stash house—did not actually exist. See, e.g.,

United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir.

2008) (explaining that the non-existent status of the drugs is

not a defense to a conspiracy charge).

Jimenez Recio and the stash-house cases confirm that the

failure to seize marijuana is not fatal to the government’s

prosecution of Niebla. Indeed, Niebla could have been

convicted of participating in a conspiracy to distribute

marijuana even if no marijuana had ever existed. Niebla’s

corpus delicti challenge instead turns on whether the

government presented sufficient corroborating evidence to

demonstrate that he knowingly entered into an agreement to

assist marijuana traffickers by scouting.

2. Corroborating Evidence of the Offense

“[A] conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial

evidence that the defendants acted together with a common

goal.” Williams, 547 F.3d at 1196 (quoting United States v.
14 UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES

Iriarte-Ortega, 113F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997), amended

by United States v. Iriarte-Ortega, 127 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir.

1997)); see also Sandez v. United States, 239 F.2d 239, 244

(9th Cir. 1956) (“The corpus delicti may be proved by

circumstantial evidence.”). Here, the government introduced

independent, circumstantial evidence that Niebla knowingly

entered into an unlawful agreement to smuggle marijuana. 

Agent Colella arrested Niebla in close proximity to his codefendant, Andres Garcia-Espinoza, on a remote mountaintop

in an area known to be frequented by marijuana smugglers

and their mountaintop scouts. Niebla was dressed in

camouflage, and Agent Colella testified that he saw two

people hiding together on the mountain for several days

before the arrest. When they were apprehended, Niebla and

Garcia-Espinoza had hand-held radios, cellular telephones,

and binoculars.3 According to the government’s expert

witness, Border Patrol Agent Carlos Rochin, scouts use these

items “to observe law enforcement movement and then relay

it back to the guide,” so the guide can avoid apprehension

while smuggling drugs across the desert. The remote

geographic area, the communications equipment, and the

expert witness’s testimony are circumstantial evidence of the

agreement that was at the heart of this drug-distribution

conspiracy. See United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d

299, 302–03 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding that presence

of scouts and defendant’s use of a push-to-talk radio

3 Niebla argued that the district court erred by admitting the

binoculars (Exhibit 55) and a photo of the binoculars and two-way radios

(Exhibit 14) at trial because the government authenticated both exhibits

with hearsay testimony. We held that it was not plain error for the district

court to admit these exhibits in a memorandum disposition filed

concurrently with this opinion.
UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES 15

constituted circumstantial evidence of an agreement to

engage in drug trafficking).

Agent Rochin also explained that drug-trafficking

organizations control the majority, if not all, of the smuggling

routes in the Ajo Border Patrol station’s area of operations,

and that they typically traffic marijuana. Although aliens are

also smuggled along these routes, Agent Rochin testified that

one would need prior permission from the drug-trafficking

organizations in order to cross into the United States on these

routes, and that an individual must pay a fee, work as a scout,

or carry drugs across the desert in order to gain the drugtrafficking organizations’ permission to cross.

The government also presented evidence of Niebla’s 2011

arrest to counter Niebla’s argument that he was on the

mountain for several days with no knowledge of why he was

there.4 Border Patrol Agent Vincente Paco testified that he

arrested Niebla for scouting in 2011 close to the location

where Agent Colella arrested Niebla for the current offense. 

Niebla was not charged in 2011. Although Agent Paco’s

team was conducting an investigation into alien smuggling

when they encountered Niebla, Agent Paco testified that he

did not know whether Niebla was scouting for a humantrafficking or drug-trafficking operation, but that the area

where his team found Niebla is mostly used for narcotic

smuggling.

4 Niebla argued the district court erred by admitting evidence of the

prior arrest under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). We held that the

district court properly admitted this evidence in a memorandum

disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.
16 UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES

We conclude that the government satisfied the first prong

of the Lopez-Alvarez corpus delicti test by introducing

sufficient corroborating evidence that the core conduct of

Niebla’s crime actually occurred. To satisfy the corpus

delicti doctrine, “the corroborative evidence does not have to

prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a

preponderance, as long as there is substantial independent

evidence that the offense has been committed . . . .” Smith v.

United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954). The government

established that: (1) agents arrested Niebla in an area

controlled by drug-trafficking organizations; (2) those

organizations typically traffic marijuana; (3) Agent Colella

saw two men on the mountain trying to hide for several days

leading up to the arrest; (4) Niebla was wearing camouflage

clothing and carrying a cellular phone and radio batteries at

the time of the arrest; (5) the arresting agents found

binoculars and hand-held radios in nearby caves; (6) scouts

use these same items to help backpackers traverse the valley

floor carrying marijuana; and (7) Niebla was arrested on

suspicion of scouting for a smuggling operation in the same

area three years earlier.

D. Reliability of the Confession

Niebla also argues that the government’s evidence was

insufficient to corroborate his confession under LopezAlvarez’s second prong. This part of the corpus delicti test

requiresthatthe government “introduce independent evidence

tending to establish the trustworthiness of the admissions,

unless the confession is, by virtue of special circumstances,

inherently reliable.” Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 592. In

Valdez-Novoa, we held that the fact that a confession “is

recorded, voluntary, and the result of an interrogation that is

conducted in a manner consistent with the constitutional
UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES 17

protections afforded the accused supports a determination that

it is ‘inherently reliable’ under Lopez-Alvarez’s second

prong.” 780 F.3d at 925.

Niebla emphasizes the two-hour delay between the time

he received the Miranda-advisement and the time his

interview was videotaped, and maintains that his demeanor

during the interview is consistent with pre-interview

coaching. Niebla does not challenge whether his “statement

was voluntary and Miranda-compliant, but rather, whether

there was evidence which shed doubt on the confession’s

reliability.”

Niebla’s argument that his confession was coached is not

supported by the videotape. In fact, the district court’s

finding that the videotape demonstrates Niebla’s confession

was “spontaneous and unrehearsed” is well supported. 

Contrary to Niebla’s claim, Agent Alonzo did not raise his

voice or speak harshly during Niebla’s interview. Niebla is

soft-spoken and has slumped, downcast posture in the video,

but he does not appear frightened of Agent Alonzo or

intimidated into answering questions. Cf. United States v.

Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 

Contrary to his assertion that he was coached, the videotape

shows that Niebla corrected Agent Alonzo several times

during the interview, and sometimes responded negatively to

Alonzo’s leading questions. The record demonstrates that

Agent Alonzo did not insist on particular answers to his

questions or repeatedly badger Niebla until he received

satisfactory responses. See Preston, 751 F.3d at 1013.

Niebla failed to show that his interrogation was

inconsistent “with the constitutional protections afforded the

accused.” See Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d at 925. The recording
18 UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES

allowed the court to see how the interview unfolded and to

assess the voluntariness of Niebla’s responses. “Where the

government complies with all of the procedural protections

afforded the accused and the defendant’s videotaped

statement is shown to the [trier of fact], there is no elevated

risk that the confession was the product of coercion or that

the defendant’s words were misconstrued.” Id.

Furthermore, the same physical and circumstantial

evidence that corroborates Niebla’s confession to the core of

the offense also verifies the authenticity of his confessed

involvement in the conspiracy. See id. at 924–25. Niebla

stated that he was on the mountain for several days before the

arrest, which is consistent with Agent Colella’s observation

of two people hiding together on the mountain for that period

of time. Niebla explained that he helped two groups of eight

or ten people cross the border into the United States, and that

each suitcase weighed twenty kilograms. Testimony from the

government’s expert witness was in accord. The expert

testified that smugglers typically traverse the valley floor in

groups of five to ten people carrying backpacks that weigh

between forty and sixty pounds each, which is consistent with

Niebla’s twenty-kilogram estimate. The agents found handheld radios, radio batteries, cell phones, and binoculars on the

mountain, and in his videotaped confession Niebla admitted

that he and his co-conspirator used these items to

communicate with and guide smugglers across the desert

undetected. The government’s expert also testified that

scouts for marijuana-trafficking organizations in the Ajo

corridor use these devices. We conclude that the government

introduced sufficient corroborating evidence to satisfyLopezAlvarez’s second prong.
UNITED STATES V. NIEBLA-TORRES 19

For the foregoing reasons, Niebla’s confession was

adequately corroborated under the corpus delicti doctrine. 

Because the confession is sufficiently corroborated, viewing

all the evidence (including the confession) in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Niebla knowingly

entered into an unlawful agreement to serve as a scout for

marijuana traffickers. See Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d at 978.

III. CONCLUSION

Niebla failed to meet his burden of showing that the

government did not introduce sufficient independent evidence

to corroborate his confession. Because the evidence adduced

at trial satisfied the corpus delicti doctrine, the district court

correctly denied Niebla’s motion for a judgment of acquittal

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.

AFFIRMED.