IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs at Knoxville November 28, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ARTT TANNER HORNE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2015-B-871 Cheryl Blackburn, Judge

No. M2017-00752-CCA-R3-CD

_____________________________

After a bench trial, a judge found the Defendant, Artt Tanner Horne, guilty of theft of 

property valued less than $500 and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days 

of unsupervised probation. The trial court also ordered that he stay away from Walmart, 

where the theft occurred, and continue with his mental health treatment. On appeal, the 

Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After 

review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J. and J. ROSS DYER, J. joined.

Newton S. Holiday, III, (at trial) and Nicholas Tuck McGregor (on appeal), Nashville, 

Tennessee, for the appellant, Artt Tanner Horne. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrew C. Coulam, Assistant 

Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; Nathan Kristin McGregor, 

for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

This case arises from an incident at Walmart wherein the Defendant was accused 

of stealing a toaster oven. The Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant for 

theft of property valued less than $500. The Defendant waived a right to a trial by jury 

and proceeded to a bench trial. 

During the Defendant’s bench trial, the parties presented the following evidence: 

Amber Martin testified that she worked at Walmart in the loss prevention department at 

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the time of this incident. When she was working on October 9, 2014, the Defendant 

came into the store, as could be seen in the surveillance video from the store that day. 

The video was entered into evidence. Ms. Martin said that she noticed the Defendant on 

the surveillance videos because he was looking around for cameras, so she began 

following him by camera through the store. 

Ms. Martin testified that the Defendant placed a toaster oven in his cart and paid 

for it. He left the store and then came back into the store a few minutes later. The 

Defendant then placed the same make and model toaster oven in his cart, along with 

some bananas. Ms. Martin said that the video surveillance showed the Defendant getting 

into a line, then putting the bananas in a random place on a shelf, and then exiting the 

store with the toaster oven in his cart. He was not seen paying for the toaster oven. 

Ms. Martin said that she watched the Defendant on surveillance video exit the first 

set of doors and then went to the front of the store to stop him. She approached him with 

another loss prevention associate. The Defendant was cooperative and returned to the 

store with her. The Defendant gave Ms. Martin his identification, and Ms. Martin copied 

some of the Defendant’s information onto a reporting sheet. The Defendant asked her 

why she apprehended him, and she said for his unpaid toaster oven. The Defendant then 

pulled out a receipt for a toaster oven and said that he had paid for it. Ms. Martin said 

that she told the Defendant that his receipt was for the toaster oven he purchased earlier, 

and the Defendant said that he did not have to stay in the office and left with the toaster 

oven. Ms. Martin said that she was not “allowed” to stop the Defendant from leaving, 

but she had already called the police department and was hoping they would respond 

before he left. As the Defendant left, he expressed anger that Ms. Martin had made him 

“miss [his] bus.” Ms. Martin said that the video footage showed the Defendant leave the 

store and get into a car. 

Ms. Martin said that when she saw the Defendant get into his car on the 

surveillance camera, she ran out to the car. She saw two toaster ovens in the backseat of 

his car. The Defendant drove away.

Ms. Martin identified the Defendant’s receipt, which indicated a time of 3:39 p.m. 

and showed the purchase price of $49.96. The receipt indicated that it was from register 

number twelve. Ms. Martin testified that the surveillance video from the Defendant’s 

second return trip into the store was from 4:00 p.m. until 4:10 p.m. Accordingly, the 

video was for a time frame after the Defendant had purchased the first toaster oven. Ms. 

Martin said that she had previously seen other customers use this tactic to steal from 

Walmart.

During cross-examination, Ms. Martin identified a receipt with the date of the 
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incident, October 9, 2014, and time stamped 3:58:45 p.m. showing the purchase of a 

toaster oven.

During redirect examination, Ms. Martin testified that the surveillance video, 

which is synchronized with the registers, showed that the Defendant did not make a 

purchase at 3:58 p.m. At that time, he was on the video in the grocery section headed 

toward the front registers. 

Brian Hicks, a Walmart employee, identified the receipt for a toaster oven the 

Defendant said that showed he purchased a second toaster oven in the electronics 

department on October 9, 2014, at 3:58 p.m. The face of the receipt appeared to indicate 

that the purchase was made at that date and time. Mr. Hicks testified that the Walmart 

store used technology that allowed him to scan the bar code on receipts and ascertain the 

history of any particular item. The receipt produced by the defense showed that the item 

was purchased on register 67, which was located in the electronics department. The item 

was purchased at 3:58 p.m. Mr. Hicks said that he cross-referenced this receipt with 

Walmart’s computer system, and it appeared that there was no such purchase at register 

67 at that date and time.

Mr. Hicks said that, armed with this information, he asked the customer service 

department and asked them to scan the receipt’s barcode. The bar code indicated that the 

transaction had occurred on register 67 but that the item was purchased November 2, 

2014 at 2:49 p.m., almost a month after this incident. Everything on the face of the 

receipt was correct except the date and time. The receipt number also did not match the 

sequence for register 67 on October 9, 2014, but did match for November 2, 2014. Mr. 

Hicks opined that the receipt had been forged. He said he could only base this upon the 

fact that the surveillance and internal records proved the receipt was false. 

Mr. Hicks testified that the store’s records indicated that, after the Defendant’s 

initial purchase of a toaster oven on October 9, 2014, no one bought a toaster oven from 

the store that day until 6:11 p.m. 

During cross-examination, Mr. Hicks testified that when he reviewed Walmart’s 

register system, he found no anomalies or errors for October 9, 2014. During redirect 

examination, Mr. Hicks said that the toaster oven purchase on November 2, 2014, was a 

cash purchase, meaning there would be no way to confirm the date with a credit or debit 

card.

The Defendant testified that he had viewed the videotape of the Walmart

transaction. He explained that he went to the kitchen department, got the toaster oven, 

and put it in his basket. He purchased the toaster oven with his credit card. When he left 
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the store, he spoke with a friend, “Meko,” who wanted to purchase a housewarming gift 

for a friend. He told her that he was at Walmart and could pick it up for her. He noted 

that the video did not show him with a receipt in his hand when he returned to the store. 

He put another toaster oven in his basket and saw a white man standing at the electronics 

department. The man immediately checked him out, and he purchased the toaster oven.

The Defendant described his actions in going other places in the store, and he 

noted that there were four or five minutes where there is no surveillance video of him. 

The Defendant’s account then comported with the other witnesses until he was stopped 

by security. He testified that, after showing security his receipt, they apologized to him, 

returned his driver’s license, and told him that he was free to leave. The Defendant said 

that, as he was leaving, he said “[H]ey, you all might hear [from] my attorney about this.” 

He said that, when he said this, everyone in the loss prevention department looked at him 

and did not say anything. 

The Defendant said he left and went to his car. The Defendant said that he 

cooperated with the loss prevention officers and that he was “victimized” by this incident. 

The Defendant said that he paid for both toaster ovens, and he expressed his belief that 

his prosecution was based on the fact that the prosecutor had a problem with the fact that 

“some people just don’t have enough money on their credit card if they got money in 

their pocket.” The Defendant identified his bank statement that showed that he made a 

purchase at Walmart on the day in question for $54.48. He said that he made the second 

purchase in cash and that he received a receipt for both transactions. He said that he 

showed the receipt that showed he paid in cash in the electronics department to the loss 

prevention employees, who then apologized to him and returned his license. The 

Defendant said that he thought that this was the end of the incident until police officers 

came to his home at 2:30 a.m., telling him that there was a warrant for his arrest.

During cross-examination, the State asked the Defendant if the second receipt that 

he had produced was from a transaction that occurred on October 9, 2014. The 

Defendant said that he purchased the toasters on the same day and that the store must 

have given him a receipt that had the incorrect transaction number listed. The Defendant 

reminded the State that he was, in fact, the victim in this case. The Defendant agreed that 

he was out on bond on November 2, 2014, but he said he did not purchase a second 

toaster oven at Walmart on that date.

On redirect examination, the Defendant testified that he had no control over the 

receipt that he was given by the cashier, or the computer system, or the registers. He was 

just a customer there to make a purchase.

After the conclusion of the evidence and the arguments of the parties, the trial 
5

court found the Defendant guilty of theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial

court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days of unsupervised 

probation and ordered him to stay away from Walmart. It is from this judgment that the 

Defendant now appeals. 

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for theft because the evidence did not show that he intended to deprive 

Walmart of their property. He contends that he produced an “authentic receipt” that 

showed a “real purchase” and that a “real purchase proves no intent to deprive the receipt 

issuer of their property.” The Defendant asserts that Ms. Martin testified that the 

“3:58pm receipt [wa]s valid” and that she should be believed. If that receipt was valid, 

he asserts, then there is no proof that he deprived Walmart of the toaster oven. He further 

asserts that the evidence is insufficient because the State did not offer video surveillance 

footage from the electronics cash register where the “3:58pm” transaction occurred. 

Finally, he asserts that the State did not prove that the Walmart cameras were in sync 

with the cash registers on the day in question. The State counters that it offered proof 

that the “3:58pm” receipt was forged and invalid. The State further counters that the 

Defendant’s other two contentions go to the weight of the evidence not to whether the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We agree with the State. 

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s standard 

of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

State, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Tenn. R. 

App. P. 13(e); State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Reid, 

91 S.W.3d 247, 276 (Tenn. 2002)). This standard applies to findings of guilt based upon 

direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and 

circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1999) (citing State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). In the 

absence of direct evidence, a criminal offense may be established exclusively by 

circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 1973). “The jury 

decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and ‘[t]he inferences to be 

drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with 

guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury.’” State v. 

Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 

(Tenn. 1958)). “The standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence] ‘is the same 

whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. 

Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 

275 (Tenn. 2009)).
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In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or 

reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1990). Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact 

from the evidence. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Liakas v. 

State, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956)). “Questions concerning the credibility of 

witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues 

raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 

659 (Tenn. 1997). “A guilty verdict by [the trier of fact] . . . accredits the testimony of 

the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” 

State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated 

the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge 

and the jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe 

their demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be 

given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 

523, 527 (Tenn. 1963)). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the “‘strongest 

legitimate view of the evidence’” contained in the record, as well as “‘all reasonable and 

legitimate inferences’” that may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d at 

775 (quoting State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of 

guilt against a defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption 

of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence 

was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 

557-58 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted).

A person commits theft of property if that person: (1) “knowingly obtains or 

exercises control over the property,” (2) “with intent to deprive the owner” of the 

property, and (3) “without the owner’s effective consent.” T.C.A. § 39-14-103 (2014). 

In addition to these three elements, the fact-finder must also determine the classification 

of the theft, based on the value of the property stolen. At the time of this offense, theft of 

property valued under $500 was a Class A misdemeanor. T.C.A. 39-14-105(a)(1). 

In the case under submission, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the State, proved that the Defendant entered Walmart and looked around suspiciously, 

drawing Ms. Martin’s attention. She followed the Defendant through the store by 
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camera, watched him legally purchase a toaster oven, and then watched him exit the 

store. She then saw the Defendant re-enter the store, again looking around suspiciously, 

so she again followed him by camera. Ms. Martin watched him get another toaster oven 

and place it in his basket. She saw him on camera, the footage of which was entered at 

trial, walking toward the front of the store at 3:58 p.m. The Defendant added bananas to 

his basket, got into a checkout line, and then removed the bananas from his cart and 

proceeded to exit the store. Ms. Martin stopped the Defendant, who produced the receipt 

from the first transaction as proof that he had purchased the subsequent toaster oven. 

Before trial, the Defendant produced a receipt for a second toaster oven, dated at 

3:58 p.m. on the same day as the purchase of the first toaster oven, October 9, 2014. 

Walmart’s loss prevention witness testified that this receipt appeared to be forged in that 

the date and the time listed on the receipt did not correspond with the date and time of the 

transaction number. The transaction number indicated that the toaster oven was not 

purchased until November. Further, he testified that Walmart’s records indicated that no 

one purchased a toaster oven from the cash register in the electronics department on 

October 9, 2014, around the time the Defendant was in the store.

The trial court did not err when it determined that the evidence proved that the 

Defendant did not purchase the second toaster oven on October 9, 2014. Therefore, it is 

sufficient to prove that he knowingly, with intent to deprive Walmart, obtained or 

exercised control over Walmart’s property without Walmart’s effective consent. He is 

not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

_________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE