NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, 

Appellee,

v.

ALEXANDER PAUL CELAYA, 

Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0849 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2013-415890-001 

The Honorable Pamela Hearn Svoboda, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

DeBrigida Law Offices, PLLC, Glendale 

By Ronald M. DeBrigida, Jr. 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. CELAYA 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Donn Kessler joined. 

S W A N N, Judge: 

¶1 Alexander Paul Celaya (“Defendant”) appeals his convictions 

for five counts of molestation of a child. Defendant contends the court erred 

by denying his motion to sever Counts 1 and 2 from Counts 3 through 13. 

He also contends that the court erred by denying his motions for judgments 

of acquittal. Because Defendant waived severance at trial and the state 

presented substantial evidence of all elements of the molestation charges, 

we affirm the convictions. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In July 2012, K.C., Defendant’s daughter, spent several weeks 

with him in Arizona before returning to her mother in New Mexico. 

Defendant and the mother had been divorced since 2010 and shared time 

with K.C. In November 2012, K.C.’s mother found her in her play tent 

without her pants or undergarments with a stuffed animal between her 

legs. Her mother asked what she was doing, and K.C. began to cry and said 

that it was what her “Daddy” does. Her mother contacted the police in 

New Mexico. An investigator in New Mexico interviewed K.C., and a 

specially trained nurse conducted a physical exam. K.C. stated that 

Defendant had taken her to his room and touched his hand and penis to her 

vaginal area. The physical exam revealed nothing abnormal. 

¶3 When Defendant’s uncle and aunt who lived in Arizona 

learned about K.C.’s statements, they asked their daughter, J.H., if 

Defendant had ever touched her inappropriately. She told her mother that 

Defendant had done so when she was around six years old, on more than 

one occasion. J.H.’s father called the police. An investigator interviewed 

J.H. but did not request a physical examination because of the length of time 

since the incidents. J.H. stated that Defendant took her upstairs into 

another room, removed their pants, and made her touch her vaginal area 

and his penis. 

¶4 Several family members confronted Defendant to try to get a 

confession. According to J.H.’s father, Defendant initially denied the 
STATE v. CELAYA 

Decision of the Court 

3

accusations, but then said that he “[didn’t] recall” the incidents, “[didn’t] 

think that could have happened,” and “didn’t remember [molesting the 

girls].” 

¶5 For victim K.C., Defendant was indicted on one count of 

molestation of a child, a class 2 felony and a dangerous crime against 

children, and one count of public sexual indecency to a minor, a class 5 

felony. For victim J.H., he was indicted on seven counts of kidnapping, 

class 2 felonies, and four counts of molestation of a child, class 2 felonies 

and dangerous crimes against children. Defendant moved to have Counts 

1 and 2 for K.C. severed from Counts 3 through 13 for J.H., contending 

severance was necessary for a fair trial. The court denied the motion. The 

parties later stipulated to the dismissal of five kidnapping counts. 

¶6 At trial, both victims testified, and the state played a portion 

of J.H.’s interview with the investigator. At the close of the state’s evidence, 

the state agreed that it did not provide evidence to support Count 2 (public 

sexual indecency), and the court granted a judgment of acquittal on that 

count. Defendant argued that the court should grant judgments of acquittal 

for the remaining counts. He asserted that K.C. did not identify him as the 

perpetrator, only referring to the perpetrator as “Dad,” which could have 

been Defendant or her stepfather, and J.H. did not remember the 

molestation by the time the case went to trial. The court denied the motion 

on the remaining counts. 

¶7 The jury found Defendant not guilty of both kidnapping 

charges but found him guilty of the five molestation charges. The court 

entered judgment on the verdicts and sentenced Defendant accordingly. 

¶8 Defendant appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

I. DEFENDANT WAIVED SEVERANCE BY FAILING TO RENEW 

HIS MOTION TO SEVER. 

¶9 Defendant contends the court erred by denying his motions 

to sever Counts 1 and 2 for victim K.C. from Counts 3 through 13 for victim 

J.H. A defendant is entitled to severance as of right when the offenses are 

“joined only by virtue of Rule 13.3(a)(1),[1]

 unless evidence of the other 

 

1 According to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3(a)(1), two or more offenses may 

be joined if they “[a]re of the same or similar character.” The counts were 

joined in this case because of the same or similar character. 
STATE v. CELAYA 

Decision of the Court 

4

offense or offenses would be admissible under applicable rules of evidence 

if the offenses were tried separately.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.4(b). The 

defendant must make the motion to sever at least 20 days before trial or at 

the omnibus hearing, and if the court denies the motion, the defendant must 

renew it during trial or before the close of evidence. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

13.4(c). The defendant waives severance if the motion is not timely and 

renewed at trial. Id.

¶10 Defendant did timely make his initial motion for severance. 

He did not, however, renew the motion “during trial or at the close of 

evidence.” He therefore waived the issue, and we have no grounds upon 

which to review the court’s decision. 

II. THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENTS OF ACQUITTAL ON THE MOLESTATION 

COUNTS. 

¶11 Defendant also contends that the court erred by denying his 

Rule 20 motion for judgments of acquittal on the remaining counts at trial 

as the state presented no physical evidence of molestation and the victims’ 

testimony was uncorroborated. 

¶12 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a) requires the court to enter a judgment 

of acquittal “if there is no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.” 

Substantial evidence is “such proof that reasonable persons could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” State v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 406, ¶ 11 (App. 2015) 

(citation omitted). We examine whether “after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State 

v. Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, 330-31, ¶ 24 (App. 2013) (citation omitted). 

We review a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. State v. 

Bon, 236 Ariz. 249, 251, ¶ 5 (App. 2014). 

¶13 Because the court granted the Rule 20 motion for Count 2 on 

public sexual indecency to a minor and the jury acquitted Defendant of 

kidnapping, we must only consider the molestation charges. The state was 

required to prove that Defendant “intentionally or knowingly engag[ed] in 

or caus[ed] a person to engage in sexual contact . . . with a child who is 

under fifteen years of age” for each of the charges of molestation. A.R.S. § 

13-1410(A). The statutory definition of “sexual contact” is “any direct or 

indirect touching, fondling or manipulating of any part of the genitals . . . 

by any part of the body . . . or causing a person to engage in such contact.” 

A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(3). 
STATE v. CELAYA 

Decision of the Court 

5

¶14 The testimony at trial provided substantial evidence for each 

element of the molestation counts. K.C. testified that when she was four 

years old Defendant had touched her vaginal area with both his hand and 

his penis, which qualifies as sexual contact. She identified the person who 

touched her inappropriately as “Daddy,” a name she used only for her 

biological father. While there was some confusion about the exact date of 

the act, the court concluded it occurred within the time frame in the 

indictment. J.H. also testified that, when she was around six years old, 

Defendant on more than one occasion touched her vaginal area and made 

her touch his penis, and she identified Defendant in court. Defendant 

asserts that no physical evidence supports the convictions, only testimony 

from the victims, but “[p]hysical evidence is not required to sustain a 

conviction where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 149, ¶ 42 (2002). 

Neither is it required to defeat a Rule 20 motion. 

¶15 Defendant also argues that because the victims’ testimony 

was uncorroborated, he was entitled to judgments of acquittal. The 

argument is both legally and factually unfounded. See State v. Jerousek, 121 

Ariz. 420, 427 (1979) (“In child molestation cases, the defendant can be 

convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.”). In addition to 

the victims’ testimony, the court also heard testimony from K.C.’s mother, 

J.H.’s father, the investigating officer, J.H.’s forensic interviewer and K.C.’s

examining nurse, which supported the victims’ testimony. 

CONCLUSION 

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.