[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio4809.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-4809 

CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION, D.B.A. CLEVELAND CLINIC, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS, v. BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND,

APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 

Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4809.] 

Zoning—Administrative appeals—R.C. 2506.04—Standard of review for court of 

appeals in reviewing decision of common pleas court—Appellate court’s 

must affirm unless it finds, as matter of law, that common pleas court 

decision is unsupported by substantial, reliable, and probative record on 

whole record.

(No. 2013-0654—Submitted February 25, 2014—Decided November 5, 2014.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 98115, 2012-Ohio-6008. 

_____________________ 

 
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 O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} This administrative appeal arises from a decision by appellee, the 

Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Cleveland (“BZA”), which denied a 

permit to appellants, Cleveland Clinic Foundation (“the Clinic”) and Fairview 

Hospital (“the Hospital”), to build a helipad on the roof of a new two-story 

addition on the Hospital. 

{¶ 2} We decide a narrow issue: the proper standard of review for courts 

to apply in appeals, pursuant to R.C. 2506.04, from decisions of zoning 

authorities that restrict the use of property. Because we conclude that the Eighth 

District Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard of review in reversing the 

decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, we reverse the 

appellate court’s judgment. And because we conclude that the trial court properly 

ruled in favor of the appellants, we reinstate its judgment. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

{¶ 3} Construction of the Hospital, which is owned by the Clinic, in its 

current location began in 1952. The Hospital sits on two parcels of land located at 

18101 Lorain Avenue in Cleveland (“the City”). 

{¶ 4} In March 1964, the City rezoned both of the Hospital’s parcels of 

land. After rezoning, both parcels were zoned as a Local Retail Business District, 

which is “a business district in which such uses are permitted as are normally 

required for the daily local retail business needs of the residents of the locality 

only.” Cleveland Code of Ordinances (“C.C.O.”) 343.01(a). The Hospital has 

remained in a Local Retail Business District zone since 1964, but many variances 

subsequently were granted to the Hospital. 

{¶ 5} Today, the Hospital has a Level III Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, 

serving pediatric patients at the highest risk. It also has a Level II Trauma Center 

and provides critical care and intervention to cardiac and stroke patients. 
January Term, 2014 

3

{¶ 6} In October 2010, the Clinic filed an application with the City’s 

Department of Building and Housing seeking approval of three construction 

projects for the Hospital: (1) construction of a 153,470-square-foot, two-story 

addition to the Hospital, (2) renovation of a parking lot, and (3) construction of a 

helipad on the roof of the two-story addition. Central to this appeal is the request 

for approval to construct a helipad. 

{¶ 7} On November 10, 2010, the City denied the application in its 

entirety due to “non-conformance.” In its notice rejecting the application for the 

heliport, the City cited C.C.O. 343.01(b)(8), which provides that “accessory 

uses”1

 are allowed “only to the extent necessary normally accessory to the limited 

types of neighborhood service use permitted under this division.” Thus, the City 

rejected the appellants’ assertions that a helipad was a permitted use for property 

within a Local Retail Business District. 

{¶ 8} The appellants appealed to the BZA. During the public hearing by 

the BZA, it heard evidence from both opponents and proponents of the Hospital’s 

requests. 

{¶ 9} The opponents’ arguments included concerns about traffic, 

parking, and noise problems in their neighborhood, which have increased as the 

Hospital has grown over the years. Other concerns focused on the safety of 

helicopters flying onto the low roof of the proposed new building. Notably, 

however, there was no dispute that the use of helipads by hospitals is common 

and that helipads foster better patient outcomes. To the contrary, the testimony 

established that helipads at medical facilities have not only become nearly 

ubiquitous but are also vital to critical-care patients. 

{¶ 10} The testimony at the hearing suggested that most hospitals in Ohio 

and other states have helipads. More importantly, the unrebutted evidence at the 

 

1

 An “accessory use or building” is “a subordinate use or building customarily incident to and 

located on the same lot with the main use or building.” C.C.O. 325.02. 
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4

hearing established that almost all of the hospitals in the Cleveland metropolitan 

area have helipads. In fact, of the seven hospitals located in Cleveland, only 

Fairview does not have one. And of the 14 hospitals in the Cleveland 

metropolitan area, only two, including Fairview, have no helipad. Put another 

way, nearly 88 percent of hospitals in and around Cleveland have helipads. 

{¶ 11} The need for a hospital-based helipad at Fairview was also made 

clear through the testimony at the hearing. 

{¶ 12} Jan Murphy, the president of the Hospital, testified that the purpose 

of using a helicopter to transport patients “is really to save lives,” particularly for 

pediatric and adult patients with immediately life-threatening conditions. As 

Murphy explained, there is a very limited “golden hour” in which “the lives of the 

majority of critically injured or critically ill patients can be saved,” and a helipad 

helps the Hospital significantly reduce patient transport time: 

[I]f we look at ground transport from Fairview Hospital to 

Cleveland Clinic Main Campus * * *, by ground it’s 22 minutes 

and this is from our trauma statistics, and that [by] a helicopter [it] 

would be five minutes * * *, Fairview to Rainbow Babies and 

Children’s by ground is 24 minutes and then by helicopter is five 

minutes, and then the last is Medina to Fairview * * *, and ground 

from Medina to Fairview is 32 minutes and about eight minutes in 

a helicopter. So, that just gives us calculations of time frames for 

travel. 

The testimony thus established a significant reduction in transport time for 

critically ill patients when a helicopter is used. 

{¶ 13} After the hearing, the BZA determined that the parking-lot 

renovation was a permitted use and granted a variance permitting the construction 
January Term, 2014 

5

of the two-story addition. But the BZA denied a permit to construct the helipad 

atop the addition. Citing C.C.O. 343.01(b)(8), the BZA determined that a helipad 

is not “an accessory use authorized as of right” because “those uses that the 

Zoning Code characterizes as retail businesses for local or neighborhood needs 

would not involve a heliport as normally required for the daily local retail 

business needs of the residents of the locality.” 

{¶ 14} Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506, appellants appealed the BZA’s 

denial of the helipad to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. The court 

reversed, relying on C.C.O. 343.01(b)(1). That section provides that with limited 

exceptions, all uses permitted in the Multi-Family District are also permitted in 

the Local Retail Business District. The common pleas court looked at C.C.O. 

325.721, 325.02, and 325.721 and concluded that a helipad is “customarily 

incident to” a hospital and therefore qualifies as an “accessory use.” The court 

reasoned that “hospitals and their accessory uses are expressly permitted in the 

City’s Multi-Family District, and are therefore permissible in the City’s areas that 

are zoned ‘Local Retail Business District.’ ” The common pleas court concluded 

that because the “record before this [court]” established that a helipad qualified as 

an “accessory use” in a Multi-Family District, it was “therefore permissible in the 

instant case.” 

{¶ 15} The BZA appealed the common pleas court’s decision to the 

Eighth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed. 

{¶ 16} The appellate court’s initial, unanimous opinion held that the 

common pleas court abused its discretion, “because the zoning ordinance was 

ambiguous and the trial court was required to defer to the BZA’s reasonable 

interpretation of the ordinance.” Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of 

Zoning Appeals, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98115, 2012-Ohio-4602, ¶ 6. It 

explained: 
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The trial court determined that there was no statutory 

ambiguity; it could resolve the conflict between the parties through 

a “plain reading of the Code itself, and [by] following the exact 

language of the Code.” J.E. at 5. Relying on C.C.O. 343.01(b)(1), 

the trial court determined that because a hospital is a permitted use 

in a Multi-Family District, then it is also a permitted use in a Local 

Retail Business District. The court then determined (and the Clinic 

agrees) that a helipad is “customarily incident to” a hospital, and 

that, therefore, a helipad is a permitted accessory use in a Local 

Retail Business District. 

* * * 

In contrast, the BZA relied on C.C.O. 343.01(b)(8) and 

upheld the Zoning Administrator’s determination that a helipad is 

prohibited in a Local Retail Business District. C.C.O. 343.01(b)(2) 

sets forth various uses that qualify as retail business for local or 

neighborhood needs in a Local Retail Business District. These uses 

include a variety of retail establishments, eating establishments, 

service establishments, business offices, automotive services, 

parking garages, charitable institutions, and signs. Accessory uses 

are also permitted under C.C.O. 343.01(b)(8), but “only to the 

extent necessary normally accessory to the limited types of 

neighborhood service use permitted under this division.” C.C.O. 

343.01(b)(8). 

Relying on C.C.O. 343(b)(8).01, the BZA found that under 

the zoning statute, a helipad was not a permissible accessory in a 

Local Retail Business District. Specifically, the BZA determined 

that the evidence set forth that a helipad was not “normally 

required for the daily local retail business needs of the resident 
January Term, 2014 

7

locality only,” and so a helipad was not “an accessory use as of 

right in a Local Retail Business District.” BZA Resolution. 

* * * 

These two reasonable and, yet, different statutory positions 

taken by the BZA and the trial court make clear that the ordinance 

is susceptible to more than one interpretation and is, therefore, 

ambiguous. In fact, the trial court’s journal entry and opinion 

highlights the ambiguity. 

Id. at ¶ 15-18. 

{¶ 17} On reconsideration, the appellate court attempted to clarify its 

analysis. It adhered to its previous judgment, but the court was now divided. It 

recognized that the law requires any ambiguity in a zoning ordinance to be 

construed in favor of the property owner, but unlike in the earlier opinion, the 

court declined to address the issue of ambiguity, finding instead that the issue is 

which provision of the C.C.O. applies. “When the BZA reasonably relies on a 

code provision, its determination should hold so long as its decision is not 

unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by 

the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole 

record.” Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98115, 2012-Ohio-6008, ¶ 22. The court held that the BZA had 

“reasonably relied on C.C.O. 343.01(b)(8) and the evidence in the record” in 

concluding that a helipad was not an accessory use as of right, and the trial court 

abused its discretion “in determining that the administrative order was not 

supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” It further held that 

courts must give “due deference” to an agency that has accumulated special 

expertise. 
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{¶ 18} One judge, however, dissented. She asserted that given the 

ambiguity in C.C.O. 343.01(b)(8), the trial court properly reversed the BZA 

resolution because ambiguous zoning provisions must be construed in favor of the 

property owner. Id. at ¶ 29 (Boyle, P.J., dissenting). 

{¶ 19} The appellants again sought reconsideration and en banc review 

and also asked the court of appeals to certify its decision as in conflict with those 

of other courts of appeals. Those motions were denied. 

{¶ 20} We granted the appellants’ request for discretionary review, 136 

Ohio St.3d 1449, 2013-Ohio-3210, 991 N.E.2d 256, and now reverse. 

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review 

{¶ 21} Our analysis begins with an examination of the proper standard of 

review to be used by the courts in considering appeals from the decisions of local 

zoning boards. 

{¶ 22} R.C. Chapter 2506 governs appeals to the courts of common pleas 

from final orders of administrative officers and agencies of political subdivisions, 

including municipal boards of zoning appeals. R.C. 2506.04 governs the standard 

of review the trial court must apply in such an appeal. It provides that “the court 

may find that the order, adjudication, or decision is unconstitutional, illegal, 

arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of 

substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record.” The statute 

further provides that the court’s judgment may be appealed by any party to the 

court of appeals “on questions of law.” 

{¶ 23} This court has explained the standard of review in the common 

pleas court in appeals from zoning boards and contrasted it with the very different 

standard to be applied by the court of appeals: 

 
January Term, 2014 

9

The scope of review by the trial court is set forth in R.C. 2506.04, 

which requires the court to examine the “substantial, reliable and 

probative evidence on the whole record.” This court has noted in 

Cincinnati Bell v. Glendale (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 368, 370, 328 

N.E.2d 808, that, “ * * * [a]lthough a hearing before the Court of 

Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 is not de novo, it often in 

fact resembles a de novo proceeding. R.C. 2506.03 specifically 

provides that an appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506.01, ‘shall proceed as 

in the trial of a civil action,’ and makes liberal provision for the 

introduction of new or additional evidence.” 

A court of common pleas should not substitute its judgment 

for that of an administrative board, such as the board of zoning 

appeals, unless the court finds that there is not a preponderance of 

reliable, probative and substantial evidence to support the board’s 

decision. This court pointed out in Dudukovich v. Housing 

Authority (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 202, 207, 389 N.E.2d 1113, “[t]he 

key term is ‘preponderance.’ ” The court went on further to explore 

the scope of review by the appellate courts and found, “[i]n 

determining whether the standard of review prescribed by R.C. 

2506.04 was correctly applied by the Court of Common Pleas, both 

this court [the Supreme Court] and the Court of Appeals have a 

limited function.” Id. In an R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative 

appeal of a decision of the board of zoning appeals to the common 

pleas court, the court, pursuant to R.C. 2506.04, may reverse the 

board if it finds that the board's decision is not supported by a 

preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence. An 

appeal to the court of appeals, pursuant to R.C. 2506.04, is more 

limited in scope and requires that court to affirm the common 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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pleas court, unless the court of appeals finds, as a matter of law, 

that the decision of the common pleas court is not supported by a 

preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence. 

(Emphasis added and brackets sic.) Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 465 

N.E.2d 848 (1984). 

{¶ 24} Thus, R.C. Chapter 2506 confers on the common pleas courts the 

power to examine the whole record, make factual and legal determinations, and 

reverse the board’s decision if it is not supported by a preponderance of 

substantial, reliable, and probative evidence. Dudukovich at 207. Although a 

hearing before a common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 is not a de novo 

review, “it often in fact resembles a de novo proceeding.” Cincinnati Bell, 42 

Ohio St.3d at 370, 328 N.E.2d 808. 

{¶ 25} By contrast, the standard of review for an appellate court 

reviewing a judgment of a common pleas court in this type of appeal is narrower 

and more deferential to the lower court’s decision. Kisil at 34. In fact, we have 

stressed that the “standard of review to be applied by the courts of appeals in an 

R.C. 2506.04 appeal is ‘more limited in scope.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Henley v. 

Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147, 735 N.E.2d 433 

(2000), quoting Kisil at 34. The courts of appeals may review the judgments of 

the common pleas courts only on questions of law; they do not have the same 

power to weigh the evidence. Id. “[T]he application of [a statute] to the facts is a 

‘question of law’—[a]n issue to be decided by the judge, concerning the 

application or interpretation of the law.’ Black’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 

1260.” Id. at 148. Accord Lang v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 134 Ohio 

St.3d 296, 2012-Ohio-5366, 982 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 12 (“A question of statutory 

construction presents an issue of law that we determine de novo on appeal”). 

 
January Term, 2014 

11

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals 

{¶ 26} We now turn to an examination of the court of appeals decision in 

light of the principles outlined above. We must determine whether the appellate 

court applied the correct standard in reversing the judgment of the common pleas 

court. Upon review, we hold that it did not. 

{¶ 27} The court of appeals applied the incorrect standard of review when 

it reversed the trial court’s decision because “[t]he BZA reasonably interpreted 

the ordinance, and its decision was not unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, 

capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, 

reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record.” 2012-Ohio-6008, ¶ 13. As 

we have emphasized, R.C. 2506.04 requires the court of appeals to affirm unless 

the court of appeals finds, as a matter of law, that the decision of the common 

pleas court is not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence. The appellate court in this case thus reviewed the wrong 

decision. It found that the BZA’s resolution was properly supported by the 

requisite quantum of evidence. It should have applied that standard to the 

decision of the common pleas court. 

{¶ 28} The appellate court did devote some of its discussion to a review of 

the trial court’s decision, but limited its remarks to faulting that court for failing to 

explain its rationale and failing to identify supporting evidence. Id. at ¶ 20. While 

these may or may not be flaws in the trial court’s opinion, they are not fatal. The 

appellate court had a duty to affirm unless it found, as a matter of law, that the 

trial court’s decision was unsupported by the required evidence. The court of 

appeals made no such finding in this case. Instead, it found that the decision of 

the BZA “was not unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or 

unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence 

on the whole record.” Id. at ¶ 13. 
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{¶ 29} We take further note of the court of appeals’ comment that the 

common pleas court had a duty to defer to the decision of the BZA. Not so. A 

court owes no duty of deference to an administrative interpretation unless it finds 

the ordinance ambiguous. “A court, as well as an agency, must give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of [the legislature].” Lang, 134 Ohio St.3d 296, 

2012-Ohio-5366, 982 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 12. The common pleas court in this case did 

not find that the ordinances in question were ambiguous. In fact, it stated that 

from a “plain reading of the Code,” it is “clear” that a helipad is a permitted 

accessory use. Therefore, it cannot be faulted for according no deference to the 

BZA. 

{¶ 30} In sum, the standard of review for courts of appeals in 

administrative appeals is designed to strongly favor affirmance. It permits 

reversal only when the common pleas court errs in its application or interpretation 

of the law or its decision is unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence as a 

matter of law. The court of appeals made no such finding in this case. It 

therefore erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment. 

Application of the Proper Standard of Review 

{¶ 31} Having set forth the proper standards of review, we proceed with 

the analysis. 

{¶ 32} The common pleas court found that “hospitals and their accessory 

uses are expressly permitted in the City’s Multi-Family District, and are therefore 

permissible in the City’s areas that are zoned ‘Local Retail Business District.’ ” 

The parties do not dispute that conclusion. Rather, they dispute whether a helipad 

is an accessory use. 

{¶ 33} In order to determine the accessory uses that are permitted in a 

Multi-Family District, we will focus primarily on the language of C.C.O. 325.02 

and 325.721 (defining “accessory use”), 337.08 (listing the types of buildings 

permissible in a Multi-Family District), and 343.01(b) (listing permitted buildings 
January Term, 2014 

13

and uses in a Local Retail Business District). All have significance here. In our 

analysis of these ordinances, we must bear in mind two principles. 

{¶ 34} The first of these principles states that zoning ordinances are to be 

construed in favor of the property owner because they are in derogation of the 

common law and deprive the property owner of uses to which the owner would 

otherwise be entitled. Univ. Circle, Inc. v. Cleveland, 56 Ohio St.2d 180, 184, 383 

N.E.2d 139 (1978). Thus, we have long held that restrictions imposed on the use 

of private property via ordinance, resolution, or statute must be strictly construed, 

and the scope of the restrictions cannot be extended to include limitations not 

clearly prescribed. See Saunders v. Clark Cty. Zoning Dept., 66 Ohio St.2d 259, 

261, 421 N.E.2d 152 (1981); see also State ex. rel. Moore Oil Co. v. Dauben, 99 

Ohio St. 406, 124 N.E. 232 (1919). In other words, we do not permit zoning 

“limitations by implication.” Henley, 90 Ohio St.3d at 152, 735 N.E.2d 433. 

{¶ 35} Second, we have long held that when applying a zoning provision, 

a court must not view the provision in isolation; rather, its “meaning should be 

derived from a reading of the provision taken in the context of the entire 

ordinance.” Id. 

{¶ 36} Mindful of those principles, we now consider the relevant 

provisions of the C.C.O. in this case. 

{¶ 37} C.C.O. 325.02 defines “accessory use or building” to mean “a 

subordinate use or building customarily incident to and located on the same lot 

with the main use or building.” C.C.O. 325.721 defines “use, accessory” as “[a] 

subordinate land use located on the same lot or parcel as a Principal Use * * * and 

serving a purpose customarily incidental to that of the Principal Use.” The 

proposed helipad at the hospital fits these definitions because the helipad will be 

built on the same lot or parcel, and a helipad is customarily incidental to the 

principal use of the property, a hospital. 
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{¶ 38} C.C.O. 337.08 provides that no building shall be permitted in a 

Multi-Family District for any use other than the uses listed therein. Division 

(e)(5) expressly includes hospitals among the buildings permitted in a MultiFamily District (and therefore in a Local Retail Business District, where the 

Hospital is located, see C.C.O. 343.01(b)(1)). And C.C.O. 337.23(a)(9) 

specifically permits within a Multi-Family District “[a]ny other accessory use 

customarily incident to a use authorized in a Residence District except that no use 

prohibited in a Local Retail Business District shall be permitted as an accessory 

use.” 

{¶ 39} C.C.O. 343.01 governs Local Retail Business Districts. As we 

have noted, C.C.O. 343.01(b)(1) establishes that except where otherwise 

provided, all uses permitted in a Multi-Family District are permitted in a Local 

Retail Business District. The parties do not cite, and we are unable to find, any 

provision in Cleveland’s zoning code that expressly forbids helipads in a Local 

Retail Business District or in a Multi-Family District. The absence of any 

prohibition on helipads was key to the trial court’s decision, which found no 

ambiguity in the ordinance.2

{¶ 40} Notwithstanding the absence of a prohibition on helipads, the BZA 

asserts that because C.C.O. 343.01(b)(8) provides that accessory uses are allowed 

“only to the extent necessary normally accessory to the limited types of 

neighborhood service use permitted under this division,” a helipad is forbidden 

because helipads are not “normally required for the daily local retail business 

needs of the residents of the locality only.” But that argument seems designed to 

 

2

 The record suggests that at least one city councilperson acknowledged that although other cities 

have enacted zoning provisions governing helipads, Cleveland has not. Cleveland, of course, is 

free to do so, within constitutional limits. 
January Term, 2014 

15

inject ambiguity into a code that is not ambiguous.3 Rather than focusing solely 

on one isolated provision in the code, the BZA was required to look to the code as 

a whole. Univ. Circle, 56 Ohio St.2d at 184, 383 N.E.2d 139. 

{¶ 41} The BZA’s argument ignores that under the code as a whole, a 

hospital is expressly permitted within a Multi-Family District, and therefore a 

hospital is also permitted in a Local Retail Business District. The salient question, 

then, is not whether any other business in the Local Retail Business District 

normally requires a helipad, but rather, whether a hospital normally requires a 

helipad. If a helipad is customarily incident to a hospital, it is a permitted use 

under the code. 

{¶ 42} Given the record before us, we have little trouble concluding that 

the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence supports the 

trial court’s conclusion that helipads are customarily incident to hospitals, at least 

in Cleveland. The record establishes that every other hospital in Cleveland has a 

helipad and that nearly 88 percent of hospitals in the Cleveland metropolitan area 

have helipads. There was no rebuttal to the assertion at the hearing that most 

hospitals in Ohio and around the country have helipads. In the absence of any 

evidence to the contrary, the only conclusion to be drawn from the record is that 

helipads are customarily incident to hospitals. Therefore, under the zoning 

provisions at issue here, the trial court properly found that the Hospital was 

entitled to construct the helipad and the appellate court erred in reversing that 

determination. 

 

 

3

 Even if we were to hold that any of these ordinances are ambiguous, however, the result would 

be the same. An ambiguous zoning provision must be construed in favor of the property owner. 

Univ. Circle, Inc. v. Cleveland, 56 Ohio St.2d 180, 184, 383 N.E.2d 139 (1978). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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CONCLUSION

{¶ 43} Under the current version of the Cleveland zoning ordinances, a 

helipad is a permitted accessory use for a hospital in a Local Retail Business 

District. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 

this case to the common pleas court to reinstate its decision in favor of the 

appellants. 

Judgment reversed, 

and cause remanded. 

PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and BELFANCE, JJ., 

concur. 

EVE BELFANCE, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for O’NEILL, J. 

_____________________ 

 Tucker Ellis L.L.P., Irene C. Keyse-Walker, and Benjamin C. Sassé; and 

Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, L.L.C., Sheldon Berns, Timothy J. Duff, and Gary 

F. Werner, for appellants. 

 City of Cleveland Law Department, Barbara A. Langhenry, Director of 

Law, and Carolyn M. Downey, Assistant Director of Law, for appellee. 

_____________________