alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 24

SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

The undersigned constitutes and appoints J. Brandon
Black and Paul Grinberg, and each of them, his true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent with full power of substitution and re-substitution, for him and in his name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to sign the Annual Report on Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010, for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission by Encore Capital Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation, together with any and all amendments to such Form 10-K, and to file the same with
all exhibits thereto, and all documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, granting to such attorneys-in-fact and agents, and each of them, full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing
requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully and to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorneys-in-fact and agents, or each of them, may lawfully do or
cause to be done by virtue hereof.



|                 |  |                                                 
|---------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------
|                 | 
|February 8, 2010 |  | /S/    GEORGE
LUND George Lund                  
|                 | 
|February 9, 2010 |  | /S/    TIMOTHY J.
HANFORD Timothy J. Hanford    
|                 | 
|February 8, 2010 |  | /S/    RICHARD A.
MANDELL Richard A. Mandell    
|                 | 
|February 8, 2010 |  | /S/    WILLEM
MESDAG Willem Mesdag              
|                 | 
|February 8, 2010 |  | /S/    JOHN J.
OROS John J. Oros                
|                 | 
|February 8, 2010 |  | /S/    J. CHRISTOPHER
TEETS J. Christopher Teets
|                 | 
|February 8, 2010 |  | /S/    H RONALD
WEISSMAN H Ronald Weissman      
|                 | 
|February 8, 2010 |  | /S/    WARREN
WILCOX Warren Wilcox
Dale C. DANIELS, Jr., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D18-1471

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 20, 2018

Dale C. Daniels, Jr., pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

The petition for belated appeal is denied. *See* Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(A).

Wolf, Jay, and Winsor, JJ., concur.
Anthony RAYOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-3169

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 3, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
HARBOR FREIGHT TOOLS, INC. and Safety National Casualty Corp./Corvel, Appellants, v. Patricia WHITEHEAD, Appellee.

No. 1D17-3194

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 18, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 14, 2018

Daniel M. Schwarz and Gina M. Jacobs of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Plantation, for Appellants.

Daniel J. Glary, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

A judge of compensation claims awarded workers' compensation benefits based on the so-called "120-day rule," which generally precludes carriers from denying compensability if they begin paying benefits and do not challenge compensability within 120 days. *See* § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2015) ; *see also**Sierra v. Metropolitan Protective Servs.,*188 So.3d 863, 866-67 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). But "[a] claimant's 'defense' of waiver to an [employer's] ability to deny compensability of an accident or specific injury/condition pursuant to the '120-Day Rule' is an affirmative pleading which must be timely raised and specifically plead[ed]." *Teco Energy, Inc. v. Williams* , 234 So.3d 816, 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). Here the claimant did not specifically plead application of the 120-day rule. The judge of compensation claims therefore erred in awarding benefits based on the rule.

REVERSED .

Lewis, Kelsey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kevin Rhodes, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 881]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (John Cataldo, J.), rendered April 25, 2001, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of six years to life, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant’s application made pursuant to *Batson v Kentucky*(476 US 79 [1986]). After the prosecution explained its reasons for the challenges at issue, defendant failed to preserve his current arguments concerning the alleged pretextuality of these explanations *(see People v Smocum,*99 NY2d 418, 423 [2003]; *People v Allen,*86 NY2d 101, 111 [1995]), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review defendant’s claims, we would find that the record supports the court’s finding that the nondiscriminatory reasons provided by the prosecutor for the challenges in question were not pretextual. This finding is entitled to great deference *(see People v Hernandez,*75 NY2d 350 [1990], *affd*500 US *320352 [1991]). The prosecutor raised legitimate concerns about the attentiveness or level of engagement of these panelists. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Williams and Friedman, JJ.
COX, Circuit Judge, specially concurring: I join Judge Tjoflat’s opinion for th e court except for the two consecutive paragraphs that conclude the acceptance of checks is an exte nsion of credit. The first of these paragraphs begins: “Whenever a seller,” etc. I concur in the judgment.
#### Kelvin G. CHIPP, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Stephanie HOLLEMBAEK, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6366

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 31, 2017

Decided: September 8, 2017

*187Kelvin G. Chipp, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Russell Pender, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges..

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Kelvin G. Chipp, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pau-peris, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Chipp v. Hollembaek,*No. 5:15-hc-02284-BO (E.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and-argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Victor W. STUDEVANT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Commonwealth of VIRGINIA, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6072

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 31, 2017

Victor W. Studevant, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Victor W, Studevant seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as successive his 28 U.S.C, § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Studevant has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauper-is, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and ar*96gument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**


Certification
      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


As
      Adopted Pursuant To


Section
      906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002








In
      connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of M~Wave,
      Inc.
      for the three months ended June 30, 2007, I, Jim Mayer, Interim Chief Executive
      Officer of M~Wave, Inc. do hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      as
      adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





(1)
      such
      Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the three months ended June 30, 2007, fully
      complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      the
      information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the three
      months ended June 30, 2007, fairly presents, in all material respects, the
      financial condition and results of operations of M~Wave, Inc.











Dated:  October
                  22, 2007
              /s/  Jim
                  MayerJim
                  MayerInterim
                  Chief Executive Officer
No. 07

- 17

- 00075

- CR

Christopher Ryan Peek Appellant

v.

The State of Texas Appellee §

§

§

§ From the 31st District Court of Wheeler County

August 1, 2017

Opinion by Justice Pirtle

J U D G M E N T

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated August 1, 2017

, it is ordered,

adjudged and decreed that the judgme nt of the trial court be affirmed.

Inasmuch as this is an appeal in forma pauperis , no costs beyond those that

have been paid are adjudged.

It is further ordered that this decision be certified below for observance.

o O o
EXHIBIT 32


                              CERTIFICATION OF THE

           PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

                                   PURSUANT TO

                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Paul D. Hamm, the Chief Executive Officer of Endavo Media and Communications,
Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Endavo
Media and Communications, Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December
31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual
Report on Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of Endavo Media and Communications, Inc.



Date: April 17, 2006                        /s/  Paul D. Hamm
                                            ------------------------------------
                                                 Paul D. Hamm
                                                 Chief Executive Officer



I, Paul D. Hamm, the acting Chief Financial Officer of Endavo Media and
Communications, Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
Report of Endavo Media and Communications, Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operations of Endavo Media and
Communications, Inc.



Date: April 17, 2006                        /s/  Paul D. Hamm
                                            ------------------------------------
                                                 Paul D. Hamm
                                                 Acting Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

The certification set forth
below is being submitted in connection with the Quarterly Report of First Data Corporation on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Ray E. Winborne, the Chief Financial Officer of First Data Corporation, certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of First Data Corporation.



|                   |  |                                        
|------------------ |  | ---------------------------------------
|Date: May 13, 2011 |  | /S/    RAY E.
WINBORNE                 
|                   |  | Ray E. Winborne Chief Financial Officer
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 Certificate Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as Adopted Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Catalina Marketing Corporation (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Christopher W. Wolf, Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. /s/ Christopher W. WolfChristopher W. WolfExecutive Vice President andChief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)September 15, 2004
D'Angelo Lavelle DIXON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0147

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mandamus is denied.
Victor Manuel MACHUCA-DEJESUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3002

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed January 23, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
**Officer Certification** Exhibit 31.2
I, Christopher W. Wolf, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Catalina MarketingCorporation; 2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untruestatement of material fact or omit to            state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under whichsuch statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this quarterly report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this quarterly report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations and cashflows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisquarterly report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand we have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this quarterly report is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, asof the end of the period covered by this quarterly report based on suchevaluation; and c) Disclosed in this quarterly report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s boardof directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses inthe design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: September 15, 2004   By:       /s/ Christopher W. Wolf      ExecutiveVice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### Ricky BANKS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Johnny HAWKINS, Warden, Nash Correctional Institution, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6410

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

Ricky Banks, Appellant Pro Se. Nichol-aos George Vlahos, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ricky Banks seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

*162We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Banks has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit



Exhibit 10.5



SCHEDULE I


DIRECTOR COMPENSATION SCHEDULE


August 2, 2018


The following shall remain in effect until changed by the Board:


	
				
	Base Cash Retainer
	 

	All Independent Directors (other than a member of the Audit Committee)
	

	$50,000
	


	Members of the Audit Committee
	

	$56,000
	


	Annual Stock Retainer (FMV)(1)
	 

	All Independent Directors
	

	$70,000
	


	Supplemental Cash Retainers(2)
	 

	Non-Executive Chair
	

	$50,000
	


	Audit Committee Chair
	

	$12,500
	


	Compensation Committee Chair
	

	$10,000
	


	Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Chair
	

	$10,000
	


	Finance and Investment Committee Chair
	

	$10,000
	







Independent Directors will not receive any fees for attendance at meetings of the Board of Directors or committees thereof.


(1) Effective for the service year ending at the 2019 annual meeting.


(2) Effective August 2, 2018
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 99.2


                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Umbrella Bancorp, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30 2002 as filed with the
Securities Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Frank J.
Shinnick, Principal Accounting and Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Frank J. Shinnick

Frank J. Shinnick
Principal Accounting and Financial Officer
August 26, 2002
i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-09-00734-CR

Brenda MEDRANO,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 406th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2008-CRP-000366-D4

Honorable O.J. Hale, Jr., Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 10, 2010

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

The trial court imposed sentence on July 13, 2009, and appellant did not file a motion for new

trial. The deadline for filing a notice of appeal was therefore August 12, 2009. TEX. R. APP. P.

26.2(a)(1). A notice of appeal was not filed until October 14, 2009. Appellant did not file a timely

motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3. 
04-09-000734-CR

-2-

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction to entertain

the appeal. See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996);see also Ater v. Eighth

Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (explaining that writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs out-of-time appeals from

felony convictions). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

Do Not Publish