1 16-1182-ag Zheng v. Sessions BIA Christensen, IJ A205 611 064 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DA TABASE (WITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the Unite d States Court of Appeals fo r the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courth ouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4 th day of October, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT: ROBE RT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges

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-------------------------------------- -------------------------------- SHENG ZHENG, Petitioner , v. No. 16-1182-ag JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent

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---------------------------- ---------------------------- ------------ APPEARING FOR PETITIONER: TROY NADER MOSLEMI, Esq., Queens, New York. APPEARING FOR RESPONDENT: SUNAH LEE, Trial Attorney (Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director, on the brief ), Office of Immigration Litiga tion, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.2 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this pe tition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Sheng Zheng, a na tive and citizen of the Peopl e’s Republic of China, seeks review of the BIA’s a ffirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relie f under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Sheng Zheng, No. A205 611 064 (B.I.A. Mar. 28, 2016), aff’g No. A205 611 064 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Sept. 19, 2014). Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s op inions “for the sake of completeness,” Wangchuck v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2 d Cir. 2006), applying well-established standards of review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder , 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2 d Cir. 2009). In so doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural histor y of this case, which we reference only as necessary to explain our d ecision to deny the petition. Zheng seeks review of the agency’s deci sion that he failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persec ution, which is required in the absence of any allegation of past persecution. See Hongsheng Le ng v. Mukasey , 528 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2008); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). To carry this burden, Zheng had to show “a reasonable possibility []he will be singled out for persecution” or “‘ a pattern or practice in his . . . country of nationality . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to [him] . . .’” Lianping Li v. Lynch , 839 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)). This fear of fu ture persecution must be “objectively3 reasonable,” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft , 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004), and requires “some showing that authorities in [the petitioner’s] country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities,” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey , 528 F.3d at 143. Future pe rsecution claims like Zheng’s, by Chinese nationals alleging that they have taken up the mantle of pro-democrac y political activities only after arriving in the United States, are “especially easy to manufacture” and are subject to particular scrutiny. Y.C. v. Holder , 741 F.3d 324, 338 (2d Cir. 2013). We discern no error in the agency’s conclusion that Zheng failed to meet his burden of proof. Insofar as Zheng contends th at the agency erred in giving his evidence no weight at all, the record does not support this contentio n. Rather, the record shows that the agency cons idered Zheng’s proffered evidence , but gave it minimal weight, a decision within its discretion. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that weight afforded to applican t’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within discretion of agency). Specifically, the agency reasonably gave diminished weight to Zheng’s evidence that the Chinese government was aware of his political activ ities and affiliation with the Party for Freedom and Democracy in China (“PFDC”) in the United States. Zheng did not have first-hand knowledge of the alleged visits to his mother in Chin a by Chinese police. Because Zheng’s mother was an in terested witness not available for crossexamination, the agency did not exceed its discretion in accor ding diminished weight to her letter reporting such visits. See Y.C. v. Holder , 741 F.3d at 334 (d eferring to agency’s decision to give diminished weight to eviden ce “submitted by an interested witness”).4 The same conclusion obtains as to the purported police note, which was unauthenticated.
See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey , 529 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that IJ is afforded “considerable flexibility” in de termining authenticity of documents). Although the IJ did not specify how the police note could have be en authenticated, the only evidence of its authenticity came from Zheng’s mother’s le tter, which itself had been accorded little evidentiary value. Accordingly, given the diminished weight of the evidence, th e agency reasonably concluded that the Chinese government wa s not likely to become aware of Zheng’s political activities. Nor is a different conc lusion compelled by Zheng’s testimony that such awareness could be infe rred from the fact that he “p ublicly joined ” the PFDC by publishing five articles on the organization’ s website. C.A.R. 105. The agency reasonably found such publication insufficien t to prove that the Chinese government would take notice of Zheng’ s pro-democracy stance. See Y.C. v. Holder , 741 F.3d at 334 (observing that it is “most unlikely” that “t he Chinese government is aware of every antiCommunist or pro-demo cracy piece of commentary publis hed online”). Zheng further faults the IJ for relying on th e fact that the PFDC is not a “banned” organization. This contention is defeated by the record, whic h demonstrates that the IJ acknowledged Zheng’s evidence that the Chinese government had designated the PFDC as an “enemy organization,” C.A.R. 69–70, but observed that, even if true , such evidence was insufficient to establish that the Chinese government woul d become aware of Zheng’s PFDC activities if he returned to China.5 The agency also found that Zheng failed to prov ide reasonably available corroboration from his sister. The agency may rely on “an alien’s failure to provide corroborating evidence in conclu ding that the alien failed to meet his burden of proof.” Chuilu Liu v. Holder , 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Here, the IJ specified the expe cted evidence, i.e. , testimony or a letter from Zheng’s sister, and why it was reasona bly available (namely, that Zheng is in contact with his sister who resides in the Un ited States). Because Zheng did not identify any barrier to communicating with his siste r, the agency did not err in requiring the evidence. See Chuilu Liu v. Holder , 575 F.3d at 199 (affirming denial of relief for lack of corroboration where IJ “specifically identifie d the types of documents that might have adequately supplemented [petitioner’s] testimony”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). Finally, the agency also reasonably determ ined that Zheng did not show that he was “similarly situated” to individuals who had been persecuted for their political opinions in China. The 2011 United States Department of State report on China that Zheng submitted confirms that the Chin ese government monitors and imprisons individuals who engage in pr o-democracy activities in China, but it doe s not show that the government seeks out individuals par ticipating in such activities abroad. See Lianping Li v. Lynch , 839 F.3d at 150–51 (affirming denial of relief where petitioner could not show that Chinese government pers ecuted “those similarly situated to her: returning Chinese citizens w ho joined [pro-dem ocracy organizations] in the United States”). The testimony about PFDC member s who were arrested upon returning to China from the United States pr imarily involved individuals who were not demonstrably6 similar to Zheng: three were leaders or fo rmer leaders of the PFDC, and no detail was provided about the rank or leve l of political activity of the fo urth PFDC member. Zheng, as administrative secretary of the PFDC logi stics department, is a relatively low-level member, and the agency reasonably determined that he was unlikely to draw the interest of the Chinese government. See Y.C. v. Holder , 741 F.3d at 337 (obs erving that Chinese government was unlikely to persecute petitioner who “had a relatively low level of involvement in the [pro-democ racy organization]”). Because Zheng has not shown the objec tively reasonable fear of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim, he di d not meet the higher standard required to succeed on his claims fo r withholding of rem oval and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 2006). We have considered Zheng’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons , the petition for review is DENIED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court