alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth APPLE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4716

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 30, 2017

Decided: July 21, 2017

Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Shannon S. Quill, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Uzo Asonye, Katherine L. Wong, Assistant United States Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before DIAZ, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Kenneth Apple of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (Count 1); wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2 (2012) (Counts 2 through 4); obstruction of an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), 2 (2012) (Count 6); and making false statements and representations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 2 (2012) (Counts 7 through 9). Apple appeals his convictions on Counts 1 through 4. His sole challenge is that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the offenses occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia. The Government asserts that Apple waived any objection by failing to raise the issue of venue in the district court. We agree.

Apple contends that he preserved his claim by making a general motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 at the close of the evidence. He argues that his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was sufficient to preserve a challenge to the Government’s purported failure to prove venue. However, Apple’s arguments are not supported by our precedent.

First, we have noted that venue is not an offense element. *See United States v. Engle,*676 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Venue is not a substantive element of a crime.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, we have held that a challenge to venue is waived and unreviewable when a defendant raises it for the first time in a post-trial motion for acquittal. *See, e.g., United States v. Delfino,*510 F.3d 468, 473 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Because the Delfinos’ improper venue claim was raised in their post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal and/or new trial, we conclude that it was untimely and that the claim is waived”); *United States v. Collins,*372 F.3d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f an *216indictment properly alleges venue, but the proof at trial fails to support the venue allegation, an objection to venue can be raised at the close of evidence.”)- Further, a bare Rule 29 motion for acquittal that does not mention venue waives the venue argument. *See United States v. Knox,*540 F.3d 708, 716 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Apple’s failure to specifically raise the issue of venue in the district court has waived appellate review.

Thus, we affirm Apple’s convictions. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
EXHIBIT 23




                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS



As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of our
report dated January 29, 2002, on the consolidated balance sheets of Argonaut
Group, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2001 and 2000, and the related
consolidated statements of operations, comprehensive income, shareholders'
equity and cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended December
31, 2001, incorporated by reference in this Form 10-K into Argonaut Group,
Inc.'s previously filed Form S-8 Registration Statement File Nos. 333-43230 and
333-43228. It should be noted that we have not audited any consolidated
financial statements of the Company subsequent to December 31, 2001 or performed
any audit procedures subsequent to the date of our report.



                                                             ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP


San Francisco, California
March 25, 2002
Annette KIELHURN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Gamze CAPANER, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0373

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 07, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
A.L., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-1959

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[March 17, 2018]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Virginia Murphy, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

May, Ciklin and Kuntz, JJ., concur.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.
 Date:
March 17, 2008
    
    /s/ Randall Gausman

Randall GausmanVice President andChief Financial Officer
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
SOKHEANG IM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-5050

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 2, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Yuraddis Llorente TAMAYO, Appellant, v. Karl Harry MILLER, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-2320

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 10, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

REGION Ill 

1650 Arch Street 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 191 03-2029 

The Honorable John Quigley, Secretary 

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 

Rachel Carson State Office Building 

P.O. Box 2063 

Harrisburg, P A 17105-2063 

Dear Secretary Quigley: 

On June 30, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received a revision to the 

Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan (SIP) from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 

Protection (PADEP) pertaining to amendments to 25 Pa. Code Chapters 121 and 139 that clarify 

requirements related to the measurement and reporting of condensable particulate matter (PM). EPA 

has determined that the submittal is administratively and technically complete, and is reviewing it to 

prepare a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) action. 

If members of your staff have any questions, they may direct them to Maria A. Pino, Office of 

Air Program Planning, at (215) 814-2181, or at pino.maria@epa.gov. She is the principal contact for 

this rulemaking. 

Sincerely, 

~~ Diana Esher, Director 

Air Protection Division 

#"' 

~~ Printed on I 00% recycled/recyclable paper with I 00% post-consumer fiber and process chlorine free. 

Customer Service Hotline: 1-800-438-2474
Paul STILL, Appellant, v. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 1D17-1938

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 23, 2018

Paul Still, pro se, Appellant.

Thomas I. Mayton, Jr. and Erin H. Preston of St. Johns River Water Management District, Palatka, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Rowe, and Jay, JJ., concur.
Charles KADI, Appellant, v. MASSEY SERVICES, INC., Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-629

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 20, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Oliver M. BOLING, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN FCI ESTILL, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6042

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 26, 2017

Decided: June 2, 2017

Oliver M. Boling, Appellant Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

*119Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Oliver M. Boling, a District of Columbia prisoner serving his sentence in a federal facility, seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition without prejudice as an unauthorized second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012), When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Boling has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
AMENDMENT TO
THE 1997 NON-OFFICER EMPLOYEE
STOCK OPTION PLAN OF
RENTRAK CORPORATION

         THIS SECOND  AMENDMENT to The 1997  Non-officer  Employee  Stock Option
Plan  of  Rentrak   Corporation  (the  "Plan")  is  hereby  adopted  by  Rentrak
Corporation, an Oregon corporation (the "Company"), effective November 16, 1998.

1.  Incorporation;  Definitions.  The terms and provisions of this Amendment are
incorporated  by this  reference in the Plan as though fully set forth  therein.
Terms not otherwise described herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in
the Plan.

2.   Amendment.

         a.  Shares  Subject  to Plan.  Section  2.1 of the Plan is hereby
amended to read in its entirety as follows:

               2.1  Shares  Subject  to Plan.  The  shares of stock  subject  to
               Options shall be the Company's  common stock, par value $.001 per
               share.  The  aggregate  number of such shares which may be issued
               upon  exercise  of such  Options  under the Plan shall not exceed
               Eight hundred thousand (800,000).

3. No Other Change. Except as specifically modified in this Amendment, all other
provisions  and terms of the Plan shall remain  unchanged  and in full force and
effect.
**EXHIBIT 31.2****CERTIFICATION**PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002     I, Brion Umidi, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ReGen Biologics, Inc.;     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a — 15(e) and15d — 15(e)) for the registrant and have:     a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;     b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and     c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and     5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):     a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and     b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date:November 10, 2005         By:                      /s/ BRION UMIDI    Name:  Brion Umidi    Title:  *Chief Financial Officer*
p.1 

OAR Box 1190 

Prepped by Candice Davis 

Document Number: 

72) ll-E-2 

Docket Number: 

A-90-28 

Printed 5/5/2008 9:13:51 AM Sheet 72 of 106 
P.2 

\ j&'S, 

USB. 

\ , •*tpfVLf«> V 

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 2_ 

MEMORANDUM 

TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

The Fil e 

OFFICE OF 

AIR ANO RADIATION 

Leila Holmes Cook, Attorney/Advisor/J^/ 

Manufacturers Operations Division tf** 

Telephone call with General Motors regarding 

technological feasibility concerns presented by 

California's OBD II 

DATE: March 15, 1993 

The following is a summary of the telephone call between EPA 

(Andy Brooks, Karl Simon and Lee Cook) and General Motors (Sam 

Leonard, Steve Mahan, Mark Hester, Dave Ferris) and on March 11, 

1993 to learn of General Motors' concerns regarding the 

technological feasibility of California's OBD II regulations. 

GM has at least two technological feasibility issues of 

which it wanted to make EPA aware. The first has to do with 

catalyst monitoring (LEVs '96) and the second with misfire 

monitoring ('97). 

Catalyst monitoring 

This is an issue for '96 because LEV standards require warm up 

catalysts (underfloor no longer adequate). GM is using 

underfloor for TLEVs. Designs for '96 must be in place this 

summer. 

Discussion of SAE 931034 

Oxygen storage capacity is the only known method of 

evaluating catalyst efficiency. There is however, no known cause 

and effect relationship. There is not consistent correlation 

between oxygen storage capacity and catalyst efficiency. The 

worst correlation occurs in the case of warmup converters. And 

the pollutant with the worst correlation is HC. 

GM wants to monitor as a system. They can't do so under 

CARB regulations because can't demonstrate that a malfunction 

will be indicated when the front catalyst is alone 

Recycled/Recyclable 

Primed with Soy/Canola Ink on paper that 

contains at least 50% recycled fiber 
P.3 

- 2 -

malfunctioning. GM say this would lead to false MILs because as 

a system catalyst efficiency is still likely to be adequate. 

Manufacturers prefer EPA emissions increment methodology and 

see it as the only possible solution right now. 

Engine Misfire 

If CARB would relax requirement slightly to exclude area in lower 

right hand corner the rest is feasible. The operation in this 

area is minimal(0.1%).
Exhibit









Exhibit 10.22


SCHEDULE I
CHANGE OF CONTROL SEVERANCE PLAN PARTICIPANTS
SECTION 16 OFFICERS


	
		
	Benefit Level - 3

	Baxter, Warner L.
	Mark, Richard J.

	Diya, Fadi M.
	Moehn, Michael

	Lyons, Martin J.
	Nelson, Gregory L.

	Benefit Level - 2

	Amirthalingam, Bhavani
	 














































_______________________
1 Benefit Levels are defined as a payment amount equal to a cash severance multiple of base pay, target short-term incentive award, short-term incentive award in year of termination (prorated at target), the actuarial equivalent of the benefit under the qualified defined benefit retirement plan and any excess or supplemental retirement plan.
#### Starsha M. SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1632

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: September 14, 2017

Decided: September 19, 2017

Starsha M. Sewell, Appellant Pro Se. Gerard J. Stief, Associate General Counsel, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Starsha M. Sewell appeals the district court’s orders dismissing this action alleging discrimination in employment and a conspiracy concerning child custody and denying her motions for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Sewell v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,*No. 8:16-cv-02456-GJH (D. Md. July 19 & Aug. 29, 2016; Mar. 13 & Apr. 28, 2017). We deny the motion for initial hearing en banc and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Reynold MURRELL, also known as Rennie Murrell, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50952 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 5, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, Zachary Carl Richter, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*191Robert Otto Switzer, I, Esq., Law Offices of Robert 0. Switzer, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

In accordance with a written plea agreement, Defendant-Appellant Reynold Mur-rell, aka Rennie Murrell, pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography. He waived his appeal rights in his plea agreement, but he contends that the waiver no longer bars his attack on his 220-month sentence because the government breached the plea agreement.

In that agreement, the government agreed not to recommend a five-level increase for distribution in exchange for a thing of value. Several months later, the government objected to the presentence report by arguing in favor of the five-level increase. However, at sentencing, Mur-rell’s attorney reminded the government of that part of the plea agreement, after which the government apologized, withdrew its objection, and agreed that a lesser increase was specified in the agreement. The court then applied the lesser increase.

We need not decide whether Murrell adequately objected to preserve his claim for de novo appellate review. Even if we were to apply de novo review, we would find that the government initially breached the agreement but then “cured its breach by withdrawing its objection and urging the application of the lesser enhancement.” *United States v. Purser,*747 F.3d 284, 294 (5th Cir. 2014); *see Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 140, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (noting that a breach is curable if the government simply forgot its commitment but was willing to abide by the agreement when reminded). Consequently, the timely corrected agreement did not invalidate Murrell’s waiver of his right to appeal.

Murrell’s appeal waiver is otherwise knowing and voluntary because he was properly advised that he was giving up his right to appeal. *See United States v. Jacobs,*635 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). Murrell cannot show that the sentencing court’s misstatements about his right to appeal, made in passing almost two years after the plea, could have affected his decision to plead guilty or to waive his right to appeal. *See United States v. Melancon,*972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992). Murrell’s appeal waiver is valid, so we need not address his challenges to his sentence. His appeal is therefore DISMISSED. *See Purser,*747 F.3d at 294-95; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant To 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the Court Has Determined That This Opinion Should Not Be Published and Is Not Precedent Except Under the Limited Circumstances Set Forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.
#### IN RE: Lateef FISHER Petitioner.

No. 17-1746

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 19, 2017

Decided: October 23, 2017

Lateef Fisher, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lateef Fisher filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the district court to order the Federal Public Defender’s Office to turn over discovery to him related to his 2015 drug convictions. We conclude that Fisher is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,*426 *230U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988).

Fisher filed a motion for release of discovery materials in the district court that the court denied after Fisher filed this petition for writ of mandamus. To the extent that Fisher sought an order alleging undue delay, the petition is moot. Further, mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. *In re Lockheed Martin Corp.,*503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007). The relief sought by Fisher is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pau-peris, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*