[Cite as State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-4387.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOHN HARRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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APPEAL NO. C-230074

TRIAL NOS. 22CRB-18454A, B, C, D

O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 6, 2023

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsely, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, 

and Ashton Tucker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant 

Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
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WINKLER, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant John Harris appeals his convictions for 

aggravated menacing, obstruction of official business, being in the park after hours, 

and criminal trespass. Harris raises one assignment of error that argues his various 

convictions were based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the municipal court.

Background

{¶2} Around 4:45 a.m. on October 25, 2022, Harris was in Washington Park 

warming his hands from a lit heater stored by the gazebo in the center of the park. 

Washington Park is a public park owned by the Cincinnati Park Board and is open 

from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. The park is managed by the Cincinnati City Center 

Development Corporation (“3CDC”). A 3CDC employee saw Harris at the gazebo and 

called the police to have Harris removed from the park.

{¶3} Cincinnati Police Officer Chris Vogelpohl was on detail for 3CDC that 

night to patrol parking lots managed by 3CDC. Officer Vogelpohl was dispatched and 

approached Harris, who was standing by the gazebo with his hands above the lit fire 

of a patio heater. Officer Vogelpohl asked to see Harris’s identification, but Harris 

refused to produce it. Instead, Harris gathered his bags and started walking away from 

Officer Vogelpohl.

{¶4} This was not the first time that Harris and Officer Vogelpohl interacted. 

It is unclear from the record what transpired in those previous encounters, but the 

record indicates that Officer Vogelpohl had encountered Harris three times previously 

and each time, demanded Harris’s identification. The record indicates Harris 

produced his identification each time but exchanged heated words with Officer 
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Vogelpohl. Officer Vogelpohl did not charge or ticket Harris in any of these 

encounters.

{¶5} As Harris gathered his belongings and took his first steps away from 

Officer Vogelpohl, the officer said, “Sir, I’m going to give you a ticket for being in the 

park after hours.” Harris began arguing with Officer Vogelpohl while continuing to 

walk away from him. Harris argued that he was allowed to walk through the park and 

denied lighting the heater.

{¶6} After Harris left Washington Park and crossed the street, he yelled to 

Officer Vogelpohl that Harris “would blow [Officer Vogelpohl’s] brains out.” Harris 

then continued down the street while carrying two bags, with one in each hand. Officer 

Vogelpohl followed Harris, asking him to repeat the statement. Harris eventually 

stopped and dropped the bag held in his right hand and reached for the bag held in his 

left hand. Officer Vogelpohl drew his firearm in response. Harris did not take 

anything out of either bag, but walked down the street, leaving one bag behind. Officer 

Vogelpohl followed Harris and called for backup. Harris turned around the block and 

went down an alley.

{¶7} A police cruiser pulled down the alley in front of Harris to block him. 

Officer Vogelpohl ordered Harris to stop. Harris ran around the police cruiser and 

down the alley, heading back to Washington Park. Officer Vogelpohl and the police 

cruiser chased Harris and caught up with him at the same corner where Harris yelled 

that he would blow Officer Vogelpohl’s brains out. Officer Vogelpohl arrested Harris.

{¶8} Harris was charged with four offenses: aggravated menacing in 

violation of R.C. 2903.21, obstruction of official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31, 

being in the park after hours in violation of Cincinnati Park Board Rule 21
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(“Park Rule 21”), and criminal trespass in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(1). Harris was 

tried in municipal court by a jury on the aggravated-menacing, obstruction, and 

trespass counts, and tried to the bench on the count of being in the park after hours.

{¶9} Officer Vogelpohl testified to the events on that night and walked the 

jury through the recording on his body-worn camera. Officer Vogelpohl testified at 

first that he “didn’t like” Harris saying that he would blow his brains out. On redirect 

examination, Officer Vogelpohl testified that Harris’s statement made him feel afraid 

and explained how his training as a police officer limited how his fear showed on his 

body-worn camera recording.

{¶10} Harris took the stand in his own defense and testified that he walked 

away from Officer Vogelpohl and did not produce his identification because he had 

done so on previous occasions.

{¶11} After trial, the jury found Harris guilty on the aggravated-menacing, 

obstruction-of-official-business, and criminal-trespass charges. Harris was convicted 

by the court on the charge of being in the park after hours. Harris now timely appeals

all four convictions.

Law and Analysis

{¶12} Harris raises a sole assignment of error, arguing his four convictions 

were based on insufficient evidence and were contrary to the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Though Harris raises both challenges together in the sole assignment of 

error depending on the conviction, “a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

differs from a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. McKnight, 

107 Ohio St.3d 101, 2005-Ohio-6046, 837 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 69.
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{¶13} Broken down for each conviction, Harris argues (1) his conviction for 

aggravated menacing was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) his 

conviction for obstructing official business was not supported by sufficient evidence 

and was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and (3) his convictions for 

criminal trespass and being in the park after hours were not supported by sufficient 

evidence and were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. For organizational 

clarity, we address Harris’s arguments in the order he made them.

I. Standard of Review

{¶14} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction 

requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of production at 

trial. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997) (Cook, J., 

concurring). It is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Ellison,

178 Ohio App.3d 734, 2008-Ohio-5282, 900 N.E.2d 228, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.), citing 

Thompkins at 386 (Cook, J., concurring). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

requires a court to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to 

determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that all essential elements 

of a crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sims, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

Nos. C-150252 and C-150253, 2015-Ohio-4996, ¶ 7. In deciding whether the evidence 

is sufficient, an appellate court does not “resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the 

credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120561, 

2013-Ohio-5386, ¶ 45.

{¶15} In contrast to a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, in deciding 

whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court 

determines whether the state has appropriately carried its burden of persuasion. 
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Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). When reviewing a challenge to the manifest 

weight of evidence, an appellate court sits as the “thirteenth juror” and “review[s] the 

entire record, weigh[s] the evidence, consider[s] the credibility of the witnesses, and 

determine[s] whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest 

miscarriage of justice.” Sims at ¶ 7, citing Thompkins at 387 (Cook, J., concurring). 

An appellate court may substitute its judgement for that of the trier of fact on the issue 

of witness credibility when “it is patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way in 

arriving at its verdict.” State v. Porter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200459, 

2021-Ohio-3232, ¶ 25. However, an appellate court may not substitute its own 

judgement for that of the trier of fact “[w]here reasonable minds can reach different 

conclusions upon conflicting evidence.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279, 

574 N.E.2d 492 (1991).

II. Aggravated Menacing

{¶16} First, Harris argues that his conviction for aggravated menacing is 

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The aggravated-menacing statute 

provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender 

will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person.” 

R.C. 2903.21(A). Harris concedes that he knowingly threatened to blow Officer 

Vogelpohl’s brains out and that act would constitute serious physical harm. However, 

Harris argues that Officer Vogelpohl’s testimony about his belief that Harris would 

cause serious physical harm was not credible.

{¶17} Generally, the jury is in the best position to assess the credibility of the 

witnesses and can freely accept or reject testimony. State v. French, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-050375, 2007-Ohio-726, ¶ 24, citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 
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227 N.E.2d 212, (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Hence, a verdict is not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence where the jury’s resolution of credibility is 

reasonable and where the jury ultimately chose to believe the state’s witness as 

opposed to the defense witness. See State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26490, 

2013-Ohio-5112, ¶ 20, citing State v. Andrews, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25114, 

2010-Ohio-6126, ¶ 28.

{¶18} Harris argues two issues with Officer Vogelpohl’s testimony. First, 

Harris argues Officer Vogelpohl’s actions shown on his body-worn camera contradict 

his claim that he was afraid. Officer Vogelpohl did not call for backup or seek cover 

when threatened. Instead, he followed Harris asking, “You’re going to do what?” to 

get Harris to repeat the threat. Officer Vogelpohl drew his firearm only after Harris 

dropped one bag to reach another. Second, Harris notes that Officer Vogelpohl only 

testified on redirect after the lunch break that he took the threat seriously and was 

afraid, but he initially testified that Harris’s threat frustrated him. Harris testified that 

previous interactions with Officer Vogelpohl had gone poorly, and that Officer 

Vogelpohl was harassing Harris.

{¶19} We hold the jury did not lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage 

of justice when it found Harris guilty of aggravated menacing. The jury watched the 

body-worn camera video which recorded Harris making the threat, heard both 

Harris’s and Officer Vogelpohl’s testimony about what happened that night, and 

observed both witnesses on the stand. The jury did not lose its way when it found 

Officer Vogelpohl’s fear credible based on the events of the night and Officer 

Vogelpohl’s explanation of his own thoughts and feelings. See State v. Carson, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180336, 2019-Ohio-4550, ¶ 19. The jury was free to accept 
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Officer Vogelpohl’s version of the events and reject Harris’s version of events, 

particularly where, as here, the jury watched a video recording of the threat and 

observed Harris’s tone and demeanor in that moment. To the extent that Harris 

claimed Officer Vogelpohl is racially biased, and thus his testimony is not credible, 

that is a determination best left to the jury. See State v. Staley, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. 

C-200270, C-200271 and C-200272, 2021-Ohio-3086, ¶ 24. Accordingly, Harris’s

conviction for aggravated menacing was not contrary to the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

III. Obstruction of Official Business

{¶20} Second, Harris argues his conviction for obstructing official business 

was not supported by sufficient evidence and was contrary to the manifest weight of 

the evidence.

{¶21} To support a conviction for obstructing official business under 

R.C. 2921.31(A), the state must prove that Harris “(1) performed an act; (2) without 

privilege; (3) with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public 

official of any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity; and (4) that 

hampered or impeded the performance of the public official’s duties.” In re Payne, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, ¶ 11. Harris’s argument focuses 

on element (3), whether he purposefully obstructed official business, and element (4),

whether his actions hampered or impeded Officer Vogelpohl’s investigation.

{¶22} Turning to whether Harris actually hampered or impeded Officer 

Vogelpohl’s investigation, not every act that “can conceivably be said to hinder a police 

officer rises to the level of criminal conduct.” Id. at ¶ 16. Interference with the police 

by citizens must be “ ‘viewed as a continuum along which, at a certain point, the line 
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is crossed’ ” where the conduct is punishable. Id., quoting State v. Stayton, 

126 Ohio App.3d 158, 164, 709 N.E.2d 1224 (1st Dist.1998). R.C. 2921.31(A) does not 

criminalize every “minor ‘delay, annoyance, irritation, or inconvenience’ ” put on a 

police officer. State v. Harris, 2018-Ohio-4316, 121 N.E.3d 21, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), quoting 

State v. Vitantonio, 2013-Ohio-4100, 995 N.E.2d 1291 (11th Dist.), ¶ 14, quoting 

Lakewood v. Simpson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80383, 2002-Ohio-4086, ¶ 16.

{¶23} Rather, the statute criminalizes conduct where the defendant commits

an affirmative act, and that affirmative act creates a “substantial stoppage” in the 

police officer’s official business. See State v. Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700, 

2009-Ohio-372, 906 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.). A “substantial stoppage” is not a 

set period of time; rather the defendant’s act must “actually hamper or impede” the 

officer’s performance of official duties. State v. Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 

2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). Additionally, the defendant need 

not be successful in preventing the officers from performing their duties; merely 

obstructing the officers from doing so is enough. Id. at ¶ 19. The mere refusal to 

produce identification upon request of a police officer is not an “affirmative act” for 

the purposes of obstructing official business. Grice at ¶ 9. Ordinarily, an individual 

can be found guilty of obstructing official business by performing a specific act after a 

police officer has ordered him or her to stop. State v. Gibson, 2019-Ohio-1022, 

133 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), quoting City of Girard v. Oakman, 2018-Ohio-1212, 

110 N.E.3d 530, ¶ 52 (11th Dist.). But “if an officer has the right to detain an individual, 

the individual cannot continue walking away from the officer once he or she is aware 

that the officer is trying to detain him or her.” State v. Easterling, 2019-Ohio-2470, 

139 N.E.3d 497, ¶ 37 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-5378, 
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56 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.); see State v. Lohaus, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-020444, 

2003-Ohio-777, ¶ 11-12 (holding R.C. 2921.31 prohibits “fleeing from a lawful Terry 

stop across several lawns after being told to stop * * * .”).

{¶24} Harris did not obstruct official business when he refused to provide his 

identification at the outset of the encounter, or argued with and swore at Officer 

Vogelpohl, or shouted his frustration into the night. Had that been the only evidence, 

this would be a different case. But Harris heard Officer Vogelpohl say, “I’m going to 

issue you a ticket for being in the park after hours,” so Harris knew Officer Vogelpohl 

intended to cite him. But Harris walked away from Officer Vogelpohl, necessitating a 

seven-minute foot pursuit. Five minutes into walking after Harris, Officer Vogelpohl 

called for a backup car. When the additional police cruiser arrived to stop Harris,

Officer Vogelpohl ordered Harris to stop. Harris ran from the officers, and, after a 

brief chase, they had to physically restrain him. Harris did not merely refuse to 

cooperate; Harris engaged in the affirmative act of gathering his belongings and 

walking away when he knew that Officer Vogelpohl intended to detain him and issue 

him a ticket. Then, when ordered to stop a few minutes later, Harris ran. Viewing this 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a trier of fact could reasonably 

conclude that Harris created a substantial stoppage by impeding Officer Vogelpohl

from issuing the ticket while he followed Harris until Harris was arrested.

{¶25} Turning to whether Harris purposefully obstructed official business, a 

person acts “purposefully” when it is the person’s “specific intention” to cause a certain 

result or engage in the prohibited conduct, regardless of what the person intends to 

accomplish by doing so. See R.C. 2901.22(A). “The purpose with which a person does 

an act is determined from the manner in which it is done, the means used, and all the 
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other facts and circumstances in evidence.” In re Payne 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, at ¶ 15. A trier of fact must be able to reasonably 

infer from the nature of a person’s conduct that the person intended his conduct to 

obstruct official business. Id.

{¶26} The record here supports an inference from the nature of Harris’s

conduct that Harris specifically intended to obstruct Officer Vogelpohl from issuing a 

ticket to Harris. The body-worn camera footage shows Officer Vogelpohl telling Harris 

he would receive a ticket and Harris responded by gathering his belongings and 

walking away. Harris continued walking away from Officer Vogelpohl for several 

minutes, and when a police car pulled in front of Harris to stop him, he ran. Viewing 

this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder 

could conclude that Harris affirmatively acted by walking away from Officer 

Vogelpohl. That reasonable factfinder could conclude that Harris impeded Officer 

Vogelpohl’s performance of his police duties during the pursuit. From that conduct, 

a reasonable factfinder could infer that Harris specifically intended to avoid the ticket

by walking and then running away from Officer Vogelpohl.

{¶27} Ultimately, the jury was presented with sufficient evidence that Harris 

committed an affirmative act that caused a substantial stoppage of Officer Vogelpohl’s 

investigation and that Harris specifically intended to cause that result. We hold the 

jury did not lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice when it found 

Harris guilty of obstruction of official business.
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IV. Criminal Trespass and Being in Washington Park After Hours

{¶28} Harris argues that his convictions for criminal trespass and being in 

Washington Park after hours were not supported by sufficient evidence and were

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶29} The criminal trespass statute provides that “[n]o person, without 

privilege to do so, shall * * * [k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of 

another.” R.C. 2911.21(A)(1). Park Board Rule 21 provides that Washington Park, 

among other specified parks, “shall be closed to the public between 11:00 p.m. and 

6:00 a.m. except for vehicular traffic on through roadways or vehicular or pedestrian 

traffic within, accessing, or exiting public parking garages directly connecting to city 

streets.” Cincinnati Park Rule 21, https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/cincyparks/visit-apark/park-board-rules/ (accessed September 12, 2023). A violation of any Park Board 

Rule is punishable as a minor misdemeanor. Cincinnati Park Board Rule 39.

{¶30} Generally, “a person has a privilege to enter and be upon the public 

areas of public property.” State v. Shelton, 63 Ohio App.3d 137, 578 N.E.2d 473 

(4th Dist.1989). However, a person may commit a criminal trespass onto public 

property when his or her general privilege to be there has been properly revoked. 

A “ ‘public official or agency into whose charge the property is put can withdraw or 

revoke the privilege otherwise enjoyed by a member of the public.’ ” Staley, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton Nos. C-200270, C-200271 and C-200272, 2021-Ohio-3086, at ¶ 13, quoting 

Dayton v. Moore, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 13369, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 1647 

(Mar. 25, 1993).

{¶31} Here, the record establishes that 3CDC, the entity charged with 

managing Washington Park, set out three signs that display the hours that the park is 
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open. Outside of those hours, the signs notify members of the public that their

privilege to be in Washington Park is revoked by Park Rule 21. While it is unclear from 

the record whether the signs state that Washington Park closes at 10:00 p.m. or 

11:00 p.m., Harris was in the park at 4:45 a.m., well after either closing time and before 

the park opens at 6:00 a.m. Additionally, Officer Vogelpohl testified that on previous 

occasions, he had told Harris not to be in Washington Park when it is closed, also 

revoking Harris’s privilege to be in Washington Park when it is closed. Officer 

Vogelpohl’s body-worn camera recorded Harris shouting, “I’ll be back at 6!” after he 

left the park. This statement demonstrates Harris knew the park opened at 6:00 a.m., 

that Harris was not currently permitted to be in the park, and that Harris would be 

permitted in the park when it was open.

{¶32} Harris contends he was passing through Washington Park, but Park 

Rule 21 only exempts “pedestrian traffic within, accessing, or exiting public parking 

garages.” The rule does not generally exempt pedestrian traffic walking through the 

park. Harris does not argue he fell under the exception for accessing or exiting from a 

public parking garage. Even if he did argue the exception applied, the evidence 

suggests otherwise. Harris was stopped at the gazebo in the middle of the park, away 

from the access points to the parking garages or the routes from those access points to

the street.

{¶33} Viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could determine that Harris was in the park 

between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. and that the posted signs revoked Harris’s privilege 

to be in the park. Thus, the finder of fact was presented with sufficient evidence to 

find Harris guilty of criminal trespass and being in the park after hours. Nor did the 
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finder of fact lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding Harris 

guilty of obstruction of official business.

Conclusion

{¶34} Based on the foregoing reasoning, Harris’s conviction for aggravated 

menacing was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and Harris’s

convictions for obstructing official business, criminal trespass, and being in the park 

after hours each were supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the 

manifest weight of the evidence. This is not one of those “exceptional cases in which 

the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction” such that reversal on the basis of 

manifest weight is required. See Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, 

(Cook, J., concurring), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 

717 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶35} Accordingly, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm the 

judgments of the municipal court.

Judgments affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.