Opinion filed October 30, 2015

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-13-00298-CR

__________

DUANE ERIC WEST, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 39th District Court

Haskell County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 6709

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Duane Eric West appeals his jury conviction for aggravated sexual assault of 

a child younger than fourteen years of age. The jury assessed his punishment at 

confinement for a term of fifty years in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence 

in three appellate issues. We affirm.
2

Background Facts

Appellant was a deputy sheriff in Kent County. Texas Ranger Philip 

Vandygriff testified that he received a report from the mother of T.M.H., a thirteenyear-old girl, in December 2012 that Appellant had engaged in inappropriate conduct 

with T.M.H. in the summer of 2012 while T.M.H. lived in Kent County with her 

father. Appellant subsequently provided a written statement to Ranger Vandygriff 

wherein he admitted to having frequent social contact with T.M.H., including 

permitting her to ride with him in his patrol vehicle. Appellant’s written statement 

detailed an incident occurring at the cemetery in Clairemont:

We were sitting on the tailgate of the truck and [T.M.H.] began kissing 

on me. I started returning the gesture. [T.M.H.] began removing items 

of her clothing. I didn’t put a stop to anything. I allowed [T.M.H.] to 

remove my belt. I continued to kiss her. I kissed her all over her body. 

I started with her lip[s] and kissed her on her neck, her breasts and her 

vagina. I used my hands and rubbed her breasts and vagina. I believe 

I digitally penetrated [T.M.H.’s] vagina and then I had oral sex with 

her.1

Appellant was indicted in Kent County for the aggravated sexual assault of 

T.M.H. He filed a motion to change venue based upon the allegation that he could 

not obtain a fair and impartial trial in Kent County. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 31.03 (West 2006). The State agreed to the requested change of venue,

and the trial court granted the motion by changing venue to Haskell County. In this 

regard, the 39th Judicial District is composed of Haskell, Kent, Stonewall, and 

Throckmorton Counties. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.141 (West 2004). 

Appellant was subsequently tried and convicted in Haskell County. Article 31.08 of 

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure contains a provision whereby the trial court 

 

1Appellant’s written statement detailed additional sexual conduct that occurred that same night at 

the cemetery. We are not including these additional details because they are not relevant to our analysis.
3

may return the cause to the original county on the completion of a trial in which a 

change of venue has been ordered. See CRIM. PROC. art. 31.08, § 1(a) (West Supp. 

2014). The trial court did not return the underlying proceedings to Kent County. 

Accordingly, the appeal was filed with this court. See GOV’T § 22.201(1) (West 

Supp. 2014).2

Analysis

Appellant asserts in his first issue that the trial court erred in refusing to submit 

a charge on the lesser included offense of indecency with a child by sexual contact. 

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1), (c)(1) (West 2011). We apply the 

Aguilar/Rousseau3test to determine whether an instruction on a lesser included 

offense should be given to the jury. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012). This is a two-prong test. The first prong is to determine “if the 

proof necessary to establish [the elements of] the charged offense also includes the 

lesser offense.” Id. If this threshold is met, the second prong has us decide whether 

there is some evidence “in the record that would permit a jury rationally to find that 

if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense.” Rousseau, 855 

S.W.2d at 673. The purpose of the lesser included instruction is to avoid leaving 

jurors with two “equally distasteful” options: (1) acquit the defendant even though 

the jury believes he is guilty of the lesser included offense or (2) convict the 

defendant even though the jury does not believe he committed the charged offense. 

Eldred v. State, 578 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). To avoid 

such a situation, lesser included instructions are liberally permitted. Bignall v. State, 

887 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

 

2An appeal from Kent County would be filed in the Amarillo Court of Appeals. See GOV’T 

§ 22.201(h).

3See Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Aguilar v. State, 682 S.W.2d 

556, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
4

The first step asks whether the lesser included offense is included within the 

proof necessary to establish the offense charged. McKithan v. State, 324 S.W.3d 

582, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We compare the statutory elements and any 

descriptive averments in the indictment for the greater offense with the statutory 

elements of the lesser included offense. Ex parte Amador, 326 S.W.3d 202, 206 n.5 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ex parte Watson, 306 S.W.3d 259, 263 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009); Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also

CRIM. PROC. art. 37.09 (West 2006). The first step is a question of law, and it does 

not depend on the evidence raised at trial. Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 382; Hall, 225 

S.W.3d at 535. Article 37.09(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an 

offense is a lesser included offense if “it is established by proof of the same or less 

than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.” CRIM.

PROC. art. 37.09(1). The State acknowledges that indecency with a child is a lesser

included offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child when both offenses are

predicated on the same act. See Evans v. State, 299 S.W.3d 138, 142–43 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2009). Accordingly, we focus our attention on the second prong of the 

Aguilar/Rousseau test.

The second step requires us to determine whether there is some evidence that 

would permit a rational jury to find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only 

of the lesser offense. Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 383; Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536; 

Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). This second step is a 

question of fact and is based on the evidence presented at trial. Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d 

at 383. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if some 

evidence from any source raises a fact issue on whether he is guilty of only the lesser

offense, regardless of whether the evidence is weak, impeached, or contradicted. Id.

(citing Bell v. State, 693 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
5

Prior to reviewing the evidence presented at trial under the second prong of 

the Aguilar/Rousseau test, we note Appellant’s contention that the test should not be 

applied whenever a defendant requests a charge on a lesser included offense. The 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the State is not bound by the second 

prong of the “Royster–Rousseau4test” when the State requests the submission of a 

lesser included offense. Grey v. State, 298 S.W.3d 644, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

Citing Grey, Appellant contends that his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are violated if the State is relieved of the 

requirement to demonstrate compliance with the second prong of the 

Aguilar/Rousseau test whenever it requests the submission of a charge on a lesser

included offense but a defendant is not relieved of the requirement. We disagree. 

As noted by the court in Grey, “[i]t is the State, not the defendant, that chooses what 

offense is to be charged.” Id. at 650. Accordingly, there is no logical reason to 

impose the requirement of the second prong on the State’s decision to seek the 

submission of a charge on a lesser included offense. Id. at 649–50. Therefore, there 

is a valid basis for imposing different requirements on the State and the criminal 

defendant. Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has continued to 

require compliance with the second prong of the Aguilar/Rousseau test after Grey

when defendants request the submission of a charge on a lesser included offense, as 

evidenced by its holding in Cavazos. See Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 385–86.

The indictment charged Appellant with the first-degree felony offense of 

aggravated sexual assault of a child. See PENAL § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B), (e) 

(West Supp. 2014). Specifically, the indictment alleged that Appellant intentionally 

and knowingly caused “contact of the female sexual organ of [T.M.H.], a child who 

 

4The court in Grey referred to the test as the “Royster–Rousseau test.” See Royster v. State, 622 

S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (plurality opinion on reh’g). The court subsequently referred 

to the applicable test as the “Aguilar/Rousseau test” in Cavazos. Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 382.
6

was then and there younger than fourteen (14) years of age, by [Appellant’s] mouth.” 

Appellant requested the submission of a charge for the lesser included offense of 

indecency with a child, a second-degree felony, under Section 21.11(a)(1). Under 

this section of the Penal Code, a person commits an offense if he or she engages in 

sexual contact with a child younger than seventeen years of age. Id. § 21.11(a)(1). 

As applicable to the facts in this appeal, the statute defines sexual contact as any 

touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or 

any part of the genitals of a child, if committed with the intent to arouse or gratify 

the sexual desire of any person. See id. § 21.11(c)(1).

The factual element that distinguishes the charged offense of aggravated 

sexual assault from the lesser included offense of indecency with a child is the 

allegation that Appellant caused contact of T.M.H.’s sexual organ with his mouth. 

As reflected above in his written statement, Appellant stated that he kissed T.M.H. 

on her vagina. T.M.H. testified as follows about what occurred at the cemetery: 

Q. Okay. Now, when you got to the cemetery, what happened?

A. I got out of the truck and went and looked at the headstones 

of all the different people and we headed back to the truck. And I was 

on the passenger’s side and he -- we started kissing and he -- he put his 

hands on me and stuff. And then we moved to the back of the -- on the

tailgate and he kissed me some more. And at that time, my clothes had 

winded up coming off. And he kissed me down from my mouth, to my 

neck, to my breasts, and down to my vagina.

. . . .

Q. . . . You said he, ultimately, kissed you on your vagina?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And I talked to you yesterday and we talked in a little more 

detail. And you understand what the term “oral sex” means, don’t you?

A. Yes, sir.
7

Q. And I asked you if he did that. And what was your response 

-- what would be your response to that?

A. No.

Thus, the accounts offered into evidence from both Appellant and T.M.H. 

indicated that Appellant contacted T.M.H.’s female sexual organ with his mouth. In 

this regard, the term “female sexual organ” includes the vagina. Everage v. State, 

848 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no pet.). Appellant argues on 

appeal that T.M.H.’s response that Appellant did not engage in “oral sex” with her 

raised the possibility that Appellant was only guilty of indecency with a child by 

sexual contact. We disagree that this evidence would permit a rational jury to find 

that, if Appellant was guilty, he was guilty only of the lesser included offense of 

indecency with a child. See Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 383; Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536. 

The “no” response by T.M.H. to the prosecutor’s question about “oral sex” 

immediately followed her testimony confirming that Appellant kissed her on her 

vagina. The prosecutor’s reference to his prior conversation with T.M.H. about “oral 

sex” indicated that he was obviously referring to conduct beyond oral contact by 

Appellant’s mouth with T.M.H.’s vagina when he asked the subsequent question. 

We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

In his second issue, Appellant asserts that his trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he alleges that trial counsel failed to 

object to a reference by Ranger Vandygriff to a polygraph examination, that trial 

counsel failed to object to various instances of hearsay, and that trial counsel failed 

to adequately assert Appellant’s right to the submission of a charge on the lesser 

included offense that we addressed in the previous issue.
8

To determine whether Appellant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance, we must first determine whether Appellant has shown that his counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, if so, then 

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different but for his counsel’s errors. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55–57 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1986). We must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and Appellant must 

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action could 

be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Tong v. State, 25 

S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel must be firmly founded in 

the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged 

ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The 

record on direct appeal is generally undeveloped and rarely sufficient to overcome 

the presumption that trial counsel rendered effective assistance. Bone v. State, 77 

S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14. The 

Court of Criminal Appeals has said that “trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded 

an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective.” 

Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). If trial counsel did 

not had an opportunity to explain his actions, we will not find deficient performance 

unless the challenged conduct was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would 

have engaged in it.” Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 

We note at the outset of our analysis that Appellant did not file a motion for new 

trial. Accordingly, the appellate record does not contain an explanation from trial 

counsel concerning his actions.
9

Appellant initially asserts that trial counsel should have objected to Ranger 

Vandygriff’s reference to a polygraph examination. When asked why his initial 

interview with Appellant terminated, Ranger Vandygriff stated, “I advised 

[Appellant] at the time that I didn’t think he was giving us the complete truth and 

that at this point, I think it would be appropriate if we asked him for a polygraph 

interview, and he said he would give a polygraph interview.” Ranger Vandygriff 

then explained that a polygraph examination of a law enforcement officer requires 

some additional steps that needed to be done and that, during the interim, Appellant 

decided to speak with an attorney. Appellant contends that he was harmed by this 

testimony because it constituted evidence that he refused to take a polygraph 

examination.

To show ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to object during trial, 

Appellant must show that the trial judge would have committed error in overruling 

the objection. Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Ex 

parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“The failure to object 

to . . . admissible testimony . . . is not ineffective assistance.”). “Numerous cases 

have held that where a witness gives a nonresponsive answer that mentions a 

polygraph test was offered or taken, but does not mention the results of such a test, 

there is no error in failing to grant a mistrial.” Martines v. State, 371 S.W.3d 232, 

251 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (quoting Kugler v. State, 902 

S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d). No evidence 

was offered of the results of any polygraph examination. Furthermore, there is no 

evidence that Appellant refused to take a polygraph examination. To the contrary, 

Ranger Vandygriff indicated that Appellant was initially willing to take a polygraph 

examination. See Garcia v. State, 907 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

1995), aff’d, 981 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). However, the polygraph 

examination was ultimately not performed because Appellant confessed to the crime 
10

within a few hours in his subsequent interview with Ranger Vandygriff. 

Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the 

nonresponsive mention of a polygraph examination.

The instances of hearsay that Appellant cites involve testimony by 

Ranger Vandygriff pertaining to the alleged offense that T.M.H.’s mother reported 

to him, testimony by Ranger Vandygriff that Kent County Sheriff William Scogin 

had reported that an allegation had been made against Appellant, and testimony by 

Ranger Vandygriff pertaining to reports made to him by T.M.H.’s stepmother and 

Appellant’s wife. Appellant also contends that trial counsel should have objected to 

the admission of search warrant affidavits on hearsay and Confrontation Clause 

grounds. See U.S. CONST. amend VI.

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 

at trial, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). 

A statement not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay. 

Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The State may offer 

out-of-court statements into evidence without violating the hearsay rule to explain 

why the defendant became the subject of the investigation by law enforcement 

officials. Id. Extrajudicial statements of this type are not inadmissible hearsay 

because they are not admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id. We 

conclude that the trial court would not have erred in overruling hearsay objections 

to these matters cited by Appellant because they addressed the manner by which 

Appellant became a suspect.

Moreover, even if the trial court had erred in overruling Appellant’s 

Confrontation Clause and hearsay objections, such errors would be subject to a harm 

analysis. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2; Rubio v. State, 241 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007) (“[A]ny Confrontation Clause violation, once proven, is subject to harmless 

error analysis.”); Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 905–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 
11

(conducting harmless error analysis on hearsay). When a trial court erroneously 

admits hearsay, but the matter asserted by the out-of-court statement is otherwise 

established through other admitted evidence, no harm is done to the party 

challenging the hearsay. See Clay, 240 S.W.3d at 905–06 (holding that erroneously 

admitted hearsay “established little, if anything, negative about appellant that was 

not also well established by the properly admitted evidence” and was therefore 

harmless). The same rule applies with respect to evidence elicited in violation of the 

Confrontation Clause. See Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 853–56 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006) (observing that testimony admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause 

was cumulative of other admitted evidence and that any error was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt). The matters cited by Appellant were cumulative of the facts set 

out in Appellant’s written statement and the live testimony offered at trial. 

Accordingly, the alleged deficiencies cited by Appellant do not satisfy the second 

prong of Strickland because they do not demonstrate a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the case would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Finally, Appellant contends that trial counsel failed to present the correct 

argument in seeking the submission of a charge on the lesser included offense of 

indecency with a child that we addressed in the first issue. He contends that counsel 

should have cited the holding in Evans that indecency with a child is a lesser included 

offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child when both offenses are predicated on 

the same act. See Evans, 299 S.W.3d at 142–43. We disagree. We have determined

that Appellant was not entitled to the requested charge because the evidence did not 

raise the possibility that he was only guilty of the lesser included offense. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling was supported by the record irrespective of the 

argument made by trial counsel. We overrule Appellant’s second issue.

In his third issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting a 

topless photograph of T.M.H. into evidence during the punishment phase of trial. 
12

T.M.H. took the photograph of herself in a mirror with her cell phone. She sent the 

photograph to Appellant electronically. Taylor County Deputy Sheriff Craig Griffis, 

an expert in computer and cell phone forensics, recovered the photograph from 

Appellant’s computer. Deputy Griffis testified that he found three copies of the 

photograph in a folder on Appellant’s computer. Appellant objected on multiple 

grounds to the admission of the photograph into evidence during the punishment 

phase. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting the photograph

under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 because its probative value was outweighed by 

its prejudicial effect. We disagree. 

We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an 

abuse of discretion standard. See Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts outside the zone of 

reasonable disagreement. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2003). At the punishment phase, the State may introduce evidence of any matter the 

court deems relevant to sentencing, including any extraneous bad acts. CRIM. PROC. 

art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1).

What is “relevant” to the punishment determination is simply that 

which will assist the fact finder in deciding the appropriate sentence in 

a particular case. When the jury assesses punishment, it must be able 

to tailor the sentence to the particular defendant, and relevance is 

simply “a question of what is helpful to the jury in determining the 

appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a particular case.”

Sims v. State, 273 S.W.3d 291, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (footnote omitted) 

(quoting Ellison v. State, 201 S.W.3d 714, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

Rule 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 

or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. The State
13

contends that the photograph was probative to establish that the alleged conduct was 

not a one-time lapse in judgment on the part of Appellant. In this regard, the 

prosecutor argued that the photograph constituted a “trophy” of what Appellant had 

done with T.M.H. in the cemetery. While the photograph was graphic in nature and 

certainly prejudicial, it merely reflects what Appellant had done with respect to the 

child victim and is probative of the nature of their relationship. See Sonnier v. State, 

913 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Appellant’s possession of the topless

photograph of T.M.H. was relevant to his character at punishment. We cannot 

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the 

photograph’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice by admitting the photograph into evidence during the punishment 

phase of trial. We overrule Appellant’s third issue.

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY

JUSTICE

October 30, 2015

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.