*

 Appellees notified this court that they were never served with process in the

district court and would not be filing a brief or otherwise participating in this

appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded

that oral argument is unnecessary. Accordingly, the appeal is submitted on the

appellant’s brief and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 22, 2005*

Decided October 19, 2005

Before

 Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 05-2175

GREGORY ADAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

U. DURAI, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Western Division

No. 05 C 50048

Philip G. Reinhard, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Illinois inmate Gregory Adams suffers from schizophrenia. In a complaint

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Adams claims that a prison doctor and several

administrators were deliberately indifferent to his condition in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. Adams appeals.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-2175 Page 2

1Priapism is a “[p]ersistent, painful erection of the penis without sexual

desire or arousal.” American Medical Association, Complete Medical Encyclopedia

1017 (Jerrold B. Leikin & Martin S. Lipsky eds., 2003). It is a rare side effect of

Seroquel and other psychotropics, Physicians’ Desk Reference 664 (59th ed. 2005),

and a reported side effect of Paxil, id. at 1591.

For our purposes we accept the allegations in the complaint as true. 

Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000). Because of his

schizophrenia Adams hears voices. While he was incarcerated at Stateville

Correctional Center, doctors treated him with a combination of Seroquel (a

psychotropic) and Paxil (an antidepressant). He took these medications without

experiencing adverse side effects. After Adams was transferred from Stateville to

the Dixon Correctional Center, he met with a Dr. Durai for the first time and told

him that his current medications controlled the voices he heard during the day, “but

at night the voices got really bad.” In response Dr. Durai substituted Risperdal (a

psychotropic) for the Seroquel and Paxil. Adams took the Risperdal, but it caused

him to regurgitate every time he ate, resulting in the discontinuance of this

medication under the direction of another physician at the Dixon infirmary. 

Dr. Durai thereafter prescribed what Adams identifies as “the Psy. Med. Agiocath.” 

Adams asked the physician about the medication’s possible side effects, and

Dr. Durai replied that Agiocath was “new to the market” but would control the

voices.

 After beginning treatment with Agiocath, Adams experienced an episode of

priapism.1 Doctors at Dixon referred Adams to the University of Illinois Research

Center, where examining physicians concluded that the “Agiocath” caused the

priapism and recommended that Adams stop taking the medication. When Adams

returned to Dixon, Dr. Durai and a second physician again prescribed Seroquel and

Paxil. Adams reported to Dr. Durai two or three weeks later that he was “doing

fairly well” taking Seroquel and Paxil. Dr. Durai continued him on Seroquel but

discontinued the Paxil.

Adams later experienced a second episode of priapism. Dixon’s Medical

Director, Dr. Mesrobian, treated Adams for this second episode, cancelled all of his

medications, and sent him back to the University of Illinois Research Center to

determine whether “the medications has or had any lifetime problems or had any

adverse effect on [Adams’s] reproductive organs.” The university doctors concluded

that Adams was “alright/OK,” but at the time he filed his lawsuit Adams was being

given nothing to combat the voices he hears.

Prior to filing suit, Adams submitted two prison grievances, each complaining

about Dr. Durai’s choice of medications and the resulting side effects. Adams

demanded reassignment to another psychiatrist. Counselors Schryver and Callan
No. 05-2175 Page 3

denied the grievances. Adams submitted an appeal to the Administrative Review

Board, which was met with a request for additional information. Adams, who

apparently never responded to the request, then brought this action against

Dr. Durai, Schryver and Callan, and reviewing official Walker. The district court

dismissed the complaint at the initial screening stage, reasoning that Adams

pleaded no more than his disagreement with Dr. Durai’s medical judgment and

that, without a valid claim against the doctor, his case against the administrators

who denied his grievances also failed.

Adams, who was pro se in the district court, is now represented by counsel. 

He argues on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint under

§ 1915A(b)(1) because he adequately pleaded a § 1983 claim for denial of medical

care arising out of Dr. Durai’s decisions to treat him with Agiocath, a drug that does

not appear in a search of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration website, and to

remove him entirely from other medications. Although Adams’s complaint does not

focus on the possibility that Agiocath was an unapproved drug, this allegation is

consistent with the facts he pleaded, so we may consider it on appeal. See Travel

All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir.

1996) (holding that appellate court may consider new factual allegations raised for

first time on appeal so long as they are consistent with complaint).

We review Adams’s complaint de novo and draw all inferences in his favor. 

See Zimmerman, 226 F.3d at 571. A complaint need include only “the bare

minimum facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that he can

file an answer,” Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002), and thus we

cannot affirm the dismissal unless “it appears beyond doubt” that Adams can prove

no set of facts that would entitle him to relief, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957); see Zimmerman, 226 F.3d at 571. Moreover, because Adams proceeded pro

se in the district court, we construe his complaint liberally and subject it to less

stringent scrutiny than complaints prepared by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir.

2001).

To establish § 1983 liability for denial of medical care, an inmate must

demonstrate that he was suffering from an objectively serious medical condition

that the defendants knew about but ignored. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653

(7th Cir. 2005); Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2005). Negligence

or even gross negligence does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim, but

blatantly inappropriate treatment or intentional mistreatment is actionable under

§ 1983. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Pate, 493

F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974). Moreover, the Eighth Amendment protects against

deliberate indifference to current serious health problems as well as to conditions

that pose “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to future health.” Board, 394

F.3d at 479 (emphasis omitted).
No. 05-2175 Page 4

Adams’s allegations extend beyond mere disagreement with Dr. Durai’s

choice of treatment. Schizophrenia is a serious illness. See Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of

Cook County, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997); Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191

(7th Cir. 1996). Adams complains that Dr. Durai administered an unapproved drug

that caused potentially serious side effects and then later discontinued his

FDA-approved medications altogether. His allegations may not be true, and quite

possibly Adams is mistaken about the drugs he was given or that are now available

to him. Nonetheless, we are required to accept his allegations as true, as was the

district court at this early stage of the litigation. Thus the district court should

have allowed the case to proceed as to Dr. Durai.

We reach a different result as to Schryver, Callan, and Walker. To establish

an Eighth Amendment claim against these administrative officials for denying his

grievances, Adams would have to show that they were personally responsible for the

alleged constitutional deprivations. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428

(7th Cir. 1996). Just because an inmate has complained to prison officials about

unconstitutional conditions of confinement does not mean that the administrator

who reviewed but denied the complaint bears personal responsibility for the alleged

conduct. Especially in the area of medical care, prison officials who are not

physicians themselves are entitled to defer to the medical judgment of staff

physicians. See Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872, 875-76 (7th Cir. 2002). An

administrator does not become responsible for a doctor’s exercise of medical

judgment simply by virtue of reviewing an inmate grievance, see Greeno, 414 F.3d

at 655-56, and that is all Adams alleges here. The district court’s dismissal of the

claims against defendants Schryver, Callan, and Walker was proper. 

Accordingly, the judgment is VACATED insofar as it dismisses the suit

against Dr. Durai, and the case is REMANDED for the case against him to proceed. 

In all other respects the judgment is AFFIRMED.