8764 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 32 / Wednesday, February 16, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

RULE] that the employer can 

demonstrate are at least as protective as 

powered industrial trucks that are 

designed and constructed in accordance 

with one of the consensus standards 

listed in paragraph (c)(1)(vi)(A) of this 

section will be deemed to be in 

compliance with the requirements of 

paragraph (c)(1)(vi)(A) of this section. 

(C) All industrial trucks manufactured 

on or after [DATE OF PUBLICATION 

OF THE FINAL RULE] and used by an 

employer shall meet the design and 

construction requirements for powered 

industrial trucks established in the 

applicable ANSI B56 standard in table 

1 to this paragraph (c)(1)(vi). 

(D) Powered industrial trucks 

manufactured on or after [DATE 30 

DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE 

FINAL RULE] that the employer can 

demonstrate are at least as protective as 

powered industrial trucks that are 

designed and constructed in accordance 

with the applicable ANSI B56 standard 

in table 1 to this paragraph (c)(1)(vi) will 

be deemed to be in compliance with the 

requirements of paragraph (c)(1)(vi)(C) 

of this section. 

(E) All industrial trucks in use shall 

meet the applicable requirements of 

stability, inspection, testing, 

maintenance, and operation, as defined 

in American National Standards 

Institute B56.1–1969, Safety Standards 

for Powered Industrial Trucks. 

TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (c)(1)(vi) 

Design and construction requirements for powered industrial trucks in ANSI B56 1

ANSI/ITSDF B56.1—2020, Safety Standard for Low Lift and High Lift Trucks. 

ANSI/ITSDF B56.5—2019, Safety Standard for Driverless, Automatic Guided Industrial Vehicles and Automated Functions of Manned Industrial 

Vehicles. 

ANSI/ITSDF B56.6—2021, Safety Standard for Rough Terrain Forklift Trucks. 

1 Incorporated by reference, see § 1926.6. 

* * * * * 

[FR Doc. 2022–01155 Filed 2–15–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–26–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Parts 1 and 27 

[AU Docket No. 20–429; DA 22–120; FR ID 

71309] 

Auction of Flexible-Use Licenses in the 

2.5 GHz Band for Next-Generation 

Wireless Services; Further Comment 

Sought on Competitive Bidding 

Procedures for Auction 108 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; proposed auction 

procedures. 

SUMMARY: The Office of Economics and 

Analytics and the Wireless 

Telecommunications Bureau seek 

further comment on the procedures to 

be used for Auction 108, an auction of 

approximately 8,300 geographic overlay 

licenses in the 2.5 GHz band. This 

document describes the procedures for 

an ascending clock auction format and 

seeks comment on whether this format 

would address concerns and suggestions 

raised by commenters with respect to 

both the single-round and simultaneous 

multiple-round auction formats on 

which the Federal Communication 

Commission (Commission or FCC) 

sought comment in the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice. 

DATES: Comments are due on or before 

February 23, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file 

comments in AU Docket No. 20–429. 

Comments may be filed using the 

Commission’s Electronic Comment 

Filing System (ECFS) or by filing paper 

copies. Interested parties are strongly 

encouraged to file comments 

electronically. 

• Electronic Filers: Comments may be 

filed electronically using the internet by 

accessing the ECFS at https://

www.fcc.gov/ecfs/. 

• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to 

file by paper must file an original and 

one copy of each filing. 

• Filings in response to the Public 

Notice can be sent by commercial 

courier or by first-class or overnight U.S. 

Postal Service mail. All filings must be 

addressed to the Commission’s 

Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 

Federal Communications Commission. 

• Commercial deliveries (other than 

U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and 

Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 

Junction Dr., Annapolis Junction, MD 

20701. 

• U.S. Postal Service first-class, 

Express, or Priority mail must be 

addressed to 45 L Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20554. 

• Until further notice, the 

Commission no longer accepts any hand 

or messenger delivered filings. This is a 

temporary measure taken to help protect 

the health and safety of individuals, and 

to mitigate the transmission of COVID– 

19. 

• Email: Commenters are asked to 

also submit a copy of their comments 

and reply comments electronically to 

the following address: auction108@

fcc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Auction Legal Questions: Daniel 

Habif, (202) 418–0660, Daniel.Habif@

fcc.gov; Lyndsey Grunewald, (202) 418– 

0660, Lyndsey.Grunewald@fcc.gov; or 

Scott Mackoul, (202) 418–0660, 

Scott.Mackoul@fcc.gov. 

General Auction Questions: (717) 

338–2868. 

2.5 GHz Band Licensing Questions: 

Madelaine Maior, (202) 418–1466, 

Madelaine.Maior@fcc.gov 

Madelaine.Maior@fcc.gov or Nadja 

Sodos-Wallace, (202) 418–0955, 

Nadja.Sodoswallace@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice, AU Docket No. 

20–429, DA 22–120, adopted on 

February 9, 2022 and released on 

February 9, 2022. The complete text of 

the Auction 108 Further Comment 

Public Notice is available on the 

Commission’s website at https://

www.fcc.gov/auction/108 or by using 

the search function for AU Docket No. 

20–429, DA 22–120, on the 

Commission’s Electronic Comment 

Filing System (ECFS) web page at 

www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Alternative formats 

are available to persons with disabilities 

by sending an email to FCC504@fcc.gov 

or by calling the Consumer & 

Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 

418–0530 (voice), (202) 418–0432 

(TTY). 

I. Introduction 

1. By the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice, the Office of 

Economics and Analytics (OEA), jointly 

with the Wireless Telecommunications 

Bureau (WTB), seeks further comment 

on the auction format to be used for 

Auction 108. Specifically, the Public 

Notice seeks comment on whether the 

use of an ascending clock auction 

format—a multiple-round auction with 

bidding for frequency-specific blocks— 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 32 / Wednesday, February 16, 2022 / Proposed Rules 8765 

would address certain concerns and 

suggestions raised by commenters with 

respect to both the single-round and 

simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) 

auction formats on which the 

Commission sought comment in the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice, 86 

FR 12146, March 3, 2021. 

2. On January 13, 2021, the 

Commission released the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice seeking 

comment on competitive bidding 

procedures and various other 

procedures to be used in Auction 108, 

in accordance with 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3). 

In that public notice, the Commission 

described and sought comment on a 

single-round auction format with userdefined package bidding, and on an 

SMR auction format. 

3. Numerous commenters responded 

to the Auction 108 Comment Public 

Notice expressing specific concerns 

with one or the other format. In 

particular, several commenters express 

concern that the potentially long 

duration of an SMR auction could deter 

participation. Some commenters assert 

that the costs of monitoring an overly 

long auction, as well as complying with 

an extended quiet period, would be 

burdensome for bidders, especially 

smaller entities, and accordingly, they 

favor the single-round approach. On the 

other hand, several commenters cite the 

unfamiliarity of the single-round format 

as problematic, claiming that the 

additional resources needed to 

understand the auction format and 

develop an optimal bidding strategy 

could deter participation. 

4. The Auction 108 Further Comment 

Public Notice seeks comment on 

whether the clock auction procedures 

set forth here would be an appropriate 

means of addressing these concerns and 

suggestions. The clock auction 

procedures described below, like the 

SMR, would be for a multiple-round 

auction, a characteristic which is 

favored by several commenters. A clock 

auction is a familiar auction format, 

which has been used in a number of 

recent FCC spectrum and Universal 

Service Fund auctions. In addition, 

comments filed in response to the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice 

suggest the use of intra-round bidding to 

reduce the length of an SMR auction. 

Intra-round bidding, however, is not a 

feature of Commission SMR auctions, 

but has been regularly used in clock 

auctions. Commenters also suggest the 

use of proxy bidding as an option to 

reduce the costs to bidders of 

continually monitoring a lengthy 

multiple-round auction. Proxy bidding 

has been provided as an option to 

bidders in reverse clock auctions, but 

has not been a feature of past SMR 

auctions. 

5. To date, the Commission has used 

an ascending clock auction format in 

situations in which multiple frequency 

blocks of similar spectrum were offered, 

where a clock auction could be 

conducted more efficiently than could 

an SMR auction with license-by-license 

bidding. Consistent with these 

experiences, in the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice the Commission 

discounted the appropriateness of the 

typical clock auction format it uses— 

with multiple generic blocks in a 

category— for this auction of 

heterogenous licenses. However, given 

commenters’ requests for a familiar 

auction format with a manageable 

duration, with the benefits of intraround bidding and proxy bidding, the 

Auction 108 Further Comment Public 

Notice seeks comment on whether the 

clock auction format is more responsive 

to bidder needs than the auction formats 

outlined in the Auction 108 Comment 

Public Notice. 

6. As an initial matter, the Auction 

108 Further Comment Public Notice 

seeks comment on whether the 

proposals concerning upfront payments 

and bidding eligibility as described in 

the Auction 108 Comment Public Notice 

remain reasonable and appropriate if 

Auction 108 is conducted under the 

clock auction format discussed herein. 

The clock auction procedures discussed 

in the Auction 108 Further Comment 

Public Notice do not impact the 

proposals described in the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice with respect to 

implementation of the Commission’s 

part 1 competitive bidding rules. Thus, 

in calculating its upfront payment 

amount and hence its initial bidding 

eligibility for the clock auction format 

set forth below, an applicant would 

determine the maximum number of 

bidding units on which it may wish to 

bid in any single round, and submit an 

upfront payment amount covering that 

total number of bidding units. 

7. The Auction 108 Further Comment 

Public Notice seeks focused input on 

whether the clock auction bidding 

format discussed herein would address 

issues raised by commenters with 

respect to both the SMR and singleround auction formats. It is not intended 

to invite further comment on other 

procedures proposed in the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice apart from 

auction design. In light of the limited 

scope of the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice and comments 

urging the Commission to move 

expeditiously to the start of bidding, 

OEA and WTB provide for a single 

round of comments by February 23, 

2022, with no filing period for reply 

comments. A subsequent public notice 

will announce final procedures for 

Auction 108, including the procedures, 

terms, conditions, dates, and deadlines 

for applying to and participating in 

Auction 108, as well as provide an 

overview of the post-auction application 

and payment processes. 

II. Further Comment Sought on Bidding 

Procedures 

8. The Auction 108 Further Comment 

Public Notice seeks comment on 

additional multiple-round auction 

procedures prompted by filings in this 

proceeding. In particular, OEA and 

WTB ask for feedback on the use of a 

clock auction format with bidding on 

specific licenses. This clock auction 

format, if adopted, would follow the 

basic structure of the ascending clock 

auction used in previous FCC spectrum 

clock auctions, in which bidding in the 

clock phase was conducted for multiple 

generic spectrum blocks in a category in 

a geographic area, with adjustments, as 

described below, to account for the fact 

that Auction 108 would have only a 

single frequency-specific license in a 

category in a county. If the clock auction 

format were adopted for Auction 108, 

there would be up to three categories of 

licenses in each county, with one 

license block in each category. 

Accordingly, OEA and WTB refer to this 

specific format as a clock auction with 

a supply of one in each category—or a 

clock-1 auction format. Unlike previous 

FCC spectrum clock auctions, Auction 

108 would not include an assignment 

phase, as none is needed with a format 

that provides for bidding on specific 

licenses. 

9. OEA and WTB released a technical 

guide concurrently with the Auction 

108 Further Comment Public Notice 

supplementing the information in it and 

providing the mathematical details and 

algorithms of the procedures described 

therein. The Clock-1 Technical Guide 

details procedures and provide 

examples for bidding in Auction 108 if 

a clock auction is adopted. 

A. Clock-1 Auction Structure 

10. Using the clock-1 format, if 

adopted, each bidder would be able to 

bid for licenses, where specific licenses 

will be identified by a category within 

a county. As in the SMR auction format, 

the auction would proceed in a series of 

rounds, with bidding conducted 

simultaneously for all licenses available 

in the auction. Consistent with prior 

FCC clock auctions, during each bidding 

round, the bidding system would 

announce a clock price for each license, 

and a bidder would indicate its demand 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
8766 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 32 / Wednesday, February 16, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

for licenses at the clock prices 

associated with the current round. After 

the first round, intra-round bids would 

also be allowed. 

11. The clock price for a license 

would increase from round to round if 

more than one bidder indicates demand 

for that license. The bidding rounds 

would continue until, for all licenses— 

that is, all categories in all counties—the 

number of bidders demanding each 

license does not exceed one. Once 

bidding rounds stop, the bidder with 

demand for a license becomes the 

winning bidder. 

12. The Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice seeks comment 

on the specific procedures OEA and 

WTB describe for conducting an auction 

of 2.5 GHz licenses, as an alternative 

approach that addresses the concerns of 

commenters with respect to the singleround and SMR formats described in the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice. 

1. Single Licenses in Three Bidding 

Categories 

13. Auction 108 will offer geographic 

overlay licenses for unassigned 

spectrum in the 2.5 GHz (2496–2690 

MHz) band, offered in up to three blocks 

of spectrum—49.5 megahertz, 50.5 

megahertz, and 17.5 megahertz blocks— 

licensed on a county basis. With overlay 

licenses, licensees obtain the rights to 

geographic area licenses overlaid on top 

of the existing incumbent licenses, 2.5 

GHz Report and Order, 84 FR 57343, 

October 25, 2019. As with an ordinary 

flexible-use license, the overlay licensee 

may operate anywhere within its 

geographic area, subject to protecting 

the licensed areas (i.e., circular 

Geographic Service Areas with a 35- 

mile radius) of incumbent licensees. If 

an incumbent licensee in a county 

cancels or terminates its license, then 

the overlay licensee obtains the rights to 

operate in the geographic area and on 

the channel of the canceled license. An 

overlay licensee may clear its 

geographic area by purchasing the 

incumbent licenses, but it does not have 

the exclusive right to negotiate with the 

incumbent licensee for its spectrum 

rights or to purchase an incumbent 

license in the geographic area in which 

it has the overlay rights. For bidding in 

this clock auction, in the counties where 

available, OEA and WTB would 

designate the 49.5 megahertz block as 

bidding category 1 (C1); the 50.5 

megahertz block as bidding category 2 

(C2); and the 17.5 megahertz block as 

bidding category 3 (C3). Specifically, the 

C1 license block would include 

channels A1–A3, B1–B3, C1–C3 (49.5 

megahertz); the C2 license block would 

include channels D1–D3, the J channels, 

and channels A4–G4 (50.5 megahertz); 

and the C3 license block would include 

channels G1–G3 and the relevant K 

channels (16.5 megahertz of contiguous 

spectrum and 1 megahertz of the K 

channels associated with the G channel 

group). Therefore, the combination of a 

bidding category and a county would 

define a single specific license, and 

bidding for a category and a county 

under the clock-1 auction format would 

constitute license-by-license bidding, as 

in the SMR format. 

2. Bidding Rounds 

14. Under the clock-1 auction format, 

Auction 108 would consist of multiple, 

sequential bidding rounds, each 

followed by the release of round results, 

as would an SMR auction. Bidding 

would be conducted simultaneously for 

all licenses—all categories in all 

counties available in the auction. In the 

first bidding round of Auction 108, a 

bidder would indicate, for each category 

and county, whether it demands the 

license at the minimum opening bid 

price. During each subsequent bidding 

round, the bidding system would 

announce a start-of-round price and a 

clock price for each license, and 

qualified bidders would indicate the 

licenses for which they wish to bid at 

the prices associated with the current 

round. Bidding rounds would be open 

for predetermined periods of time. 

Bidders would be subject to activity and 

eligibility rules that govern the pace at 

which they participate in the auction. 

15. For each category and county— 

that is, each license—the clock price for 

a license would increase from round to 

round if more than one bidder indicates 

demand for that license. The bidding 

rounds would continue until, for every 

category and county, demand does not 

exceed one. At that point, the bidder 

still indicating demand for a license 

would be deemed the winning bidder. 

16. As would be the case with the 

SMR format, the initial bidding 

schedule for a clock-1 auction would be 

announced in a public notice to be 

released at least one week before the 

start of bidding, and OEA would retain 

the discretion to adjust the bidding 

schedule in order to foster an auction 

pace that reasonably balances speed 

with the bidders’ needs to study round 

results and adjust their bidding 

strategies. Such adjustments may 

include changes in the amount of time 

for bidding rounds, the amount of time 

between rounds, and/or the number of 

rounds per day, and would depend 

upon bidding activity and other factors. 

17. Regardless of the format 

ultimately adopted, OEA and WTB 

would conduct Auction 108 over the 

internet. Under the clock-1 format, as 

with an SMR auction, a bidder would 

submit its bids using the bidding 

system’s upload function, which allows 

bid files in a comma-separated values 

(CSV) text format to be uploaded. The 

bidding system would allow a bidder to 

submit bids only for licenses in counties 

the bidder selected on its FCC Form 175 

and for which the bidder has sufficient 

bidding eligibility. 

18. During each round of the bidding, 

a bidder would be able to modify its 

bids placed in the current bidding 

round. It would do so by uploading a 

new file of all its bids, including the 

modifications, which would replace 

bids previously submitted in the round. 

The system would take the last bid file 

submission as that bidder’s bids for the 

round. 

3. Stopping Rule 

19. As in previous FCC clock and 

SMR auctions, with a clock-1 format for 

Auction 108, OEA and WTB would use 

a simultaneous stopping rule, under 

which all licenses would remain 

available for bidding until the bidding 

stops on all licenses. The Commission 

has discretion to establish stopping 

rules before or during multiple round 

auctions in order to complete the 

auction within a reasonable time, 47 

CFR 1.2104(e). Specifically, bidding 

would close for all licenses after the first 

round in which demand does not 

exceed one for any license. 

Consequently, under this approach, it is 

not possible to determine in advance 

how long Auction 108 would last. 

4. Availability of Bidding Information 

20. The bidding system would 

disclose, after each round of Auction 

108, clock auction round results 

analogous to those for an SMR auction: 

Namely, for each license, the aggregate 

demand, the posted price of the last 

completed round, and the clock price 

for the next round. The posted price of 

the previous round is, generally, the 

start-of-round price if supply exceeds 

demand; the clock price of the previous 

round if demand exceeds supply; or the 

price at which a reduction caused 

demand to equal supply. Note that, for 

Auction 108, supply equals one. The 

identities of bidders making specific 

bids would not be disclosed until after 

the close of bidding in the auction. 

21. Each bidder would have access to 

additional information related to its 

own bidding and bid eligibility. 

Specifically, after the bids of a round 

have been processed, the bidding 

system would inform each bidder of the 

licenses it currently demands (its 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 32 / Wednesday, February 16, 2022 / Proposed Rules 8767 

processed demand) and its eligibility for 

the next round. 

B. Activity Rule 

22. In order to ensure that the auction 

closes within a reasonable period of 

time, an activity rule requires bidders to 

bid actively throughout the auction, 

rather than wait until late in the auction 

before participating, an approach that is 

routinely used in multiple-round 

auctions such as the SMR and the clock 

auction. For a clock-1 auction, a 

bidder’s activity in a round for purposes 

of the activity rule would be the sum of 

the bidding units associated with the 

bidder’s demands as applied by the 

auction system during bid processing 

(its processed demand). Bidders are 

required to be active on a specific 

percentage (the activity requirement 

percentage) of their current bidding 

eligibility during each round of the 

auction. Failure to maintain the 

requisite activity level would result in a 

reduction in the bidder’s eligibility, 

possibly curtailing or eliminating the 

bidder’s ability to place bids in 

subsequent rounds of the auction. 

23. Under this auction format, a 

bidder would be required to maintain a 

fixed, high level of activity in each 

round of Auction 108 in order to 

maintain its bidding eligibility. 

Specifically, a bidder would be required 

to be active on between 90% and 100% 

of its bidding eligibility in all rounds, 

with the specific percentage within this 

range to be set for each round. Thus, the 

activity rule would be satisfied when a 

bidder has bidding activity on licenses 

with bidding units that total 90% to 

100% of its current eligibility in the 

round. OEA and WTB would set the 

activity requirement percentage initially 

at 95%. If the activity rule is met, then 

the bidder’s eligibility would not change 

for the next round. If the activity rule is 

not met in a round, the bidder’s 

eligibility would be reduced 

accordingly. Bidding activity would be 

based on the bids that are applied by the 

FCC auction bidding system. That is, if 

a bidder bids to reduce its demand for 

a license, but the FCC auction bidding 

system cannot apply the request because 

demand for that license would fall 

below one, then the bidder’s activity 

would reflect its unreduced demand. 

24. OEA would retain the discretion 

to change the activity requirement 

percentage during the auction. The 

bidding system would announce any 

such changes in advance of the round in 

which they would take effect, giving 

bidders adequate notice to adjust their 

bidding strategies. 

25. Contingent Bidding Limit. The 

Auction 108 Further Comment Public 

Notice seeks comment on procedures by 

which, after Round 1, a bidder may 

submit bids with bidding units totaling 

up to a contingent bidding limit greater 

than or equal to the bidder’s current 

bidding eligibility for the round, as in 

the three most recent FCC clock 

auctions. A bidder’s contingent bidding 

limit would be calculated as its current 

eligibility times a contingent bidding 

percentage equal to or greater than 

100%. 

26. Allowing a bidder to submit bids 

with associated bidding activity greater 

than its current bidding eligibility 

would potentially help a bidder avoid 

having its eligibility reduced as a result 

of submitted bids that could not be 

applied during bid processing. 

However, even under these additional 

procedures, the bidder’s activity as 

applied by the auction system during 

bid processing would not exceed the 

bidder’s current bidding eligibility. That 

is, if a bidder were allowed to submit 

bids with associated bidding units 

exceeding 100% of its current bidding 

eligibility, its processed activity would 

never exceed its eligibility. 

27. The Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice seeks comment 

on whether OEA and WTB should allow 

bidders to submit bids with associated 

bidding activity greater than their 

current bidding eligibility. If adopted, 

OEA and WTB would set the initial 

contingent bidding percentage at 120%, 

which would apply starting in Round 2, 

subject to change in subsequent rounds 

within a range of 100% to 140%. In any 

bidding round, the auction bidding 

system would advise the bidder of its 

current bidding eligibility, its required 

bidding activity, and its contingent 

bidding limit. 

C. Acceptable Bids 

1. Minimum Opening Bids 

28. Minimum opening bids would 

serve as initial clock prices under a 

clock-1 auction format. In Round 1 of 

the auction, qualified bidders would 

indicate the licenses they demand at the 

minimum opening bids. OEA and WTB 

seek comment on whether use of a 

clock-1 auction format would warrant 

any change to the minimum opening 

bids proposed in the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice. 

2. Clock Price Increments 

29. Under clock-1 procedures for 

Auction 108, after bidding in the first 

round and before each subsequent 

round, for each license, the FCC auction 

bidding system would announce the 

start-of-round price (also referred to as 

the posted price) and the clock price for 

the upcoming round—that is, the lowest 

price and the highest price at which 

bidders can indicate their demand for 

the license during the round. As long as 

aggregate demand for the license 

exceeds one, the start-of-round price 

would be equal to the clock price from 

the prior round. If demand equaled one 

at a price in a previous round, then the 

start-of-round price for the next round 

would be equal to the price at which 

demand equaled one. If demand was 

zero in the previous round, then the 

start-of-round price for the next round 

would not increase. 

30. The clock price for a license for 

a round would be set by adding a 

percentage increment to the start-ofround price. OEA would set the 

increment percentage within a range of 

5% to 30% inclusive, with the initial 

increment percentage at 10%, and 

potentially would adjust the increment 

as rounds continue. OEA would retain 

the discretion to cap the increment if 

the total dollar amount of the increment 

(the difference between the clock price 

and the start-of-round price) would 

exceed a certain amount. The 5% to 

30% increment range and cap would 

allow OEA and WTB to set a percentage 

that manages the auction pace and takes 

into account bidders’ needs to evaluate 

their bidding strategies while moving 

the auction along quickly. 

3. Intra-Round Bids 

31. The use of intra-round bidding has 

been suggested as a method of reducing 

the number of bidding rounds needed 

for the auction to reach equilibrium 

prices. Intra-round bidding could be 

particularly useful in the instant context 

given the number of licenses being 

offered, such that there would be more 

benefit than usual in reducing the 

number of bidding rounds. While the 

Commission has never conducted an 

SMR auction with intra-round bidding, 

it is a familiar feature of the 

Commission’s recent clock auctions. To 

address commenters’ concerns about the 

length of a multiple-round auction 

while also being mindful of comments 

that the use of a familiar auction format 

would foster participation, the Auction 

108 Further Comment Public Notice 

seeks comment on use of intra-round 

bidding under the clock-1 format. Could 

intra-round bidding be useful in 

reducing the number of bidding rounds 

needed for the auction to reach 

equilibrium prices? 

32. In a clock-1 auction, in a round 

after the first round, a bidder would be 

permitted to make intra-round bids by 

indicating a point between the start-ofround price and the clock price at 

which its demand for a license changes. 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
8768 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 32 / Wednesday, February 16, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

In placing an intra-round bid for a 

license, a bidder would indicate a 

specific price and the changed quantity 

it demands (either zero or one) if the 

price for the license should increase 

beyond that price. 

33. Intra-round bid amounts would be 

limited to multiples of $10 for prices 

below $10,000; to multiples of $100 for 

prices between $10,000 and $100,000, 

inclusive; and to multiples of $1,000 for 

prices above $100,000. 

34. Intra-round bids would be 

optional; a bidder may choose to 

express its demands only at the start-ofround price or the clock price. Using 

intra-round bidding would allow the 

auction system to use relatively large 

percentage increments, thereby 

speeding up the auction, without 

running the risk that a jump in the clock 

price will overshoot the market clearing 

price—the point at which only one 

bidder demands the license—because 

bidders could specify an amount lower 

than the clock price. 

4. Proxy Bids 

35. To address commenters’ concerns 

that monitoring every round of a 

multiple-round auction may be 

burdensome, especially for smaller 

bidders, the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice seeks comment 

on providing each bidder with the 

option to use proxy bidding under the 

clock-1 format. OEA and WTB would 

permit a bidder to submit a proxy 

instruction to the bidding system to 

reduce its demand for a license to zero 

at a price higher than the current 

round’s clock price. A bidder would 

submit its proxy instructions along with 

its bids, using the bidding system’s 

upload function described in Section 

II.A.2 (Bidding Rounds), above. Proxy 

instructions to increase a bidder’s 

demand for a license at a given price 

would not be permitted. 

36. Under these procedures, if a proxy 

instruction has been submitted, the 

bidding system would automatically 

submit a proxy bid to maintain the 

bidder’s demand for the license in every 

subsequent round as long as the clock 

price for the round is less than the 

proxy instruction price. In the first 

round in which the clock price is greater 

than or equal to the proxy instruction 

price, the bidding system would submit 

a proxy bid on behalf of the bidder to 

reduce the bidder’s demand for that 

license to zero at the proxy instruction 

price. 

37. In the case that a bid to reduce 

demand, placed according to proxy 

instructions or submitted by the bidder 

in the round, is not applied during bid 

processing, the bidding system would 

automatically generate a proxy 

instruction at the bid price and, in the 

following rounds, submit proxy bids on 

behalf of the bidder according to that 

proxy instruction. 

38. In any round, a bidder can remove 

or modify any existing proxy 

instructions or proxy bids for the round 

by uploading a new bid file, including 

the modifications, which would replace 

any bids and proxy instructions 

previously submitted. The system 

would take the last bid file submission 

as that bidder’s bids and proxy 

instructions. 

39. As is the case for intra-round bid 

amounts, proxy instruction prices 

would be limited to multiples of $10 for 

prices below $10,000; to multiples of 

$100 for prices between $10,000 and 

$100,000, inclusive; and to multiples of 

$1,000 for prices above $100,000. Proxy 

instructions would not be publicly 

released either during or after the 

auction. 

5. Bid Types 

40. Under a clock-1 auction format for 

Auction 108, as in other FCC spectrum 

clock auctions, a bidder would indicate 

in each round the licenses it demands 

at the prices associated with the round. 

Bidders would be permitted to make 

two types of bids: Simple bids and 

switch bids. 

41. A simple bid indicates a desired 

quantity (in this auction, one or zero) at 

a price. A bidder that is willing to 

maintain its demand for a license at the 

new clock price would bid for the 

license at the clock price, indicating that 

it is willing to pay up to that price, if 

need be, for the license. A bidder that 

wishes to change the quantity it 

demands for a license (relative to its 

processed demand from the previous 

round) would express the price (either 

the clock price or an intra-round price) 

at which it wishes to change its 

demand. 

42. A switch bid allows the bidder to 

request to move its demand for a license 

from C1 to C2, or vice versa, within the 

same county at a price for the from 

category (either the clock price or an 

intra-round price). Switch bids are 

allowed only in counties with both an 

available Category 1 and a Category 2 

license. 

43. Bids to maintain demand would 

always be applied by the auction 

bidding system during bid processing. 

Simple bids to change demand and 

switch bids would not necessarily be 

applied during bid processing. See 

Section II.D (Bid Processing) below for 

details on bid processing. 

6. Missing Bids 

44. Under the clock-1 auction format, 

a bidder would be required to indicate 

its demands in every round or have a 

proxy instruction in place (as in other 

FCC spectrum clock auctions), even if 

its demands at the new round’s prices 

are unchanged from the previous round. 

If a bidder does not submit a new bid 

for a license for which it had processed 

demand from the previous round and 

does not have a proxy instruction in 

place, the system will consider that a 

missing bid. 

45. Missing bids are treated by the 

auction bidding system as requests to 

reduce to a quantity of zero for the 

license. If these requests are applied, 

then a bidder’s bidding activity, and its 

bidding eligibility for the next round, 

may be reduced. Unlike in previous FCC 

clock auctions, under the clock-1 format 

for Auction 108, a bidder would be 

permitted to enter proxy instructions. 

Thus, a bidder that is unable to indicate 

its demands in every round can avoid 

having missing bids by entering 

appropriate proxy instructions. 

D. Bid Processing 

46. After each bidding round, bid 

processing procedures would process 

bids to change demand to determine the 

processed demand of each bidder for 

each license and a posted price for each 

license that would serve as the start-ofround price for the next round. The bid 

processing procedures described below 

are similar in many respects to other 

FCC spectrum clock auctions. 

1. No Excess Supply Rule for Bids To 

Reduce Demand 

47. Under the clock-1 auction format, 

the FCC auction bidding system would 

not allow a bidder to reduce its demand 

for a license if the reduction would 

cause demand to fall below one. 

Therefore, if a bidder has been bidding 

for a specific license but submits a 

simple bid to reduce its demand to zero 

for the license if the price should 

increase above the price in its bid, the 

FCC auction bidding system would treat 

the bid as a request to reduce demand 

that would be applied only if the no 

excess supply rule would be satisfied. 

Similarly, if a bidder submits a switch 

bid to move its demand from the C1 

license to the C2 license in the same 

county, the FCC auction bidding system 

would treat the bid as a request that 

would be applied only if the no excess 

supply rule would be satisfied for C1 in 

the county, and vice versa. Note, 

however, if a bid to reduce demand is 

not applied, the bidder will not be asked 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 32 / Wednesday, February 16, 2022 / Proposed Rules 8769 

to pay more for the license than the 

highest price it agreed to pay. 

2. Eligibility Rule for Bids To Increase 

Demand 

48. The bidding system would not 

allow a bidder to increase its demands 

for licenses if the total number of 

bidding units associated with the 

bidder’s demands exceeds the bidder’s 

bidding eligibility for the round. 

Therefore, if a bidder submits a simple 

bid to add a license for which it did not 

have processed demand in the previous 

round, the FCC auction bidding system 

would treat the bid as a request to 

increase demand that would be applied 

only if that would not cause the bidder’s 

activity to exceed its eligibility. Note, 

the eligibility rule for bids to increase 

demand is always satisfied for switch 

bids because the bidder’s processed 

activity does not change when a switch 

bid is applied (since, in a given county, 

the C1 and C2 licenses have the same 

number of bidding units). 

3. Processed Demand 

49. After a round ends, the bidding 

system would first consider and apply 

all bids to maintain demand, and then 

it would process bids to change demand 

in order of price point, where the price 

point represents the percentage of the 

bidding interval for the round. The 

bidding system would process bids to 

change demand in ascending order of 

price point, first considering intra-round 

bids in order of price point and then 

bids at the clock price. The system 

would consider bids at the lowest price 

point across all licenses, then look at 

bids at the next price point across all 

licenses, and so on. If there are multiple 

bids at a single price point, the system 

would process bids in order of a bidspecific pseudo-random number. As it 

considers each submitted bid during bid 

processing, the FCC auction bidding 

system would determine whether there 

is excess demand for a license at that 

point in the processing in order to 

determine whether a bidder’s request to 

reduce demand for that license can be 

applied. Likewise, the auction bidding 

system would evaluate the activity 

associated with the bidder’s most 

recently determined demands at that 

point in the processing to determine 

whether a request to increase demand 

can be applied. 

50. Because in any given round some 

bidders may request to increase 

demands for licenses while others may 

request reductions, the price point at 

which a bid is considered by the auction 

bidding system can affect whether it is 

applied. In addition, bids that were not 

applied because demand would fall 

below one or because the bidder’s 

activity (as applied by the auction 

system) would exceed its eligibility 

would be held in a queue and 

considered, again in price point order, 

if there should be excess demand or if 

the bidder’s activity (as applied by the 

auction system) is reduced sufficiently 

later in the processing after other bids 

are processed. 

51. Therefore, once a round closes, 

the auction system would process bids 

to change demand by first considering 

the bid submitted at the lowest price 

point and determining whether that bid 

can be applied given bidders’ demands 

as determined at that point in the bid 

processing. If the bid can be applied, the 

licenses that the bidder holds at that 

point in the processing would be 

adjusted, and aggregate demand for the 

license would be recalculated 

accordingly. If the bid cannot be 

applied, the unfulfilled bid would be 

held in a queue to be considered later 

during bid processing for that round. 

The FCC auction bidding system would 

then consider the bid submitted at the 

next lowest price point, applying it or 

not given the most recently determined 

demands of bidders. Any unfulfilled 

requests would again be held in the 

queue, and aggregate demand would 

again be recalculated. Every time a bid 

is applied, the unfulfilled bids held in 

the queue would be reconsidered, in the 

order of the original price points of the 

bids (and by pseudo-random number, in 

the case of tied price points). The 

auction bidding system would not carry 

over unfulfilled bid requests to the next 

round. The bidding system, however, 

would generate a proxy bid in the case 

of bids to reduce to zero that are not 

applied. The bidding system would 

advise bidders of the status of their bids 

when round results are released. 

4. Price Determination 

52. The FCC auction bidding system 

further would determine, based on 

aggregate demand, the posted price for 

each license for the round that would 

serve as the start-of-round price for the 

next round. The price for a license 

would increase from round to round as 

long as there is excess demand for the 

license but would not increase if only a 

single bidder demands the license. 

53. If, at the end of a round, the 

aggregate demand for a license exceeds 

the supply of one, the posted price 

would equal the clock price for the 

round. If a reduction in demand was 

applied during the round and caused 

demand to fall to one, the posted price 

would be the price at which the 

reduction was applied. If aggregate 

demand is zero, or one and no bid to 

reduce demand was applied for the 

license, then the posted price would 

equal the start-of-round price for the 

round. The range of acceptable bid 

amounts for the next round would be set 

by adding the percentage increment to 

the posted price. 

54. Under these procedures for a 

clock-1 auction, if a bid to reduce 

demand is not applied, it is because 

there is not excess demand for the 

license and, therefore, the posted price 

would not increase. Hence, a bidder that 

makes a bid to reduce demand that 

cannot be applied would not face a 

price for the license that is higher than 

its bid price. 

55. After the bids of the round have 

been processed, if the stopping rule has 

not been met, the FCC auction bidding 

system would announce clock prices to 

indicate a range of acceptable bids for 

the next round. Each bidder would be 

informed of the licenses for which it has 

processed demand and the extent of 

excess demand for the licenses. 

E. Winning Bids 

56. Under a clock-1 auction format for 

Auction 108, a bidder with processed 

demand for a license at the time the 

stopping rule is met would become the 

winning bidder for the license. The final 

price for a license would be the posted 

price for the final round. 

F. Digital Equity and Inclusion 

57. Finally, as part of the 

Commission’s continuing effort to 

advance digital equity for all, including 

people of color and others who have 

been historically underserved, 

marginalized, and adversely affected by 

persistent poverty and inequality, OEA 

and WTB invite comment on any 

equity-related considerations and 

benefits (if any) that may be associated 

with the issues discussed herein. 

Specifically, OEA and WTB seek 

comment on how any bidding 

procedures for Auction 108 may 

promote or inhibit advances in 

diversity, equity, inclusion, and 

accessibility. 

III. Procedural Matters 

A. Second Supplemental Initial 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

58. OEA and WTB have prepared a 

Second Supplemental Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (Second 

Supplemental IRFA) of the possible 

significant economic impact on small 

entities of the policies and rules 

addressed in the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice to supplement 

the Regulatory Flexibility Analyses 

completed in the 2.5 GHz Report and 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
8770 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 32 / Wednesday, February 16, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

Order, Auction 108 Comment Public 

Notice, and other Commission orders 

pursuant to which Auction 108 will be 

conducted. Written public comments 

are requested on the Second 

Supplemental IRFA. Comments must be 

identified as responses to the Second 

Supplemental IRFA and must be filed 

by the same deadline for comments 

specified in the DATES section of this 

document. OEA and WTB will send a 

copy of the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice, including the 

Second Supplemental IRFA, to the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration (SBA). In 

addition, the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice and the Second 

Supplemental IRFA (or summaries 

thereof) will be published in the Federal 

Register. 

59. Need for, and Objectives of, the 

Proposed Rules. The Auction 108 

Further Comment Public Notice seeks 

further comment on procedural rules to 

govern Auction 108, which will auction 

geographic overlay licenses of 

unlicensed spectrum in the 2.5 GHz 

band (2496–2690 MHz). The process is 

intended to provide notice of and 

adequate time for potential applicants to 

comment on these additional auction 

procedures. To promote the efficient 

and fair administration of the 

competitive bidding process for all 

Auction 108 participants, the Auction 

108 Further Comment Public Notice 

seeks further comment on the use of a 

clock auction format, including the 

following modified bidding procedures 

that would address concerns and 

suggestions raised by commenters, 

including small entities, in response to 

the Auction 108 Comment Public 

Notice: 

• Use of a clock auction format with 

a supply of one for Auction 108, under 

which each qualified bidder would 

indicate in successive clock bidding 

rounds its demand for the single license 

in each category in each specific 

geographic area; 

• establishment of categories based 

on the framework set forth in the 2.5 

GHz Report and Order, in which up to 

three blocks of spectrum—49.5 

megahertz, 50.5 megahertz, and 17.5 

megahertz blocks—would be offered in 

each available county; 

• retention by OEA of discretion to 

adjust the bidding schedule in order to 

manage the pace of Auction 108; 

• use of a simultaneous stopping rule 

for Auction 108, under which all 

licenses would remain available for 

bidding until the bidding stops on all 

licenses; 

• use of information procedures 

which would make public after each 

round of Auction 108, for each category 

in each county, the aggregate demand, 

the posted price of the last completed 

round, and the clock price for the next 

round; 

• use of an activity rule that would 

require bidders to be active on between 

90% and 100% of their bidding 

eligibility in all regular clock rounds, 

with the initial activity requirement 

percentage set at 95% and with OEA 

retaining discretion to change the 

activity requirement percentage during 

the auction; 

• use of a contingent bidding limit 

that would allow a bidder to submit 

bids with associated bidding activity 

greater than its current bidding 

eligibility; 

• establishment of an initial 

contingent bidding percentage at 120%, 

which would be subject to change in 

subsequent rounds within a range of 

100% to 140%; 

• a specific minimum opening bid 

amount for licenses available in Auction 

108; 

• establishment of acceptable bid 

amounts, including clock price 

increments and intra-round bids, along 

with a methodology for calculating such 

amounts; 

• to permit a bidder to submit a proxy 

instruction to reduce its demand for a 

license to zero at a price higher than the 

current round’s clock price; 

• to permit bidders to make two types 

of bids, simple bids and switch bids, in 

which a simple bid indicates a desired 

quantity of blocks (one or zero) for a 

license at a price (either the clock price 

or an intra-round price), and a switch 

bid allows the bidder to request to move 

its demand from C1 to C2, or vice versa, 

within the same county at a price for the 

from category (either the clock price or 

an intra-round price); 

• a requirement that bidders indicate 

their demands in every round or submit 

appropriate proxy instructions, even if 

their demands at the new round’s prices 

are unchanged from the previous round, 

and the treatment of bids that are not 

reconfirmed as requests to reduce 

demand to a quantity of zero for the 

license; and 

• a methodology for processing bids 

and requests to reduce and increase 

demand. 

60. The procedures for the conduct of 

Auction 108 on which the Auction 108 

Further Comment Public Notice seeks 

further comment constitute the more 

specific implementation of the 

competitive bidding rules contemplated 

by 47 CFR parts 1 and 27, the 2.5 GHz 

Report and Order, and relevant 

competitive bidding orders, and are 

fully consistent therewith. 

61. Legal Basis. The Commission’s 

statutory obligations to small businesses 

under the Communications Act of 1934, 

as amended, are found in 47 U.S.C. 

309(j)(3)(B) and 309(j)(4)(D). The 

statutory basis for the Commission’s 

competitive bidding rules is found in 

various provisions of the 

Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended, including 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 

301, 302, 303(e), 303(f), 303(r), 304, 307, 

and 309(j). The Commission has 

established a framework of competitive 

bidding rules, updated most recently in 

2015, pursuant to which it has 

conducted auctions since the inception 

of the auctions program in 1994 and 

would conduct Auction 108. 

62. Description and Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities to Which the 

Proposed Rules Will Apply. The RFA 

directs agencies to provide a description 

of, and, where feasible, an estimate of 

the number of small entities that may be 

affected by the proposed rules and 

policies, if adopted. The RFA generally 

defines the term small entity as having 

the same meaning as the terms small 

business, small organization, and small 

governmental jurisdiction. In addition, 

the term small business has the same 

meaning as the term small business 

concern under the Small Business Act. 

A small business concern is one which: 

(1) Is independently owned and 

operated; (2) is not dominant in its field 

of operation; and (3) satisfies any 

additional criteria established by the 

SBA. 

63. As noted above, Regulatory 

Flexibility Analyses were incorporated 

into the 2.5 GHz Report and Order and 

the Auction 108 Comment Public 

Notice. In those analyses, the 

Commission described in detail the 

small entities that might be significantly 

affected. In the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice, OEA and WTB 

incorporate by reference the 

descriptions and estimates of the 

number of small entities from the 

previous Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses in the 2.5 GHz Report and 

Order and the Auction 108 Comment 

Public Notice. 

64. Description of Projected 

Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 

Compliance Requirements for Small 

Entities. OEA and WTB do not expect 

the processes and procedures described 

in the Auction 108 Further Comment 

Public Notice will require small entities 

to hire attorneys, engineers, consultants, 

or other professionals to participate in 

Auction 108 and comply with the 

procedures ultimately established 

because of the information, resources, 

and guidance the Commission makes 

available to potential and actual 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 32 / Wednesday, February 16, 2022 / Proposed Rules 8771 

participants. For example, OEA intends 

to make information on the bidding 

system available and offer 

demonstrations and other educational 

opportunities for applicants in Auction 

108 to familiarize themselves with the 

FCC auction application system and the 

auction bidding system, consistent with 

the additional bidding procedures 

described in the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice. By providing 

these resources as well as the resources 

discussed below, OEA and WTB expect 

small entities that use the available 

resources to experience lower 

participation and compliance costs. 

Nevertheless, while OEA and WTB 

cannot quantify the cost of compliance 

with the procedures on which they seek 

further comment, they do not believe 

that the costs of compliance will unduly 

burden small entities that choose to 

participate in the auction because the 

additional procedures for Auction 108 

on which the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice seeks further 

comment are similar in many respects to 

the procedures in recent spectrum 

auctions conducted by the Commission. 

65. Steps Taken to Minimize the 

Significant Economic Impact on Small 

Entities, and Significant Alternatives 

Considered. The RFA requires an 

agency to describe any significant, 

specifically small business, alternatives 

that it has considered in reaching its 

proposed approach, which may include 

the following four alternatives (among 

others): (1) The establishment of 

differing compliance or reporting 

requirements or timetables that take into 

account the resources available to small 

entities; (2) the clarification, 

consolidation, or simplification of 

compliance and reporting requirements 

under the rule for such small entities; 

(3) the use of performance rather than 

design standards; and (4) an exemption 

from coverage of the rule, or any part 

thereof, for such small entities. 

66. OEA and WTB have taken steps to 

minimize any economic impact of the 

additional procedures on small entities 

through, among other things, the 

Commission’s potential use of a clock 

auction format. Among the comments 

received in response to the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice were several 

that support the SMR format at least in 

part because it is familiar to bidders, 

suggesting that small entities may be 

deterred from participating under the 

single-round format with package 

bidding described in the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice. The potential 

length of an SMR auction, however, is 

seen by some commenters as a 

disadvantage. With those comments in 

mind, the clock auction format on 

which the Auction 108 Further 

Comment Public Notice seeks comment 

would be a familiar format to small 

entities that have previously 

participated in Commission auctions, 

and would consist of multiple rounds of 

bidding and incorporate intra-round 

bidding to potentially help manage the 

duration of the auction, thereby 

lessening the burden of a multipleround auction on small entities. In 

addition, bidders would have an option 

to choose to use proxy bid instructions 

to reduce the time they spend 

monitoring the auction, further 

benefitting small entities. 

67. OEA and WTB have also taken 

steps to minimize any economic impact 

of the Commission’s auction procedures 

on small entities through, among other 

things, the many resources that the 

Commission provides to potential 

auction participants. These resources, 

which are described in detail in the 

Supplemental IRFA incorporated into 

the Auction 108 Comment Public Notice 

are provided at no cost and include, for 

example, access to an FCC Auctions 

Hotline for information about the 

auction process and procedures; an FCC 

Auctions Technical Support Hotline for 

technical assistance on issues such as 

access to or navigation within the 

electronic FCC Form 175 and use of the 

FCC’s auction bidding system; a webbased, interactive online tutorial 

produced by Commission staff to 

familiarize applicants with auction 

procedures, filing requirements, bidding 

procedures, and other matters related to 

an auction; the opportunity to 

participate in a mock auction; and the 

opportunity to participate in Auction 

108 electronically via the internet. 

Additionally, eligible small businesses 

and rural service providers will be able 

to participate in the bidding credit 

program for Auction 108, which may 

lower their relative costs of 

participation. In the Auction 108 

Further Comment Public Notice, OEA 

and WTB incorporate by reference the 

description of the additional steps taken 

to minimize the significant economic 

impact on small entities, and significant 

alternatives considered, from the 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis in the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice. 

68. The procedures for the conduct of 

Auction 108 on which the Auction 108 

Further Comment Public Notice seeks 

further comment constitute the more 

specific implementation of the 

competitive bidding rules contemplated 

by 47 CFR parts 1 and 27, the 2.5 GHz 

Report and Order, and relevant 

competitive bidding orders, and are 

fully consistent therewith. 

69. Federal Rules that May Duplicate, 

Overlap, or Conflict with the Proposed 

Rules. None. 

B. Deadlines and Filing Procedures 

70. Pursuant to 47 CFR 1.415(d) and 

1.419, interested parties may file 

comments on or before the date 

indicated in the DATES section of this 

document. Comments may be filed 

using the Commission’s Electronic 

Comment Filing System (ECFS) or by 

filing paper copies. 

71. Ex Parte Requirements. This 

proceeding has been designated as a 

permit-but-disclose proceeding in 

accordance with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules. Persons making oral ex parte 

presentations must file a copy of any 

written presentations or memoranda 

summarizing any oral presentation 

within two business days after the 

presentation (unless a different deadline 

applicable to the Sunshine Period 

applies). Persons making oral ex parte 

presentations are reminded that 

memoranda summarizing the 

presentations must (1) list all persons 

attending or otherwise participating in 

the meeting at which the ex parte 

presentation was made, and (2) 

summarize all data presented and 

arguments made during the 

presentation. If the presentation 

consisted in whole or in part of the 

presentation of data or arguments 

already reflected in the presenter’s 

written comments, memoranda, or other 

filings in the proceeding, the presenter 

may provide citations to such data or 

arguments in his or her prior comments, 

memoranda, or other filings (specifying 

the relevant page and/or paragraph 

numbers where such data or arguments 

can be found) in lieu of summarizing 

them in the memorandum. Documents 

shown or given to the Commission staff 

during ex parte meetings are deemed to 

be written ex parte presentations and 

must be filed consistent with 47 CFR 

1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by 

47 CFR 1.49(f) or for which the 

Commission has made available a 

method of electronic filing, written ex 

parte presentations and memoranda 

summarizing oral ex parte 

presentations, and all attachments 

thereto, must be filed through the 

electronic comment filing system 

available for that proceeding, and must 

be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, 

.xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants 

in this proceeding should familiarize 

themselves with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules. 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
8772 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 32 / Wednesday, February 16, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

Federal Communications Commission. 

William Huber, 

Associate Chief, Auctions Division, Office of 

Economics and Analytics. 

[FR Doc. 2022–03182 Filed 2–15–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Defense Acquisition Regulations 

System 

48 CFR Chapter 2 

[Docket DARS–2019–0067] 

Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation Supplement: Public 

Meeting on Noncommercial Computer 

Software (DFARS Case 2018–D018) 

AGENCY: Defense Acquisition 

Regulations System, Department of 

Defense (DoD). 

ACTION: Proposed rule; rescheduling of 

public meeting. 

SUMMARY: DoD is rescheduling a public 

meeting to hear the views of experts and 

interested parties in Government and 

the private sector regarding amending 

the Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to 

implement a section of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2018 that requires DoD to consider 

all noncommercial computer software 

and related materials necessary to meet 

the needs of the agency. 

DATES: 

Public Meeting Date: The public 

meeting previously scheduled for March 

3, 2022, is rescheduled for March 10, 

2022, from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., 

Eastern time. The public meeting will 

end at the stated time, or when the 

discussion ends, whichever comes first. 

Registration Date: Registration to 

attend the public meeting must be 

received no later than close of business 

on March 3, 2022. Information on how 

to register for the public meeting may be 

found under the heading 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this notice. 

ADDRESSES: The virtual public meeting 

will be held using Zoom video 

conferencing software. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

David E. Johnson, telephone 571–372– 

6115. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: DoD is 

hosting a public meeting to continue a 

dialogue with experts and interested 

parties in Government and the private 

sector regarding amending the DFARS 

to implement section 871 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2018, which requires DoD to 

consider all noncommercial computer 

software and related materials necessary 

to meet the needs of the agency. DoD 

published a proposed rule in the 

Federal Register on January 28, 2022, at 

87 FR 4546. 

Registration: Individuals wishing to 

participate in the virtual meeting must 

register by March 3, 2022, to facilitate 

entry to the meeting. Interested parties 

may register for the meeting by sending 

the following information via email to 

osd.dfars@mail.mil and include ‘‘Public 

Meeting, DFARS Case 2018–D018’’ in 

the subject line of the message: 

• Full name. 

• Valid email address, which will be 

used for admittance to the meeting. 

• Valid telephone number, which 

will serve as a secondary connection 

method. Registrants must provide the 

telephone number they plan on using to 

connect to the virtual meeting. 

• Company or organization name. 

• Whether the individual desires to 

make a presentation. 

Individuals who registered for the 

prior meeting date will not need to reregister for the rescheduled public 

meeting date. Pre-registered individuals 

will receive instructions for connecting 

using the Zoom video conferencing 

software not more than one week before 

the meeting is scheduled to commence. 

Presentations: Presentations will be 

limited to 5 minutes per company or 

organization. This limit may be subject 

to adjustment, depending on the 

number of entities requesting to present, 

in order to ensure adequate time for 

discussion. If you wish to make a 

presentation, please submit an 

electronic copy of your presentation via 

email to osd.dfars@mail.mil no later 

than the registration date for the specific 

meeting. Each presentation should be in 

PowerPoint to facilitate projection 

during the public meeting and should 

include the presenter’s name, title, 

organization affiliation, telephone 

number, and email address on the cover 

page. 

Correspondence, Comments, and 

Presentations: Please cite ‘‘Public 

Meeting, DFARS Case 2018–D018’’ in 

all correspondence related to the public 

meeting. There will be no transcription 

at the meeting. The submitted 

presentations will be the only record of 

the public meeting and will be posted 

to the following website at the 

conclusion of the public meeting: 

https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/ 

technical_data_rights.html. 

Jennifer D. Johnson, 

Editor/Publisher, Defense Acquisition 

Regulations System. 

[FR Doc. 2022–03319 Filed 2–15–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PROPOSALS1