alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 11

                              THE FINOVA GROUP INC.
                        Computation of Earnings Per Share
                  (Dollars in Thousands, except per share data)
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                               Three Months Ended                            Six Months Ended
                                                    June 30,                                     June 30,
                                     ---------------------------------------     ---------------------------------------
                                            1997                  1996                  1997                  1996
                                     -------------------    ----------------     -----------------     -----------------
<S>                                  <C>                    <C>                  <C>                   <C>              
Income from Continuing
 Operations                          $          33,751      $         28,852     $         65,409      $          55,608
                                     =================      ================     ================      =================

Net Income                           $          33,751      $         28,121     $         65,409      $          55,242
                                     =================      ================     ================      =================

Average common shares
 outstanding before
 common equivalents                         27,135,000            27,365,000           27,139,000             27,342,000

Common equivalent stock
 options                                       753,000               596,000              767,000                600,000
                                     -----------------      ----------------     ----------------      -----------------

Average outstanding common
 and equivalent shares                      27,888,000            27,961,000           27,906,000             27,942,000
                                     =================      ================     ================      =================

Earnings from continuing
 operations per common
 and equivalent share                $            1.21      $           1.03     $           2.34      $            1.99
                                     =================      ================     ================      =================

Earnings per common and
 equivalent share                    $            1.21      $           1.01     $           2.34      $            1.98
                                     =================      ================     ================      =================
</TABLE>
#### Richard ASARE, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-1479

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2016

Decided: November 23, 2016

Gerald Karikari, KARIKARI *&*ASSOCIATES, P.C., New York, New York, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director, Song E. Park, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Richard Asare, a native and citizen of Ghana, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying Asare’s motion to reconsider its decision upholding the Immigration Judge’s denial of his motion for a continuance. We have reviewed the administrative record and Asare’s claims, and find them to be without merit. We accordingly find *842no abuse of discretion in the denial of reconsideration, see Narine v. Holder, 559 F.3d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 2009), and deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. See In re Asare (B.I.A. Mar. 31, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in' the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### Pedro Arturo SALMERON-SALMERON, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-2209

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 28, 2017

Decided: August 4, 2017

Bradley B. Banias, BARNWELL, WHALEY, PATTERSON, AND HELMS, Charleston, South Carolina, for Petitioner. Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director, Jennifer A. Bowen, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Pedro Arturo Salmeron-Salmeron, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s decision denying his motion to reopen. We *197have reviewed the administrative record and the Board’s order and find no abuse of discretion. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b) (2017). We therefore deny the petition for review substantially * for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In re Salmeron-Salmeron*(B.I.A. Oct. 14, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*

*

 We note that Salmeron-Salmeron failed to establish that he was prejudiced by former counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance as required by *In re Lozada,*19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 640 (B.I.A. 1988). *See Zelaya v. Holder,*668 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that resisting gang recruitment is "an amorphous characteristic providing neither an adequate benchmark for determining group membership nor embodying a concrete trait that would readily identify a person as possessing such a characteristic"); *In re S-E-G-,*24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that harm or threats inflicted for refusal to join a gang, without more, does not constitute persecution on account of a protected ground). Accordingly, even if Salmeron-Salmeron could establish that he informed former counsel prior to the entry of his pre-conclusipn voluntary departure order that he feared harm in El Salvador, a remand under *INS v. Ventura,*537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002), would not be warranted "[bjecause the result of a remand to the Board is a foregone conclusion such that remand would amount to nothing more than a mere formality.” *Hus-sain v. Gonzales,*477 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2007).
MYRET, LLC, Appellant, v. GROUP LX, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 3D17-768

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed June 27, 2018

Marva L. Wiley, P.A., and Marva L. Wiley, Hialeah, for appellant.

Alvarez Barbara, LLP, and Richard L. Barbara and Jose L. Torres, Miami, for appellee Group LX, Inc.

Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SUAREZ and LAGOA, JJ.

ROTHENBERG, C.J.

Myret, LLC ("Myret") appeals a final judgment and the trial court's prior orders determining that Group LX, Inc. ("Group LX") is entitled to its attorney's fees and setting the amount of fees. In its appeal, Myret disputes the amount of the fees awarded. However, where, as here, no transcript of the hearing where the amount of the fees was addressed has been provided, and the judgment is not fundamentally erroneous on its face, we must affirm. *See* *Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee*, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) :

> When there are issues of fact the appellant necessarily asks the reviewing court to draw conclusions about the evidence.

> *1025Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory. Without knowing the factual context, neither can an appellate court reasonably conclude that the trial judge so misconceived the law as to require reversal.

*See also* *Smith v. Orhama Inc.*, 907 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (holding that without the ability to see what the trial court actually found in reference to the evidence presented below, it is not possible to reverse unless there is fundamental error on the face of the trial court's order); *Ahmed v. Travelers Indem. Co.*, 516 So.2d 40, 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) ("Where there is no record of the testimony of witnesses or of evidentiary rulings, and where a statement of the record has not been prepared pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(a)(3) or (b)(3), a judgment which is not fundamentally erroneous on its face must be affirmed.").

Affirmed.
### NUMBER 13

- 1 8

- 00 058

- CV 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________ GORDON DEAN HALEY, A NTON SCOTT HALEY, GORDON DEAN HALEY AS INDEPENDENT CO

- EXECUTOR OF THE E STATE OF MARGARET L. HALEY, A ND ANTON SCOTT HALEY AS INDEPENDENT CO

- EX ECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARGARET L . HALEY , A ppellants ,
v. BENEFICIAL FINANCIAL I INC., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BENEFICIAL TEXAS, INC. , A ppellee

.

____________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________ 

## ORDER
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes Order Per Curiam2

A ppe l la n t Gordon Dean Haley and others pe r f e c t e d a n appea l f r o m a summary judgment rendered in trial court cause number 2015DCV

- 1306

- C in the 94th District Court of Nueces county, Texas. Appellant Haley has now filed a motion for emergency relief, temporary restraining order, and stay of execution pending appeal. He requests that we stay the writ of execution and possession issued in the underlying case pending resolution of this appeal. The Court, hav ing examined and fully considered this motion, is of the opinion that it should be granted pending receipt and review of a response filed by appellee,
B eneficial Financial I Inc., Successor by Merger to Beneficial Texas, Inc. Accordingly,
we order the Wri t of Possession and Writ of Execution, and all other post

- judgment proceedings, to be stayed pending further order of th is Court. We request appellee to file a response to appellant’s motion for temporary relief, temporary restraining order, and stay of e xecution within seven days from the date of this order. IT IS S O ORDERED.
P ER C U RIAM

De l i v e red a n d f i l e d t h e 20 th da y o f March , 2 0 1 9

.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Marcel Alejandro RIVERA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11673 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 21, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jerry Van Beard, Esq., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, Jason Douglas Hawkins, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Marcel Alejandro Rivera pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. The district court sentenced Rivera to 240 months of imprisonment to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. The Government moves for summary affirmance or, alternatively, for an extension of time to file a brief on the merits. Rivera does not oppose summary affirmance. Summary affirmance is proper where, among other instances, “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” *Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,*406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

In his brief, Rivera argues that the district court plainly erred under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing a sentence based on an amount of methamphetamine that was not supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Tuma,*738 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2013), and *United States v. Bazemore,*839 F.3d 379, 392-93 (5th Cir. 2016), He also argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the applicable advisory guideline was not formulated using empirical evidence. This issue is foreclosed by *United States v. Duarte,*569 F.3d 528, 530-31 (5th Cir. 2009), and *United States v. Mondragon-Santiago,*564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2009).

The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment is AFFIRMED. The alternative mo*157tion for an extension of time to file a brief on the merits is DENIED as unnecessary.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47,5.4.
Tamra LEASURE, DOC #T73226, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-921

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 18, 2018

Tamra Leasure, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan M. Shanahan, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SALARIO, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1508 

AN ACT 

To require a guidance clarity statement on certain agency 

guidance, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 1508 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Guidance Clarity Act 

3 of 2021’’. 

4 SEC. 2. GUIDANCE CLARITY STATEMENT REQUIRED. 

5 (a) REQUIREMENT.—Each agency, as defined in sec6 tion 551 of title 5, United States Code, shall include a 

7 guidance clarity statement as described in subsection (b) 

8 on any guidance issued by that agency under section 

9 553(b)(3)(A) of title 5, United States Code, on and after 

10 the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Direc11 tor of the Office of Management and Budget issues the 

12 guidance required under subsection (c). 

13 (b) GUIDANCE CLARITY STATEMENT.—A guidance 

14 clarity statement required under subsection (b) shall— 

15 (1) be displayed prominently on the first page 

16 of the document; and 

17 (2) include the following: ‘‘The contents of this 

18 document do not have the force and effect of law 

19 and do not, of themselves, bind the public or the 

20 agency. This document is intended only to provide 

21 clarity to the public regarding existing requirements 

22 under the law or agency policies.’’. 

23 (c) OMB GUIDANCE.—Not later than 90 days after 

24 the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Of25 fice of Management and Budget shall issue guidance to 

26 implement this Act. 
3 

•HR 1508 EH

1 SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS. 

2 The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 

3 complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, 

4 shall be determined by reference to the latest statement 

5 titled ‘‘Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation’’ for this 

6 Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record 

7 by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, pro8 vided that such statement has been submitted prior to the 

9 vote on passage. 

Passed the House of Representatives October 20, 

2021. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1508 

AN ACT 

To require a guidance clarity statement on certain 

agency guidance, and for other purposes.
#### Jay KRUISE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert M. SPEER, Acting Secretary of the Army, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-2359

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 15, 2017

Decided: July 21, 2017

Paul Victor Jorgensen, Middletown, Maryland, for Appellant. Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Charles W. Scarborough, Abby C. Wright, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jay Kruise appeals the district court’s order dismissing his claims against the Acting Secretary of the United States Army seeking to challenge the suspension of his security clearance under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701 to 7961 (West 2008 & Supp. 2016); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (2012); the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C.A; § 5596 (West 2007 & Supp. 2017); and the Due Process Clause. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. *See Kruise v. Speer,*No. 1:16-cv-00830-TSE-IDD (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 12, 2016 & entered Oct. 18, 2016); *see also Dep’t of Navy v. Egan,*484 U.S. 518, 525-30, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (precluding judicial review of security clearance decisions); *Hegab v. Long,*716 F.3d 790, 794 (4th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that “courts are generally without subject-matter jurisdiction” to review security clearance decisions because “a court should not be put in the position of second-guessing the discretionary judgment of an executive agency assessing national security risks”); *Becerra v. Dalton,*94 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[I]f permitted to review the initial stage of a security clearance determination to ascertain whether it was a retaliatory act, the court would be required to review the very issues that the Supreme Court has held are non-reviewable.”). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
EX PARTE Willie Leon BANKS

CR-16-0628

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 9, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

The certification set forth below is being submitted in
connection with the Quarterly Report of First Data Corporation on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended March 31, 2006 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Henry C. Duques, the Chief
Executive Officer of First Data Corporation, certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of First Data Corporation.
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                         |  |  |  |                        
|------------------------ |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Date: September 15, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Henry C. Duques    
|                         |  |  |  | Henry C. Duques        
|                         |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry Jermaine LOCKEE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7479

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2017

Decided: August 2, 2017

Lynne Louise Reid, L.L. REID LAW, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas B. Murphy, Stephen Aubrey West, Assistant United States Attorneys, Seth Morgan Wood, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, FLOYD, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Terry Jermaine Lockee seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Lockee has not made the requisite showing.* Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal con*188tentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*

*

 We held this appeal in abeyance pending our decision in *United States v. Royster,*No. 15-4757. Although *Royster*did not resolve the issues presented in this appeal, we conclude that Lockee's claim for relief is squarely foreclosed by other recent, binding authority. *See Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 895, 897, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017); *United States v. Foote,*784 F.3d 931, 932-33 (4th Cir. 2015).