COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ROBERT A. WORLEY 

v. Record No. 1913-94-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JANUARY 30, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 

Richard H. C. Taylor, Judge 

 Bruce P. Ganey, (Ganey & Laibstain, P.C., on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

 brief), for appellee. 

 

 Robert A. Worley appeals his convictions for transportation 

of cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to distribute 

cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 

possession of cocaine while in possession of a firearm, and 

driving on a suspended operator's license. Worley contends that 

the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress the 

drugs seized from his vehicle and by ruling the stop to be legal. 

 We hold that there was no reasonable suspicion to conduct a 

Terry stop and that, therefore, the trial court should have 

sustained the motion to suppress and held the stop to be illegal. 

 The defendant was "seized" for the purposes of the Fourth 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Amendment when Deputy Sheriff McGrain stopped the defendant's 

truck. Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 

708, 709 (1988). An investigatory Terry stop does not violate 

the Fourth Amendment when the officer possesses an "articulable 

and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an 

automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an 

occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law." 

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). Although Deputy 

McGrain determined that the owner of the truck had a suspended 

license, he did not determine whether the driver was the owner 

before stopping the truck. See id. at 661 (stating that there 

must be an "articulable basis amounting to reasonable suspicion 

that the driver is unlicensed") (emphasis added). 

 In Hoye v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 132, 133-34, 442 S.E.2d 

404, 405-06 (1994), a police officer stopped a vehicle after 

determining that the registered owner was a habitual offender. 

We held that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion 

because she obtained a description of the owner from the 

Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records and confirmed "that 

the vehicle's driver matched the description of the registered 

owner as to gender and approximate height, weight, and hair 

color." Id. at 135, 442 S.E.2d at 406. 

 The record in the present case does not show that Deputy 

McGrain obtained a description of the truck's owner when he 

checked the DMV records. In fact, Deputy McGrain testified that 
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he did not know whether the defendant was the owner when he 

stopped the truck. Although Hoye does not require the police to 

verify every detail of the description of a suspended license a 

police officer must possess some articulable fact or facts to 

support the inference that the driver is the owner of the 

vehicle. Deputy McGrain had no reason and articulated no basis 

to suspect that the driver of the truck was the owner whose 

license was suspended, and therefore, Deputy McGrain's stop was 

based solely upon a hunch.1

 See Beckner v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. 

App. 533, 537, 425 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1993) (holding that the facts 

the police rely on must amount to more than a "hunch"). 

 Admittedly, because automobiles "are subjected to pervasive 

and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including 

periodic inspection and licensing requirements," an individual's 

expectation of privacy in his automobile is greatly diminished. 

 

 1 Deputy McGrain testified that he initially became 

suspicious of the defendant and his companion because "[t]hey 

were . . . wandering up and down the aisles" of the 7-Eleven 

store. However, the Deputy did not indicate that he stopped the 

truck for any reason other than to investigate whether the 

defendant was the owner and was operating the truck with a 

suspended license. Accordingly, we do not decide whether the 

Deputy's observations may have created reasonable suspicion that 

the defendant and his companion were "casing" the store. 
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South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976). Nonetheless, 

to hold that a police officer has a reasonable suspicion to 

conduct a Terry stop where the officer has determined only that 

the vehicle's owner has a suspended operator's license would 

justify the indiscriminate stop of every vehicle owned by an 

individual with a suspended license. The Fourth Amendment does 

not countenance such an intrusive violation of privacy. See

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662 ("An individual operating or 

traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable 

expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use 

are subject to government regulation.") Therefore, we hold that 

the officer in this case did not possess reasonable suspicion to 

conduct a Terry stop and that the trial court erred by overruling 

the motion to suppress and by ruling the stop to be legal. The 

defendant's convictions are reversed and the case is remanded for 

further proceedings if the Commonwealth be so advised. 

Reversed and remanded.