DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

BRIDGET INGWELL,

Appellant,

v.

PATRICIA IBRAHIM and 

SCI FUNERAL SERVICES OF FLORIDA, LLC,

Appellees.

No. 4D2024-1390

[September 25, 2024]

Appeal of nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth 

Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Steven J. Levin, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

2024-CA-000049. 

Christina Lehm, Fort Lauderdale, and Regina Rabitaille, Orlando, of 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, for appellant.

Joshua D. Ferraro of Lesser, Lesser, Landy & Smith, PLLC, West Palm 

Beach, for appellee Patricia Ibrahim.

No appearance for appellee SCI Funeral Services of Florida, LLC.

PER CURIAM.

Bridget Ingwell appeals a nonfinal order denying her emergency motion 

for temporary injunction.1 The motion sought to place a hold on the 

cremation of Ingwell’s father’s body and to compel an autopsy. We affirm 

because the trial court correctly concluded that the decedent’s spouse 

(Ingwell’s stepmother) has priority to make this decision under the 

pertinent statute, and the spouse objected to an autopsy.

Section 872.04(2), Florida Statutes (2023), provides:

Unless otherwise authorized by statute, no autopsy shall be 

performed without the written consent by the health care 

surrogate, as provided in s. 765.202, if one has been 

designated. If a health care surrogate has not been designated, 

1 The trial court granted a stay pending appeal.
2

then written consent may be provided by the spouse, nearest 

relative, or, if no such next of kin can be found, the person who 

has assumed custody of the body for purposes of burial. When 

two or more persons assume custody of the body for such 

purposes, then the consent of any one of them shall be 

sufficient to authorize the autopsy.

§ 872.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2023) (emphasis added).

Ingwell contends that, under this statute, she is a “nearest relative” 

that has equal priority to consent to an autopsy as the “spouse.” As set 

forth below, we disagree. 

We review the trial court’s purely legal conclusion de novo. Kephart v. 

Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006) (“The interpretation of a statute 

is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of 

review.”). The trial court correctly determined that the statute sets out a 

hierarchy of who may consent and that the spouse is listed first and has 

priority over other relatives. The Legislature included the term “spouse” 

in the list, and this term should be given weight. “[W]ords in a statute 

should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Sun Gas Mktg. & Petroleum 

LLC v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 383 So. 3d 118, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) 

(quoting Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 

366 (Fla. 2005)). The list is clearly prioritized as it concludes with who 

may consent when “no such next of kin can be found.” § 872.04(2), Fla. 

Stat. (2023).

Additionally, for purposes of section 872.04(2), we conclude that a 

spouse, if one exists, would be the “nearest relative” of the decedent. The 

term “nearest relative” is not defined by section 872.04. Black’s Law 

Dictionary defines “nearest relative” as follows: 

nearest relative (17c) 1. next of kin. 2. The closest living kin 

within a statutorily designated hierarchy of kinship that 

begins with the person’s spouse or civil partner, and then adult 

children, parents, siblings, and so on.

Relative, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). 

This definition is persuasive and resolves any ambiguity because, in 

these circumstances, the decedent’s wife is both the “spouse” and “nearest 

relative” under section 872.04(2)’s plain language.

This reading is consistent with the hierarchy that the Legislature has 

established for a “[l]egally authorized person” under Chapter 497, Florida 
3

Statutes (2023), which regulates funeral and cremation services. See § 

497.005(43)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023) (giving a spouse priority over an adult 

child). These related statutes should be read together. See Larimore v. 

State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008) (“The doctrine of in pari materia is a 

principle of statutory construction that requires that statutes relating to 

the same subject or object be construed together to harmonize the statutes 

and to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” (quoting Fla. Dep’t of State v. 

Martin, 916 So. 2d 763, 768 (Fla. 2005))).

Additionally, the common law rule is that “[g]enerally, in the absence of 

a testamentary disposition, the spouse of the deceased or the next of kin 

has the right to the possession of the body for burial or other lawful 

disposition.” Arthur v. Milstein, 949 So. 2d 1163, 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)

(citing Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950)). 

Ingwell does not cite any authority that would support giving a 

decedent’s child the ability to override the decision of the decedent’s

spouse in determining a body’s disposition. As the trial court noted, a 

child who suspects “foul play” can contact authorities, who would have 

the power to require an autopsy. See § 406.11(1)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2023) 

(authorizing a district’s medical examiner to “perform such examinations, 

investigations, and autopsies as he or she deems necessary or as 

requested by the state attorney” in enumerated circumstances, including 

when a person dies in this state “[s]uddenly, when in apparent good 

health”); Jackson v. Rupp, 228 So. 2d 916, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) (“In 

spite of the fact that an exclusive right does vest in the surviving spouse, 

relative, or next of kin to dispose of a corpse, autopsies may be authorized 

by public authorities for the protection of health or the discovery of 

crime.”).

Because Ingwell fails to show any error in the trial court’s conclusion 

that section 872.04(2) gives the spouse priority in this situation, we affirm.

Affirmed.

WARNER, CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.