alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit
        24.5**
 STATE
        OF
        TEXAS §
 COUNTY
        OF
        DALLAS §
  POWER
        OF
        ATTORNEY
 
 Know
        all
        men by these presents, that I, WILLIAM M. SAMS, a Director of AMERICA’S
        CAR-MART, INC., a Texas corporation, do constitute and appoint TILMAN J.
        FALGOUT, III and JEFFREY A. WILLIAMS my true and lawful attorneys-in-fact,
        with
        full power of substitution, for me in any and all capacities, to sign, pursuant
        to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Annual
        Report on Form 10-K for AMERICA’S CAR-MART, INC. for the fiscal year ended April
        30, 2006 and to file the same with the Securities and Exchange Commission
        and
        National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., together with all exhibits
        thereto and other documents in connection therewith, and to sign on my behalf
        and in my stead, in any and all capacities, any amendments to said Annual
        Report, incorporating such changes as said attorneys-in-fact deem appropriate,
        hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorneys-in-fact, or their
        substitute or substitutes may do or cause to be done by virtue
        hereof.
 
 In
        witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 10 th day of
        July, 2006.
 
 
 
 /s/
                  William M.
                  SamsWILLIAM
                  M. SAMS
 
 
 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT
 
 Before
        me
        this 10 th day of
        July, 2006, came WILLIAM M. SAMS, personally known to me, who in my presence
        did
        sign and seal the above and foregoing Power of Attorney and acknowledged
        the
        same as his true act and deed.
 
 
 
 /s/
                  Mary Sellner
                  ThomasNOTARY
                  PUBLIC
Henry Frank LENT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 4D17-2157 4D17-2158

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 26, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

*Affirmed.*
Shamichael JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-1856

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed March 28, 2018

Shamichael Johnson, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, LAGOA, and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

*461Shamichael Johnson appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. On appeal from a summary denial, this Court must reverse unless the postconviction record, *see* Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A), shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief, *see* Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D).

Because the record now before us fails to make the required showing, we reverse the order and remand for attachment of records conclusively showing that the appellant is not entitled to any relief or an evidentiary hearing. *Langdon v. State*, 947 So.2d 460 (Fla. App. 3d DCA 2006). If the trial court again enters an order summarily denying the postconviction motion, the court shall attach record excerpts conclusively showing that the appellant is not entitled to any relief.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Arnold A. COVINGTON, DOC# 191358, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-4837

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 4, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
SCPW-21-0000373

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

 

FRANCIS P. GRANDINETTI, Petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE PETER K. KUBOTA, Judge of the Circuit Court of the

Third Circuit, State of Hawai#i, Respondent Judge.

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

(CASE NO. 3PC930000141)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.)

Upon consideration of petitioner Francis P.

Grandinetti’s motion for reconsideration, filed on July 16, 2021,

and the record, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for

reconsideration is denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, July 20, 2021.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Todd W. Eddins

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCPW-21-0000373

20-JUL-2021

08:07 AM

Dkt. 10 ODMR
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alejandro VILLAREAL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6578

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

Alejandro Villareal, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Alejandro Villareal seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v.*McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Villareal has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 99 

 

Review Report of Independent Certified Public Accountants 

 

The Board of Directors 

Catalina Marketing Corporation 

 

We have reviewedthe accompanying condensed consolidated balance sheet of Catalina Marketing Corporation as of December 31, 2002, and the related condensed consolidated statements of income for the three- and nine-month periods then ended and the consolidatedstatement of cash flows for the nine-month period then ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company’s management. The consolidated balance sheet of Catalina Marketing Corporation as of March 31, 2002, was audited byother accountants whose report dated April 18, 2002, expressed an unqualified opinion on the financial statements of which that statement is a part. The condensed consolidated financial statements of Catalina Marketing Corporation for the periodended December 31, 2001 were reviewed by other accountants whose report dated January 16, 2002, stated that they were not aware of any material modifications that should be made to those statements for them to be in conformity with accountingprinciples generally accepted in the United States. 

 

We conductedour review in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A review of interim financial information consists principally of applying analytical procedures to financial data, and making inquiriesof persons responsible for financial and accounting matters. It is substantially less in scope than an audit conducted in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States, which will be performed for the full year with theobjective of expressing an opinion regarding the financial statements taken as a whole. Accordingly, we do not express such an opinion. 

 

Based on our review, we are not aware of any material modifications that should be made to the accompanying condensed consolidated financial statements atDecember 31, 2002, and for the three- and nine-month periods then ended for them to be in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States. 

 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

 

Tampa, Florida 

February 5, 2003
Exhibit 10.21
 AMENDMENT NO. 11
AND LIMITED WAIVER TO LOAN AND SECURITY AGREEMENT
 This
Amendment No. 11 and Limited Waiver to Loan and Security Agreement Amendment R ae Systems Inc. , Borrower Silicon Valley Bank (Bank).
 Recitals
 A. Loan Agreement
 B. Existing Default
 C.
 AGREEMENT
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing Recitals and intending to be legally
bound, the parties hereto agree as follows:
 1. Event of Default and Limited Waiver.
 2. Amendments to Loan Agreement.
 2.1
Section 2.3 (Interest Rate).
 Interest Rate.
 2.2 2.4 (Fees).




---



##### 



Commitment Fee.
 2.3 Section 6.8 (Financial Covenants).
 Minimum EBITDA.
 2.4 Section 13.1 (Definitions).
 Borrowing Base Non-Formula Line
 Revolving Line Maturity Date
 8.11 Section 13.1 (Definitions).
 Non-Formula Line
 Eleventh Amendment Effective Date
 2.5 Exhibit D (Compliance Certificate). Exhibit A
 3. Borrowers Representations and Warranties.
 (a)
 (b)
 (c)
 2




---



##### 



(d)
 (e)
 (f)
  4. Limitation.
 5. Effectiveness.
 5.1 Amendment.
 5.2
Payment  of Loan Fee.
 5.3 Payment of Bank Expenses.
 6. Counterparts.
 7. Integration.
 3




---



##### 



thereto and no extrinsic evidence whatsoever may be introduced in any judicial or
arbitration proceeding, if any, involving this Amendment; except that any financing statements or
other agreements or instruments filed by Bank with respect to Borrower shall remain in full force
and effect.
 8. Governing Law; Venue .
  Borrower:
    Rae Systems Inc.a Delaware corporation
 By:
    /s/  Randall K. Gausman
 Printed Name:
    Randall K. GausmanTitle:  CFO
 Bank:
    Silicon Valley Bank
 By:

/s/ Ray Aguilar
 Printed Name:
    Ray AguilarTitle:  
    RM
 4
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 (a) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT**
I, Phillip**J. Smith, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Stater Bros. Holdings Inc.; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state amaterial fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant asof, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-l 5(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to bedesigned under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the periodin which this report is being prepared;  b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and
5.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and  b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significantrole in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.   Date: May 11, 2005     /s/ Phillip J. Smith  Phillip J. Smith
SCWC-18-0000099 and SCWC-18-0000712

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB,

DOING BUSINESS AS CHRISTINA TRUST,

NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,

BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR BCAT 2015-14BTT,

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ISABELO PACPACO DOMINGO; MICHELE ELANOR DOMINGO,

Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants,

and

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; HALEWILI PLACE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,

Respondents/Defendants-Appellees.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-18-0000099; CAAP-18-0000712; CIV. NO. 13-1-202K)

ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.)

Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants’ application for 

writ of certiorari, filed on October 7, 2022, is hereby 

accepted. 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-18-0000099

14-DEC-2022

07:47 AM

Dkt. 23 OGAC
2

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no oral argument will be 

heard in this case. Any party may, within ten days and pursuant 

to Rule 34(c) of the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure, move 

for retention of oral argument.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, December 14, 2022.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Todd W. Eddins
Home » Agencies » ENRD » About the Division » Organization » LAS » Where Our Cases Have Taken Us » Big Cypress National Preserve

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The Land Acquisition Section secured sites for the creation and subsequent expansions of Big Cypress National Preserve. Covering

almost 1,200 square miles, the Preserve was established by Congress in 1974 because it plays a crucial ecological role as the northern

watershed for Everglades National Park.

Big Cypress National Preserve website

Did you know? The preserve is home to nine endangered species, including the West Indian Manatee, the eastern indigo snake,

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http://www.justice.gov/enrd/4866.htm 12/5/2011
#### Thomas Edward KING, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E. VALENZUELA; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55905

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 27, 2017

*606Thomas Edward King, Jr., Pro Se

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Thomas Edward King, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to prosecute his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. *Al-Torki v. Kaempen,*78 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.

King failed to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his action for failure to prosecute, and has therefore waived any such challenge. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *see also Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant.... ”).

Even if King had not waived his challenge, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing King’s action for failure to prosecute because King failed to file an amended complaint despite receiving an extension of time to do so and being warned of the consequences of failing to file it. *See Pagtalunan v. Galaza,*291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the five factors for determining whether to dismiss for failure to prosecute).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NO. 07-07-0264-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL D

	AUGUST 7, 2008

	______________________________

	JOSEPH MARK DAIGLE, APPELLANT

	V.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 320TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

	NO. 52,293-D; HONORABLE RICHARD DAMBOLD, JUDGE

	_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

	ABATEMENT AND REMAND

	Appellant, Joseph Mark Daigle, appeals from his conviction by jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child, enhanced, and sentence of 99 years of imprisonment.1  The trial court filed its certification representing that appellant has the right of appeal.  However, the appellate record reflects that appellant failed to sign the certification, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellant Procedure 25.2(d), which requires the certification to be signed by appellant and a copy served on him.2  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d).

	Consequently, we abate the appeal and remand the cause to the 320th District Court of Potter County for further proceedings.  On remand, the trial court shall utilize whatever means it finds necessary to secure and file with this Court a certificate of right to appeal that complies with Rule 25.2(d).  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d).

	If necessary, the trial court shall execute findings of fact, conclusions of law, and any necessary orders it may enter regarding the aforementioned issues and cause its findings, conclusions, and orders, if any, to be included in a supplemental clerk’s record. The trial court shall file the supplemental clerk’s record and the supplemental reporter’s record, if any, with the Clerk of this Court by September 8, 2008. 

	It is so ordered. 

							Per Curiam

Do not publish.
A.B.P. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2160055

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 7, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Corion Leshon MOORE v. STATE

CR-16-0462

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 21, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Luis Miguel Fontal VASQUEZ and Jose Manuel Otero, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Aliec Lazo MARTINEZ, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-1628

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

NOVEMBER 03, 2017

Upon the Court's own motion, it is ordered that this appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida is dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's order dated September 18, 2017, and with the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ROTHENBERG, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LUCK, JJ., concur.
## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXA S
N O . P D - 1 0 7 2 - 1 9

D A N I E L T H O M A S B A R N E S A p p e l l a n t

v . T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S O R D E R R E G A R D I N G R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

G R E G G C O U N T Y

P e r c u r i a m . O R D E R Appellant was convicted of burg lary of a habitation in cause number 48,046-A in the 188 t h District Court of Gre g g County
. Appellant was sentenc ed to c onfinement for 40 y ear s. The court of appea ls aff

irmed the judgme nt of the trial court. Ba rnes v. State, No. 06-19-00045- CR (Tex. App.

— T ex ar ca na, delivere d September 25, 2019). The State’s petition for discretionar y revie w was g rante d by this Court on Dec ember 11, 2019. Appellant is entitled to repr esenta tion befor e this Court at this time. See Article 1
. 051(a) (d)( 2), V.A.C.C.P. Appellant is without repr esenta tion in thisCourt. Acc ording ly , the trial court is order ed to de termine if Appellant is c urre ntly repr esente d by

counsel, and if so, to inform this court who repr esents Appellant. I f Appell ant is not curr ently repr esente d by counsel and desires c ounsel, the trial cour t must first determine whether Appellant is indige nt. I f the trial court finds Appellant is indige nt, that court shall appoin t an at t o rn ey to repr esent Appel l an t b efor e this court in reg ard to PDR No. PD-1072-19, in acc ord with the provisions of Articles 1.051 a nd 26.04, V.A.C.C.P. Any hear ing c onducted pursuant to this order shall be held within 30 day s of the date of this order
. The trial court' s order appointing counsel, any finding s of fac t, aff

idavits, or transcr iption of the court repor ter 's n o t es and any other supplementation of the rec ord shall be returne d to this court within 45 day s of the date of this order
. I T I S SO ORDERED THI S THE 30 DAY OF DECEMBER, 2019 T H DO NOT PUBL I SH
R.J.C., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Joseph SEEBER, Superintendent, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0879

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 20, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Granted.