alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE COMPANY'S SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 REPORT ON FORM
10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                       3,358,413
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,549,404
<PP&E>                                         716,523
<DEPRECIATION>                                 517,115
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,853,941
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          644,395
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        851
<COMMON>                                         3,578
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,205,117
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,853,941
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               750,131
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,778,100
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,027,969)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,027,969)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,027,969)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.89)<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.89)<F1>
<FN>
PER SHARE DATA HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED TO REFLECT A ONE-FOR-FIVE REVERSE SPLIT OF THE
COMPANY'S OUTSTANDING COMMON STOCK WHICH WAS EFFECTED ON MAY 13, 1998.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Kelvin Demetrius CONERLY v. STATE

CR-16-0281

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Ashley TUNSTALL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. A. Gordon TUNSTALL, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-1180

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 07, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied. Petitioner's motion for attorney's fees is denied.

LaROSE, C.J., and VILLANTI and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Brandon B. HANDY, Defendant-Appellant

No. 14-30392 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 21, 2017

Camille Ann Domingue, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

George Frazier, Esq., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Brandon B. Handy was convicted of aggravated robbery of mail matter and was sentenced to serve 288 months in prison *259and a five-year term of supervised release. He argues that for purposes of the career offender sentencing guidelines, his Louisiana unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling offense is not a crime of violence because the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a)(2) (2013) is unconstitutionally vague under *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015).

Because Handy did not raise his arguments on appeal in the district court, they are reviewed for plain error. *See United States v. Narez-Garcia,*819 F.3d 146, 149 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S.-, 137 S.Ct. 175, 196 L.Ed.2d 145 (2016). To prevail under this standard, he must show an error that is clear or obvious and that affects his substantial rights. *See Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). Whether an error is clear or obvious is determined at the time of appeal and requires this court to “decide whether controlling circuit or Supreme Court precedent has reached the issue in question, or whether the legal question would be subject to reasonable dispute.” *United States v. Fields, 111*F.3d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If Handy satisfies the first three prongs of plain error review, we have the discretion to correct the error, but will do so only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. *See Puckett,*556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423.

After Handy submitted his appellate brief, the Supreme Court held that the § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause “is not void for vagueness” because “the Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause.” *Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 892, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017). Accordingly, Handy’s arguments regarding § 4B1,2(a)(2)’s residual clause are unavailing.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Adam Joseph BARFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6403

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: September 26, 2017

Decided: October 26, 2017

Adam Joseph Barfield, Appellant Pro Se. Barbara Dickerson Kocher, Donald Russell Pender, Stephen Aubrey West, Seth Morgan Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Jennifer E. Wells, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Adam Joseph Barfield seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion.. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of *264the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Barfield has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JAMES BATTLE,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 418 WAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 24th day of March, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PENTA HOSPITALITY, LLC and Tarun S. Patel, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-17354

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 14, 2016 * San Francisco, California

Filed November 21, 2016

Timothy Carl Aires, Aires Law Group, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Tarun S. Patel, Pro Se, San Jose, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

*922Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

The district court’s order denying the plaintiff an extension of time within which to file post-judgment motions and closing the case file is vacated.

The district court did not explain why it was strictly enforcing the October 30, 2014, filing deadline, and we cannot infer any reasons from the record to support such strict enforcement. *See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc.,*624 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010) (denial of a time extension is an abuse of discretion if it is “without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record”). The district court originally set the October 30 deadline for “[a]ll motions for assigning or charging orders” in light of a post-judgment examination scheduled for October 27. The plaintiff asserts that'it could not file such motions without obtaining information from the defendant, Tarun Patel, and his business entity, Pracrea Inc., at the post-judgment examination, which the district court had ordered Patel and Pracrea Inc. to attend. After they failed to attend, it was apparent that the examination would need to be rescheduled and that the filing deadline would therefore need to be reset to a later date following the rescheduled examination. Thus, we cannot infer any plausible reason for insisting on the October 30 deadline or for severely enforcing it against an otherwise diligent judgment creditor by closing the case file.

Motions for time extensions should be granted when there is good cause, construed broadly, and no showing of bad faith or prejudice to the nonmoving party. *Id.*at 1259. Here, the district court denied the plaintiffs request for a time extension solely for lack of good cause. However, the district court abused its discretion by summarily rejecting the plaintiffs explanation that it was moving for an extension due to the fact that Patel and Pracrea Inc. had failed to appear at the scheduled examination. There is no indication that the plaintiffs request was in bad faith, and an extension would not unduly prejudice the absent defendant because it was his own failure to appear at the examination that gave rise to the need to reschedule the examination and reset the deadline in the first place.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Harry CLARIDY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-2103

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 20, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Granted. Dismissed.
S.M., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1358

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 27, 2018

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Joanna Beth Conner, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
Robert KENON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-1955

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 10, 2018]

Robert Lee Kenon, Carrabelle, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Warner, Gross and Conner, JJ., concur.
#### Jermaine SURTAIN, Petitioner-Appellant v. J. A. BARNHART, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution Pollock, Respondent-Appellee

No. 16-30894 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 28, 2017

Jermaine Surtain, Pro Se

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and ELROD and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

*174PER CURIAM: *

Jermaine Surtain, federal prisoner # 27627-034, was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and aiding and abetting the use of fire to commit obstruction of justice. He appeals the district court’s denial and dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, which relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in *Rosemond v. United States,*— U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014).

The dismissal of a § 2241 petition is reviewed de novo. *Pack v. Yusuff,*218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000). A § 2241 petition that attacks a federal sentence may be considered under the “savings clause” if the petitioner shows that 28 U.S.C. § 2265 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” § 2255(e). The petitioner must show that his claim is “based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense” and that his claim was “foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.” *Reyes-Requena v. United States,*243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001).

In *Rosemond,*the Supreme Court held that, to prove that the defendant aided and abetted a firearms violation under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the Government must show that the defendant had. “advance knowledge” of the firearm. Assuming without deciding that *Rosemond*applies retroactively to cases outside the § 924(c) context, we conclude that Surtain has not shown that he was convicted of a nonexistent offense. We found on direct appeal that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Surtain knew of his co-defendant’s plan to burn a vehicle that had been used in the commission of other crimes. *See United States v. Surtain,*519 Fed.Appx. 266, 278 (5th Cir. 2013). Because Surtain has failed to show he was convicted of a nonexistent offense, he has failed to meet the requirements of the savings clause.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5m *Cir. R. 47:5, the*court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir, R. 47.5,4.
Omri W. HENTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-3965

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 2, 2018

Omri W. Henton, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Gerald E. Bisbee, Jr. the Chief Executive Officer of
ReGen Biologics, Inc. (the Company), has executed this certification in
connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending June
30, 2003 (the Report). The undersigned hereby certifies that:



|(1) |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

|      |  |                 |  |                               
|----- |  | --------------- |  | ------------------------------
|Date: |  | August 14, 2003 |  | /s/ Gerald E. Bisbee, Jr.     
|      |  |                 |  | Name: Gerald E. Bisbee, Jr.   
|      |  |                 |  | Title: Chief Executive Officer
#### Clement Makung AYER, AKA Clement Ayer, AKA Clement M. Ayer, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles L. RYAN, Director at Arizona State Prison Complex, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-15976

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

Clement Makung Ayer, Pro Se

Joseph Scott Conlon, Renaud Cook Dru-ry Mesaros, PA, Phoenix, AZ, Kelley J. Morrissey, Assistant Attorney General, *595Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Arizona state prisoner Clement Makung Ayer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not providing elbow surgery or a diabetic diet. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego,*670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Ryan because Ayer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Ayer’s health. *See Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health); *Jones v. Williams,*297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (under § 1983, there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ayer’s motion to amend judgment and motion for relief from judgment because Ayer failed to establish any grounds for such relief. *See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,*5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief from judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)).

Ayer’s appeal of the denial of his motion for preliminary injunction is moot. *See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan,*954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary relief would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We do not consider issues which are not supported by argument. *See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle,*7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Ezra Pierre DABNEY v. STATE

CR-16-0377

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Steven R. CONSTANT and Davida Constant, Appellant/petitioner(s), v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Appellee/respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-0555

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

October 20, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-13-00413-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS

v.

HORACIO CHAVEZ

On Appeal from the

264th District Court of Bell County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 60802

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

November 21, 2013
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 21

- 00016

- CV

Revolution Insurance Technologies, Inc. , Appellant

v.

John Warren , Appellee

FROM THE 261ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D

- 1

- GN

- 20

- 004409 , THE HONORABLE CATHERINE MAUZY , J UDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Revolution Insurance Technologies, Inc. has filed an unopposed moti on

to dismiss this appeal. We g rant appellant’s motion and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App.

P. 42.1(a)

.

__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker and Smith

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: April 28, 2021
#### Esther Cruz QUIROZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-71765

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 14, 2017

Vikram Badrinath, Esquire, Attorney, Vikram Badrinath, PC, Tucson, AZ, for Petitioner

OIL, Enitan Otunla, Trial Attorney, Bernard Joseph, Christina J. Martin, Esquire, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Esther Cruz Quiroz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her application for cancellation of removal. We have *644jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act. *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo constitutional claims. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on numerous inconsistencies between Cruz Quiroz’s testimony, her witnesses’ testimony, and her documentary evidence. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B)-(C); *Shrestha,*590 F.3d at 1039-45 (detailing REAL ID Act adverse credibility standards). Cruz Quiroz’s explanations for the inconsistencies, including her contentions regarding her husband’s mental illness, do not compel a contrary conclusion. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000).

The record does not support Cruz Qui-roz’s contentions that the BIA failed to consider relevant evidence and arguments presented on appeal. *See Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (agency need not write an exegesis on every contention); *Fernandez v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner did not overcome the presumption that the BIA did review the record).

We reject Cruz Quiroz’s contention that she was denied a fair hearing, *see Colmenar v. INS,*210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (due process claims require showing that proceedings were “so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), or denied a substantive due process right, *see Lim v. Holder,*710 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Cancellation of removal is a form of discretionary relief which does not give rise to a substantive interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.