IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeal of Gressen Properties, :

LLC :

:

From Decision of City of Philadelphia :

Commission on Human Relations :

: No. 349 C.D. 2023

Appeal of: Christopher Leidig : Submitted: April 11, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 9, 2024

Christopher Leidig (Appellant) appeals from the Philadelphia County 

Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) March 17, 2023 order reversing the City of 

Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations’ (PCHR) decision that determined 

that although Appellant did not establish a discrimination claim, Appellant did 

establish a claim for two counts of retaliation. Essentially, the issue before this Court

is whether the trial court erred by reversing the contested portion of the PCHR’s 

decision.

1

 After review, this Court affirms.

1 Appellant presented five issues in his “Questions Involved:” (1) whether the trial court 

erred by substituting its own judgment for the PCHR’s judgment on the weight, credibility and 

relevance of the evidence; (2) whether the trial court erred by ruling that Appellant failed to name 

the correct respondent; (3) whether the trial court erred by ruling that it was logically incongruous 

that a complainant failed to prevail on an underlying discrimination claim, but still prevailed on a 

retaliation claim; (4) whether the trial court erred by ruling that the relief granted by the PCHR 

was not justified; and (5) whether the trial court erred by using the wrong standards when it 

reviewed the case. Appellant Br. at 5. All of the issues are subsumed in the issue as stated by this 

Court and will be addressed accordingly.
2

On or about February 1, 2017, Appellant and his mother, Patricia Leidig 

(Mother), signed a lease with Scott Gressen (Gressen)2to reside at a portion of 

Gressen’s property designated as first floor apartment, 448 Seville Street, 

Philadelphia (Apartment), as tenants (Lease). See Original Record (O.R.) at 275-

278.

3

 On June 1, 2019, Gressen Properties, LLC (Gressen Properties) sent a notice 

to all tenants that pursuant to Clause 13 of the Lease,4it amended the building rules 

and added no vaping to the no smoking policy (June 1, 2019 Notice).

5

 See O.R. at 

301. On June 6, 2019, Appellant sent a picture of his medical marijuana card to 

Gressen Properties’ employee, Johnny,

6

and stated: “Here is a picture of my legal 

verification for marijuana I vaporize[.] [I]t is against the law to tell me I cannot take 

my prescription[.] I will sue you if you try to kick us out for it[.] I do not smoke

mariju[ana] . . . .”

7

 O.R. at 299. To which, Johnny responded: “You never stated 

this on your application[,] and you are violating our [n]o [s]moking policy for the 

2 Gressen owns the property Appellant and Mother leased.

3 Because the pages in the original record are not numbered, the page numbers referenced 

herein reflect electronic pagination.

4 Clause 13 of the Lease provided:

Building Rules. Tenant will comply with the rules of the [b]uilding 

adopted and altered by [l]andlord from time to time and will cause 

all of its agents, employees, invitees[,] and visitors to do so; all 

changes to such rules will be sent by [l]andlord to [t]enant in writing. 

The initial rules for the [b]uilding are attached hereto . . . and 

incorporated herein for all purposes.

O.R. at 276.

5 The original no smoking policy prohibited smoking inside the apartments. The June 1, 

2019 Notice provided: “Any violation of this rule will be cause for eviction.” O.R. at 301.

6

Johnny’s last name is not included in the original record.

7 The rest of the text is cut off.
3

building. Vape or not. That’s the issue at hand. You were asked not to do it in the 

building.” O.R. at 300.

On June 14, 2019, Appellant sent a list of complaints regarding the 

condition of his Apartment to Gressen Properties. On June 17, 2019, Gressen 

Properties’ manager Carrie Anne Sanford (Sanford) responded:

Thank you for bringing these items to our attention. Per 

our conversation earlier, Johnny will be by on Wednesday,

June 19th around 1[:00] p[.]m[.] to evaluate the items on 

the list.

The timing of which you chose to report these items is a 

little ironic since you have recently told us you will not be

renewing your [L]ease after we reached out to you about 

violating the no smoking policy.

After discussing your complaint with [Gressen], he has 

decided that we would [sic] let you out of your [L]ease 

early without penalty if you wish to do so. We want all of 

our tenants to be happy and [] satisfied. Please let me 

know what you decide[].

O.R. at 308.

On June 18, 2019, Appellant emailed the following to Sanford at 12:39 

p.m.:

I sent a picture to Johnny of my prescription and let him 

know that I vaporize it and do not smoke there is no 

smoking clause on my [L]ease that I saw it my water [sic] 

looked over it and prove [sic] that I was right[.] I decided 

not to renew my [L]ease because he told me[,] but it does 

not matter and I should have let him know my medications 

prior to that which is highly illegal according to my 

[L]ease if I want to renew it I will let my landlord who is 

[Gressen] no [sic] not Johnny who is not the landlord[.] I 

am not talking to Johnny anymore because he has violated 

my rights time and time again [sic] I’m in the right here 
4

and I’ve already set up legal aid and they also agreed that 

I’m not violating my [L]ease so I would appreciate it if

you looked at my rights before you guys decided to violate 

them[.]

O.R. at 297. At 12:39 p.m., that same date, Appellant again emailed Sanford stating:

Find [sic] me that according to the Fair Housing Act[8] my 

prescriptions are my business and the fact that I gave you 

a copy of it after the fact and you guys are still coming at 

me[,] I might just have to go to my lawyer again because 

this is blatant discrimination on my disabilities[.]

Id. Finally, at 12:53 p.m., that same date, Appellant emailed Sanford:

Here is once again another of my legal prescription [sic] 

from the Department of Health Pennsylvania and I am 

supposed to vaporize it indoors that [sic] the legal way to 

use it and that is the legal way that I do use it[.] I do not 

smoke it[,] it does not violate the smoking [c]lause that 

does not even exist and I would like the email sent to me 

have a copy of our signatures on the addendum on the 

[L]ease that says the non-smoking [c]lause that we do not 

have[.]

Id.

On June 21, 2019, as a result of complaints from neighboring tenants

that marijuana smoke was infiltrating their apartments, Counsel for Gressen 

Properties (Counsel) sent a notice to Appellant and Mother regarding their violation 

of the building rules and reiterating the new rule (June 21, 2019 Notice).

9 See O.R. 

8

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631.

9 The June 21, 2019 Notice reiterated:

This rule goes into effect immediately. Any violation of this rule 

will be cause for eviction. This letter is also placing you on notice 

of your prior violation of the oral warning provided at the inception 
5

at 302. On June 27, 2019, Counsel sent a letter to Appellant and Mother notifying 

them that their Lease was terminated due to a violation of the building rules and 

giving them 10 days to vacate the premises. See O.R. at 305. On or about July 16, 

2019, Appellant filed a complaint with the PCHR alleging disability discrimination. 

See O.R. at 522-525. On August 27, 2019, Counsel sent another letter to Appellant 

and Mother notifying them that their Lease would not be renewed and instructing 

them to vacate the premises. 

On September 9, 2019, Appellant filed a complaint with the Fair 

Housing Commission (FHC). On December 3, 2019, after holding a hearing, the 

FHC determined that the August 27, 2019 lease nonrenewal notice was not 

retaliatory “as there were issues between the parties that preceded [the] letter from 

[landlord] to [t]enant[,]” and that the PCHR will address Appellant’s claim that the 

no smoking policy is discriminatory and should be waived as an accommodation. 

O.R. at 322. On December 5, 2019, Counsel sent a letter to Appellant and Mother

again notifying them that their Lease will not be renewed and instructing them to 

“vacate on or before January 31, 2020.” O.R. at 496. On or about January 17, 2020, 

Appellant filed another complaint with the PCHR alleging disability discrimination 

and retaliation. See O.R. at 526-528. Appellant vacated the premises on February 

1, 2021, after his Lease term expired.

On May 14, 2021, the PCHR held a hearing. On October 21, 2021, the 

PCHR determined that Appellant failed to establish a claim of disability 

discrimination/failure to accommodate a disability under Section 9-1108 of the 

of your [L]ease. No further warnings shall issue in this regard. 

Continued violation of this rule will be cause for eviction. 

O.R. at 302.
6

Philadelphia Fair Practice Ordinance (PFPO);10 and that Gressen Properties violated 

the PFPO by retaliating against Appellant for engaging in protected activities on two 

occasions.11 The PCHR directed Gressen Properties to: (1) pay a $2,000.00 penalty 

for each retaliatory action; (2) reimburse Appellant for reasonable attorney’s fees 

and costs; and (3) cease and desist engaging in retaliatory actions. 

On October 27, 2021, Gressen Properties appealed to the trial court. On 

March 17, 2023, the trial court reversed the contested portion of the PCHR’s 

decision. On April 10, 2023, Appellant appealed to this Court.12 On May 1, 2023, 

the trial court directed Appellant to file a Statement of Errors Complained of on 

10 Philadelphia, PA, Code, §§ 9-1101–9-1133 (12th ed. 2020). The PFPO is not included 

in the original record but can be found at:

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/philadelphia/latest/philadelphia_pa/0-0-0-278561 (last 

visited May 8, 2024). The PCHR incorrectly referenced Section 9-1103 of the PFPO, which 

prohibits unlawful employment practices. See Philadelphia, PA, Code, § 9-1103. Section 9-1108

of the PFPO prohibits unlawful housing and real property practices. See Philadelphia, PA, Code, 

§ 9-1108.

11 Specifically, the PCHR determined that the two separate acts of retaliation were: (1) 

seeking to evict Appellant after Appellant filed claims with the PCHR and the FHC; and (2) 

seeking to evict Mother. See O.R. at 533.

12

This Court has consistently held that our scope of review is limited 

to a determination of whether the [PCHR’s] adjudication is in 

accordance with law, constitutional rights have been violated or the 

findings of the [PCHR] are not supported by substantial evidence.

Civil Serv[.] Comm[’n] of Phila[.] v. Banks, . . . 442 A.2d 41 ([Pa. 

Cmwlth.] 1982). “Substantial evidence must be something more 

than a scintilla creating a mere suspicion of the existence of a fact, 

and must be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

consider adequate to support a conclusion.” Barnes v. Dep[’t] of 

Just[.] . . . , 452 A.2d 593, 595 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1982).

City of Phila. Comm’n on Hum. Rels. v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 496 A.2d 435, 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1985).
7

Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(b) (Rule 

1925(b) Statement). On May 19, 2023, Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) Statement. 

On August 1, 2023, the trial court filed a Notice of No Supplemental Opinion 

pursuant to Rule 1925(a).

Appellant argues that the trial court reweighed the evidence and the 

credibility determinations, and substituted its judgment for that of the PCHR. 

Specifically, Appellant contends that the trial court reassessed the facts, and then 

arrived at the conclusion it would have had it been sitting as the fact-finder. Gressen 

Properties rejoins that the trial court did not substitute its own judgment for the 

PCHR’s judgment on the weight, credibility, and relevance of the evidence, but 

rather it determined that the evidence could not support the PCHR’s findings, and 

that there was no explanation regarding why the award was entered against an 

incorrect party.

The PCHR concluded, in relevant part:

8. [Appellant] did not present sufficient evidence to 

establish a failure to accommodate claim under the PFPO. 

While [Appellant] is unequivocally a qualified individual 

with a disability, he did not present sufficient evidence to 

show that [Gressen Properties’] building policies 

precluded him from being able to take his prescribed 

medication.

9. [Appellant] did establish a retaliation claim under [the] 

PFPO. In fact, [Appellant] established that [Gressen 

Properties] engaged in two separate acts of retaliation: (1) 

seeking to evict [Appellant] after [Appellant] filed claims 

with the PCHR and FHC[;] and (2) seeking to evict 

[Mother]. Clearly, [Appellant] engaged in the protected 

activity of filing complaints against [Gressen 

Properties] and [Gressen Properties] took adverse 

action against both [Appellant] and [Mother]. 
8

O.R. at 532-533 (emphasis added).

Section 9-1108(1)(g) of the PFPO provides that it shall be unlawful

[f]or any person to harass, threaten, harm, damage or 

otherwise penalize, retaliate or discriminate in any 

manner against any person because he, she or it has 

complied with the provisions of this Chapter, exercised 

his, her or its rights under this Chapter, enjoyed the 

benefits of this Chapter, or made a charge, testified or 

assisted in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or 

hearing hereunder.

Philadelphia, PA, Code, § 9-1108(1)(g) (emphasis added). “PFPO claims are 

generally evaluated under the same legal framework as Title VII claims.” Darby v. 

Temple Univ., 216 F. Supp. 3d 535, 543 (E.D. Pa. 2016). “[R]etaliation claims are 

subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See Moore v. City of 

Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying the McDonnell Douglas [Corp. 

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)], framework to a Title VII retaliation claim)[.]” 

Griswold v. Drexel Univ., ___ F.3d ___, ___ (E.D. Pa., No. 22-0568, filed March 1, 

2024), slip. op. at 3.

Under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,

13

[a] prima facie case of retaliation requires [Appellant] to 

show that (i) []he was engaged in a protected activity; (ii) 

[Gressen Properties] was aware of the protected activity; 

(iii) subsequent to participation in the protected activity 

[Appellant] was subjected to an adverse [] action; and (iv) 

there is a causal connection between participation in the 

protected activity and the adverse [] action. Robert 

Wholey Co[.], Inc. v. [Pa.] Hum[.] [Rels.] Comm[’n], . . . 

606 A.2d 982, 983 ([Pa.] 1992). Upon showing a prima 

facie case, the burden shifts to [Gressen Properties] to 

articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 

13 Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.
9

action. See McDonnell Douglas. Finally, the burden 

shifts to [Appellant] to show that [Gressen Properties’] 

proffered reasons are pretextual. Id.

Spanish Council of York, Inc. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 

879 A.2d 391, 399 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

Jackson v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 308 A.3d 900, 907 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024).

Here, the PCHR determined that Gressen Properties engaged in 

retaliation based on nothing more than the fact that Appellant filed complaints with 

the FHC and the PCHR, and sometime thereafter, Gressen Properties sent a second 

notice of non-renewal/notice to quit to Appellant and Mother. See O.R. at 531 

(Findings of Fact 13-15). 

However, Mother was not a party to the complaint before the PCHR, 

thus whether Gressen Properties sought to evict Mother is irrelevant to the issue of 

retaliation. Further, and most significantly, the PCHR completely ignored the fact 

that, on June 27, 2019, over two months before Appellant filed his complaints with 

the FHC and the PCHR, Counsel sent a letter to Appellant and Mother notifying 

them that their Lease was terminated due to a violation of the building rules and 

giving them 10 days to vacate the premises. See O.R. at 305. Thus, there is no 

causal connection between participation in the protected activity and the adverse 

action. Moreover, the record is replete with evidence establishing that Gressen 

Properties had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, i.e., Appellant’s 

violation of the no smoking policy. 

Here, the trial court correctly stated its standard of review. Specifically, 

the trial court described:

Under Pennsylvania law, the trial court’s review of a local 

agency’s determinations is analogous to that of an 
10

appellate court of a trial court’s legal ruling. Due 

deference is accorded to [the] agency’s fact-finding 

determinations. Review is limited to determining whether 

the [agency] had committed an error of law or a manifest 

abuse of discretion. Allegheny W. C[ivic] Council Inc. v. 

Zoning [Bd.] of Adjustment, 689 A.2d 225, 227 (Pa. 1997). 

2 Pa.C.S. § 752. When, as in the instant case, no further 

evidence is introduced before the trial court, “review is 

limited to determining whether the [reviewing] [agency] 

committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law in 

rendering its decision. [The appellate court] may conclude 

that the [agency] abused its discretion only if its findings 

are not supported by substantial evidence, which [courts] 

have defined as ‘relevant evidence which a reasonable 

mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion 

reached.” Marshall v. City of Phila[.], 97 A.3d 323, 331 

(Pa. 2014).

Both Pennsylvania [c]ommon [l]aw and [r]ules of 

[a]dministrative [l]aw allow the trial court to overturn an 

agency decision, only after “determining whether there 

was a constitutional violation, an error of law, a failure by 

[the] local agency to comply with the statutes procedural 

provisions, or a material finding of fact that is unsupported 

by substantial evidence.” Johnson v. Lansdale 

Borough, . . . 146 A.3d 711 ([Pa.] 2016)[;] 42 Pa.C.S. § 

704. If the trial court does not affirm the agency decision, 

the trial court may enter any order authorized by . . . 

[Section] 706 [of the Judicial Code, which] authorizes the 

trial court to “affirm, modify, vacate, set aside, or reverse 

any order brought before it for review and may remand the 

matter and direct the entry of such appropriate order. . . .” 

42 Pa.C.S.[] § 706.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6.

Using this standard, the trial court determined, in relevant part: “[T]he 

PCHR’s fundamentally erroneous findings effectively undermined the resulting 

decision. Substantial evidence did not support [its] determinations. . . . Thus, 
11

reversal of the PCHR’s [o]rder of October 21, 2021[,] is due.” Id. at 7 (emphasis 

added). This Court discerns no error in the trial court’s determination.14

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

14 Given this Court’s determination, the issue of whether the PCHR entered its award 

against an incorrect party is moot.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeal of Gressen Properties, :

LLC :

:

From Decision of City of Philadelphia :

Commission on Human Relations :

: No. 349 C.D. 2023

Appeal of: Christopher Leidig :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of May, 2024, the Philadelphia County 

Common Pleas Court’s March 17, 2023 order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge