United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-3911

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Steve Winkle, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Arkansas.

Southwestern Bell Telephone *

Company, * 

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: September 16, 1999

Filed: November 4, 1999 

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Before BOWMAN, LAY, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

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LAY, Circuit Judge.

Steve Winkle ("Winkle") began working for Southwestern Bell Telephone

Company ("SWB") on April 14, 1980, in the Operator Services Center located in Hot

Springs, Arkansas. In 1982, Winkle was promoted to a first line management position

and remained in that position until his termination in March 1997. SWB's stated
1

In response to complaints regarding Winkle's office conduct, SWB personnel

met with him on December 10, 1996, and January 27, 1997, and informed him of

disciplinary measures taken and the conditions necessary for his continued

employment.

2The Honorable H. Franklin Waters, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Arkansas, presiding.

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reasons for terminating Winkle included his refusal to comply with conditions of

employment1 and his inappropriate office conduct.

Winkle filed suit against SWB alleging that his termination violated the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. ("ADA"), Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), and the Arkansas Civil

Rights Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-107 (Michie Supp. 1997). Following discovery,

SWB filed a motion for summary judgment. 

In a detailed fifty-seven page opinion, the district court2 thoroughly examined all

of the evidence. Winkle v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., No. 97-6147 (W.D. Ark.,

October 16, 1998). The district court held Winkle had failed to prove a prima facie

case of disability discrimination because he failed to provide evidence of a substantial

limitation on a major life activity and because he failed to provide evidence that his

recent job performance met the legitimate job expectations of his employer. The

district court went on to note that, assuming Winkle had made a prima facie showing,

his claim still failed because he did not present evidence that his termination was the

result of his disability. 

With respect to the Title VII claim, the district court concluded Winkle failed to

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was meeting the legitimate

expectations of employment. Despite this conclusion, the court assumed such a

showing, and held Winkle had failed to meet his burden of proving that SWB's
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proffered reasons for termination were pretextual. With regard to the Arkansas Civil

Rights Act claim, the district court held the claim failed because Winkle did not

produce evidence that his termination was the result of sex or disability discrimination.

On appeal, Winkle argued the district court erred in three ways: 1) by looking

at the evidence in a light more favorable to SWB; 2) in finding Winkle failed to

establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination and failed to prove SWB's reasons

for termination were pretextual; and 3) by finding Winkle's depression did not

constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo applying the

same standard used by the district court. Lynn v. Deaconess Med. Ctr. West Campus,

160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1998). "Summary judgment is proper if the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Id.

We have carefully reviewed the record in this case and find the evidence

supports a finding that SWB articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for

terminating Winkle and Winkle failed to produce any evidence that these reasons were
3Under the burden-shifting analysis of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502 (1993), once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination the

burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination; if such a reason is articulated, the burden shifts

back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that such reason is mere pretext for discrimination.

In this case, Winkle's proffer of evidence on pretextuality consisted mainly of his

seventeen years of good employment history, together with assertions that his conduct

did not constitute sexual harassment and that males were treated differently than

females. Winkle, however, did not contest the occurrence of most of the conduct

which SWB relied on in terminating him. Consequently, we hold that Winkle's claim

of pretext does not constitute evidence of pretext or in any way prove that the

nondiscriminatory reasons articulated by SWB were false. 

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pretextual.3 Consequently, we find Winkle failed to present a genuine issue of material

fact on his Title VII claim. 

We also hold that Winkle failed to prove a disability within the meaning of the

ADA because he presented no evidence that a major life activity was impaired.

Consequently, we find Winkle failed to present a genuine issue of material fact on his

ADA claim.

We affirm the district court's decision granting SWB's motion for summary

judgment.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.