NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 22-1577

__________

MONICA NICULCEA,

Appellant

v.

STONE RIDGE TOWNE CENTER, 

(Retirement Living) New Dawn Christian Community Services

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-02096)

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 17, 2022

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 7, 2022)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Pro se Appellant Monica Niculcea appeals from the District Court’s judgment in 

this employment discrimination action. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.

I.

Niculcea began working at Stone Ridge Towne Center (“Stone Ridge”), a 

retirement community, in 2003, and she was promoted to the title of Registered Nurse

(“RN”) Supervisor and hired to work as a Charge Nurse approximately two years later. 

In March 2013, while working a shift, Niculcea slipped and injured her hamstring and 

right sciatic nerve. As a result of her injury, in the months that followed, Niculcea took 

periods of leave and worked on sedentary or light duty, according to the

recommendations of her medical providers. Niculcea was terminated from Stone Ridge 

in April 2014 after she was accused of resident abuse.

Niculcea filed suit against Stone Ridge in 2017; in her second amended complaint, 

she raised claims under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”), 42 

U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et 

seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., related to her 

employment and eventual termination. Stone Ridge filed a motion to dismiss, which the 

District Court granted in part, dismissing Niculcea’s claims under the ADEA and GINA

with prejudice. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment on the 

remaining claims. Over Niculcea’s objections, the District Court entered an order

adopting, with one modification, the Report and Recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, 
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granting Stone Ridge’s motion for summary judgment, and denying Niculcea’s. Niculcea 

filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 

over decisions granting motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. See

Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012); Blunt v. Lower Merion 

Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). In reviewing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), 

we must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Fleisher, 679 F.3d at 120. Summary judgment 

is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party, “there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact [such] that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248,

253 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[U]nless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to 

reasonably find for the nonmovant,” summary judgment should be granted. Barefoot 

Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011). 

III.

We agree with the District Court’s disposition of Niculcea’s claims. First, the 

District Court properly dismissed Niculcea’s claims under the ADEA and GINA. The 

ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against 

an employee based on age, see 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), while the GINA prohibits the same 

with respect to genetic information, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1). In support of her 
4

ADEA claim, Niculcea asserted that the Stone Ridge employee who provided statements

against her about the incident of resident abuse of which she was accused was younger 

than her. She otherwise made conclusory allegations that she was terminated because of 

her age. These allegations failed to state a plausible claim under the ADEA. See

Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (describing elements 

of prima facie case of age discrimination). Likewise, Niculcea’s allegations that Stone 

Ridge violated the GINA were insufficient to survive dismissal, as Niculcea failed to 

plead facts demonstrating that she had undergone genetic testing or that Stone Ridge took 

adverse action against her based on her genetic information. See James v. City of 

Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (observing that we may “disregard rote 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory 

statements”).

1

Stone Ridge was also entitled to summary judgment on Niculcea’s claims that 

survived dismissal.2

 Niculcea first challenges the District Court’s disposition of her 

claims that Stone Ridge denied her reasonable accommodations for the disability arising 

out of her March 2013 work-related injury by refusing to provide her with a reserved 

1 Although Niculcea makes some factual allegations in support of her GINA claim in her 

opening brief, we will not consider them for the first time on appeal. See Jenkins v.

Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 88 n.12 (3d Cir. 2013).

2 Contrary to Niculcea’s assertions on appeal, we see no indication that the District Court 

applied the incorrect legal standard for deciding a motion for summary judgment or 

otherwise placed too high a burden on Niculcea at the summary judgment phase.
5

parking spot and scooter, failing to provide a team member to assist her with lifting more 

than 10 pounds, and refusing to allow her to leave work early to seek medical attention 

immediately following her injury.3 The ADA requires employers to “mak[e] reasonable 

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 

individual with a disability . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the 

accommodations would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 312 (3d Cir. 

1999) (reasoning that “both parties have a duty to assist in the search for appropriate 

reasonable accommodation and to act in good faith” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

Niculcea did not provide sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Stone Ridge 

failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. The record demonstrates that Stone 

Ridge allowed Niculcea to utilize any of the visitor’s spots located near the facility’s

entrance when she asked to park closer to the building and granted her request to use a 

scooter, albeit at her own cost. While Niculcea contends that Stone Ridge should have 

paid for a scooter, Stone Ridge also offered a wheelchair, and the ADA allows employers 

to choose an easier or less expensive accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.

3 Niculcea also alleged that Stone Ridge failed to accommodate her request to attend 

water pool therapy, but she has forfeited this claim on appeal by failing to raise it in her 

opening brief. See M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 

n.2 (3d Cir. 2020). 
6

§ 1630.9; see also Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n 

employee cannot make his employer provide a specific accommodation if another 

reasonable accommodation is instead provided.”). And during periods in which Niculcea 

was not on leave due to her injury, Stone Ridge offered her light and sedentary duty 

work, in which she could use a wheelchair and obtain help from a team member to lift

more than 10 pounds. Niculcea suggests that Stone Ridge should have assigned a team 

member to assist with her lifting limitations, but she failed to provide evidence that she 

raised this issue with Stone Ridge or that this accommodation was possible. Cf. Capps v. 

Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that a plaintiff bringing 

a failure-to-accommodate claim must show that she “requested an accommodation” and 

“could have been reasonably accommodated”).

4 Further, even assuming Niculcea 

showed that her injury was a disability and that Stone Ridge refused to accommodate her 

request to obtain immediate medical assistance for her injury, we agree with the District 

Court that Stone Ridge demonstrated that such accommodation would have constituted 

an undue burden. Specifically, Stone Ridge represented that it is required under state law 

to maintain an RN Supervisor on duty, and no one else was available to cover Niculcea’s 

role at the time. Niculcea has not meaningfully contested this explanation either before 

the District Court or on appeal.

4 We note, further, that “redundant staffing is not a reasonable accommodation.” Hansen 

v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 2000).
7

Next, Niculcea challenges the District Court’s disposition of her claims that she 

was terminated because of her disability and Romanian national origin. Even if Niculcea 

made a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA or Title VII, Stone Ridge 

demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate her. 

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (describing 

burden-shifting framework for Title VII discrimination claims); Shaner v. Synthes, 204 

F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to ADA claims). 

Namely, Stone Ridge provided evidence of its investigation into allegations that Niculcea 

abused a resident on April 23, 2014. Rebecca Schnoke, a Licensed Practical Nurse who 

aided Niculcea with the resident, alleged that Niculcea removed the resident’s shorts and 

briefs to conduct a skin assessment of her buttocks even though the resident did not

consent, and that Niculcea grabbed the top of the resident’s arms and attempted to sit her 

in a wheelchair when she attempted to leave the room. Stone Ridge provided evidence 

that these actions violated policies pertaining to a resident’s right to refuse treatment and 

justified immediate termination. Niculcea was terminated six days after the incident. 

Niculcea argues that Schnoke’s account of the April 23 incident was false, that she 

did not commit resident abuse, and that her termination therefore must have been 

discriminatory. “To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, however, the plaintiff 

cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken.” Fuentes v. 

Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994). The issue is therefore not whether Schnoke’s 

allegations against Niculcea “were substantiated or valid, or whether [Stone Ridge] was 
8

remiss to rely upon” them, but rather whether Stone Ridge believed the allegations “to be 

accurate and actually relied upon them.” Id. at 766-67; see also Pulczinski v. Trinity 

Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1003 (8th Cir. 2012) (“To prove that the 

employer’s explanation was false, the employee must show the employer did not truly 

believe that the employee violated company rules.”). Niculcea has provided no evidence 

to suggest that Stone Ridge did not truly believe or rely on Schnoke’s account.

Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Stone 

Ridge on this claim.5

Niculcea also contends that the District Court improperly dismissed her claim 

under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). The District Court did not, 

5 Niculcea’s contention that administrators only believed Schnoke’s account of events 

because of Schnoke’s American national origin is not supported by the record. With 

respect to Niculcea’s argument that her termination was discriminatory because another 

RN Supervisor, Gayle Cooper, was not terminated after she refused to perform the duties 

of a charge nurse and improperly posted a photo of a resident on Facebook, Niculcea did 

not provide sufficient evidence to show that these circumstances could give rise to an 

inference of unlawful discrimination. The record demonstrates that Cooper was not hired 

to work as a charge nurse, so it is not clear why she should have been disciplined for 

failing to perform charge nurse duties. And with respect to Cooper’s Facebook post, 

Niculcea did not demonstrate that she and Cooper “engaged in acts of ‘comparable 

seriousness.’” Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation 

and emphasis omitted); see also de Lima Silva v. Dep’t of Corrs., 917 F.3d 546, 559 (7th 

Cir. 2019) (“Conduct may be comparably serious if it violates the same rule or is of a 

similar nature.”). Lastly, as for Niculcea’s related claim that she was given a higher 

workload than Cooper because of her national origin, we conclude, for substantially the 

same reasons provided by the District Court, that this contention is speculative. Cf. Uhl 

v. Zalk Josephs Fabricators, Inc., 121 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Facts, not an 

employee’s perceptions and feelings, are required to support a discrimination claim.”). 
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however, construe Niculcea’s second amended complaint as raising a claim under the 

PHRA, as Niculcea repeatedly stated that she brought her action under the ADA, Title 

VII, the ADEA, and the GINA. Even if this conclusion was incorrect, any error was 

harmless, as the PHRA is analyzed under the same standards as its federal counterparts,

see Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996), and as noted above, the 

District Court properly resolved Niculcea’s claims under those statutes in favor of Stone 

Ridge.6

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

6 We have considered the remaining arguments raised in Niculcea’s opening brief and 

conclude that they lack merit.