[J-72A-2014] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant** 

**v.**

**JOSE A. CARRASQUILLO, Appellee**  **: :**  **: :**  **: :**  **: :**  **: :**  **: :**  **No. 7 EAP 2014 Appeal from the judgment of Superior**  **Court entered 10/08/2013 at No. 1045 EDA 2011, vacating the judgment of sentence**  **entered on 11/30/10, of the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division,**  **Philadelphia County at Nos. CP-51-CR-0009652-2009 and**  **CP-51-CR-0009653-2009, Dated November 30, 2010, and Remanding**  **78 A.3d 1120 (Pa. Super. 2013) ARGUED: September 10, 2014** 

CONCURRING OPINION

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS **I join the majority in its entirety. I write separately to emphasize my disapproval with th**  **e Superior Court’s bright-line rule that prohibited, as a matter of law**  **, trial courts from assessing the credibility**

**of an “assertion of innocence” made in the context of a presentence motion to withdraw a**  **guilty plea. This per se approach, which was based upon the utterance of “magic**  **words,” undermined the trial court’s role as a finder o f fact and removed necessary**  **discretion from the court. I agree with the majority that such an approach was**  **unsatisfactory. Trial courts must be permitted to evalu ate the credibility of an accused’s** **[J-72A-2014] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 2**

**assertion of innocence, including the evidence of guilt, of delay, and of ulterior or illicit**  **motive in ruling upon an accused’s presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.**  **Moreover, since the majority is reversing the Superior Court as it relates to the first**  **issue, I agree with the majority that it is not necessar y, for disposition of this particular**  **case, to reach the Commonwealth’s second issue, which concern s prejudice to the**  **Commonwealth. However, in order to provide guidance to the courts below, it is clear** 

**the Commonwealth demonstrated it would have been subst antially prejudiced by the**  **withdrawal of Appellee’s guilty plea. I specifically disagree with the Superior Court that th**  **e evidence of the psychological and emotional harm to the young victim, N**  **.O., was insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate substantial prejudice to the Com**  **monwealth or that it was largely irrelevant to the inquiry of prejudice. The Superior**  **Court’s bright-line rule, which**

**attributed no value to the interests of the victims of crime, is inapposite to public policy in** 

**this area of the law and to the value of the criminal justice system generally. Rather, as**  **the trial court properly concluded, evidence of the ha rmful effect of Appellee’s withdrawal**  **of his plea upon N.O.’s psychological and emotional well -being was relevant to the trial**  **court’s inquiry since it had the tendency to make the Com monwealth’s claim of prejudice**  **more or less probable than it would be without that e vidence.** 

**As to whether the Commonwealth adduced substantial evid ence of the**  **psychological harm to N.O., I agree with the trial cour t that it did so in this case. The**  **Commonwealth relied upon videotaped testimony of N.O ., which was corroborated by**  **testimony from N.O.’s family and a school principal, to argue the child victim’s**  **psychological and emotional well-being would be comprom ised if the trial court granted** **[J-72A-2014] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 3**

**Appellee’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Based on the evidence presented, the trial**  **court concluded N.O. was emotionally vulnerable and op ined harm would be caused by**  **denying N.O. closure and threatening to force N.O. to relive the brutal rape she endured**  **by testifying at trial. I find no error in the tria l court’s conclusion of substantial prejudice in**  **this regard. Mr. Justice Baer joins this concurring opinion.**