[Cite as In re R.P., 2018-Ohio-885.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

In re R.P. Court of Appeals Nos. L-17-1267 

 

 Trial Court No. JC 16253252 

 

 DECISION AND JUDGMENT

 Decided: March 9, 2018 

* * * * * 

 Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant. 

 Jill E. Wolff, for appellee. 

* * * * * 

MAYLE, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, A.B.-P., appeals the October 2, 2017 judgment of the 

Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating her parental rights 

and granting permanent custody of her daughter, R.P., to Lucas County Children’s 

Services (“LCCS”). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment. 

 
2. 

I. Background 

A. LCCS is awarded interim, then temporary custody of R.P. 

{¶ 2} R.P. was born in April of 2006, and is the daughter of appellant, A.B.-P. 

(“mother”), and J.P. (“father”). LCCS filed a complaint in dependency and neglect on 

February 5, 2016, after receiving referrals in January of 2016, alleging that R.P. had not 

attended school since September of 2015; her parents were abusing drugs; she was living 

in a home with no gas or running water; the condition of the home was “deplorable;” her 

mother was spending all of her money on drugs; there were transient people in and out of 

the home; the family had a vicious dog; and R.P. had witnessed incidents of domestic 

abuse between her parents. The agency had received similar complaints about the family 

in September of 2015, and mother had “an extensive referral history” dating back even 

further. 

{¶ 3} Following a shelter care hearing on February 5, 2016, the trial court awarded 

interim custody of R.P. to LCCS and appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for R.P. It 

also ordered mother and father to undergo a dual diagnostic assessment and to submit to 

drug testing. 

{¶ 4} R.P. could not immediately be placed with a foster family, and in the 

meantime, mother “took off” with R.P. Their whereabouts were unknown for 

approximately six weeks. Through an anonymous call, LCCS learned that mother and 

R.P. were residing with R.P.’s paternal grandmother. 

 
3. 

{¶ 5} On March 28, 2016, LCCS arranged for an emergency placement for R.P., 

and the next day she was placed in a therapeutic foster home. Her father died two days 

later. On April 15, 2016, R.P. was adjudged dependent and neglected. Temporary 

custody was awarded to LCCS. 

B. A case plan is devised. 

{¶ 6} Mother did not initially cooperate with LCCS, however, a case plan was 

filed with the juvenile court on March 9, 2016, with a goal of reunification. The case 

plan was amended on May 20, 2016, once mother made herself available to LCCS. 

Consistent with the juvenile court’s interim custody order, mother was required to 

undergo a dual diagnostic assessment to evaluate the need for mental health and 

substance abuse treatment, and was required to submit to random urine screens. Because 

there were concerns about the history of domestic violence, she was asked to engage in a 

domestic violence victims group. She was also required to obtain suitable housing and to 

seek employment. Visits between mother and R.P. were permitted to take place at LCCS 

at least one time per week. 

C. Mother begins services. 

{¶ 7} Mother failed to engage in the diagnostic assessment until July of 2016. 

Once she did, she was referred for mental health and substance abuse treatment. She 

began weekly counseling, and was scheduled for intensive outpatient treatment (“IOP”) 

and a psychiatric evaluation. Mother submitted to a urine screen on July 5, 2016, and it 

was negative, but she tested positive for cocaine on July 8, 2016. She denied cocaine use 

despite the positive screen. 
4. 

{¶ 8} From July until roughly October or November of 2016, mother was “fairly 

compliant” in participating in services. She completed IOP, but did not engage in 

aftercare. She completed a domestic violence victims’ survivors course in August of 

2016, but it consisted of individual counseling instead of the group counseling that LCCS 

required of her. 

{¶ 9} Despite participating in services, mother missed 11 urine screens and 

provided a diluted sample in August of 2016. She offered many excuses for missing the 

urine screens. In August of 2016, mother tested positive for opiates, but had a 

prescription for pain medication because she had been bitten by a dog. 

{¶ 10} Mother consistently visited R.P. as allowed by the case plan. 

D. R.P. makes allegations of abuse. 

{¶ 11} On October 25, 2016, LCCS received a referral from R.P.’s counselor 

indicating that R.P. had disclosed instances of abuse by her parents. Specifically, R.P. 

disclosed that her parents injected her with a needle and that mother was taking R.P.’s 

ADHD medication. An LCCS investigator met with R.P., and R.P. relayed her 

allegations to the investigator. R.P. said that she was given the injections to help her 

sleep. The investigator met with mother, who denied having injected R.P. with anything. 

She said that it was possible that R.P. had seen her give herself B12 injections. Because 

mother denied the allegations, LCCS was unable to substantiate the alleged abuse. 

{¶ 12} More allegations by R.P. followed. On March 7, 2017, she told her 

counselor that two men had touched her. One, she said, was an alcoholic who stayed at 

her parents’ house. R.P. claimed that he touched her vagina on two occasions. The other 
5. 

was a boy her age who touched her one time after school. On May 1, 2017, R.P. told her 

counselor that she does not miss how her mom smoked weed, crack cocaine, and heroin, 

and how other people would come over and smoke it too. And on June 6, 2017, R.P. told 

her counselor that she had been raped at a bar that her mom took her to. R.P. described to 

her caseworker that she felt “like bricks [were] coming off her back” by being able to 

disclose these things. 

{¶ 13} Mother denied all of R.P.’s allegations of abuse. 

E. R.P. sustains traumatic brain injury in an auto accident. 

{¶ 14} On November 7, 2016, R.P. was a passenger in a serious car accident and 

sustained a traumatic brain injury. She was hospitalized at Nationwide Children’s 

Hospital in Columbus for nearly two months, where she was comatose for a period. 

Mother went to Columbus to be with R.P. Initially she was permitted to be at the child’s 

bedside, but because arrangements could not be made for constant supervision, visits 

ceased. 

{¶ 15} It was observed by R.P.’s caseworker and a number of medical 

professionals that when R.P. was in the process of coming out of her coma, she appeared 

to become agitated by her mother’s presence in the room. The presence of her foster 

mother appeared to calm her. 

{¶ 16} After the auto accident, R.P. was restricted from playing sports for one 

year. She continued to follow up with a number of doctors and therapists at Nationwide 

Children’s Hospital, who also provided input in devising R.P.’s individualized education 

program (“IEP”) at school. 
6. 

F. R.P.’s counselor asks that visits be reduced, then eliminated. 

{¶ 17} After R.P was released from the hospital, mother visited with R.P a couple 

of times. But as R.P. started disclosing instances of abuse, her counselor observed that 

R.P. appeared anxious after visits with mother. Her counselor recommended that visits 

be limited to once per month. 

{¶ 18} In March of 2017, R.P. became very anxious and told her counselor that 

her mother had told her to say that she made up the allegations of abuse and that her 

mother said that these allegations were the reason they were apart. R.P. told her 

counselor that she would tell her everything if her mom told her she could. The 

counselor determined that it was in R.P.’s best interest that visits with her mother stop. 

Visitation terminated effective March 23, 2017. After visits with mother ceased, R.P.’s 

counselor saw a decrease in R.P.’s anxiety level. 

{¶ 19} Mother was permitted to contact R.P. by phone, which she did sporadically. 

R.P. sometimes did not want to talk to her, despite encouragement from her foster 

mother. When R.P did speak with her mother, she often kept the conversations brief. At 

some point, telephone communication stopped altogether. Mother would later claim that 

she believed that she was not permitted to call her daughter.

G. Mother pursues services herself instead 

of complying with the case plan. 

{¶ 20} Mother missed urine screens in February and March of 2017. In March of 

2017, when visits were suspended, mother was upset and wanted to meet with LCCS with 

her attorney. She did not call to schedule that meeting, however, until June of 2017. In 
7. 

the interim, LCCS lost contact with her. Mother did not participate in case plan services, 

did not submit to urine screens, and did not return phone calls. LCCS removed her from 

the case plan. 

{¶ 21} When they finally met in June, mother reported that on April 28, 2017, she 

admitted herself to the psychiatric floor of Flower Hospital. She was there until May 17, 

2017. Records from her stay indicated that upon admission, mother tested positive for 

cocaine. She claimed to have been sober for 17 years, but said that she was persuaded to 

use cocaine with an old high school friend. The records also showed that mother 

sometimes declined to participate in group therapy during her hospitalization. 

{¶ 22} Upon leaving Flower, mother began staying at Sparrow’s Nest. Part of her 

hospital discharge plan included following up with Unison Health. Mother engaged in 

IOP at Unison and completed those services shortly before the case progressed to trial. 

Required aftercare would not be completed until October 2017. Mother submitted to 

numerous urine screens, all of which came back negative. Her IOP counselor reported 

that she had perfect attendance, had maintained her sobriety, and was a compliant, 

cooperative patient who actively participated in group sessions. 

{¶ 23} Mother successfully completed the women survivors of domestic violence 

course back in 2016, and had scored a 100 percent on the test that followed. In June of 

2017, she began seeing a therapist for individual and cognitive processing therapy. It was 

expected that that therapy could be completed in October of 2017. 

 
8. 

{¶ 24} LCCS was not satisfied with mother’s participation in these programs 

because they did not take place pursuant to a referral. This meant that mother’s Unison 

counselors had not been advised of LCCS’s specific concerns that had led to R.P.’s 

removal from the home. 

H. R.P. makes progress in foster care. 

{¶ 25} R.P. has adjusted well to foster care. She is bonded to her foster mother, 

has made friends, and enjoys school. She is excited and eager to learn. She has traveled 

with her foster family and engages in church with them. R.P. has expressed that she 

wants to remain with her foster family. 

{¶ 26} Because of the significant amounts of school she missed when she was in 

her mother’s care, R.P. initially struggled at school. She is on an IEP. She engaged in 

tutoring the first summer she was with her foster family. The auto accident resulted in 

additional setbacks, and she especially struggles with math. R.P. was again referred for 

summer tutoring. 

{¶ 27} R.P. undergoes occupational and speech therapy at Nationwide for further 

rehabilitation of the conditions caused by the November 2016 auto accident. She was 

told not to engage in sports for a year so as to avoid a head injury. She sees her counselor 

for weekly trauma therapy. Her counselor has said that it is important for her continued 

progress and social functioning that she remain in counseling and that her environment be 

predictable, dependable, stable, and safe.

 
9. 

I. LCCS is not satisfied that mother 

can provide suitable housing for R.P. 

{¶ 28} Mother’s case plan required her to obtain suitable housing. She has a 

history of moving around. Mother has at various times lived at the home she shared with 

her husband on Western Avenue. The condition of the home remains unsuitable. There 

is no furnace, no water heater, and no pipes in the home. Mother has claimed that she 

was going to fix up the house, but that has not yet occurred. 

{¶ 29} For a while after R.P. was removed from the home, mother lived with a 

friend. Mother intended to live there with R.P., but had a falling out with the friend. 

After their falling out, the friend contacted LCCS and provided information that was of 

concern to the agency. Mother told LCCS that she does not want the agency to 

communicate with the friend. 

{¶ 30} Mother is currently residing at the Sparrow’s Nest. She has said that a 

relative of her late husband, K.K., has offered to help her obtain housing and is also 

willing to take custody of R.P. if custody cannot be returned to mother. K.K. has never 

met R.P. LCCS began its background check of K.K., but it has concerns because mother 

only recently met her and has communicated with her primarily through Facebook. Also 

of concern to the agency is that mother intends for her adult son to move in with her if 

she does not regain custody of R.P. Her son struggles with heroin addiction, and has his 

own history with LCCS relative to the care of his young daughter. 

 
10. 

J. LCCS seeks permanent custody. 

{¶ 31} On May 31, 2017, LCCS moved for permanent custody. Mother filed a 

motion for legal custody on July 27, 2017. Both motions were tried to the juvenile court 

on August 30, 2017. LCCS presented testimony from R.P.’s caseworker, Lauri Wolfe, 

the LCCS investigator who investigated R.P.’s allegations of abuse, Melissa Coburn, and 

R.P.’s counselor, Rachel Tincher. Mother testified, and called two of her Unison 

therapists to testify—Kim Grower-Dowling and Giovanni Santacroce. The GAL also 

testified. The facts recited above were elicited from their testimony, as well as from the 

case planning documents that were filed with the court. 

{¶ 32} In support of its motion for permanent custody, LCCS argued that R.P. has 

been in its custody for 14 of the last 22 months and is in need of a secure, predictable 

environment which mother has been unable to provide. It cited a number of concerns 

including mother’s long history with the agency; ongoing concerns about mother’s 

substance abuse issues; mother’s failure to complete case plan services; mother’s lack of 

suitable housing; mother’s suggestions to R.P. that she lie to her trauma counselor; and 

mother’s insistence that R.P.’s traumatic brain injury caused her to invent allegations of 

abuse. LCCS maintained that R.P. is doing well in foster care and wishes to remain with 

her foster family. The GAL agrees with LCCS that it is in R.P.’s best interest that 

permanent custody be awarded to LCCS. 

{¶ 33} Mother maintained that except for two relapses, she has been sober for 17 

years. She insisted that she is well along the way to substantially remedying the reasons 

for R.P.’s removal from her custody. She pointed to a number of unusual events that 
11. 

impeded her case plan progress, including the death of her husband, R.P.’s involvement 

in a serious auto accident, and the decision to admit herself to Flower Hospital. She 

asked that she be given legal custody of her daughter, or that temporary custody of LCCS 

be extended until March 2018, to allow her time to establish that it is in R.P.’s best 

interest that she be reunified with her mother. 

G. The trial court awards permanent custody to LCCS. 

{¶ 34} In a judgment entry journalized on October 2, 2017, the trial court granted 

LCCS’s motion for permanent custody and denied mother’s motion for legal custody. 

Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the court found that R.P. had been removed from her 

home over 17 months ago. It found by clear and convincing evidence that under R.C. 

2151.353(A)(4) and R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4), and (16), R.P. cannot or should not be 

placed with mother within a reasonable period of time. And it found that under R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1), an award of permanent custody to LCCS is in R.P.’s best interest. 

{¶ 35} Mother appealed and assigns the following errors for our review: 

I. The trial court’s decision to award custody to the agency was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence when the child’s disclosures of 

abuse were not substantiated, were made after the child suffered a traumatic 

brain injury which affected her memory, and no expert medical testimony 

was presented to address the cognitive effects of the child’s injury as 

regards the disclosures. 

II. The trial court abused its discretion and erred to the substantial 

prejudice of appellant by permitting both the caseworker and the child’s 
12. 

counselor to testify to the lack of effect of the child’s injury on her memory 

when neither was qualified as a medical professional. 

II. Law and Analysis 

{¶ 36} While mother has assigned two errors which would appear to present 

discrete issues—i.e. whether the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence and whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony—the 

arguments in support of those assignments are not delineated quite so clearly. Instead of 

organizing our discussion by assignment of error, we break mother’s arguments into two 

issues: (1) testimony pertinent to R.P.’s brain injury, and (2) manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

A. Testimony pertinent to R.P.’s brain injury. 

{¶ 37} Mother claims that R.P.’s allegations of abuse and neglect occurred after 

she suffered a traumatic brain injury, therefore, it was incumbent on LCCS to present 

expert medical testimony showing that R.P.’s allegations were not “fictitious” or 

“imaginary.” She also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing R.P.’s 

caseworker and counselor to testify that her brain injury did not impair her memory. 

There are a number of problems with mother’s position. 

{¶ 38} First, it is clear from the record that R.P. first made disclosures of abuse on 

October 25, 2016—before the November 7, 2016 car accident. Thus, it is not true that all 

of her allegations of abuse were made after she suffered a traumatic brain injury. 

{¶ 39} Second, to the extent that mother claims that R.P.’s caseworker was 

permitted to provide opinions that R.P.’s brain injury did not affect her memory or 
13. 

cognition, our review of the record reveals that she rendered no such opinions. She 

merely stated that mother “continues to blame the traumatic brain injury for these 

memories that [R.P.] is involving [sic].” 

{¶ 40} Third, it was mother—not LCCS—who elicited testimony from R.P.’s 

counselor about the extent to which R.P.’s memory may have been impaired as a result of 

the accident. On cross-examination, counsel for mother asked R.P.’s counselor: 

Q: Are you aware that [R.P.] was in a serious automobile accident? 

A: Yes, sir. 

* * * 

Q: And are you aware of how her memory was impacted by the 

accident? 

A: I was not informed of or saw any reports that said her memory 

was impaired. 

Q: Did you see any exhibits that she exhibited confusion [sic]? 

A: No, not that I recall. 

Q: And that her communication skills were impaired? 

A: Not that I can recall. 

Q: And that remember concentration was impaired [sic]? 

A: Not that I can recall. 

{¶ 41} Because of the suggestion from mother’s attorney that R.P.’s allegations of 

abuse were not credible because of cognitive or memory impairment resulting from the 
14. 

auto accident, the GAL followed up on this line of questioning on cross-examination of 

R.P.’s counselor: 

Q: * * * Have you in your counseling sessions with [R.P.], does she 

exhibit confusion when she is disclosing at any point during your sessions 

[sic]? 

A: When she has disclosed the incidents that I reported, and even 

just talking about everyday things, I have never noted where she’ll 

backtrack or have a confusing mix up or state a different story as opposed 

to what she had originally stated. So I have never noted any kind of 

confusion or – or memory lapse of any kind. 

{¶ 42} We do not believe that the question posed by the GAL elicited expert 

medical opinions from R.P.’s counselor. But even if it did, under the invited error 

doctrine, a party may not take advantage of an error that he invited or induced the trial 

court to make. Brock-Hadland v. Weeks, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 170, 2015-

Ohio-834, ¶ 6, quoting Center Ridge Ganley, Inc. v. Stinn, 31 Ohio St.3d 310, 313, 511 

N.E.2d 106 (1987). Here, any purported error was invited when counsel posed questions 

to R.P.’s counselor that required her to relay her personal observations relating to R.P.’s 

cognition and memory. Mother, therefore, may not claim error in the trial court’s failure 

to exclude the opinions of R.P.’s counselor. This is especially true given that mother did 

not seek exclusion of any such opinions at trial. 

{¶ 43} Finally, mother has cited no authority requiring LCCS to affirmatively 

prove that R.P.’s allegations of abuse were not a product of the brain injury she sustained, 
15. 

especially given that LCCS witnesses did not perceive R.P.’s memory or cognition to be 

impaired. If mother believed that R.P.’s traumatic brain injury caused her to invent 

allegations of abuse, it was incumbent on mother—not LCCS—to present expert 

testimony to this effect. She failed to do so. 

{¶ 44} Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in failing to exclude 

opinions from R.P.’s counselor, and LCCS was not required to present expert medical 

testimony as to the effect of R.P.’s brain injury on her cognition and memory. 

B. Manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 45} Mother claims that the trial court judgment is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence because (1) R.P.’s disclosures of abuse were not substantiated, (2) her 

disclosures were made after she suffered a traumatic brain injury, and (3) no medical 

evidence was presented to address the cognitive effects of the brain injury she sustained. 

Although not specifically assigned as error, mother also claims that the evidence showed 

that she had “turned a corner with her services,” thus she should have been allowed more 

time to demonstrate that she is able to care for her daughter. 

1. R.C. 2151.414. 

{¶ 46} R.C. 2151.414 provides the analysis that a juvenile court must undertake 

when considering whether to terminate parental rights and vest permanent custody in a 

children’s service agency. Under that statute, the court must first find by clear and 

convincing evidence that one of the circumstances described in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-

(d) exists. Subsection (b) of that provision requires a finding that the child is abandoned; 

subsection (c) requires a finding that the child is orphaned and there are no relatives who 
16. 

are able to take permanent custody; and subsection (d) requires a finding that the child 

has been in the temporary custody of a public children’s services agency or a private 

child placing agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. 

Subsection (a) requires a finding that the child has not been abandoned or orphaned, has 

not been in the custody of a public children’s services agency or a private child placing 

agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, and that the child cannot 

be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either 

parent. In re E.B., 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2009-10-139, CA2009-11-146, 2010-Ohio1122, ¶ 14-15. 

{¶ 47} If the court finds that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies, it must consider both 

whether granting permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s best interest and

whether any of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E) are present which would 

indicate that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or 

should not be placed with either parent. In re B.K., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1053, 2010-

Ohio-3329, ¶ 43. But where the court finds that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), (c), or (d) 

applies, it need only find that it is in the child’s best interest that permanent custody be 

awarded to the agency. In re Johnathon A., 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-05-1314, L-05-1315, 

2006-Ohio-2115, ¶ 55 (“If, however, the child has been in the custody of the agency for 

12 or more months of a consecutive 22 month period, the court may grant permanent 

custody to the agency based only on a finding that it is in the best interests of the child.”). 

 
17. 

{¶ 48} All of the court’s findings under R.C. 2515.414 must be by clear and 

convincing evidence. “Clear and convincing evidence” is evidence sufficient for the trier 

of fact to form a firm conviction or belief that the essential statutory elements for a 

termination of parental rights have been established. In re Tashayla S., 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L–03–1253, 2004-Ohio-896, ¶ 14; Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 

118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. Clear and convincing evidence is the highest 

level of evidentiary support necessary in a civil matter. In re Stacey S, 136 Ohio App.3d 

503, 520, 737 N.E.2d 92 (6th Dist.1999).

{¶ 49} We review a trial court’s determination in a permanent custody case under 

a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. In re P.W. 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1060, 

2012-Ohio-3556, ¶ 20. In doing so, we must weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact 

clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the decision must be reversed. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio 

St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). While we review the evidence and consider 

witnesses’ credibility, we must be mindful that the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, is in 

the best position to weigh evidence and evaluate testimony. In re P.W. at ¶ 20. Its 

discretion in determining whether an order of permanent custody is in the best interest of 

a child “‘should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and 

the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.’” 

(Internal citations omitted.) In re C.P., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-1128, 2009-Ohio2760, ¶ 10. 
18. 

2. The trial court’s findings. 

{¶ 50} The trial court found that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies—i.e., that R.P. 

has been in the temporary custody of LCCS for at least 12 of the past 22 months. Having 

made this finding, the court was required to determine only whether permanent custody 

with LCCS is in R.P.’s best interest. Although not required, the court also examined the 

R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. It found R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4), and (16) to be 

applicable: 

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home 

and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the 

agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the 

child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and 

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be 

placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have 

substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental 

utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and 

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to 

the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to 

resume and maintain parental duties. 

(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual 

disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is 

so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent 

home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year 
19. 

after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section or 

for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised 

Code; 

* * * 

(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the 

child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child 

when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide 

an adequate permanent home for the child; 

* * * 

(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant. 

{¶ 51} As to (E)(1), the court found that mother failed to complete case plan 

services, and only recently reengaged in treatment; failed to obtain housing; exhibited a 

lack of consistency in communicating with R.P.; demonstrated a lack of insight into 

R.P.’s allegations of abuse, claiming they were made up; missed urine screens; and failed 

to complete mental health treatment. 

{¶ 52} As to (E)(2), the court found that mother had been diagnosed with PTSD 

and major depressive disorder; failed to complete services; was admitted to Flower 

Hospital’s psychiatric floor; and had a long history with the agency. 

{¶ 53} As to (E)(4), the court found that mother missed a number of visits; failed 

to remain in contact via telephone after her visits were suspended; and disappeared for “a 

period of months” during which she failed to keep in contact with the caseworker to ask 

about R.P.’s well-being and failed to contact R.P. 
20. 

{¶ 54} And as to (E)(16), the court found that mother’s testimony was vague, 

inconsistent, and “full of excuses.” 

{¶ 55} The court then turned to the best-interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1): 

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s 

parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and 

any other person who may significantly affect the child; 

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or 

through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of 

the child; 

(c) The custodial history of the child * * *; 

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and 

whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of 

permanent custody to the agency; 

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this 

section apply in relation to the parents and child. 

{¶ 56} The court found that permanent custody in favor of LCCS is in R.P.’s best 

interest because the case has been pending for almost two years; the child has special 

needs that are being addressed by her foster parents; the child is doing well in services; 

the child wants to be adopted by the foster family; the child is in need of a legally secure 

permanent placement and the award of permanent custody will facilitate an adoptive 

placement; and the GAL and caseworker agree that permanent custody is in the child’s 

best interest. 
21. 

3. Mother’s claims. 

{¶ 57} In arguing that the trial court judgment is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, mother claims that R.P.’s allegations of abuse were not substantiated and were 

made after she suffered a traumatic brain injury. She again suggests that medical 

testimony was required before her allegations could be relied upon. She insists that those 

allegations do not constitute clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s 

decision. Mother also maintains that she was making progress toward completing case 

plan services and should have been allowed additional time to complete those services. 

{¶ 58} As we noted earlier, R.P. began disclosing incidents of abuse before her car 

accident, and we have already rejected mother’s contention that LCCS was required to 

present expert testimony as to R.P.’s memory and cognition. As to the failure to 

substantiate R.P.’s allegations of abuse, we would observe that the concerns that led to 

R.P.’s removal from the home, LCCS’s award of temporary custody, and the agency’s 

motion for permanent custody extended well beyond those allegations of abuse. 

Mother’s challenges do not suffice to establish that the trial court judgment was against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 59} Turning to mother’s claim that she should have been given additional time 

to complete services, because the trial court found that R.P. had been in the temporary 

custody of LCCS for more than 12 of the last 22 months under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), it 

was not required to consider whether the child could be returned to mother within a 

reasonable time. Although the trial court did consider factors relevant to that inquiry, it 
22. 

was not required to do so. It could grant custody to LCCS if it found that it was in R.P.’s 

best interest to do so. 

{¶ 60} Here, the trial court expressly considered each of the best-interest factors 

enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), and determined that it was in R.P.’s best interest that 

permanent custody be awarded to LCCS. Given the child’s expressed desire to remain 

with her foster family, the GAL’s opinion consistent with those wishes, the amount of 

time the case has been pending, and the importance of continuing the progress that R.P. 

has made socially, educationally, emotionally, and medically, we cannot say that the trial 

court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 61} R.P.’s counselor did not provide improper opinion testimony as to the lack 

of effect of the child’s injury on her memory, and LCCS was not required to present 

medical expert testimony to establish that the child’s injury did not affect her memory 

and cognition. Additionally, the trial court’s findings that the child had been in LCCS 

custody for more than 12 of the last 22 months and that permanent custody in favor of 

LCCS was in the child’s best interest were not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶ 62} Accordingly, we find A.B.-P.’s two assignments of error not well-taken, 

and we affirm the October 2, 2017 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating A.B.-P.’s parental rights and granting permanent 

custody to LCCS. A.B.-P. is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 
23. 

In re R.P. 

L-17-1267 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

James D. Jensen, J. 

_______________________________ 

Christine E. Mayle, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE