IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Joseph A. Price,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:18-cv-128

Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiff Joseph A. Price brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(g) for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for a

period of disability and disability insurance benefits. In a

decision rendered on January 30, 2017, the ALJ found that plaintiff

has severe impairments consisting of lumbar degenerative disc

disease, spondylosis, osteoarthritis, depressive disorder, anxiety

disorder and alcohol dependence. PAGEID 992. The ALJ concluded

that plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

perform a reduced range of sedentary work with specified physical

limitations and, addressing plaintiff’s mental impairments, that

“the claimant is limited to goal based production measured by end

result not pace work, will be off task for 5% of [the] workday, and

needs work in a low stress job, defined as only occasional changes

in the work setting.” PAGEID 994. Relying on the testimony of a

vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that there are jobs which

plaintiff can perform and that plaintiff is not disabled. PAGEID

1003-05.

This matter is before the court for consideration of

plaintiff’s November 6, 2018, objections to the October 24, 2018,
report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, recommending

that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.

I. Standard of Review

If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and

recommendation, the court “shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the

court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The court’s review “is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner’s decision ‘is supported by substantial evidence and

was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Ealy v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also,

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social

Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,

shall be conclusive.”). Even if supported by substantial evidence,

however, “‘a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where

the [Commissioner] fails to follow its own regulations and where

that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the

claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).

II. Plaintiff’s Objections

A. Plaintiff’s Mental RFC - Dr. Lai’s Opinion

In her December 30, 2014, review of the medical records, Dr.

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Jaime Lai, Ph.D., a state agency psychological consultant, stated

that plaintiff “would benefit from some flexibility in his break

and work schedule during periods of increased symptoms” and “would

benefit from access to supervisory support during times of change.” 

PAGEID 66-67. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not including

these limitations in his RFC and by not adequately explaining his

failure to do so.

A claimant’s RFC is the most that a claimant can do despite

his or her limitations. 20 U.S.C. §404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ, not

a medical expert, ultimately determines the claimant’s RFC. 

Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F.App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir.

2010); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(e)(2) and 404.1546(c). An ALJ’s

decision to give weight to medical opinion evidence does not

require the ALJ to incorporate every restriction proposed by the

medical source. Salisbury v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:11-CV2277, 2013 WL 427733, *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2013). “Even where an

ALJ provides ‘great weight’ to an opinion, there is no requirement

that an ALJ adopt a state agency psychologist’s opinions verbatim;

nor is the ALJ required to adopt the state agency psychologist’s

limitations wholesale.” Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F.

App’x 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2015).

Although the ALJ was not obligated to give “good reasons” for

the weight he assigned to the opinion of Dr. Lai, a consultative

examiner, see Ealy, 594 F.3d at 514, the ALJ gave a sufficient

explanation for his decision to give her opinion partial weight. 

In regard to the limitations noted by plaintiff, the ALJ stated

that Dr. Lai

found that the claimant would need assistance during

times of change and some ability to be off task and these

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are generally consistent with the above residual

functional capacity which has been set forth in more

vocationally relevant terms.

PAGEID 1002 (emphasis supplied). The ALJ also assigned little

weight to Dr. Lai’s opinion that plaintiff would require

superficial interaction with others, as that opinion was

inconsistent with the evidence and with Dr. Lai’s findings of mild

social limitations.

As the magistrate judge correctly noted, PAGEID 1249, the ALJ

reasonably found that the limitations proposed by Dr. Lai and noted

by plaintiff were sufficiently addressed by the RFC. The RFC

limitations of “goal based production measured by end result not

pace work” and allowing plaintiff to be “off task for 5% of [the]

workday” addressed the proposed limitation that plaintiff might

need some flexibility in his break and work schedule during periods

of increased symptoms. By its nature, goal based production would

permit more flexibility for break times than pace work on an

assembly line. Dr. Lai’s suggestion that plaintiff would benefit

from access to supervisory support during times of change was

addressed by the RFC requirement that plaintiff have a low stress

job with only occasional changes in the work setting, which would

also reduce the need for supervisory support.

The magistrate judge also correctly determined that Stacey v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 451 F. App’x 517, 518-20 (6th Cir. 2011),

relied on by plaintiff, is distinguishable. In Stacey, the ALJ

completely failed to discuss what weight, if any, he assigned to

the opinion of a consultative examining physician who concluded

that the claimant was permanently limited to performing sedentary

work, providing the appellate court with no means of review. In

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contrast, the ALJ here addressed the recommendations of Dr. Lai

referenced by plaintiff and concluded that they were “generally

consistent with the above residual functional capacity which has

been set forth in more vocationally relevant terms.” PAGEID 1002. 

The ALJ adequately explained the weight he assigned to Dr. Lai’s

opinion and how he incorporated her recommendations in the RFC.

B. Treating and Nontreating Source Opinions

Plaintiff also objects to the magistrate judge’s rejection of

his argument that the ALJ unreasonably discounted the mental health

evidence favorable to plaintiff’s position in crafting plaintiff’s

RFC and inadequately explained the weight assigned to the treating

source and other opinions. As to the first argument, the court

notes that a decision supported by substantial evidence is not

subject to reversal, even if the reviewing court might arrive at a

different conclusion. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir.

1986). “Substantial evidence exists when ‘a reasonable mind could

accept the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion [and] ...

presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the

decision-makers can go either way, without interference by the

courts.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th

Cir. 2009)(internal citation omitted). An ALJ’s failure to cite

specific evidence does not indicate that it was not considered. 

Simons v. Barnhart, 114 F. App’x 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2004).

The court agrees with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that

the RFC is supported by substantial evidence despite plaintiff’s

identification of evidence supporting a more restrictive RFC. As

the magistrate judge commented, PAGEID 1252-53 (citing evidence

supporting the RFC determination), the record is more mixed than

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plaintiff acknowledges. The ALJ considered the entire record in

formulating plaintiff’s RFC and did not engage in a one-sided

review. PAGEID 994. For example, he discussed plaintiff’s

complaints of mental health symptoms and treatment notes

documenting plaintiff’s depression. See PAGEID 993; 998-1000. He

discounted the weight given to the opinions of consulting

psychologists James N. Spindler, M.S., and Karla Voyten, Ph.D.,

concluding that the medical evidence supported a level of mental

impairment above what those experts opined. PAGEID 1002. However,

the ALJ also discussed ample record evidence which indicated that

plaintiff’s mental symptoms are not disabling, including the fact

that plaintiff did not take medication for his depression, and that

his mental limitations, frequently described as mild or moderate,

did not restrict his activities of daily living. PAGEID 993, 998-

1000. The ALJ’s RFC determination is well within the permitted

zone of choice.

The court also agrees with the magistrate judge’s finding that

the ALJ adequately explained the weight he assigned to the treating

and nontreating sources. Under SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2,

1996), treating-source opinions must be given “controlling weight”

if: (1) the opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques”; and (2) the opinion

“is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the]

case record.” See 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL

374188 at *2-3. The Commissioner is required to provide “good

reasons” for discounting the weight given to a treating-source

opinion. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2)-(6); Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013). However, a formulaic

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recitation of factors is not required. See Friend v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 375 F.App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2010).

The ALJ assigned little weight to the opinions of William

Froilan, Ph.D., a treating psychologist, because: 1) the opinions

were inconsistent with the evidence as a whole (citing extensively

to exhibits in the record which indicated that plaintiff was mildly

depressed and had mild or normal findings relating to

concentration, insight, memory and judgment); 2) the limited

medical evaluations from Dr. Froilan were inconsistent with reports

of plaintiff’s daily activities and failed to set forth specific

functional limitations due to plaintiff’s mental impairments; and

3) Dr. Froilan’s opinions related to plaintiff’s workers’

compensation claim, and the decisions of other agencies are not

binding on the Commissioner. PAGEID 1000-1001.

The ALJ also gave little weight to the 2014 and 2015 opinions

of Lee Roach, Ph.D., a treating psychologist, noting that these

opinions: 1) were inconsistent with the medical evidence, which

indicated that plaintiff had mostly normal or mild findings on

mental status evaluations and was not taking psychotropic

medication; and 2) were inconsistent with his own treatment notes,

which documented no more than moderate impairments and which

indicated, for example, that plaintiff had reconnected with friends

and family, had begun a new relationship, and had improved with

treatment. PAGEID 1001. The ALJ gave partial weight to Dr.

Roach’s January 25, 2016, letter opinion on whether plaintiff had

reached maximum medical improvement with respect to his workers’

compensation claim. The ALJ agreed with Dr. Roach’s opinion that

plaintiff had moderate limitations and was improving with

treatment, but rejected his opinion that plaintiff was unable to

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return to work, as this was a determination reserved to the

Commissioner. See Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir.

2007); 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(e). The ALJ also rejected the workers’

compensation work ability forms prepared by Dr. Roach in 2016 as

they were inconsistent with the evidence and based on the rules

applicable to workers’ compensation disability. PAGEID 1001-02.

The ALJ considered the workers’ compensation forms completed

by Holly Conant, LISW, a treating licensed social worker. He

correctly noted that Ms. Conant was not an “acceptable medical

source” who could provide a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R.

§§404.1527(a)(2) 416.927(a)(2). He also gave her opinions little

weight because they were inconsistent with the medical evidence of

record. PAGEID 1002.

Although the “good reasons” requirement only applies to

treating sources, see Ealy, 594 F.33 at 514, the ALJ also discussed

the weight he gave to the opinions of nontreating sources. He gave

little weight to the August 24, 2013, mental health evaluation of

workers’ compensation consultative examiner Marian Chatterjee,

Ph.D. and her opinion that plaintiff was unable to work. The ALJ

noted that the determination of disability was a matter reserved to

the Commissioner, and that Dr. Chatterjee’s conclusion that

plaintiff was unable to work was inconsistent with her own findings

on examination that plaintiff was mildly depressed and had fair

short-term concentration and attention and intact memory. PAGEID

1002.

The ALJ gave partial weight to the September 9, 2014, mental

health evaluation of consultative examiner James N. Spindler, M.S. 

Although Mr. Spindler found that plaintiff had few mental

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limitations, the ALJ assessed some greater mental limitations in

the RFC because plaintiff used alcohol in greater quantities than

he admitted to Mr. Spindler. As discussed above, the ALJ discussed

why he gave partial weight to the opinion of Dr. Lai. a state

agency consultant. He gave little weight to the September 2014

records review by Karla Voyten, Ph.D., a state agency psychological

consultant, because the medical evidence did not support her

findings that plaintiff had no severe mental impairment. PAGEID

1002. The ALJ also thoroughly discussed why he gave little weight

to the medical sources who assigned GAF (global assessment of

functioning) ratings to plaintiff. PAGEID 1002-03. The ALJ

adequately explained his reasons for the weight he assigned to the

various expert opinions. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the ALJ

gave good reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for the

weight he assigned to the expert opinions and for his formulation

of plaintiff’s RFC. The RFC determination and the Commissioner’s

non-disability finding are supported by substantial evidence. The

court overrules the plaintiff’s objections (Doc. 13), and adopts

and affirms the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (Doc.

12). The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed, and this action

is dismissed. The clerk is directed to enter final judgment in

this case.

It is so ordered.

Date: January 31, 2019 s/James L. Graham 

 James L. Graham

 United States District Judge

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