NO. 88-417 

IN THE SIJPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTAJYA 

1989 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

KATHRYN K . STEPHEI!SON, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

SAM STPPHENSON, 111, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROF: District Court of the Second Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Silver BOW, 

The Konorahle Arnol.6 Olsen, Judge presiding. 

COIJNSEL OF F.ECORD : 

For Appellant: 

Pichael J. McKeon, Anaconda, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Mark A Vucurovich; Henningsen, Purcell, TTvcurovich & 

i- Richardson, Rutte, Fontana Ci' 

Submitted. on Briefs: March 23, 1989 

Decided: April 25, 1989 

-+ ----- -- Clerk 
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Petitioner, Kathryn K. Stephenson, filed for divorce from her 

husband of twenty-one years in 1986. The dissolution was tried on 

May 12, 1988, in the District Court of the Second Judicial 

District, County of Silver Bow. Judge Arnold Olsen divided the 

marital assets and provided maintenance to petitioner. Appellant, 

Sam Stephenson, 111, appeals the findings of the court. 

We affirm. 

Appellant asks us to resolve three issues in dispute: 

1. Whether the District Court, in a dissolution of marriage 

proceeding, erred in not making a specific finding of net worth for 

the purpose of separating marital assets. 

2. Whether the District Court erred in the award of maintenance to petitioner. 

3. Whether the District Court erred in awarding one-half of 

husband's inheritance to wife. 

The District Court entered findings of fact and conclusions 

of law on June 29, 1988, separating the marital estate and 

providing maintenance for petitioner, Kathryn Stephenson (Kathryn). 

During the time that the parties were married, respondent Sam 

Stephenson (Sam) was employed with ~tlantic Richfield Company as 

an environmental coordinator. Kathryn graduated from high school 

prior to the marriage but attained no further degrees, nor does she 

have any job experience. Kathryn was mother and housewife during 

the marriage. 

When the parties separated, both children were over eighteen 

years of age but continue to live with Kathryn. 

On June 29, 1988, the findings of fact and conclusions of law 

were filed by the District Court. In dispensing the marital assets 

to the parties, the court did not make a determination of the net 
worth of the parties. Instead, Judge Olsen distributed the assets 

without calculating the net worth. The following is a list of the 

property divided from the marital estate: 

(1) extensive gun collection of Sam's 

acquired during marriage to be appraised and Sam would get the gun 

collection; 

(2) husband received all household furnishings located in the cabin at Elk 

Park, all mechanical tools, milling 

machine, lathe and accessories; 

(3) husband received 1986 Ford pickup, 

1972 Kawasaki, 1971 Suzuki motorcycle, 1969 Bell trailer, and 1976 

Layton trailer; 

(4) wife received household furnishings 

in the Butte family residence and 

all household yard tools and equipment ; 

(5) stocks valued in excess of $54,000 

and a money market account with 

Piper, Jaf f ray and Hopwood was 

equally divided between the parties; 

(6) husband awarded the cabin and thirty-eight acres located at Elk Park, 

Jefferson County; 

(7) wife awarded family residence in 

Butte ; 

(8) all debts of the marriage the responsibility of the husband; 

(9) Kathryn was awarded the sum of $750 

per month for at least five years, 

until she could rehabilitate herself; 
(10) Sam was also required to pay the 

house payments of $244 a month. 

Sam contends that the stocks valued at $54,000 and the cabin at 

Elk Park were inherited by him in 1981 and are his sole and exclusive property. These, he asserts, should not be included in the 

marital estate. 

The first issue is whether the District Court erred in not 

determining the net worth of the marital estate. Appellant Sam 

contends that if the District Court does not appraise the value of 

all the assets from the marriage, the Supreme Court cannot review 

the division of property to determine whether it was equitable or 

arbitrary. 

The standard of review by which we judge the District Court's 

determination, as adopted by this Court in In re the Marriage of 

Stewart (Mont. 1988), 757 P.2d 765, 45 St.Rep. 850 is: 

[that the] District Court has far-reaching 

discretion in dividing the marital property. 

Our standard of review is that the District 

Court's judgment, when based upon substantial 

credible evidence, will not be altered unless 

a clear abuse of discretion is shown. 

Stewart, 727 P.2d at 767, 45 St.Rep. at 852; Marriage of Watson 

(Mont. 1987), 739 P.2d 951, 954, 44 St.Rep. 1167, 1170. 

Section 40-4-202 (I), MCA, provides that in a proceeding for 

division of property, the court shall "equitably apportion between 

the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both, 

however and whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is in 

the name of the husband or wife or both.It The statute does not 

specifically require the District Court to determine the net worth 

of the assets of the parties. We have specifically held in 

previous cases that the District Court must determine the net 

worth. As a guideline, it is helpful to this Court in reviewing 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the District Court 

that a determination of net worth is made, but in this case it is 

not imperative. The test is whether the findings as a whole are 

sufficient to determine the net worth and to decide whether the 

distribution was equitable. Nunally v. Nunally (Mont. 1981), 625 

P.2d 1159, 1161, 38 St.Rep. 529, 531. 

We hold that the District Court in this case made an equitable 

distribution of the assets of the Stephensons and did not abuse 

its discretion in not determining a net worth of the assets. In 

reviewing the assets of the parties and the distribution by the 

court, each party received an equitable portion of the marital 

estate. "Here, the emphasis placed on the parties1 needs and their 

relative financial situations indicates a careful exercise of the 

court's discretion.I1 Bailey v. Bailey (1979), 184 Mont. 418, 420, 

603 P.2d 259, 260. 

The second issue is whether the District Court erred in 

awarding Kathryn maintenance of $750 per month. 

Sam contends that Kathryn has done nothing to "rehabilitate" 

herself in the two years since the dissolution of the marriage. 

However, Kathryn has no training for employment and spent the 

twenty-one years of the marriage as a mother and a homemaker. The 

District Court established that she was to receive $750 per month 

for no less than five years. This, we believe, is a reasonable 

time for Kathryn to rehabilitate herself. Although Sam contends 

she is physically capable, good health alone is not enough for 

providing for oneself. . Proper training for some employment is 

necessary in the rehabilitation process. 

Section 40-4-203, MCA, directs under what circumstances 

maintenance can be awarded. The court can order maintenance for 

either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: 
(1) (a) lacks sufficient property to provide 

for his reasonable needs; and 

(b) is unable to support himself through 

appropriate employment . . . 

(2) The maintenance order shall be in such 

amounts and for such periods of time as the 

court deems just, without regard to marital 

misconduct, and after considering all relevant 

facts including: 

(a) the financial resources of the party 

seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet 

his needs independently . . . 

(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient 

education or training to enable the party 

seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment ; 

(c) the standard of living established during 

the marriage; 

(d) the duration of the marriage; 

(e) the age and the physical and emotional 

condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; 

and 

(f) the ability of the spouse from whom 

maintenance is sought to meet his needs while 

meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance. 

Maintenance is necessary in the case at bar, and we hold that the 

District Court made a just determination. The court did not abuse 

its discretion. 

The third issue is whether the District court erred in awarding one-half of Sam's inheritance to Kathryn. 
In 1981, Sam inherited $50,000 worth of stocks and bonds, and 

real estate located at Elk Park in Jefferson County, valued at 

approximately $20,000. Sam contends that Kathryn has not participated in the enhancement of the stocks and bonds and has not 

contributed to the maintenance of the Elk Park property. The 

District Court, though, included both of these inheritances in the 

assets of the marital estate. The court divided equally the 

$54,000 value of the stocks and bonds. The court awarded the 

husband the Elk Park property. It is Sam's contention that the 

property is exclusively his and should not be considered in the 

division of property. 

In dividing property in a marriage dissolution 

the District Court has far-reaching discretion 

and its judgment will not be altered without 

a showing of clear abuse of discretion. The 

test of abuse of discretion is whether the 

trial court acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the 

bounds of reason resulting in a substantial 

injustice. 

Becker v. Becker (1985), 218 Mont. 229, 232, 707 P.2d 526, 528; In 

re the Marriage of Rolf (1985), 216 Mont. 39, 45, 699 P.2d 79, 83, 

citing In re the Marriage of Vert (1984), 210 Mont. 24, 680 P.2d 

587. 

Section 40-4-202(l)(a), MCA, provides that in dividing 

property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent, the court 

shall consider the contributions of the other spouse, including 

nonmonetary contribution of the homemaker contributions facilitating the maintenance of the property. The determining factor is 

whether an equitable distribution was made and within the bounds 

of reason. In this case, we hold that the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion and acted soundly in dividing the marital 

assets. 
Affirmed. 

,- 

. - 

Chief Justice 

We concur: