Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 28 / Thursday, February 10, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 7681 

FAA; or TCCA; or Airbus Canada Limited 

Partnership’s TCCA Design Approval 

Organization (DAO). If approved by the DAO, 

the approval must include the DAOauthorized signature. 

(k) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Elizabeth Dowling, Aerospace 

Engineer, Mechanical Systems and 

Administrative Services Section, FAA, New 

York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, 

Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 

516–228–7300; fax 516–794–5531; email 

9-avs-nyaco-cos@faa.gov. 

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Transport Canada Civil Aviation AD 

CF–2021–01, dated January 8, 2021. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(3) For TCCA AD CF–2021–01, contact 

Transport Canada National Aircraft 

Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, 

Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada; telephone 888– 

663–3639; email AD-CN@tc.gc.ca; internet 

https://tc.canada.ca/en/aviation. 

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, Operational 

Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des 

Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. 

(5) You may view this material that is 

incorporated by reference at the National 

Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA). For information on the availability 

of this material at NARA, email 

fr.inspection@nara.gov, or go to: https://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued on January 20, 2022. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2022–02753 Filed 2–9–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2021–0944; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2020–00800–G; Amendment 

39–21925; AD 2022–03–08] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; FiberglasTechnik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. 

KG (Type Certificate Previously Held 

by GROB Aircraft AG, Grob Aerospace 

GmbH i.l., Grob Aerospace GmbH, 

Burkhart Grob Luft—und Raumfahrt 

GmbH & Co. KG) Gliders 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner 

GmbH & Co. KG (type certificate 

previously held by GROB Aircraft AG, 

Grob Aerospace GmbH i.l., Grob 

Aerospace GmbH, Burkhart Grob Luft— 

und Raumfahrt GmbH & Co. KG) Model 

G102 ASTIR CS, G103 TWIN ASTIR, 

G103 TWIN II, G103A TWIN II ACRO, 

G103C TWIN III ACRO, and G 103 C 

TWIN III SL gliders. This AD was 

prompted by mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by the aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as corrosion on the elevator 

control pushrod. This AD requires 

inspecting the elevator control pushrod 

for water and corrosion and replacing 

the pushrod if necessary. The FAA is 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective March 17, 

2022. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of March 17, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner 

GmbH & Co. KG, Steige 3, D–88487 

Walpertshofen, Germany; phone: +49 (0) 

7353 22 43; email: info@LTBLindner.com; website: https://www.ltblindner.com. You may view this service 

information at the FAA, Airworthiness 

Products Section, Operational Safety 

Branch, 901 Locust, Kansas City, MO 

64106. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call (817) 222–5110. It is also available 

at https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2021–0944. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2021–0944; or in person at Docket 

Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

final rule, the MCAI, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

address for Docket Operations is U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 

20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jim 

Rutherford, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

General Aviation & Rotorcraft Section, 

International Validation Branch, FAA, 

901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, MO 

64106; phone: (816) 329–4165; email: 

jim.rutherford@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf 

Lindner GmbH & Co. KG Model G102 

ASTIR CS, G103 TWIN ASTIR, G103 

TWIN II, G103A TWIN II ACRO, G103C 

TWIN III ACRO, and G 103 C TWIN III 

SL gliders. The NPRM published in the 

Federal Register on October 29, 2021 

(86 FR 59903). The NPRM was 

prompted by MCAI originated by the 

European Union Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Union. EASA issued EASA AD 2020– 

0138, dated June 19, 2020 (referred to 

after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to address an 

unsafe condition on Fiberglas-Technik 

Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG Model 

G102 ASTIR CS, G103 TWIN ASTIR, 

G103 TWIN II, G103A TWIN II ACRO, 

G103C TWIN III ACRO, and G 103 C 

TWIN III SL gliders. The MCAI states: 

During a routine inspection, a severely 

corroded elevator control pushrod was found 

in the vertical fin on a Grob TWIN ASTIR 

sailplane. The technical investigation results 

revealed that water had soaked into the 

elevator control pushrod, causing the 

corrosion damage and subsequent 

considerable weakening of the steel tube 

pushrod. 

This condition, if not detected and 

corrected, could lead to failure of the elevator 

control pushrod, possibly resulting in loss of 

control of the sailplane. 

To address this unsafe condition, 

Fiberglas-Technik R. Lindner GmbH & Co.KG 

published the [technische mitteilung/service 

bulletin] TM/SB and [anweisung/ 


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7682 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 28 / Thursday, February 10, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 

instructions] A/I–G09, at original issue, 

providing instructions for elevator control 

pushrod inspection and replacement. 

Prompted by this development, EASA issued 

AD 2020–0121 to require a one-time 

inspection of the elevator control pushrod in 

the vertical fin and, depending on findings, 

replacement. 

After EASA AD 2020–0121 was issued, it 

was determined that Grob G 103 ‘‘TWIN II’’ 

sailplanes, and additional Grob G 103 A 

‘‘TWIN II ACRO’’ sailplanes, are also prone 

to elevator control pushrod corrosion and 

Fiberglas-Technik R.Lindner GmbH & Co.KG 

issued the TM/SB to make the inspection 

instructions applicable to these sailplane 

models. 

For the reasons described above, this 

[EASA] AD retains the requirements of EASA 

AD 2020–0121, which is superseded, and 

expands the Applicability. 

You may examine the MCAI in the 

AD docket at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2021– 

0944. 

Discussion of Final Airworthiness 

Directive 

Comments 

The FAA received no comments on 

the NPRM or on the determination of 

the costs. 

Conclusion 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country and is approved for operation in 

the United States. Pursuant to the FAA’s 

bilateral agreement with this State of 

Design Authority, it has notified the 

FAA of the unsafe condition described 

in the MCAI and service information 

referenced above. The FAA reviewed 

the relevant data and determined that 

air safety requires adopting this AD as 

proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on these products. This AD is 

adopted as proposed in the NPRM. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

The FAA reviewed Fiberglas-Technik 

Rudolf Lindner Anweisung/Instructions 

(A/I–G09), Revision 1, dated May 14, 

2020. This service information provides 

instructions to inspect the elevator 

control pushrod for water and corrosion, 

replace the elevator control pushrod if 

any water or corrosion is found, and 

apply corrosion prevention if no water 

and no corrosion are found. This service 

information is reasonably available 

because the interested parties have 

access to it through their normal course 

of business or by the means identified 

in ADDRESSES. 

Other Related Service Information 

The FAA also reviewed FiberglasTechnik Rudolf Lindner Service 

Bulletin (SB–G09), Revision 1, dated 

May 14, 2020. This service information 

refers to the instructions in A/I–G09 to 

inspect and replace the elevator control 

pushrod on various gliders. 

The FAA reviewed Grob TFE Service 

Bulletin TM 315–34, dated December 8, 

1987. This service information provides 

effectivity, reason, and high-level 

instructions for inspecting and replacing 

the elevator control pushrod on certain 

Model G 103 A TWIN II ACRO gliders. 

The FAA reviewed Grob TFE Repair 

Instructions No. 315–34 for Service 

Bulletin TM 315–34, dated December 8, 

1987. This service information provides 

more detailed instructions for 

inspecting and replacing the elevator 

control pushrod on certain Model G 103 

A TWIN II ACRO gliders. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

MCAI 

The MCAI applies to Model ASTIR CS 

77, ASTIR CS Jeans, CLUB ASTIR II, 

STANDARD ASTIR II, TWIN ASTIR 

TRAINER, GROB G 103 C ‘‘TWIN III,’’ 

ASTIR CS 77 TOP, ASTIR CS JEANS 

TOP, and ASTIR CS TOP gliders. This 

AD does not apply to these model 

gliders because they do not have an 

FAA type certificate. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD 

affects 149 gliders of U.S. registry. The 

FAA estimates that it would take about 

4 work-hours per glider to inspect the 

elevator control pushrod and require 

parts costing $100. The average labor 

rate is $85 per work-hour. Based on 

these figures, the FAA estimates the cost 

to inspect the elevator control pushrod 

on U.S. operators to be $65,560 or $440 

per glider. 

In addition, the FAA estimates that 

for gliders with water or corrosion 

within the elevator control pushrod, 

replacement would take about 8 workhours and require parts costing $500. 

The average labor rate is $85 per workhour. Based on these figures, the FAA 

estimates the cost to replace the elevator 

control pushrod on U.S. operators to be 

$1,180 per glider. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. For the reasons 

discussed above, I certify that this AD. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD. 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2022–03–08 Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf 

Lindner GmbH & Co. KG (Type 

Certificate Previously Held by GROB 

Aircraft AG, Grob Aerospace GmbH i.l., 

Grob Aerospace GmbH, Burkhart Grob 

Luft—und Raumfahrt GmbH & Co. KG): 

Amendment 39–21925; Docket No. 

FAA–2021–0944; Project Identifier 

MCAI–2020–00800–G. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 28 / Thursday, February 10, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 7683 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective March 17, 2022. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to the following gliders, 

all serial numbers, certificated in any 

category: 

(1) Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner 

GmbH & Co. KG (type certificate previously 

held by GROB Aircraft AG, Grob Aerospace 

GmbH i.l., Grob Aerospace GmbH, Burkhart 

Grob Luft—und Raumfahrt GmbH & Co. KG, 

GROB TFE, GROB–WERKE GMBH & CO KG 

(a division of Burkhart Grob Flugzeugbau)) 

Model G102 ASTIR CS. 

(2) Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner 

GmbH & Co. KG (type certificate previously 

held by GROB Aircraft AG, Grob Aerospace 

GmbH i.l., Grob Aerospace GmbH, Burkhart 

Grob Luft—und Raumfahrt GmbH & Co. KG) 

Model G103 TWIN ASTIR, G103 TWIN II, 

G103A TWIN II ACRO, G103 C TWIN III 

ACRO, and G 103 C TWIN III SL. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 2730, Elevator Control System. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by the aviation authority of another 

country to identify and correct an unsafe 

condition on an aviation product. The MCAI 

describes the unsafe condition as corrosion 

on the elevator control pushrod. The unsafe 

condition, if not addressed, could result in 

failure of the elevator control pushrod and 

loss of control of the glider. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Actions 

(1) Within 25 hours time in service (TIS) 

after the effective date of this AD, inspect the 

elevator control pushrod in the vertical fin 

for water and corrosion and replace the 

elevator control pushrod before further flight 

if there is any water or corrosion in 

accordance with the Actions and 

Instructions, paragraph 3, of FiberglasTechnik Rudolf Lindner Anweisung/ 

Instructions (A/I–G09), Revision 1, dated 

May 14, 2020. 

(2) If no water and no corrosion is detected, 

before further flight, treat the inside of the 

elevator control pushrod with corrosion 

preventative LPS 3 or equivalent. 

(3) If required by paragraph (g)(1) of this 

AD, you must replace the elevator control 

pushrod before further flight with an elevator 

control pushrod that has zero hours TIS or 

with an elevator control pushrod that has 

passed the inspection in accordance with 

paragraphs (g)(1) and (2) of this AD. 

(h) Credit for Previous Actions 

You may take credit for the actions 

required by paragraphs (g)(1) and (2) of this 

AD if you performed these actions before the 

effective date of this AD using FiberglasTechnik Rudolf Lindner Anweisung/ 

Instructions (A/I–G09), dated April 8, 2020. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, International Validation 

Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In 

accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or local 

Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the certification office, 

send it to the attention of the person 

identified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD and 

email to: 9-AVS-AIR-730-AMOC@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact Jim Rutherford, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, General Aviation & Rotorcraft 

Section, International Validation Branch, 

FAA, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, 

MO 64106; phone: (816) 329–4165; email: 

jim.rutherford@faa.gov. 

(2) Refer to European Union Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020–0138, dated 

June 19, 2020, for more information. You 

may examine the EASA AD in the AD docket 

at https://www.regulations.gov by searching 

for and locating Docket No. FAA–2021–0944. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner 

Anweisung/Instructions (A/I–G09), Revision 

1, dated May 14, 2020. 

Note 1 to paragraph (k)(2)(i): This service 

information contains German to English 

translation. EASA used the English 

translation in referencing the document from 

Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner. For 

enforceability purposes, the FAA will cite the 

service information in English as it appears 

on the document. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf 

Lindner GmbH & Co. KG, Steige 3, D–88487 

Walpertshofen, Germany; phone: +49 (0) 

7353 22 43; email: info@LTB-Lindner.com; 

website: https://www.ltb-lindner.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust, 

Kansas City, MO 64106. For information on 

the availability of this material at the FAA, 

call (817) 222–5110. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

email: fr.inspection@nara.gov, or go to: 

https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locations.html. 

Issued on January 20, 2022. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2022–02717 Filed 2–9–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2021–1012; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2021–00697–R; Amendment 

39–21916; AD 2022–02–19] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) 

Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH 

(AHD) Model EC135P1, EC135P2, 

EC135P2+, EC135P3, EC135T1, 

EC135T2, EC135T2+, and EC135T3 

helicopters. This AD was prompted by 

a report of restricted collective lever 

movement caused by entanglement of 

the emergency flashlight strap with the 

cargo hook emergency release lever, 

causing the emergency flashlight to 

leave its seat. This AD requires 

replacing each affected emergency 

flashlight with a serviceable part, as 

specified in a European Union Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is 

incorporated by reference. The FAA is 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective March 17, 

2022. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of March 17, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: For EASA material 

incorporated by reference (IBR) in this 

AD, contact EASA, Konrad-AdenauerUfer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; 

telephone +49 221 8999 000; email 

ADs@easa.europa.eu; internet 

www.easa.europa.eu. You may find the 

EASA material on the EASA website at 

https://ad.easa.europa.eu. For Airbus 

Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) 

service information identified in this 

final rule, contact Airbus Helicopters, 


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