Filed: January 14, 2005

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-4091

(CR-03-175)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

LUIS PEREZ,

Defendant - Appellee.

O R D E R

The court amends its opinion filed December 29, 2004, as

follows:

On page 1, the third line of the district court information

is amended by substituting “Joseph R. Goodwin” for “Charles H.

Haden II” immediately before “District Judge.”

For the Court - By Direction

 /s/ Patricia S. Connor 

 Clerk
PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 04-4091

LUIS PEREZ,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.

Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge.

(CR-03-175)

Argued: October 1, 2004

Decided: December 29, 2004

Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, and

Roger W. TITUS, United States District Judge for the

District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

Reversed by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in

which Chief Judge Wilkins and Judge Titus joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Joshua Clarke Hanks, Assistant United States Attorney,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West

Virginia, for Appellant. David Robert Bungard, Assistant Federal

Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellant. Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge: 

Luis Perez was charged in a four-count indictment with narcotics

and firearms offenses after law enforcement officers searched his

home pursuant to an informant’s tip. Perez filed a pretrial motion to

suppress the evidence recovered in the search and his confession to

the officers executing the search warrant. The district court granted

Perez’s motion to suppress, holding that the warrant was not supported by probable cause and was thus invalid and that the good faith

exception to the warrant requirement did not apply. The government

appeals, and we reverse. 

I.

On July 11, 2002, Deputy Kevin Unger, an officer employed by the

Roane County, West Virginia, Sheriff’s Department, was approached

by Timothy Taylor while Unger was investigating a reported breaking

and entering at the home of Taylor’s parents. At Taylor’s request,

Unger spoke with him in private. Taylor revealed that ongoing drugrelated activities had been occurring at the residence of Sarah Parkinson and Perez, who was Parkinson’s boyfriend, on Mount Hope Road

in Roane County. Taylor occasionally visited Parkinson’s home

because Parkinson was the mother of his girlfriend. Taylor told Unger

that he witnessed Parkinson and Perez possessing and using large

quantities of marijuana on several occasions. Unger spoke with Taylor for approximately 30 minutes and reduced the substance of their

conversation to the following written statement, which was signed by

Taylor and included his post-office box, date of birth, and social

security number:

Myself and Stephanie Workman were living in the old

school house on Mt. Hope. Sarah Parkinson McGlothlin,

2 UNITED STATES v. PEREZ
Stephanie’s mom, rented it to us. Sarah’s house is the two

story white house on the same driveway as Rick Moores.

Louis Perez lives there and her other daughter stays there.

While at her house I’ve seen big bags of marijuana on several occasions. They have also smoked it around me on several occasions. I don’t want my girlfriend around this. I also

would like my name to be confidential and anonymous. 

I have read this statement and find it to be true and correct. 

J.A. 17. The signed statement was dated July 11, 2002. 

The next day, Unger prepared an affidavit to be submitted with his

application for a search warrant, which recounted his conversation

with Taylor: "This officer took a statement from a reliable and credible witness that stated on several occasions [he had] been to the residence [of Perez and Parkinson]. While there, [he] noticed several bags

of marijuana and observed [Perez and Parkinson] smoking marijuana

on several occasions at the above residence." J.A. 18. 

Unger presented to the magistrate his affidavit and the statement

signed by Taylor. Additionally, Unger told the magistrate that Taylor

indicated he had observed this marijuana use within a few days of

their July 11 conversation. Prior to submitting the application for a

search warrant, Unger learned from Senior Trooper Doug Starcher,

who was familiar with Perez, that Perez had been convicted of distributing cocaine in 1995; however, there is no record evidence that

Unger passed this information along to the magistrate. The magistrate

issued the search warrant, pursuant to which Unger, Starcher, and

other officers recovered marijuana, cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and

firearms from the Mt. Hope residence identified by Taylor. Perez

acknowledged responsibility for these items in response to questions

from law enforcement officers. 

Perez was indicted for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and possession of

a firearm by a felon. Perez moved to suppress the items yielded by

UNITED STATES v. PEREZ 3
the search as well as his confession. The district court granted the

motion. 

First, the district court determined that the search warrant was not

supported by probable cause and was therefore invalid. The district

court based this conclusion on its belief that "Unger lacked information concerning Taylor’s veracity or reliability" and "completely

failed to corroborate any of the information provided by Taylor." J.A.

90. "[B]ecause Taylor’s allegations of criminal misconduct provided

the sole support for the issuance of the warrant," J.A. 89, the district

court reasoned that the magistrate judge "lacked a substantial basis to

believe the known facts and circumstances were sufficient" to establish probable cause that "evidence of a crime would be found at Parkinson’s home." J.A. 94. 

Second, the district court considered whether, even if the search

had been illegal, the evidence was admissible under the good faith

exception to the exclusionary rule carved out in United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897 (1984). In concluding that the Leon good faith exception

was not applicable, the district court reasoned that the "issuing judicial officer acted as a rubber stamp" for the "‘bare bones’ affidavit"

submitted by Unger, and that "[a] reasonably well[-]trained officer

would have known the search was illegal, despite the Magistrate

Judge’s authorization." J.A. 96. Thus, the district court suppressed the

evidence recovered from Perez’s residence, and it determined that

Perez’s confession could not be used because "[t]he questions posed

to [Perez] by law enforcement would not have been asked without the

presence of the illegally seized contraband." J.A. 98. 

The government immediately appealed this ruling. 

II.

Assuming without deciding that the district court correctly concluded the search warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause, we

exercise our discretion to proceed directly to the question of good

faith. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 925; United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240,

243 (4th Cir. 1994). 

4 UNITED STATES v. PEREZ
The "search of private property without proper consent" violates

the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches

"unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant" or it falls

within "certain carefully defined classes of cases" that permit warrantless searches. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S.

523, 528-29 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence

obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, of course, is generally subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. See United

States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) ("[E]vidence obtained

in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal

proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.");

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The "prime purpose" of the

judicially created exclusionary rule is "to deter future unlawful police

conduct," Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347; however, "the application of the

rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives

are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at 348. 

"Leon teaches that a court should not suppress the fruits of a search

conducted under the authority of a warrant, even a ‘subsequently

invalidated’ warrant, unless ‘a reasonably well trained officer would

have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.’" United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002)

(Motz, J.) (quoting Leon, 468 at 922 n.23). The Court explained in

Leon that the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule is not

achieved through the suppression of evidence obtained by "an officer

acting with objective good faith" within the scope of a search warrant

issued by a magistrate. 468 U.S. at 920. Hence, under Leon’s good

faith exception, evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued

by a neutral magistrate does not need to be excluded if the officer’s

reliance on the warrant was "objectively reasonable." Id. at 922. 

Usually, searches conducted "pursuant to a warrant will rarely

require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by

a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement

officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search." Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Leon, however, identifies four circumstances in which an officer’s reliance on a warrant would not qualify

as "objectively reasonable": (1) when the issuing judge "was misled

by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would

have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth";

UNITED STATES v. PEREZ 5
(2) when "the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role

in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S.

319 (1979)"; (3) when "an affidavit [is] so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable"; or (4) when "a warrant [is] so facially deficient — i.e., in

failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be

seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to

be valid." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In any of these four circumstances, then, the Leon good faith exception does not apply. 

A.

The core of the district court’s rejection of the good faith exception

was premised upon the third circumstance identified by Leon — that

the supporting affidavit was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause

as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Id.

The district court found that Unger submitted a "bare bones" affidavit

that was so deficient that any "reasonably well[-]trained officer would

have known the search was illegal, despite the Magistrate Judge’s

authorization," and that, in issuing the warrant, the magistrate essentially "acted as a rubber stamp for law enforcement." J.A. 96. As set

forth below, we cannot agree.1

Although the concept of probable cause resists an exacting definition, it "exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found" in a particular place.

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). Because "[i]t is

well settled that probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and

information received from informants," United States v. Dequasie,

373 F.3d 509, 518 (4th Cir. 2004), a judicial officer’s assessment of

probable cause based upon the totality of the circumstances must

include a review of "the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

238 (1983). Certainly, an informant’s reliability may also be bolstered

1Perez does not contend that Unger misled the magistrate with false

information or that the warrant is so deficient on its face that no officer

could reasonably believe it was valid. 

6 UNITED STATES v. PEREZ
by "[t]he degree to which [the] informant’s story is corroborated."

United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 309 (4th Cir. 2004); United

States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1580 (4th Cir. 1993). But, "there is

no set requirement that all tips be corroborated by subsequent police

investigation in order to be considered credible." Dequasie, 373 F.3d

at 519 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The officer

applying for the warrant "need not . . . entirely eliminate the risk that

an informant is lying or in error." United States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d

327, 333 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.

denied, 124 S. Ct. 1187 (2004). 

We conclude that Unger’s reliance on the warrant was objectively

reasonable. Undeniably, the information supplied by Unger within the

four corners of his affidavit leaves much to be desired. On its face,

it does not identify the informant or even make clear whether the

informant was known or anonymous. Moreover, the affidavit standing

alone does not explain the basis for Unger’s conclusion that the

source was "reliable and credible." There are no details supplied by

the affidavit itself that would explain the nexus between the informant

and the alleged wrongdoers. 

However, we are not limited to consideration of only the facts

appearing on the face of the affidavit. See Legg, 18 F.3d at 243

("[E]ven assuming that the affidavit itself lacked sufficient indicia of

probable cause to support reasonable reliance on the warrant, the affidavit did not contain all of the facts presented to the magistrate.").

Instead, "the court should examine the totality of the information presented to the magistrate in deciding whether an officer’s reliance on

the warrant could have been reasonable." Id. at 244 n.1. 

During the application process, Unger presented the magistrate

with Taylor’s signed statement, which the affidavit explicitly referenced. Taylor’s statement was sufficiently detailed for the magistrate

to conclude, first, that the information was supplied to Unger in person by a known witness. There is a substantial difference between an

informant who deals with the authorities in person and an anonymous

phone caller. Indeed, "courts have had no difficulty distinguishing

between cases involving face-to-face encounters with informants and

cases involving anonymous tipsters." United States v. Christmas, 222

F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 2000). Unlike an anonymous tipster, "an

UNITED STATES v. PEREZ 7
informant who meets face-to-face with an officer provides the officer

with an opportunity to assess his credibility and demeanor and also

exposes himself to accountability for making a false statement."

Dequasie, 373 F.3d at 523. Second, the statement clearly indicated

that Taylor’s knowledge derived from personal observation rather

than hearsay, observation that was facilitated by Taylor’s relationship

with Parkinson’s daughter. Thus, the magistrate was presented with

a detailed basis for Taylor’s knowledge. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 268

n.20 (White, J., concurring). Furthermore, Taylor’s statement

reflected his personal concern for his girlfriend’s well-being, which

we have found to be another indication of an informant’s credibility.

See Dequasie, 373 F.3d at 523 (recognizing that informant’s "obvious

personal interest in [the victim’s] well-being" supplied "a corresponding motive to be truthful"); cf. United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695,

699 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining that an informant’s personal interest

can "creat[e] a strong motive to supply accurate information"). In

light of all the circumstances presented to the magistrate, we conclude

that Unger reasonably concluded that Taylor was credible. 

One additional point bears mentioning. The district court noted that

the information supplied by Taylor to Unger was stale, indicating that

the information supplied by Taylor was more than one year old. And,

in fact, neither the affidavit nor Taylor’s statement indicates when

Taylor observed the drug related activity. The district court, therefore,

suggested that the magistrate "did not know the age of the information

presented in the affidavit," J.A. 91, which further eroded the magistrate’s basis for finding probable cause. See United States v. McCall,

740 F.2d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[E]vidence seized pursuant to

a warrant supported by ‘stale’ probable cause is not admissible in a

criminal trial to establish the defendant’s guilt."). Presumably, the district court’s observation was based upon Taylor’s testimony at the

suppression hearing that he did not tell Unger that the information

was as fresh as "within days" of their meeting. The district court,

however, did not acknowledge Unger’s contradictory testimony that

Taylor claimed he had witnessed Perez’s drug use recently. 

Although the conflicting testimony regarding what Taylor originally said about the freshness of the information may well be relevant

to the theory that Unger knowingly or recklessly misled the magistrate, Perez does not make this argument. Moreover, this theory did

8 UNITED STATES v. PEREZ
not serve as one of the bases for the district court’s ruling, which

rested instead on the court’s conclusion that the affidavit completely

lacked any indicia of probable cause and that the magistrate that

issued the warrant did not adequately perform its detached and neutral

judicial function. 

Our focus, therefore, is properly on the information presented to

the magistrate. Taylor, of course, was not able to comment on what

information was presented to the magistrate. At the suppression hearing, Unger’s uncontroverted testimony was that Unger stated orally to

the magistrate that Taylor, during the July 11 meeting, indicated that

Perez’s conduct had been "ongoing for a period of time," and that

Taylor had witnessed the events he described "within days" of his

encounter with Unger. J.A. 62. As it is the only evidence of what was

presented to the magistrate regarding the staleness of Taylor’s information, Unger’s reliance on the warrant was reasonable in this regard

as well. Cf. United States v. Edwards, 798 F.2d 686, 691 (4th Cir.

1986) (concluding that officer’s unrecorded oral presentation of vital

information not contained in the supporting affidavit did not preclude

application of good faith exception). 

In light of the totality of the circumstances, Unger’s reliance on the

warrant was objectively reasonable. The affidavit, when considered

together with Taylor’s statement that was presented to the magistrate,

was not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

B.

The district court’s conclusion that the Leon good faith exception

does not apply to Unger’s "bare bones" affidavit was premised on our

decision in United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1996). In

Wilhelm, an officer obtained a search warrant based solely upon an

anonymous phone caller’s tip that the caller had recently observed

marijuana sales in Wilhelm’s residence. The officer did not learn the

caller’s name or any other identifying information, nor did he meet

with the caller in person at any point. Nevertheless, the officer’s affidavit described the anonymous caller as "a reliable source who is a

concerned citizen, a resident of Iredell County, a mature person with

UNITED STATES v. PEREZ 9
personal connections with the suspects and has projected a truthful[ ]

demeanor to this applicant." Id. at 118. The affidavit indicated that the

applying officer had confirmed directions to the residence supplied by

the caller and that the caller’s description of the drug transactions (for

which the officer gave no specific details) was consistent with the

officer’s "knowledge of how marijuana is packaged and sold." Id. 

We held that the affidavit was insufficient to support the issuance

of a search warrant for Wilhelm’s residence because it "depended on

information from an unnamed informant" and offered only "conclusory descriptions" rather than specific information that would establish the "informant’s truthfulness or reliability." Id. at 120. Further,

the tipster’s description of the criminal activity, as recounted by the

affidavit, could have been provided by "anyone who occasionally

watches the evening news," without any knowledge of what was happening inside of the residence, and thus afforded no basis for a probable cause finding. Id. at 121. 

Next, we held that the good faith exception did not apply because

the facts presented the third circumstance identified in Leon — the

supporting "affidavit [is] so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to

render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468

U.S. at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Wilhelm, 80 F.3d

at 123. Specifically, we determined that the supporting affidavit,

described as "bare bones," failed to justify reasonable reliance

because (1) it provided only unsupported, conclusory statements

rather than facts from which a magistrate could independently verify

the existence of probable cause, and (2) the information was supplied

by an unknown informant whose credibility could not be assessed.

See Wilhelm, 80 F.3d at 121-22; see also Dequasie, 373 F.3d at 521,

524. We explained that the officer’s reliance "on an unknown,

unavailable informant" would not be reasonable "without significant

corroboration," Wilhelm, 80 F.3d at 123, that was actually presented

to the magistrate, see id. at 121-22.2

2

In Wilhelm, we rejected the government’s argument that the affiant

officer did, in fact, corroborate various details "because the only evidence presented to the state magistrate was contained in [the supporting]

affidavit." 80 F.3d at 121. Any additional information that was not presented to the state magistrate was "irrelevant" for purposes of determining whether an officer could reasonably rely upon the affidavit. Id. at

122. 

10 UNITED STATES v. PEREZ
In the present case, the district court found that Unger’s affidavit

presented "few distinguishing features" from the "bare bones" Wilhelm affidavit, noting only that Unger had a "personal encounter with

the informant." J.A. 96. The district court, however, concluded that

Unger’s "brief meeting [with Taylor] does nothing to transform the

‘bare-bones’ affidavit" into one upon which Unger could reasonably

rely. J.A. 96. 

Wilhelm does not dictate the result reached by the district court.

First, it is no small difference that Unger relied on information

obtained in a face-to-face meeting with a witness who revealed his

identity and social security number instead of the anonymous phone

call at issue in Wilhelm. As previously noted, the circumstances necessarily surrounding a face-to-face meeting alone provide certain indicia of credibility that are lacking when the warrant is based solely on

a telephone call from an anonymous, never-to-be-identified informant. See Dequasie, 373 F.3d at 523; Christmas, 222 F.3d at 144.

Thus, very much unlike the affiant officer in Wilhelm, Unger was able

to observe Taylor’s demeanor and had at least some basis for assessing Taylor’s credibility. Additionally, the fact that Taylor was willing

to reveal his identity and tacitly accept responsibility for the accuracy

of his statement bolstered his credibility. 

Second, although Wilhelm did not find that the supporting affidavit

was presented in bad faith, we observed that the officer’s "use of

phrases such as ‘concerned citizen,’ ‘mature’ and ‘truthful demeanor’

strike this court as attempts to endue the affidavit with the appearance

of genuine substance; this tactic suggests that [the officer] knew that

probable cause was lacking, and thus that reliance on the resulting

warrant was not reasonable." Wilhelm, 80 F.3d at 123. The facts in

Wilhelm, therefore, fit comfortably within Leon’s first category of circumstances that do not permit good faith reliance on a warrant. See

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (good faith exception inapplicable when the

magistrate "was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant

knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless

disregard of the truth"). Even though Wilhelm does not explicitly

identify this category as an analytical basis for declining application

of the good faith exception, the officer’s "puffing" regarding the reliability of the anonymous caller provided an additional reason to question that officer’s reliance on the warrant. See Dequasie, 373 F.3d at

UNITED STATES v. PEREZ 11
524-26. Because Unger had an articulable basis for judging Taylor’s

credibility, this case does not present the same impediment to good

faith reliance. 

Third, Unger’s affidavit submitted with the warrant application,

unlike the one in Wilhelm, was not a "bare bones" affidavit containing

"wholly conclusory statements which lacked the facts and circumstances from which a judicial officer could have independently determined probable cause." Dequasie, 373 F.3d at 524. The Wilhelm

affidavit was completely devoid of any details that would have

allowed a judicial officer to conclude the informant was credible or

that there was a nexus between the informant and the defendant or the

premises to be searched. In fact, the affidavit in Wilhelm might as

well have simply stated, "Drugs are being sold at Wilhelm’s home —

take my word for it, the source is credible and the description of the

sales is consistent with my knowledge of a typical drug transaction."

A "‘bare bones’ affidavit is similar to, if not the same as, a conclusory

affidavit" in that it "states only the affiant’s belief that probable cause

existed." United States v. Williams, 224 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2000)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, in Wilhelm we concluded

that the magistrate, in concluding this take-my-word-for-it affidavit

established probable cause, essentially shirked his duty to act independent of law enforcement and "acted as a rubber stamp." Wilhelm,

80 F.3d at 123. As detailed previously, the information presented by

Unger to the magistrate does far more than merely state "the affiant’s

belief that probable cause existed." Williams, 224 F.3d at 533 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, for the reasons explained previously, the magistrate’s issuance of a search warrant pursuant to Unger’s application can in no

sense be viewed as tantamount to "act[ing] as a rubber stamp." Wilhelm, 80 F.3d at 123. To the extent that the district court’s statement

that the "issuing judicial official acted as a rubber stamp for law

enforcement," J.A. 96, suggests that the magistrate judge abandoned

his neutral role in some fashion unconnected to the bare-bones premise, we disagree. We find no evidence in the record supporting the

theory that the issuing magistrate judge abandoned his neutral role as

contemplated by Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979),

where the issuing magistrate judge effectively "allowed himself to

become a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was

12 UNITED STATES v. PEREZ
essentially a police operation," id. at 326-27. See also Leon, 468 U.S.

at 923. 

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Deputy Unger’s

reliance on the search warrant for the contraband that precipitated

Perez’s arrest was objectively reasonable under Leon. Accordingly,

we reverse the decision of the district court.

REVERSED

UNITED STATES v. PEREZ 13