United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued January 23, 2007

Decided March 2, 2007

Before

Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 06-2028

SOFIANE DJELLOULI,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney

General of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A77-656-296

O R D E R

Sofiane Djellouli, an Algerian citizen, petitions for review of an order denying

him withholding of removal. Djellouli claims that he was threatened by

unidentified “terrorists” because he provided medical care to members of the

Algerian military and police. An Immigration Judge decided that the treatment

Djellouli suffered did not rise to the level of persecution, and that the risk he would

be harmed if sent home was too remote to compel withholding of removal. Because

this conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, we deny the petition.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-2028 Page 2

Background

In May 2000, Djellouli came to the United States on a visitor’s visa at the

invitation of his sister and overstayed. By his own account, he was not initially

planning to seek asylum. However, he changed his mind after he was placed in

removal proceedings by the INS in early 2003 for overstaying his visa. At this

point, more than two and a half years after he first arrived in the United States,

Djellouli applied for asylum, withholding, and relief under the Convention Against

Torture (CAT). 

Djellouli claimed that he would be harmed by an unnamed terrorist group on

account of his political opinion and membership in a particular social group if he

returned to Algeria. Specifically, he said at his asylum hearing that a terrorist

group he described as the “Djehad” targeted him because, as a dental assistant at a

clinic located near a police station, he frequently provided medical treatment to the

members of the Algerian military and police. According to Djellouli’s testimony, he

heard gunshots one morning in November 1998 as he was leaving his house and got

out of his car to investigate. Neighbors told him that “terrorists” were “around” and

were going into his house. Djellouli was frightened and left the neighborhood,

moving in with his sister who lived in another town. He did not actually see the

terrorists who entered his home, but he was told afterwards by his mother—who

was home at the time—that the terrorists asked her about his and his brother’s

whereabouts. Djellouli asserted in his asylum application that the terrorists were

after his brother because his brother worked as a security guard at a university. He

also said that terrorists burned his car. Djellouli’s brother was killed about six

weeks after the shooting incident. Djellouli contended that terrorists were

responsible but that conclusion was based entirely on the prior events. 

Djellouli’s brother-in-law and sister (a different sister from the one with whom

he stayed in Algeria) also testified in person. The brother-in-law testified that a

group called “Islamic Jihad” had killed Djellouli’s brother, burned his car, burned

the clinic where he worked, and would kill Djellouli if he returned. However, the

brother-in-law has lived in the United States since 1994, so it appears that his

knowledge was based entirely on information he received second-hand from family

members in Algeria. He also admitted that conditions in Algeria have improved at

least in the large cities. Although the sister, who came to the United States a few

months after Djellouli, confirmed that terrorists (she was unable to name the

specific group) had threatened Djellouli and killed his brother, the details of her

testimony differed from the testimony of both Djellouli and the brother-in-law. She

said that Djellouli was threatened, not because he provided medical care to the

authorities, but because he refused to provide medical care to the terrorists. Her

testimony about the fate of Djellouli’s clinic also differed from the account given by

the brother-in-law. She suggested that, rather than being intentionally burned, it

was accidentally bombed when terrorists targeted the nearby police station. 
No. 06-2028 Page 3

The IJ concluded that Djellouli was barred from seeking asylum because he

failed to file within one year of his entry into the United States and had not shown

that exceptional circumstances excused the delay. With respect to Djellouli’s

withholding claim, the IJ reasoned that Djellouli had not experienced persecution

because the mistreatment he alleged consisted of a single unfulfilled threat, which

as a general rule would not be sufficient to constitute persecution. The IJ

acknowledged Djellouli’s testimony that his brother was later killed by terrorists,

but he concluded that this “extremely weak and vague testimony does not show that

the death of the respondent’s brother is any way a result of the respondent’s

actions.” The IJ also noted that Djellouli was “extremely vague” about who

threatened him and why. Finally, the IJ decided that Djellouli’s claim was

undermined by the fact that he remained in Algeria for almost a year and a half

without suffering any more threats or violence from terrorists, that his mother and

sister still lived there and had never been harmed, and that terrorist attacks had

decreased since he had left Algeria. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without

adding any significant analysis. 

Analysis

Djellouli concedes that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the denial of

his asylum claim because he filed it more than a year after he entered the United

States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (a)(3). He also has waived any argument

about his CAT claim by failing to address that claim in his brief. See Balliu v.

Gonzales, 467 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2006). Therefore our review is limited to the

decision denying him withholding. The standard for withholding is more stringent

than that for asylum and required Djellouli to show that his life or freedom would

be threatened if he returned to Algeria. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Firmansjah v.

Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2005). To demonstrate this he had to

establish that it was more likely than not that he would face persecution on account

of one of the grounds specified in the asylum statute. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2);

Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2006). If he showed that he was

persecuted in the past, he was entitled to a presumption that his life or freedom

would be threatened in the future. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). We review a

denial of withholding for substantial evidence and will reverse only if the evidence

compels a different conclusion. Pavlyk, 469 F.3d at 1087. 

Although there are some problems with the IJ’s decision, the record does not

compel a different result. The only harm that Djellouli personally suffered was the

threat made by the alleged terrorists who visited his house. We have frequently

upheld findings by immigration courts that unfulfilled threats did not qualify as

persecution. See, e.g., Bejko v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 2006); Boykov

v. INS, 109 F.3d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1997). As we have explained, threats will

constitute persecution “only in the most extreme circumstances, such as where they
No. 06-2028 Page 4

are of a most immediate or menacing nature or if the perpetrators attempt to follow

through on the threat.” See Bejko, 468 F.3d at 486. In this instance Djellouli

provided few details about the alleged threat. Although he submitted a police

report stating that he was threatened with assassination, he did not elaborate on

this event in his testimony. He admitted that he had no personal contact with the

terrorists, and his account of what they told his mother was quite limited; he said

only that they asked after his whereabouts, not that they threatened to kill or

otherwise harm him. It is not clear that this inquiry even qualifies as a threat,

much less an immediate and menacing threat. 

Djellouli argues, however, that the terrorists did fulfill their threat because

they killed his brother. The IJ discounted this evidence because Djellouli had not

shown that his brother’s death was “in any way a result of [his] actions.” Though

this statement is ambiguous, the IJ presumably meant that there was not enough

evidence to connect the brother’s death with the earlier inquiry about both brothers. 

This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. Although Djellouli, his

brother-in-law, and his sister all testified that the same terrorists who came to

Djellouli’s house killed the brother, none of them witnessed the killing or explained

how they knew who killed his brother. It is not even clear that the killing of

Djellouli’s brother was an intentional act. Djellouli submitted a police report

recounting that his brother was killed by terrorists, but the report does not say

whether the brother was targeted or merely a victim of random violence. Although

the IJ could have done a better job of explaining his decision to discount this event,

given the lack of detail about either the initial threat or the killing, the record does

not compel a different conclusion. See Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 611, 613, 618–19

(7th Cir. 2003) (former Algerian police officer’s vague testimony about death threats

to his brother did not compel finding that he had well-founded fear of persecution);

Bhatt v. Reno, 172 F.3d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1999) (vague evidence that petitioner was

threatened many years ago does not compel finding that he had well-founded fear of

persecution).

Djellouli next argues that, even if he did not show that he suffered past

persecution, he still showed that it is more likely than not that he would be

persecuted in the future. Specifically, he faults the IJ for finding that he lived in

Algeria for over a year after his brother’s death without suffering further harm;

Djellouli insists that the IJ ignored his sister’s testimony that he remained in

hiding and rarely left his other sister’s house during this time. Although the IJ

perhaps should have given this testimony some consideration, his decision was

based on more than the absence of harm to Djellouli while he lived with his sister. 

The IJ also pointed out that terrorist violence in Algeria had decreased since the

late 1990s when Djellouli was threatened. The country reports that Djellouli

submitted support this conclusion as does the most recent report of which this court

may take judicial notice, see Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 556 n.6 (7th Cir.

2006). For example, the 2002 and 2003 reports that Djellouli submitted reflect that
No. 06-2028 Page 5

according to press reports violent deaths decreased significantly from 1,386 people

in 2002 to 1,162 people in 2003 (a number that includes terrorists and security force

personnel as well as civilians). The 2002 number itself represented a decrease from

2001. The most recent report reflects that, according to government numbers, only

488 people (and only 76 civilians) died in 2005. U.S. Department of State, Report on

Human Rights Practices: Algeria 1 (2005). The report also states that terrorist

violence occurred primarily in rural and mountainous areas, id. at 2, and the 2002

and 2003 reports state that the security forces had “largely forced the terrorists out

of the cities.” Furthermore, since 1999 the Algerian government has twice offered

amnesty to members of armed groups who agree to lay down their weapons, and

this has led to a considerable decrease in violence by Islamic militants. BBC News,

Country Profile: Algeria 1-2 (2006); BBC News, Algeria Amnesty Deadline Expiring

1 (2006). 

Finally, the IJ found that Djellouli’s mother and sister continued to live in

Algeria without being harmed. The fact that a petitioner’s family has not been

harmed undermines a claim that the petitioner faces a risk of future harm. 

Toptchev v. INS, 295 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2002); Sayaxing v. INS, 179 F.3d 515,

522 (7th Cir. 1999). Djellouli says that the terrorists had no reason to target his

family, but if the terrorists really wanted to find Djellouli they might have

continued to harass his family to discover his whereabouts as they did when they

first went to his house. 

For the above reasons, we DENY the petition.