alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
                                                                     EXHIBIT 3.2


                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                                       OF
                           SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED
                         CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF
                            ENGAGE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

                             Pursuant to Section 242
                        of the General Corporation Law of
                              THE STATE OF DELAWARE


      Engage Technologies, Inc. (hereinafter called the "Corporation"),
organized and existing under and by virtue of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware, does hereby certify as follows:

      At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporation a resolution was
duly adopted, pursuant to Section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware, setting forth certain amendments to the Second Amended and
Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Corporation and declaring said
amendments to be advisable. The stockholders of the Corporation duly approved
said proposed amendments in accordance with Section 242 of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware by special meeting in accordance with
Section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware. The
resolutions setting forth the amendments are as follows:

RESOLVED    That Article FIRST of the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of
            Incorporation of the Corporation be and hereby is deleted in its
            entirety and the following paragraph is inserted in lieu thereof:

            FIRST. The name of the Corporation is:

            Engage, Inc.

FURTHER
RESOLVED:   That the first paragraph of Article FOURTH of the Second Amended and
            Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Corporation be and
            hereby is deleted in its entirety and the following paragraph is
            inserted in lieu thereof:

            FOURTH: The total number of shares of all classes of stock which the
            Corporation shall have authority to issue is 355,000,000 shares,
            consisting of (i) 350,000,000 shares of
<PAGE>
            Common Stock, $.01 par value per share ("Common Stock"), and (ii)
            5,000,000 shares of Preferred Stock, $.01 par value per share
            ("Preferred Stock").

RESOLVED:   That this Certificate of Amendment of Second Amended and Restated
            Certificate of Incorporation shall be effective on April 28, 2000 at
            2:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.


      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this Certificate of
Amendment to be signed by its President this 28th day of April, 2000.

                            Engage Technologies, Inc.

                            By:/s/ Paul L. Schaut
                               -----------------------
                               Paul L. Schaut,  President
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rhakeim THOMAS, a.k.a. King, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10974 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(February 3, 2017)

Gregory Schiller, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Jamie Galvin, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Lisa Tobin Rubio, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. *615Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

William M. Norris, William M.' Norris, PA, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Rhakeim Thomas appeals his sentence of 57 months of imprisonment for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Thomas argues that the district court “failed to make specific, individualized findings” explaining its decision to hold him accountable for all the drugs sold during his participation in the conspiracy. We affirm.

The district court did not clearly err. Thomas admitted in his factual proffer that he “willingly joined [a] plan” to “dis-tribut[e] illegal narcotics” and that he “managed [two] trap houses [from which he] sold narcotics” and “regularly updated [the leaders of the conspiracy] regarding the status of the trap houses, and requested resupplies when the supply of narcotics was running low.” Thomas also admitted that his coconspirators sold cocaine base, powder cocaine, Ethylone, Alprazolam, and marijuana and that “law enforcement recovered more than 83 grams of crack cocaine and more than 160 grams of powder cocaine.” These admissions provided specific and reliable evidence on which the district court based its finding that “[t]he scope of [Thomas’s] agreement was to sell illegal narcotics from the trap houses” for “the time period” he participated in the conspiracy. *See United States v. Lawrence,*47 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995). The district court was entitled to, in its words, hold Thomas “accountable for his sales and the sales of other persons [of the various types of narcotics] .., during the time period for which he sold drugs at the trap house” because “the conduct of each of those persons was within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,” was made “in furtherance of that criminal ae-tivityt,] and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” *See*United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (Nov. 2015); *United States v. Ismond,*993 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993) (“For sentencing purposes a member of a drug conspiracy is liable for his own acts and the acts of others in furtherance of the activity that the defendant agreed to undertake and that are reasonably foreseeable in connection with that activity.”). And Thomas agreed that the government made a “reasonable” estimate that, during his participation, the conspiracy sold 120 grams of cocaine base and 120 grams of powder cocaine. Ample evidence supported the amount of drugs attributed to Thomas.

We AFFIRM Thomas’s sentence.
#### Linda E. EWING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randy MEGRDLE, Detective Employee Number 135509 an Officer of Lancaster Sheriff's Dept; C. Husbands, Sergeant Employee Number 135509 an Officer of Lancaster Sheriff's Dept, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-56061

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 23, 2017

Linda E. Ewing, Pro Se

Jonathan McCaverty, Stephen Takaaki Niwa, Los Angeles County Counsel, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Linda E. Ewing appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego,*670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ewing’s Fourth Amendment judicial deception claim because Ewing failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Megrdle procured the search warrant by making misrepresentations or omissions intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth. *See Bravo v. City of Santa Maria,*665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements of a Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of judicial deception).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for leave to amend because granting leave to amend would be prejudicial to defendants and cause undue delay. *See Jackson v. Bank of Haw.,*902 F.2d 1385, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard of review and relevant factors; noting that prejudice is the most important factor). We reject as without merit Ewing’s contention that the district court improperly considered the motion seeking leave to amend after grant-*525mg defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for reconsideration because Ewing did not present any newly discovered evidence. *See Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,*833 F.2d 208, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (setting forth standard of review and noting that evidence is not newly discovered if it could have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence); *see also*C.D. Cal. R. 7-18.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); *see also Greenwood v. F.A.A.,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim[.]”).

AFFIRMED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
----

**Exhibit      32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONS      PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**(18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**

|  | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the                Company. |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/   Nicolae                Luca                                                          |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Nicolae                LucaInterim                Chief Executive OfficerDecember                14, 2007 |   |

----
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7355

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus LUICITO NERVIL, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge. (CR-89-112-G, CA-97-627-2) Submitted: November 19, 1998 Decided: December 3, 1998 Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Luicito Nervil, Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin H. White, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find noreversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Nervil , No. CR-89-112-G; CA-97-627-2 (M.D.N.C. May 12, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Shawn Emmanuel RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-2157

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed February 20, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 27, 2018

Shawn Emmanuel Richardson, Perry, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock Mcguigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LURENZO LEE WILLIAMS,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

SERVIN, a.k.a. Cervantes,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 11-57252

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00789-CBM-JC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 14, 2013** 

Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Lurenzo Lee Williams appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that

defendant used excessive force against him while he was a pretrial detainee in the

county jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a

FILED

MAY 21 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-57252

dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Williams’s action without prejudice

because Williams did not exhaust the county jail’s grievance procedures

concerning his claims. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95 (2006)

(exhaustion is mandatory and must be done in a timely manner consistent with

prison policies); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (“[T]he PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they

involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong.”). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motions

for appointment of counsel because Williams failed to demonstrate exceptional

circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting

forth standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for

appointment of counsel).

AFFIRMED.
Aerionte JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-904

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 5, 2018]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Narine N. Austin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Ciklin, Conner and Forst, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-7711

JAMES CURTIS WILLIAMSON, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. THEODIS BECK, Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cv-00022-WO-PTS)

Submitted: December 16, 2008 Decided: December 24, 2008

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Curtis Williamson, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, Mary Carla Hollis, Assistant Attorneys General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.PER CURIAM: James Curtis Williamson seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);

Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williamson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Williamson’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

23 facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
May  6th,  1999



Pomeroy  Select  Integration  Solutions,  Inc.
1020  Petersburg  Road
Hebron,  Kentucky  41048

Gentlemen:

     Reference  is  made to that certain Asset Purchase Agreement dated May 6th,
1999,  and an Assignment and Assumption Agreement of even date herewith pursuant
to  which  the  undersigned,  SYSTEMS  ATLANTA COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS, INC. (Seller)
sold,  assigned,  transferred  and  conveyed  to  POMEROY  SELECT  INTEGRATION
SOLUTIONS,  INC.  (Purchaser  No.  2")  to the extent permitted, its interest in
certain  contracts  as  set  forth  on Exhibit A attached to said Assignment and
Assumption  Agreement.  Pursuant  to  such  Assignment and Assumption Agreement,
Seller  agreed  to  take  additional  action to carry out the terms of the Asset
Purchase  Agreement  to  enable  Purchaser  No.  2 to perform the obligations of
Seller  under  these  contracts  and to allow Purchaser No. 2 to enforce Sellers
rights  under  these  contracts.

     In  order  to  fulfill  this obligation, the undersigned hereby agrees that
until  such  time  as  a  new  contract  with these customers is obtained, or an
assignment  is  approved by them, Purchaser No. 2 is hereby engaged by Seller to
perform  Sellers  obligations  under  the  contracts  in  consideration  for all
remaining  amounts  to  be  paid to Seller under such contracts and/or any other
consideration  to  be  provided to Seller under the contracts.  Seller agrees to
cooperate with Purchaser No. 2 in performing these contracts and in dealing with
the  customers,  including  such  billing  procedures,  invoicing  procedures,
collection  procedures and other bookkeeping issues or customer relations issues
as  Purchaser  No.  2  may  deem necessary and appropriate to fulfill its duties
under  the  contracts.  To  acknowledge  your  agreement  and  acceptance to the
foregoing, please execute the duplicate original enclosed herewith and return it
to  the  undersigned.

                              Sincerely,

                              SYSTEMS  ATLANTA  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEMS,  INC.


                              By:  ___________________________________________
                                    B.  Scott  Dobson,  Vice-President

Agreed and Accepted this 6th day of May, 1999

                              POMEROY  SELECT  INTEGRATION  SOLUTIONS,  INC.


                              By:  ___________________________________________
                                   Stephen E. Pomeroy, Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Gerald E. Bisbee, Jr. the Chief Executive Officer of
ReGen Biologics, Inc. (the Company), has executed this certification in
connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending
September 30, 2003 (the Report). The undersigned hereby certifies that:

(1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

|                        |  |                               
|----------------------- |  | ------------------------------
|Date: November 14, 2003 |  | /s/ Gerald E. Bisbee, Jr.     
|                        |  |                               
|                        |  | Name: Gerald E. Bisbee, Jr.   
|                        |  | Title: Chief Executive Officer
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-40665 Summary Calendar

BENNIE FINISTER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus CHRISTOPHER WHITE; UNIDENTIFIED WELCH, Defendants-Appellees, and UNIDENTIFIED ALFRED, Defendant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:94-CV-897

- - - - - - - - - - June 13, 1997 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHE’ and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Bennie Finister, Texas state prisoner #649506, requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in the appeal of the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. On March 4, 1997, this court advised Finister that his appeal would be dismissed in thirty days unless he moved to proceed IFP within the proceduresNo. 95-40665 - 2 - of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”). Although Finister timely responded, the documents he filed do not comply with § 1915(a); the trust fund account information covers the wrong six-month period. See § 1915(a). Accordingly, Finister’s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED for want of prosecution. See 5th Cir. R. 42.3. Should Finister wish to reinstate his appeal, he is instructed to pay the $105 filing fee to the clerk of the district court within 30 days from the date of this order. Finister’s motion for injunctive relief is DENIED without prejudice to his right to refile the motion should he choose to pursue his appeal by paying the appellate filing fee.
MOTIONS TO PROCEED IFP AND FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DENIED;
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 13, 2018

No. 04-02-00551-CR

Sean Devon CLARK,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2001-CR-6202

Honorable Mark R. Luitjen, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The Appellant’s Motion to Recall Mandate is hereby DENIED. 

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 13th day of April, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
Carlos G. GUZMAN, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-1007

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

OCTOBER 09, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Proposed Rule: Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Subpart W

Meeting Documentation: FLIR 07/13/10

Date Staff Contact 

Information (Name, 

email, phone #)

Name of 

Organization 

(Attach list of all 

attendees names 

and emails if 

possible) 

Summary of Discussion (e.g., applicability, 

reporting requirements, etc.)

Written 

Comments 

Provided?

Did they

also submit 

to Docket?

Date sent to

EPA- CCD

07/13/10

Roger Fernandez

Suzie Waltzer

Akachi Imegwu

Debora Ottenger 

Tomas Carbonell

VanNess Feldman

Paul Czerepuszko

FLIR

Tomas Scanlon

FLIR

FLIR presented to EPA on their optical imaging 

camera technology. 

See attached Power Point Presentation

Written 

comments 

were submitted 

to the docket.

June 10, 2010