IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jeffrey James Beers, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 338 M.D. 2018

: Submitted: July 20, 2018

Pennsylvania State Police :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge 

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: August 29, 2018

Before us in our original jurisdiction are the Pennsylvania State Police’s

(PSP) preliminary objections to Jeffrey James Beers’ (Beers) petition for review 

seeking mandamus relief and monetary damages for alleged harm to his reputation.

Representing himself, Beers filed a complaint in the nature of mandamus alleging the 

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)1 was unconstitutional 

as applied to him pursuant to Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), 

cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018). PSP argues Beers fails to state a 

claim for mandamus relief because he is currently incarcerated, and it challenges his 

standing. Notably, PSP’s preliminary objections did not acknowledge Beers’ 

damages claim. Upon consideration, we overrule PSP’s preliminary objections, and 

we direct it to file an answer to the petition for review.

 

1 Sections 9799.10-9799.41 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§9799.10-9799.41, 

effective December 20, 2012. SORNA, commonly known as Megan’s Law IV, was enacted “[t]o 

bring the Commonwealth into substantial compliance with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 

Safety Act of 2006[,] [42 U.S.C. §§16901-16945].” 42 Pa. C.S. §9799.10(1).
2

I. Background

Beers is currently serving an aggregated sentence of 10 to 25 years in 

prison for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. See Pet. for Review (Pet.) at ¶¶5-6. 

In 2008, when Beers pled guilty and was sentenced for this offense, Megan’s Law 

III2 was in effect. 

 

Megan’s Law III was replaced by SORNA. Muniz. Beers’ offense, 

relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, is classified as a Tier III offense 

requiring lifetime registration under SORNA. 42 Pa. C.S. §9799.14(d)(4). SORNA 

vests regulatory authority in PSP, and PSP maintains the sex offender registry. 

In January 2017, our Supreme Court decided Muniz, holding that 

SORNA’s registration provisions were punitive in nature. As a result, it reasoned 

the retroactive application of those provisions violated the ex post facto clauses of 

the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

3

 In addition, the Court held 

“SORNA’s registration and online publication provisions place a unique burden on 

the right to reputation, which is particularly protected in Pennsylvania.” Muniz, 164 

A.3d at 1223.

 

2 The General Assembly enacted Megan’s Law III, the Act of November 24, 2004, P.L. 

1243, when our Supreme Court deemed portions of Megan’s Law II, the Act of May 10, 2000, 

P.L. 74, constitutionally infirm in Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003). Megan’s 

Law II followed Megan’s Law I, the Act of October 24, 1995, P.L. 1079 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), 42 

Pa. C.S. §§9791-9799.6, which our Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999).

3 Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “No 

State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law ....” U.S. CONST. art. I, §10. Article I, Section 17 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in pertinent part that, “No ex post facto law ... shall be 

passed.” PA. CONST. art. I, §17.
3

In May 2018, Beers filed a petition for review consisting of two counts. 

In the first count, he sought mandamus relief from SORNA’s registration 

requirements pursuant to Muniz.

4

 Specifically, he alleged “SORNA is incapable of 

being utilized in [his] situation based upon the fact that SORNA did not exist at the 

time of either his original conviction or sentencing.” Pet. at ¶8. He requested this 

Court direct his removal from the SORNA registry and shield him from additional 

sanctions imposed by SORNA, and direct “place[ment] on the correct version of 

Megan’s Law or remov[al] completely based upon proper application of stare 

decisis.” Pet. at ¶13. 

In the second count, Beers sought monetary damages for violation of

his right to reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution based on publication on 

the SORNA registry. Pet. at ¶¶14-19. He alleged claims sounding in tort, including 

negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ¶¶15, 19. 

PSP filed preliminary objections asserting Beers fails to state a 

cognizable claim because he is not subject to SORNA’s registration requirements 

while he is incarcerated. Because SORNA has not been applied to Beers, and he is 

not listed in the registry, PSP contends Beers’ claim is not ripe. For the same reason, 

PSP also asserts Beers lacks standing. 

 

4

In his petition for review, Beers cites SORNA, 42 Pa. C.S. §§9799.10-9799.41, as the 

basis for his mandamus claim based on Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018). However, the General Assembly amended certain 

provisions of SORNA through the Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (commonly known 

as Act 10), and added new sections, 42 Pa. C.S. §§9799.42, 9799.51-9799.75. Various provisions 

of Act 10 were reenacted and amended by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29 (Act 29),

which became effective immediately. Beers’ petition seeks no relief based on legislation enacted 

subsequent to SORNA. 
4

Beers filed a response to the preliminary objections, acknowledging his 

current incarceration. Because he is unable to consult the sexual offender 

registration, Beers denied that he is not presently listed in the registry. Beers alleges 

that some inmates were listed on the registry despite their incarceration. See

Response to Prelim. Objs. at ¶14. Beers also filed a brief in support of his response.5

After briefing, the matter is ready for disposition. 

II. Discussion

A demurrer contests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Barge v. Pa.

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 39 A.3d 530 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), aff’d, 96 A.3d 360 (Pa. 

2014). When assessing legal sufficiency, this Court must accept as true all wellpled, material and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every inference fairly 

deducible from those facts. Markham v. Wolf, 147 A.3d 1259 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) 

(en banc). This Court, however, is not required to accept as true conclusions of law, 

unwarranted inferences from facts or expressions of opinion. Doe v. Miller, 886 

A.2d 310 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). “To sustain preliminary objections, it must appear 

with certainty the law will not permit recovery, and any doubts should be resolved 

by a refusal to sustain them.” Id. at 314. With these principles in mind, we address 

PSP’s preliminary objections. 

 

5

In his brief, Beers argues for the first time that he should not be subjected to any sexual 

offender registration “regardless of any legislative enactment such as Act 10 of 2018, or any future 

enacted statutory provision.” Pet’r’s Br. at 7 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, Beers did not 

amend his petition to include a claim for relief from subsequent sexual offender registration or 

request leave to amend. Thus, such a claim is not properly before us. 
5

A. Mandamus Claim

To state a mandamus claim, the petitioner must prove “a clear legal right 

to relief ... a corresponding duty in the respondent and the lack of any other adequate 

and appropriate remedy.” Smires v. O’Shell, 126 A.3d 383, 387 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). 

Mandamus cannot lie “to compel performance of a discretionary act or to govern the 

manner of performing [the] required act.” Coppolino v. Noonan, 102 A.3d 1254, 

1263 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (en banc), aff’d, 125 A.3d 1196 (Pa. 2015) (citation 

omitted). Mandamus only offers a remedy to enforce established rights. Smires.

1. Standing & Ripeness

First, we address PSP’s challenge to Beers’ standing and related 

challenge to the ripeness of his claim.

Our Supreme Court recognizes the “considerable overlap” between 

standing and ripeness, especially where the objecting party’s challenge to 

justiciability “focused on arguments that the interest asserted by the petitioner is 

speculative, not concrete, or would require the court to offer an advisory opinion.” 

Yocum v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 161 A.3d 228, 234 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). 

However, “[s]tanding and ripeness are distinct concepts insofar as ripeness also 

reflects the separate concern that relevant facts are not sufficiently developed to 

permit judicial resolution of the dispute.” Id.

“[T]he doctrine of ripeness mandates the presence of an ‘actual 

controversy’ and requires consideration of ‘whether the issues are adequately 

developed and the hardships that the parties will suffer if review is delayed.’” Bucks 
6

Cty. Servs., Inc. v. Phila. Parking Auth., 71 A.3d 379, 390 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) 

(quoting Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 8 A.3d 866, 874 (Pa. 

2010)).

To have standing, a litigant must show his interest in the litigation is 

substantial, direct and immediate. Van Doren v. Mazurkiewicz, 695 A.2d 967 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1997) (rejecting ripeness challenge under Megan’s Law I; holding inmate 

had standing to challenge registration requirements). The three elements of standing 

are well-established. As this Court explained: 

[A] ‘substantial’ interest is an interest in the outcome of the 

litigation which surpasses the common interest of all citizens in 

procuring obedience to the law. A ‘direct’ interest requires a 

showing that the matter complained of caused harm to the 

party’s interest. An ‘immediate’ interest involves the nature of 

the causal connection between the action complained of and the 

injury to the party challenging it .... 

Markham, 147 A.3d at 1282 n.9 (quoting S. Whitehall Twp. Police Serv. v. S. 

Whitehall Twp., 555 A.2d 793, 795 (Pa. 1989)).

In the instant matter, there is no dispute that Beers is currently 

incarcerated in a state correctional institution for involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse. Pet. at ¶2. This felony in the first degree is a sexual offense requiring 

registration as a sexual offender. 

PSP contends Beers is not adversely impacted by SORNA because he 

is not subject to its registration requirements while he is incarcerated. We disagree.
7

That the statute tolls registration requirements while Beers is 

incarcerated, see 42 Pa. C.S. §9799.15(c)(1)(i), does not deprive him of standing. 

A sexual offender has standing to challenge registration requirements to which he 

may be subject upon his release from prison. Padgett v. Noonan (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

412 M.D. 2017, filed July 30, 2018) (unreported) (granting inmate summary relief 

from SORNA as construed in Muniz); Van Doren; see also Gregory v. Pa. State 

Police, 160 A.3d 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (single j. op.) (overruling PSP’s 

preliminary objection challenging inmate’s standing to request relief from SORNA 

registration); accord Gregory v. Pa. State Police, 185 A.3d 1202 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) 

(granting inmate’s application for relief from SORNA) (Gregory (2018)).

Recently, in Padgett, this Court considered PSP’s challenge to an 

inmate’s standing to obtain relief from SORNA registration requirements based on 

his incarceration. Like this case, in Padgett PSP contended an inmate could not state 

a claim in mandamus to preclude SORNA’s retroactive application because SORNA 

was not yet applied to him. PSP maintained that the inmate’s claim would not ripen 

until the registration requirement was imposed, upon his release from prison. 

We rejected PSP’s ripeness argument, and we overruled PSP’s 

preliminary objection to standing on that ground. Id. In so doing, we adopted the 

reasoning Judge Cohn Jubelirer set forth in Gregory. Prior to this Court’s panel 

decision granting the inmate summary relief in Gregory (2018), this Court concluded 

incarcerated inmates have standing to challenge the retroactive application of

SORNA’s registration requirements to them under Muniz. Because SORNA’s

registration requirements would be imposed on the inmate by operation of law, this 
8

Court recognized the inmate’s substantial and direct interest in relief from SORNA 

that surpassed that of other citizens. Padgett. 

Like the inmate in Gregory, Beers has a direct and substantial interest 

in protecting himself from the retroactive application of SORNA. Our Supreme 

Court deemed the registration requirements punitive in nature, and it held that 

application of SORNA to persons whose convictions for sexual offenses predated 

SORNA’s enactment was unconstitutional. Muniz. Beers would be aggrieved by 

the unconstitutional application of SORNA to him.

Further, the harm Beers complains of is not speculative or remote. 

Padgett; Van Doren. Beers claims he has been placed on SORNA’s sexual offender 

registry, and that “was the proximate cause of [him] being harassed, threatened, and 

vilified by others ... subject[ing] him to additional scrutiny based upon the ‘scarlet 

letter’ of ‘sex offender.’” Pet. at ¶18. These are allegations of fact that, if true, may 

form the basis for a claim for relief. While PSP makes contrary factual assertions, 

at the preliminary objection stage, we are constrained to accept Beers’ averments as 

true. Markham.

Application of subsequent legislation (SORNA) that requires sexual 

offender registration upon release from prison, although not yet imposed, aggrieves 

an inmate who is subject to such registration by operation of law. See Van Doren; 

Gregory. Even if Beers’ release from prison is not imminent, this fact does not render 

the harm remote. Padgett. 
9

Further, we are unpersuaded that Beers faces no concrete injury to the 

extent he is subjected to sexual offender registration upon his release from prison. 

PSP acknowledges Beers would be required to register as a sexual offender, “if 

released today,” under Act 10. Resp’t’s Br. at Section III (B) (unpaginated). Our 

Supreme Court and this Court recognize the punitive effect that sexual offender 

registration exacts. Muniz; see Coppolino, 102 A.3d at 1272 n.26 (citing E.B. v. 

Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), as to negative consequences of Megan’s 

Law registration). 

Therefore, because Beers alleges a substantial and direct injury that will 

be imposed by operation of law, as well as an injury to his reputation by virtue of 

placement on the sexual offender registry, we overrule PSP’s challenge to his 

standing. 

2. Demurrer

Next, we consider PSP’s demurrer to Beers’ mandamus claim. 

Significantly, PSP argues mandamus relief is not cognizable because Beers has no 

current obligation to register based on his incarceration. 

We rejected PSP’s identical argument in Padgett. Muniz pertained to 

the retroactive application of SORNA and held it was unconstitutional as applied to 

those whose sexual offense convictions predated its enactment. Beers’ 2008 

convictions predate SORNA. Because the holding in Muniz was not limited to 

sexual offenders who were registered under a prior version of Megan’s Law or 

SORNA, Beers may state a claim for relief from SORNA’s application to him.
10

Moreover, here, Beers asserts he was placed on the SORNA sexual 

offender registry despite the fact that Megan’s Law III was in effect at the time of 

his conviction. He is seeking his removal if not already removed, and protection 

from any other SORNA punitive measures pursuant to Muniz. Because application 

of SORNA to Beers’ 2008 conviction is unconstitutional, he may state a claim for 

relief from SORNA’s provisions. Padgett.

B. Damages Claim 

Significantly, PSP did not file a preliminary objection to Beers’ 

damages claim. Indeed, PSP did not acknowledge that Beers sought any relief other 

than mandamus. 

Specifically, PSP’s objection for failure to state a claim avers “[Beers] 

cannot succeed on a mandamus action, when the relief he requests is not cognizable.” 

Resp’t’s Prelim. Objs. at ¶9. Although damages can be recovered in mandamus if 

the damages relate to the mandate sought, School District of Pittsburgh v. City of 

Pittsburgh, 352 A.2d 223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976), Beers did not seek damages related 

to PSP’s alleged failure to perform a mandatory duty.6

 

6

 Beers raised two theories of recovery in his damages claim: (1) PSP’s violation of his 

constitutional right to reputation, for which he cited Muniz; and, (2) PSP’s tortious infliction of 

emotional distress, for which he cited the Restatement (Third) of Torts. PSP did not address either 

theory in its preliminary objections, or its brief in support. 

To the extent his claim for damages relates to a constitutional violation, to date, this Court 

has declined to recognize a cause of action for damages for violating a constitutional right. See

Balletta v. Spadoni, 47 A.3d 183, 192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (declining to recognize damages claim 

for constitutional defamation; stating “To date, neither Pennsylvania statutory authority, nor 

appellate case law has authorized the award of monetary damages for a violation of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution.”); Jones v. City of Phila., 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (en

banc), appeal denied, 909 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 2006) (stating “neither statutory authority, nor appellate 

case law has authorized the award of monetary damages for a violation of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution”; declining to recognize cause of action for damages for alleged violations of search 
11

PSP did not assert any objection to Beers’ damages claim, which is 

separate from and set forth different legal and factual grounds than his mandamus 

claim. See Pet. at ¶14-19. Therefore, we decline to dismiss it at this juncture 

regardless of its likelihood of success. Bell v. Rockview State Corr. Facility, 620 

A.2d 645 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993); see Lutweiler v. Northchester Corp., 319 A.2d 899, 

901 n.5 (Pa. 1974) (explaining dismissal of cause of action on court’s own motion 

was inappropriate; “limiting [its] consideration of the decree appealed from to the 

preliminary objections which were raised”); see, e.g., Taylor v. Pa. State Police, 132 

A.3d 590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (addressing each preliminary objection in the nature 

of a demurrer to each legal challenge sex offender raised to SORNA); Malone v. Pa. 

State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 577 M.D. 2015, filed April 28, 2017) (unreported), 

2017 WL 1533870 (addressing PSP’s demurrer to each claim separately; recognizing 

PSP did not demur to challenge to SORNA notification provisions and requiring 

PSP to answer claims to which it did not object). 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, PSP’s preliminary objections are overruled, 

and we direct PSP to file an answer to the petition for review. 

 

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

 

and seizure clause of Pennsylvania Constitution, based in part on sufficient protection of 

equivalent right under federal constitution).

To the extent his damages claim relates to the torts involving infliction of emotional distress, 

PSP did not challenge its legal sufficiency or otherwise object to the claim. Beers alleged that “by

presenting him on the SORNA website as a public display with a ‘scarlet letter’ of ‘sex offender,’”

Pet. at ¶14, PSP committed a tortious act that subjected him to harassment. Id. at ¶¶15, 18.

If appropriate, PSP may file an application for summary relief as to these claims. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jeffrey James Beers, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 338 M.D. 2018

:

Pennsylvania State Police :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 29th day of August, 2018, Respondent Pennsylvania 

State Police’s (PSP) preliminary objections to Petitioner Jeffrey James Beers’

Petition for Review in the Nature of a Complaint in Mandamus are OVERRULED. 

Accordingly, PSP is directed to file an answer within thirty (30) days of the date of 

this order. 

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge