United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 20-2803

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Nancy Woods

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

The Circuit Attorney's Office of the City of St. Louis, et al.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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 Submitted: April 14, 2021

Filed: August 25, 2021

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Kimberly Gardner, an African American, was elected Circuit Attorney of the

City of St. Louis and took office in January 2017. Nancy Woods, a 64-year-old

Caucasian, was then employed as a paralegal in the Child Support Unit (CSU) of the

Circuit Attorney’s Office. In November of 2017, Gardner gave CSU Director John

Dockery, a 67-year-old Caucasian who had worked in the office for 43 years, the
option to retire or be fired. On the day Dockery retired, Woods yelled “they fucking

fired John” and “fuck this office” multiple times in the halls of the Circuit Attorney’s

Office.1 In January 2018, Woods began a verbal altercation with coworker Carletta

Fielder over new assignments. Fielder reported the altercation to Chief Clerk Eula

Simmons, Woods’ African American supervisor. Simmons cautioned Woods, “you

will not have another outburst again in this office.” 

 

Simmons prepared a memorandum confirming this conversation and reported

the incident to Michael Warrick, the Office’s African American Chief of Staff. 

Warrick investigated, credited Fielder’s account, and prepared a memorandum

recommending the Office “reinforce to Ms. Woods that [it] has a zero tolerance of

verbal or physical confrontations amongst or between employees.”2 Warrick orally

advised Gardner of the memorandum. Gardner told Woods she could resign or be

fired. Woods chose termination, filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, and then commenced this action against the

Circuit Attorney’s Office, Gardner, Simmons, Warrick, and Robert Steele, Gardner’s

African American First Assistant, asserting state and federal causes of action for race

and age discrimination and a civil conspiracy claim. 

The district court3 granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

dismissing all claims. Woods v. The Circuit Attorney’s Office of the City of St.

Louis, et al., No. 4:19-cv-01401, Mem. & Order (E.D. Mo. July 28, 2020). Woods

appeals the grant of summary judgment and earlier discovery orders. Reviewing the

former de novo and discovery rulings for abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

1Woods does not dispute she yelled profanities in the workplace. 

2The Office personnel manual provides, “unprofessional behavior will not be

tolerated and will be subject to discipline up to and including termination.”

3The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

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1. Woods first argues the district court erred in concluding she failed to present

direct evidence of race and age discrimination. Woods relies primarily on her

recollection of two statements. First, she argues that Steele’s statement during an allstaff meeting months before Woods’s termination -- “You people might think we’re

stupid because we’re poor and black, but we’re not” -- was direct evidence of

intentional racial discrimination. The district court concluded this stray comment by

a non-decisionmaker was not direct evidence under controlling Eighth Circuit law. 

We agree. See, e.g., St. Martin v. City of St. Paul, 680 F.3d 1027, 1033 (8th Cir.

2012) (direct evidence must show “a specific link between the alleged discriminatory

animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding . . . that an

illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action”). Second,

Woods argues that Gardner’s statement in their introductory conversation in January

2017 -- “Oh really, why are you still here?” -- was direct evidence of age

discrimination. The district court concluded this comment “was a reaction to

Woods’s statement of her tenure, not her age,” and therefore is not direct evidence of

age discrimination. Again, we agree. See Casey v. City of St. Louis, 212 F.3d 385

(8th Cir. 2000).

2. Alternatively, Woods argues the district court erred in concluding she failed

to present sufficient evidence that defendants’ legitimate non-discriminatory reasons

for termination -- shouting profanities when Dockery retired and the altercation with

Fielder were contrary to the Office’s unprofessional behavior policy, and Woods had

an “over-all negative attitude toward the new administration of the Circuit Attorney’s

Office” -- were a pretext for intentional race and age discrimination. After discussing

at length the evidence on which Woods relied in arguing she made a sufficient

indirect showing of pretext, including evidence of other employment decisions by

Gardner that allegedly demonstrated a pattern of race and age discrimination, the

district court concluded that “Woods has failed to show that Defendants’ legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for her termination were pretextual.” After careful de

novo review of the summary judgment record, we agree with the district court’s

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thorough analysis of these issues. The civil conspiracy claim fails for these same

reasons. See Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999).

3. Finally, Woods argues the district court abused its discretion in denying her

motion to compel production of the employment records of an employee who was

terminated by Gardner for similar reasons to Woods, which the Circuit Attorney’s

Office claimed were privileged, and in denying her motion to reopen the deposition

of Gardner out-of-time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(ii). Woods argues that these

evidentiary rulings deprived her of evidence showing that other employment

decisions by Gardner support Woods’s claim of intentional discrimination.4

We “will not reverse a district court’s discovery ruling absent a gross abuse of

discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness.” Gov’t of Ghana v. ProEnergy Servs.,

LLC, 677 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The district court

ordered defendants to produce specific personnel records responsive to specific

requests for the production of documents. After this production, when Woods

pressed for more, the district court directed that both sides respond to specific alleged

deficiencies in defendants’ discovery responses. On appeal, Woods’s lengthy

argument, focused on insignificant discovery issues, totally fails to make the requisite

showing -- that “the district court’s discovery ruling[s] prevented [Woods] from

adequately opposing Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.” Rowles v. Curators

of Univ. of Mo., 983 F.3d 345, 354 (8th Cir. 2020). There was no gross abuse of

discretion, most likely no abuse at all. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. Rule 47B. 

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4Woods’s further contention, that we should reverse because the district court

abused its discretion in making other discovery rulings of little significance to its

final order, is frivolous. 

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