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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 18, 2018

LINDA SUE HASSLER v. RIDLEY DAVID HASSLER

Appeal from the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County

No. 2016-PF-5294 Larry M. Warner, Judge

No. E2017-02365-COA-R3-CV

The parties negotiated, signed, and submitted to the trial court a marital dissolution 

agreement. The trial court approved and incorporated the MDA into its final judgment. 

Twenty-nine days after entry of the judgment, Ridley David Hassler (husband) filed a 

“motion to set aside” the final judgment and MDA. He told the trial court that he wanted 

to repudiate the MDA, arguing that it was ambiguous and that he and Linda Sue Hassler 

(wife) had differing interpretations of it. The trial court denied the motion, finding the 

MDA unambiguous, valid, and enforceable. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Probate and Family Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

MCCLARTY and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JJ., joined. 

Randal R. Boston, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ridley David Hassler.

Kevin R. Bryant, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Linda Sue Hassler. 

OPINION

I.

Wife filed for divorce on September 30, 2016. Following mediation and 

negotiation, the parties signed the MDA on June 26, 2017. Each party was represented 

by counsel. The MDA addresses property division. The parties have no children and 

agreed that neither would pay spousal support. They owned real estate in Crossville and 

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a condominium in Destin, Florida. The MDA provides that wife will receive the 

Crossville property and husband the Florida condominium. The provisions of the MDA 

at issue provide as follows:

REALTY: The parties herein own real property located at 42 

Adelaide Street, Crossville, Tennessee (including adjacent 

lot) and Condominium Unit No. 1414 of SunDestin 

International located in Destin, Florida.

The parties have agreed that the Wife shall receive the 

property located at 42 Adelaide Street, Crossville, Tennessee. 

The Wife shall assume and pay any and all outstanding

indebtedness due and owing on said property and shall hold 

the Husband harmless from payment of same. The Wife 

agrees to refinance said property to remove the Husband’s 

name. The Husband shall be divested of any and all right, 

title and interest in the above listed property and shall execute 

a QuitClaim Deed(s) to the Wife.

* * *

DEBTS: Other than the above referenced each party agrees to 

pay any and all debts in their own individual name holding 

the other party harmless from any indebtedness thereon.

(Underlining in original.)

The Crossville property was encumbered with a deed of trust in the amount of 

$125,000. There was also a debt in the amount of $45,000 on a line of credit solely in 

husband’s name. Husband testified that the $45,000 was spent to purchase the lot 

adjacent to the marital residence in Crossville and to renovate the marital residence. He 

thought that wife would be responsible for the $45,000 debt under the MDA’s provision 

that she “shall assume and pay any and all outstanding indebtedness due and owing on 

said property.” 

The parties submitted their signed and notarized MDA to the trial court. In the

final divorce judgment, entered on June 26, 2017, the trial court stated that the MDA “is 

fair and equitable” and “is in all respects ratified and approved by this Court and is made 

part of this [d]ecree by reference.” Thereafter, husband learned that wife did not list the 
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$45,000 debt as hers when she attempted to refinance the Crossville property as the MDA 

required. On July 25, 2017, husband filed a “motion to set aside final order of divorce 

and marital dissolution agreement.” He alleged that he “believed that the agreement he 

made included the $45,000.00 owed to First National Bank of Tennessee which was 

spent exclusively for the benefit of the adjoining lot and renovations for 42 Adelaide 

Street, Crossville, Tennessee.” Husband argued that the MDA “was obscure in its clarity 

of the intent of the parties and the inadequacy of the wording the parties in reality did not 

agree with the intent of the resolution proposed.”

After a hearing at which husband briefly testified, the trial court denied the motion 

to set aside, finding the MDA to be clear and unambiguous. Husband timely filed a 

notice of appeal. 

II.

As the Supreme Court observed in Barnes v. Barnes, 193 S.W.3d 495, 498 (Tenn. 

2006), 

Our review is de novo upon the record of the proceedings 

below with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s 

factual findings unless the evidence preponderates against 

those findings. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The trial court’s 

conclusions of law, however, are accorded no such 

presumption. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 

S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

A marital dissolution agreement is a contract and thus is 

generally subject to the rules governing construction of 

contracts. Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 896 (Tenn.

2001); Honeycutt v. Honeycutt, 152 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2003). Because “the interpretation of a contract is a 

matter of law, our review is de novo on the record with no 

presumption of correctness in the trial court’s conclusions of 

law.” Honeycutt, 152 S.W.3d at 561 (citations omitted).

III.

This Court has held on several occasions that 

Marital dissolution agreements are contractual and, once 

approved by the trial court, “become legally binding 
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obligations on the parties.” Long v. McAllister–Long, 221 

S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. Jan. 29, 2007) (explaining that with the two “notable 

exceptions” of child support and alimony, which remain 

modifiable by the courts, “the agreements in a marital 

dissolution agreement are enforceable contract obligations”).

McKay v. McKay, No. M2016-01989-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 742075, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. 

App., filed Feb. 7, 2018). In Barnes, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s refusal 

to allow a party to a signed and notarized MDA that had been presented to the trial court 

to repudiate the agreement before the trial court approved it. 193 S.W.3d at 497. The

Barnes Court held the MDA to be an enforceable agreement and found that “Husband 

has provided no valid defense to the agreement’s enforcement.” Id. at 501. The facts of 

this action are similar to Barnes, but present a stronger case for enforcement of the 

MDA, because in this case the trial court approved and incorporated it into its final 

judgment before husband attempted to repudiate it. 

Husband testified as follows:

Q. And prior to the hearing, this Marital Dissolution 

Agreement was prepared and you had the opportunity to read 

it with your lawyer, is that right?

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. And the two of you signed this document; you don’t 

dispute that?

A. No.

Q. Okay, and then we came to court and you raised your 

right hand and she raised her right hand, and we announced 

the terms. The Judge asked each of you again if you 

understood it and you both nodded that you did, is that right?

A. Yes.
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Q. And are you aware that under Debts, it talks about each of 

you are responsible for debts that ha[ve] your own individual 

names?

A. Yes.

Q. And that line of credit which we were just talking about, 

is it in your own name?

A. Yes.

Q. And it’s not secured by a mortgage or any other 

instrument to that Adelaide property, is it?

A. No.

Q. And so, when the Marital Dissolution Agreement talks 

about ‒ on Page 4 under Realty ‒ that [wife] received the 

property at 42 Adelaide and she will assume any 

indebtedness on the property and refinance, the refinance 

that we’re talking about is with your best friend; that’s the 

only mortgage on that property, isn’t it?

A: Yes, it is.

The MDA recites that “[e]ach party acknowledges that this agreement has been entered

into of his or her own volition with full knowledge and information” and “[e]ach believes 

the terms and conditions to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.” 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated as follows:

I just can’t see how it [the MDA] can be any clearer. I mean, 

there’s just no doubt about what it says. It will be a matter for 

the Court of Appeals to look at. I would construe it exactly 

the way you [wife] are presenting it. I mean, that’s the only 

way I can read it. I can’t read anything else into it. I just 

can’t.

Like the trial court, we find the MDA clear, unambiguous, and enforceable. “Because the 

parties are not entitled to a marital dissolution agreement that is different from the one 

they negotiated, we must avoid rewriting the agreement under the guise of ‘construing’
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it.” Long, 221 S.W. 3d at 9. Furthermore, “[a]n ambiguity does not arise in a contract 

merely because the parties may differ as to interpretations of certain of its provisions.” 

Cookeville Gynecology & Obstetrics, P.C. v. Southeastern Data Systems, Inc., 884 

S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). As in Barnes, husband did not establish a valid 

defense to the contract he negotiated, signed, and presented to the trial court, and which 

the court approved before his attempt at repudiation. 

IV.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are assessed to the 

appellant, Ridley David Hassler.

_______________________________

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE