IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

CHRISTOPHER WEHDE,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee.

§

§

§ No. 435, 2019

§

§ Court Below—Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 0804024505 (N)

§

§

§

Submitted: January 28, 2020

 Decided: April 7, 2020

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 

Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, the 

State’s response, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 

(1) The record reflects that, in January 2009, Wehde pled guilty to fourthdegree rape, sexual solicitation of a child, and second-degree conspiracy. These 

convictions arose from Wehde’s facilitation of sexual intercourse between his wife

and his minor son. The Superior Court declared Wehde a habitual offender under 

11 Del. C. § 4214(a) for the rape charge. The Superior Court sentenced Wehde as 

follows: (i) for fourth-degree rape, as a habitual offender under § 4214(a), 15 years 

of Level V incarceration; (ii) for sexual solicitation of a child, 15 years of Level V 
2

incarceration, suspended after 4 years for decreasing levels of supervision; and (iii) 

for second-degree conspiracy, 2 years of Level V incarceration, suspended for Level 

III probation. On appeal, this Court ultimately affirmed the Superior Court’s

judgment.

1 The Court subsequently affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Wehde’s 

motions for sentence reduction and sentence correction.2

(2) Beginning on January 1, 2017, eligible habitual offenders may petition 

the Superior Court for modification of their sentences under § 4214(f). On 

September 26, 2018, an attorney with the Public Defender’s Office filed a motion

for a certificate of eligibility for Wehde as required by Superior Court Special Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 2017-1.

3

 After the State responded and Wehde’s counsel 

filed an amended motion, the Superior Court granted the motion for a certificate of 

eligibility on February 15, 2018. 

 

1 Wehde v. State, No. 137, 2009 Order (Del. Nov. 2, 2009) (concluding that the mandate for the 

Court’s August opinion affirming Wehde’s convictions and sentence could issue after the return 

from remand for the Superior Court to address whether the State filed a motion to declare Wehde 

a habitual offender before sentencing); Wehde v. State, 983 A.2d 82, 85-86 (Del. 2009) (affirming 

Wehde’s convictions and sentence).

2 Wehde v. State, 2015 WL 5276752, at *3-4 (Del. Sept. 9, 2015) (affirming the Superior Court’s 

denial of Wehde’s motion for correction of illegal sentence); Wehde v. State, 2011 WL 181461, at 

*1 (Del. Jan. 14, 2011) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Wehde’s motion for reduction of 

sentence).

3 The General Assembly directed the Superior Court to establish rules for implementation of § 

2014(f). 11 Del. C. § 2014(f).
3

(3) On April 2, 2019, Wehde’s counsel filed a petition for sentence 

modification under § 4214(f), which the State opposed. In an order dated September 

13, 2019, the Superior Court denied the petition. This appeal followed. 

(4) On appeal, Wehde’s counsel (“Counsel”) filed a brief and a motion to 

withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, based upon a 

complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable 

issues. Counsel informed Wehde of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 

Wehde with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief. 

(5) Counsel also informed Wehde of his right to identify any points he 

wished this Court to consider on appeal. Wehde has raised points for this Court’s 

consideration. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and has moved to 

affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 

(6) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 

under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 

conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii) 

conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 

devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an 

adversary presentation.

(7) Wehde’s arguments on appeal may be summarized as follows: (i) his 

habitual offender sentence was not based on two previous violent felony convictions 
4

as suggested by the Superior Court; (ii) the Superior Court ignored his achievements 

in prison, misstated his criminal history and disciplinary violations in prison, and 

incorrectly found that he had not accepted responsibility for his crimes; and (iii) the 

Superior Court should have appointed conflict counsel to handle his § 4214(f) 

proceedings.

(8) Under § 2014(f), the Superior Court is not required to grant an eligible 

petitioner’s motion for sentence modification.4 We therefore review the Superior 

Court’s denial of a motion for sentence modification under § 4214(f) for abuse of 

discretion. “An abuse of discretion occurs when ‘a court has...exceeded the bounds 

of reason in view of the circumstances,’ [or]...so ignored recognized rules of law or 

practice...to produce injustice.”5 To the extent the claim involves a question of law, 

we will review the claim de novo.6 

(9) As Wehde notes, the Superior Court incorrectly referred to the current 

version of § 4214(b) as providing that habitual offenders who commit two Title 11 

violent felonies are subject to mandatory minimum sentence of half the maximum 

 

4

11 Del. C. § 4214(f) (“Nothing in this section, however, shall require the Court to grant such a 

petitioner a sentence modification pursuant to this section.”). See also Superior Court Special Rule 

of Procedure 2017-1(d)(9) (“The court may in its sole discretion grant or deny the petition for 

modification of sentence.”).” See also Lewis v. State, 797 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Del. 2002) (reviewing 

the Superior Court’s exercise of authority under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) for abuse of 

discretion).

5 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1994) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Adams, 

541 A.2d 567, 571 (Del. 1988)).

6

State v. Culp, 152 A.3d 141, 144 (Del. 2016).
5

sentence for the offense. In fact, current § 4214(b) provides that a habitual offender 

who has previously committed three felonies and is thereafter convicted of his first 

Tile 11 violent felony (like Wehde in 2008) is subject to a mandatory minimum 

sentence of half the maximum sentence for that offense. Notwithstanding this 

mistake, the Superior Court correctly recognized that someone sentenced under 

current § 4214(b) for fourth-degree rape would be subject to a minimum sentence of 

7.5 years and proceeded to consider whether Wehde’s 15-year sentence for fourthdegree should be reduced to 7.5 years. 

(10) Most of Wehde’s arguments on appeal relate to his dissatisfaction with 

the Superior Court’s review of his petition for sentence modification. Under § 

4214(f), the Superior Court’s review was required to include “a review of the 

applicant's prior criminal history, including arrests and convictions, a review of the 

applicant’s conduct while incarcerated, and available evidence as to the likelihood

that the applicant will reoffend if released, including a formal, recent risk 

assessment.”7 The Superior Court was also required to “articulate on the record the 

results of its review and its rationale for granting or denying a petition.”

8

(11) The Superior Court’s carefully reasoned order complied with the 

requirements of § 4214(f). The Superior Court reviewed Wehde’s prior criminal 

 

7

11 Del. C. § 4214(f).

8

Id.
6

history (the figures that Wehde challenges appear in his petition and the DELJIS 

charge summary), his conduct while incarcerated (which included his completion of 

prison programs as well as disciplinary infractions), and available evidence as to his 

likelihood to reoffend (which included his recent risk assessment). The Superior 

Court acknowledged Wehde’s arguments in support of sentence reduction, including 

his employment and completion of numerous programs while in prison, but also 

noted his significant criminal history, a 2013 disciplinary offense and his subsequent 

dishonesty concerning his history of substance abuse, and his continuing refusal to 

accept responsibility for his fourth-degree rape conviction. The record supports 

these findings. There is no indication that the Superior Court exceeded the bounds 

of reason or ignored the rules of law. We therefore find no abuse of the Superior 

Court’s discretion in denying Wehde’s petition for sentence modification. 

(12) Finally, Wehde argues that conflict counsel, not the Public Defender’s 

Office, should have been appointed to file his § 4214(f) motion. He notes that 

conflict counsel represented him in 2008 because the Public Defender’s Office

originally represented his co-defendant (his wife) on the charges arising from the

incidents with his son. After Wehde initially requested the appointment of conflict 

counsel for his § 4214 proceedings, the Superior Court denied his request because 

the Public Defender’s Office had already determined that he was eligible for 

sentence modification. We find no merit to Wehde’s claim. 
7

(13) Under Superior Court Special Rule of Criminal Procedure 2017-1(b), 

the Office of Defense Services must represent a petitioner in § 4214(f) proceedings 

unless the petitioner privately retains an attorney. Wehde has not shown that the 

Public Defender’s Office’s initial representation of his wife in 2008 precluded their 

representation of him almost 10 years later in his § 4214(f) proceedings. 

(14) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 

Wehde’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 

issue. We also are satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine 

the record and the law and has properly determined that Wehde could not raise a 

meritorious claim in this appeal. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 

Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor

Justice