[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13626

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

$219,970.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, 

Defendant,

KEVIN HARTLEY, 

Claimant-Appellant,

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13626

YOLIMA A. HARTLEY, 

Claimant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01844-LMM

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kevin Hartley, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

order granting summary judgment in favor of the government in a 

civil forfeiture action, proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 

18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), for $219,970.00 seized during a traffic stop 

(“the Defendant Currency”). On appeal, Hartley first argues that 

the district court erred in determining that he did not dispute the 

legality of the traffic stop, because his statement in his deposition 

that he did not change lanes and did not receive a citation for failure 

to maintain his lane was sufficient to dispute Trooper Jordan Ennis’s statements. Second, Hartley argues that the district court incorrectly found that several material facts were not in dispute pertaining to the facts supporting the forfeitability of the Defendant 

Currency, and therefore the government could not demonstrate 

that the Defendant Currency was linked to illegal activity. Finally, 

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Hartley challenges the district court’s holding rejecting his argument that the record evidence showed that the government’s actions with respect to the notice of forfeiture constituted bad faith 

or a disregard of his rights.

Because we write only for the parties who are already familiar with the facts, we set out only such facts as are necessary to 

understand this opinion.

I. The Traffic Stop and Inventory Search of the Car

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th 

Cir. 2001). Although pro se pleadings are held to less stringent 

standards, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are 

deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 

2008). We “may affirm for any reason supported by the record, 

even if not relied upon by the district court.” Hill v. Emp. Benefits 

Admin. Comm. of Mueller Grp. LLC, 971 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 

2020) (quotation marks omitted).

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving 

for summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions 

of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

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Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has properly 

supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to 

the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A nonmoving party 

may dispute a material fact through a declaration, which “must be 

made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent 

to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). 

Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine 

issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587. 

“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the 

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for 

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

247-48 (1986).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party at summary judgment and pro se

complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant 

does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a 

genuine dispute of material fact. Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 

670 (11th Cir. 1990).

We will not reverse where an error was harmless. See Knight 

through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 807 (11th Cir. 2017). 

A harmless error is one that does not affect a party’s substantial 

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rights, and thus is not a basis for vacating or modifying that judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Accordingly, the appellant bears the burden to show an error was not harmless. See Ermini v. Scott, 937 F.3d 

1329, 1343 (11th Cir. 2019).

“Traffic stops qualify as seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). 

“An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” Whren 

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). As a general matter, the 

decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have 

a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred, that is, 

“a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 

person stopped of breaking the law.” Heien v. North Carolina, 

574 U.S. 54, 57, 60 (2014) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [does not depend] on the 

actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren, 

517 U.S. at 813. Only legally obtained evidence may be used to 

meet the government’s burden under the civil forfeiture standard. 

One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Com. of Pa., 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965).

Under Georgia law, “[w]henever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single 

lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first 

ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” 

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1).

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The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant before 

the government can conduct a search of persons, houses, papers, 

and effects. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176‐78 (1984). The 

Fourth Amendment affords motor vehicles somewhat less protection than other property. United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 189, 

193 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979).1 For example, law enforcement may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if the vehicle is readily mobile 

and law enforcement has probable cause to search it. United States 

v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).

Another exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is “an inventory search of an arrestee’s personal property to itemize its contents pursuant to standard inventory procedures.” United States v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889, 910 (11th Cir. 2020). 

“The government carries the burden to show that the requirements of this exception were met.” Id. The subjective intent of the 

officer as to the inventory search is irrelevant, as “the mere expectation of uncovering evidence will not vitiate an otherwise valid 

inventory search.” United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th 

Cir. 1982). Georgia Department of Public Safety policy provides 

an inventory search may be conducted “[w]henever a member arrests the driver/owner of a vehicle and the arrest involuntarily separates the driver/owner from their vehicle, unless the vehicle is released to the control of a custodian designated by the driver/owner 

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), 

this Court adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth 

Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

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at the time of the arrest.” Georgia Department of Public Safety 

Policy Manual No. 17.06.4(G)(4).

An issue not raised on appeal will be deemed abandoned and 

will only be addressed in extraordinary circumstances. United 

States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872-73 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (addressing abandonment in a criminal matter), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 

95 (2022). A party fails to adequately brief a claim when he does 

not plainly and prominently raise it, for instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument to those claims. Sapuppo v. Allstate 

Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). Abandonment 

of a claim or issue can also occur when the passing references to it 

are made in the “statement of the case” or “summary of the argument” sections, or when only passing references appear in the argument section of an opening brief, particularly when the references are mere background to the appellant’s main arguments or 

when they are buried within those arguments. Id. at 681-82.

Here, the district court did not err in determining that there 

was no genuine issue of material fact as to the legality of the traffic 

stop because Hartley did not dispute the facts supporting Ennis’s 

decision to stop him, which demonstrated that Ennis had a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred when he executed 

the stop. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 57, 60.2 

2 To the extent the district court applied a higher burden by analyzing 

whether Ennis had probable cause to execute the stop, rather than the lower 

bar of reasonable suspicion, any such error is harmless because Hartley has 

not alleged or shown that his substantial rights were affected by the district 

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First, Hartley’s argument that the government failed to provide video evidence of the traffic stop to him or to the court, and 

that the government was required to submit this evidence to the 

court, is, at least as to the production aspect, contradicted by the 

government’s statement that it provided the relevant video footage 

to Hartley during discovery. The government corroborated this 

by providing the FedEx receipt of its mailing of a CD containing 

the photos and videos in its response to Hartley’s motion to strike. 

Therefore, we reject Hartley’s argument that he was not provided 

such evidence. As to the second aspect of Hartley’s argument—

that the government was required to submit this evidence to the 

court because Hartley challenged Ennis’s testimony—as discussed 

in greater detail below, Hartley’s conclusory challenges to Ennis’s 

testimony do not create a genuine dispute of material fact such that 

the government needed to put forth additional evidence to support 

Ennis’s affidavit. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587; 

Brown, 906 F.2d at 670.

Second, the traffic stop was justified by Ennis’s reasonable 

articulated suspicion that Hartley committed a traffic violation because Ennis attested that he observed Hartley commit a traffic violation, and Hartley failed to controvert Ennis’s testimony that he 

observed Hartley fail to maintain his lane. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 57, 

60. A traffic stop is reasonable where, as here, the officer had a 

court applying a higher bar to the traffic stop. See Kerr, 856 F.3d at 807; Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 61; Ermini, 937 F.3d at 1343.

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reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred. Id. Ennis’s 

statement that he observed Hartley fail to maintain his lane, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40 6-48(1), is sufficient to show that he had a 

reasonable articulable suspicion upon which to base the stop. See 

Delgado, 981 F.3d at 897; O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1). Hartley does not 

contradict this statement in his affidavit or his deposition. Though 

Hartley argues that his deposition testimony stating that he never 

changed lanes was sufficient to dispute Ennis’s attestation, this argument fails: the statute Hartley was cited under, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-

48(1), penalizes the failure to drive within a single lane as well as 

changing lanes improperly. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1). Therefore, 

Ennis’s statement that Hartley failed to maintain his lane falls 

squarely within the conduct prohibited by the statute, and Hartley’s assertion that he did not change lanes fails to dispute Ennis’s 

statement. 

Several of Hartley’s arguments, such as his argument that 

the government failed to provide video of the traffic stop or the 

relevance of Ennis’s issuance of a citation for driving on a suspended license rather than failure to maintain his lane, rest on the

incorrect assertion that the government was required to provide 

more evidence corroborating the statements in Ennis’s affidavit 

than already provided. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Delgado, 

981 F.3d at 897. Ennis’s affidavit, sworn under penalty of perjury, 

was proper evidence upon which the court could rely at summary 

judgment. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The government 

therefore sufficiently demonstrated with the evidence provided 

that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the purpose 

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and legality of the traffic stop. Because Hartley provided no evidence disputing Ennis’s statements, as his testimony at his deposition and in his affidavits did not squarely contradict Ennis’s statements, and offers only allegations in his briefs directly challenging 

Ennis’s statements, the government was not required to put forth 

any further evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48; Brown, 906 

F.2d at 670. 

Finally, Hartley’s argument that the district court erred by 

stating that Hartley’s car was the target of a BOLO fails because the 

district court did not rely on the existence of a BOLO in determining that the traffic stop was permissible. Instead, the district court 

relied on Ennis’s statement that he stopped Hartley because he observed Hartley fail to maintain his lane. As discussed above, the 

district court properly found that Ennis’s observation of a traffic 

violation was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion upon 

which to base the stop. Therefore, any such error was harmless 

because it was not material to the court’s finding, and Hartley failed 

to demonstrate that if the district court erred, such error was not 

harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; Ermini, 937 F.3d 1343. 

Hartley failed to challenge in his initial brief on appeal the 

district court’s determination that the inventory search of the vehicle was legal and thus has abandoned the issue.

II. Forfeitability of the Defendant Currency

The Controlled Substances Act provides for the civil forfeiture of money “furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance . . . , all proceeds 

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traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys used or intended to 

be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter.” 21 U.S.C. 

§ 881(a)(6). 

As a result of the enactment of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (“CAFRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 981 et seq., in 2000, the government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

property is subject to forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). We look at 

the “totality of the circumstances” when determining whether the 

government met its burden. United States v. $121,100.00 in U.S. Currency, 999 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1993). The government may 

use circumstantial evidence, hearsay, and evidence gathered after 

it filed the civil forfeiture complaint to meet its burden. United 

States v. $291,828.00 in U.S. Currency, 536 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 

2008). Additionally, the government is not required to produce evidence connecting the money to a particular narcotics transaction. 

United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004) (en 

banc). It need only show that the money was related to some illegal 

drug transaction. Id. Both the district court and ourCourt evaluate 

the evidence presented with a commonsense view to the realities 

of normal life. $291,828.00, 536 F.3d at 1237; see $242,484.00, 

389 F.3d at 1160. We have recognized that “[a] common sense reality of everyday life is that legitimate businesses do not transport 

large quantities of cash rubber-banded into bundles and stuffed in 

packages in a backpack” because “there are better, safer means of 

transporting cash if one is not trying to hide it from the authorities.” $242,484.00, 389 F.3d at 1161.

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Once the government meets its burden, the burden shifts to 

the claimant to prove by a preponderance of evidence either a defense to the forfeiture or that the property is not otherwise subject 

to forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d); United States v. Cleckler, 270 F.3d 

1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001). The claimant may satisfy its burden 

either by refuting the government’s evidence or by producing evidence that demonstrates the claimant is an innocent owner. 18 

U.S.C. § 983(c), (d); Cleckler, 270 F.3d at 1334. The non-movant 

must demonstrate that there is indeed an issue of material fact that 

precludes summary judgment. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 

929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence 

supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there 

must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find 

for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 

1990).

The government met its initial burden to show that the Defendant Currency (which was found in Hartley’s car during the traffic stop) was related to illegal drug activity by offering Officer 

Caillouet’s affidavit, Officer Ennis’s affidavit, and the surveillance 

photographs, which, taken together, showed that Hartley was affiliated with Peters during the window in which Peters was engaged in drug trafficking activities. Shortly before the officers saw 

Hartley with Peters, the investigation by law enforcement had located Peters’ tractor-trailer at a warehouse affiliated with the drug 

distribution scheme being investigated. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1); 

242,484.00, 389 F.3d at 1160. Caillouet stated that Hartley drove 

Peters around and provided the tools with which he worked on the 

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tractor-trailer used to move cocaine shortly before Peters’ arrest, 

when he was found to be in possession of 13 kilograms of cocaine

in his tractor-trailer. And Ennis stated that the Defendant Currency 

was packaged in a manner consistent with the proceeds of illegal 

activities. In that vein, this Court has noted that “[a] common 

sense reality of everyday life is that legitimate businesses do not 

transport large quantities of cash rubber-banded into bundles and 

stuffed in packages in a backpack.” See $242,484.00, 389 F.3d at 116. 

Taken together, a commonsense view of this evidence supports the 

conclusion that the Defendant Currency was related to drug trafficking activity. See $291,828.00, 536 F.3d at 1237.

Hartley also failed to meet his burden to show that the Defendant Currency was not subject to forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 

983(d); Cleckler, 270 F.3d 1331, 1334. First, as the government 

notes, Hartley did not introduce any evidence of innocent ownership of the Defendant Currency or propose any manner in which 

he acquired it. He did not attest in his affidavit to a legitimate 

source for the money. And at his deposition, he confirmed that his 

annual income during the relevant period averaged around $50,000 

from performing odd jobs but repeatedly evaded questioning as to 

where the Defendant Currency came from, what it was for, and 

why he was travelling with such a large amount of cash. In sum, 

despite ample opportunity, Hartley did not offer evidence of, or 

even truly allege, innocent ownership.

Nor did he offer even a scintilla of evidence, beyond his own 

unsupported assertions in his briefs, to refute the government’s 

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demonstration that the Defendant Currency was linked to illegal 

activity. See Walker, 911 F.2d at 1577. In his deposition, he stated 

only that the money “was nothing illegal.” While Hartley did challenge the validity of the narcotics detection dog alert below, the 

district court explicitly found that even without considering the 

alert, the government presented sufficient evidence of the Defendant Currency’s link to illegal activity. So too, here, Hartley failed 

to refute the other evidence put forth by the government. 

Though Hartley attempts to refute the government’s evidence by questioning various facts, such as the date and location of 

Peters’ arrest, they are ultimately immaterial to the government’s 

case, and therefore fail to refute the forfeitability of the Defendant 

Currency. See Clark, 929 F.2d at 608. He does correctly state that 

law enforcement did not observe him handling drugs, but as the 

government did not allege that Hartley personally handled drugs 

during the surveillance window, this statement does not refute the 

government’s evidence supporting forfeiture. See Clark, 929 F.2d 

at 608; Walker, 911 F.2d at 1577. Hartley argues that, if the government reasonably believed the Defendant Currency was related to 

illegal activity, it would have used the Defendant Currency as probable cause to search Peters’ trailer. However, that argument does 

not undermine the government’s evidence because Hartley offers 

no evidence of the actual grounds upon which law enforcement 

searched Peters’ trailer. In sum, Hartley’s several arguments and 

his vague statement in his deposition that the Defendant Currency 

was not obtained illegally are insufficient to defeat the government’s demonstration that no genuine issue of material fact exists 

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as to the forfeitability of the Defendant Currency. See Clark, 929 

F.2d at 608. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding 

that the government showed by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the Defendant Currency was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance, or proceeds derived 

from such an exchange, and therefore subject to forfeiture. See 21 

U.S.C. § 881(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). 

III. Notice of Forfeiture

After seizing property for administrative forfeiture, the government is required to provide notice by publication and to send 

written notice to all interested parties. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a); 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1607(a). The publication requirement may be satisfied by publishing once each week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper 

of general circulation in the judicial district where the property was 

seized. 28 C.F.R. § 8.9(a)(1)(i). The personal written notice must 

explain the date on which the notice was sent and the deadline for 

filing a claim; the property seized and the date, statutory basis, and 

place of the seizure; and the identity of the seizing agency and 

where a claim may be filed. Id. § 8.9(b). The agency’s notice also 

must meet the constitutional requirement of due process. Mesa 

Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1196 (11th Cir. 2005). To 

be constitutional, notice need only be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

objections.” Id. at 1196-97 (quotation marks omitted). The government need not prove that it provided actual notice; it need only 

show an attempt to provide actual notice. Id. at 1197. 

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Upon motion by the government, a court may extend the 

period for sending notice for up to 60 days, which may be further 

extended by the court for 60-day periods, as necessary, if the court 

determines, based on a written certification of a supervisory official 

in the headquarters office of the seizing agency, that there is reason 

to believe that notice may have an adverse result, including: endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; flight from prosecution; destruction of or tampering with evidence; intimidation of 

potential witnesses; or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(C), (D).

Once notified, one may choose to allow the forfeiture to 

proceed administratively by doing nothing or compel the government to initiate a judicial forfeiture action by filing a claim for the 

property. See id. § 983(a)(2)(A), (3)(A). A claim must be made 

within 35 days of the mailing of notice or, if the letter is not received, within 30 days after the date of final publication of notice 

of seizure. Id. § 983(a)(2)(B). After that deadline, there is a limited 

mechanism for appealing a forfeiture:

Any person entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture 

statute who does not receive such notice may file a 

motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture with respect to that person’s interest in the property, which 

motion shall be granted if—

(A) the Government knew, or reasonably should 

have known, of the moving party’s interest and failed 

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to take reasonable steps to provide such party with 

notice; and

(B) the moving party did not know or have reason to 

know of the seizure within sufficient time to file a 

timely claim.

Id. § 983(e)(1). A motion under § 983(e) is the exclusive remedy for 

seeking to set aside a forfeiture declaration under a civil forfeiture 

statute. Id. § 983(e)(5); see also Mesa Valderrama, 417 F.3d at 1195.

As a protection against bad faith and misconduct, we have

discretion to exercise equitable jurisdiction if the claimant’s “failure 

to properly seek legal relief resulted from errors of procedure and 

form or the government’s own misconduct.” In re $67,470.00, 

901 F.2d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1990). However, our “decision to 

invoke equitable jurisdiction is highly discretionary and must be 

exercised with caution and restraint.” Id. at 1544. “Such jurisdiction, therefore, is only appropriate in exceptional cases where equity demands intervention.” Id.

Here, the district court did not err in determining that there 

was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the government 

complied with the notice requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(C) 

and (D) because the government properly sought and received extensions of the notice period, and Hartley failed to put forth evidence to show that those extensions were fraudulent or otherwise 

irregular. The district court also did not err in concluding that there 

was no evidence the government acted with unclean hands, as the 

extensions were not shown to be fraudulent or irregular. 

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Moreover, the district court also noted that Hartley did receive actual notice and was able to pursue his claim, so Hartley was not 

deprived of a remedy at law.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 

is

AFFIRMED.

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