In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-2737 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY MORGAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 18 CR 158 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 30, 2020 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2021 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and WOOD and BRENNAN, Circuit 

Judges. 

WOOD, Circuit Judge. Anthony Morgan pleaded guilty to 

conspiring to receive seven firearms from out of state without 

the necessary licenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The district court imposed a 48-month sentence and various conditions of supervised release. Morgan raises several challenges 

to his sentence, but we find merit in only one. He contends 
2 No. 19-2737 

that the district court failed to justify supervised-release condition 23 with reference to the sentencing criteria in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553, and that it did not explain why this condition had to 

be added to the rest of the discretionary conditions. We agree 

with him and thus order a remand limited to this point. 

I

Over a period of two years, Morgan transferred funds (using the services of a Walmart in Illinois) to an acquaintance 

living in New Mexico. The recipient, who remains unnamed, 

used those funds to buy guns in New Mexico and mail them 

to Morgan’s residence in Chicago. Seven firearms made their 

way northeast in that manner. It is unclear who was on the 

receiving end of the shipments. While Morgan admits that the 

firearms were sent to his home, and that several of his housemates (as he puts it, “friends [and] brothers”) had direct access to the residence and thus the parcels, Morgan could not 

recall in whose hands the guns came to rest. Law-enforcement 

officers eventually recovered six of the guns. Several were 

linked to gang-related homicides, including one of a child. 

In 2018, the United States charged Morgan with violating 

18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (unlicensed receipt of a firearm). He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, which specified that he had unlawfully received 

firearms purchased outside the State of Illinois while not being a licensed importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector. 

The plea agreement provided that the substantive receipt

charge would be dropped.

In anticipation of Morgan’s sentencing, the U.S. Probation 

Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). 

The PSR assigned Morgan an offense level of 17, a criminal 
No. 19-2737 3

history category of I, and an anticipated sentencing guidelines range between 24 to 30 months’ incarceration. The offense level of 17 factored in Morgan’s acceptance of responsibility, which brought his offense level from 20 down to 17. 

Morgan’s counsel did not object to these calculations. 

At the start of the sentencing hearing on August 27, 2019, 

the district court accepted the PSR and its findings. Stressing 

the gun violence that had followed in the wake of Morgan’s 

scheme, the government pushed for the statutory maximum

of 60 months. Morgan asked for a sentence of 24 months, the 

low end of his guidelines range. 

Before the judge imposed the sentence, the following exchange took place: 

Morgan: First, I just want to apologize to the Court and my 

mother and family. And I’m just sorry for what I have 

done. And I take full responsibility for my actions. And I 

know—I know now that—I knew that it wasn’t right, and 

again, I’m just sorry. 

Court: When you say you knew it wasn’t right, what do 

you mean?

Morgan: That I knew that I wasn’t a licensed gun collector 

or anything, and that me receiving guns and making them 

accessible or knowing they was accessible was wrong. 

Court: Accessible to whom?

Morgan: Anybody that was in and out of that house.

Court: Well, who was in and out of the house?

Morgan: Friends, brothers. That’s it.

Court: Have you completed the sentence?
4 No. 19-2737 

Morgan: Yes.

Court: Friends and brothers?

Morgan: And myself. I was in and out of the house. 

... 

Court: All right. The defendant has been given credit for 

responsibility—acceptance of responsibility. But this statement ignores totally the government’s argument and position 

that when the defendant distributed the guns that he knew 

that they would be used for unlawful purposes by gang members, not just friends and family. And so this is a total failure 

to accept the reality of the situation.... 

The court then stated that Morgan’s omission of any description of the gang involvement with the guns he had procured amounted to a total failure to come to grips with the 

collateral consequences of his actions. This, the court said, “is 

a factor” that it would take “into account in pronouncing the 

sentence.” Before the court pronounced sentence, however, 

Morgan’s counsel asked that Morgan have a chance to follow 

up on his allocution. The court agreed to hear him. Morgan 

then stated: “When I said family and friends, [I meant] the 

gang bangers that was mentioned in the government report. I 

didn’t want to avoid what I was—my actions or what I was 

admitting to. I’m sorry for that.” Morgan did not specify the 

names of the recipients or what he expected the recipients to 

do with the guns, beyond anticipating that they would be 

used for “illegal things.”

Ultimately the court sentenced Morgan to 48 months’ incarceration, commenting that this “case cries out for a sentence that is fair but heavy enough” for general deterrence. In 

rejecting the government’s request for an above-guideline 
No. 19-2737 5

sentence of 60 months, the court explained that “there are indeed many 3553 factors that the Court has to consider, and I 

have indeed done so, including various letters submitted by 

the defense counsel.” 

The court also imposed several discretionary conditions of 

release. One of these conditions, condition 16, authorized the 

probation office to visit Morgan at home, work, school, or 

other locations and confiscate any contraband in plain view. 

Another condition, condition 23, authorized the probation office to search Morgan’s “person, property, house, residence, 

vehicle, papers, [computers], or office,” if the search was supported by reasonable suspicion.

Morgan raises three issues on appeal: (1) that the 48-

month prison sentence was substantively unreasonable and 

procedurally defective: (2) that the district court committed 

clear error by refusing to credit his acceptance of responsibility; and (3) that the court abused its discretion by imposing 

discretionary condition 23. We address them in that order.

II

A 

1 

Federal criminal sentences must be both procedurally 

sound and substantively reasonable. We evaluate procedural 

challenges to sentences de novo. United States v. Pennington, 

908 F.3d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 2018). The process for sentencing

must begin with “correctly calculating the applicable Guideline range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); RosalesMireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904 (2018). Sentencing 

courts must also explain themselves, and a deficient explanation may give rise to procedural error. United States v. Lyons, 
6 No. 19-2737 

733 F.3d 777, 784–86 (7th Cir. 2013). A judge’s explanation of 

her sentencing decision is particularly important in cases 

where the final sentence significantly exceeds the guideline 

range. United States v. Lockwood, 789 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2015). 

When evaluating the procedural soundness of a sentence, 

we do not explore its reasonableness; that inquiry is reserved 

for a substantive challenge. United States v. Castro–Juarez, 425 

F.3d 430, 433 (7th Cir. 2005). For procedural purposes, 

“[w]hile more detail is always better than less in sentencing 

findings,” the burden on the sentencing judge is not particularly onerous. United States v. Burke, 148 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 

1998). Accordingly, we have permitted courts to discharge 

their obligations by expressly adopting the factual findings 

and the guideline recommendations in the PSR. United States

v. Taylor, 135 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 1998); see also United States

v. Pippen, 115 F.3d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. 

McKinney, 98 F.3d 974, 981–82 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Substantive reasonableness is a different matter. We review the district judge’s choice of a sentence deferentially, under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Wallace, 

531 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 2008). When evaluating the sentence, we recognize “that substantive reasonableness occupies a range, not a point, and that the sentencing judge is in 

the best position to apply the § 3553(a) factors to the individual defendant.” United States v. Warner, 792 F.3d 847, 856 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). On appeal, we presume that “a within-guidelines sentence is reasonable.” Id. at 

856 (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007)). 

That does not mean, however, that a sentence that falls 

above the guideline range is unreasonable, either presumptively or absolutely. United States v. Henshaw, 880 F.3d 393, 396 
No. 19-2737 7

(7th Cir. 2018). For such sentences, we “must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variance.” Gall, 

552 U.S. at 50. Greater deviations require more thorough justifications. Id. Nonetheless, we do not need to find “extraordinary circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range,” and the Supreme Court has rejected “the use of 

a rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the 

justifications required for a specific sentence.” Id. at 47. “As 

long as the sentencing judge gives adequate justification,” the 

judge “may impose a sentence above the guidelines range if 

he believes the range is too lenient.” United States v. Hayden, 

775 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 2014). 

2 

In light of these principles, we conclude that Morgan’s 

48-month prison sentence was neither procedurally unsound 

nor substantively unreasonable. At the start of the sentencing 

proceedings, the court expressly adopted the PSR and its findings for purposes of sentencing. As we mentioned, it assigned 

a guideline range of 24 to 30 months to Morgan. The court

alluded to this fact when it imposed the sentence:

It is the judgment of the Court that you serve 48 

months in the Bureau of Prisons. The recommendation 

of the probation officer is a good one, 30 months. The 

government is recommending the maximum sentence 

in this case. Defense counsel has said within the guideline range would be appropriate but at the lower end 

of 24. 
8 No. 19-2737 

The court also discussed the section 3553 factors thoroughly. 

It emphasized sections 3553(a)(2)(1) and (2), which call on the 

court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense 

and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the 

need for the sentence imposed ... to reflect the seriousness of 

the offense ... and to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 

conduct.” It highlighted the context of Morgan’s crimes, noting that Morgan knowingly affiliated himself with gang members and introduced seven guns into their hands while knowing that the gang was involved in conflicts with rivals. The 

court further explained that it wanted to promote general deterrence through its 48-month sentence. We see no procedural 

error in its approach. 

Nothing in this record would support a finding that the 

48-month sentence was substantively unreasonable, either. 

The court reasoned that “anyone in the public should be 

aware ... [i]f you distribute as many as seven guns, knowing 

that they will be picked up and used by gang members for 

unlawful consequences ... you are going to the Bureau of Prisons for a fair but appropriate sentence.” If Morgan’s sentence 

was too light, the court added, it would “deprecate[] the seriousness of what has happened.” We are satisfied that the 

court did not abuse its discretion in reaching its decision. 

B 

Morgan next argues that the district court committed clear 

error by failing to credit his acceptance of responsibility.

United States v. Schuler, 34 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 1994) (articulating the clear “error” standard of review on this issue). But 

this argument proceeds from an inaccurate premise. In fact, 

the court did give Morgan credit (to the tune of three offense 

levels) for acceptance of responsibility. It reflected that 
No. 19-2737 9

decision both through its adoption of the guidelines calculations in the PSR and in its remarks at sentencing. When it 

nonetheless expressed concern that Morgan’s allocution appeared to be inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility, it 

was doing no more than considering whether the section 3553 

factors called for a sentence that deviated from the guidelines 

range, as was its right. 

Criminal sentencing has not been rigidly governed by the 

Sentencing Guidelines for more than 15 years, when the Supreme Court handed down United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 

220 (2005). Instead, guided by 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and relevant 

statutory maxima and minima, the judge is free to select a sentence within, below, or above the guidelines. That is all that 

this sentencing judge did. 

C 

Last, Morgan argues that the court abused its discretion by 

imposing discretionary supervised release condition 23. Here, 

he has a point, and he preserved it by objecting at the correct 

time in the district court. Although a sentencing judge has 

“wide discretion in determining the conditions of supervised 

release,” United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 193 (7th Cir.

2014), this discretion is not without limits. “All discretionary 

conditions ... require findings,” United States v. Kappes, 782 

F.3d 828, 846 (emphasis in original), and a judge considering

a condition of supervised release must “make an independent

judgment ... of the appropriateness of the recommended conditions” by referring to the defendant’s conduct and character

rather than on the basis of generalizations about the defendant’s crime and criminal history. United States v. Siegel, 753 

F.3d 705, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original). A condition of release must be (1) “reasonably related to the factors 
10 No. 19-2737 

identified in § 3553(a),” (2) “involve no greater deprivation of 

liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth 

in § 3553(a),” and (3) be “consistent with the policy statements 

issued by the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Evans, 

727 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Reversal is not warranted every time a judge fails adequately to justify a discretionary condition of supervised release; any such error must make a difference—that is, it must 

not be harmless. Siegel, 753 F.3d at 713. In cases where multiple conditions of supervised release are imposed, we have 

held that a condition that duplicates the liberty constraints of 

another may be removed without remanding the case, because the error is harmless. See United States v. Chatman, 805 

F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 2015). On the other hand, some type of 

remand is necessary in other circumstances. So, for example, 

when we find non-harmless “error in the supervised release 

portion of the sentence, but no error in the custodial portion,” 

we have remanded “for resentencing of the supervised release issue only.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 866. In other circumstances, we have remanded “for an entire resentencing because reconsideration of those [vacated] conditions may conceivably induce [the judge] to alter the prison sentence that he 

imposed.” Id. (cleaned up).

The judge in Morgan’s case imposed two conditions of supervised release (both discretionary) that are relevant to this 

appeal. We reproduce them in full: 

(16) [x] you shall permit a probation officer to visit you 

[x] at any reasonable time or [x] as specified:

[x] at home [x] at work [x] at school [x] at a 

community service location [x] other reasonable location specified by a probation officer [x] you 
No. 19-2737 11

shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed 

in plain view of the probation officer. 

... 

(23) You shall submit your person, property, house,

residence, vehicle, papers, [computers (as defined in 18 

U.S.C. 1030(e)(1)), other electronic communications or

data storage devices or media,] or office, to a search

conducted by a United States Probation Officer(s). Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation ofrelease. You shall warn any other occupants that

the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to

this condition. An officer(s) may conduct a search pursuant to this condition only when reasonable suspicion

exists that you have violated a condition of your supervision and that the areas to be searched contain evidence of this violation. Any search must be conducted

at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.

Judges generally impose condition 23 on sex offenders 

who are required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C). That 

does not describe Morgan. The judge reasoned, however, that 

“having a probation officer from time to time, where appropriate, and using reasonable discretion, decides [sic] to make 

a visit to where the defendant resides or to inspect a house or 

residence or vehicle for guns ... would be appropriate in this 

case ... [g]iven the nature of the offense ... especially where

... some of those weapons have been used for these unfortunate collateral consequences.” 

At a high level of generality, the judge may have been 

making a valid point, but nothing in that remark explains why 
12 No. 19-2737 

both condition 16 and condition 23 were necessary. Under condition 16, a probation officer already is permitted to visit Morgan’s home or other reasonable location and conduct a superficial inspection, even without reasonable suspicion. Although Morgan did obtain “weapons” that were used in “unfortunate collateral consequences,” there is no indication that 

Morgan used computers or that a search warrant was ever executed on his home. Instead, the judge’s reason for imposing 

condition 23 seems to be just the fact that Morgan committed 

the crime—something, in other words, that would apply to 

every defendant. That will not do. Moreover, even on the assumption that there are some cases in which both condition 

16 and condition 23 are warranted, the judge offered no reason to think that this is one of those cases. 

In our view, the appropriate remedy for that omission is 

to vacate condition 23 and remand exclusively on that point 

to the district court, so that it can reconsider whether both 

condition 16 and 23 are necessary and to explain why (or why 

not). It is not apparent why a condition that is historically tied 

to computer-mediated offenses is appropriate for someone 

who illegally procured guns for a street gang. Yet condition 

23 does appear to cover more ground than condition 16 and 

thus it imposes a greater restriction on the defendant’s liberty. 

We are not persuaded that the imposition of condition 23 was 

harmless error. 

III

We AFFIRM the sentence in all respects with the exception 

of discretionary condition of supervised release 23, which we 

VACATE and REMAND for reconsideration consistent with this 

opinion.