alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT EUGENIO C OLON,

Pla i ntiff - Appe lla

nt, v. C AR OLYN W . C OLVIN, Ac ting C om m issione r of Soc i a l Se c urity , De fe nda n t - Appe lle e . No. 13-35875 D.C . No. 3:12-c v-05640-JLR M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the W e ste rn Distric t of W a shington Jam e s L. R oba

rt, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d Oc tobe r 15, 2015 Se attle , W a s hington B e fore : KOZINSKI, W . FLETC HER and FISHER , C i rc uit Judge s. Euge nio C olon a

ppe a ls the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt a ffirm ing the a dm inistra

tive la w judge ’ s (ALJ) de nia l of his a pplic ation for disa

bility insura nc e be ne fits a nd supple m e nta l se c urity

inc om e unde r Title s II and XVI of the Soc ia l Se c urity Ac t. W e a ffirm . 

# FIL ED N OV 13 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* T his disposition is not a ppropria te for public ation a

n d is not pre c e d e nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.1. The ALJ provide d “ spe c ific , c le ar and c onvinc ing re a sons” supporte d by

substa ntia l e vide nc e for c onc luding C olon wa s not c re dible . Se e Molina v . Astrue , 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th C ir. 2012). TheALJ ga ve se ve n inde pe nde nt rationa le s for he r finding, a ll but oneof whic h a re va lid. The six va lid ra

tiona le s c onstitute d spe c ific , c le ar and c onvinc ing re a sons to disc ount C o lon’ s c re dibility . Se e C armic k lev . C omm’r, Soc . Se c . Admin. , 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th C ir. 2008). 2. The ALJ did not im

p rope rly re je c t the opinions of five e xam ining sourc e s and one non-e xam ining sourc e . The ALJ provide d “ s pe c ific and le gitim ate re a sons that are supporte d by

substa ntia l e vide nc e in the re c ord” for disc ounting the c ontra dic te d m e dic a l opinions of e a c h e xam ining sourc e . S e e Leste r v . C

hate r , 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th C ir. 1996). Theopinion of the non-e xam ining sourc e wa s am biguous, a

nd the ALJ prope rly

re solve d the am

biguity by c iting “ suc h re le va

nt e vide nc e a s a re a sona

ble m ind m ight a c c e pt a s a de quate to support a c onc lusion.” Se e Burc h v . Barnhart , 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th C ir. 2005) (quoting M agallane s v . Bow e n , 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th C i r. 1989)). The ALJ a lso c onside re d C o lon’ s GAF sc ore s a

nd, c onsiste n t with 20 C .F.R . §§ 404.1527(c ), 416.927(c ) and SSR 06-03p, disc ounte d the m

be c a use the y provide d littleinform ation on oc c upationa l func tioning.

23. The ALJ did not err by fa iling to c onside r in he r re sidua l func tiona l c a pa c ity a sse ssm e nt m e dic a l e vide nc e she de te rm ine d to be nonc re dible be c a

use she “ wa s not re quire d to inc orporate e vide nc e from . . . opinions . . . whic

h we re pe rm issibly

disc o unte d.” Batson v . C omm’r of Soc
. Se c . Admin. , 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th C ir. 2004). AFFIRM E D.

3
#### CORCEL CORPORATION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, INC., A Virginia Corporation, Line-Tec, Inc., A Florida Corporation, AKA Services, Inc., A Florida Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15315 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed (January 30, 2017)

Ricardo Corona, Nina Tarafa, Corona Law Firm, PA, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Christopher N. Bellows, Holland & Knight, LLP, Miami, FL, Alison K. Brown, Eleni Sevasti Kastrenakes, William Newton Shepherd, Seth Jason Weiner, Matthew Z. Zimmerman, Holland & Knight, LLP, West Palm Beach, FL, for Defendant-Appellee Ferguson Enterprises, Inc.

Leonard Feuer, Leonard Feuer, PA, West Palm Beach, FL, for Defendant-Ap-pellee Line-Tec, Inc.

Chase A. Berger, Laura Elizabeth Burgess, Berger Firm, PA, Hollywood, FL, for Defendant-Appellee AKA Services, Inc.

Before TJOFLAT, HULL and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

*973PER CURIAM:

After review and careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm the district court’s order granting Defendants-Appellees’ motions for summary judgment, which concluded that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiff-Appellant’s civil Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act claims, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. The parties are already familiar with the facts and procedural history, and we •affirm for the reasons outlined in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned order dated March 8, 2016.

AFFIRMED.
Dismissed and Opinion Filed May 21, 2019.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-18-01198-CV

JOSE R. TORRES, Appellant

V.

SONIA L. MCGINNIS AND ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees

On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-01286

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Myers, Molberg, and Carlyle

Opinion by Justice Carlyle

Appellant’s brief in this case is overdue. By postcard dated April 24, 2019, we notified 

appellant the time for filing his brief had expired. We directed appellant to file a brief and an 

extension motion within ten days. We cautioned appellant that failure to file a brief and an 

extension motion would result in the dismissal of this appeal without further notice. To date, 

appellant has not filed his brief or otherwise corresponded with the Court regarding the status of 

this appeal.

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1); 42.3(b), (c).

181198F.P05

/Cory L. Carlyle/

CORY L. CARLYLE

JUSTICE
–2–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

JOSE R. TORRES, Appellant

No. 05-18-01198-CV V.

SONIA L. MCGINNIS AND ALLSTATE 

FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE 

COMPANY, Appellees

On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-01286.

Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle, 

Justices Myers and Molberg participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED.

It is ORDERED that appellees SONIA L. MCGINNIS AND ALLSTATE FIRE AND 

CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY recover their costs, if any, of this appeal from appellant 

JOSE R. TORRES.

Judgment entered this 21st day of May, 2019.
Order entered August 8, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00880-CR

JONATHAN MATTHEW LEATHERWOOD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F15-34596-M

ORDER

On July 26, 2016, the Court received appellant’s pro se notice of appeal and affidavit of 

indigency. We ORDER the trial court to appoint counsel to represent appellant on this appeal. 

We further ORDER the trial court to send this Court the order appointing new counsel within 

FIFTEEN DAYS of the date of this order.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to the Honorable Ernest White, 

Presiding Judge, 194th Judicial District Court; and the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eduardo BUENO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6383

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

*159Eduardo Bueno, Appellant Pro Se. Alan 'Mark Salsbury, Assistant United States Attorney, Elizabeth Marie Yusi, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Eduardo Bueno seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Bueno has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny the motion: for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
CITY OF GAINESVILLE and Underwriters Safety & Claims Inc., Appellants, v. Nicole S. MARSHALL, Appellee.

No. 1D17-3581

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 13, 2018

Tracey J. Hyde of McConnaughhay, Coonrod, Pope, Weaver & Stern, P.A., Panama City; and Laura A. Buck of McConnaughhay, Coonrod, Pope, Weaver & Stern, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellants.

Matthew Carrillo of Carrillo & Carrillo, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf and Wetherell, JJ., and Forst, Alan O., Associate Judge, concur.
I
. I Implications of Proposed PM Coarse Standard onNYC PM
- 10 Nonattainment December2005 Overview EPA has recentlyproposed to revoke the annual PM 10 standard upon promulgation ofa new coarse standard
. This document discusses the possible implications on NYC PM
- 10 nonattainment, including whether Region 2 should take further action on approving New York's PM-10 SIP (and possibly a NY request to redesignate the area to attainment). 

### Backeround
• On December 21, 2005, EPAproposed a new coarse standard and revised fine particle standard. EPA proposed to revoke the annual PM 10 standard upon promulgation ofthe coarse standard in September 2006. NYC nonattainment is based on violation ofthe annual standard.
• The NY SIP submitted in 1995 was never approved since it was deemed incomplete by Region 2. The 1995 SIP included: 1990 Baseline Emission Inventory 

## * Projected Emission Inventory (1997,2000) 

## * Control Measures (Federal Diesel Control Measures, NSR program (6 NYCRR Part 231), New York Cityban on apartment house incinerators ( 15 RCNY'3-01) Attainment Modeling Demonstration 

## * Note: Part 5 model used; off

-road emissions not.addressed

• New York no longer operates the PM 10 traffic-oriented FRM monitor at Madison Avenue (design value site). The monitorhas undergone modifications and doesn't meet FRM siting criteria. For all practical purposes, the monitor at Madison Avenue is considered a Special Purpose Monitor (SPM). The only other nearby PM 10 FRM monitor is located at Canal Street.
• In a September 12,2002 letter to NYSDEC Director Warland, EPA concluded that NYC is maintaining PM-10NAAQS and is not required to bereclassified to serious nonattainment. However the clean data determination cannot be used to redesignate to attainment at this time. The 3 most recent years ofvalid PM-10 data from Madison Ave was 1996, 1997, 1998, with an annual arithmetic mean of 49.7 g/m3• Air quality data from 1999

-2001 was not considered reliable due to local construction, etc. (i.e
. could not be used for NAAQS determination). We also acknowledged that the Madison Ave monitor cannot be brought into compliance with siting criteria.
t,"( 

cc: Hon. Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

Alejandro Rodriguez 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

2
Jacob JONES Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-2915

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 2, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 4, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit



Ex. 10.6



Grant Date: March 1, 2016


APPENDIX A


January 1, 2016 - June 4, 2018, Performance Criteria*


	
						
	Objectives
	Weighting
(Percent)
	Threshold
(50%)
	Target
(100%)
	Stretch
(150%)
	Superior
(200%)

	Total Shareholder Return (TSR) versus EEI Index1
(Interpolation applicable)
	100%
	30th 
Percentile
	50th
Percentile
	70th Percentile
	90th Percentile






*Time-based vesting applies for the remainder of the Award Period (i.e., Grantee must remain employed by the Company through the date Performance Shares are paid in order to receive any Performance Shares earned based on the TSR percentile rank achieved between January 1, 2016, and June 4, 2018 (the “Measurement Period”)).






















































1 TSR is compared to an industry peer group of the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) index of electric companies during the applicable measurement period (i.e., the Great Plains Energy Measurement Period or the Evergy Measurement Period).  At the end of and with respect to each measurement period, the Committee will assess total shareholder return compared to the EEI index for the applicable measurement period. Depending on Great Plains Energy’s or Evergy’s percentile rank, as applicable, the Grantee will receive a percentage of the Performance Share Award.  Interpolation will be used to determine payouts if percentile rank of relative total shareholder return falls between the percentile ranks shown.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-2234

ZEBEDEE MILBY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTRAR,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, District Judge. (3:17-cv-00590-MHL)

Submitted: February 15, 2018 Decided: February 16, 2018

Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Zebedee Milby, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Zebedee Milby seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his complaint 

without prejudice. Before addressing the merits of Milby’s appeal, we first must be 

assured that we have jurisdiction. Porter v. Zook, 803 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2015). We 

may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain 

interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen 

v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). The district court 

determined that Milby failed to allege any facts upon which the court could conclude that 

Milby had standing to raise his claim. Because Milby might be able to cure this defect by 

filing an amendment to the complaint, we conclude that the order Milby seeks to appeal 

is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order. See Goode v. Cent. Va. 

Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2015); Domino Sugar Corp. v. 

Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, 

we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court 

with instructions to allow Milby to amend his complaint. Goode, 807 F.3d at 630. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED AND REMANDED
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-427-CV

AJRO REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS, LLC APPELLANT

V.

TOWN OF LITTLE ELM APPELLEE

----------

FROM PROBATE COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

----------

We have considered appellant’s “Unopposed Motion To Dismiss.” It is

the court’s opinion that the motion should be granted; therefore, we dismiss the

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f).

Costs of the appeal shall be paid by appellant, for which let execution

issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.4.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and GARDNER, JJ.

DELIVERED: August 13, 2009
EXHIBIT
32.2
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In connection with the Annual Report of
Salon Media Group, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended March
31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the “Report”), I, Norman Blashka, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
 
 (2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Norman
Blashka


June
      26, 2009
            Norman
      Blashka


Chief Financial Officer
Ernest KING, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-1575

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed November 15, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 26 (Tuesday, February 8, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7230-7231]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-02605]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11645]


Notice of Determinations; Culturally Significant Object Being 
Imported for Conservation and Exhibition--Determinations: ``Juan de 
Pareja'' Exhibition

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: I 
hereby determine that one object being imported from abroad pursuant to 
an agreement with its foreign owner or custodian for temporary 
conservation and display in the exhibition ``Juan de Pareja'' at The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, New York, and at possible 
additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is of cultural 
significance, and, further, that its temporary conservation and 
exhibition or display within the United States as aforementioned are in 
the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these 
determinations be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chi D. Tran, Program Administrator, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-
632-6471; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#9ceff9ffe8f5f3f2aea8a9a5dcefe8fde8f9b2fbf3ea"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="fa899f998e939594c8cecfc3ba898e9b8e9fd49d958c">[email protected]</span></a>). The mailing address is U.S. 
Department of State, L/PD, 2200 C Street NW (SA-5), Suite 5H03, 
Washington, DC 20522-0505.

[[Page 7231]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The foregoing determinations were made 
pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), E.O. 12047 of March 27, 1978, the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681, 
et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of Authority No. 234 
of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236-3 of August 28, 
2000, and Delegation of Authority No. 523 of December 22, 2021.

Stacy E. White,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Professional and Cultural Exchanges, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2022-02605 Filed 2-7-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
Andre L. WHITE, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-1684

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

SEPTEMBER 19, 2017

Following review of the petition for habeas corpus relief, and the response and reply thereto, it is ordered that said petition is hereby dismissed as unauthorized.

ROTHENBERG, C.J., and LAGOA and SCALES, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Chester Davidson, Appellant, v Brion D. Travis, as Chair of New York State Division of Parole, Respondent.

[770 NYS2d 911]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Feldstein, J.), entered May 29, 2003 in Franklin County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner’s request for parole release.

Since the December 2001 determination giving rise to this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner has reappeared before the Board of Parole and his request for parole release has again been denied. Consequently, this matter is now rendered moot and the appeal must be dismissed *(see Matter of Le Grand v Travis,*309 AD2d 1091 [2003]).

Spain, J.P., Mugglin, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.
EXHIBIT 99.1



STATEMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF

CRESCENT BANKING COMPANY

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

§ 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Crescent Banking Company (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A
for the period ended June 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, J. Donald Boggus, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                           
|-----------------------------------------------------------
|/s/    J. DONALD BOGGUS,
JR.                               
|J. Donald Boggus, Jr. President and Chief Executive Officer



April 15, 2003



STATEMENT OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF

CRESCENT BANKING COMPANY

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

§ 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Crescent Banking Company (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A
for the period ended June 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Leland W. Brantley, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.



|                                               
|-----------------------------------------------
|/s/    LELAND W.
BRANTLEY, JR.                 
|Leland W. Brantley, Jr. Chief Financial Officer



April 15, 2003
Herman ROBINSON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-0378

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 17, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.