alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Antonio Jermaine MOORE, a/k/a 10-4, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6671

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 17, 2017

Decided: August 22, 2017

Antonio Jermaine Moore, Appellant Pro Se. Jason Harris Cowley, Rudy E. Renfer, Seth Morgan Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KEENAN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Antonio Jermaine Moore seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

*125We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Moore has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Moore’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
### Biography, Official Photo and Responsibilities

U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa hosts CNO and MCPON in Naples, Italy 
NAPLES, Italy –  Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Lisa Franchetti and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) James Honea traveled to Naples, Italy to visit facilities and meet with Sailors and civilians in the region, Jan. 22, 2024.

Click Here to Read More

**MCPON Honea Completes First Fleet Engagement**NORFOLK, Va**                    13 Sep 2022                

U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa hosts CNO and MCPON in Naples, Italy 

Click Here to Read More

**
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

October 31, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 131147 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 131147 COA: 264658 Wayne CC: 85-003281-01 JOSEPH HENRY SIMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the March 23, 2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, a nd it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishi ng entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

d1023 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 31, 2006

Clerk
STATE of Louisiana v. Damion SAVAGE

NO. 2017-KO-1083

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 1, 2018

Denied.
MEMORANDUM

DATE: 06/16/2014

FROM: Laura Farris/EPA Region 8

TO: Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket Id: OAR–2013-0602

SUBJECT: Grand March for Climate Change Action held on 06/16/2014

SUMMARY: 

EPA Region 8’s Regional Administrator, Shaun McGrath, attended the Grand March for Climate Change 

Action held on 06/16/2014 to discuss the President’s Climate Action Plan and the proposed Clean Power 

Plan for Existing Power Plants. The Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants was proposed on June 2, 

2014.

ATTENDEES:

EPA

Shaun McGrath/EPA Region 8

External Stakeholders

Members of the Public and Press

ATTACHMENTS

None.
(1)
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of StemCells, Inc.;(2)
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;(3)
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
quarterly report;(4)
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     (5)
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
    /s/ Martin McGlynn

Martin McGlynnPresident and Chief Executive Officer
Miterrio D. BANKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-4018

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 9, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE FORM
10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           8,918
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          11,561
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                      5,348
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        174,985
<ALLOWANCE>                                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 238,506
<DEPOSITS>                                     179,832
<SHORT-TERM>                                    28,510
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             11,536
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             5
<OTHER-SE>                                      18,623
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 238,506
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  4,032
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                   45
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   177
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 4,254
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               2,249
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,871
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            1,383
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      185
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  5,245
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    543
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         543
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       386
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.79
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.74
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0<F1>
<LOANS-NON>                                      4,826
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   814
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  984<F1>
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               984<F1>
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>THIS INFORMATION IS NOT DISCLOSED IN THE FORM 10-Q.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Consent of Glen Cole
 
 I consent to the inclusion in this annual report on Form 40-F of New Gold Inc., which is being filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, of reference to my name in connection with, and to the use of information derived from, the technical report entitled “NI 43-101 Feasibility Study of the Rainy River Project, Ontario, Canada” effective date January 16, 2014, included in the Annual Information Form of New Gold Inc. for the financial year ended December 31, 2013, and I consent to the incorporation by reference of such information in the registration statement on Form S-8 (File No. 333-160500) of New Gold Inc.
 
 
 Dated this 28th day of March, 2014
 
 
 “Glen Cole”Name:
Glen Cole, P.GeoTitle:
Principal Consultant (Resource Geology)
Ramon Wade RENFRO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-3451

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 10, 2018

Ramon Wade Renfro, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

The appellant appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm the denial of the motion, but write to address the claim raised in ground one.

In 2014, the appellant was convicted of lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or lascivious molestation, and unlawful sexual activity with certain minors, stemming from sexual encounters he had with three victims during a camping trip. In ground one *518of his motion, the appellant alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a DNA expert to testify. At trial, counsel attempted to introduce an FDLE report indicating that amylase found on underwear allegedly belonging to one of the victims, C.D., excluded the appellant as a contributor.* That request was denied. The appellant alleges that counsel should have called an expert to testify to the report's conclusion, that he was excluded as the contributor to amylase found on C.D.'s underwear. He alleges that this would prove he did not commit any of the crimes.

The appellant's claim was properly denied. Even if an expert had been called to testify that the amylase found on C.D.'s underwear did not belong to the appellant, there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Here, the DNA evidence only related to the clothing of one of the victims. Thus, it would have no bearing on two of his three convictions.

As to the count involving C.D., the State never argued that DNA evidence proved its case. The record reflects that the state presented evidence from witnesses that the appellant penetrated the victim with his finger, had intercourse with the victim, and that the victim performed oral sex on him. There was also testimony that C.D. and another victim performed oral sex on each other, and that one or more unidentified people had sexual contact with C.D. Neither the presence of an unidentified party's DNA, nor the absence of the appellant's saliva on C.D.'s underwear, would prove that the appellant did not engage in the alleged sex acts. As such, the appellant cannot show that had counsel called an expert to testify that someone else's saliva was found on C.D.'s underwear, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different. *See**Strickland v. Washington* , 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (holding that to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel not acted deficiently).

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Jay and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.

*

It appears from the trial court's attachments that no semen was found on the underwear. The DNA evidence the appellant refers to in his motion appears to be amylase, which is an enzyme found in saliva and other bodily fluids.
Victorino CATI, DOC# H26754, Appellant, v. Jessica CATI, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1313

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 14, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### IN RE: Erik M. DUNLAP, Debtor. Erik M. Dunlap, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Educational Credit Management Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1227

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 24, 2017

Decided: September 7, 2017

Kenneth Love, KARRENSTEIN, LOVE, AND DILLENBECK, Matthews, North Carolina, for Appellant. Lisa P. Sumner, NEXSEN PRUET, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

During the course of his bankruptcy proceedings, Erik M. Dunlap filed an adversary proceeding seeking partial discharge of his student loan debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). The bankruptcy court dismissed Dunlap’s complaint. Dunlap appealed and the district court dismissed Dunlap’s appeal for failure to comply with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(1) as Dunlap had failed properly to designate *177the issues for appeal. Dunlap now appeals to this court. In his opening brief, however, Dunlap failed to challenge the procedural basis for the district court’s dismissal of his appeal. Dunlap, therefore, has forfeited appellate review of the district court’s order. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); *see also Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc.,*562 F.3d 599, 605 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009) (failure to challenge issue on appeal waives appellate review of issue); *Skinner v. First Union Nat’l Bank,*No. 98-1627, 1999 WL 261944, at *1-*2 (4th Cir. May 3, 1999) (argued but unpublished) (where district court dismissed appeal of bankruptcy court order for failure to timely file brief, only orders properly on appeal were district court’s orders of dismissal and denying reconsideration).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
The State of TexasAppellee

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 2, 2015

No. 04-15-00199-CR

Gabriel JIMENEZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015CR0420

Honorable Ron Rangel, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The Appellant’s motion for extension of time to file the brief is GRANTED. Time is 

extended to November 2, 2015. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF TIME WILL BE 

ALLOWED.

_________________________________

Jason Pulliam, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 2nd day of October, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
Cheryl SAUNDERS and David Saunders, her husband, Appellants, v. Rafael Christopher HACISKI, M.D., Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-706

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 27, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Matthew Aaron BURCH, Appellant, v. Michelle Nicole BURCH, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4868

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 18, 2018

Clark H. Henderson of Oberliesen & Henderson, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellant.

Michael T. Webster, Shalimar, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

Matthew Aaron Burch appeals an order dismissing his motion to modify the final judgment of dissolution as to the parents' respective time-sharing of the children.1 Because the former husband did not show a substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances, the trial court properly denied modification. *See**Korkmaz v. Korkmaz* , 200 So.3d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Osterhaus and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.

1

The order of dismissal left pending the issue of modification of child support. An order subsequently entered denying modification of child support. The order dismissing the petition for modification of child custody is therefore a final, appealable order. *See* Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(l).
Zachary Maurice HEATH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 4D17-3446 4D17-3447

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 17, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Robert Jenkins, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Tasker Capital Corp.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining  disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
have:

         (a) designed such disclosure  controls and  procedures,  or caused such
disclosure  controls and  procedures to be designed  under our  supervision,  to
ensure that material  information  relating to the small business issuer is made
known to us by others,  particularly  during the period in which this  report is
being prepared;

         (b)  evaluated  the   effectiveness  of  the  small  business  issuer's
disclosure  controls  and  presented  in this report our  conclusions  about the
effectiveness  of the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

         (c) disclosed in this report any change in the small business  issuer's
internal  control  over  financial  reporting  that  occurred  during  the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially  affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,
based  on  our  most  recent  evaluation  of  internal  control  over  financial
reporting,  to the small business  issuer's  auditors and the audit committee of
the small  business  issuer's  board of  directors  (or persons  performing  the
equivalent functions);

         (a) all significant  deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal  control over financial  reporting which are reasonably
likely to  adversely  affect  the small  business  issuer's  ability  to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

         (b) any fraud,  whether or not material,  that  involves  management or
other  employees  who have a  significant  role in the small  business  issuer's
internal control over financial reporting.

April 15, 2005

/s/ Robert Jenkins
----------------------------
Robert Jenkins
Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7665

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus GREG STEVEN COOKE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge. (CR-95-160, CA-00-1056) Submitted: March 4, 2002 Decided: April 16, 2002 Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Greg Steven Cooke, Appellant Pro Se. Paul Alexander Weinman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Greg Steven Cooke seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Cooke , Nos. CR-95-160; CA-00-1056 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 2, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Seven Acre Wood Street Associates, Inc., Respondent, v Petruccelli Engineering et al., Appellants.

[769 NYS2d 902]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Kapnick, J.), entered on or about July 3, 2002, which, inter alia, granted plaintiffs cross motion to vacate a self-executing order of preclusion against it on the condition that plaintiff’s counsel pay defendants’ counsel $1,500, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Inasmuch as plaintiff demonstrated a meritorious cause of action and a reasonable excuse for its default in timely complying with the discovery directives in the subject order of preclusion, *397plaintiffs cross motion to vacate the self-executing preclusion order was properly granted *(see*CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; *Fernandez v Tsoumpas Bros. Co.,*140 AD2d 257 [1988]; *cf. Clarke v United Parcel Serv.,*300 AD2d 614 [2002]; *Tejeda v 750 Gerard Props. Corp.,*272 AD2d 124 [2000]). Plaintiffs default was not willful and its submission of its responses to defendants’ discovery demands, albeit after an 18-day delay, demonstrated its good faith intent to prosecute the action. Any prejudice to defendants by reason of plaintiffs late compliance was adequately addressed by the court’s provision conditioning the grant of plaintiff’s cross motion upon payment of $1,500 to defendants’ counsel *(see Heffney v Brookdale Hosp. Ctr.,*102 AD2d 842 [1984], *appeal dismissed*63 NY2d 770 [1984]; *Maglieri v Saks,*33 AD2d 898 [1970]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Williams, Marlow and Gonzalez, JJ.
Jarmeel Earl BENNETT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-4938

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 16, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Granted.