NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2024 IL App (3d) 230640-U

Order filed January 30, 2024

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2024 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

JAKOBI A. KINSEY, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 18th Judicial Circuit, 

Du Page County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-23-0640 

Circuit No. 22-CF-2452 

Honorable 

Margaret M. O’Connell, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice McDade specially concurred. 

Justice Hettel dissented. 

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s decision to detain defendant was an abuse of discretion.

¶ 2 In November 2022 defendant, Jakobi A. Kinsey, was indicted for aggravated battery (720 

ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2022)) and three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 

24-1.2(a)(2), (b)). His bond was set at $1 million, and he remained in custody. On September 25, 

2023, defendant filed a motion seeking pretrial release. In response, the State filed a verified 

petition to deny pretrial release, alleging defendant was charged with a forcible felony, and his 
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release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community 

under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)). After a hearing, the circuit court granted the State’s petition to deny 

pretrial release. We reverse and remand.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The factual basis provided at the detention hearing established that the officers were 

dispatched to Yorktown Mall around 3 p.m. for the report of shots fired. Witnesses indicated that 

two individuals, one with a ski mask covering his face and the other with dreadlocks, were seen 

running towards their vehicle. They got into their vehicle and chased after a Ford Escape. The 

individual with the ski mask was on the passenger side and was seen leaning out the window, 

firing several shots towards the Escape. Officers recovered five spent shell casings in the area of 

the shooting. 

¶ 5 Officers later received information from Good Samaritan Hospital of a patient with a 

gunshot wound. Upon arrival at the hospital, officers found the Escape and made contact with 

the occupants. There had been three occupants in the Escape at the time of the shooting, one of 

which was being treated. The other two victims stated that they were in Yorktown Mall when 

they had a confrontation with two unknown men, one wearing a ski mask and one with 

dreadlocks. They stated the one with the ski mask told the one with the dreadlocks to pass me 

that, which the victims interpreted to mean to pass him a gun. The victims left the mall and drove 

away in the Escape. As they were driving away, they saw the individuals from the mall outside 

and saw the two men start running to their vehicle. They then saw the one with the ski mask lean 

out of the window and shoot several shots towards them, hitting the female victim in the arm. 
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¶ 6 Surveillance video from the mall showed the confrontation in the mall as well as the car 

chase. The video showed the man with dreadlocks as the first who began to run towards the 

vehicle to chase after the victims. The man with dreadlocks driving the vehicle was identified as 

defendant. Defendant admitted that he and his co-defendant had a confrontation with the victims 

in the mall, chased after the victims in the car, and that the co-defendant fired several shots 

toward the victims. Defendant had previously received second chance probation in 2019 for 

forgery, which was successfully terminated. 

¶ 7 A hearing was held on the petition on November 6, 2023. The State provided the factual 

basis and noted that the offense happened “in the middle of the day,” “at a very busy mall.” The 

State noted that defendant “is the first one they see sprinting towards his car” and that after the 

incident, defendant and his co-defendant just returned to the mall “almost as if nothing 

happened.” The State also indicated that when defendant chased the Escape in his vehicle, he 

almost hit the victim’s vehicle. 

¶ 8 Defense counsel admitted into evidence four letters speaking to defendant’s character and 

various certificates defendant had earned in the jail, amassing approximately 530 hours. Defense 

counsel called Stephanie Williams to testify, who was a forensic mental health therapist with the 

Du Page County Health Department. She was the primary clinician in the recovery pod at the 

jail. Defendant was accepted into the recovery pod and participated in all programming. She was 

unaware of defendant having any disciplinary problems in the jail. Defendant expressed to her 

that he would like to continue working with a sponsor even if he was released. 

¶ 9 Defendant’s counsel argued that defendant would not pose a danger to anyone if released, 

noting that he did not have a history of violence and was not the shooter. Counsel stated that 

defendant followed the Escape after the verbal altercation to get the license plate number and 
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said he did not know his co-defendant was going to fire shots. Counsel further argued that 

defendant expressed remorse and that defendant would follow any conditions, as evidenced by 

his participation in the recovery pod. 

¶ 10 The court granted the State’s petition finding the State met its burden by clear and 

convincing evidence. In doing so, it stated, 

“So I do believe that the presumption is great that [defendant] committed a 

qualifying offense. Does he pose a real and present threat to the safety of specific, 

identifiable persons or the community at large? While [I] respect the hard work 

that he’s done while he’s been incarcerated, this is an event where, quite honestly, 

if they had just driven the other way, we wouldn’t be in this situation. His 

inability to at that point control his desire to have *** some sort of confrontation 

with the victims in this case shows to me that he is a threat to the safety of the 

community at large.” 

The court further stated that no conditions would “prevent a situation like this from happening 

again.” 

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in granting the petition 

to detain. Specifically, he contends that there were conditions that would mitigate any 

dangerousness he posed. We consider factual findings for the manifest weight of the evidence, 

but the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s petition to detain is considered under an 

abuse of discretion standard. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Under either 

standard, we consider whether the court’s determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.; see also 

People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 19. 
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¶ 13 Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be 

denied in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a 

verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the 

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great 

that defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a “real and present” threat to 

any person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate 

this threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and 

the conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can 

consider. Id. §§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5. 

¶ 14 We find the court abused its discretion in granting the petition. Defendant was not the 

shooter in this case and did not have a violent criminal history. The court found defendant was a 

real and present threat based on one incident that occurred nearly a year prior to the hearing, and 

neither the State nor the court could point to anything else in the record that would indicate 

defendant was a “present” threat to the community as required by the statute. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(2).

In fact, the record indicates the opposite. All the evidence in the record indicated his willingness 

and ability to follow any conditions the court placed on him. He had successfully completed 

probation previously and was working toward bettering himself in the jail by completing several 

programs while in custody. The court’s decision that no conditions were available that would 

mitigate defendant’s dangerousness was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the 

court, thus, erred in granting the State’s petition. We therefore remand the matter for the court to 

release defendant and determine which conditions are necessary for his release.

¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed and remanded. 
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¶ 17 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 18 PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring:

¶ 19 I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order for abuse of 

discretion. However, I specially concur under the belief that the decision could have been based 

on simpler grounds. 

¶ 20 Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 states that “[a]ll 

defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release. . . .” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 

2022). As the majority explains, to rebut this presumption, the State must prove not just one or 

two, but the following three elements, by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the proof is 

evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a detainable offense; (2) that 

the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the 

community, or is a flight risk; and (3) that no conditions can mitigate this threat or risk of flight. 

Id. 

¶ 21 The dissent acknowledges that the State in no way argued the third element of 

ineligibility, regarding whether any conditions of release can mitigate the threat posed by 

defendant. This alone demonstrates that the State failed to meet its burden to rebut the 

presumption of eligibility, and that the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. This 

alone also warrants reversal of the trial court’s order.

¶ 22 Of further note, the State’s failure to make a showing toward the third element of 

ineligibility also deprives us of the ability to review whether the trial court’s factual findings 

under this element were against the manifest weight of the evidence, since there was, in fact, no 

evidence presented. This, in turn, further deprives us of the ability to review whether the trial 
7 

court abused its discretion by denying defendant pretrial release, again because there was no 

evidence presented on the third element. 

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s order on the above grounds, 

without reaching those discussed by the majority.

¶ 24 JUSTICE HETTEL, dissenting.

¶ 25 I would find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition. 

¶ 26 In this case, defendant’s participation in services and good behavior while in custody are 

certainly admirable. However, the nature and circumstances of the offense support the trial 

court’s finding that defendant still poses a threat if he is released. See id. § 110-5(a)(1) (the 

nature and circumstances of the charged offense is a relevant factor to consider in the trial court’s 

assessment of what, if any, conditions of release will mitigate the threat the defendant poses to 

any other person or the community). The evidence indicated that defendant had an altercation 

with individuals he did not know at a mall in middle of the day. Shortly thereafter, the unknown 

victims left the mall in another vehicle. Defendant then ran to his car, jumped in the driver’s seat, 

and proceeded to chase them. As defendant pursued them, his co-defendant leaned out the 

passenger window and fired several shots at their vehicle, injuring one of the victims. 

¶ 27 The factual basis further provided that the victims heard the co-defendant tell defendant 

to “pass him that” which meant pass him a gun, indicating defendant possessed the gun at some 

point. While defense counsel may have argued that defendant did not know that his co-defendant 

was going to shoot the gun at the other vehicle, the evidence suggests otherwise as during his 

police interview, the co-defendant told officers that defendant urged him not to shoot his gun. In 

addition to the circumstances of the offense, defendant’s county jail therapist testified that she 

was not aware of any plans defendant had made to follow-up with services if he is released. 
8 

Thus, while defendant presented evidence of his commendable efforts of self-improvement in 

jail, the court’s concern as to his dangerousness was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. The trial court’s decision, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 28 In reaching my conclusion, I recognize the State did not discuss any conditions of release, 

nor did it argue that “no condition or combination of conditions *** can mitigate” the threat 

posed by defendant. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(3). Although section 110-6.1(e) requires the State to show 

clear and convincing evidence of all three elements of ineligibility, the statute does not require 

the State to specifically set forth the reasons why conditions would not mitigate any threat at the 

detention hearing. See People v. Madrigal, 2024 IL App (2d) 230438-U, ¶ 19; People v. Perez, 

2024 IL App (2d) 230416-U, ¶ 29 (rejecting defendant’s argument that because the State did not 

argue the third element at the detention hearing, it failed to meet its burden of proving by clear 

and convincing evidence that no conditions can mitigate the threat). The statute directs only that 

the court enter an order of detention “summarizing the court’s reasons for concluding that the 

defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not 

avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or person or the community, based on 

the specific articulable facts of the case.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). The trial court 

complied with that directive. I would therefore affirm the court’s order granting the State’s 

petition to deny pretrial release.