alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Martin Rafael DIAZ-AMEZCUA, aka Martin Diaz, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-71040

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 23, 2017

William Frick, Law Office of William Frick, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Karen L. Melnik, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Martin Rafael Diaz-Amezcua, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, where Diaz-Amezcua failed to show that his prior counsel’s performance was deficient. *See Mohammed,*400 at 793 (to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel failed to perform with sufficient competence and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance); *Torres-Chavez v. Holder,*567 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (counsel’s tactical decision was not ineffective assistance of counsel). Contrary to Diaz-Amezcua’s contention, the BIA did not rely on unsupported conjecture or make an adverse credibility determination.

*548The BIA did not abuse its.discretion in denying Diaz-Amezcua’s motion to reopen to apply for new relief as untimely, where it was filed more than two years after his final order of removal, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Diaz-Amezcua failed to establish changed country condition in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Because these determinations are dis-positive, the BIA did not err by not reaching the merits of Diaz-Amezcua’s claims for adjustment of status and asylum and related relief. *See Simeonov v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to reach non-dispositive issues). For the same reason, we do not reach these claims.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<PAGE>   1




              EXHIBIT 11.1-COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS (LOSS) PER SHARE
                      (in thousands, except per share data)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                Three Months Ended            Six Months Ended
                                                                                       June 30                      June 30
                                                                                  1999         1998           1999          1998
                                                                                  ----         -----          ----          -----
<S>                                                                             <C>           <C>            <C>           <C>
Income applicable to common shares:

Net Income (Loss)                                                               $   471       $  (817)       $   926       $  (823)
                                                                                -------       -------        -------       -------
          Income (Loss) applicable to common shares                             $   471       $  (817)       $   926       $  (823)
                                                                                =======       =======        =======       ========

Weighted average number of common shares outstanding                              7,350         7,289          7,344         7,289


          Weighted average common shares                                          7,350         7,289          7,344         7,289
                                                                                =======       =======        =======       ========



Income (Loss) per common share                                                  $  0.06        $(0.11)       $  0.13        $(0.11)
                                                                                =======        =======       =======       ========


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-2383

MARY NEIHSUNG ZANGIAT,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A95-226-761)

Submitted: May 19, 2004 Decided: July 7, 2004

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Yousof W. Nesari, LAW OFFICE OF J. W. NESARI, L.L.C., Herndon,

Virginia, for Appellant. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney

General, Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director, Carolyn M. Piccotti,

Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Mary Neihsung Zangiat petitions this court for review of

a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board). The Board

affirmed the action of the immigration judge in pretermitting

Zangiat’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and

relief under the Convention Against Torture, with respect to Burma.

Zangiat lived in India from 1988 to 2001, and entered this country

in 2001 with an Indian passport. She offered no documentary

evidence of her Burmese citizenship. Thus, the Board held that the

immigration judge did not err in pretermitting the applications. 

Zangiat complains that she was denied due process when

the immigration judge stopped the hearing without taking her

testimony. Removal and asylum hearings are subject to the

constraints of procedural due process. Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316,

320 (4th Cir. 2002). To prevail on a claim of denial of due

process at an asylum hearing, the alien must show that any such

denial resulted in prejudice. Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Bd. of

Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1256-57 (4th Cir. 1995).

Prejudice may be found only when the due process violation “‘is

likely to impact the results of the proceeding.’” Rusu, 296 F.3d

at 320 (quoting Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 2000)).

This court reviews claims of due process violations de novo.

Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 278 (4th Cir. 2004).
- 3 -

Zangiat had many months to obtain documents establishing

her Burmese nationality and citizenship, but offered nothing, and

still refers to no such proof. Therefore, even if the actions of

the immigration judge as affirmed by the Board denied Zangiat due

process, she cannot establish the prejudice necessary to entitle

her to relief.

We deny Zangiat’s petition for review. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donte Bernard BAKER, a/k/a Tay, a/k/a Donnie, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6689

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

Donte Bernard Baker, Appellant Pro Se. Debra Lynn Dwyer, Joshua Thomas Fer-rentino, Robert Reeves Harding, Assistant United States Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland; Anthony Joseph Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Donte Bernard Baker seeks to appeal the district court’s orders dismissing his 28 U.S.C, § 2255 (2012) motion as successive and denying reconsideration. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling *178is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Baker has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### John A. VELA, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Lauro CHAPA; Safety Manager Stepson Chapa; Toolpusher Joe Saenz, Defendants-Appellees

No. 15-20685

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

October 6, 2017

'John A. Vela, Harris County Sheriffs Office, Houston, TX, pro se.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

John A. Vela, while incarcerated in the Harris County Jail, SPN # 01688406, moved for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint After he filed his notice of appeal, Vela moved to dismiss the appeal without prejudice. In response to an order issued by a Judge of this court, Vela notified this court, in writing, that he wished to proceed with his appeal because his motion to dismiss without prejudice was filed by mistake.

The district court denied Vela’s motion to proceed IFP and certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A) that the appeal was not taken in good faith. Vela now moves this court for leave to proceed IFP. By moving to proceed IFP, Vela is challenging the district court’s certification that the instant appeal is not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). In evaluating whether the appeal is taken in good faith, the' relevant inquiry is “whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

With the benefit of liberal construction, Vela challenges the district court’s determination that Lauro Chapa, the CEO of Scorpion Drilling, Chapa’s stepson, a safety manager at Scorpion Drilling, and Joe Saenz, a tool pusher at Scorpion Drilling, are not state actors and therefore are not subject to liability under § 1983. Vela has not demonstrated that these defendants can be characterized as acting under color of state law: *See West v. Atkins,*487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); *Cinel v. Connick,*15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, Vela has not shown that he will present a nonfrivo-lous issue on appeal. *See Howard,*707 F.2d at 220.

*230Vela’s motions to dismiss the appeal without prejudice and to proceed IFP are DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d 202 & n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2. The dismissal of Vela’s complaint and the dismissal of his appeal both count as strikes for purposes of § 1915(g). *See Brown v. Megg,*857 F.3d 287, 290-92 (5th Cir. 2017); *Adepegba v. Hammons,*103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996). Vela is WARNED that if he accumulates a third strike, he will not be allowed to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal while incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. *See*§ 1915(g).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### IN RE: David L. SMITH, Petitioner.

No. 17-1362

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: July 31, 2017

David Lee Smith, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

David Lee Smith petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the district court to review a filing in Smith’s civil case as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, reduce Smith’s state sentence to time served, and order the state custodian to release him. We conclude that Smith is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. *In re Lockheed Martin Corp.,*503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007). Further, this court does not have jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief against state officials, *Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg Cty.,*411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1969), and does not have jurisdiction to review final state court orders, *Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,*460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).

The relief sought by Smith is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in for-ma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argu*137ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
C.B., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas N. FISCHGRUND, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0464

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 22, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Yowab BEN-ISRAEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D16-4922

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 31, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
# C o urt o f A ppe a ls

o f th e S ta te o f G e o rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ The C o u rt o f Appea ls h ereb

y p a s s es the fo llo wi

n g order:

A 24A 1 259

. J PM ORGA N CH A SE B A N K , N . A

. , SUCCESSOR B Y MERGER TO W A SH I N GTON M UTUA L, N

. A

. v

. W I L LI A M E. W H I T A K ER, A S A D M I N I STRA T OR OF TH E ESTA TE OF N

. R. H I N ES, et al.

J PM o rgan Chase B a nk , N

. A. ( “ t h e B a n k ” ), a s the su c c esso r in interest to
W ashingto n M u tu al, N

. A

. f iled su it against the e s tate of N

. R. H ines a n d H i n es’ s heirs ( c o llec tiv ely, “the H ineses” ), seek ing r ef o r ma t i o n o f a lo an agreement and

sec u rity d eed

. The H ineses mo v ed f o r su mmary j ud gment, argu ing that the statu te o f
limitatio n had exp ired o n the B ank ’ s c laim f o r ref ormatio n. The t r ial c o u rt agreed and

o n J une 27 , 2023, it entered an ord er granting the mo tio n fo r su mmary ju d gment. On
Oc to ber 27 , 2 0 2 3 , t he B ank f iled a no t ic e o f ap p eal. T he H ineses hav e mo v ed to d ismiss the ap p eal, argu ing that this Co u rt lac k s j u risd ic tio n. W e agree.

A no tic e o f ap peal mu st b e f iled w ithin 30 d ays o f entry o f the j u d gment o r trial

c o u rt o rd er so u ght to be ap p ealed

. OCGA § 5

- 6 -38 (a). “The p ro per and timely f iling

o f a n o t i c e of ap p eal is a n abso lu te requ irement to c o nf er j u r isd ic tio n u p o n an
ap p ellate c o u rt. ” P

erlma n v

. Perlma n , 31 8 Ga. Ap p

. 7 31 , 7 39 (4) ( 7 34 SE2d 56 0) (201 2) (p u nc tu atio n o mitted ). H ere, the Bank ’ s no tic e o f ap p eal w as u ntimely, as it w as f iled
f o u r mo nths af

ter entry o f the trial c o u rt’ s o rd er. A c co rd ingly, w e lac k j u risd ic tio n to

c o nsid er this ap p e al. Fo r t hat reaso n, the Hineses’ mo tio n to d ismiss is GRA N TED , and this ap p eal is hereby D ISM I SSED

. April 29, 2024To the extent that the trial c ou rt d id no t p r o v id e the B ank w ith timely no tic e o f

its J u ne 27 , 2023 o rd e r, t he B ank ’ s remed y is to p etitio n the trial c o u rt to v ac ate and

re- enter the o rd er a s a means o f c o rrec t ing the pro blem. C a mb ro n v

. C

a n al In s

. C

o

. , 246 Ga. 1 47 , 1 48- 1 49 (1 ) ( 26 9 SE2d 426 ) (1 9 80), d isap pro v ed in p art o n o ther gro u nd s by W ri ght v

. Yo u n

g , 29 7 Ga. 6 83, 6 84 n. 3 (7 7 7 SE2d 47 5) (201 5).

C o u r t o f A p p e a ls o f t h e S t a t e o f G e o r g ia C le r k ’ s O ffic e , A t la n t a ,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r t ify t h a t t h e a b o v e i

s a t r u e e x t r a c t fr o m
t h e m in u t e s o f t h e C o u r t o f A pp e a ls o f G e o r g ia

. W it n e s s m y s ig n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o f s a id c o u r t h e r e t o a ffix e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r la s t a b o v e w r

it t e n

.

, C le r

k

. 04/29/2024
---

# Exhibit 32.2

# Statement of
Chief Financial Officer of RARE Hospitality International, Inc.

# Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

# as Adopted
Pursuant to Section 906 of the

# Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of RARE Hospitality International, Inc.
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 29, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, W. Douglas Benn, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material  respects,  the financial  condition and results of
         operations of the Company.

/s/ W. Douglas Benn
-------------------------------------------
W. Douglas Benn
Chief Financial Officer
August 12, 2003

A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906,
has been provided to RARE Hospitality International, Inc. and will be retained
by RARE Hospitality International, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Jonathan SANCHEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Ricardo IV Montilla OSORIO, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2068

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

OCTOBER 24, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Steven DONEHOO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-1048

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 2, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 3, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 99


                                 March 27, 2002







Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C. 20549


Ladies and Gentlemen:

         Pursuant to temporary note 3T, Argonaut Group, Inc. (the "Company") has
obtained a letter of representation from Arthur Andersen dated March 25, 2002
stating that the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the Company
and its subsidiaries as of December 31, 2001 and for the year then ended was
subject to Arthur Andersen's quality control system for the U.S. accounting and
auditing practice to provide reasonable assurance that the engagement was
conducted in compliance with professional standards, that there was appropriate
continuity of Arthur Andersen personnel working on the audit and availability of
national office consultation. Availability of personnel at foreign affiliates of
Arthur Andersen was not relevant to the audit.

                                Very truly yours,

                                                     ARGONAUT GROUP, INC.



                              By /s/ Mark Haushill
                              Name:  Mark Haushill
                              Title:    Vice President, Chief Financial
                                        Officer and Treasurer
**Exhibit 23.2**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTEREDPUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We hereby consent to theincorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (FileNos. 333-121054 and 333-135903) of Tasker Products Corp. (formerly known as"Tasker Capital Corp.") of our report, dated March 24, 2004,relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Tasker Capital Corp. as ofDecember 31, 2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated statements ofoperations, stockholders' deficiency, and cash flows for each of the yearsending December 31, 2003 and 2002, and for the period from inception,May 13, 1996, to December 31, 2003, which report appears in thisAnnual Report on Form 10-KSB of Tasker Capital Corp. for the year endedDecember 31, 2003.

 

 
| Vancouver,  Canada | /s/ Morgan & Company |
|--------------------|--------------------------|
| October 26, 2006   | Chartered Accountants    |

 

----