NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2006-3302 

CAROL L. IDE, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 

 Respondent, 

and 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

Intervenor. 

Randall A. Schmidt, of Savannah, Georgia, for petitioner. 

Raymond W. Angelo, Acting Associate General Counsel, Office of the General 

Counsel, United States Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington, DC, for 

respondent. With him on the brief were B. Chad Bungard, General Counsel, and Rosa M. 

Koppel, Deputy General Counsel. 

Brain S. Smith, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United 

States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for intervenor. With him on the brief 

were Peter D. Keisler, Acting Attorney General, and Kathryn A. Bleecker, Assistant 

Director. 

 

Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection Board 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

 

2006-3302 

CAROL L. IDE, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 

 Respondent, 

and 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

 Intervenor. 

___________________________ 

 DECIDED: October 10, 2007 

___________________________ 

Before RADER, Circuit Judge, CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and DYK, Circuit 

Judge. 

RADER, Circuit Judge. 

Carol Ide appeals the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board 

(“MSPB” or “Board”) denying her petition for review of the dismissal of her appeal of an 

allegedly involuntary resignation. Ide v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. AT-0752-03-0379-M-1 
(M.S.P.B. Mar. 29, 2006). This court affirms. 

I 

Ms. Ide, a disabled veteran, began work on July 15, 2001 as a student trainee in 

Savannah, Georgia for the Social Security Administration (“SSA” or “Agency”). Nearing 

completion of her degree, Ms. Ide was slated to end her trainee position in Savannah 

and begin a permanent position with the Agency in September 2002 in Statesboro, 

Georgia. Ms. Ide’s graduation from college was a prerequisite to starting in this 

permanent position. In early August 2002, she learned that she had failed a Regents 

examination and could not graduate before she was scheduled to begin her permanent 

position with the Agency. Ms. Ide did not immediately inform her supervisors of her 

situation, but waited until the third time she was questioned by Russell Waller (SSA 

District Manager, Savannah) about her status after Ms. Ide knew that she had failed the 

Regents exam. In September, Ms. Ide was informed that her employment would be 

terminated, as she had not graduated from college as anticipated and there were no 

funds allocated to continue her employment as a student trainee. She asked if she had 

any options, and was informed by Mr. Waller that she could resign. On September 6, 

2002, Ms. Ide signed a resignation letter, which stated that she was resigning for 

“personal reasons.” 

In January 2003, Ms. Ide filed an appeal asserting that her resignation was not 

voluntary. An MSPB administrative judge dismissed her appeal, finding that she did not 

meet the statutory definition of “employee” entitled to file an appeal with the Board 

under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) (2000). After the MSPB denied her petition for review, Ms. 

Ide appealed to this court, which reversed the Board’s decision, stating that the record 

2006-3302 2
was insufficient to determine whether she was preference eligible and that she had 

made nonfrivolous arguments on that issue. Ide v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 131 Fed. Appx. 

728 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (unpublished). On remand, the administrative judge assumed that 

Ms. Ide met the statutory definition of “employee,” but nonetheless concluded that the 

Board lacked jurisdiction because she voluntarily resigned from her position. After 

unsuccessfully petitioning the MSPB for review, Ms. Ide now appeals to this court. 

II 

Whether the MSPB had jurisdiction to adjudicate a case is a question of law, 

which this court reviews de novo. Forest v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 47 F.3d 409, 410 (Fed. 

Cir. 1995). This court’s review of the Board’s factual determinations supporting its 

assessment of jurisdiction is limited, and the Board must be affirmed unless its 

determination is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with the law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 

7703(c) (2000). 

An appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her 

appeal is within the Board’s jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2)(i). Resignation from 

the federal service is presumed to be a voluntary act, outside the Board’s jurisdiction. 

Braun v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 50 F.3d 1005, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 1995). To rebut the 

presumption, the appellant must show: “(1) that the resignation or retirement was the 

product of misinformation or deception by the agency; or (2) that the resignation or 

retirement was the product of coercion by the agency.” Terban v. Dep’t of Energy, 216 

F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Importantly, “where an employee is faced merely 

2006-3302 3
with the unpleasant alternatives of resigning or being subject to removal for cause, such 

limited choices do not make the resulting resignation an involuntary act.” Schultz v U.S.

Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987). But, if an employee can prove that the 

agency knew that its reason for threatened removal could not be substantiated, then the 

threatened action was coercive. Id.

To rebut the presumption that her resignation was voluntary, Ms. Ide argues that 

the Agency’s reason for removal cannot be substantiated for two reasons: 1) she was 

not required by regulation or by her contract to graduate by a particular date, but only to 

graduate within a reasonable time; and 2) there was no immediate need to terminate 

her position, as she was without fault for failing her examination and the student position 

was funded throughout the fiscal year. 

The Board found that Ms. Ide had told the agency repeatedly that she would 

graduate in August 2002. In making this determination, the Board weighed Ms. Ide’s 

testimony against the testimony of Mr. Waller and Tommy Morris (SSA Georgia Area 

Director), documentary evidence including two emails between Mr. Waller and Mr. 

Morris from March 2002 and July 2002 indicating that they understood Ms. Ide intended 

to graduate in August and begin her permanent position in September, Ms. Ide’s own 

testimony that she had purchased a car in July 2002 in anticipation of commuting to her 

new job in Statesboro, and Ms. Ide’s own acknowledgement that she was ineligible to 

start her permanent position prior to graduation. Mr. Morris also testified before the 

administrative judge that he decided that extending Ms. Ide’s student position was 

unwarranted given her unforthcoming approach to disclosing her failure to graduate as 

well as the staffing commitments already made for the next fiscal year. 

2006-3302 4
After conducting a hearing, the administrative judge concluded that the agency’s 

version of the events “simply ma[de] sense,” while Ms. Ide’s assertions were “inherently 

improbable.” Ide v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. AT-0752-03-0379-M-1 (M.S.P.B. Nov. 16, 

2005). This court is ill-positioned to second-guess the administrative judge’s credibility 

determinations on which his overall findings rest. Indeed, an administrative judge’s 

credibility determinations are “virtually unreviewable.” Frey v. Dep’t of Labor, 359 F.3d 

1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting King v. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 133 

F.3d 1450, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Although the administrative judge did not specifically 

address the requirement in 5 C.F.R. § 213.3202(b) cited by Ms. Ide that graduation 

must be “accomplished in a reasonable and appropriate timeframe,” that provision only 

applies to Ms. Ide’s temporary position and does not authorize appointment to a 

permanent position before completion of graduation. Nor do the regulations guarantee 

permanent positions to students who successfully complete program requirements: 

“[s]tudents, who are U.S. citizens, may be noncompetitively converted from the Student 

Career Experience Program to a term, career or career-conditional appointment.” 5 

C.F.R. § 213.3202(b)(11) (2001) (emphasis added). The administrative judge’s 

conclusion that Ms. Ide’s permanent employment with the Agency was contingent upon 

her August 2002 graduation was thus based on substantial evidence and was not 

clearly erroneous. 

Ms. Ide’s assertion that she should have been retained at least through the end 

of the fiscal year in her student position is intertwined with her argument that she was 

subjected to time pressure to resign, an indication of involuntariness. Time pressure 

may provide a basis for involuntariness, but only where the agency demands that the 

2006-3302 5
2006-3302 6

employee make an “immediate decision.” Middleton v. Dep’t of Def., 185 F.3d 1374, 

1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Staats v. U.S. Postal Serv., 99 F.3d 1120, 1126 (Fed. 

Cir. 1996). Ms. Ide was informed that she would be terminated and signed the 

resignation on the same date. But, Ms. Ide has not pointed to anything in the hearing 

record that indicates that she was to be terminated that very day. The Board did not 

abuse its discretion in concluding that Ms. Ide’s resignation was not coerced. 

 Substantial evidence therefore supports the MSPB’s conclusion that the SSA 

had a supportable reason for removing Ms. Ide, namely that her continued employment 

required her to graduate from college. Although Ms. Ide may have been faced with the 

“unpleasant alternatives” of resigning or being terminated, this does not make her 

choice involuntary. In resigning, Ms. Ide preserved her good standing to reapply for a 

future job with the Agency, but sacrificed the procedural protections that are afforded to 

a terminated employee. She cannot now seek relief from the MSPB or this court for this 

voluntary choice. 

Because the MSPB’s conclusion that Ms. Ide’s resignation was voluntary is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Board properly determined it lacked jurisdiction 

over her appeal, and its decision is therefore affirmed.