United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 13, 2019*

Decided March 13, 2019

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐1397

PAUL CHATMAN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

GREG GOSSETT, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:15‐cv‐01228

Joe Billy McDade,

Judge.

O R D E R

Paul Chatman, an Illinois inmate, sued prison employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violating his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights during two strip searches of

prison bakery workers who might have hidden yeast and sugar to make alcohol. The

district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. It correctly reasoned that

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐1397    Page 2

no violations occurred because valid penological reasons justified the searches, and no

evidence suggested that the searches were designed to harass Chatman, so we affirm.   

At the summary‐judgment phase, we construe the facts in the light most

favorable to the non‐moving party, Chatman. Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 840

(7th Cir. 2016). Chatman worked in the prison bakery for five years. During his tenure,

some bakery workers began using sugar and yeast to make alcohol, and some appeared

inebriated on the job. In response, the warden (a defendant) required guards to strip

search bakery workers every day when they left for lunch and at the end of their shift

“to locate and dispose of contraband ... in order to maintain the safety and security of

the facility.”   

Guards conducted these searches in different ways. Typically, guards took ten

inmates at a time into the bathroom, ordered them to remove their clothing, and

visually inspected them. Ordinarily, the guards did not require inmates to lift their

genitals, bend over, or spread their buttocks. Chatman does not contest the legality of

this manner of searching inmates. When defendants Nicholas Conklin and David

Bryant, both prison guards, were put in charge of an unscheduled bakery shift, they

altered the process for two of the searches. They had not previously searched these

bakery workers, and to Chatman it appeared that they did not know the standard

approach—they looked “hesitant” and “bewildered.”

   

In their first search, Conklin and Bryant strip searched inmates two at a time, in

the foyer of the bakery, which lies between two doors. The inner doors have narrow,

rectangular windows about 4 by 20 inches, through which other inmates watched the

searches. Chatman found the foyer cold and filthy. It smelled, had fly traps on the

ceiling, black mold on the walls, and mice droppings on the floor. Before starting the

search, the defendants ordered inmates to remove dirty equipment and lay down

cardboard to stand on. The defendants told Chatman to strip, raise his arms, and permit

a visual inspection for contraband. They also told him to lift his genitals, bend over, and

spread his buttocks. The search lasted five minutes. Besides their commands, the

defendants said nothing and did not touch the inmates. (Conklin, Chatman says, had “a

smile on his face and [the search] didn’t seem like it was bothering him in the least.”)

After he was searched, Chatman and other inmates had to wait outside, where it was

raining, for about 45 minutes until the defendants finished the remaining searches.

Chatman says he developed a sore throat that night and had a cough for the next eight

days.   
No. 18‐1397    Page 3

The second search occurred a week later and only Conklin conducted it. That

day, inmates could choose to be searched in the bathroom or bakery office—Chatman

chose the office. The office has big windows, but the blinds were closed when Chatman

entered. Conklin called in Chatman and another inmate and told them to undress.

While they were taking off their clothes, Conklin opened the blinds and the door so that

he could also observe the bakery floor during the search. He then searched Chatman

and the other inmate. Chatman does not know if anyone on the floor saw him and does

not remember if Conklin told him to bend over and spread his buttocks. Again, Conklin

did not touch Chatman. After the search was complete Conklin told the inmates to get

dressed, and he dismissed them.

After lodging complaints in the prison, Chatman turned to federal court. He

contends that Conklin and Bryant violated his Eighth and Fourth Amendment rights by

conducting two searches in an inhumane and harassing manner, and the warden

violated those rights by enacting the policy that allowed the searches. The district court

granted summary judgment for the defendants. It reasoned that neither search

constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and the

defendants did not violate Chatman’s privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.   

We review a district court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Wilson

v. Warren Cty., 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016). We turn to the Eighth Amendment

claim first. Chatman maintains that the searches violated his Eighth Amendment rights

because both the purpose and manner of the searches were unconstitutional.   

Strip searches of prisoners violate the Eighth Amendment if their purpose is

“maliciously motivated, unrelated to institutional security, and hence totally without

penological justification.” Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Searches are penologically justified when

reasonably related to finding contraband that threatens the safety and security of the

prison. See Peckham v. Wis. Depʹt of Corr., 141 F.3d 694, 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1998); Del Raine

v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1029, 1041 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

550–51 (1979)). The prison presented uncontradicted evidence that the searches were

intended to prevent ingredients for alcohol production and consumption from leaving

the bakery. Preventing the distribution of intoxicating substances is a valid penological

justification. And Chatman has not furnished evidence to support his contention that

the purpose of the searches was simply to punish inmates for their alcohol use.   
No. 18‐1397    Page 4

Chatman next argues that the manner in which the two searches were conducted

violated the Eighth Amendment. To overcome summary judgment with that argument,

Chatman had to furnish evidence suggesting that the defendants conducted the

searches “in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict psychological pain.”

Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003).   

No evidence would permit a rational jury to find that the defendants intended to

harass, humiliate, or psychologically injure Chatman. It is undisputed that the

defendants did not touch the inmates, they made no gratuitous or insulting comments,

and the searches were not prolonged. Conklin’s smile while he searched Chatman is not

unconstitutional abuse. See Del Raine, 32 F.3d at 1040. Chatman suggests three ways in

which the defendants intended to harass him, but none has merit.   

First, Chatman argues that the windows exposed him to others, but the searches

were not “in public,” and the defendants sought to limit exposure. They chose semi‐

private rooms and searched inmates in groups of two, which respected their privacy.

Moreover, we have upheld a strip search that occurred in a public “lobby area,” where,

like here, the plaintiff presented “no evidence of calculated harassment unrelated to

prison needs.” Del Raine, 32 F.3d at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)). Second, Chatman argues that the foyer

was cold and dirty, and the inmates had to wait in the rain until the searches were over,

but he ignores details that eliminate an inference of an intent to harass or humiliate. He

concedes that the defendants did not regularly conduct these searches. Because they

seemed to find the location for the searches “in haste, under pressure, and ... without

the luxury of a second chance,” a jury could not find an intent to harass or humiliate. Id.

(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). Moreover, they removed dirty objects and protected

inmates by placing cardboard on the floor. And safety concerns justified keeping the

searched inmates separate from the others. (No evidence suggests that the defendants

knew that it might rain while those inmates waited.) Third, Chatman contends that a

rectal inspection was not justified to look for yeast and sugar. But “it cannot be

questioned that the body cavities of prisoners are capable of secreting a surprising array

of objects.” Id. at 1042 (alterations omitted).   

Chatman next argues that the strip searches violated his Fourth Amendment

privacy rights. But we have said that the Fourth Amendment only protects “prisoners’

bodily integrity against unreasonable intrusions into their bodies.” King v. McCarty,

781 F.3d 889, 900 (7th Cir. 2015). Chatman “has not alleged any intrusion into his
No. 18‐1397    Page 5

body ..., so even if we assume such treatment of a convicted prisoner is subject to the

Fourth Amendment, he has failed to state a viable claim.” Id.   

In closing, we address two procedural matters. First, Chatman contends that the

district court unreasonably denied his requests for counsel. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d

647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). But in his prison grievances and federal complaint, he

showed the district court that he could adequately explain why he thought the searches

were unconstitutional. Given the straightforward nature of the claim as measured

against his demonstrated abilities to litigate it, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Chatman’s request for counsel. See id. at 654–56.

Second, Chatman argues that the district court erred in denying his discovery

motions. He asked the district court to order the defendants to provide photographs of

the foyer and office that he could use at trial. The court reasonably responded that the

case was not set for trial and that Chatman could describe the area in response to a

summary‐judgment motion, which he later did. “Trial courts retain broad discretion to

limit and manage discovery under Rule 26 of the civil rules.” Geiger v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,

845 F.3d 357, 365 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal alterations omitted). Because Chatman could

describe the locations at issue, the judge’s denial was permissible. Chatman also asked

the court to order the defendants to turn over Conklin’s and Bryant’s performance

records. But this filing violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)(1)(A) because

Chatman sent it to the court and not the defendants, and he did not explain why he

could not follow the proper procedure. So the court appropriately struck it. To the

extent that this filing could be construed as a motion to compel, Chatman did not

submit the requisite certification. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). We have considered

Chatman’s remaining arguments, and none has merit.   

AFFIRMED