alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002



(18 U.S.C. 1350)



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), the undersigned officer of Elephant Talk Communications Corp., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”),
does hereby certify, to the best of such officer’s knowledge and belief, that to my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2014 (the “Form 10-K”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all materials respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|Date: April 30, 2015 | /s/ Mark Nije                        
|-------------------- | -------------------------------------
|                     | Mark Nije, Chief Financial Officer,  
|                     | Principal FinancialAccounting Officer
Reo T. NANCE, DOC #C01631, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2282

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 16, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Dave WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D18-474

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 12, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

*Affirmed.*
Exhibit






AMENDMENT NO. 6


to


CONSULTING AGREEMENT
dated May 3, 2012


by and between
AXIS Specialty Limited (the “Company”)
and
Michael A. Butt (the “Consultant”)


Dated December 5, 2018


WHEREAS, the Company and the Consultant entered into a consulting agreement dated as of May 3, 2012, as amended (the “Agreement”); and


WHEREAS, the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of AXIS Capital Holdings Limited, the Company and the Consultant have determined that it is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders to make certain revisions to the Agreement in order to further extend the term of service thereof;


NOW, THEREFORE, the Agreement is hereby amended, effective as of the date hereof, as follows:


		
	1.
	Section 3 of the Agreement (Consulting Fee) is hereby amended to insert the following after “April 2019.”:




“For service from the date of the Annual General Meeting of AXIS Capital Holdings Limited in 2019 through the Annual General Meeting of AXIS Capital Holdings Limited in 2020, the Company shall pay the Consultant a fee in the amount of $500,000 payable in the amount of $125,000 no later than the first business day of July and October 2019 and January and April 2020.”  
		
	2.
	Section 4 of the Agreement (Consulting Term) is hereby amended by deleting the reference to “2019” with “2020”.




		
	3.
	Section 8 of the Agreement (Noncompetition and Nonsolicitation) is hereby amended by deleting the reference to “May 31, 2020” in the last line thereof and replacing such reference with “May 31, 2021”.




		
	4.
	Except as set forth herein, all other terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.   




                                               











IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Amendment as of the date first written above.


AXIS Specialty Limited




By: /s/ Peter J. Vogt
Name: Peter J. Vogt
Title:  Executive Vice President and
           Chief Financial Officer                                


                        
Consultant




/s/ Michael A. Butt
Michael A. Butt


2
#### Ronald R. SANTOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Renee BAKER, Warden; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-17230

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed March 3, 2017

Ronald R. Santos, Pro Se

Clark G. Leslie, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGNV—Nevada Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for Defendants-Appellees

*587Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ronald Santos, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and equal protection claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, *Hamilton v. Brown,*630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Santos’s equal protection claim set forth in Count II because Santos failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was treated differently from similarly situated individuals, or discriminated against based on his membership in a protected class without rational basis. *See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech,*528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (elements of an equal protection “class of one” claim); *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998) (elements of a § 1983 equal protection claim); *see also Cousins v. Lockyer,*568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (failure to follow internal state prison policies does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation).

The district court properly dismissed Santos’s equal protection claim challenging the ban on the use of tobacco products set forth in Count III because Santos failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he is a member of a suspect class, that tobacco use is a fundamental right, or that the ban does not bear a rational relation to legitimate governmental objectives. *See Webber v. Crabtree,*158 F.3d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing equal protection claim based on smoking ban).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to amend Santos’s due process claim set forth in Count I because amendment would be futile. *United States v. Corinthian Colleges,*655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Santos’s requests, set forth in his reply brief, are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid*588ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Earvin SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D14-1635

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed June 6, 2018

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jeffrey R. Geldens, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SUAREZ, LAGOA, SALTER, EMAS, FERNANDEZ, LOGUE, SCALES, LUCK and LINDSEY, JJ.

***ON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT***

PER CURIAM.

This case returns to us from the Florida Supreme Court, which quashed that portion of our earlier decision reversing Smith's conviction and sentence for armed burglary.1*See**State v. Smith*, 241 So.3d 53 (Fla. 2018). In accordance with the Florida Supreme Court's opinion and pursuant to its mandate, we reinstate and affirm Earvin Smith's conviction and sentence for armed burglary.

1

*Smith v. State*, 211 So.3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). We stayed the issuance of our mandate pending review by the Florida Supreme Court.
Michael WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case Nos. 2D16-2294 2D16-2326

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 18, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Berton G. TOAVS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert BANNISTER; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-17199

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

*579Berton G. Toavs, Pro Se

Clark G. Leslie, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGNV—Nevada Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, NY, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Berton G. Toavs, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Togucki v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Toavs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants Dr. Bannister, Dr. Johns, or Dr. Mar were deliberately indifferent in treating Toavs’s medical problems. *See id.*at 1057, 1060 (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health; a difference in opinion is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Toavs’s motion to amend his complaint because Toavs failed to establish “good cause” for his delay in seeking amendment, and amendment would have been futile. *See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,*975 F.2d 604, 607, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard of review and “good cause” requirement to modify a scheduling order); *see also Chappel v. Lab. Corp.,*232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.... ”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Toavs’s opposed motion to transmit physical exhibits (Docket Entry No. 11) is denied.

Toavs’s request for costs, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Roy Livingston ROLLE, III, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Case No. 5D17-1599

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed June 1, 2018

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Andrew Mich, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

PER CURIAM.

We conclude that there was no competent, substantial evidence to support a downward departure sentence in this battery case. Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand this cause with instructions that the lower court sentence Appellee in accordance with the Criminal Punishment Code.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

TORPY, WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
Christan Lamar STARKES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-5371

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 22, 2018

Christan Lamar Starkes, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Bryan Jordan, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

Upon consideration of Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Appellant's Response in Opposition, the Court has determined that the appeal must be dismissed because the order on appeal is not among those reviewable by a defendant in a criminal case. *Cf.* Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1). Appellee's motion is granted, and the appeal is hereby dismissed.

Wolf, Lewis, and Ray, JJ., concur.
LAND ROVER EMISSION DEFECT INFORMATION REPORT NO. L10042D0A Causal part name: DIAGNOSTIC MODULE – TANK LEAKAGE (DMTL) Causal part number: WTR500020

Issued: 20 July 2010 Page 1 of 2 Code of Federal Regulations. Title 40. Part 85. Subpart T. §85.1903 - Emissions Defect Information Report
(c)(1) The manufacturers corporate name. Land Rover.
(c)(2) A description of the defect. DMTL replacements are made when dealer technicians investigate M.I.L. illumination and find evaporative leak codes stored.
(c)(3) A description of each class or category of vehicles potentially affected by the defect including make, model, model year, and such other information as may be required to identify these vehicles. See table in section (c)(4)(i) below. (c)(4) For each class or category of vehicle or engine desc ribed in response to paragraph (c)(3) of this section, the following shall also be provided: (c)(4)(i) The number of vehicles or engines known or estimated to have the defectand an explanation of the means by which this number was determined.

MODEL YEAR TEST GROUP MODEL SALES CLAIMS / DEFECTS 2007 7LRXT04.2001 Range Rover Sport 2627 119 2007 7LRXT04.4001 Range Rover Sport; LR3 13736 573 2008 8LRXT03.2001 LR2 14669 129 2008 8LRXT04.2001 Range Rover Sport 5833 141 2008 8LRXT04.4001 Range Rover Sport; LR3 21136 529 The above data was taken from Land Rover's warranty tracking report dated 2010Q1.
(c)(4)(ii) The address of the plant at which the potentially defective vehicles or engines were produced. Land Rover Solihull Plant, Birmingham, England. Land Rover Halewood Plant, Liverpool, England.LAND ROVER EMISSION DEFECT INFORMATION REPORT NO. L10042D0A Causal part name: DIAGNOSTIC MODULE – TANK LEAKAGE (DMTL) Causal part number: WTR500020

Issued: 20 July 2010 Page 2 of 2 (c)(5) An evaluation of the emissions impact of the defect and a description of any driveability problems which a defective vehicle might exhibit. A defective DMTL prevents successful completion of the leak check cycle; it cannot cause an evaporative leak. There is no adverse impact on driveability associated with this issue. This issue illuminates the M.I.L.
(c)(6) Available emissions data which relate to the defect. There is no adverse impact on emissions caused by the DMTL.
(c)(7) An indication of any an ticipated manufacturer follow-up. This issue is regarded as self campaigning; M.I.L. illumination prompts drivers to return the vehicle to a Land Rover dealer for rectification.
Slater Thomas MOODY, DOC #R58049, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3322

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 18, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Roderick Jerome RILEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3716

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 4, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
SCWC-14-0000840
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

STATE OF HAWAI # I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. BRANDETTE K. RAMOS-LABENIA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-14-0000840; CASE NO. 1DCW-12-000335) ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Reck tenwald, C.J., Nak ayama, Mc Kenna, Po llack, an d Wilson, JJ.)

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Brandette K. RamosLabenia’s application for writ of certiorari filed on October 11, 2015, is hereby rejected.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, November 13, 2015. Tae W. Kim for petitioner Stephen K. Tsushima for respondent /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack /s/ Michael D. Wilson Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-14-0000840 13-NOV-2015 10:04 AM
Joseph Nelson WEST, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D16-5379

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 20, 2018

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and David A. Henson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

Joseph Nelson West appeals his conviction for burglary of a dwelling with a battery, alleging that the trial court improperly denied his challenges to strike jurors for cause, and assessed an erroneous $352 battery surcharge against him at sentencing. We affirm without comment, except with respect to the fee.

Mr. West was convicted of breaking into the home of the mother of his child and committing battery. With convictions of this type, § 938.08, Florida Statutes, requires the imposition of a $201 domestic violence-related surcharge. Here, the trial court assessed a $352 surcharge. But no authority exists to support the additional $151 surcharge amount imposed by the court.

The State argues that the additional $151 amount is supported by § 775.0835(1), which allows the trial court to levy an optional fine for causing injury to another person. But the trial court did not purport to fine Mr. West, but only to impose the battery surcharge. Furthermore, the court didn't make the findings necessary to impose such a fine. Before imposing a fine under § 775.0835(1), a court must find "that the defendant has the present ability to pay the fine and finds that the impact of the fine ... will not cause [the defendant's] dependents to be dependent on public welfare." *Id.* The trial court did not make these findings. *See**Houle v. State* , 33 So.3d 822, 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (striking fines imposed under § 775.0835 due to the absence of required findings). We thus remand with directions to strike $151 from the battery surcharge amount, leaving only the $201 amount authorized by § 938.08.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with directions.

Wolf, Osterhaus, and Winsor, JJ., concur.
Adriana JARDIM and Jose Gomes Jardim, Jr., Appellants, v. COUNTRY WIDE HOME LOANS, INC., Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1868

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed December 26, 2017 Rehearing Denied January 29, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Public Comments to Advisory Committee

The Rail Vehicles Access Advisory Committee is using regulations.gov as its electronic docket. The public is encouraged to submit comments to assist the Committee as it develops its recommendations for the US Access Board. See Advisory Committee Charter for more information on the purpose of the committee.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lance Terrell REESE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6947

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 19, 2017

Decided: October 24, 2017

Lance Terrell Reese, Appellant Pro Se. George Zachary Terwilliger, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lance Terrell Reese seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. *256§ 2253(c)(2) (2012). When-the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Reese has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
PD-1603-14 

# COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEA'5 ALONZOGRAYSON,JR. § INTHE JAN302015 PETITIONER § § 

## vs. -' § texas AbelAcosta,Clei* § STATE OF TEXAS/ § RESPONDENT. § COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS PETTTTONER'S MOTION FOR SUSPENSION OF RU1LES TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS: 

### Comas Now, Alonzo Grayson, Jr., "Petitioner," pursuant 

## to rule2oftheTexasRulesofAppellateProcedureaRtLoieapfect

## COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS fully moves this Court tosuspendrule 9.3(b)(1) andwith respect 

### JAN302313 thereto will shwo the following: 

### a. statementofthecase AbelAcosta,,Cierk 1. Petitioner is pursuing a Petition For Discretionary Review with this court from a final judgment out of the 296th 

### District Court of Collin County, Texas and affirmation on appeal from the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Dallas Texas under 

### cause numbers 296-81500-2012 and 05-13-00832-Cr respectively.
B. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES 2. Rule 2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure (TRAP) allows this Court to suspend the rules for good cause shown. Petitioner is an indigent Texas state prisoner and has 

### no access to any duplication equipment to provide the original 

### and eleven copies of his Petitionwith attached opinion from the Court of Appeals.

Page 1.3. Petitioner has absolutely no way to provide this Court with the required copies. He has only one copy of the opinion 

### which he cannot provide with the Petition as it is needed for further court review if he is denied relief from the Court of Criminal Appeals. 4. Petitioner in exercising his First Amendment right 

### of access to courts respectfully moves this court to suspend the requirement of providing the original and eleven copies 

### of the Petition and rule 68.4(i) as he cannot meet the requir ement of the copies and opinion.. 5. Suspension of the two rules will not hinder the review 

### proceedings or cause any burden on anyparty. The opinion can be reviewed electronically and the Petitioner can be scanned to be reviewed by all Justices of the Court. C. PRAYER 6. Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully prays this Court 

### to suspend rules 9.3(b)(1) and 68.4(i) whichwill give him effective and meaningful access to the Courts in his Petitioner for Discretionary Review. Respectfully submitted,

Page 2. Along$ Grayabn, Ji 

### Clements Unlt-186^695 9601 Spur 591 

### Amarillo, TX:79107-9606VERIFICATION 

### Petitioner under penalty of perjury herein states that all statments made within this motion are true and correct. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

### This is to certify that I have on this 17th day of Janaury, 2015 provided a true and exact copy of this motion on Respondent 

### byplacing the same in the prison mail systempostage paid addresed
to: Wes Wynne, 

### Assistant District Attorney 2100 Bloomdale Red., Suite 20004 McKinney, TX 75071

Page 3. 

## AlonafoGrayso/n,Jr/,