UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4593

MARILYN HARPER SMITH STAFFORD,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.

Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.

(CR-97-28)

Submitted: January 19, 1999

Decided: March 22, 1999

Before WIDENER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

William Arthur Webb, Federal Public Defender, Robert H. Hale, Jr.,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M.

Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Marilyn Harper Smith Stafford appeals from the district court's

order revoking her supervised release and imposing an additional

term of imprisonment. We affirm.

Approximately one month after Stafford's release from prison

where she was serving a sentence for possession of stolen property,

her probation officer filed a petition to revoke Stafford's supervised

release. The probation officer alleged that Stafford had violated four

conditions of her supervised release: (i) based on a positive urinalysis,

she possessed cocaine; (ii) she failed to report to the probation officer

as directed; (iii) she failed to report a change of employment within

seventy-two hours; and (iv) she absconded supervision. Stafford

admitted the violations at the revocation hearing. The court revoked

Stafford's supervised release and sentenced her to a twelve-month

term of imprisonment.

On appeal, Stafford challenges the district court's revocation of her

supervised release, contending that the court did not make an express

finding regarding whether the availability of a substance abuse treatment program warranted an exception to the mandatory imprisonment

rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (1994). Because Stafford did not assert

her present claim in the district court, we review only for plain error.

See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993).

The district court must revoke the supervised release of a defendant

who has violated one of the conditions of supervised release by possessing a controlled substance, and Stafford admitted to having possessed cocaine. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). In such revocation cases,

district courts are to consider whether "the availability of appropriate

substance abuse treatment programs, or an individual's current or past

participation in such programs" warrants a departure from § 3583(g)'s

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mandatory revocation rule. See 18 U.S.C.A.§ 3583(d) (West Supp.

1998); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4, comment. (n.6) (1997). It was not plain error for the district court not to

have made an express finding as to this consideration. See United

States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995) ("A court need not

engage in ritualistic incantation in order to establish its consideration

of a legal issue. It is sufficient if . . . the district court rules on issues

that have been fully presented for determination. Consideration is

implicit in the court's ultimate ruling.").

Accordingly, we affirm the revocation of supervised release and

the imposition of a twelve-month sentence. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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