alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sherwin Antwain CARTER, a/k/a Peetey Weeze, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4581

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 30, 2017

Decided: July 18, 2017

Bradley M. Kirkland, BRADLEY M. KIRKLAND, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appel-lee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Sherwin Antwain Carter pleaded guilty, pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012). The parties agreed to a 96-month term of imprisonment, and the district court accepted the plea and sentenced Carter accordingly. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), questioning whether Carter was properly sentenced. Although notified of his right to do so, Carter did not file a pro se supplemental brief, and the Government elected not to respond to the *Anders*brief. We affirm in part and dismiss in part

Generally, we review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “However, not all sentences are subject to appellate review.” *United States v. Williams,*811 F.3d 621, 622-23 (4th Cir. 2016). In this case, we lack jurisdiction to review Carter’s sentence because it was imposed in accordance with the terms of his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and was neither based on a Sentencing Guidelines range nor imposed in violation of law. *See id.*at 623-25.

In accordance with *Anders,*we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have, found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore dismiss Carter’s challenge to his sentence of imprisonment and affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Carter, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Carter requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. *200Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Carter.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART*
STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond DARNELL

NO. 2017-KO-1526

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 25, 2018

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.

CRICHTON, J., recused.
Exhibit





EXHIBIT 10.GG





AMENDMENT 
TO THE
VALLEY NATIONAL BANK
CHANGE IN CONTROL SEVERANCE PLAN
EFFECTIVE AS OF JANUARY 27, 2016
WHEREAS, Valley National Bancorp (the “Company”) adopted the Valley National Bank Change in Control Severance Plan, effective as of January 27, 2016 (the “2016 Plan”) to provide for certain severance benefits to First Senior Vice Presidents and Senior Vice Presidents of the Company in the event of certain terminations of employment following a change in control of the Company; and
WHEREAS, in Section 9.03 of the 2016 Plan, the Company reserved to itself by action of the Compensation and Human Resources Committee (the “Committee”) the right to amend or terminate the 2016 Plan prior to the occurrence of a Change in Control (as defined therein), by providing at least twelve (12) months advance written notice to each Participant therein; and
WHEREAS, no Change in Control has occurred as of the date of this Amendment; and
WHEREAS, the Company wishes to freeze participation in the 2016 Plan as to all employees who are hired or rehired on or after January 1, 2019; 
WHEREAS, the Company wishes to terminate the 2016 Plan as to all Participants, effective as of January 1, 2021 (the “Termination Date”); and
WHEREAS, the Committee approved this Amendment at a meeting on January 30, 2019
NOW, THEREFORE, the 2016 Plan is amended as follows, effective as of December 31, 2018:
		
	1.
	Article I is amended by adding the following new paragraph to the end thereof:


“Notwithstanding anything else herein to the contrary, the Plan is terminated effective as of January 1, 2021, except with respect to Qualifying Terminations occurring prior to such date.  In addition, no individual who is hired or rehired by the Company on or after January 1, 2019 shall be eligible to receive benefits under this Plan under any circumstances.”


	
			
	101497274.1
	 
	 










EXHIBIT 10.GG









		
	2.
	Article II of the Plan is amended by adding the following new sentence to the end of the definition of “Eligible Employee”:


“Notwithstanding anything else herein to the contrary, no individual who is hired or rehired by the Company on or after January 1, 2019 shall be treated as an Eligible Employee hereunder for any purpose.”
		
	3.
	 Section 3.01 of the Plan is amended by adding the following sentence to the end thereof:


“Notwithstanding anything else herein to the contrary, no Eligible Employee shall be entitled to receive any payments or rights under this Plan if he or she receive benefits under the Valley National Bancorp 2019 Change in Control Severance Plan.”
		
	4.
	Section 8.01 of the Plan is amended by deleting the words “Carol Diesner, Director of Human Resources” and replacing them with “Yvonne Surowiec, Executive Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer”.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, being duly authorized, I have hereunto set my hand this 30 day of January, 2019.
	
	
	 

	By: 

	Gerald Korde, Chairman,



	Compensation and Human Resources Committee




            




	
			
	101497274.1
	2
	 




.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nicolas Santiago Bacca CORDOBA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-15469 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Date Filed: 11/30/2016

Germaine Seider, Daniel Michael Baeza, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, Kathy Peluso, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*746Nicolas Santiago Bacca Cordoba, FCI Jesup—Inmate Legal Mail, Jesup, GA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Thomas Burns, appointed counsel on appeal for Nicolas Santiago Bacca Cordoba in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Cordoba’s conviction and sentence is AFFIRMED.
Robert James BRIM, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0953

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 06, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                          24,855
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,220
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (190)
<INVENTORY>                                      9,227
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                42,049
<PP&E>                                          39,569
<DEPRECIATION>                                (23,689)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  59,810
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            8,481
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        214
<COMMON>                                         2,355
<OTHER-SE>                                      43,568
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    59,810
<SALES>                                         33,140
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                33,140
<CGS>                                           26,520
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   26,520
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (10,461)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (10,461)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.60)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.60)


</TABLE>
Maurice E. CLIMES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0095

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 28, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Catalina Marketing Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the
period ending September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, L. Dick Buell, Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350,
as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                  
|------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ L. Dick Buell                                                 
|L. Dick Buell                                                     
|Chief Executive Officer and Director (Principal
Executive Officer)
|November 8, 2006
_______________________________________ __ Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

September 28, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh 127902 Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. JOYCE DIFALCO, JAMES DIFALCO, Stephen J. Markman, and K. JIN LIM, Tr ustee in Bankruptcy Justices for the ESTATE OF JOYCE DIFALCO and JAMES DIFALCO, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v SC: 127902 COA: 250675 Oakland CC: 00-028388-NM ROBERT L. DOCK, M. D., F.A.C.O.O.G., SINAI HOSPITAL, d/b/a SINAI PROFESSIONAL OB-GYN, SINAI GRACE HOSPITAL, d/b/a SINAI PROFESSIONAL OB/GYN, Defendants-Appellants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appe al the December 16, 2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presen ted should be reviewed by this Court.

l 0919 I, CORBIN R. DAVIS, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 28, 2005

Clerk
In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-23-00100-CR

DENEEKO TRAVON SHAVERS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 102nd District Court

Bowie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 22F1020-102

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Deneeko Travon Shavers pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance in an amount 

greater than four grams but less than two hundred grams.

1

 Pursuant to a plea bargain with the 

State, Shavers was sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment.2 The trial court certified that this 

was a plea-bargain case and that Shavers had no right of appeal; nonetheless, Shavers, acting pro 

se, filed a notice of appeal. Because we find that we are without jurisdiction over this case due 

to the plea bargain between Shavers and the State, we dismiss the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction.3

The Texas Legislature has granted a very limited right of appeal in plea-bargain cases. 

Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure details that right as follows:

(2) . . . . In a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s 

plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the 

punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a

defendant may appeal only:

(A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on 

before trial,

(B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or

(C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). There is no indication in the record before this Court that Shavers

either (1) filed a motion that was ruled on before trial or (2) obtained the trial court’s permission 

1TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(d) (Supp.).

2Shavers’s punishment range was enhanced to that of a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §12.42(b).

3

In conjunction with the plea agreement, Shavers waived his right of appeal. In addition, Shavers’s notice of appeal 

was untimely. 
3

to appeal. To the contrary, the trial court’s certification of Shavers’s right of appeal indicates 

that he has no right of appeal. Pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, this Court is required to dismiss an appeal if, as in this case, the trial court’s 

certification indicates no right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).

We informed Shavers of this apparent defect in our jurisdiction over his appeal and 

afforded him an opportunity to respond and, if possible, cure such defect. Although Shavers 

responded to our letter, his response failed to convince this Court that it has jurisdiction over this 

attempted appeal. 

Because Shavers has no right of appeal due to his plea bargain with the State and because

the trial court’s certification correctly indicates that he is without a right of appeal, we dismiss 

this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Jeff Rambin

Justice

Date Submitted: May 31, 2023

Date Decided: June 1, 2023

Do Not Publish
#### PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant v. AMAZON.COM INC., Amazon Web Services, LLC, Defendants-Appellees

2015-2008

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

December 7, 2016

William M. Jay, Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by Jennifer A. Albert, Stephen Schreiner, Ce Li; David Zimmer, San Francisco, CA; Douglas J. Kline, Boston, MA; Timothy Robert Dewitt, 24IP Law Group USA, PLLC, Alexandria, VA.

Joseph R. re, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, LLP, Irvine, CA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by Joseph S. Cianfrani, Kent N. Shum, Jeremy Angus Anapol; Colin B. Heideman, Seattle, WA; Gabriel Bell, Gregory G. Garre, Jonathan Y. Ellis, Latham *&*Watkins LLP, Washington, DC; Jeffrey H. Dean, Amazon.com, Inc., Seattle, WA.

(Hughes, Schall, and Stoll, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
EXHIBIT 99(a)

              CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
                     ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, I, Robert Boeckman, Chief Operations Officer
and Co-Chief Executive Officer of Breda Telephone Corp., certify that to my
knowledge (i) Breda Telephone Corp.'s Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 (the "Report") fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Breda
Telephone Corp.

Date:  March 28, 2003


                                   /s/ Robert Boeckman
                                   --------------------------------------------
                                   Robert Boeckman, Chief Operations Officer
                                   and Co-Chief Executive Officer



                                      E-2
Exhibit 99.1





CERTIFICATIONS OF PERIODIC REPORT


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with this annual report on Form 10-K of eOn Communications Corporation (Registrant) I, Troy E. Lynch, Chief
Executive Officer of Registrant, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.  The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.  The information contained in this report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
Registrant.





/s/    TROY E. LYNCHTroy E. Lynch Chief Executive
Officer





Date:    October 29, 2002





In connection with this annual report on Form 10-K of eOn Communications Corporation (Registrant) I,
Lanny N. Lambert, Chief Financial Officer of Registrant, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.  The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.  The information contained in this report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
Registrant.





/s/    LANNY N. LAMBERTLanny N. Lambert Chief
Financial Officer





Date:    October 29, 2002
No. 28,822.

#### The State of Kansas, *Appellee,*v. Sebastian Rausch, *Appellant.*

(276 Pac. 799.)

Opinion filed May 4, 1929.

*William Keith*and *Lester Wilkinson,*both of Wichita, for the appellant.

*William A. Smith,*attorney-general, *William J. Werts,*county attorney, *George L. Adams, Wilmer E. Harms*and *Harvey C. Osborne,*assistant county attorneys, for the appellee.

*292The opinion of the court was delivered by

Harvey, J.:

Sebastian Rausch was found guilty on two counts of the violation of the intoxicating liquor laws. He has appealed, and contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.

The evidence disclosed that defendant lived upon and conducted a farm; that the officers went to his place for the purpose of making a search. No one was at home. 'At the barn, a short distance from the house, were found forty-five 52-gallon barrels, several of which contained mash in process of fermentation, then having an alcoholic content of five per cent. Ten or fifteen of the barrels had just been emptied. There were a lot of empty bottles, corks, jugs, thermometers for testing liquor, funnels, and a frame on burners, and a number of empty five-gallon kegs. The bottles had contained whisky. A number of broken bottles were just outside of the barn. There was a gasoline pump to pump water, and a well drilled in the barn. Just outside of the barn there were some empty kegs and a new barrel that had contained liquor, with a big hole cut in it. On the ground near the barrel was a wet spot, and when a match was touched to this it burned. The coil for distilling was not found. With the exception of the coil there was a complete outfit for the manufacture of intoxicating liquors, which had been, in part at least, wrecked and dismantled just before the officers reached the place.

Defendant testified that he was in possession and control of the premises, but denied that he personally had anything to do with this liquor manufacturing outfit; that a week or so previous to the raid he had met a man in a neighboring town who wanted permission to install the outfit in his barn. The man was a stranger, said it would be safe to make mash and liquor there, and offered defendant $50 a week for the privilege of doing so, which privilege he granted on those terms.

Perhaps the jury did not believe the last part of defendant’s story. Certainly they were not compelled to do so. But it is really not material, for, under his own evidence, given full credence, he aided and assisted in the unlawful business (R. S. 21-2137), and could be prosecuted as a principal (R. S. 62-1016).

There is no merit in the appeal, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
**Exhibit 4.6.1**

 
 

At the December 6, 2004 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, shareholders approved an increase in the allocation of Ordinary Shares reserved and available for issuance under the Amended and Restated 1999 Non-Employee Directors Stock Plan to 3,790,00 Ordinary Shares.

 

At the March 29, 2005 Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, shareholders approved the following amendments to the Amended and Restated 1999 Non-Employee Directors Stock Plan:
- to empower the Board of Directors, in its discretion, to provide a one-time option grant to non-employee Directors, other than the Executive Chairman of the Board, in an amount of up to 75,000 options per non-employee Director, based on the fair market value of an Ordinary Share on the date of the Meeting and according to the vesting schedule detailed under the Company’s Amended and Restated 1999 Nonemployee Directors Stock Option Plan; and  
-   to accelerate the vesting period of certain unvested options held by Mr. Udi Netzer, to March 29, 2005.  

At the December 30, 2005 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, shareholders approved the following amendments to the Amended and Restated 1999 Non-Employee Directors Stock Plan:
- Section 6(j) to the Company’s Amended and Restated 1999 Nonemployee Directors Stock Option Plan is amended to read as follows: **Termination.**  In the event of Termination, Options held at the date of Termination, to the extent then exercisable, may be exercised in whole or in part at any time within three months after the date of Termination, (but in no event after the Expiration Date), but not thereafter.  With respect to an Optionee  who has performed his/her duties to the Company for a period of at least three years, upon Termination, any outstanding Options that are not vested at the time of Termination will be accelerated  and become  fully  vested  and  exercisable  for  a  period  of 180  days thereafter,  unless termination was due to the Optionee’s resignation or for one of the causes set forth in the Israel Companies Law. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if Termination is due to death or Disability, Options held at the date of Termination, to the extent then exercisable, may be exercised in whole or in part at any time within two years from the date of Termination (but in no event after the Expiration Date) by the Optionee or by the Optionee’s guardian or legal representative in the case of Disability or in the case of death, by the person to whom the Option is transferred by will or the laws of descent and distribution.
- The above described amendment to the Amended and Restated 1999 Nonemployee Directors Stock Option Plan also be applicable to and govern Board termination of non-employee directors holding director options pursuant to the Amended and Restated Israeli Share Option Plan.