In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-2000

RANDY MUCHA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF OAK BROOK, a municipality, and

THOMAS SHEAHAN, in his official and

individual capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:07-cv-05350—William T. Hart, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2010—DECIDED FEBRUARY 14, 2011

Before BAUER, WOOD and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Sergeant Randy Mucha was

arrested in 2006 for unlawfully requesting a criminal

background check. After the prosecutors dropped all

charges against him, Mucha filed a series of complaints

in both federal and state court. The only federal claim to

survive the defendants’ motions to dismiss was Mucha’s
2 No. 10-2000

false arrest claim. Upon the parties’ cross motions for

summary judgment, the district court entered judgment

in favor of the defendants. This appeal followed.

We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2004, Acting Police Chief Steve Larson assigned

Sergeant Randy Mucha the task of conducting an

internal investigation into officer misconduct. His investigation revealed that squad cars frequently parked

outside the Gaiks’ home for long periods of time, causing

Mucha to wonder whether some police officers were

sitting idle on the job. Mucha’s suspicions were not

without merit, and at least one officer was disciplined

for improperly parking outside the Gaiks’ residence.

This was Mucha’s first encounter with the Gaiks.

In January 2005, Officer Ben Kadolph reported receiving

a phone call from Frances Gaik on his home telephone

number even though he had never given Gaik his

contact information. Mucha became concerned that

police officers had provided the Gaiks with an internal

police list containing the names, addresses, and phone

numbers of all Oak Brook police. Adding to his general

distrust of the Gaiks, Mucha discovered that Frances

Gaik was one of the primary organizers of an advocacy

group named Citizens For a Better Government, or

CBG, which publically criticized the Oak Brook Police

Department.

Toward the end of January, Mucha informed his superiors that he was not investigating the Gaiks and that he
No. 10-2000 3

had never contacted them. Contrary to these representations, however, Mucha had created “lindalucinda,” a

false electronic identity, and sent Frances Gaik a series of

e-mails in order to infiltrate CBG meetings. These e-mails

quickly won Frances Gaik’s trust, and within days

Mucha had arranged for two agents to attend and

report back on a CBG meeting. Mucha then drafted a

rebuttal to CBG’s criticisms and posted his rebuttal on

the police union website. Three days later, Mucha

learned that Frances Gaik had complained of this

posting to his superiors.

On February 1, 2005, Mucha used the Law Enforcement

Agencies Data System (“LEADS”) to run a criminal

background check on Frances Gaik. Only police officers

have access to LEADS, and their use of this system is

heavily regulated and restricted. One such restriction is

the prohibition against using LEADS for personal purposes.

While unaware that Mucha had run a criminal history

check, the Gaiks filed a civil rights lawsuit against the

Village of Oak Brook, Mucha, and the Village of Oak

Brook prosecutor. They alleged that Mucha attempted

to stifle Frances Gaik’s freedom of expression on

matters of public concern by spying on the Gaiks’ home

and sending surreptitious e-mails to Frances Gaik. Although Mucha has since admitted to these allegations,

when the Gaiks deposed Mucha, he testified under

oath that he did not have any law enforcement bases

for interacting with Frances Gaik, that he did not in fact

investigate the Gaiks, and that he did not create the

fictional electronic account “lindalucinda.”
4 No. 10-2000

Only in rare circumstances not present here is prosecutorial 1

discretion subject to judicial scrutiny.

Meanwhile, in March 2005, Acting Police Chief Larson

was replaced by Police Chief Thomas Sheahan. Since

all of the above events happened prior to Sheahan’s appointment, Sheahan could not have known of these

events unless he was informed of them by Mucha or

some other individual.

More than a year later, in July 2006, the Gaiks subpoenaed the Illinois State Police and discovered that

Mucha had requested a criminal history report on

Frances Gaik. Approximately two weeks later, police

officers called Mucha and asked him whether he ran

a background check on Frances Gaik in February 2005.

Mucha replied, “I don’t recall,” which he later admitted was a lie. Given Mucha’s response to this question, together with all other facts known to Sheahan on

August 16, 2006, Sheahan obtained a warrant and

arrested Mucha for unlawfully requesting a criminal

history check in violation of § 18(H) of the Uniform Conviction Information Act, 20 ILCS 2635/1.

Prosecutors eventually dismissed all charges against

Mucha. Soon thereafter, Mucha filed multiple claims 1

in both state and federal court; the only federal claim

surviving the defendants’ motions to dismiss was his

§ 1983 false arrest claim. Upon the parties’ cross motions

for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment in favor of the defendants on the false arrest

claim and dismissed Mucha’s state law claims without

prejudice. Mucha timely appealed. 
No. 10-2000 5

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants de novo, construing

all facts and reasonable inferences in Mucha’s favor.

Summary judgment in favor of the defendants is

proper only if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures, and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of

material fact such that the defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Mucha makes two arguments on appeal, arguing

first that he was falsely arrested and second that the

defendants do not have qualified immunity. We disagree.

A. Probable Cause to Arrest Mucha

Mucha contends that he was falsely arrested and seeks

relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010). To succeed on this

claim, Mucha must prove that Sheahan lacked probable

cause to arrest him. See Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d

392, 398-99 (7th Cir. 2007).

As an initial matter, we affirm the district court’s

finding that Sheahan did not learn of the background

check on Frances Gaik until July 2006. While Mucha

testified that he could not recall when or whether he

told Sheahan about the background check, Sheahan

testified under oath that he did not learn of the background check until July 31, 2006. Because Mucha’s testimony is inconclusive, it cannot by itself create a

genuine factual dispute. See Steinhauer v. DeGolier, 359

F.3d 481, 485 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004) (demonstrating that
6 No. 10-2000

inconclusive testimony cannot by itself create a

genuine factual dispute); Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d

833, 837 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that “a factual dispute

is ‘genuine’ for summary judgment purposes only when

there is ‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving

party for a jury to return a verdict for that party’ ”)

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986)). We therefore affirm the district court’s finding

that, viewing all facts in the record most favorable to

Mucha, it is proper to assume that Sheahan did not learn

of the background check until July 31, 2006.

We now turn to whether Sheahan possessed probable

cause in August 2006 to arrest Mucha for unlawfully

requesting a criminal background check. Probable cause

exists if “at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to

warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution,

in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the

suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to

commit an offense.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d

526, 537 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443

U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). Probable cause requires only that a

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity

exists; it does not require the existence of criminal activity

to be more likely true than not true. See Purvis v. Oest,

614 F.3d 713, 722-23 (7th Cir. 2010); Mannoia v. Farrow,

476 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2007). In evaluating probable

cause, we look only to the information known to the

officer at the time of arrest, and we view the circumstances of the arrest from the perspective of a reasonable

person in the position of the officer. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d
No. 10-2000 7

at 537. Thus, the jury should determine the existence of

probable cause only if “there is room for a difference

of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.” Id. (citing Sornberger v.

City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1013-14 (7th Cir. 2006)).

Sheahan learned the following information in

March 2005: (1) Mucha was conducting an internal investigation into police misconduct; (2) Mucha discovered that squad cars were frequently parked outside

the Gaiks’ home; (3) an officer was disciplined for improperly parking outside the Gaiks’ home; and

(4) Mucha was concerned that police officers may

have provided the Gaiks with an internal police list that

contained the names, addresses, and phone numbers of

Oak Brook police officers. However, by August 16, 2006

(the date of Mucha’s arrest), Sheahan had discovered the

following additional information through the Gaiks’

civil lawsuit, newspaper articles, and other means:

(1) Mucha did not approve of CBG, the group

organized primarily by Frances Gaik; (2) Mucha spied

on the Gaiks, infiltrated CBG meetings, and created a

false e-mail account through which he contacted

Frances Gaik; (3) Mucha ran Google searches on Frances

Gaik for purposes unrelated to any police investigation;

(4) although Mucha had previously testified under

oath that he did not run a criminal background check

on Frances Gaik, the Illinois State Police records

indicated that Mucha did in fact run the background

check; (5) at no time was Frances Gaik a witness in

any police investigation or the focus of any police investigation; and (6) when asked for a second time whether
8 No. 10-2000

he had run a criminal history check on Frances Gaik,

Mucha responded “I don’t recall,” a response that Mucha

now admits was a lie. Even if we assume that Mucha

secretly held a legitimate reason to run the criminal

background check—as he now asserts he did—Sheahan

was not armed with knowledge of Mucha’s innocent

motive at the time of Mucha’s arrest. Given everything

that Sheahan knew in August 2006, we find that he had

probable cause to arrest Mucha because a reasonable

person could believe, under these circumstances, that

there was a substantial probability that Mucha had unlawfully requested a criminal background check. This is

true even if Sheahan was maliciously motivated; an officer’s motivations are not relevant to the probable cause

determination. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153

(2004). We affirm the district court’s judgment.

B. Qualified Immunity

Mucha also argues that the defendants cannot succeed

on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity because,

when procuring Mucha’s arrest warrant, Sheahan knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the

truth made false statements that were necessary to the

judge’s probable cause determination. We need not reach

this issue, however, because the existence of probable

cause protects the defendants from liability, and the

defendants therefore do not require the additional protection of qualified immunity. See Whitlock v. Brown,

596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that probable

cause is “an absolute defense to any claim under

Section 1983 against police officers for wrongful arrest”)
No. 10-2000 9

(quoting Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th

Cir. 2006)). 

C. State Law Claims

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mucha’s state

law claims because Mucha has no viable federal claim

and neither party contends that we should retain jurisdiction over state law issues.

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

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