Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1073 | January 24, 2019 Page 1 of 5

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Troy D. Warner

Deputy Public Defender

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James Woodrow Morrison,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 24, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1073

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable Elizabeth C. 

Hurley, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D08-1702-F3-11

Shepard, Senior Judge.

[1] James Morrison claims his convictions of both resisting law enforcement while 

operating a vehicle in a manner that causes death and operating a vehicle with a 

controlled substance in the body causing serious bodily injury violate his right 

against double jeopardy. Concluding that his rights were not violated, we 

affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1073 | January 24, 2019 Page 2 of 5

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2017, a police officer observed a vehicle he believed was recently 

stolen. After using the plate number to confirm this belief, the officer attempted 

to stop the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle, who was later identified as 

Morrison, accelerated and refused to stop for the officer. Morrison disregarded 

a red traffic light and collided with a pick-up truck, killing its driver. Morrison’s 

three passengers were also severely injured. The collision involved four other 

vehicles that were struck by either the stolen vehicle, the pick-up truck, or 

debris. Morrison admitted to medical personnel that he had used heroin earlier 

in the day, which was later confirmed by a blood test.

[3] Morrison was charged with Count I resisting law enforcement while operating a 

vehicle in a manner that causes death, a Level 3 felony;1Count II operating a 

vehicle with a controlled substance in the blood causing death, a Level 4 

felony;2and Counts III-V operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the 

body causing serious bodily injury, all as Level 6 felonies.3 Pursuant to a plea 

agreement, he pleaded guilty to all the charges. The plea agreement also 

reserved Morrison’s “right to appeal his sentence regarding double jeopardy 

issues that may be directly related to issues raised by” this Court’s decision in 

 

1

Ind. Code §§ 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), (b)(3) (2016).

2

Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(b)(2) (2016).

3

Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4(a)(2) (2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1073 | January 24, 2019 Page 3 of 5

Edmonds v. State, 86 N.E.3d 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. granted. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2, p. 37. 

[4] Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, sentencing was left to the court’s discretion. 

The court entered judgment on all counts but did so on the lesser-included 

offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor for 

Count II. The court sentenced Morrison to sixteen years on Count I and twelve 

months on Count II, to be served concurrently, and to thirty months each on 

Counts III-V, to be served consecutively to each other as well as consecutively 

to Counts I and II. The total is thus twenty-three and one-half years.

Issue

[5] Morrison presents one issue: whether his convictions violate double jeopardy.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Morrison contends that, in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Edmonds v. 

State, 100 N.E.3d 258 (Ind. 2018), his convictions of (1) resisting law 

enforcement while operating a vehicle in a manner that causes death, and (2) 

operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the body causing serious 

bodily injury constitute a statutory double jeopardy violation.

4

 

4 Morrison’s plea agreement reserved his right to appeal his sentence based upon this Court’s decision in 

Edmonds, 86 N.E.3d 414. However, following Morrison’s plea but prior to the filing of his appellate brief, our 

Supreme Court granted transfer in Edmonds and issued a decision in June 2018. Accordingly, on appeal 

Morrison bases his argument on the decision of our Supreme Court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1073 | January 24, 2019 Page 4 of 5

[7] In Edmonds, the defendant’s convictions included one count of felony resisting 

law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing death and two counts of felony 

resisting law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing serious bodily injury. 

The Supreme Court held that Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1, which makes 

resisting law enforcement unlawful, authorizes only one felony conviction 

where a single act of resisting law enforcement while operating a vehicle causes 

both death and serious bodily injury, regardless of how many people are 

harmed. Id. at 262-63.

[8] Here, Morrison was convicted of only one offense under the resisting statute—

resisting law enforcement while operating a vehicle in a manner that causes 

death. His convictions for causing serious bodily injury while operating a 

vehicle arise from the operating while intoxicated statute. See Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 2, pp. 146-47; see also Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4(a)(2). In Edmonds, the Supreme 

Court plainly stated that its decision was specific to and rested only on the 

statutory grounds of the resisting statute. While a perpetrator who races away 

from police after a multiple victim collision commits only one “resisting,” a 

perpetrator whose driving injures multiple victims commits multiple offenses 

under the operating statutes.

[9] Morrison’s convictions do not create a statutory double jeopardy violation.

[10] In his brief to this Court, Morrison also includes a constitutional double jeopardy 

analysis. Assuming, arguendo, that his plea agreement permits a constitutional 

double jeopardy challenge, we conclude there is none. Morrison’s convictions 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1073 | January 24, 2019 Page 5 of 5

for resisting law enforcement and operating a vehicle causing serious bodily 

injury involve separate victims. The driver of the pick-up truck is the victim of 

Morrison’s resisting conviction, and Morrison’s three passengers are the 

victims, individually, of his three convictions of operating a vehicle causing 

serious bodily injury. See Rawson v. State, 865 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 

(stating that our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where convictions 

arise from situation where separate victims are involved, no double jeopardy 

violation exists), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[11] We conclude Morrison’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy. 

[12] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.