[Cite as Bonifield v. Bonifield , 2021-Ohio-95.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

CHRISTOPHER BONIFIELD, Appellee,

- vs -

KRISTEN BONIFIELD, Appellant. :

:

:

:

:

: CASE NO . CA2020-02-022

O P I N I O N

1/19/2021

APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. DR 2018 01 0035

Frank J. Schianove, IV, 9078 Union Centre, Suite 240, West Ches ter, Ohio 45069, for appellee Joseph A. Cesta, 1160 E. Main Street, P.O. Box 36, Lebanon, Ohi o 45036, for appellee Hochwalt & Schiff, LLC, Thomas R. Schiff, 500 Lincoln Park Blvd ., Suite 216, Kettering, Ohio 45429, for appellant

S. POWELL, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Kristen Bonifield ("Mother"), appeals the decision o f the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, allo cating parenting time and designating appellee, Christopher Bonifield ("Father"), as thei r child's residential parent forButler CA2020-02-022

- 2 - school purposes. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm. {¶ 2} Mother and Father were married on November 6, 2010. There was one child born issue of the marriage, a boy, born on April 8, 2013. The child has been diagnosed with high risk Pre-B Cell Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia. This d iagnosis requires the child to have regular blood draws, injections, lumbar puncture intrav enous chemotherapy, several prescription medications, and numerous doctor appointme nts. Father is employed at a local retail warehouse working second shift Monday through Thursday, 4:00 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. Mother works as a dog groomer at a pet grooming salo n approximately 20 to 30 hours per week. Father resides next door to his parents who he lp take care of the child

when Father is at work. Mother would like to homeschool the ch ild throughout her workday by bringing the child with her to work. Father prefers the chi ld be enrolled in public school

within the school district where Father resides. {¶ 3} On January 19, 2018, Father filed for divorce from Mother. A g uardian ad litem was then appointed for the child. After several other an cillary matters unrelated to this appeal were resolved, the matter ultimately proceeded to a thre e-day final contested divorce hearing. During this hearing, both Mother and Father t estified. Following this hearing, the parties submitted a number of joint stipulations i nto the record. As part of these joint stipulations, the parties agreed that shared parenting wa s in the child's best interest. This left unresolved only Mother's and Father's parental rights and responsibilities as it relates to: (1) their allotted parenting time, and (2) who woul d be designated as the child's residential parent for school purposes. There is no dispute th at these are the only two issues subject of this appeal. {¶ 4} On October 17, 2019, the domestic relations court issued a deci sion allocating Mother and Father with nearly equal parenting time on an altern ating weekly basis. There is no dispute that the parenting time schedule the domestic rel ations court put into place isButler CA2020-02-022

- 3 - the same approximate parenting time schedule that Father reques ted as part of his proposed shared parenting plan. There is also no dispute that the guardian ad litem recommended a parenting time schedule that provided Mother and Father with equal parenting time similar to what the domestic relations court ult imately put into place. {¶ 5} The domestic relations court's decision designated Father as th e child's residential parent for school purposes. In so holding, the dom estic relations court noted that Father was concerned by Mother's plan to bring the child w ith her to work in order to homeschool the child throughout her workday. The domestic rela tions court also noted that Father was concerned about the difficulty that Mother would lik ely face while at work in providing the proper care and attention the child required. Th e domestic relations court further noted Father's belief that Mother's place of employment – a dog grooming salon – was not "the most sanitary environment" that could "further com promise" the child's already fragile health. {¶ 6} The domestic relations court additionally noted in regard to Mo ther and her

desire to homeschool the child: [Mother] has always believed that home schooling for their minor child would be best. She believed the parties always agreed [the child] would be home schooled. She maintains that home schooling is 'better' for children than public school. Sh e believes strongly that she can provide the necessary skills to make sure [the child] thrives academically. [Mother] lacks formal training and education but maintains that neither are necessary. The record indicates that these were the same concerns expresse d by the child's guardian ad litem as part of the guardian ad litem's report and recommen dation. Mother now appeals the domestic relations court's decision, raising two assignment s of error for review. {¶ 7} Assignment of Error No. 1: {¶ 8} THE COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OFButler CA2020-02-022

- 4 - THE EVIDENCE AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS IT RELATES TO THE IS SUE OF

PARENTING TIME. {¶ 9} In her first assignment of error, Mother argues the domestic re lations court erred in the allocation of the parties' parenting time schedule s. We disagree. {¶ 10} "R.C. 3109.04 governs the award of parental rights and responsi bilities."

Whitaker v. Whitaker , 12th Dist. Fayette Nos. CA2019-05-008 and CA2019-05-009, 2020

- Ohio-2774, ¶ 16. This includes the allocation of parenting tim e. Id. at ¶ 19. The primary concern is the best interest of the child in making this determ ination. Albrecht v. Albrecht , 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2014-12-240 and CA2014-12-245, 2015-Oh io-4916, ¶ 22. In order to determine the best interest of a child, the domestic relatio ns court must consider all relevant factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Bristow v. Bristow , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-05-139, 2010-Ohio-3469, ¶ 8. These factors include, but are not limited to, (1) the wishes of the child's parents regarding the child's care, (2) t he wishes and concerns of the child, (3) the child's interaction and interrelationship with t he child's parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest, (4) the mental and physical health of all persons involved, and (5) the child's ad justment to the child's home, school, and community. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a) thru (e). {¶ 11} The domestic relations court's "determination regarding its bes t interest finding will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Leach v. Leach , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-06-092, 2020-Ohio-1181, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretio n implies that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable

. Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). "[T]he vast majority of cases in which an abuse of discretion

is asserted involve claims that the decision is unreasonable." Effective Shareholder Solutions v. Natl. City Bank, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-080451 and C-090117, 2009-Ohio6200, ¶ 9. A decision is unreasonable where it is not supporte d by a sound reasoningButler CA2020-02-022

- 5 - process. In re B.B. , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2019-07-057, 2020-Ohio-4007, ¶ 22. {¶ 12} Relying heavily on her own testimony as to what she believes wo uld be in the child's best interest, Mother argues the domestic relations cou rt erred in how it allocated the parties' respective parenting time schedules. This include s, for instance, Mother's testimony that she was the child's primary caregiver and was mo re knowledgeable of the child's medical treatment and specialized needs than Father. H owever, after a thorough review of the record, it is clear that Mother's argument is not hing more than a challenge to the weight that the domestic relations court gave to each of th e best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). But, as this court has stated previousl y, it is the role of the domestic relations court, not this court, to determine the relative weig ht to assign to each factor when determining the child's best interest. See Mack v. Mack , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-09- 179, 2019-Ohio-2379, ¶ 33. {¶ 13} This court should not, and will not, second-guess the domestic relations court's decision as to the appropriate weight to be given to an y one of those best interest

factors. In re A.B. , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-10-257, 2010-Ohio-2823, ¶ 35. T he same

is true as it relates to the domestic relations court's decisio n regarding Mother's credibility. See, e.g., Albert v. Albert , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24000, 2010-Ohio-6112, ¶ 32 ("[w]e defer to the trial court's determinations of the parties' credi bility and of the appropriate weight to be given to the statutory factors"). This is because "it is well-established that a trial court, particularly a domestic relations court, is in the best position to resolve disputes of fact, and assess the 'credibility of witnesses' and the weig ht to be given to their testimony." Bates v. Bates , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-137, 2005-Ohio-3374, ¶ 38. {¶ 14} The domestic relations court, after hearing testimony from both Mother and Father, and upon reviewing the guardian ad litem's report and r ecommendation, determined that granting Mother and Father a nearly equal parenting time s chedule was in the child'sButler CA2020-02-022

- 6 - best interest. Despite Mother's claims, we find nothing about the domestic relation court's decision to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable so as to constitute an abuse of

discretion. The domestic relations court's decision was also n ot against the manifest weight of the evidence. This holds true no matter how stringently Mot her opposes the domestic relations court's decision, nor how strongly Mother believes sh e should be given more parenting time with the child than Father. It is the child's b est interest and not the parent's wishes that is controlling. See Harrold v. Collier , 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶ 44 ("a parent's wishes should [not] be placed before a child's bes t interest"). Therefore, finding no merit to any of the arguments advanced by Mother herein, Mot her's first assignment of

error lacks me rit and is overruled. {¶ 15} Assignment of Error No. 2: {¶ 16} THE DESIGNATION OF FATHER AS THE RESIDENTIAL PARENT FOR

SCHOOL PURPOSES WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. {¶ 17} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues the domestic r elations court erred by designating Father as the child's residential parent f or school purposes. We disagree. {¶ 18} The domestic relations court's primary concern is the best inte rest of the child when determining which parent should be designated as that chil d's residential parent for school purposes. Payson v. Hennessey , 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2017-03-030 and CA2017-03-036, 2018-Ohio-2437, ¶ 23. In making this determinat ion, the domestic

relations court must consider the best interest factors set for th in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).

Beucler v. Beucler , 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2014-05-009, 2015-Ohio-1084, ¶ 19. As noted above, these factors include, but are not limited to, (1) the w ishes of the child's parents regarding the child's care, (2) the wishes and concerns of the child, (3) the child's interactionButler CA2020-02-022

- 7 - and interrelationship with the child's parents, siblings, and a ny other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest, (4) the mental and physical health of all persons involved, and (5) the child's adjustment to the child's home, s chool, and community. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a) thru (e). {¶ 19} The domestic relations court's decision to designate one parent as the child's residential parent for school pur poses over the other will not be reversed absent an abuse

of discretion. Leach , 2020-Ohio-1181 at ¶ 10; Allen v. Allen , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010- 11-107, 2011-Ohio-1478, ¶ 11 ("we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in designating Father as the residential parent for school enrollm ent purposes"). As stated previously, this requires the domestic relations court's decisi on to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Fee v. Fee , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-11-274, 2003-Ohio6781, ¶ 22. A decision is unreasonable where it is not support ed by a sound reasoning

process. In re B.B. , 2020-Ohio-4007 at ¶ 22. {¶ 20} As noted above, Mother believes it is in the child's best inter est for her to homeschool the child. Father disagrees and believes it is in t he child's best interest to attend public school in the school district where he resides. The domestic relations court agreed with Father. The domestic relations court's decision wa s not an abuse of discretion nor was it against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶ 21} As the record indicates, the dom estic relations court's decisio n to designate Father as the child's residential parent for school purposes wi ll allow the child to attend public school in a school district that provides a safe and qui et environment for the child to learn and grow. We find no error in the domestic relations cou rt's decision when considering

the alternative was for Mother to homeschool the child at Mothe r's workplace – a dog grooming salon – during Mother's workday. This is particularly true here when considering the child's already fragile health, as well as the concerns exp ressed by the guardian adButler CA2020-02-022

- 8 - litem in regard to Mother's ability to effectively homeschool t he child given her lack of formal training. The domestic relations court, just as this court on appeal, must act in a way that places the child's best interest above all else. Mack , 2019-Ohio-2379 at ¶ 36. Based on the record properly before this court, the domestic relations c ourt's decision does just that. Therefore, finding no merit to any of the arguments raised here in, Mother's second assignment of error also lacks merit and is overruled. {¶ 22} Judgment affirmed.

HENDRICKSON, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.