17-971-cr United States v. Vega 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AF TER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERM ITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROC EDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPEND IX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATAB ASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMM ARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthous e, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26 th day of February, two thousand eighteen. PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, PETER W. HALL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges

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--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------- U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff-Appellee , v. No. 17-971-cr
C ARLOS V EGA , Defendant-Appellant

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--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------- For Appellant: Ph ilip L. Weinstein, Of Counsel, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, New York. For Appellee: Alexandra Rothman and Karl Metzner, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York.

### 2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Chin,* J. ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the dist rict court entered on April 3, 2017, is AFFIRMED

. Defendant Carlos Vega (“Veg a”) appeals from the fifteen-month consecutive term of imprisonment imposed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Chin, J. ), following revocation of his term of supervis ed release. Specifically, Vega challenges the district court’s decision to sentence him to a term of imprisonment to run consecutive to his undischarged twelve-and-a-half-year state sentence imposed after Vega pleaded guilty to the state law crime of first-degree manslaughter. We review a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release for “reasonableness.” United States v. Verkhoglyad , 516 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 261–64 (2005)); United States v. McNeil , 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The standard of review on the appeal of a sentence for violation of s upervised release is now the same standard as for sentencing generally: whether the sentence imposed is reasonable.”). “A sentence is substantively unreasonab le if it cannot be loca ted within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Jenkins , 854 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 2017) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether a sentence falls within the permissible ra nge, we patrol th e boundaries of reasonableness, cognizant of the fa ct that responsibility for sentencing is placed largely with the district courts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In undertaking this review, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of the prior pro ceedings, which we reference only

*The Honorable Denny Chin, United States Circuit Judge, sitting by designation.

### 3 as necessary to explain our decision to affirm the district court’s decision. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court may, after cons idering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment. A district co urt’s sentencing decision is guided by the “‘nonbinding policy statements found in Chapter Seven of the Guidelines Manual [including Section 7B1.3],’ [but] the court ultimately has ‘broad discre tion to revoke its previo us sentence and impose a term of imprisonment’ up to the statutory maximum.” United States v. Pelensky , 129 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cr. 1997) (quoting United States v. Sweeney , 90 F.3d 55, 57 (2d Ci r. 1996)). Section 7B1.3(f) of the Guidelines provide s, in relevant part, that “[a] ny term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of . . . supervis ed release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Vega argues that the district court abused it s discretion in ordering a consecutive sentence despite Vega’s lengthy pretrial detention and le ngthy state sentence. Specifically, Vega claims that the district court improperly relied on its belief that Vega’s twelve-and-a-half -year sentence was lenient for a manslaughter convi ction. Vega further claims th at the district court imposed “needless punishment,” considering the unique circ umstances of his nine-a nd-a-half-year pretrial detention for his state law sentence. Appellant’s Br. at 9. In his view, a consecutive sentence does not serve as a general deterrent because there are no similarly situated defendants in light of his lengthy pretrial detention. Finally, Vega implies that the dist rict court erred by waiting to sentence him until after his state case was resolved.

### 4 Vega’s arguments are unavailing. The district court did not rely on a belief that Vega’s state sentence was lenient. At sentencing, the distri ct court asked defense counsel whether a twelve-and-a-half-year sentence wa s “typical” for a first-degree manslaughter conviction. App’x at 31. The district court stated that it was its “instinct” that a twelve-a nd-a-half-year sentence was “on the low-end for killing someone.” Id. In reaching its senten cing decision, however, the district court ultimately drew no conclusions as to the lenien cy or harshness of Vega’s state

sentence. Id. at 39 (“I don’t know whether 12 and-a-half years is a lo ng sentence[] [or] a short sentence for a state court crime.”). Furthermore, Vega’s deterrence argument i gnores the deterrence purposes served by a consecutive sentence. The dist rict court ordered a consecutive sentence to send a message to those who commit serious crimes while on supervised release that their supervision term will not simply be subsumed within the sentence impos ed for the new charge. In other words, a consecutive sentence serves as a separate punishm ent to deter supervisees from violating the terms of supervised release and thereby breachi ng the trust of the district court. Finally, the district court did not err in waiting until Vega’s state proceedings were resolved before sentencing him on his supervised release violation. There is no i ndication in the record that Vega objected to the long adjournment of the federal proceedings pending the resolution of his state case. Further, we have explained that “[r]equiring a federal court to begin revocation proceedings before the state court has determined whether the defendant is guilty on the charges underlying revocation would thrust the federal court into a determination of the defendant’s guilt under state law, an area fundamenta lly reserved to the states.” United States v. Ramos , 401 F.3d 111, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2005). Likewise , “judicial efficiency is better served in any event by

### 5 ascertaining the defendant’s guilt once in state court, rather than twice.” Id. at 118. We have considered Vega’s remaining argumen ts on appeal and find them to be without merit. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court