alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT
      32.1 – CEO Certification**








**HEARTLAND,
      INC.**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUNT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with the Annual Report of Heartland, Inc. (the "Company") on
      Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Trent Sommerville,
      Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Company,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss. 1350, as added by ss. 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.         The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.         The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and
      for
      the period covered by the Report.








/s/
      Trent Sommerville


Trent
      Sommerville, CEO


And
      Chairman of the Board of Directors





April
      17,
      2007





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 ("Section 906"), or other document authenticating, acknowledging,
      or
      otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the
      electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been
      provided to Heartland, Inc., and will be retained by Heartland, Inc. and
      furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.
Rodney JACOBSON, Appellant, v. Paula JACOBSON, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1234

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 20, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### CHIEN HWA SHEN, Petitioner, v. Jeff B. SESSIONS, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 11-72626

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 23, 2017

Chien Hwa Shen, Pro Se

Sheri Robyn Glaser, Trial Attorney, Suzanne N. Nardone, Esquire, OIL, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office .of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Chien Hwa Shen, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shen’s motion as untimely and number-barred where Shen filed his third motion to reopen more than seven years after the final administrative order, *see 8*C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Shen failed to demonstrate he qualified for a regulatory exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); *see also Najmabadi,*597 F.3d at 991 (concluding that evidence submitted with motion to reopen did not establish changed circumstances arising within the country of nationality); *cf. Chandra v. Holder,*751 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that an alien can satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) by presenting “evidence of changed country conditions that are relevant in light of the petitioner’s changed circumstances”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000798538
<NAME> ADEN ENTERPRISES, INC.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-1998
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        8,773,547
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     2,383,564
<OTHER-SE>                                (11,157,111)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,544,494
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             543,269
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,087,763)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,087,763)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,087,763)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.12)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.12)


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1518 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1518

  To improve the national instant criminal background check system in 
  order to search the National Data Exchange database when conducting 
                      criminal background checks.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 2, 2021

Mr. Rice of South Carolina (for himself, Ms. Mace, Mr. Vicente Gonzalez 
   of Texas, and Mr. Kind) introduced the following bill; which was 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To improve the national instant criminal background check system in 
  order to search the National Data Exchange database when conducting 
                      criminal background checks.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``21st Century NICS Act''.

SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT THAT THE NICS SYSTEM SEARCH THE NATIONAL DATA 
              EXCHANGE DATABASE IN CONDUCTING BACKGROUND CHECKS.

    Section 103(e)(1) of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (34 
U.S.C. 40901(e)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(L) Search of national data exchange database.--
                The system established under this section may search 
                the database of the National Data Exchange in 
                conducting a background check under this section.''.
                                 <all>
```
### BILL OF COSTS

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DISTRICT, AT TEXARKANA

No. 06

- 15

- 00021

- CV

Sidney B. Hale, Jr.

v.

City of Bonham

(No. CV

- 14

- 41722 IN 336TH DISTR ICT COURT OF FANNIN COUNTY)

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID BY

MOTION FEE

REPORTER'S RECORD

CLERK'S RECORD

SUPREME COURT CHAPTE R 51 FEE

INDIGENT

FILING

STATEWIDE EFILING FE E $10.00 $315.00 $223.00 $50.00 $25.00 $100.00 $20.00 E

- PAID

PAID

PAID

PAID

PAID

PAID

PAID CARRIE M MCKERLEY

COATS & EVANS, PC

GARY L. EVANS

CARRIE M MCKERLEY

CARRIE M MCKERLEY

CARRIE M MCKE RLEY

CARRIE M MCKERLEY

Balance of costs owing to the Sixth Court of Appeals, Texarkana, Texas: 0.00

Court costs in this cause shall be paid as per the Judgment issued by this Court.

I, DEBRA AUTREY, CLERK OF THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE O F TEXAS, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the cost bill of THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, showing the charges and payments, in the above numbered and styled cause, as the same appears of re cord in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my hand and the Seal of

the COURT OF APPEALS for the Sixth District of Texas, this July 6, 2016

.

DEBRA AUTREY, CLERK

By __

_________________________ Deputy
## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 21

- 00088

- CV

M ARIA R OBLES

, J.A., AND J OSE

A LMAGUER V

AZQUEZ

, Appellants

V

.

C OX I NSURANCE G ROUP

, LLC AND

O LD A MERICAN C OUNTY M UTUAL

, Appellees §

§

§

§ O n Appeal from the 67th District Court

of Tarrant County ( 067

- 319936

- 20 )

January 20 , 2022

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no rever sible er ror in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

It is further ordered that appellant s Ma ria Robles, J.A., and Jose Almaguer

Vazquez shall bear the costs of this appeal, for which let execution is sue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Brian Walker Justice Brian Walker
PART II -
OTHER INFORMATION





Exhibit
32.2 Section 906 CFO Certification





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the filing of this quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A for the
Quarter Ended April 5, 2009 (the "Report") by Pomeroy IT Solutions, Inc., the
undersigned hereby certifies that:





1.
            The Report containing the
      financial statements fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
      or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
      and





2.
            The information contained in the
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and results of operation of Pomeroy IT Solutions,
    Inc.





August
24, 2009


/s/
      Craig J. PropstCraig
      J. PropstSenior
      Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial
  Officer





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Pomeroy IT Solutions, Inc. and will be retained by Pomeroy IT Solutions, Inc.
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
Charles ODOM and Kimberley Odom, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. U. S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D16-5220

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 27, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 16

- 00050

- CV

R ICHARD S EIM AND L INDA S EIM

, Appellants

V

.

A LLSTATE T EXAS L LOYDS AND L ISA

S COTT , Appellees §

§

§

§

§ O n Appeal from the 141st District Court

of Tarrant County (141

- 2705 31

- 1 4)

July 3 0 , 2019

Opinion by Justice Gabriel

Dis sent by Chief Justice Sudderth

JUDGMENT ON REMAND AND ON EN BANC RECONSIDERATION

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that th e judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

It is further ordered that appellant s Richard Seim and Linda Seim shall bear the

costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Lee Gabriel

Justice Lee Gabriel
#### Maria Del Carmen CORZA and Ramiro Corza-Cervantes, Petitioners, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72921

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 23, 2017

Maria Del Carmen Corza, Pro Se

Ramiro Corza-Cervantes, Pro Se

OIL, Matthew Allan Spurlock, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Maria. Del Carmen Corza and Ramiro Corza-Cervantes, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying their motion to reconsider. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reconsider. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir.2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ successive motion to reopen and reconsider as untimely and number-barred where it was filed nearly 11 years after the order of removal became final, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2),(c)(2) and they have not established that any statutory or regulatory exception applies, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

We lack jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ unexhausted contentions regarding new evidence of hardship and ineffective assistance of counsel, *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).

To the extent petitioners contend that the agency should have exercised its sua sponte authority to reopen their case, we also lack jurisdiction to consider that contention. *See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder,*633 F.3d 818, 823-824 (9th Cir. 2011); *cf. Bonilla v. Lynch,*840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

We lack jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ request for prosecutorial discretion. *See Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder,*688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (order).

Petitioners’ request for a stay of removal is dismissed as moot.

*551PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part, DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Deano ELIAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4300

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

January 31, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Unassociated Document


    DEMAND PROMISSORY
NOTE

    


    
      	
              $________.00

            	
              As
      of March 16, 2009

            


    

    


    FOR VALUE
RECEIVED, BBM Holdings, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Utah,  hereby promises to pay to the order of
AIGH Investment Partners, LLC, a limited liability company organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, the sum of ______ THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($__,000.00), with interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum
upon the unpaid balance from time to time outstanding from the date set forth
above, same being payable in lawful money of the United States of
America.

     

    This Note
shall be paid in full upon written demand therefor made by the holder thereof.
The principal of and accrued interest on this Note may be prepaid in whole or in
part at any time and from time to time without penalty or
premium.  Any payments not made when due shall be subject to interest
at the rate of 15 percent (15%) per annum upon the unpaid balance from time to
time outstanding from the date set forth above.  Notwithstanding
anything set forth herein to the contrary, in no event shall the interest
payable hereunder be higher than the maximum amount permitted under applicable
law.

     

    The
undersigned agrees to pay all filing fees and similar charges and all costs
incurred by the holder hereof in collecting or securing or attempting to collect
or secure this Note, including reasonable attorney's fees. The undersigned shall
be responsible for the payment of any documentary stamp taxes which may now or
hereafter apply to this Note.

     

    In any
action or proceeding brought in connection with this Note, the undersigned
hereby: (a) waives demand, presentment, protest, notice of dishonor, suit
against or joinder of any other person, and all other requirements necessary to
charge or hold the undersigned liable with respect to the loan evidenced hereby;
(b) submits to the jurisdiction of the state and federal courts in the State of
New York for purposes of any such action or proceeding; and (c) agrees that the
venue of any such action or proceeding may be laid in New York County, New York
and waives any claim that the same is an inconvenient forum. No provision of
this Note shall limit the holder's right to serve legal process in any other
manner permitted by law or to bring any such action or proceeding in any other
competent jurisdiction. This Note shall be governed by, and construed and
enforced in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York.

     

    
      
        	 	MAKER:	 
	 	 	 
	 	BBM HOLDINGS,
      INC.	 
	 	 	 	 
	
              	
                By:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eliseo LOPEZ-DOMINGUEZ, a/k/a Luis Montoya, a/k/a Arcadio Salinas, a/k/a Juan Gregario, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-4079

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: July 31, 2017

Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, First Assistant United States Attorney, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Elíseo Lopez-Dominguez appeals his sentence of 24 months imposed following his conviction for illegal reentry by an aggravated felon, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2012). He contends that his sentence is unreasonable because his offense level and criminal history score overstate the seriousness of his case. We affirm.

We review Lopez-Dominguez’s sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” *United States v. McCoy,*804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). This review entails appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. *Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. We presume that a sentence imposed within the properly calculated Sentencing Guidelines range is reasonable. *United States v. Louthian,*756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

*145Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Lopez-Dominguez has not overcome the presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable, nor has he shown that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable. In particular, Lopez-Dominguez’s assertion that he was defending his brother-in-law from being attacked runs squarely counter to his guilty plea to aggravated robbery, *cf. Blackledge v. Allison,*431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977); *Christian v. Ballard,*792 F.3d 427, 444 (4th Cir. 2015), and even setting aside his conviction for aggravated robbery, Lopez-Dominguez has a substantial history of illegal conduct. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, and we conclude that Lopez-Dominguez’s sentence is reasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-30385 USDC No. 97-CV-3435-R

REGINALD J. THOMAS, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF LOUISIANA; MICHAEL BENOV, Warden, Respondents-Appellees.

--------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

--------------------- August 25, 1998
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. BY THE COURT: Reginald J. Thomas, federal prisoner # 09506-112, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) from the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because his petition was denied on procedural grounds rather than on the merits, Thomas must first make a credible showing that the district court erred. Murphy v. Johnson , 110 F.3d 10, 11 (5th Cir. 1997). Thomas asserts that the district court erred in determining that it lackedO R D E R No. 98-30385 - 2 - jurisdiction over the petition as one brought under § 2254; in construing his petition as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and dismissing it as such; and in denying COA. Thomas has not demonstrated any error on the district court’s part. Nevertheless, we grant COA and vacate and remand to the district court for the purposes of allowing it to consider in the first instance whether the case should be transferred sua sponte to the Central District of California as the court of proper venue in light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year statute-of-limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a) and 2255. COA GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED.