J-S09045-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TIMOTHY F. BALCHICK,

Appellant No. 1720 WDA 2014

Appeals from the Judgment of Sentence entered October 8, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001120-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES, and ALLEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2015

Timothy F. Balchick (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after he pled guilty to statutory sexual assault, unlawful 

contact with a minor, corruption of minors, indecent assault of a person less 

than sixteen years of age, and disorderly conduct.1 We affirm.

On April 24, 2013, the victim, a fifteen year old female, reported to 

the Washington Township Police Department in Fayette County that 

Appellant had sexually assaulted her. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 6/5/13. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(a)(1), 6318(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3126(a)(8), and 

5503(a)(4).
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Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with the aforementioned 

crimes.

At a hearing on October 1, 2014, Appellant entered his guilty plea, and 

on October 8, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six (6) to twentyfour (24) months of imprisonment plus a consecutive five (5) years of 

probation. Appellant was notified of his duty to register as a sex offender for 

the entirety of his lifetime in accordance with the Sex Offender Registration 

and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10 et seq.

2

Appellant presents two constitutional issues for our review:

I. IS IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO REQUIRE AN APPELLANT TO 

REGISTER FOR A LIFETIME WHEN SAID REGISTRATION 

REQUIREMENT EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM 

PENALTY FOR APPELLANT’S OFFENSE?

____________________________________________

2

“The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed SORNA as Act 111 of 2011, 

signed December 20, 2011. In so doing, it provided for the expiration of 

prior registration requirements, commonly referred to as Megan's Law, 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9791–9799.9, as of December 20, 2012, and for the 

effectiveness of SORNA on the same date. The General Assembly set forth 

its purposes in adopting SORNA, which included bringing Pennsylvania into 

substantial compliance with the Adam Walsh Act and providing a mechanism 

for the general public and law enforcement to obtain information concerning 

sexual offenders. Id. § 9799.10. SORNA also includes legislative findings 

and a declaration of policy instructing that ‘[t]he Adam Walsh Child 

Protection and Safety Act of 2006 provides a mechanism for the 

Commonwealth to increase its regulation of sexual offenders in a manner 

which is nonpunitive but offers an increased measure of protection to the 

citizens of this Commonwealth.’ Id. § 9799.11(a)(2) ...” In re J.B., ---

A.3d ---, 2014 WL 7369785, at 1 (Pa. 2014).
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II. IS THE ADAM WALSH STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN 

REQUIRING AN APPELLANT TO REGISTER FOR TWENTY 

FIVE (25) YEARS? 3

Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant’s issues are interrelated. Therefore, we will 

address them together. 

Appellant argues that SORNA is unconstitutional because the lifetime 

registration requirement exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the 

crimes to which he pleaded guilty, and because the lifetime registration 

requirement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 11. Preliminarily, we note that the argument portion of Appellant’s 

brief in which he asserts that SORNA is unconstitutional consists of less than 

four full pages, and does not reference the constitutional provisions upon 

which Appellant bases his argument. Nor does Appellant in his brief direct 

this Court to the specific provisions of SORNA that he seeks to have declared 

unconstitutional. It is Appellant’s responsibility to develop arguments in his 

brief and where he has not done so we will find the claim waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 284 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010) (“It is Appellant's obligation to sufficiently 

develop arguments in his brief by applying the relevant law to the facts of 

the case, persuade this Court that there were errors below, and convince us 

____________________________________________

3 The record indicates that Appellant is subject to lifetime registration and 

not twenty-five (25) years as he suggests in his statement of questions. 

See N.T., 10/8/14, 4-5.
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relief is due because of those errors [and if] an appellant does not do so, we 

may find the argument waived.”). Thus, we find that based upon his failure 

to sufficiently develop his constitutional argument, Appellant has waived his 

constitutionality claims. 

Moreover, even if Appellant had not waived his claims, they are devoid 

of merit. With regard to Appellant’s claim that the lifetime registration 

requirement constitutes excessive punishment and is unconstitutional 

because it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, our Courts have found 

such claims unavailing. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, under the 

now-expired provisions of Megan’s Law, that lifetime registration 

requirements are not punitive but remedial in nature, and “[b]ecause we do 

not view the registration requirements as punitive but, rather, remedial, we 

do not perceive mandating compliance by offenders who have served their 

maximum term to be improper.” Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 

616, 622 (Pa. 1999) and Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 

2003). See also Commonwealth v. Benner, 853 A.2d 1068 (Pa. Super. 

2004).

In reliance on Gaffney, Williams and Benner, this Court in 

Commonwealth v. McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067, 1070-1710 (Pa. Super. 

2014) recently explained, “[w]hile Gaffney and Benner were decided prior

to the effective date of SORNA, the same principles behind the registration 

requirements for sexual offenders under Megan's Law apply to those subject 

to SORNA. Namely, to effectuate, through remedial legislation, the non-
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punitive goal of public safety.” Accordingly, because SORNA is a nonpunitive remedial scheme, and not a punishment, we concluded in 

McDonough that the appellant’s claims – that his registration requirements 

constituted excessive punishment, and that SORNA was unconstitutional for 

requiring an individual to register for many years longer than the maximum 

penalty – failed. Id.

In the present case, Appellant advances arguments identical to those 

raised in McDonough, in which we declined to find SORNA unconstitutional. 

Although McDonough pertained to a fifteen (15) year registration 

requirement, the rationale is equally applicable to the lifetime registration 

requirement at issue in the present case. Consonant with McDonough, 

Appellant’s constitutional claims fail. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/11/2015