RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2867-15T3

K.T.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.F.,

Defendant-Appellant.

———————————————————————————————————

Argued June 8, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Hoffman and O'Connor.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FV-09-1170-16.

Lynne M. Machtemes argued the cause for 

appellant (Iacullo Martino, LLC, attorneys; 

Ms. Machtemes, on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

In this unopposed appeal, defendant A.F. appeals from a 

January 28, 2016 final restraining order (FRO) entered against him 

pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (the Act), 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

July 28, 2017
2 A-2867-15T3

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.1. Based on our careful review of the 

entire record,1 we reverse and remand for a new FRO hearing.

I.

The parties dated for two years, with the relationship ending 

in August 2013. Both parties work for the Hudson County 

Corrections Department, but they serve on separate shifts. On 

November 6, 2015, plaintiff filed a domestic violence complaint 

and obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant 

based on her allegation that defendant came to her residence in 

Jersey City and "slash[ed] her front driver[-]side car tire." The 

complaint further alleged defendant committed the predicate acts 

of criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3; harassment, N.J.S.A.

2C:33-4; and stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10. The complaint also 

referenced five prior acts of domestic violence that occurred in 

2013, 2014, and 2015.

On December 1, 2015, the parties were self-represented at the 

FRO hearing. Plaintiff testified that at 6 p.m. on November 5, 

2015, she was at home with her ten-year-old daughter, looking out 

her window, when she saw defendant "creeping" by her car. 

Plaintiff stated she saw defendant make a motion, described by the 

 

1 After defendant filed his notice of appeal, he filed a motion 

to supplement the record, which we reserved for consideration by 

the merits panel. Following oral argument, we granted defendant's 

motion.
3 A-2867-15T3

court for the record as a stabbing gesture, and then heard a 

hissing noise come from the tire; however, she could not see what, 

if anything, was in his hands at the time. Plaintiff testified 

she and her boyfriend, Rodney Hill, ran outside, but defendant got 

into a car (later described as a "dark Volkswagen"), made a quick 

U-turn, and sped away.

When the court questioned plaintiff regarding the prior 

history of domestic violence referenced in her complaint, starting 

with a July 2015 incident, plaintiff described an incident when 

defendant came to her residence at 1 a.m., wanting "to talk." When 

she refused his request and closed the door, "he continued on 

ringing my doorbell[,] waking up my children."2 Plaintiff claimed 

to have a police report regarding the incident; however, the police 

report concerned a May 2015 incident. Plaintiff attempted to 

explain her confusion, noting "there were so many incidents that 

took place." She then stated the incident occurred the year 

before, in July 2014; she also cited three different incidents of 

defendant "peeking through the window."

The court asked plaintiff if she was describing three 

incidents or one incident in July, "[b]cause there's only one" 

 

2 In contrast to her testimony at the FRO hearing, plaintiff's 

complaint alleged defendant came to her "apartment trying to get 

in her door to fight her."
4 A-2867-15T3

incident listed in the complaint. Plaintiff replied, "A 

combination of incidents." The court responded:

We can't do that. What you need to do is you 

need to go down to the [DV] Unit and amend the 

complaint to specify . . . every incident.

. . . .

You can't . . . combine three incidents into 

one in July[,] [a]nd then testify the way 

you've been. . . . [T]he complaint doesn't 

support that. So you need to amend the 

complaint . . . to specify the particular 

dates.

The court then adjourned the final hearing, and plaintiff filed 

an amended complaint, alleging seven more prior acts of domestic 

violence.

3

The FRO hearing resumed on January 15, 2016, with plaintiff 

continuing her testimony regarding defendant's history of domestic 

violence against her. While plaintiff's complaint alleged 

defendant came to her apartment in July 2015, "trying to get in 

her door to fight her," she retreated from this allegation when 

she testified, "I was arguing, he talked, it was . . . an argument 

in a sense, ain't nothing physical happened that day."

 

3 Of note, the amended complaint did not list any July 2014 

incidents, even though plaintiff's testimony regarding these 

incidents — not listed in plaintiff's initial complaint —

represented the reason the court adjourned the initial FRO hearing.
5 A-2867-15T3

Plaintiff testified about six other incidents of domestic 

violence by defendant; however, she demonstrated little command 

of the dates and times when these events occurred. Plaintiff 

described several incidents of stalking behavior during 2013, 

ultimately clarifying, "They all happened [during] the week of the 

8th of [August] 2013."

On cross-examination, defendant attempted to confront 

plaintiff with documentation from her car dealer from August 14, 

2013. This documentation would appear to undermine significant 

parts of plaintiff's testimony regarding acts of domestic violence 

defendant allegedly committed during the week of August 8, 2013. 

However, the court failed to allow defendant to question plaintiff 

regarding these documents, limiting him to questions only:

[DEFENDANT]: I got copies of paperwork where 

[plaintiff] asked me to pick up 

her vehicle that was at the 

dealer[,] and this happened on 

August 14th. I have documents 

of that so she allegedly, I 

last talked about –

THE COURT: No. Questions.

[DEFENDANT]: Oh, she – oh, so this couldn't 

have happened. I got documents 

–

THE COURT: Questions.

[DEFENDANT]: The question I'm going to ask 

her.
6 A-2867-15T3

[DEFENDANT]: How did this happen if I have 

documents of me picking up her 

vehicle at her request from the 

dealer?

[PLAINTIFF]: Are you asking me? No. 

Wherever you get the documents 

from, I don't know. You ain't 

picked up nothing.

[DEFENDANT]: I got documents –

THE COURT: Was there some point in all 

this of that year where he –

you asked him to do something 

as far as your car is 

concerned?

[PLAINTIFF]: No.

[DEFENDANT]: I have documents, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Questions.

[DEFENDANT]: Like, oh, the next question?

THE COURT: Yes.

[DEFENDANT]: Okay, so you don't want the 

documents?

THE COURT: Right now, it's cross – you're 

crossing –

[DEFENDANT]: Okay.

THE COURT: Listen to me, please. Right 

now this is your crossexamination of [plaintiff]. 

That involves you're asking 

her questions.

[DEFENDANT]: Okay.

THE COURT: Not producing documents, not 

testifying, asking questions.
7 A-2867-15T3

Defendant also indicated he had documents to challenge 

plaintiff's claim he sped away in a Volkswagen.

4 The judge again 

refused to allow defendant to use any documents to challenge 

plaintiff's testimony, stating, "Questions, [defendant]." 

Inexplicably, the judge did not have defendant's documents marked 

for identification and otherwise failed to explore the possible 

impact of the documents upon plaintiff's credibility.5

After plaintiff's testimony, three other persons testified: 

plaintiff's friend, the friend's adult son, and plaintiff's 

boyfriend; all claimed witnessing the alleged tire-slashing 

incident of November 5, 2015. The witnesses offered widely varying 

accounts of the time of the tire slashing, from 1 p.m. to midnight. 

All testified defendant fled in a Volkswagen.

Defendant then testified on his own behalf regarding the 

November 5, 2015 incident.

I have no clue what happened on November 5th

alleging her car. I was in – at home and on 

 

4 The document defendant referenced was a car dealer buyer's 

order showing defendant's girlfriend, who owned a Volkswagen that 

defendant sometimes used, traded in her Volkswagen for a Jeep in 

January 2015, almost ten months before the tire slashing incident.

5 A court should generally mark all exhibits referenced at trial, 

even those not introduced in evidence. See R. 1:2-3; Manata v. 

Pereira, 436 N.J. Super. 330, 336 (App. Div. 2014); N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245, 264 (App. Div. 

2002) (stating that the failure to properly identify documents 

"not only violate[s] basic rules of trial practice . . . but 

inhibit[s] the appellate process").
8 A-2867-15T3

the phone with a friend of mines [sic] until 

the time my son arrived home from karate 

class. And I have evidence to prove my 

location based on cell phone records from the 

cell phone company and documentation that my 

son was in karate class from the time that 

she's alleging that I was in her house.

The court then asked, "What documentation do you have that 

proves where you were?" Defendant replied, "Cell phone records

with the locations." The court then viewed the documents and 

asked questions about them. The record contains no indication the 

court reviewed defendant's documentation regarding his son's 

karate class schedule.

Regarding the November 5th incident, the court found 

defendant's cell records only account for a period of approximately 

half an hour, and while the witnesses' accounts differed on the 

exact time, they were all "consistent in terms of what they saw." 

The court found defendant went to plaintiff's home and punctured 

her tire in the late afternoon or evening of November 5. The 

judge also credited plaintiff's testimony in finding defendant 

committed three prior acts of domestic violence involving 

harassment and stalking in 2013, 2014, and 2015. Based on these 

findings, the judge found plaintiff in need of an FRO and issued 

the order under review. This appeal followed.
9 A-2867-15T3

II.

The permissible scope of cross-examination is an issue within 

the trial court's discretion. Persley v. N.J. Transit Bus 

Operations, 357 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 

N.J. 490 (2003). Ordinarily, we will not interfere with a trial 

court's decision regarding the scope of cross-examination "unless 

there is a clear abuse of discretion which has deprived a party 

of a fair trial." Ibid. However, "[t]o the extent defendant's 

argument . . . raises a question of law, . . . our review is de 

novo and plenary.” State v. J.D., 211 N.J. 344, 354 (2012).

As recognized by our Supreme Court, cross-examination 

represents "the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the 

discovery of truth.'" State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 309 (2006) 

(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 

1935, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 497 (1970)). In the present case, the 

court ruled, without explanation, that defendant could only ask 

questions, and precluded him from confronting plaintiff with 

documentary evidence that would appear to challenge significant 

parts of her direct testimony. We can discern no basis for the 

court's decision to restrict cross-examination in this manner, nor 

do we find the court properly addressed the documentary evidence 

identified by defendant. 
10 A-2867-15T3

Although we usually "accord deference to family court 

factfinding," Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998), our 

review of the record in the present matter has convinced us that 

defendant has raised valid issues regarding the fairness of the 

proceedings and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

court's findings. Because we conclude the manner in which the 

trial was conducted resulted in a miscarriage of justice, we 

reverse and remand for a new trial. 

Our Supreme Court previously emphasized the importance of the 

due process rights of litigants in domestic violence proceedings:

Many litigants who come before our courts in 

domestic violence proceedings are 

unrepresented by counsel; many are unfamiliar 

with the courts and with their rights. 

Sifting through their testimony requires a 

high degree of patience and care. The 

pressures of heavy calendars and volatile 

proceedings may impede the court's willingness 

to afford much leeway to a party whose 

testimony may seem disjointed or irrelevant. 

But the rights of the parties to a full and 

fair hearing are paramount.

[J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 481, (2011).]

We have noted, "[P]ro se litigants are not entitled to greater 

rights than litigants who are represented by counsel." Ridge at 

Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 

2014).

But we also recognized in Rubin — in 

concluding that a self-represented litigant 

was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to 
11 A-2867-15T3

be heard due to a lack of understanding of 

motion practice — that it is "fundamental that 

the court system . . . protect the procedural 

rights of all litigants and to accord 

procedural due process to all litigants."

[Ibid. (quoting Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. 

Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1982)).]

We vacate the FRO and remand for a new FRO hearing, to be 

conducted on an expedited basis no later than September 29, 2017.

Because the FRO judge made credibility findings, we direct that a 

different judge conduct the FRO proceeding on remand. Pending the 

scheduling and completion of the remand hearing, we reinstate the 

previously issued TRO. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Vacated and remanded.