alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Marilyn OKULA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0193

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 13, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
---

# Exhibit 99.1Statement of Chief Executive Officer of RARE Hospitality International, Inc.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of RARE Hospitality International, Inc.
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 30, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Philip J. Hickey, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1)  The  Report  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of  Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities

2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material  respects,  the financial
        condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Philip J. Hickey, Jr.
-------------------------
Philip J. Hickey, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer
May 9, 2003
EX PARTE Shicolbe Devol BELL

1160304 (CR-15-1052)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 10, 2017

Cert. denied.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

JC/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL JOSEPH TRUJILLO,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

DARRELL G. ADAMS, Warden,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 08-15045

D.C. No. 05-cv-02251-JKS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

James K. Singleton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 16, 2010** 

Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

California state prisoner Manuel Joseph Trujillo appeals from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. We

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

FILED

MAR 02 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JC/Research 2 08-15045

Trujillo contends he is entitled to equitable tolling because his state appellate

counsel’s failure to exhaust a federal claim before the California Supreme Court,

despite assurances she would do so, prevented the timely filing of his federal

habeas petition and that circumstance was beyond his control. We agree with the

district court that counsel’s omission was more akin to ordinary negligence than an

egregious omission. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002);

cf. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2003). Further, the record shows

that Trujillo received, shortly before it was filed, a copy of the petition for review

appellate counsel filed with the California Supreme Court. Thus, Trujillo’s

contention fails. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

Trujillo also contends we should remand to the district court for an

evidentiary hearing on the availability of equitable tolling. This contention lacks

merit. See Tapia v. Roe, 189 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999).

We deny Trujillo’s request to expand the certificate of appealability to

include his claim that his first federal habeas petition was improperly dismissed as

unexhausted. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1103-05 (9th Cir. 1999)

(per curiam).

AFFIRMED.
Tiffany Ann MARINO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-5125

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 16, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Consolidated Financial Statements of The BISYS Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries for
the nine months ended March 31, 1996 and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
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<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                          25,902
<SECURITIES>                                     2,604
<RECEIVABLES>                                   45,580
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,587
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                79,461
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<DEPRECIATION>                                  19,563
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 187,327
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           43,540
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<COMMON>                                           474
<OTHER-SE>                                     142,809
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   187,327
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               174,138
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   91,590
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                10,416
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             21,716
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.93<F1>
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<FN>
<F1>We have calculated earnings per share amounts in accordance with FAS 128
"Earnings Per Share". We have entered basic and diluted amounts in place of
primary and fully diluted, respectively.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Eric PIERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF STOREY, a political subdivision of the State of Nevada; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15646

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

*578Eric Pierson, Pro Se

Katherine F. Parks, Attorney, Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger, A Professional Corporation Law Offices, Reno, NV, Brandon R. Price, Attorney, AGNV—Office of the Nevada Attorney General (RENO), Reno, NV, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Eric Pierson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from the filing of a criminal complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Haupt v. Dillard,*17 F.3d 285, 287 (9th Cir. 1994). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Pierson’s federal and state law malicious prosecution claims because Pierson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants brought the action without probable cause. *See id.*at 290 (explaining when a plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating a probable cause determination made at preliminary hearing); *Lester v. Buchanen,*112 Nev. 1426, 929 P.2d 910, 912 (1996) (elements of a malicious prosecution claim under Nevada law).

We do not consider the district court’s dismissal of Pierson’s First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and other state law claims because Pierson raises only new arguments on appeal concerning the district court’s grounds for dismissal and has therefore waived his appeal of the district court’s ruling on these claims. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (we do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal); *Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”).

We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

Pierson’s motion to reconsider (Docket Entry No. 7) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
LOGO

Horwath Orenstein LLP

Chartered Accountants

2 Bloor Street East, Suite 1100

Toronto, ON, Canada M4W 1A8

T 416.596.1711

F 416.596.7894

www.horwathorenstein.com



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement on Form S-3 (No. 333-114084) of Yak Communication Inc. and subsidiaries of our report dated September 15, 2005, except for Note 5 as to which the date is September 27, 2005, which appears on page i of this annual report on Form
10-K for the year ended June 30, 2005.







LOGO

|                                      |  | 
|------------------------------------- |  | 
|Chartered Accountants Toronto, Canada |  | 
|                                      | 
|September 27, 2005                    |  |
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Humberto VALDEZ-RUIZ, a.k.a. Humberto Ruiz Valdez, a.k.a. Ruiz Valdez-Humberto, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Humberto Valdez-Ruiz, a.k.a. Humberto Ruiz Valdez, a.k.a. Humberto Ruiz-Valdez, a.k.a. Ruiz Valdez-Humberto, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10598, No. 15-10599

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 3, 2017 *

Filed March 07, 2017

Christina Marie Cabanillas, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU- Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Humberto Valdez-Ruiz, Pro Se

Before: HUG, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

*

**The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*598MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated appeals, Humberto Valdez-Ruiz appeals from the district court judgment and challenges his guilty-plea conviction and 63-month sentence for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the revocation of supervised release and consecutive 7-month sentence imposed upon revocation. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Valdez-Ruiz’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. Valdez-Ruiz has filed a pro se supplemental brief. No answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Enrique ORTIZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLE, Avenal State Prison Correction Officer, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-17555

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted January 18, 2017 *

Filed January 26, 2017

Enrique Ortiz, Pro Se

Justin Walker, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Enrique Ortiz, a former California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. *Williams v. Paramo,*775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Ortiz failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted his administrative remedies. *See Ross v. Blake,*— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1856, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act is mandatory).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Nathan Dexter PAUL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-1105

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 19, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Robert Glen HILL, II, Appellant, v. Julie L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.

No. 1D17-1638

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 17, 2018

Robert Glen Hill, II, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee; Kenneth Steely, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

Appellant challenges the trial court's summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied the motion as successive in an order filed on February 2, 2017. However, at the time the trial court denied the motion, an appeal of a previously filed postconviction motion raising substantially similar claims was pending in this Court. That appeal did not become final until June 2017. Because the appeal of the earlier 3.850 motion was pending before this Court when the trial court ruled on the instant motion, the trial court was without jurisdiction, as both motions raised the same or related issues. *See**McFarland v. State* , 808 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ("While an appeal of a prior postconviction motion is pending, the trial court has no jurisdiction to rule on a subsequent post-conviction motion when the issues in the two motions are related."). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to once again consider Appellant's motion when it has jurisdiction to do so.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Bilbrey and Jay, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         226,508
<SECURITIES>                                    41,151
<RECEIVABLES>                                  215,928
<ALLOWANCES>                                    21,429
<INVENTORY>                                      3,678
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               533,314
<PP&E>                                         293,318
<DEPRECIATION>                               (106,591)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 881,998
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          530,177
<BONDS>                                              0
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<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,508
<OTHER-SE>                                     323,796
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   881,998
<SALES>                                        496,039
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               727,849
<CGS>                                           46,786
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  191,636
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               604,230
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                14,983
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (5,784)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (61,034)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (12,531)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (73,565)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (73,565)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.49)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 99.2


                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350
     (AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

I, Lior Kadosh, Interim Chief Financial Officer (principal financial officer) of
rStar Corporation (the "Registrant"), certify, to the best of my knowledge,
based upon a review of the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended
December 31, 2002 of the Registrant (the "Report"), that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.


/s/ Lior Kadosh
----------------------------------------
Name: Lior Kadosh
Date: April 15, 2003


This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 or any other provision of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.


                                       4
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 27 (Wednesday, February 9, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7456-7457]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-02648]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention


Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended, and the Determination of the Director, Strategic 
Business Initiatives Unit, Office of the Chief Operating Officer, CDC, 
pursuant to Public Law 92-463. The grant applications and the 
discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial 
property such as patentable material, and personal information 
concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: Disease, Disability, and Injury Prevention 
and Control Special Emphasis Panel (SEP)--SIP22-003, Improving and 
evaluating measures to identify tics and tic disorders including 
Tourette syndrome in children in epidemiologic studies and clinical 
settings.
    Date: April 28, 2022.
    Time: 11:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m., EDT.
    Place: Teleconference.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    For Further Information Contact: Jaya Raman, Ph.D., Scientific 
Review Officer, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and 
Health Promotion, CDC, 4770 Buford Highway, Mailstop S107-B, 
Atlanta, Georgia 30341, Telephone: (770) 488-6511, Email: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#38726a59555956785b5c5b165f574e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="460c14272b27280625222568212930">[email protected]</span></a>.

    The Director, Strategic Business Initiatives Unit, Office of the 
Chief Operating Officer, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
has been delegated the authority to sign Federal Register notices 
pertaining to announcements of meetings and other

[[Page 7457]]

committee management activities, for both the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention and the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry.

Kalwant Smagh,
Director, Strategic Business Initiatives Unit, Office of the Chief 
Operating Officer, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
[FR Doc. 2022-02648 Filed 2-8-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4163-18-P


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#### Wilbert GILCHRIST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. LARD, Defendant-Appellee, and Unknown; Wendall Pixley, Warden, sued individually and in official capacity; Inder Jeet Singh Gujral, Dr., sued individually and in official capacity; John Doe 1; J. Edwards, Nurse, sued individually and in official capacity; Mayhue, Ms., sued individually and in official capacity; Jane Doe 1; Tracie Poarch, Food Manager, sued individually and in official capacity; Natarcha Gregg, Ms., sued individually and in official capacity; Jeffery B. Kiser, Warden; Roy Clary, Assistant Warden; R. Kelly, Major; B. Kelly, Sgt.; John Sykes, Unit Manager; Y. Taylor, IPM; Brian Mitchell, Lt.; C. Armes, Lt.; M. Olsin, Food Director; Dr. Edson, Physician; E. Whited, RNCB Medical; Dr. Armette, DOC Chief Physician; C. St. Jean, Nurse, sued individually and in official capacity; John Doe 2, Dental Assistance, sued individually and in official capacity, Defendants.

No. 17-6585

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 1, 2017

Wilbert Gilchrist, Appellant Pro Se. Lisa H. Leiner, HARMAN CLAYTOR CORRI-GAN & WELLMAN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Wilbert Gilchrist appeals the magistrate judge’s* order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action against Defendants. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the magistrate judge. See *Gilchrist v. Lard,*No. 3:14-cv-00630-RCY, 2017 WL 1227934 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

*

 The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2012) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.