SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4995-15T1

MIA M. WERNEGA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EDWARD J. VOLPA,

Defendant-Respondent.

Submitted May 17, 2017 – Decided June 21, 2017

Before Judges Carroll and Farrington.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, 

Gloucester County, Docket No. FM-08-844-94.

Mia M. Wernega, appellant pro se.

Nash Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for respondent 

(William A. Nash, on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

 Plaintiff Mia M. Wernega appeals from portions of the Family 

Part's June 10, 2016 post-judgment matrimonial order. Although 

the order emancipated the parties' son, it required plaintiff to 

contribute to the ongoing cost of health insurance premiums that 

defendant Edward J. Volpa continues to pay for the son's medical 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-4995-15T1

insurance coverage. The order also directed plaintiff to reimburse 

defendant $1175.22 for child support that defendant overpaid prior 

to the effective date of the son's emancipation. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 

 The parties were married in 1989 and have two children, a 

daughter, born in 1991, and a son, born in 1993. An amended dual 

final judgment of divorce was entered on October 18, 1994, which 

incorporated the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA). 

Pertinent to this appeal, the PSA provided that the parties would 

have joint legal custody of the children, and designated plaintiff 

as the primary residential custodial parent. Defendant agreed to 

pay plaintiff $575 per week in child support until the children's 

emancipation, as defined in the PSA. Defendant also agreed to 

continue to provide his existing medical insurance coverage for 

the children, with the parties equally sharing the cost of all 

uninsured medical expenses. 

 Various disputes between the parties thereafter resulted in 

a series of post-judgment orders. By consent order entered on 

March 2, 2001, defendant's child support obligation for the two 

children was modified to $500 per week. Plaintiff was required 

to pay the first $250 per year per child for all unreimbursed 

medical expenses pursuant to the New Jersey Child Support 
3 A-4995-15T1

Guidelines1 (Guidelines). Thereafter, defendant was required to 

pay eighty percent of such expenses and plaintiff the remaining 

twenty percent. A June 24, 2005 order left these provisions 

essentially unchanged. 

 In 2011, defendant moved to be designated parent of primary 

residence of the parties' daughter, who was then living with him, 

and to adjust child support based on her residency change. On 

February 10, 2012, the court entered an order granting defendant's 

motion and reducing his child support obligation to $177 per week. 

Notably, the Guidelines worksheets attached to the order included 

a $70 cost under the line item "[c]hild's share of health insurance 

premium." 

 In 2014, defendant moved to be designated parent of primary 

residence of the parties' son, to adjust child support accordingly, 

and to compel plaintiff to contribute toward the children's health 

insurance premiums and college expenses. On October 17, 2014, the 

court designated defendant parent of primary residence, set 

plaintiff's child support obligation at $50 per week for both 

children pursuant to the Guidelines, and ordered plaintiff to pay 

her share of the children's health insurance premiums and college 

expenses. The order further provided that the parties' daughter 

 

1 R. 5:6A. 
4 A-4995-15T1

would be deemed emancipated effective January 1, 2015, at which 

time plaintiff's child support obligation for the parties' son 

would adjust to $40 per week. 

 In the motion under review, filed on April 14, 2016, plaintiff 

sought the emancipation of the parties' son and consequential 

termination of her child support obligation. Plaintiff certified 

that her son was twenty-three years old and scheduled to graduate 

from college on May 12, 2016. She also contended her son moved 

out of her home in 2014, and in October 2015 he ceased all 

communication with her. Defendant opposed the motion, and crossmoved to enforce litigant's rights. In his supporting 

certification, defendant stated he intended to provide health 

insurance for his son until the son either turned age twenty-six2

or found employment that provided health insurance coverage. 

Defendant thus sought to compel plaintiff to reimburse him twenty 

 

2 We note that federal law bars insurers from preventing willing 

parents from adding a child under twenty-six – whether dependent 

or non-dependent – to family coverage. See Patient Protection and 

Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148, § 2714, 124 Stat. 119, 132 

(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14(a)) (stating that a 

health insurer offering group or individual coverage that provides 

support to a dependent child "shall continue to make such coverage 

available for an adult child (who is not married) until the child 

turns [twenty-six] years of age"); 45 C.F.R. § 147.120 (2013) 

(stating that an insurer may require proof of a child-parent 

relationship, and that the child is under the age of twenty-six, 

but may not consider the child's financial dependency, residency, 

student status, or employment status). 
5 A-4995-15T1

percent of the cost of this continued coverage. Defendant further 

certified that he overpaid plaintiff $1175.22 in child support, 

and had sent her a proposed consent order to resolve this issue 

that she refused to sign. Defendant also sought reimbursement for 

plaintiff's unpaid share of the children's college expenses, 

unreimbursed medical expenses, and health care coverage. 

 On June 10, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting 

plaintiff's motion to emancipate the parties' son as of May 12, 

2016, the date of his college graduation, and terminated her child 

support obligation effective that date. The court granted 

defendant's cross-motion in part. The order required plaintiff 

to reimburse defendant twenty percent of the amount that he pays 

for the son's health care coverage; $1175.22 for his overpayment 

of child support; and $4415 in unpaid college expenses. 

 On appeal, plaintiff challenges the requirement that she 

contribute to the continued cost of her son's medical insurance 

coverage. She argues that the child's share of health insurance 

was a component of child support as calculated under the 

Guidelines, and consequently her obligation to contribute 

terminated upon her son's emancipation. Plaintiff also argues 

that the trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of 

laches to bar defendant's claim for overpayment of child support. 
6 A-4995-15T1

 Clear standards guide our limited review. "We 'do not disturb 

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge 

unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported 

by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]'" 

Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 213 (App. Div. 2015) 

(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invr's Ins. Co. of Am., 65 

N.J. 474, 484 (1974)); accord N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). "Also, '[b]ecause of the family 

courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, 

appellate courts should accord deference to family court 

factfinding.'" Llewelyn, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 213 (quoting 

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "Accordingly, when 

a reviewing court concludes there is satisfactory evidentiary 

support for the trial court's findings, 'its task is complete and 

it should not disturb the result, even though it has the feeling 

it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial 

tribunal.'" Id. at 213-14 (quoting Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 

(1981)). 

 However, we confer no deference upon a trial court's 

interpretation of the law, which is subject to plenary review.

See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.

366, 378 (1995). We may also exercise more extensive review of 
7 A-4995-15T1

trial court findings that do not involve a testimonial hearing or 

the opportunity to assess witness credibility. Cf. N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 396 (2009) (stating 

that deference to Family Court conclusions is not required where 

"no hearing takes place, no evidence is admitted, and no findings 

of fact are made"). Nevertheless, "[r]eversal is reserved only 

for those circumstances when we determine the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the trial judge went 'so wide of the mark 

that a mistake must have been made.'" Llewelyn, supra, 440 N.J. 

Super. at 214 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 

189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)). 

 The application of emancipation is a legal concept, imposed 

when "the fundamental dependent relationship between parent and 

child" ends. Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. Div. 

2006). "It is not automatic and 'need not occur at any particular 

age[.]'" Llewelyn, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 216 (quoting Newburgh 

v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543 (1982)). "When the circumstances 

surrounding the parent-child relationship support a finding the 

child is emancipated, 'the parent relinquishes the right to custody 

and is relieved of the burden of support, and the child is no 

longer entitled to support.'" Ibid. (quoting Filippone v. Lee, 

304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997)). 
8 A-4995-15T1

 In the present case, there is no challenge to the trial 

court's decision emancipating the parties' son. The issue, then, 

is whether a party has a legal duty to bear a share of a child's 

medical insurance premium following his or her emancipation. While 

no doubt commendable, we find no such legal duty compels an 

unwilling parent, such as plaintiff, to do so here.3 Rather, as 

we recently reaffirmed, "the court's authority to impose support 

obligations is circumscribed; it terminates with a child's 

emancipation." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 571 (App. 

Div. 2017). Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the June 10, 

2016 order that requires plaintiff to reimburse defendant twenty 

percent of the amount defendant pays for the son's health insurance 

coverage. 

 Plaintiff next argues that defendant's claim for 

reimbursement of child support that he overpaid prior to the son's 

emancipation is barred by the doctrine of laches. We find this 

 

3 We recognize that a court, upon application of a parent or child, 

may convert (on the basis of exceptional circumstances, including 

but not limited to a mental or physical disability) a child support 

obligation to another form of financial maintenance for a child 

who has reached age twenty-three. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67e. Our 

decision is not intended to preclude either defendant or the 

parties' son from seeking to convert plaintiff's child support 

obligation to a contribution toward health insurance premiums upon 

a showing of "exceptional circumstances," which we are unable to 

conclude exist based on the present record. 
9 A-4995-15T1

argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following. 

 "Laches is an equitable doctrine, operating as an affirmative 

defense that precludes relief when there is an 'unexplainable and 

inexcusable delay' in exercising a right, which results in 

prejudice to another party." Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417 

(2012) (quoting Cty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 105 (1998)). 

"Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient 

opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum and the 

prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had 

been abandoned." Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 181 (2003). "The 

key factors to be considered in deciding whether to apply the 

doctrine are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, 

and the 'changing conditions of either or both parties during the 

delay.'" Ibid. (quoting Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145, 152 

(1982)). "[W]hether laches should be applied depends upon the 

facts of the particular case and is a matter within the sound

discretion of the trial court." Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 179 

N.J. 425, 436 (2004) (internal citation omitted). 

 The doctrine of laches is applicable to divorce proceedings.

Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 572 (1960). However, laches 

"cannot validly be used to sponsor an inequitable result." Linek 
10 A-4995-15T1

v. Korbeil, 333 N.J. Super. 464, 475 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 

165 N.J. 676 (2000). 

 Guided by these principles, we discern no abuse of discretion 

in the trial court's failure to apply laches to bar defendant's 

claim for overpayment. The record reflects that defendant sought 

to resolve this issue amicably, first by contacting the Probation 

Department, and then by way of a proposed consent order that 

plaintiff chose not to sign. Any delay by defendant in seeking 

this relief in his cross-motion is thus explainable and excusable, 

and plaintiff lacks any reasonable basis to believe defendant 

abandoned this claim. 

 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.