PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 

Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 

LAWRENCE P. MEDICI 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 991389 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

 June 9, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we determine whether the Court of Appeals 

erred in ruling that the trial court correctly (1) refused to 

strike for cause a prospective juror, (2) admitted into evidence 

the defendant's prior rape convictions in the guilt/innocence 

phase of his trial, and (3) refused to accept the defendant's 

stipulation that he had prior rape convictions. 

I 

 A grand jury of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County 

indicted Lawrence P. Medici on four offenses. Count I of the 

indictment charged that Medici "did rape [the victim], a second 

or subsequent offense." Count II charged that Medici "did 

engage in cunninlingus with [the victim], against her will, by 

force, threat or intimidation, a second or subsequent offense." 

Count III charged that Medici "did engage in fellatio with [the 

victim], against her will, by force, threat or intimidation, a 

second or subsequent offense." Count IV charged that Medici 

"did attempt to engage in anal sodomy with [the victim], against 

her will, by force, threat or intimidation." 
 A jury found Medici guilty of each offense charged. The 

jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment for each charge 

set forth in Counts I, II, and III of the indictment and 10 

years' imprisonment for the charge contained in Count IV of the 

indictment. By order entered February 17, 1998, the trial court 

sentenced Medici in accordance with the jury's verdict. 

 In an unpublished opinion dated May 25, 1999, the Court of 

Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. Lawrence P. Medici

v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Record No. 0527-98-4. We awarded 

Medici an appeal limited to the issues stated above.1

II 

 A brief summary of the facts will suffice. The eighteenyear-old victim, a drug addict, was acquainted with Medici as 

her supplier of illicit drugs. On May 21, 1997, Medici left a 

message on the victim's answering machine advising her that he 

had "an amazing amount of cocaine" and that she should come over 

to his house. The victim went to Medici's house the following 

morning on her way to school. Medici escorted the victim to the 

basement where she saw a mirror covered with white powder. As 

the victim observed the powder, Medici ordered her to remove her 

 

1

 We also awarded an appeal on the issue whether the indictment 

is defective. We will not consider Medici's contention that the 

indictment is defective, however, because the issue was not 

raised before the jury returned its verdict, as required by Rule 

3A:9. Therefore, the issue was waived. 

2
clothing. The victim initially refused, but did remove her 

clothing when she noticed that Medici was armed with a knife. 

Thereafter, Medici forced the victim to engage in fellatio, 

cunninlingus, and sexual intercourse, and he attempted to engage 

the victim in anal sodomy. The victim immediately reported the 

incident to her high school guidance counselor. 

III 

 We first consider whether the trial court erred in refusing 

to strike for cause a potential juror. During voir dire, Medici 

sought to have Inga Bennett stricken for cause because Bennett's 

husband had been murdered and the accused murderer was then 

represented by Medici's counsel's employer, the Office of the 

Public Defender. When questioned by counsel and the trial 

court, Bennett unequivocally stated that those circumstances 

would not affect her ability to judge the evidence fairly and 

impartially. The trial court refused to strike Bennett for 

cause, stating that "she was very adamant that she could be 

objective in this case." 

 We considered a similar issue in Cantrell v. Crews, 259 Va. 

47, 523 S.E.2d 502 (2000), decided after the decisions of the 

trial court and the Court of Appeals in the present case. In 

Cantrell, the issue was "whether the trial court erred in 

refusing to strike for cause a prospective juror who, at the 

time of trial, was a client of the law firm representing the 

3
plaintiff." Id. at 49, 523 S.E.2d at 503. The prospective 

juror was, at the time, a plaintiff in a pending personal injury 

action. In response to questioning, the prospective juror 

assured the trial court that she could "ignore" her 

representation by the plaintiff's law firm and "be totally fair 

to both sides." Id. at 50, 523 S.E.2d at 503. The trial court 

denied the defendants' motion to strike the prospective juror 

for cause, concluding that she could ignore her personal 

relationship and be fair. Id. 

 We held that the trial court abused its discretion in 

refusing to strike the juror for cause and that the ruling 

constituted reversible error. In so holding, we stated the 

following: 

Public confidence in the integrity of the process is 

at stake. It cannot be promoted when a sitting juror 

is, at the time of trial, a client of the law firm 

representing one of the parties to the litigation as a 

result of a similar occurrence. 

 This is true even though, as the record shows, 

the juror states that the circumstances of her 

representation would have no "bearing" on her judgment 

as a juror and that she could "be totally fair to both 

sides." 

Id. at 51, 523 S.E.2d at 504. 

 It is true, as the Attorney General argues, that an 

appellate court must give deference to a trial court's ruling 

whether to exclude or retain a prospective juror and that the 

ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly 

4
wrong and amounts to an abuse of discretion. Vinson v. 

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999). We 

think, however, that the present case is controlled by our 

decision in Cantrell. Here, the prospective juror's husband had 

been murdered, and the accused murderer was represented by a 

lawyer in the same Public Defender's Office that also served as 

counsel for Medici. While we have no reason to question 

Bennett's honesty and sincerity, we think that permitting her to 

sit as a juror, in the circumstances of this case, would weaken 

public confidence in the integrity of criminal trials. 

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion 

in failing to strike Bennett as a juror and that the ruling 

constitutes reversible error. 

IV 

 We next consider whether Medici's prior convictions of rape 

in California were improperly admitted into evidence during the 

Commonwealth's case-in-chief. Medici makes three arguments in 

support of this contention.2

A 

 First, Medici argues that the admission of the evidence in 

the guilt/innocence phase of his trial violated the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 

 

2

 We will consider Medici's other assignments of error because 

the issues raised are likely to arise again upon retrial. 

5
As previously noted, Medici was charged in three counts of the 

indictment with violating the rape and forcible sodomy statutes. 

He was also charged with the violation of Code § 18.2-67.5:3, 

which provides in subsection A as follows: 

Any person convicted of more than one offense 

specified in subsection B, when such offenses were not 

part of a common act, transaction or scheme, and who 

has been at liberty as defined in § 53.1-151 between 

each conviction shall, upon conviction of the second 

or subsequent such offense, be sentenced to life 

imprisonment and shall not have all or any portion of 

the sentence suspended, provided it is admitted, or 

found by the jury or judge before whom he is tried, 

that he has been previously convicted of at least one 

of the specified offenses. 

 Medici asserts that, "because the Commonwealth currently 

has a bifurcated system in place[,] . . . the prior conviction 

should be introduced in the [penalty] phase of the trial." 

Medici further assets that, "[t]o do otherwise would be to 

violate a defendant's right to due process." 

 In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567-69 (1967), the 

Supreme Court upheld a defendant's conviction despite the 

admission into evidence in the guilt/innocence phase of the 

trial of the defendant's prior conviction for the purposes of 

sentence enhancement. More recently, in Marshall v. Lonberger, 

459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983), the Supreme Court reaffirmed 

Spencer and held that the accused's due process rights were not 

violated by the admission of his prior conviction into evidence 

in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Similarly, in Brown

6
v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 56, 59, 307 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1983), we 

ruled that "[d]ue process does not require that an accused be 

given a bifurcated trial when he is charged under a statute 

authorizing enhanced punishment for repeating offenders." 

 The Supreme Court also has stated that "a state rule of law 

'does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another 

method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give 

a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at bar.'" 

Spencer, 385 U.S. at 564 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 

U.S. 97, 104 (1934)). The Court has further noted that "[a] 

determination of the 'best' recidivist trial procedure 

necessarily involves a consideration of a wide variety of 

criteria . . . [and] is a far cry from a constitutional 

determination that this method of handling the problem is 

compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 567-68. 

 In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury 

that Medici's prior convictions "should be considered . . . only 

for proof . . . of a prior conviction, and not as proof that 

[Medici] committed the offenses to which he is charged." We 

presume that jurors followed a court's instruction, unless the 

record plainly shows otherwise. See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 

240 Va. 78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 

(1990). Here, nothing in the record suggests that the jury did 

not follow the court's instruction. 

7
 We express no opinion whether the better policy would be to 

introduce a prior conviction into evidence only during the 

sentencing phase. We also do not decide whether a prior 

conviction is an element of the offense charged. Medici's 

assignment of error merely alleges that the admission into 

evidence of his prior convictions in the guilt/innocence phase 

of his trial violated his "right to due process." We reject 

this contention and, for the reasons stated, hold that Medici's 

due process rights were not violated. 

B 

 Medici next contends that the trial court erred in 

admitting into evidence his prior California rape convictions 

because the California statute "allows a conviction for rape for 

acts that do not constitute an offense under Code § 18.2-61," 

thereby rendering the Virginia and California statutes not 

"substantially similar." We do not agree. 

 "Prior convictions," within the meaning of Code § 18.2-

67.5:3(C), include "adult convictions for felonies under the 

laws of any state or the United States that are substantially 

similar to those listed in subsection B." (Emphasis added.) 

Subsection B of Code § 18.2-67.5:3 includes the crime of rape. 

 In 1985, Medici was convicted of rape in California, in 

violation of California Penal Code § 261(2), which, at the time 

8
of the offense and his conviction, read, in pertinent part, as 

follows: 

Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with 

a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any 

of the following circumstances: 

 . . . . 

(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will 

by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful 

bodily injury on the person or another. 

 Code § 18.2-61(A)(i), under which Medici was charged in the 

present case, provides the following: 

If any person has sexual intercourse with a 

complaining witness who is not his or her spouse . . . 

against the complaining witness's will, by force, 

threat or intimidation of or against the complaining 

witness or another person, . . . he or she shall be 

guilty of rape. 

 It is true that the California statute, when read in its 

entirety, permits a rape conviction for acts that would not 

necessarily constitute rape in Virginia. In making a comparison 

regarding the similarity of the statutes, however, we need only 

compare the Virginia rape statute with the subsection of the 

California statute under which Medici was charged and convicted. 

See Honaker v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 682, 684, 454 S.E.2d 

29, 30 (1995). 

 Clearly, the language in subsection 2 of California Penal 

Code § 261 is substantially similar to the language in Virginia 

Code § 18.2-61(A)(i). Therefore, we hold that the trial court 

9
did not err in admitting into evidence Medici's convictions 

under a substantially similar statute. 

C 

 Medici also contends that the trial court erred in 

admitting the California convictions into evidence because, 

according to him, the conviction order was not properly 

certified. The prior convictions order admitted in the present 

case was marked on the back with a stamp reading, "Allen Slater, 

Executive Officer and Clerk of the Superior Court of the State 

of California, in and for the County of Orange." The order also 

contained the seal of the Orange County Superior Court and was 

signed by "Flor L. Perez," whose signature appears next to the 

word, "Deputy." 

 Code § 8.01-389(A1) provides that "[t]he records of any 

judicial proceeding and any other official record of any court 

of another state or country, or of the United States, shall be 

received as prima facie evidence provided that such records are 

authenticated by the clerk of the court where preserved to be a 

true record." We think the California order complies with the 

requirements of Code § 8.01-389(A1), and, therefore, the trial 

court properly admitted it into evidence. 

V 

 Finally, we consider Medici's offer to stipulate. Medici 

offered to stipulate his prior rape convictions in the 

10
sentencing phase of his trial if he were convicted of the 

charged offenses. He contends on appeal that the trial court 

erred in refusing to accept the stipulation. We have held, 

however, that an accused "may not preclude the Commonwealth from 

introducing otherwise admissible evidence by offering to 

stipulate the facts which the evidence would show." Spencer, 

240 Va. at 91, 393 S.E.2d at 617. We conclude, therefore, that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 

accept Medici's qualified stipulation offer. 

VI 

 In sum, we hold that the trial court committed reversible 

error in refusing to strike for cause prospective juror Bennett, 

and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's 

ruling. We further hold that the trial court did not err in 

admitting into evidence Medici's California rape convictions and 

in refusing to accept Medici's stipulation and that the Court of 

Appeals did not err in affirming these rulings of the trial 

court. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgments of the trial 

court and the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court 

of Appeals with direction that the case be remanded to the trial 

court for further proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded. 

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