alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Jesse E. LARAMEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3725

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 13, 2018

Jesse E. Laramee, Blountstown, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, TORPY and WALLIS, JJ., concur.
----

|   | 1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company      as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the    Report. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/ Dinesh Paliwal |                                                                 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Name:              | Dinesh      Paliwal                                                  |
| Title:             | Chairman      and Chief Executive Officer                            |
|               | (Principal      Executive Officer)                                   |
|               |                                                                 |   |
|               |                                                                 |   |
| /s/ Herbert Parker |                                                                 |
| Name:              | Herbert      Parker                                                  |
| Title:             | Executive      Vice President and Chief Financial Officer            |
|               | (Principal      Financial Officer and Principal Accounting  Officer) |

----
1 The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United St ates District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-3525

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Eastern District of Missouri. * Lance Cockrell, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: January 20, 2010 Filed: January 25, 2010

___________ Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Lance Cockrell appeals from the j udgment of the District Court 1 entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of conspir acy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. The court sentenced Cockrell to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release. On appeal, Cockrell’s counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Followi ng careful de novo review, we affirm. See United States v. Williams , 534 F.3d 980, 985 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review).-2- The evidence at trial included th e testimony of Drug Enforcement Administration agents who conducted surveillance, monitored telephone conversations, interpreted those conversations, and in terviewed Cockrell after executing a search warrant at his residen ce. The agent who conducted the interview testified that Cockrell admitte d that he permitted his reside nce to be used as a “stash house” for the drugs and that Cockrell ac knowledged brokering drug transactions for others. We conclude that the evidence inthis case was legally sufficient to support the conviction. Seeid. (noting that to convict on charge of conspiracy, government must prove, by direct or circumstantial evid ence, existence of agreement to distribute illegal drugs and that defendant knew of c onspiracy and intentionally joined it); United States v. Nunez , 257 F.3d 758, 763–64 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming conviction based on evidence that supported government’s theory that defendant’s role in drug conspiracy included maintaining stash hous e and collecting proceeds from drug sales carried out by coconspirator).
Having reviewed the record i ndependently under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issu es. We affirm the judgment of the District Court and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, provided that counsel inform Cockrell about the procedures for filing pro se petitions for rehearing and for certiorari.

______________________________
**EXHIBIT 10.11**

 

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO CREDIT AGREEMENT

 

THISFOURTH AMENDMENT TO CREDIT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is entered into as of February 11,2005, by and between RENTRAK CORPORATION, an Oregon corporation (“Borrower”),and WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (“Bank”).

 

RECITALS

 

WHEREAS,Borrower is currently indebted to Bank pursuant to the terms and conditions ofthat certain Credit Agreement between Borrower and Bank dated as of July 15,2002, as amended from time to time (“Credit Agreement”).

 

WHEREAS,Bank and Borrower have agreed to certain changes in the terms and conditionsset forth in the Credit Agreement and have agreed to amend the Credit Agreementto reflect said changes.

 

NOW,THEREFORE, for valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which arehereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree that the Credit Agreement shallbe amended as follows:

 

1.                                       Section 4.9(d) is hereby deleted in its entirety, and the following substitutedtherefor:

 

“(d)                           Netincome after taxes not less than $1.00 on an annual basis, determined as ofeach fiscal year end, and pre-tax profit not less than $1.00 on a quarterlybasis, determined as of each fiscal quarter end.”

 

2.                                       Exceptas specifically provided herein, all terms and conditions of the CreditAgreement remain in full force and effect, without waiver or modification.  All terms defined in the Credit Agreementshall have the same meaning when used in this Amendment.  This Amendment and the Credit Agreement shallbe read together, as one document.

 

3.                                       Borrowerhereby remakes all representations and warranties contained in the CreditAgreement and reaffirms all covenants set forth therein.  Borrower further certifies that as of thedate of this Amendment there exists no Event of Default as defined in theCredit Agreement, nor any condition, act or event which with the giving ofnotice or the passage of time or both would constitute any such Event ofDefault.

 

**UNDEROREGON LAW, MOST AGREEMENTS, PROMISES AND COMMITMENTS MADE BY BANK CONCERNINGLOANS AND OTHER CREDIT EXTENSIONS WHICH ARE NOT FOR PERSONAL, FAMILY ORHOUSEHOLD PURPOSES OR SECURED SOLELY BY THE BORROWER’S RESIDENCE MUST BE INWRITING, EXPRESS CONSIDERATION AND BE SIGNED BY BANK TO BE ENFORCEABLE.**

 

INWITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be executedas of the day and year first written above.

 
|                     | WELLS FARGO  BANK,                |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| RENTRAK  CORPORATION     |   NATIONAL  ASSOCIATION |
|                     |                              |
| By:                      | /s/ Mark Thoenes                  |   | By: | /s/ Victoria  Vohs |   |
| Mark Thoenes             |                              | Victoria Vohs |
| Chief Financial  Officer |                              | Vice President |
|                          |                                   |  |  |  |  |

 

1

----
#### Wayne L. HARDY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

16-1391

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 10, 2017

For Plaintiff-Appellant: Wayne L. Hardy, pro se, Hempstead, New York

For Defendant-Appellee: Anthony Min-gione, Anna K. Svensson (on the brief), Blank Rome LLP, New York, New York

Present: John M. Walker Jr., Debra Ann Livingston, Gerard E. Lynch, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Wayne L. Hardy, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Caproni, *J.),*entered on March 31, 2016, in favor of his former employer Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of New York (“PCNY”), in his employment discrimination and retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2Q00e *et seq.,*and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. *Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t,*706 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to PCNY. Except as noted below, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough decision. *See Hardy v. Pepsi Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc.,*No. 14-CV-4007 (VEC), 2016. WL 1301181 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016).

The district court did not explicitly address Hardy’s claim that PCNY retaliated against him for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Nonetheless, this claim was properly dismissed because Hardy could not bring a.workers’ compensation retaliation claim in district court. The Workers’ *61Compensation Board has exclusive jurisdiction over any claims for violation of New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law, including claims that an employer retaliated against an employee for filing for workers’ compensation. *See Isabella v. Koubek,*733 F.3d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 2013) (exclusive jurisdiction); N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 120 (retaliation claims).

Hardy argues for the first time on appeal that the arbitrator violated New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law and the collective bargaining agreement. Generally, we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, and there is no reason to do so here. *See Harrison v. Republic of Sudan,*838 F.3d 86, 96 (2d Cir. 2016).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hardy’s motions for counsel. *See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Charles W. Sears Real Estate, Inc.,*865 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir. 1988) (reviewing the denial of counsel for abuse of discretion); *Hodge v. Police Officers,*802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that a “threshold requirement” to appoint counsel is that “the indigent’s position [must] seem[ ] likely to be of substance”).

We have considered all of Hardy’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 15

- 00368

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.N.

, a Child

From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014

- PA

- 02675 Honorable Martha B. Tanner, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION

, JUSTICE BARNARD , AND JUSTICE ALVAREZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order is REVERSED as to the termination of M.M.P.N.’s and B.W.N.’s parental rights. The trial court’s order appointing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services’ appointment as managing

conservator of M.N. is AFFIRMED.

No costs of court are taxed against either M.M.P.N. or B.W.M.

SIGNED October 14, 2015.

_____________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
## In **T he**  **Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo**  No. 07 - 22 - 00269 - CV IN RE LONNIE KADE WELSH, RELATOR ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

### October 28 , 2022 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. Lonnie Kade Welsh is a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order which prohibits him from filing new litigation in any Texas court without first obtaining permission from the local administrative judge. See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . §§ 11.101 - .103. Despite the prefiling order prohibiting new filings, Welsh filed a petition for writ of mandamus with this Court without an accompanying order permitting the filing. Chapter 11 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires courts to dismiss new actions filed by a vexatious litigant unless the litigant also files an order from the local administrative judge permitting the filing of the new action. See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . § 11.1035 . By letter of September 28, 2022, we admonished Welsh that this2 proceeding would be dismissed unless he filed an order granting the required permission by October 10 , 2022 . On October 11, 2022, we received Welsh ’s Motion to Stay Dismissal. Within it, he represented that he sought the requisite permission from the Regional Administrative Judge on October 5, 2022. Yet, no proof of such a request to the Administrative Judge, like a copy of the request, was appended to his motion. Nor did he append proof that the Regional Administrative J udge received or otherwise knew of his request. Furthermore, no order permitting him to proceed has been received by this court to date. Accordingly, w e deny the “M otion to S tay D ismissal ” and dismiss , without prejudic e, his petition for writ of mandamus . See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . § 11.1035(b). Per Curiam
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21 - 0644 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. KAITLYN DAWN POLICH,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including February 2 1 , 2023, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

January 11 2023

01/11/2023

Case Number: DA 21-0644
Cesar Augusto Bertrand ZELAYA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-1506

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 4, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-50035

Summary Calendar

ISIDRO MARTINEZ RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

FRANK TURRIGLIO, Corporal; R. SAENZ,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(SA-96-CV-107)

February 23, 1998

Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Isidro Martinez Ramirez, a Texas state prison er, filed suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two detention officers whom he

alleges subjected him to excessive force in violation of his

constitutional rights. The jury concluded that the defendants had2 The jur y answered in the affirmative to a special

interrogatory that asked: “Do you find that all of the plaintiff’s

claims in this case are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or

that the plaintiff continued to litigate after they clearly became

so?”

3 FDIC v. Mijalis , 15 F.3d 1314, 1318-19 (5th Cir. 1994).

2 not used excessive force, and that Ramirez’s suit was frivolous. 2

On appeal, Ramirez raises the following assignments of error:

(1) the magistrate judge admitted prejudicial evidence, (2) defense

counsel engaged in improper cross-examination, and (3) the verdict

resulted from defense counsel’s improper closing argument.

We have considered these points carefully. We find that the

district court did not commit error, plain or otherwise.

Furthermore, Ramirez has failed to make the requisite showing that

his substantial rights were affected. 3

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Adrian SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11451 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed October 2, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Adrian Sanchez, Pro Se

Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Adrian Sanchez has moved for leave to with*206draw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Sanchez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Michael MITCHELL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-2197

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 28, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Appeal is dismissed.
## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 22

- 1707

___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Thomas Charles Mart

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

____________

Submitted: August 3 , 2022 Filed: August 8, 2022 [Unpublished]

____________ Before BENTON, S HEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

____________
PER CURIAM.

Thomas Charles Mart appeals the sentence the district court 1 imposed after he pled guilty to drug and firearm offenses. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.-2- Counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California

, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that Mart’s sentence is unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Mart. The court properly considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and there is no indication that it overlooked a relevant factor, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors. See United States
v. Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 461

- 62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Further, the court imposed the statutory minimum sentence. See United States v. Woods , 717 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 2013).

This court has independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988), and finds no non

- frivolous issues for appeal.

The judgment is affirmed, and counsel’s motion to withdraw is g ranted.

______________________________
Ricky MONTGOMERY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D18-594

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 12, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

*Affirmed.*
Valerie Nicole BRINKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4402

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 27, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Edward P. CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D18-395

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 12, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

*Affirmed.*
Exhibit








SECOND AMENDMENT TO
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


This Second Amendment to Employment Agreement (the “Amendment”) is dated effective January 1, 2019 and amends the Employment Agreement by and between Umpqua Holdings Corporation (“Umpqua”) and Ron Farnsworth (“Officer”) dated as of March 5, 2008 (as previously amended, the “Employment Agreement”).


1.    PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT AND DURATION OF AGREEMENT.  


1.1    The purpose of this Amendment is to extend the term of the Employment Agreement, which is set to expire December 31, 2018, and to amend certain provisions of the Employment Agreement as set forth below.


1.2    The duration of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended and extended to December 31, 2019, unless sooner terminated as set forth in the Employment Agreement.


2.    SEVERANCE. The first sentence of Section 9 of the Employment Agreement is amended to change the Severance Benefit and is replaced with the following: “In the event of Termination Without Cause or Termination for Good Reason, in addition to receiving Earned Compensation, Officer will receive a severance benefit equal to twelve months Base Salary (the ‘Severance Benefit’).”


3.    CHANGE IN CONTROL.  The second sentence of Section 10 of the Employment Agreement is amended to change the period over which the Change in Control Benefit is paid and is replaced with the following: “Subject to Section 12.3 below, the Change in Control Benefit shall be paid in equal installments over eighteen months, starting on the next regular payday following termination.”


4.    TRADE SECRETS. The following provision is added to Section 17 of the Agreement:


“NOTICE OF IMMUNITY UNDER THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996, AS AMENDED BY THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016: Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement: (A) Officer will not be held criminally or civilly liable under any federal or state trade secret law for any disclosure of a trade secret that is made: (1) in confidence to a federal, state, or local government official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney and solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law; or (2) in a complaint or other document that is filed under seal in a lawsuit or other proceeding; and (B) if Officer files a lawsuit for retaliation by Umpqua for reporting a suspected violation of law, Officer may disclose Umpqua’s trade secrets to Officer’s attorney and use the trade secret information in the court proceeding if Officer (1) files any document containing the trade secret under seal; and (2) does not disclose the trade secret, except pursuant to court order.”


5.    EFFECT OF AMENDMENT.  Except as specifically set forth herein, the Employment Agreement shall continue in full force and effect as written.




1









6.    DEFINED TERMS.  Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Amendment have the meanings set forth in the Employment Agreement.


UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORPORATION




By:    /s/ Sheri Burns
Title:    EVP/Chief People Officer


OFFICER


    
/s/ Ron Farnsworth
Ron Farnsworth






2
Exhibit 23.1
  CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
   We have issued our reports dated July 14 , 2009, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting included in the Annual Report of America’s Car-Mart, Inc. on Form 10-K for the year ended April 30, 2009. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said reports in the
Registration Statements of America’s Car-Mart, Inc. on Forms S-8 (File Nos. 33-59519, 33-59527, 33-41960, 33-22590, 33-71090, 333-38475, 333-147915, 333-139270, 333-139269, 333-129727).
   /s/ Grant Thornton LLP
  Tulsa, OK
  July 14, 2009