alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

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###### Office of Science and Technology Policy

# AGENCY:

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).

# ACTION:

Notice; correction.

# SUMMARY:

                        OSTP published a document in the                         **Federal Register**                         of January 5, 2022, requesting input on how digital health technologies are used, or could be used in the future, to transform community health, individual wellness, and health equity. The document closing date was stated as February 28, 2022. We are extending the closing date to March 31, 2022 to allow more time for input.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Jacqueline Ward at                         *connectedhealth@ostp.eop.gov*                         or by voicemail at 202-456-3030.                    

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

## Correction

                    In the                     **Federal Register**                     of January 5, 2022, in FR Doc. 2021-28193, on page 492, in the second column, correct the                     **DATES**                     caption to read:                

**DATES:**                         Interested persons and organizations are invited to submit comments on or before 5:00 p.m. ET on March 31, 2022.                    

Dated: January 31, 2022.

Stacy Murphy,

Operations Manager.

[FR Doc. 2022-02289 Filed 2-3-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3270-F1-P
Robert G. GENUNG, Appellant, v. Caroline L. CONSTANTINO as Personal Representative of the Estate of Martha A. Genung, Deceased, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3986

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 16, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Michael James HICKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. BOBBALLA; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-17255

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*560Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 24, 2017

Edmund F. Brennan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **

Michael James Hicks, Pro Se

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. *See*28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Michael James Hicks, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying him leave to proceed in forma pauperis in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations in connection with his medical treatment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), *Andrews v. Cervantes,*493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007), and for an abuse of discretion its denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis, *O’Loughlin v. Doe,*920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990). We reverse and remand.

The district court improperly denied Hicks’ request to proceed in forma pauper-is because Hicks made plausible allegations that he was “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time he lodged the complaint, including that the inadequate physical therapy he received caused paralysis in his left arm and his prescribed pain medication puts him at heightened risk for liver disease because he suffers from hepatitis C. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); *see also Andrews,*493 F.3d at 1055 (an exception to the three-strikes rule exists “if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing”).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<S>                                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                         JAN-01-1996
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<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                   393,961,474
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<CASH>                                   4,938,481
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                      18,065,126
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         543,324,206
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<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                     11,042,260
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<PAGE>
#### In the Matter of Raymond C. Toth, Petitioner, v H. Carl McCall, as State Comptroller, Respondent.

[769 NYS2d 918]

*713Crew III, J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by the order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent which denied petitioner’s application for ordinary disability retirement benefits.

Petitioner, a former supervisor with the Education Department, filed an application for ordinary disability retirement benefits alleging that job-related stress, depression, anxiety and substance abuse rendered him permanently disabled from the performance of his duties. Following a series of hearings, at which various medical experts appeared and testified, petitioner’s application was denied upon the ground that he had failed to establish that he was permanently incapacitated from performing the duties of his position. Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking to annul respondent’s determination.

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the record as a whole indeed contains substantial evidence to support respondent’s denial of petitioner’s application for retirement benefits. Petitioner’s treating physician, a family practitioner, testified that petitioner suffered from a host of ailments including, insofar as is relevant to this proceeding, depression, alcohol abuse and back pain. Although acknowledging that some of these conditions were treatable, petitioner’s treating physician opined that petitioner’s back pain, which was caused by cervical stenosis, significantly reduced petitioner’s flexibility and caused such severe pain as to permanently incapacitate petitioner from the performance of his duties, which included frequent traveling and stair climbing.

Conversely, the orthopedic surgeon who evaluated petitioner on behalf of the New York State and Local Employees’ Retirement System found no evidence of a permanently disabling orthopedic disability, and the neurologist who conducted a similar evaluation for the Retirement System found only a mild degree of stenosis which, in his opinion, did not render petitioner permanently disabled. Finally, although the psychiatrist who examined petitioner stated that petitioner was partially disabled due to alcohol-related problems and suffered from a moderate depressive disorder, both of which were treatable, he found no evidence of a permanent psychiatric disorder. Accordingly, none of the Retirement System’s experts concluded that petitioner was permanently incapacitated from the performance of his *714duties. As respondent was free to credit this testimony over that offered by petitioner’s treating physician *(see Matter of Gaglianese v New York State & Local Retirement Sys.,*308 AD2d 669, 670 [2003]), we are unable to discern any basis upon which to disturb respondent’s determination.

Mercure, J.P., Peters, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
EXHIBIT
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report of
Salon Media Group, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended March
31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the “Report”), I, Norman Blashka, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and





(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







/s/ Norman
      BlashkaJune
      27, 2007
            Norman
      BlashkaChief
      Financial Officer
Exhibit
23.1








CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM








We have
issued our reports dated June 9, 2009, with respect to the consolidated
financial statements, schedule, and internal control over financial reporting
included in the Annual Report of California Micro Devices Corporation on Form
10-K for the year ended March 31, 2009. We hereby consent to the incorporation
by reference of said reports in the Registration Statements of California Micro
Devices Corporation on Forms S-8 (File No. 33-159134, effective May 11, 2009,
File No. 333-159133, effective May 11, 2009, File No. 333-159095, effective May
8, 2009, File No. 333-147302 effective November 9, 2007, File No. 333-120313
effective November 9, 2004, File No. 333-108443 effective September 2, 2003,
File No. 333-102199, effective December 24, 2002, File No. 333-88250, effective
May 15, 2002, File No. 333-69268, effective September 12, 2001, File No.
333-43138, effective August 4, 2000, File No. 333-90919, effective November 12,
1999, File No. 333-61833, effective August 19, 1998, File No. 333-44959,
effective January 27, 1998, File No. 333-10257, effective August 15, 1996, File
No. 033-61907, effective August 17, 1995, File No. 033-84758, effective October
6, 1994, File No. 033-39000, effective February 20, 1991, and File No.
033-22836, effective June 29, 1988, and Forms S-3 (File No. 333-113695,
effective March 17, 2004, File No. 333-108417, effective September 23, 2003,
File No. 333-102198, effective February 25, 2003, File No. 333-76206, effective
May 15, 2002, File No. 333-44986, effective September 8, 2000, File No.
333-91073, effective November 16, 1999, and File No. 033-76986, effective March
28, 1994).






/s/ GRANT
THORNTON LLP




San Jose,
California


June 9,
2009
Blanca ABREU, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. CABANA CLUB APARTMENT ASSOCIATES LTD., etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-0986

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

OCTOBER 02, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1468 

To amend title 40, United States Code, to eliminate the leasing authority 

of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 1, 2021 

Ms. NORTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend title 40, United States Code, to eliminate the 

leasing authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securities and Ex5 change Commission Real Estate Leasing Authority Rev6 ocation Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1468 IH

1 SEC. 2. LEASING OF SPACE FOR SECURITIES AND EX2 CHANGE COMMISSION. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3304 of title 40, United 

4 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol5 lowing: 

6 ‘‘(e) LEASING OF SPACE FOR SECURITIES AND EX7 CHANGE COMMISSION.—Notwithstanding any other provi8 sion of law, on and after the date of enactment of this 

9 subsection, the Securities and Exchange Commission may 

10 not lease general purpose office space. The Administrator 

11 may lease such space for the Securities and Exchange 

12 Commission under section 585 and this chapter.’’. 

13 (b) LIMITATION ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.— 

14 The amendment made by subsection (a) may not be con15 strued to invalidate or otherwise affect a lease entered into 

16 by the Securities and Exchange Commission before the 

17 date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
Torren Dewayne WILLIAMS v. STATE

CR-15-1040

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT
32.1
 
 SECTION
1350 CERTIFICATION
 
 Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, I, Charles Deisbeck, Chief Executive Officer of Breda
Telephone Corp., certify that to my knowledge (i) Breda Telephone Corp.'s Annual
Report on Form 10-KSB/A for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006 (the
"Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of Breda Telephone Corp.
 
 Date:
December 14, 2009
 
 /s/ Charles DeisbeckCharles
      Deisbeck, Chief Executive
Officer







E-3
Lisha Thomas STODDARD, as Personal Representative, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0455

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 30, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Exhibit
10.1


 


AMENDMENT
NO. 2 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT



BETWEEN


DIEGO
PELLICER WORLDWIDE, INC.


AND


RON
THROGMARTIN


 


This Amendment No. 2 to
Employment Agreement (the "Amendment") is dated as of this 15th day of February, 2019 and amends the Employment
Agreement dated as of September 17, 2014, as amended on February 8, 2017 (collectively, the "Employment
Agreement"), by and between DIEGO PELLICER WORLDWIDE, INC. ("Diego") and RON THROGMARTIN
("Executive"). Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms used shall have the meaning ascribed to them
in the Employment Agreement. In consideration of the foregoing, and other good and valuable consideration, including
Executive's continued employment with Diego, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Executive and
Diego hereby agree as follows:


 


		I.	AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT



 


Section 1 "Term”
is hereby amended by deleting: "September 16, 2019” and by inserting "September
16, 2024” in the place of such deleted text.


 


		II.	GENERAL PROVISIONS.



 


All other terms
and conditions of the Employment Agreement that have not been specifically amended herein shall remain in full force and effect.
This Amendment, together with the Employment Agreement, contains all of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties hereto
regarding the subject matter hereof. All prior agreements, promises, negotiations and representations, either oral or written,
relating to the subject matter of this Amendment or the Employment Agreement not expressly set forth in this Amendment or the Employment
Agreement are of no force or effect. Any waiver, alteration or modification of any of the terms of this Amendment shall be valid
only if made in writing and signed by both parties hereto. This Amendment may be executed in up to two counterparts, each of which
shall be deemed an original but together shall constitute one and the same instrument.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties
have executed this Amendment as of the date first set forth above.





	DIEGO PELLICER WORLDWIDE,
    INC.	EXECUTIVE
	 	 
	By: /s/ Christopher Strachan	/s/ Ron Throgmartin
	      Christopher
    Strachan	Ron Throgmartin
	      Chief Financial
    Officer	 















 


EXECUTION COPY-02-15-2019
Mitchell W. REIBLICH, Doc# C11100, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-5568

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 21, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v. Lori FELLER, Legal Guardian of the Person and Property of James Mondello, R. Keith Williams, Individually; R. Keith Williams, P.A. ; Christine Mondello; Richard G. Halpern, etc., et al., Respondents.

Case No. 5D17-2346

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed February 2, 2018

Jason M. Azzarone and Kari K. Jacobson, of La Cava & Jacobson, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioner.

O. John Alpizar and Scott Alpizar, of Alpizar Law, LLC, Palm Bay, for Respondent, Lori Feller.

No Appearance for other Respondents.

EVANDER, J.

Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari, challenging an order overruling its work-product and attorney-client privilege objections to the production of parts of its case file. We previously ordered the trial court to conduct an in camera review of the documents originally requested by Respondent, Lori Feller. *See**Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Feller* , 163 So.3d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).

On remand, the trial court conducted an extensive in camera review of the numerous documents initially at issue. Petitioner now challenges the June 2017 order to the extent it requires Petitioner to produce documents 119, 132, 134, 135, 218-219, 220-221, 231-232, 360-361, 393-396, and 596-597 as designated in the sealed portion of the record.

After conducting our own review of the documents, we conclude that documents 218-219, 231-232, and 596-597 are privileged attorney-client communications. Accordingly, the trial court's order requiring production of said documents constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law. *See* § 90.502(2), Fla. Stat. (2006) ; *see also**Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.* , 74 So.3d 1064, 1068 (Fla. 2011) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege, unlike the work-product doctrine, is not concerned with the litigation needs of the opposing party.") We also conclude that *466documents 360-361 are protected by the work-product doctrine. We deny the petition as to the remaining documents.

PETITION GRANTED, in part; DENIED, in part; and REMANDED.

BERGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
Pressley Bernard ALSTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Pressley Bernard Alston, Petitioner, v. Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.

No. SC17-499 No. SC17-983

Supreme Court of Florida.

[May 17, 2018]

Robert A. Norgard of Norgard, Norgard, & Chastang, Bartow, Florida, and Billy H. Nolas, Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer L. Keegan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Pressley Bernard Alston's appeal of the circuit court's order denying Alston's motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and Alston's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. *See* art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9) Fla. Const. We withdraw the opinion issued on January 22, 2018, and substitute this opinion in its place.

Alston seeks relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in *Hurst v. Florida* , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in *Hurst v. State* , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), *cert. denied* , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Alston's appeal and consideration of his habeas petition pending the disposition of *Hitchcock v. State* , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), *cert. denied* , *886--- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided *Hitchcock* , Alston responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why *Hitchcock* should not be dispositive in both cases. Then, after this Court decided *State v. Silvia* , 235 So.3d 349 (Fla. 2018), Alston responded to this Court's order to show cause why *Silvia* should not be dispositive in both cases.

After reviewing Alston's responses to the orders to show cause, as well as the State's arguments in reply, we conclude that Alston's valid waiver of postconviction proceedings and counsel in 2003 precludes him from claiming a right to relief under *Hurst* . *See**Silvia* , 235 So.3d 349 ; *Alston v. State* , 894 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2004). Moreover, Alston's sentence of death became final in 1999. *Alston v. State* , 723 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1998). Thus, even if Alston's postconviction waiver did not preclude him from raising a *Hurst* claim, *Hurst* would not apply retroactively to Alston's sentence of death. *See**Hitchcock* , 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's denial of relief and deny Alston's habeas petition.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS, J., dissents.

CANADY, J., concurring in result.

I would base the denial of relief to Alston on my view that *Hurst* should not be given retroactive application. *See**Mosley v. State* , 209 So.3d 1248, 1285-91 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Edwin L. DEMPS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2122

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

OCTOBER 02, 2017

On the Court's own motion, this cause is hereby transferred to the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Miami-Dade County, Florida.

ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SUAREZ and SALTER, JJ., concur.