alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony Ravon RUFFIN, a/k/a Anthony Ray Ruffin, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6107

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 31, 2017

Anthony Ravon Ruffin, Appellant Pro Se. Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Ravon Ruffin seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the rec*81ommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion and the order denying Ruf-fin’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ruffin has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, although we grant Ruffin’s motions to file addendums to his informal brief, we deny his motions for a certificate of appealability and for appointment of counsel and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alex NEGRETE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-11018 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Date Filed: 12/16/2016

Robert J. Brady, Jr., Wifredo A. Ferrer, Emily M. Smachetti, Nalina Sombuntham, U.S. Attorney’s Office, MIAMI, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Alex Negrete, Pro Se

Before HULL, WILSON and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Scott Sakin, appointed counsel for Alex Negrete in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L,Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is *770GRANTED, and Negrete’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 12

                              THE FINOVA GROUP INC.
                 COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF INCOME TO FIXED CHARGES
                             (Dollars in Thousands)


                                                            NINE MONTHS ENDED
                                                              SEPTEMBER 30,
                                                          ----------------------
                                                            2000          1999
                                                          --------      --------

Income from continuing operations before income taxes     $ 53,841      $264,255
Add fixed charges:
  Interest expense                                         454,421       330,680
  One-third rentals                                          3,335         2,433
                                                          --------      --------
    Total fixed charges                                    457,756       333,113
                                                          --------      --------
Income as adjusted                                        $511,597      $597,368
                                                          --------      --------
Ratio of income to fixed charges                              1.12          1.79
                                                          ========      ========

Preferred stock dividends on a pre-tax basis              $  4,770      $  4,770
Total fixed charges and preferred stock dividends         $462,526      $337,883
                                                          --------      --------
Ratio of income from continuing operations to fixed
 charges and preferred stock dividends                        1.11          1.77
                                                          ========      ========
EXHIBIT 32.2

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report of ERHC Energy Inc., a Colorado corporation
(the  "Company"),  on Form 10-K for the year ended  September 30, 2005, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), Cosmas Okpala, Chief
Financial  Officer of the Company,  does hereby certify,  pursuant to ss. 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss. 1350), that to his knowledge:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
            material respects,  the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.


/s/ Cosmas (Ike) Okpala
-------------------------
Cosmas (Ike) Okpala
Chief Financial Officer
December 29, 2005

[A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided  to ERHC Energy  Inc.  and will be  retained  by ERHC  Energy Inc.  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.]
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric Martin VANBUREN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6897

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 19, 2017

Decided: October 24, 2017

Eric Martin Van Burén, Appellant Pro Se. Jean Barrett Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Eric Martin VanBuren appeals the district court’s orders denying his most recent attempts for a sentence reduction. We have reviewed the record and discern no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny VanBuren’s self-styled motion for leave to file a Rule (d) motion and affirm the district court’s orders. *See United States v. VanBuren,*No. 3:00-cr-00066-NKM-1 (W.D. Va. June 27, 2017 *&*July 6, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
Second Amendment to Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan - Lee Brady



 Exhibit 10.7 
 SECOND AMENDMENT TO 
 THE LA PORTE SAVINGS BANK 
 SUPPLEMENTAL EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT AGREEMENT 
 DATED AUGUST, 1, 2002 
 FOR 
 LEE BRADY 
 THIS AMENDMENT executed on this 4th day of March, 2004, by and between THE LA PORTE
SAVINGS BANK, a state chartered mutual savings bank located in La Porte, Indiana (the “Company”), and LEE BRADY (the “Executive”). 
 On August 1, 2002, the Company and the Executive executed the SUPPLEMENTAL EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”). 
 Pursuant to the power of amendment reserved by Article 7 of the Agreement, the undersigned hereby amends, in part, said Agreement for the purposes of: (i) removing definitions, (ii) changing the Effective Date, and
(iii) changing the Plan year. Therefore, 
 Section 2.3.3 shall be added to the Agreement as follows: 
 The benefit amount is subject to a vesting schedule of zero percent (0.0%) in the first Plan Year, and one hundred percent (100%) thereafter. 
 IN WITNESS OF THE ABOVE, the Executive and the Company have agreed to this First Amendment. 
  

									
	Executive:	 		 	Company:
			
		 		 	THE LA PORTE SAVINGS BANK
				
	/S/    LEE BRADY	 		 	By	 	/S/    RUSS KLOSINSKI
		 	Lee Brady	 		 	Title	 	Executive Vice President
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Francisco Deyes, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 662]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McKay, J.), rendered July 3, 2001, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Generally, in order to preserve a challenge to the factual sufficiency of a plea allocution, there must be a motion to withdraw the plea or a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction *(see People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 665 [1988]). Where, however, the defendant’s factual recitation negates an essential element of *576the crime pleaded to, the court may not accept the plea without further inquiry. If the court fails to conduct the inquiry, the defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the allocution on direct appeal, despite the absence of a post-allocution motion *(see People v Lopez, supra).*

It is undisputed that the defendant did not move to withdraw his plea on the ground now asserted on appeal as a basis for vacatur. Furthermore, the narrow exception to the preservation requirement set forth in *Lopez*does not apply to this case. The record does not show that the defendant made any statements during the plea allocution which would negate the elements set forth in Penal Law § 140.25 (2) or cast significant doubt on his guilt of the crime of burglary in the second degree *(see People v Konstantinides,*295 AD2d 537 [2002]). Thus, the defendant’s contention is unpreserved for appellate review *(see People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636 [1983]). Santucci, J.P., Goldstein, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24

- 1482

FAYE BEATRICE HAYES , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. MARYLAND TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION; HOLLY ARNOLD, Administrator, MDOT MTA; VERONICA LOWE, Deputy Director, Office of Labor and Employee Relations , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. Julie R. Rubin , District Judge. ( 1:23

- cv - 01195

- JRR )

Submitted : September 19, 2024 Decided: September 23, 2024

Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and HEYTENS , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Faye Beatrice Hayes, Appellant Pro Se. Leon Mathias Debes, Jr., Laura Jenifer, MARYLAND TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1482 Doc: 12 Filed: 09/23/2024 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Faye Beatrice Hayes appeals the district court’s orders (1) granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment on Hayes’ claims brought
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e

- 17 , the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 , and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654 , and for intentional infliction of emotional distress , and denying Hayes’ “Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment”; and (2) deny ing Hayes ’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court ’s orders

. Hayes v. Md. Transit Admin. , No. 1:23

-

cv - 01195

- JRR ( D. Md

. Dec. 21, 2023; May 6, 2024 ). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED USCA4 Appeal: 24-1482 Doc: 12 Filed: 09/23/2024 Pg: 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 23.2


            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM


The Board of Directors

Endavo Media and Communications, Inc.:


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement of
Endavo Media and Communications, Inc. on Form S-8 (File No. 333-119586) filed on
October 7, 2004 of our report dated February 13, 2004, on the consolidated
balance sheets of Endavo Media and Communications, Inc. as of December 31, 2003
and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders' deficit and
cash flows for the year then ended, which report appears in Endavo Media and
Communications, Inc.'s Annual Report on Form 10-KSB.


/s/  Tanner+Co.
-----------------------------
     Tanner+Co.

Salt Lake City, Utah

April 14, 2005
#### Rodolfo Mario MARAVILLA, Petitioner, v. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

No. 15-14438 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Date Filed: 11/29/2016

Pablo Sergio Hurtado, The Pablo Hurta-do Law Firm, PA, Fort Myers, FL, for Petitioner

Ashley Young Martin, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Thomas W. Hussey, OIL, Office of Immigration *745Litigation, Washington, DC, Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, Loretta Lynch, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Marc Jeffrey Moore, ICE Field Office Director, KROME SPC, Miami, FL, Michelle Ressler, District Counsel’s Office, USICE, Miami, FL, for Respondent

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Rodolfo Mario Maravilla petitions for review of an order that expedited his removal from the United States as an alien convicted of' an aggravated felony. *See*8 U.S.C. §§ 1228(b), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Mara-villa argues that the Department of Homeland Security failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is an alien and that the Department violated his right to due process during the expedited removal proceedings. We dismiss in part and deny in part Maravilla’s petition.

We lack jurisdiction to review the finding that Maravilla is an alien. .Maravilla received written notice that he was subject to removal as a native and citizen of Mexico who had been convicted twice in the Florida courts for drug-related crimes and that he had ten days to submit evidence to rebut the charge. *See 8*C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(i). Maravilla failed to respond to the notice. “[Ajbsent a cognizable excuse or exception,” we “lack jurisdiction to consider a claim raised in a petition for review unless the petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies.” *Amayar-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,*463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006). We dismiss this part of Maravilla’s petition.

The Department did not violate Maravil-la’s right to due process. To establish a violation of due process, an alien must prove that he was deprived of liberty without notice or an opportunity to respond and that he was substantially prejudiced by the alleged error. *Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,*779 F.3d 1284, 1299 (11th Cir. 2015). Maravilla did not dispute that he was removable and instead applied for withholding of removal. Maravilla argues that he “did not have actual physical possession of the Notice” until three days before a response was due, but he failed to request an extension of time to respond despite being informed of that right in the notice. And Maravilla cannot prove that he was prejudiced by the delay. Maravilla acknowledges that “he does not know where he was born” and he fails to identify any evidence that would have changed the outcome of his proceeding. We deny this part of Maravilla’s petition.

PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
#### In the Matter of Dov Bronner et al., Appellants, v Division of Housing and Community Renewal, Respondent.

[771 NYS2d 121]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Tejada, J.), entered November 21, 2002, which upheld the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) Commissioner’s order, dated April 3, 2002, affirming the Rent Administrator’s determination, dated November 7, 2001, that the subject apartment had already been deregulated, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner tenants claimed that the Rent Administrator exceeded her authority in determining the apartment already luxury-deregulated, under Rent Stabilization Code ([RSC] 9 NYCRR) § 2520.11 (r) (2), because the landlord had brought a deregulation proceeding on other grounds. But the finding of prior deregulation under RSC § 2520.11 (r) (2) was jurisdictional in that it deprived DHCR of considering the landlord’s later deregulation petition on other grounds *(see e.g. Matter of Rosillo v New York City Loft Bd.,*260 AD2d 237 [1999], *lv denied*93 NY2d 815 [1999]). The Commissioner’s order was rationally based upon arguments and evidence submitted to the Rent *431Administrator (see *Matter of Franco v State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal,*251 AD2d 140 [1998], *lv denied*92 NY2d 818 [1999]; *Matter of Meyer v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal,*192 AD2d 375 [1993]).

Nor do we perceive any due process violation. After requesting the vacancy lease of the current tenants and the last renewal lease of the prior tenants, the Rent Administrator issued a proposed order declaring that the apartment had already been deregulated, as a high-rent accommodation, as of petitioners’ entry in May 1995, at a legal regulated rent in excess of $2,000 per month, but gave petitioners an opportunity to respond to that ruling. Furthermore, the commencement of petitioners’ initial lease predated the amendment of section 26-504.2 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (Local Law No. 12 [2000] of City of New York § 2), which introduced the requirement that tenants be notified of high-rent deregulation by certified mail. In any event, any alleged failure to serve petitioners with such notice did not extend DHCR’s jurisdiction to consider the question of deregulation in the latest proceeding *(see Thorgeirsdottir v New York City Loft Bd.,*161 AD2d 337 [1990], *affd*77 NY2d 951 [1991]).

We have considered petitioners’ other arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Ellerin, Williams and Gonzalez, JJ.
#### Sabrina D. DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1869

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 19, 2017

Decided: October 23, 2017

Sabrina D. Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Carmelo Barone Sammataro, TURNER, PADGET, GRAHAM & LANEY, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Sabrina D. Davis appeals the district court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting summary judgment for Defendant in Davis’s civil action related to a life insurance claim. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in' for-ma pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Davis v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,*No. 6:16-cv-03100-TMC, 2017 WL 2703972 (D.S.C. June 23, 2017). We deny Davis’s request to remove this appeal to another United States Circuit Court and her motion for Defendant to correct its informal brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Javier HERRERA-CASTANEDA, Petitioner, v. Jeff B. SESSIONS, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72489

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed February 22, 2017

Zulu Ali, Law Office of Zulu Ali, Riverside, CA, for Petitioner

OIL, Edward C. Durant, Timothy Bo Stanton, Attorneys, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Javier Herrera-Castañeda, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Avagyan v. Holder,*646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Herrera-Castaneda’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than two years after his final order of removal, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Herrera-Castañeda did not demonstrate his motion came within any statutory or regulatory exception to the filing deadline, *see*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Herrera-Castañeda contends the BIA did not address his contention regarding equitable tolling. Although his motion to reopen uses the term equitable tolling, his request also refers to sua sponte reopen*515ing, uses the standard for sua sponte reopening instead of discussing tolling factors, and cites to authority regarding sua sponte reopening. Because the BIA’s order does address sua sponte reopening, remand is not warranted.

In light of this decision, we need not address Herrera-Castaneda’s remaining contentions regarding the merits of his motion to reopen or eligibility for cancellation of removal.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<PAGE>

<ARTICLE>           5

<LEGEND>
                    The Schedule contains summary financial 
                    information extracted from the financial
                    statements for Fogelman Mortgage LP 1
                    and is qualified in its entirety by reference
                    to such financial statements
</LEGEND>

<RESTATED>          

<CIK>               0000800608
<NAME>              Fogelman Mortgage LP 1
<MULTIPLIER>        1

<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               Dec-31-1996

<PERIOD-START>                  Jan-1-1996

<PERIOD-END>                    Dec-31-1996

<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-Mos

<CASH>                          1,708,313

<SECURITIES>                    0

<RECEIVABLES>                   26,123,955

<ALLOWANCES>                    0

<INVENTORY>                     0

<CURRENT-ASSETS>                0

<PP&E>                          489,061

<DEPRECIATION>                  0

<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  28,321,329

<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           205,706

<BONDS>                         0

<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0

<PREFERRED>                     0

<COMMON>                        0

<OTHER-SE>                      28,115,623

<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    28,321,329

<SALES>                         0

<TOTAL-REVENUES>                2,642,987

<CGS>                           0

<TOTAL-COSTS>                   328,116

<OTHER-EXPENSES>                0

<LOSS-PROVISION>                0

<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0

<INCOME-PRETAX>                 0

<INCOME-TAX>                    0

<INCOME-CONTINUING>             0

<DISCONTINUED>                  0

<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0

<CHANGES>                       0

<NET-INCOME>                    2,314,871

<EPS-PRIMARY>                   38.08

<EPS-DILUTED>                   0


</TABLE>