Docket No. 92162–Agenda 11–May 2002.

KINGBROOK, INC., Appellant, v. JOHN A. PUPURS et al.,  								Appellees.

Opinion filed October 18, 2002.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

	The subject of this appeal is appellate jurisdiction. The circuit

court of Boone County entered summary judgment against

plaintiff Kingbrook, Inc. (Kingbrook), and denied Kingbrook’s

motion to reconsider. Kingbrook appealed, but the appellate court

found that Kingbrook’s motion to reconsider was ineffective to

toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the

appellate court found the notice of appeal to be untimely and

dismissed Kingbrook’s appeal. The question before us is: In a

nonjury case, what degree of detail must be included in a motion

to reconsider for such a motion to qualify as a “post-judgment

motion” within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure (see

735 ILCS 5/2–1203 (West 1998)) and the rules of this court (see

155 Ill. 2d R. 301(a)), such that the motion will toll the time for

filing a notice of appeal until its disposition?

BACKGROUND

	Kingbrook sued John A. Pupurs and Rockford Manufacturing,

Inc. (Rockford), based on a theory of unjust enrichment, and sued

R&D Thiel, Inc. (Thiel), for unjust enrichment and breach of

contract. Although the issues before this court are solely

procedural, we briefly note that according to the allegations of the

complaint, Kingbrook is a commercial real estate agent which

showed a specific property to Thiel. Thiel placed multiple offers on

the property, but never completed a purchase from the original

seller. Instead, the property was sold to Rockford, a corporation of

which Pupurs is the sole shareholder. Rockford then sold the

property to Thiel for $500,000 more than Rockford had paid the

original seller. Kingbrook, characterizing Rockford’s profit as a

commission, sued Rockford, Pupurs and Thiel on the above-noted

theories.

	Rockford, Pupurs and Thiel (collectively, defendants) moved

to dismiss Kingbrook’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and

the circuit court granted that motion. However, this judgment was

reversed on appeal and the cause was remanded to the circuit court

for further proceedings. Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, Nos. 2–98–1120, 2–98–0550 cons. (2001) (unpublished order under

Supreme Court Rule 23).

	It is at this time that the proceedings pertinent to this appeal

began. On remand, defendants moved for summary judgment. The

circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on

January 21, 2000. On February 17, 2000, Kingbrook filed a

document titled “Motion For Reconsideration.” The body of that

document read, in its entirety, as follows:

		“N[ow comes] the plaintiff, K[ingbrook, Inc.], an Illinois

corporation, by and through its attorneys, B[arrick],

S[witzer], L[ong], B[alsey] & V[anavera], and hereby

moves the Court to reconsider its decision granting

severing [sic] judgment in favor of the Defendants.”

No additional materials in support of or opposition to the motion

were filed by any party or requested by the circuit court. Kingbrook

noticed up the motion within the time allowed by the circuit court

rules, and the circuit court denied the motion on April 28, 2000.

	On May 30, 2000, Kingbrook filed a notice of appeal. In the

appellate court, defendants moved to dismiss the appeal for want

of jurisdiction, arguing that Kingbrook’s notice of appeal was late

because the motion to reconsider was not a proper post-judgment

motion. The appellate court agreed with defendants and dismissed

the appeal. No. 2–00–0611 (unpublished order under Supreme

Court Rule 23). We granted Kingbrook leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d

R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

	Before this court there is but one central issue. The parties

agree that the filing of a timely notice of appeal is mandatory and

jurisdictional. R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 159 (1998). The parties also agree that the notice of appeal

was timely if and only if Kingbrook’s motion to reconsider tolled the 30-day filing period.1 The sole question is whether Kingbrook’s motion did toll the filing period. The parties’ arguments may be

briefly summarized as follows. Kingbrook contends that neither the

Code of Civil Procedure nor the rules of this court demand any

specificity in post-judgment motions in cases decided without a

jury, whereas the Code does explicitly require specificity in post-

judgment motions in cases decided by a jury. Thus, Kingbrook

argues, the motion filed in this case was sufficient because it was

timely filed, was in proper form, and requested the appropriate type

of relief. Defendants respond that a bare motion with no specifics,

such as the motion in this case, cannot serve the purpose of a

proper post-judgment motion and is nothing more than a subterfuge

to delay the time for filing the notice of appeal. Such chicanery,

defendants argue, should not be countenanced. Some detail, some argument, they contend, must be presented for a post-judgment

motion to toll the time for filing the notice of appeal.

	The pertinent portions of the Code and our rules read as

follows. Our Rule 303(a)(1) governs when a notice of appeal must

be filed in civil cases. It states that

			“Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the notice

of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court

within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment

appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed

against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a

nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order

disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion.” 155

Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).

	Section 2–1203(a) of the Code, which governs post-judgment

motions in cases decided without a jury, provides that

			“In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within

30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any

extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a

retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the

judgment or for other relief.” 735 ILCS 5/2–1203(a) (West

1998).

	Kingbrook also calls our attention to section 2–1202 of the

Code, which governs post-trial motions in cases decided by a jury.

Section 2–1202(b) provides in part that

			“Relief desired after trial in jury cases, heretofore sought

by reserved motions for directed verdict or motions for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in arrest of

judgment or for new trial, must be sought in a single post-

trial motion. *** The post-trial motion must contain the

points relied upon, particularly specifying the grounds in

support thereof, and must state the relief desired, as for

example, the entry of a judgment, the granting of a new

trial or other appropriate relief.” 735 ILCS 5/2–1202(b)

(West 1998).

	Our primary job in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give

effect to the intent of the legislature. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The plain language of a statute provides the most reliable indicator of

legislative intent, and “ ‘[w]e must not depart from the plain

language of [a statute] by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or

conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent.’ ”

Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 56 (1998), quoting Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996). Moreover, if the meaning is not unmistakable from the face of the

statute, our civil appeals rules are to be interpreted liberally, in

order that lawsuits may be decided on the merits. Parks v. McWhorter, 106 Ill. 2d 181, 185 (1985); 735 ILCS 5/1–106 (West 1998).

	Each side claims support for its position in previous decisions

of this court. Defendants rely on Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232 (1991), and Andersen v. Resource Economics Corp., 133 Ill. 2d 342 (1990), both of which involved the same basic question as the

case at bar: whether a particular document constituted a post-

judgment motion within the meaning of section 2–1203(a) of the Code. Defendants note that in those cases, this court explicitly

stated that specificity is required in post-judgment motions. See

Beck, 144 Ill. 2d at 241; Andersen, 133 Ill. 2d at 347. They suggest that this precedent is conclusive.2

	Kingbrook contends that Beck and Andersen are not controlling. Kingbrook argues that in both cases the court had

already concluded that the documents in question were not post-

judgment motions for other reasons than the lack of specificity and

thus that the mention of specificity was dictum. Moreover, Kingbrook notes that when mentioning the specificity requirement,

Beck merely cited Andersen, and the only authority cited in Andersen was Brown v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 83 Ill. 2d 344 (1980). Kingbrook contends that this chain of precedent casts

doubt on the validity of the statements in Beck and Andersen, because Brown involved a post-judgment motion after a jury verdict. As Kingbrook points out, sections 2–1202 and 2–1203 of

the Code differ, in that the former–which governs post-judgment

motions after a jury verdict–explicitly requires specificity and the

latter does not. See Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., Chicago, 297 Ill. App. 3d 891, 894-97 (1998), vacated & dismissed on other grounds, 193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000). Moreover, even in Brown this court did not hold that the nonspecific post-judgment motion did

not qualify as a post-judgment motion at all. Rather, we stated that

the motion was insufficient to preserve specific issues for appeal,

and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment affirming the judgment entered on the jury verdict. We did not find a lack of appellate

jurisdiction in Brown.

	For Kingbrook’s part, it relies on Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., 193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000). Kingbrook notes that after considering

various contentions as to why specificity should be required of

post-judgment motions under section 2–1203, the statement was

made that such arguments were only

		“ ‘reason[s] for denying the motion or granting counsel an

additional opportunity to respond after the initial hearing

is concluded. It is not a reason for holding that the motion

does not even qualify as a motion. A lame horse, after all,

is still a horse.’ ” Berg, 193 Ill. 2d at 200 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).

However, as Kingbrook admits, the language on which it relies is

contained in a dissent; it does not represent a holding of this court.

The majority did not address whether the motion sufficed to toll the

time for filing the notice of appeal. Berg, 193 Ill. 2d at 188.

	Nevertheless, we find that the plain language of the Code and

rules supports Kingbrook’s position. Rule 303(a) makes no

mention of the contents of any post-judgment motion. It merely

states that if a motion is filed, a notice of appeal must be filed

within 30 days after the order disposing thereof. Nor does section

2–1203(a) of the Code speak to the contents of any such motion–in

direct contradistinction to section 2–1202(b) of the Code,

governing post-judgment motions in cases decided by a jury.

Compare 735 ILCS 5/2–1203(a) (West 1998) with 735 ILCS

5/2–1202(b) (West 1998) (post-trial motions after a jury verdict

“must contain the points relied upon, particularly specifying the

grounds in support thereof”). There simply is no basis in the plain

language of the Code or our rules for a specificity requirement.

	There are practical difficulties as well with the notion of

holding that a timely, properly filed post-judgment motion which

requests appropriate relief might not qualify as a motion because

of a lack of specificity. For instance, although it may seem

unlikely, it is not difficult to imagine a circumstance in which a

circuit court might wish to grant such a motion. A judge could take cross-motions for summary judgment under advisement, then sign

the wrong order. Upon presentation of even a cursory motion for

reconsideration, the court could realize its error and enter the

judgment it had intended to enter. But if the cursory motion was not even a motion, as defendants argue, the court would be without jurisdiction to enter such an order if 30 days had elapsed from the

entry of the mistaken judgment.3 Indeed, the court would lose jurisdiction to enter any order, even an order denying or striking the purported post-judgment motion.

	On the other hand, the burdens on a victorious litigant by

tolling the time for filing a notice of appeal until disposition of all

properly formed and filed motions are relatively slight. Such

motions must be brought within 30 days of judgment or such

extension of time as the trial court might grant within 30 days after

the entry of judgment. Local rules of court generally will require

motions to be noticed up for hearing within a fairly short time after

their filing–in this case, two months. This delay is an

inconvenience, to be sure, but we cannot help but note that motions

for extensions of time are fairly routinely granted in the appellate

court and this court; a three-month delay is hardly without

precedent. It does not, at any rate, persuade us to ignore the plain

language of the Code and rules and to muddy the waters of

jurisdiction.

	Defendants protest that a nonspecific post-judgment motion

cannot serve the purpose of a post-judgment motion–giving the

circuit court the opportunity to correct its errors before a case is

brought up on appeal. Kingbrook rejoins that especially in a case

such as the instant one, which was decided on a motion for

summary judgment, the arguments of the losing party would have been presented to the court quite recently, in the briefing in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Kingbrook argues

that there would be no point in requiring a party to reiterate the

same arguments to avoid risking its right to an appeal.

	We decline to hold that post-judgment motions in nonjury

cases must contain some undefined degree of detail, lest the filer

risk that the reviewing court hold that the motion is not a motion

at all. It is not clear that a nonspecific motion could not fulfill its

role, and there is no reason to require the filer to guess how much

detail is enough.

	Defendants also argue that we should uphold the dismissal of

the appeal because of certain conduct by Kingbrook in the circuit

court. Defendants contend that counsel for Kingbrook did not even

prepare a draft order by the entry of which the circuit court could

have granted the motion, but prepared only the order entered in this

case, which denied its motion. Further, they refer to a letter from

counsel for Kingbrook to counsel for defendants in which the

author stated that he “intend[ed] to present [the draft order denying

the motion] to the Judge on the scheduled date so that the matter

could be concluded.” Defendants contend that these facts evince

that the motion was not made in good faith. Kingbrook objects that

there is no evidence of record that Kingbrook prepared only the

draft order denying its motion, and also argues that the letter to

which defendants refer is not properly of record and should not be

considered.

	These contentions are irrelevant to our analysis. The issue

before us is the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Defendants’

argument is, at its heart, that the appeal was properly dismissed

because the motion to reconsider was brought solely as a delaying

tactic–in other words, that dismissal was proper because of

Kingbrook’s motives for bringing the motion. But defendants cite

no authority, nor are we aware of any, that suggests that

jurisdiction should depend on the perceived intent or mind-set of

the litigants. Reviewing courts are generally unsuited to fact-

finding; appellate jurisdiction is not and should not be based on

inferences the reviewing court draws from a cold record regarding

the motives of the parties in making filings before the circuit court.

If the litigant satisfies the requirements of the Code and rules, jurisdiction vests in the appellate court; otherwise, not. The good

or bad faith of the parties does not enter into the equation.

	There are procedures in place to resolve contentions of bad-

faith litigation. Our Rule 137 specifically allows a party to request

sanctions against a party and its counsel for filings “interposed for

any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. We believe that accusations and

imputations of bad-faith litigation must be dealt with as such,

within the channels established for resolution of such issues, rather

than requiring reviewing courts to make factual determinations in

the first instance, in the context of deciding their jurisdiction to

review the merits of the case. We of course intimate no opinion as

to whether any conduct in the instant case might be sanctionable.

In this case, as in general, that fact-based determination should be

made initially by the circuit court.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated above, the order of the appellate court

dismissing the appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded to the

appellate court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

	Reversed and remanded.

	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.

	JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring:

	I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the motion in

question was permissible under the current language of section

2–1203(a). I write separately to express serious concerns regarding

the practical effects of the statute in its current form.

	As the majority states, section 2–1203(a) of the Code makes

mention of the contents of any post-judgment motion. As such, the

majority correctly concludes that the plain language of the Code

provides no basis for a specificity requirement. However, the current requirements raise the specter that a motion need be

nothing more than an empty shell in order to be effective.

Permitting skeletal motions invites sloppiness and will only create

more confusion for reviewing courts. A motion that is devoid of

detail does not meaningfully inform the trial court, or reviewing

courts, of what objections or points have been raised. A party

could, theoretically, file a motion that says nothing more than, “We

request a do over.”

	Furthermore, it is not difficult to envision abuse of the

requirements as currently written. The lack of a specificity

requirement encourages spurious pleadings or blatant attempts to

extend the time for leave to appeal through the filing of an empty,

meaningless motion to reconsider.

	While I agree with the majority that the filer of a motion

should not have to guess how much detail is enough (slip op. at 8),

there is a difference between insufficient detail and no detail at all.

I believe that a motion containing absolutely no identification and

articulation of objections or points is deficientdoes not contribute to fair and

informed dcecisionmaking. T The law demands some specificity to be

administered effectively and consistently. To that end, I sincerely

hope that the legislature addresses the lack of any content

requirements for motions to reconsider in nonjury cases.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this special concurrence.