alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, that:



|(1) | The accompanying quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the accompanying Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: November 9, 2006



/s/ Fred B. ParksFred B. ParksChairman and Chief Executive Officer/s/ Elissa J. LindsoeElissa J. LindsoeChief Financial Officer
Exhibit
      23.1











CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM








The
      Board
      of Directors


Pacific
      Continental Corporation and Subsidiary








We
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Annual Report on Form 10-K
      of
      Pacific Continental Corporation and Subsidiary (Pacific Continental Corporation)
      of our report dated March 12, 2007, with respect to the consolidated balance
      sheets of Pacific Continental Corporation as of December 31, 2006 and 2005,
      and
      the related consolidated statements of income, changes in stockholders’ equity,
      and cash flows for the years ended December 31, 2006 and 2005, and in our same
      report, with respect to Pacific Continental Corporation management’s assessment
      of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the
      effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which report is
      included in this annual report on Form 10-K of Pacific Continental Corporation
      for the year ended December 31, 2006.













Portland,
      Oregon


March
      12,
      2007
steam

_ record - Re: Tampa Electric Compan y Polk Power Station Request for Extension

Greetings,

This e-mail is a confirmation that your exte nsion request for the steam electric effluent guidelines questionnaire was received. Extension requests will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Please be aware that submittal of an ex tension request to EPA does not alter the due date of your questionnaire unless and until EPA agre es to the extension and establishes a new date.

Sincerely,

-----"Young, Kevin A." <kayoung@tecoenergy.com> wrote: -----

To: Jezebele Alicea/DC/USEPA/US@EPA From: "Young, Kevin A." <k ayoung@tecoenergy.com> Date: 07/13/2010 04:20PM cc: "Kroh, Stanley M." <smkroh@tecoenergy.com> Subject: Tampa Electric Company Polk Power Station Request for Extension From: <Alicea.Jezebele @ epamail.epa. g ov> To: "Young, Kevin A." <kayoung@tecoenergy.com> Date: 7/14/2010 6:15 AM Sub j ect: Re: Tampa Electric Company Polk Power Station Request for Extension Attachments: PPS.PDF Pa g e 1 of 2

2/23/2011 file://C:\Documents and Settin g s\TMedle y \Local Settin g s\Tem p \XP g r p wise\4C3D5606DO

...Dear Ms. Alicea,

Please find attached to this em ail a copy of Tampa Electric Company's request for extension of the deadline for response to EPA' s Questionnaire for Steam Electric Effluent Guidelines for Polk Power Station. Please contact me if you have any questions.

Thank you,

Kevin Young

NOTICE: This email is intended only for the individual(s) to whom it is addressed and may contain confidential information. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender immediately, delete this email from your system and do not copy or disclose it to an yone else. Although we take precautions to protect against viruses, we advise you to take your own precautions to protect against viruses as we acc ept no liability for any which remain. Pa g e 2 of 2

2/23/2011 file://C:\Documents and Settin g s\TMedle y \Local Settin g s\Tem p \XP g r p wise\4C3D5606DO

...Greetings,

This e-mail is a confirmation that your exte nsion request for the steam electric effluent guidelines questionnaire was received. Extension requests will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Please be aware that submittal of an ex tension request to EPA does not alter the due date of your questionnaire unless and until EPA agre es to the extension and establishes a new date.

Sincerely, Pa g e 1 of 1

8/29/2011 file://C:\Documents and Settin g s\TMedle y \Local Settin g s\Tem p \XP g r p wise\4C3D5516DO

...
Sheila H. KURTZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Helen GELLER, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-1781

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

SEPTEMBER 26, 2017

Upon the Court's own motion, it is ordered that this appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida is dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's order dated August 21, 2017, and with the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SUAREZ and SALTER, JJ., concur.
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-16-00139-CR

No. 10-16-00140-CR

No. 10-16-00141-CR

No. 10-16-00142-CR

No. 10-16-00143-CR

IN RE TROY DANIEL THOELE

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On May 4, 2016, Troy Daniel Thoele filed a document in this Court titled “On 

Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus from final conviction from the 272nd Judicial 

District Court of Brazos County, Texas.” In the application, Thoele requests this Court 

to, “issue a Writ of Prohibition or injunction prohibiting [Respondent] from asking for, 

or accepting assistance from the Texas Attorney General’s Office, or any under the 

employ from involvement in Relator’s Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.”

We will issue a writ of prohibition only to protect our jurisdiction. In re Simmonds, 
In re Thoele Page 2

271 S.W.3d 874, 878 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.). Its use is limited to cases in which 

we have actual jurisdiction of a pending proceeding. Id. Thoele has not identified a 

pending proceeding over which this court has jurisdiction and by which this court might 

have jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition to prohibit a future act by Respondent. 

Thus, we have no pending jurisdiction to protect or preserve by way of a writ of 

prohibition, and we lack jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition.

It appears that Thoele has a writ of habeas corpus pending in the Court of Criminal 

Appeals pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 11.07. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO.

ANN. art. 11.07 § 3 (a) (b) (West 2015). An intermediate court of appeals has no 

jurisdiction over post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases. See Ex parte 

Martinez, 175 S.W.3d 510, 512-13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, orig. proceeding); Self v. 

State, 122 S.W.3d 294, 294-95 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, no pet.) The Court of Criminal 

Appeals and this court have recognized that “the exclusive post-conviction remedy in 

final felony convictions in Texas courts is through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

[article] 11.07.” Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 525 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see Ex parte 

Mendenhall, 209 S.W.3d 260, 261 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.).

Because we have nothing pending in this Court, we have no jurisdiction to issue a 

writ of prohibition, and we have no jurisdiction over a post-conviction habeas corpus 

proceeding in a felony case, we dismiss Thoele’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.
In re Thoele Page 3

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed June 9, 2016

Do not publish

[OT06]
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 0609

_____________________________
R ICHARD L EROY D OUGLAS , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Cour t for Duval County

. Angela M. Cox , Judge

. May 11, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. W OLF , B ILBREY , and K ELSEY , JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_ ____________________________2 Richard Leroy Douglas, pro se
, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
Edwin L. DEMPS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-2371

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

NOVEMBER 15, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Transferred.
John E. MOXLEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jake Bell, Appellant, v. INFINITY INDEMITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-3973

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 7, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant,

No. 16-10074

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 14, 2017

Amy E. Brown, USPX—Office of the US Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Deborah Ann Bigbee, Esquire, Attorney, Scottsdale, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jerry Lopez challenges the 37-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to transport illegal aliens within the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(v)(I) and (a)(l)(B)(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The government argues that the appeal should be dismissed on the basis.of the appeal waiver contained in the plea agreement. In light of the district court’s ambiguous statement regarding the scope of the waiver during the plea colloquy, we decline to dismiss. *See*Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(b)(l)(N); *United States v. Buchanan,*59 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1995).

Lopez contends that the district court erred by increasing his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2Ll.l(b)(6) upon finding that he recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury in the course of his offense. He argues that the court was required to find the facts supporting the enhancement by clear and convincing evidence and such evidence was lacking. The undisputed facts showed that Lopez transported three individuals in the trunk of his sedan, two individuals were in the trunk for approximately two hours, and the trunk was cramped with no fresh or cool air. Two of the individuals stated they feared for their safety, and one explained she was short of breath.' We need not resolve what evidentiary standard the district court should have applied because, under any standard, these facts were sufficient to support the enhancement. *See*U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1 cmt. n.5 (2015) (“transporting persons in the trunk ... of a motor vehicle” example of conduct warranting increase); *United States v. Bernardo,*818 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2016).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publi' cation and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Leon BRUNSON Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-0083

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 11, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 25, 2018

Leon Brunson Jr., pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew David OWENS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4730

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 29, 2017

Decided: July 14, 2017

Terry F. Rose, Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, First Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*197PER CURIAM:

Andrew David Owens appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 21 months’ imprisonment followed by 18 years’ supervised release. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” *United States v. Webb,*738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” *United States v. Thompson,*595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); *Thompson,*595 F.3d at 546-47. “A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.” *Thompson,*595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Owens claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain the reasons for imposing the term of supervised release. Having reviewed the record, we find that the district court’s explanation, although brief, was sufficient.

Accordingly, we reject Owens’ challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his revocation sentence and affirm. We deny Owens’ pro se motion to file a supplemental brief and to reconsider the order denying Owens’ motion to replace counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
Richard A. MORSE, Jr., DOC #T52004, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3250

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 23, 2018.

Richard A. Morse, Jr., pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7433 ANTONIO DOUGLAS WINSLOW, a/k/a Troy Winslow, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (CA-97-1095-2) Submitted: April 15, 1999 Decided: April 21, 1999 Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.Antonio Douglas Winslow, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Bain Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Antonio Winslow seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant Winslow leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Winslow v. Angelone , No. CA-97-1095-2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 22, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Colby Allen SMITH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D17-3478

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 18, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 25, 2018

Rocco Joseph Carbone, III, of Rocco Joseph Carbone, III, PLLC, St. Augustine, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven Edward Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

DISMISSED . *See**Baker v. State* , 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2004).

Wolf, Roberts, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.
#### Irene Melup, Plaintiff-Respondent, v Kevin P. Morrissey, M.D., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[771 NYS2d 8]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered August 27, 2003, which, to the extent appealed from, denied defendant Morrissey’s motion for partial summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The “continuous treatment” doctrine applied to the decedent’s visit in December 1997, during which Dr. Morrissey performed the colonoscopy that is central to plaintiffs failure-to-diagnose claim *(see*CPLR 214-a; *McDermott v Torre,*56 NY2d 399, 405-406 [1982]; *Hein v Cornwall Hosp.,*302 AD2d 170 [2003]). The colonoscopy was a “treatment” within the meaning of the statute—a regularly scheduled visit and part of Dr. Morrissey’s monitoring of the decedent, a patient at high risk for colon cancer, during which he excised two small polyps from her colon. The decedent’s return visit in September 1998, complaining of anemia and epigastric pain, was sufficiently related to her original condition as to constitute treatment continuous to the December 1997 visit *(see Gehbauer v Baker,*292 AD2d 255 [2002]). That the decedent consulted other physicians for her anemia between December 1997 and September 1998 does not, under the facts of this case, evince an intention to terminate the physician-patient relationship with Dr. Morrissey. The decedent consulted other internists precisely because she had no- reason to believe that her anemia was related to her colonic condition and the allegedly deficient December 1997 colonoscopy. However, the other physicians provided no treatment related to the decedent’s colon and, when laboratory tests *392failed to reveal the cause of her condition, she returned to Dr. Morrissey and discussed the possibility that her anemia was being caused by gastrointestinal bleeding. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that by seeing other physicians, the decedent evinced an intention to abandon her reliance on Dr. Morrissey’s treatment and care *(cf. Allende v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,*90 NY2d 333, 339 [1997]).

It was unnecessary, however, for the court to reach the issue of continuous treatment dating back to 1991, since plaintiff had expressly discontinued all claims for treatment prior to 1997, and there is no evidence of any malpractice before then. Concur—Tom, J.P., Williams, Marlow and Gonzalez, JJ.
#### Roscoe BONNER, Claimant-Appellant v. Robert D. SNYDER, Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee

2016-1589

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

February 8, 2017

Philip Sheng, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Menlo Park, CA, argued for claimant-appellant. Also represented by Andrew Yaphe.

Igor Helman, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by Benjamin C. Mizer, Robert E. Kirsohman, Jr„ Martin F. Hockey, Jr.; Samantha Ann Syverson, Brian D. Griffin, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

(Lourie, Moore, and Taranto, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
# USS Leyte Gulf Takes Down Semi-Submersible Vessel

### 8 Apr 2024

More DetailsMore DetailsIn March, while on patrol in the Atlantic Ocean, the crew detected a self-propelled semi-submersible drug smuggling vessel (SPSS). With assistance from Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 50, the crew acquired the location of the SPSS and LEDET members launched a rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) to intercept the vessel. The LEDET detained the individuals aboard the SPSS and seized approximately 2,370 kilograms of cocaine. Then the crew conducted a sinking exercise (SINKEX) on the SPSS.“Spotting this vessel was like finding a needle in the haystack,” said Lt. Commander Travis Lee, Leyte Gulf’s senior aviator. “I’ve been doing this for seven years and not once been able to find and acquire such an asset until now.”Taking down the SPSS was only the latest success for USS Leyte Gulf on this deployment.In February, while on patrol in the Caribbean Sea, the ship intercepted three different vessels using coordinated air and surface operations involving both U.S. and partner nation forces.During the interdictions, the LEDET boarded and took positive control of each vessel. On Feb. 6, the ship recovered 520 kilograms of cocaine worth an estimated $12.8 million. On Feb. 15, they recovered 600 kilograms of cocaine worth an estimated $15.25 million. Then on Feb. 28, the crew recovered another 600 kilograms of cocaine worth an estimated $15 million.“Our Leyte Gulf team was ready when called upon to execute all three interdictions,” said Commanding Officer Capt. Nathan Diaz. “The successful seizure of more than $42 million in illicit drugs is a testament to the interoperability of our partner nations, the Coast Guard and the Leyte Gulf team.”“It was an exciting day to be the Officer of the Deck running the bridge for one of our interdiction operations,” said Lt. j.g. Jayden Hodgson, an officer of the deck and public affairs officer aboard the ship. “Leyte Gulf prevented the illicit importation of drugs that day and we are only getting started.”USS Leyte Gulf is currently deployed in the USSOUTHCOM AOR to support bilateral and multinational maritime operations with partners in the region, conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) port visits, and to support JIATF-South in countering illicit-drug trafficking.LEDETs are deployable specialized forces of the U.S. Coast Guard that enforce U.S. laws and treaties in the maritime domain.U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet supports U.S. Southern Command’s joint and combined military operations by employing maritime forces in cooperative maritime security operations to maintain access, enhance interoperability, and build enduring partnerships in order to enhance regional security and promote peace, stability and prosperity in the Caribbean, Central and South American region.Learn more about USNAVSOUTH/4th Fleet at https://www.fourthfleet.navy.mil, https://www.facebook.com/NAVSOUS4THFLT and @NAVSOUS4THFLT.