15-2868 

Liang v. Sessions 

BIA 

Laforest, IJ 

A205 235 719 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

13th 4 day of March, two thousand seventeen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

8 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 

9 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 ZHOU HUI LIANG, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 15-2868 

17 NAC 

18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 19 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Stuart Altman, New York, N.Y. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

26 Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. 

27 Scadron, Assistant Director; Wendy 

 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General 

Jefferson B. Sessions, III, is automatically substituted for former Attorney 

General Loretta E. Lynch as Respondent.
2 

1 Benner-León, Trial Attorney, Office 

2 of Immigration Litigation, United 

3 States Department of Justice, 

4 Washington, D.C. 

5 

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

9 DENIED. 

10 Petitioner Zhou Hui Liang, a native and citizen of the 

11 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 27, 2015, 

12 decision of the BIA, affirming a December 3, 2014, decision of 

13 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Liang’s application for 

14 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

15 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhou Hui Liang, No. A205 235 

16 719 (B.I.A. Aug. 27, 2015), aff’g No. A205 235 719 (Immig. Ct. 

17 N.Y. City Dec. 3, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

18 with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

19 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

20 the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 

21 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of 

22 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 

23 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 
3 

1 The agency may base a credibility determination on 

2 inconsistencies in an applicant’s testimony and among his 

3 testimony, prior statements, and supporting evidence. See 8 

4 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. 

5 “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, 

6 from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 

7 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 

8 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. As discussed below, 

9 the adverse credibility determination rests on substantial 

10 evidence. 

11 The agency reasonably relied on an inconsistency 

12 concerning the date of Liang’s arrest, an event central to his 

13 claim of past persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);

14 Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland 

15 Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an 

16 inconsistency material to the alleged persecution that is the 

17 basis of a claim is substantial evidence). Liang testified 

18 that he was arrested on June 3, 2011, during a church service. 

19 When prompted by his attorney, Liang changed the date to March 

20 6, 2011, explaining that he was “very nervous.” The IJ 

21 reasonably rejected this explanation, noting the difference in 

22 seasons between March and June and concluding that “[i]nverting 
4 

1 the month and day is more likely to be an error committed by 

2 someone who has memorized a statement.” See Majidi v. 

3 Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must 

4 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent 

5 statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a 

6 reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his 

7 testimony.” (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 77, 76 (2d 

8 Cir. 2004))). Nor would the agency be compelled to accept 

9 Liang’s current explanation that he ultimately gave the date 

10 consistent with his application, as it does not account for the 

11 initial inconsistent testimony. Id. 

12 The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies 

13 between Liang’s testimony and evidence concerning his church 

14 attendance in the United States. Liang’s testimony that he 

15 attended church “once a week or once every two weeks” clearly 

16 conflicted with a letter from his church that he attended only 

17 16 times between April 2012 and November 2014. The IJ was not 

18 compelled to accept Liang’s response that he sometimes forgot 

19 to sign in when he arrived late, as it did not account for the 

20 substantial discrepancy between the 16 times stated in the 

21 church’s letter and the 60 to 120 times to which he testified. 

22 See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) 
5 

1 (“[I]n assessing the credibility of an asylum applicant’s 

2 testimony, an IJ is entitled to consider whether the applicant’s 

3 story is inherently implausible.”). Moreover, as the IJ 

4 pointed out, this inconsistency was particularly troubling 

5 because the church’s letter reflected that Liang attended 

6 church less frequently following his baptism in April 2012, 

7 calling into question the sincerity of his religious beliefs. 

8 Liang’s credibility concerning his church attendance in 

9 the United States was further undermined by his lack of recall 

10 of a sermon he heard two days before he testified. Liang’s 

11 argument, that his ability to name the pastor of the church 

12 renders his testimony credible, is not compelling because it 

13 does not actually explain his failure to testify to any detail 

14 regarding the sermon. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

15 Having questioned Liang’s credibility, the agency did not 

16 err in concluding that Liang’s corroborating evidence was 

17 insufficient to rehabilitate his testimony. See Biao Yang v. 

18 Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s 

19 failure to corroborate his . . . testimony may bear on 

20 credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general 

21 makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has 

22 already been called into question.”). “We defer to the 
6 

1 agency’s determination of the weight afforded to an alien’s 

2 documentary evidence.” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d 

3 Cir. 2013). The agency reasonably accorded diminished weight 

4 to letters from Liang’s mother and church friend. The letters 

5 were unsworn, prepared for the purpose of litigation and from 

6 interested parties not subject to cross examination. See

7 Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y- Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 

8 2010) (agency may give little weight to document drafted by 

9 interested witness not subject to cross examination), rev’d on 

10 other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 

11 2012). 

12 Liang argues that the agency erred in relying on a purported 

13 inconsistency concerning his father’s profession. Liang’s 

14 application and testimony reported that his father was a 

15 fisherman, but his household registration booklet listed his 

16 father’s profession as a “farmer.” On appeal to the BIA, Liang 

17 submitted evidence that fishing is a type of farming. Even 

18 assuming that the agency erred in relying on this inconsistency, 

19 the error is not fatal because the totality of the circumstances 

20 outlined above nonetheless supports the adverse credibility 

21 determination. See Lianping Li v. Lynch, No. 15-219, 2016 WL 

22 5799651, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2016); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 
7 

1 F.3d 160, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2007). Given the multiple 

2 inconsistencies related to the bases of the claims and the lack 

3 of reliable corroborating evidence, it cannot be said “that no 

4 reasonable fact-finder could make such a credibility ruling.” 

5 Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The credibility ruling is 

6 dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief 

7 because all three forms of relief are based on the same factual 

8 predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 

9 2006). 

10 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

11 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

12 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

13 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

14 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

15 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

16 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

17 34.1(b). 

18 FOR THE COURT: 

19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk