J-A14029-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

A.A.

Appellant No. 1176 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 19, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005893-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED MAY 29, 2015

Appellant A.A. appeals pro se from the order entered in the Lancaster 

County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition seeking relief 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this appeal as follows:

On January 9, 2012, the District Attorney of Lancaster 

County filed a Criminal Information (No. 5893-2011) 

charging [Appellant] with 14 counts of sexual offenses 

involving three different child-victims, all of whom were 

related to [Appellant].1 These offenses occurred between 

the dates of January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2010, at 

which time [Appellant] engaged in sexual intercourse with 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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three separate complainants who were less than 13 years 

of age.

1

[Appellant] was initially charged as a juvenile 

through the filing of a Juvenile Petition, as he was a 

minor at the time the offenses were committed 

(D.O.B. 08/01/1992). On September 31, 2011, the 

Commonwealth filed a Petition to Transfer Juvenile to 

the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, 

Criminal Division, and a hearing was ordered to be 

held on December 6, 2011. Furthermore, a guardian 

ad litem was appointed for [Appellant]. On 

December 30, 2011, when he was 19 years of age, 

[Appellant] knowingly, voluntarily, and with the 

benefit of counsel and his guardian ad litem entered 

into five stipulations that effectively transferred his 

case from Juvenile Court to the Court of Common 

Pleas, and the court entered an order transferring 

[Appellant] to criminal court on that same day.

More specifically, in addition to vaginal and anal 

intercourse, [Appellant] placed his penis in the mouth of 

his half-sister, F.T. (D.O.B. 2/20/1997), placed his mouth 

on the child’s vagina, and committed one act of forcible 

sexual intercourse against this child by holding her against 

her will. At various times [Appellant] also fondled the 

child’s breasts and ejaculated on the victim’s face and 

chest. Additionally, [Appellant] raped his other half-sister, 

K.T. (D.O.B. 5/13/1999), by at various times engaging in 

vaginal intercourse while touching the child’s buttocks 

without her consent. Finally, [Appellant] engaged in 

sexual intercourse with his cousin, S.J. (D.O.B. 1/24/2000) 

and placed his penis in this victim’s mouth.

Counts 1, 2, 10, and 13 of the Criminal Information 

charged [Appellant] with four separate instances of rape of 

a child,2a felony of the first degree. Count 6 charged 

[Appellant] with rape by forcible compulsion,3a felony of 

the first degree. Counts 3, 4, and 14 charged [Appellant] 

with three instances of involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse with a child,4 a felony of the first degree. 

Count 5 charged [Appellant] with aggravated indecent 

assault of a child,5a felony of the first degree. Counts 7 
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and 12 charged [Appellant] with three instances of 

indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age.7

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c)[.]

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(1)[.]

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b)[.]

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(b)[.]

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302(a)[.]

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7)[.]

On January 10, 2012, [Appellant] appeared before the 

Honorable Judge Louis J. Farina and entered into a guilty 

plea pursuant to a negotiated agreement. At the 

conclusion of the guilty plea hearing, Judge Farina 

accepted [Appellant’s] guilty plea after finding it was 

knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The court then entered 

an order directing that [Appellant] undergo an assessment 

by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board [(“SOAB”)], 

and sentencing was deferred until completion of the 

assessment.

A sexually violent predator [(“SVP”)] hearing was held 

before Judge Farina on May 29, 2012, in order to 

determine whether [Appellant] was [an SVP]. After the 

hearing, in which Dr. Veronique N. Valliere testified on 

behalf of the Commonwealth and Dr. Timothy P. Foley 

appeared and testified on behalf of [Appellant], the court 

found the Commonwealth had proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that [Appellant] was [an SVP]. 

Thereafter, sentence was imposed pursuant to the 

negotiated plea agreement, at which time [Appellant] 

received an aggregate prison sentence of not less than 10 

years nor more than 30 years in the state correctional 

institution.9

9

[Appellant] was sentenced as follows: (1) 10 to 30 

years[’] imprisonment on each of the four counts of 

rape of a child; (2) 10 to 30 years[’] imprisonment 

on the charge of rape by forcible compulsion; (3) 10 
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to 30 years[’] imprisonment on each of the three 

counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with 

a child; (4) 10 to 30 years[’] imprisonment on the 

charge of aggravated indecent assault of a child; (5) 

1 to 2 years[’] imprisonment for each of the two 

counts of incest; (6) 1 to 5 years[’] imprisonment for 

each of the two counts of felony indecent assault of a 

minor; and (7) 1 to 2 years[’] imprisonment on the 

charge of misdemeanor indecent assault of a minor. 

All sentences were to be served concurrent with one 

another.

On June 27, 2012, [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal. On 

July 23, 2012, [Appellant] filed a statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, alleging the trial court committed 

error by denying his request to submit a written expert 

report in lieu of live testimony at the SVP hearing and by 

denying his request for the court to fund that expert 

testimony. However[, Appellant’s] counsel subsequently 

filed an Anders brief in the appeal and sought leave to 

withdraw.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania filed a memorandum 

decision on April 3, 2013, granting counsel’s request to 

withdraw and affirming the judgment of the trial court. On 

March 4, 2014, [Appellant] filed a pro se document titled 

“Notice of Appeal” with the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, which was later returned to [Appellant] 

because his appeal was not timely.

[Appellant] then submitted a pro se motion for [PCRA] 

relief, post-marked April 2, 2014 and filed on April 7, 

2014. In his motion, [Appellant] requested release from 

custody and a new trial by alleging his guilty plea was 

unlawfully induced and his appellate counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a petition 

for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania. Thereafter, on April 23, 2014, Christopher 

P. Lyden, Esquire, was appointed as counsel to represent 

[Appellant] on his PCRA motion.

On May 15, 2014, after investigating [Appellant’s] claims, 

counsel submitted a no-merit letter pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 
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(Pa.Super.1988) and Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 

A.2d 927 (Pa.1988), expressing the opinion that the issues 

raised in [Appellant’s] pro se PCRA motion had no merit. 

Counsel also conducted an independent review of the 

record, finding “no other claims of merit to present” on 

[Appellant’s] behalf. Counsel simultaneously filed a motion 

to withdraw as counsel, complying with the requirements 

of Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 

(Pa.Super.2006) (overruled on other grounds).[2] 

In accordance with Pennsylvania rules of criminal 

procedure, [the PCRA] court then conducted an 

independent review of the record. On May 29, 2014, the 

court issued a Rule 907 notice concluding that 

[Appellant’s] PCRA motion was patently frivolous, the 

allegations were not supported by the record, and there 

were no genuine issues concerning any material fact. 

Pursuant to Rule 907 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, [Appellant] was allowed twenty (20) days from 

the date of the notice to file a response to the proposed 

dismissal. Thereafter, on June 19, 2014, the court filed an 

order dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition.13

13 On June 19, 2014, at 9:27 a.m., the court filed an 

order dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA motion, noting 

that [Appellant] had failed to submit a timely 

response within twenty days of the Rule 907 notice 

as required. On June 19, 2014, at 9:40 a.m., 

[Appellant’s] reply to rule 907 notice was filed with 

the Lancaster County Office of the Prothonotary. 

Consequently, [Appellant’s] reply was not before the 

court for consideration prior to dismissal of the PCRA 

motion.[3]

____________________________________________

2 See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 879 (Pa.2009) (“To the 

extent Friend stands for the proposition that an appellate court may sua 

sponte review the sufficiency of a no-merit letter when the defendant has 

not raised such issue, we disavow such holding.”).

3 The PCRA court’s failure to consider Appellant’s response to the Rule 907 

notice before dismissing his PCRA petition is irrelevant; Appellant suffered no 

prejudice because the PCRA court addressed the claims asserted in 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On July 7, 2014, [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal to the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania. A concise statement of 

matters complained of on appeal was submitted on July 

23, 2014, asserting three errors. First, [Appellant] alleges 

the trial court erred in permitting PCRA counsel to 

withdraw his appearance without investigating 

[Appellant’s] mental health claims. Second, [Appellant] 

alleges PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate the aforementioned mental health claims. 

Finally, [Appellant] alleges his guilty plea was unlawfully 

induced due to his “mental infirmity,” and as such he was 

not aware of the nature of the charges against him or of 

the permissible range of sentences which could be 

imposed. 

PCRA Court Opinion, filed September 5, 2014, (“PCRA” Opinion) at 1-6 

(unnecessary capitalization, citations to the record, and some footnotes 

omitted).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

WHETHER THE PCRA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR 

FAILING TO RAISE THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF APPELLATE 

AND TRIAL COUNSEL CONCERNING APPELLANT’S MENTAL 

HEALTH?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PCRA 

COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW HIS APPEARANCE WITHOUT 

INVESTIGATING ANY OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIMS?

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Appellant’s response in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. See Commonwealth 

v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1277 (Pa.Super.2013) (“It is apparent from the 

court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that it received and evaluated those 

documents, albeit after it issued its order denying Appellant’s petition. The 

court concluded that all of the claims asserted in Appellant’s responses were 

meritless.... Appellant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the 

court’s failure to consider his responses to the Rule 907 notice prior to 

denying his petition.”).
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WHETHER APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS UNLAWFULLY 

INDUCED DUE TO HIS LACK OF MATURITY, AND MENTAL 

HEALTH ISSUES?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

In his first two issues, Appellant argues his PCRA counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate claims about his mental health. 

Appellant claims he presented issues of arguable merit and that the PCRA 

court erred by allowing counsel to withdraw without pursuing these issues. 

We disagree.

Our standard of review is well-settled. “In reviewing the denial of 

PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 

86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa.2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“The scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 

at the trial level.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa.2014) 

(citation omitted). “It is well-settled that a PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations are binding upon an appellate court so long as they are 

supported by the record.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 82 A.3d 998, 

1013 (Pa.2013) (citation omitted). However, this Court reviews the PCRA 

court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 

1084 (Pa.Super.2014) (citation omitted). 
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Our Supreme Court has explained the procedure required for courtappointed counsel to withdraw from PCRA representation:

[Turner and Finley] establish the procedure for 

withdrawal of court-appointed counsel in collateral attacks 

on criminal convictions. Independent review of the record 

by competent counsel is required before withdrawal is 

permitted. Such independent review requires proof of:

1) A ‘no-merit’ letter by PCRA counsel detailing the 

nature and extent of his [or her] review;

2) A ‘no-merit’ letter by PCRA counsel listing each 

issue the petitioner wished to have reviewed;

3) The PCRA counsel’s ‘explanation’, in the ‘no-merit’ 

letter, of why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;

4) The PCRA court conducting its own independent 

review of the record; and

5) The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the 

petition was meritless.

Pitts, 981 A.2d at 876 n.1 (citations omitted). In addition, this Court has 

required that PCRA counsel who seeks to withdraw must:

contemporaneously serve a copy on the petitioner of 

counsel’s application to withdraw as counsel, and must 

supply the petitioner both a copy of the ‘no-merit’ letter 

and a statement advising the petitioner that, in the event 

the court grants the application of counsel to withdraw, he 

or she has the right to proceed pro se or with the 

assistance of privately retained counsel.

Friend, 896 A.2d at 614 (emphasis deleted). Further,

[i]f counsel fails to satisfy the foregoing technical 

prerequisites of Turner/Finley, the court will not reach 

the merits of the underlying claims but, rather, will merely 

deny counsel’s request to withdraw. Commonwealth v. 

Mosteller, 633 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa.Super.1993). Upon 
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doing so, the court will then take appropriate steps, such 

as directing counsel to file a proper Turner/Finley request 

or an advocate’s brief. Commonwealth v. Karanicolas,

836 A.2d 940, 948 (Pa.Super.2003).

However, where counsel submits a petition and no-merit 

letter that do satisfy the technical demands of 

Turner/Finley, the court—trial court or this Court—must 

then conduct its own review of the merits of the case. If 

the court agrees with counsel that the claims are without 

merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and deny 

relief. Mosteller, 633 A.2d at 617. By contrast, if the 

claims appear to have merit, the court will deny counsel’s 

request and grant relief, or at least instruct counsel to file 

an advocate’s brief.

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Pa.Super.2007). 

Instantly, Appellant filed a timely pro se motion for PCRA relief. On 

April 23, 2014, the court appointed PCRA counsel, who filed a motion to 

withdraw on May 15, 2014. Along with his motion to withdraw, counsel filed 

a no-merit letter, which detailed the nature and extent of his review by 

stating that he reviewed Appellant’s PCRA petition, the court file, the notes 

of testimony from the guilty plea hearing and sentencing hearing and did 

additional legal research. See Turner/Finley Letter, dated May 15, 2014. 

Counsel listed the issue Appellant wished to have reviewed and explained 

that appellate counsel had no obligation to continue with Appellant’s appeal 

after the Superior Court had granted him permission to withdraw. Counsel 

stated that Appellant’s issue was, therefore, meritless and that, after 

conducting an independent review of the record, Appellant had no other 

claims of merit to present. Id. The PCRA court then conducted its own 
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“thorough review of the record” and concluded Appellant’s PCRA motion was 

“patently frivolous, the allegations are not supported by the record, and 

there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact.” Rule 907 Notice, 

filed May 29, 2014, at 15. Thus, the court properly granted counsel’s motion 

to withdraw.

Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate Appellant’s mental health. Although ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims are cognizable under the PCRA, Appellant’s issue merits no 

relief.

This Court follows the Pierce4test adopted by our Supreme Court to 

review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:

When a petitioner alleges trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in 

a PCRA petition, he must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the 

truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of 

guilt or innocence could have taken place. We have 

interpreted this provision in the PCRA to mean that the 

petitioner must show: (1) that his claim of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness has merit; (2) that counsel had no 

reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and 

(3) that the error of counsel prejudiced the petitioner-i.e., 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error 

of counsel, the outcome of the proceeding would have 

been different. We presume that counsel is effective, and it 

is the burden of Appellant to show otherwise.

____________________________________________

4 Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa.1987).
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Commonwealth v. duPont, 860 A.2d 525, 531 (Pa.Super.2004) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of 

proving all three prongs of this test. Commonwealth v. Meadows, 787 

A.2d 312, 319-320 (Pa.2001). “If an appellant fails to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence any of the Pierce prongs, the Court need not 

address the remaining prongs of the test.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 

979 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa.2010) (citation omitted). 

Appellant complains his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate why Appellant was raping his young family members. He claims 

a psychiatric evaluation would have revealed poor mental health, specifically 

a pedophilic sexual disorder. However, Appellant fails to elaborate on why 

counsel would have investigated this claim, how it would have helped his 

case, or how he has been prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to pursue it.

The PCRA court reasoned:

Addressing his alleged “mental defect,” [Appellant] was 

found by clear and convincing evidence to be affected by 

Paraphilia (N.O.S.) during the SVP Hearing, which satisfied 

the statutory criteria for classification as [an SVP]. 

* * *

However, a SVP Hearing and a diagnosis of Paraphilia

(N.O.S.) do not affect [Appellant’s] competence to stand 

trial, and [Appellant] may not use that finding as a means 

to attack his underlying conviction. To that end, none of 

the psychological experts involved in this case, including 

[Appellant’s] expert, ever used this diagnosis as a basis for 

questioning [Appellant’s] competence in any way.
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Moreover, any argument PCRA counsel could have made 

as to [Appellant’s] alleged mental defect or competency to 

stand trial would have been fatally undercut by the record. 

As part of [Appellant’s] transfer from Juvenile Court to the 

Court of Common Pleas, [Appellant] stipulated he was “not 

committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or 

mentally ill.” Furthermore, prior to the on-the-record 

colloquy conducted by the court during his guilty plea 

hearing, [Appellant] signed a seven-page Guilty Plea 

Colloquy and Post-Sentence Rights form stating he had 

never been treated for mental illness. When asked 

whether a mental illness or its treatment would affect his

ability to understand his rights or why he was in court at 

that time, [Appellant] replied “N/A.” Additionally, 

[Appellant’s] counsel noted there were two psychological 

evaluations done on [Appellant] prior to his waiver of the 

certification hearing which do not support [Appellant’s] 

assertions that he suffered from a mental defect.

PCRA Opinion, at 16-17.

As Appellant cannot establish that his claim of ineffectiveness has any 

merit, we need not address the remaining prongs of the Pierce test. See 

Fitzgerald, supra.

In his third and final issue, Appellant argues his guilty plea was 

unlawfully induced due to his lack of maturity and mental health issues. 

This issue lacks merit.

“The entry of a guilty plea is a protracted and comprehensive 

proceeding wherein the court is obliged to make a specific determination 

after extensive colloquy on the record that a plea is voluntarily and 

understandingly tendered.” Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 

1046 (Pa.Super.2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 

312, 314 (Pa.Super.1993) (citation omitted). At a minimum, the trial court 
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must determine that: (1) the defendant understands the nature of the 

charges to which he is pleading guilty, (2) there is a factual basis for the 

plea, (3) the defendant understands that he has a right to trial by jury, (4) 

the defendant understands that he is presumed innocent until proven guilty, 

(5) the defendant is aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or 

fines for the charged offenses, and (6) the defendant is aware that the judge 

is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement tendered unless the judge 

accepts the agreement. Yeomans, 24 A.3d at 1047 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 

590, Comment).

“[T]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the 

outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that 

[his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

made.” Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1001 (Pa.Super.2013) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Pa.Super. 

2010) (alterations in original)). A guilty plea colloquy must “affirmatively 

demonstrate the defendant understood what the plea connoted and its 

consequences.” Id. at 1002 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 

497, 501 (Pa.Super.1998)). After a defendant enters a guilty plea, “it is 

presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of 

proving involuntariness is upon him.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa.Super.2008)). 
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Whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty “requires a finding 

that the defendant comprehends the crime for which he stands accused, is 

able to cooperate with his counsel in forming a rational defense, and has a 

rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Willis, 

68 A.3d at 1002 (citing Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 

(Pa.Super.2007)). 

Here, the trial court conducted a thorough colloquy before Appellant, 

who was 19 years old, entered his guilty plea. See N.T., 1/10/12, at 3-22. 

The court explained the charges and the maximum penalties and fines each 

charge warranted. Id. at 3-5. The court advised Appellant of his right to a 

jury trial and the Commonwealth’s burden to prove him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. at 8. Appellant then admitted to the factual bases for 

all of his charges. Id. at 9-11. Additionally, Appellant signed a guilty plea 

colloquy and post-sentence rights form in which he indicated he was not 

being treated for any mental illness. After the court apprised Appellant of 

his rights, Appellant acknowledged that he was competent and understood 

everything in the guilty plea colloquy he reviewed with his attorney, that he 

was not being coerced into entering the plea, that he did not have any 

questions, and that it was his own decision to plead guilty. Id. at 17-22. 

Thus, Appellant’s guilty plea was not unlawfully induced, and his claim lacks 

merit. See Yeomans, supra.
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After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties and the 

applicable law, we conclude the PCRA court properly denied Appellant PCRA 

relief and properly granted counsel’s petition to withdraw from 

representation of Appellant. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/29/2015