IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

CORITHIAN EDWARDS A/K/A 

CORINTHIAN CONWAY EDWARDS, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 66893 

FILED 

MAY 1 2 2016 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a 

jury verdict, of six counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, three counts of 

burglary while in possession of a firearm, three counts of assault with a 

deadly weapon, six counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, 

three counts of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and 

one count of battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial 

bodily harm. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kathleen E. 

Delaney, Judge. 

First, appellant Corinthian Edwards contends that the State 

exercised a peremptory challenge in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 

U.S. 79 (1986). Proving a Batson violation involves three steps. Hawkins 

v. State, 127 Nev. 575, 578, 256 P.3d 965, 966 (2011); Purkett v. Elem, 514 

U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (summarizing the three-step Batson analysis). First, 

"the opponent of the peremptory challenge must make out a prima facie 

case of discrimination." Ford v. State, 122 Nev. 398, 403, 132 P.3d 574, 577 

(2006). Next, "the production burden then shifts to the proponent of the 

challenge to assert a neutral explanation for the challenge." Id. Finally, 

"the trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the challenge 

has proved purposeful discrimination." Id. This court reviews the district 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1.947A msep ip-AL-kci(C<Ci 
court's ruling on a Batson challenge for clear error. Conner v. State, 130 

Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 327 P.3d 503, 510 (2014). 

The district court found that Edwards made a prima facie case 

of discrimination and asked the State to give a race-neutral reason for its 

exercise of a peremptory challenge on potential juror 394, an African 

American. The State explained that it did not want her on the jury 

because she had testified as an alibi witness in her cousin's criminal trial.' 

Edwards argued that the State's explanation was pretextual, which was 

evidenced by the fact that the State withdrew its challenge to a different 

potential juror who was also African American. Edwards also argued that 

eliminating all jurors who had testified on behalf of a family member in a 

criminal trial would have a disparate impact on African Americans as a 

group. The district court held that the State's reason was not pretextual 

and denied the Batson challenge. 

Edwards fails to demonstrate that the district court erred. 

Edwards provides no analysis of the bases for pretext this court has 

previously acknowledged, see Hawkins, 127 Nev. at 578-79, 256 P.3d at 

968; Conner, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 327 P.3d at 510, and has not 

convinced us that we should disregard the district court's determination 

that the prosecutor's given reason was race-neutral, see Hernandez v. New 

York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 ("In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the 

'On appeal, the State argues that the prosecutor might have 

exercised a peremptory challenge on potential juror 394 because she was 

related to noted public defenders in Clark County. We decline to consider 

this argument as it was not offered below. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 

U.S. 231, 246 (2005) ("It would be difficult to credit the State's new 

explanation, which reeks of afterthought."). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) I947A 
decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a 

peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much 

evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the 

demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge."). Accordingly, we 

conclude that no relief is warranted on this claim. 

Second, Edwards contends that insufficient evidence supports 

two of his attempted murder convictions because there was no indication 

that the shooters intended to kill the victims. 2Our review of the record on 

appeal, however, reveals sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact. See OrigelCandido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998); Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The evidence presented at trial 

clearly indicates that the suspects shot at the victims and the jury could 

reasonably infer they intended to kill the victims even though they did not 

announce their intent to do so. See NRS 200.010 (defining murder); NRS 

193.330(1) (defining attempt); see also Grant v. State, 117 Nev. 427, 435, 

24 P.3d 761, 766(2001) ("Intent need not be proven by direct evidence but 

can be inferred from conduct and circumstantial evidence."). A verdict will 

not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, it is supported by substantial 

evidence. See Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981); see 

also McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). 

2In his reply brief, Edwards contends that the State presented 

insufficient evidence that he specifically intended for his accomplice to kill 

the victim he shot at and the instruction regarding accomplice liability 

was insufficient. We decline to consider these assertions as they were 

raised for the first time in Edwards' reply brief. See La Chance v. State, 

130 Nev., Adv. Op. 29, 321 P.3d 919, 929 n.7 (2014); NRAP 28(c). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

3 

(0) 1947 A 
Third, Edwards contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by allowing a detective to testify that he confessed to his 

cellmate that he committed the robberies. We review the district court's 

decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. Thomas v. State, 122 

Nev. 1361, 1370, 148 P.3d 727, 734 (2006). This testimony was not 

hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but 

to explain why the detective did not test evidence for DNA. See NRS 

51.035. However, because the statement was not offered for the truth of 

the matter asserted, its probative value was substantially outweighed by 

the danger for unfair prejudice. See NRS 48.035. We thereby conclude 

that the district court abused its discretion by admitting this testimony. 

However, we also conclude that the error was harmless for several 

reasons. First, the district court gave a strong admonishment regarding 

the permissible use of the evidence. See Allred v. State, 120 Nev. 410, 415, 

92 P.3d 1246, 1250 (2004) (explaining that this court presumes juries 

follow instructions). Second, Edwards, not the State, brought up the fact 

that he had allegedly confessed in his opening statement. Third, the 

evidence against Edwards was strong, consisting of numerous eyewitness 

identifications, physical evidence, and video evidence. 3 See Tavares v. 

3Edwards also argues that admission of the evidence violated his 

right to confrontation and warranted a mistrial. We are not convinced 

that Edwards preserved these claims because, after counsel Jeannie Hua 

made these arguments below, counsel Jonathan MacArthur made 

statements which suggest that the defense withdrew these objections 

MacArthur also noted that any prejudice could be remedied by an 

admonishment, which the district court gave. In any event, admission of 

the evidence did not violate Edwards' right to confrontation because it was 

not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See Crawford v. 

continued on next page . . . 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 4 

(0) 1947A 
State, 117 Nev. 725, 732, 30 P.3d 1128, 1132(2001) (explaining that the 

test for nonconstitutional harmless error "is whether the error had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict" (internal quotation marks omitted)), holding modified by Mclellan 

v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 182 P.3d 106 (2008). Accordingly, we conclude that 

no relief is warranted on this claim. 

Fourth, Edwards contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by declining to admit the judgment of conviction and guilty plea 

agreement of his accomplice, Lamar Harris. 4We conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion because the relationship between this 

evidence and the point Edwards claims he was trying to make was 

tenuous at best and therefore he fails to convince us that the evidence was 

relevant or otherwise admissible. See NRS 48.015 (defining relevant 

evidence); NRS 48.035 (explaining that relevant evidence may be excluded 

when it is confusing or misleading). Accordingly, we conclude that no 

relief is warranted on this claim. 

. . . continued 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004); see generally Williams v. Illinois, 

U .S. , 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2235 (2012) (reiterating that the 

Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for 

purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted). 

Moreover, under the circumstances, a mistrial was not warranted. See 

Rudin v. State, 120 Nev. 121, 143, 86 P.3d 572, 586 (2004). 

4Edwards also argues that the district court erred by declining to 

admit evidence regarding an alternative suspect. We decline to consider 

this claim because it was not adequately raised until Edwards' reply brief. 

See LaChance, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 29, 321 P.3d at 929 n.7; NRAP 28(c). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 5 

(0) 1947A 
Fifth, Edwards contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion for a continuance in order for his expert 

to testify regarding cross-racial identifications and the proper methods for 

constructing photographic lineups. The record reflects, however, that the 

district court did not exclude the testimony because it would have required 

a continuance, but rather because the testimony was not anticipated and 

therefore a foundation was not laid for it, which was necessary for the 

testimony to assist the jury. This court will not reverse a district court's 

decision regarding the admission of expert testimony absent an abuse of 

discretion. See Hereford v. State, 126 Nev. 719, 367 P.M 778 (2010). 

Edwards fails to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 

Even assuming otherwise, any error was harmless given the strong 

evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, we conclude that no relief is 

warranted on this claim. 

Sixth, Edwards contends that cumulative error warrants 

relief. No relief is warranted on this claim because we have only found 

one error, which, in of itself, does not warrant relief. 

Having considered Edwards' contentions and concluded that 

no relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

AA; 

Hardesty 

Saitta Pickering 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

6 

J. 

(0) 1947A ern 
cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge 

Jonathan E. MacArthur 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 7 

(0) 1947A