# FILED October 8, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE APRIL 1999 SESSION
STATE OF TENNESSEE , * C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9803-CR -00093 Appellee, * SULLIVAN COUNTY v. * Hon. Phyllis H. Mil ler, Judge JIMMY A. SALYER , * (Attempted Second Degree Murder) Appellant. *

For Appellant : For Appellee : Gerald L. Gulley, Jr. John Knox Walkup P.O. Box 1708 Attorney General and Reporter Knoxville, TN 37901-1708 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Terry L. Jordan P.O. Box 839 R. Stephen Jobe Blountville, TN 37617 Assistant Attorney General Criminal Justice D ivision 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Barry Staubus and Lisa Croc kett Assistant District Attorneys General Blountville, TN 37617
OPINION FILED: ____________________

AFFIRMED
NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE1 The app ellan t con tend s tha t the tr ial co urt e rred by fa iling to give him cred it for ja il time serv ed p rior to his con viction . The orig inal ju dgm ent e ntere d by the tr ial co urt d oes not r eflec t any pret rial ja il cred it for tim e se rved prio r to sentencing. Pursuant to the amended judgment fi led December 22, 1998, which corr ectly r eflect s pretri al jail credit f rom 9/12 /96 to 01/0 9/98 , this is sue is mo ot. 2

OPINION O n N ov em be r 19 , 19 97 , the ap pe llan t, Jim m y A . Sa lye r, w as co nv icte d b y a jury in th e Sulli van County Criminal Court of at tempted second degree m urder, a cl ass B Felony. On January 9, 1998, the t rial court sentenced t he appellant as a Range I standard of fender t o an effect ive sentence of te n y ea rs in ca rce rat ion in th e T en ne ss ee D ep art m en t of C orr ec tion
.
In th is a pp ea l as of r igh t, the ap pe llan t pr es en ts th e fo llow ing iss ue s fo r ou r re vie w : (I) W he the r th e e vid en ce is s uffic ien t to s us tain the ap pe llan t’s co nv ictio n o f atte m pte d s ec on d d eg ree m urd er; (II) W heth er the trial cou rt erred by s ente ncin g the app ellant to a term of te n (1 0) y ea rs im pris on m en t; (II I) Whether the t rial court err ed by refusing t o give the defendant cr edit f or jai l t ime already served; 1 and (IV) W heth er the trial cou rt erred by fa iling to g rant the ap pe llan t a s en ten cin g a lter na tive to in ca rce rat ion
. Fo llow ing a re vie w of th e re co rd a nd the pa rties ’ brie fs, w e a ffirm the jud gm en t of th e tria l co urt. I. Factual Background Th e o ffen se in th is c as e o cc urr ed as a re su lt of a sh oo ting on Se pte m be r 12 , 19 96 , ne ar t he res ide nc e o f the vic tim , G ary Alv is. O n th e m orn ing of th e s ho otin g, th e a pp ella nt te lep ho ne d Alv is a nd ad vis ed him to le av e th e a pp ella nt’s gir lfrie nd alo ne . A lvis rep lied tha t he w as no t “fo olin g” w ith th e a pp ella nt’s gir lfrie nd , Ju dy W alk ey . A ltho ug h W alk ey an d A lvis ha d d ate d in 19 92 an d 1 99 3, the y n o lo ng er h ad a re latio ns hip . Alv is te stifie d th at a pp rox im ate ly tw o w ee ks be fore this ca ll, the appellant had left a messa

ge on Alvis’ answering machine stating, “Well, I ’m going to ki ll you because yo u w ill no t he lp m e a ny m ore .”3 O n th e a fter no on of th e s ho otin g, a t ap pro xim ate ly 4 :00 p.m ., A lvis w as w ork ing in h is lawn when he noticed t he appell ant’ s yell ow Honda CRX automobil e parked across t he street at t he ho m e o f R ita L oc kh art Ev an s. A lvis als o n otic ed tha t the ap pe llan t’s c ar w as fac ing in th e d irec tion of the dead-end of t he streetand that t he appellant was sitti ng in the car st aring at him. Alvis walked tow ard the ca r an d a sk ed the ap pe llan t, “Jim , do yo u h av e s om eth ing to s ay to m e? ” T he ap pe llan t rep lied , “y ea h,” an d s ho w ed him a s m all p isto l an d a ch ain . A lvis the n tu rne d a nd pro ce ed ed up his driveway.

W

he n A lvis ha d g on e a pp rox im ate ly tw o-t hird s o f the w ay up his dri ve w ay , he he ard a gu ns ho t. A lvis tes tified tha t w he n h e h ea rd th e s ho t he “au tom atic ally froz e,” fe arin g m ore gu ns ho ts w ou ld b e fir ed at h im . W he n q ue stio ne d a s to w hy he did no t flee ins ide his res ide nc e, A lvis ex pla ine d that t he appellant knew the layout of hi s home , and knew he did not own a gun. M oreover, Al vis’ girlfr ien d w as ins ide the res ide nc e a nd he did no t w an t to p lac e h er in da ng er.
After h earin g the gun sho t, Alvis tu rned and saw that the app ellant h ad tu rned arou nd at the dea d-en d of th e stre et an d w as d riving b ack dow n the stree t tow ard A lvis. Alv is’s ne ighb or w as ha vin g h is ro of re pa ired an d c on stru ctio n tru ck s w ere pa rke d a lon g th e s tree t. A s A lvis ran tow ard the truc ks in a n e ffort t o h av e th e d rive rs b loc k th e s tree t, the ap pe llan t dro ve do w n th e s tree t, sto od , an d fire d a pis tol fiv e tim es fro m the su nro of o f the ca r. W he n th e a pp ella nt r ea ch ed Alv is, h e s w erv ed his ca r tow ard Alv is a nd stru ck his righ t leg . Alv is, w ho w as ho ldin g a w ee d e ate r, “s w un g” th e w ee d e ate r at th e s un roo f in a n e ffort t o k no ck the pis tol fro m the ap pe llan t’s h an d. T he w ee d e ate r str uc k th e ca r’s w ind sh ield, w hic h s ha ttere d.

Th e a pp ella nt s top pe d h is c ar a nd rel oa de d th e p isto l. A lvis so ug ht r efu ge be hin d h is girlf rien d’s ca r, a C he ve tte, w hic h w as pa rke d o n th e s tre et in fro nt o f his res ide nc e. A s th e a pp ella nt left h is c ar a nd ap pro ac he d th e C he ve tte, A lvis thr ew the w ee d e ate r at the ap pe llan t, str ikin g h im on the he ad . A s th e a pp ella nt b eg an sh oo ting at A lvis , A lvis m ov ed aro un d th e c ar in a n a ttem pt to av oid4 the sh ots . W hile the tw o m en w ere m ov ing aro un d th e c ar, th e a pp ella nt fire d fiv e a dd ition al s ho ts. A s Alv is a ttem pte d to av oid a s ho t, his leg co llap se d a nd a s ho t stru ck him in th e s ide . Th e a pp ella nt th en entered hi s car and fl ed the scene.

Alv is te stifie d th at th e b ulle t w ou nd co llap se d h is lu ng an d th at h e c on tinu es to s uffe r physical pai n from the bull et, which i s lodged in hi s body cavity. Alvis al so suffer ed nerve dam age and inju ry t o h is a rm an d le g fr om the co llisio n w ith th e a pp ella nt’s ca r. F urt he rm ore , A lvis tes tified tha t this ep iso de ha s a ffec ted him m en tally an d h as left h im afr aid to b e o ut in gro up s o f pe op le.
On cross-exam

inati on, Alvi s testi fi ed that he did not consider t he telephone message tw o w ee ks prio r to th e s ho otin g to be a th rea t. M ore ov er, th e a pp ella nt s ou nd ed no rm al o n th at oc ca sio n. H ow ev er, A lvis tes tified tha t he ha d c on sid ere d th e te lep ho ne co nv ers atio n w ith th e ap pe llan t on the m orn ing of th e s ho otin g to be thre ate nin g.
Rita LockhartEvans testif ied that she lived acr oss the str eet fr om A lvi s. Evans knew the ap pe llan t an d re ca lled tha t on the afte rno on of S ep tem be r 12 , 19 96 , the ap pe llan t vis ited he r ho us e. T he ap pe llan t w as driv ing a y ello w H on da C R X a uto m ob ile w hic h h e p ark ed in h er y ard
. Ac cord ing to Ev ans , on th at aftern oon the a ppe llant se em ed “v ery u pse t” and “m ad a t Ga ry.” Th e ap pe llan t sh ow ed Ev an s a pis tol a nd a le ng th o f ch ain an d to ld E va ns tha t he w as go ing to k ill Alv is. Evans becam

e upset and threw the chain underneat h some nearby bushes. The appellant r etri eved the len gth of c ha in a nd retu rne d to his ca r.
On cross-exam

inati on, Evans testi fi ed that at this poi nt she went int o shock and, as a res ult, d oe s n ot c om ple tely rec all a ll the ev en ts th at tra ns pire d. E va ns did rem em be r se ein g th e ap pe llan t dr ivin g d ow n th e s tre et w hile sh oo ting at A lvis , w ho w as w ork ing in h is y ard . W hile w itne ss ing the se ev en ts, s he sc rea m ed , “G ary , ge t do w n, h e’s go ing to k ill yo u.” E va ns als o a dm itted that she regul arly consumes a “beer or two” i n the mornings.5 Sc ott C ulb erts on tes tified tha t he w as Alv is’ n eig hb or. H e liv ed tw o h ou se s u p th e stre et fr om Alv is o n th e o pp os ite s ide of th e s tre et. O n S ep tem be r 12 , 19 96 , w ork ers w ere rep airin g the roo f of h is h ou se . At ap pro xim ate ly 4 :00 p.m ., C ulb erts on he ard gu ns ho ts a nd loo ke d o uts ide . H e tes tified tha t the gu ns ho t so un ds w ere dis tinc t from the ha m m erin g o n th e ro of. C ulb erts on w alk ed to a n ea rby w ind ow , loo ke d o uts ide , an d o bs erv ed Alv is s qu attin g d ow n a t the left fro nt c orn er o f a c ar. At the rig ht r ea r co rne r of the ca r, h e o bs erv ed the ap pe llan t po intin g a gu n a t A lvis . T he ap pe llan t w as sta nd ing on his tipto es in a n e ffort t o g et a cle ar s ho t ov er th e c ar a t Alv is. A lvis sto od up an d thre w a w ee d e ate r w hic h s truc k th e a pp ella nt in the he ad or s ho uld er. C ulb erts on the n o bs erv ed the ap pe llan t fire thr ee or fou r sh ots ov er t he ca r at Alv is. W he n th e s ho otin g e nd ed , the ap pe llan t en tere d h is c ar a nd dro ve aw ay w hile Alv is p roc ee de d to his res ide nc e.
Ne xt, the S tate p rese nted the te stim ony of Ja ck B ow en w ho w as a lso a neig hbo r of Alvi s. On September 12, 1996, at approximatel y 4:00 p. m., Bowen heard a gunshot. Bowen observed Alvis st anding in hi s driveway and also saw a yellow car matching the descri pti on of the appell ant’s car driving quic kly tow ard th e de ad-e nd o f the s treet. A lvis pro cee ded up th e stre et tow ard th e oth er en d of h is lo t w ith a w ee d e ate r. O nc e a t the de ad -en d, th e c ar h es itate d a nd the n c am e ra pid ly d ow n th e stre et to w ard Alv is, w ho w as sta nd ing be hin d a bu sh. As the ap pe llan t dro ve by , Alv is s w un g th e w ee d e ate r an d h it the ye llow ca r. T he ca r pr oc ee de d a no the r ten to th irty fe et a nd sto pp ed
. Ac co rdin g to Bo w en, the ap pe llan t ex ited the ca r an d b eg an sh oo ting at A lvis w ho du ck ed be hin d a ne arb y p ark ed ca r. T he ap pe llan t fired five sh ots at A lvis , w ho the n th rew the w ee d e ate r at th e ap pe llan t. B ow en furth er te stifie d th at a fter th e a pp ella nt fire d th e la st s ho t, he en tere d h is c ar a nd left the scene while Alvi s returned t o his resi dence. Bowen recalled that he did not know that Alvi s had bee n sh ot un til later.

D en nis Higg ins , an offic er w ith th e W as hin gto n C ou nty Sh erif f’s D ep art m en t, tes tified tha t on Se pte m be r 12 , 19 96 , at a pp rox im ate ly 6 :15 p.m ., he res po nd ed to a ca ll inv olv ing the ap pe llan t at the M ead ow broo k trailer p ark. W hen Hig gins arrive d, the app ellant a nd B obb y B enfield we re6 leani ng against a black t ruck. Higgins not iced t hat t he appell ant had a cut on hi s head. The ap pe llan t’s c ar, w ith d uc t tap e o n its sh atte red w ind sh ield , w as pa rke d n ex t to t he tru ck . T he ap pe llan t was placed under arrest and advised ofhis Miranda right s. The appell ant was “cal m” and “cooperati ve” and appeared to understand his Miranda rights. H iggins also testified th

at he disco vere d the weapon used in the shooting al ong with addit ional ammunition under a j acket in t he passenger seat of t he truck.

Ad

ditio na lly, J oh nn y M urr ay of th e S ulliv an C ou nty Sh eriff’s D ep artm en t tes tified tha t at a pp rox im ate ly 6 :00 p.m . on Se pte m be r 12 , 19 96 , he res po nd ed to a ca ll at th e M ea do w bro ok tra iler pa rk. M urr ay ob se rve d a blo od -sta ine d s hirt in the ap pe llan t’s c ar. M ore ov er, M urr ay ide ntifie d th e gu n re co ve red fro m the tru ck as a .2 2 c alib er s ix s ho t re vo lve r an d a lso ide ntifie d th e .2 2 c alib er am m un ition ca se rec ov ere d fr om the tru ck . M urr ay rec alle d th at th e g un co nta ine d fiv e s pe nt s he lls an d o ne live rou nd of a m m un ition, ind ica ting tha t the w ea po n h ad be en fired five tim es . A cc ord ing to Murray, ei ghteen rounds of amm unit ion were missi ng from the ammuniti on case. The appell ant was “nerv ous ” but “m ild m ann ered ,” app eare d to u nde rstan d w hat w as h app enin g, an d w as “c oop erative .” In fact , Murray and the appell ant had an intel li gibl e conversati on regarding some com mon acquaintances.

Fina

lly, the S tate o ffered the te stim ony of C had Ab le, a re side nt of the M ead ow broo k tra iler pa rk. In th e a fter no on of S ep tem be r 12 , 19 96 , the ap pe llan t vis ited Ab le’s ho m e. T he ap pe llan t told Ab le th at h e w as “in tr ou ble ” an d n ee de d to sp ea k w ith A ble ’s fa the r-in law , Bo bb y B en field. W he n Ab le a sk ed the ap pe llan t w ha t ha d h ap pe ne d, th e a pp ella nt re plie d th at h e h ad be en in a dis pu te w ith so m eo ne an d th at th e in div idu al h ad sh atte red his w ind sh ield an d s truc k h im in th e h ea d w ith a w ee d eater. The appellant f urther expl ained that he had shot the indi vidual and he showed Able som e spent sh ell c as ing s, b ut h e d id n ot s ho w Ab le th e p isto l us ed in th e s ho otin g. A cc ord ing to A ble , the ap pe llan t pro ce ed ed to B en field ’s re sid en ce , an d th e p olic e a rrive d a pp rox im ate ly tw en ty to thirty m inutes later.7 Th e a pp ella nt o ffere d th e te stim on y o f Bo bb y B en field. Be nfie ld te stifie d th at h e h ad kn ow n th e a pp ella nt fo r six tee n y ea rs. O n S ep tem be r 12 , 19 96 , Be nfie ld w as in h is tra iler a t the M ea do w bro ok traile r pa rk w he n h is s on -in- law no tified him tha t the ap pe llan t ne ed ed to ta lk w ith h im
. Benfiel d went outside and was standing beside hi s truck t alki ng with the appell ant when the police arr ive d a t the tra iler pa rk. H e s tate d th at, p rior to th e a rriv al o f the po lice , he ha d n ot s ee n th e a pp ella nt w ith a w ea po n o r gu n. B en field ga ve the po lice pe rm iss ion to s ea rch his tru ck . T he se arc h re ve ale d a pis tol in the truc k, w hic h B en field sta ted did no t be lon g to him an d h ad no t be en in th e tru ck on the previous day.

N

ex t, Je rry Sa lye r, th e a pp ella nt’s bro the r, te stifie d th at h e v isite d th e a pp ella nt in ea rly S ep tem be r 19 96 at th e W oo db ridg e M en tal H os pita l w he re t he ap pe llan t w as un de rgo ing trea tm en t. D urin g S aly er’s vis it on Se pte m be r 2, 1 99 6, h e h ad a c on ve rsa tion w ith th e a pp ella nt a nd the appell ant was “irr ati onal”. The hospital r eleased the appell ant that same d ay.
Th e a pp ella nt te stifie d o n h is o w n b eh alf. H e s tate d th at o n th e d ay of th e s ho otin g, he w as “re al d ep res se d” a nd “ne rvo us .” H e c on ce de d th at h e h ad ca lled Alv is o n th e m orn ing of Se pte m be r 12 , 19 96 , to te ll him to s top ag gra va ting his girlfr ien d. T he ap pe llan t cla im ed tha t he pla ce d th e c all a t his gir lfrie nd ’s re qu es t. T he ap pe llan t ad m itted tha t on the da y o f the sh oo ting he travel ed to the home of Rita Lockhart Evans at approxi mately 4:00 p.m. However, in contr ast to Al vis’ version of events, t he appellant testi fi ed that, as he was leaving Evans’ residence, Alvis pr oceeded tow ard him ho ldin g a w ee d e ate r “like a b as eb all b at,” a nd as ke d, “H av e y ou go t so m eth ing to s ay to m e?” T he a ppe llant rep lied, “Th e on ly thing I’ve go t to sa y to y ou, G ary, is le ave Jud y [W alke y] alon e.”

Fu rthe r, the ap pe llan t tes tified tha t he pu lled ou t a p isto l an d fire d a w arn ing sh ot in to the gro un d o nly to le t A lvis kn ow tha t he co uld de fen d h im se lf. A lvis ste pp ed ba ck an d th e a pp ella nt dro ve his ca r to th e d ea d-e nd of th e s tree t to tu rn a rou nd . O nc e h e h ad driv en to th e d ea d-e nd , he2 The a ppellan t’s testimon

y indicate s that he did no t fire any sh

ots from the sun roof of h is car. 8 ob se rve d A lvis be hin d s om e b us he s, s tan din g o n a sh ort blo ck w all a dja ce nt to the str ee t. A cc ord ing to t he appell ant, Alvi s was waving the weed eater. The appellant hesit ated a moment to decide how he co uld lea ve w itho ut a ny m ore trou ble . Be ca us e o f the co ns truc tion truc ks pa rke d o n th e s ide of th e stre et, it w as no t po ss ible for the ap pe llan t to le av e w itho ut d rivin g n ea r A lvis . T he ap pe llan t de cid ed that t he best approach would be to drive by Alvi s as quickly as possi ble. When the appellant reached the bu sh es w he re A lvis w as sta nd ing, Alv is s w un g th e w ee d e ate r at h is c ar a nd sh atte red the windshield. The appellant st opped his car because he had glass in his eyes and could no l onger see to dri ve.
Ad

ditio na lly, th e a pp ella nt te stifie d th at a s h e w as ex iting the ca r, A lvis thre w the w ee d ea ter at h im , str ikin g h im on the he ad . T he ap pe llan t ex pla ine d th at h e w as ble ed ing he av ily a nd co uld no t se e. In ord er t o k ee p A lvis aw ay un til he co uld cle ar h is e ye s o f gla ss an d b loo d, th e a pp ella nt began shooting his pi stol upward, not at Alvi s. The appellant stated t hat he fi red a total of fi ve shots, inc lud ing the ea rlier w arn ing sh ot.2 Th e a pp ella nt le ft the sc en e, w as he d th e g las s a nd blo od off h is he ad , pa ck ed a s uitc as e, ta pe d h is s ha tter ed w ind sh ield , an d p roc ee de d to the M ea do w bro ok tra iler park where he had planned to stay with f riends.

In fu rthe r tes tim on y, th e a pp ella nt s tate d th at h e b ou gh t the pis tol s ho rtly b efo re th e shooting f or self -prot ecti on. He also accounted for t he eighteen missing shel ls i n the amm uniti on case by ex pla inin g th at h e h ad fired tw elv e s he lls a s p rac tice on the W ed ne sd ay be fore the sh oo ting . Th e appellant admitted that he had placed the pist ol and amm uniti on in Benfiel d’s tr uck when he fi rst arri ved at the t rail er park.

On cross examination, the appellant denied that he fired any shots at Alvis when Alvis was

behind his girlfriend’ s car, but offered no explanati on for the9 scratches located on the car following the shooting. M oreover, the appellant claimed he did not aim the pistol at Alvis at any time. The appellant explained Alvis’ injury by stating, “Appar ently he got in the way of one of the bullets.” II. Analysis Sufficiency of the Evi dence

The appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficien t to sustain his conviction of attempted secon d degree murder. In Tennessee , app ellate c ourts acc ord co ns ide rab le w eig ht to the ve rdic t of a jury in a crim ina l trial. In es se nc e, a jury co nv ictio n re m ov es the pre su m ptio n o f the de fen da nt’s inn oc en ce an d re pla ce s it w ith o ne of g uilt, s o th at th e a pp ella nt c arr ies the bu rde n o f de m on stra ting to th is c ou rt w hy the ev ide nc e w ill no t su pp ort th e ju ry’s find ing s. State v. Tuggle , 639

S.W .2d 9 13, 9 14 (T enn . 198 2). T he a ppe llant m ust e stab lish tha t “no re aso nab le trier of fac t” co uld ha ve fou nd the es se ntia l ele m en ts o f the offe ns es be yo nd a re as on ab le d ou bt. Jackson v. Vir gin ia, 443 U.S . 307 , 319 , 99 S . Ct. 27 81, 2 789 (197 9); Te nn R . Ap p. P . 13(e ).

Ac co rdin gly , on ap pe al, th e S tate is e ntitle d to the stro ng es t leg itim ate vie w of th e ev ide nc e a nd all re as on ab le in fere nc es w hic h m ay be dra w n th ere from
. State v. Willi ams

, 657 S.W.2d 40 5, 4 10 (T en n. 1 98 3). In oth er w ord s, q ue stio ns co nc ern ing the cre dib ility o f w itne ss es an d th e we ight an d va lue to be g iven the e vide nce , as w ell as fa ctua l issue s rais ed b y the evid enc e, are res olv ed by the trier of fa ct, a nd no t the ap pe llate co urts
. Sta te v . Pr ue tt , 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 ( Tenn. 199 0).

Th

e gra nd ju ry ind icted th e ap pellan t for the attem

pted first deg ree m urde r of G ary Alvis. T he ju ry fou nd th e ap pellan t guilty o f the les ser in clud ed o ffense of attem pted sec ond deg ree m urd er p urs ua nt to an ind ictm en t ch arg ing tha t the ap pe llan t: did un law fully , felo nio us ly, k no w ing ly, in ten tion ally , an d w ith pre m ed itatio n a ttem pt to kill a no the r, to w it: G ary Alv is, b y fir ing sev eral s hots from a R .G. m ode l .22 ca liber six (6) sh ot rev olve r at10 him w ith o ne sh ot striking him in the si de. . . . W ith re sp ec t to th e a pp ella nt’s co nv ictio n o f atte m pte d s ec on d d eg ree m urd er, th e applicabl e statut e provides:

(a) Se co nd de gre e m urd er is : (1) A k no w ing killin g o f an oth er. . . . Te nn. C od e A nn. § 3 9-1 3-2 10 (a) (1) (19 97 ). W ith r eg ard to th e c ulp ab le m en tal s tate , the ap plic ab le statut e instr ucts: “K

no w ing ” re fers to a pe rso n w ho ac ts k no w ing ly w ith re sp ec t to th e conduct or t o the ci rcumstances surr ounding t he conduct when the person is aware of the nat ure of t he conduct or t hat t he circ um sta nc es ex ist. A pe rso n a cts kn ow ing ly w ith r es pe ct to a r es ult of th e p ers on ’s c on du ct w he n th e p ers on is a w are tha t the co nd uc t is rea so na bly ce rtain to c au se de ath
. Te nn. C od e A nn. § 3 9-1 1-3 02 (b) (19 97 ). M ore ov er, c rim ina l atte m pt o cc urs w he n a pe rso n a ctin g w ith the kind of culpabil it y otherwise requi red for t he offense:

(1) Inte ntio na lly e ng ag es in a ctio n o r ca us es a r es ult th at w ou ld constit ute an off ense if t he circumstances surroundi ng the conduct were as the person bel ieves t hem to be; (2) Acts wit h intent to cause a result that i s an element of the off ense, and believes t he conduct will cause the result without f urther conduct on the person’ s part; or (3) Ac ts w ith in ten t to c om ple te a co urs e o f ac tion or ca us e a res ult that would const it ute the of fense, under t he circumstances surroundi ng the conduct as the person bel ieves t hem to be, and the co nd uc t co ns titute s a su bs tan tial s tep tow ard the co m m iss ion of th e off ense. Te nn. C od e A nn. § 3 9-1 2-1 01 (a)

(19 97 ).
We conclude that the State adduced ample evidence from whi ch a rational juror could hav e concluded that the appellant knowingly attempted to kill the victim. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the reco rd in this case reveals that the appellant made threatening state ments to Alvis, including one on the morning o f the shooting. Also, moment s before the shooting began, the appellant told Evans that he intended to kill Alvi s. Additionally, witnes ses11 for the State testified that the appellant, armed with a pistol, pursued Alvis aroun d a parked car and repeatedly sto od on his tip-toes as he fir ed to afford a better firing line to Alvis. Therefor

e, the evidence shows that the appellant attempted to follow through with his threats t o kill Alvis. The ev

idence also shows that the appel lant “deliberately aimed a pistol and shot several times at his intended victim,” which is sufficient proof to support a conviction for second degr ee murder. State v. Porter , No. 03C01-9606-CC00238, 1997 WL 661419, at *3 (Tenn. Crim . App. at Knoxville, October 23, 1997 ).

Regarding the appellant’s debi litating mental condition , we note that the issue of whether the appellant “knowingly” attempted to kill his victim is a question of fact for the jur y. State v. Elder , 982 S.W.2d 871, 876 (Tenn. Cr im. App. 1998). Intent, which can sel dom be proven by direct evi dence, may be deduced or inferred by the trier of

fact from the character of the assault, the nature of the act, and from all circums

tances of the case in evidence. Id. (citing State v. Holland , 860 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1993)).

Und er T en ne ss ee law , ev ide nc e o f a m en tal d ise as e o r de fec t tha t do es no t rise to th e lev el o f an ins an ity d efe ns e is ne ve rth ele ss ad m iss ible to n eg ate ele m en ts o f sp ec ific in ten t, inc lud ing pre m ed itatio n a nd de libe ratio n in a firs t de gre e m urd er c as e. State v. Phipps , 883 S.W.2d 138, 149 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. 1 99 4). See also St

ate v. H all , 95 8 S .W .2d 67 9, 6 88 -69 0 (T en n. 1 99 7), cert. denied , U.S. , 11 8 S

.C t. 23 48 (19 98 ); State v. Abrams

, 935 S.W.2d 399, 402 ( Tenn. 1996). Again, ho w ev er, th is c ou rt m ay no t rew eig h o r re ev alu ate the ev ide nc e. Pruett , 78

8 S .W .2d at 5 61
. Ac co rdin gly , w e m us t de fer to the jury ’s d ete rm ina tion tha t the ap pe llan t w as ca pa ble of fo rm ing the req uis ite in ten t if su pp orte d b y e vid en ce ad du ce d a t trial. State

v. Pe rry, No. 01C01-9710-CC-00467, 199 9 W L 23 352 2, at *8 (Te nn. C rim. A pp. a t Na shv ille, April 22

, 199 9).12 First, the appellant did not offer any expert psychiatr ic evidence aimed at negating the requisite mental state. Second, the ap pellant provided no evidence that he was suffering from mental problems on the day of the offense. Evans testified that the appellant di d not appear to be suffering fr om a mental disability ; he was merely “angry.”

Moreover, the appellant had the presence of mind to flee the scene of the shooting, pack cl othes, and travel to a friend’s home where he attempted to hide his pistol . Finally, we note that te stimony at trial indi cated that, shortly after the shooting, the appellant was calm and c ooperative with the police, able to engage in an intelligi ble conversation, and seemed t o fully appreciate what he had done when he admitted to Chad Able that he had shot Alvis. The jury obviously rejected the appel lant’s claims of a debi litating mental condition , determining that the appellant was fully capable of forming the mens rea ne cessary to commit a knowing killing. Because there is evidence to support their determination, we must def er to the results reached by the trier of fact.
Furthermore, the appellant’s contention that he was actin g under the heat of passion is not supporte d by this record. The wi tnesses for the State testifi ed that the appellant, apparently unpr ovoked, repeatedly aimed his pistol and shot at Alvis while they both moved around the parked car. Moreover, the State’s witnesses testified that, at the time the appellant shot Alvis, Alvis was not armed with the weed eater. “When the evidence is conflicting, the jury must resolve these conflicts, under proper i nstructions, and decide wheth er the homicide is mur der or manslaughter.” State v.Zandi , No. 02C01-9703-CC-00122, 1998 WL 12672, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jac kson, January 15, 1998). Her e, the trial court provi ded instructions on attempted voluntary manslaughter. The jury rejected that alternative and concluded that the appellant att empted a knowing killing and thus was guilty of attempted second degree murder. Again, this court may not reweigh the evidence13 nor substitute its own vi ew for that properly reac hed by the trier of fact. T he evidence is sufficient for a rational jury to concl ude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knowingly attem pted to kill Gary Alvi s. This issue is wi thout merit. Sentencing The appellant contends that the tr ial court erred by sentenc ing the appellant to a term of ten (1 0) years imprisonment . Specifically, the appel lant asserts that the trial c

ourt erred by: (1) im posing an excessive sentence; and (2) failing to grant the appellant ’s request for probation; o r (3) failing to sentenc e the appellant to the community c orrections program. W e disagree.
1. Excessive Sentence

W he n th ere is a ch alle ng e to the len gth , ra ng e, o r m an ne r of se rvic e o f a s en ten ce , it is t he duty of t his court to conduct a de novo review with a presumption t hat the det erminati ons ma de by the tria l co urt are co rre ct. T en n. C od e A nn . § 4 0-3 5-4 01 (d) (19 97 ). T his pre su m ptio n o f corre ctne ss is “c ond itioned upo n the affirm ative s how ing in th e rec ord th at the trial cou rt con side red the s ente ncin g prin ciples and all relev ant fa cts a nd c ircum stan ces .” State v. Ashby

, 823 S.W.2d 166, 16 9 (T en n. 1 99 1). T he bu rde n is up on the ap pe llan t to d em on stra te th e im pro prie ty o f the se nte nc e. State v. Wilkerson , 90

5 S .W .2d 93 3, 9 34 (T en n. 1 99 5). O ur r ev iew of th e a pp ella nt’s se nte nc es req uire s a n a na lys is o f (1 ) th e e vid en ce , if any, recei ved at tr ial and at the sentenci ng hearing; ( 2) the present ence report; (3) t he princi ples of sen tenc ing a nd th e arg um ents of co uns el relative to se nten cing altern atives ; (4) the natu re an d characteri sti cs of the of fenses; ( 5) any mitigat ing or enhancement factors; (6) any stat ements m ade by the ap pe llan t on his ow n b eh alf; a nd (7) the ap pe llan t’s p ote ntia l for r eh ab ilitatio n o r tre atm en t. Te nn. Co de A nn. § 40-3 5-10 2, -10 3, an d -21 0 (19 97).
The presum

pti ve sentence for Class B, C, D, and E fel onies is t he minimum sentence14 in th e ra ng e if th ere are no en ha nc em en t or m itiga ting fac tors . Te nn. C od e A nn. § 4 0-3 5-2 10 (19 97 ). If the trial c ou rt find s th at th ere are en ha nc em en t or m itiga ting fac tors , the co urt m us t sta rt at t he m inim um sen tenc e in th e ran ge, e nha nce the s ente nce within the ra nge as a ppro priate for the en ha nc em en t fac tor s, a nd the n re du ce the se nte nc e w ithin the ran ge as ap pro pria te fo r th e m itiga ting fac tors
. Id. Th e w eig ht g ive n to an y e xis ting fac tor is left to the trial c ou rt’s d isc retio n s o lo ng as the trial cou rt com plies w ith the p urpo ses and princ iples o f sen tenc ing a nd th e co urt’s find ings are ad eq ua tely su pp orte d b y th e re co rd. State v. Sh rops hire, 874 S.W.2d 634, 642 ( Tenn. Crim. App. 19 93 ). See also State v. Shelton , 85 4 S .W .2d 11 6, 1 23 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. 1 99 2). In lig ht o f the se nte nc ing pro ce ed ing s a nd the tria l co urt ’s c on sid era tion of s en ten cin g prin cip les an d a ll re lev an t fac ts a nd circ um sta nc es , w e a pp ly a pre su m ptio n o f co rre ctn es s in con duc ting ou r de n ovo revie w o f the a ppe llant’s se nten ce. T enn . Co de A nn. § 40-3 5-40 1(d). Attempted second degr ee murder is a cl ass B felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12- 10 7(a ) (1 99 7); 39 -13 -21 0(b ). T he se nte nc ing ran ge ap plic ab le to the ap pe llan t for this offe ns e is eig ht to tw elv e y ea rs. Te nn. C od e A nn. § 4 0-3 5-1 12 (a) (2) (19 97 ). T he tria l co urt se nte nc ed the ap pe llan t as a Range I standard of fender t o a mid-range sent ence of t en (10) year s for t he att empted second de gre e m urd er.
The trial court f ound four enhancemen t fact ors: t he appellant has a previous hist ory of crim ina l co nv ictio ns or c rim ina l be ha vio r in a dd ition to th os e n ec es sa ry to es tab lish the ap pro pria te ran ge ; the ap pe llan t po ss es se d o r em plo ye d a firea rm du ring the co m m iss ion of th e o ffen se ; the ap pe llan t ha d n o h es itatio n a bo ut c om m itting a c rim e w he n th e ri sk to h um an life w as hig h; a nd du ring the co m m iss ion of th e fe lon y, th e a pp ella nt w illfully inflic ted bo dily injury u po n a no the r pe rso n, o r the ac tion s o f the ap pe llan t res ulte d in the de ath of o r se riou s b od ily in jury to a vic tim or a pe rso n o the r than the in tend ed v ictim. T enn . Co de A nn. § 40-3 5-11 4(1), (9

), (10), a nd (1 2) (19

97). T he tria l cou rt pla ce d g rea t w eig ht u po n fa cto r (9 ), th at th e a pp ella nt e m plo ye d a fire arm du ring the co m m iss ion of3 The appellant’ s reliance on State v. Ba ldwin , No. 01C01-9 612-CR- 00530, 1998 WL 4261 99, at *7-8 ( Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashvil le, Jul y 29, 1998), i s misplaced. Cont rary to thi s case, the rec ord in that c ase reflect s that ther e were no other peo ple a t risk. 15 the offe ns e. F rom the se ap plic ab le e nh an ce m en t fac tor s, th e tr ial c ou rt e nh an ce d th e a pp ella nt’s se nte nc e fro m the pre su m ptiv e m inim um se nte nc e o f eig ht y ea rs to ele ve n y ea rs.
Th e tria l co urt th en ad dre ss ed the m itiga ting fac tors . Af ter c are ful c on sid era tion, the trial c ou rt fou nd on e m itiga ting fac tor, th at th e a pp ella nt w as su fferin g fro m a m en tal c on ditio n th at red uc ed his cu lpa bility . T en n. C od e A nn. § 4 0-3 5-1 18 (8) (19 97 ). H ow ev er, the tria l co urt sta ted tha t it w ou ld g ive this fac tor ve ry lit tle w eig ht c on sid erin g th e fa cts of th e c as e a nd the ap pe llan t’s ba ck gro un d. T he trial c ou rt fou nd tha t the ap pe llan t w as no t su fferin g fro m an y m en tal d isa bility on the da y o f the offe ns e d es pite ev ide nc e o f a h isto ry o f m en tal a nd em otio na l pr ob lem s. In su pp ort of th is fi nding, t he tri al court noted Evans’ test imony that, on the day of the of fense, t he appellant seeme d an gry ins tea d o f m en tally un sta ble . Fu rthe rm ore , the trial c ou rt no ted tha t the ap pe llan t ha d th e pre se nc e o f m ind to fle e th e s ce ne of th e s ho otin g, p ac k h is c loth es , tra ve l to a frie nd ’s re sid en ce in an oth er c ou nty , an d h ide the pis tol u se d in the sh oo ting . B as ed on this on e m itiga ting fac tor , the tria l co urt r ed uc ed the ap pe llan t’s s en ten ce from ele ve n to ten ye ars . The appellant cont ends that t he tri al court incorr ectl y applied several enhancem ent fac tors . Fir st, th e a pp ella nt a rgu es tha t the trial c ou rt inc orr ec tly a pp lied en ha nc em en t fac tor ( 10 ), tha t the ap pe llan t ha d n o h es itatio n a bo ut c om m itting a c rim e w he n th e ris k to hu m an life w as hig h. T he app ellant c onte nds that the re w as in sufficien t proo f from wh ich to c onc lude that o ther in dividu als w ere at ris k. A ga in, w e c an no t ag ree .
O ur c ou rt h as co ns iste ntly he ld th at e nh an ce m en t fac tor (10 ) m ay be ap plie d in situ atio ns w he re in div idu als oth er th an the vic tim are in th e a rea an d a re s ub jec t to in jury
. State v. Si ms , 909 S.W .2d 4 6, 50 (Te nn. C rim. A pp. 1 995 ). W e ag ree w ith the trial c

ourt th at the re w as suffi cient pr oof to est abli sh that ot her indi viduals were at r isk. 3 The appellant drove down a resident ial16 stre et fir ing a p isto l fro m the su nro of o f his ca r. T he ap pe llan t the n e xite d h is v eh icle an d c on tinu ed firing at A lvis as bo th m en m ov ed aro un d a pa rke d c ar. D urin g th e e ntire ep iso de , the rec ord refle cts tha t the ap pe llan t fired a to tal o f ele ve n s ho ts. A dd ition ally , tes tim on y re flec ts th at a t the tim e o f the shooting t here were neighbors both insi de and outside thei r homes and co nstruct ion workers on a nea rby ro of. M oreo ver, A lvis’ girlfriend

wa s insid e his resid enc e, w hich wa s on ly a s hort d istanc e from the p arke d ca r that A lvis hid beh

ind w hile the app ellant s hot a t him . The app ellant’s to tal disre gard of the risk of d an ge r to Alv is’ n eig hb ors an d th e c on stru ctio n w ork ers su pp ort s th e a pp lica tion of en ha nc em en t fac tor ( 10 ). T his iss ue is w itho ut m erit.

N ex t, the ap pe llan t co nte nd s th at th e tria l co urt in co rre ctly ap plie d e nh an ce m en t fac tor (12 ), tha t du ring the co m m iss ion of th e fe lon y, th e a pp ella nt w illfully inflic ted bo dily injury u po n a no the r pers on, o r the a ctions of the app ellant re sulted in the dea th of o r serio us b odily in jury to a victim or a pe rso n o the r tha n th e in ten de d v ictim . W e c an no t ag ree . The appellant , ci ti ng State v. Makoka , 885 S.W.2d 366, 373- 74 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 1994), argues t hat thi s enhancem ent fact or is i napplicabl e because it i s inherentin the of fense of att empted murder. In Makoka , this co urt he ld that e nha nce m ent fa ctor (1 2) co

uld n ot be con side red ba se d o n in jurie s s us tain ed by the vic tim of a n a ttem pte d fir st o r se co nd de gre e m urd er o n th e b as is tha t it w ou ld c on stitu te d ou ble en ha nc em en t. 88 5 S .W .2d at 3 74 . H ow ev er, in State v. Freeman, 943 S.W .2d 25 , 31 -32 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. 1 99 6), th is c ou rt dis ag ree d w ith Makoka on the basi s of our supreme court’ s fi nding i n Sta te v . Tr us ty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 313 n. 7 (Tenn. 1996), that“an att empted m urd er d oe s n ot n ec es sa rily r eq uire eith er c on tac t w ith th e v ictim or bo dily inju ry.” In Freeman, this court hel d that “ because bodily i njury i s not an essential element of the of fense of at tempted second deg ree m urde r, the trial co

urt pro perly enh anc ed th e de fend ant’s s ente nce for tha t offens e w ith reg ard to th e v ictim w ho w as ac tua lly w ou nd ed .” 9 43 S. W .2d at 3 2. It is o ur v iew tha t the sa m e re as on ing ap plie s in this ca se . Th e v ictim of a n a ttem pte d s ec on d d eg ree m urd er d oe s n ot n ec es sa rily s uffe r bod ily injury. A

cco rding ly, there is no dou ble e nha nce m ent fro m the a pplica tion of th is facto r wh ere17 the vic tim do es su ffer s uc h in jurie s. Se e S tate v. H arr is , 978 S.W.2d 109, 117 ( Tenn. Crim. App. 19 97 ); State v. Fiel ds , N

o. 0 1C 01 -95 12 -C R -00 41 4, 1 99 8 W L 7 99 17 , at *10 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. a t N as hv ille, F eb rua ry 2 6, 1 99 8), perm to appeal deni ed , (Ten n. 19 98).

Th e a pp ella nt a lso arg ue s th at th e tr ial c ou rt e rre d b y re jec ting ce rta in m itiga ting ev ide nc e u nd er th e g en era l pro vis ion of T en n. C od e A nn. § 4 0-3 5-1 13 (13 ) (1 99 7). S pe cific ally , the appellant points t o his “l ong and stable work hist ory, t he minor and relati vely recent criminal histor y, and the a ppe llant’s his tory o f m enta l prob lem s” as prop er m itigating fa ctors . W e dis agre e.
Fir st, th e a pp ella nt a rgu es tha t tria l co urt err ed by failin g to us e th e a pp ella nt’s “lo ng an d s tab le w ork his tory ” as a m itiga ting fac tor. T he pre se nte nc e re po rt sta tes tha t the ap pe llan t w as em plo ye d a t AF G Ind us tries for a pp rox im ate ly tw en ty-fiv e y ea rs. H ow ev er, th e re co rd r efle cts tha t at tim e o f the offe ns e th e a pp ella nt w as no lon ge r em plo ye d. T his co urt h as pre vio us ly n ote d th at “[e] very cit izen in t his stat e is expected t o have a stable work hist ory if the economy perm it s the cit izen to w ork, th e citize n is n ot disa bled , or the citizen is no t indep end ently w ealthy .” State v. Keel , 882 S.W .2d 41 0, 4 23 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. 1 99 4). W e fin d n o a bu se of d isc retio n b y th e tria l co urt in its refu sa l to a pp ly th is m itiga ting fac tor.

N ex t, the ap pe llan t ar gu es tha t tria l co urt err ed by failin g to us e th e a pp ella nt’s “m ino r an d re lativ ely rec en t crim ina l be ha vio r” a s a m itiga ting fac tor. A s th e S tate co rre ctly po ints ou t, the app ellant is n ot en titled to m itigation fo r a minor crim ina l re co rd a s o pp os ed to th e la ck of a crim ina l rec ord alto ge the r. Keel , 88 2 S .W .2d at 4 22 -23
. The record refl ects that the appell ant has a hist ory of crim ina l be ha vio r; the refo re, th e tria l co urt’s refu sa l to a cc ep t this m itiga ting fac tor w as no t err or.
Fin ally , reg ard ing the ap pe llan t’s h isto ry o f m en tal p rob lem s, th e re co rd r efle cts tha t the trial c ou rt did co ns ide r his m en tal h ea lth in find ing m itiga ting fac tor ( 8) a pp lica ble an d re du cin g th e se nte nc e fro m ele ve n to ten ye ars . W e fin d n o a bu se of d isc retio n b y th e tria l co urt in its re fus al to18 affo rd a dd ition al m itiga tion. Th is is su e is w itho ut m erit.
2. ProbationTh

e a pp ella nt a rgu es tha t the tria l co urt err ed by failin g to gra nt th e a pp ella nt’s req ue st fo r pr ob atio n. S pe cific ally , the ap pe llan t co nte nd s th at b ec au se the trial c ou rt m isa pp lied tw o enhancem ent fact ors and fail ed to consider certai n mitigat ing fact ors, t he ten (10) year sent ence was excessive and a sentence of eight (8) years i s appropriat e. A defendant who receives a sentence of eigh t (8) ye ars o r less , exc ept fo r certa in offen ses , is eligible fo

r prob ation. T enn . Co de A nn. § 40-3 5- 30 3(a ) (1 99 7). H ow ev er, in sp ite o f the ap pe llan t’s a rgu m en ts, w e c on clu de tha t the find ing s o f the trial c ou rt as to th e a pp lica tion of th e re lev an t en ha nc em en t an d m itiga ting fac tors is c orr ec t. Therefore, the appell ant is not eli gibl e for probat ion because the tr ial court j usti fi ably imposed a se nte nc e in ex ce ss of e igh t (8) ye ars . Th is is su e is w itho ut m erit. 3. Community Corrections

The appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to sente nce him to an alternative senten ce in a community corr ections program. Fir

st, we note that the appellant did not specifically request sentenci ng to a community correc tions program at the sentencing hearing. Consequently, the trial court did not specifically address the appellant’s eli gibility for a commun ity corrections sentence . The trial court did, however, address the appellant’s eligibil ity for probation by stati ng that the length of the appellant’s sentenc e rendered him ineligibl e for probation or other alternative sentencing

. While the trial cour

t’s remark was mis leading, we find from our de novo review that the r ecord is adequate to support the denial of an alternative sentence under the Community Correcti ons Act.

Eligibility for the C

ommunity Corrections

Program is governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106 whic h states, in relevant part:19 (a) An offender who meets al l the following minim um criteria shall be cons idered eligible for punis hment in the community under the provi sions of this chapter: . .
. (3) Persons who are convi cted of nonviolent felony offenses; (4) Persons who are convicted of felony offenses in which the use or possessi on of a weapon was not involved; . . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106(a) (1998 Supp.).

We first must determ ine if the appellant is eli gible for a community corrections sentence purs uant to subpart (a). This court has stated that a defendant is eligible for a comm unity corrections under s ubpart (a) regardless of the length of the sentence. State v. Boston , 938 S.W.2d 435, 438-39 (Tenn. C rim. App. 1996); State v. Crowe , No. 01C01-9503-CC-00064, 1995 WL 392967, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 6, 1995). However, the appellant is not eligible for community corrections

under subpart (a) because s ection (a) (3) excludes individuals convicted of crimes against the person . Attempted second degree murder is a crime against the person. Furthermore, the appellant is not eligible because section (a) (4) excludes individuals convicted of felony offenses in which the use of a weapon was involv ed. In this case, the appellant used a pistol in the commission of the offense.

An appellant ineligible for community correctio ns under subpart (a) may, however, be eligible under subpart (c), which creates a “special needs” category of eligibility:

Felony offenders not otherwi se eligible under subsecti on (a), and who would be usuall y considered unfit for probation due to histories of chronic alcohol, drug abus e, or mental health problems, but whose special needs are treatable and could be served be st in the community20 rather than in a correcti onal institution, may be considered eligible for punishment in the communit y under this chapter. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106(c) (1998 Supp.). This court has previously held that in order to be eligible fo r the Community Corr ections Program under 40-3 6-106(c), a defendant must first be statut orily eligible for pr

obation. State v. Grigsby , 957 S.W.2d 541, 546 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1997); Boston , 938 S.W.2d at 438; State v.Staten , 787 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tenn. Cr im. App. 1989). Thus, whi le Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106(a) (1998 Supp.) does not require eligibil ity for probation, secti on 40-36-106(c) (1998 Supp.) doe s. As stated earlier, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a) (1997) expressly states that a defendant shall be eligible for probation if the sentence imposed is eight (8) years or les

s. The trial court im posed a ten-year sentence. Ther efore, the appellant is not eligible for probation and, likewi se, is not eligible for sentencing under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106( c) (1998 Supp.). This i ssue is without merit. Accordingly, the judgment o f the trial court is affirmed.

__________________________________ Norma McGee Ogle, Judge

CONCUR:

_____________________________ Jerry L. Smith, Judge21 _______________________________ Joe G. Riley, Judge