## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellat e District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 23

- 00194

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 360th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 360

- 708983

- 21

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell , JJ.

In the Interest of A.B. and A

. B., Children

Memorandum Opinio n by C h ief Justice Sudderth2 MEMORANDUM OPIN ION
In this restricted appeal from a suit aff ecting th e p arent

– child relationship (S APCR) , Appellant T.B. (Father) contends that there are six error s app arent on the
face of the record : two related to service of process and four related to the sufficiency
of the e vidence. T h e Of fice of the A tto rney General (OAG) dispu tes the service

related issues but concedes that the evidence is insufficient t o support the amount s the trial court ordered Father to pay as c as h medical support and child su pport
. We
agree with OAG

. W e will reverse the suppor t o rders , rem and for a retrial of those
issues , and affirm the remainder of the SAPCR judgment

. I. Background
OA G petitioned the trial court to determine the parentage o f twin gir ls A.B. and A.B. (th e Twins), to appoin t con servators for th em, and to ord er medical an d
child support
. OAG ’ s petition was filed in November 2021, and at that time, OAG requested service of process on Father at an address in Dallas.
Almost ten months later, in S e ptember 2022, OAG moved for substitu ted

se rvi ce under Texas Rule o f Civil Procedure 106 (b)

. The motion was accompanied by
a sworn statement from OAG ’ s process server describing his numerous attempts to personally serve Father between m id

- July an d mid

- A ugust 2022

. The process server explai ned that h e had been asked to serve Father at a Carrollton apartment address,
that he had twice confirmed with the leasing office that Father resided at the relevant
apartment , and that to his knowledg e , “ this [w a]s t he most likely location for [Father]3 to re ceive not ice o f suit. ” He detailed three attempts to personally serve Father at the
Carrollton apartment , providing specific dates a nd times for each attempt and stating
that he had left del ivery n otices on Father ’s apartment doo r on each occas ion

. The
process server also noted that he had left voicem ails at the phone numbers listed for
Father and that Father had not responded to any of his phone calls

. Re lying on this sworn statement, o n Septem ber 20 , 2022, th e trial court granted
OAG ’s mot ion and auth orized substituted service of Father either by “ leaving a true copy of the citation, with a copy of the petition attached, with anyone over 16 years of

age a t [ Father ’ s C arr oll ton apartment ] ” or by “ attaching a tr ue copy of the citation,
with a copy of the petition attached, to a door at [Fat her ’ s Carrollton apartment ]. ” OAG served Father less than two weeks later by affixing the documents to the door
of Father ’ s Carrollton apartment, and the retur n of ser vice was filed with the trial

court. Fat her did not file an a nswer to OAG ’ s petitio n . Later t hat year, the trial court held a short , final hearing on OAG ’ s petition

. Again, Father did not appear
. No docu men tary evidence was of fered at the heari ng , and only one witness

— F. Y.L.F. (Mother)

— testified

. She s t ated that Father was the
Twins ’ biological father and that she d id not know where he live d

. She explained that
Father had pre viously worked as a petroleum engineer but that sh e did not know if
F ather was still employed , if he was still in the same industry , or how much money he
made

. W hen OAG floated the ide a that Father received monthly income of $8,552.66 , i t s ought Mother ’ s confirmation of this figure , but to no avail :4 Q

. [OAG] If the Office of the Attorney General is able to determine that he makes $8,552.66 per month, do y o u think that ’s incorrect or in appropriate? A. [Mother] I don ’t know

. [Indentation altered.] No other evidence was admitted to show Father ’ s income or

resources
. T h e trial court granted OAG ’ s petitio n and entered a default judgmen t

aw ardi ng OAG ’ s requested relief. It confirmed that Father was the Twins ’ father, appointed F a ther as possessory con s er v at or (with Mother as man a ging co n servator),
and establish ed the term s for p ossession of and access to the Twins

. As for medical
and child support, the trial court found that Father had gross monthly re sources of $8,552.66 and net monthly resources of $6,233.45 , and based on these findin g s , it
award ed cash m edical child su pport of $385 per month, ongoing chil d su pport of $1,558 per month, and retroactive child support of $64,884

. A lmost six months later, F a ther filed th is restricted appeal

— his first appearance in th e case . II. Sta ndard o f R e vie w To prevail in a restricted a ppeal, th e a ppellant must esta blish that (1) he filed a notice of the restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed; (2) he was a party to the underlying lawsuit; (3) he did not participate in the he a r ing that
resulted in the judgment complained of and did not timel y file any post

- judgment
motions ; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Ex parte E.H. , 6025 S.W.3d 486 , 495

– 96 (Tex. 2020) ; Ale xander v. Lynda ’ s Boutique , 134 S.W.3d 8 45, 848 (Tex. 2004) ; see Tex. R. App. P. 30

. O nly th e f ourth requirement is at issue in this appeal: whe ther error is apparent on the face of the record

. 1

“ The face of the record

. . . consists of the papers on file with the trial cour t when judgment was rend e red.” M.B. v. R.B. , No. 02

- 19

- 0034 2- CV, 2021 WL 2252792, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth June 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Clamon v. DeLong , 477 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) ).
III. Discussion
I n six is sues, which we constr u e as three, Father contends tha t er ror is apparent
on th e face of the record because (1) OAG did not adequate ly serve him with the suit ; (2) the trial c ourt failed to appoint the parents as joint managing c onse rvators even though there was no testimony sh owing fa m il y violence ; and (3) the re was no evidence to support the amount s Father was ordered to pay as ca sh medical support , ongoing child support , and retroactive child support

. A. Serv ice: No Error on the Face of t he Rec ord
In his first and second is s ues, Father challen ges OAG ’s servic e of process

. Although the precise nature of Father ’ s challenge is unclear , 2 h e appears to argue tha t

1 T he first three requirements are jur isdictional, while t he fourth goes to the merit s of the appeal. E.H. , 602 S. W.3 d at 49 6–97. The jurisdictional requirements are not only undisputed but easi ly confirmed by the rec ord : Father filed his notice of restricted appeal just shy of six months aft er the j ud g ment wa s signed, he was a party to th e underlying lawsuit, and he did not participat e in the trial cour t proceeding s or file an y post

- jud gments mo tions.6 substituted s ervice was improper because (1) the sworn state ment s upp orting OAG ’ s motion for substituted service was i nsufficient as in Cor onado v. Norma n , 1 11 S.W.3d
838 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2003, pet. denied) ; and (2) the manner of sub stituted
service authorized by th e trial court was not “ reasonably effect ive to give t he
defendan t notice of the suit. ” Tex. R. Civ

. P. 1 06 (b)

. N either argu ment reveal s er ror on the face of the record

. 1. Law on Substituted Se rvice A plaintiff may resort to substituted service only upon fail ure of the traditional
method s of service that provide proof of actual notice , such as person a l se rvice

. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Costley , 868 S.W.2d 298, 29 8–9 9 (Tex. 1993) ; In re Guardianship of Bays , 355 S.W.3d 715, 718 (Tex. A pp.

— Fort Worth 2011, n o pet.)

. S ubstituted
service r equ ires authorization from the trial court , which may b e gra n ted onl y if the plaintiff “files a motion supported by proper affidavit [or sworn stat ement] ” that complies with Texas Rule of Civil Procedu re 106(b). Guardianship of Bays , 355 S.W.3d

at 718

– 19 ; se e Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b); Wilson v. Dunn , 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex

. 1990)

.

2 Father makes numerous service

- related alle gations at various points in his brief , claiming th at OAG ’s service lacked due diligence , “o ffend[ed] the traditional understanding of due process of law, ” violated Texa s Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 79, violat ed Texas Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 106( a)(1), and violated Texas Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 106(b)(2). Several of th ese complaints are lodged summarily in a single sentence without explana tion or ana lysis

. Liberall y construing Fa ther ’s brief as a whol e in an attempt to reach the merit s of h is appeal , see Tex. R. App. P. 38.9, we interpret the core of his challenge to be ra ising the two service

- related arguments address ed herein.7 The affidavit or sworn s tatement must l ist any location where the defendant can probably be found and must state specifically the facts showing that the traditional
methods of se rvi ce ha ve been unsuccessful ly attempted at that location

. Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b). A s worn statement that does not “stat [e] spe cifically the facts showing that service has been attempted ” is insufficie nt to support substituted service , see id. , as is a

s wor n statement that is conclusory

. Wilson , 800 S.W.2d at 8 3 6

. But if the plaintiff ’ s motion and supp orting a ffidavit are sufficient, then the trial court may a uthorize service of process “ in any other manner
. . . tha t the statement or other evidence
sho ws will be reasonably effective to give the defendant notic e of the suit. ” Tex. R.
Civ. P. 106 (b)(2).
Whatever the serv ice method, “ s trict compliance with the rules for service of
citation [mu st] affi rmativel y appear on the record in order for a default ju dgment to
withstand direct attack. ” WWLC Inv., L.P. v. M iraki , 6 24 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021) ; Pr imate Const., Inc. v. Silver , 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994) ; Wilson , 800 S.W.2d

at 836

. In this co ntext, “ [t] here are no presumptions in favor of valid is sua nce, service, and return of citation .” Primate Const

. , 884 S. W.2d at 152 ; see WWLC Inv. , 624
S. W.3d at 79 9

. 2. Sufficiency of the Sworn Statement
Father first argues that the sworn statement fro m OAG ’s process server was insufficient to support au tho rization o f substituted service under Texas Rule of Civi l
Procedu re 106 (b) b ecause the process serv er did not specify the identit ies of th e8 person s in the leasing office who confirmed Father ’ s address

. Father claims that “the

exact s cen ario [that ] transpired ” here also transpired in Cor onado v. Norm an , an d the r e, the c ourt of appea ls held that the swor n state ment was insufficient to authorize
substituted service under Rule 106

. Coronado , 111 S.W.3d at 84 1– 42

. E ven if Coronado w ere binding on us , though , it wo uld undermine Father ’s argument rather than suppor t ing it. In that case , our sister court he ld that substituted
service should not have been authorized becau se the process server ’s affidavit fai led
to list a ny specific dates or times of attempted service and d id not identify any other avenues he had purs u ed to co ntact th e defendant

. Id. at 842. While Father is cor rect
that the process server in Cor onado confirmed th e defendant ’ s address by s peaking
with un named ind ividuals at the location , 3 our sister court did not take i ssue with this; in fact, it was n ot even mentione d in the cou rt ’s an alysis

. Se e id. at 840

– 42. Instead,

“ the spe cific dates and times of attempted servic e” w ere t he dispositive details m issing
from the proce ss server ’ s affidavi t. Id. at 842

. And here, OAG ’ s proc ess server included t h ese details in his sworn st atement
. The p rocess server l isted the exact dates, days of the week, and times of day that he

3 Even on this point, OAG ’s process server ’s sworn statement provided mor e detail than the affidavit in Cor on ad o . Th ere, the process server averred that “ [o] n each of the occasions [of attempted ser vice], [he] was informed that the said Defendant resided at such a ddress but that he was not there. ” Coronado , 1 11 S.W.3d at 840

. Here, in con trast, the OAG ’s proc e ss server specifi ed that he had confirmed Father ’s residen cy by speaking with a person rep res enting “ [t]he le asing office ”— not a random passe rby

.9 had visited Fathe r ’s apartment and attem pte d personal service : a Wednesday m orning

a t 10:40 a.m. , a Monday evening at 7:46 p.m. , an d a Saturday afternoon at 1: 08 p.m. , spread o ut over the course of several weeks

. The process server also referenced other
avenues he had ex plored to contact F a ther; he sw ore that he had left deli very notices

on the door of Father ’s residenc e each time he had attempte d servic e , a nd h e noted
that h e had called Father ’s known phon e numbers and left voicemails

. T he sworn

s ta tement in this case is thus distinguishable from that in Cor on ado

. See i d.
A nd a part from Father ’ s reliance on Cor o n ado , he has not id e ntified an y flaws
that render the process serv er ’s sworn statement insufficient to su pport sub sti tuted

serv ice under R u le 106

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b)

. We overrule his challenge to t he

sworn statement
. 3. Rea sonabl y Effective Manner of Substituted Service
Father al so a lleges that OAG ’ s man ner of substitu ted service was

“ unreasonable ” becaus e “ it is clear from the face of the record that [ Father ] had a
hist ory of changing addresses , ” but OAG allowed 49 days to pass between the leasing
office ’s confi r mation that Fathe r lived at the Carrollton apartment and the ex ecution
of substituted s ervice a t t hat address

. Father asserts that “ [t]here is no supporting
documentation

. . . other than the affidavit of the process server to indicate that [the
Carroll t o n apartment] is [ his] ad dress

. ”
First , it is not at a ll “ c lear from the face of the record that [F a ther] had a history
of chan ging addresses , ” and Father has not provid ed any record references to support10 this assertion. While the Dallas address listed fo r Father in OAG ’s petition was differen t f r om the Carrollton apartment whe re he was confirmed (by the leasing office via the process serv er ) to be living ten months late r , moving from one apartment to
another over the span of ten months does not equate to “ a history of chan ging
addresses ” on a regu lar basis.
S econd , as Fa ther ind irectly ack nowledges , the process serv er ’ s affidavit is , in fact, supporting evidence that Father was living at the Carrollton apartment

. Again,

t he process serv er ’s statement was swor n t o and confi rm ed that the “ leasin g of fice ”

ver ified in mid

- July 2022 and again in mid

- August 2022 that Father resided at the Carrollton apartment. While this is circumstantial, rather than direc t, evidence of
Father ’ s address 49 day s l ater , it is no n etheless probativ e evidence , and there is nothing on the f ace of the record to contradict it. C f. Palacios v. Patel , No. 02

- 18

- 00119

- CV, 2018 WL 2728441, at *7 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth June 7, 2018) (me m. op.) (noting that, “ despite the pop ula r television cl ichés about the w orth of
circumstantial ev idence, it indeed has legal, probative value ”) , supplemented on other grounds , No. 02

- 18

- 00119

- CV, 2018 WL 3385571 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth July 12, 2018, no pet .) (suppl. m em. op.)

. A lth ough we ma ke no presumption s in favor o f serv ice, see WWLC Inv. , 624
S .W.3d at 799 , we cannot make unsupported inferences against s ervice either

. Father ’ s argument would have us overlook the circumstantial evidence of his

re sid ence and assume that he moved resi denc es based on nothing mor e than the11 p assage of 49 days . There is nothing in the re cord to support such a n in ference , 4 nor has Father cited any case law holding that t he passage o f 49 days between the
confirmation of a d efendant ’s residence and the date of s erv ice gives rise to a presumption that the defendant has mo ved

. In short, Father h as not pointed to anything on the face of the record that

s hows that the manner of substituted service

— posting the petition and citat ion on the
door of an apartment that t he evidence indic a ted was F ather ’ s residence

— was not

“ reason ably effective to give the defendant notice of the suit. ” Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b)(2)

. B ecause Father has failed to show error on the face of the r ecor d, we overru le
his service

- related complaint s.
B
. Custody: Inadequ ately Bri efed
In Father ’ s third li sted issue, he alleg es t ha t “ the trial court erred in failing to name the parties as joint managing conservators absent testimony of family vio lence. ”
But he has wh oll y failed to brief this issue

. S ee Tex. R. Ap p . P. 38.1 , 38.9

. An appellant ’s brief is “ meant to acquaint the court with the issue s i n a case and

. . . present argument t [o] enable the court to decide the ca se. ” Tex. R. A pp. P.

4 Father r equested a supplemen tal clerk ’s record with “ scans of the

. . . Returned Envelope from USPS add ressed to [F a ther] with the [Carrollton apartment addres s]. ” In anticipation of th is sup pl e men t, Father claimed that it would provide “ further evidence

. . .tha t the service was insufficient. ” No such supplemental re cor d was filed , though, and there is nothing in the record indicating that correspondence mailed to Father ’s Carrollton apartment was retu rned as undeliverable

.12 38.9. To that end, th e a ppell ant must provide “ a clear a nd concise argu m ent for the

con tentions made, with appropr iate citations to authorities and to the record

. ” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (i )

. Father has failed to d o that here. A part fr om listing the absence of family

violence te stimony as an issue presen ted on appeal , Father ’ s only other me ntion of
this issue is in h is recitation of the factual ba c kground , where he refers to th e lack of a family

- violence finding

. The port ion of Father ’ s brief dedicated to his le gal argument does not m ention th e alleged necess ity of “ testimon y of family viol en c e ” at all , much
less doe s Father provide analysis of the issue o r cite relevant legal authorities.
Withou t a n “ argument for the contention [] ma de ” to “ acquaint the court with th e issue [], ” see Tex. R. App. P . 38.1( i), 38.9, we a re le f t guessing as t o the nature of
Father ’ s famil y
- violence

- related complaint

.

“ [A]ppellate courts have no duty

— or even the ri ght

— to perform an independent review o f t he record and the applicable law to determine whether there was error; we cannot mak e the p arty ’ s argument s for [hi]m, and then adjudica te the case based on the arguments we have made on [his] behalf.” Wellness & A esthetics Inst., PA v. JB&B Cap

. , LLC , No . 02

- 22

- 00330

- CV, 2023 WL 478051 1, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth July 27, 2023, pet . filed) ( mem. op.) ( quot ing C raaybeek v. Craaybeek , No

. 02

- 20

- 00080

- CV, 2021 WL 1803652, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 6, 2021, pet

. denied) (mem. op.)). B ecause Father ha s failed to brief his third issu e, he has waived13 it

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (i) ; Wellnes s & Aesthetics Inst. , 202 3 WL 4780511, at *2 ( holding appella nt wa ived issues raise d in “perfuncto ry list of ‘arguments ’”).
C
. Cash M edical Suppo rt and C h ild Support : I nsufficient Evidence
In his final three issues , Father cha llenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court ’s awa rds of cash med ical support , ongoing child support, and retroactive child support

. OAG concede s the insuffi ciency of the evid ence , and after reviewing the record, we ag ree. 5
1. Standard of Review
We review a tri al court ’ s j udg ment granting child sup por t for an abuse of
discretion

. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); B.K. v. T.K. , No.
02

- 19

- 00472

- CV, 2021 WL 2149621, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 27, 2021, no pet.) (me m. op.). A trial cou rt ab uses its disc ret ion when it acts arbitrar ily or wi thout

5 Mother has not filed a b rief. And n either Fathe r n or OAG has addresse d the potential effect of Fat her ’s fa ilure to answer on his insufficiency c ompl aint. Generally, in the contex t of a no

- an swer default judgment, courts de em the
non -answeri ng party to h ave admitted all facts properly ple ad ed in the petition. In re J.G. , No. 02

- 22

- 00238

- CV, 2023 WL 2179463, at *7 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have q uestion ed whether , “when conservatorship of children is invol ved, the sa me rules may not apply, ” but we hav e n ot resolved this issu e in the context of a SAPCR that does not i nv olve a d ivorce

. See i

d. (noting unresolved issue and summarizing case law). We need not resolve this issue today , though, be cause even if Father were dee med to have admitted to the fac ts a ll eged in OAG ’s pe tit ion, such petition did not allege the a moun t of Fathe r ’s gross or net resources , n or did it request a speci fic amount of cash medical support , ongoing child support, or re troactive child support
. Instead, O AG ’s petition asked the tria l court to or der “appropriate current and retroactive child, medic al, and dental support for the children. ”14 reference to guiding principles , or when it s judgment is suppo rted by legally or factually insufficient evidence

. B.K. , 2021 WL 2149621, at *2

. 2
. Sta tu t ory Child Support G uidelines
When calcul ating the amount o f c ash medical support , ongo ing child support ,

or retroactive child support presumed to be reasonab le u nder Texas law , the obligor ’ s gross and net resources are key varia bles

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 154. 062, . 125 , .131

. If neither parent has access to private health insurance an d the child ren rece ive
medical care through a government program

— as Mother testified the Twins do here

— the trial c ourt must or der cas h medical support in “an amount [] not to exceed nine percent of the obligor ’ s ann ual resources. ” Id. § 154.182( b) (3 ), ( b- 2)

. The amount of cash medical support i s then deducted from the obligor ’s gross

resources (along with t axes and certain oth er ex penses ) to calculate the obligor ’s net

res ources
. See id. § 154.062 (d)

. An d the amou nt of the obligor ’s net re sourc es is u sed
to determine his presumptively reasonable child support payments

. See id. §§ 1 54.122,

. 125

. By statute , “c hild support is gen erally determined by calc ulating the child
supp ort obligor ’ s monthly net resources and a p plying statutory guidelines to tha t

a mou nt. ” Gonzalez v. Gonzalez , 3 31 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2011, no pet.)

. The statutory guidelines provide , for exam pl e, that an obligor with two children
will pay e ither 20% or 25 % of his net resource s , de p ending on whether those net15 resour ces ar e abo ve a certai n threshold. T ex. Fam. Cod e Ann. § 1 54.125(b) , (c) ; see M.G. v. T.G. , No. 02

- 21

- 00433

- CV, 2023 WL 2178762, at *4 ( Tex. App.

— Fort Worth
Feb. 23 , 2023, no pet.) (m em. op.)

. These same statutory guide lines

— and the
variable s on wh ich they rel y—guide the determination of retroactive child support as
well

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.131 (providing that “ [t ] he child support guidelines are intended to guide the court in determining th e amou nt of retroactive child support ” a nd di rec ting court t o consider “ the net resources of t he obligor during the relevant time period ”).
A bsent evidence of the ob ligor ’s gro ss resources, the trial court “ shall presume
th at the party has income equal t o the federal minimum wage for a 40

- hour week ,” id. § 154.06 8 (a) , which eq uates to approximately $15,080 per year or $1, 256.67 per month. 6 2 9 U.S.C. A. § 206(a)(1)(C); M.G

. , 2023 WL 2178762, at *4 ( calculating gross

resources an d explaining ) ; Cervenka , 672 S.W.3d at 819

– 20 & n.1 (similar ) ; Gonzalez , 331 S.W.3d at 8 68 & n.2 (similar)

. 3
. No Evidence to S u pport Inflated Payment Amounts Here, there was no evidence of Father ’s gross or net res ources
. In fact, there

w as no evidence that he was e ven employed. Mother ’ s testimony was the only
evidence offered at t rial, and w hen she was a sked wh ether F a ther was working and

6 The federal m inimum wage is $7.25 per hour , resulting in gross income of $290 per 40- ho ur work week, and $ 15,080 per 52

- week year
. See 29 U.S.C. A. § 206(a)(1)(C) ; M.G. , 2023 WL 2178762, at *4; Cervenka v. Cervenk a , 672 S.W.3d 814, 8 20 n.1 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg 2023, no pet.)

.16 wh ether OAG ’s suggested sa lary fi gures seemed acc ur ate, Mother res ponded th at she
d id not know.
B ecause ther e w as no evidence of Father ’ s gross resources, the trial c o u rt was require d to presume th a t he r eceived income equal to the federal minimum wage , i .e., $15,0 80 per year or $1,25 6.6 7 per month

. 2 9 U.S.C. A. § 206(a)(1)(C) ; Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 154.068 (a)

. R at her than applying this statutory presumption , though, the t rial
court found that Fathe r had gros s resource s of $102,631.90 per year or $8,552.66 p er month

. There is no evidence to support this finding

. M or e t o the point, this erro r had the k nock

- on effect of infla t in g the amounts
of cash medica l support and child sup port that the trial c ourt ordered Father to pay

. Father ’ s cash me dical support p ayments were statutorily capped at 9% of his gross

resources

— $ 113 .1 0 p er month based on the federal minimum wage

— but th e trial court ordered Father to pay $385 per month

. Similarly for ongoing ch ild support , the

statutor y guidel i nes provided for presumpti vely reasonable payments of 20% to 25%
of Father ’ s net re sources, but t he tria l court order ed Father to pay $1,55 8 per month , which was more than 100% of his statutorily presumed gross resources o f $ 1,25 6.67 per month

. 7 The same is true for retroactive ch ild support

. T he trial cou rt ordered Father to pay $64,884 to cover a pproxima tely four years of miss ed pay ments , b ut this

7 Father ’s net resources would have be en less th an his gross resources , s ee Tex. Fam. Code A n n. § 154.0 62(d) , but becaus e t h is dif ference is not di spositiv e , and because there wa s little evidence of Father ’ s e xpenses , w e need not l inger over this dis ti nction.17 sum exceed ed the entire ty of Father ’s statutorily presumed gross resource s for all four
years , whi ch would have been $60,32 0 based on the federal mini mum wage . The face of the record thu s demonstrates th a t there is no evidence to support
the ordered sums of cash medical support, on going child support, and retroactive child supp ort
. S ee Gonzalez , 331 S.W.3d at 868 (holding error a ppa ren t on the face of
the r ecord when trial court ordered appellant to pay monthly child support of $750
without evidence of appellant ’s employment status or income ). We sustain Father ’s sufficiency c hallenges , which he lists as his fourth, fifth, and si xth is sues. IV. Conclusion
B ecause the evi dence is i nsufficient to support the tria l court ’ s a wards of cash
medical support, ongoing child support, and retroactiv e child support, we reverse
th e se porti ons of the judgment and remand the case f or a retrial of th e se issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2( d) ; Gonzalez , 331 S.W.3d at 869 ( remandin g after restricted appeal and explaining that, “ [w] hen legally insufficient evi dence supports a default judg ment , the p roper remedy is remand, not rendition ”). I n all o ther resp ec ts, the trial court ’ s judgment is a ffirmed. See Tex. R. App. P. 43. 2 (a)

. /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudder th Chief Ju stice
Delivered: Jan uary 11, 2 024