COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

EDDIE ROBERTSON, S/K/A 

 EDDIE DARNELL ROBERTSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0191-96-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 NOVEMBER 5, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 

AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY 

William L. Person, Jr., Judge 

 Andrew A. Protogyrou (Knight, Dudley, Clarke & 

Dolph, P.L.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Margaret Ann B. Walker, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Eddie Darnell Robertson (defendant) was convicted in a bench 

trial for distribution of cocaine in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-248. Defendant complains on appeal that the trial court 

erroneously rejected his entrapment defense. Finding no error, 

we affirm the conviction. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the issue on appeal. 

 "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by 

an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who 

would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Stamper v. Commonwealth, 

228 Va. 707, 715, 324 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985) (quoting Sorrells v. 

United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932)); see McCoy v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 227, 231, 385 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1989). 

Entrapment occurs when criminal conduct of an accused results 

from "'creative activity' [by police] that implants in the mind 

of an otherwise innocent person the disposition to commit an 

offense and induces its commission in order to prosecute." 

Stamper, 228 Va. at 715, 324 S.E.2d at 687 (quoting Johnson v. 

Commonwealth, 211 Va. 815, 817-18, 180 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1971)). 

However, "[t]here is nothing improper in the use, by the police, 

of decoys, undercover agents, and informers to invite the 

exposure of willing criminals and to present an opportunity to 

one willing to commit a crime." Id.; see Pannell v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 170, 173, 384 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1989). 

Moreover, "[r]eluctance to engage in crime is not transformed 

into entrapment whenever a person hesitantly, but willingly, 

acquiesces in the request of a close ally to commit a crime." 

McCoy, 9 Va. App. at 232, 385 S.E.2d at 630. 

 When a defendant waives a jury trial the 

trial judge assumes the role of the jury in 

deciding whether entrapment has occurred. 

Accordingly, his factual findings are 

entitled to the same weight as that accorded 

a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support them. This is so because 

the credibility of witnesses and the weight 

accorded their testimony are matters solely 

for the fact finder who has the opportunity 

of seeing and hearing the witnesses. 
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Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 

736-37 (1985) (citations omitted). 

 Here, although defendant initially may have been unaware of 

the undercover officer's intention to purchase drugs, once her 

purposes were made known to him, he stated that he had "no 

problem" with people using crack cocaine and he could take the 

officer to "somebody that had it." When the officer refused to 

purchase the cocaine herself, defendant received the purchase 

money from her, obtained the drug from another and delivered it 

to the officer. Under such circumstances, we are guided by the 

Supreme Court's holding in Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 18, 

197 S.E.2d 207 (1973). 

 In Neighbors, the government agent came to Neighbors' home, 

"begging" for drugs, and "had to be forced 'out the door.'" Id.

at 19, 197 S.E.2d at 208. Later that same day, the agent again 

asked Neighbors for drugs, pleading that he was "'about to die.'" 

Id. After advising that "he did not 'have anything' but would 

see what he could do," Neighbors purchased the requested 

narcotics, contacted the agent, and resold the drugs to him. Id.

The Court reasoned that "all the police . . . did was to afford 

an opportunity for the commission of the offense, an opportunity 

the defendant willingly accepted," concluding that "the evidence 

was insufficient, as a matter of law, to create . . . 

entrapment." Id. at 19, 197 S.E.2d at 208-09. 

 Here, the officer's overtures were even less compelling, but 
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defendant willingly facilitated the transaction, acting as both 

agent and courier, free of trickery, persuasion, or fraud by 

police. 
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 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.