J-S54045-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSEPH LAWRENCE THOMAS

Appellant No. 654 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered April 14, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0006200-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, MUNDY, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J. FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2014

Appellant, Joseph Lawrence Thomas, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence the Court of Common Pleas of York County entered on April 14, 

2014.1 Appellant argues the trial court erred in not granting his motion to 

suppress the evidence seized following an illegal stop. Specifically, Appellant 

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1

 Appellant purports to appeal from the January 10, 2014 order denying his 

pre-trial motion to suppress/dismiss—the nature of the underlying motion 

changes throughout the brief. It would seem that Appellant deems a motion 

to suppress and a motion to dismiss to be the same. Elsewhere Appellant 

purports to appeal from the “judgment of sentence . . . entered January 

10, 2014, and made final when Appellant was sentenced on April 14, 2014.” 

Appellant’s Brief, first page (unnumerated). An appeal does not lie from the 

denial of a pre-trial motion or from the conviction, but from the judgment of 

sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 562 n.1 (Pa. 

Super. 2007). Additionally, there is no indication Appellant filed a postsentence motion, which would have made the judgment final. See, e.g., 

Pa.R.A.P. 301(a)(2). We have corrected the caption accordingly. 
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alleges the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him to 

investigate about some criminal activity in which he was allegedly involved. 

We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm.

The trial court adequately summarized the factual background of this 

case as follows:

On March 2, 2013, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Trooper 

Newcomer was traveling northbound on State Route 74 where it 

intersects I-83. He testified that he observed a white Nissan 

sedan attempting to pull out of the Citizen’s [sic] Bank parking 

lot. He stated that upon seeing the marked unit, the Nissan 

backed up into the parking lot of the bank and utilized a nearby 

business parking lot to access State Route 74. Trooper 

Newcomer testified that this appeared suspicious because he 

was aware of multiple bank incidents where ATMs were being 

broken into throughout the state. He subsequently decided to 

follow the vehicle. Upon following the vehicle, the trooper 

noticed that the validating sticker on the registration plate was 

not in the correct indentation on the registration plate. 

Therefore, he initiated a traffic stop. Upon making contact with 

Appellant, the trooper detected an odor of alcoholic beverage 

emanating from his breath and observed his eyes to be glassy 

and bloodshot. Appellant exited the vehicle to perform 

standardized field sobriety tests. Appellant also admitted to 

consuming a shot of Hennessy forty-five minutes prior to these 

events and to smoking marijuana. 

Upon completion of the field sobriety testing, Appellant showed 

clues of impairment and was placed under arrest. Appellant was 

transported to York Hospital for a chemical blood test. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/9/14, at 2-3 (citations to record omitted).2 

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2 We note Appellant failed to append a copy of the Rule 1925 trial court 

opinion or the order denying motion to suppress to his brief, despite the 

clear language of Pa.R.A.P. 2111(b). 
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On appeal, Appellant argues the police officer did not have reasonable 

suspicion to stop him to investigate whether he was engaged in some 

criminal activity. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. This argument is without 

merit.

Appellant fails to appreciate the facts of the case and the legal 

consequences resulting from them. The alleged basis for the officer to stop 

the vehicle was a violation of the Vehicle Code, not the investigation of 

criminal activity. N.T. Motion to Dismiss, 1/10/14, at 6-7. See also Trial 

Court Opinion, 5/9/14, at 2; N.T. Trial, 2/25/14, at 11-12, 14, 15. A 

vehicular violation provides a valid ground for stopping a vehicle. The 

quantum of cause to stop a vehicle depends on the violation itself, namely 

whether it is an investigatable violation or not. See Commonwealth v. 

Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 115-16 (Pa. 2008). If the violation speaks for itself, 

i.e., there is no need for further investigation, then the quantum of cause 

needed is probable cause. If further investigation is necessary, then 

reasonable suspicion suffices. Id. 

Appellant does not argue he did not violate the Vehicle Code, nor did 

he challenge in any fashion what the trial court eloquently called a “crap 

charge.”3 Additionally, Appellant did not address whether the underlying 

vehicular violation required reasonable suspicion or probable cause to 

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3 N.T. Trial, 2/25/14, at 15.
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warrant a stop. Finally, Appellant did not challenge the trial court’s finding 

that the vehicular violation gave the officer probable cause to stop. 

Appellant focuses his challenge on what he perceives to be the actual 

reason for the stop, namely to investigate Appellant’s suspected criminal 

activity. Specifically:

Though Trooper Newcomer cited Appellant with an equipment 

code violation for failure to place his registration sticker in the 

proper indentation on the license plate[, ] this does not change 

the nature of the stop any more than the fact Trooper Newcomer 

charged Appellant with [d]riving [u]nder the [i]nfluence. 

Trooper Newcomer followed and stopped Appellant for the 

express purpose of investigating the possibility that he was 

engaged in criminal activity at or around the ATM machine in the 

bank parking lot.

Appellant’s Brief at 10.

Appellant ignores well-settled principles of law that directly contradict 

this argument. Even if the actual motive was the investigation of suspected 

criminal activity, this motive is irrelevant for purposes of determining the 

legality of the seizure. “[T]he United States Supreme Court made clear that 

case law ‘foreclose[s] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness

of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers

involved.’ In other words, if police can articulate a reasonable suspicion of a 

Vehicle Code violation, a constitutional inquiry into the officer’s motive for 

stopping the vehicle is unnecessary.” Chase, 960 A.2d at 120 (citing 

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
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In sum, Appellant’s argument is flawed on multiple levels. First, a 

violation of the Vehicle Code provides enforcement officers with a valid 

ground to conduct a vehicular stop. The only question pertains to the 

quantum of cause to conduct the stop, i.e., reasonable suspicion or probable 

cause. By failing to challenge or address the underlying vehicular violation, 

or the trial court’s finding of probable cause to stop the vehicle for a 

vehicular violation, Appellant de facto admitted the officer had probable 

cause to stop the vehicle.4 A challenge to the actual motive for stopping the 

vehicle, as opposed to the alleged one, is pointless once the stopping officer 

showed and proved (here, not even challenged) he had a legitimate reason 

(i.e., vehicular violation) to stop him. Based on what Appellant challenges, 

and most importantly what he does not challenge, we are constrained to 

conclude the officer had probable cause to warrant a stop of the vehicle.5

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

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4 Our conclusion is based on Appellant’s (or lack thereof) argument. We are 

not holding the trial court properly concluded the officer needed probable 

cause to stop the vehicle. 

5

In his prayer to this Court, Appellant asks us to reverse the decision of the 

trial court denying his motion to dismiss criminal information. Appellant’s 

Brief at 11. Given Appellant challenged, in essence, the sufficiency of the 

evidence offered by the Commonwealth in support of the stop, it is clear that 

a motion to dismiss is an improper method to test the sufficiency of the 

Commonwealth’s case. See Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 

1179 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“We note that a motion to dismiss is not the 

proper means by which to test the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s 

evidence pre-trial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 306 (now 578), Comment[.]”). 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum.

Judge Mundy concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/10/2014