alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-2704

___________________________

Lance LaFevers

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Hot Springs

 ____________

Submitted: March 2, 2022

Filed: March 9, 2022

[Unpublished]

____________

Before BENTON, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Lance LaFevers appeals the district court’s1 order affirming the denial of

disability insurance benefits. We conclude that the Commissioner’s decision is

1The Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Kraus v. Saul, 988

F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2021) (standard of review). Specifically, the

administrative law judge (ALJ) properly considered the opinion of LaFevers’s

treating physician, and LaFevers’s subjective complaints. See Anderson v. Astrue,

696 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2012) (ALJ properly discounted physician’s conclusory,

checkbox opinion, as it set forth significant limitations that were not reflected in

medical records and that were inconsistent with claimant’s daily activities); Tellez v.

Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005) (ALJ properly found claimant’s daily

activities, including caring for special needs child, cooking, doing housework, and

paying bills, were inconsistent with alleged disability). Further, the evidence

supported the ALJ’s determination of LaFevers’s residual functional capacity (RFC),

see Despain v. Berryhill, 926 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 2019) (substantial

evidence supported RFC finding based on treating and other providers’ notes, state

agency consultants’ opinions, and claimant’s treatment and daily activities); Wildman

v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 969 (8th Cir. 2010) (ALJ did not err by declining to include

in RFC limitations based on claimant’s allegations that he found not credible, or

limitations from physicians’ opinions he properly disregarded); and the ALJ’s

determination that LaFevers did not have a medically determinable impairment

affecting his hands, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (impairment must be established by

objective medical evidence from acceptable medical source).

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

-2-
FLEETWING CORPORATION, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. David RICKETTS, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-1445

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 16, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
#### Mohammed Moe MOOSAVI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FAIRFAX COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT; Department of Social Services; Department of Tax Administration; John Russ, Mr. Commissioner; Dean Sadredin, Mr. Step-son in Minnesota; Reycon Properties, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-2461

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 13, 2017

Decided: June 23, 2017

Mohammed Moe Moosavi, Appellant Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Mohammed Moe Moosavi appeals the district court’s order dismissing his action with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order to particularize his claims. *See*Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Moosavi’s complaint, given that nothing in his filings suggests a viable federal claim. However, based on the possibility that Moosavi did not receive the district court’s order to particularize, *see Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,*370 U.S. 626, 632, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962), and our consideration of the factors in *Ballard v. Carlson,*882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989), we conclude that the dismissal should be without prejudice. We therefore deny Moosavi’s motion to appoint counsel and affirm the district court’s judgment as modified to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED*
Ceophia PERKINS, Petitioner, v. JACKSONVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent.

No. 1D17-1698

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 6, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Thomas E. Mara, as Chief Executive Officer of The FINOVA Group Inc. (the Company) certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|(1) | the accompanying Form 10-Q report for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  |  |     |  |                        
|----------------- |  | --- |  | -----------------------
|Date: May 4, 2009 |  | By: |  | /s/    Thomas E. Mara  
|                  |  |     |  | Thomas E. Mara         
|                  |  |     |  | Chief Executive Officer
Employment Addendum




 Exhibit 10.93 
 NEXSTAR BROADCASTING GROUP, INC. 
 Amendment to Employment Agreement 
 Perry A. Sook 
 DATED: MARCH 27, 2009 
 WHEREAS, Nexstar Broadcasting Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the
“Company”), as successor to Nexstar Group, Inc., and Perry A. Sook (“Sook”) entered into an employment agreement, dated as of January 5, 1998, as amended on May 10, 2001, September 26, 2002,
August 25, 2003, July 2, 2007, November 13, 2008 and December 31, 2008 (as amended, the “Agreement”); and 
 WHEREAS, the Company and Sook now wish to amend the Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Agreement. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, of the mutual promises contained herein and of other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto hereby agree to
amend the Agreement as set forth herein. 
 FIRST: The signatories hereto agree that the Agreement is hereby amended by adding the
following as a new Paragraph 27 to read in full as follows: 
 “27. Signing Bonus.

 (a) In the event that Sook’s employment with the Company terminates at any time prior to
December 31, 2011 as a result of Sook’s retirement or termination without Good Reason, Sook shall be required to repay to the Company an amount equal to a pro rata portion of the $350,000 cash lump sum received by Sook in connection with
the signing of the addendum to the Agreement, dated November 13, 2008 (the “Signing Bonus”), determined by multiplying the amount of the after-tax proceeds of the Signing Bonus by a fraction, the numerator of which is the
number of days remaining from the date of termination until December 31, 2011 and the denominator of which is 1,144. Such amount shall be repaid to the Company no later than ninety (90) days following the date of Sook’s termination of
employment.” 
 SECOND: Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement.

 THIRD: All other terms and conditions of the Agreement will remain in full force and effect. 








 Please indicate your agreement with and acceptance of the terms and conditions of this addendum as of the
date listed above by signing below. 
 [Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank.] 
  

 2 










	
	Sincerely,
	
	/s/    MATTHEW E. DEVINE        
	 Matthew E. Devine
 Chief Financial Officer, Executive
Vice
 President



  

	
	Agreed and Accepted:
	
	/s/    PERRY A. SOOK        
	 Perry A. Sook
 President and Chief Executive Officer




 [SIGNATURE PAGE TO EMPLOYMENT 
 AGREEMENT ADDENDUM]
Jason P. KRALOVETZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0399

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 29, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Granted.
IIB 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1443 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 12, 2021 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

Urban Affairs 

AN ACT 

To amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to require the 

collection of small business loan data related to LGBTQowned businesses. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 1443 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘LGBTQ Business 

3 Equal Credit Enforcement and Investment Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. SMALL BUSINESS LOAN DATA COLLECTION. 

5 Section 704B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 

6 (15 U.S.C. 1691c–2) is amended— 

7 (1) by inserting ‘‘LGBTQ-owned,’’ after ‘‘mi8 nority-owned,’’ each place such term appears; 

9 (2) in subsection (e)(2)(G), by inserting ‘‘, sex10 ual orientation, gender identity’’ after ‘‘sex’’; and 

11 (3) in subsection (h), by adding at the end the 

12 following: 

13 ‘‘(7) LGBTQ-OWNED BUSINESS.—The term 

14 ‘LGBTQ-owned business’ means a business— 

15 ‘‘(A) more than 50 percent of the owner16 ship or control of which is held by 1 or more 

17 individuals self-identifying as lesbian, gay, bi18 sexual, transgender, or queer; and 

19 ‘‘(B) more than 50 percent of the net prof20 it or loss of which accrues to 1 or more individ21 uals self-identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, 

22 transgender, or queer.’’. 

23 SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS. 

24 The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 

25 complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, 

26 shall be determined by reference to the latest statement 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 1443 RFS

1 titled ‘‘Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation’’ for this 

2 Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record 

3 by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, pro4 vided that such statement has been submitted prior to the 

5 vote on passage. 

Passed the House of Representatives June 24, 2021. 

Attest: CHERYL L. JOHNSON, 

Clerk. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
MEMORANDUM

TO: Record

FROM: James K. O’Connell, ERG

DATE: March 12, 2015

SUBJECT: Summary of EPA and State Discussions Regarding Warren POTW (DCN 

SGE00786)

Between June 17 and 19, 2014, EPA Office of Water (EPA OW) communicated with 

EPA Region 5 (EPA R5) and Ohio EPA to obtain information on the Warren (OH) Publicly 

Owned Treatment Works (POTW). EPA OW was looking to update information obtained in July 

2012 about the Warren POTW, specifically regarding industrial wastewater discharges received 

by the Warren POTW from the Patriot Centralized Waste Treatment (CWT) facility (which 

treats unconventional oil and gas (UOG) extraction wastewater). EPA OW also had information 

stating that the Warren POTW’s NPDES permit allowed the POTW to accept a maximum of 

100,000 gallons of UOG extraction wastewater per day (0.67% of the POTW’s maximum total 

daily flow) at a maximum TDS concentration of 50,000 mg/L. In June 2014, EPA OW inquired 

from EPA R5 about whether or not the Warren POTW was still accepting wastewater from the 

Patriot CWT and if the permit information listed above was correct and current as of June 2014. 

EPA R5 contacted Ohio EPA to obtain answers to these questions.

In June 2014, Ohio EPA provided the following information about the Warren (OH) 

POTW:

- The Warren POTW NPDES permit was effective on April 1, 2012 and will expire on 

January 31, 2017.

- Permit number 3PE00008*ND is still the current NPDES permit for the Warren POTW. 

The NPDES permit is available on Ohio EPA’s website.

- The Warren POTW’s pretreatment Annual Report lists the Patriot facility as a significant 

industrial user, and the Patriot facility is still operating.
Alden Benjamin WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D16-2282

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[June 6, 2018]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Conner, J.

Appellant Alden Benjamin White appeals his conviction and sentence to life in prison with twenty-five years as a minimum mandatory, after a jury found him guilty of a second degree murder with a firearm that he committed when he was 17 years old. Appellant raises two issues on appeal: (1) his sentence is illegal because it does not provide for a subsequent judicial review as required for juvenile offenders by section 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2016) ; and (2) the trial court erred in not granting his motions for judgment of acquittal.

We affirm the denial of Appellant's motions for judgment of acquittal without discussion. The State concedes that the trial court should have provided for sentence review after 25 years as required by section 921.1402(2)(b). We accept the concession and remand for the trial court to provide for sentence review. § 775.082(3)(a)5.c. Fla. Stat. (2016) ("The court shall make a written finding as to whether a person is eligible for a sentence review hearing under s. 921.1402(2)(b) or (c).").

The trial court at sentencing considered the factors set out in section 921.1401(2) in deciding whether to sentence Appellant to life in prison. Thus, a new sentencing hearing with Appellant's presence is not required for this ministerial sentence correction. *See**Jordan v. State* , 143 So.3d 335, 339 (Fla. 2014) (finding the defendant's presence is not required where resentencing "involves only a ministerial act"); *Cook v. State* , 225 So.3d 268, 269 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (affirming the sentence but remanding for the trial court to enter a written finding allowing for sentence review).

*Affirmed in part and remanded with instructions.*

Ciklin and Forst, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
unaudited consolidated financial statements and notes thereto included in the
Company's Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 1997 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         546,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  899,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                294,512,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             339,985,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                     57,500,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       209,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  93,096,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               339,985,000
<SALES>                                     61,057,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               57,312,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,833,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,075,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,758,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,758,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.09
        

</TABLE>
Michael S. MILLER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0667

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 21, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Document Headings

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                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Education

          - [Docket No.: ED-2022-SCC-0011]

# AGENCY:

Office of Postsecondary Education (OPE), Department of Education (ED).

# ACTION:

Correction notice.

                    On February 8, 2022, the U.S. Department of Education published a correction notice in the                     **Federal Register**                     (Vol. 87, No 26, Page 7163, Column 2) seeking to correct the public comment period closing date for an information collection entitled, “Supplemental Support under the American Rescue Plan (SSARP) Application.” The Docket Number for the correction (ED-2020-SCC-0011), is incorrect, and the correct Docket Number is ED-2022-SCC-0011.                

The PRA Coordinator, Strategic Collections and Clearance, Office of the Chief Data Officer, Office of Planning, Evaluation and Policy Development, hereby issues a correction notice as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

Dated: February 8, 2022.

Kate Mullan,

PRA Coordinator, Strategic Collections and Clearance Office of the Chief Data Officer, Office of Planning, Evaluation and Policy Development.

[FR Doc. 2022-02997 Filed 2-10-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4000-01-P
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 15

- 00542

- CR

Lee ANDERSON

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the Criminal District Court, Magistrate Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015W0196

Honorable Andrew Carruthers, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION

, JUSTICE ANGELINI , AND JUSTICE BARNARD

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the appellant’s motion to withdraw

appeal is GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED.

SIGNED September 16, 2015

_____________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
#### Ronyell D. MORNING, Sr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold CLARKE, Director of VADOC, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6542

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 17, 2017

Decided: August 22, 2017

Ronyell D. Morning, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin Hyman Katz, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KEENAN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*121PER CURIAM:

Ronyell D. Morning, Sr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Morning has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Anthony B. MCCULLOUGH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D18-0911

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 27, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 23, 2018

Anthony B. McCullough, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

The petition for belated appeal is denied on the merits.

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.