# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 22, 2021 *

Decided December 28, 2021

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON , Circuit Judge

No. 21-1547

HENRIETTA E. ARNOLD SIMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

LOUIS DEJOY, Postmaster General Defendant-Appellee

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 19-CV-789

William E. Duffin,

M agistrate Judge

.

O R D E R

Henrietta Simpson was robbed at gunpoint when working at a branch of the

United States Postal Service. After the ro bbery, USPS allowed the severely distressed Simpson to work temporarily at a window equipped with protective glass, installed protective glass at her usual station, and always scheduled a coworker to work with her. Simpson later sued USPS after she repo rted that these measures were insufficient—

* We have agreed to decide the case wi thout oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and le gal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 32.1No. 21-1547 Page 2

primarily because the person working with her would leave the room at times—and

USPS did not do more to accommodate her an xiety. The district court entered summary judgment for USPS, ruling that no reasonable jury could conclude that USPS had not reasonably accommodated Simpson’s presumed disability. We affirm.

We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to Simpson, the non-moving
party. Yochim v. Carson , 935 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2019). Simpson requested in late 2017 that USPS accommodate the anxiety she developed after she was robbed at gunpoint while working a customer-service window. At her doctor’s urging, Simpson asked that she not be scheduled to work alone at her window until protective glass was installed. USPS agreed to install the glass on her window and, until then, transferred her to a station with protected windows. USPS also scheduled someone to work with Simpson when she was assigned to a window without gl ass, though that coworker often left the room for twenty minutes. Simpson could also leave the window when she wished.

Simpson’s coworkers began making fun of her. Though the record is unclear

about when this ridicule occurred or who t ook part, Simpson attests that her coworkers laughed at her and complained about “babysi tting” her. Her supervisor also picked on her and once reprimanded her for accidentally cursing in front of a customer.

On six occasions around this time, Simpso n requested time off under the Family and Medical Leave Act to care of her dying father. Her supervisor threatened to write her up if she took the leave, but USPS a pproved each request. Simpson took all the leave she requested and did not receive any re primand or reduction in pay or benefits.

Simpson considered suing USPS but then settled her potential claims. Still, after September 2018, the date through which she re leased her claims, problems persisted, eventually leading to this lawsuit. In her complaint, Simpson alleged that USPS discriminated against her because of her anxi ety, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), by inadequately accommodating her disability and fostering a hostile work environment. She al so alleged interference with her right to

take FMLA leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

USPS eventually moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion. It explained that no reasonable jury could conclude that Simpson had a qualifying disability or that, if she did, US PS had failed to reasonably accommodate it after September 2018. Nor could a reasonable jury find that a handful of barbs from herNo. 21-1547 Page 3

coworkers created a hostile work environmen t. Finally, the court ruled that the FMLAinterference claim failed because Simpson took all the leave she had requested.

Simpson appealed, but USPS asks us to dismiss the appeal under Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedur e because, it argues, Simpson has not articulated any error. But we discern some ge neral arguments in Simpson’s brief, which we construe liberally, Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd. , 845 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), and so we will explain briefly why summary judgment for USPS was proper.

Simpson principally asserts that USPS unreasonably accommodated her anxiety, but no reasonable jury could find in her fa vor. We can assume that the anxiety Simpson developed after the armed robbery—a condition that her doctor insisted required job modifications such as not working alone at an unfortified service window—qualifies as a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Even so, Simpson lacks evidence that USPS

failed to accommodate the condition in a reas onable way. The record shows that USPS fulfilled Simpson’s request not to assign her to work alone at an unprotected window: It moved her to a station with protective glass, installed a shield at her usual window, and scheduled coworkers to work alongside her. Simpson laments that the coworkers often

left her alone at the service window to take breaks or complete tasks elsewhere. But she admits that she, too, could step away, an d she does not cite any added measure USPS could have taken to make the workplace more accessible, other than further altering her coworkers’ jobs. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co ., 417 F.3d 789, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2005). Because USPS supplied the precise accommoda tions requested—even if they did not altogether ease Simpson’s mind—a reasonable jury could not find in her favor on this

claim. See Yochim , 935 F.3d at 591 (affirming summ ary judgment when employer provided accommodations, though not precisely those requested).

Nor could a reasonable jury conclude that USPS fostered a hostile work environment based on Simpson’s disability. Although such a claim is available under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Ford v. Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Office , 942 F.3d 839, 852 (7th Cir. 2019), and presumably under the Rehabilitation Act, see Yochim , 935 F.3d at 593, Simpson needed evidence that she suffe red “severe or pervasive” harassment at

work. Id. But a few unkind or even cruel remarks about Simpson needing a babysitter, and one warning for cursing at a customer, ca nnot amount to the sort of hostility that

creates an unlawful environment. See Ford , 942 F.3d at 857

. (“[E]mployers generally do not face liability for off-color comments, isolated incidents, teasing, and other unpleasantries.”).No. 21-1547 Page 4

Finally, summary judgment also was proper with respect to Simpson’s FMLA claim. To prevail on an interference cl aim under 29 U.S.C. § 2615, Simpson must show that USPS prejudiced her ability to exercise her rights secured by the FMLA. See Guzman v. Brown County , 884 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The FMLA ... makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with an employee’s attempt to exercise FMLA rights.”). The record, however, shows that USPS approved all the leave Simpson requested to attend to her ailing father and did not pu nish her for taking that leave.

AFFIRMED