alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>          5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM PREMARK
INTERNATIONAL, INC.'S 1997 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS FILED IN ITS ANNUAL REPORT
ON FORM 10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>      1,000
       
<S>                              <C>   
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-27-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-29-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-27-1997
<CASH>                                         151,300
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  446,200
<ALLOWANCES>                                    18,100
<INVENTORY>                                    394,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,077,400
<PP&E>                                         986,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 550,900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,765,800
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          545,300
<BONDS>                                        112,300
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        69,000
<OTHER-SE>                                     838,900
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,765,800
<SALES>                                      2,406,800
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,406,800
<CGS>                                        1,525,800
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,525,800
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                (2,900)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 4,400
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              12,100
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                174,700
<INCOME-TAX>                                    70,900
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            103,800
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   103,800
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.67
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.59
        
        


</TABLE>
Pauline ANDERS and Ferrell S. Anders v. FAIRHOPE SINGLE TAX CORP.

1150879

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 10, 2017

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 21



Subsidiaries
of Oncologix Tech, Inc.

Subsidiaries
of Registrant





|Subsidiary                                | State
    of Incorporation or Jurisdiction | Percent
    of Ownership of Oncologix Tech, Inc.
|----------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------
|Dotolo Research Corporation               | Louisiana                                  | 100%                                            
|Angels of Mercy, Inc.                     | Louisiana                                  | 100%                                            
|Oncologix
    Corporation                 | Nevada                                     | 90%                                             
|International
    Environment Corporation | Delaware                                   | 100%                                            
|Interpretel
    (Canada) Inc.             | Province
    of Ontario                    | 100%                                            
|Interpretel,
    Inc.                     | Arizona                                    | 100%                                            
|Telplex
    International                 | Arizona                                    | 100%
No. 07-15-00119-CR

Emery Dominique Emmitt a/k/a Emery

Dominiaue Emmitt

 Appellant

v.

The State of Texas

 Appellee

§

§

§

§

From the 432nd District Court

 of Tarrant County

October 6, 2015

Opinion by Justice Campbell

J U D G M E N T

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated October 6, 2015, it is ordered,

adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.

Inasmuch as this is an appeal in forma pauperis, no costs beyond those that

have been paid are adjudged.

It is further ordered that this decision be certified below for observance.

o O o

FILE COPY
# United States Court of Appeals

f or the Fifth Circuit

No. 21

- 50018 Summary Calendar

Anthony Quinton Johnson, Jr.,

Plaintiff

— Appellant ,

versus

United Law Firm Sanders Grossman, L.L.C.,

Defendant

— Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 7:20

- CV

- 32

Before Southwick, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges

. Per Curiam : *
Anthony Quinton Johnson, Jr., moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s order dismissing as frivolous his lawsuit against two law firms for legal malpractice, pursuant to

* Pursuant to 5th Cir cuit R ule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir cuit R ule 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED November 30, 2021
Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 21-50018 Document: 00516110670 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/30/2021No. 21

- 50018

2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The district court denied his IFP motion, certifying that his appeal was not taken in good faith.
By moving to proceed IFP, Johnson is challenging the district court’s
certification. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into an appella nt’s good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Johnson does not renew the merits of his claim, does not brief any argument addressing the district court’s order of dismissal, and provides no argument challenging the district court’s reasons for certifying that his appeal is not taken in good faith. Although we liberally constr ue briefs of pro se litigants, see Grant v. Cuellar , 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995), Johnson has abandoned any challenge to the certification decision and has failed to show that he will raise a nonfrivolous issue for appeal by failing to point to any error
in the district court’s decision. See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff
Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987); Howard , 707 F.2d at 220

. Accordingly, the motion to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED , and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh , 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24. Johnson’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED

. S ee Ulmer v.
Chancellor , 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). Case: 21-50018 Document: 00516110670 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/30/2021
Dazhan KING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-2620

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 10, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          23,746
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  147,071
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    130,121
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               315,559
<PP&E>                                          21,822
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 846,388
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,541,954
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        17,638
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   846,388
<SALES>                                        701,526
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               701,526
<CGS>                                          214,061
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  214,061
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,558,596
<LOSS-PROVISION>                           (1,071,131)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (140,819)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,173,837)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                665
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,173,837)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0



</TABLE>
No. 28,370.

#### The State of Kansas, *Appellee,*v. Otis Razor and Harold J. McKeever, *Appellants.*

(278 Pac. 746.)

Opinion filed July 6, 1929.

*Edgar Bennett,*of .Washington, for the appellants.

*William A. Smith,*attorney-general, and *William C. Berry,*county attorney, for the appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Hopkins, J.:

The defendants were convicted of the larceny of hogs, and appeal, contending chiefly that the court erred in permitting the state during the trial to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense, thereby preventing the defendants from relying on a defense of alibi. Also, in unduly restricting the cross-examination of the state’s witnesses. We have given due consideration to these contentions but cannot concur therein.

A claim that the state’s witnesses first laid the commission of the crime as of March 27, 1926, and that later on rebuttal it was changed to the date of March 30, is not sustained by the record. The state’s witnesses testified substantially that the theft was committed during the last of March or just before the first of April. The evidence as a whole shows that the defendants were at the residence of one Fred Hubka, the place to which the hogs were transported after *460being stolen, on two nights the latter part of March. The state at no time fixed the date of the larceny other than March 30. The defendants fixed March 27, the night after a hog sale in Washington, Kan., as the date on which they were at the Hubka'place, and then attempted to prove that if the crime was committed on the night they were at Hubka’s they did not participate therein and had no knowledge of it. A setting out of the evidence in detail is not necessary. In our opinion it justified the verdict.

Concerning the alleged limitation of the cross-examination of the state’s witnesses the record shows the court first limited such examination, later concluded the limitation was wrong, reversed itself and permitted the examination.

Complaint is made of some of the instructions. This complaint has to do with the question of alibi above discussed and cannot be sustained, because the instructions given, while contrary to the theory of the defendants, were in substantial accordance with the testimony brought out in the trial.

A complaint that there was a lack of corroborating testimony as to the kind and color of the hogs alleged to have been stolen cannot be sustained; nor a complaint that the court erred in not granting a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. *(State v. Evans,*119 Kan. 469, 239 Pac. 996; *State v. Turner,*121 Kan. 364, 247 Pac. 427.)

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Ericscande GARCIA-LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72166

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 16, 2017

*590Ali Manuchehry, Esquire, Attorney, Benjamin Wiesinger, Pope & Associates, PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner

Matthew Allan Spurlock, Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *590*See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ericscande Garcia-Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo constitutional claims. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Garcia-Lopez’s contention that the agency violated due process by failing to consider relevant evidence of hardship is not supported by the record. *See Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (the agency must consider the issues raised and express its decision “in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Almaghzar v. Gonzales,*457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the immigration judge’s decision need not discuss every piece of evidence, and accepting the immigration judge’s general statement that he considered all of the evidence before rendering a decision.)

To the extent Garcia-Lopez requests review of the agency’s discretionary determination that he failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives, we lack jurisdiction to consider this contention. *See Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder,*688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (absent a colorable legal or constitutional claim, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination regarding hardship, and traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process -violations do not restore jurisdiction).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part, DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid*591ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Brian Hampton WATSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Director, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6138

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 31, 2017

Brian Hampton Watson, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher P. Schandevel, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Ap-pellee.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*102PER CURIAM:

Brian Hampton Watson seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing without prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(e)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C, § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Watson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
No. 28,678.

#### The State of Kansas, *Appellee,*v. Sam Kerley et al., *Appellants.*

(276 Pac. 802.)

Opinion filed May 4, 1929.

*J. N. Tincher, Don Shaffer, Rubert G. Martin, Mabel Jones Shaffer,*all of Hutchinson, *C. B. Hudson*and *Clyde M. Hudson,*both of Wichita, for the appellants.

*William A. Smith,*attorney-general, *Roland Boynton,*assistant attorney-general, and *Bert E. Church,*county attorney, for the appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Marshall, J.:

Each of the defendants appeals from a judgment rendered against him for violating the prohibitory liquor laws of the state of Kansas. The defendants were jointly charged with six separate violations of the law. Each of the defendants was found guilty under the fourth, fifth and sixth counts of the information. The fourth count charged the defendants with having intoxicating liquor in their possession; the fifth count charged the sale of liquor to one Luther Pergrem; and the sixth count charged that the defendants kept and maintained a common nuisance.

The contention of the defendants is that the evidence introduced was not sufficient to sustain a conviction. There was evidence which tended to prove that the defendants were operating a filling station on a public highway north of Wellington in Sumner county; that they had in their employ one Elmer Day; that through Elmer Day intoxicating liquor was purchased by Luther Pergrem from each of the defendants; that the liquor sold belonged to the defendants ; that on one occasion liquor was- purchased with a marked bill which was immediately thereafter found on the person of the defendant Kenneth Kerley; that the defendants had instructed Elmer Day as to the manner in which sales should be made and concerning the manner of putting alcohol in beer; that the liquor *230sold was obtained by Elmer Day from the premises occupied by the defendants or under their control; that each of the defendants sold intoxicating liquor; that the place was raided by officers, and that intoxicating liquor was found. The instructions of the court appear to be regular, and no evidence was introduced except what was proper and competent. There does not appear to have been any error.

The judgment is affirmed.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C U IT
LUC IO ER

NESTO GOM EZALVARENGA,

Pe t i tione r,
v. JEFFER SON B . SESSIONS III, Attorne y Ge ne ra l, R e sponde nt. No. 14-70603 Age n c y No. A095-140-956
M EM O R ANDUM *

On Pe tition for Re vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igration Appe a ls Argue d a nd Subm itte d M ay 9, 2017 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : WALLAC E , C H R ISTEN, a nd WATFORD, C irc uit Judge s . The B oa rd of Im m igrat ion Appe a ls (B IA) did not a buse its disc re tion in de ny ing Luc io Gom e z -Alva re nga ’ s m otion to re ope n his proc e e dings or to
re c o nside r his prior m otion to re m and to theim m i gration judge
. 

# F IL ED MAY23 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.Pa ge 2 of 2

B oth m otions to re ope n a nd m otions to re m a

n d m ust e sta b lish a prim a fa c ie showing of e ligibility

for the unde rly ing re l ie f sought in order to be grante d. Ramire z-Munoz v
. Ly nc h , 816 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th C ir. 2016); Angov v . Ly nc h , 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th C ir. 2015). For Gom e z -Alva re nga to be e l igible for te m pora ry prote c te d sta

t us, his fe lony c onvic tion ba rring tha t re lie f unde r 8 U.S.C
. § 1254a (c )(2)(B ) m

u st ha ve be e n va c ate d for re a sons re late d to the m e rits of the unde rly ing c rim ina l proc e e dings, a s oppose d to re ha bilita t ive or im m i gration
re a s ons. Se e Matte r of Marroquin-Garc ia , 23 I. & N. De c . 705, 713 (A.G. 2005). Ye t ne ithe r Gom e z -Alva

re nga ’ s m otion to re ope n nor his m otion to re m and a lle ge d that his fe lony

c onvic tion wa s va c ate d for re a sons re late d to the m e rits of the unde rly ing c rim ina l proc e e dings. TheB IA c o uld not bee xpe c te d to infe r that
a lle gation from

his ne wly subm itte d e vide nc e , whic h indic ate s only tha t the
c onvic tion wa s va c a te d in furthe ranc e of justic e unde r C a lifornia Pe na l C ode § 1385, a provision e nc om

pa ssing a broa d range of re a sons for re lie f. S e e Pe ople
v . Supe rior C

ourt (Rome ro) , 917 P.2d 628, 648 (C a l. 1996). Gom e z -Alva re nga ’ s
m otion to re o pe n a

nd his m otion to re m and thus fa i le d to m ake a prim a fa c ie showing tha

t he is e ntitle d to the unde rly ing re lie f sought. PE T IT IO N DE NIE D.
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 599 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 3500 West 6th Street, Suite 103 in Los Angeles, California, as the ‘‘Dosan Ahn Chang Ho Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 599 EH

1 SECTION 1. DOSAN AHN CHANG HO POST OFFICE REDESIG2 NATION. 

3 (a) REDESIGNATION.—Section 1 of Public Law 108– 

4 239 is amended by striking ‘‘3751 West 6th Street in Los 

5 Angeles, California’’ and inserting ‘‘3500 West 6th Street, 

6 Suite 103 in Los Angeles, California’’. 

7 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg8 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

9 States to the facility referred to in section 1 of Public Law 

10 108–239 as amended by subsection (a) shall be deemed 

11 to be a reference to the ‘‘Dosan Ahn Chang Ho Post Of12 fice’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives January 31, 

2024. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 599 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostAhn Chang Ho Post Office’’. 103 in Los Angeles, California, as the ‘‘Dosan al Service located at 3500 West 6th Street, Suite
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

The Board of Directors
Ariba, Inc.:

    We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-81773, 333-89119, 333-95665, 333-33544 and 333-46820) of
Ariba, Inc. of our report dated October 16, 2000, relating to the consolidated
balance sheets of Ariba, Inc. and subsidiaries as of September 30, 2000 and
1999, and the related consolidated statements of operations and comprehensive
loss, stockholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the
three-year period ended September 30, 2000, and the related financial statement
schedule which report appears in the September 30, 2000, annual report on
Form 10-K of Ariba, Inc.

                                          /s/ KPMG LLP

Mountain View, California
December 28, 2000