- 380 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

James D. Bramble, appellee, v

Lori A. Bramble, appell

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed June 21, 2019. No. S-18-682.

1. Judgments: Justiciable Issues. Justiciability issues that do not involve 

a factual dispute present a question of law.

2. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Although mootness 

does not prevent appellate jurisdiction, it is a justiciability doctrine that 

can prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction.

3. Justiciable Issues. A justiciable issue requires a present, substantial 

controversy between parties having adverse legal interests susceptible 

to immediate resolution and capable of present judicial enforcement.

4. Moot Question. Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing of 

a suit which eradicate the requisite personal interest in the resolution of 

the dispute that existed at the beginning of the litigation.

5. Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A moot case is one which seeks 

to determine a question that no longer rests upon existing facts or 

rights—i.e., a case in which the issues presented are no longer alive.

6. Moot Question. As a general rule, a moot case is subject to summary dismissal.

7. Contempt: Moot Question: Appeal and Error. An appeal challenging 

a finding of civil contempt is rendered moot once the contemnor voluntarily purges the contempt.

8. Contempt: Appeal and Error. In a civil contempt proceeding, the contemnor has a choice once he or she is found to be in willful contempt 

of court and a sanction and purge plan is put in place: The contemnor 

can either seek a stay of the sanction pending an appeal or comply 

with the purge plan and thereby purge the finding of contempt and end 

the matter.

9. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. An appellate court may choose to 

review an otherwise moot case under the public interest exception if it 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

07/05/2019 09:05 AM CDT
- 381 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

involves a matter affecting the public interest or when other rights or 

liabilities may be affected by its determination.

10. Moot Question: Words and Phrases. The public interest exception to 

the mootness doctrine requires consideration of the public or private 

nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative 

adjudication for future guidance of public officials, and the likelihood of 

future recurrence of the same or a similar problem.

11. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. Application of the public interest 

exception is inappropriate where the issues presented on appeal do not 

inherently evade appellate review.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: W. 

Russell Bowie III, Judge. Appeal dism

C.G. (Dooley) Jolly and Travis M. Jacott, of Adams & 

Sullivan, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.

Elizabeth Stuht Borchers and Steven J. Riekes, of Marks, 

Clare & Richards, L.L.C., for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy

Papik, and Freudenberg, J

Stacy, 

This appeal stems from civil contempt proceedings in a dissolution action. The primary question presented is whether a 

contemnor’s full compliance with a purge plan renders moot a 

subsequent appeal of the finding of contempt. We conclude it 

does, and we dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

In January 2016, after a trial, the district court for Douglas 

County entered a decree dissolving the marriage of James D. 

Bramble and Lori A. Bramble. Both parties moved to alter or 

amend the decree, and the court thereafter entered an amended 

decree on February 22, 2016.

As relevant to the issues on appeal, the amended decree 

awarded the parties joint legal custody of their two minor 
- 382 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

children, and Lori was awarded primary physical custody. 

Regarding the marital home, the amended decree provided:

The real estate is awarded to [James] as is. The parties 

have stipulated that the value of the house is $169,000. 

There is $47,500 of marital equity. [James] shall refinance 

the house within 60 days of the entry of the Amended 

Decree to remove [Lori]’s name from the mortgage, and 

pay [Lori] her share of the equity of $23,750.00. [Lori] 

shall have until February 29, 2016, to vacate the residence. [Lori] shall leave the house in good condition, 

and not remove any fixtures or major appliances (except 

that [Lori] may remove either the clothes washer or the 

clothes dryer), on her departure. [James] has been paying 

the mortgage and all expenses since moving out of the 

marital home, and shall continue to do so until after he 

takes possession.

[Lori] shall execute a Quitclaim Deed to [James] 

releasing her interest in the marital residence, whether 

said interest is marital, legal, equitable, contractual or 

otherwise, to be held by her attorney, who shall release 

the deed to the title company or lending institution to be 

held in escrow pending the refinancing and payment of 

the marital equity.

Contempt Proceed

On March 14, 2016, James filed an application for an order 

to show cause. As relevant to this appeal, James alleged Lori 

improperly removed several fixtures and items of personal 

property from the residence. A show cause order was issued, 

and Lori entered a voluntary appearance.

After a continuance to permit mediation, the contempt application was taken up on October 24, 2016, with both parties 

represented by counsel. Evidence was adduced, and the matter was continued to January 10, 2017, so additional evidence 

could be offered. On January 13, the court entered an order 
- 383 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

finding that Lori had willfully violated the provisions of the 

amended decree in the following respects:

[U]pon her departure, [Lori] removed both the clothes 

washer and dryer, and replaced the dryer with another 

unit. Further [Lori] admits to removing the ceiling fans, 

the dishwasher, range, refrigerator and microwave upon 

her departure, a direct violation of the Amended Decree, 

and [Lori] is in [willful] contumacious contempt of 

this provision.

The January 13 order established a purge plan, but did not 

impose a sanction for the contempt. The pertinent portions of 

the order provided:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that [Lori] is in [willful] contempt of court for violation [of] paragraph 9(f) of 

the Amended Decree, and shall appear in Douglas County 

District Court #504 . . . on Monday, March 13, 2017, at 

10:30 a.m. for sentencing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Lori] may purge 

herself of contempt by paying the sum of $3,573.00 to 

[James] no later than March 10, 2017.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Lori] shall pay 

to the Clerk of the District Court of Douglas County, 

Nebraska, the sum of $1,500.00 as an . . . attorney’s fee 

for [James’] attorney, no later than March 10, 2017.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall 

inform the court by the close of business March 10, 

2017, whether the sentencing hearing is necessary so that 

the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office can allocate their 

resources.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any requested relief 

not specifically granted is denied.

Lori filed a timely motion to alter or amend, arguing the 

order was “not supported by the law or the evidence adduced 

at trial.” She did not object to the procedure ordered by the 

court or the imposition of a purge plan without a sanction. 
- 384 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

The court overruled the motion to alter or amend, and Lori 

timely appealed.

First Appea

On appeal, Lori argued the district court erred by finding 

her in contempt, by imposing a purge plan, and by awarding 

attorney fees to James. James cross-appealed, assigning the 

district court erred in not letting him reopen the evidence in 

the dissolution trial.

In a memorandum opinion issued April 3, 2018,1 the 

Nebraska Court of Appeals determined Lori had not appealed 

from a final order and it dismissed the appeal. The opinion 

noted that an order of contempt in a postjudgment proceeding 

to enforce a previous final judgment is a final order,2 but that 

“the law in Nebraska has long been that the finding of contempt alone, without an order of sanction is not appealable.”3

Because the district court’s January 13, 2017, order did not 

impose a sanction, the Court of Appeals concluded Lori had 

not appealed from a final, appealable order. The opinion also 

sympathized with Lori’s predicament:

In reaching this result, we are cognizant of the difficult position in which Lori is placed. When the district 

court chooses to in essence impose a purge plan without a 

sanction, [Lori’s] choice is to either (1) follow the directions of the court to avoid sentencing, even though she 

believes the district court erred in its finding of contempt; 

or (2) choose not to abide by the court’s directives and 

risk a heavier sanction once sentence is imposed. Once 

1 Bramble v. Bramble, No. A-17-264, 2018 WL 1614352 (Neb. App. Apr. 3, 

2018) (selected for posting to court website).

2 See id., citing Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 

782 N.W.2d 848 (2010), disapproved on other grounds, Hossaini v. 

Vaelizadeh, 283 Neb. 369, 808 N.W.2d 867 (2012).

3 Id. at *3.
- 385 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

the sanction is imposed, she could then seek a stay of its 

imposition pending appeal. [Citation omitted.] While we 

cannot say it was error for the district court to give Lori 

an opportunity to comply with its order prior to imposing 

a sanction with a formalized purge plan, the court’s order 

does place Lori in a difficult situation. In any event, her 

efforts to appeal immediately are premature and we have 

no alternative other than to dismiss her appeal for lack 

of jurisdiction.4

Regarding James’ cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals found the 

record on appeal was insufficient to support the assignment 

of error and affirmed the district court’s order. The Court of 

Appeals’ mandate issued May 9, 2018.

Proceedings on 

On May 18, 2018, the district court ordered Lori to appear 

on June 11 “for sentencing on a previous finding of . . . contempt.” At the June 11 hearing, James’ attorney asked the court 

to reopen the record for the purpose of including additional 

attorney fees as part of the purge plan.

In an order entered June 11, 2018, the district court reiterated its prior finding of contempt and sentenced Lori to 10 

days in jail, ordering her to self-surrender no later than 8 a.m. 

on Friday, June 15. The order provided that Lori could purge 

herself of contempt by paying to the clerk of the Douglas 

County District Court the sum of $5,073 no later than close 

of business on June 14. The order further provided that if Lori 

failed to pay the purge amount and failed to self-surrender, a 

warrant would be issued for her arrest. Finally, the order overruled James’ request to reopen the record to submit additional 

evidence of attorney fees.

Two days later, on June 13, 2018, Lori filed what she captioned as a “Notice of Compliance With Purge Order; and 

4 Id. at *4.
- 386 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

Application for Order.” In this filing, Lori stated that at the 

time of her first appeal, she deposited a $5,000 supersedeas 

bond with the clerk of the district court and she represented 

that sum was still on deposit with the clerk. Lori also alleged 

that on June 12, she paid an additional $73 into the clerk of 

the district court. Lori asked that the funds deposited with the 

clerk, totaling $5,073, be used to purge her contempt.

The next day, on June 14, 2018, the district court entered 

a stipulated order for distribution directing the clerk of the 

district court to “release to [James] the sum of $5,073” and 

to “record this transaction in complete satisfaction” of the 

purge order.

Second Ap

On July 10, 2018, Lori filed a notice of appeal, purporting 

to appeal from the contempt orders of January 13, 2017, and 

June 11, 2018. After Lori filed her opening brief, James moved 

to summarily dismiss the appeal, arguing it was rendered moot 

when Lori satisfied the conditions of the contempt order and 

purged the finding of contempt. Lori opposed summary dismissal, arguing alternatively that (1) the appeal still presents 

legally cognizable interests or (2) the public interest exception 

to the mootness doctrine should apply.

The Court of Appeals overruled the motion for summary 

dismissal and directed the parties to address the mootness issue 

in the remaining briefing. After briefing was complete, we 

moved the case to our docket.5

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Lori assigns, slightly restated, that the district court erred 

in (1) finding her in contempt, (2) making insufficient factual 

findings to support a finding of willful contempt, (3) finding 

her in contempt of provisions in the amended decree that were 

5 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
- 387 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

vague, (4) awarding attorney fees to James, and (5) not awarding attorney fees to Lori.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Justiciability issues that do not involve a factual dispute 

present a question of law.6

ANALYSIS

Before we address James’ argument that this appeal of 

a civil contempt order is moot, we discuss the nature of 

civil contempt proceedings generally. We have explained that 

“[c]ivil contempt proceedings are ‘“instituted to preserve and 

enforce the rights of private parties to the suit and to compel 

obedience to orders and decrees made to enforce the rights 

and to administer the remedies to which the court has found 

them to be entitled . . . .”’”7 Civil contempt proceedings are 

often described as “remedial and coercive in their nature.”8 As 

such, courts in civil contempt proceedings have broad remedial 

power, including the power to order “compensatory relief that 

is limited to a complainant’s actual losses sustained because 

of a contemnor’s willful contempt”9 and the power to order 

equitable relief.10

Historically, Nebraska did not permit appeals to be taken 

from civil contempt orders imposing only civil, coercive sanctions.11 But in the 2010 case of Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. 

6 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659, 825 N.W.2d 149 (2012).

7 Smeal Fire Apparatus Co., supra note 2, 279 Neb. at 672, 782 N.W.2d at 

860 (emphasis omitted).

8 Id. (emphasis omitted).

9 Id. at 676, 782 N.W.2d at 862.

10 Smeal Fire Apparatus Co., supra note 2.

11 See, e.g., Dunning v. Tallman, 244 Neb. 1, 504 N.W.2d 85 (1993), 

overruled, Smeal Fire Apparatus Co., supra note 2; State ex rel. Kandt 

v. North Platte Baptist Church, 225 Neb. 657, 407 N.W.2d 747 (1987), 

overruled, Smeal Fire Apparatus Co., supra note 2.
- 388 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

Kreikemeier,

12 we held that “a party may appeal from a final 

order of contempt, regardless whether the court’s sanction is 

labeled criminal or civil.”

With this framework in mind, we address James’ argument 

that this appeal is moot because Lori has purged herself of the 

civil contempt finding she now seeks to challenge.

Appeal Is M

[2,3] Although mootness does not prevent appellate jurisdiction, it is a justiciability doctrine that can prevent courts from 

exercising jurisdiction.13 A justiciable issue requires a present, 

substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal 

interests susceptible to immediate resolution and capable of 

present judicial enforcement.14

[4-6] Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing of a 

suit which eradicate the requisite personal interest in the resolution of the dispute that existed at the beginning of the litigation.15 A moot case is one which seeks to determine a question 

that no longer rests upon existing facts or rights—i.e., a case in 

which the issues presented are no longer alive.16 As a general 

rule, a moot case is subject to summary dismissal.17

James argues that because Lori voluntary and fully complied with the purge order, she has purged herself of contempt 

and this appeal is moot. We considered a similar argument 

in McFarland v. State.18 In that case, a county court judge 

12 Smeal Fire Apparatus Co., supra note 2, 279 Neb. at 707-08, 782 N.W.2d 

at 882.

13 Blakely, supra note 6.

14 Professional Firefighters Assn. v. City of Omaha, 282 Neb. 200, 803 

N.W.2d 17 (2011).

15 Blakely, supra note 6.

16 Id.

17 Putnam v. Fortenberry, 256 Neb. 266, 589 N.W.2d 838 (1999).

18 McFarland v. State, 165 Neb. 487, 86 N.W.2d 182 (1957).
- 389 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

(respondent) refused to sign an order fixing a time, date, and 

place for a probate hearing, believing such an order already 

had been issued. A mandamus action was filed against the 

respondent in district court, and a peremptory writ of mandamus issued. When the respondent did not comply with 

the peremptory writ, an alias peremptory writ of mandamus 

issued, commanding the respondent to comply with the previous writ by signing the order setting a time, date, and place 

for the probate hearing. When the respondent again refused, 

he was found in contempt and ordered committed to jail until 

he purged himself of contempt by signing the order. The 

respondent then complied with the purge provision and filed 

a notice of such compliance with the district court. The district court thereafter noted the respondent’s compliance with 

the alias writ of mandamus and suspended execution of the 

jail sentence. The respondent appealed to challenge the prior 

commitment order, and a question was raised about whether 

the appeal was moot. We found it was, and dismissed the 

appeal, reasoning:

[I]t is self evident that no issue remains to be decided 

here. Nothing could be gained by our holding that the 

commitment was improper for respondent is no longer 

in jail. He has not been found guilty of criminal contempt, in which case he would be entitled to have his 

conviction reviewed. Here the purpose of the order to 

jail was to coerce respondent to comply with the mandamus order of the court. Whether or not [the mandamus] 

order is correct can properly be determined in an appeal 

taken therefrom.19

[7] Although McFarland was decided before Smeal Fire 

Apparatus Co. recognized the right to appeal a civil contempt 

order, the mootness analysis in McFarland is consistent with 

19 Id. at 493-94, 86 N.W.2d at 186.
- 390 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

that of other courts to have considered the issue.20 We agree 

with those state21 and federal22 courts which hold that an 

appeal challenging a finding of civil contempt is rendered 

moot once the contemnor voluntarily purges the contempt. 

Such appeals do not present a justiciable issue because, given 

the coercive nature of civil contempt proceedings, once a 

finding of contempt has been fully purged and obedience with 

the order has been accomplished, there is no remaining controversy between the parties and no effective relief that can 

be afforded on appeal.

20 See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 448 § 26 (1970 & Supp. 2019) (and cases cited 

therein).

21 See, e.g., Belt v. Cabinet for Families, 520 S.W.3d 406 (Ky. App. 2017) 

(appeal of contempt proceedings arising out of failure to pay child 

support rendered moot when contemnor paid full purge amount); Union 

Hill Homes Ass’n v. RET Development, 83 S.W.3d 87 (Mo. App. 2002) 

(appeal of contempt order rendered moot when contemnor fully complied 

with purge order and thus purged itself of contempt); Central Emergency 

Med. v. State, 332 Ark. 592, 966 S.W.2d 257 (1998) (appeal of contempt 

order moot where contemnor purged itself of contempt by paying fine 

imposed); Yeager v. Yeager, 622 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. App. 1981) (husband’s 

appeal of contempt order in dissolution action rendered moot when he paid 

amounts due and purged himself of contempt); Herring v. Herring, 236 

Ga. 43, 222 S.E.2d 331 (1976) (civil contempt appeal rendered moot when 

contemnor paid entire purge amount); Clement v. Clement, 295 Minn. 569, 

204 N.W.2d 819 (1973); Reap’s Appeal, 88 Pa. Super. 147 (1926) (civil 

contemnor has choice to either appeal finding of contempt or purge it by 

voluntarily paying fine and thus ending matter).

22 See, e.g., Marshall v. Whittaker Corp., Berwick Forge, etc., 610 F.2d 1141 

(3d Cir. 1979) (appeal from civil contempt is moot once civil contempt has 

been purged); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan, 535 F.2d 679 

(2d Cir. 1976) (appeal from order of contempt is moot where contemnor 

purges himself of contempt and no live controversy remains); Matter of 

Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1975) (where contemnor has complied 

and contempt has been purged, appeal of contempt order is moot); United 

States v. Watson Chapel School District No. 24, 446 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 

1971) (when parties comply and have purged themselves of contempt, 

there is no justiciable controversy and appeal must be dismissed).
- 391 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

An example is the case of Clement v. Clement.23 In that case, 

the father was found to be in contempt of court for failing to 

make court-ordered child support payments. He was ordered 

committed to jail for 45 days unless he purged himself by 

making an arrears payment of $1,450. A stay of enforcement 

was ordered for a period of 30 days to permit the father to 

appeal, but he neither appealed nor paid the purge amount. He 

was later apprehended, and, the same day, he purged himself 

of contempt by making the required payment. He then sought 

appellate review of the order finding him in contempt. The 

Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, reasoning “[t]here is nothing before this court to pass on. [The 

father] paid monies as he was ordered to do to purge himself 

of the contempt.”24

[8] Like the contemnor in Clement, Lori was presented with 

a choice once she was found to be in willful contempt of court 

and a sanction and purge plan was put in place: She could 

either seek a stay of the sanction pending an appeal or comply 

with the purge plan and thereby purge herself of contempt and 

end the matter.25 She chose the latter, and fully purged herself of contempt by paying into the clerk of the district court 

the sum of $5,073, which has since been disbursed to James. 

The purpose of the civil contempt proceeding—to preserve 

and enforce the rights of the parties and to compel obedience 

to the decree26—has been accomplished. On these facts, we 

23 Clement, supra note 21.

24 Id. at 569, 204 N.W.2d at 819.

25 See, e.g., In re Crystal Palace Gambling Hall, Inc., 817 F.2d 1361, 

1365 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[i]f the appellants believed that the district court 

incorrectly issued an order, their remedy was to appeal and request a stay 

pending the appeal”); In re Marriage of Crow & Gilmore, 103 S.W.3d 778 

(Mo. 2003) (in response to civil contempt order, contemnors have two 

options: They may purge contempt by complying with order rendering 

case moot or may appeal contempt order).

26 See Smeal Fire Apparatus Co., supra note 2.
- 392 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

find Lori’s appeal seeking to overturn the finding of contempt 

presents no justiciable issue and is moot.

No Legally Cognizab

Interest Rem

Lori does not dispute that she voluntarily and completely 

complied with the purge order, but she nevertheless urges us 

to find that she still has a legally cognizable interest in overturning the finding of contempt. Specifically, she argues that 

because she was “deemed a contemnor”27 that could have implications if she is involved in future contempt proceedings.

Because Lori has fully purged herself of contempt, she is 

seeking, in essence, an advisory appellate opinion on whether 

the contempt order was correct, to use in a future contempt 

action that may never occur. Our mootness analysis might be 

different in an appeal where the purge provision has not yet 

been fully satisfied, but that is not the case here. On these 

facts, Lori has no legally cognizable interest in this appeal and 

it is moot.28

Public Interest Ex

Inapplica

[9] Lori argues that even if her appeal is moot, we should 

nevertheless review it under the public interest exception to the 

mootness doctrine. An appellate court may choose to review 

an otherwise moot case under the public interest exception if 

it involves a matter affecting the public interest or when other 

rights or liabilities may be affected by its determination.29 This 

is not such a case.

[10] The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine 

requires consideration of the public or private nature of the 

27 Reply brief for appellant at 3.

28 See Professional Firefighters Assn., supra note 14.

29 Nesbitt v. Frakes, 300 Neb. 1, 911 N.W.2d 598 (2018).
- 393 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

303 Nebraska Report

BRAMBLE v. BRAMBLE

Cite as 303 Neb. 380

question presented, the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for future guidance of public officials, and the likelihood 

of future recurrence of the same or a similar problem.30 Lori’s 

appeal challenges the trial court’s interpretation of specific 

terms in her dissolution decree, and findings regarding the 

parties’ particular actions. The questions presented are private, 

not public, in nature, and the likelihood of the same or similar 

issues recurring in another case is remote.31

[11] Moreover, application of the public interest exception is inappropriate where, as here, the issues presented 

on appeal do not inherently evade appellate review.32 As 

explained above, Lori had an opportunity to challenge the 

district court’s finding of contempt by seeking a stay pending 

appeal, but instead, she chose to purge herself of contempt and 

comply with the order. The public interest exception has no 

application on these facts.

CONCLUSION

This appeal is moot, because Lori has fully and voluntarily 

purged herself of the civil contempt finding she seeks to overturn. No legally cognizable interest continues to exist, and the 

public interest exception to the mootness doctrine does not 

apply. We therefore dismiss this appeal because it presents no 

justiciable issues.

Appeal dismissed

30 Id.

31 See Putnam, supra note 17 (public interest exception does not apply when 

appeal presents issues that rest on terms of particular sale and particular 

deeds and bequests, because highly unlikely another case could present 

similar factual situation).

32 See id.