COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Beales , Russell and Malveaux Argued at Charlotte sville, Virginia

STACEY A. WHARAM, F/K/A STACEY AUSTIN MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No . 2044-16-2 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES DECEMBER 5, 2017 RICHARD E. AUSTIN

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY Cheryl V. Higgins, Judge Tonya N. Gibbs (TNG Legal, PLC, on briefs), for appellant. Lawrence D. Diehl (Ann Brakke C ampfield; Barnes & Diehl, P.C. , on brief), for appellee.
Stacey Wharam (formerly “Stacey Austin”) (“wife”) appeals the circuit court’s November 18, 2016 order awarding Richard Austin (“husband”) child suppor t in the amount of $1,289 per month and finding wife in contempt for failure to comply with a previous order of the circuit court. The court ordere d wife to pay husband $647,83 2.81 in restitutio n, in accordance with a monthly payment plan, to purge herself o f the contempt order. Wife ass igns ten assignments of error to the circuit court’s order and requests appellate attorney’s fees. Husband also asks fo r attorney’s fees related to this appeal.
I. B ACKGROUND We review the evidence in the light most favorable to husband, as we must as he is the party prevailing below, and for the sam e reason, grant him all “reaso nable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” Anderson v. Anderso n, 29 Va. App. 6 73, 678, 514 S. E.2d 369, 372 (1999).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - So viewed, the evidence in the record establishes that, prior to their marriage on April 25, 1997, husband and wife executed a pre nuptial agreement. During the marriage, husband was employed by REA Development, w hich, through its holding compani es, operated two Arby’s Roast Beef franchises. Wife w as employed as the bookkeeper for husband’s business. During the marriage, husband and wife had three children. The parties separated on June 22, 2013. Thereafter, the parties engaged in contentious proceedings reg arding property distribution, child custody, and c hild support. After the divo rce proceedings began, and while wife was in sole possession of the former marital residence, wi fe removed numerous items of tangible personal property from the home. She sold many of the se items at auction through Pete Elliot’s Auction Services on April 5, 2014 and April 12, 2014. On June 26, 2014, after wife’s actions were discovered, the tria l court ordered wife to returnthose items within 45 days. For any items wife sold, the courtordered wife to provide a receip t indicating the item and the sale price. On August 12, 2014, husband made a motion for a rule to show c ause. In support of his motion, he stated that wife ha d not facilitated the return of t his personal property or provided any receipts. On August 18, 2014, the trial court found wife in ci vil contempt for failure to comply with the June 26, 2014 order. The o rder again provided that wi fe could purge her contempt by returning the items not sold by September 1, 2014 and by provid ing receipts for the items sold. The October 2014 Trial and t he December 2014 Order On October 27 and 28, 2014, a trial w as held on the divorce, d istribution of property, child custody, and child support . Following the hearing, in a December 3, 2014 order, the court granted the parties a divorce. On December 31, 2014, the court i ssued a second ruling on matte rs addressed at the October 2014 trial (the “Decembe r 2014 order”). This order gra nted wife primary physical- 3 - custody of the children. However , as wife had relocated to Nor thern Virginia, the court required the children to remain in the ca re of their maternal grandmothe r during school days to permit them to continue attending school in Albemarle County. With respect to distribution of pr operty, the court awarded the martial home to husband as his separate property, given the terms of the prenuptial agr eement. The court also made several findings regarding fraudulent actions taken by wife. N amely, the court found wife had: (1) forged a Deed of Gift purpor ting to transfer the marital ho me from husband to the parties as tenants by the entireties; (2) forged a power of attorney and u sed it to secure a mortgage on the marital home for $63,543.50 and to obtain a Deed of Trust on he r separate property for $902,224.28 with husband’s businesses as guarantors and the parties as co-borrowers; (3) forged powers of attorney to purchase a nd title a property in the part ies’ joint names without husband’s authorization; and (4) fraudulentl y obtained a line of credit w ithout husband’s knowledge or approval, in the amount of $649,874.90 with husband’s businesse s’ property as collateral and husband’s businesses as guarantor s. The court ordered that wif e was responsible for the debts secured by these forgeries. 1 The December 2014 order also addressed the tangible personal pr operty that is a central issue in this appeal. The cour t ordered wife to return husband ’s gold bullion, silver and gold coins, guns and ammunition, and all personal property removed b y wife and auctioned by Pete Elliot’s Auction Services. The c ourt ruled that each of these items, as well as all items in the marital home, were husband’s se parate property. With respect t o the tangible property wife already sold or could not return, the court’s order stated that “a determination of said property’s

1 The order also recognized that wife had failed to pay husband $22,382.81, representing one-half of the mortgage payments on the marital home, pursuant to the circuit court’s August 22, 2013 ruling. The December 2014 order required wife to pay husband this amount.- 4 - value is hereby reserved and sha ll be addressed upon a future m otion of either party.” The court also awarded husband $6,000 in attorney’s fees. The June 2016 Hearing On June 16, 2016, the parties again a ppeared before the court to address husband’s motion for child support 2 and to address husband’s renewed m otion to show cause concerni ng wife’s failure to comply w ith the December 2014 order. 3 At the start of the hearing, counsel for wife informed the court that she was not retained to represente d wife on husband’s show cause motion – just child custody, visi tation, and support. However, as the hearing proceeded, counsel for wife participated in the h earing on the show cause matters. Also, at the beginning of the hearing, the trial court and couns el discussed the possibility that the court’s ruling on the show cause may be affected by wife’s bankruptcy proceedings. After this discussion, the court stated that it may hear the evidence , but not enter a final order unti l the parties had an opportunity to submit briefs on the bankruptcy issue. During the hearing, when aske d about his employment, husband t estified that he was forced to sell his Arby’s franchises because, as a result of wi fe’s fraudulent actions, he was unable to reinvest in them. He testified, “[T]he banks are pur suing me for the notes that she took out, and I have no credit whatsoev er – my credit rating is dest royed. She left me with $110,000

2 The parties continue d to litigate over ch ild custody following the October 2014 trial. On February 20, 2015, upon being notif ied that wife had removed the children to Northern Virginia and was homeschooling t hem, in violation of the Decemb er 2014 order, the court awarded husband primary physical c ustody. The parties subseque ntly agreed to a consent custody and visitation order, whi ch the court entered on June 1 6, 2016. This order also granted husband primary physical custody.

3 Prior to this hearing, on January 28, 2015, husband again file d a show cause motion for wife’s failure to comply with t he December 2014 order. During the hearing on the motion, on June 22, 2015, the court found that th ere was evidence to find wife in contempt of the December 2014 order, but the court reserved t he matter for further heari ng to be commenced after wife’s bankruptcy proceedings had concluded.- 5 - on the American Express card. She l eft other cards maxed out. She cleaned out all of my bank accounts, personal and otherwise.” Husband further testified t hat the bank “fire-sold the properties that Ms. Austin ha d in her name for 30 cents on the dollar. And they’re coming after my money.” He claimed that he cont inues to be in litigation wi th the bank on the remaining amount due. Husband testified that he was not actively seeking employment. He testified that he received $15,000-$16,000 per year in int erest income from his c hecking account where he kept approximately $500,000, which he obtai ned from the sale of his businesses. He also testified that he would continue receiving similar interest income on that account as long as his account balance did not drop below $500,000. As part of husband’s show cause petition to the circuit court, husband testified that wife violated the December 2014 orde r by failing to pay him the $22, 832.81 for mortgage payments, failing to return the gold bullion and silver coins, and failin g to return his firearms. Husband also testified that wife never returned the other pieces of per sonal property addressed by the December 2014 order. Over wife’s objection, the court admitted husband’s exhibit, a personal inventory (husband’s “Personal I nventory List”), which listed h is valuations for pieces of personal property that he claimed wife removed. 4 In admitting the exhibit, the court noted that it had previously admitted the exhibit at the October 2014 trial. The court also admitted an exhibit that was identified as an ident ical list, except that a paintin g that wife claimed was a forgery was removed from the list. 5 Husband testified that the values he attributed to each of th e items were

4 Included in the list were tw o South Sea Tahitian pearl necklac es, which husband conceded on appeal should not have been included in the award.

5 It is undisputed that wife ret urned this painting to husband’s counsel prior to the hearing. Also omitted from the second list was one other item– “150 silver rounds” listed as worth $2,887.50. Otherwise, the two lists appear to be identic al.- 6 - the best estimates that he coul d give at the time he prepared t he list. Husband als o testified to having seen a few pieces of his personal property for sale in a ntique stores, and he provided the court with the listing price gi ven by the antique stores for th ese items. During wife’s testimony, wife info rmed the court that she was employed and making $75,000 a year. She testified that she disagreed with values p laced on the tangible personal property, claiming that they wer e “highly exaggerated”; however , she did not provide any contrary evidence of the property’s value other than Pete Ellio t’s Auction List. On cross-examination, wif e testified that she had remarried and th at her husband was employed and grossed approximately $190,000 per year. The trial court issued a ruli ng from the bench awarding husban d child support and finding wife in contempt of the December 2014 order. With respect to t he child support, the court declined to impute income f or husband. It awarded him $1,289 p er month of child support, the amount prescribed by the guideline s. The court ordered the chi ld support to be retroactive to April 2016, and for the months of April, May, June, and July 20 16, the court reduced the award to $1,129 per month. As a result of t he child support award be ing made retroactive, the court ordered wife to pay $3,387 in arrear ages. As for the personal property, the court ordered wife to pay husband $619,000 in restitution t o purge herself of the con tempt order. In setting this amount, the court stated, “So wh ile the amount that Mr. Austin has submitted to the Court is high, I can’t find it’s unreasona ble, in looking at all of the other circumstances.” The November 2016 Hearing On November 1, 2016, wife filed a “Motion to Suspend Execution of the June 16, 2016 Hearing Final Order” although a t the time, no final written ord er had been entered. She also filed a motion to reconsider the ruling from June 16, 2016. OnNovember 18, 2016, the trial court held a hearing for entry of a final order from the June 1 6, 2016 hearing. The parties used- 7 - the hearing to seek clarificati on from the court on the June 16 , 2016 ruling from the bench and to finalize a proposed order. After the hearing, the trial court entered the final or der awarding child support and finding wife in contem pt, consistent with the rulin g from the bench. The written order also provides that wife must pay husband an additional $2 2,832.81 for unpaid mortgage reimbursement payments and $6,000 for attorney’s fees from the October 2014 trial. This brought the total judgment against wife to $647,832.81. The wr itten order also clarified the payment plan for wife to purge he rself of the contempt. Under the plan, wife was to pay a total of $2,589 to husband each month for restitution, child support, and arrearages until wife satisfies her restitution obligations. Wi fe objected to the final order, citing to the reasons included in her November 1, 2016 motion. This appeal followed.
II. A NALYSIS A. Tangible Personal Property Wife lists three assignment of error regarding the award to hu sband for the tangible personal property. We address ea ch of these assignments of err or in turn. 1. Sufficient Evidence to Determine Value First, wife assigns error to t he trial court’ s award of $619,00 0 because the “Court lacked sufficient evidence that would allow the Court to reasonably as sess the value of the tangible personal property to support the monetary award.” Wife argues the court’s valuation was mere guesswork because the court relied significantly on husband’s P ersonal Inventory List, which wife claims “fails to provide su fficiently clear identificationof items.” She specifically takes issue with the inventory’s desc ription of two items of property as “Yes,” for which husband attributed the values of $27,500 and $6,500. Wife also argues that the reliability of husband’s Personal Inventory List is disc redited by the fact that, in his original list, he had valued a painting at $750,000, when the painting was o nly appraised for a few hun dred dollars.- 8 - This Court reviews wife’s first assignment of error for abuse o f discretion. Estate of Hackler v. Hackler, 44 Va. App. 51, 64, 602 S.E.2d 426, 432-33 (2004); Hamad v. Hamad, 61 Va. App. 593, 606, 739 S.E.2d 232, 239 (2013). Moreover, “the value of property is an issue of fact, not of law,” Howe ll v. Howell, 31 Va. App. 332, 340, 523 S.E.2d 514, 518 (2000), and this Court “will not overturn [a] f actual finding unless plainly wro ng or without evidence to support it.” Bchara v. Bchar a, 38 Va. App. 302, 313, 563 S.E.2d 398, 4 03 (2002) (alteration added). Wife repeatedly failed to compl y with the orders of the trial c ourt directing her to return husband’s property, which ultimate ly led to the contempt order. “Reviewing courts cannot cont inue to reverse and remand . . . [equitable distribution] cases where the parties have had an adequate opportunity to introduce evidence but ha ve failed to d o so. Parties should not be allowed t o benefit on review for the ir failure to introduce evidence at trial . . . . At some point we must ‘ring the curtain down.’” Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 617-18, 359 S.E.2d 546, 550 ( 1987) (citing In re Marriage of Smith, 448 N.E.2d 545, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)). Although the court’s order was for contempt, not equitable distribution, we fi nd the same principle applies. Wife had the opportunity at the June 16, 2016 hearing to introduce ev idence of the property’s v alue. 6 The only evidence of value that she introduced was a list of the items she auctioned and their auction sale price. The trial court, acting within its discre tion, rejected wife’s argument t hat those amounts represented the value of the property. 7 Wife did not present other evi dence on the value of the prope rty, nor did

6 We deduce from the record tha t wife also had the opportunity t o present evidence of the property’s value at the October 2014 trial where the trial cour t addressed matters involving distribution of property. Husba nd presented the court with his Personal Inventory List at that time, and we assume wife was provided with a similar opportunit y to present evidence. However, wife did not provide thi s Court with a t ranscript of t hat proceeding.

7 The circuit court did not disreg ard the auction list entirely. Instead, the co urt relied on it in concluding that the property w ife sold was more valuable tha n an auction price indicated. In its ruling from the bench at the June 16, 2016 hearing, the cou rt noted, “The Court in looking- 9 - wife even cross-examine husband regarding the items listed as “ Yes.” Because wife had an opportunity to present evidence on these items’ value and the o nly evidence she presented was largely rejected by the trial court , the evidence before the tr ial court was sufficient to find, based on all the relevant evidence, i ncluding husband’s Personal Inve ntory List, that wife had sold or otherwise disposed of propert y worth at least $619,000. Theref ore, we do not find that the court’s finding of fact in valuing the property wife removed at $619,000 was plainly wrong. 8 Although we find no error with the trial court’s reliance on h usband’s Personal Inventory List for setting the amount of t he judgment against wife, we re mand the judgment to the trial court in order for the trial c ourt to find the va lue of the two South Sea Tahitian pearl necklaces based on the existing record. 9 Husband valued these neck laces together at $24,000 on his personal inventory. However, husband conceded on brief and in oral argument that the necklaces should not have been included on the list because the y were gifts from husband’s father to his granddaughters (i .e., husband’s daughters). Ther efore, the award should be reduced by the value of the pearl neckla ces, as they did not belong to husband, and we instruct the trial court to enter a new judgment w ith the value of the pearls dedu cted. 2. Methodology to Assess Value In wife’s second assignment of erro r, wife contends that the tr ial court erred because it “failed to utilize aproven methodology to a ssess the value of the tangible personal property.” Wife argues that husband’s valuations are based on the assumpti on that the items were in pristine

back through the file found that wh en the items were auctioned off, simply auctioned, it was over $87,000 that was acquired, and that’s a great deal of money for items that are auctioned . . . .”

8 Of course, valuing these items was quite difficult given that the items were gone because of wife’s actions.

9 As wife’s counsel agreed during or al argument, the only evidenc e on the record is that the pearls are worth $24,000.- 10 - condition and that, for the ite ms for which husband offered spe cific testimony, husband repeatedly testified to the highe st listed price. Wife further argued that the tr ial court should have valued the property based on t he sale prices of the proper ty at auction. On this assignment of error, we affirm the trial court. It is generally recognized that the opinion testimony of the owner of property . . . is compete nt and admissible on the ques tion of the value of such property, reg ardless of his knowledge of property values. It is not necessary to show that he was acqua inted with the market value of such pr operty or that he is an expert on values. Haynes v. Glenn, 197 Va. 746, 750, 91 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1956). Husband was the owner of the property, and, as such, his tes timony was competent and admissi ble on the property’s value. Furthermore, as discussed supra , the court was acting within its discretion whe n it rejected t he argument that the auction prices r epresented the items’ values. 3. Husband’s Separate Property In her third assignment of error , wife argues that “the Court e rred because it improperly included in the judgement [sic] e ntered against [wife] amounts for property not previously found to be [husband’s] separate property in the equitable distributi on pursuant to the December 31, 2014, Order and the pre-nuptial agreem ent.” Wife claims that there are items on husband’s Personal Inventory List that a re not included on Pete Elliot’s Auction List nor specifically included in the December 2014 order. Wife also claims that a number of items of jewelry were gifts to her, and thus, pursuant t o the prenuptial agreement, a re not husband’s separate property. On wife’s third assignment of erro r, we affirm the trial court. As discussed with respect to wife’s first and second assignm ents of error, the trial court was permitted to accept husband’s testimony that the items on husband’ s Personal Inventory List w ere his separate property and that the value of the items exceeded $619,000. Although wife’s brie f states that husband’s Personal Inventory List includes jewelry w hich belongs to wife, there is no support for that claim in the- 11 - record. Furthermore, it appears that the time for wife to have argued that the jewelry belonged to her would have been at the Oct ober 2014 trial where the court a ddressed the distribution of property. Wife did not provide t his Court with a copy of the t ranscript from that proceeding to allow us to determine if wife presented evidence on the jewelryat that time, and we therefore consider this argument waived. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 464, 469, 706 S.E.2d 889, 893 (2011) (“[T]he failure to fil e an indispensable transc ript result[s] in waiver of the issue associated with the transcr ipt.” (alteration added)). B. Time to Retain Counsel In her fourth assignment of error, wife argues that the trial c ourt erred because it “failed to give [wife] a fair and reasonabl e opportunity to retain Counsel for the Show Caus e Hearing on June 16, 2016, and adequate time to develop and present evidence on the valuation of the tangible personal property incident to the divorce.” In support of this assignment of erro r, wife argues: (1) husband withheld dis covery from her; (2) the discovery he d id provide was not provided until a week before trial, including husb and’s Personal Inventory List that wife did not receive until June 9, 2016; (3) wife did not retain cou nsel for the show cause matter because she relied on her bankruptcy counsel’s representation that it would be improper for the cour t to proceed while bankruptcy proceedings were occurring regarding wife’s estate; and (4) the trial judge proceeded to rule on the show cause matter af ter initially stating tha t she would reserv e judgment on the ma tter. However, wife failed to preserve this issue for appeal. In this assignment of error, wife asks us to equate her counsel ’s statement to the trial court that she was not retained as counsel in the show cause matter a s a request for a continuance, which this Court would review for an a buse of discretion. Rosenberge r v. Commonwealt h, 159 Va. 953, 957, 166 S.E. 464 , 465-66 (1932). Howev er, although wife’s cou nsel informed the judge that she was not retained for the show cau se issue, neither she nor wife requested a continuance or objected- 12 - to proceeding with the hearing. Instead, wife’s counsel procee ded with representing wife on the show cause matters. Furthermore , the trial court’s initial sta tement reg arding waiting to make a final ruling on the show cause does not support wife’s argument . The court clearly represented that it only intended to wait to rul e until it received short briefs from counsel regardin g the effect of the bankruptcy. The trial court never implied that it would reserv e making a ruling to allow the parties to present more evidence on the m erits of the show cause. Beca use wife never requested a continuance, we find that she did not preserve this assignment of error, Rule 5A:18, and we affirm the ruling of th e trial court. C. Introduction of the Inventory Exhibit In wife’s fifth assignment of erro r, wife argues the trial cour t erred when it “allowed into evidence, utilized, and relie d on in rendering its decision, [h usband’s] Personal Inventory, which [husband] failed to timely provide in discovery.” Wife claims that her attorney, who was not representing her in the show cau se matter, requested all exhibi ts for the June 16, 2016 trial in discovery, but she did not recei ve the list until seven days pr ior to trial. 10 As a result, the only time she claims that she was able to prepare to defend against husband’s valuations was during the lunch recess. “[A] trial court’s decision to a dmit evidence that is not timel y disclosed . . . will not be reversed unless the court’s acti on amounts to an abuse of discr etion.” Rappold v. Ind. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 246 Va. 10, 15, 431 S.E.2d 302, 305 ( 1993) (citing First Charter v. Middle Atlantic, 218 Va. 304, 308-09, 237 S.E.2d 145, 147-48 (1 977)). We find no abuse of discretion in the admission (a nd reliance) on husband’s Persona l Inventory List. Even if the exhibit was produced late in di scovery, an exhibit substantiall y similar to husband’s Personal

10 Wife’s counsel states that a lthough she received the list seve n days before trial on page 96 of a 99 page document, she did not actually see it before th e day of the hearing.- 13 - Inventory List was admitted at the October 2014 trial, and ther e were apparently just two items actually omitted on the list admitte d at the later hearing. Thus, wife had approximately a year and a half to prepare to counter t he values contained in this e xhibit. We affirm the trial court on its admission of the exhibit. D. Restitution Payments In her sixth assignment of error , wife claims the trial court e rred by requiring her “to pay excessive and continuing rest itution payments on the judgement [sic].” Specifically, wife claims that the monthly amount she was required to pay was excessive. She argues that the amount exceeds the amount she would be required to pay under Virginia garnishment laws. Pursuant to Code § 34-29(a)(1), a debtor ma y not have more than 25% of his or her disposable wages garnished per paycheck. She als o argues that requiring her to continue to pay restitution after she has fulfilled her child support obligations will prevent he r from being a “self-sufficient and an economically contributing member to society.” We find wife’s argument unconvincing. The monthly payment amou nt set by the court was not a garnishment; it was a pa yment plan to allow her to pu rge herself of contempt. The law governing garnishments does not a pply to this case. See Frazie r v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 84, 87, 348 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1986) (“Code § 34-29 applies to ga rnishments and nothing more, and is not applicable to this cau se.”). Therefore, we affirm t he decision of the trial court. E. Ability to Pay Wife’s seventh assignment of erro r concerns wife’s ability to pay the judgment. She argues that the court improperly considered the income of wife’ s new husband, Mr. Daniel Wharam, when considering her ability to pay restitution. We af firm the trial court because it expressly recognized that this d ebt was not the responsibility of Mr. Wharam, and it did not establish the payment plan with t he intent that Mr. Wharam be r equired to pay any amount of it.- 14 - The court expressly stated tha t Mr. Wharam “is not indebted, bu t I think there is a reasonable question about do they share expe nses, what are her expenses, a nd what is the amount that she really can pay, taking all these f actors into account.” The co urt was considering Mr. Wharam’s income for the sole purpose of de termining his contribution to the Wharam household expenses, in order to then determine what w ife’s expenses actually are. Wife has provided no legal authority supporting her position that the trial court was proh ibited from considering his income for simply this purpose, and we do not believe that the trial c ourt erred. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. F. Child Support Wife assigns two errors to the t rial court’s child support awar d to husband. In wife’s eighth assignment of error, wife claims that the court “erred b ecause it utilized speculation and conjecture to adjust [husband’ s] bank account balance for futur e months for child support.” Wife claims the court was specu lating when it stated, “I cannot see that [husband’s] spending as it is occurring now will continue over the long term, and that’ s why the Court made the deviation that it is.” Wife claims that the court “based this speculatio n on the fact that [husband’s] checking account required that he keep a $500,000.00 balance to maintain the account.” She argues the court “based the sta ndard of deviation entirely on [ husband’s] speculated future spending habits and therefore a decrease in available resources , instead of the current circumstances as required under the law” when it only deviated downward for four months of child support. 11 With respect to husband’s bank account, wife argues the court “ relied on [husband’s] fraudulent misrepresentations g iven under oath v ia his testimon y.” She claims his testimony

11 Presumably, wife is arguing tha t she is entitled to a deviatio n in child support payments until husband’s $500,000 account is depleted. However, wife do es not expressly state this in her brief.- 15 - about needing to maintain a $500,000 minimum balance was false because according to “BB&T’s posted Personal Services Pricing Guide, effective April 10, 2016, the minimum balance requirement for a BB&T Private Vantage Checking account , the type of account [husband] maintains, i s $15,000.00, not the $500,000.00, [husba nd] testified under oath to.” We find no error with the trial c ourt’s calculation of child su pport. “The determination of child suppor t is a matter of discretion f or the trial court, ‘and such awards will not be reversed on appeal un less plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.’ Although the amount of child support called for by the guidelines set forth in Code § 20-108.2 is presumptively correct, this presumption may be rebutted . . . .” Riggins v. O’Brien, 34 Va. App. 82, 93, 538 S.E.2d 320, 325 (20 00) (quoting Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 30 Va. App. 283, 295, 516 S.E.2d 698, 703 (1999)). Wife has not provided this Cour t with any authority supporting her claim that the trial court was required to continue t o deviate from the guidelines b ased on the amount in husband’s checking account. The child supportaward was presumptively co rrect as it was based on the child support guidelines, and wife has provided no support for her conclusion that the trial court’s not deviating for a longe r period was an abuse of discr etion. Furthermore, it is clear from husband’s testimony and his excha nges with the court, that the $500,000 balance was necessary in order for husband to cont inue receiving a higher rate of interest that would produ ce $15,000 to $16,000 per year in inte rest income, which was his primary income after he was esse ntially forced to sell his busi ness. The court found that husband was required to keep $500,000 in his account based on the evide nce that husband needed this money to continue providing f or himself and his children. 12 Thus, the trial court did not err in setting child support at the am ount prescribed by the child sup port guidelines.

12 At one point in the proceedings, the court asked husband the f ollowing question: “If for the sake of the Court’s hypothetical, the remaining money i n the BB&T bank account is- 16 - Wife’s ninth assignment of error states that the trial court “e rred by failing to give greater weight to [husband’s] financial resources, work history, previo us income, extravagant spending, and voluntary unemployment for child support imputation purpose s and to provide a greater deviation downward and for a l onger period.” The crux of this assignment of error is wife’s claim that the court erred i n failing to impute income on husba nd because of his “voluntary unemployment.” “The party seeking imputati on has the burden of proving that th eir spouse was voluntarily forgoing employment . . . .” deCa mp v. deCamp, 64 Va. App. 137, 150, 765 S.E.2d 863, 870 (2014) (citing McKee v. M cKee, 52 Va. App. 482, 490, 664 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2008) ( en banc )). “The decision to impute income i s within the sound discretion o f the trial court and its refusal to impute income will not be revers ed unless plainly wrong or unsu pported by the evidence.” McKee, 52 Va. App. at 489, 664 S.E.2d at 509 (quoting Blackburnv. Michael, 30 Va. App. 95, 102, 515 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1999)). On this argument, we affirm the decision of the trial court bec ause wife failed to meet her burden of proving that husband was voluntarily unemployed, and failed to produce evidence showing how much income should be imputed, even if husband were voluntarily unemployed. The record establishes that the trial court concluded that husb and was not voluntarily unemployed. When overruling wif e’s objection to husband’s expl anation for selling his businesses, the court stated, “ The Court is going to overrule t he objection, because if he sold them just because he doesn’t want to work anymore and the busin esses were too much of a headache, the Court’s going to impute income.” Husband then pr oceeded to testify that he was unemployed because wife’s fraudul ent actions forced him to sell his business. Based on the

spent, then literally the only m onies or investment or equity o r source of funds that you have is what is in the E*TRADE. Am I correct?” Husband answered affir matively.- 17 - record before us, the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impute income to husband. G. Distribution of Property In wife’s final assignment of e rror, she argues that one of the powers of attorney that wife used to fraudulently secure vari ous debts and lines of credit w as not a forgery and that husband admits to this in his complaint . Wife argues that her alleged fraud weighed heavily in the trial court’s equitable distributi on decision and the decision regard ing the tangible personal property. She claims that, because the tangible personal property was not valued until the November 18, 2016 order, there was no final orde r on the equitable distribut ion until that time. Further, wife claims that, because “the entire case has been laced with [husb and’s] misrepresentations,” the property distribution awa rd should be reversed. The December 2014 order expressly states that the tangible pers onal property was husband’s separate property. The only issue remaining for the court to decide about the personal property from that December 2014 or der was the valuing of husba nd’s separate property, which the court addressed in the show cause proceeding. Wife did not appeal from the order that contained the findings of fact r egarding wife’s forgeries. The refore, this assignment of error is not properly before us as wife did not preserve it below, and w e do not address it on the merits. H. Appellate Attorney’s Fees Both parties request attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. Pursuant to Rule 5A:30(b), this Court may award attorney’s fees to a party who makes the r equest and the Court “shall consider all the equities of the case.” Having considered the equities, we decline to award appellate attorney’s fees t o either party in this case.- 18 - III. C ONCLUSION In summary, although we find that the circuit court did not er r in ordering wife to pay husband $647,832.81 for failing to comply with the court’s Dece mber 2014 order, we reverse and remand to the trial court solely f or a finding of fact of the v alue of the South Sea Tahitian pearl necklaces that grandfather gave granddaughters, based on the cu rrent record before it. The circuit court should then re duce the $647,832.81 award wife mus t pay to husband by the value of these pearl necklaces. Husba nd conceded – both in his brief an d at oral argument – that these pearl necklaces should not have been included on husband’s Pers onal Inventory List. However, we affirm the circuit court on wife’s assignments of e rror two through ten. The circuit court did not err in admitting husband’s Personal Inven tory List, or in relying on husband’s exhibits and testimony a s to the value of the propert y. Wife did not request a continuance at trial, and, theref ore, did not preserve that ass ignment of error f or appeal, despite her claims now on appeal. The c ourt did not err in ordering wi fe to make the payments to husband that it ordered on a con tinuing monthly basis. The cou rt also did not err in awarding husband child support at the level determined by the child supp ort guidelines. Wife’s final assignment of error regarding t he circuit court’s finding that the power of attorney was forged was not preserved below as wife did not appeal that order in a timely manner. Finally, we decline to grant either party’s request for appellate attorney’ s fees. Affirmed in part and reve rsed and remanded in part.