UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHEDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) EARL C. DAVIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil CaseNo. 79-02561 (RJL) ) UNITED STATESDEPARTMENTOF ) LABOR, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ) 

### .h.- MEMORANDUM OPINION November 

### "lo,2012 [## 185; 200; 201] I. INTRODUCTION Before the Court for a second time are plaintiffs Appeal of Magistrate Judge Order Docket No. 180 to the Federal District Judge ("Appeal") [185], defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Appeal ("Opp'n") [186], and plaintiffs Reply to Defendants' Opposition ("Reply") [187]. Plaintiffappeals theMagistrateJudge's order [182] denying plaintiffs Motion for Clarity [180]. Plaintiffargues that the Magistrate Judge exceeded herauthorityunderthe Longshore andHarborWorkers' CompensationAct("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. § 92l(d) (2006), by refusing to give proper weight to the findings of the LHWCA administrative complaint process. !d. §§ 92l(a)-(c); see Appeal at 2. Plaintiff also requests thatthis Court issue an injunction ordering compliance with its prior order in this case. !d. at4-5, 17.In 2011, the ChiefJudge ofthis Court issued an order [189] denying the Appeal. However, that order was vacated after the ChiefJudge granted a motion to disqualify himself from this case [198]. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a Motion for "Further Proceedings" as Required by United States CourtofAppeals for the District ofColumbia [200] and a Motion to Enforce Administrative Decision and Order Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §921(d) [201]. Having carefully considered the appeal, opposition, reply, subsequent motions, and thevoluminous record in this case, the CourtAFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge's order and DENIES plaintiffsrequest for injunction. Forthe samereasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs motions for further proceedings and for enforcement of the administrative decision and order. Additionally, since there is no longer an active controversy within this Court'sjurisdiction,this casewillbeterminated from the Court'sactive docket. II. BACKGROUND A. Summary ofthe 

### Case In 1982, plaintiff Earl C. Davis was adjudicated under the LHWCA as permanently disabled by an on-the-job injury that occurred in 1965, while he was in the employ ofdefendant George Hyman Construction Company ("Hyman"). See Director's Response to Magistrate Robinson's July 1, 2005 Order ("Director's Response") [117] at 1-2. In 1982, this court entered judgment in the form of an order ("1982 Order") establishing the procedures by which the Mr. Davis was to submit reimbursements to defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual") (defendant Hyman's insurance carrier), and the time and format by which Liberty Mutual was to respond.

2Director's Response Ex. A (copy ofthe 1982 Order). In 2000, in response to Mr. Davis' ongoing difficulties in obtaining reimbursements from LibertyMutual, this Courtgranted Mr. Davis' motiontorevivethejudgment. Sept. 1, 2000 Order [23]. In 2001, Mr. Davis' motion to hold Liberty Mutual in contempt of the 1982 Order was referred to the Magistrate Judge. Feb. 28, 2001 Order [46]. The Magistrate Judge modified the 1982 Order to clarify the reporting requirements and to provide that Liberty Mutual would be subject to a monetary penalty for delays in compliance with the 1982 Order. Mar. 15, 2001 Order("Modified Order") [50]. Since 2002 the parties have had an ongoing dispute involving four requests for reimbursement filed by Mr. Davis. See Appeal at 8; Reply at 10. These claims were pursued viathe administrative process ofthe LHWCA, including a determination by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), an appeal to the Benefits Review Board ("BRB"), and an appeal to the D.C. Circuit, resulting in a final decision that partially granted, partially denied, and partially dismissed Mr. Davis' claims. See Director's Response at 3-4; see generally Reply Attach. 18-49.OF1 While the administrative process was ongoing, Mr. Davis pursued an action in this Court to enforce the 1982 Order under § 921(d) of the LHWCA, to require Liberty Mutual to respond to Mr. Davis' reimbursement requests in the form specified by the Modified Order, and to enforce the monetary penalty specified in the Modified Order for lack oftimely response by Liberty Mutual. In November 2003, the Magistrate Judge ordered Liberty Mutual to submit a Attachmentstothe Reply are not separately labeledornumbered; pagenumbers are as reported in theECF documentheader (ALJ decision 18-34;BRB decision 35-44; D.C. Circuitorder45-49). 3detailed response addressing each of the four disputed reimbursement requests ("DocumentProduction Order"), which is the basis ofMr. Davis' argumentto this Court. Appeal at 10. B. Procedural History The record is replete with hearings before the Magistrate Judge, orders for consultations and status reports, and orders in response to a series of motions in an attempt to resolve this ongoing enforcement dispute over an administrative action that received its final status almost sevenyears ago.2 The following is a short summary ofthe relevanthistory ofthis case. In May 2005, Mr. Davis moved to compel compliance with the Modified Order and to impose the penalty specified in that order. See generally Pl.'s Mot. to Compel Compliance [111]; Pl.'s Mot. to Impose Penalty [103]. In November 2005, the Department of Labor provided a status update in response to the Magistrate Judge's order. See generallyDirector'sResponse. InMay 2006, the MagistrateJudge orderedthe parties to meet and submit a detailed report on all outstanding issues, and dismissed Mr. Davis' two motions withoutprejudice. See generallyMay 5, 2006 Order [119]. At a January 2007 status hearing, the Magistrate Judge fined Liberty Mutual $5,500 for late payment ofone ofthe disputed claims and again ordered the parties to confer and produce a status report on the remaining claims. See Jan. 10, 2007 Minute Order; Pl.'s Mot. Leave to File Resp. [141] at 23-24 (quoting portions oftranscript of

2 TheD.C. Circuitissued its opinion affirmingthereview oftheALJ's decision in March 2005. Davis v. Director, Office ofWorkers' Compensation Programs, 124F. App'x 1(D.C. Cir. 2005).

4Jan. 10, 2007 hearing). This Court upheld the fine imposed by the Magistrate Judge. Oct. 12, 2008 Order [168]. In 2008 the Magistrate Judge denied Mr. Davis' outstanding motions for enforcement ofthe Modified Order. See generally Sept. 22, 2008 Mem. Order [165]. Also in 2008, defendant Department ofLabor was dismissed from the case. Sept. 23, 2008 Minute Order. Mr. Davis' Motion for Reconsideration and subsequent Motion for Enforcement were denied in 2009 and 2010, respectively. See generally Sept. 21, 2009 Order [171]; Mar. 31, 2010 Mem. Order [179]. Mr. Davis' Motion for Clarity was denied in 2011. See generally Mar. 23, 2011 Order [182]. The Appeal ofthis most recent orderis nowbeforethis Court. On February 24, 2012, Chief Judge Royce Lamberth denied this Appeal. See Febr. 24, 2012 Order [189]; Feb. 24, 2012 Mem. Op. [190]. However, this denial was vacated after the ChiefJudge granted a motion to disqualify himselffrom the case. See Oct. 1, 2012 Mem. Op. and Order [198]. Thereafter, Mr. Davis filed a Motion for Further Proceedings [200] and a Motion to Enforce the Administrative Decision and Order [201], asking this Court to take action and to enforce the August 1982 Order as modified onMarch 15, 2001 [50]. IV. ANALYSIS The Court finds that the decision of the Magistrate Judge was not "clearly

erroneous or contrary to law." L. Civ. R. 72.2(c). Therefore the Appeal will be denied. Additionally, since the matter ofthe four disputed requests for reimbursement has been

now been settled, and there are no other reimbursement disputes active between the

5parties, this Court has no furtherjurisdiction under the LHWCA, and this case will be terminated from the Court'sactive docket. A. The Deferential Standard ofReview ofLocal Civil Rule 72.2(c) Applies to ThisMotion This case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for full case management. Feb. 26, 2008 Order [159]. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2(a), the Magistrate Judge determines all motions and matters that arise in the case, except for those matters specified in Local Civil Rule 72.3, for which the Magistrate Judge will report proposed findings offact and a recommendation for disposition. See id. at 1n.1. The motion before the Magistrate Judge was not one enumerated in Local Civil Rule 72.3; thereforethe standard ofreviewin this matteris addressed in Local Civil Rule 72.2. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2(c), the order ofthe Magistrate Judge may only be set aside ormodified ifit is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law."2F3 See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (specifYing the standard ofreview for objections to magistrate judge orders on nondispositive motions). As such, the court will affirm the finding of a magistratejudge "unless 'on the entire evidence' the court 'is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."' Neuder v. Battelle Pac. Nw. Nat. Lab., 194 F.R.D. 289, 292 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting UnitedStates v. US. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.364,365(1948D.

3Plaintiffincorrectly citesto Local CivilRule 72.3. Appeal at 1. ReviewunderLocal CivilRule 72.3 wouldrequire amore searchinganalysis underthede novo standard. See Local Civil Rule 72.3(c). Becausethe motion at issue is not one coveredbyLocal Civil Rule 72.3, themore deferential standard ofLocal Civil Rule 72.2(c) is applicable.

6B. The PlaintiffHas Not Met The Burden ofShowing that the Magistrate Judge's OrderWas ClearlyErroneous or ContraryTo Law This Court'sjurisdiction over this dispute is limited under the LHWCA. As the D.C. Circuit noted in reviewing the administrative disposition of Mr. Davis' claims, "[t]he district court hasjurisdiction only to process and enforce" any award arising from the administrative process under LHWCA. 

### Davis, 124 F. App'x at 2; 

### see also Marshall

v. Barnes & 

### Tucker Co., 432 F. Supp. 935, 938 (W.D. Pa. 1977) ("[A] district courtunder § 921(d) can only enforce an order; it may not affirm, modify, suspend or set aside an order."). Mr. Davis asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred by refusing to give proper weight to the findings ofthe ALJ, as affirmed by the BRB and the D.C. Circuit. Appeal at 2. Yet a review ofthe record shows that the Magistrate Judge correctly refused to address any substantive questions regarding the award or denial ofclaims. 

### See, e.g., Sept. 22, 2008 Mem. Order [165] at 5 ("this court cannot review a decision to deny a claim, order additional payments to a provider or sanction Liberty Mutual, other than in accordancewith"the ModifiedOrder). Mr. Davis' complaint seeks strict enforcement ofthe letter ofthe 1982 Order, the Modified Order, and the DocumentProduction Order. Appeal at 1 0; id. at 17. This has led him to claim entitlementto fines ofapproximately $30 million.3F4 

### See Appeal at 12 (emphasizing the $500 fine); id. at 10 (highlighting the Document Production Order); Motion for Clarity at 12 (calculatingthe fine for failure to comply at over $27 million as

4 The Courtnotesthattherequestfor nearly $30 million infines on an initial dispute overclaims totaling approximately $50,000-muchofwhichwas adjudicatednot payableviatheLHWCAadministrativeprocess-bordersonthe frivolous.

7ofSept. 2009). But Mr. Davis misapprehends the language ofthe 1982 Order and the DocumentProduction Order. First, the 1982 Order applies 

### onlyto reimbursements to Mr. Davis personally, and does not address any other payments for medical services (such as the disputed direct payments to Mr. Davis' doctor and treating hospital). The stated purpose, in the preamble ofthe 1982 Order, is "to secure payment ofmedical expenses, transportation expenses, reimbursement ofprescription costs, and orthopedic footwear." 1982 Order at 1. However, the Orderclearlyaddresses only "expenses for which [Mr. Davis] is seeking reimbursement." 

### ld. at 1-2. Under the LHWCA, this is all the Order can address. 33 U.S.C. § 902(12) (2006) ('"Compensation' means the money allowance

### payable to an employee or to his dependents" (emphasis added)). The Modified Order addresses only the form ofthe required response to a reimbursement request; it does not change the scope ofthe 1982 Order. 

### See generallyModified Order. Therefore the MagistrateJudge correctly refused to address questions ofpayments to Mr. Davis' doctor and treating hospital. Sept. 28, 2008 Orderat4-5. Second, the Document Production Order left to Liberty Mutual's discretion the form that the reply must take. Appeal at 10 ("preferably in the form ofa spreadsheet 

### or in any other manner thatyou believe would aid the Court in making its determination" (quoting the Magistrate Judge at the Nov. 13, 2003 hearing) (emphasis added)). The basis ofMr. Davis' complaintis thatLibertyMutual has notcompliedwiththis document production order. Yet the record is replete with document production from Liberty Mutual, which was extensively reviewed by the Magistrate Judge. Whether the form of

8response was properly responsive to the Document Production Order is a matter left to the Court's discretion. CfS.E.C. v. Solow, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that in considering a petition for a civil contempt citation for failure to comply with a court order, the moving party must show lack of compliance by clear and convincing evidence, and that the court may take a good faith effort to comply into account in declining to issue the citation), 

### ajf'd, 396 F. App'x 635 (11th Cir. 2010). The Magistrate Judge held that Liberty Mutual had complied with the Document Production Order sufficiently for her to determine compliance with the Modified Order. See Mar. 31, 2010 Mem. Order [179] at 2-3 (enumerating the record ofdocuments produced and reviewed in reachingthe decision). Finally, the MagistrateJudge appliedthe fine structure from the Modified Orderto the extentthatLiberty Mutual was clearly not in compliance withthe order. TheJanuary 2007 order requiring Liberty Mutual to pay $5,500 to Mr. Davis was based on clear documentary evidence thatpayment on one reimbursement request was 11 days late, and the order was affirmed by this Court in 2008. See Jan. 10, 2007 Minute Order; Oct. 12, 2008 Order [168]. That the Magistrate Judge was satisfied that the otherreimbursement requests either were in compliance with the Modified Order or were not covered by the 1982 Orderis clearfrom therecord. This Court sympathizes with Mr. Davis' concerns over his long history of difficulties in dealing with Liberty Mutual, which gave rise to the 1982 Order and the Modified Order. The Department ofLabor, in its Motion to Withdraw, noted that it assisted in obtaining the Modified Order because "Liberty Mutual chronically failed to

9respond to Davis's requests to pay medical expenses that he believed were mandated by the compensation order." Director'sMot. to Withdraw [157] at 3. Still, aplaintiffcannot continually attemptto relitigate the same claims, after ajudgmenton the merits has been entered. As the Magistrate Judge noted, "motions for reconsideration may not be used to relitigate old matters." Mar. 23, 2011 Order [182] (quoting 

### Solomon v. Univ. of 

### S. Cal, 255 F.R.D. 303, 305 (D.D.C. 2009)) (internal edits omitted). The 1982 Order and the Modified Order were provided to ensure responsiveness from Liberty Mutual, not as a basis for ongoing litigation concerning matters that have long since been fully adjudicated. C. Resolution of the Matter of the Four Disputed Reimbursement Requests and the Lack ofAny Subsequent Dispute Ends This Court's Jurisdiction OverThis Matter Underthe LHWCA, the District Courthasjurisdictiononly to enforce compliance with a final compensation order arising from the LHWCA's administrative process. 33 U.S.C. § 921(d) (2006); 

### see also Davis, 124 F. App'x at 2 ("[t]he district court has jurisdiction only to process and enforce"the award). TheMagistrateJudge's orders have donejustthat, with respect to the four disputed reimbursementrequests. This Court can do nothing further on this matter. The 1982 Orderand the Modified Orderexistto ensure Liberty Mutual's complete and timely response to Mr. Davis' ongoing requests for reimbursement. They do not exist to provide Mr. Davis a potential windfall from disputes overthe form ofdocumentproduction. In 1982, an Administrative Law Judge adjudicated Mr. Davis as permanently and totally disabled under the LHWCA, entitling Mr. Davis to continued medical care

10provided by the defendants. See Director's Response at 1-2. Therefore, Mr. Davis is entitledto employ this Court's enforcementjurisdictionunder§ 921(d)wheneverLiberty Mutual fails to adequately respond to an outstanding request. At this time, however, there are no outstanding requests. In 2005, the Department ofLabor stated that there

were no pending administrative actions, nor requests for the Department to resolve any disputes or issues. Director's Response at 8. Additionally, Liberty Mutual has adduced evidence that Mr. Davis has not requested any new reimbursements, nor responded to Liberty Mutual's inquiries, in over five years. See Defs.' Mem. ofLaw in Support of Opp'n [186-1] at 3-4; Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. Enforcement Ex. 1 [172-2]. As the matter of the four disputed reimbursement requests is now settled, and no additional disputes have beenpresented, there are no longer any matters before the Court within its jurisdictionunder §921(d). 

### V. CONCLUSION Under Local Civil Rule 72.2, this Court reviews the decision ofthe Magistrate Judge to determine whether it is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." L. Civ. R. 72.2(c). The Magistrate Judge followed thejurisdictional restrictions of § 921(d) ofthe LHWCA, as well as the scope ofthe 1982 Order and Modified Order, and the decision rendered on that basis is not contrary to law. Nor is the Magistrate Judge's decision to limit Mr. Davis' recovery under the Modified Order to the $5,500 fine imposed in January 2007 clearly erroneous. This Court cannot say that "a mistake has been committed." Neuder, 194 F.R.D. at 292. In the absence of any disputes between the parties, there is no further action for this Courtto takeunder §921(d).

11Forthe foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff's appeal and request for an injunction [185], plaintiff's motion for further proceedings [200], and plaintiff's motion to enforce [201]. The Court further ORDERS that this case be terminated from the Court'sactive docket. A separate Orderconsistentwith thisMemorandum Opinion shall issuethis date. 

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# ~~**RICH~** United StatesDistrictJudge

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