Filed 1/4/23 B.M. v. D.V. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

B.M.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

D080908

(Super. Ct. No. FLHE2003482)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, 

Johnnetta E. Anderson, Judge. Affirmed. 

Law Office of Randy K. Bell and Randy K. Bell for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

D.V. appeals a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) imposed by 

the court as requested by B.M., the father of D.V.’s child, G.M.1 D.V.

contends the trial court abused its discretion by granting a DVRO based on 

1 Pursuant to rule 8.90 of the California Rules of Court, we refer to the 

parties and their child by first and last initials only. 
2

conduct that could not constitute abuse for purposes of granting a restraining 

order under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA). (Fam. Code,2

§ 6200 et seq.) D.V. also contends that even if the alleged conduct could

constitute abuse, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

findings.3 

We conclude that the conduct, as alleged, could constitute domestic 

violence under the DVPA. Further, we conclude the trial court had a 

sufficient evidentiary basis to issue a permanent DVRO. Because the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the order.

I. PROCEDURAL AND BACKGROUND FACTS

As the appellant, D.V. has the burden of providing an adequate record, 

showing that error occurred, and that the error was prejudicial. (Aguilar v. 

Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132.) Absent an 

adequate record to demonstrate error, a reviewing court presumes the 

judgment or order is supported by the evidence. (In re Angel L. (2008) 159 

Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136–1137.) Since D.V., as appellant, has not presented a 

complete version of the relevant facts, we set forth below a more detailed

explanation of the events leading to these proceedings. 

2 All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise 

specified. 

3 Although B.M. did not file a brief in this appeal, D.V. still bears the 

“affirmative burden to show error whether or not the respondent’s brief has 

been filed,” and we “examine the record and reverse only if prejudicial error is 

found.” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 110, fn. 1

(F.M. & M.M.).) 
3

A. Relationship Between D.V. and B.M.

D.V. and B.M., who both have extensive histories of abusing narcotics, 

met in a drug rehabilitation program. They dated for about five years and

eventually moved in together. During this time, they used drugs together 

every day. 

In 2016, the parties had a child, G.M. D.V. and B.M. continued to use 

drugs both during the pregnancy and after G.M. was born. G.M. was born 

addicted to drugs, so Child Protective Services (CPS) initiated a dependency 

case to remove him from D.V.’s custody. B.M. maintained full custody of 

G.M. during the dependency case. Once the dependency case ended in 2017, 

the court granted joint physical and legal custody to both parents. B.M. and 

D.V. resumed living together in an apartment as co-parents of G.M. for 

almost a year before being evicted. After that, D.V. moved in with her father, 

and B.M. moved in with his mother. Despite living apart, B.M. said they 

continued with an on-and-off relationship as a couple. 

In December 2018, D.V. requested and obtained a DVRO against B.M. 

She requested the DVRO because of an incident where B.M. accused her of 

sleeping with someone else, grabbed her hair and hit her, and then 

threatened to “kill” her and “dump [her] body” off a freeway. Despite the 

claimed abuse, she chose to not go through with a permanent DVRO in 2018

saying she was “loyal” to B.M. and wanted their family to work. B.M. said

the court dismissed the 2018 DVRO.4 

On June 8, 2020, D.V. filed another request for DVRO accusing B.M. of 

a variety of abusive conduct toward D.V. and their son. Among other things, 

4 The record on appeal does not include D.V.’s DVRO against B.M. from 

2018. 
4

she claimed that B.M. showed up at her home unannounced and loudly 

cursed at her from the front door; disclosed or threatened to disclose personal 

and embarrassing information about her to friends and family; spread false 

rumors about her being a prostitute; threatened to shoot her with a gun; 

physically hit both D.V. and G.M.; repeatedly texted her with what the court 

found to be “very vulgar” accusations about her promiscuity; sent her 

ominous messages about how he is “mentally unstable” and wants to “harm” 

himself, D.V., and G.M. whenever they were are around him; and frequently 

stole her phone to search through it or destroy evidence of his abuse. The 

court issued a temporary DVRO against B.M.

At a hearing on the merits in August 2020, B.M. generally denied ever 

being physically abusive or having contacted D.V. after the temporary 

restraining order issued in June 2020. B.M. also claimed that he decided to 

get sober and entered a drug rehabilitation program after D.V. filed the 

DVRO in June 2020. Ultimately, the court found there was insufficient 

evidence to grant a permanent restraining order. The court was skeptical of

D.V.’s claims of abuse, noting that B.M. is in her life “consensually,” and that 

she “voluntarily” got together with him on a weekly basis. The court also 

found that both parents were placing G.M. at risk by using drugs and 

arguing in front of him. Since the main issues raised concerned “drugs” and 

“custody,” the court ordered CPS to conduct an immediate welfare check and 

investigation of D.V. and B.M. For the time being, the court maintained the 

prior temporary orders, which gave full custody of G.M. to D.V. The court 

commented that B.M. was “not really in a position to have custody” at the 

time because he was undergoing inpatient rehabilitation. 

The CPS investigation “found no evidence to suggest that the child, 

[G.M.], is at risk of abuse or neglect in the care of the mother, [D.V.].” 
5

Accordingly, CPS determined that G.M. “can be safely maintained in the 

care” of D.V. and that there appeared to be “no nexus” between D.V.’s prior 

substance abuse relapse and the care of G.M. The investigation was 

“inconclusive” as to B.M., however, because CPS was unsuccessful in its 

efforts to contact him. Therefore, CPS determined that G.M. could not be 

safely maintained in B.M.’s care at this time. 

B. B.M.’s First DVRO Request Against D.V.

Approximately six months later, in April 2021, B.M. requested a DVRO 

against D.V. B.M. stated in a supporting declaration that D.V.’s brother 

called a CPS hotline regarding her continued drug use and tendency to leave 

G.M. “unsupervised” with dangerous objects and equipment. B.M. further 

claimed that D.V. “absconded” from both a CPS social worker investigating 

the situation and from B.M. during a recent custody exchange. Lastly, B.M.

alleged that D.V. violated the current custody arrangements “on numerous 

occasions” over the prior several months by not allowing him to visit G.M. 

during the specified time. The court issued a temporary DVRO against D.V.

that awarded sole legal and physical custody of G.M. to B.M. and denied D.V.

visitation rights.

However, the court subsequently dismissed B.M.’s DVRO at a hearing

on May 21, 2021. Although the court was concerned about D.V.’s continued 

drug use, the court did not “see this as a domestic violence matter” based on 

the allegations. The court granted D.V. visitation rights for “no less than five 

hours a week” based on her representation that she was now staying in an

all-women’s “mommy and me” rehabilitation program that allows mothers to 

keep their children on site. The court otherwise maintained the custody 

orders in favor of B.M. until another judge could decide a more permanent 

custody order at a later hearing.
6

C. B.M.’s Second DVRO Request Against D.V.

A few months later, on August 3, 2021, B.M. requested another DVRO 

against D.V. B.M.’s supporting declaration restated many of the drug-related 

allegations from his initial DVRO request. But B.M. also alleged a new

incident in which D.V. abducted G.M. and threatened to keep G.M. away 

from B.M. permanently. B.M. asserted that he was in “fear for [his] son’s 

life,” since D.V. “is a habitual drug user” who had “previously absconded with 

our son when CPS was investigating her earlier this year.” Based on these 

allegations, the court issued the temporary DVRO against D.V. 

During the permanent restraining order hearing, B.M. testified that he 

enrolled G.M. in preschool after obtaining full custody in May 2021, and later 

he enrolled G.M. in kindergarten in August 2021. B.M. provided the daycare

with the existing custody and visitation orders and explained that D.V. was 

not allowed to pick up G.M. At about 5:00 p.m. on August 2, 2021, however, 

D.V. arrived at the school as B.M.’s mother was picking up G.M. D.V.

grabbed G.M. from B.M.’s mother’s car, “threatened” B.M.’s mother with 

“paperwork” by claiming that G.M. belonged to her notwithstanding any 

court orders, and drove off with G.M. B.M.’s mother and employees at the 

kindergarten called the police to report the incident. Later that evening, 

D.V.’s mother contacted B.M. and advised him to contact D.V. “to work this 

visitation [sic] if [he wanted] to ever see [G.M.] again.” 

B.M. spoke with the police to inform them of the existing custody order 

and advised them that D.V. likely took G.M. to her rehabilitation center. The 

police and CPS went to D.V.’s rehabilitation center on August 2 and 3, 2021. 

The center confirmed that D.V. was there but refused to disclose whether 

G.M. was there without a search warrant. Eventually, D.V. called the police 

to confirm she had G.M. with her at the rehabilitation center. The police 
7

then relayed this information to B.M. late at night on August 4, 2021.5 They 

said he could pick G.M. up either that night or the next morning. B.M. then 

went with the police the next morning to pick up his son from the 

rehabilitation center. 

At the hearing, the court asked counsel whether the allegation that 

D.V. “abducted the minor child in violation of a court order” could “rise to the 

level of domestic violence.” B.M.’s counsel argued it does because by 

knowingly violating the custody order and keeping the child in a drug 

rehabilitation center for three days without cooperating with the police, D.V.

took the child “out of his routine” and “put the child at risk.” D.V.’s counsel 

responded that this was simply a child custody dispute, because there were 

no allegations that D.V. had “any interest or anything that she wants to do 

with [B.M.] except for having her child back.” 

Initially, the court agreed with D.V.’s counsel that “this is a custody 

issue.” Nevertheless, the court determined that D.V. disturbed B.M.’s peace 

in violation of the DVPA. The court found that “from August 2nd until 

August 5th,” B.M. “had to not be at peace in terms of what was going on with 

this minor child,” as shown by “the efforts he had to take to try and retain 

physical custody of the minor child.” The court characterized the ordeal as 

“unsettling.” Accordingly, the court granted the DVRO against D.V., 

awarded full legal and physical custody of G.M. to B.M., and maintained the 

five hours of supervised visitation per week to D.V. This appeal followed. 

5 B.M.’s testimony was inconsistent as to whether G.M. was at the 

rehabilitation facility for three days or four days. As any ambiguity in the 

record is resolved in favor of the appealed judgment (Winograd v. American 

Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631), we will assume the trial 

court found G.M. was at the facility for the longer duration of four days. 
8

II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse,” a court may issue 

a protective order “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual 

abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic 

violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of 

the causes of the violence.” (§§ 6220; 6300, subd. (a).) The statute should “be 

broadly construed in order to accomplish [its] purpose” of preventing acts of 

domestic abuse. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 

1498 (Nadkarni).) 

The DVPA defines “abuse” as “intentionally or recklessly” causing or 

attempting to cause bodily injury, sexual assault, placing a person in 

reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or 

to another, or engaging in any behavior that could be enjoined pursuant to 

section 6320. (§ 6203, subd. (a).) “Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction 

of physical injury or assault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) Rather, it includes a broad 

range of harmful behaviors enumerated under section 6320, including 

“disturbing the peace of the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (a).) 

Section 6320, in turn, defines “disturbing the peace of the other party” 

as conduct that, “based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the 

mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (c); Nadkarni, 

supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) This conduct “may be committed directly 

or indirectly, including through the use of a third party, and by any method 

or through any means.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) Disturbing the peace “includes, 

but is not limited to, coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in 

purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and 

personal liberty.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) 
9

We review the trial court’s grant or denial of a DVRO request for an 

abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 

220, 226.) Abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court exceeds the bounds of 

reason, fails to apply correct legal standards and thereby acts outside the 

confines of the applicable principles of law, or acts without substantial 

support in the evidence. (Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 

420–421.) 

“ ‘To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial court’s 

factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of review.’ ” (In re 

Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) “We draw all reasonable 

inferences in support of the court’s ruling and defer to the court’s express or 

implied findings when supported by substantial evidence.” (J.M. v. G.H.

(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 925, 935.) “All conflicts in the evidence are drawn in 

favor of the judgment,” and “[w]hen supported by substantial evidence, we 

must defer to the trial court’s findings,” including its finding on the 

credibility of witnesses. (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 364–

365.) 

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Alleged Conduct Could Constitute Abuse

D.V. contends the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the DVRO 

on September 14, 2021, because her conduct, as alleged, could not constitute 

domestic violence under the DVPA. Specifically, she argues that the violation 

of a child custody order, without more, cannot constitute abuse. As we 
10

explain below, we disagree with D.V.’s interpretation of the trial court’s 

ruling, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion as to what 

conduct could constitute domestic violence under the DVPA.6 

D.V. primarily seizes on the court’s comment at the hearing that “this 

is a custody issue, and it should have been dealt with by [a request for order] 

as part of a restraining order.” Noting the lack of allegations regarding 

physical violence toward B.M. or harm to G.M., she argues that the

allegations were limited to her taking G.M. for three days in violation of 

existing custody orders. To D.V.’s point, the court indicated that the 

allegations in B.M.’s prior DVRO request—which included D.V.’s drug use, 

her leaving G.M. unattended, and her previously “absconding” with G.M. 

during a custody exchange—were all “collateral issues” that were not 

“material or relevant” to its current determination. 

Even if B.M.’s allegations were limited to D.V.’s August 2, 2021, 

custody order violation, however, the alleged conduct arguably could 

constitute a disturbance of B.M.’s peace. As one of our sister courts observed 

in dicta, “if the evidence establishes that [a parent] has cut off access to [a 

child] in violation of the court’s order granting [the other parent] sole legal 

and physical custody, that may constitute abuse” by disturbing the peace of 

the other parent. (F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 120, fn. 5.) The 

6 Mother largely relies on the depublished case In re Marriage of L.R. & 

K.A. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1130 (depublished Nov. 10, 2021, S271047), in 

violation of rule 8.1115(a) of the California Rules of Court. (See Hoffman v. 

162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1193, fn.16.) We will not 

rely upon this unpublished authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a).) 
11

allegation that D.V. knowingly violated the custody order makes the conduct 

even worse. “A knowing violation of a [court order] cannot be characterized 

‘as “a de minimis and technical violation.” ’ ” (See N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 

Cal.App.5th 595, 603 (internal quotation omitted).)

In any case, the court’s ruling was not limited to the violation of the 

custody order. The court focused on the alleged abduction of G.M. and the 

emotional ramifications of D.V.’s keeping G.M. away from B.M. Specifically, 

the court highlighted “the efforts [B.M.] had to take to try and retain physical 

custody of the minor child.” The court also emphasized that B.M. “had to not 

be at peace in terms of what was going on with this minor child,” particularly

since B.M. believed that D.V. was keeping G.M. at a drug rehabilitation 

center. Further, although the court did not discuss it, we presume the court 

also considered B.M.’s allegation that D.V. and her mother threatened to 

keep G.M. permanently unless B.M. complied with D.V.’s demands. (See

Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“A judgment or order of 

the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are 

indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error 

must be affirmatively shown.”] (emphasis in original).)

Altogether, these allegations fall within the ambit of the DVPA’s 

definition of “disturbing the peace.” Although the “DVPA was not enacted to 

address all disputes between former couples” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 

Cal.App.5th 1, 13), “[d]epriving a parent of access to his or her child certainly 

may qualify as abuse under this definition. (F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 

Cal.App.5th at p. 120, fn. 5.) Moreover, section 6320 lists nonexhaustive 

examples of “coercive control” that as a pattern of behavior can constitute 

“ ‘disturbing the peace of the other party.’ ” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) These 

examples include “[i]solating the other party from friends, relatives, or other 
12

sources of support” and “[c]ompelling the other party by force, threat of force, 

or intimidation . . . to abstain from conduct in which the other party has a 

right to engage.” (§ 6320, subd. (c)(1), (4).) Although the court did not treat

the “absconding” allegations in B.M.’s prior DVRO request as relevant or 

material to its final decision, the prior “absconding” establishes a pattern of 

behavior by D.V. of isolating B.M. from their son, or alternatively, forcing or 

threatening to force B.M. to abstain from engaging in his right to have 

custody of G.M.

Accordingly, the conduct as alleged in B.M.’s DVRO request sufficiently 

meet the definition of “disturbing the peace” under section 6320. Therefore, 

the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the alleged conduct could 

constitute domestic violence under the DVPA. 

B. The Court’s Findings Were Supported by Substantial Evidence

D.V. next contends that there was insufficient evidence that her 

conduct disturbed B.M.’s peace because there was no evidence that B.M.

suffered emotional or mental harm. Once again, we disagree with D.V.’s 

interpretation of the record, and we conclude there was substantial evidence 

to support the court’s finding that D.V. disturbed B.M.’s peace. 

D.V. mostly focuses on the lack of testimony at the September 14, 2021 

hearing regarding whether the events affected B.M. emotionally or mentally. 

By doing so, however, D.V. ignores the declaration B.M. submitted under 

penalty of perjury with the August 3, 2021, DVRO request. There, B.M.

claimed he was “in fear for [G.M.’s] safety as [D.V.] was living in a drug

rehabilitation center who is now aiding and abetting her absconding our son.” 

Later, while describing D.V.’s abduction and threats to permanently keep 

G.M. away from him, B.M. reiterated that he “fear[s] for [his] son’s life.” 
13

D.V.’s counsel did not ask B.M. any questions at the hearing to challenge his

claimed emotional or mental state. 

The statements in B.M.’s declaration provide substantial evidence that 

D.V. destroyed his emotional or mental calm. The trial court has discretion 

to issue a protective order under the DVPA “simply on the basis of an 

affidavit showing past abuse.” (Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 

327, 334, 337.) The “DVPA does not impose a heightened standard for 

specificity, nor does it contain any corroboration requirement.” (F.M. & 

M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 118.) Notably, B.M.’s declaration was filed 

the day after the abduction incident and while G.M. was still out of B.M.’s 

custody. If anything, the declaration may be a better reflection of how D.V.’s 

conduct affected B.M.’s contemporaneous mental and emotional state than 

what he may or not have said at a hearing roughly one and a half months 

later. 

D.V.’s other factual arguments are unpersuasive. For instance, she 

points out that B.M. was not physically present when she took G.M. from the 

kindergarten. But this is not a requirement under the DVPA. Section 6320 

makes clear that abusive conduct may be committed “indirectly” and “by any 

method or through any means.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) We see no reason why 

B.M. would feel any less disturbed, not to mention helpless, to hear that his 

son was abducted after the fact. She also highlights B.M.’s testimony that he 

suspected D.V. had “likely” taken G.M. to the rehabilitation center where she 

was staying, though she does not explain the import of this fact. Even if we 

could infer from B.M.’s suspicion of G.M.’s whereabouts that B.M. was not 

emotionally or mentally disturbed, the trial court drew other, reasonable 

inferences from the evidence. We cannot reweigh the evidence or resolve 
14

evidentiary conflicts, and we may not substitute our own judgment for that of 

the trial court. (M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1145.) 

Further, D.V. argues that the court applied the wrong legal standard in

considering the evidence. She criticizes the court’s use of the term 

“unsettling” instead of language found in section 6320 stating the conduct 

must “destroy the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” We 

understand the term “unsettling” to be synonymous; to “unsettle” means “to 

perturb or agitate mentally or emotionally.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 

Dict. (11th ed. 2003) p. 1372, col. 2.) In any case, the court otherwise 

described the conduct as “disturbing the peace” of B.M., which certainly 

suffices under the statute. 

D.V. also attempts to distinguish her conduct from the conduct found to 

be abusive in Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 and two of its progeny 

cases; Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140 and In re 

Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416. She argues 

that these cases show that the DVPA is designed to address “systematic and 

calculating” conduct, whereas she “did not engage in a concerted and 

deliberate course of action.” However, “concerted and deliberate” conduct is 

not required, as the DVPA’s definition of “abuse” includes “reckless” conduct. 

(§ 6203, subd. (a).) Moreover, the Legislature intended that the DVPA be 

“broadly construed” to accomplish its purposes. (Nadkarni, at p. 1498.) We 

therefore decline to limit the DVPA’s scope as D.V. suggests. 

Finally, D.V. contends there was no evidence to show that her conduct 

was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, because there was 

“considerable confusion as to the existing orders in place at the time of the 

alleged abuse.” We recognize that custody of G.M. changed hands several 

times over the course of multiple different proceedings. Nevertheless, the 
15

evidence at the September 14, 2021 hearing showed that D.V. was receiving 

regular supervised visitations during the two months prior to August 2, 2021 

abduction. D.V. never claimed to have custody during those months, nor did 

she ever try to go to G.M.’s school to pick him up prior to that incident. There 

is no reason to believe that D.V. was confused about the existing orders in 

place when she removed G.M. from the B.M.’s mother’s car on August 2, 

2021. 

Based on the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence in support of the 

trial court decision to issue the DVRO against D.V. on September 14, 2021. 

Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

IV. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. No costs are awarded. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.278(a)(5).) 

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

DATO, J.