United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued January 21, 2022 

Decided February 8, 2022 

Before 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge 

No. 21-2164 

MEGAN GARZA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 

No. 19-CV-5237 

Sheila Finnegan, 

Magistrate Judge. 

O R D E R 

 Struggling with depression, anxiety, and back pain, Megan Garza applied for 

Social Security disability insurance benefits. An administrative law judge found that 

Garza was not disabled because she could still perform jobs available in the national 

economy despite her impairments. The district court upheld this decision, and Garza 

appealed. Because Garza has failed to show an error in the ALJ’s decision, we affirm. 

 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 21-2164 Page 2 

I 

In September 2016, Megan Garza, 39 years old, applied for disability insurance 

benefits roughly a week after leaving her job of 17 years doing administrative work for 

her family’s children’s book company. She alleged a disability onset date of September 

7, 2016, alleging disability due to anxiety, depression, chemical dependency, panic 

attacks, bipolar disorder, and social anxiety disorder, rendering her unable to work. She 

has a high school education and lives with her husband and two youngest children.

The Social Security Administration denied Garza’s application. A state agency 

psychologist, David Voss, reviewed Garza’s medical records in February 2017 and rated 

her mental functioning capacity. Dr. Voss concluded that Garza’s mental capacity 

resulted in only moderate and mild limitations. Garza applied for reconsideration and 

the administration denied that too. Another state agency psychologist, Howard Tin, 

reviewed Garza’s records in August 2017 at the reconsideration stage. Dr. Tin affirmed 

Dr. Voss’s findings, stating that Garza was not severely impaired due to her anxiety and 

depression and retained the mental capacity to perform routine/repetitive tasks 

involving simple instructions with limited social demands.

Garza then filed a request for a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 

The ALJ denied Garza’s claim. Applying the familiar five-step analysis, the ALJ found 

at step 1 that Garza had no substantial gainful employment since the alleged onset date. 

The ALJ found at step 2 severe impairments (major depressive disorder, generalized 

anxiety disorder, substance abuse addiction in remission, and degenerative disc disease 

of the lumbar spine) and one non-severe impairment (bilateral hearing loss). At step 3 

the ALJ found that none of Garza’s impairments—in isolation or combined—

established a per se disability. At step 4 the ALJ found Garza retained the ability to 

perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with some limitations, and 

that with this residual functioning capacity (RFC), she could not perform her past 

relevant work. At step 5, based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ 

concluded that a person of Garza’s age, education, and work experience with Garza’s 

RFC—including her limitations the ALJ identified—could perform numerous jobs 

available in the national economy, so she was not disabled. The Appeals Council then 

rejected Garza’s request for review, and Garza filed for administrative review in the 

Northern District of Illinois. The magistrate judge, acting with the parties’ consent 

under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), upheld the earlier decisions. This appeal 

followed. 
No. 21-2164 Page 3 

II 

We review the magistrate judge’s decision de novo, but apply a deferential 

standard to the ALJ’s decision, reversing only if the ALJ’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence or is the result of legal error. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th 

Cir. 2021). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 

1154 (2019) (citation omitted). 

First, Garza argues the ALJ erred at steps 2 and 3 of the analysis. But she did not 

raise either of these arguments below, and arguments made for the first time on appeal 

are waived. Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Shramek v. Apfel, 226 

F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying the general rule that “issues that are not raised 

before the district court are waived on appeal” to a claimant appealing the district 

court’s decision regarding disability benefits under the Social Security Act). Because 

Garza failed to make any arguments regarding errors at step 2 or step 3 before the 

district court, both are waived on appeal. 

Even if these arguments were not waived, we have no basis to find that the ALJ 

erred at either of these steps. At step 2, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment (or combination of impairments). Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 

926 (7th Cir. 2010). A finding at this step is merely “a threshold issue.” Arnett v. Astrue, 

676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2012). So long as the ALJ finds one severe impairment, the 

ALJ is obligated to move on to the remaining steps in the five-step analysis, where he 

considers “the entire constellation of ailments.” Castile, 617 F.3d at 926–27 (quoting 

Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003)). Here, the ALJ found several 

severe impairments, including major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 

substance abuse addiction in remission, and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 

spine. This finding satisfied the threshold requirement for step 2. After finding one 

severe impairment, the ALJ was obligated to move through the remaining analysis, as 

he did. 

Likewise, Garza provides no reason for us to find that the ALJ’s determination at 

step 3 was erroneous. A finding at step 3 that a claimant is per se disabled under a listed 

impairment is a very high bar and requires that the claimant meet or equal all of the 

criteria specified in a listing. Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2006). The 

ALJ concluded that Garza did not meet listings 1.04 (disorders of the spine), 12.04 

(depression), or 12.06 (anxiety). Garza contends that the ALJ erred by failing to consider 

evidence that shows she meets these listings. But at oral argument, Garza was unable to 

point us to any evidence in the record that the ALJ overlooked. See Gross v. Town of 
No. 21-2164 Page 4 

Cicero, Ill., 619 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that we do not consider a parties’ 

factual assertions “that lack direct citation to easily identifiable support in the record”). 

And the ALJ does not err when he does not discuss every piece of evidence in the 

record in explaining his determinations. See Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 

2004) (“We have long held that an ALJ is not required to provide a complete written 

evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence.”) (quotation omitted). 

Next, Garza contends that the ALJ erred at step 5 in finding that Garza could 

work in available jobs, including laundry folder, house cleaner, and mail clerk. She 

argues that her limitations make it impossible for her to work in any job in the national 

economy. But she does not contest that the vocational expert, whose testimony the ALJ 

relied on to find that jobs were available for someone with Garza’s RFC, heard a 

summary of Garza’s limitations before making her recommendation. See Cass v. Shalala, 

8 F.3d 552, 555–56 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the questions posed to the vocational 

expert should incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations from the medical record). 

And Garza makes no argument against using the vocational expert’s testimony and 

designates no evidence contradicting it. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e); Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 

1155 (stating that a vocational expert’s testimony can constitute substantial evidence 

supporting an ALJ’s finding at step 5). So the ALJ was permitted to rely on the 

vocational expert’s testimony as substantial evidence of Garza’s ability to work in other 

jobs available in the national economy. 

Last, Garza argues that the ALJ overlooked facts in the record. Garza’s argument 

is vague and mentions only one fact that the ALJ may have overlooked: her opioid 

abuse disorder, when determining her RFC. First, Garza’s meager treatment of this 

argument constitutes waiver. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 

1991) (such a “skeletal ‘argument’, really nothing more than an assertion, does not 

preserve a claim”). Garza provides no citation to the record to support this argument. In 

fact, the record states that Garza is in remission for an opioid addiction. Regardless, the 

ALJ did not ignore Garza’s addiction in assessing her RFC. The ALJ considered Garza’s 

addiction and depressive disorders and her remission from prior substance abuse 

following treatment in making his RFC determination. Admin. R. at 19 (Exhibit 3) (“The 

record shows that ... she was addicted to pain medication about two and a half years 

ago ... [and] does not indicate that the claimant had any further issues with opioid 

abuse. ... [H]er mental impairments [] are present regardless of the claimant’s opioid 

abuse disorder.”). 

AFFIRMED