Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-572 | August 30, 2019 Page 1 of 6

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Valerie K. Boots

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lindsay N. Grubbs,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 30, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-572

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable David Hooper, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G25-1807-F6-24993

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-572 | August 30, 2019 Page 2 of 6

[1] Lindsay N. Grubbs appeals her convictions of Class A misdemeanor possession 

of methamphetamine1 and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.2

 

Grubbs asserts the State failed to present sufficient evidence that she possessed

methamphetamine and paraphernalia. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 27, 2018, Officer Katrina McEvilly of the Indianapolis Metropolitan 

Police Department (“IMPD”) was on patrol on the east side of Indianapolis 

when she ran the license plate on a black Monte Carlo travelling westbound on 

Washington Street. The report she received indicated the license plate was 

registered to a gray Pontiac, so Officer McEvilly initiated a traffic stop. The 

Monte Carlo was occupied by three people: the driver, the front seat passenger, 

and Grubbs, who was sitting in the back seat behind the passenger. Also in the 

back seat with Grubbs “was a bunch of personal property. It had a bunch of 

clothes, bags, personal belongings . . . a lot of people’s personal belongings.” 

(Tr. Vol. II at 9.) Next to Grubbs on the back seat was a blue purse, and 

Grubbs was holding a purse on her lap. Grubbs placed the purse she had been 

holding on the back seat when she exited the car. 

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a).

2 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1). 
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[3] Officer McEvilly determined she would tow the Monte Carlo in accordance 

with IMPD’s standing general order 7.3, which controls the towing or 

impounding of vehicles, (see State’s Ex. 2), and provides a vehicle may be towed 

if it has “no or improper certificate of registration or license plate.” (State’s Ex. 

2 at 3.) Prior to the tow, Officer McEvilly was required to inventory all the 

property inside the car, including the items in the bags in the back seat of the 

car. Inside the purse that Grubbs had been holding, Officer McEvilly found a 

glass pipe used for smoking narcotics and “a baggie with white powder residue 

in it.” (Tr. Vol. II at 14.) Laboratory testing determined the white powder 

residue was methamphetamine.

[4] The State charged Grubbs with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine 

and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Grubbs waived her 

right to a jury trial. After hearing evidence, the trial court found Grubbs guilty 

as charged. The court entered Grubbs’ conviction of the Level 6 felony as a 

Class A misdemeanor because it was Grubbs’ first felony conviction. The court 

sentenced Grubbs to 365 days for possession of methamphetamine, with 201 

days suspended, and to 60 days for possession of paraphernalia, with 60 days 

suspended.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Grubbs alleges the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. When 

considering whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to support convictions, 

“we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-572 | August 30, 2019 Page 4 of 6

support the trial court’s finding[s] of guilt.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 

(Ind. 2011). If there is conflicting evidence, we considered it in the light most 

favorable to the judgment. Id. The evidence need not overcome every 

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. Rather, we must affirm “unless no 

reasonable trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime [proven] 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

[6] Specifically, Grubbs asserts the State failed to demonstrate she knowingly

possessed the methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Convictions for 

possession of illegal items can be based on either actual or constructive 

possession. Id. Actual possession occurs when a person “has direct physical 

control over” an item. Id. Constructive possession can be inferred when a 

person had the capability and intent to maintain dominion and control over the 

item. Id. 

[7] Grubbs asserts “the only evidence of constructive possession was her close 

proximity to the contraband.” (Br. of Appellant at 4.) In support of her 

assertion, Grubbs notes the back seat of the Monte Carlo was filled with bags of 

personal items and yet the State produced no evidence that she knew what was 

in the “bag” that she had been holding. (See, e.g., Reply Br. at 7) (“the State 

points to no additional circumstantial evidence to support an inference of guilty 

knowledge: only to the evidence that the bag was in Grubbs’ control as it sat on 

her lap”) (emphasis in original). 
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[8] In her briefs, Grubbs fails to acknowledge the “bag” she was holding was 

neither, for example, a large trash bag of personal property nor a suitcase of 

clothing, either of which she could have needed to hold to sit on the back seat 

that was filled with bags of personal property. Rather, the “bag” that Grubbs 

was holding on her lap was a purse. When there were two women and two 

purses in the car and Grubbs had one purse on her lap, the only reasonable 

inference is that the purse Grubbs was holding was her own. See Norris v. State, 

732 N.E.2d 186, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting a purse “is generally not an 

object for which two or more persons share common use and authority”). 

Officer McEvilly identified the purse Grubbs was holding as the purse 

containing “the pipe and also a baggie with white powder residue in it.” (Tr. 

Vol. II at 14.) 

[9] Although Grubbs testified that she does not carry a purse, that she did not have 

a bag in her lap, and that she did not know what was inside any of the bags in 

the back seat of the car, the trial court was not required to believe her testimony 

or to give it more weight than Officer McEvilly’s testimony. See Edgecomb v. 

State, 673 N.E.2d 1185, 1194 (Ind. 1996) (“The jury is not required to believe 

every part of a defendant’s testimony.”), reh’g denied. Grubbs argues the State 

failed to prove she knew the methamphetamine and pipe were in the purse, 

such that she could have knowingly possessed those illegal items; however, 

when we have already concluded the evidence supports a reasonable inference 

that Grubbs was holding her own purse, such evidence also supports the 

inference that Grubbs knew what was inside her own purse. See Halsema v. 
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State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind. 2005) (“[W]hen determining whether an 

element exists, the [trier of fact] may rely on its . . . common sense and 

knowledge acquired through everyday experiences.”). 

Conclusion

[10] Because the evidence was sufficient to support Grubbs’ convictions, we affirm 

the trial court’s judgment.

[11] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.