### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 21

- 00380

- CV

Patricia A. Grant, Ph.D. , Appellant

v. Richard W. Heo, et al. , Appellee s

FROM THE 155TH DISTRICT COURT OF FAYETTE COUNTY NO. 2012V

- 126 , THE HONORABLE JEFF R. STEINHAUSER , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This attem pted interlocutory appeal arise s out of appellant ’ s petition seeking to compel parti ti on of land and mineral rights. On July 21, 2 021, the trial court sen t a letter to th e parties, stating that “ at least some of the parties ” did not oppose partitioning appellant ’ s interest
out of the tract and asking that the parties either file a n agr eed order detailing appellant ’ s undivided ownership interests or execute partition deeds , thus “ saving all parties some time and

expenses. ” Appellant filed o bject ions to the letter and then filed notice that she was setting her
motion fo r summary judgment for a hearing in late August. After appellee Richard W. He o informed the trial court tha t he was in the proce ss of acquiring the interests from “ [m] os t of the defendants, ” the trial court sent another letter on August 4 stat ing that it was staying all actions
on its own motion until November 1 to allow appellee Heo to “ purchase [] all the undi vided
interests he is able to acquire. ” The court stated it “ believes this is the mo st appropriate way to proceed since it will simplify the case with regard to the join der of ne cessary parties, service of2 citation, costs, etc. ” The court a lso stated tha t it was canceling appellant ’ s hearing on her motion for summary judgment. Appellant object ed to that letter and filed her notice of appeal, stating she was appealing from the court ’ s July 21 and August 4 l etters

. We sent appellant a letter asking her t o explain how this Court could exercise jurisdiction over the appeal, observing that letters from a trial court are not generally subject to appeal, see Goff v. Tuchscherer , 627 S.W.2d 397, 398

- 99 (Tex. 1982); Schwartz v. Schwartz , No. 03

- 15

- 00651

- CV, 2016 WL 5874873, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Austin Oct. 5, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) , and that the ruling s did not appea r to be the kind of order or judgment from which interlocutory appeal could be taken, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. Appellant respon ded , contending that the trial court ’ s letters “ cons titute final
orders with deci sion s and judg ements impacting ” her hearing on summary judgment
and substantially comply with the requi sites of a formal judgment or order. See Schwartz , 2016 WL 5874873, at *2 . She also asserts that the letters are “ evidence of [the court ’ s] decisions actually ren dered ” and that , because she “ is legally questioning their sales as statutory fraud, ”
the y “ are all evidence informing of judge ’ s judgemen t and directives final it y at the time of sig ning ” and “ are finalities granting appellant review jurisdiction. ”
We have reviewed the content of t he trial court ’ s letters , and the y do not amount

to the kin d of judgment or order that can be appealed. See id

. And, as we observed in our notice to appellant, even i f we could view the letters as such, neither of them is the type of ruling from which an interlocutory appeal may be taken. See CMH Homes v. Perez , 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011) ( “ We strictly apply statutes grantin g inter locutory appeals because they are a narrow3 exception to the general rule that interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable. ” ). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction

. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3( a ).

______________________ _

___________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Kelly
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: November 3, 2021