### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILL E Se pte m be r 19, 200 6 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . THOMAS EDWARD HOG UE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 99-B-823 J. Randall Wyatt, Judge

No. M2005- 02874-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 28, 2007

Be fore the court is pe titioner Thomas Edwar d Hog ue’s appea l f rom the Davidson CountyCriminal Court’s dismiss al of his Octobe r 2005 “Petition to Set Aside Guilty Plea and to I ssue a Writ of Err or Cor a m N ob is. ” B a se d u po n a n u nti me ly fi lin g of the pe tit ion , w e a ff

ir m th e or de r o f d ism iss a l.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Paul J . Br uno, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Thomas Edwar d Hog ue.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., At torne y

Gen eral & Re po rt e r; Ma rk A. F ulk s, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J o h n s o n , I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Lisa Nay lor, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION The pe tition under review alleg ed that the p et i t i o n er w as ar rested on D ece mber 4, 1998, for the Septe mber 25, 1998 rape and sexual battery of a 16-y ear -old victim, was indicted f or both offen s es o n Ap ri l 23, 1999, and pursuant to a plea a g ree ment that called f or dismissal of the rape count, pl eade d g uilty to sexual battery on J uly 22, 1999, and ac cepte d a mostly suspended thre ey e ar s e nte nc e . T he c ha

rg e s were ba se d u po n a lle g a tio ns that, o n Se pte mbe r 2 5, 19 98 , th e vic tim awoke to find the defe ndant, her cousin, in bed with her w ith his mouth on her nipple a nd his finge r in her va g ina.

Th e pe tit ion a lle g e s th a t, o n Jun e 27 , 2 00 5, the vic tim state d in writi ng a nd un de r o a th that the i nvestig atory statements attribut ed to her were false and that the def endant ne ither pene trated nor sexually

assaulted her on S eptember 25, 1998. I n the 2005 statement, the vic tim speculated that the fa lse 1998 ac cusations wer e attributed to he r by her mother , who was a ng ry with the petitioner-2-

at the time. She ave rre d in the 2005 statement that her mother “w as a cra ck head” and had a history of fa lsely char g ing pe ople with crimes.

I n a separate sworn stateme nt appende d to the petition, the petitioner stated that
ne ith e r h e no r his c ou ns e l we re pe rm itt e d to inte rv ie w the vic tim prior to the su bmi ssi on of the g uil ty plea a nd that, had he know n that the victim would have testified tr uthfully had he g one to trial, he would not have plea ded g uilty

.

Ba sed upon the victim’s 2005 sworn r efuta tion of the199 8 alleg ations of sexual battery and ra pe, the pe titioner sought to vac ate his convic tion via a writ of e rror c or am no bis and to w ith dr a w h is g uil ty ple a

. Th e pe tit ion e r, re pr e se nte d b y re ta ine d c ou ns e l, s ou g ht a he ari ng on his claims.

On No v e mb e r 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 , th e c r im in a l c o u r t e n te r e d it s w r it te n f a c tu a l f in d ing s and leg al conc lusions. Notably , the court f ound that the petition was filed “ over six (6) y ear s after the judgme nt of conviction bec ame f inal” and de termined that, e ither as a Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedur e 32(f

) petition to withdraw the g uiltyplea or as a petition for post-conviction re lief, the petition was unti mely

. As to the claim to c or am no bis re lie f, the c ou rt

fo un d th a t th e Sta te pr op e rl y raised the bar of

the statute of limitations. The court held t hat t he petiti on for the writ of er ror coram
no bis wa s “ tim e ba

rr e d a s f ile d o uts ide the on e y e ar s ta tut e of lim itatio ns , a ndno du e pr oc e ss g rounds exist [ed] that require the tolling of the s tatute .

. . .” The c ourt, opining f urther that a hea

ring on the merits of the pe tition was “not warr anted,” dismiss ed the pe tition.

Th e pe tit ion e r f

ile d a tim e ly no tic e of app e a l. He c la ims that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in deny ing a hearing a nd in apply ing time ba rs to both prong s of the petition.

F ir s t, w e a d d r e s s th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s c laim to a w r it of error c or

am no bis . The
a va ila bil ity of the writ is a dd re sse d by statut e in Te nn e sse e . T his statut e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art : Up on a sh ow ing by the de fe nd a nt that th e de fe nd a nt w a s w ith ou t f a ult in f ailing to pr esent c erta in evidence at the prope r time, a writ of err or [ c or am no bis ] wil l lie for subsequently or newly discovere d evidenc e relating to matters which wer e litigated at the trial if the j u d ge determines that such evi d en ce may have r esulted in a diff ere nt judgme nt, had it been pr esente d at t he trial. The issue shall be tried by the court without the i nterve ntion of a jury , and if the de cision be in favor of

the petitioner, the judg ment compl ai n ed of shall be set aside a nd the def

endant sha ll be g rante d a new trial in that cause

. T.C.A. § 40-26-105 ( 2000).

The discove ry

of re cante d testimony may become the basis for r elief w hen:W e u s e t h e t er m “ r ec an t ” bec au s e t h e v i ct i m’ s 2005 s t at eme n t re f u t es t h e s t at eme n t s a t t r i bu t ed t o h er i n 1998. 1
I n a ct ual i t y , howev er , t he i mp ort of t he 20 05 st at ement i s not t o re can t he r 199 8 “ s t at ement ” but t o deny t hat s he eve r
m a d e su c h p rio r sta te m e n ts.
-3-

(1) the trial judge is r easona bly well satisfied that the te stimonyg iven by a material witness was fa lse and that the new t estimony is true; 2) the def endant wa s rea sonably

di lige nt in discovering the new evidenc e or sur

prised by false te stimony , or unable to know of the falsity until after the trial; and 3) the jury might have re ache d a differ ent conc lusion had the truth been told.

State v. Mix on , 9 83 S.W. 2d66 1, 66 6, 67 2- 73 (T e nn

. 19 99 ) ( app ro vin g sta nd ardfo r r e vie wi ng c la ims of re cante d testimonyas utiliz ed by court of c riminal appea ls).

“The writ of er

ror [ c or am no bis ] may

be had within one (1) y ear afte r t he judg ment be c ome s fi na l by pe tit ion pr e se nte d to the jud g e a t c ha mbe rs or in op e n c ou rt , w ho ma y or de r i t to operate as a

superse deas or

not.” Id. § 27-7-103 ( 2000); see M ixon , 983 S.W .2d at 670 (holding that
a petition f

or a writ of er

ror c or am no bis is untim ely

unless it is brought within one y ear of the e ntry of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s “ fi na l,” or la st, or de r; the tim e fo r fi lin g is no t e xten de d by the pu rs uit

of a tim e ly direc t appea l). Principles of due pr ocess of law, howe ver, ma y

prec lude the use of

the statute of limit ations to bar a c laim in c or am no bis

. W

or k ma n v . S tat e , 41 S.W .3d 100, 103 (T en n. 2001). “‘[B]efor e a state may terminate a claim for failure to c omply with proce dural re quirements such a s statutes of limitations, due proce ss r equire s that potential litigants be pr ovided an opportunityfor the prese ntation of

claims at a me aning ful time and in a mea ningf ul manner.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g Burford v. Sta te , 845 S.W .2d 204 (Tenn. 1992)). Thus, principles of due proce ss may interce de whe n, “under the circ umstances of

a particular c ase, a

pplication of the statute [of li m i t at i o n s ] m aynot affor d a
rea sonable opportunity to have the claimed issue he ard a nd decide d.” Bu rfo rd , 845 S.W .2d at 208;
se e als o Fre sh wat e r v . S tat e , 160 S.W .3d 548, 556 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004)

.

In t h e p r e s e n tc a s e , t h e o n e

- ye ar s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s e x p i r e d i n 2 0 0 0

. A c c o r d i n g l y, the claim for

a writ of err or c or

am no bis is b arr e d u nle ss the pe tit ion e r w a s n ot a ff or de d a re a so na ble opportunity

to present the c laim before the limitations period ran.

I n th e pe tit ion , the p eti ti on er’s on ly e xpla natio n f

or the la te fi lin g is that he “ on ly
rec ently became awa

re that the alleg ed victim would come f orwa rd with the truth in this case,” and in his affidavit attac hed to the petition, the petitioner stated only that he “re cently discovere d that the alleg ed victim . . . woul d h av e t ru t h fu l l ytestified at trial.” Although it may not be the role of the petition to prove a

c la im to a du e -p ro c e ss ov e rride of the statut e of

lim itatio ns , th e pe tit ion sh ou ld
a t le a st a rt ic ulate wh y

princ ipl e s o f d ue pr oc e ss s ho uldpr e va il a nd a lle g e ho w a du e pr oc e ss c la im would be proven. I n the prese nt c ase, the petitioner does not a rticulate how or whe n the re cantation
came to light. We note t hat t he victim was approxi mately 23 y ear s of ag e whe n she made the 2005

1 statement. She had be en an a dult for appr ox imately five y ear s; y et, the petition f ails to speak to how
a n d w h y t h e v i c t i mw a s p r o m p t e d t o g i v e t h e n e w s t a t e m e n to r w h e n t h e p r o m p t i n g o c c u rr e d

. In-4-

short, we fail to se e how the petition stated a viable c ause of action in c or

am no bis , g iven that by

the petition’s terms, the statute of limit ations had expired. Thus, we hold that the criminal court did not
err in dismi ssing the c or

am no bis claim without a hea ring

. Se e Sta te v . R ichard Ha le Au sti n , No. W2005-02591-CCA-R3-CO, slip op. at 10 (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, Dec .13, 2006) (a ffirming the denial of a c or

am no bis he ari ng a ndthe app oin tme nt o f c ou ns e l w he n th e pe tit ion didno t “ state a cla im for c or

am no bis relief

”). Furthermor e, because the presentation of t he claim is barred, w e need not a ddress whe ther it is otherwise a pt for c or am no bis consideration.

Ne xt, we re v i e w t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s c l a i mt h a th e s h o u l d b e a l l o w e d t o w i t h d r a w h is g uiltyplea. The withdrawal of a g uiltyplea is g overne d by Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 32(f) : (1) Be fore Sentence I mposed. Be fore sentenc e is imposed, the court

ma y g r a n ta m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w a

g u i l t y p l e a f o r a n y f a i r a n d jus t
rea son. ( 2 ) A f

ter Sentenc e B ut Be fore J udg ment Final. Af ter sente nce is imposed but before the judgme nt becomes final, the court may set
a sid e th e j u d g m e n to f

c o n v i c t i o n a n d p e r m i tt h e d e f e n d a n tto withdraw the plea to cor

rec t manifest injustice.

Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 32( f)

. Th is co urt has re c og nize d tha t the op po rtun iti e s f or wi thd ra wi ng a

g uil ty plea a re “ applicable only

until the judgment has beco m e final.” State v. Antonio Dem onte Lyons , No. 01C01-9508-CR-00263, slip op. at 13 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug . 15, 1997). Onc e the judgme nt becomes f

inal, the convicte d person is re leg ated to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, see T. C.A . § § 4 0- 30 -1 01 thr ou g h 3 13 (2 00 3 & Sup p. 20 05 ), a s a mea ns of c ha lle ng ing his or

he r g uil ty plea. Antonio Demonte Lyons , slip op. at 13. This latter exercise entails a cla im that the guilty plea was not ente red voluntarily , intelligently , and knowing ly or wa s o b t ai n ed throug h the abridgme nt of some other

constitutional right, such a s the rig ht to the effec tive assistance of counse l. Id ., sli p op. at 13-14.

Th us , in the pr e se nt c a se , th e mot ion to withd ra w the g uil ty ple a wa s n ot c og niza

ble pursuant to Rule 32(f) , and the c laim was bar red a s a post-convic tion claim because it was filed a fter the running of t he one-y ear post-conviction s tatute of limit ations. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102 ( 2003).

I n view of the fore g oing analy sis, the order of the criminal court is affirmed.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE