NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROLINE J. KARL, Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP.; et al., Defendant - Appellees. No. 11-17941 D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00473-RCJ-VPC
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Robert C. Jones, District Judge, Presiding Submitted January 15, 2014 ** San Francisco, California Before: GRABER and NGUYEN, Circuit J udges, and DEARIE, Senior District Judge. *** 

# FILED
JAN 27 2014 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Raymond J. Dearie, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.Plaintiff Caroline J. Karl appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to remand this quiet title action to Nevada state court. Reviewing de novo, Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. , 651 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), we affirm. The district court properly exercised its removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(b). The appeal therefore hinges on whether, despite its proper exercise of removal jurisdiction, th e district court was nevertheless required to abstain from hearing Karl’s action and remand the proceedings to state court in accordance with either the doctrine of prio r exclusive jurisdiction or the abstention doctrine set forth in Colorado River Wate r Conservation District v. United States , 424 U.S. 800 (1976). See Chapman , 651 F.3d at 1043-44; 40235 Wash. St. Corp. v. Lusardi , 976 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). That issue does not depend on the Nevada Supreme Court’s re solution of the question we certified in Chapman : whether an action to quiet title is properly characterized as in personam , in rem or quasi in rem . See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. , 302 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Nev. 2013). Rather, the issue depends on whether the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction or Colorado River abstention even applies when a single in remor quasi in remaction is properly removed and no other parallel state

2court proceeding exists in which the state court has exercised jurisdiction over the
res . We recently answered that question in the negative. Sexton v. NDEX W., LLC , 713 F.3d 533, 537-38 (9th Cir. 2013). “The doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction applies to a federal court’s jurisdiction over property only if a state court has previously exercised jurisdicti on over that same property and retains that jurisdiction in a separate, concurrent pr oceeding. Where, as here, the defendant appropriately removes the case to federal court, the state court’s jurisdiction over the property terminates, and the federa l court’s jurisdiction begins.” Id. at 537 (citations omitted). “[A]s with prior exclusive jurisdiction, Colorado River abstention does not apply absent ‘pending state court proceedings’ involving the same property.” Id. at 538 (quoting Lusardi , 976 F.2d at 588). Sexton controls the result here. AFFIRMED.

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