UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SHIRLEY JOHNSON, : : Plaintiff, : : Civil Action No.: 15-0796 (RC) v. : : Re Document No.: 8 DAVID S. MAO, : Acting Librarian of Congress , : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING IN P ART AND D ENYING IN P ART D EFENDANT ’ S M OTION TO D ISMISS , OR , IN THE A LTERNATIVE , FOR S UMMARY J UDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Shirley Johnson is a fe male employee and supervisor a t the Library of Congress. After she and her own supervisors disagreed about procedures fo r managing Ms. Johnson’s supervisees on detail in anot her Library unit, she brought disc rimination allegations against her employer, first at the administ rative level a nd then in federal court. 1 Ms. Johnson’s complaint in

1 Although Ms. Johnson’s complaint named the “United States Gove rnment” as Defendant, see Compl., ECF No. 1, the government correctly notes that, in a T itle VII suit against a federal agency, the proper defendant is the head of that agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (“[T]he head of t he . . . agency . . . shall be t he defendant.”); Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 1 n.1, ECF No. 8. This failure to name the proper defendant wou ld typically be cause to dismiss the complaint. See Norris v. Salazar , 885 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413–14 (D.D.C. 2012). Here, however, the government “does not object to the amendment of th e caption to conform to this statutory requirement.” Def. ’s Mot. Dismiss 1 n.1. Acting Libra rian of Congress David S. Mao is therefore substituted as Defendant in this action. See generally About the Librarian , Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/abou t/about-the-libr arian (last v isited March 31, 2016) (“David S. Mao became Acting Librarian of Congress Oct. 1, 2015, upon t he retirement of James H. Billington.”).2 this Court states three “claim s for relief”: violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, intentional infliction of emoti onal distress, and injunctive re lief. In a pre-answer motion, the Lib rary moves to dismiss Ms. Johnso n’s complaint, or, in the alternative, for summary judgm ent in its favor on Ms. Johnson’s claims. Because, on the record presented, a reasonable jury coul d return a verdict for Ms. Joh nson on her Title VII claims based on sex discrimination or retalia tion with respect to the remova l of certain supervisory duties, the Court declines to grant the Libr ary’s motion for summary judgme nt on those claims. But because Ms. Johnson has not shown significa nt, tangible harm arising fr om her performance appraisal, the Court will dismiss Ms. Johnson’s Title VII claims based on sex discrimination or retaliation with respect to her performan ce appraisal. And because Ms. John son’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim alleges harm for which Title VII provi des a remedy, Title VII preempts that claim and the Court will dismiss it. Lastly, because a cla im for injunctive relief is not a freestanding cause of action, the Court will also dismiss Ms. J ohnson’s third claim.

II. BACKGROUND 2 A. Ms. Johnson’s Supervisory Structure According to the Complaint, Pla intiff Shirley Johnson is a fema le employee of the Library of Congress, where she has worked for forty years. Comp l. ¶¶ 8, 11, ECF No. 1. At the time of the events at issue in t his case, she was the Superviso r for the Library’s On-site Constituent Support Unit. Id. ¶ 11. Ms. Johnson’s role as Super visor was supposed to include

2 At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court presumes that the pl aintiff’s factual allegations in the Complaint are true. See, e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). When citing to documents outside of the pleadings, the Court views the evidence in the light m ost favorable to Ms. Johnson. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (explaining that , in the summary judgment context, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and a ll justifiable inferences ar e to be drawn in [her] favor”).3 significant supervisory and manage rial responsibilities: she wa s tasked with supervising a group of employees and with staffing tw o reading rooms at the Library

. See Pl.’s Ex. 10, ECF No. 9-13 (reproducing excerpts of Ms. Johns on’s performance plan for the appraisal period from March 1, 2014 through August 29, 2014). Ms. Johnson’s immediate supervis or was Supervisor Librarian David Waters. See Compl. ¶ 11; Pl.’s Ex. 7, at 1, ECF No. 9-10; Pl.’s Ex. 1, ¶ 1 0, ECF No. 9-4. Her next-level supervisor was S teven Herman, the Chief of the L ibrary’s Collections Access, Loan and Management (CALM) Division. See Compl. ¶ 19; Pl.’s Ex. 8, ECF No. 9-11; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 1, ECF No. 9-12. Still hi gher on Ms. Johnson’s superv isory ladder was Mark Sweeney, the Library’s Direct or for Preservation. See Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 1. 3 B. 2014 Performance Appraisal Ms. Johnson submits that, in her role at the Library, she works “extraordinar[il]y hard and consistently demonstrates a pattern of relentless and stead y execution of not only her essential duties, but also assignm ents, projects and tasks that fall beyond the scope of her duties.” Compl. ¶ 11. Her 2014 performance appraisal covers the rating p eriod from March 1, 2013 through February 28, 2014, was signe d by Mr. Waters and Ms. Joh nson on May 16, 2014, and agrees with Ms. Johnson’s assessmen t of her work: she received an overall rating of “Commendable,” meaning that her “performance and initiative [we re] worthy of special notice.” Def.’s Ex. 4, at 1–2, ECF No. 8-4. Ms. Johnson also received a “Commendable” rating for each of her major areas of responsibility. See id. at 2–3. In particular, her perf ormance appraisal noted that she possessed “extensive supervisory experience” and “perf orm[ed] very well as Supervisor

3 Ms. Johnson at times refers to Mr. Sweeney as the “Acting Asso ciate Librarian for Library Service.” See Compl. ¶ 22; Def.’s Ex. 1, at 5, E CF No. 8-1 (reproducing Ms. Johnson’s formal administrative discrimination complaint).4 of the On-site Constituent Support Unit while [she] and [her] s taff adjust[ed] to changing job duties and work with various units in CALM.” Id. at 2. C. Detail Assignments for Ms. Johnson’s Supervisees A number of Ms. Johnson’s superv isees were detailed in 2014 to work on developmental assignments. See Pl.’s Ex. 1, ¶ 14, ECF No. 9-4; Pl.’s Ex. 8, ECF No. 9-11; Pl. ’s Ex. 9, at 1–2, ECF No. 9-12. In groups of two at a time, they performed tempor ary rotations supporting the Library’s collections-related a ctivities, managed by the CALM C ollections Officer, Beatriz Haspo. See Pl.’s Ex. 8; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 1–2. Because Ms. Haspo was not a supervisor at the Library, she was not responsible f or the supervisees’ sign-in a nd sign-out processes. See Pl.’s Ex. 1, ¶ 14; Pl.’s Ex. 8; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 1–2. Instead, Ms. Joh nson’s supervisors told Ms. Johnson that she would continue functioning as supervisor and timekeepe r for her supervisees on detail with Ms. Haspo. Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 1.
D. Treatment of Ms. Johnson’s Mal e Supervisee on Detail (Rober t Bunch) Early in 2014, two of Ms. Johnson’s male supervisees, Robert Bu nch and Rodney Marshall, were working on detail with Ms. Haspo. See Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 1, ECF No. 9-12. After a concern arose about the accurac y of Mr. Bunch’s sign-in times, Ms. Johnson approached Mr. Waters and Ms. Haspo about the issue. See id. at 2; see also Compl. ¶ 12. Because Mr. Bunch was scheduled to report fo r work earlier than Ms. Johnson , Ms. Johnson asked to have Mr. Bunch sign in at the CALM Div ision Office, where the office secretary would be able to monitor Mr. Bunch’s sign-in times. See Compl. ¶ 12; Pl.’s Ex. 9, a t 2. Mr. Waters granted Ms. Johnson’s request. Compl. ¶ 12; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. After that, both Mr. Bunch and Mr. Marshall began signing in at the Division Office. Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. But even though t hey were signing in at the Division Office, Ms. Johnson still5 wanted to continue functioning as their supervisor, and she sti ll wanted to review and enter their sign-in and sign-out times. See id. (“I wanted to continue to do . . . t heir WebTA sheets, as I ha d done for the four previous staff members [on detail, because] my office is next door to the division office.”). Mr. Waters , however, “no longer allowed [he r] to be their timekeeper but instead had the office secret ary . . . check and validate Mr. M arshall’s and Mr. Bunch’s” sign-in and sign-out times. Id. E. Treatment of Ms. Johnson’s Female Supervisee on Detail (Hel en Drakeford)

After Mr. Bunch and Mr. Marsha ll’s time on detail ended, two of Ms. Johnson’s female supervisees went on detail wit h Ms. Haspo. Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2, E CF No. 9-12

. One was Simone Rankin, who began her detail on April 7, 2014. Id. The other was Helen Drakeford, who had already worked a detail with Ms. Haspo, and who began her secon d detail on June 9, 2014. Id. Earlier that year, Ms. Johnson ha s issued supervisory memoranda instructing Ms. Drakeford about Ms. Drakeford’s inappropria te use of leave, failure to re main in her work area, and failure to follow supervisory instructions. Compl. ¶ 14 (“Ms. Drakeford received a Counseling Memo on January 29, 2014 and an Admonishment Memo on April 4, 2014 . . . .”); accord Pl.’s Ex. 1, ¶ 14, ECF No. 9-4; Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2, ECF No. 9-7. 4 Between Tuesday, June 17, 2014 and Friday, June 20, 2014, howev er, problems between Ms. Drakeford, Ms. Johnson, and Ms. Johnson’s supervisors inten sified. On Tuesday, June 17, 2014, Ms. Johnson was on leave for the day . Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. She nonetheless learned, through an ema il from Mr. Waters, that Ms. Drakeford had called the

4 The Library also states, though w ithout citation to evidence, that Ms. Drakeford had previously received a Notice of Proposed Adverse Action for a t en-day suspension. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, or i n the Alternative for Summ. J . 14–15, ECF No. 8 [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.].6 Library and had stated that, because Ms. Drakeford’s mother was in the hospital, Ms. Drakeford would not be at work for one or two days. Id. Mr. Waters’s email also stated that Ms. Drakeford would contact Ms. Johnson if Ms. Dra keford needed further time off from work. Id. On Wednesday, June 18, 2014, Ms. Dra keford reported to work. Co mpl. ¶ 13; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. But when Ms. Johnson received a telephone message for Ms. Drakeford, Ms. Johnson could not locate Ms. Drakeford in her work area. Compl. ¶ 13; Pl.’s E x. 9, at 2. Ms. Johnson then left Ms. Drakeford a handwritten message at her work station, asking Ms. Drakeford to contact Ms. Johnson. Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. Ms . Drakeford did not contact M s. Johnson that day. Id. On Thursday, June 19, 2014, Ms. Drake ford still did not contact Ms. Johnson and did not report to work. Compl. ¶ 13; Pl. ’s Ex. 9, at 2. Instead, Ms. Jo hnson learned from Ms. Haspo that Ms. Drakeford had left Ms. Haspo a text message, which stated t hat Ms. Drakeford would not be reporting to work that day. Pl. ’s Ex. 9, at 2. By this point, M s. Johnson’s other supervisees had begun telling Ms. Johnson that Ms. Drakeford was not properly r equesting or using leave time.
Id. Concerned about Ms. Drakefor d leaving work early and failing t o sign out, Ms. Johnson met with Mr. Waters to di scuss the issue. Id. After Ms. Johnson asked Mr. Waters whether Ms. Drakeford had requested or r eceived leave for that day from him, Mr. Waters answered that Ms. Drakeford had not. Id. To improve the situation, Ms. Joh nson asked Mr. Waters whether Ms. Johnson’s supervisees on deta il with Ms. Haspo could resume signing in and out with Ms. Johnson, instead of at the Division Office. Id. Mr. Waters granted Ms. Johnson’s request and stated that Ms. Johnson had disc retion over her supervisees. See Compl. ¶ 15; Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. On Friday, June 20, 2014, Ms. Johnson implemented the agreed-up on plan: She verbally counseled Ms. Drakeford about pr oper procedures for leave reque sts, for which Ms. Drakeford7 should request leave from Ms. Johnson first, and then go up the supervisory ladder if Ms. Johnson was not available. C ompl. ¶ 16; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. And Ms. Johnson informed both Ms. Drakeford and Ms. Rankin t hat they should sign in and out w ith Ms. Johnson instead of at the Division Offi ce. Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. Later that day, Mr. Waters told Ms. Johnson that he had changed his mind. Compl. ¶ 16; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. Instead of signing in and out with Ms. Johns on, Mr. Waters had decided that Ms. Drakeford and Ms. Rankin s hould continue to sign in and out at the Division Office. Compl. ¶ 16; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2. When Ms. Johnson asked him why he had changed his mind, he merely responded “[b]ecause I said so.” Compl. ¶ 16. Ms. Johnson also spoke with her second-line supervisor, Mr. Her man, on June 20, 2014. Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2. She and Mr. Her man discussed what kind of le ave they would charge Ms. Drakeford, and they agreed on charging her annual leave. Id. Ms. Johnson also mentioned her concerns about Mr. Waters al lowing Ms. Drakeford to continu ing signing in and out at the Division Office. Id. Mr. Herman told Ms. Johnson that he would speak with Mr. Water s about the issue. Id. In July and August 2014, while her mother was in the hospital a nd after her mother died, Ms. Drakeford continued to take leave from work without getting Ms. Johnson’s approval. Compl. ¶ 17; Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2. On July 9, 2014, some of Ms. Jo hnson’s other supervisees told Ms. Johnson that Ms. Drakefor d would no longer ask Ms. Johnson for leave, because Mr. Waters had told Ms. Drakeford that as king Ms. Johnson was unnecessary. Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2.
F. Treatment of Ms. Johnson’s Mal e and Female Supervisees in G eneral According to Ms. Johnson, Mr. Wate r’s decisions about Ms. Drake ford were consistent with other decisions made i n the time around the June 2014 even ts. See Compl. ¶ 20. In 2014 and8 2015, Ms. Johnson attempted to issue supervisory counseling mem oranda to Ms. Drakeford and other female supervisees, but Mr . Waters and Mr. Herman process ed these memoranda slowly or not at all. Id. In contrast, Mr. Waters and Mr . Herman reviewed Ms. Johnson’s counseling memoranda to similarly situated male employees, edited them, an d sent them to the Library’s Human Resources department for fin al approval in less than a we ek. Id. Additionally, when some of Ms. Johnson’s other supe rvisees—including Mr. Bunch—had a parent or spouse who died, Ms. Johnson reports that t hose supervisees were not given “any especial treatment . . . or favors.” Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2, ECF No. 9-7. G. Discussions with Ms. Johnson’s Supervisors On August 6, 2014, Ms. Johnson met with both Mr. Waters and Mr. Herman to discuss Ms. Drakeford’s continued unapproved leave. Compl. ¶ 19; Pl.’s Ex. 1, ¶ 14, ECF No. 9-4. But instead of agreeing with Ms. Johns on’s position, Mr. Waters inf ormed Ms. Johnson that he would approve Ms. Drakeford’s leave. Compl. ¶ 19. He justified his position with statements about how Ms. Johnson had not take n similar actions with some o f her other supervisees. Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2, ECF No. 9-7. He also t old Ms. Johnson that she was no longer Ms. Drakeford’s supervisor. Compl. ¶ 19; Pl. ’s Ex. 1, ¶ 14; Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2, ECF No. 9-7. At the meeting, Mr. Herman “simply sat there,” without doing anything “other th an telling Mr. Waters that he had to be fair.” Def.’s Ex. 1, at 5, ECF No. 8-1; see also Compl. ¶ 19

. On August 13, 2014, Ms. Johnson put her narrative in writing an d sent an email to Mr. Sweeney about what had happe ned between herself, her superv isors, and her supervisees on detail with Ms. Haspo. Compl. ¶ 22; see Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 1–2, ECF No. 9-12. In response, Mr. Sweeney took three sets of actions: (1) he noted the possible discrimina tion allegations in Ms. Johnson ’s email, and forwarded the email to the L ibrary’s Office of Opportunity,9 Inclusiveness and Com pliance (OIC), which is tasked with proces sing allegations of employment discri mination made by Library employ ees; (2) he directed Mr. Herman to write a memo clarifying Ms. Johnson’s supervisory responsibilities for staff members on detail with M s. Haspo; and (3) he reviewed Ms. Drakeford’s registers and time sheets, determin ed that she was charged leave for all da ys she was not present, noted t hat she was not charged leave for one day for which the register was unclea r, and indicated that he would work wit h Mr. Herman to resolve the amb iguity relating to that one day. Compl. ¶ 22; Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 1; see Pl.’s Ex. 3, ECF No. 9-6 (show ing that OIC handled Ms. Johnson’s discrimination allegations); Pl.’s Ex. 5, ECF No. 9-8 (same). Having taken these actions, he considered the matter “closed” and directed Ms. Joh nson to “work through [her] established management chain of command.” Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 1.
H. Aftermath In a memorandum to Ms. Johnson dated August 27, 2014, Mr. Herma n “establish[ed] the reporting structure . . . in place for staff members serving on developmental assignments” with Ms. Haspo. Pl.’s Ex. 8, ECF No. 9-11. The memorandum affirmed M r. Waters’s decision to have Ms. Johnson’s supervisees “sign in and sign out in the CALM Div ision Office.” Id. ¶ 1. It went on to state that, for Ms. Johnson’ s supervisees on detail, “[a] ll requests for leave and for other scheduling-related issues” woul d be “the responsibility of RohnRoaché,” Ms. Haspo’s first-line supervisor. Id. ¶ 2; Def.’s Ex. 1, at 5. In Mr. R oaché’s absence, Mr. Herman, as Mr. Roaché’s immediate supervisor, would handle leave and scheduling issues. Pl.’s Ex. 8, ¶ 3; Def.’s Ex. 1, at 5. The memorandum further stated that day-to-day assignment of work and performance monitoring would rest with Ms. Haspo. Pl.’s Ex. 8, ¶ 4. After a supervisee completed his or her detail, Ms. Haspo would provide both Ms. Johnson and Mr. Roaché with “an assessment of how the employee performed.” Id.10 After the August 27, 2014 memorandum, Ms. Johnson’s supervisees still at times contacted her to request leave, because they could not reach Mr . Roaché or Mr. Herman. Def.’s Ex. 1, at 5. Because Mr. Herman and Mr. Roaché were often in me etings and sometimes worked off-site, and because Mr. Roaché did not work on Tuesdays, Mr. Herman and Mr. Roaché were not as available as Ms. Johnson. Id. I. Administrative Proceedings Alleging discrimination by Mr. Waters and Mr. Herman, Ms. Johns on filed an informal complaint on September 3, 2014 with the Library’s Office of Opp ortunity, Inclusiveness and Compliance (OIC). See Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-4. On September 10, 2014, the OIC told Ms. Johnson by letter that, because no resolution of her inform al complaint had been reached, she was “entitled to file a forma l discrimination complaint.” P l.’s Ex. 3, ECF No. 9-6. Ms. Johnson filed a formal discri mination complaint on Septembe r 16, 2014. See Pl.’s Ex. 4, ECF No. 9-7. But, on December 19, 2014, the OIC notified Ms. Johnson that it would not accept her formal complaint because she did not timely file it. See Compl. ¶ 10; Pl.’s Ex. 5, at 1, ECF No. 9-8. Ms. Johnson appealed t he decision and argued that her formal complaint was in fact timely. Compl. ¶ 10. On March 2, 2015, after reconsidering Ms. Johnson’s claims, the OIC affirmed that Ms. Johnson’s appeal was denied. See id. ; Def.’s Ex. 2, ECF No. 8-2. The OIC further specified that, eve n if Ms. Johnson had timely filed he r formal complaint, it “would not be accepted for investigation due to [her] failure to show an a dverse employment action.” Id. J. 2015 Performance Appraisal In 2015, Ms. Johnson received a l ower overall rating on her per formance appraisal for the rating period from Marc h 1, 2014 through February 28, 2015: “Su ccessful,” instead of the “Commendable” that s he had received in 2014. See Compl. ¶ 24. Compare Pl.’s Ex. 7, at 1, ECF11 No. 9-10, with Def.’s Ex. 4, at 1, ECF No. 8-4 (reproducing Ms. Johnson’s 201 4 performance appraisal). Her performance ra ting for her “Supervisory and Man agerial Responsibilities” was also “Successful,” not “Commendable.” Pl.’s Ex. 7, at 3. Ms. Jo hnson took offense to the lower ratings and, on April 7, 2015, she ref used to sign the performa nce appraisal. See id. at 6–7. In her comments, she charged Mr. Waters with making a “personal” perfo rmance evaluation instead of an “objective” one, because Ms. J ohnson had filed informal and formal discrimination complaints against him in September 2014. Id. at 6. She also noted tha t, for both the past two rating periods in which Mr. Water s was her supervisor, she had received a “Commendable” rating from Mr. Waters. Id. 5 K. Procedural History Ms. Johnson filed suit in this C ourt against the government on May 30, 2015. See Compl. Her complaint brings three “clai ms for relief”: (1) violation o f Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 6 (2) intentional infliction of e motional distress, and (3) inju nctive relief. Id. ¶¶ 26–39. In the complaint, Ms. Johnson alleg es that Mr. Waters and Mr. Herm an showed “preferential treatment to a female employee [],” which “created a hostile work environment and dissen[s]ion” among Ms. Johnson’s supervisees. Id. ¶ 21. The complaint further all eges that, after Ms. Johnson filed her administrativ e complaints, “she has received continuo us backlash from David Waters,” including removal of her supervis ory duties and a lower rating on a performance appraisal. Id. ¶ 24. Ms. Johnson cites her supervis ors’ actions as the basis f or her claims of “sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of . . . Title VII of the Civil Ri ghts Act of 1964.” Id. ¶¶ 24–32.

5 In her opposition brief, Ms. Johnson further alleges that she received a “Successful” rating just once, “over 20 years a go,” and that sh e “received arating of ‘Commendable’ for all other years.” Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 9-1 [hereinafter Pl.’s Me m.]. 6 Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII , 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17).12 In stating her intentional inf liction of emotional distress cla im, Ms. Johnson’s complaint contends that she “has suffere d and continues to suffer severe emotional distress as a result of the Library’s extreme and outrageous conduct.” Id. ¶ 36. In stating her claim fo r injunctive relief, Ms. Johnson asks the Court “to enj oin the Library from similarl y discriminating against its employees,” alleges that “[m]ore irreparable harm will result d uring the pendency of this legal action due to the Library’s illeg al discriminatory actions agai nst its employees,” and argues that “[p]ublic interest will be served if relief is granted.” Id. ¶¶ 38–39. In its pre-answer motion, the Lib rary seeks dismissal of Ms. Jo hnson’s complaint, or, in the alternative, summary judgmen t in its favor on Ms. Johnson’s claims. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, or in the A lternative for Summ. J. 1–4 & n .2, ECF No. 8 [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.]. The Library argues for di smissal of Ms. Johnson’s Title VII claim and contends that she (1) failed to exhaust administra tive remedies, (2) failed to ma ke a prima facie showing of discrimination, (3) failed to show causation, and (4) cannot ma intain a hostile work environment claim. Id. at 4–15. 7 The Library also argues that T itle VII preempts Ms. Johnson’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and that, even if it di d not, Ms. Johnson failed to exhaust administrative remedies for tha t claim under the Federal Tort C laims Act. Id. at 15–18. Lastly, the Library argues for dismissa l of Ms. Johnson’s claim for inj unctive relief by c ontending that Ms. Johnson “shows no basis for this extraordinary relief she r equests.” Id. at 18.

7 Because the Library has withdrawn the argument that Ms. Johnso n failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court will not address that argume nt in this opinion. See Reply Mem. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 1 n.1, ECF No. 11 [hereinafter D ef.’s Reply Mem.] (“Defendant will withdraw its argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.”); Rubiella Decl., ECF No. 11-1 (“I have examined the administrative file . . . and have determined that Ms. Johnson’s Complaint of Discrimination . . . was timely filed . . . .”). The Court also addresses the Li brary’s hostile work environment argument only briefly, because Ms. Johnson has not advanced that theory of sex discrimination in her opposition brief. See infra note 10.13 III. ANALYSIS The Court addresses the parties’ arguments for each claim in tu rn, beginning with Ms. Johnson’s Title VII claim. For each claim, the Court must d etermine the proper legal standard before proceeding to the merits.
A. Title VII 1. Legal Standard When, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), “matters outside the ple adings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the m otion must be treated as on e for summary judgment under Rule 56” and the parties “must be given a reasonable opportunit y to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Here, both parties have submitted evidence outside the pleadings in suppor t of their positions, and they r ely on them when discussing Ms. Johnson’s Title VII claim. See, e.g. , Def.’s Mem. 12 (citing to Ms. Johnson’s 2014 performance appraisal when ar guing that she failed to show caus ation); Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No. 9-1 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mem.] (citing to Mr. Herman’s August27, 2014 memorandum and to Mr. Sweeney’s email when respond ing to the Library’s Title VII argument). And though it is improper to convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction into a motion for summary judgment, see Ord v. District of Columbia , 587 F.3d 1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the Library’s arguments about Ms. Johnson’s Title V II claim do not assert that this Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim. See Def.’s Mem. 8–15. Therefore, the Court finds that conversion of the Government’s m otion to a motion for summary j udgment is appropriate. See Allen v. Napolitano , 774 F. Supp. 2d 186, 195 (D.D.C. 2011). 8

8 Although the Library seems to urge the Court to treat the Libr ary’s motion in its entirety as a motion to dismiss, see Def.’s Mem. 4 n.2, the Court notes t hat, if the Court did so, one of the Library’s key arguments would imm ediately fall flat. Ms. Johnso n, at the pleading stage, is not14 Given that the Library’s moti on comes before discovery has comm enced in this case, the Court pays special heed to the pr inciple that, typically, “summ ary judgment may not be granted until all parties have had a full opportunity to conduct discov ery.” United States ex rel. Folliard v. Gov’t Acquisitions, Inc. , 764 F.3d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks om itted) (quoting Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 684 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). T his principle is particularly relevant in a Title VII case, where “discovery may even uncover direct evidence of discrimination, thus entirely e liminating the need to prove a p rima facie case.” Chappell–
Johnson v. Powell , 440 F.3d 484, 488–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Th e Court could thus d eny the Library’s motion for summary j udgment on Ms. Johnson’s Title VI I claims simply because of this case’s preliminary posture. B ut, to ensure that this case is not the atypical one in which pre-discovery summary judgment is proper, the Court will analyz e the Library’s arguments on their merits, using the legal s tandard applicable to Rule 56 mo tions for summary judgment. Cf. Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated Printing Servs. , 338 F.3d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that summary judgm ent “ordinarily” is proper only after discovery (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Americable Int’l, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy , 129 F.3d 1271, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).

required to plead a prima f acie case of discrimination. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002); accord Jones v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l , 642 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[A]n employment discrimi nation plaintiff is not require d to plead every fact necessary to establish a prima facie case to survive a motion to dism iss.”). Thus, if the Court con sidered the Library’s Title VII arguments unde r motion-to-dismiss legal sta ndards, the Library’s argument that Ms. Johnson failed to estab lish a prima facie case of disc rimination or retaliation would be even less successful than it is under the summary judgment lega l standard. See generally Def.’s Mem. 5–12 (arguing that Ms. Johnso n failed to establish a primafacie case); infra Parts III.A.3–4 (explaining why the Library does not merit summary ju dgment on all of Ms. Johnson’s Title VII claims at this time).15 Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must grant summary judgment if “the movant shows th at there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ . P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substant ive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The inquiry under Rule 56 is essentially “whether the e vidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submi ssion to a jury or whether it is s o one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251–52. The principal purpose of summar y judgment is to determine wheth er there is a genuine need for trial by disposing of f actually unsupported claims or defenses. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). The mova nt bears the initial bur den of identifying portions of the record that dem onstrate the absence of any genu ine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323. In response, the non-movant must point to specific facts in the record tha t reveal a genuine issue that i s suitable for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant may not rest upon mere allega tions or denials but must instead present affirmative evidence. Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 257). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must “esc hew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007). All underlying facts and infe rences must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the

non-movant. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, con clusory assertions offered without16 any evidentiary support do not estab lish a genuine issue for tr ial. See Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 2. Title VII Principles The Court now turns to the mer its of Ms. Johnson’s Title VII cl aim. Title VII declares that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees . . . in . . . the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimi nation based on . . . sex . . . .” 42 U.S .C. § 2000e-16(a). This provision extends to Library of Congress em ployees “the full rights avail able in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector.” Loeffler v. Frank , 486 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chandler v. Roudebush , 425 U.S. 840, 841 (1976)). These rights include those under Title VII’s antiretaliation provisio n, which “forbids employer actions that ‘discriminate against’ an employee . . . because he has ‘o pposed’ a practice that Title VII forbids or has ‘made a charge . . . or participated in’ a Title VII ‘investigation, proceeding, or hearing.’” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 60 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framewor k applies when a Title VII plaintiff offers only indirect e vidence of discrimination at su mmary judgment, which Ms. Johnson does here. Taylor v. Small , 350 F.3d 1286, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See generally Compl. ¶¶ 11–32; Pl.’s Mem. 4–8 (di scussing only circumstantial and indirect evidence of discrimination). Under McDonnell Douglas , the plaintiff has the in itial burden of production to establish a prima facie case of di scrimination; if she does, th en the employer must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory r eason for its action; and if it does, then the plai ntiff must receive an opportunity to show that the em ployer’s reason was a pretextual cover for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). Although McDonnell17 Douglas shifts the burden of production be tween the parties, the plain tiff retains the burden of persuasion. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1993). 9 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate-treatme nt sex discrimination by establishing (1) that she is a member of a protected class, i.e. , that she is a woman, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that the unfavor able action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. See Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill , 43 F.3d 1507, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1995). She establishes a prima facie case of retalia tion by showing (1) that she opposeda practice made unlawful by Title VII, (2) that her employer took a materially adverse action aga inst her, and (3) t hat a causal link connects the plaintiff’s opposition to the unlawful practice an d the materially adverse action.
McGrath v. Clinton , 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). For a retaliation claim, the materia lly adverse action need not be workplace-related or employment -related, but it must be an acti on that “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a char ge of discrimination.’”

9 The Court must forgo the McDonnell Douglas framework when, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court immediately observes tha t a plaintiff suffered an “adverse employment action” and her employer asserted a “legiti mate, non-discriminatory reason” for the alleged discrimination. See Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (directing the Court, in those circumstanc es, to resolve simply whether “the employee produced sufficient evid ence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that th e employer intentionally discriminated against the emp loyee on the basis of . . . sex”). Because the Library has not advanced a legitimate, non-discri minatory reason for Ms. Johnso n’s discrimination allegations, but instead attacks her prima facie case, see Def.’s Mem. 5–15, Brady ’s condensed analysis is inapplicable here. See generally Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 812 F.3d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (applying Brady “[i]n reviewing a summary judgmen t motion where the defendant has proffered some legitimate reason for its adverse employment act ion”); Brady , 520 F.3d at 494 n.2 (noting that the plaintiff mu st still establish a prima fac ie case in “those cases in which the defendant does not assert any legitimate, nondiscriminatory r eason for the [employment] decision”); Mokhtar v. Kerry , 83 F. Supp. 3d 49, 77 (D.D.C. 2015) (same).18 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales , 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Under either theory of Title VII liability, the plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie cas e “is not oner ous.” Wiley v. Glassman , 511 F.3d 151, 126–27 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)); accord Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 494 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 3. Sex Discrimination 10 The Library’s principal argumen t for summary judgment on Ms. Jo hnson’s sex discrimination claim is that she fails to make a prima facie sh owing of discrimination because she has not shown that the Libr ary took an adverse employment a ction against her. See Def’s

10 Title VII sex discrimination claim s typically allege disparate treatment on the basis of sex, see, e.g. , Holbrook v. Reno , 196 F.3d 255, 260–62 (D.C. Cir. 1999), butTitle VII also provides a cause of action ba sed on a hostile or abusive work e nvironment, when the harassment is so abusive that it affects a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment, see Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc. , 275 F.3d 1119, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986)). Ms. Johnson’s complaint alleges that h er supervisors’ actions “have created a hostile work environm ent,” Compl. ¶ 21, but she seems to abandon this line of argument in her opposition brief. Compare Pl.’s Mem. 4–8 (declining to pursue her hostile work environment allegation), with Def.’s Mem. 13–15 (arguing for di smissal of Ms. Johnson’s host ile work environment claim). Because the Court will not enter summary judgment on all of Ms. Johnson’s Title VII claims at this time, the Court need not address the merits of a ny hostile work environment allegations. The Court does not e, however, that, if Ms. Johnson ’s Title VII claim were solely a hostile work environment claim , she would have failed to establ ish a prima facie case. Ms. Johnson’s complaint and evidence do not allege that she was a v ictim of sexual harassment, nor do they develop many of the element s of a prima facie hostile w ork environment case. See, e.g. , Compl. ¶¶ 11–32; Pl.’s E x. 9, at 1–2, ECF No. 9-12. See generally Davis , 275 F.3d at 1122–23 (explaining that a plaintiff esta blishes a prima facie hostile work environment case by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she received unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was because of he r sex; (4) the harassment unrea sonably interfered with her work performance and created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) respondeat superior liability exists).19 Mem. 8–12. 11 The Court briefly summarizes th e law on this element of Ms. Jo hnson’s prima facie case before analyzing how her alleged adverse employment actions—removal of supervisory duties and a lower r ating on her performance apprai sal, see Compl. ¶¶ 24, 31—fare under that law. For a discrimination claim, an a dverse employment action is “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant c hange in benefits.” Baird v.
Gotbaum , 662 F.3d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (inte rnal quotation mark s omitted) (quoting Douglas v. Donovan , 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). The plaintiff must “expe rience materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions , or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities su ch that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Douglas , 559 F.3d at 552 (brackets omitted) (quoting Forkkio v. Powell , 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). “Obj ectively tangible harm” tends to “relate to one’s work responsibilities and position” a nd “cause a significant change in employment status.” Id. at 552–53 (noting that award or denial of a bonus or pay raise, li ke hiring, firing, failing to promote, and reassignment with s ignificantly different responsi bilities, could show objectively tangible harm because it has a measurable effect on compensatio n). Adverse employment actions do not encompass “mere idiosyncracies of personal preference” and “[p]urely subjective

11 The Library’s argument that Ms. Johnson has “presented no evid ence of causation,” Def.’s Mem. 12–13, is relevant t o Ms. Johnson’s retaliation all egations, but not to her discrimination allegations. See Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (articulating the elements of a prima facie sex discrimination case without including causation as one of them). And because, as discussed below, the Court will n ot enter summary judgment on Ms. Johnson’s sex discrimination claim at this time, the Court will not discuss the merits of any hostile work environment claim, w hich the Library also addresse s in its brief. See Def.’s Mem. 13–15; supra note 10.20 injuries,” such as “dissatisf action with a reassignment, or pub lic humiliation or loss of reputation.” Forkkio , 306 F.3d at 1130–31 (brackets, cita tions, and internal quotat ion mark omitted) (quoting Brown v. Brody , 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). a. Removal of Supervisory Duties As one of her alleged adverse employment actions, Ms. Johnson s ubmits that the Library removed Ms. Johnson’s supervisory duties over Ms. Drakeford whe n Mr. Waters told Ms. Johnson that “she was no longer Ms. Drakeford’s supervisor. ” Compl. ¶¶ 19, 24, 31. In cases involving lateral tran sfers, withdrawal of supervisory duties c an be an adverse employment action. See Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 350, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Sim ilarly, in reassignmen t cases, a plaintiff suffers an adve rse employment action if, at her new position, she has significantly changed benefits or significantly different respo nsibilities. See Youssef v. FBI , 687 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Ginger v. District of Columbia , 527 F.3d 1340, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Czekalski , 475 F.3d at 355. “[I]f a reasonable juror could find that the reassignment left the plaintiff with significantl y diminished responsibilities,” then the jury must d ecide whether the reassignment was an adverse ac tion; “[t]he court may not take t hat question away from the jury.” Czekalski , 475 F.3d at 356. At this time, on the limited evide nce available, a reasonable j uror could find that the removal of some of Ms. Johnson’s supervisory duties caused such a significant change in her employment status that it was an adverse employment action. To be sure, the Library argues that “Ms. Drakeford was not removed as a direct report to Ms. Johnso n,” and that Mr. Herman’s August 27, 2014 memorandum “expressl y acknowledged that Ms. Dra keford’s performance continued to be within Ms. Johns on’s purview.” Def.’s Mem. 8. B ut Mr. Herman’s memorandum belies this characterization of t he facts; it envisions a very limited role for Ms. Johnson as21 supervisor to Ms. Drakeford and other supervisees on detail. Co ntrary to the Library’s position, Ms. Johnson would not “receive f eedback on Ms. Drakeford’s perf ormance during the developmental assignment,” id. ; she would receive only a on e-time “assessment of how [Ms. Drakeford] performed” duri ng her detail “at the end” of th e time Ms. Drakeford was on detail with Ms. Haspo, Def.’ s Ex. 3, ECF No. 8-3. Nor would Ms. Johnson have responsibility any longer for Ms. Drakeford’s sign-in and sign-out timekeeping

. See id. ; cf. Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2, ECF No. 9-12 (noting that Ms. J ohnson had functioned as a supervisor and timekeeper for “the four previous staff members” w ho had been detaile d to work with Ms. Haspo). Mr. Herman’s memorandum implies that, practica lly speaking, Ms. Johnson ceas ed to function as Ms. Drakeford’s supervisor duri ng the time Ms. Drakeford was ondetail. And the memorandum impacted not just Ms. Drakefor d, but also any supervisees of Ms . Johnson who would be detailed to Ms. Haspo in the future. See Def.’s Ex. 3 (establishing the reporting structure for all “st aff members serving on developmental assignments . . . managed by . . . Beatriz Haspo,” not just the reporting structure for Ms. Drakeford). The record does not specify exac tly how many Library employees Ms. Johnson supervised. It does, however, make clear that supervisory and m anagerial responsibilities were a major area of responsibility for Ms. Johnson: twenty-five perce nt of her overall performance rating rested on those responsibilities. See Pl.’s Ex. 10, at 2–3, ECF No. 9-13. And whether she succeeded in her supervisory and man agerial responsibilities de rived, to some extent, from how “[e]ffectively [she] set[] schedul es to meet the needs of the d ivision”— i.e. , how effectively she managed her supervisees’ work and leave time to ensure the Libr ary’s goals were met. See id. at 3. With two of Ms. Johnson’s supe rvisees at a time serving deta il assignments, and no end date for the detail assignments forecas ted, Mr. Herman’s memorandum stripped Ms. Johnson of22 supervisory responsibilities fo r two supervisees indefinitely. See Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 2 (indicating that Ms. Johnson’s supervisees typical ly went on detail in groups of two); Def.’s Ex. 3 (including no end date for the developmental assignments with Ms. Haspo). Based on this skeletal record, areasonable juror could potenti ally find, on the evidence presented, that Ms. Johnson experien ced the equivalent of a lat eral transfer or a reassignment in which she received “significantl y different responsibilities” a nd in which the Library withdrew many of her former supervisory duties. See Czekalski , 475 F.3d at 364 (quoting Forkkio , 305 F.3d at 1131). The change in Ms. J ohnson’s employment duties re lated to her “work responsibilities and position,” a nd thus a reasonable juror cou ld potentially find it “obvious” that it significantly changed h er employment status. Douglas , 559 F.3d at 552. Given these potential findings (if based on a fuller r ecord), Ms. Johnson’s change in supervisory duties would be “conclusively presumed to be [an] adverse employment action[], even if any alleged harm is speculative.” Id. at 552–53. Hence, contrary to the L ibrary’s argument, Ms. John son need not show that the Library’s actions would result “in a diminution i n pay or benefits” or would “affect[] . . . future employmentopportunities.” Def.’s Mem. 9

. 12 Given that a reasonable juror could potentially find on a fulle r record that the Library took an adverse employment action against Ms. Johnson, a reason able juror could also proceed

12 Of course, Ms. Johnson’s situa tion does not neatly fall into a “lateral transfer” or “reassignment” category. See Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing adverse employment actions in the context of these two categori es of employer actions). But facts cognizable as Title VII discrimination need not fall unde r preordained categories. Indeed, the statute itself broadly bars discrimination “with respect to [the plaintiff’s] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” in addition t o discrimination in hiring and fi ring decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). And, as the D.C. Circuit has declared, “[s]o long as a plaintiff meets the statutory requirement of be ing ‘aggrieved’ by an employer’s action, we do not categorically rej ect a particular personnel a ction as nonadverse simply because it does not fall into a cognizable type.” Holcomb v. Powell , 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)).23 to find that Ms. Johnson established each of the three elements of a prima facie case of sex discrimination: First, she is a woman, and therefore a member o f a protected class. See Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill , 43 F.3d 1507, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Second, Ms. Johnson’s loss of supervisory duties can be t he requisite adverse employm ent action. Third, a reasonable juror could infer discrimination f rom the Library’s actions bec ause, for Ms. Johnson’s supervisees on detail, the Libra ry transferred Ms. Johnson’s ti mekeeping responsibilities to Rohn Roaché, a male supervisor. See Def.’s Ex. 3, ECF No. 8-3. See generally Czekalski , 475 F.3d at 366 (“[A] plaintiff can satisf y the third prong of the prima fa cie test . . . by demonstrating that she was treated differently from similarly situated employees w ho are not part of the protected class . . . .” (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting George v. Leavitt , 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2005))). To rebut this prima facie show ing of discrimination, the Librar y has offered no legitimate, non-discriminatory reas on for the change in Ms. Joh nson’s supervisory duties. See Def.’s Mem. 5–12. 13 Based on the current record, there fore, “there is sufficient e vidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to r eturn a verdict for that par ty.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Accordingly, the Court must deny th e Library summary judgment on Ms. Johnson’s sex discrimination claim. See id. ; see also Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Whether a particular reassignm ent of duties constitutes an adverse action for purposes of Title VII is generally a jury qu estion.”). But the Court reiterates

13 Although Mr. Herman’s August27, 2014 memorandum indicates tha t the Library implemented changes to Ms. Johns on’s supervisory duties “[t]o e nsure the most efficient and consistent record keeping” for Ms. Johnson’s supervisees on det ail, Def.’s Ex. 3, ECF No. 8-3, the Library’s brief does not adopt this argument. See Def.’s Mem. 4–15 (declin ing to make this argument when urging dismissal of Ms. Johnson’s Title VII claim ).24 that this is a preliminary c onclusion based on a vastly inadequ ate record. The Court’s views may change based on a full record after discovery. b. Lower Rating on Performance Appraisal Ms. Johnson’s complaint names a lower rating on her performance appraisal as another adverse employment action the Library took against her. See Compl. ¶¶ 24, 31. The D.C. Circuit has more than once noted that “per formance evaluations ordinari ly are not actionable under Title VII” because the harm they cause is often speculative. Douglas v. Donovan , 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see Taylor v. Small , 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that poor performance evaluations shou ld not be considered adverse a ctions when they do not affect the employee’s grade or salary); Russell v. Principi , 257 F.3d 815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The result of an evaluation is ofte n speculative, making it difficu lt to remedy.”). But, more recently, the Circuit has cautioned that even an unchanged performance ev aluation could be an adverse employment action: “An employ ee whose volume and quality of wor k demonstrably improved, or who had significant difficultie s at work in the prior period that she had overcome, might fairly deserve a significantly impr oved rating and would be materially harmed if discrimination prevented appropriate recognition.” Walker v. Johnson , 798 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In determining whether a performa nce evaluation is actionable unde r Title VII, therefore, the critical question is whether th e evaluation “caused a significa nt, tangible harm.” Id. Ms. Johnson has not produced evide nce showing that her lowered performance rating caused “significant, tangible harm.” Id. Although the evidence suggests that Ms. Johnson’s overall rating of “Successful” on her 2015 performance appraisa l is lower compared to her past ratings of “Commendable,” see Pl.’s Ex. 7, at 6, ECF No. 9-10, Ms. Johnson has not alleged t hat the lower rating will lead to economic harm, or even decreased responsibilities on the job. Nor25 has she alleged that her “volum e and quality of work demonstrab ly improved,” or that she “had significant difficulties at work in the prior period that she h ad overcome.” Walker , 798 F.3d at 1095. Indeed, Ms. Johnson’s oppositi on brief does not even adva nce the argument that her lower performance appraisal rating is an adverse employment action co gnizable in Title VII sex discrimination. See Pl.’s Mem. 4–11 (discussing Ms. J ohnson’s performance appraisa l in the context of her retaliation alle gations only). On the record pre sented, therefore, Ms. Johnson’s lowered rating is not an adverse employment action that can gro und a prima facie sex discrimination claim. Thus, to the extent that Ms. Johnson’s se x discrimination claim is based on her lowered performance ra ting, that claim is dismissed. See Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (indica ting that, even thoug h a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case to defend again st a motion for summary judgmen t, she still must show that she “has suffered an adverse employment action”). 4. Retaliation The Court now turns to the Library’s arguments about Ms. Johnso n’s Title VII retaliation allegations. As the Library did f or Ms. Johnson’s discriminatio n claim, the Library argues that her retaliation claim must fail because she cannot show the adv erse action necessary to establish a prima facie case. Def.’s Mem . 8–12. The Library also argues t hat she has presented “no evidence of causation,” a necessary element of a prima facie re taliation case. Id. at 12–13; see McGrath v. Clinton , 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). But, for Ms. Johnson’s retaliation c laim based on the removal of her supervisory duties, neither argum ent proves that the Library me rits summary judgment.26 a. Materially Adverse Action As one element of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that her employer took a mat erially adverse action against her. McGrath v. Clinton , 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Although an adverse action is a cr itical element of the prima f acie case for both Title VII discrimination and Title VII reta liation, “Title VII’s substant ive [antidiscrimination] provision and its antiretaliation provision are not coterminous” in the s et of employer actions they forbid. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006); see also id. at 61–62 (juxtaposing the two provisi ons and observing that, though the substantive provision’s text “limit[s] the scope of that provi sion to actions t hat affect em ployment or alter the conditions of the workplace,” “[n]o such limiti ng words appear in the antiret aliation provision”). The Court must therefore analyze whether , separate from Ms. Johnson’s pri ma facie discrimination case, Ms. Johnson’s alleged adverse actions suffice for a prima facie retaliation case. As before, the Court begins with general princi ples before analyzing whether M s. Johnson’s alleged adverse employer actions can sustain a p rima facie case of retaliation. “The scope of the antiretalia tion provision extends beyond work place-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.” Id. at 67. It does not, however protect an employee “from all retaliation” —only “from retaliation that pro duces an injury or harm.” Id. Along these lines, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision protec ts employees from materially adverse harms, which might have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales , 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Because the harm must be “material,” “petty27 slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” do not rise to the level of materially adverse employer actions. See id. But no bright line separates mate rially adverse employer action s from immaterial actions:
“Context matters.” Id. at 69. An “act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue , 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2005)). Nonethel ess, determining whethe r an action is materially adverse “does not require considerat ion . . . of the severity of the un derlying act of discrimination to which the employee objected, or . . . of the courage that [a] p articular employee demonstrated by reporting it (and hence of her asse rted imperviousness to acts of retaliation).” Steele v. Schafer , 535 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
i. Removal of Supervisory Duties Although Ms. Johnson’s filings are not models of clarity, one m ay infer from her complaint that she views the r emoval of her supervisory duties as a potential act of retaliation, as well as a potential act of sex discrimination. See Compl. ¶ 24 (alleging that Ms. Johnson “has received continuous back lash from David Waters, which includes the . . . act of taking away her staff”); cf. Pl.’s Mem. 4–8 (discussing the removal of Ms. Johnson’s superv isory duties, but without clearly specifying wheth er Ms. Johnson views the actionas one of discrimination or retaliation). From the retalia tion perspective, Ms. Johnson app ears to argue that, in response to her concerns about disparate trea tment of Ms. Johnson’s male an d female supervisees, the Library removed her supervisory du ties to cover up its “prior d iscriminatory animus.” See Pl.’s
Mem. 5–6. The Court must therefore asse ss based on the extremely limited record before it whether the removal of Ms. Johnson’s supe rvisory duties is a materially adverse action for purposes of a28 Title VII retaliation c laim. As discussed earlier, a reasonable juror could find that the change in supervisory duties was an adverse employment action in a discri mination case. See supra Part III.A.3.a. Consequently, a reasonable juror could also find tha t, in a retaliation c ase, the change in supervisory duties was a mate rially adverse action. After al l, “[t]he scope of t he antiretaliation provision extends beyond” the scope of Title VII’s antidiscrimi nation provision. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). And given that Ms. Johnson lost supervisory responsibilities for two supervis ees indefinitely, in a year wh en twenty-five percent of her overall performance rating depended on how well she performed her super visory responsibilities, the lost supervisory responsibilities “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales , 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Thus, based on this limited recor d, the Court concludes that a reasonable juror could find tha t Ms. Johnson has established th e materially adverse action necessary to maintain a prima f acie retaliation claim under Tit le VII. But the Court’s view could change based on a fuller record.
ii. Lower Rating on Performance Appraisal Ms. Johnson also alleges that t he lower rating on her 2015 perf ormance appraisal was a retaliatory act. See Compl. ¶ 24 (contending that “a lower rating on Johnson’s Perf ormance Appraisal” was also “backlash fro m David Waters”). But just as the lower performance rating was not an adverse personnel acti on that could sustain Ms. John son’s prima facie discrimination case, it also is not cognizable a s a materially adverse action that can sustai n her prima facie retaliation case. Although the law articulates the a dverse actions required for p rima facie discrimination and retaliation cases differently, see Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53,29 61–67 (2006), both types of adverse action must cause a “signif icant, tangible harm” to comprise part of a prima facie case. See Walker v. Johnson , 798 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining that “[w]hether an a ssessment is adverse” hinges on “whether discrimination or retaliation caused a significant, tangible harm” (emphasis added)). As the Court stated earlier, Ms. Johnson lacks evidence of “si gnificant, tangible harm” flow ing from her lower rating. See

supra Part III.A.3.b. The rating thus i s not a materially adverse ac tion and is not cognizable as Title VII retaliation. Nonetheless, because the removal of Ms. Johnson’s supervisory d uties is cognizable as a materially adverse action, the Cour t next analyzes whether she can show causation, another necessary element of a primafacie retaliation case.
b. Causation To reiterate, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of ret aliation by showing (1) that she opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII, (2) that her employer took a materially adverse action against her, and ( 3) that a causal link connects the plaintiff’s opposition to the unlawful practice and the m aterially adverse action. McGrath v. Clinton , 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). If the plaintiff’s opposition activity and the employer’s materially adverse actio n occurred close in time, then their temporal proximity can s upport an inference of causation. Hamilton v. Geithner , 666 F.3d 1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Although a two-month gap can suppo rt an inference of causation,
id. at 1358, and a twenty-mont h gap suggests no causality, Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden , 532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001) (per curiam), t he Court must evaluate “the specific facts of each case to determine whether inferri ng causation is appropriate,” Hamilton , 666 F.3d at 1358.30 The Library argues that Ms. Johns on cannot show temporal proxim ity because “the retaliatory act occu r[red] after the pr otected activity, and no t before.” Reply Mem. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 8, ECF No. 11 [hereinaf ter Def.’s Reply Mem.]. Butthe Library’s argument assumes that Ms. Johnson’s protected oppositi on activity— i.e. , the activity that allegedly spurred the Library’s materially advers e action—was her informal discri mination complaint, which she filed on September 3, 2014. See Def.’s Mem. 12–13; Def.’s Re ply Mem. 7–8; Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-4 (reproducing Ms. Johnson’s in formal complaint). In doin g so, the Library overlooks where Ms. Johnson explains that th e removal of her supervisory duties came after she raised concerns about Mr. Waters’s “ref us[al] to execute the identical appropriate disciplinary actions upon . . . female employees that had b een enforced against simi larly situated male employees.” Pl.’s Mem. 5. From this chain of events, Ms. Johnson argues tha t the removal of her supervisory duties “was . . . motivated by the pr ior discriminatory animus, disparate treatment of [her] female and male staff by David Waters.” Id. at 6. Instead of offering Ms. Johnson’s informal discrimination complaint as he r protected opposition activity, Ms. Johnson points to her conversations with Mr. Waters a bout possible disparate treatmen t of Ms. Johnson’s female and male supervisees. See id. at 5–6; Compl. ¶¶ 16–17 (al leging that, on June 20, 2014, “Joh nson reminded David Waters that he a greed to have the male employees sign-in and sign-out with her directly in order for their tim e to be monitored accurately,” b ut “he did not impose the same requirement for Ms. Drakeford”). T his narrative changes the tem poral proximity analysis, making it less of an easy win for the Library. Indeed, it provi des a solid foundation for the causation element in Ms. Johnson’s prima facie retaliation case

. Title VII’s antiret aliation provision protects employee opposit ion to any practice that Title VII made unlawful. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The Supreme Court has made clear that31 the opposition need not be the in itiation of a written discrimi nation complaint; it can be more informal, such as “standing pat . . . by refusing to follow a s upervisor’s order t o fire a junior worker for discriminatory reasons.” Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t , 555 U.S. 271, 277 (2009). And the Supreme Court has noted tha t “employees will often face ret aliation not for opposing discrimination they themselves face, but for reporting discrimi nation suffered by others.” Id. at 279 n.3. Here, therefore, Title VII’s a ntiretaliation provision likely p rotected Ms. Johnson’s opposition to what she perceived to be disparate treatment of h er female and male supervisees, expressed through her conversati ons with her supervisors on Jun e 20, 2014, August 6, 2014, and August 13, 2014. See Compl. ¶¶ 16–17 (stating that, on June 20, 2014, Ms. Johnson s poke with Mr. Waters about Ms. Drakeford’s treatment); id. ¶ 19 (stating that, on August 6, 2014, Ms. Johnson met with Mr. Herman a nd Mr. Waters about Ms. Drakef ord’s treatment); id. ¶ 22 (stating that, on August 13, 2014, Ms. Johnson told Mr. Sweeney about Ms. Drakeford’s treatment). At least, for purpos es of this motion, the Library does not argue otherwise. Even if, as the Library contends, Mr. Water s and Mr. Herman were not favori ng Ms. Johnson’s female supervisees, “opposition activ ity may be protected even though the employer’s practices do not amount to a violation of Title VII” when “the employee-plaintif f . . . [has] a good faith and reasonable belief that the practices are unlawful.” Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors,
Chairman , 709 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2013); cf. Def.’s Mem. 14–15 (arguing that evidence contradicts Ms. Johnson’s allega tion that her supervisors favor ed her female supervisees over her male supervisees). No evidence i n the record indicates that Ms. Johnson lacked a reasonable belief that her supervisors’ pract ices were unlawful; her submi ssions, which contain detailed explanations about how and why her views arose, show Ms. Johnso n’s consistent beliefs about32 her supervisees’ disparate treatment based on their sex. See generally Pl.’s Ex. 1, ¶ 14, ECF No. 9-4 (juxtaposing treatment of Ms. Johnson’s female and male supervisees); Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2, ECF No. 9-7 (same); Pl.’s Ex. 9, a t 1–2, ECF No. 9-12 (same). T hus, for purposes of this motion, it is undisputed that Ms. Johnson’ s communications with her sup ervisors on June 20, 2014, August 6, 2014, and August 13, 2014 were all opposition activit ies Title VII protected. Having established that Ms. Johns on engaged in protected opposi tion activities in June 2014 and early August 2014, the tempor al proximity analysis bec omes simple. As discussed above, Ms. Johnson has preliminar ily established a materially a dverse action for her prima facie retaliation case: the removal of her supervisory duties over su pervisees on detail with Ms. Haspo.
See supra Part III.A.4.a.i. That remo val happened, in part, on August 6, 2014, when Mr. Waters told Ms. Johnson that she was no l onger Ms. Drakeford’s supervi sor. Compl. ¶ 19; Pl.’s Ex. 1, ¶ 14; Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 2. And, on August 27, 2014, Mr. Herman’s memorandum extended Mr. Waters’s decision to remove Ms. Johnson’s supervisory duties ov er Ms. Drakeford to all of Ms. Johnson’s supervisees on detail. See Pl.’s Ex. 8, ECF No. 9-11. Given this timeline, Ms. Johnson’s protected opposition activit ies all came shortly before employer actions that removed s ome of her supervisory duties. F irst, Ms. Johnson’s initial June 20, 2014 conversation with Mr. Water s about perceived disparate treatment, see Compl. ¶¶ 16–17, occurred about two months be fore she lost supervisory duties on August 6, 2014 and August 27, 2014. Second, her August 6, 2014 statements expressi ng concern about the disparate treatment immediately preceded Mr. Waters’s statement removing Ms. Johnson’s supervisory duties over Ms. Drakeford that very day. Id. ¶ 19. Third, Ms. Johnson’s August 13, 2014 email to Mr. Sweeney about the situation oc curred just two weeks before Mr. Herman’s August 27, 2014 memorandum removing her supervisory duties for all her supervis ees on detail. See Pl.’s Ex. 8;33 Pl.’s Ex. 9. Given the relativ ely small time period between Ms. Johnson’s protecte d activities and her later loss of supe rvisory duties, a reasonable juror could infer that Mr. Waters and Mr. Herman retaliated against Ms. Johnson in response to her di scrimination allegations, which she had recently expressed to he r supervisors through conversat ion and email. Ms. Johnson has thus made out each of the three elements of a p rima facie retaliation case: (1) she opposed her supervis ors’ disparate treatment of h er female and male supervisees, (2) her supervisors removed her supervisory duties over supervi sees on detail, and (3) these two sets of actions occurred close e nough in time that a reasonable juror could infer retaliation. In response to her prima facie ca se, the Library has offered no le gitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the alleged retaliation. See Def.’s Mem. 5–12. On the reco rd as it stands now, a reasonable juror could find at trial that Ms. Johnson has prove n her retaliation claim. Because “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party,” summary judgment for t he Library on Ms. Johnson’s retal iation claim based on the removal of her supervisory duties is not warrante d at this time

. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Ms. Johnson’s complaint also brings a common law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Compl. ¶¶ 33–36. The Library ar gues—correctly—that Title VII p rovides the exclusive remedy for this cl aim and so the claim must be di smissed. See Def.’s Mem. 15–16. Before addressing the Library’s a rgument, however, the Court mu st specify the legal standard applicable to this portion of the Library’s motion.34 1. Legal Standard Where the Library’s briefs address Ms. Johnson’s claim for inte ntional infliction of emotional distress, they do not c ite “matters outside the plead ings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see Def.’s Mem. 15–18; Def.’s Reply M em. 9. Federal Rule of Civil P rocedure 12(d) accordingly does not require the Court to tre at the Library’s motion, where it argues to dismiss Ms. Johnson’s emotional distress claim, as a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)

. Having determined that the Librar y’s motion, as it relates to M s. Johnson’s emotional distress claim, is a motion to di smiss, the Court must decide w hich legal standard to apply: the one for motions under Rule 12(b) (1) arguing lack of subject-mat ter jurisdiction, or the one for motions under Rule 12(b)(6) argui ng the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Fed. R. C iv. P. 12(b)(6)

. The Library brings its motion under both Rules. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 1 (“Defendant . . . respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint . . . .”). The citati on to both rules makes sense her e because the Library’s motion brings two alternative argument s attacking Ms. Johnson’s emotio nal distress claim: (1) Title VII preempts her claim, because it provides the exclusive remedy fo r federal employees bringing employment discrimination claim s, Def.’s Mem. 15–16, and (2) ev en if Title VII did not preempt her claim, the Court lacks jurisdiction, because sovereign immu nity shields the federal government from suit and Ms. Johns on’s claim does not fall with in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)’s waiver of s overeign immunity, id. at 16–18. 14

14 The FTCA does not appear to appl y here: “under the Federal Emp loyees Compensation Act (“FECA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq. , federal employees are sta tutorily precluded from bringing suits for money damages for injuries sustained during the course of their employment,” and thus they cannot rely on the FTC A to bring work-related tor t claims. See Davis v. United States , 973 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2014); see also id. at 28 n.4 (noting that th e D.C. Circuit35 The Library’s first argument is properly analyzed under Rule 12 (b)(6); the second under Rule 12(b)(1). See King v. Holder , 950 F. Supp. 2d 164, 170, 173 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing under Rule 12(b)(6) “common l aw tort claims . . . based on the exact same conduct as the Plaintiff's Title VII claims”); Clayton v. District of Columbia , 931 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200 (D.D.C. 2013) (“If sovereign immunity ha s not been waived, a claim is s ubject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”). Because th e Court finds the first argument sufficient to dismiss Ms. Johnson’s claim, see infra Part III.B.2, the Court applies only the Rule 12(b)(6) legal standard. In considering a motion to dismi ss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Cou rt presumes that the complaint’s factual allegations are true and construes them lib erally in the pl aintiff’s favor. See,

e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not test a pl aintiff’s ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff ha s properly stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Brewer v. District of Columbia , 891 F. Supp. 2d 126, 130 (D.D.C. 2012). Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a m otion to dismiss, a complaint mu st contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief t hat is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This means that a plain tiff’s factual allegations “mus t be enough to raise aright to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the alle gations in the complaint are true

“has not yet decided whether FECA covers claims for [intentiona l infliction of emotional distress],” but nonetheless observing that FECA “does not seem to distinguish [intentional infliction of emotional distress] from other intentional torts on its face”). And though the Library of Congress, as a creature of C ongress instead of the Executive Branch, has several unique aspects, the Court notes that th e FECA appears to apply to empl oyees “in any branch of the Government of the United Sta tes.” 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1)(A).36 (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555–56 (citations and footnote omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the eleme nts of a cause of action, supp orted by mere conclusory statements,” are therefore ins ufficient to withstand a motion t o dismiss. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678

. A court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, see id. , nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched as factual a llegations, see Twombly , 550 U.S.
at 555. 2. Claim Subsumed in Title VII Claim The Library moves to dismiss Ms . Johnson’s emotional distress c laim because “Title VII preempts” it. Def.’s Mem. 15–16. T itle VII does “provide[] the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination i n federal employment.” Brown v. GSA , 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976);
accord Ramey v. Bowsher , 915 F.2d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam); King v. Holder , 950 F. Supp. 2d 164, 173 (D.D.C. 2013). Hence, when a common law to rt claim arises out of the same conduct as the plaintiff’s Title VII claim , Title VII pree mpts that claim. See King , 950 F. Supp. 2d at 173. Along these lines, “ [a]ny emotional injuries a rising from the alleged [Title VII claim] are subsumed within Ti tle VII,” though th is principle do es not extend to emotional distress based on “alleged assaul tive conduct” or other conduct that Title VII does not redress. Boyd v. O’Neill , 273 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (D.D.C. 2003); accord Jackson v. Am. Chem. Soc’y , 812 F. Supp. 239, 243 (D.D.C. 1993); Stewart v. Thomas , 538 F. Supp. 891, 895–96 (D.D.C. 1982). Thus, a victim of discrimination can maintain a common law tort claim only when the claim alleges a harm that Title VII does not remedy. See Boyd , 273 F. Supp. at 96–97; Stewart , 538 F. Supp. at 895–96. Ms. Johnson’s tort claim does not allege such a harm. In her co mplaint, Ms. Johnson’s emotional distress claim clearl y derives from her discriminatio n allegations: It incorporates the37 same facts as those underlying Ms . Johnson’s Title VII claim. C ompl. ¶ 33. And, without alleging additional facts, it argues that because “[t]he Librar y acted intentionall y in conspiring to discriminate against its male employees and retaliate against [ Ms.] Johnson,” Ms. Johnson “has suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress.” Id. ¶¶ 34–36. In her opposition brief, Ms. Johnson does not change the position taken in her complaint : it repeats two sentences of the complaint, Compl. ¶¶ 34–35, before concluding that Ms. Johnson’ s “emotional suffering is the direct result of Defendant’s [di scriminatory and retaliatory] c onduct.” Pl.’s Mem. 9. In sum, Ms. Johnson has not, anywhere in her filings, alleged an assaul t or other facts “actionable apart from Title VII because [they are] beyond the meaning of discrim ination.” Boyd , 273 F. Supp. 2d at 96. Her emotional distress claim derives completely from the Library’s alleged Title VII violations, and thus “[a]ny emoti onal injuries” arising from th ose violations “are subsumed within Title VII.” Id. Because Title VII provides a remedy for Ms. Johnson’s emotiona l injuries, it preempts her common law e motional distress claim. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (allowing the Court to award “equ itable relief as the court dee ms appropriate” to redress “an unlawful employment practice” under Title VII); id. § 2000e-16(a), (d) (making § 2000e-5 applicable to civil actions aga inst the Library of Congress). T he Court will therefore grant the Library’s motion to dismiss th at common law tort claim. C. Injunctive Relief Ms. Johnson styles the last count of her complaint as a claim f or “Injunctive Relief.” See Compl. ¶¶ 37–39. Without citing t o documents beyond the complai nt, the Library urges dismissal of this last count b ecause injunctive relief is “not usually available in employment cases,” “is an extraordinary r emedy,” and “must be sparingly gr anted.” Def.’s Mem. 18 (quoting
Robinson–Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ. , 626 F. Supp. 2d 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2009)). Because the38 Library’s argument does not refer ence “matters outside the plea dings,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), and does not argue that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdic tion, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the Court analyzes this argumen t under the legal standard for m otions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); supra Part III.B.1 (articula ting the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review). Although the Library contends t hat Ms. Johnson “shows no basis for this extraordinary relief she requests” in her third claim, Def.’s Mem. 18, the Co urt chooses to dismiss the claim for a more basic reason: “Injunctiv e relief . . . is not a freestan ding cause of action, but rather . . . a form of relief to redress the other claims asserted by [Ms. Joh nson].” Base One Techs., Inc. v.
Ali , 78 F. Supp. 3d 186, 199 (D.D.C. 2015); accord Lewis v. Gov’t of D.C. , No. 15-0521, 2015 WL 8082293, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2015) . Of course, as this Cou rt has repeatedly held in similar circumstances, “this dismissal does not preclude the court from ultimately issuing an injunction if a future determination on the merits warrants such equitable relief.” Kemp v. Eiland , No. 14-1572, 2015 WL 5826873, at *10 n.13 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 201 5); accord Lewis , 2015 WL 8082293, at *3; Ali , 78 F. Supp. 3d at 199. Thus, if Ms. Johnson were to prevail o n her Title VII claim, she might merit an injunction at that time. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (authorizing injunctive relief “[i]f the court finds that the [ Library] has intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment prac tice charged in the complai nt”). For now, however, Ms. Johnson’s claim for injunctiv e relief must be dismissed bec ause it is “a type of remedy, not a freestanding cause of action.” Equitas Disability Advocates, LLC v. Bryant , No. 14-1644, 2015 WL 5728365, at *10 (D.D.C. Sep t. 29, 2015). And any requests fo r injunctive relief will be addressed, if necessary, as a re medy at the conclusion of the c ase.39 IV. CONCLUSION Because, based on the skeletal reco rd currently before it, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could return a ve rdict in Ms. Johnson’s favor o n her Title VII claim based on sex discrimination or retaliation with r espect to the removal of ce rtain supervisory duties, the Court denies the Library summary judgm ent on Ms. Johnson’s first clai m for relief, asserted in Count I of her complaint. See Compl. ¶¶ 26–32. But because Ms. J ohnson’s other claims are no t claims upon which relief may be grante d, the Court dismisses Ms. Johns on’s claims for relief concerning her performance a ppraisal, asserted in Count I of he r complaint, as well as her second and third claims for relief, a sserted in Counts II and III of h er complaint. See Compl. ¶¶ 33–39. For the foregoing reasons, the Library’s motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and conte mporaneously issued.

Dated: March 31, 2016 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge