alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### THE TUSCAN. ANGELLSEN v. UNITED STATES.

No. 1702-KA.

First Division. Ketchikan.

March 20, 1934.

W. C. Arnold, of Ketchikan, for libelant.

G. W. Folta, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Juneau, for the United States.

ALEXANDER, District Judge.

The court has heard and considered the evidence on the question of liability in this case and the argument of counsel on respondent’s motion to dismiss, and finds therefrom:

That the libelant has failed to establish any liability on the part of the respondent.

The libelant has advanced several theories as to how this collision may have occurred, but each of these theories *525is based wholly or partially on approximations and assumptions not supported by the evidence.

It is not within the province of this court to theorize or speculate on what caused the collision. The law requires .that the libelant prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. This we feel he has utterly failed to do. Both the charting of the courses as shown by the exhibits, and the testimony of the captain and quartermaster in charge of the navigation of the Tuscan from the time the Penguin came in sight until after the collision wholly fail to establish any liability on the part of the Penguin.

The practically undisputed testimony shows that the Penguin promptly rendered every aid and assistance to the disabled Tuscan immediately following the collision and brought her into port, or nearly so, and turned her safely over to the salvage boat Akutan.

The motion will therefore be granted, and the libel ordered dismissed with prejudice. Findings and judgment may be prepared in accordance with this opinion.
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                      6-MOS               6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  MAY-31-1997         MAY-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                     JUN-01-1996         JUN-01-1995                  
<PERIOD-END>                       NOV-30-1996         NOV-30-1995    
<CASH>                                  12,579                   0   
<SECURITIES>                                 0                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                          185,235                   0
<ALLOWANCES>                                 0                   0
<INVENTORY>                                  0                   0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                       206,624                   0
<PP&E>                                 114,830                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                          18,541                   0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       5,968,251                   0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                  531,318                   0
<BONDS>                              1,470,800                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0                   0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         5,968,251                   0
<SALES>                                      0                   0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                       190,442                   0
<CGS>                                        0                   0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                        1,694,362             136,955 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             0                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             0                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      34,635              33,995
<INCOME-PRETAX>                     (1,192,420)            564,910 
<INCOME-TAX>                                 0                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                 (1,192,420)            564,910  
<DISCONTINUED>                               0                   0
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<NET-INCOME>                        (1,192,420)            564,910  
<EPS-PRIMARY>                             (.10)                .07
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</TABLE>
EX PARTE Ronnie Lynn KIRKSEY

(In re: Ronnie Lynn Kirksey v. State of Alabama)

1160522

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 23, 2017

Randall S. Susskind, Alicia A. D'Addario, and Jennifer R. Taylor of Equal Justice Initiative, Montgomery, for petitioner.

MAIN, Justice.

WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.

Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Sellers, JJ., concur.

Murdock, J., dissents.

MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).

I would grant certiorari review in this capital case. Ronnie Lynn Kirksey, the petitioner, seeks review by this Court of a decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding his sentence of death. The decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals follows certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court of the Court of Criminal Appeals' earlier decision upholding the petitioner's capital conviction and sentence of death and a remand by that Court to the Court of Criminal Appeals for further consideration of the sentence in light of the Supreme Court's holding in *Hurst v. Florida*, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). See *Kirksey v. State*, 191 So. 3d 810 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015), vacated, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2409 (2016).

I am concerned that the issue whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances in a capital case, as required for the imposition of the death penalty under Alabama law, sufficiently partakes of the nature of a factual inquiry so as to trigger the principles articulated in *Hurst*. I also believe this Court should further consider the petitioner's argument that the jury's verdict was constitutionally insufficient to support a death sentence because the jury was instructed that its verdict would merely be a recommendation.
EXHIBIT 12

                              THE FINOVA GROUP INC.
            COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF INCOME TO COMBINED FIXED CHARGES
                          AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS
                             (Dollars in Thousands)


                                                           Nine Months Ended
                                                             September 30,
                                                          -------------------
                                                            1998       1997
                                                          --------   --------

Income before income taxes and preferred dividends        $205,398   $163,331
Add fixed charges:
 Interest expense                                          347,794    304,647
 One-third rentals                                           2,786      2,052
                                                          --------   --------
   Total combined fixed charges                            350,580    306,699
                                                          --------   --------
Income as adjusted                                        $555,978   $470,030
                                                          --------   --------
Ratio of income to fixed charges                              1.59       1.53
                                                          ========   ========

Preferred stock dividends on a pre-tax basis              $  4,744   $  5,095
Total combined fixed charges and preferred
  stock dividends                                         $355,324   $311,794
                                                          --------   --------
Ratio of income to combined fixed charges and
preferred stock dividends                                     1.56       1.51
                                                          ========   ========
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1704

_____________________________

CLIFTON R. BAXTER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Mark W. Moseley, Judge.

July 27, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BILBREY, WINOKUR, and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Clifton R. Baxter, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1482

FAYE BEATRICE HAYES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MARYLAND TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION; HOLLY ARNOLD, Administrator, 

MDOT MTA; VERONICA LOWE, Deputy Director, Office of Labor and Employee 

Relations,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

Julie R. Rubin, District Judge. (1:23-cv-01195-JRR)

Submitted: September 19, 2024 Decided: September 23, 2024

Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Faye Beatrice Hayes, Appellant Pro Se. Leon Mathias Debes, Jr., Laura Jenifer, 

MARYLAND TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1482 Doc: 12 Filed: 09/23/2024 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

Faye Beatrice Hayes appeals the district court’s orders (1) granting Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment on Hayes’ claims brought 

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, the 

American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213, and the Family and Medical 

Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress,

and denying Hayes’ “Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment”; and (2) denying Hayes’

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. Hayes v. Md. Transit Admin., No. 1:23-

cv-01195-JRR (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2023; May 6, 2024). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1482 Doc: 12 Filed: 09/23/2024 Pg: 2 of 2
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-40705 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus SANTOS GALVAN-YBARRA, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. B-01-CR-130-1

- - - - - - - - - - April 11, 2002 Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *The Federal Public Defender representing Santos GalvanYbarra (Galvan) has requested leave to withdraw as counsel and has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Galvan has filed a response asserting that his sentence was too harsh and requesting to proceed pro se. The motion to proceed pro se is DENIED. See United States v. Wagner , 158 F.3d 901, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1998). Our independent review of the brief, Galvan’s response, and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave toNo. 01-40705 -2- withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities, and the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
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<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                          10,172
<SECURITIES>                                    14,404
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,676
<ALLOWANCES>                                       493
<INVENTORY>                                      5,991
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                41,756
<PP&E>                                           3,505
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  59,465
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,072
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            16
<OTHER-SE>                                      48,377
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    59,465
<SALES>                                         19,116
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                19,116
<CGS>                                            9,533
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,827
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   158
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (73)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (73)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (73)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)
        

</TABLE>
STATE EX REL. Malcolm DIGGS v. STATE of Louisiana

No. 2017-KH-0550

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 18, 2018

**ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE**

PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of *Strickland v. Washington* , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, *see*28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

WEIMER, J., recused.
### i i i i i i



# MEM ORA ND UMOP INION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 05 1- CR Andre w RE YE S , Appellant
v . The STA TE of Texas, Appellee Fr om the 175th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CR-5055B Honora ble Mary Roman, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Sandee B ryan Marion , J ustice Sitt ing: Sandee B ryan Marion , J ustice

Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: September 9, 2009 AFF I RMED Def endant, Andr ew Reyes, pled n o co n t es tto first-degree burg lary , pursuant to a plea barg ain. The trial court assessed punishment at te n year s’ confine ment, and grante dd efe ndant pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l. Def endant’ s court-a

ppointed appellate attorney filed a brief containing a pr o fe ssional evaluation of the rec ord and de monstrating that there a re no a rguable grounds to be adva nced.04
- 09
- 00 05 1- CR

1 

## ... N o s u b stitute c o u n se l will b e a p p o inte d
. See I n r e Schulm an , 252 S. W
. 3d 403, 408 n
. 22 ( T ex . Cr i m. App. 2 0 0 8 ). Sho ul d de f

end ant wi sh t o s eek f

urt her r evi ew o f

t hi s case by t he T exas C o u rt o f C ri m i nal A p p eal s, de f end ant mus t ei t her ret ai n a n a t t orn ey t o f i l e a pet i t i on f

or di s cr et i onar y r evi ew or f i l e a p ro se pet i t i on f

or di s cr et i onar y r evi ew. A n y p e tit io n fo r d isc re tio n a ry re v ie w m u st b e filed w ithin thirty d a ys fro m the d a te o f eithe r th is o p inio n o r th e las t t im e ly m o tio n fo r re h e a rin g tha t i s o v e rr u le d b y this c o u rt. See T EX . R. A PP . P
. 6 8 .2. A ny p eti t i o n for d i scre t i o na ry review m ust be f i l ed wi t h t h i s c ou r t , a f

t er w h i ch i t w i l l be f

or wa r ded t o t h e T ex as Cour t of Cr i mi n al Appea l s a l on g w i t h t h e r es t of the fi ling s in th is c a se . See T EX . R. A PP . P
. 68
. 3
. A n y p e tit io n fo r di scr et i o nary revi ew m ust co m p l y wi t h t he re q u ire m e n ts o f T e x a s R u le s o f A p p e llate P ro c e d u re 6 8 .4
.

- 2- 

## Counsel c oncludes that the appea l is without merit. The brief meets the re quirements of Anders v. Cal ifo rn ia , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Def endant was informed of his right to revie w the re cord. Counsel provided defe ndant with a copy of the brief and advised him of his right to f ile a pro se brief. Def endant did not file a

pro se brief. After revie wingthe re cord a

nd counsel’s brief, w e agree the appe al is frivolous and without merit. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s judgment, and we GR AN T appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw
. 1 

## Nic ho ls v . S tate , 954 S.W .2d 83, 86 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.); Brun s v . S

tate , 924 S.W .2d 176, 177 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.).

Sandee B ryan Marion , J ustice DO NO T PU B L I SH
1 

### Daniels, Nia (FAA)

From: Daniels, Nia (FAA)

Sent: Friday, October 02, 2015 10:14 AM

To: 'info@siliconvalleyuav.com'

Cc: '333exemptions@faa.gov'; Hi ghtower, Gerald CTR (FAA) Subject: Request for Additional Information: Shawn Maylen dba Silicon Valley UAV
(FAA-2015-2362)



### October 2, 2015

Dear Mr. Maylen:

This letter is to inform you that the following information is missing from your petition (Docket No. FAA2015-2362). This information is necessary for the Fe deral Aviation Administration (FAA) to process your petition.

On page four of your petition, you stated that you w ill conduct unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations

over ‘stadium events’.

 Provide a detailed operations plan of conducting UAS operations at st adium events, including where the stadium operations will be conducted.

 If you wish to remove ‘stadium events’ from your petition, you can do so by responding to this email or on your docket.

Please submit the additional information (non-proprietary) to your docket at www.regulations.gov and submit any proprietary information to the FAA Hea dquarters or electronically via e-mail to 333exemptions@faa.gov . If you want us to process your request a ny further, we must receive the information described above by October 16, 2015. If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 267-2999.

Sincerely,

Nia Daniels, ARM

‐ 108

Federal Aviation Administration

Office of Rulemaking, Airmen & Airspace Rules Division

800 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20591

PH: (202) 267 ‐ 7626

Fax: (202) 267 ‐ 5075 nia.daniels@faa.gov
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-41004

Summary Calendar

 

LINETTE GLADIS ABREGO; LUIS GERARDO ABREGO, 

In his own right and name and as next friend 

to is minor daughter, Linette,

Petitioners-Appellants,

versus

E.M. TROMINSKI, District Director, Immigration 

and Naturalization Service; JANET RENO, 

U.S. Attorney General; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondents-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. B-99-CV-1

--------------------

June 13, 2000

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Luis Abrego and his daughter, Linette, appeal the district

court’s dismissal of their 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, which

challenged the denial of Luis Abrego’s request to be paroled into

the United States pending a resolution of his appeal of his

removal order. The Abregos argue that Luis Abrego was entitled

to a hearing on his request to be paroled into the country and
No. 99-41004

-2-

that the denial of his parole request constituted a due process 

violation.

Without regard to whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) applies and prohibits

habeas review of the Abregos’ claims or whether the Abregos were

in custody for purposes of having standing to file habeas

petition, we note that the decision not to parole Luis Abrego

into the country was within the Attorney General’s discretion. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Because it was a discretionary

decision, and given that Luis Abrego had already been deported

when he filed his parole request, the Abregos did not have a

procedural due process right to a hearing or a liberty interest

in Luis Abrego being paroled. See Gisbert v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,

988 F.2d 1437, 1442-43 (5th Cir. 1993). The district court’s

dismissal of the Abregos’ habeas petition is 

AFFIRMED.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-15-00368-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.N., a Child

From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014-PA-02675

Honorable Martha B. Tanner, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION, JUSTICE BARNARD, AND JUSTICE ALVAREZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order is REVERSED 

as to the termination of M.M.P.N.’s and B.W.N.’s parental rights. The trial court’s order 

appointing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services’ appointment as managing 

conservator of M.N. is AFFIRMED. 

No costs of court are taxed against either M.M.P.N. or B.W.M.

SIGNED October 14, 2015.

_____________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
EXHIBIT 32



SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS



The undersigned hereby certify that the annual report on Form 10-K of Insight Communications Company, Inc. (the Registrant) for the year ended December 31,
2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



/s/ Michael S. WillnerMichael S. WillnerVice Chairman, President andChief Executive OfficerMarch 16, 2005




/s/ John AbbotJohn AbbotSenior Vice President andChief Financial OfficerMarch 16, 2005
D.H.B. v. STATE

CR-15-1444

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.