SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0496-18T4

WANDA NELSON,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW and

NEWARK BETH ISRAEL

MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,

Respondents.

____________________________

Submitted December 16, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of 

Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 

154,762.

Wanda Nelson, appellant pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent Board of Review (Jane C. Schuster, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Sean P. 

Havern, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

April 15, 2020
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A-0496-18T4

Respondent Newark Beth Israel Medical Center, Inc.,

has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Wanda Nelson concluded her twenty-nine-year employment at Newark 

Beth Israel Medical Center when she voluntarily resigned from her receptionist 

position effective June 1, 2018, because the medication she takes to alleviate her 

pain from rheumatoid arthritis caused drowsiness that made her driving

commute to and from her home in Easton, Pennsylvania unsafe.

1 She appeals 

from the Board of Review's final agency decision disqualifying her from 

receiving unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because she left 

work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. We affirm.

Our review of decisions by administrative agencies is limited, with those 

challenging a decision carrying a substantial burden of persuasion. See In re 

Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). An agency's determination must be 

sustained "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Russo v. Bd. of Trs., 

1

 Several years ago, before Nelson's resignation, she moved to Easton in order 

to assist in caring for her elderly mother. The record does not indicate whether 

she still cared for her mother when she resigned, but it does reflect that at the 

time of her Appeal Tribunal hearing she was caring for her father and sixteenyear-old son, which apparently kept her in Easton. 
3

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Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting In re Herrmann, 

192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)). "[I]f substantial evidence supports the agency's 

decision, 'a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's even 

though the court might have reached a different result[.]'" In re Carter, 191 N.J. 

474, 483 (2007) (quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 

513 (1992)). The burden of proof rests with the employee to establish a right to 

collect unemployment benefits. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 218 

(1997). With these principles in mind, we conclude Nelson's appeal is without 

merit. 

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) provides that "[a]n individual shall be disqualified for 

benefits . . . [f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily 

without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until 

the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment 

. . . ." "An individual who leaves a job due to a [health condition] which does 

not have a work-connected origin but is aggravated by working conditions will 

not be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work without good cause 

'attributable to such work,' provided there was no other suitable work available 

which the individual could have performed . . . ." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b). 

Further, "[w]hen an individual leaves work for health or medical reasons, 
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medical certification shall be required to support a finding of good cause

attributable to [such] work." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d). Good cause is defined as 

"any compelling personal circumstance, including illness, which would 

normally prevent a reasonable person under the same conditions from reporting 

to work." N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.2(b).

The Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision denying Nelson 

benefits. The Appeal Tribunal determined: 

[Nelson] failed to submit medical documentation which 

would have enabled the employer to offer work within 

[her] medical limitations. It is the employee's 

responsibility to do what is reasonable and necessary to 

remain employed. Therefore, [Nelson's] contention is 

rejected. 

In this case, [Nelson] never submitted any 

documentation that indicated that the work was having 

an adverse effect on her health or that the work either 

caused or aggravated her medical condition. Therefore, 

[Nelson's] leaving of work because of her medical 

condition is considered . . . a personal reason for 

leaving the job. Hence, [she] is disqualified for benefits 

as of [May 27, 2018], under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), as 

[she] left work voluntarily without good cause 

attributable to such work. 

We appreciate the unfortunate events that caused Nelson to end her 

longtime employment short of qualifying for retirement benefits, however, she 

did not provide the necessary documentation showing her duties as a receptionist 
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had an adverse effect on her health or either caused or aggravated her medical 

condition.

2

 The essence of her problem is the medication she takes to mitigate 

the ill effects from rheumatoid arthritis makes it dangerous for her to safely drive

to and from the Pennsylvania home she was forced to relocate to in order to 

assist in caring for her elderly mother. Although it was reasonable for Nelson 

to voluntarily leave her job because of the potential danger posed by the long 

distance drive of her commute, we cannot conclude on this record that it was 

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for the Board to find she did not establish 

her medical condition was aggravated by her job under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b). 

Because there is no good cause attributable to Nelson's functions or conditions 

in the workplace for her voluntary resignation, she is not eligible for 

unemployment benefits based upon requirements of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) and the 

aforementioned regulations. 

Affirmed. 

2

 Nelson does not contend, nor is there any evidence in the record, indicating

the Board failed to advise her – a pro se claimant – that she needed a medical 

certification if she was arguing she left her job because of medical or health 

reasons.